apostolus quoque Paulus: dilectio, inquit, dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis.
Nullum est isto dei dono excellentius. solum est quod diuidit inter filios regni aeterni et filios perditionis aeternae. dantur et alia per spiritum munera, sed sine caritate nihil prosunt. nisi ergo tantum impertiatur cuique spiritus sanctus, ut eum dei et proximi faciat amatorem, a sinistra non transferuntur ad dextram. nec spiritus proprie dicitur donum nisi propter dilectionem, quam qui non habuerit, si linguis hominum loquatur et angelorum, sonans aeramentum est et cymbalum tinniens; et si habuerit prophetiam et scierit omnia sacramenta et omnem scientiam et habuerit omnem fidem, ita ut montes transferat, nihil est; et si distribuerit omnem substantiam suam et si tradiderit corpus suum, ut ardeat, nihil prodest. quantum ergo bonum est, sine quo ad aeternam uitam neminem bona tanta perducunt? ipsa uero dilectio siue caritas — nam unius rei est nomen utrumque — si habeat eam qui non loquitur linguis nec habet prophetiam nec omnia scit sacramenta omnemque scientiam nec distribuit omnia sua pauperibus, uel non habendo quod distribuat uel aliqua necessitate prohibitus, nec tradit corpus suum, ut ardeat, si talis passionis nulla temtatio est, perducit ad regnum, ita ut ipsam fidem non faciat utilem nisi caritas.
The apostle Paul also says: The love of God has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us.
There is no gift of God more excellent than this. It alone is what separates the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal perdition. Other gifts too are given through the Spirit, but without love they profit nothing. Unless, then, the Holy Spirit is imparted to each person to such a degree that he makes him a lover of God and of neighbor, he is not transferred from the left to the right. Nor is the Spirit properly called a gift except because of love; and whoever does not have it, even if he speaks with the tongues of men and of angels, is a sounding piece of bronze and a clanging cymbal; and if he has prophecy and knows all mysteries and all knowledge and has all faith, so as to move mountains, he is nothing; and if he distributes all his substance and hands over his body to be burned, it profits nothing. How great a good, then, is that without which such great goods lead no one to eternal life? But love itself, or charity—for both are the name of one thing—if a person has it who does not speak in tongues, nor has prophecy, nor knows all mysteries and all knowledge, nor distributes all his possessions to the poor, either because he has nothing to distribute or because he is prevented by some necessity, nor hands over his body to be burned, if there is no trial of such suffering, it leads to the kingdom, so that it is love alone that makes faith itself useful.
sine caritate quippe fides potest quidem esse, sed non et prodesse. propter quod et apostolus Paulus: in Christo, inquit, Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid ualet neque praeputium, sed fides, quae per dilectionem operatur, sic eam discernens ab ea fide, qua et daemones credunt et contremescunt. dilectio igitur, quae ex deo est et deus est, proprie spiritus sanctus est, per quem diffunditur in cordibus nostris dei caritas, per quam nos tota inhabitat trinitas. quocirca rectissime spiritus sanctus, cum sit deus, uocatur etiam dei donum. quod donum proprie quid nisi caritas intellegenda est, quae perducit ad deum et sine qua quodlibet aliud dei donum non perducit ad deum?
An et hoc probandum est, donum dei dictum esse in sacris litteris spiritum sanctum? si et hoc exspectatur, habemus in euangelio secundum Iohannem domini Christi uerba dicentis: si quis sitit, ueniat ad me et bibat. qui credit in me, sicut dicit scriptura, flumina de uentre eius fluent aquae uiuae. porro euangelista secutus adiunxit: hoc autem dixit de spiritu sancto, quem accepturi erant credentes in eum. unde dicit etiam Paulus apostolus: et omnes unum spiritum potati sumus. utrum autem donum dei sit appellata aqua ista, quod est spiritus sanctus, hoc quaeritur. sed sicut hic inuenimus hanc aquam spiritum sanctum esse, ita inuenimus alibi in ipso euangelio hanc aquam dei donum appellatam.
Without love, faith can indeed exist, but it cannot also profit. For this reason the apostle Paul also says: In Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision has any value, but faith working through love—thus distinguishing it from that faith by which even the demons believe and tremble. Therefore the love that is from God and is God is properly the Holy Spirit, through whom the love of God is poured into our hearts, and through whom the whole Trinity dwells in us. Wherefore most rightly the Holy Spirit, since he is God, is also called the gift of God. And what is that gift properly to be understood as, if not love, which leads to God, and without which any other gift of God does not lead to God?
But must this also be proved, that the Holy Spirit is called the gift of God in the sacred Scriptures? If this too is expected, we have it in the Gospel according to John, in the words of the Lord Christ saying: If anyone thirsts, let him come to me and drink. Whoever believes in me, as the Scripture says, rivers of living water will flow from his belly. Then the evangelist added by way of explanation: But this he said of the Holy Spirit, whom those who believed in him were to receive. Hence the apostle Paul also says: And we have all been made to drink of one Spirit. But whether this water, which is the Holy Spirit, is called the gift of God—that is the question. Yet just as we find here that this water is the Holy Spirit, so we find elsewhere in the same Gospel that this water is called the gift of God.
nam dominus idem quando cum Samaritana muliere ad puteum loquebatur, cui dixerat: da mihi bibere, cum illa respondisset, quod Iudaei non conterentur Samaritanis, respondit Iesus et dixit ei: si scires donum dei et quis est qui dicit tibi: da mihi bibere, tu forsitan petisses ab eo et dedisset tibi aquam uiuam. dicit ei mulier: domine, neque in quo haurias habes et puteus altus est; unde ergo habes aquam uiuam? et cetera. respondit Iesus et dixit ei: omnis, qui bibit ex hac aqua, sitiet iterum; qui autem biberit ex aqua, quam ego dabo ei, non sitiet in aeternum; sed aqua, quam dabo ei, fiet in eo fons aquae salientis in uitam aeternam. quia ergo haec aqua uiua, sicut euangelista exposuit, spiritus sanctus est, procul dubio spiritus donum dei est, de quo hic dominus ait: si scires donum dei et quis est qui dicit tibi: da mihi bibere, tu forsitan petisses ab eo, et dedisset tibi aquam uiuam. nam quod ibi ait: flumina de uentre eius fluent aquae uiuae, hoc in isto loco: fiet, inquit, in eo fons aquae salutis in uita aeterna.
For when the Lord himself was speaking with the Samaritan woman at the well, to whom he had said, "Give me to drink," and she had answered that Jews do not associate with Samaritans, Jesus answered and said to her: "If you knew the gift of God and who it is that says to you, 'Give me to drink,' perhaps you would have asked of him, and he would have given you living water." The woman says to him: "Lord, you have nothing with which to draw, and the well is deep; from where, then, do you have living water?" and the rest. Jesus answered and said to her: "Everyone who drinks of this water will thirst again; but whoever drinks of the water that I will give him will not thirst forever; but the water that I will give him will become in him a fountain of water springing up into eternal life." Since, therefore, this living water, as the evangelist explained, is the Holy Spirit, without doubt the Spirit is the gift of God, of which the Lord here says: "If you knew the gift of God and who it is that says to you, 'Give me to drink,' perhaps you would have asked of him, and he would have given you living water." For what he says there—"rivers of living water will flow from his belly"—corresponds in this place to: "It will become," he says, "in him a fountain of water of salvation in eternal life.
Paulus uero apostolus: unicuique, inquit, nostrum datur gratia secundum mensuram donationis Christi atque ut donationem Christi spiritum sanctum ostenderet, secutus adiunxit: propter quod dicit: ascendit in altum, captiuauit captiuitatem, dedit dona hominibus. notissimum est autem dominum legum, cum post resurrectionem a mortuis ascendisset in caelum, dedisse spiritum sanctum, quo impleti qui crediderunt linguis omnium gentium loquebantur. nec moueat quod ait: dona, non "donum". id enim testimonium de psalmo posuit; hoc autem in psalmo ita legitur: ascendisti in altum, captiuasti captiuitatem, accepisti dona in hominibus. sic enim plures codices habent, maxime graeci, et ex hebraeo sic interpretatum habemus. dona itaque dixit apostolus quemadmodum propheta, non donum. sed cum propheta dixerit: accepisti i n hominibus, apostolus maluit dicere: dedit hominibus, ut ex utroque scilicet uerbo, uno prophetico, apostolico altero — quia in utroque est diuini sermonis auctoritas — ut sensus plenissimus redderetur. utrumque enim uerum est, et quia dedit hominibus et quia accepit in hominibus. dedit hominibus tamquam caput membris suis; accepit in hominibus idem ipse, utique in membris suis, propter quae membra sua clamauit de caelo: Saule, Saule, quid me persequeris? et de quibus membris suis ait: quando uni ex minimis meis fecistis, mihi fecistis.
But the apostle Paul says: "To each one of us grace is given according to the measure of the gift of Christ," and in order to show that the Holy Spirit is the gift of Christ, he went on to add: "Therefore it says: He ascended on high, he led captivity captive, he gave gifts to men." Now it is well known that the Lord of the law, after he had risen from the dead and ascended into heaven, gave the Holy Spirit, with which those who believed were filled and spoke in the tongues of all nations. Nor should it disturb anyone that he says "gifts," not "gift." For he cited that testimony from a psalm; but in the psalm it is read thus: "You ascended on high, you led captivity captive, you received gifts among men." For many manuscripts have it this way, especially the Greek ones, and we have it so interpreted from the Hebrew. So the apostle said "gifts," as the prophet did, not "gift." But whereas the prophet said "you received among men," the apostle preferred to say "he gave to men," so that from both words—the one prophetic, the other apostolic (since in both is the authority of the divine word)—the fullest sense might be rendered. For both are true: both that he gave to men and that he received among men. He gave to men as the head to his members; the same one received among men, namely in his members, on whose account his members cried out from heaven: "Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?" and of which members he says: "When you did it to one of the least of mine, you did it to me.
ipse ergo Christus et dedit de caelo et accepit in terra. porro autem dona ob hoc ambo dixerunt, ut propheta et apostolus, quia per donum, quod est spiritus sanctus, in commune omnibus membris Christi multa dona, quae sunt quibusque propria, diuiduntur. non enim singuli quique habent omnia, sed hi illa et alii illa, quamuis ipsum donum, a quo cuique propria diuiduntur, omnes habent, id est spiritum sanctum. nam et alibi cum multa dona commemorasset: omnia, inquit, haec operatur unus atque idem spiritus, diuidens propria unicuique prout uult. quod uerbum et in epistula, quae ad Hebraeos est, inuenitur, ubi scriptum est: attestante deo signis et ostentis et uariis uirtutibus et spiritus sancti diuisionibus. et hic cum dixisset: ascendit in altum, captiuauit captiuitatem, dedit dona hominibus: quod autem ascendit, ait, quid est, nisi quia et descendit in inferiores partes terrae? qui descendit, ipse est et qui ascendit super omnes caelos, ut adimpleret omnia. et ipse dedit quosdam quidem apostolos, quosdam quidem prophetas, quosdam autem euangelistas, quosdam autem pastores et doctores. ecce quare dicta sunt dona; quia, sicut alibi dicit: numquid omnes apostoli? numquid omnes prophetae? et cetera. hic autem adiunxit: ad consummationem sanctorum in opus ministerii, in aedificationem corporis Christi.
So then Christ himself both gave from heaven and received on earth. Furthermore, both the prophet and the apostle spoke of gifts for this reason: that through the gift which is the Holy Spirit, many gifts, which are proper to each individual, are distributed in common to all the members of Christ. For not each and every one has all things, but some have these and others those, although all have that very gift by which the proper gifts are distributed to each one, that is, the Holy Spirit. For elsewhere, when he had mentioned many gifts, he says: "But one and the same Spirit works all these things, distributing to each one individually just as he wills." This word is also found in the epistle which is to the Hebrews, where it is written: "God bearing witness by signs and wonders and various powers and distributions of the Holy Spirit." And here, when he had said: "He ascended on high, he led captivity captive, he gave gifts to men"—"But what does 'he ascended' mean," he says, "except that he also descended into the lower parts of the earth? He who descended is the same one who ascended above all the heavens, that he might fill all things. And he gave some indeed as apostles, some indeed as prophets, some as evangelists, and some as pastors and teachers." Behold why they are called gifts: because, as he says elsewhere: "Are all apostles? Are all prophets?" and the rest. But here he added: "for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of ministry, for the building up of the body of Christ.
haec est domus, quae, sicut psalmus canit, aedificatur post captiuitatem, quoniam qui sunt a diabolo eruti, a quo captiui tenebantur, de his aedificatur corpus Christi, quae domus appellatur ecclesia. hanc autem captiuitatem ipse captiuauit, quia diabolum uicit. et ne illa quae futura erant sancti capitis membra in aeternum supr plicium secum traheret, eum iustitiae prius, deinde potentiae uinculis alligauit. ipse itaque diabolus est appellata captiuitas, quam captiuauit qui ascendit in altum et dedit dona hominibus uel accepit in hominibus.
Petrus autem apostolus, sicut in eodem libro canonico legitur, ubi scripti sunt Actus apostolorum, loquens de Christo, commotis corde Iudaeis et dicentibus: quid ergo faciemus, fratres? monstrate nobis, dixit ad eos: agite paenitentiam, et baptizetur unusquisque uestrum in nomine Iesu Christi in remissione peccatorum, et accipietis donum spiritus sancti. itemque in eodem libro legitur Simonem Magum apostolis dare uoluisse pecuniam, ut ab eis acciperet potestatem, qua per impositionem manus daretur spiritus sanctus. cui Petrus idem: pecunia, inquit, tua tecum sit in perditione, quia donum dei aestimasti pecunia possidere.
This is the house which, as the psalm sings, is built after the captivity, since those who have been rescued from the devil, by whom they were held captive, are the ones from whom the body of Christ is built—this house is called the church. But he himself led this captivity captive, because he conquered the devil. And lest he drag with him into eternal punishment those who were to be members of the holy head, he first bound him with the chains of justice, then with those of power. So then the devil himself is the captivity that he led captive—he who ascended on high and gave gifts to men, or received them in men.
But the apostle Peter, as is read in that same canonical book where the Acts of the Apostles are written, speaking of Christ, when the Jews were cut to the heart and said, "What then shall we do, brothers? Show us," he said to them: "Repent, and let each one of you be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit." And again in the same book it is read that Simon Magus wished to give money to the apostles, so that he might receive from them the power by which the Holy Spirit was given through the laying on of hands. To him Peter said: "May your money be with you unto perdition, because you have thought that the gift of God could be possessed with money.
et alio eiusdem libri loco, cum Petrus Cornelio et eis qui cum illo fuerant loqueretur annuntians et praedicans Christum, ait scriptura: ad huc loquente Petro uerba haec cecidit spiritus sanctus super omnes, qui audiebant uerbum, et obstipuerunt qui ex circumcisione fideles simul cum Petro uenerant, quia et in nationes donum spiritus sancti effusum est. audiebant enim illos loquentes linguis et magnificantes deum. de quo facto suo, quod incircumcisos baptizauerat, quia, priusquam baptizarentur, ut nodum quaestionis huius auferret, in eos uenerat spiritus sanctus, cum Petrus postea redderet rationem fratribus, qui erant Hierosolymis et hac re audita monebantur, ait post cetera: cum coepissem autem loqui ad illos, cecidit spiritus sanctus in illos, sicut et in nos initio. memoratusque sum uerbi domini, sicut dicebat: quia Iohannes quidem baptizauit aqua, uos uero baptizabimini spiritu sancto. si igitur aequale donum dedit illis . sicut et nobis, qui credidimus dominum Iesum Christum, ego quis eram, qui possem prohibere deum non dare illis spiritum sanctum? et multa alia sunt testimonia scripturarum, quae concorditer attestantur donum dei esse spiritum sanctum, in quantum datur eis qui per eum diligunt deum. sed nimis longum est cuncta colligere, et quid eis satis est quibus haec quae diximus satis non sunt?
And in another place in the same book, when Peter was speaking to Cornelius and those who were with him, proclaiming and preaching Christ, the Scripture says: While Peter was still speaking these words, the Holy Spirit fell upon all who were hearing the word, and the faithful of the circumcision who had come with Peter were astonished, because the gift of the Holy Spirit had also been poured out upon the nations. For they heard them speaking in tongues and magnifying God. Concerning this deed of his, that he had baptized the uncircumcised—because, before they were baptized, the Holy Spirit had come upon them, to remove the knot of this question—when Peter afterward gave an account to the brethren who were at Jerusalem and who were disturbed upon hearing this matter, he said among other things: When I had begun to speak to them, the Holy Spirit fell upon them, just as upon us at the beginning. And I remembered the word of the Lord, as he said: John indeed baptized with water, but you will be baptized with the Holy Spirit. If therefore he gave them the same gift as to us who believed in the Lord Jesus Christ, who was I that I could prevent God from giving them the Holy Spirit? And there are many other testimonies of the Scriptures which agree in attesting that the Holy Spirit is the gift of God, insofar as he is given to those who through him love God. But it is too long to gather all of them; and what is enough for those for whom what we have said is not enough?
Sane admonendi sunt, quando quidem donum dei iam uident dictum spiritum dei sanctum, ut, cum audiunt: donum spiritus sancti, illud genus locutionis agnoscant, quod dictum est: in expoliatione corporis carnis. sicut enim corpus carnis nihil aliud est quam caro, sic donum spiritus sancti nihil aliud est quam spiritus sanctus. in tantum ergo donum dei est, in quantum datur eis quibus datur. apud se autem deus est, etsi nemini detur, quia deus erat patri et filio coaeternus, antequam cuiquam daretur. nec quia illi dant, ipse datur, ideo minor est illis. ita enim datur sicut dei donum, ut etiam se ipsum det sicut deus. non enim dici potest non esse suae potestatis de quo dictum est: spiritus ubi uult spirat; et apud apostolum quod iam supra commemoraui: omnia autem haec operatur unus atque idem spiritus, diuidens propria unicuique prout uult. non est illis condicio dati et dominatio dantium, sed concordia. dati et dantium.
Indeed they must be admonished, since they now see that the Holy Spirit of God has been called the gift of God, so that when they hear "the gift of the Holy Spirit," they may recognize that manner of speaking which was used in "the putting off of the body of the flesh." For just as the body of the flesh is nothing other than flesh, so the gift of the Holy Spirit is nothing other than the Holy Spirit. Therefore it is the gift of God to the extent that it is given to those to whom it is given. In himself, however, God is, even if he is given to no one, because God was coeternal with the Father and the Son before he was given to anyone. Nor, because they give him, is he himself given, and therefore is he less than they. For he is given as the gift of God in such a way that he also gives himself as God. For it cannot be said that he is not under his own power, of whom it was said: The Spirit blows where he wills; and in the Apostle, which I have already mentioned above: But all these things are worked by one and the same Spirit, distributing to each one individually just as he wills. There is no condition of being given and dominion of those giving in them, but concord between the one given and those giving.
Quapropter, sicut sancta scriptura proclamat, deus caritas est, illa quae ex deo est et in nobis id agit, ut in deo maneamus et ipse in nobis. et hoc inde cognoscimus, quia de spiritu suo dedit nobis; ipse spiritus est deus caritas. deinde si in donis dei nihil maius est caritate et nullum est maius donum dei quam spiritus sanctus, quid consequentius, quam ut ipse sit caritas, quae dicitur et deus et ex deo? et si caritas, qua pater diligit filium et patrem diligit filius, ineffabiliter communionem demonstrat amborum; quid conuenientius, quam ut ille proprie dicatur caritas, qui spiritus est communis ambobus? hoc enim sanius creditur uel intellegitur, ut non solum spiritus sanctus caritas sit in illa trinitate, sed non frustra proprie caritas nuncupetur propter illa quae dicta sunt, sicut non solus est in illa trinitate uel spiritus uel sanctus, quia et pater spiritus et filius spiritus, et pater sanctus et filius sanctus, quod ambigit nequaquam pietas. et tamen ipse non frustra proprie dicitur spiritus sanctus. quia enim est communis ambobus, id uocatur ipse proprie quod ambo communiter. alioquin si in illa trinitate solus spiritus sanctus est caritas, profecto et filius non solius patris uerum etiam spiritus sancti filius inuenitur.
Therefore, as holy Scripture proclaims, God is love; that love which is from God also works in us, so that we remain in God and he in us. And we know this from the fact that he has given us of his Spirit; that same Spirit is God, love. Then, if among the gifts of God nothing is greater than love, and no gift of God is greater than the Holy Spirit, what follows more necessarily than that he himself is the love which is both called God and is from God? And if the love by which the Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father shows ineffably the communion of both, what is more fitting than that he be properly called love who is the Spirit common to both? For this is more soundly believed or understood: that not only is the Holy Spirit love in that Trinity, but that he is not without reason properly named love on account of those things which have been said—just as he alone is not in that Trinity either spirit or holy, since both the Father is spirit and the Son is spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy, which godliness by no means doubts. And yet he is not without reason properly called the Holy Spirit. For since he is common to both, that which both share is properly called by him. Otherwise, if in that Trinity the Holy Spirit alone were love, then surely the Son would be found to be the Son not of the Father alone but also of the Holy Spirit.
ita enim locis innumerabilibus dicitur et legitur filius unigenitus dei patris, ut tamen et illud uerum sit quod apostolus ait de deo patre: qui eruit nos de potestate tenebrarum et transtulit in regnum filii caritatis. suae. non dixit: "filii sui"; quod si diceret, uerissime diceret, quemadmodum quia saepe dixit, uerissime dixit; sed ait: filii caritatis suae. filius ergo est etiam spiritus sancti, si non est in illa trinitate caritas dei nisi spiritus sanctus. quod si absurdissimum est, restat, ut non solus ibi sit caritas spiritus sanctus, sed propter illa de quibus satis disserui, proprie sic uocetur, quod autem dictum est: filii caritatis suae, nihil aliud intellegatur quam filii sui dilecti, quam filii postremo substantiae suae. caritas quippe patris, quae in natura eius est ineffabiliter simplici, nihil est aliud quam eius ipsa natura atque substantia, ut saepe iam diximus et saepe iterare non piget. ac per hoc filius caritatis eius nullus est alius quam qui de substantia eius est genitus.
For in countless places he is called and read as the only-begotten Son of God the Father, yet that too is true which the apostle says of God the Father: who rescued us from the power of darkness and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love. He did not say "of his Son"; for if he had said that, he would have spoken most truly, just as, because he often said it, he spoke most truly; but he said: of the Son of his love. Therefore the Holy Spirit is also a son, if in that Trinity the love of God is nothing other than the Holy Spirit. But if that is utterly absurd, it remains that the Holy Spirit is not the only one there who is love, but, for the reasons I have discussed sufficiently, he is properly so called; whereas what was said, of the Son of his love, should be understood as nothing other than of his beloved Son, finally of the Son of his own substance. For the love of the Father, which is in his ineffably simple nature, is nothing other than his very nature and substance, as we have often said and are not reluctant often to repeat. And therefore the Son of his love is no one other than he who was begotten from his substance.
CCXLIII. DE INTERROGATIONE HAERETICI CONTRA EOS QVI VNIGENITVM DEI NON PATERNAE SVBSTANTIAE, SED VOLVNTATIS FILIVM ESSE DIXERVNT. EX LIBRO DE TRINITATE XV, T. XX.
Acute sane quidam respondit haeretico uersutissime interroganti, utrum deus filium nolens an nolens genuerit, ut, diceretur nolens, absurdissima dei miseria sequeretur, si autem nolens, continuo quod contendebat uelut inuicta ratione concluderet, non naturae esse filium, sed uoluntatis. at ille uigilantissime uicissim quaesiuit ab eo, utrum deus pater uolens an nolens sit deus, ut, si responderet nolens, sequeretur illa miseria, quam de deo credere magna insania est, si autem diceret uolens, responderetur ei: "ergo et ipse uoluntate sua deus est, non natura". quid ergo restabat, nisi ut obmutesceret et sua interrogatione obligatum insolubili uinculo se uideret? sed uoluntas dei si et propria dicenda est aliqua in trinitate persona, magis hoc nomen spiritui sancto competit sicut caritas. nam quid est aliud caritas quam uoluntas?
CCXLIII. On the Questioning of a Heretic, Against Those Who Said That the Only-Begotten of God Is a Son Not of the Father's Substance but of His Will. From Book XV on the Trinity, T. XX.
Someone acutely indeed replied to a heretic who was most craftily asking whether God begot the Son willing or unwilling, so that, if "unwilling" were said, the most absurd misery of God would follow—if, however, "unwilling," he would at once conclude what he was contending for, as if by invincible reasoning: that the Son is not of nature but of will. But he, most watchfully in turn, asked him whether God the Father is God willing or unwilling, so that, if he answered "unwilling," that misery would follow which it is great madness to believe about God; but if he said "willing," it would be answered to him: "Therefore he too is God by his own will, not by nature." What then remained but that he fall silent and see himself bound by his own questioning with an insoluble bond? But if the will of God is also to be called proper to some person in the Trinity, this name belongs more to the Holy Spirit, as does love. For what else is love than will?
[Video me de spiritu sancto in isto libro secundum scripturas sanctas hoc disputasse quod fidelibus sufficit iam scientibus deum esse spiritum sanctum, nec alterius substantiae nec minorem, quam est pater et filius, quod in superioribus libris secundum easdem scripturas sanctas uerum esse docuimus. de creatura etiam, quam fecit deus, quantum ualuimus, admonuimus eos qui rationem de rebus talibus poscunt, ut inuisibilia eius per ea quae facta sunt, sicut possent, intellecta conspicerent, et maxime per rationalem uel intellectualem creaturam, quae facta est ad imaginem dei, per quod uelut speculum, quantum possent, si possent, cernerent trinitatem deum in nostra memoria, intellegentia, uoluntate. quae tria in sua mente naturaliter diuinitus instituta quisquis uiuaciter perspicit et quam magnum sit in ea, unde potest etiam sempiterna immutabilisque natura recoli, conspici, concupisci — reminiscitur per memoriam, intuetur per intellegentiam, amplectitur per dilectionem — profecto reperit illius summae trinitatis imaginem. ad quam summam trinitatem reminiscendam, uidendam, diligendam, ut eam recordetur, eam contempletur, ea delectetur, totum debet referre quod uiuit.
I see that in this book I have discussed the Holy Spirit according to the holy Scriptures in a way that suffices for the faithful who already know that the Holy Spirit is God, neither of another substance nor less than the Father and the Son, which I have taught to be true in the earlier books according to the same holy Scriptures. Concerning creation also, which God made, I have admonished as far as I was able those who demand a rational account of such things, that through the things that are made they might, as they could, understand and behold his invisible things, and especially through the rational or intellectual creature, which was made in the image of God, through which as through a mirror they might, as far as they could, if they could, discern the Trinity, God, in our memory, understanding, and will. Whoever keenly perceives these three things divinely established by nature in his own mind, and how great is that in it from which even the eternal and unchangeable nature can be recalled, beheld, and desired—it is remembered through memory, beheld through understanding, embraced through love—surely finds there the image of that supreme Trinity. And to that supreme Trinity, to be remembered, seen, and loved—that it may be recalled, contemplated, and delighted in—whatever lives ought wholly to be referred.
uerum ne hanc imaginem ab eadem trinitate factam et suo uitio in deterius commutatam ita eidem comparet trinitati, ut omni modo existimet similem, sed potius in qualicumque ista similitudine magnam quoque dissimilitudinem cernat, quantum satis esse uidebatur, admonui.
TRIA QVAE SVNT IN IMAGINE DEI, ID EST MEMORIA, INTEL- LECTVS ET AMOR, VNIVS ESSE PERSONAE, QVIA NON HOC EST EI ESSE QVOD HAEC HABERE. EX LIBRO XV DE TRINITATE, T. XXII.
Verum haec quando in una sunt persona, sicut est homo, potest nobis quispiam dicere: tria ista, memoria, intellectus et amor, mea sunt, non sua, nec sibi, sed mihi agunt quod agunt, immo ego per illa. ego enim memini per memoriam, intellego per intellegentiam, amo per amorem, et quando ad memoriam meam aciem cogitationis aduerto ac sic in corde meo dico quod scio uerbumque uerum de scientia mea gignitur, utrumque meum est, et scientia utique et uerbum. ego enim scio, ego dico in corde meo quod scio. et quando in memoria mea cogitando inuenio iam me intellegere, iam me amare aliquid, qui intellectus et amor ibi erant et antequam inde cogitarem, intellectum meum et amorem meum inuenio in memoria mea, quo ego intellego, ego amo, non ipsa. item quando cogitatio mea memor est et uult redire ad ea quae in memoria reliquerat eaque intellecta conspicere atque intus dicere, mea memoria memor est et mea uult uoluntate, non sua.
But lest it compare this image, made by that same Trinity and by its own fault changed for the worse, to that same Trinity in such a way as to think it similar in every respect, but rather discern in this likeness, such as it is, also a great unlikeness, as far as seemed sufficient, I have admonished.
THE THREE THINGS THAT ARE IN THE IMAGE OF GOD, THAT IS, MEMORY, UNDERSTANDING, AND LOVE, ARE OF ONE PERSON, BECAUSE FOR IT TO BE IS NOT THE SAME AS TO HAVE THESE. FROM BOOK XV ON THE TRINITY, T. XXII.
But when these three are in one person, as is the case with man, someone may say to us: these three—memory, understanding, and love—are mine, not their own, nor do they act for themselves but for me, or rather I act through them. For I remember through memory, I understand through understanding, I love through love; and when I turn the keen edge of thought to my memory and thus in my heart say what I know, and a true word is begotten from my knowledge, both are mine—both the knowledge and the word. For I know, I say in my heart what I know. And when by thinking I find in my memory that I already understand, that I already love something—which understanding and love were there even before I thought of them from there—I find my understanding and my love in my memory; it is I who understand, I who love, not they themselves. Likewise, when my thought remembers and wishes to return to the things it had left in memory and, having understood them, to look upon them and speak within, it is my memory that remembers and by my will that wishes, not its own.
ipse quoque amor meus cum meminit atque intellegit quid appetere debeat, quid uitare, per meam, non per suam memoriam meminit, et per intellegentiam meam, non suam quidquid intellegenter amat intellegit. quod breuiter dici potest: ego per omnia illa tria memini, ego intellego, ego diligo, qui nec memoria sum nec intellegentia nec dilectio, sed haec habeo. ista ergo dici possunt ab una persona, quae habet haec tria, non ipsa est haec tria. in illius uero summae simplicitate naturae, quae deus est, quamuis unus sit deus, tres tamen personae sunt, pater et filius et spiritus sanctus.
Aliud est itaque trinitas res ipsa, aliud imago trinitatis in re aliqua; propter quam imaginem simul et illud in quo sunt haec tria imago dicitur, sicut imago dicitur simul et tabula et quod in ea pictum est, sed propter picturam, quae in ea est, simul et tabula nomine imaginis appellatur.
My own love, too, when it remembers and understands what it ought to seek and what to avoid, remembers through my memory, not its own, and through my understanding, not its own, it understands whatever it loves with understanding. This can be stated briefly: I remember through all those three, I understand, I love—I who am neither memory nor understanding nor love, but have these. These things, then, can be said of one person who has these three, though that person is not these three. But in the supreme simplicity of that nature which is God, although there is one God, there are nevertheless three persons: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.
It is one thing, therefore, for the Trinity to be the reality itself, and another for the image of the Trinity to be in some thing; on account of that image, that in which these three are is also called an image, just as both the panel and what is painted on it are together called an image, but on account of the painting that is on it, the panel too is called by the name of image.
QVAM VERA IN DEI TRINITATE VNITAS ET QVAM VERA IN EIVSDEM VNITATE SIT TRINITAS. EX LIBRO XV DE TRINITATE, T. XXIII.
Verum in illa summa trinitate, quae incomparabiliter rebus omnibus antecellit, tanta est inseparabilitas, ut cum trinitas hominum non possit dici unus homo, illa unus deus et dicatur et sit, nec in uno deo sit illa trinitas, sed unus deus. nec rursus quemadmodum ista imago, quod est homo, habens illa tria una persona est, ita est illa trinitas, sed tres personae sunt, pater filii et filius patris et spiritus sanctus patris et filii.
How true is the unity in the Trinity of God, and how true is the Trinity in the unity of the same. From Book XV On the Trinity, chapter 23.
But in that supreme Trinity, which surpasses all things incomparably, the inseparability is so great that, whereas the trinity in man cannot be called one man, that Trinity is both called and is one God, and that Trinity is not in one God, but is one God. Nor again is that Trinity as this image, which is man, having those three, is one person; but they are three persons: the Father of the Son and the Son of the Father and the Holy Spirit of the Father and of the Son.
quamuis enim memoria hominis, et maxime illa quam pecora non habent, id est qua res intellegibiles ita continentur, ut non in eam per sensus corporis uenerint, habeat pro modulo suo in hac imagine trinitatis incomparabiliter quidem imparem, sed tamen qualemcumque similitudinem patris; itemque intellegentia hominis, quae per intentionem cogitationis inde formatur, quando quod scitur dicitur et nullius linguae cordis uerbum est, habeat in sua magna disparilitate nonnullam similitudinem filii; et amor hominis de scientia procedens et memoriam intellegentiamque coniungens tamquam parenti prolique communis — unde nec parens intellegitur esse nec proles — habeat in hac imagine aliquam, licet ualde imparem similitudinem spiritus sancti: non tamen, sicut in ista imagine trinitatis non haec tria unus homo, sed unius hominis sunt, ita in ipsa summa trinitate, cuius haec imago est, unius dei sunt illa tria, sed unus deus est, et tres sunt illae, non una persona. quod sane mirabiliter ineffabile est uel ineffabiliter mirabile, cum sit una persona haec imago trinitatis, ipsa uero summa trinitas tres personae sint, inseparabilior est illa trinitas personarum trium quam haec unius.
For although man's memory, and especially that memory which beasts do not have—that is, the memory by which intelligible things are so contained that they have not entered it through the senses of the body—has, according to its own measure, in this image of the Trinity, a likeness of the Father, incomparably unequal indeed, yet such as it is; and likewise man's understanding, which is formed from it through the intention of thought, when what is known is spoken and is the word of the heart belonging to no language, has in its great unlikeness some likeness of the Son; and man's love, proceeding from knowledge and joining memory and understanding as something common, as it were, to the parent and the offspring—whence it is understood to be neither the parent nor the offspring—has in this image some likeness, though a very unequal one, of the Holy Spirit: nevertheless, just as in this image of the Trinity these three are not one man but belong to one man, so in that supreme Trinity itself, of which this is the image, those three are not of one god, but are one God, and they are three, not one person. This is truly wondrously ineffable, or ineffably wondrous: since this image of the Trinity is one person, while the supreme Trinity itself is three persons, that Trinity of three persons is more inseparable than this one of one.
illa quippe in natura diuinitatis, siue id melius dicitur deitatis, quod est, hoc est atque incommutabiliter inter se ac semper aequalis est nec aliquando non fuit aut aliter fuit nec aliquando non erit aut aliter erit. ista uero tria, quae sunt in impari imagine, etsi non locis, quoniam non sunt corpora, tamen inter se nunc in ista uita magnitudinibus separantur. neque enim quia moles nullae ibi sunt, ideo non uidemus in alio maiorem esse memoriam quam intellegentiam, in alio contra, in alio duo haec amoris magnitudine superari, siue sint ipsa duo inter se aequalia siue non sint aequalia, atque ita et a singulis bina et a binis singula et a singulis singula, maioribus minora uincuntur. et quando inter se aequalia fuerint ab omni languore sanata, nec tunc aequabitur rei natura immutabili ea res, quae per gratiam non mutabitur, quia non aequatur creatura creatori, et quando ab omni languore sanabitur, mutabitur.
For in the nature of divinity—or, to speak more aptly, of deity—what it is, it is, and it is immutably and always equal to itself, and it never was not, nor was it ever otherwise, nor will it ever not be, nor will it ever be otherwise. But these three things which are in the unequal image, although not in respect of places, since they are not bodies, are nevertheless in this life separated from one another by magnitudes. For it is not because there are no masses there that we do not see that in one person memory is greater than understanding, in another the reverse, in another that these two are surpassed by the magnitude of love—whether those two themselves are equal to each other or are not equal—and thus both the two are surpassed by the single one and the single ones by the two, and single ones by single ones, the lesser being conquered by the greater. And when they shall have been made equal to one another, healed of all weakness, even then that thing which will not be changed by grace will not be made equal to the immutable nature of the thing, because the creature is not made equal to the creator, and when it shall be healed of all weakness, it will be changed.
Sed hanc non solum incorporalem uerum etiam summe inseparabilem uereque immutabilem trinitatem, cum uenerit uisio, quae facie ad faciem nobis promittitur, multo clarius certiusque uidebimus, quam nunc eius imaginem, quod nos sumus; per quod tamen speculum et in quo aenigmate qui uident, sicut in hac uita uidere concessum est, non illi sunt qui ea quae digessimus et commendauimus in sua mente conspiciunt, sed illi qui eam tamquam imaginem uident, ut possint ad eum cuius imago est quomodocumque referre quod uident, et per imaginem, quam conspiciendo uident, etiam illud uidere coniciendo, quoniam nondum possunt facie ad faciem. non enim ait apostolus: "uidemus nunc in speculum", sed: uidemus nunc per speculum.]
CCXLIIII. CVR BIS DATVS SIT SPIRITVS SANCTVS. EX LIBRO SVPRA SCRIPTO.
Quid uero fuerit causae, ut post resurrectionem suam in terra prius daret et de caelo postea mitteret spiritum sanctum, hoc ergo existimo, quia per ipsum donum diffunditur caritas in cordibus nostris, qua diligamus deum et proximum secundum duo illa praecepta, in quibus tota lex pendet et prophetae, hoc significans dominus Iesus bis dedisse spiritum sanctum, semel in terra propter dilectionem proximi et iterum de caelo propter dilectionem dei.
But this Trinity—not only incorporeal but also supremely inseparable and truly immutable—when the vision comes that is promised to us face to face, we shall see much more clearly and certainly than we now see its image, which is what we ourselves are. Yet through that mirror and in that enigma, those who see, as it is granted to see in this life, are not those who contemplate in their own mind the things we have set out and commended, but those who see it as an image, so that they may in some way refer what they see to him whose image it is, and through the image, which they see by contemplating it, may also see that other thing by inference, since they cannot yet see face to face. For the apostle does not say, "We now see in a mirror," but: "We now see through a mirror."
CCXLIIII. WHY THE HOLY SPIRIT WAS GIVEN TWICE. FROM THE BOOK WRITTEN ABOVE.
But what was the reason that after his resurrection he first gave the Holy Spirit on earth and afterwards sent him from heaven? This then I think: that through this same gift love is poured out into our hearts, by which we love God and our neighbor according to those two commandments on which the whole law and the prophets hang. The Lord Jesus signified this by giving the Holy Spirit twice: once on earth for the love of neighbor, and again from heaven for the love of God.
et si forte alia ratio reddatur de bis dato spiritu sancto, eundem tamen spiritum sanctum datum, cum insufflasset Iesus, de quo mox ait: ite, baptizate gentes in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti, ubi maxime commendatur haec trinitas, ambigere non debemus. ipse est igitur qui etiam de caelo datus est die pentecostes, id est post diem decimum quam dominus ascendit in caelum. quomodo ergo deus non est qui dominus ascendit in caelum? quomodo ergo deus non est qui dat spiritum sanctum? immo quantus deus est qui dat deum? neque enim aliquis discipulorum eius dedit spiritum sanctum. orabant quippe, ut ueniret in eos quibus manum imponebant, non ipsi eum dabant; quem morem in suis praepositis etiam nunc seruat ecclesia.
EX SERMONE DE ASCENSIONE DOMINI.
Quaerat a me aliquis, quare bis dedit spiritum sanctum.
multi multa dixerunt et sicut homines quaesierunt et aliquid dixerunt, quod non esset contra fidem, alius hoc, alius illud, utrumque quod non excederet regulam ueritatis. si dicam me scire quare bis dederit, mentior uobis. nescio. qui se dicit scire quod nescit temerarius est; qui se negat scire quod scit, ingratus est. ergo fateor uobis: quare bis dederit dominus spiritum sanctum, adhuc quaero et ad aliquid certius cupio peruenire. adiuuet me dominus orantibus uobis, ut quod donare dignatur uobis non taceatur. ergo nescio.
And if perhaps some other explanation is given for the Holy Spirit having been given twice, we must not doubt that it was the same Holy Spirit who was given when Jesus breathed on them, of whom he shortly afterward says: Go, baptize the nations in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, where this Trinity is most especially commended. He therefore is the one who was also given from heaven on the day of Pentecost, that is, after the tenth day since the Lord ascended into heaven. How then is he not God, who ascended into heaven as Lord? How then is he not God, who gives the Holy Spirit? Indeed, how great a God is he who gives God? For none of his disciples gave the Holy Spirit. They indeed prayed that he would come upon those on whom they laid hands, but they themselves did not give him; and this custom the church observes even now in its overseers.
FROM THE SERMON ON THE ASCENSION OF THE LORD.
Someone may ask me why he gave the Holy Spirit twice.
Many have said many things, and as men they inquired and said something that was not contrary to the faith—one this, another that, each not exceeding the rule of truth. If I say that I know why he gave him twice, I lie to you. I do not know. He who says he knows what he does not know is rash; he who denies that he knows what he does know is ungrateful. Therefore I confess to you: why the Lord gave the Holy Spirit twice, I am still seeking and I desire to arrive at something more certain. May the Lord help me, as you pray, so that what he deigns to grant you may not be left unspoken. Therefore, I do not know.
quid tamen existimem nondum sciens, nondum pro certo tenens, sicut certissimum teneo dedisse — quid ergo existimem non tacebo. si hoc est, confirmet dominus; si aliud est quod uerius appareat, donet dominus. ergo arbitror, sed arbitror, ideo bis datum spiritum sanctum, ut commendarentur duo praecepta caritatis. duo sunt enim praecepta et una est caritas: diliges dominum deum tuum ex toto corde tuo et ex tota anima tua; et diliges proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum. in his duobus praeceptis tota lex pendet et prophetae. una caritas et duo praecepta, unus spiritus et duo data. non enim alius datus est prius et alius datus est postea, quia non alia caritas diligit proximum quam illa quae diligit deum. non ergo alia caritas est; qua caritate proximum diligimus, ipsa caritate et deum. sed quia aliud est deus, aliud proximus, una caritate diliguntur, non sunt tamen unum qui diliguntur. quia ergo magna est primitus commendanda dilectio dei, secunda dilectio proximi, a secunda autem incipitur, ut ad primam perueniatur
What I should think, however, I do not yet know, nor do I yet hold it for certain, as I hold it most certain that he gave it — what, then, I should think, I will not keep silent. If this is so, let the Lord confirm it; if there is something else that appears truer, let the Lord grant it. I think, then — but I think — that the Holy Spirit was given twice for this reason: that the two commandments of love might be commended. For there are two commandments and one love: You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart and with your whole soul; and you shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments hang the whole law and the prophets. One love and two commandments, one Spirit and two givings. For it was not one Spirit that was given first and another that was given afterward, because it is not another love that loves the neighbor than that which loves God. So it is not another love; by the very love with which we love the neighbor, we love God also. But because God is one thing and the neighbor another, they are loved by one love, yet those who are loved are not one. Since, therefore, the love of God is great and must be commended first, and the love of the neighbor second, but a beginning is made from the second so that one may arrive at the first.
— si enim fratrem, quem uides, non diliges, deum, quem non uides, quomodo diligere poteris? — ideo forte informans nos ad dilectionem proximi dedit in terra conspicuus et proximis proximus spiritum sanctum insufflando in faciem eorum; ut ab hac proximi caritate peruenirent ad eius (caritatem) qui in caelis est, de caelo misit iterum spiritum sanctum. accipe in terra et diliges fratrem; accipe de caelo et dilige deum, quia et in terra quod accepisti de caelo est. in terra Christus dedit, sed de caelo est quod dedit. ille enim dedit qui de caelo descendit; hic inuenit cui daret, sed inde attulit quod daret.
Quid est ergo, fratres? an forte commemoro et hoc, quomodo caritas ad spiritum sanctum pertineat? Paulum audite: non solum autem, inquit, sed et gloriamur in tribulationibus scientes, quia tribulatio patientiam operatur, patientia probationem, probatio uero spem, spes autem non confundit, quia caritas dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris. unde? quid tibi dabas? quid quasi de tuo praesumebas? quid enim habes, quod non accepisti? ergo unde nisi, quod sequitur, per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis?
For if you do not love your brother, whom you see, how can you love God, whom you do not see? Therefore perhaps, forming us for the love of neighbor, he gave the Holy Spirit on earth, visible and as a neighbor to neighbors, by breathing into their faces, so that from this love of neighbor they might come to his love who is in heaven; and from heaven he sent the Holy Spirit again. Receive on earth and love your brother; receive from heaven and love God, because even what you received on earth is from heaven. Christ gave on earth, but what he gave is from heaven. For he gave who descended from heaven; here he found the one to whom he would give, but from there he brought what he would give.
What then is this, brothers? Or perhaps I should also remind you how love pertains to the Holy Spirit? Listen to Paul: Not only this, he says, but we also glory in tribulations, knowing that tribulation produces endurance, endurance produces proven character, and proven character produces hope, and hope does not disappoint, because the love of God has been poured out into our hearts. From where? What were you giving yourself? What were you presuming as if from your own? For what do you have that you did not receive? Therefore from where, except as follows, through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us?
Caritas ista non tenetur nisi in unitate ecclesiae. non illam habent diuisores, sicut dicit apostolus ludas: hi sunt qui se ipsos segregant, animales, spiritum non habentes; ideo defluunt, quia coagulum non habent caritatis.
CCXLV. QVID QVODAM SERMONE AD POPVLVM DISPVTATVM SIT DE DIFFERENTIA GENERATIONIS FILII ET PROCESSIONIS SPIRITVS SANCTI. EX LIBRO DE TRINITATE XV, T. XXVII.
Verum quia in illa coaeterna et aequali et incorporali et ineffabiliter immutabili atque inseparabili trinitate difficillimum est generationem a processione distinguere, sufficiat interim eis qui extendi non ualent amplius id quod de hac re in sermone quodam proferendo ad aures populi christiani diximus dictumque conscripsimus. inter cetera enim, cum per scripturarum sanctarum testimonia docuissem de utroque procedere spiritum sanctum: "si ergo" inquam "et de patre et de filio procedit spiritus sanctus, cur filius dixit: de patre procedit ? cur, putas, nisi quemadmodum solet ad eum referre et quod ipsius est de quo ipse est ? unde illud est quod ait: mea doctrina non est mea, sed eius qui me misit. si igitur hic intellegitur eius doctrina, quam tamen dixit non suam, sed patris, quanto magis illic intellegendus est et de ipso procedere spiritus sanctus, ubi sic ait: de patre procedit, ut non diceret: "de me non procedit"?
That love is not possessed except in the unity of the church. The dividers do not have it, as the apostle Jude says: These are they who separate themselves, sensual, not having the Spirit; therefore they flow away, because they do not have the bond of love.
CCXLV. What Was Disputed in a Certain Sermon to the People Concerning the Difference Between the Generation of the Son and the Procession of the Holy Spirit. From the Book On the Trinity XV, T. XXVII.
But because in that coeternal and equal and incorporeal and ineffably immutable and inseparable Trinity it is most difficult to distinguish generation from procession, let it suffice for now for those who cannot extend themselves further, what we said on this matter in a certain sermon when delivering it to the ears of the Christian people, and wrote down as spoken. For among other things, when I had taught by the testimonies of the holy Scriptures that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both: "If therefore," I said, "the Holy Spirit proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, why did the Son say: He proceeds from the Father? Why, do you think, except that he is accustomed to refer to him even what is his own of whom he himself is? Hence that saying of his: My doctrine is not mine, but his who sent me. If therefore here his doctrine is understood, which nevertheless he said was not his own but the Father's, how much more must it be understood there that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from him, where he says: He proceeds from the Father, so as not to say: "He does not proceed from me"?
a quo autem habet filius, ut sit deus — est enim de deo deus — ab illo habet utique, ut etiam de illo procedat spiritus sanctus. ac per hoc spiritus sanctus, ut etiam de illo procedat, sicut procedit de patre, ab ipso habet patre. hic utcumque etiam illud intellegitur, quantum a talibus, quales nos sumus. intellegi potest, cur non dicatur natus esse, sed potius procedere spiritus sanctus, quoniam, si et ipse filius diceretur, amborum utique filius diceretur: quod absurdissimum est. filius quippe nullus est duorum nisi patris et matris. absit autem, ut inter deum patrem et dei filium tale aliquid suspicemur, quia nec filius hominum simul ex patre et ex matre procedit, sed cum in matrem procedit ex patre, nondum procedit ex matre, et cum in hanc lucem procedit ex matre, non tunc procedit ex patre. spiritus autem sanctus non de patre procedit in filium et de filio procedit ad sanctificandam creaturam, sed simul de utroque procedit, quamuis hoc filio pater dederit, ut quemadmodum de se, ita de illo quoque procedat. neque enim possumus dicere, quod non sit uita spiritus sanctus, cum uita pater, uita sit filius; ac per hoc sicut pater, cum habeat uitam in semet ipso, dedit et filio habere uitam in semet ipso, sic ei dedit uitam procedere de illo, sicut procedit et de ipso." [haec de illo sermone in hunc librum transtuli, sed fidelibus, non infidelibus loquens.
But the Son has from the Father that he is God—for he is God from God—and from him he certainly has it that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from him. And therefore the Holy Spirit, in order that he may also proceed from him, just as he proceeds from the Father, has this from the Father himself. Here, in whatever way, that too is understood, as far as it can be understood by such as we are: why the Holy Spirit is not said to be born, but rather to proceed, since if he too were called a son, he would certainly be called the son of both, which is utterly absurd. For no one is a son of two except of a father and a mother. But far be it from us to suspect any such thing between God the Father and the Son of God, because not even a son of men proceeds at once from father and mother, but when he proceeds into the mother from the father, he does not yet proceed from the mother, and when he proceeds into this light from the mother, he does not then proceed from the father. But the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father into the Son and proceed from the Son to sanctify the creature, but proceeds from both at once, although the Father has given this to the Son, that just as he proceeds from himself, so he may also proceed from him. For we cannot say that the Holy Spirit is not life, since the Father is life and the Son is life; and therefore, just as the Father, having life in himself, gave the Son also to have life in himself, so he gave him that life may proceed from him, just as it proceeds from himself. I have transferred these things from that discourse into this book, speaking to the faithful, not to the unfaithful.
Verum si ad hanc imaginem contuendam et ad uidenda ista quam uera sint quae in eorum mente sunt nec tria sic sunt, ut tres personae sint, sed omnia tria hominis sunt, quae una persona est, minus idonei sunt: cur non de illa summa trinitate, quae deus est, credunt potius quod in sacris litteris inuenitur, quam poscunt liquidissimam reddi rationem sibi, quae ab humana mente, tarda scilicet infirmaque, non capitur? et certe cum inconcusse crediderint scripturis sanctis tamquam ueracissimis testibus, agant orando et quaerendo et bene uiuendo, ut intellegant, id est ut, quantum uideri potest, uideatur mente quod tenetur fide. quis hoc prohibeat, immo uero ad hoc quis non hortetur? si autem propterea negandum putant ita esse, quia ea non ualent caecis mentibus cernere, debent et illi qui ex natiuitate sua caeci sunt esse solem negare. lux ergo lucet in tenebris; quod si tenebrae eam non comprehendunt, inluminentur dei dono prius, ut sint fideles et incipiant esse lux in comparatione infidelium, atque hoc praemisso fundamento aedificentur ad uidenda quae credunt, ut aliquando possint uidere. sunt enim quae ita creduntur, ut uideri iam omnino non possint; non enim Christus iterum in cruce uidendus est. sed nisi hoc credatur quod ita factum atque uisum est, ut futurum ac uidendum iam non speretur, non peruenitur ad Christum, qualis sine fine uidendus est.
But if they are too unfit to contemplate this image and to see how true those things are that are in their mind—and yet they are not three in such a way as to be three persons, but all three belong to the man, who is one person—why do they not rather believe about that supreme Trinity, which is God, what is found in the sacred Scriptures, instead of demanding that a most lucid account be rendered to them, which is not grasped by the human mind, slow and weak as it is? And surely, once they have firmly believed the holy Scriptures as the most truthful witnesses, let them act by praying, seeking, and living well, so that they may understand—that is, so that, as far as it can be seen, what is held by faith may be seen by the mind. Who would forbid this? Indeed, who would not urge it? But if they think it must be denied to be so for the reason that their blind minds cannot discern it, then those who are blind from birth ought also to deny that the sun exists. Therefore the light shines in the darkness; but if the darkness does not comprehend it, let them first be enlightened by God's gift, so that they may be faithful and begin to be light in comparison with unbelievers, and with this foundation laid, let them be built up to see what they believe, so that they may at some time be able to see. For there are things that are believed in such a way that they can by no means now be seen; for Christ is not to be seen again on the cross. But unless it is believed that this was done and seen in such a way that it is no longer hoped for as future and to be seen, one does not come to Christ as he is to be seen without end.
quantum uero attinet ad illam summam, ineffabilem, incorporalem incommutabilemque naturam per intellegentiam utcumque cernendam, nusquam se melius, regente dumtaxat fidei regula, acies humanae mentis exerceat quam in eo quod ipse homo in sua natura melius ceteris animalibus, melius etiam ceteris animae suae partibus habet, quod est ipsa mens, cui quidam rerum inuisibilium tributus est uisus et cui tamquam in loco superiore atque interiore honorabiliter praesidenti iudicanda omnia nuntiant etiam corporis sensus et qua non est superior, cui subdita regenda est, nisi deus.
Verum inter haec quae multa iam dixi et nihil illius summae trinitatis ineffabilitate dignum me dixisse audeo profiteri, sed confiteri potius mirificatam scientiam eius ex me inualuisse nec potuisse me ad illam, o tu, anima mea, ubi te esse sentis, ubi iaces aut ubi stas, donec ab eo qui propitius factus est omnibus iniquitatibus tuis sanentur omnes languores tui? agnoscis te certe in illo esse stabulo, quo Samaritanus ille perduxit eum quem repperit multis a latronibus inflictis uulneribus semiuiuum, et tamen multa uera uidisti non his oculis, quibus uidentur corpora colorata, sed eis pro quibus orabat qui dicebat: oculi mei uideant aequitatem. nempe ergo multa uera uidisti eaque discreuisti ab illa luce, qua tibi lucente uidisti. attolle oculos ad ipsam lucem et eos in ea fige, si potes.
As far as pertains to that highest, ineffable, incorporeal, and unchangeable nature, to be discerned by understanding in whatever way possible, the keenness of the human mind never exercises itself better—with the rule of faith governing, at least—than in that which man himself has in his own nature, better than other animals, better even than the other parts of his soul: that is, the mind itself, to which a certain sight of invisible things has been granted, and to which, as presiding honorably in a higher and more inward place, all things to be judged are reported even by the senses of the body, and which has no superior to whom it must be subject and by whom it must be ruled, except God.
But among these many things I have already said, I dare not profess that I have said anything worthy of the ineffability of that supreme Trinity, but rather to confess that the wondrous knowledge of it has grown weak from me and that I could not reach it—O you, my soul, where do you feel yourself to be, where do you lie or where do you stand, until by him who has been propitious to all your iniquities all your sicknesses are healed? You surely recognize that you are in that inn to which that Samaritan brought the man whom he found half-dead from the many wounds inflicted by robbers, and yet you have seen many true things not with these eyes, with which colored bodies are seen, but with those for which he prayed who said: Let my eyes see equity. Surely, then, you have seen many true things and have distinguished them from that light by whose shining you saw them. Lift up your eyes to that light itself and fix them in it, if you can.
sic enim uidebis quid distet natiuitas uerbi dei a processione doni dei, propter quod filius unigenitus non de patre genitum — alioquin frater eius esset — sed procedere dixit spiritum sanctum, unde, cum sit communio quaedam consubstantialis patris et filii, amborum spiritus, non amborum, quod absit, dictus est filius. sed ad hoc lucide perspicueque cernendum non potes ibi aciem figere, scio, non potes. uerum dico, mihi dico, quid non possim scio. ipsa tibi tamen ostendit in te tria illa, in quibus te summae ipsius, quam fixis oculis contemplari nondum uales, imaginem trinitatis agnosceres. ipsa ostendit tibi uerbum uerum esse in te, quando de scientia tua gignitur, id est quando quod scimus dicimus, etsi nullius gentis lingua significantem uocem uel proferamus uel cogitemus, sed ex illo quod nouimus cogitatio nostra formetur sitque in acie cogitantis imago simillima cognitionis eius, quam memoria continebat, ista duo scilicet uelut parentem ac prolem tertia uoluntate siue dilectione iungente. quam quidem uoluntatem de cognitione procedere — nemo enim uult quod omnino quid uel quale sit nescit — non tamen esse cognitionis imaginem et ideo quandam in hac re intellegibili natinitatis et processionis insinuari distantiam, quoniam non hoc est cogitatione conspicere quod appetere uel etiam perfrui uoluntate, cernit discernitque qui potest.
For in this way you will see what distinguishes the birth of the Word of God from the procession of the gift of God; for this reason the only-begotten Son is not said to have been born of the Father—otherwise he would be his brother—but he said that the Holy Spirit proceeds; hence, since there is a certain consubstantial communion of the Father and the Son, he is called the Spirit of both, not the Son of both—far be it. But to discern this clearly and perspicuously you cannot fix your gaze there—I know you cannot. I speak truly, I speak to myself, I know what I cannot do. Yet that very [nature] shows you in yourself those three things in which you might recognize the image of that supreme Trinity, which you are not yet able to contemplate with fixed eyes. It shows you that the true word is in you when it is begotten from your knowledge, that is, when we say what we know, even if we neither utter nor think a significant sound of any people's tongue, but from that which we know our thought is formed, and there is in the keenness of the thinker an image most like that cognition of his which memory contained—these two, namely, as it were parent and offspring, with a third, will or love, joining them. Indeed, that will proceeds from cognition—for no one wills what he does not know at all, either what it is or of what sort it is—yet it is not the image of cognition, and therefore a certain distinction of birth and procession is suggested in this intelligible matter, since it is not the same thing to behold by thought as to desire or even to enjoy by will; he who can, sees and discerns this.
potuisti et tu, quamuis non potueris neque possis explicare sufficienti eloquio, quod inter nubila similitudinum corporalium, quae cogitationibus humanis occursare non desinunt, uix uidisti. sed illa lux, quae non est quod tu et hoc tibi ostendit aliud esse illas incorporeas similitudines corporum et aliud esse uerum, quod eis reprobatis intellegentia contuemur, haec et alia similiter certa oculis tuis interioribus lux illa monstrauit. quae igitur causa est, cur acie fixa ipsam uidere non possis, nisi utique infirmitas? et quis eam tibi fecit nisi utique iniquitas? quis ergo sanat omnes languores tuos, nisi qui propitius fit omnibus iniquitatibus tuis ?]'
CCXLVI. QVOD OMNIS DOCTRINA VEL BBRVH SIT VEL SIGNORVM, ET RES, QVA PRVENDVM EST, SIT DEVS TRINITAS. EX LIBRO DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA PRIMO.
Omnis doctrina uel rerum est uel signorum; sed res per signa discuntur. proprie autem nunc res appellaui, quae non ad significandum aliquid adhibentur, sicut est lignum, lapis, pecus atque huius modi cetera. sed non illud lignum, quod in aquas amaras Mosen misisse legimus, ut amaritudine carerent, neque ille lapis, quem Iacob ad caput sibi posuit, neque illud pecus, quod pro filio immolauit Abraham. haec namque ita res sunt, ut aliarum etiam signa sint rerum. sunt autem alia signa, quorum omnis usus in significando est, sicuti sunt uerba.
You too could have done so, although you could not and cannot explain with sufficient eloquence what you have scarcely seen amid the clouds of bodily likenesses, which never cease to meet human thoughts. But that light, which is not what you are, has also shown you that those incorporeal likenesses of bodies are one thing and the truth, which we contemplate with the understanding once those likenesses are rejected, is another; that light has shown these and other similarly certain things to your inner eyes. What, then, is the cause why, with your gaze fixed, you cannot see it, except surely weakness? And who made this for you except surely iniquity? Who, then, heals all your sicknesses, except he who is propitious to all your iniquities?
CCXLVI. That all doctrine is either of things or of signs, and that the thing to be enjoyed is God the Trinity. From the first book of On Christian Doctrine.
All doctrine is either of things or of signs; but things are learned through signs. Now I have properly called things those which are not employed to signify something, such as wood, stone, cattle, and other such things. But not that wood which we read Moses cast into the bitter waters so that they might lose their bitterness, nor that stone which Jacob placed at his head, nor that animal which Abraham sacrificed for his son. For these are things in such a way that they are also signs of other things. There are, however, other signs whose whole use is in signifying, such as words.
nemo enim utitur uerbis nisi ad aliquid, significandi gratia. ex quo intellegitur, quid appellem signa; res eas uidelicet, quae ad significandum aliquid adhibentur. quam ob rem omne signum etiam res aliqua est. quod enim nulla res est, omnino nihil est. non autem omnis res etiam signum est. et ideo in hac diuisione rerum atque signorum, cum de rebus loquimur, ita loquemur, ut, etiam si earum aliquae adhiberi ad significandum possint, non impediant partitionem, qua prius de rebus, postea de signis disserimus, memoriterque teneamus id nunc in rebus considerandum esse quod sunt, non quod aliud etiam praeter se ipsas significant.
Res ergo aliae sunt, quibus fruendum est, aliae, quibus utendum est, aliae, quae fruuntur et utuntur. illae quibus fruendum est nos beatos faciunt; istis quibus utendum est tendentes ad beatitudinem adiuuamur et quasi adminiculamur, ut ad illas quae nos beatos faciunt peruenire atque his inhaerere possimus. nos uero, qui fruimur et utimur inter utrasque constituti, si eis quibus utendum est frui uoluerimus, impeditur cursus noster et aliquando etiam deflectitur, ut ab his rebus, quibus fruendum est, obtinendis uel retardemur uel etiam reuocemur, inferiorum amore praepediti.
For no one uses words except for some purpose, for the sake of signifying. From this it is understood what I call signs: namely, those things that are employed to signify something. For this reason every sign is also some thing. For what is no thing at all is nothing. But not every thing is also a sign. And therefore in this division of things and signs, when we speak of things, we shall so speak that, even if some of them can be employed for signifying, they do not hinder the division by which we first discuss things and afterward signs, and let us hold it in memory that now in things we must consider what they are, not that they also signify something other than themselves.
Therefore some things are to be enjoyed, others to be used, and others that enjoy and use. Those that are to be enjoyed make us blessed; those that are to be used help and, as it were, support us as we tend toward blessedness, so that we may be able to arrive at those things that make us blessed and cling to them. But we, who enjoy and use, placed between the two, if we wish to enjoy the things that are to be used, our course is hindered and sometimes even turned aside, so that we are either delayed or even called back from obtaining those things that are to be enjoyed, held fast by love of lower things.
Frui est enim amore inhaerere alicui rei propter ae ipsam, uti autem, quod in usum uenerit ad id quod amas optinendum referre, si tamen amandum est. nam usus inlicitus abusus potius uel abusio nominanda est. quomodo ergo, si essemus peregrini, qui beate uiuere nisi in patria non possemus, eaque peregrinatione utique miseri et miseriam finire cupientes in patriam redire uellemus, opus esset uel terrestribus uel marinis uehiculis, quibus utendum esset, ut ad patriam, qua fruendum erat, peruenire ualeremus; quod si amoenitates itineris et ipsa gestatio uehiculorum nos delectaret, conuersi ad fruendum his quibus uti debuimus, nollemus cito uiam finire et peruersa suauitate implicati alienaremur a patria, cuius suauitas faceret beatos: sic in huius mortalitatis uia peregrinantes a domino si redire ad patriam uolumus, ubi beati esse possimus, utendum est hoc mundo, non fruendum, ut inuisibilia dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciantur, hoc est ut de corporalibus temporalibusque rebus aeterna et spiritalia capiamus.
For to enjoy is to cling in love to something for its own sake; but to use is to refer to the obtaining of that which you love whatever has come into use, if nevertheless it is to be loved. For an unlawful use is rather to be called abuse or misuse. How then, if we were strangers, who could not live blessedly except in our homeland, and in that wandering we were certainly wretched and, desiring to end our misery, wished to return to our homeland, we would need either land or sea vehicles, which we would have to use so that we might be able to reach the homeland, which was to be enjoyed; but if the pleasantness of the journey and the very riding in the vehicles delighted us, turning to enjoy these things which we ought to have used, we would not wish to finish the journey quickly and, entangled by a perverse sweetness, we would be alienated from the homeland, whose sweetness would make us blessed: so in the journey of this mortality, as we wander from the Lord, if we wish to return to the homeland where we can be blessed, this world must be used, not enjoyed, so that the invisible things of God may be seen, understood through the things that have been made, that is, so that from bodily and temporal things we may grasp eternal and spiritual things.
Res igitur, quibus fruendum est, pater et filius et spiritus sanctus eademque trinitas, una quaedam summa res communisque omnibus fruentibus ea, si tamen res, et non rerum omnium causa; si tamen et causa. non enim facile nomen, quod tantae excellentiae conueniat, inueniri potest, nisi quod melius ita dicitur trinitas haec unus deus, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia. ita pater et filius et spiritus sanctus et singulus quisque horum deus et simul omnes unus deus et singulus quisque horum plena substantia et simul omnes una substantia. pater nec filius est nec spiritus sanctus, filius nec pater est nec spiritus sanctus, spiritus sanctus nec pater nec filius est, sed pater tantum pater et filius tantum filius et spiritus sanctus tantum spiritus sanctus. eadem tribus aeternitas, eadem incommutabilitas, eadem maiestas, eadem potestas. in patre unitas, in filio aequalitas, in spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque concordia, et tria haec unum omnia propter patrem, aequalia omnia propter filium, conexa omnia propter spiritum sanctum.
The things, then, which are to be enjoyed are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, the same Trinity, a certain one highest thing and common to all who enjoy it—if indeed it is a thing, and not the cause of all things; if indeed it is also a cause. For a name that suits such great excellence cannot easily be found, except that it is better said thus: this Trinity is one God, from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things. Thus the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and each one of these individually is God, and all together are one God, and each one of these individually is full substance, and all together are one substance. The Father is neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit; the Son is neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son; but the Father is only Father, and the Son is only Son, and the Holy Spirit is only Holy Spirit. The same eternity belongs to the three, the same immutability, the same majesty, the same power. In the Father is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the concord of unity and equality; and these three are all one because of the Father, all equal because of the Son, all connected because of the Holy Spirit.
Diximusne aliquid et sonuimus aliquid dignum deo ? immo uero nihil me aliud quam dicere uoluisse sentio. si autem dixi, non est quod dicere uolui. hoc unde scio, nisi quia deus ineffabilis est ? quod autem a me dictum est si ineffabile esset, dictum non esset. ac per hoc ne ineffabilis quidem dicendus est deus, quia et cum hoc dicitur, aliquid dicitur et fit nescio qua pugna. uerborum, quoniam, si illud est ineffabile quod dici non potest, non est ineffabile quod uel ineffabile dici potest. quae pugna uerborum silentio cauenda potius quam uoce pacanda est. et tamen deus, cum de illo nihil digne dici possit, admisit humanae uocis obsequia et uerbis nostris in laude sua gaudere nos uoluit. nam inde est et quod dicitur deus. non enim re uera in strepitu istarum duarum syllabarum ipse cognoscitur, sed tamen omnes latinae linguae socios, cum aures eorum sonus iste tetigerit, monet ad cogitandam excellentissimam quandam immortalemque naturam.
Have we said anything, and sounded anything, worthy of God? Rather, I feel that I have done nothing other than wish to speak. But if I did speak, it is not what I wished to speak. How do I know this, except that God is ineffable? But if what I said were ineffable, it would not have been said. And for this reason God is not even to be called ineffable, because when this is said, something is said, and by some struggle of words it comes about that, since that is ineffable which cannot be said, then what can at least be called ineffable is not ineffable. This struggle of words is to be avoided by silence rather than pacified by the voice. And yet God, when nothing worthy of him can be said, has admitted the service of the human voice, and has willed that we rejoice in his praise with our words. For from this comes even what is called God. For in truth he is not known in the sound of these two syllables, but nevertheless, when this sound has touched the ears of all who share the Latin language, it admonishes them to think of a certain most excellent and immortal nature.
Nam cum ille unus cogitatur deorum deus, ab his etiam qui alios et suspicantur et uocant et colunt deos siue in caelo siue in terra ita cogitatur, ut aliquid quo nihil sit melius atque sublimius illa cogitatio conetur attingere.
CCXLVII. DE PVRQVTIONE MENTIS AD FRVENDAM ILLAM LVCEM, QVAE SE VIAM NOBIS PRAEBENS A SVPEBBIS STVLTE FECISSE PVTATA EST HVMANVM QVNVS, DE CONTRABIIS ET SIMILIBVS CVRANS. EX EODEM LIBRO PRIMO.
Quapropter cum illa ueritate perfruendum sit, quae incommutabiliter uiuit, et in ea trinitas deus, auctor et conditor uniuersitatis, rebus, quas condidit, consulat, purgandus est animus, ut et perspicere illam lucem ualeat et inhaerere perspectae. quam purgationem quasi ambulationem quandam et quasi nauigationem ad patriam esse arbitremur. non enim ad eum qui ubique praesens est locis mouemur, sed bono studio bonisque moribus.
For when that one God of gods is thought of, even by those who also suspect, name, and worship other gods, whether in heaven or on earth, He is thought of in such a way that that thought strives to reach something than which nothing is better and more sublime.
247. On the purification of the mind for the enjoyment of that light which, offering itself to us as the way, was foolishly thought by the proud to have made the human race vile; treating of contraries and similitudes. From the same first book.
Therefore, since that truth must be enjoyed which lives immutably, and in it the Trinity, God, the author and founder of the universe, provides for the things He has created, the mind must be purified so that it may both be able to perceive that light and, having perceived it, cleave to it. This purification we should regard as a kind of journey and a kind of voyage to our homeland. For we are not moved toward Him who is present everywhere by places, but by good zeal and good morals.
Quod non possemus, nisi ipsa sapientia tantae etiam nostrae infirmitati congruere dignaretur et uiuendi nobis praeberet exemplum non aliter quam in homine, quoniam et nos homines sumus. sed quia nos, cum ad illam uenimus, sapienter facimus, ipsa, cum ad nos uenit, ab hominibus superbis quasi stulte fecisse putata est. et quoniam nos, cum ad illam uenimus, conualescimus, ipsa, cum ad nos uenit, quasi infirma existimata est. sed quod stultum est dei, sapientius est quam homines, quod infirmum est dei, fortius est quam homines. cum ergo ipsa sit patria, uiam quoque se nobis fecit ad patriam.
Et cum sano et puro interiori oculo ubique sit praesens, eorum qui oculum illum infirmum immundumque habent oculis etiam carneis apparere dignata est. quia enim in sapientia dei non poterat mundus per sapientiam cognoscere deum, placuit deo per stultitiam praedicationis saluos facere credentes. non igitur per locorum spatia ueniendo, sed in carne mortali mortalibus apparendo uenisse ad nos dicitur. illuc ergo uenit, ubi erat, quia in hoc mundo erat et mundus per eum factus est. sed quoniam cupiditate fruendi pro ipso creatore creatura homines configurati huic mundo et mundi nomine congruentissime uocati non eam cognouerunt, propterea dixit euangelista: et m undus eum non cognouit. itaque in sapientia dei non poterat mundus per sapientiam cognoscere deum.
This we could not do unless Wisdom itself had deigned to match even our great weakness and to offer us an example of living, not otherwise than in a man, since we too are men. But because we, when we come to it, act wisely, it itself, when it came to us, was thought by proud men to have acted as if foolishly. And because we, when we come to it, grow strong, it itself, when it came to us, was reckoned as if weak. But what is foolish of God is wiser than men, what is weak of God is stronger than men. Since, then, it is itself the homeland, it has also made itself the way for us to the homeland.
And although with a sound and pure inner eye it is present everywhere, it deigned to appear even to bodily eyes of those who have that eye weak and unclean. For since in the wisdom of God the world could not through wisdom know God, it pleased God through the foolishness of preaching to save those who believe. Not, therefore, by coming through spaces of places, but by appearing to mortals in mortal flesh, is it said to have come to us. It came, then, to where it was, because it was in this world and the world was made through it. But since men, conformed to this world by the desire of enjoying the creature instead of the Creator himself, and most fittingly called by the name of the world, did not know it, the evangelist therefore said: And the world did not know him. And so in the wisdom of God the world could not through wisdom know God.
cur ergo uenit, cam hic esset, nisi quia placuit deo per stultitiam praedicationis saluos facere credentes?
Quomodo uenit, nisi quod uerbum caro factum est et habitauit in nobis? sicuti cum loquimur, ut id quod animo gerimus in audientis animum per aures carneas inlabatur, fit sonus uerbum, quod corde gestamus, et locutio uocatur, nec tamen in eundem sonum cogitatio nostra conuertitur, sed apud se manens integra formam uocis, qua se insinuet auribus, sine aliqua labe suae mutationis assumit: ita uerbum dei non commutatum caro tamen factum est, ut habitaret in nobis.
Sicut autem curatio uia est ad sanitatem, sic ista curatio peccatores sanandos reficiendosque suscepit. et quemadmodum medici, cum alligant uulnera, non incomposite, sed apte id faciunt, ut uinculi utilitatem quaedam pulchritudo etiam consequatur: sic medicina sapientiae per hominis susceptionem nostris est accommodata uulneribus, de quibusdam contrariis curans et de quibusdam similibus. sicut etiam ille qui medetur uulneri corporis adhibet quaedam contraria, sicut frigidum calido uel humido siccum uel quid aliud eius modi, adhibet etiam quaedam similia, sicut linteolum uel rotundo uulneri rotundum uel oblongum oblongo, ligaturamque ipsam non eandem membris omnibus, sed similem similibus coaptat: sic sapientia dei hominem curans se ipsam exhibuit ad sanandum, ipsa medicus, ipsa medicina.
Why, then, did he come, since he was here, unless because it pleased God to save believers through the foolishness of preaching?
How did he come, unless in that the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us? Just as when we speak, so that what we carry in our mind may slip into the mind of the hearer through fleshly ears, the word that we carry in our heart becomes a sound and is called speech, and yet our thought is not turned into that same sound, but remaining whole in itself it assumes the form of the voice by which it may insinuate itself into the ears, without any blemish of its own change: so the Word of God, though not changed, was yet made flesh, that he might dwell in us.
But just as healing is the way to health, so this healing took up sinners to be healed and restored. And as physicians, when they bind up wounds, do so not clumsily but fittingly, so that a certain beauty also accompanies the usefulness of the bandage: so the medicine of wisdom, through the assumption of a man, was adapted to our wounds, curing some by contraries and some by similars. Just as he who treats a wound of the body applies certain contraries, such as cold to heat or dry to moist or something else of that kind, and also applies certain similars, such as a small linen cloth, or a round one to a round wound or an oblong one to an oblong wound, and fits the bandage itself not the same to all members but similar to similar: so the wisdom of God, healing man, presented itself for healing, itself the physician, itself the medicine.
quia ergo per superbiam homo lapsus est, humilitatem adhibuit ad sanandum. serpentis sapientia decepti sumus, dei stultitia liberamur. quemadmodum autem illa sapientia uocabatur, erat autem stultitia contemnentibus deum, sic ista quae uocatur stultitia sapientia est uincentibus diabolum. nos immortalitate male usi sumus, ut moreremur, Christus mortalitate bene usus est, ut uiueremus. corrupto animo feminae ingressus est morbus, integro corpore feminae processit salus. ad eadem contraria pertinet, quod etiam exemplo uirtutum eius uitia nostra curantur. iam uero similia quasi ligamenta membris et uulneribus nostris adhibita illa sunt, quod per feminam deceptos per feminam natus homo homines, mortalis mortales, morte mortuos liberauit.
CCXLVIII. VTRVM FBVI SE HOMO DEBEAT AN VTI, ET DE REGVLA DILECTIONIS DIVINITVS CONSTITVTA. EX LIBRO DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA PRIMO.
Because, therefore, man fell through pride, he applied humility to heal us. We were deceived by the wisdom of the serpent; we are set free by the foolishness of God. But just as that wisdom was so called, yet was foolishness to those who despise God, so this which is called foolishness is wisdom to those who overcome the devil. We used immortality badly, so that we might die; Christ used mortality well, so that we might live. Into a corrupted soul of a woman disease entered; from an intact body of a woman salvation came forth. To these same opposites it also belongs that our vices are cured even by the example of his virtues. Moreover, those things were applied like bands to our limbs and wounds, namely that through a woman deceived, through a woman a man was born, and being mortal he freed mortals, by death he freed the dead.
248. Whether man ought to enjoy or to use, and on the rule of love divinely established. From the first book of On Christian Doctrine.
Magna quaestio est, utrum frui se homines debeant an uti an utrumque. praeceptum est nobis, ut diligamus inuicem. sed quaeritur, utrum propter se homo ab homine diligendus sit an propter aliud. si enim propter se, fruimur eo; si prop ter aliud, utimur eo. uidetur autem mihi propter aliud diligendus. quod enim propter se diligendum est, in eo constituitur beata uita, cuius etiam si nondum res, tamen spes eius nos hoc tempore consolatur. maledictus autem qui spem suam ponit in hominem. sed nec se ipso quis frui debet, si liquide aduertas, quia nec se ipsum debet propter se ipsum diligere, sed propter illud quod fruendum est. tunc est quippe optimus homo, cum tota uita sua pergit in incommutabilem uitam et toto affectu inhaeret illi. si autem se propter se diligit, non se refert ad deum, sed ad se ipsum conuersus non ad incommutabile aliquid conuertitur et propterea iam cum defectu aliquo se fruitur, quia melior est, cum totus inhaeret atque constringitur incommutabili bono, quam cum inde uel ad se ipsum relaxatur. si ergo te ipsum non propter te debes diligere, sed propter illum, ubi dilectionis tuae rectissimus finis est, non suscenseat alius homo, si etiam ipsum propter deum diligis.
There is a great question whether men ought to enjoy themselves, or use themselves, or both. We are commanded to love one another. But it is asked whether a man is to be loved by a man for his own sake or for the sake of something else. For if for his own sake, we enjoy him; if for the sake of something else, we use him. But it seems to me that he is to be loved for the sake of something else. For that which is to be loved for its own sake is that in which the blessed life is established, whose reality, even if not yet present, is nevertheless consoled in this time by its hope. But cursed is he who places his hope in man. Yet neither ought anyone to enjoy himself, if you consider it clearly, because he ought not to love himself for his own sake, but for the sake of that which is to be enjoyed. For then is a man best, when his whole life presses on toward the unchangeable life and cleaves to it with his whole affection. But if he loves himself for his own sake, he does not refer himself to God, but turned toward himself he is not turned toward something unchangeable, and therefore he now enjoys himself with some defect, because he is better when, wholly cleaving and bound to the unchangeable good, than when he is released from it even toward himself. If, therefore, you ought not to love yourself for your own sake, but for the sake of him in whom the most upright end of your love is placed, let not another man be angry if you also love him for the sake of God.
haec enim regula dilectionis diuinitus constituta est: diliges, inquit, proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum; deum uero ex toto corde et ex tota anima et ex tota mente, ut omnes cogitationes tuas et omnem uitam et omnem intellectum in illum conferas, a quo habes ea ipsa quae confers. cum autem ait: toto corde, tota anima, tota mente, nullam uitae nostrae partem reliquit, quae uacare debeat et quasi locum dare, ut re alia uelit frui, sed quidquid aliud diligendum uenerit in animum, illuc rapiatur quo totus dilectionis impetus currit. quisquis ergo recte diligit proximum, hoc cum eo debet agere, ut etiam ipse toto corde, tota anima, tota mente diligat deum. sic enim eum diligens tamquam se ipsum totam dilectionem sui et illius refert in illam dilectionem dei, quae nullum a se riuulum duci extra patitur, cuius deriuatione minuatur.
Non autem omnia, quibus utendum est, diligenda sunt, sed ea sola quae aut nobiscum societate quadam referuntur ad deum, sicuti est homo uel angelus, aut ad nos relata beneficio dei per nos indigent, sicuti est corpus. nam utique martyres non dilexerunt scelus persequentium se, quo tamen usi sunt ad promerendum deum.
For this rule of love has been divinely established: "You shall love," he says, "your neighbor as yourself"; but God with your whole heart and with your whole soul and with your whole mind, so that you direct all your thoughts and your whole life and all your understanding to him from whom you have these very things which you direct. But when he says "with the whole heart, with the whole soul, with the whole mind," he has left no part of our life that ought to be idle and, as it were, give place to wishing to enjoy some other thing; but whatever else comes into the mind to be loved should be swept along to where the whole impulse of love runs. Whoever, therefore, rightly loves his neighbor ought to act with him so that he too loves God with his whole heart, with his whole soul, with his whole mind. For in this way, loving him as himself, he refers the whole love of himself and of that other to that love of God which suffers no rivulet to be drawn off from it, by whose diversion it might be diminished.
But not all things which are to be used are to be loved, but only those which either, together with us, are referred to God by some fellowship, such as man or an angel, or, referred to us, stand in need through us by the benefit of God, such as the body. For certainly the martyrs did not love the crime of those who persecuted them, which nevertheless they used to earn God's favor.
CCXLVIIII. DE REBVS QVATTVOR DILIGENDIS, ET ORDINATAM HABERI OPORTERE DILECTIONEM ET CONIVNCTIORIBVS PRO SORTE CONSVLENDVM. EX EODEM LIBRO PRIMO.
Cum ergo quattuor sint diligenda, unum quod supra nos est, alterum quod nos sumus, tertium quod iuxta nos est, quartum quod infra nos est, de secundo et quarto nulla praecepta danda erant. quantumlibet enim homo excidit a ueritate, remanet illi dilectio sua et dilectio corporis sui. fugax enim animus ab incommutabili lumine omnium regnatore id agit, ut ipse sibi regnet et corpori suo, et ideo non potest nisi et se et corpus suum diligere. magnum autem aliquid adeptum se putat, si etiam sociis, id est aliis hominibus dominari potuerit. inest enim uitioso animo id magis appetere et sibi tamquam debitum uindicare, quod uni proprie debetur deo. talis autem sui dilectio melius odium uocatur. inimicum est enim, quia uult sibi seruire quod infra se est, cum ipse superiori seruire nolit, rectissimeque dictum est: qui autem diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam, et ideo fit infirmus animus et de mortali corpore cruciatur; necesse est enim, ut illud diligat et eius corruptione praegrauetur. immortalitas enim et incorruptio corporis de sanitate animi exsistit, sanitas autem animi est firmissime inhaerere potiori, hoc est incommutabili deo.
CCXLIX. CONCERNING THE FOUR THINGS TO BE LOVED, AND THAT LOVE OUGHT TO BE ORDERED, AND THAT PROVISION SHOULD BE MADE FOR THOSE MORE CLOSELY JOINED TO US ACCORDING TO THEIR LOT. FROM THE SAME FIRST BOOK.
Since, therefore, there are four things to be loved—one that is above us, another that we ourselves are, a third that is next to us, and a fourth that is below us—no commandments needed to be given concerning the second and the fourth. For however far a man has fallen away from the truth, his love of himself and his love of his own body remain with him. For the soul that flees from the unchangeable light, the ruler of all things, strives to rule itself and its own body, and therefore it cannot but love both itself and its body. But it thinks it has obtained something great if it can also lord it over its companions, that is, over other men. For it is in the vicious soul to desire this all the more and to claim it for itself as though due, which is owed properly to God alone. But such love of self is better called hatred. For it is an enemy, because it wishes what is below it to serve it, when it itself is unwilling to serve what is above it; and it has been most rightly said: "But he who loves iniquity hates his own soul." And therefore the soul becomes weak and is tormented by the mortal body; for it must necessarily love that body and be weighed down by its corruption. For the immortality and incorruption of the body arise from the health of the soul, and the health of the soul is to cling most firmly to the stronger, that is, to the unchangeable God.
cum uero etiam eis qui sibi naturaliter pares sunt, hoc est hominibus, dominari affectat, intolerabilis omnino superbia est.
Nemo ergo se odit. et hinc quidem nulla cum aliqua secta quaestio fuit. sed neque corpus suum quisquam odit. uerum est enim quod ait apostolus: nemo umquam carnem suam odio habuit. et quod nonnulli dicunt malle se esse sine corpore omnino, falluntur; non enim corpus suum, sed corruptiones eius et pondus oderunt. non itaque nullum corpus, sed incorruptum et celerrimum corpus uolunt habere, sed putant nullum corpus esse, si tale fuerit, quia tale aliquid esse animam putant. quod autem continentia quadam et laboribus quasi persequi uidentur corpora sua, qui hoc recte faciunt, non id agunt, ut non habeant corpus, sed ut habeant subiugatum et paratum ad opera necessaria. libidines enim male utentes corpore, id est consuetudines inclinationis animae ad fruendum inferioribus, per ipsius corporis laboriosam quandam militiam extinguere affectant. nam non se interimunt, et curam suae ualetudinis gerunt. qui autem peruerse id agunt, quasi naturaliter inimico suo corpori bellum ingerunt. in quo . fallit eos quod legunt: caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem; haec enim inuicem aduersantur sibi.
But when it even strives to dominate those who are by nature its equals, that is, human beings, this is altogether intolerable pride.
Therefore no one hates himself. And on this point there has indeed been no dispute with any sect. But neither does anyone hate his own body. For it is true what the apostle says: No one ever hated his own flesh. And those who say that they would rather be without a body altogether are mistaken; for it is not their body that they hate, but its corruptions and its weight. So it is not that they wish to have no body, but an incorrupt and very swift body; but they think that there is no body if it is of such a kind, because they think that the soul is something of that sort. But those who, by a kind of continence and by labors, seem as it were to persecute their own bodies—those who do this rightly do not aim at not having a body, but at having it subdued and ready for necessary works. For they strive to extinguish the lusts that make bad use of the body, that is, the habits of the soul's inclination to enjoy lower things, through a certain laborious warfare of the body itself. For they do not kill themselves, and they take care of their own health. But those who do this perversely wage war, as it were, against their own body as a natural enemy. In this they are deceived by what they read: The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to one another.
dictum est enim hoc propter indomitam carnalem consuetudinem, aduersus quam spiritus concupiscit, non ut interimat corpus, sed ut concupiscentia eius, id est consuetudine mala, edomita faciat spiritui subiugatum, quod naturalis ordo desiderat. quia enim hoc erit post resurrectionem, ut corpus omni modo cum quiete summa spiritui subditum immortaliter uigeat, hoc etiam in hac uita meditandum est, ut consuetudo carnalis mutetur in melius nec inordinatis motibus resistat spiritui. quod donec fiat, caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem, non per odium resistente spiritu, sed per principatum, quo magis quod diligit uult subditum esse meliori, nec per odium resistente carne, sed per consuetudinis uinculum, quod a parentum etiam propagine inueteratum naturae lege inoleuit. id ergo agit spiritus in domanda carne, ut soluat malae consuetudinis quasi pacta peruersa et fiat pax consuetudinis bonae.
For this was said because of untamed carnal habit, against which the spirit lusts, not so as to destroy the body, but so that, once its lust, that is, its evil habit, has been subdued, it may make the body subject to the spirit, which is what the natural order desires. For since this will be the case after the resurrection, that the body, wholly at peace, may flourish immortal and subject to the spirit, this must also be meditated upon in this life, that the carnal habit may be changed for the better and may not resist the spirit with disordered motions. Until this comes about, the flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh, the spirit resisting not out of hatred but out of its preeminence, by which it more greatly wills that what it loves be subject to the better, and the flesh resisting not out of hatred but by the bond of habit, which, grown old even from the propagation of parents, has taken root by the law of nature. Therefore the spirit works this in subduing the flesh, that it may dissolve, as it were, the perverse agreements of evil habit, and that the peace of good habit may be made.
Diliges, inquit, dominum deum tuum ex toto corde tuo et ex tota anima tua et ex tota mente tua, et: diliges proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum: in his duobus praeceptis tota lex pendet et prophetae. finis itaque praecepti est dilectio, et ea gemina, id est dei et proximi. quod si te totum intellegas, id est animum et corpus, et proximum totum, id est animum et corpus eius — homo enim ex anima constat et corpore — nullum rerum diligendarum genus in his duobus praeceptis praetermissum est. cum enim praecurrat dilectio dei eiusque dilectionis modus praescriptus appareat, ita ut cetera in illum confluant, de dilectione tua nihil dictum uidetur, sed cum dictum est: diliges proximum tuum sicut te ipsum, simul et tui abs te dilectio non praetermissa est.
Ille autem iuste et sancte uiuit qui rerum integer aestimator est; ipse est autem qui ordinatam habet dilectionem, ne aut diligat quod non est diligendum aut non diligat quod diligendum est aut amplius diligat quod minus diligendum est aut aeque diligat quod uel minus aut amplius diligendum est aut minus uel amplius quod aeque diligendum est. omnis peccator, in quantum peccator est, non est diligendus; et omnis homo, in quantum homo est, diligendus est propter deum, deus uero propter se ipsum. et si deus omni homine amplius diligendus est, amplius quisque deum debet diligere quam se ipsum.
You shall love, he says, the Lord your God with your whole heart and with your whole soul and with your whole mind, and: you shall love your neighbor as yourself; on these two commandments the whole law hangs and the prophets. The end of the commandment, therefore, is love, and that twofold, namely of God and of neighbor. But if you understand yourself wholly, that is, soul and body, and your neighbor wholly, that is, his soul and body—for a human being consists of soul and body—no kind of thing to be loved has been omitted in these two commandments. For since love of God goes before and the measure of that love is clearly prescribed, so that all other things flow into it, nothing seems to have been said about love of yourself; but when it was said: you shall love your neighbor as yourself, at the same time love of yourself by yourself was not omitted.
But he lives justly and holily who is an impartial assessor of things; and he is the one who has an ordered love, so that he neither loves what should not be loved, nor fails to love what should be loved, nor loves more what should be loved less, nor loves equally what should be loved either less or more, nor loves less or more what should be loved equally. Every sinner, insofar as he is a sinner, is not to be loved; and every human being, insofar as he is a human being, is to be loved on account of God, but God on account of himself. And if God is to be loved more than any human being, each person ought to love God more than himself.
item amplius alius homo diligendus est quam corpus nostrum, quia propter deum omnia ista diligenda sunt, et potest nobiscum alius homo deo perfrui, quod non potest corpus, quia corpus per animam uiuit, qua fruimur deo.
Omnes autem aeque diligendi sunt. sed cum omnibus prodesse non possis, his potissimum consulendum est qui pro locorum et temporum uel quarumlibet rerum opportunitatibus constrictius tibi quasi quadam sorte iunguntur. sicut enim si tibi abundaret aliquid, quod dari oporteret ei qui non haberet, nec duobus dari potuisset, si tibi occurrerent duo, quorum neuter alium uel indigentia uel erga te aliqua necessitudine superaret, nihil iustius faceres, quam ut sorte eligeres cui dandum esset quod dari utrique non posset: sic in hominibus, quibus omnibus consulere nequeas, pro sorte habendum est, prout quisque tibi temporaliter colligatius adhaerere potuerit.
Likewise, another human being is to be loved more than our own body, because all these things are to be loved for the sake of God, and another human being can enjoy God together with us, which the body cannot do, since the body lives through the soul, by which we enjoy God.
But all are to be loved equally. Yet since you cannot benefit all, those who are bound to you more closely, as if by a kind of lot, by reason of places and times or the opportunities of whatever circumstances, are to be cared for above all. For just as, if you had something in abundance that ought to be given to one who did not have it, and it could not be given to two, if two should meet you, neither of whom surpassed the other either in need or in some bond of relationship toward you, you would do nothing more just than to choose by lot to whom should be given what could not be given to both: so among human beings, since you cannot care for all, it must be reckoned as a matter of lot, according as each one has been able to cling to you more closely in temporal matters.
Omnium autem, qui nobiscum frui possunt deo, partim eos diligimus quos ipsi adiuuamus, partim a quibus adiuuamur, partim quorum et indigemus adiutorio et indigentiae subuenimus, partim quibus nec ipsi conferimus aliquid commodi nec ab eis ut nobis conferatur attendimus. uelle tamen debemus, ut omnes nobiscum diligant deum, et totum, quod eos uel adiuuamus uel adiuuamur ab eis, ad unum illum finem referendum est.
CCL. DE PRINCIPIO VIARVM SECVNDVM SALOMONEM. EX EODEM LIBRO PRIMO.
Cum homine in deo frueris, deo potius quam homine frueris; illo enim frueris quo efficeris beatus, et ad eum te peruenisse laetaberis, in quo spem ponis, ut uenias. inde ad Filemonem Paulus: ita, frater, inquit, ego te fruar in domino. quod si non addidisset: in do m ino et te fruar tantum dixisset, in eo constituisset spem beatitudinis suae. quamquam etiam uicinissime dicitur frui cum dilectione uti. cum enim adest quod diligitur, etiam delectationem secum necesse est gerat, per quam si transieris eamque ad illud ubi permanendum est rettuleris, uteris ea et abusiue, non proprie diceris frui. si uero inhaeseris atque permanseris, finem in ea ponens laetitiae tuae, tunc uere et proprie frui dicendus es: quod non faciendum est nisi in illa trinitate, id est summo et incommutabili bono.
But of all those who can enjoy God together with us, we love some whom we ourselves help, some by whom we are helped, some whose help we need and whose need we relieve, and some to whom we ourselves contribute nothing of advantage, nor do we look to them to confer anything on us. Nevertheless we ought to will that all love God together with us, and all that we either help them in or are helped by them should be referred to that one end.
FROM THE SAME FIRST BOOK, ON THE BEGINNING OF THE WAYS ACCORDING TO SOLOMON.
When you enjoy a human being in God, you enjoy God rather than the human being; for you enjoy that by which you are made blessed, and you will rejoice to have come to him in whom you place your hope of coming. Hence Paul to Philemon says: Yes, brother, I would enjoy you in the Lord. But if he had not added "in the Lord" and had only said "I would enjoy you," he would have placed the hope of his blessedness in him. Although even most closely, to enjoy is said to be to use with love. For when what is loved is present, it must necessarily carry delight with it; if you pass through that delight and refer it to that in which you must remain, you use it, and you are said to enjoy it abusively, not properly. But if you cling to it and remain in it, placing the end of your joy in it, then you are truly and properly said to enjoy it—which is not to be done except in that Trinity, that is, the highest and unchangeable good.
Vide quemadmodum, cum ipsa ueritas et uerbum, per quod facta sunt omnia, caro factum esset, ut habitaret in nobis, tamen ait apostolus: etsi noueramus Christum secundum carnem, sed nunc iam non nouimus. ille quippe qui non solum peruenientibus possessionem sed etiam uiam se praebere uoluit uenientibus, ad principium uiarum noluit carnem assumere. unde est etiam illud: dominus creauit me principium uiarum suarum, ut inde inciperent qui uellent uenire. apostolus igitur, quamuis adhuc ambularet in uia et ad palmam supernae uocationis sequeretur uocantem dominum, tamen ea quae retro sunt obliuiscens et in ea quae ante sunt extentus iam principium uiarum transierat, hoc est eo non indigebat, a quo tamen aggrediendum et exordiendum iter est omnibus, qui ad ueritatem peruenire et in uita aeterna permanere desiderant. sic enim ait: ego sum uia et ueritas et uita, hoc est "per me peruenitur, ad me peruenitur, in me permanetur". cum enim ad ipsum peruenitur, ad patrem peruenitur, quia per aequalem ille cui est aequalis agnoscitur uinciente et tamquam agglutinante nos sancto spiritu, quo in summo atque incommutabili bono permanere possimus.
See how, although the truth itself and the Word through which all things were made became flesh so that it might dwell among us, the apostle nevertheless says: Even if we had known Christ according to the flesh, yet now we no longer know him. For he who wished to offer himself not only as a possession to those who arrive but also as the way to those who are coming did not wish to assume flesh as the beginning of the ways. Hence also that saying: The Lord created me as the beginning of his ways, so that those who wished to come might begin from there. The apostle, therefore, although he was still walking on the way and following the one who called him toward the prize of the heavenly calling, nevertheless, forgetting the things that are behind and stretching out toward the things that are ahead, had already passed beyond the beginning of the ways—that is, he no longer needed that by which, nonetheless, the journey must be begun and started by all who desire to reach the truth and remain in eternal life. For thus he says: I am the way and the truth and the life—that is, "through me one arrives, to me one arrives, in me one remains." For when one arrives at him, one arrives at the Father, because through the equal one that one to whom he is equal is known, the Holy Spirit binding and, as it were, gluing us together, so that we may be able to remain in the highest and unchangeable good.
ex quo intellegitur, quia nulla res in uia tenere nos debeat, quando nec ipse dominus, in quantum uia nostra esse dignatus est, tenere nos uoluerit, sed transire, ne rebus temporalibus, quamuis ab illo pro salute nostra susceptis et gestis haereamus infirmiter, sed per eas potius curramus alacriter, ut ad eum ipsum, qui nostram naturam a temporalibus liberauit et collocauit ad dexteram patris, prouehi atque peruehi mereamur.
Omnium igitur, quae dicta sunt, ex quo de rebus tractamus, haec summa est, ut intellegatur legis et omnium diuinarum scripturarum plenitudo et finis esse dilectio rei, qua fruendum est, et rei, quae nobiscum ea re frui potest, quia, ut se quisque diligat, praecepto non opus est. hoc ergo ut nossemus atque possemus, facta est tota pro nostra salute per diuinam prouidentiam dispensatio temporalis, qua debemus uti, non quasi mansoria quadam dilectione et delectatione, sed transitoria potius tamquam uiae, tamquam uehiculorum uel aliorum quorumlibet instrumentorum aut si quid congruentius dici potest, ut ea quibus ferimur propter illud ad quod ferimur diligamus.
From this it is understood that no thing on the way ought to hold us, since not even the Lord himself, insofar as he deigned to be our way, wished to hold us, but to pass on, lest we cling in weakness to temporal things, even though they were undertaken and accomplished by him for our salvation, but rather run eagerly through them, so that we may deserve to be carried forward and brought through to him himself, who freed our nature from temporal things and set it at the right hand of the Father.
The sum of all that has been said, since we are treating of things, is this: that it be understood that the fullness and end of the law and of all the divine Scriptures is love of the thing which is to be enjoyed and of the thing which can enjoy it together with us, since for each one to love himself there is no need of a commandment. Therefore, that we might know and be able to do this, the whole temporal dispensation for our salvation was made by divine providence, which we ought to use not with a certain abiding love and delight, but rather as transitory, as of a way, as of vehicles or any other instruments whatsoever, or whatever can be said more fittingly, so that we love those things by which we are borne toward that for the sake of which we are borne.
Quisquis igitur scripturas diuinas uel quamlibet earum partem intellexisse sibi uidetur, ita ut eo intellectu non aedificet istam geminam caritatem dei et proximi, nondum intellexit. quisquis uero talem inde sententiam duxerit, ut huic aedificandae caritati sit utilis, nec tamen hoc dixerit quod ille quem legit eo loco sensisse probabitur, non perniciose fallitur nec omnino mentitur. inest quippe in mentiente uoluntas falsa dicendi, et ideo multos inuenimus, qui mentiri uelint, qui autem falli, neminem. cum igitur hoc sciens homo faciat, illud nesciens patiatur, satis apparet in una eademque re illum qui fallitur eo qui mentitur esse meliorem, quando quidem pati melius est iniquitatem quam facere. omnis autem, qui mentitur, inique facit, et si cuiquam uidetur aliquando utile esse mendacium, potest uideri utilem aliquando esse iniquitatem. nemo enim mentiens in eo quod mentitur seruat fidem; nam hoc utique uult, ut cui mentitur fidem sibi habeat, quam tamen ei mentiendo non seruat. omnis autem fidei uiolator iniquus est. aut igitur iniquitas aliquando est utilis, quod fieri non potest, aut mendacium semper inutile est.
Whoever, therefore, thinks that he has understood the divine Scriptures, or any part of them, in such a way that by that understanding he does not build up this twofold love of God and neighbor, has not yet understood. But whoever draws from them such a meaning as is useful for building up this love, yet does not say what the one whom he reads is proven to have meant in that place, is not harmfully deceived, nor does he lie at all. For in the liar there is the will to speak falsely, and therefore we find many who wish to lie, but no one who wishes to be deceived. Since, then, a man does this knowingly and suffers that unknowingly, it is quite clear that in one and the same matter the one who is deceived is better than the one who lies, since indeed it is better to suffer iniquity than to do it. But everyone who lies does iniquity, and if a lie ever seems useful to anyone, iniquity can seem useful to him at some time. For no one who lies keeps faith in that in which he lies; for he certainly wants the one to whom he lies to have faith in him, which nevertheless he does not keep toward him by lying. But every violator of faith is iniquitous. Therefore either iniquity is sometimes useful, which cannot happen, or a lie is always useless.
sed quisquis in scripturis aliud sentit quam ille qui scripsit, illis non mentientibus fallitur, sed tamen, ut dicere coeperam, si ea sententia fallitur, qua aedificet caritatem, quae finis praecepti est, ita fallitur, ac si quisquam errore deserens uiam eo tamen per agrum pergat, quo etiam uia illa perducit. corrigendus est tamen et quam sit utilius uiam non deserere demonstrandum est, ne consuetudine deuiandi etiam in transuersum aut peruersum ire cogatur.
Asserendo enim temere quod ille non sensit quem legit, plerumque incurrit in alia quae illi sententiae contexere nequeat. quae si uera et certa esse contendit, illud non possit . uerum esse quod senserat fitque in eo nescio quomodo, ut amando sententiam suam scripturae incipiat offensior esse quam sibi. quod malum si serpere siuerit, euertetur ex eo. per fidem enim ambulamus, non per speciem; titubabit autem fides, si diuinarum scripturarum uaccillat auctoritas. porro fide titubante caritas etiam ipsa languescit. nam si a fide quisque ceciderit, a caritate etiam necesse est cadat. non enim potest diligere quod esse non credit. porro si credit et diligit, as bene agendo et praeceptis morum bonorum obtemperando efficit, ut etiam speret se ad id quod diligit esse uenturum.
But whoever understands the Scriptures in a sense other than that of the one who wrote them is deceived by them, though they do not lie; yet, as I began to say, if he is deceived in a meaning by which he builds up love, which is the end of the commandment, he is deceived just as if someone, by error abandoning the road, nevertheless travels through the field to the same place where that road also leads. He must still be corrected, however, and it must be shown how much more useful it is not to leave the road, lest by the habit of straying he be forced to go even crosswise or perversely.
For by rashly asserting what the one he reads did not mean, he often runs into other things which he cannot connect with that meaning. And if he contends that these are true and certain, that cannot be true which he had understood, and it comes about in him, I know not how, that by loving his own meaning he begins to be more offended by the Scripture than by himself. And if he allows this evil to creep on, he will be overturned by it. For we walk by faith, not by sight; but faith will totter if the authority of the divine Scriptures wavers. Moreover, when faith totters, love itself also grows languid. For if anyone falls from faith, he must necessarily fall from love as well. For he cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and loves, he brings it about, by acting well and obeying the precepts of good conduct, that he also hopes he will come to that which he loves.
CCLI. QVOD FIDE ET SPE DECEDENTE CARITAS MANEAT ET QVOD TEMPORALE QVID VILESCAT, CVM VENERIT, AETERNVM VERO ARDENTIVS DILIGATVR. EX EODEM LIBRO PRIMO.
Itaque tria haec sunt, quibus et scientia omnis et prophetia militat: fides, spes, caritas.
Sed fidei succedet species, quam uidebimus, speciei succedet beatitudo ipsa, ad quam peruenturi sumus; caritas autem etiam istis decedentibus augebitur potius. si enim credendo diligimus quod nondum uidemus, quanto magis, cum uidere coeperimus? et si sperando diligimus quo nondum peruenimus, quanto magis, cum peruenerimus ? inter temporalia quippe atque aeterna hoc interest, quod temporale aliquid plus diligitur, antequam habeatur, uilescit autem, cum aduenerit — non enim satiat animam, cui uera est et certa sedes aeternitatis — aeternum autem ardentius diligitur adeptum quam desideratum. nulli enim desideranti conceditur plus de illo existimare quam se habet, ut ei uilescat, cum minus inuenerit, sed quantum quisque ueniens existimare potuerit, plus perueniens inuenturus est.
CCLI. THAT WHEN FAITH AND HOPE PASS AWAY, LOVE REMAINS; AND THAT A TEMPORAL THING BECOMES VILE WHEN IT COMES, BUT THE ETERNAL IS LOVED MORE ARDENTLY. FROM THE SAME FIRST BOOK.
So these three are the things for which all knowledge and prophecy serve as soldiers: faith, hope, love.
But in place of faith will come sight, which we shall see; in place of sight will come the very blessedness to which we are to arrive; but love, even when these pass away, will rather increase. For if by believing we love what we do not yet see, how much more when we have begun to see? And if by hoping we love that to which we have not yet arrived, how much more when we have arrived? For this is the difference between temporal and eternal things: a temporal thing is loved more before it is possessed, but it becomes vile when it has come—for it does not satisfy the soul, for which the true and certain seat of eternity exists—but the eternal is loved more ardently when attained than when desired. For no desirer is granted to think more of it than it actually is, so that it should become vile to him when he finds less, but whatever a person coming could think, he will find more when he arrives.
Homo itaque fide, spe et caritate subnixus eaque inconcusse retinens non indiget scripturis nisi ad alios instruendos. itaque multi per haec tria etiam in solitudine sine codicibus uiuunt. unde in illis arbitror iam impletum esse quod dictum est: siue prophetiae, euacuabuntur, sine linguae, cessabunt, siue scientia, euacuabitur, quibus tamen quasi machinis tanta fidei et spei et caritatis in eis surrexit instructio, ut perfectum aliquid tenentes ea quae sunt ex parte non quaerant: perfectum sane, quantum in hac uita potest; nam in comparatione futurae uitae nullius iusti est et sancti uita ista perfecta. ideo: manent, inquit, fides, spes, caritas, tria haec: maior autem horum est caritas, quia et cum quisque ad aeterna peruenerit, duobus istis decedentibus caritas auctior et certior permanebit.
Quapropter cum quisque cognouerit finem praecepti esse caritatem de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta, omnem intellectum diuinarum scripturarum ad ista tria relaturus ad tractationem illorum librorum securus accedat. cum enim diceret: caritas, addidit: de corde puro, ut nihil aliud quam id quod diligendum est diligatur. conscientiam uero bonam subiunxit propter spem; ille enim se ad id quod credit et diligit peruenturum esse desperat cui malae conscientiae scrupulus inest. tertio: et fide, inquit, non ficta.
Therefore the man supported by faith, hope, and love, and holding fast to these without wavering, has no need of the Scriptures except for instructing others. Hence many live even in solitude without books by means of these three. Whence I think that in them has already been fulfilled what was said: whether prophecies, they shall be done away; whether tongues, they shall cease; whether knowledge, it shall be done away—yet by these as it were engines such an edification of faith, hope, and love rose up in them that, holding something perfect, they do not seek the things that are in part. Perfect, indeed, as far as it can be in this life; for in comparison with the future life, the life of no just and holy man is perfect in this world. Therefore: they remain, he says, faith, hope, love, these three; but the greater of these is love, because even when each one has come to eternal things, with those two passing away, love will remain more increased and more certain.
Wherefore when each one has known that the end of the commandment is love out of a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned, he who is about to refer every understanding of the divine Scriptures to these three should approach the treatment of those books with confidence. For when he said love, he added, out of a pure heart, so that nothing other than that which ought to be loved may be loved. But he joined a good conscience on account of hope; for he despairs that he will come to that which he believes and loves, who has a scruple of an evil conscience within him. Third, he says, and faith unfeigned.
si enim fides nostra mendacio caruerit, tunc et non diligimus quod non est diligendum et recte uiuendo id speramus, ut nullo modo spes nostra fallatur.
CCLII. DE SIGNIS NATVHALIBVS ET DE DATIS. EX LIBRO SECVNDO DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA.
Quoniam de rebus cum scriberem, praemisi commonens, ne quis in eis attenderet nisi quod sunt, non etiam si quid aliud praeter se significant, uicissim de signis disserens hoc dico, ne quis in eis attendat quod sunt, sed potius quod signa sunt, id est quod significant. signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem uenire, sicut uestigio uiso transisse animal, cuius uestigium est, cogitamus et fumo uiso ignem subesse cognoscimus et uoce animantis audita affectionem animi eius aduertimus set de tuba sonante milites uel progredi se uel regredi et quid aliud pugna postulat oportere nouerunt. signorum igitur alia sunt naturalia, alia data. naturalia sunt quae sine uoluntate atque ullo appetitu significandi praeter se aliquid aliud ex se cognosci faciunt, sicuti est fumus significans ignem. non enim uolens significare id facit, sed rerum expertarum animaduersione et notatione cognoscitur ignem subesse, etiam si fumus solus appareat.
For if our faith has been free of falsehood, then we also do not love what should not be loved, and by living rightly we hope for that which our hope will in no way be deceived.
252. ON NATURAL SIGNS AND GIVEN SIGNS. FROM THE SECOND BOOK OF ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.
Since, when I was writing about things, I prefaced a warning that no one should attend in them to anything except what they are, and not also to whatever else they signify beyond themselves, so in turn, discussing signs, I say this: that no one should attend in them to what they are, but rather to the fact that they are signs, that is, to what they signify. For a sign is a thing which, beyond the appearance it impresses on the senses, makes something else come into thought from itself, as when a footprint is seen we think that an animal whose footprint it is has passed by, and when smoke is seen we recognize that fire lies beneath, and when the voice of an animal is heard we perceive the affection of its mind; but from a sounding trumpet soldiers know whether they should advance or retreat and whatever else the battle requires. Of signs, then, some are natural, others given. Natural signs are those which, without any will or desire to signify, make something else besides themselves known from themselves, as smoke signifies fire. For it does not do this wishing to signify, but by the observation and notation of things experienced it is recognized that fire lies beneath, even if only the smoke appears.
sed et uestigium animantis transeuntis ad hoc genus pertinet et uultus irati seu tristis affectionem animi significat etiam nulla eius uoluntate qui aut iratus aut tristis est, aut si quis alius motus animi uultu indice proditur, etiam nobis non id agentibus, ut prodatur.
Data uero signa sunt, quae sibi quaeque uidentia inuicem dant ad demonstrandos, quantum possunt, motus animi sui uel sensa aut intellecta quaelibet, nec ulla causa est nobis significandi, id est signi dandi, nisi ad depromendum et traiciendum in alterius animum id quod animo gerit qui signum dat. horum igitur signorum genus, quantum ad homines attinet, considerare atque tractare statuimus, quia et signa diuinitus data, quae in scripturis sanctis continentur, per homines nobis indicata sunt, qui ea conscripserunt.
CCLIII. QVOD INTER OMNIA SIGNA VERBA TENEANT PRINCIPATVM, QVAE PROPTER PECCATVM SVPERBIAE NON POTVERINT CVNCTIS GENTIBVS ESSE COMMVNIA. EX EODEM LIBRO II.
But the trace of a passing animal also belongs to this class, and an angry or sad expression signifies the affection of the mind even without any will of the one who is angry or sad, or if any other movement of the mind is betrayed by the face as its indicator, even when we are not doing this so that it may be betrayed.
Given signs, however, are those which all living beings give to one another in order to demonstrate, as far as they can, the movements of their own mind or whatever things they have sensed or understood; nor is there any reason for us to signify, that is, to give a sign, except to bring forth and transfer into another's mind that which the one who gives the sign carries in his mind. Therefore we have decided to consider and treat this class of signs, as far as it pertains to men, because even the signs divinely given, which are contained in the holy scriptures, have been indicated to us through men who wrote them.
253. THAT AMONG ALL SIGNS WORDS HOLD THE PRINCIPATE, WHICH BECAUSE OF THE SIN OF PRIDE COULD NOT BE COMMON TO ALL NATIONS. FROM THE SAME BOOK II.
Omnia signa uerbis comparata paucissima sunt. uerba enim prorsus inter homines obtinuerunt principatum significandi quaecumque animo concipiuntur, si ea quisque prodere uelit. nam et odore ungenti dominus, quo perfusi sunt pedes eius, signum aliquod dedit et sacramento corporis et sanguinis sui per gustatum significauit quod uoluit, et cum mulier tangendo fimbriam uestimenti eius salua facta est, nonnihil significat. sed innumerabilis multitudo signorum, quibus suas cogitationes homines exerunt, in uerbis constituta est. nam illa signa omnia, quorum genera breuiter attigi, potui uerbis enuntiare, uerba uero illis signis nullo modo possem.
Sed quia uerberato aere statim transeunt nec diutius manent quam sonant, instituta sunt per litteras signa uerborum. ita uoces oculis ostenduntur, non per se ipsas, sed per signa quaedam sua. ista signa igitur non potuerunt communia esse omnibus gentibus peccato quodam dissensionis humanae, cum ad se quisque principatum rapit, cuius superbiae signum est erecta illa turris in caelum, ubi homines impii non solum animos sed etiam uoces dissonas habere meruerunt.
All signs compared with words are very few. For words have obtained the chief place among men for signifying whatever is conceived in the mind, if anyone wishes to bring it forth. For the owner also gave some sign by the scent of the ointment with which his feet were anointed, and by the tasting of the sacrament of his body and blood he signified what he willed, and when the woman was healed by touching the hem of his garment, it signifies something. But the innumerable multitude of signs by which men express their thoughts is established in words. For all those signs, whose kinds I have briefly touched upon, I could utter in words, but words I could by no means [utter] in those signs.
But because struck air passes away at once and does not remain longer than it sounds, signs of words were instituted through letters. Thus voices are shown to the eyes, not through themselves, but through certain signs of their own. These signs, then, could not be common to all nations because of a certain sin of human dissension, when each one seizes the chief place for himself, of which pride the sign is that tower raised up to heaven, where impious men deserved to have not only discordant minds but also discordant voices.
Ex quo factum est, ut scriptura diuina, qua tantis morbis humanarum uoluntatium subuenitur, ab una lingua profecta,» qua opportune potuit per orbem terrarum disseminari, per uarias interpretum linguas longe lateque diffusa innotesceret gentibus ad salutem, quam legentes nihil aliud appetunt quam cogitationes uoluntatemque illorum a quibus conscripta est inuenire et per illas uoluntatem dei, secundum quam tales homines locutos credimus.
Sed multis et multiplicibus obscuritatibus et ambiguitatibus decipiuntur qui temere legunt, aliud pro alio sentientes, quibusdam autem locis quid uel falso suspicentur non inueniunt: ita obscure dicta quaedam densissimam caliginem obducunt. quod totum prouisum esse diuinitus non dubito ad edomandam labore superbiam et intellectum a fastidio renouandum, cui facile inuestigata plerumque uilescunt.
CCLIIII. QVOD EX ALIQVA SIMILITVDINE SCRIPTVRA SVAVIVS EXCITET ANIMVM, VT ILLVD EXEMPLI CAVSA DE CANTICIS CANTICORVM: DENTES TVI SICVT GREX DETONSARVM. EX LIBRO SVPRA SCRIPTO.
From this it came about that the divine Scripture, by which such great diseases of human wills are relieved, having proceeded from one tongue, by which it could be spread abroad over the whole world at the fitting time, was made known to the nations for salvation far and wide through the various languages of translators, so that those who read it seek nothing else than to find the thoughts and will of those by whom it was written, and through them the will of God, according to which we believe such men spoke.
But many are deceived by many and manifold obscurities and ambiguities who read rashly, perceiving one thing in place of another; and in certain places they do not find what they may even falsely suspect: thus some things obscurely spoken draw the thickest darkness over them. All of this I do not doubt was provided by God to subdue pride through labor and to renew the intellect from disdain, for which things easily investigated for the most part become cheap.
CCLIIII. That from some similitude Scripture more sweetly stirs the soul, as for example from the Song of Songs: Your teeth are like a flock of shorn sheep. From the book written above.
Quid est, quaeso, quod, si quisquam dicat sanctos esse homines atque perfectos, quorum uita et moribus Christi ecclesia de quibuslibet superstitionibus praecidit eos qui ad se ueniunt et imitatione bonorum sibimet quodam modo incorporat; qui boni fideles et uere boni serui deponentes onera saeculi ad sanctum baptismi lauacrum uenerunt atque inde ascendentes conceptione sancti spiritus fructum dant geminae caritatis, id est dei et proximi — quid est ergo, quod, si haec quisquam dicat, minus delectat audientem, quam si ad eundem sensum locum illum exponat de Canticis canticorum, ubi dictum est ecclesiae, cum tamquam pulchra quaedam femina laudaretur: dentes tui sicut grex detonsarum, ascendens de lauacro, quae omnes geminos creant, et sterilis non est in illis? num aliud homo discit, quam cum illud planissimis uerbis sine similitudinis huius adminiculo audiret? et tamen nescio quomodo suauius intueor sanctos, cum eos quasi dentes ecclesiae uideo praecidere ab erroribus homines atque in eius corpus emollita duritia quasi demorsos mansosque transferre. oues etiam iocundissime agnosco detonsas, oneribus saecularibus tamquam uelleribus positis, et ascendentes de lauacro, id est de baptismate, creaturas omnes geminos, duo praecepta dilectionis, et nullam esseab isto sancto fructu sterilem uideo.
What is it, I ask, that if anyone says that there are holy and perfect men, by whose life and conduct the church of Christ cuts off those who come to her from any superstitions whatsoever, and by the imitation of the good incorporates them, so to speak, into herself—good faithful men and truly good servants who, laying down the burdens of the world, came to the holy washing of baptism and, ascending from there, by the conception of the Holy Spirit bear the fruit of a twofold love, that is, of God and of neighbor—what is it, then, that if anyone says these things, it delights the hearer less than if he expounds that passage from the Song of Songs to the same meaning, where it was said to the church, when she was praised as a certain beautiful woman: Your teeth are like a flock of shorn ewes, ascending from the washing, which all bear twins, and none is barren among them? Does a man learn anything other than this when he hears it in the plainest words without the aid of this similitude? And yet I do not know how it is that I behold the saints more sweetly when I see them as the teeth of the church, cutting men off from errors and, their hardness softened, transferring them into her body as though bitten and made gentle. I also most joyfully recognize the ewes as shorn, their secular burdens laid aside like fleeces, and ascending from the washing, that is, from baptism, all creatures bearing twins, the two commandments of love, and I see that none is barren of this holy fruit.
sed quare suauius uideam, quam si nulla de diuinis libris talis similitudo promeretur, cum res eadem sit eademque cognitio, difficile est dicere et alia quaestio est. nunc tamen nemo ambigit et per similitudines libentius quaeque cognosci et cum aliqua difficultate quaesita multo gratius inueniri. qui enim prorsus non inueniunt quod quaerunt, fame laborant; qui autem non quaerunt, quia in promtu habent, fastidio saepe marcescunt: in utroque autem languor cauendus est. magnifice igitur et salubriter spiritus sanctus ita scripturas sanctas modificauit, ut locis apertioribus fami occurreret, obscurioribus autem fastidia detergeret. nihil enim fere de illis obscuritatibus eruetur, quod non planissime dictum alibi. reperiatur.
Ante omnia igitur opus est dei timore conuerti ad cognoscendam eius uoluntatem, quid nobis appetendum fugiendumque praecipiat. timor autem iste cogitationem de nostra mortalitate et de futura morte necesse est incutiat et quasi clauatis carnibus omnes superbiae motus ligno crucis affigat. deinde mitiscere opus est pietate neque contradicere diuinae scripturae siue intellectae, si aliqua uitia nostra percutit, siue non intellectae, quasi nos melius sapere meliusque praecipere possimus, sed cogitare potius et credere id esse melius et uerius quod ibi scriptum est, etiam si lateat, quam id quod nos per nos ipsos sapere possumus.
But why I see it more sweetly than if no such similitude from the divine books were brought forth, since the matter is the same and the knowledge the same, is difficult to say and is another question. Now, however, no one doubts that all things are more gladly known through similitudes, and that things sought with some difficulty are found much more gratefully. For those who do not find at all what they seek labor with hunger; but those who do not seek, because they have it at hand, often wither with disgust: in both, however, sluggishness must be guarded against. Magnificently therefore and wholesomely has the Holy Spirit so moderated the holy Scriptures, that in the more open places he might meet hunger, but in the more obscure he might wipe away disgust. For almost nothing is drawn out from those obscurities which is not found most plainly stated elsewhere.
Before all things, therefore, there is need, by the fear of God, to be converted to knowing his will, what he commands us to seek and to flee. But this fear must necessarily strike into our thought concerning our mortality and future death, and, as it were with the flesh nailed down, affix all the motions of pride to the wood of the cross. Then there is need to grow mild through piety, and not to contradict the divine Scripture, whether understood, if it strikes against some of our vices, or not understood, as if we could know better and command better, but rather to think and believe that what is written there is better and truer, even if it lies hidden, than what we can know by ourselves through ourselves.
post istos duos gradus timoris atque pietatis ad tertium uenitur scientiae gradum, de quo nunc agere institui. nam in eo se exercet omnis diuinarum scripturarum studiosus, nihil in eis aliud inuenturus quam diligendum esse deum propter deum et proximum propter deum, et illum quidem ex toto corde et ex tota anima et ex tota mente, proximum uero tamquam se ipsum, id est ut tota proximi sicut etiam nostri dilectio referatur in deum. de quibus duobus praeceptis, cum de rebus ageremus, libro superiore tractauimus. necesse est ergo, ut primo se quisque in scripturis inueniat amore huius saeculi, hoc est temporalium rerum, implicatum longe seiunctum esse a tanto amore dei et tanto amore proximi, quantum scriptura ipsa praescribit. tum uero timor ille, quo cogitat de iudicio dei, et illa pietas, qua non potest nisi credere et cedere auctoritati sanctorum librorum, cogit eum se ipsum lugere. nam ista scientia bonae spei hominem non se iactantem, sed lamentantem facit. quo affectu impetrat sedulis precibus consolationem diuini adiutorii, ne desperatione frangatur.
After these two steps of fear and piety, one comes to the third step, that of knowledge, about which I have now undertaken to speak. For in it every student of the divine Scriptures exercises himself, about to find nothing else in them than that God is to be loved for God's sake and the neighbor for God's sake—and God indeed with the whole heart and the whole soul and the whole mind, but the neighbor as oneself, that is, that the whole love of the neighbor, just as also of ourselves, may be referred to God. Concerning these two commandments, when we were treating of things, we discussed in the previous book. It is necessary, then, that each person first find himself in the Scriptures entangled in the love of this world, that is, of temporal things, and far separated from so great a love of God and so great a love of neighbor as the Scripture itself prescribes. Then indeed that fear by which he thinks of the judgment of God, and that piety by which he cannot but believe and yield to the authority of the holy books, compel him to mourn for himself. For this knowledge makes a person of good hope not boastful but lamenting. By this affection he obtains, through diligent prayers, the consolation of divine help, lest he be broken by despair.
CCLV DE SIGNIS PROPRIIS ET TRANSLATIS AGENS DAT EXEMPLVM, QVOD BOS PROPRIE PECVS, TRANSLATE EVANGELISTA MON- STRETVR. EX LIBRO SVPRA SCRIPTO.
Duabus autem causis non intelleguntur quae scripta sunt, si aut ignotis aut ambiguis signis obteguntur. sunt autem signa uel propria uel translata. propria dicuntur, cum his rebus significandis adhibentur, propter quas sunt instituta, sicut dicimus bouem, cum intellegimus pecus, quod omnes nobiscum latinae linguae homines hoc nomine uocant. translata sunt, cum et ipsae res, quas propriis uerbis significamus, ad aliquid aliud significandum usurpantur, sicut dicimus bouem et per has duas syllabas intellegimus pecus, quod isto nomine appellari solet, sed rursus per illud pecus intellegimus euangelistam, quem significauit scriptura interpretante apostolo: bouem triturantem non infrenabis.
CCLVI. DE RERVM IGNORANTIA, QVAE FACIT OBSCVRAS FIGVRATAS LOCVTIONES, CVM IGNORAMVS VEL ANIMALIVM VEL LAPIDVM VEL HERBARVM NATVRAS. EX EODEM LIBRO II.
CCLV. On Proper and Figurative Signs, Giving the Example That "Ox" Properly Means a Beast, but Figuratively an Evangelist. From the Book Written Above.
Now, what is written is not understood for two reasons: if it is obscured either by unknown or by ambiguous signs. But signs are either proper or figurative. They are called proper when they are applied to signifying those things for the sake of which they were instituted, as when we say "ox" and understand the beast which all men of the Latin tongue along with us call by this name. They are figurative when even the things themselves which we signify by proper words are used to signify something else, as when we say "ox" and by these two syllables understand the beast which is customarily called by this name, but again through that beast we understand the evangelist, whom the Scripture signified, as the apostle explains: You shall not muzzle the ox that treads out the grain.
CCLVI. On Ignorance of Things, Which Makes Figurative Expressions Obscure, When We Are Ignorant of the Natures of Animals or Stones or Plants. From the Same Book II.
Rerum autem ignorantia facit obscuras figuratas locutiones, cum ignoramus uel animantium uel lapidum uel herbarum naturas aliarumue rerum, quae plerumque in scripturis similitudinis alicuius gratia ponuntur. nam et de serpente quod notum est totum corpus eum pro capite obicere ferientibus, quantum inlustrat sensum illum, quod dominus iubet astutos nos esse sicut serpentes, ut scilicet pro capite nostro, quod est Christus, corpus potius persequentibus offeramus, ne fides christiana tamquam caput necetur in nobis, si parcentes corpori negemus deum. uel illud, quod per cauernae angustias coartatus deposita uetere tunica uires nouas accipere dicitur, quantum concinit ad imitandam serpentis astutiam exuendumque ipsum ueterem hominem, sicut apostolus dicit, ut induamur nouo, et exuendum per angustias dicente domino: intrate per angustam portam! ut ergo notitia naturae serpentis inlustrat multas similitudines, quas de hoc animante scriptura dare consueuit, sic ignorantia nonnullorum animalium, quae non minus per similitudines commemorat, impedit plurimum intellectorem; sic lapidum, sic herbarum uel quaeque tenentur radicibus. nam et carbunculi notitia, quod lucet in tenebris, multa inluminat etiam obscura librorum, ubicumque propter similitudinem ponitur, et ignorantia berylli uel adamantis claudet plerumque intellegentiae fores.
But ignorance of things makes figurative expressions obscure, when we do not know the natures of animals or stones or plants or other things, which are very often placed in the Scriptures for the sake of some similitude. For even that which is known about the serpent—that it offers its whole body to those striking it in place of its head—how greatly it illuminates that sense, that the Lord bids us be wise as serpents, namely that in place of our head, which is Christ, we should rather offer our body to persecutors, lest the Christian faith, as it were our head, be slain in us, if, sparing the body, we deny God. Or that which is said of it, that when squeezed through the narrow confines of a cavern it lays aside its old skin and is said to receive new strength—how greatly it harmonizes with imitating the serpent's shrewdness and with putting off the old man himself, as the apostle says, that we may put on the new, and with putting it off through straits, as the Lord says: Enter through the narrow gate! Therefore, just as the knowledge of the serpent's nature illuminates many similitudes which Scripture is accustomed to give concerning this creature, so ignorance of certain animals, which it no less mentions through similitudes, greatly hinders the reader; so too of stones, so too of plants or whatever things are held by roots. For even the knowledge of the carbuncle, that it shines in darkness, illuminates many even obscure things in the books, wherever it is placed for the sake of a similitude, and ignorance of the beryl or the adamant often closes the doors of understanding.
nec aliam ob causam facile est intellegere pacem perpetuam significari oleae ramulo, quem rediens ad arcam columba pertulit, nisi quia nouimus et olei lenem contactum non facile alieno humore corrumpi et arborem ipsam frondere perenniter. multi autem propter ignorantiam hysopi, dum nesciunt, quam uim habeat uel ad purgandum pulmonem uel, ut dicitur, ad saxa radicibus penetranda, cum sit herba breuis atque humilis, omnino inuenire non possunt, quare sit dictum: asparge me hysopo, et mundabor.
CCLVII. DE NVMERORVM IMPERITIA, QVAE MVLTA FACIT NON INTELLEGI. EX LIBRO SVPRA SCRIPTO.
Numerorum etiam imperitia multa facit non intellegi translate ac mystice posita in scripturis. ingenium quippe, ut ita dixerim, ingenuum non potest nisi mouere, quid sibi uelit quod et Moses et Helias et ipse dominus quadraginta diebus ieiunauerunt. cuius actionis figuratus quidam nodus nisi huius numeri cognitione et consideratione non soluitur. habet enim denarium quater tamquam cognitionem omnium rerum intextam temporibus. quaternario namque numero et diurna et annua curricula peraguntur, diurna matutinis et meridianis, uespertinis nocturnisque horarum spatiis, annua uernis, aestiuis, autumnalibus hiemalibusque mensibus.
Nor is it for any other reason easy to understand that perpetual peace is signified by the little branch of olive which the dove brought back to the ark when it returned, except that we know both that the gentle touch of oil is not easily corrupted by a foreign liquid and that the tree itself puts forth leaves perpetually. Many, however, through ignorance of hyssop, since they do not know what power it has either for cleansing the lung or, as it is said, for penetrating rocks with its roots, although it is a short and lowly herb, cannot at all find out why it was said: Sprinkle me with hyssop, and I shall be cleansed.
CCLVII. ON IGNORANCE OF NUMBERS, WHICH CAUSES MANY THINGS NOT TO BE UNDERSTOOD. FROM THE BOOK WRITTEN ABOVE.
Ignorance of numbers, too, causes many things that are placed in the Scriptures figuratively and mystically not to be understood. For a naturally discerning mind, so to speak, cannot but be moved by what is meant by the fact that both Moses and Elijah and the Lord himself fasted forty days. And a certain figurative knot of this action is not loosed except by the knowledge and consideration of this number. For it has the number ten four times, as it were the knowledge of all things interwoven with times. For by the number four both the daily and the yearly courses are completed—the daily by the spaces of the hours at morning and midday, at evening and at night; the yearly by the spring, summer, autumn, and winter months.
a temporum autem delectatione, dum in temporibus uiuimus, propter aeternitatem, in qua uiuere uolumus, abstinendum et ieiunandum est, quamuis temporum cursibus ipsa nobis insinuetur doctrina contemnendorum temporum et appetendorum aeternorum. porro autem. denarius numerus creatoris atque creaturae significat scientiam. nam trinitas creatoris est, septenarius autem numerus creaturam indicat propter uitam et corpus. nam in illa tria sunt, unde etiam toto corde, tota anima, tota mente diligendus est deus; in corpore autem manifestissima quattuor apparent quibus constat elementa. in hoc ergo denario, dum temporaliter nobis insinuatur, id est quater ducitur, caste et continenter a temporum delectatione uiuere, hoc est quadraginta diebus ieiunare. hoc lex, cuius persona est in Mose, hoc prophetia, cuius personam gerit Helias, hoc ipse dominus monet, qui tamquam testimonium habens ex lege et prophetis medius inter illos in monte tribus discipulis uidentibus atque stupentibus claruit.
But from the delight of times, while we live in times, we must abstain and fast for the sake of eternity, in which we wish to live, although by the courses of times the teaching itself is suggested to us of despising temporal things and desiring eternal things. Furthermore, the number ten signifies the knowledge of the Creator and the creature. For the Trinity is of the Creator, but the number seven indicates the creature on account of life and body. For in that [Trinity] there are three, whence also God must be loved with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind; but in the body four things appear most manifestly, by which the elements consist. In this ten, therefore, while it is suggested to us temporally, that is, it is multiplied four times, to live chastely and continently from the delight of times, this is to fast forty days. This the law, whose person is in Moses, this prophecy, whose person Elijah bears, this the Lord himself admonishes, who as having testimony from the law and the prophets, in the middle between them on the mountain, with three disciples seeing and marveling, shone forth.
deinde ita quaeritur, quomodo quinquagenarius de quadragenario numero exsistat, qui non mediocriter in nostra religione sacratus est propter pentecosten; quomodo ter ductus propter tria tempora ante legem, sub lege, sub gratia, uel propter nomen patris et filii et spiritus sancti adiuncta eminentius ipsa trinitate ad purgatissimae ecclesiae mysterium referatur perueniatque ad centum et quinquaginta tres pisces, quos retia post resurrectionem domini in dextram partem missa ceperunt. ita multis aliis atque aliis numerorum formis quaedam similitudinum in sanctis libris secreta ponuntur, quae propter numerorum imperitiam legentibus clausa sunt.
CCLVIII. DE RERVM MVSICARVM IGNORANTIA. EX LIBRO SVPRA SCRIPTO.
Non pauca etiam claudit atque obtegit nonnullarum rerum musicarum ignorantia. ceterum et de psalterii et citharae differentia quidam non inconcinne aliquas rerum figuras aperuit, et decem cordarum psalterium non importune inter doctos quaeritur utrum habeat aliquam musicam legem, quae ad tantum neruorum numerum cogat, an uero, si non habet, eo ipso magis sacrate accipiendus sit ipse numerus uel propter decalogum legis. de quo item numero si quaeratur, non nisi ad creatorem creaturamque referendus est uel propter superius expositum ipsum denarium.
Then the question is asked how the number fifty arises from the number forty, which is hallowed in no small measure in our religion because of Pentecost; how, taken three times over—on account of the three ages before the law, under the law, and under grace, or on account of the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit—being joined more eminently to the Trinity itself, it is referred to the mystery of the most purified church, and arrives at the hundred and fifty-three fish which the nets, cast to the right side after the resurrection of the Lord, caught. Thus in many other and yet other forms of numbers certain secrets of similitudes are placed in the holy books, which are closed to readers because of their ignorance of numbers.
CCLVIII. ON IGNORANCE OF MUSICAL MATTERS. FROM THE BOOK WRITTEN ABOVE.
Not a few things also does ignorance of certain musical matters close off and conceal. Moreover, concerning the difference between the psaltery and the cithara, someone has not inelegantly disclosed certain figures of things, and among the learned it is not unreasonably asked whether the psaltery of ten strings has some musical law which compels it to so great a number of strings, or whether, if it does not, for that very reason the number itself is to be received the more sacredly, perhaps on account of the decalogue of the law. Concerning which number again, if it be asked, it is to be referred to nothing other than the Creator and the creature, or on account of the denarius itself expounded above.
et ille numerus aedificationis templi, qui commemoratur in euangelio, quadraginta scilicet et sex annorum, nescio quid musicum sonat et relatus ad fabricam dominici corporis, propter quam templi mentio facta est, cogit nonnullos haereticos confiteri filium dei non falso, sed uero et humano corpore indutum. et numerum quippe et musica plerisque locis in sacris scripturis honorabiliter posita inuenimus.
Non enim audiendi sunt errores gentilium superstitionum, qui VIIII Musas Iouis et Memoriae filias esse finxerunt. refellit eos Varro, quo nescio utrum apud eos quisquam talium rerum doctior uel curiosior esse possit. dicit enim ciuitatem nescio quam — non enim nomen recolo — locasse apud tres artifices terna simulacra Musarum, quod in templo Apollinis donum poneret, ut quisquis artificum pulchriora formasset, ab illo potissimum electa emerent. ita contigisse, ut opera sua quoque illa artifices aeque pulchra explicarent, et placuisse ciuitati omnes nouem atque omnes esse emtas, ut in Apollinis templo dedicarentur. quibus postea dicit Hesiodum poetam imposuisse uocabula. non ergo Iuppiter nouem Musas genuit, sed tres fabri ternas creauerunt. tres autem non propterea illa ciuitas locauerat, quia in somnis eas uiderat aut tot se cuiusquam illorum oculis demonstrauerant, sed quia facile erat animaduertere omnem sonum, quae materies cantilenarum est, triformem esse natura.
And that number of the building of the temple, which is mentioned in the Gospel—namely, forty-six years—sounds something musical, and when referred to the fabric of the Lord's body, on account of which mention was made of the temple, it compels certain heretics to confess that the Son of God was clothed not in a false but in a true and human body. And indeed we find number and music placed honorably in very many places in the sacred Scriptures.
For the errors of the gentile superstitions are not to be heeded, which imagined that the nine Muses were the daughters of Jupiter and Memory. Varro refutes them—though I do not know whether anyone among them could be more learned or more curious in such matters. For he says that a certain city—for I do not recall its name—commissioned from three artists three statues each of the Muses, to set up as a gift in the temple of Apollo, so that whichever of the artists had fashioned the more beautiful ones, from him above all the chosen ones might be bought. It so happened that those artists also produced their own works equally beautiful, and all nine pleased the city, and all were bought, so that they might be dedicated in the temple of Apollo. He says that afterwards the poet Hesiod imposed names on them. Therefore Jupiter did not beget the nine Muses, but three craftsmen created three each. But that city had not commissioned the three for the reason that it had seen them in dreams, or that so many had shown themselves to the eyes of any of them, but because it was easy to observe that every sound, which is the material of songs, is threefold in nature.
aut enim uoce editur, sicuti eorum est qui faucibus sine organo canunt, aut flatu, sicut tubarum et tibiarum, aut pulsu, sicut in citharis et tympanis et quibuslibet aliis quae percutiendo canora sunt.
Sed siue ita se habeat quod Varro rettulit, siue non ita, nos tamen non propter superstitionem profanorum debemus musicam fugere, si quid inde utile ad intellegendas sanctas scripturas rapere potuerimus, nec ad illorum theatricas nugas conuerti, si aliquid de citharis et de organis, quod ad spiritalia capienda ualeat, disputemus. neque enim et litteras discere non debuimus, quia earum deum dicunt esse Mercurium, aut quia Iustitiae Virtutique templa dedicauerunt et quae corde gestanda sunt in lapidibus adorare maluerunt, propterea nobis iustitia uirtusque fugienda est. immo uero quisquis bonus uerusque christianus est, domini sui esse intellegat ubicumque inuenerit ueritatem, quam conferens et agnoscens etiam in litteris sacris superstitiosa figmenta repudiet doleatque homines atque caueat, qui cognoscentes deum non sicut deum glorificauerunt.,
For it is either produced by the voice, as is the case with those who sing with their throat without an instrument, or by breath, as with trumpets and pipes, or by striking, as on lyres and drums and any other things that are melodious when struck.
But whether what Varro reported is so or not, we nevertheless ought not to shun music on account of the superstition of the profane, if we have been able to snatch from it anything useful for understanding the holy Scriptures; nor should we be turned to their theatrical trifles, if we discuss something concerning lyres and organs that is of value for grasping spiritual things. For neither ought we to have refrained from learning letters because they say Mercury is the god of them, or because they dedicated temples to Justice and Virtue and preferred to adore in stones what ought to be carried in the heart—for that reason are justice and virtue to be shunned by us? On the contrary, whoever is a good and true Christian should understand that truth belongs to his Lord wherever he finds it; and comparing and recognizing it, even in the sacred writings, let him reject superstitious fictions, and let him grieve over and beware of those who, knowing God, did not glorify him as God.
CCLVIIII. DE SIGNIS SVPERSTITIOSIS, QVIBVS PERNICIOSE DAEMONVM SOCIETAS COMPARATVR. EX EODEM LIBRO SVPRA SCRIPTO.
Duo sunt genera doctrinarum, quae in gentilibus etiam moribus exercentur: unum earum rerum, quas instituerunt homines, alteram earum, quas animaduerterunt iam peractas aut diuinitus institutas. illud quod est secundum institutiones hominum partim superstitiosum est, partim non est superstitiosum.
Superstitiosum est quidquid institutum est ab hominibus ad facienda et colenda idola pertinens uel ad colendam sicut deum creaturam partemue ullam creaturae uel ad consultationes et pacta quaedam significationum cum daemonibus placita atque foederata, qualia sunt molimina magicarum artium, quae quidem commemorare potius quam docere assolent poetae, ex quo genere sunt, sed quasi licentiore uanitate, aruspicum et augurum libri.
258. On superstitious signs, by which fellowship with demons is perniciously procured. From the same book written above.
There are two kinds of teachings which are practiced even in the customs of the gentiles: one of those things which men have instituted, the other of those things which they have observed either as already done or as divinely instituted. That which is according to human institutions is partly superstitious and partly not superstitious.
Superstitious is whatever has been instituted by men pertaining to the making and worshiping of idols, or to worshiping as God a creature or any part of a creature, or to consultations and certain agreements of signs with demons, pleasing and covenanted, such as are the devices of magical arts, which indeed the poets are accustomed to mention rather than to teach—of which kind are, though with a sort of more unrestrained vanity, the books of the haruspices and augurs.
ad hoc genus pertinent omnes etiam ligaturae atque remedia, quae medicorum quoque disciplina condemnat, sine in praecantationibus siue in quibusdam notis, quos caracteres uocant, sine in quibusque rebus suspendendis atque ligandis uel etiam saltandis quodam modo, non ad temperationem corporum, sed ad quasdam significationes aut occultas aut etiam manifestas, quae mitiore nomine physica uocant, ut quasi non superstitione implicare, sed natura prodesse uideantur, sicut sunt inaures in summo aurium singularum, aut de strutihonum ossibus ansulae in digitis, aut cum tibi dicitur singultienti, ut dextra manu sinistrum pollicem teneas. his adiunguntur milia inanissimarum obseruationum, si membrum aliquod salierit, si iunctim ambulantibus amicis lapis aut canis aut puer medius interuenerit. atque illud, quod lapidem calcant tamquam diremtorem amicitiae, minus molestum est quam cum innocentem puerum colapho percutiunt, si pariter ambulantibus intercurrit. sed bellum est, quod aliquando pueri uindicantur a canibus. nam plerumque tam superstitiosi sunt quidam, ut etiam canem, qui medius interuenerit, ferire audeant, non impune; namque a uano remedio cito ille interdum percussorem suum ad uerum medicum mittit.
To this class belong also all amulets and remedies, which even the discipline of physicians condemns, whether consisting in incantations or in certain marks, which they call characters, or in any objects whatsoever that are hung on or bound on or even in some way danced, not for the regulation of the body but for certain significations, whether occult or even manifest, which they call by the milder name of physical, so that they may seem not to involve superstition but to profit by nature—as are earrings at the top of each ear, or handles on the fingers made from the bones of ostriches, or when it is said to one who is hiccuping that he should hold his left thumb with his right hand. To these are added thousands of the most empty observances: if some limb has twitched, if a stone or a dog or a boy has come between friends walking together. And that practice, that they tread on a stone as though it were a divider of friendship, is less troublesome than when they strike an innocent boy with a blow if he runs in between people walking together. But it is a fine thing that sometimes the boys are avenged by the dogs. For some are so superstitious that they even dare to strike a dog that has come in between, not with impunity; for often by a vain remedy that dog quickly sends its striker to the true physician.
hinc sunt etiam illa: limen calcare, cum ante domum suam transit; redire ad lectum, si quis, dum se calciat, sternutauerit; redire domum, si procedens offenderit; cum uestis a soricibus roditur, plus tremere suspicione futuri mali quam praesens damnum dolere. unde illud eleganter dictum est Catonis; qui cum esset consultus a quodam, qui sibi a soricibus erosas caligas diceret, respondit non esse illud monstrum, sed uere monstrum habendum fuisse, si sorices a caligis roderentur.
Neque illi ab hoc genere perniciosae superstitionis segregandi sunt, qui genethliaci propter natalium dierum considerationem, nunc autem uulgo mathematici uocantur.
Quare istae quoque opiniones quibusdam rerum signis humana praesumtione institutis ad eadem illa quasi quaedam cum daemonibus pacta et conuenta referendae sunt. hinc enim fiet, ut occulto quodam iudicio diuino cupidi malarum rerum homines tradantur inludendi et decipiendi pro meritis uoluntatum suarum inludentibus eos atque decipientibus praeuaricatoribus angelis, quibus ista mundi pars infirma secundum pulcherrimum ordinem rerum diuinae prouidentiae lege subiecta est.
Hence also those practices: to tread on the threshold when passing before one's own house; to return to bed if someone has sneezed while putting on his shoes; to return home if one has stumbled on going out; when clothing is gnawed by mice, to tremble more from the suspicion of future misfortune than to grieve over the present loss. Whence that saying of Cato, elegantly put: when he was consulted by a certain man who said that his leggings had been gnawed by mice, he replied that this was not a portent, but that it truly would have had to be considered a portent if the mice had been gnawed by the leggings.
Nor are those to be separated from this kind of pernicious superstition who, from the consideration of birth days, are called genethliaci, but now are commonly called mathematicians.
Wherefore these opinions also, [resting] on certain signs of things instituted by human presumption, must be referred to those same, as it were, pacts and agreements with demons. For from this it will come about that, by a certain hidden judgment of God, men desirous of evil things are handed over to be mocked and deceived, according to the merits of their wills, by the angels who transgress and mock and deceive them, to whom this weak part of the world is subjected, according to the most beautiful order of things, by the law of divine providence.
quibus inlusionibus et deceptionibus euenit, ut istis superstitiosis et perniciosis diuinationum generibus multa praeterita et futura dicantur nec aliter accidant, quam dicuntur, multaque obseruantibus secundum obseruationes suas eueniant, quibus implicati curiosiores fiant et sese magis magisque inserant multiplicibus laqueis superstitiosissimi erroris. hoc genus fornicationis animae salubriter diuina scriptura non tacuit neque ab ea sic deterruit animam, ut propterea talia negaret esse sectanda, quia falsa dicuntur a professoribus eorum, sed etiam: si dixerint uobis, inquit, et ita euenerit, ne credatis eis. non enim quia imago Samuhelis mortui Saul regi uera pronuntiauit, propterea talia sacrilegia, quibus imago illa praesentata est, minus execranda sunt, aut quia in Actibus apostolorum uentriloqua femina uerum testimonium perhibuit apostolis domini, ideo Paulus apostolus pepercit illi spiritui ac non potius feminam illius daemonii correptione atque exclusione mundauit. omnes igitur artes huius modi uel nugatoriae uel noxiae superstitionis ex quadam pestifera societate hominum et daemonum quasi pacta infidelis et dolosae amicitiae constituta penitus sunt repudianda et fugienda christiano, non quod idolum sit aliquid, ait apostolus, sed quia quae immolant gentes, daemoniis immolant et non deo, nolo uos socios daemoniorum fieri.
Through these mockeries and deceptions it comes about that by these superstitious and pernicious kinds of divination many past and future things are foretold, and they do not happen otherwise than as they are foretold, and many things happen to those who observe them according to their observances, by which, once entangled, they become more curious and thrust themselves more and more into the manifold snares of the most superstitious error. This kind of fornication of the soul divine Scripture did not keep silent about, for it is salutary, nor did it so deter the soul from it as to deny that such things are to be followed on the ground that they are said to be false by their professors; but even: if they say to you, it says, and so it has come to pass, do not believe them. For it is not because the image of the dead Samuel foretold true things to King Saul that such sacrileges, by which that image was presented, are for that reason less to be execrated, nor because in the Acts of the Apostles a ventriloquist woman gave true testimony to the apostles of the Lord, did the apostle Paul therefore spare that spirit, and did he not rather cleanse the woman by the rebuke and expulsion of that demon. All the arts, then, of this kind of either frivolous or harmful superstition, established as it were by pacts of faithless and deceitful friendship out of a certain pestilent association of men and demons, are to be utterly repudiated and shunned by a Christian, not because an idol is anything, says the apostle, but because the things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons and not to God, and I do not want you to become partners with demons.
quod autem de idolis et immolationibus, quae honori eorum exhibentur, dixit apostolus, hoc de omnibus imaginariis signis sentiendum est, quae uel ad cultum idolorum uel ad creaturam eiusque partes tamquam deum colendas trahunt uel ad remediorum aliarumque obseruationum curam pertinent, quae non sunt diuinitus ad dilectionem dei et proximi tamquam publice constituta, sed per priuatas appetitiones rerum temporalium corda dissipant miserorum. in omnibus ergo istis doctrinis societas daemonum formidanda atque uitanda est, qui nihil cum principe suo diabulo nisi reditum nostrum claudere atque obserare conantur. sicut autem de stellis, quas condidit et ordinauit deus, humanae et deceptoriae coniecturae ab hominibus institutae sunt, sic etiam de quibusque nascentibus uel quoquo modo diuinae prouidentiae administratione exsistentibus rebus multi multa humanis suspicionibus quasi regulariter coniectata litteris mandauerunt, si forte insolite acciderint, tamquam si mula pariat aut fulmine aliquid percutiatur.
But what the apostle said about idols and the sacrifices offered in their honor must be understood of all figurative signs, whether they draw people to the worship of idols or to the worship of the creature and its parts as though they were gods, or whether they pertain to the care of remedies and other observances, which have not been divinely established, as public institutions, for the love of God and neighbor, but through private appetites for temporal things scatter the hearts of the wretched. In all these teachings, then, the fellowship of demons is to be feared and avoided, who with their prince the devil attempt nothing but to shut and block our return. But just as concerning the stars, which God created and ordered, human and deceptive conjectures have been instituted by men, so also concerning any things being born or existing in any way by the administration of divine providence, many have committed to writing many things conjectured by human suspicions as though by rule, if perhaps something unusual has happened, as if a mule should give birth or something be struck by lightning.
Quae omnia tantum ualent, quantum praesumtione animorum quasi communi quadam lingua cum daemonibus foederata sunt. quae tamen plena sunt omnia pestiferae curiositatis, cruciantis sollicitudinis, mortiferae seruitutis. non enim quia ualebant, animaduersa sunt, sed animaduertendo atque signando factum est, ut ualerent, et ideo diuersis diuerse proueniunt secundum cogitationes et praesumtiones suas. illi enim spiritus, qui decipere uolunt, talia procurant cuique, qualibus eum irretitum per suspiciones et consensiones eius uident.
All these things have as much power as they have been, as it were, bound in a kind of common language with the demons by the presumption of minds. Yet they are all full of a pestilential curiosity, a tormenting anxiety, a deadly servitude. For they were not observed because they had power, but by being observed and marked out, it came about that they had power; and therefore they come about differently for different people according to their own thoughts and presumptions. For those spirits who wish to deceive procure for each person such things as they see him entangled in through his suspicions and agreements.
sicut enim uerbi gratia una figura litterae, quae deousatim notatur, aliud apud Graecos, aliud apud Latinos ualet, non natura, sed placito et consensione significandi, et ideo qui utramque linguam nouit, si homini Graeco uelit aliquid significare scribendo, non in ea significatione ponit hanc litteram, in qua eam ponit, eum homini soribit Latino; et beta uno eodemque sono apud Graecos litterae, apud Latinos holeris nomen est; et cum dico: "lege", in his duabus syllabis aliud Graecus, aliud Latinus intellegit - sicut ergo hae omnes significationes pro sua cuiusque societatis confessione animos mouent et, quia diuersa confessio est, diuerse monent, nec ideo consenserunt in eas homines, quia iam ualebant ad significationem, sed ideo ualent, quia consenserunt in eas: sic etiam illa signa, quibus perniciosa daemonum societas comparatur, pro cuiusque obseruationibus ualent. quod manifestissime ostendit ritus augurum, qui et antequam obseruent et posteaquam obseruata signa tenuerint, id agunt, ne uideant uolatus aut audiant noces auium, quia nulla ista signa sunt, nisi consensus obseruantis accedat.
For example, just as one written character, which is marked with a downward stroke, has one value among the Greeks and another among the Latins—not by nature, but by the consent and agreement of those who assign meaning—and therefore one who knows both languages, if he wishes to signify something to a Greek man by writing, does not put this letter in the same meaning in which he puts it when he writes to a Latin man; and beta, by one and the same sound, is a letter among the Greeks and the name of a vegetable among the Latins; and when I say "lege," in these two syllables a Greek understands one thing and a Latin another—just as, then, all these meanings move minds according to the confession of each particular society, and because the confession is different, they move them differently, nor did men agree upon them because they already had power for signification, but they have power because men agreed upon them: so also those signs by which the pernicious society of demons is procured have power according to each person's observances. This the ritual of the augurs most manifestly shows, who both before they observe and after they have grasped the observed signs act so as not to see the flights or hear the calls of birds, because none of these are signs unless the consent of the observer is added.
CCLX. DE SCIENTIA SENTENTIARVM, CONEXIONVM, DEFINITIONVM, DIVISIONVM ET PARTITIONVM. EX EODEM LIBRO DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA n.
Restant ea quae non ad corporis sensus, sed ad rationem animi pertinent, ubi disciplina regnat disputationis et numeri. sed disputationis disciplina ad omnia genera quaestionum, quae in litteris sanctis sunt, penetranda et dissoluenda plurimum ualet; tantum ibi cauenda est libido rixandi et puerilis quaedam ostentatio decipiendi aduersarium. sunt enim multa, quae appellantur sophismata, falsae conclusiones rationum et plerumque ita ueras imitantes, ut non solum tardos, sed ingeniosos etiam minus diligenter attentos decipiant. proposuit enim quidam dicens ei cum quo loquebatur: "quod ego sum, tu non as". at ille consensit. uerum enim erat ex parte uel eo ipso, quod iste insidiosus, ille simplex erat. tum ille addidit: „ego autem homo sum." hoc quoque cum ab illo accepisset, conclusit dicens: "tu igitur non es homo". quod genus captiosarum conclusionum scriptura, quantum existimo, detestatur illo loco, ubi dictum est: qui sophistice loquitur, odibilis est. quamquam etiam sermo non captiosus, sed tamen abundantius, quam grauitatem decet, uerborum ornamenta consectans sophisticus dicitur. sunt etiam uerae conexiones ratiocinationis falsas habentes sententias, quae consecuntur errorem illius cum quo agitur.
CCLX. ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF SENTENCES, CONNECTIONS, DEFINITIONS, DIVISIONS, AND PARTITIONS. FROM THE SAME BOOK ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.
There remain those matters which pertain not to the senses of the body but to the reason of the mind, where the discipline of disputation and of number reigns. But the discipline of disputation is of the greatest value for penetrating and resolving all the kinds of questions that are found in the holy writings; only there must be guarded against the lust for wrangling and a certain childish ostentation of deceiving one's opponent. For there are many things called sophisms, false conclusions of arguments, and for the most part they imitate true ones so closely that they deceive not only the slow-witted but even the clever, when they are less carefully attentive. For a certain man put this proposition to the one with whom he was speaking: "What I am, you are not." And the other agreed; for it was true in part, namely in this very respect, that the one was crafty and the other simple. Then he added: "But I am a man." When he had received this also from him, he concluded, saying: "You therefore are not a man." It is this kind of captious conclusion that Scripture, as I judge, detests in that passage where it is said: "He who speaks sophistically is hateful." Although even speech that is not captious, but nevertheless pursues ornaments of words more abundantly than gravity permits, is called sophistic. There are also true connections of reasoning that have false propositions, which follow upon the error of the one with whom one is dealing.
quae tamen ad hoc inferuntur a bono et docto homine, ut in his erubescens ille cuius errorem consecuntur eundem relinquat errorem, quia, si in eodem manere uoluerit, necesse est etiam illa quae damnat tenere cogatur. non enim uera inferebat apostolus, cum diceret: neque Christus resurrexit, et illa alia: inanis est praedicatio nostra, inanis est et fides uestra et deinceps alia. quae omnino falsa sunt, quia et Christus resurrexit et non erat inanis praedicatio eorum qui hoc annuntiabant, nec fides eorum qui hoc crediderunt, sed ista falsa uerissime conectebantur illi sententiae, qua dicebatur non esse resurrectionem mortuorum. istis autem falsis repudiatis, quoniam uera erant, si mortui non resurgunt, consequens erit resurrectio mortuorum. cum ergo sint uerae conexiones non solum uerarum sed etiam falsarum sententiarum, facile est ueritatem conexionum etiam in scholis illis discere, quae praeter ecclesiam sunt; sententiarum autem ueritas in sanctis libris ecclesiasticis uestiganda est.
These things, however, are brought forward by a good and learned man for this purpose, that the one who blushes for them, whose error they follow, may abandon that same error; because, if he wishes to remain in it, he is necessarily compelled also to hold those things which he condemns. For the apostle was not inferring true things when he said, "Neither has Christ risen," and those other things: "Our preaching is vain, and your faith is vain," and the rest. These are altogether false, because both Christ has risen and the preaching of those who announced this was not vain, nor the faith of those who believed it; but these false things were most truly connected to that sentence by which it was said that there is no resurrection of the dead. But when these false things are rejected, since they were true if the dead do not rise, it will follow that there is a resurrection of the dead. Since, therefore, there are true connections not only of true but also of false sentences, it is easy to learn the truth of connections even in those schools which are outside the church; but the truth of sentences is to be sought in the holy ecclesiastical books.
Ipsa tamen ueritas conexionum non instituta, sed animaduersa est ab hominibus et notata, ut eam possint uel discere uel docere; nam est in rerum ratione perpetue diuinitus instituta. sicut enim qui narrat ordinem temporum, non eum ipse componit, et locorum situs et naturas animalium uel stirpium uel lapidum qui ostendit, non res ostendit ab hominibus institutas, et ille qui demonstrat sidera eorumque motus, non a se uel homine aliquo rem institutam demonstrat: sic etiam qui dicit: "cum falsum est quod consequitur, necesse est, ut falsum sit quod praecedit uerissime dicit neque iste facit, ut ita sit, sed tantum ita esse demonstrat. ex hac regula illud est quod de apostolo commemorauimus. praecedit enim non esse resurrectionem mortuorum, quod dicebant illi quorum errorem destruebat apostolus. porro illam sententiam praecedentem, qua dicebant non esse resurrectionem mortuorum, necessario sequitur: neque Christus resurrexit. hoc autem quod sequitur falsum est; Christus enim resurrexit. falsum est ergo et quod praecedit. praecedit enim non esse resurrectionem mortuorum. est igitur resurrectio mortuorum. quod totum breuiter ita dicitur: "si non est resurrectio mortuorum, neque Christus resurrexit. Christus autem resurrexit; est igitur resurrectio mortuorum". hoc ergo, ut consequenti ablato auferatur etiam necessario quod praecedit, non instituerunt homines, sed ostenderunt.
Nevertheless, the truth of these connections was not instituted but observed and noted by men, so that they might be able to learn or teach it; for it is perpetually instituted by God in the nature of things. For just as one who narrates the order of times does not himself compose it, and one who shows the locations of places and the natures of animals or plants or stones does not show things instituted by men, and he who demonstrates the stars and their motions does not demonstrate a thing instituted by himself or by any man: so too, one who says, "When what follows is false, it is necessary that what precedes be false," speaks most truly, and he does not make it so, but only demonstrates that it is so. From this rule comes that point which we recalled concerning the apostle. For what precedes is that there is no resurrection of the dead, which those whose error the apostle was destroying used to say. Furthermore, that preceding proposition, by which they said there is no resurrection of the dead, is necessarily followed by: neither has Christ risen. But this that follows is false; for Christ has risen. Therefore what precedes is also false. For what precedes is that there is no resurrection of the dead. Therefore there is a resurrection of the dead. The whole of this is stated briefly thus: "If there is no resurrection of the dead, neither has Christ risen. But Christ has risen; therefore there is a resurrection of the dead." Therefore, that when the consequent is removed, what necessarily precedes is also removed, men did not institute but demonstrated.
et haec regula pertinet ad ueritatem conexionum, non ad ueritatem sententiarum.
Sed in hoc loco de resurrectione cum ageretur, et regula. conexionis uera est et ipsa in conclusione sententia. in falsis autem sententiis conexionis ueritas est isto modo. faciamus aliquem concessisse: "si animal est coclea, uocem habet". hoc concesso cum probatum fuerit uocem cocleam non habere, quoDiam consequenti ablato illud quod praecedit aufertur, concluditur non esse animal cocleam. quae sententia falsa est, sed ex concesso falso uera conclusionis conexio. ueritas itaque sententiae per se ipsam ualet, ueritas autem conexionis ei eius cum quo agitur opinione uel concessione consistit. ideo autem, ut supra diximus, infertur uera conexione quod falsum est, ut eum cuius errorem corrigere uolumus paeniteat sensisse praecedentia, quorum consequentia uidet esse respuenda. iam hinc intellegere facile est sicut in falsis sententiis ueras, sic in ueris sententiis falsas conclusiones esse posse. fac enim aliquem proposuisse: "si iustus est ille, bonus est et esse concessum; deinde assumsisse: "non est autem iustus"; quo item concesso intulisse conclusionem: "non est igitur bonus". quae tametsi uera sint omnia, non est tamen uera regula conclusionis. non enim, sicut ablato consequenti aufertur necessario quod praecedit, ita etiam ablato praecedenti aufertur necessario quod sequitur.
And this rule pertains to the truth of connections, not to the truth of propositions.
But in this passage, when the resurrection was being discussed, both the rule of connection is true and the conclusion itself is true. In false propositions, however, the truth of the connection works in this way. Let us suppose someone has conceded: "If it is an animal, a snail has a voice." Once this is conceded, when it has been proved that a snail does not have a voice, since by removing the consequent that which precedes is removed, it is concluded that a snail is not an animal. This proposition is false, but from a false concession the connection of the conclusion is true. Thus the truth of a proposition stands by itself, but the truth of a connection consists in the opinion or concession of the one with whom one is arguing. For this reason, as we said above, by a true connection that which is false is inferred, so that the one whose error we wish to correct may regret having held the premises, whose consequents he sees must be rejected. From this point it is easy to understand that just as true conclusions can be found in false propositions, so false conclusions can be found in true propositions. For suppose someone had proposed: "If he is just, he is also good," and this had been conceded; then he assumed: "But he is not just," and this too having been conceded, he inferred the conclusion: "Therefore he is not good." Although all these things are true, nevertheless the rule of the conclusion is not true. For it is not the case that, just as when the consequent is removed the antecedent is necessarily removed, so also when the antecedent is removed the consequent is necessarily removed.
quia uerum est, cum dicimus: nai orator est, homo est", ex qua propositione si assumamus: "non est autem orator": non erit consequens, cum intuleris: "non est igitur homo".
Quapropter aliud est nosse regulas conexionum, aliud sententiarum ueritatem. in illis discitur quid sit consequens, quid non consequens, quid repugnans. consequens est: "si orator est, homo est"; "si homo est, orator est" inconsequens; repugnans: "si homo est, quadrupes est". hic ergo de ipsa conexione iudicatur. in ueritate autem sententiarum ipsae per se sententiae, non earum conexio consideranda est. sed ueris certisque sententiis cum incertae uera conexione iunguntur, etiam ipsae certae fiant necesse est. quidam autem sic se iactant, cum ueritatem conexionum didicerint, quasi sententiarum ipsa sit ueritas. et rursus quidam plerumque retinentes ueram sententiam male se contemnunt, quia leges conclusionis ignorant, cum melior sit qui nouit esse resurrectionem mortuorum quam ille qui nouit consequens esse, ut, si resurrectio mortuorum non est, neque Christus resurrexerit.
For it is true when we say, "If he is an orator, he is a man"; but if from this proposition we assume, "But he is not an orator," it will not follow when you infer, "Therefore he is not a man."
Wherefore it is one thing to know the rules of connections, and another the truth of propositions. In the former it is learned what is consequent, what is not consequent, what is repugnant. It is consequent: "If he is an orator, he is a man"; "If he is a man, he is an orator" is inconsequent; repugnant: "If he is a man, he is a quadruped." Here, then, judgment is made about the connection itself. But in the truth of propositions, the propositions themselves must be considered in themselves, not their connection. Yet when true and certain propositions are joined with uncertain ones by a true connection, they too must necessarily become certain. Some, however, boast in this way, when they have learned the truth of connections, as though it were the truth of the propositions themselves. And again, some for the most part, holding a true proposition, wrongly despise themselves because they are ignorant of the laws of conclusion, although better is he who knows that there is a resurrection of the dead than he who knows that it is consequent that, if there is no resurrection of the dead, neither has Christ risen.
Item scientia definiendi, diuidendi atque partiendi quamquam etiam in rebus falsis plerumque adhibeatur, ipsa tamen falsa non est neque ab hominibus instituta, sed in rerum ratione comperta. non enim, quia et fabulis suis eam poetae et opinionibus erroris sui uel falsi philosophi uel etiam haeretici, hoc est falsi christiani, adhibere consueuerunt, propterea falsum est neque in definiendo neque in diuidendo aut partiendo aliquid complectendum esse, quod ad rem ipsam non pertinet, aut aliquid quod pertinet praetereundum. hoc uerum est, etiam si ea quae definiuntur aut distribuuntur uera non sint. nam et ipsum falsum definitur, cum dicimus falsam esse significationem rei non ita se habentis, ut significatur, siue alio aliquo modo: quae definitio uera est, quamuis falsum uerum esse non possit. possumus etiam diuidere dicentes duo esse genera falsi, unum eorum quae omnino esse non possunt, alterum eorum quae non sunt, quamuis esse possint. nam qui dicit septem et tria undecim esse, id dicit quod omnino esse non potest. qui autem dicit kalendis, uerbi gratia, ianuariis pluisse, tametsi factum non sit, id tamen dicit quod fieri potuerit. definitio ergo et diuisio falsorum potest esse uerissima, quamuis falsa ipsa utique uera non sint.
Likewise, the science of defining, dividing, and partitioning, although it is very often applied even to false things, is itself not false, nor was it instituted by men, but is found in the nature of things. For it is not because poets have been accustomed to apply it to their fables, and philosophers of their own error—or false philosophers—or even heretics, that is, false Christians, to their opinions, that it is therefore false that in defining, dividing, or partitioning nothing should be included that does not pertain to the thing itself, or that anything pertaining to it should be passed over. This is true even if the things that are defined or distributed are not true. For even the false itself is defined, when we say that a false signification is that of a thing not being as it is signified, or in some other way; which definition is true, although a false thing cannot be true. We can also divide, saying that there are two kinds of false: one of things that cannot exist at all, the other of things that do not exist although they could. For one who says that seven and three are eleven says that which cannot exist at all. But one who says, for example, that it rained on the Kalends of January, although it did not happen, still says that which could have happened. The definition and division of false things can therefore be most true, although the false things themselves are certainly not true.
CCLXI. VT NEC DE ELOQVENTIA SE QVISPIAM IACTET, QVAE NON VT INTELLEGAMVS, SED VT INTELLECTA PROFERAMVS ADHIBETVR. EX LIBRO DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA II.
Sunt etiam quaedam praecepta uberioris disputationis, quae iam eloquentia nominatur, quae nihilominus uera sunt, quamuis eis possint etiam falsa persuaderi; sed quia et uera possunt, non est facultas ipsa culpabilis, sed male utentium peruersitas. nam neque hoc ab hominibus institutum est, ut ueritatis expressio conciliet auditorem aut ut facile quod intendit insinuet breuis et aperta narratio et uarietas eius sine fastidio teneat intentos et ceterae huius modi obseruationes, quae siue in falsis siue in ueris causis uerae sunt tamen, quantum uel sciri uel credi aliquid faciunt aut ad expetendum fugiendumue animos mouent, et inuentae potius, quod ita se habeant, quam ut ita se haberent, institutae.
CCLXI. That no one should boast of eloquence either, which is employed not so that we may understand, but so that we may set forth what we have understood. From Book II of On Christian Doctrine.
There are also certain precepts of a fuller discourse, which is now called eloquence, which are nonetheless true, even though false things can also be persuaded by them; but because they can also persuade true things, the faculty itself is not blameworthy, but the perversity of those who use it badly. For it was not instituted by men that the expression of truth should win over the hearer, or that a brief and clear narrative should easily instill what it intends, and that its variety should hold attentive listeners without disgust, and the other observances of this kind, which whether in false or in true causes are nonetheless true, insofar as they cause something to be known or believed or move minds to seek or avoid something—these were discovered rather, in that they are so, than instituted so that they would be so.
Sed haec pars cum discitur, magis ut proferamus ea quae intellecta sunt, quam ut intellegamus adhibenda est. illa uero conclusionum et definitionum et distributionum plurimum intellectorem adiuuat. tantum absit error, quo uidentur sibi homines ipsam beatae uitae ueritatem didicisse, cum ista didicerint. quamquam plerumque accidat, ut facilius homines res eas assequantur, propter quas assequendas ista discuntur, quam talium praeceptorum nodosissimas et spinosissimas disciplinas. tamquam si quispiam uolens dare praecepta ambulandi moneat non esse leuandum posteriorem pedem, nisi cum posueris priorem, deinde minutatim quemadmodum articulorum et poplitum cardines oporteat mouere describat; uera enim dicit nec ambulari aliter potest; sed facilius homines haec faciendo ambulant, quam animaduertunt, cum faciunt, aut intellegunt, cum audiunt. qui autem ambulare non possunt, multo minus ea curant quae nec experiendo possunt attendere.
But this part, when it is learned, is to be applied more for the sake of setting forth what we have understood than for understanding. That other part, however, concerning conclusions and definitions and divisions, greatly aids the one who understands. Only let that error be far away by which men think they have learned the very truth of the blessed life when they have learned these things. Although it very often happens that men more easily attain those things for the sake of attaining which these things are learned, than the most knotty and thorny disciplines of such precepts. As if someone, wishing to give precepts for walking, should advise that the rear foot is not to be lifted unless you have placed the front one, and then should describe in detail how the joints of the limbs and knees ought to be moved; for he speaks the truth, nor can one walk otherwise; but men walk more easily by doing these things than they notice them when they do them, or understand them when they hear them. But those who cannot walk care far less for these things, which they cannot attend to even by experience.
ita plerumque citius ingeniosus uidet non esse ratam conclusionem quam praecepta eius capit, tardus autem non eam uidet, sed multo minus quod de illa praecipitur, magisque in his omnibus ipsa spectacula ueritatis saepe delectant, quam ex eis in disputando aut iudicando adiuuamur; nisi forte quod exercitatiora reddunt ingenia, si etiam maligniora aut inflatiora non reddant, hoc est ut aut decipere uerisimili sermone atque interrogationibus ament aut aliquid magnum, quo se bonis atque innocentibus anteponant, se assecutos putent qui ista didicerint.
CCLXII. QVOD NVMERI DISCIPLINA NON SIT AB HOMINIBVS INSTITVTA, SED POTIVS INDAGATA ET INVENTA, ET AD DEI LAVDEM, A QVO VERA EST, REFERENDVM EST. EX LIBRO SVPRA SCRIPTO II.
Iam uero numeri disciplina cuilibet tardissimo clarum est quod non sit ab hominibus instituta, sed potius indagata et inuenta. non enim, sicut primam syllabam Italiae, quam breuem pronuntiauerunt ueteres, uoluit Vergilius et longa facta est, ita quisquam potest efficere, cum uoluerit, ut ter terna aut non sint nouem aut non possint efficere quadratam figuram aut non ad ternarium numerum tripla sint, ad senarium sesqua, ad nullum dupla, quia intellegibilis numeri semissem non habent.
Thus for the most part the clever man sees more quickly that a conclusion is not valid than he grasps the rules of it, while the slow man does not see this, but far less what is prescribed concerning it; and in all these matters the very spectacles of truth often delight us more than we are helped by them in disputing or judging—unless perhaps in that they make minds more practiced, provided they do not also make them more malicious or more inflated; that is, so that men do not either rave about deceiving by plausible speech and questioning, or think they have attained some great thing by which they may set themselves before the good and innocent, if they have learned these things.
CCLXII. That the discipline of numbers was not instituted by men, but rather investigated and discovered, and is to be referred to the praise of God, from whom is truth. From the book written above, II.
Now as to the discipline of numbers, it is clear to even the dullest that it was not instituted by men, but rather investigated and discovered. For it is not as when Virgil wished the first syllable of Italia, which the ancients pronounced short, to be made long; so no one can bring it about, when he wishes, that three times three are not nine, or cannot form a square figure, or that threefold numbers are not related to the number three, sesquialter to six, double to no number, because intelligible numbers do not have a half.
siue ergo in se ipsis considerentur siue ad figurarum aut sonorum aliarumue motionum leges numeri adhibeantur, incommutabiles regulas habent neque ullo modo ab hominibus institutas, sed ingeniosorum sagacitate conpertas. quae tamen omnia quisquis ita dilexerit, ut iactare se inter imperitos uelit et non potius quaerere, unde sint uera quae tantummodo uera esse persenserit, et unde quaedam non solum uera sed etiam incommutabilia, quae incommutabilia esse comprehenderit, ac sic ab specie corporum usque ad humanam mentem perueniens, cum et ipsam mutabilem inuenerit, quod nunc docta, nunc indocta sit, constituta tamen inter incommutabilem supra se ueritatem et mutabilia infra se cetera ad unius dei laudem atque dilectionem cuncta conuertere, a quo cuncta esse cognoscit,: doctus uideri potest, esse autem sapiens nullo modo.
Whether, then, they are considered in themselves, or whether the laws of number are applied to figures or to sounds or to other motions, they have immutable rules, and in no way instituted by men, but discovered by the sagacity of the ingenious. Yet whoever has so loved all these things that he wishes to boast of himself among the unskilled, and not rather to seek whence the things are true which he has perceived to be only true, and whence certain things are not only true but also immutable, which he has comprehended to be immutable, and so, passing from the appearance of bodies all the way to the human mind, when he has found even this to be mutable, in that it is now learned and now unlearned, yet is set between the immutable truth above it and the other mutable things below it, to turn all things to the praise and love of the one God, from whom he knows that all things are: he can seem learned, but he is in no way wise.
Quam ob rem uidetur mihi studiosis et ingeniosis adulescentius et timentibus deum beatamque uitam quaerentibus salubriter praecipi, ut nullas doctrinas, quae praeter ecclesiam Christi exercentur, tamquam ad beatam uitam capessendam secure sequi audeant, sed eas sobrie diligenterque diiudicent, et si quas inuenerint ab hominibus institutas, uarias propter diuersam uoluntatem instituentium et ignotas propter suspiciones errantium, maxime si habent etiam cum daemonibus initam societatem per quarundam significationum quasi quaedam pacta atque conuenta, repudient penitus et detestentur, alienent etiam studium a superfluis et luxuriosis hominum institutis. illa uero instituta hominum, quae ad societatem conuiuentium ualent, pro ipsa uitae huius necessitate non neglegant. in ceteris autem doctrinis, quae apud gentes inueniuntur, praeter historiam rerum uel praeteriti temporis uel praesentis, ad sensus corporis pertinentium, quibus etiam utilium artium corporalium experimenta et coniecturae annumerantur, et praeter rationem disputationis et numeri nihil utile esse arbitror. in quibus omnibus tenendum est Ne quid nimis, et maxime in his quae ad corporis sensus pertinentia uoluuntur temporibus et continentur locis.
Wherefore it seems to me that it should be salutarily enjoined upon studious and talented young people, and upon those who fear God and seek the blessed life, that they should not dare to follow securely, as though for attaining the blessed life, any teachings that are practiced outside the Church of Christ, but should judge them soberly and carefully; and if they find any that were instituted by men—various because of the differing will of those who instituted them, and unknown because of the conjectures of those who err, especially if they also have an established association with demons through certain significations, as it were certain pacts and agreements—they should utterly reject and detest them, and should turn their study away also from the superfluous and luxurious institutions of men. But those institutions of men that are of value for the society of those living together they should not neglect, on account of the very necessity of this life. In the other teachings, however, that are found among the nations—apart from the history of things either of past or of present time pertaining to the senses of the body, to which are also reckoned the experiments and conjectures of useful bodily arts, and apart from the rationale of disputation and of number—I judge that nothing is useful. In all of these it must be held, "Nothing in excess," and especially in those things which, pertaining to the senses of the body, are rolled along in times and contained in places.
CCLXIII. QVOD VTILES DISCIPLINAS PHILOSOPHORVM HVIVS SAKCVLI TAMQVAM DIVITIAS DE AEGVPTO EXIENS CHRISTIANVS AVFEBRE DEBEAT. EX LIBRO II.
Philosophi autem qui uocantur si qua forte uera et fidei nostrae accommodata dixerunt, maxime Platonici, non solum formidanda non sunt, sed etiam ab eis tamquam ab iniustis possessoribus in usum nostrum uindicanda.
CHAPTER CCLXIII. THAT A CHRISTIAN LEAVING EGYPT, LIKE THE ISRAELITES, OUGHT TO CARRY OFF THE USEFUL DISCIPLINES OF THE PHILOSOPHERS OF THIS WORLD AS SPOILS. FROM BOOK II.
But as for those who are called philosophers, if by chance they have said anything true and suited to our faith, especially the Platonists, these are not only not to be feared, but are even to be claimed from them for our use, as from unjust possessors.
sicut enim Aegyptii non tantum idola habebant et onera grauia., quae populus Israhel detestaretur et fugeret, sed etiam uasa et ornamenta de auro et argento qu uestem, quae ille populus exiens de Aegypto sibi potius tamquam ad usum meliorem clanculo uindicauit, non auctoritate propria, sed praecepto dei, ipsis Aegyptiis nescienter accommodantibus ea quibus non bene utebantur: sic doctrinae omnes gentilium non solum simulata et superstitiosa figmenta grauesque sarcinas superuacanei laboris habent, quae unusquisque nostrum duce Christo de societate gentilium excidens debet abhominari atque uitare, sed etiam liberales disciplinas usui ueritatis aptiores et quaedam morum praecepta utilissima continent, denique de ipso uno deo colendo nonnulla uera inueniuntur apud eos, quod eorum tamquam aurum et argentum, quod non ipsi instituerunt, sed de quibusdam quasi metallis diuinae prouidentiae, quae ubique infusa est, eruerunt et quo peruerse atque iniuriose ad obsequia daemonum abutuntur, cum ab eorum misera societate sese animo separat, debet ab eis auferre christianus ad usum iustum praedicandi euangelii. uestem quoque illorum, id est hominum quidem instituta, sed tamen accommodata humanae societati, qua in hac uita carere non possumus, accipere atque habere licuerit in usum conuertenda christianum. nam quid aliud fecerunt multi boni fideles nostri?
For just as the Egyptians had not only idols and heavy burdens, which the people of Israel detested and fled from, but also vessels and ornaments of gold and silver and clothing, which that people, on departing from Egypt, claimed for themselves secretly, as it were for better use—not by their own authority but by the command of God, while the Egyptians themselves unknowingly supplied them with things they were not using well—so all the teachings of the Gentiles contain not only simulated and superstitious fictions and the heavy packs of superfluous labor, which each one of us, with Christ as our leader, departing from the fellowship of the Gentiles, ought to abhor and avoid, but they also contain the liberal disciplines, more suited to the use of truth, and certain very useful precepts of conduct; and finally, concerning the worship of the one God himself, some true things are found among them. That is their gold and silver, which they did not themselves establish but drew out, as it were, from certain mines of divine providence, which is infused everywhere; and when one separates himself in spirit from their wretched fellowship, since they perversely and unjustly abuse these things for the service of demons, a Christian ought to take them from them for the just use of preaching the gospel. Their clothing too—that is, human institutions indeed, yet adapted to human society, without which we cannot live in this life—it has been permitted to receive and keep, to be converted to Christian use. For what else have many good faithful among us done?
nonne aspicimus, quanto auro et argento et ueste suffarcinatus exierit de Aegypto Cyprianus, et doctor suauissimus et martyr beatissimus? quanto Lactantius? quanto Victorinus, Optatus, Hilarius, ut de uiuis taceam? quanto innumerabiles Graeci? quod prior ipse fidelissimus dei famulus Moses fecerat, de quo scriptum est, quod eruditus fuerit omni sapientia Aegyptiorum. quibus omnibus uiris superstitiosa gentilium consuetudo, et maxime illis temporibus, cum Christi recutiens iugum christianos persequebatur, disciplinas, quas utiles habebat, numquam commodaret, si eas in usum colendi unius dei, quo uanus idolorum cultus scinderetur, conuersum iri suspicaretur; sed dederunt aurum et argentum et uestem suam exeunti de Aegypto populo dei, nescientes, quemadmodum illa quae dabant in Christi obsequium redderentur. illud enim in exhodo factum sine dubio figuratum est, ut hoc praesignaret, quod sine praeiudicio alterius aut paris aut melioris intellegentiae dixerim.
Do we not see with how much gold and silver and clothing Cyprian went forth from Egypt, laden, both a most sweet doctor and a most blessed martyr? With how much Lactantius? With how much Victorinus, Optatus, Hilarius, to say nothing of the living? With how much countless Greeks? Which the most faithful servant of God, Moses himself, had done before, of whom it is written that he was instructed in all the wisdom of the Egyptians. To all these men the superstitious custom of the gentiles, and especially in those times when, shaking off the yoke of Christ, it persecuted Christians, would never have lent the disciplines it held useful, if it had suspected that they would be turned to the use of worshipping the one God, by which the vain worship of idols would be cut down; but they gave their gold and silver and clothing to the people of God departing from Egypt, not knowing how those things which they gave would be rendered in service to Christ. For that which was done in Exodus was without doubt figured, so that it might prefigure this, which I would say without prejudice to another understanding, whether equal or better.
Sed hoc modo instructus diuinarum scripturarum studiosus, cum ad eas perscrutandas accedere coeperit, illud apostolicum cogitare non cesset: scientia inflat, caritas aedificat. ita enim sentit, quamuis de Aegypto diues exeat, tamen, nisi pascha egerit, saluum se esse non posse. pascha autem nostrum immolatus est Christus nihilque magis immolatio christianos doeet, quam illud quod ipse clamat tamquam ad eos quos in Aegypto sub Pharaone uidet laborare: uenite ad me qui laboratis et onerati estis, et ego uos reficiam. tollite iugum meum super uos et discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde, et inuenietis requiem animabus uestris. iugum enim meum lene est et sarcina mea lenis est. quibus, nisi mitibus et humilibus corde, quos non inflat scientia, sed caritas aedificat ? meminerit ergo eorum qui pascha illo tempore per umbrarum imaginaria celebrabant, cum signari postea sanguine agni iuberentur, ysopo fuisse signatos — herba haec humilis et mitis est et nihil fortius et penetrabilius eius radicibus—ut in caritate radicati et fundati possimus comprehendere cum omnibus sanctis, quae sit latitudo et longitudo et altitudo et profundum, id est crucem domini. est etiam in ysopo uis purgatoria, ne inflante scientia de diuitiis ab Aegypto ablatis superbe aliquid pulmo tumidus anhelet: asperges me, inquit, ysopo et mundabor, lauabis me et super niuem dealbabor.
But one instructed in this way, a student of the divine Scriptures, when he has begun to come to them to search them through, should never cease to think on that apostolic saying: Knowledge puffs up, but love builds up. For he understands thus: although he may go forth rich from Egypt, yet unless he has kept the Passover, he cannot be saved. For our Passover, Christ, has been sacrificed, and the sacrifice teaches Christians nothing more than that which he himself cries out, as it were to those whom he sees laboring in Egypt under Pharaoh: Come to me, all you who labor and are burdened, and I will refresh you. Take my yoke upon you and learn from me, for I am gentle and humble of heart, and you will find rest for your souls. For my yoke is easy and my burden is light. To whom is this said but to the gentle and humble of heart, whom knowledge does not puff up but love builds up? Let him therefore remember those who in that time celebrated the Passover through the imagery of shadows, when they were later commanded to be marked with the blood of the lamb, that they were marked with hyssop—this is a lowly and gentle herb, and nothing is stronger or more penetrating than its roots—so that, rooted and founded in love, we may be able with all the saints to comprehend what is the breadth and length and height and depth, that is, the cross of the Lord. There is also in hyssop a purifying power, lest, puffed up by knowledge concerning the riches taken from Egypt, the swollen lung pant something proudly: Sprinkle me, he says, with hyssop and I shall be cleansed; wash me and I shall be made whiter than snow.
auditui meo dabis exsultationem et laetitiam. deinde consequenter adnectit, ut ostendat purgationem a superbia significari ysopo: exsultabunt ossa humiliata.
Quanto autem minor est auri, argenti uestisque copia, quam de Aegypto ille populus secum abstulit, in comparatione diuitiarum, quas postea Hierosolymae consecutus est, quae maxime in Salomone rege ostenduntur, tanta fit cuncta scientia, quae quidem est utilis collecta de libris gentium, si diuinarum scripturarum scientiae comparetur. nam quidquid homo extra didicerit, si noxium est, ibi damnatur; si utile est, ibi inuenitur. et cum ibi quisque inuenerit omnia, quae utiliter alibi didicerit, multo abundantius ibi inueniet ea quae nusquam omnino alibi, sed in illarum tantummodo scripturarum mirabili altitudine et mirabili humilitate discuntur. hac igitur instructione praeditum cum signa incognita lectorem non impedierint, mitem et humilem corde, subiugatum leniter Christo et oneratum sarcina leui, fundatum et radicatum et aedificatum in caritate, quem scientia inflare non possit, accedat ad ambigua signa in scripturis consideranda et discutienda.
You will give joy and gladness to my hearing. Then he connects what follows in sequence, to show that purification from pride is signified by hyssop: the humbled bones will rejoice.
But as much smaller as the abundance of gold, silver, and clothing is, which that people carried away with them from Egypt, in comparison with the riches which they afterward obtained at Jerusalem, which are shown most of all in King Solomon, so much smaller does all knowledge become—the knowledge that is indeed useful, gathered from the books of the nations—if it is compared with the knowledge of the divine Scriptures. For whatever a man has learned outside them, if it is harmful, it is condemned there; if it is useful, it is found there. And when anyone has found there all the things that he has usefully learned elsewhere, he will find there in much greater abundance those things which are found nowhere at all elsewhere, but only in the wonderful height and wonderful humility of those Scriptures. Therefore, when a reader furnished with this instruction is not hindered by unknown signs—a reader meek and humble of heart, gently subjected to Christ and burdened with a light load, founded and rooted and built up in love, whom knowledge cannot puff up—let him draw near to consider and examine the ambiguous signs in the Scriptures.
CCLXIIII. DE SIGNIS AMBIGVIS ET DISTINCTIONIBVS EXEMPLI GRATIA PONIT, QVALITEB DISTINGVATVB: IN PRINCIPIO ERAT VEBBVM, ET: QVID ELIGAM IGNORO. EX LIBRO DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA m.
Qui eo loco animi est, ut per nos instrui ualeat, sciat ambiguitatem scripturae aut in uerbis propriis esse aut in translatis, quae genera in secundo libro demonstrauimus.
Sed cum uerba propria faciunt ambiguam scripturam, primo uidendum est, ne male distinxerimus aut pronuntiauerimus. cum ergo adhibita intentio incertum esse peruiderit, quomodo distinguendum aut quomodo pronuntiandum sit, consulat regulam fidei, quam de scripturarum planioribus locis et ecclesiae auctoritate percepit, de qua satis egimus, cum de rebus in libro primo loqueremur. quod si ambae uel etiam omnes, si plures fuerint partes ambiguitatis, secundum fidem sonuerint, textus ipse sermonis a praecedentibus et consequentibus partibus, quae ambiguitatem illam in medio posuerunt, restat consulendus, ut uideamus, cuinam sententiae de pluribus, quae se ostendunt, ferat suffragium eamque sibi contexi patiatur. iam nunc exempla considera. illa haeretica distinctio: in principio erat uerbum, et nerbum erat apud deum, et deus erat. uerbum, ut alius sit sensus: nerbum hoc erat in principio apud deum, non uult deum uerbum confiteri.
264. ON AMBIGUOUS SIGNS AND DISTINCTIONS, HE GIVES EXAMPLES OF HOW A QUALITY IS TO BE DISTINGUISHED: "IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE WORD," AND "I DO NOT KNOW WHAT TO CHOOSE." FROM THE BOOK ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.
Whoever is of such a mind that he can be instructed by us should know that the ambiguity of Scripture lies either in proper words or in transferred words, which kinds we demonstrated in the second book.
But when proper words make Scripture ambiguous, we must first see to it that we have not punctuated or pronounced it wrongly. When, therefore, careful attention has perceived that it is uncertain how it should be punctuated or how it should be pronounced, let him consult the rule of faith, which he has received from the clearer passages of the Scriptures and from the authority of the church, about which we have said enough when we spoke of things in the first book. But if both, or even all the parts of the ambiguity, should there be several, sound in accordance with the faith, then the text of the discourse itself must be consulted from the preceding and following parts, which have placed that ambiguity in the middle, so that we may see to which of the several meanings that present themselves it gives its support and allows to be woven together with itself. Now consider examples. That heretical punctuation: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was"—so that the sense is different: "this Word was in the beginning with God"—does not wish to confess that the Word is God.
sed hoc regula fidei refellendum est, qua nobis de trinitatis aequalitate praescribitur, ut dicamus: et deus erat nerbum, deinde subiungamus: hoc erat in principio apud deum. illa uero distinctionis ambiguitas neutra parte resistit fidei et ideo textu ipso sermonis diiudicanda est, ubi ait apostolus: et quid eligam ignoro. compellor autem e duobus, concupiscentiam habens dissolui et esse cum Christo; multo enim magis optimum, manere in carne necessarium propter uos. incertum est enim, utrum e duobus concupiscentiam habens, an compellor autem ex duobus, ut illud adiungatur: concupiscentiam habens dissolui et esse cum Christo. sed quoniam ita sequitur: multo enim magis optimum, apparet eum eius optimi dicere se habere concupiscentiam, ut, cum ex duobus compellatur, alterius tamen habeat concupiscentiam, alterius necessitatem: concupiscentiam scilicet esse cum Christo, necessitatem manere in carne. quae ambiguitas uno consequenti uerbo diiudicatur, quod positum est, enim. quam particulam qui abstulerunt interpretes, illa potius sententia ducti sunt, ut non solum compelli ex duobus sed etiam duorum habere concupiscentiam uideretur. sic ergo distinguendum est: et quid eligam ignoro. compellor autem ex duobus. quam distinctionem sequitur: concupiscentiam habens dissolui et esse cum Christo.
But this must be refuted by the rule of faith, by which the equality of the Trinity is prescribed to us, so that we say: and the Word was God, and then add: this was in the beginning with God. But that ambiguity of distinction resists the faith on neither side, and therefore it must be decided from the very texture of the discourse, where the apostle says: and what I should choose I do not know. But I am pressed from two things, having a desire to depart and to be with Christ; for much more better, to remain in the flesh is necessary for you. For it is uncertain whether it is having a desire from the two, or but I am pressed from the two, so that this is joined: having a desire to depart and to be with Christ. But since it follows thus: for much more better, it appears that he says he has a desire for that better thing, so that, while he is pressed from two, he nevertheless has a desire for one and a necessity for the other: namely, a desire to be with Christ, a necessity to remain in the flesh. And this ambiguity is decided by one following word, which is placed, for. And those interpreters who have removed this particle were led rather by that meaning, so that he would seem not only to be pressed from two but also to have a desire for two. So therefore it must be distinguished: and what I should choose I do not know. But I am pressed from two. This distinction follows: having a desire to depart and to be with Christ.
et tamquam quaereretur, quare huius rei potius habeat concupiscentiam: multo enim magis optimum, inquit. cur ergo e duobus ©ompeUitur? quia est manendi necessitas, quam ita subiecit: manere ia carne necessarium propter uos. ubi autem neque praescripto fidei neque ipsius sermonis textu ambiguitas explicari potest». nihil obest secundum quamlibet earum quae ostenduntur sententiam distinguere. ueluti est illa ad Corinthios: has ergo promissiones habentes, carissimi, mundemus nos ab omni inquinatione carnis et spiritus, perficientes sanctificationem in timore dei capite nos: nemini nocuimus. dubium quippe est, utrum mundemus nos ab omni inquinatione carnis et spiritus secundum illam sententiam: ut sit sancta et corpore et, spiritu, an mundemus nos ab omni coinquinatione carnis, ut alius sit sensus: et spiritus perficient.ea sanctificationem in timore dei capite nos. tales igitur distinctionum ambiguitates in potestate legentis sunt
And as if it were being asked why he should rather have a desire for this thing: "For it is much better," he says. Why then is he constrained by two? Because there is a necessity of remaining, which he subjoined thus: "to remain in the flesh is necessary for your sake." But where the ambiguity cannot be resolved either by the rule of faith or by the text of the discourse itself, it does no harm to distinguish according to whichever of the meanings that are shown. For example, that passage to the Corinthians: "Having therefore these promises, beloved, let us cleanse ourselves from every defilement of flesh and spirit, perfecting sanctification in the fear of God, our head: we have harmed no one." For it is doubtful whether we should read "let us cleanse ourselves from every defilement of flesh and spirit" according to that meaning: that she may be holy both in body and in spirit, or "let us cleanse ourselves from every defilement of flesh," so that the sense is different: "and spirit, perfecting sanctification in the fear of God, our head." Such ambiguities of distinctions, therefore, are within the power of the reader.
CCLXV. DE AMBIGVIS P«01fVNTLA.TIONIB VS PONIT BUHPU CAVSA : QVIS AGCVSABIT ELECTOS DEI? HI. LIBRO SVPRA. SCRIPTO III
Quaecumque autem de ambiguis distinctionibus diximus, eadem obseruanda sunt et in ambiguis pronuntiationibus. nam et ipsae, nisi lectoris nimia uitientur incuria, aut regulis fidei corriguntur aut praecedentis uel consequentis contextione, sermonis aut, si neutrum horum adhibetur ad correctionem, nihilominus dubiae remanebunt, ut quolibet modo lector pronuntiauerit, non sit in culpa. nisi enim fides reuocet, qua credimus deum non accusaturum aduersus electos suos et Christum non condemnaturum electos suos, potest illud sic pronuntiari: quis accusabit aduersus electos dei? ut hanc interrogationem quasi responsio subsequatur: deus, qui iustificat et item interrogetur: quis est, qui condemnet? et respondeatur: Christus Iesus, qui mortuus est. quod credere quia dementissimum est, ita pronuntiabitur, ut praecedat percontatio, sequatur interrogatio. inter percontationem autem et interrogationem hoc ueteres interesse dixerunt, quod ad percontationem multa responderi possunt, ad interrogationem uero aut "non" aut "etiam". pronuntiabitur ergo ita, ut post percontationem, qua dicimus: quis accusabit aduersus electos dei? illud quod sequitur sono interrogantis enuntietur: deus, qui iustificat? ut tacite respondeatur: "non" et item percontemur: quis, qui condemnat?
CCLXV. CONCERNING AMBIGUOUS PRONUNCIATIONS, HE SETS FORTH THE REASON FOR THE PASSAGE: WHO WILL BRING AN ACCUSATION AGAINST GOD'S ELECT? BOOK III WRITTEN ABOVE.
But whatever we have said concerning ambiguous distinctions must also be observed in ambiguous pronunciations. For these too, unless they are corrupted by the excessive carelessness of the reader, are either corrected by the rules of faith or by the context of the preceding or following speech; or, if neither of these is applied for correction, they will nonetheless remain doubtful, so that in whatever way the reader has pronounced it, he is not at fault. For unless faith recalls us, by which we believe that God will not bring an accusation against his elect and that Christ will not condemn his elect, that passage can be pronounced thus: Who will bring an accusation against God's elect? so that this question is followed, as it were, by the answer: God, who justifies. And likewise let it be asked: Who is it that condemns? and let the answer be: Christ Jesus, who died. Because it is utterly insane to believe this, it will be pronounced so that the inquiry comes first and the question follows. But between inquiry and question the ancients said there is this difference: that to an inquiry many things can be answered, but to a question only "no" or "yes." Therefore it will be pronounced thus, that after the inquiry by which we say: Who will bring an accusation against God's elect? what follows is uttered with the tone of one asking: God, who justifies? so that "no" is silently answered; and likewise let us inquire: Who is it that condemns?
rursusque interrogemus: Christus Iesus, qui mortuus est, magis autem, qui resurrexit, qui est in dextera dei et qui interpellat pro nobis? ut ubique tacite respondeatur: "non". at uero illo in loco, ubi ait: quid ergo dicemus? quia gentes, quae non sectabantur iustitiam, apprehenderunt iustitiam, nisi post percontationem, qua dictum est: quid ergo dicemus? responsio subiciatur: quia gentes, quae non sectabantur iustitiam, apprehenderunt iustitiam, textus consequens non cohaerebit. qualibet autem uoce pronuntietur illud quod Natauahel dixit: a Nazareth potest aliquid boni esse, sine affirmantis, ut illud solum ad interrogationem pertineat, quod ait: a Nazareth, sine totum cum interrogatione dubitantis, non uideo, quomodo discernatur; uterque autem sensus fidem non impedit. est etiam ambiguitas in sono dubio syllabarum, et haec utique ad pronuntiationem pertinens. nam quod scriptum est: non est absconditum a te os meum, quod fecisti in abscondito, non elucet legenti, utrum correpta littera os pronuntiet an producta. si enim corripiat, ab eo quod sunt ossa, si autem producat, ab eo quod sunt ora intellegitur numerus singularis. sed talia linguae praecedentis inspectione diiudicantur; nam in graeco non ax'fxa, sed daxovv positum est. unde plerumque loquendi consuetudo uulgaris utilior est significandis rebus quam integritas litterata.
And again let us ask: Is it Christ Jesus, who died, yes rather, who rose again, who is at the right hand of God, who also intercedes for us? So that everywhere the silent answer may be: "No." But in that place where it says: What then shall we say? That the Gentiles, who did not pursue righteousness, have attained righteousness—unless after the question, where it is said, What then shall we say? the answer be subjoined: That the Gentiles, who did not pursue righteousness, have attained righteousness—the following text will not cohere. But in whatever tone that saying of Nathanael is pronounced: Can anything good come from Nazareth?—whether as one affirming, so that only the words "from Nazareth" pertain to the question, or the whole with the questioning of one who doubts—I do not see how it can be distinguished; yet either sense does not hinder the faith. There is also ambiguity in the doubtful sound of syllables, and this too pertains to pronunciation. For what is written: My bone is not hidden from you, which you made in secret—it does not appear to the reader whether "bone" is pronounced with a short letter or a long one. For if he shortens it, it is understood as the singular number from that which is "bones"; but if he lengthens it, from that which is "mouths." But such things are judged by inspection of the preceding language; for in Greek it is not os but osteon that is set down. Whence for the most part the common habit of vulgar speech is more useful for signifying things than learned correctness.
mallem quippe cum barbarismo dici: non est absconditum a te ossum meum, quam ideo esset minus apertum, quia magis latinum est. sed aliquando dubius syllabae sonus etiam uicino uerbo ad eandem sententiam pertinente diiudicatur; sicuti est illud apostoli: quae praedico uobis, sicut praedixi, quoniam qui talia agunt regnum dei non possidebunt. si tantummodo dixisset: quae praedico uobis, neque subiunxisset: sicut praedixi, non nisi ad codicem praecedentis linguae recurrendum esset, ut cognosceremus, utrum in eo quod dixit: praedico producenda an corripienda esset syllaba media. nunc autem manifestum est producendam esse. non enim ait: sicut praedicaui, sed: sicut praedixi.
Non solum autem istae sed etiam illae ambiguitates, quae non ad distinctionem uel ad pronuntiationem pertinent, similiter considerandae sunt. qualis illa est ad Thessalonicenses: propterea consolati sumus fratres in uobis. dubium enim, utrum "o fratres" an "hos fratres". neutrum autem horum eat contra fidem; sed graeca lingua hos casus pares non habet et ideo illa inspecta renuntiatur uocatiuus, id est "o fratres", quod si uoluisset interpres dicere: "propterea consolationem habuimus fratres, in uobis", minus seruitum esset uerbis, sed minus de sententia dubitaretur, aut certe adderetur: "nostri".
For I would rather have it said with a barbarism, "My bone is not hidden from you," than that it should be less clear for the reason that it is more Latin. But sometimes a doubtful sound of a syllable is also resolved by a neighboring word pertaining to the same meaning; such is that passage of the apostle: "which I foretell to you, as I foretold, that those who do such things will not possess the kingdom of God." If he had only said, "which I foretell to you," and had not added, "as I foretold," one would have had to have recourse only to the codex of the preceding language, to know whether in what he said, "I foretell," the middle syllable should be lengthened or shortened. But now it is manifest that it is to be lengthened. For he did not say, "as I have foretold," but "as I foretold."
But not only these ambiguities, but also those which pertain neither to punctuation nor to pronunciation, are to be considered in like manner. Such is that one to the Thessalonians: "therefore we were comforted, brothers, in you." For it is doubtful whether it is "O brothers" or "these brothers." But neither of these is against the faith; but the Greek language does not have these cases alike, and therefore, when that is inspected, it is reported as the vocative, that is, "O brothers." But if the translator had wished to say, "therefore we had consolation, brothers, in you," he would have served the words less, but there would be less doubt about the meaning, or certainly "our" would be added.
nemo enim fere ambigeret uocatiuum casum esse, cum audiret: propterea consolati sumus, fratres nostri, in uobis; sed iam hoc periculosius permittitur. ita factum est in illa ad Corinthios, cum ait apostolus: cotidie morior per uestram gloriam, fratres, quam habeo in Christo Iesu, ait enim quidam interpres: cotidie morior per uestram iuro gloriam, quia in graeco uox iurantis manifesta est sine ambiguo sono. rarissime igitur et difficillime inueniri potest ambiguitas in propriis uerbis, quantum ad libros diuinarum scripturarum spectat, quam non aut circumstantia ipsa sermonis, qua cognoscitur scriptorum intentio, aut interpretum collatio aut praecedentis linguae soluat inspectio.
CCLXVL DE AMBIQVITATIBV VERBORVM TBANSLATOBVM, IN QVIBVS CAVENDVM PRAEMONET, NE FIGVRATA LOCVTIO AD LITTERAM ACCIPIATVB. EX LLBBO ITEM IIL
Sed uerborum translatorum ambiguitates, de quibus deinceps loquendum est, non mediocrem curam industriamque desiderant. nam in principio eauendum est, ne figuratam locutionem ad litteram accipias. et ad hoc enim pertinet quod ait apostolus: littera occidit, spiritus autem uiuificat. cum enim figurate dictum sic accipitur. tamquam proprie dictum sit, carnaliter sapitur, neque ulla mors animae congruentius appellatur, quam cum id etiam quod in ea bestiis antecellit, hoc est intellegentia, carni subicitur sequendo litteram. qui enim sequitur litteram, translata uerba.
For hardly anyone would doubt that it is the vocative case when he heard: "For this reason we have been comforted, our brothers, in you"; but now this is allowed too dangerously. Thus it happened in the letter to the Corinthians, when the apostle says: "Daily I die through your glory, brothers, which I have in Christ Jesus." For a certain translator said: "Daily I die through your glory, I swear," because in Greek the word of one swearing is manifest without ambiguous sound. Therefore very rarely and with the greatest difficulty can ambiguity be found in proper words, as far as the books of the divine Scriptures are concerned, which is not resolved either by the very context of the discourse, by which the intention of the writers is recognized, or by the comparison of translators, or by the inspection of the preceding language.
CCLXVL CONCERNING THE AMBIGUITIES OF TRANSLATED WORDS, IN WHICH HE WARNS BEFOREHAND THAT ONE MUST BE ON GUARD LEST A FIGURATIVE EXPRESSION BE TAKEN LITERALLY. FROM THE SAME BOOK III
But the ambiguities of translated words, of which we must speak next, require no small care and diligence. For in the beginning one must be on guard lest you take a figurative expression literally. And to this pertains what the apostle says: "The letter kills, but the spirit gives life." For when what is said figuratively is thus taken as though it were said properly, it is understood carnally, and no death of the soul is more fittingly called than when even that which excels the beasts in it, that is, the intelligence, is subjected to the flesh by following the letter. For he who follows the letter, [follows] translated words.
sicut propria tenet neque illud quod proprio uerbo significatur refert ad aliam significationem, sed si sabbatum audierit uerbi gratia, non intellegit nisi unum diem de septem, qui Continuo uolumine repetuntur, et cum (audierit sacrificium, non excedit cogitatione illud quod fleri de uictimis pecorum terrenisque fructibus solet. ea demum est miserabilis animae seruitus, Signa pro rebus accipere et supra creaturam corpoream oculum mentis ad hauriendum aeternum lumen leuare non posse.
Quae tamen seruitus in ludaeo populo longe a ceterarum gentium more distabat, quando quidem rebus temporalibus ita subiugati erant. ut unus in eis omnibus commendaretur deus. et quamquam signa rerum spiritalium pro ipsis rebus obseruarent, nescientes quo referrentur, id tamen insitum habebant, quod tali seruitute uni omnium quem non uidebant placerent deo; quam custodiam tamquam sub paedagogo paruulorum fuisse scribit apostolus. et ideo qui talibus signis pertinaciter inhaeserunt, contemnentem ista deum, cum iam tempus reuelationis eorum uenisset, ferre non potuerunt atque inde calumnias, quod sabbato curaret, moliti sunt principes eorum, populusque signis illis tamquam rebus astrictus non credebat deum esse uel a deo uenisse, quia ea sicut Iudaeis obseruabantur nollet attendere.
just as it holds its own proper meanings, and does not refer what is signified by a proper word to another meaning; but if it hears "sabbath," for example, it understands nothing other than one day out of seven, which are repeated in a continuous cycle, and when it hears "sacrifice," it does not go beyond the thought of that which is customarily done with the victims of flocks and earthly fruits. This, then, is the miserable slavery of the soul: to take signs for the things themselves, and to be unable to lift the eye of the mind above corporeal creation to drink in the eternal light.
Yet this slavery in the Jewish people was far different from the custom of the other nations, since they were so subjected to temporal things that in all of them one God might be commended, and although they observed the signs of spiritual things in place of the things themselves, not knowing to what they referred, they nevertheless had this implanted in them: that by such slavery they might please the one God of all, whom they did not see; the apostle writes that this guardianship was like that of a tutor over little children. And therefore those who stubbornly clung to such signs could not endure God's contempt for them when the time of their revelation had now come, and from this the leaders of the Jews contrived accusations, because he healed on the sabbath, and the people, bound to those signs as though to the things themselves, did not believe that he was God or that he had come from God, because he was unwilling to observe them as the Jews observed them.
sed qui crediderant, ex quibus facta est prima ecclesia Hierosolymitana, satis ostenderunt, quanta utilitas fuerit eo modo sub paedagogo custodiri, ut signa, quae temporaliter imposita erant seruientibus, ad unius dei cultum, qui fecit caelum et terram, opinionem obseruantium religarent.
CCLXVII. HVNC MODVM PRAEFIGIT INVENIENDAE LOCVTIONIS, PROPRIANE AN FIGVRATA SIT, VT QVIDQVID IN SCRIPTVRIS EX PERSONA DEI VEL SANCTORVM SAEVVM AVT FLAGITIOSVM IMPERITIS VIDETVR, SALVBRITER FIGVRATVM INTELLEGANT. EX EODEM LIBRO m.
Demonstrandus est igitur prius modus inueniendae locuti onis, propriane an figurata sit. et iste omnino modus est, ut quidquid in sermone diuino neque ad morum honestatem neque ad fidei ueritatem proprie referri potest figuratum esse cognoscas. morum honestas ad diligendum deum et proximum, fidei ueritas ad cognoscendum deum pertinet. spes autem cuique sua est in conscientia propria, quemadmodum se sentit ad dilectionem dei et proximi cognitionemque proficere. de quibus omnibus primo libro dictum est.
But those who believed, from whom the first church at Jerusalem was made, showed clearly enough how great a benefit it was to be kept in that manner under a pedagogue, so that the signs which had been imposed temporally upon those who served might bind the opinion of the observers to the worship of the one God, who made heaven and earth.
267. HE PREFIGURES THIS METHOD OF DISCOVERING WHETHER AN EXPRESSION IS PROPER OR FIGURATIVE, SO THAT WHATEVER IN THE SCRIPTURES, SPOKEN IN THE PERSON OF GOD OR OF THE SAINTS, SEEMS TO THE UNLEARNED TO BE SAVAGE OR OUTRAGEOUS, THEY MAY UNDERSTAND TO BE SALUTARILY FIGURATIVE. FROM THE SAME BOOK.
Therefore the method of discovering whether an expression is proper or figurative must first be demonstrated. And this is the method altogether: that whatever in the divine discourse can be referred properly neither to the honesty of morals nor to the truth of faith, you should recognize to be figurative. The honesty of morals pertains to loving God and neighbor; the truth of faith pertains to knowing God. But each person's hope is in his own conscience, according as he perceives himself to be advancing toward the love of God and the knowledge of neighbor. Concerning all these things it was spoken in the first book.
sed quoniam procliue est humanum genus non ex momentis ipsius libidinis, sed potius suae consuetudinis aestimare peccata, fit plerumque, ut quisque hominum ea tantum culpanda arbitretur, quae suae regionis et temporis homines uituperare atque damnare consueuerunt, et ea tantum probanda atque laudanda, quae consuetudo eorum cum quibus uiuit admittit, eoque contingit, ut, si quid scriptura uel praeceperit quod abhorreret a consuetudine audientium uel quod non abhorreret culpauerit, si animum eorum iam uerbi uinxit auctoritas, figuratam locutionem putent. non autem praecipit scriptura nisi caritatem nec culpat nisi cupiditatem et eo modo informat mores hominum. item si animum praeoccupauit alicuius erroris opinio, quidquid aliter asseruerit scriptura, figuratum homines arbitrentur. non autem asserit nisi catholicam fidem rebus praeteritis et futuris et praesentibus: praeteritorum narratio est, futurorum praenuntiatio, praesentium demonstratio. sed omnia haec ad eandem caritatem nutriendam atque roborandam et cupiditatem uincendam atque extinguendam ualent. caritatem uoco motum animi ad fruendum deum propter ipsum et se atque proximum propter deum; cupiditatem autem motum animi ad fruendum se et proximo et quolibet corpore non propter deum.
But since it is easy for the human race to estimate sins not by the impulses of their own desire but rather by their own custom, it commonly happens that each person thinks only those things are to be blamed which the people of his own region and time have been accustomed to censure and condemn, and thinks only those things are to be approved and praised which the custom of those among whom he lives allows. And thus it happens that if Scripture has commanded something that would be abhorrent to the custom of its hearers, or has blamed something that would not be abhorrent, if the authority of the word has already bound their mind, they think it is a figurative expression. But Scripture commands nothing except love, and blames nothing except cupidity, and in that way it shapes the conduct of men. Likewise, if the opinion of some error has preoccupied a person's mind, whatever Scripture asserts otherwise, men think is figurative. But it asserts nothing except the catholic faith concerning things past, future, and present: the narration of past things, the foretelling of future things, the demonstration of present things. But all these things are of value for nourishing and strengthening that same love and for conquering and extinguishing cupidity. I call love a movement of the mind to enjoy God for His own sake and oneself and one's neighbor for God's sake; but cupidity is a movement of the mind to enjoy oneself and one's neighbor and any body whatever not for God's sake.
quod autem agit indomita cupiditas ad corrumpendum animum et corpus suum, flagitium uocatur; quod autem agit, ut alteri noceat, facinus dicitur. et haec sunt duo genera omnium peccatorum, sed flagitia priora sunt. quae cum exinaniuerint animum et ad quandam egestatem perduxerint, in facinora prosilitur, quibus remoueantur impedimenta flagitiorum ant adiumenta quaerantur. item quod agit caritas quo sibi prosit, utilitas est; quod autem agit, ut prosit proximo, beneficientia nominatur. et hic praecedit utilitas, quia nemo potest ex eo quod non habet prodesse alteri. quanto autem magis regnum cupiditatis destruitur, tanto caritatis augetur.
Quidquid ergo asperum et quasi saeuum factu dictuque in sanctis scripturis legitur ex persona dei uel sanctorum eius, ad cupiditatis regnum destruendum ualet. quod si perspicue sonat, non est ad aliud referendum, quasi figurate dictum sit. sicuti est apostoli: thesaurizas tibi iram in die irae et reuelationis iusti iudicii dei, qui reddet . unicuique secundum opera sua: his quidem qui secundum sustinentiam boni operis gloriam et honorem et incorruptionem quaerentibus uitam aeternam; his autem qui ex contentione sunt et diffidunt ueritati, credunt autem iniquitati, ira et indignatio. tribulatio et angustia in omnem animam hominis operantis malum, Iudaei primum et Graeci.
But what untamed desire does to corrupt one's own mind and body is called disgraceful conduct; but what it does to harm another is called a crime. And these are the two kinds of all sins, but disgraceful conduct comes first. When these have emptied the mind and brought it to a certain destitution, there is a leaping forth into crimes, by which either the hindrances to disgraceful conduct may be removed or its aids sought. Likewise, what love does for its own benefit is advantage; but what it does to benefit a neighbor is called beneficence. And here advantage comes first, because no one can benefit another from what he does not have. But the more the kingdom of desire is destroyed, the more that of love is increased.
Therefore, whatever is read in the holy Scriptures as harsh and, as it were, savage in deed or word, from the person of God or of his saints, is of value for destroying the kingdom of desire. But if it sounds plainly, it is not to be referred to anything else, as though it were said figuratively. As is that of the apostle: You treasure up for yourself wrath on the day of wrath and of the revelation of the just judgment of God, who will render to each one according to his works: to those who by endurance in good work seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life; but to those who are of contention and do not believe the truth, but believe iniquity, wrath and indignation. Tribulation and distress upon every soul of man who does evil, of the Jew first and also of the Greek.
sed hoc ad eos, cum quibus euertitur ipsa cupiditas, qui eam uincere noluerunt. cum autem in homine, cui dominabantur, regna cupiditatis subuertuntur, illa est aperta locutio: qui autem Iesu Christi sunt, carnem suam crucifixerunt cum passionibus et concupiscentiis, nisi quia et hic quaedam uerba translata tractantur, sicuti est ira dei et crucifixerunt; sed non tam multa sunt uel ita posita, ut obtegant sensum et allegoriam uel aenigma faciant, quam proprie figuratam locutionem uoco. quod autem Hieremiae dicitur: ecce constitui te hodie super gentes et regna, ut euellas et destruas et disperdas et dissipes, non dubium, quin figurata locutio tota sit ad eum finem referenda, quem diximus.
Quae autem quasi flagitiosa imperitis uidentur, siue tantum dicta siue etiam facta sunt uel ex dei persona uel ei hominum, quorum nobis sanctitas commendatur, tota figurata sunt, quorum ad caritatis pastum enucleanda secreta sunt. quisquis autem rebus praetereuntibus restrictius utitur, quam sese habent mores eorum cum quibus uiuit, aut intemperans aut superstitiosus est. quisquis uero sic eis utitur, ut metas consuetudinis bonorum, inter quos uersatur, excedat, aut aliquid significat aut flagitiosus est. in omnibus enim talibus non usus rerum, sed libido utentis in culpa est.
But this applies to those with whom that desire itself is overthrown, who were unwilling to conquer it. When, however, the kingdoms of desire are overthrown in the man whom they were dominating, that is plain speech: "But those who are of Jesus Christ have crucified their flesh with its passions and desires"—except that here too certain transferred words are handled, such as "the wrath of God" and "they have crucified"; but they are not so many or so placed as to obscure the sense and make an allegory or a riddle, which I call properly a figurative expression. But what is said to Jeremiah, "Behold, I have set you this day over nations and kingdoms, to root up and destroy and scatter and pull down," there is no doubt that the whole is a figurative expression to be referred to that end which we have mentioned.
But the things that seem to the unskilled to be, as it were, disgraceful, whether only said or also done, either from the person of God or from that of men whose holiness is commended to us, are all figurative, and their secrets are to be extracted for the nourishment of love. But whoever uses passing things more restrictedly than the customs of those with whom he lives require is either intemperate or superstitious. But whoever uses them in such a way as to exceed the bounds of the custom of the good among whom he moves either signifies something or is disgraceful. For in all such things the fault lies not in the use of things but in the lust of the user.
neque ullo modo quisquam sobrius crediderit domini pedes ita ungento pretioso a muliere perfusos, ut luxuriosorum et nequam hominum solent, quorum talia conuiuia detestamur. odor enim bonus fama bona est, quam quisque bonae uitae operibus habuerit, dum uestigia Christi sequitur, quasi pedes eius pretiosissimo odore perfundit. ita quod in aliis personis plerumque flagitium est, in diuina uel prophetica persona magnae cuiusdam rei signum est alia est quippe in perditis moribus, alia in Osee prophetae uaticinatione coniunctio meretricis, nec si flagitiose in conuiuiis temulentorum et lasciuorum nudantur corpora, propterea in balneo nudum esse flagitium est.
CCLXVIII. DE SENTENTIA GENERALIS IVSTITIAE: QVOD TIBI FIEBI KON VIS, ALII NE FECERIS. EX EODEM LIBRO III.
Varietate innumerabilium consuetudinum commoti quidam dormientes, ut ita dicam, qui neque alto somno stultitiae sopiebantur nec in sapientiae luce poterant euigilare, putauerunt nullam esse iustitiam per se ipsam, sed unicuique genti consuetudinem suam iustam uideri. quae cum sit diuersa omnibus gentibus, debeat autem incommutabilis manere iustitia, fieri manifestum nullam usquam esse iustitiam. non intellexerunt, ne multa commemorem, quod tibi fieri non uis, alii ne feceris, nullo modo posse ulla eorum gentili diuersitate uariari.
Nor would any sober person ever believe that the Lord's feet were so anointed with precious ointment by a woman as those of luxurious and wicked men usually are, whose banquets of that kind we detest. For the good odor is a good reputation, which each person has by the works of a good life, and while he follows in the footsteps of Christ, he pours, as it were, a most precious fragrance upon his feet. Thus what in other persons is for the most part a disgrace, in a divine or prophetic person is the sign of some great matter. For the joining with a harlot is one thing in depraved morals, and another in the prophecy of Hosea; nor, if bodies are shamefully uncovered at the banquets of drunkards and wanton persons, is it for that reason a disgrace to be naked in a bath.
268. ON THE SENTENCE OF GENERAL JUSTICE: WHAT YOU DO NOT WISH TO BE DONE TO YOU, DO NOT DO TO ANOTHER. FROM THE SAME BOOK III.
Moved by the variety of countless customs, certain persons, as it were asleep—who were neither lulled by the deep sleep of folly nor able to awake in the light of wisdom—thought that there was no justice in itself, but that to each nation its own custom seemed just. Since this is different among all nations, while justice ought to remain unchangeable, it would be made manifest that there is no justice anywhere. They did not understand—not to mention many things—that "what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another" can in no way be varied by any diversity among their nations.
quae sententia cum refertur ad dilectionem dei, omnia flagitia moriuntur, cum ad proximi, omnia facinora. nemo enim uult corrumpi habitaculum suum: non ergo debet corrumpere habitaculum dei, se ipsum scilicet. et nemo uult sibi a quoquam noceri: nec ipse igitur cuiquam nocuerit.
Sic euersa tyrannide cupiditatis caritas regnat iustissimis legibus dilectionis dei propter deum, sui et proximi propter deum.
CCLXVIII. ITEM DE PIGVRATIS LOCVTIONIBVS NON INTELLECTIS TAMDIV VERSANDIS, QVAMDIV AD REGNVM CARITATIS INTERPRETATIO PERDVCATVB. ITEM EX EODEM TERTIO LIBRO.
Seruabitur ergo in locutionibus figuratis regula huius modi, ut tamdiu uersetur diligenti consideratione quod legitur, donec ad regnum caritatis interpretatio perducatur, si autem iam hoc proprie sonat, nulla putetur figurata locutio.
Si praeceptiua locutio est aut flagitium aut facinus uetans aut utilitatem aut beneficientiam iubens, non est figurata. si autem flagitium aut facinus uidetur iubere aut utilitatem et beneficientiam uetare, figurata est. nisi manducaueritis, inquit, carnem filii hominis et sanguinem biberitis, non habebitis uitam in uobis, facinus uel flagitium uidetur iubere: figura ergo est, praecipiens passioni dominicae esse communicandum et suauiter atque utiliter recondendum in memoria, quod pro nobis caro eius crucifixa et uulnerata sit.
When this principle is referred to the love of God, all shameful deeds die; when to the love of neighbor, all crimes. For no one wishes his own dwelling to be corrupted; therefore he ought not to corrupt the dwelling of God, namely himself. And no one wishes to be harmed by anyone; therefore let him not harm anyone himself.
Thus, with the tyranny of cupidity overthrown, charity reigns by the most just laws of love: of God on account of God, and of oneself and of neighbor on account of God.
CCLXVIII. Likewise, concerning figurative expressions that are not understood, they are to be pondered as long as the interpretation leads to the kingdom of charity. Likewise from the same third book.
Therefore, in figurative expressions, a rule of this kind will be preserved: that what is read be pondered with diligent consideration for as long as the interpretation is brought to the kingdom of charity. But if it already sounds proper in this way, let it not be thought to be a figurative expression.
If the expression is preceptive, either forbidding a shameful deed or a crime, or commanding a useful act or a beneficence, it is not figurative. But if it seems to command a shameful deed or a crime, or to forbid a useful act and a beneficence, it is figurative. Unless you eat, he says, the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you will not have life in you, it seems to command a crime or a shameful deed; therefore it is a figure, commanding that we be made partakers of the Lord's passion and that we sweetly and usefully store in memory that his flesh was crucified and wounded for us.