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In Categorias Aristotelis Libri Quatuor

Boethius. Severinus · ogl-pl

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tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:1 · narrative
Source · Latin

AN. MANL. SEV. BOETH IN CATEGORIAS ARISTOTELIS LIBRI QUATUOR.

LIBER PRIMUS.

Expeditis his quae ad praedicamenla Aristotelis Porphyrii institutione digesta sunt,hos quoque commentarios in prasdicamenta perscribens mediocris styli seriem persecutus, nihil de altiorum quaestionum tractationepermiscui,seddilucidandi moderatione servata, nec angere lectorem brevitate volui, nec dilatatione confundere. Quare prius breviter hujus operis aperiendavideturintentio, quae est hu. jusmodi: Rebus praejacentibus, et in propria principaliter naturae constitutione manentibus,humanum solum genus exstitit, quod rebus nomina posset imponere. Unde factum est ut sigillatim omnia prosecutus hominis animis singulis vocabula rebus aptaret. Et hoc quidem, verbi gratia, corpus, hominem vocavit,iJlud vero, lapidem,aliud lignum,aliudvero colorem. Et rursus quicunque ea se alium genuisset, pars vocabulo nuncupavit. Mensuram quoque magnitudinis proprii forma nominis terminavit,ut diceret bipedale esse, aut tripedale, et in aliis eodem modo.Omnibus ergo nominibus ordinatis,ad ipsorum rursus vocabulorum proprietates figurasque reversus est, et hujusmodi vocabuli formam, quae inflecti casibus possit, nomen vocavit; qua? vero temporibus distribui, verbum. Prima igitur illa fuit nominum positio,per quam vel intellectui subjecta vel sensibus designaret.

English

THE FOUR BOOKS OF ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS ON THE CATEGORIES OF ARISTOTLE.

BOOK ONE.

Now that those matters which were set forth in Porphyry's introduction to Aristotle's Predicaments have been dealt with, I too, in writing out these commentaries on the Predicaments, have followed a course of modest style, and have mixed in nothing of the treatment of loftier questions, but, preserving a moderation that aims at clarity, I have wished neither to vex the reader by brevity nor to confound him by expansion. Wherefore it seems that the intent of this work should first be briefly set out, which is as follows: With things lying before us and remaining principally in the constitution of their own nature, the human race alone came into being, which could impose names upon things. Hence it came about that, having gone through all things one by one, man fitted individual words to individual things in the minds of men. And this, for example, he called body, that man, another stone, another wood, and another color. And again, whatever had begotten these as another kind, he named by the word part. He also bounded the measure of magnitude by the form of its own name, so as to say that it is two feet long or three feet long, and in the same way in other cases. When, therefore, all names had been ordered, he turned again to the properties and figures of the words themselves, and he called that form of a word which can be inflected by cases a noun; but that which is distributed by tenses, a verb. That, then, was the first imposition of names, through which he designated either things subject to the intellect or things subject to the senses.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:2 · narrative
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Secunda consideralio, qua singulas proprietates nominum figurasque perspicerent,ita ut primum nomen sit ipsum rei vocabulum: ut, verbi gratia, cum quaelibet res homo dicatur. Quod autem ipsum vocabulum, id est homo, nomen vocatur,non ad significationem nominis ipsius refertur, sed ad figuram, idcirco quod possit casibus inflecti. Ergo prima positio nominis secundum significationem vocabuli facta est, secunda vero secundum figuram: et est prima positio, ut nomina rebus imponerentur, secunda vero ut aliis nominibus ipsa nomina designarentur.Nam cum homo vocabulumsitsubjectaesubstant-iae, id quod dicitur homo, nomen est bominis, quod ipsius nominis appellatio est. Dicimus enim, Qnale vocabulum est homo?et proprie respondetur, nomen. In hoc igitur opere hæc intentio est, de primis rerum nominibus, et devocibus res significantibus disputare, non in eo quod secundum aliquam proprietatem figuramque formantur, sed in eo quod significantes sunt. Nam quodcunque de substantia vel facere vel pati dicitur, non ita tractatur, quasi unum eorum casibus inflectipOBsit, aliud vero temparibus permutari, sed quasi aut hominem, aut equum,autindividuum aliquod,aut,speciem genusve significet.Estigitur hujus operis intentio de vocibus ressignificantibus,ineo quod significantes sunt pertractare.

English

The second consideration is that by which they discern the individual properties and forms of names, such that the first name is the very word for a thing: for example, when any thing whatsoever is called man. But that the very word itself, that is man, is called a name, is not referred to the signification of the name itself, but to its form, for the reason that it can be inflected by cases. Therefore the first positing of a name was made according to the signification of the word, but the second according to its form: and the first positing is that names be imposed on things, the second that names themselves be designated by other names. For since man is the word for an underlying substance, that which is called man is the name of man, which is the appellation of the name itself. For we say, Of what sort of word is man? and the proper answer is, A name. In this work, therefore, the intention is to dispute concerning the first names of things, and concerning the utterances that signify things, not insofar as they are formed according to some property and form, but insofar as they are significative. For whatever is said of substance, whether to do or to suffer, is not treated as though one of them could be inflected by cases, while another is changed by tenses, but as though it signifies either a man, or a horse, or some individual, or a species or a genus. The intention of this work, therefore, is to treat thoroughly of utterances that signify things, insofar as they are significative.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:3 · narrative
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Haec quidem est tempori introductionis, et simplicis expositionis apta sententia,quam nosnunc Porphyrium sequentes, quod videbatur expeditior esse planiorque digessimus.Est vero in mente deintentione, utilitate et ordine, tribus quaestionibus disputare,videlicetin alio commentario quem componere proposui de eisdem categoriis ad doctiores, quarum una est quid prædicamentorum velitintentio, ibique numeratis diversorum sententiis, docebimus cui nostrum quoque accedat arbitrium, quod nemo huic in praesentia sententiae repugnare miretur,cum videatquanto ilia sit altior cujus non nimium ingredientium mentes capaces esse potuissent,adquosmediocriter imbuendos ista conscripsimus. Afficiendi ergo,etquodam modo disponendi mediocri expositione aun in ipsi quasi disciplinae hujus forifcus,quos ad hanc paramus scientiam admittere.

English

This indeed is a suitable account for the time of introduction and for simple exposition, which we have now set out following Porphyry, since it seemed more expedient and clearer. But it is a matter of deeper intention, utility, and order to dispute three questions—namely, in another commentary that I have proposed to compose on the same Categories, for the more learned. One of these is what the intention of the predicaments wants; and there, having enumerated the opinions of various thinkers, we shall teach which judgment our own also accedes to. No one should wonder that this conflicts with the present account, since he sees how much loftier that one is, whose depths the minds of those entering upon it could not have sufficiently grasped—those whom we have written these things to imbue in a moderate way. Therefore, they are to be affected and in a certain manner disposed by a moderate exposition, so that they may be admitted, as it were, into the very forum of this discipline, whom we are preparing for this knowledge.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:4 · narrative
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Hanc igitur causammutatae sententiae utriusque operis lector agnoscat, quod illic ad scientiam Pythagoricam perfectamque doctrinam,hic ad simplices introducendorum motus expositionis sit accommodata sententia;sed nunc ad propositum revertamur, sitque in praesens praedicamentorum intentio, quae superius est comprehensa, id est,de primis vocibus significantibus prima rerum genera, in eo quod significantes sunt disputare: et quoniam res infinitae sunt, infinitas quoque voces, quae significent eas esse necesseest: sed infinitorum nulla cognitio est,infinita namque; animo comprehendi nequeunt.Quod autem ratione mentis circumdari non potest, nullius scientiae fine concluditur, quare infinitorum scientia nulla est: sed hicAristotelas non de infinitis rerum significationibus tractat, sed decem praedicamenta constituens, ad quae ipsa infinita multitudo significantium vocum referri debeat, terminavit: ut, verbi gratia, cum dico homo, lignum, lapis, equus, animal, plumbum,stannum, argentum, aurum, et alia hujusmodi quae nimirum infinitum sunt,haec omnia ad unum substantiæ vocabulum deducantur.Hæc namque, etsi qua sunt alia quae certae sunt infinita vocabula unum substantiae nomen includit.Rursus cum dico bipedale,tripedale, sex, quatuor, decem, lineam superficiem, solid itatem, et quæcunque alia ex eodem genere quae iniinita sunt, uno quantitas nomine continentur, ut haec omnia sub

English

Let the reader therefore recognize this cause of the changed intention in each work: that in the one, the exposition is accommodated to Pythagorean knowledge and perfect doctrine, while in the other, to the simple motions of those being introduced. But now let us return to the proposed subject, and let the intention of the Categories for the present be what was comprehended above, namely, to dispute concerning first words signifying the first genera of things, insofar as they are signifying. And since things are infinite, the words that signify them must also be infinite. But of infinite things there is no knowledge, for infinite things cannot be comprehended by the mind. Moreover, what cannot be encompassed by the reasoning of the mind is concluded by the boundary of no science; wherefore there is no knowledge of infinite things. But here Aristotle does not treat of the infinite significations of things, but, establishing the ten categories, he has bounded them, to which that infinite multitude of signifying words ought to be referred. So that, for example, when I say man, wood, stone, horse, animal, lead, tin, silver, gold, and other things of this kind, which are undoubtedly infinite, all these are brought down to the one word substance. For these, and whatever other words there are that are certainly infinite, the one name of substance includes. Again, when I say two-footed, three-footed, six, four, ten, line, surface, solidity, and whatever other things from the same genus that are infinite, they are contained by the one name of quantity, so that all these under

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:5 · narrative
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quantitate ponantur. Rursus cum dico album, vel scientiam, vel bonum, vel malum, vel alia hujusmodi, quaeque in hoc quoque genere infinlta sunt,unum tamen nomen concludens omnia qualitatis occurrit,et de aliis quoque similiter.Rerum ergo diversarum indeterminatam infinitamque multitudinem,decem prædicamentorum paucissima numerositate concludit,ut ea quae infinita sub scientiam cadere non poterant,decem propriis generibus diffinita scientiae comprehensione claudantur.Ergo decem prædicamenta quae dicimus, infinitarum in vocibus significationum genera sunt, sed quoniam omnis vocum significatio de rebus est, quæ voce significantur in eo quod significantes sunt,genera rerum necessario significabunt.Utigiturconcludenda sit intentio, dicendum est in hoc libro de primis vocibus, prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod significantes sunt,dispositum esse tractatum. Sed quoniam de intentione dictum est, breviter hujus operis utilitas explicanda est.

English

are placed in quantity. Again, when I say white, or knowledge, or good, or evil, or other things of this sort, which in this genus too are infinite, one name nevertheless occurs that encloses all of quality, and similarly concerning other things. Therefore the indeterminate and infinite multitude of diverse things he confines within the smallest number of the ten predicaments, so that those things which, being infinite, could not fall under knowledge might be enclosed by the comprehension of knowledge, defined by ten proper genera. Therefore the ten predicaments which we speak of are the genera of infinite significations in words, but since every signification of words is about things, which are signified by a word insofar as they are signifying, they will necessarily signify the genera of things. Therefore, to conclude the intention, it must be said that in this book a treatise has been set out concerning primary words, which signify the primary genera of things insofar as they are signifying. But since the intention has been discussed, the usefulness of this work must briefly be explained.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:6 · narrative
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Nam cum res infinit-e inGnitis quoque vocibus significarentur,et (ut dictum est) sub scientiam venire non possent, hac definitione,qua decem prædicamentorum divisio facta est,cunctarum rerum et vocum significantium acquirimus disciplinam.Hinc est quod ad logicum tendentibus primus hic liber legendus occurrit,idcirco quod cum omnis logica syllogismorum ratione sit constituta syllogismi vero propositionibus jungantur, propositiones vero sermonibus constent, prima est utilitas quid quisque sermo significet,propriæ scientiae diffinitione cognoscere. Haec quoque nobis de decem prædicamentis inspectio,et in physica Aristotelis doctrina,et in moralis philosophiæ cognitione perutilis est,quod per singula currentibus magis liquebit. Quocirca de ordine quoque libri hujus eadem ratio est.Nam quoniam res simplices compositis natura priores sunt,quæ enim composita sunt,ex simplicibus componuntur. Hic quoniam de simplicibus vocibus res significentibus disputatur, secundum ipsius simplicitatis principalem naturam, primus hic Aristotelisliberinchoantibusaddiscitur.

English

For since things infinite were signified by infinite words as well, and (as has been said) could not come under knowledge, by this definition, by which the division of the ten categories was made, we acquire the understanding of all things and of the words that signify them. Hence it is that for those tending toward logic this book is the first to be read, for the reason that since all logic is constituted by the reasoning of syllogisms, and syllogisms are joined together from propositions, and propositions consist of words, it is of primary utility to know by the definition of its proper science what each word signifies. This inspection of the ten categories is also very useful to us both in Aristotle's physical doctrine and in the knowledge of moral philosophy, which will become clearer as we run through the individual points. Wherefore the same reasoning holds also concerning the order of this book. For since simple things are by nature prior to composite things — for composite things are composed of simple ones — and since here there is discussion of simple words signifying things, according to the principal nature of simplicity itself, this book of Aristotle is learned first by those beginning.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:7 · narrative
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Nec illud fere dubium est,ad quam partem pbilosophiae hujus libri ducatur intentio, idcirco quoniam qui de significativis vocibustractat,derebusquoque est aliquatenus tractaturus.Res etenim et rerum significatio juncta est, sed principalior erit illa disputatio quae de sermonibus est: secundo vero loco illa quæ de rerum ratione formatur. Quare quoniam omnis ars logica de oratione est,et in hoc opere de vocibus principaliter tractatur (quanquam enim sit hujus libri relatio ad caeteras quoque philosophiae partes) principaliter tamen refertur ad logicam,de cujus quodammodo simplicibus elementis,id est, de sermonibus in eo principaliter disputavi.Aristotelis vero neque ullius alterius liber est,idcirco quod in omni philosophia sibi ipse de hujus operis disputatione consentit,et brevitas ipsa atque subtilitas ab Aristotele non discrepat,alioqui interruptum imperfectumque opus edidissevidereturqui desyllogismis scriberet,si aut de propositionibus praetermisisset, aut de primis vocibus tractatum, quibus ipsae propositiones continentur,omitteret.Quanquam exstet alter Aristotelis liber de eisdem disputans, eadem fere continens, cum Sit oratione diversus; sed hic proprietatis liber calculum coepit.

English

Nor is it generally doubtful to which part of philosophy the intention of this book leads, since one who treats of significant words will also to some extent have to treat of things. For a thing and the signification of a thing are joined, but that disputation which concerns words will be more principal; in the second place, however, is that which is formed concerning the rational account of things. Wherefore, since every logical art concerns speech, and in this work there is principal treatment of words (for although this book has a relation to the other parts of philosophy as well), it is principally referred to logic, of whose, so to speak, simple elements—that is, of words—I have principally disputed in it. But the book is Aristotle's and no other's, for the reason that in all philosophy he is consistent with himself concerning the disputation of this work, and its very brevity and subtlety do not disagree with Aristotle; otherwise he would seem to have published an interrupted and imperfect work, who, writing about syllogisms, had either passed over propositions or omitted a treatment of the first words, by which the propositions themselves are contained. Although there exists another book of Aristotle disputing about the same matters, containing nearly the same things, though different in style; but this book began the reckoning of its own peculiar character.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:8 · narrative
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Archites etiam d']oscomposuit libros quos inscripsit, quorum in primo haec decem praedicamenta disposuit.Unde posteriores quidam non esse Aristotelem hujus divisionis inventorem suspicati sunt,quod Pythagoricus vir eadem conscripsisset, in qua sententia Jamblicus philosophus est non ignobilis,cui non consentit Themistius,neque concediteum fuisse Architem,qui Pythagoricus Tarentinusque esset,quique cum Platone aliquantulum vixisset, sed peripateticum aliquem Architem,qui novo operi auctoritatemvetustate nominis conderet,sed de bisalias. Restatinscriptio quaevariafuit. Inscripsere namque - *x alii de rebus, alii de generibus rerum, quos eadem similisque culpa confudit. Namque (ut docuimus) non de rerum generibus,neque de rebus, sed de ser.

English

Archytas also composed books on the subject, to which he gave the title, and in the first of these he set out these ten categories. Hence certain later thinkers suspected that Aristotle was not the inventor of this division, because a Pythagorean man had written on the same subjects. In this opinion Jamblichus, a philosopher not undistinguished, stands, with whom Themistius does not agree, nor does he concede that it was that Archytas who was a Pythagorean and a Tarentine, and who had lived for some little time with Plato, but rather a certain Peripatetic Archytas, who sought to lend authority to a new work by the antiquity of the name. But of these matters elsewhere. There remains the title, which was varied. For some entitled it On Things, others On the Genera of Things, whom the same or a similar fault of confusion misled. For (as we have taught) it is not about the genera of things, nor about things, but about meanings.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:9 · narrative
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monibus rerum genera significantibus in hoc opere tractatus habetur, hoc vero Aristoteles ipse declarat cum dicit: Eorum quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur, singulum aut substantiam significat,aut quantitatem.Quod si de rebus divisionem faceret,non dixisset significat; res enim significatur, non ipsa significat.IIlud quoque maximo argumento est Aristotelem non de rebus, sed de sermonibus res significantibus speculari,quod ait: Singulum igitur eorum que dicta sunt,ipsum quidem secundum se in nulla affirmatione dicitur,horum antem ad seinvicem complexione affirmatio fit.Resenim sijungantur,affirmationem nullo modo perficiunt,affirmatio namque in oratione est.Quocirca si prædicamenta juncta faciunt affirmationem (affirmatiovero non nisi in oratione est,quae autem junguntur ut affirmatio fiat,hae suntrerumsignificantesvoces)praedicamentorumtractatus non de rebus,sed de vocibus est;male igitur vel de rebus vel rerum generibus inscripserunt.Annotant alii bunc librum legendum ante Topica,quod nimis absurdum est. Cur enim non magis ante Physica? quasi vero minor hujus sit libri usus in Physicis, cum primi ReHulotorii ante Topica!egantur,etante primos ResuloLorios Perihermenias liber ad cognitionem veniatinchoantis,curnon magis hunc librum vel ante Perihermenias,vel ante Resolutorios inscripserunt?

English

In this work the treatment concerns the genera of things that signify, and Aristotle himself declares this when he says: "Of those things which are said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity." But if he were making a division concerning things, he would not have said "signifies"; for a thing is signified, it does not itself signify. That too is the greatest argument that Aristotle is examining not things but words that signify things, which he says: "Each therefore of those things which have been said, is indeed said in itself in no affirmation, but from the combination of these with one another an affirmation comes about." For things, if they are joined, in no way complete an affirmation, for an affirmation is in speech. Wherefore if the categories joined make an affirmation (but an affirmation is only in speech, and those things which are joined so that an affirmation may come about are words signifying things), the treatment of the categories is not concerning things but concerning words; therefore they have wrongly entitled it either concerning things or concerning the genera of things. Others note that this book should be read before the Topics, which is excessively absurd. For why not rather before the Physics? As if indeed the use of this book in the Physics were less, when the first Analytics are read before the Topics, and before the first Analytics the book On Interpretation comes for the knowledge of a beginner, why did they not rather inscribe this book either before the On Interpretation or before the Analytics?

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Quare repudianda est inscriptionis istius quoque ipsa sententia,dicendumque est: Quoniam rerum prima decem genera sunt,necesse fuit decem quoque esse simplices voces, quae de subjectis rebus dicerentur: omne enim quod significat de illa re dicitur quam significat,ergo inscribendus liber est de decem Prsedicamentis.Sed forte quis dicat,si de significantibus rerum vocibus ipsa disputatio est,cur de ipsis disputat rebus? Dicendum est,quoniam res semper cum propria significatione conjunctae sunt, et quidquid in res venit,'hoc quidem in rerum vocabulis invenitur: quare recte de vocabulis disputans, proprietatem significantium vocum de his quae significabantur, id est de rebus assumpsit. Erit alia quoque fortasse quaestio: Cur enim hic orationem in decem praedicamenta sit partitu3,in Perihermenias libro in duas tantum partes divisionem fecit,in verbum videlicet et nomen?

English

Therefore the very meaning of that title must also be rejected, and it must be said: Since there are ten primary genera of things, there necessarily had to be ten simple words as well, which are predicated of the underlying things. For everything that signifies is said of that thing which it signifies. Therefore the book must be titled On the Ten Categories. But perhaps someone may say: if the discussion itself concerns words that signify things, why does it discuss the things themselves? It must be said that things are always joined with their proper signification, and whatever applies to things is also found in the words for things. Therefore, in rightly discussing words, he took up the property of significant words from those things which were signified, that is, from things. There will perhaps be another question as well: Why did he here divide discourse into ten categories, while in the book On Interpretation he made a division into only two parts, namely the verb and the noun?

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Sed hoc interest quod illic figuras vocabulorum dividit,in hoc de significationibus tractat,quare non est sibi ipse contrarius.InPerihermenias enim libro de nomine et verbo considerat quae secundum figuram quamdam vocabuli sunt,quod illud inflecti casibus potest,illud variari per tempora: hic vero non secundum has figuras, aed in eo quod voces significantes sunt disputatur: quare diversam in diversis rebus atque tractatibus faciendo divisionem, nulla contrarietate notabitur, neque nunc orationem dividit,sed ad multitudinem generumnominaipsadisperlit: namquoniam decem rerum genera sunt non secundum orationem, sed secundum rerum significationem in decem praedicamenta voces dividit, deque bis tractat.

English

But there is this difference: that in the former work he divides the forms of words, while in this one he treats of significations; wherefore he is not contradicting himself. For in the book On Interpretation he considers the noun and the verb according to a certain form of the word—that the one can be inflected by cases, the other varied by tenses; here, however, he disputes not according to these forms, but insofar as words are significant. Wherefore, by making a different division in different matters and treatises, he will be marked by no contradiction; nor does he now divide speech, but distributes the names themselves according to the multitude of genera. For since there are ten genera of things, he divides words into ten categories not according to speech, but according to the signification of things, and treats of these.

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Atque ideo necesse fuit quodammodo disputationem de rebus quoque misceri,ita (ut dictum est) ut non aliter nisi ex rebus proprietates in sermonibus apparerent,atque ita non de rebus proprie, sed de praedicamentis, id est,de ipsis rerum significativis vocibusin eo quod significantes sunt,seriem disputationis orditur.Cur autem,si de praedicamentis disputat, de aequivocis, vel univocis,vel denominativis primus illi tractatus est?Idcirconimirum quod quaedam semper a disputantibus praemittuntur,quibus positis facilior de sequentibus possit esse doctrina: ut in geometria, prius termini praeponuntur,post theorematum ordo conteritur.Itaquoque hic quidquid ad prædicamentorum disputationem possitesseutile,priusquam ad I ipsa prædicamentaveniret,exposuit: quare quoniam quae prædicenda erant exp!icavi,nunc ad ipsius disputationis seriem textumque veniamus.Quid autem aequivoca vel univoca vel denominativa utilitatis habeant, secundum ipsas singulorum rationesdiffinitionesque tractabitur.

English

And therefore it was necessary that the discussion be in a certain way mixed with things as well, so (as has been said) that the properties of things could not appear in words except from things, and thus he begins the series of his discussion not properly about things, but about the categories, that is, about the very words significant of things insofar as they are significant. But why, if he is disputing about the categories, is his first treatment of equivocals, univocals, or denominatives? For this reason, surely, that certain things are always premised by disputants, which, once posited, may make the teaching about what follows easier: as in geometry, the terms are first set out, then the order of theorems is unfolded. So too here, whatever could be useful for the discussion of the categories, he set forth before he came to the categories themselves. Wherefore, since I have explained what had to be explained, let us now come to the series and text of the discussion itself. But what usefulness equivocals, univocals, or denominatives have will be treated according to the individual accounts and definitions of each.

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DE ÆQUIVOCIS.

Æquivoca dicuntur quorum solum nomen commune estysecundum nomen vero substantiæ ratio diversa,ut animal, homo et quod pingitur. Horum enim solum nomen commune est,secundum nomen vero substantiæ ratio diversa.Si quis enim assignet quid sit utrumque eorum,quo sint animalia,propriam assignabit utrisque rationem.

Omnis res aut nomine autdiffinitionemonstratur: namque subjectam rem aut proprio nomine vocamus, aut diffinitione quid sit ostendimus.Ut verbi gratia, quamdam substantiam vocamus hominis nomine, et ejusdem definitionem damus dicentes esse hominem animal rationale,mortale; ergo quoniam res omnis aut diffinitione autnominedeclaratur,exhisduobus, nomine scilicet et deffinitione,diversitates quatuor procreantur.Omnes namque res aut eodem nomine et eadem definitione junguntur,ut homo etanimal, utraque enim animalia dici possunt, et utraque una diffinitione junguntur.Est namque animal substantia animata sensibilis,et homo rursus substantia animata sensibilis,et haeo vocantur univoca. Alia vero quae neque nominibus nequediffinitionibusconjungunlur: ut ignis, lapis, color, et qaae propriae substantiae natura discreta sunt,hæc autem vocanturdiversivoca.

English

ON EQUIVOCALS.

Equivocals are said to be those of which only the name is common, but according to the name the account of substance is different, as animal, man, and that which is painted. For of these only the name is common, but according to the name the account of substance is different. For if anyone assigns what each of them is, in that they are animals, he will assign a proper account to each.

Every thing is made known either by name or by definition: for we either call the underlying thing by its proper name, or we show by definition what it is. For example, a certain substance we call by the name of man, and we give the definition of the same, saying that man is a rational, mortal animal; therefore, since every thing is declared either by definition or by name, from these two, namely name and definition, four differences are produced. For all things are either joined by the same name and the same definition, as man and animal—for both can be called animals, and both are joined by one definition. For animal is an animated, sensible substance, and man again is an animated, sensible substance, and these are called univocals. But others which are joined neither by names nor by definitions, as fire, stone, color, and those which are distinguished by the proper nature of their substance—these are called diversivocals.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:14 · narrative
Source · Latin

Alia vero quae diversis nominihus nuncupantur, et uni diffinitioni designationique subduntur, ut gladius,ensis; hæc enim multa sunt nomina,sed id quod significantunadiffinitionedeclaratur,elhoc vacatur multivocum.Alia vero quae nomine quidem congruunt,diffinitionibus discrepant: ut est homo vivens et homo pictus, nam utrumque vel animalia vel homines nuncupantur.Si vero quis velit picturam hominemquediffinire,diversas utrisque diffinitiones aptabit, et haec vocantur aequivoca. Quare quoniam quid sinl aequivoca dictum est, singulis Aristotelicae diffinitionis sententias persequamur. Æquivoca, inquit, dicitur res scilicet, quae per se ipsas aequivocae non sunt, nisi uno nomine prasdicentur; quare quoniam ut aequivoca sint, ex communi vocabulo trahunt,recteait,aequivocadicuntur. Non enim sunt aequivoca,sed dicuntur.

English

But others which are called by different names and are brought under one definition and designation, as sword and blade; for these are many names, but what they signify is declared by one definition, and this is called multivocal. But others which agree in name yet differ in definitions, as is a living man and a painted man, for each is called either an animal or a man. But if anyone wishes to define a painting and a man, he will apply different definitions to each, and these are called equivocals. Therefore, since it has been said what equivocals are, let us follow the meanings of Aristotle's definition one by one. Equivocals, he says, are said—namely, things which are not in themselves equivocal unless they are predicated by one name; therefore, since they derive their being equivocal from a common term, he rightly says they are called equivocals. For they are not equivocals, but are called so.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:15 · narrative
Source · Latin

Fit autem non solum in nominibus,sed etiam in verbis aequivocatio: utcum dico complector te,etcomplector a te.In quibus significationibus cum unum nomen sit complector, alia tamen faciendi ratio est, alia patiendi: atque ideo hic quoque aequivocatio est: unum enim nomen quod est complector,diversis faciendi et patiendi diffinitionibus terminatur.In præpositionibus quoque,et in conjunctionibus frequenter aequivocatio reperitur,atque ideo quod ait: Quorum nomen solum commune est, nomen accipiendum est omnis rerum per vocem significatio,id est,omne vocabulum non proprium solum,aut appellativum, quod ab illud tantum nomen pertinet quod casibus inflecti potest,sed ad nomen rerum significationem, qua rebus imposita vocabula prædicamus. Solum autem duobus modis dicitur: semel cum aliquid unum esse dicirnus, ut si dicamus solusest mundus, id est unus; alio vero modo cum dicimus ad quamdam ab altero divisionem,ut si quis dicat solam me habere tunicam,id eSI,non etiam togam,ad divisionem videlicet togae. Hic ergo Aristoteles posuit dil'ens,Solum nomen commune est,quasi hoc voluisset intelligi non etiam diffinitio, aequivoca enim jungunturnomine,sed diffinitione dissentiunt.Communequoquemultisdiciturmodis.Diciturcommune quod in partes dividitur,et non jam totumcommune est, sed partes ejus propriae singularum,ut domus.

English

Equivocation, however, occurs not only in nouns but also in verbs: as when I say "I embrace you" and "I am embraced by you." In these significations, although "embrace" is one name, one is a mode of doing and the other of undergoing; and therefore here too there is equivocation, for the one name "embrace" is delimited by different definitions of doing and of undergoing. In prepositions too, and in conjunctions, equivocation is frequently found. And therefore, when he says "whose name alone is common," "name" must be understood as every signification of things through a word, that is, every word—not only a proper or appellative noun, which belongs to that name alone which can be inflected by cases, but [extending] to the signification of things, by which we predicate words imposed on things. "Alone," moreover, is said in two ways: first, when we say that something is one, as if we should say "the world is alone," that is, one; in another way, when we speak with respect to some division from another, as if someone should say "I have only a tunic," that is, not also a toga—evidently with respect to the division of the toga. Here, therefore, Aristotle set down "alone": "the name alone is common," as if he wished this to be understood, but not also the definition; for equivocals are joined by name but disagree in definition. "Common" also is said in many ways. That is called common which is divided into parts, and is no longer common as a whole, but its parts are proper to individuals, as a house.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:16 · narrative
Source · Latin

Dicitur commune quod id partes non dividitnr,sed vicissim in usus habentium transit, ut servus communis vel equus.Dicitur etiam commune quod utendo cujusque fit proprium,post usum vero in commune remittitur,ut est theatrum,uamcum eo utor,meum est,cum inde discedo, in commune remisi.Dicitur quoque commune,quod ipsum quidem nullis divisum parLibus,totum uno tempore in singulos venit. ut vox vel sermo ad multorum aures uno eodemque tempore totus atque integer pervenit. Secundum hanc igitur ultimam communis significationem Aristoteles putat aequivocis rebus commune esse vocabulum.Namque in homine picto et in homine vivo totum in utrisque vocabulum dicitur animalis,secundum nomen vero substantiæ ratio diversa,hoc hac significatione praemittit,ut si aliter reddanturdiffinitiones quam secundum nomen,statim tota diffinitio labet ac titubet.Ac primumde diffinitionisproprietale dicendum est.Illae enim certa; diffinitiones sunt quæ convertuntur, ut si dicas,Quid est bono? animal rationale mortale?homo,hoc quoqueverum est.At vero si ita quis dicat,Quid est homo?substantia animata sensibilis. verum est;quid substantia animata sensibilis? homo,hoc non modisomnibusverum est,idcirco quod equus quoque est substantia animata sensibilis, sed bomo non est. Ergo illas constat esse diffinitiones integras quæ converti possunt.

English

A thing is called common which does not divide its parts, but passes in turn into the uses of those who have it, as a common slave or horse. A thing is also called common which, by use, becomes one's own, but after use is returned to the common, as a theater: when I use it, it is mine; when I leave it, I have returned it to the common. A thing is also called common which, though divided by no parts, comes whole at one time into individuals, as a voice or speech comes whole and entire to the ears of many at one and the same time. According to this last signification of common, therefore, Aristotle thinks that the word is common to equivocal things. For in a painted man and in a living man the word "animal" is said to be whole in both, but according to the name the account of substance is different. He premises this with this signification, so that if definitions are rendered otherwise than according to the name, the whole definition immediately slips and falters. And first, concerning the property of definition, it must be said. For those definitions are certain which are convertible, as if you say, "What is man? A mortal rational animal," and this also is true: "A mortal rational animal? Man." But if someone says thus, "What is man? An animated sensible substance," it is true; "What is an animated sensible substance? Man," this is not true in all ways, for the reason that a horse also is an animated sensible substance, but is not a man. Therefore it is agreed that those definitions are complete which can be converted.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:17 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed hoc fit in iis quae non de communi, sed uno tantum,ut cum de hominis nomineredduntur, verbi gratia.Animal est commune nomen,si dixerit quis,Homo est substantia animata sensibilis,procedi: si non convertatur; quia de communi nomine reddita est diffinitiojsin vero de uno nomine redditur, tunc de ipso nomine facienda est diffinitiojsic tamen est recta facienda, ut hominis diffinitio sit animal rationale mortale, non substantia animata sensibilis,illa enim secundum hominis nomen,ista secundum animalis est reddita. Idem etiam in his nominibus quae de duabus rebus communiter prædicantur, si secundum nomen substantiae ratio non reddatur,potest aliquoties fieri,utexunivocisaequivoca sint, et ex aequivocis univoca; namque homo atqueequuscum secundum nomen animalis univoca I sint, possunt esse aequivoca, si secundum nomen minime diffinita sunt.Homo namque et equus communi nomine animalia nuncupatur, si quis ergo hominis reddat diffinitionem dicens,aninal rationale mortale, et equi,animal irrationale hinnibile, diversas reddidit diffinitiones,et:erunt res univocsein aequivocas permutatæ.

English

But this happens in those things which are not predicated from something common, but from one only, as when definitions are given from the name of man, for example. Animal is a common name; if someone says, Man is a substance animate and sensible, he has not proceeded correctly, because the definition has been given from a common name. But if the definition is given from one name, then the definition must be made from that name itself. Yet it must be made correctly in such a way that the definition of man is rational mortal animal, not animate sensible substance; for the latter has been given according to the name of man, the former according to that of animal. The same holds also in those names which are predicated in common of two things: if the account of the substance is not given according to the name, it can sometimes happen that univocals become equivocals, and equivocals become univocals. For man and horse, although they are univocal according to the name of animal, can be equivocal if they are not defined according to the name. For man and horse are called animals by a common name; if, therefore, someone gives the definition of man, saying, rational mortal animal, and of horse, irrational neighing animal, he has given different definitions, and things that were univocal will have been changed into equivocals.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:18 · narrative
Source · Latin

Hoc autem idcirco evenit, quoddiffinitiones non secundum animalis nomen redditsesunt,quod eorumcommunevocabulumest, sed secundum hominis atque equi.Nam si secundum commune nomen quod est animal diffinitio redderetur,ita fieret,homo est substantia animata sensibilis, secundum nomen scilicet animalis; et rursus, equus est substantia animata sensibilis, secundum nomen rursus animalis, secundum idem namque animalis vocabulum equus atque homo univoce prædicantur.Rursusexequivocis univoca fiunt hoc modo;siquisPyrrbum Achillis filium et Pyrrhum Epiroten dicat esseunivocos,idcirco quod uno nomine et Pyrrhi dicantur, et sint animalia rationabilia atque mortalia.Hic secundum nomen hominisredditadiffinitio, ex aequivocis fecit univoca. Quod si secundum nomen Pyrrbi diffinitionis ratio jungeretur vel a parentibus vel a patria,diversis eos oporteret diffinitionibus terminari.Recte igitur additum est,secundum nomen,idcirco quod si aliter facta sit diffinitio, stabilis esse non poterit, et frequenterdiversos secum ducit errores. Ratio quoque multimodo dicitur. Est enim ratio animae, et est ratio computandi,est ratio naturae,ipsa nimirum similitudo nascentium,est ratio quae in diffinitionibusvel descriptionibusredditur.Et quoniam generalissima genera genere carent,individuavero nulla substantiali diffe.

English

But this happens for this reason, that definitions are not given according to the name of animal, which is their common term, but according to the name of man and of horse. For if a definition were given according to the common name which is animal, it would come about thus: Man is a substance animated, sensible, that is, according to the name of animal; and again, Horse is a substance animated, sensible, again according to the name of animal; for according to the same term animal, horse and man are predicated univocally. Again, from equivocals univocals are made in this way: if someone says that Pyrrhus the son of Achilles and Pyrrhus the Epirote are univocals, for the reason that they are called by the one name of Pyrrhus, and are rational and mortal animals. Here the definition given according to the name of man has made univocals out of equivocals. But if the account of the definition were joined according to the name of Pyrrhus, either from his parents or from his homeland, they would have to be delimited by different definitions. Rightly, therefore, "according to the name" was added, for the reason that if the definition is made otherwise, it cannot be stable, and often brings with it various errors. "Ratio" also is said in many ways. For there is the ratio of the soul, and there is the ratio of calculating, there is the ratio of nature, namely the very likeness of things being born, and there is the ratio which is given in definitions or descriptions. And since the most general genera lack a genus, but individuals lack any substantial difference.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:19 · narrative
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rentia discrepant, diffinitio vero ex genere et differentia trahitur,neque generalissimorum generum, neque individuorum ulla potest diffinitio reperiri. Subalternorum vera generum, quoniam et differentias habent et genera, diffinitiones esse possunt.At vero quorum diffinitiones reddi nequeunt,illa tantum descriptionibus terminantur.Descriptio autem est, quae quamlibet rem propria quadam proprietate designat. Sive ergo diffinitio sit sive descriptio,utraque rationem substantiæ designat.Quare cum substantiae rationem dixit,et diffinitionis et descriptionis nomen inclusit. Æquivocorum alia sunt casu, alia consilio. Casu, ut Alexander Priami filius et Alexander Magnus.Casus enim id egit,ut idem utrique nomen poneretur.Consilio vero, ea quaecunque hominum voluntate sunt posita. Horum autem alia sunt secundum sirnilitudinem, ut homo pictus et homo verus quo nunc utitur Aristoteles exemplo: alia secundum proportionem, ut principium est in numero unitas,in lineis punctus.Et haec aequivocatio secundum proportionem esse dicitur. Aliavero suntquae ab uno descendunt, ut medicinale ferramentum;medicinale pigmentum,ab una enim medicinacequivocatio ista descendit.Alia quæ ad unum referuntur,utsi quisdicat salutaris veclatioest,salutaris esca est, haec scilicet idcirco sunt aequivoca, quod ad salutis unum vocabulum referuntur. Cur autem prius de æquivocis post de univocis tractat?

English

they differ, but a definition is drawn from genus and differentia, no definition of either the most general genera or of individuals can be found. But definitions of subaltern genera can exist, since they have both differentiae and genera. Yet those things whose definitions cannot be rendered are delimited only by descriptions. A description, moreover, is that which designates any thing by some proper characteristic. Whether, therefore, it is a definition or a description, each designates the account of substance. Wherefore, when he spoke of the account of substance, he included both the name of definition and of description. Of equivocals, some are by chance, others by design. By chance, as Alexander the son of Priam and Alexander the Great. For chance brought it about that the same name was applied to both. By design, however, are all those which are imposed by human will. Of these, moreover, some are according to similarity, as a painted man and a true man, which is the example Aristotle now uses; others according to proportion, as the principle in number is the unit, in lines the point. And this equivocation is said to be according to proportion. Others, however, are those which descend from one thing, as a medical tool, a medical ointment; for this equivocation descends from one thing, medicine. Others are those which are referred to one thing, as if someone should say that a healthy walk is, a healthy food is; these, namely, are equivocal for this reason, that they are referred to the one term of health. Why, moreover, does he treat of equivocals before univocals?

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:20 · narrative
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Idcircoquod ipsa decem prasdicamenta cum diffinitionibus diversa sint, uno praedicationis vocabulo nuncupantur; cuncta enim praedicamenta dicimus, ipsa vero prædicamenta quoniam rerum genera sunl,de subjectis rebus univoce praedicantur.Omne enim genus de speciebus propriis univoce dicitur, quare rectius primodeomnibuspraedicamentorum communi vocabulo tractat,quasidehincquemadmodum singula de speciebus propriis prædicarentur, exprimeret.At si (ut dictum est) non de rebus,sed de nominibus libri hujus intentio est.Cur de aequivocis et non de aequivocatione tractavit? æquivocæae namque res sunt, aequivocatio vero vocabulum. Idcirco. quomam ipsum nomen nibil in se retinet,,; æquivocationis,nisi diversæ sint res de quibus illud vocabulum prædicetur.Quare inde substantiam ipsa aequivocatio trahit, de ipsis dignus inchoatum est. Videtur autem alius esse modus æqui vocationis quem Aristoteiesomnino non recipit.Namsicutdiciturpes hominis,ilaquoquedicitur pes navis,et pes montis,, quae hujusmodi omniasecundumtranslationemdicuntur. Translatio vero nullius proprietatis est.

English

For this reason, because the ten categories themselves are distinct in their definitions, they are called by the single term of predication; for we call them all categories. But the categories themselves, since they are the genera of things, are predicated univocally of the subjects beneath them. For every genus is said univocally of its own species. Therefore he more rightly treats first of what is common to all the categories by a shared term, as if he would then express how each single one is predicated of its own species. But if (as has been said) the intention of this book is not about things but about names, why did he treat of equivocals and not of equivocation? For equivocal things are things, but equivocation is a word. For this reason, because the name itself retains nothing in itself of equivocation unless the things of which that word is predicated are diverse. Wherefore equivocation draws its substance from thence, and it was fitting to begin from those things themselves. But there appears to be another mode of equivocation which Aristotle does not admit at all. For just as the foot of a man is spoken of, so too the foot of a ship and the foot of a mountain are spoken of, all of which are spoken of in this way according to transference. But transference belongs to no property.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:21 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quare secundum translationem cequivocanunquam sunt,nisi propriis et immutabilibus subjectæ res vocalubis appellentur.Estautem taliseorum universalis inspeclio.Neque enim omnis translatio abaequi-, vocatione sejungitur,sed ea tantum cum ad res habentes positum vocabulum, ab aliajam nominata re nomenornatuscausatransfertur,utquiajam dicitur quidam auriga, dicitur etiam gubernator, si quis ornatusgratiacumquigubernatorestdicataurigam, non erit auriga nomen sequivocum,licet diversa,id est,moderatorem currus navisque significet.Sed quoties res quidem vocabulo eget,ab alia vero re quaevocabulum sumit,tuncistatranslatio aequivocationis retinet proprietatem,ut ex homine vivo ad picturam nomen hominis dictum est.Et de aequivocis hactenus; nunc de univocis pertractemus.

DE UNIVOCIS.

Univoca vero dicuntur quorum nomen commune est, et secundum nomen eadem ratio substantiæ,ut animal, homo atque bos,communi enim nomine utraque animalianuncupantur,et est substantiæ ratio eadem.Si quis enim assignet utriusque rationem quidulrumque sit, quo sint animalia, eamdem assignabit rationem.

English

Wherefore according to transfer they are never equivocal, unless things are called by their own and immutable words. But such is the universal consideration of them. For not every transfer is separated from equivocation, but only that when the word applied to things having it is transferred from another thing already named for the sake of ornament, as because someone is already called a charioteer, he is also called a helmsman, if anyone for the sake of ornament, together with the one who is a helmsman, is called a charioteer, the name charioteer will not be equivocal, although it signifies different things, that is, the driver of a chariot and of a ship. But whenever a thing indeed needs a word, but from another thing which takes the word, then that transfer retains the property of equivocation, as from a living man the name man was applied to a picture. And about equivocals thus far; now let us treat of univocals.

ON UNIVOCALS.

But univocals are said to be those whose name is common, and according to the name the same account of substance, as animal, man and ox; for by the common name both are called animals, and the account of substance is the same. For if anyone assigns the account of each, what each is, in that they are animals, he will assign the same account.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:22 · narrative
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Post aequivocorum diffinitionem ad univocorum terminum transitum fecit,in quibus nihil aliud discrepat, nisi quod aequivoca diffinitione disjuncta sunt,univoca ipso quoque termino conjunguntur,sed cætera omnia quæ cunque in æquivocorum diffinitione dicta sunt,in hac quoque univocorum designatione conveniunt.Nam quemadmodum in gequivocissecundum nomen aequivocarum rerum diffinitio fiebat,ita quoque in univocis secundumnomensubstantiaeratio assignabitur.Suntautemunivocaaut genera speciebus, aut species speciebus, genera speciebus,ut animal atque bomo. Nam cum hominis genus sit animal,dicitur homo animal,ergo et animal et homo animalia nuncupantur.Secundum igitur commune nomen si utrosque diffinias,dicis animal esse subatantiam animatam atque'sensibiJem,hominem quoque secundum id quod animal est, si substantiam animatam sensibilem dixeris,nihn in eo falsitatis in. venies. Species vero speciebus univocae sunt, quæ uno atque eodem genere continentur, ut homo, equus atque bos,his commune genus est animal,et communi nomineanimalia nominantur.Ergo secundum nomen unum quod illis commune estanimalis, una illius ratio diffinitionis aptabitur,omnia enim suntsubslantiae animataeatquesensibiles.Secundum igitur posteriorem univocationisdesignationem Aristoteles qua speciebus species univocae sunt,ut homo et bos, quae sub eodem sunt genere, sumpsit exemplum.

English

After the definition of equivocals he made a transition to the term of univocals, in which nothing else differs except that equivocals are separated by definition, while univocals are joined also by the term itself; but all other things whatsoever that were said in the definition of equivocals also apply in this designation of univocals. For just as in equivocals the definition of equivocal things was made according to the name, so too in univocals the account of substance will be assigned according to the name. Now univocals are either genera in relation to species, or species in relation to species: genera in relation to species, as animal and man. For since animal is the genus of man, man is called an animal; therefore both animal and man are called animals. Therefore, if you define both according to the common name, you say that animal is an animated and sensible substance; and if you say that man also, according to the fact that he is an animal, is an animated and sensible substance, you will find nothing false in this. But species are univocal in relation to species which are contained under one and the same genus, as man, horse, and ox: their common genus is animal, and they are named animals by the common name. Therefore, according to the one name of animal that is common to them, one account of its definition will be fitted, for all are animated and sensible substances. Therefore, according to the latter designation of univocation, by which species are univocal in relation to species, as man and ox, which are under the same genus, Aristotle took an example.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:23 · narrative
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DE DENOMINATIVIS.

Denominativa vero dicuntur quæcunque ab aliquo solo differentia casu secundum nomen habent appellationem, ut a grammatica grammaticus, et a tortitudine fortis.

Haec quoque diffinitio nihil habet obscurum.Casus enim antiqui nominabantaliquasnominumtransfigurationes, ut a justitia justus, a fortitudine tortis,etc.Haec igitur nominis transfiguratio,casus ab antiquioribus vocabatur.Atque ideo quotiescunque aliqua res alia participat, ipsa participatione sicut rem,ita quoque nomenadipiscitur,utquidamhomo, quiajustitia participat et rem quoque inde trahitet nomen, dicitur enim justus.Ergodonominativavocantur quaecunque a principalinominesolocasu,id est sola transfiguratione discrepant. Nam cum sit nomen principalejustitia,ab hoc transfiguratum nomen justus efficitur. Ergo illa sunt denominativa quaecunque a principali nomine solo casus id est sola nominis discrepantia,secundum principalenomen habent appellationem.Tria sunt autem necessaria,ut denominativa vocabula constituantur:prius ut re participet, post ut nomine, postremo ut sit quaedam noministransfiguratio,ul cum aliquis dicitur a fortitudine fortis,est enim quaedam fortitudo qua fortis ille participet,habet quoque nominis participationem,fortis enim dicitur.At vero est quaedam transfiguratio, fortis enim et fortitudo non eisdem syllabis terminantur.

English

ON DENOMINATIVES.

Denominatives, however, are said to be whatever things have their appellation from something else, differing only in case according to the name, as from grammar a grammarian, and from crookedness a crooked one.

This definition too has nothing obscure. For the ancients called cases certain transformations of names, as from justice a just one, from fortitude a brave one, etc. This transformation of a name, therefore, was called a case by the more ancient writers. And for this reason, whenever some thing participates in another, by that participation it acquires both the thing and the name, as a certain man, because he participates in justice, derives both the thing and the name from it; for he is called just. Therefore those are called denominatives, whatever things differ from a principal name by case alone, that is, by transformation alone. For since the principal name is justice, from it the transformed name just is produced. Therefore those are denominatives, whatever things have their appellation from a principal name by case alone, that is, by the discrepancy of the name alone, according to the principal name. But three things are necessary for denominative terms to be constituted: first, that it participate in the thing; second, that it participate in the name; and finally, that there be a certain transformation of the name, as when someone is called brave from fortitude. For there is a certain fortitude in which that brave person participates, and he also has a participation in the name, for he is called brave. But there is also a certain transformation, for brave and fortitude do not terminate in the same syllables.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:24 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si quid vero sit quod re non participet, neque nomine participare potest. Quare quaecunque re non participant,denominativa esse non possunt. Rursusquoque,quaere quidem participant, nomine vero minime, ipsa quoque adenominativorum natura discreta sunt, ut si quis,cumsit virtus, virtute ipsa participet, nullo cum alio nomine nisi sapientem vocamus.Sedvirtus et sapientia nomine ipso disjunctasunt,hicergorequidemparticipat,nomineverominime.Quare sapiens a virtute denominatus esse nondicitur,sed a sapientia,qua scilicet et participat, et nomine jungitur,et transfiguratione diversus est; rursus si transfiguratio non sit,utquaedam mulier musica,participat quidem ipsa musicas disciplina,et dicitur musica.Hæ igitur appellatio non est denominativa,sed æquivoca,uno enim nomine et disciplina et ipsa mulier musica dicitur. Quoniam ergo similis terminus syllabarum est, et nomen simile,et nulla transfiguratio,denominativa essenon poterunt,quare quidquid denominativaesse non poterunt,quare quidquid denominativum esse dicitur,illud et re participabit et nomine, et aliqua transfiguratione vocabuli discrepabit.

English

But if there is anything that does not participate in the thing, it cannot participate in the name either. Therefore, whatever things do not participate in the thing cannot be denominatives. Again, in turn, whatever things do participate in the thing but not at all in the name, these too are distinct from the nature of denominatives, as if someone, since virtue exists, participates in virtue itself, yet we call him by no other name than wise. But virtue and wisdom are distinct in their very name. He, therefore, participates in the thing but not at all in the name. Therefore, a wise man is not said to be denominated from virtue, but from wisdom, in which he both participates and is joined in name, and is different by a change of form. Again, if there is no change of form, as a certain woman is musical, she indeed participates in the discipline of music and is called musical. This appellation, therefore, is not denominative but equivocal, for by one name both the discipline and the woman herself are called musical. Since, therefore, the ending of the syllables is similar, and the name is similar, and there is no change of form, they cannot be denominatives. Wherefore, whatever is said to be a denominative will both participate in the thing and in the name, and will differ by some change of the word.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:25 · narrative
Source · Latin

Hæc igitur quæ ad praedicamenta necessaria credidit,præmisit.Multivocavero etdiversivocarespuit,quod ad praesentem tractatum utilianonputavit Brevitertarren utraque dfffinienda sunt.Multivoca sunt quorum plura nomina una diffinitio est,ut est scutum,clypeus: his enim pluranomina.seduna diffinitio est;etMarcus Porcius Cato,his enim tot nominibusres una subjecta est.Diversificasuntquorum nequenomen idem est, neque eadem diffinitio,ut homo, color, et quidquid omnino a se et nominis nuncupatione etdiffinitionis ratione discretum est.

Eorum quæ dicuntur alia quidem secundum complexionem dicuntur alia vero sine complexione, et ea quæ secundum complexionem dicuntur sunt, ut homo currit, homo vincit: ea vero quæ sine complexione dicuntur sunt, ut homo, bos, currit, vincit.

Postquam de conjunctionediffinitionumatquenominum quantum ad praesens attinebat opus,sufficienter exposuit quoniam de primis nominibus prima rerum genera significantibus divisio facienda est,non j nomine, sed genere discrepantibus, nunc ostendit quid sit sine complexione cujuslibet vocabuli facta prolatio.Sine complexione enim dicuntur quæcnnque secundum simplicem sonum nominis proferuntur,ut homo, equus: his enim extra nihil adjunctum est.

English

He therefore first set out these things that he believed necessary for the Categories. But he rejected multivocals and diversivocals, because he did not think them useful for the present treatise. Briefly, however, both must be defined. Multivocals are those that have several names but one definition, as is a scutum, a clypeus: for these have several names, but one definition; and Marcus Porcius Cato, for to him one thing is subject under so many names. Diversivocals are those of which neither the name is the same nor the definition, as man, color, and whatever altogether is distinguished from another both by the naming of the name and by the account of the definition.

Of things that are said, some are said according to combination, others without combination. And those that are said according to combination are, as man runs, man conquers; but those that are said without combination are, as man, ox, runs, conquers.

After he sufficiently expounded, as far as pertained to the work at hand, concerning the conjunction of definition and names—since the division must be made concerning primary names that signify the primary genera of things, differing not in name but in genus—he now shows what the utterance of any word made without combination is. For those things are said without combination, whatever are brought forth according to the simple sound of a name, as man, horse: for to these nothing is added from outside.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:26 · narrative
Source · Latin

Secundumcomplexionerodicunturqusecunquealiqua conjunctione copulantur,ut aut Socrales aut Plato, vel quaecunque secundnm aliquod accidens conjunguntur.Namquia,verbigratia,inSocratem venitambulatio,dicimus: Socrates ambulat, et est prolatio istasecundumcomplexionem,idcirco quia cumdico Socrates ambulat,Socratem sum cum ambulatione complexus.Quod autem ait: Eorum quae dicuntur, nihil aliud demonstrare vult nisi de primis rerum vocabulis hujus libelli disposuisse tractatum.Rerum = enim vocabula sunt quas dicuntur,ipsa enim proprie nominamus.

Eorum quæ sunt alia de subjecto quodam dicuntur, in subjecto vero nullo sunt: ut homo de subjecto quidem dicitur aliquo homine,in subjecto autem nullo est. Alia in subjecto quidem sunt,de subjecto autem nullo dicuntur. In subjecto autem esse dico, quod cum in aliquo non sicut quædam pars sit, impossibile est sine eo esse in quo est: ut quædam grammatica in subjecto quidem est, in anima,de subiecto autem nullo dicitur, et quoddam album in subjecto est corpore (omnis enim color in corpore est), de subjecto autem nullo dicitur. Alia et de subjecto quodam dicuntur, et in subjecto sunt: ut scientiæ in subjecto quidem est in anima, de subjecto autem dicitur, ut de hac grammatica. Alia neque in subjecto sunt neque de subjeclo dicuntur, ut aliquis homo, vel aliquis equus: nullum enim horum neque in subjecto est, neque de subjecto dicitur.

English

Those things are said according to combination, whatever are joined by some conjunction, as either Socrates or Plato, or whatever are joined according to some accident. For because, for example, walking comes to Socrates, we say: Socrates walks, and that utterance is according to combination, for the reason that when I say Socrates walks, I have combined Socrates with walking. But what he says, Of those things which are said, he wishes to demonstrate nothing other than that the treatise of this little book has been set out concerning the first words of things. For the words of things are those which are said, for we properly name the things themselves.

Of those things which are, some are said of some subject, but are in no subject: as man is said of some subject, indeed of some man, but is in no subject. Others are in a subject, but are said of no subject. But I say to be in a subject, that which, when it is in something not as a certain part, is impossible to be without that in which it is: as a certain grammar is in a subject, in the soul, but is said of no subject, and a certain white is in a subject, in a body (for every color is in a body), but is said of no subject. Others both are said of some subject and are in a subject: as knowledge is in a subject, in the soul, but is said of a subject, as of this grammar. Others neither are in a subject nor are said of a subject, as some man, or some horse: for none of these is either in a subject, or is said of a subject.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:27 · narrative
Source · Latin

Simpliciter autem quæ sunt individua et numero singularia, de nullo subjecto dicuntur: in subjecto autem nihil prohibet horum aliqua esse,quædam enim grammalica in subjecto est, de subjecto autem nullo dicitur.

Hic Aristoteles sermonum omnium multitudinem in parvissimam colligit divisionem.Nam quod rerum vocabula in decem prædicamenta distribuit,major hac divisione non potest inveniri,nihil enim esse poterit quod huic divisioni undecimum adjici queat.Omnis enim res aut substantia est, aut quantitas,aut qualitas,aut ad aliquid,aut facere, aut pati,aut quando, aut ubi, aut habere, aut situs; quocirca tot erunt. etiam sermones qui ista significent,et haec est maxima divisio,cui ultra nihil possit adjungi: parvissima vero est quae fit in quatuor,in substantiam et accidens,et universale et particulare. Omnis enim res aut substantia est,aut accidens,autuniversalis, aut particularis.Sicut ergo decem superioribus nihil addi poterat,ita ex his quatuor nihil demi.

English

But those things which are individual and singular in number are said without qualification of no subject; yet nothing prevents some of these from being in a subject. For a certain grammatical knowledge is in a subject, but is said of no subject.

Here Aristotle gathers the whole multitude of all statements into a very small division. For in that he distributes the names of things into ten categories, no greater division than this can be found; for there will be nothing that could be added to this division as an eleventh. For every thing is either substance, or quantity, or quality, or relation, or doing, or undergoing, or when, or where, or having, or position; and therefore there will be just so many statements also that signify these things, and this is the greatest division, to which nothing further can be added; but the smallest is that which is made into four: substance and accident, universal and particular. For every thing is either substance or accident, either universal or particular. Therefore, just as nothing could be added to the ten above, so from these four nothing can be taken away.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:28 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam neque minor ulla divisio his quatuor fieri potest,nec major quam si denario limite praedicamenta claudantur.Cum autem in his quatuor divisio facta est, paucis exponam.Prima quidem rerum est omnium divisio in substantiamatqueaccidens.Sed quoniam substantia proferri non potest nisi aut universaliter autparticulariterintelligatur: nam cum dico homo, rem dixi universalem, idcirco quod nomen hoc de multis individuis praedicatur: cum vero dico Socrates vel Plato,rem dixi particularem; quoniam Socrates de nudo subjecto dicitur et accidens quoque eodem modo; nam cum dixero scientiam,rem protuli universalem,idcirco quod scientia et de grammatica et de rhetorica, et de aliis omnibus sub se positis prædicatur; sivero dixero Platonis scientiam,quoniam omne accidens quod individua venit individuum fit,particularem scientiam dico,namque Platonisscientia,sicutipsePlato,particularis est: igitur quoniam nequesubstantianequeaccidens ullomodo proferri potest, nisi in suo nomine aut universalitatis vim,aut particularitatis induat, recte in quatuor divisio facta est, ut si omnis res aut substantia. aut accidens,et horum aut universaJi, aut particularis. Ex his igitur quatuor fiunt complexiones.Nam cum venerit universalitas in substantiam,fil universalis substantia, ut est homo vel animal.

English

For no smaller division of these four can be made, nor any greater than if the predicaments were enclosed within the tenfold boundary. But when the division into these four has been made, I shall set it forth briefly. The first division of all things is into substance and accident. But since substance cannot be brought forward unless it is understood either universally or particularly — for when I say "man," I have stated a universal thing, for the reason that this name is predicated of many individuals; but when I say "Socrates" or "Plato," I have stated a particular thing, since Socrates is said of a bare subject — and accident likewise in the same way; for when I have said "knowledge," I have brought forward a universal thing, for the reason that knowledge is predicated both of grammar and of rhetoric and of all other things placed under it; but if I have said "Plato's knowledge," since every accident that comes to individuals becomes individual, I call it particular knowledge, for Plato's knowledge, just like Plato himself, is particular. Therefore, since neither substance nor accident can be brought forward in any way unless in its own name it puts on either the force of universality or that of particularity, the division into four has rightly been made, so that every thing is either substance or accident, and of these either universal or particular. From these four, therefore, combinations are made. For when universality comes to substance, there comes to be universal substance, as is man or animal.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:29 · narrative
Source · Latin

Universale autem est quod aptum est de pluribus praedicari.Particulare vero quod de nullo subjecto prædicatur. Ergo es una complexio universalitatis et subsfantiae, ut sit substantia universalis. Si vero particularis substantiæ copulatur,fit substantia particularis,ut est Socrates vel Plato,et quidquid in substantia individuum reperitur.Atcum miscetur universalitasaccidenti,fit accidens universale,ut scientia,quæ cum sit accidens, et praeteranimam cui accidit esse non possit, tamen universalis est,quod;desubjecta grammaticavelaliis speciebus praedicari poteat.Cum vero particularitas accidenti conjungitur, fit accidens particulare, ut Platonis vel Aristotelis scientia. Fiunt enim quatuor com plexiones,substantia universalis,substantia particularis,accidens universale, accidens particulare, Ut autem accidens iu substantiae naturam transeat, vel substantia in accidens,fieri nullo modo potest,et accidens quidem venit in substantiam, sed non ut substantia fiat: neque enim quoniam color,quod est accidens venitin substantiam,idcirco color jam substantia est. Nec quoniam substantia suscipit colorem idcirco color jam substantia fit.

English

But a universal is what is capable of being predicated of many things. A particular, however, is what is predicated of no subject. Therefore there is one combination of universality and substance, so that there is universal substance. But if it is joined to particular substance, there comes to be particular substance, as is Socrates or Plato, and whatever is found to be an individual in substance. And when universality is mixed with accident, there comes to be universal accident, as knowledge, which although it is an accident, and cannot exist apart from the soul to which it is an accident, is nevertheless universal, because it can be predicated of underlying grammar or other species. But when particularity is joined to accident, there comes to be particular accident, as the knowledge of Plato or Aristotle. For four combinations come to be: universal substance, particular substance, universal accident, particular accident. But that an accident should pass over into the nature of substance, or a substance into an accident, can in no way happen; and an accident indeed comes into a substance, but not so as to become a substance: for it is not because color, which is an accident, comes into a substance, that color is therefore now a substance. Nor is it because a substance receives color that color therefore now becomes a substance.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:30 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quare neque substantia in accidentis,neque accidens in substantiae naturam transit.At vero nec particularitas, nec universalitas in se transeunt.Namque universalitas potest de particularitate prædicari, ut animal de Socrate vel Platone,et particularitas suscipiet universalitatis praedicationem,sed non ut universalitas sit particularitas, nec rursus ut quod particulare est universalitas fiat. Ergo quatuor complexiones, universalem substantiam,universale accidens,particularem substantiam,particulare accidens Aristoteles disponere cupiens,non dorum nomina, sed descriptiones apposuit.Etquoniam generalissimorum generam diffinitiones non poterat invenire, discriptionibus usus est his, id substantiam esse dicens quod in subjecto non esset,accidens vero quod in subjecto esset.Omne namque accidens in subjecto est, ut colore in corpore,scientia in anima,etsubjectam habet substantiam omne accidens. Si quis enim substantiam lollat,accidens non ent. Quare substantia locusquidam est ubi accidentis valeat natura consistere.Ipsa vero substantia per se constat,atque ideo dicitur substantia,nec ullo subjecto alio nititur,sed cunctis ipsa substantia est. Alioqui si substantia in ullo subjecto esse posset,esset accidens.Omne enim accidens in subjecto est,et quidquid in subjecto est, illud est accidens.

English

Therefore neither does substance pass into the nature of an accident, nor an accident into that of a substance. But neither do particularity and universality pass into each other. For universality can be predicated of particularity, as animal of Socrates or Plato, and particularity will receive the predication of universality, but not so that universality becomes particularity, nor again so that what is particular becomes universality. Therefore, since Aristotle wished to set out four combinations—universal substance, universal accident, particular substance, particular accident—he supplied not the names of two of these, but descriptions. And because he could not find definitions of the most general genera, he used these descriptions, saying that substance is what is not in a subject, and accident what is in a subject. For every accident is in a subject, as color in a body, knowledge in a soul, and every accident has substance as its subject. For if anyone removes substance, the accident will not exist. Therefore substance is a kind of place where the nature of an accident can subsist. But substance itself stands by itself, and for that reason is called substance, and it rests upon no other subject, but is itself the subject for all things. Otherwise, if substance could be in any subject, it would be an accident. For every accident is in a subject, and whatever is in a subject is an accident.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:31 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod si substantia essetinaliquo subjecto, continuo fieret accidens, sed substantia accidens esse non potest, sicut supra docuimus. Quare quoniam accidens in subjectoest,substantia vero accidens non est, substantia in subjecto non est. Universalitatis vero descriptio est, de subjecto praedicari.Omnis namque universalitas de subjectis particularibus prædicatur,nam quoniam universale est animal,vel homo,de Socrates praedicatur et Platone.Dicitur enim Socrates animal atque homo. Et quoniam universale est accidens scientia,di0i!ur de subjecta grammalica,grammalica enim scientia est.Particularitas vero quoniam ipsa est rerum ultimael nihil est illi subjectum,de nullo subjecto prsedicatur; nam quoniam universalitas de:subjecto prsdicatur, particularitas vero universalitas non est. particularitas de subjecto non prasdicabitur. Ubi enim res discrepant,et definitio discrepabit;ita quoque in his,nam quoniam discrepat substantia et accidens,diffinitiones quoque eorum discrepabunt.Ut quoniam est accidens in subjecto, erit substantia non in subjecto. Et quoniam universalitas de subjecto praedicatur, particularitas autem ab universalitate discrepat,de subjecto non praedicatur. Has igitur hujusmodi descriptiones Aristoteles itapermiscuit dicens: Eorum quae sunt, alia de subjecto quodam diountur, in subjecto vero nullo sunt, volens scilicet universalem substantiam demonstrare.

English

But if substance were in some subject, it would immediately become an accident; but substance cannot be an accident, as we taught above. Therefore, since an accident is in a subject, but substance is not an accident, substance is not in a subject. But the description of universality is to be predicated of a subject. For every universality is predicated of particular subjects; for since animal or man is universal, it is predicated of Socrates and Plato. For Socrates is said to be an animal and a man. And since knowledge is a universal accident, it is said of the subject grammar, for grammar is knowledge. But particularity, since it is itself the last of things and has nothing as its subject, is predicated of no subject; for since universality is predicated of a subject, but particularity is not universality, particularity will not be predicated of a subject. For where things differ, the definition will also differ; so too in these cases, for since substance and accident differ, their definitions also will differ. Thus, since an accident is in a subject, substance will not be in a subject. And since universality is predicated of a subject, but particularity differs from universality, it is not predicated of a subject. Therefore Aristotle intermingled descriptions of this kind in this way, saying: Of the things that are, some are said of a certain subject, but are in no subject, wishing, of course, to demonstrate universal substance.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:32 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam quod dixit de subjecto dicuntur,universaleest, quod vero ait. in subjecto nullo sunt, substantia: ergo quod ait quædam de subjecto dici,in subjecto vero nullo esse, universalem substantiam demonstrare contendit: ut enim Saepius dictum est, quod de subjecto dicitur, universale est; quod in nullo suhjecto est,substantia. Hrecjuncta, id est de subjecto quodam dici,et in subjecto nullo esse,universalem substantiam damonstrant. Post universalem substantiam particulare accidens posuitdicens:Alia autem in subjecto quidem sunt, de subjecto autem nullo dicuntur.Nam quod ait in subjecto sunt, accidens monstrat,quod vero addidit,desubjectoautem nullo dicuntur, particulare. Accidens enim in subjecto est, particularitas de nullo subjecto praedicatur. Ergo quæcunque res ipsa quidem in subjecto est,sed si de nullo subjecto prædicatur, accidens est particulare,utest de quaedamgrammatica,id est Aristarchi,vel alicujus hominis individua grammatica: illa enim quoniam individui hominis, ipsa quoque facta est individua et particularis; ergo quoniam quaedam'grammatica in anima est, accidens est, et quoniam de nullo subjecto praedicatur, particularis est; quemadmodum enim ipse Aristarchus de nullo subjecto dicitur,ita quoque ejus grammatica de nullo subjecto praedicatur.

English

For what he said, "are said of a subject," is universal; but what he said, "are in no subject," is substance. Therefore what he said, that certain things are said of a subject but are in no subject, he maintains demonstrates universal substance. For, as has been said rather often, what is said of a subject is universal; what is in no subject is substance. These joined together, that is, to be said of a certain subject and to be in no subject, demonstrate universal substance. After universal substance he placed particular accident, saying: "But others are in a subject and are said of no subject." For what he said, "are in a subject," shows an accident; but what he added, "are said of no subject," shows a particular. For an accident is in a subject, and particularity is predicated of no subject. Therefore whatever thing is itself in a subject but is predicated of no subject is a particular accident, as is a certain grammar, that is, the individual grammar of Aristarchus or of some man; for that grammar, since it belongs to an individual man, has itself also become individual and particular. Therefore, since a certain grammar is in the soul, it is an accident; and since it is predicated of no subject, it is particular. For just as Aristarchus himself is said of no subject, so too his grammar is predicated of no subject.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:33 · narrative
Source · Latin

Non autem dicit quod ipsa grammaticaparticularis est, sed quod quaedam grammatica,id est alicujus hominis individui grammatica,quam scilicet homo particularis propria retinet cognitione.Et quoniam incorporale accidens posuit quod animæ accideret,id est grammaticam, quæ esset in anima,ponit quoque aliud exemplum corporale; ait enim et quoddam album in subjecto est corpore, omnis enim color est in corpore: hic quoque non omne album dicit esse particulare,sed quod ad individuum corpus album venit. Probatur quoque particulare album in subjecto esse hoc modo, nam color quod genus est albi vel cujusdam albiin corpore est, et est in subjecto. Quare cujus genus In subjecto est, ipsum quoque in subjecto est. Omnes enim species vel individua;propria genere continentur,et ejusdem habent naturam. Quoniam vero esse in aliquo multis dicitur modis, qui velit Aristoteles ostendere esse insubjecto,paucisabsolvam. Dicitur enim esse aliquid in aliquo novem modis, dicimus enim esse aliquid in loco,ut in foro vel in theatro.Dicimus quoque esse in aliquo, ut in aliquo vase,ut triticum in modio.Dicitur etiam esse in aliquo velut pars in toto, ut manus in corpore.Dicitur esse in aliquo,velut totum in partibus,ut corpus in omnibus suis partibus.Rursus velut in genere species,ut in animali homo,vel genus in speciebus suis.

English

But he does not say that grammar itself is particular, but that a certain grammar, that is, the grammar of some individual man, which namely a particular man retains by his own cognition. And since he posited an incorporeal accident that befalls the soul, that is, grammar, which would be in the soul, he also posits another corporeal example; for he says that a certain white is also in a subject, namely in a body, for every color is in a body. Here too he does not say that every white is particular, but that which comes to an individual body. It is also proved that a particular white is in a subject in this way: for color, which is the genus of white or of a certain white, is in a body and is in a subject. Wherefore, that whose genus is in a subject, is itself also in a subject. For all species or individuals are contained by their own genus and have its nature. But since "to be in something" is said in many ways, I shall briefly explain what Aristotle wishes to show by "to be in a subject." For something is said to be in something in nine ways. For we say something is in a place, as in the forum or in the theater. We also say something is in something as in a vessel, as wheat in a measure. It is also said to be in something as a part in a whole, as a hand in a body. It is said to be in something as a whole in parts, as a body in all its parts. Again, as a species in a genus, as man in animal, or a genus in its species.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:34 · narrative
Source · Latin

Dicimus quoque esse in aliquo, velut aliquid in fine esse, ut quoniam bonæ vitae finis beatitudo est, si quis sit beatus; in fine est,scilicet bonae vitai.Oicimus quoque esse in aliquo ut in quolibet potente,ut in imperatore esse regimen civitatis.Dicimus quoque velutformamin materia,utsimilitudinem Achillis in £ere vel in marmore. Novem igitur modis aliquid in aliquo esse dicitur, ut in loco,ut in vase, ut pars in toto,ut totum in partibus,ut in genere species, ut in speciebus genus, ut in fine, ut in imperatores,utinmateriaforma.Horum igiturAristoteles tria sola commemorat,sed duo in unum conjuncta, aliud seperatum.Ait enim: In subjecto autem esse dico quod,cum in aliquo sit,non sicut quædam pars, impossibileestessesine eo in quo est. Sensus autem talis est: Hoc, inquit, dico esse accidens, quod sit in subjecto,id est quod ita sit in altero,ut pars ejus non sit et sine aliquo subjecto esse non possit, ut, verbi gratia,coJor cum in corpore nulla pars corporis est,et si color a corpore separatur,colornusquam est. Omnis enim color in solo corpore est. Ergo illud est accidens quod semper ita in subjecto est altero, ut ejus pars non sit,ut cum ab eo in quo est separatur, ad nihilum redigatur, ut per se sine alterius subjecto esse non possit.

English

We also say that something is in something, as something is in an end, for instance, since beatitude is the end of the good life, if anyone is blessed, he is in the end, that is, of the good life. We also say that something is in something as in any powerful person, as the governance of a city is in the emperor. We also say [something is] as a form in matter, as the likeness of Achilles is in bronze or in marble. Therefore, something is said to be in something in nine modes: as in a place, as in a vessel, as a part in a whole, as a whole in parts, as a species in a genus, as a genus in species, as in an end, as in an emperor, as a form in matter. Of these, therefore, Aristotle mentions only three, but two joined into one, and another separately. For he says: "But I say that to be in a subject is what, when it is in something, is not as a certain part, and it is impossible for it to be without that in which it is." But the sense is this: This, he says, I call an accident, that it is in a subject, that is, that it is in another in such a way that it is not a part of it and cannot be without some subject, as, for example, color, when it is in a body, is no part of the body, and if color is separated from a body, color is nowhere. For every color is in a body alone. Therefore, that is an accident which is always in another as in a subject in such a way that it is not a part of it, so that when it is separated from that in which it is, it is reduced to nothing, so that it cannot be through itself without the subject of another.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:35 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod autem ait ut non sit sicut aliqua pars, ab ea scilicet significatione in aliquo consistendi dividere voluit, secundum quam partes in toto esse dicimus,non enim tale est subjectum, ut ejus accidens pars sit. Quod vero dicit, impossibile est esse sine eo in quo est, ab ea scilicet significatione divisit, quae est esse aliquid in vase vel in loeo;quod enim in vase vel in loco est a vase j vel loco poterit separari, ut triticum quod in modio est, potest a modio segregari, et homo a theatro discedere:accidens vero ab eo in quo est segregari non potest.Quare solas tres posuitsignificationes,id est secundum quam in vase,vel in loco dicitur esse, et secundum quam pars in toto est. Sed ut in vase et ut in loco una sententia distribuit dicens, impossibile est esse sine eo in quo est. Sed fortasse quis dicat non esse diffinitionem veram,illa esse in subjecto quæ sic sint in alio non ut sint partes,et sine eo in quo sint esse non posaint, Socrates enim vel homo quilibet cum accidens non sit,tamen semper in loco est et sine loco esse non potest. Quibus respondendum est quod Socrates loca poterit permutare,et esse præter locum in quo fuit:et postremo si intelligentia capiamus,per se subsistit,accidentia vero per se ipsa non constant.

English

But when he says "as not being like some part," he wished to distinguish this from that signification of consisting in something according to which we say that parts are in a whole; for the subject is not such that its accident is a part. But when he says "it is impossible for it to be without that in which it is," he distinguished it from that signification which is to be something in a vessel or in a place; for what is in a vessel or in a place can be separated from the vessel or the place, as wheat that is in a measure can be separated from the measure, and a man can depart from the theater; but an accident cannot be separated from that in which it is. Wherefore he posited only three significations, that is, according to which something is said to be in a vessel or in a place, and according to which a part is in a whole. But "as in a vessel" and "as in a place" he treats under one statement, saying "it is impossible for it to be without that in which it is." But perhaps someone may say that the definition is not true—that those things are in a subject which are in another in such a way as not to be parts, and cannot be without that in which they are—for Socrates, or any man, since he is not an accident, is nevertheless always in a place and cannot be without a place. To these it must be answered that Socrates will be able to change places and to exist apart from the place in which he was; and finally, if we grasp it by understanding, he subsists through himself, whereas accidents do not stand through themselves.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:36 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed si quis quoque objiciat posse locum accidentia permutare, malum namque si in manu teneatur,manus mali odore completur, adeo odor quod est accidens, in aliud subjectum transire potest.Sed non hoc ait Aristoteles, quoniam mutare accidens locum non potest,nec ita dixit impossibile esse sine eo in quo erat, sed sine eo in quo est, hoc enim significat mutare quidem posse locum, sed sine aliquo subjecto non posse subsistere. Quare recta est atque integra diffinitio ejus quod in subjecto est,quod ita sint in altero non sicut quædam pars,et impossibile sit esse sine eo in quo est,secundum autem illam significationem dictum est secundum quam formam in materia esse dicimus.Namque forma,si in materia sit,per seipsam nulla ratione consistit.Postquam igitur particulare accidens quid esset ostendit dicens,quod in subjecto est et de subjecto non praedicatur, et in subjecto consistentis reidiffinitionemredditdicens,quodcum in aliquo sit non sicut quædam pars,impossibileest esse sine eo in quo est.

English

But if anyone objects that accidents can change their place—for a disease, if it is held in the hand, fills the hand with the odor of the disease, so that the odor, which is an accident, can pass over into another subject—Aristotle does not say this, since an accident cannot change its place, nor did he say that it is impossible for it to be without that in which it was, but without that in which it is. For this means that it can indeed change its place, but cannot subsist without some subject. Therefore the definition of that which is in a subject is correct and complete: that they are in another not as some part, and that it is impossible for them to be without that in which they are; but this was said according to that signification according to which we say that form is in matter. For form, if it is in matter, by itself in no way subsists. Therefore, after he showed what a particular accident is by saying that it is in a subject and is not predicated of a subject, he also gives the definition of that which consists in a subject, saying that when it is in something not as some part, it is impossible for it to be without that in which it is.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:37 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ad universale accidens continenti disputatione revertitur quod definit hoc modo.Namque post ejus rei quæ in subjecto estdiffinitionem,et post particularis accidentis exempla, ad universaleaccidenstransitumfecitjinquiens alia esse quae in subjecto sint,et de subjecto prædicentur,quod scilicet accidens universale signiticel:nam quoniam de subjecto dicitur, universale est, quoniam in subjecto est, accidens; in subjecto ergo esse,et de subjecto praedicari, universale accidens monstrat.Hujus quoque complexionis convenientia proponit exempla: ait enim scientiam in subjecto esse,in anima:nam nisi anima sit in qua scit,scientia nulla est,idcirco quod scientia actus est animæ, nam ea quae sunt inanimata nihil sciunt. Hinc sequitur substantiæ particularis propositio,quam scilicet ita declarat,quod neque in subjecto sit, neque de subjecto prædicetur, nam quod in subjecto non est,substantia est, et quod de subjecto non praedicatur,parLicularitas. Utraque igitur res de subjecto non prædicariJet in subjecto non esse, particularis est substantia.Res igitur quatuor cum propria complexione non secundum propria nomina,sed secundum proprias rationes diffinitionesque contexuit. Nam pro substantia universali posuit, quod in subjecto non est,et de subjecto prædicatur: pro accidenti particulari dixit, quod in subjecto est, et de subjecto non prædicatur.

English

He returns to universal accident in the immediately following discussion, which he defines in this way. For after the definition of that thing which is in a subject, and after the examples of particular accident, he made a transition to universal accident, saying that there are other things which are in a subject and are predicated of a subject—namely, what signifies universal accident. For since it is said of a subject, it is universal; since it is in a subject, it is an accident. Therefore to be in a subject and to be predicated of a subject indicates universal accident. He also sets forth examples suited to this combination: for he says that knowledge is in a subject, in the soul; for unless there is a soul in which one knows, there is no knowledge, because knowledge is an act of the soul, for inanimate things know nothing. From this follows the proposition of particular substance, which he sets forth as follows: that it is neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject. For what is not in a subject is substance, and what is not predicated of a subject is particularity. Therefore both things—not to be predicated of a subject and not to be in a subject—belong to particular substance. He thus wove together the four things with their proper combination, not according to their proper names but according to their proper accounts and definitions. For in place of universal substance he put what is not in a subject and is predicated of a subject; in place of particular accident he said what is in a subject and is not predicated of a subject.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:38 · narrative
Source · Latin

Accidens vero universale per hoc designavit quod ait,quod et in subjecto est, et de subjecto dicitur.Pro'particulari substantia interposuit,quod nec in subjecto est,nec de subjecto praedicatur: simpliciter autem quae sunt individua et numero singularia de subjecto nullo dicuntur;in subjecto autem nibil eaprohibetesse,quaedam enim grammatica in subjecto est. Omnis particularitas aut substantia erit aut accidens;nam cum dico Socratem,individuam et particularem significavi substantiam; cum dico quamdam grammaticam, individuum et particulare accidens dixi.Individua autem sunt quæ neque in alias species dividi possunt,neque in aliaindividua.Nam quemadmodum animal dividitur in species,hominem atque equum, homo autem in singulos homines, id est in Socratem et Platonem et cæteros,sic Plato et Socrates non dividuntur in alios. Atque hoc idem de accidentibus dici convenit:nam quemadmodum scientia dividitur in species,grammaticam et rethoricam.grammatica vero ipsa in particulares grammaticas,quas scilicet particulares homines norunt, sic ipsa particularis grammatica in particulares grammaticas non secatur. Ergo individua suut quaecunque sunt numero singularia, et in nullas alias multitudines secundum species vel secundum individua dividuntur.

English

But he designated universal accident through this, that he said it is both in a subject and is said of a subject. In place of particular substance he put that which is neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject. But simply those things which are individuals and singular in number are said of no subject; yet nothing prevents them from being in a subject, for a certain grammar is in a subject. Every particularity will be either substance or accident; for when I say Socrates, I have signified an individual and particular substance; when I say a certain grammar, I have spoken of an individual and particular accident. But individuals are those which can be divided neither into other species nor into other individuals. For just as animal is divided into species, man and horse, while man is divided into individual men, that is into Socrates and Plato and the rest, so Plato and Socrates are not divided into others. And the same must be said of accidents: for just as knowledge is divided into species, grammar and rhetoric, while grammar itself is divided into particular grammars, namely those which particular men know, so that particular grammar is not cut into particular grammars. Therefore individuals are whatever things are singular in number, and are divided into no other multitudes either according to species or according to individuals.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:39 · narrative
Source · Latin

Omne individuum, quoniam particulare est, de subjecto non praedicatur; omne autem quoa de subjecto non praedicatur, aut substantia erit, ut Plato,aut accidens,ut quædam grammatica. Ex his ergo particularibus substantia scilicet atque accidenti quae de subjecto non prædicantur,substantia quidem nec in subjecto est, accidens vero in subjecto est. Ita illa individua quae substantiae Bunt in subjecto essenon poterunt,aliavero individua quæ secundum accidentisnaturamdicuntur,illain subjecto esse nihilprohibet.Atquehocestquodait:Simpliciterautem qua sunt individua et numero singularia, de nullo subjecto dicunlurin subjecto autem ea nihil prohibet eorum aliqua esse. Quaedam enim grammatica in subjecto est, de subjecto autem nullo dicitur. Hocenim maluit demonstrare, et accidentibus substantiis particularibus hoc esse commune,quod de subjecto non prsedicantur.xiocenim dixit: Simpliciter autem quae sunt individua et numero singularia, de nullo subjecto dicuntur. Subaudiendo, scilicet sive substantiae sint sive accidentia,sed non omnia individua non sunt in subjecto.Individua enim accidentia in subjecto esse nihil prohibet. Quaedam enim grammatica cum sit individua et de subjecto non prædicetur,tamen in subjecto est, id est in anima.

English

Every individual, since it is particular, is not predicated of a subject; but everything that is not predicated of a subject will be either a substance, like Plato, or an accident, like a certain piece of grammar. From these particulars, then—namely substance and accident, which are not predicated of a subject—substance indeed is not in a subject, but accident is in a subject. Thus those individuals which are substances will not be able to be in a subject, but other individuals which are spoken of according to the nature of accident, nothing prevents those from being in a subject. And this is what he says: But simply those which are individuals and singular in number are said of no subject, but nothing prevents some of them from being in a subject. For a certain piece of grammar is in a subject, but is said of no subject. For he preferred to demonstrate this, that it is common to accidents and particular substances that they are not predicated of a subject. For he said this: But simply those which are individuals and singular in number are said of no subject. By understanding, namely, whether they be substances or accidents, but not all individuals are not in a subject. For nothing prevents individual accidents from being in a subject. For a certain piece of grammar, since it is individual and is not predicated of a subject, is nevertheless in a subject, that is, in the soul.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:40 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed ut congregatim dicatur,sensus hujusmodi est, omnia quidem quaecunquesuntindividua,desubjecto quidem nullo dicuntur,sed non omnia non sunt in subjecto.Nam cum particularis substantiain subjecto non sit,ut Plato,particulare tamen accidens in subjecto est, ut quaedam grammatica in anima. Illud quoquem agna attentione notandum est,quis sit hujus ordo propositi.Namcum sint quatuor complexiones, factæ ex quatuor rebus,quarum duas natura discrepant,ut substantia et accidens, dux quantitate, ut particularitas et universalitas conjunctis compositisque his quatuor omnibus, dissentientem lateribus dispositionem fecit.Posuit enim prius substantiam universalem dicens,quod in subjecto non est et de subjecto dicitur.Post hanc primam positionem totis discrepantem rebus,rem subdiL,id eat accidens particulare,quod in subjecto esset, et de subjecto non praedicatur.

English

But to speak in summary, the sense of this is as follows: all things whatsoever that are individuals are indeed said of no subject, but not all of them are not in a subject. For while a particular substance is not in a subject, as Plato, yet a particular accident is in a subject, as a certain piece of grammar is in the soul. This too must be noted with great attention: what the order of this proposition is. For since there are four combinations, made from four things, of which two differ in nature, as substance and accident, and two in quantity, as particularity and universality, when all these four are joined and combined, it has produced a disposition that disagrees on both sides. For it placed universal substance first, saying that it is not in a subject and is said of a subject. After this first position, wholly disagreeing in its terms, it subjoined the thing opposed to it, that is, a particular accident, which is in a subject and is not predicated of a subject.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:41 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam cum accidens dixit, a substantia disgregavit, quod particulare addidit ab universali disjunxit.Rursus ex alio latere disposuit in divisione accidens universale,dicens quod in subjecto est, et de subjecto praedicatur;etultimo substantiam particularem contrariarnsuperiori accidenti dixit, quod neque in subjectoest,nequedesubjectoprsedicatursubstantiai particularitem universalitati accidentis opponens.Sed utplaniusquoddicimussit,figuramdescriptionemque subjecimus in qua superius latus substantia accidentique notavimus,reliquum particularitatis et universalitatis titulo inscripsimus,Arisiotelicam complexionem angulariter et per latera desinantes.

Quando alterum de altero prædicatur ut desubjecto,quæcunque de eo quod prædicalur dicuntur,omnia etiam de subjecto dicunlur, ut homo prædicatur de quodam homine. animal vero de homine, ergo et de quodam homine animal prædzcabitur, quidam enim homo, et homo est et animal.

English

For when he said "accident," he separated it from substance; and in adding "particular," he disjoined it from the universal. Again, from the other side, in the division he set down universal accident, saying that it is in a subject and is predicated of a subject; and lastly he called particular substance the contrary of the superior accident, because it is neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject, opposing the particularity of substance to the universality of accident. But so that what we say may be clearer, we have appended a figure and description, in which we marked the upper side with "substance" and "accident," and inscribed the remaining side with the title of particularity and universality, terminating the Aristotelian combination at the angles and along the sides.

When one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, whatever things are said of that which is predicated are all also said of the subject; for example, man is predicated of a certain man, and animal of man; therefore animal will also be predicated of a certain man. For a certain man is both a man and an animal.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:42 · narrative
Source · Latin

Cum superius de his quæ in subjecto sunt,id est de accidentibus loqueretur,diffinitionem constitutae in subjecto rei,et praeter subjectum nullo modo permanentis, in media tractatione disposuit, dicens illud esse quod neque pars esset alicujus, nec sine subjecto posset ullo modo permanere.Patefacto igitur quid sit esse in subjecto,nunc quid sit prædicari de subjecto declarat. Duobus enim modis praedicationes fiunt,uno secundum accidens,alio de subjecto: de homine namque praedicatur album,dicitur enim homo albus,rursus de eodem homiReprsedicaturanimal,dicitur enim homo animal.Sed illa prior prasdicatio,quæ est, Homo albus est, secundum accidens est,namque accidens, quod est album, de subjecto homine prædicatur,sed non in eo quod quid sit,nam cum album sit accidens,homo snbstantia, accidens de substantia in eo quod quid sit praedicari non potest,ergo ista praedicatio secundum accidens dicitur.

English

When above he was speaking about the things that are in a subject, that is, about accidents, he set out in the middle of the discussion the definition of a thing constituted in a subject and in no way remaining apart from a subject, saying that it is that which is neither a part of anything nor can in any way remain without a subject. Since, therefore, it has been made clear what it is to be in a subject, he now declares what it is to be predicated of a subject. For predications are made in two ways: one according to accident, the other of a subject. For "white" is predicated of man—for man is said to be white—and again "animal" is predicated of the same man—for man is said to be an animal. But the former predication, which is "Man is white," is according to accident; for the accident, which is white, is predicated of the subject man, but not in respect of what it is. For since white is an accident and man a substance, an accident cannot be predicated of a substance in respect of what it is. Therefore that predication is called according to accident.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:43 · narrative
Source · Latin

De subjecto vero praedicare est, quoties altera res de altera in ipsa substantia praedicatur,ut animal de homine;nam quoniam animal et substantia est,et genus hominis,idcirco in eo quod quid sit de homine praedicatur.Quare illasola de subjectopraedicari dicunturquaecunque in cujuslibetrei substantia et in diffinitione ponuntur; ergo quotiescunque hujusmodi fuerit prædicatio,ut alterum de altero ut de subjecto praedicetur,id est ut de ejus substantia dicatur, ut animal de homine, hanc proprietatem evenire necesse est, ut si de eo quod prædicatur, quidpiam ut de subjeeto,id est ejus substantia,praedicetur necessario idem hoc quod de praedicatu dicitur, dicatur etiam de praedicati subjecto, ut bomo praedicatur quidem de Socrate in eo quod quid sit. Interrogantibus enim quid sit Socrates, hominem respondemus. At vero de ipso homine in eo quod quid sit animal dicitur, in substantia enim hominis animal praedicatur,atqueita fit utanimalquidem de homine, homo vero de Socrate in eo quod quid sit,ut de subjecto praedicentur. Ergo quoniam ista consequentia,etanimal de Socrate in eo quod quid sit praedicabitur.

English

To be predicated of a subject is whenever one thing is predicated of another in its very substance, as animal of man; for since animal is both a substance and the genus of man, for that reason it is predicated of man in respect of what it is. Wherefore those things alone are said to be predicated of a subject, whatever are placed in the substance of any thing and in its definition; therefore, whenever there is a predication of this kind, such that one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, that is, is said of its substance, as animal of man, this property must necessarily result: that if anything is predicated of that which is predicated, as of a subject, that is, of its substance, then necessarily the same thing that is said of the predicate is also said of the subject of the predicate, as man is indeed predicated of Socrates in respect of what it is. For when asked what Socrates is, we answer man. But of man himself animal is said in respect of what it is, for animal is predicated in the substance of man, and so it comes about that animal is predicated of man, and man of Socrates, in respect of what it is, as of a subject. Therefore, since this consequence holds, animal will also be predicated of Socrates in respect of what it is.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:44 · narrative
Source · Latin

Potest enim dici interrogantibus quid estSocrates,animal.Ergo manifestum est quod si qua res de alia ut de subjecto praedicetur,uthomo de Socrate, de eadem vero re quae praedicatur, de homine scilicet, alia rursus superior,ut de subjecto prædicetur,ut animal necesse erit et hanc eamdem de subjecto ejus de quo ipsum dicitur praidicari,ut animal de Socrate, Socrates namque subjectus est homini,de quo animal praedicatur.Ergo constathujusmodi diffinitio quæ dicit, quoties alterum de allero praedicatur ut de subjecto, si quid sit quod de eo quod praedicatur in eo quod quid sit dici possit,hoc idem ipsum de eo quod prius subjectum erat possit praedicari.Sed fortassequisquamdicatminimeverua] esse quod dictum est,nam cum homo de Socrate praedicetur. Socrates enim homo est, de homine vero species,homo enim species esl,Socrates speciesesse non dicitur.Et rursus cum animal de homine praedicetur,de animali vero genus,animal enim enus est. homo generis vocabulo caret,non enim dicitur homo esse genus, homo enim genus non est, sed tantum species.

English

For when people ask what Socrates is, he can be called an animal. Therefore it is clear that if some thing is predicated of another as of a subject, as man of Socrates, and again something else higher is predicated of that same thing which is predicated—namely, of man—as of a subject, as animal, then it will be necessary that this same thing also be predicated of the subject of that of which it is itself said, as animal of Socrates. For Socrates is subject to man, of whom animal is predicated. Therefore the definition of this sort stands, which says: whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, if there is something that can be said of that which is predicated in respect of what it is, this same thing can also be predicated of that which was previously the subject. But perhaps someone may say that what has been said is not at all true; for when man is predicated of Socrates—for Socrates is a man—and of man, in turn, species is predicated—for man is a species—Socrates is not said to be a species. And again, when animal is predicated of man, and of animal, in turn, genus is predicated—for animal is a genus—man lacks the designation of genus; for man is not said to be a genus, since man is not a genus but only a species.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:45 · narrative
Source · Latin

His dicendum est quod minus adverterint illam esse diffinitionem de subjecto praedicationis, quae in eo quod quid sit unumquodque et in ejus substantia praedicaretur,nunc autem species de homine non in eo quod quid sit preedicatur.Neque enim Bi quishominis diffinitionem reddat speciem nominavit,sed designativum nomen est tantum, utrum de pluribus speciei differentibus pra'dicatur hoc nomen quod esthomo,an certe tantum de solis individuis. Nam quoniam de individuissolis homo prædicetur, idcirco species dicitur,et quoniam despeciedifferentibus animal dicitur,idcirco animal genus vocamus. Et sunt quodammodo nominum nomina.Quareneque genus de animali, neque species de homine, in eo quod quid sit praedicatur, sed tantum designant, quomodo homo et animal de subjectis ( ut dictum est) propriis prædicentur. Ergo non est mirandum si ad eorum subjectum qusedesubjecto dicunturejus praedicati quod de subjecto non dicitur prædicatio perveniri non potest.

English

It must be said to these people that they have paid too little attention to the fact that that definition concerns a predicate of a subject, which is predicated in respect of what something is and in respect of its substance; but now species is not predicated of man in respect of what something is. For neither did he who gives the definition of man name the species, but it is only a designative name, whether this name which is man is predicated of several things differing in species, or indeed only of individuals alone. For since man is predicated of individuals alone, for that reason it is called a species, and since animal is said of things differing in species, for that reason we call animal a genus. And they are in a certain way names of names. Wherefore neither is genus predicated of animal, nor species of man, in respect of what something is, but they only designate how man and animal are predicated of their proper subjects, as has been said. Therefore it is not to be wondered at if the predication of that predicate which is not said of a subject cannot reach their subject, which are said of a subject.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:46 · narrative
Source · Latin

Diversorum generum et non subalternatim positorum,diversæ secundum speciem sunt differentiæ fat animalis et scientiæ,animalis siquidem differentiæ sunt,ut gressibile,volatile, bipes et aquatile,scientiæ veronulla harum est, neque enim scientia a scientia differt in eo quod est bipes. Subalternorum vero generum nihil prohibet easdem esse differentias, superiora enim de inferioribus prædicantur, quare quæcunque fuerint prædicati differentiæ erunt eædem et subjecti.

Cum multis modis genus dicatur, solum quod -nunc tractari convenit assumamus. Dicitur enim genus quodde pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod quid sit praedicatur, ut animal praedicatur de homine, et de equo, et de cane, et de bove, et de caeteris, quæ omnia specie ipsa a se discreta sunt. Species vero estquoddepluribusnumero differentibusin eo quod quidJsit prædicatur, ut homo praedicatur de Catone, Socrate, Platone, Virgilio, Cicerone, et de singulis hominibus, qui specie ipsa non differunt, sed tantum a se numero distant. Pifferentia vero est quae sub eodem genere positas species propria qualitate disterminat,namcum equusethomoquantumad genus unum sint (uterque enim animal est), differentia rationalis et irrationalis utrosque disjungit ac discernit. Qualitate enim quadam rationabilitatis et irra- I tionabilitalis uterque a propriae substantiæ diffinitione dissentiunt.

English

Of different genera that are not placed under one another subordinately, the differentiae are different in species, as of animal and of knowledge. For the differentiae of animal are, for instance, walking, flying, two-footed, and aquatic; of knowledge, however, none of these is a differentia; for knowledge does not differ from knowledge in that it is two-footed. But of subalternate genera nothing prevents the same differentiae from belonging to them; for the superior genera are predicated of the inferior, and therefore whatever differentiae belong to the predicate will be the same also for the subject.

Since genus is said in many ways, let us assume only that which it is fitting to treat now. For genus is said to be that which is predicated of several things differing in species in respect of what something is, as animal is predicated of man, and of horse, and of dog, and of ox, and of the rest, all of which are distinguished from one another by their very species. But species is that which is predicated of several things differing in number in respect of what something is, as man is predicated of Cato, Socrates, Plato, Virgil, Cicero, and of individual men, who do not differ in their very species, but are distant from one another only in number. But a differentia is that which distinguishes species placed under the same genus by a proper quality; for since horse and man are one as regards genus (for each is an animal), the differentia rational and irrational separates and discerns both. For by a certain quality of rationality and irrationality each differs from the definition of its own substance.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:47 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ergo differentia est quae de pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod quale sit praedicatur. Namque haec ipsa iifferentia quæ est irrationabilitas demultis specie differentibus praedicatur, ut de cygno, etequo, et pisce, quae omniaa secum specie ipsa dissentiant, irrationabilitatis tamen qualitate conju ncta sunt. Sed non in omnibus differentia de pluribus specie differentibus praedicatur. Sunt enim quaedam quae non nisi de una specie praedicantur, ut gravitas de sola terra, levitas de solo igne, proprie dicitur. At vero nec species semper de pluribus numero differentibus praedicatur; mundi enim species de uno solo mundo dicitur, et phcenicis species de una tantum phcenice, sed idcirco ita diffinita est, quod frequentius differentia de pluribus specie differentibus praedicatur quam de uno. Eodemque modo et species frequentius invenitur de pluribus numero differentibus praedicari, quam de una tantum re ac singulari. His ita positis, sunt quaedam genera, quae generalissima nuncupantur, quibus genus inveniri non possit,sunt species quibub alias subjectas species nullus inveniet. Inter utraque autem sunt alia quæ subalterna genera nominantur, quæ superiorum quidem species sunt, posteriorum vero genera ut substantia genus quidem est generalissimum, ut ejus genus inveniri non possit, homo vero species est, ut ejus species alia reperiri non valeat.

English

Therefore a differentia is what is predicated of several things differing in species in respect of what sort of thing it is. For this very differentia which is irrationality is predicated of several things differing in species, as of the swan, the horse, and the fish, all of which differ from one another in their very species, yet are joined by the quality of irrationality. But a differentia is not in all cases predicated of several things differing in species. For there are certain ones that are predicated of one species only, as heaviness is properly said of earth alone, lightness of fire alone. But neither is a species always predicated of several things differing in number; for the species of the world is said of one world only, and the species of the phoenix of one phoenix only. But for this reason it has been so defined, because a differentia is more frequently predicated of several things differing in species than of one. And in the same way a species is found more frequently to be predicated of several things differing in number than of one thing only and singular. These things being so posited, there are certain genera which are called most general, for which no genus can be found; there are species under which no one will find other species subordinated. Between both, however, there are others which are named subaltern genera, which are species of the higher ones and genera of the lower: as substance is indeed a most general genus, so that no genus of it can be found; but man is a species, so that no other species of it can be discovered.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:48 · narrative
Source · Latin

Animal vero ad substantiam quidem species est, ad hominem vero genus. Decem igitur praedicamentorum significatio nihil aliud demonstrat nisi rerum decem genera quae generaiissimanominamus.Ergo quoties genera generalissima discrepant,eorum quoque species discrepabunt; et quoties species discrepant, quoniam differentiis disjunguntur atque informantur, differentiae quoque diversarum specierum discrepabunt. Animal namque et scientia, quoniam est animal substantia, scientia vero ad aliquid, quoniamquegenus animalis est substantia, et genus scientiae est ad aliquid, omni substantiae a se ratione discreta sunt, et differentiae quoque scientiæ atque animalis omnibus qualitatibus disjunguntur.Edtnamque differentia animalis, bipes et quadrupes, animal enim ab alio animali differt, quod hoc quidem bipes sit, ut homo vel avis, illud vero quaarupes, ut equus atque bos; illud vero mUltipes, ut formica vel apis. Sed scientia differentias hujusmodi non habet, neque enim scientia a scientia differt in eo quod bipes est. Quare constat quoties diversa sunt genera, specierum quoque differentias esse discretas. At boc est quod ait. Diversorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diversas secundum speciem differentias esse. Et hoc exempli adjectione firmavit dicens: Animalis et scientiae diversas esse differentias, nam cum sit bipes animalis differentia, scientiae non est.

English

But animal is a species in respect of substance, and a genus in respect of man. Therefore the signification of the ten categories demonstrates nothing other than the ten genera of things which we call most general. Therefore, as often as the most general genera differ, their species also will differ; and as often as species differ, since they are distinguished and informed by differentiae, the differentiae of diverse species also will differ. For animal and knowledge, since animal is substance and knowledge is in relation to something, and since the genus of animal is substance and the genus of knowledge is in relation to something, they are distinguished from one another by every account of substance, and the differentiae of knowledge and of animal are also disjoined by all qualities. For the differentiae of animal are biped and quadruped; for animal differs from another animal in that this one is biped, as man or bird, that one quadruped, as horse and ox, and another many-footed, as ant or bee. But knowledge does not have differentiae of this sort; for knowledge does not differ from knowledge in that it is biped. Wherefore it is evident that as often as the genera are diverse, the differentiae of the species are also distinct. And this is what he says: that of diverse genera and those not placed under one another alternately, the differentiae are diverse in species. And he confirmed this by adding an example, saying: the differentiae of animal and of knowledge are diverse, for while biped is a differentia of animal, it is not of knowledge.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:49 · narrative
Source · Latin

Et hoc quidem de diversis generibus dictum est, id est, quae subalterna non sunt. Quod si subalterna sunt genera, nihil prohibet alias easdem esse differentias, alias diversas, ut avis est species animalis, et rursusest genus corvi, et est subalternum genus, avis. Sed animalis differentiae sunt rationalis atque irrationalis, avis vero differentia rationalis non est. Nulla enim avis ab alia avi differt, quod sit rationalis; ergo hoc loco non eunt eaedem subalternorum generum differentiae. Si quis vero has generis, id estanimalis differentias dicat, ut animalium alia sunt quae pascantur herbis, alia quæ seminibus, alia quæ carnihus, hæ differentiæ conveniunt in subalterno genere, videlicet in avi; namque avium sunt aliae quae seminibus vescuntur, aliae quae herbis, aliae quae carnibus, ut vultur et milvus; ergo in subalternis generibus nihil prohibet easdem esse differentias, et iterum discrepare; hoc autem idcirco evenit, quia quae de praedicato dicuntur,possunt de subjecto praedicari. Quare quod dicitur de genere, potest etiam dici de specie, atque hoc est quod ait: Subaiteraorumvero generum nihil prohibet easdem esse differentias.

English

And this indeed has been said concerning different genera, that is, those which are not subaltern. But if they are subaltern genera, nothing prevents some of the same differentiae from being the same and others different, as bird is a species of animal, and again is a genus of crow, and bird is a subaltern genus. But the differentiae of animal are rational and irrational, whereas rational is not a differentia of bird. For no bird differs from another bird in being rational; therefore in this case the differentiae of subaltern genera are not the same. But if someone calls these differentiae of the genus, that is, of animal, such that some animals feed on grasses, others on seeds, others on flesh, these differentiae do belong to a subaltern genus, namely to bird; for of birds, some feed on seeds, others on grasses, others on flesh, as the vulture and the kite. Therefore in subaltern genera nothing prevents the same differentiae from belonging and again from being absent. But this happens for the reason that things which are said of a predicate can be predicated of a subject. Wherefore what is said of a genus can also be said of a species, and this is what he says: But of subaltern genera nothing prevents the same differentiae from belonging.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:50 · narrative
Source · Latin

Superiora enim de inferioribusgeneribus prasdicantur; sed cum diceret nihil prohibeteasdem esse differentias, hoc quodam modo voluit de monstrare esselquasdam easdem differentias, alias vero posse esse diversas, cui rem contrariam intulisse videtur, cum dicit Quare quaecunque prædicati differentiae fuerint, eaedem erunt etiam subjecti: nam cum illic dixisset, nihil prohibet esse easdem differentias generum subalternorum, hic omnes easdem esse declarat, dicit enim: Quaecunque fuerint differentiae praedicati, easdem etiam subjecti esse; atque haec res plures maximis illigavit erroribus, ut emendandum crederent locum non ut esset ita. Quare quaecunque praedicati differentiæ fuerint, eaedem eruntetiam subjecti, sed ut hoc modo. Quare quaecunque subjecti differentiae fuerint, easdem erunt etiam praedicati. Sed hoc adjiciendum est, neque enim fieri potest ut in rem superiorem prædicatio posterioris redundet. Nam cum dicitur, quascunque subjecti fuerint differentiæ, eaedem erunt praedicati, hoc scilicet significatur, ut praedicatio subjecti redeat, in praedicatum, quod fieri non potest. Sed dicendum est quod sunt aliae differentias quae dicuntur completiva? praedicati et cujuslibet illius speciem informantes,quæ communi nomine specificæ nominantur. Nam cum dico animatum et sensibile, si substantiae conjungantur, diffinitionem et speciem mox animalis efficiunt.

English

For superior genera are predicated of inferior genera. But when he said that nothing prevents the same differentiae from being the same, he meant in a certain way to show that some differentiae are the same, while others can be different. Yet he seems to have introduced something contrary to this when he says: "Wherefore, whatever differentiae belong to the predicate, the same will also belong to the subject." For whereas there he had said that nothing prevents the differentiae of subaltern genera from being the same, here he declares that all are the same; for he says: "Whatever differentiae belong to the predicate, the same also belong to the subject." And this matter has entangled many in the greatest errors, so that they believed the passage must be emended so as not to read as it does: "Wherefore, whatever differentiae belong to the predicate, the same will also belong to the subject," but rather in this way: "Wherefore, whatever differentiae belong to the subject, the same will also belong to the predicate." But this must be added: for it cannot happen that the predication of the latter redounds upon the superior. For when it is said, "Whatever differentiae belong to the subject, the same will belong to the predicate," this is certainly meant: that the predication of the subject returns into the predicate, which cannot happen. But it must be said that there are other differentiae which are called completive of the predicate and which inform the species of anything whatsoever, and these are called by the common name "specific." For when I say "animate" and "sensible," if they are joined to "substance," they immediately produce the definition and species of "animal.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:51 · narrative
Source · Latin

Animal enim est substantia animata sensibilis, atque hæ differentiae dicuntur specificæ et completivae. Sunt autem aliae qum ipsæ quidem nihil complent, nec ullam speciem reddunt, sed genus tantum dividunt, ut rationale et irrationale, hæc enim dividunt genus, id est animal, Animal enim rationali differentia irrationalique dividitur. Ergo illae quae sunt generis divisivse differentiae possunt aliquoties eaedem esse,possunt aliquoties non eædem, ut animalis, quoniam divisibilis est differentia quae est rationale, potest eam non habere avis, quae est subalternum genus. Et rursus easdem divisibiles habere potest, ut easdem quas superius diximus. Nam cum dividant animal differentiae, quae carnibus, herbis, et seminibus vescuntur, eaedem possunt esse subalterni generis, id est avis; ergo hee divisibiles possuntetiam esse diversæ.Illæ vero quæ completivæ et specificæ sunt, aliquando non praedicari de subjecto non possunt. Ut quoniam animal habet differentias completivas et suae speciei effectivas, sensi. bile scilicet et animatum, hae differentiae de homine quod est subjectum animalis non prædicari non possunt.

English

For animal is a substance, animate and sensible, and these differentiae are called specific and completive. But there are others which themselves complete nothing, nor produce any species, but only divide the genus, such as rational and irrational; for these divide the genus, that is, animal. For animal is divided by the differentia rational and irrational. Therefore those which are divisive differentiae of a genus can sometimes be the same, sometimes not the same, as of animal, since the differentia which is rational is divisible, a bird, which is a subaltern genus, can fail to have it. And again it can have the same divisive differentiae, such as those we mentioned above. For since the differentiae which feed on flesh, herbs, and seeds divide animal, the same can belong to a subaltern genus, that is, to bird; therefore these divisive differentiae can also be diverse. But those which are completive and specific cannot sometimes fail to be predicated of a subject. For since animal has completive differentiae and those which effect its species, namely sensible and animate, these differentiae cannot fail to be predicated of man, who is a subject of animal.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:52 · narrative
Source · Latin

Omnes enim specificae differentiae de his praedicantur, quorum speciem complent, ut de animali praedicatur sensibile et animatum, et hoc ut de subjecto.In substantia enim animalis utraque prædicantur,sed animal prædicatur de homine, ut de subjecto; necesse est ergo animatum ae homine praedicariutdesubjecto.Hocest, euim quod superius praemisit cum diceret: Quando alterum de altero praedicatur ut de subjecto, quaecunque de eo quod praedicatur dicuntur,omnia etiam de subjecto dicuntur; atque noc ommbus generibus recte constat intelligi. Ergo divisibiles differentiae possunt aliquando cum subjectisessecommunes,aliquando diversae, specificae vero et completivae cum subjectis communes non esse non possunt. ergoAristoteles ait, Subalternorum generumnihilprohibereeasdem esse differentias, divisibiles differentias easdem esse nihil prohibere putandum est,qua e possunt esse etiam diversae.Quod ait vero: Quæcunque praedicati differentiae fuerint, eaedem erunt etiam subjecti, de specificis intelligendum est: quae cum speciem cujuslibet in forment, et de eo quod informant, ut de subjecto,prædicentur,ad quodcunque ut subjecto prædicaturillud quod ipsae differentiæ informant, de eo ut desubjectopraedicabuntur,etdeeo nonpraedicarinon possunt. Quare nihil est in hujusmodi theoremate quod ullo modo debeat emendari.

English

For all specific differentiae are predicated of those things whose species they complete, as sensible and animate are predicated of animal, and this as of a subject. For both are predicated in the substance of animal, but animal is predicated of man as of a subject; therefore it is necessary that animate also be predicated of man as of a subject. This is, moreover, what he premised above when he said: When one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, whatever things are said of that which is predicated, all are also said of the subject; and this holds rightly to be understood in all genera. Therefore divisible differentiae can sometimes be common with their subjects, sometimes diverse; but specific and completive differentiae cannot fail to be common with their subjects. Therefore Aristotle says that nothing prevents the same differentiae from belonging to subaltern genera; and it must be thought that nothing prevents divisible differentiae from being the same, which can also be diverse. But what he says: Whatever differentiae belong to the predicate, the same will also belong to the subject, is to be understood of specific differentiae: since when they inform the species of anything, and are predicated of that which they inform as of a subject, then whatever that which these differentiae inform is predicated of as of a subject, of that they will be predicated as of a subject, and cannot not be predicated of it. Wherefore there is nothing in a theorem of this kind that ought in any way to be amended.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:53 · narrative
Source · Latin

Eorum quidem quæ secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur, singulum aut substantiam significat, aut quantitatem, aut qualitatem, aut ad aliquid, aut ubi, aut quando, aut situm, aut habere, aut facere, aut pati. Est autem substantia ut figuraliter dicatur, ut homo, equus. Quantitas, ut bicubitum, tricubitum. Qualitas, ut album, grammaticum. Ad aliquid, ut duplum, dimidium, majus, minus. Ubi, ut in lyceo, in foro. Quando, ut heri, superiori anno. Situm, ut sedet,jacet. Habere, ut calceatus, armatus. Facere, ut secare, urere. Pati, ut secarx, uri. Singula igitur eorum quæ dicta sunt, •• i I •** ipsa quidem secunaum se in nulla affirmatione dicuntur, aut negalione, horum autem ad invicem affirmatio vel negatio fit complexione. Videtur autemomnis at. firmatio vel negatio, vel vera vel falsa esse: eorum autem quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur, singula neque vera, neque falsa sunt, ut homo, album, currit, vincit.

English

Of those things that are said without any combination, each signifies either substance, or quantity, or quality, or relation, or where, or when, or position, or having, or doing, or being affected. Substance is, to speak figuratively, as man, horse. Quantity, as two cubits, three cubits. Quality, as white, grammatical. Relation, as double, half, greater, less. Where, as in the Lyceum, in the forum. When, as yesterday, last year. Position, as sits, lies. Having, as shod, armed. Doing, as to cut, to burn. Being affected, as to be cut, to be burned. Each of the things that have been said, then, in itself is said in no affirmation or negation, but affirmation or negation of these comes about by combination with one another. Every affirmation or negation seems to be either true or false; but of those things that are said without any combination, each is neither true nor false, as man, white, runs, conquers.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:54 · narrative
Source · Latin

Post parvissimam in quatuor enumerationem, id est in substantiam, accidens, universalitatem, particularitatem, nunc est de partitione maxima tractaturus, quai fit in decem; hac enim enumeratione major non potest inveniri, neque enim undecim prsdicamenta poterunt inveniri, nec ultra decem ullo modo aliquod genus recte excogitari potest quare facit.bujusmodienumerationem.sed non divisionem. Divisio namque fere est generis in species; prsedicamentorum vero, quoniam genus unum non habent, divisio esse non potest, sed potius enumeratio est. Sunt vero quidam qui contendunt recte enumerationem non esse dispositam, alii namque ut supervacuaquaedam demunt, alii ut curto operi addunt, alii vero permutant, quosnimirumnon recte sentirealio nobis opere dicendum est; ait autem: Eorum quae secundumnullamcomplexionem diountur. Adeo non de rebus, sed de vocibus tractaturus est, ut diceret Dicuntur. Res enim proprie non dicuntur, sed voces: et quod addidit,singulum aut substantium significat, late patet eum de vocibus disputare; non enim res, sed voces significant, significantur autem res. Sine complexione vero dicuntur(ut dictum est)quæcunque singulariintellectu et voce proferuntur; secundum complexionem vero quaecunque aliquaconjunctione vel accidentia copulatione miscentur.

English

After the briefest enumeration into four, that is, into substance, accident, universality, and particularity, he is now about to treat of the greatest division, which is made into ten; for no greater enumeration than this can be found, nor can eleven categories be found, nor beyond ten can any genus be rightly conceived in any way. Wherefore he makes an enumeration of this kind, but not a division. For a division is generally of a genus into species; but of the categories, since they do not have one genus, there cannot be a division, but rather an enumeration. There are some, however, who contend that the enumeration has not been rightly arranged: for some remove certain things as superfluous, others add to the work as though it were deficient, and others change things; that they evidently do not think rightly must be discussed by us in another work. But he says: Of those things which are said according to no combination. He is about to treat not of things, but of words, to such an extent that he says "are said." For things are not properly said, but words; and what he added, "each signifies either substance," makes it abundantly clear that he is disputing about words; for not things but words signify, and things are signified. But those things are said without combination (as has been said) whatever are uttered by a single act of understanding and voice; but according to combination, whatever are mixed by some conjunction or by the copulation of accidents.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:55 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed quid ex iis quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur efficitur, ipse demonstrat cum dicit: Singula igitur eorum quae dicta sunt, ipsa quidem secundum se in nullaaffirmationedicuntur, horum autem ad se invicem complexioneaffirmatio fit; videturenim omnis affirmatio vel falsa esse vel vera. Eorum autem quæ secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur, neque verum quidquam, neque falsum est, ut homo, album, currit, vincit. Significat ergo et hic ea quae sine ulla complexione dicuntur affirmationis vim non obtinere. Si quiR enim dicat homo, vel album; vel dei cem, vel quidlibet simplici modo, in eo neque verum aliquid inveniet,neque falsum,sed omnis affirmatio vel vera vel falsa est. Igitur universaliter pronuntiat praedicamenta affirmationis ratione penitus non teneri: sed haec eadem si cum quadam complexione conjuncta sint, fieri propositiones necesse est, quae in se verum falsumve contineant. Sed non omnis complexio propositionem facit,nec si dixero, Socrates in foro, idcirco jam propositio est; sed si quis dicat, Socrates in foro ambulat, tunc fit propositio, quae autaffirmatio est aut negatio. Affirmationesautem et negationes, vel verævidentur esse vel falsae: atque ideo quodcunque neque verum neque falsum est, illud propositio non est.

English

But what is produced from those things which are said without any combination, he himself demonstrates when he says: Each of those things which have been said, then, is itself indeed said in no affirmation according to itself, but from the combination of these with one another an affirmation comes about; for every affirmation seems either to be false or true. But of those things which are said without any combination, nothing is either true or false, as man, white, runs, conquers. He signifies therefore here also that those things which are said without any combination do not obtain the force of an affirmation. For if anyone says man, or white, or runs, or anything at all in a simple manner, in it he will find nothing true or false, but every affirmation is either true or false. Therefore he pronounces universally that the categories are not at all held by the nature of an affirmation; but if these same things are joined with some combination, propositions must come about, which contain in themselves something true or false. But not every combination makes a proposition, nor if I say, Socrates in the forum, is it for that reason already a proposition; but if anyone says, Socrates walks in the forum, then a proposition comes about, which is either an affirmation or a negation. But affirmations and negations seem either to be true or false; and therefore whatever is neither true nor false, that is not a proposition.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:56 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ergo quadam complexione exuis quaesecundum nullam complexionem dicuntur veritas falsitasque conficitur.Affirmationem autem solam nunc Aristoteles interposuit, idcirco quod omnis affirmatio prior est; hoc enim negatio tollit, quod affirmatio ante constituit: prius quidem secundum significationem, sed non secundum genus, quod alio liquebit loco. Maxime autem monstrat Aristoteles se non de rebus, sed de vocibus tractaturum,quod ait: Horum autem ad se invicem complexione affirmatio fit; non enin: rerum complexione fit affirmatio vel negatio, sed sermonum, nec in rebus est veritas et falsitas, sed in intellectibus atque opinionibus, et post hæc in vocibus atque sermonibus. Atque hæc hactenus. Secundum complexionem ergo sunt quaecunque ex integris compositis fiunt, ut Socrates ambulat, nam et Socrates et ambulat uterque integer sermo est, et conjunctus affirmationem facit.At vero si quis dicat flammiger, vel multisonus,vel fluctivagus,secundum complexionem non erit ista prolatio, idcicco quod ex neutris integris factum est. Horum autem decem prædicameutorumdiffinitionesinveneri nonpossunt,idcirco quod ea quæ significant generalissima sunt.Substantia enim et quantitas,etqualitas nulli unquam generi videntur esse subjecta.

English

Therefore by a certain combination, from things which are said according to no combination, truth and falsehood are produced. But Aristotle has now interposed affirmation alone, for the reason that every affirmation is prior; for negation removes what affirmation first established: prior indeed according to signification, but not according to genus, which will be made clear in another place. But Aristotle especially shows that he will treat not of things but of words, when he says: From the combination of these with one another affirmation comes about; for it is not from the combination of things that affirmation or negation comes about, but of words, nor is truth and falsehood in things, but in intellects and opinions, and after these in words and speeches. And thus far on these matters. According to combination, therefore, are whatever things come about from complete components, as Socrates walks; for both Socrates and walks are each a complete expression, and joined together make an affirmation. But if anyone should say flame-bearing, or many-sounding, or wave-wandering, this utterance will not be according to combination, for the reason that it is made from neither complete part. But the definitions of these ten predicaments cannot be found, for the reason that the things which they signify are most general. For substance and quantity and quality seem never to be subject to any genus.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:57 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quare quoniam diffinitio omnis a genere ducitur,genus quod alii generi subjectum non est a diffinitione relinquitur.Sed nunc quidem omnium praedicamentorum convenientia dixit exempla, post vero latius de unoquoque tractabitur: et quoniam diffinitio inveniri nulla potest, quibusdam proprietatibusinformantur,quare quoniam de his dictum est plene, ad tractatum subs- J tantiae transeamus.

DE SUBSTANTIA.

Substantia autem quæ proprie et principaliter et maxime dicitur,est quæ neque de subjectodicitur,neque in subjecto est,ut aliquis homo, vel aliquis equus. Secundae autem substantiæ dicuntur species, in quibus illæ quæ principalitersubsiantim dicuntur, insunt. Et hæ quidem et harum specierum genera, ul aliquis homo, in specie quidem est in homine,genus vero speciei,animal esl.Secundæ ergo substantiæ hæ dicuntur, ut est homo atque animaL

English

Wherefore, since every definition is derived from a genus, the genus which is not subject to another genus is left out of definition. But for now he has given examples of the agreement of all the categories; afterwards, however, there will be a fuller treatment of each one. And since no definition can be found, they are informed by certain properties. Wherefore, since these things have been fully discussed, let us pass on to the treatment of substance.

ON SUBSTANCE.

Substance, however, which is properly and primarily and most of all called substance, is that which is neither said of a subject nor is in a subject, as some man or some horse. Secondary substances, however, are called the species in which those things that are primarily called substances are present. And these, and the genera of these species—as some man is in the species man, and the genus of the species is animal. Therefore these are called secondary substances, as is man and animal.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:58 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quaeritur cur prædicamentorum tractatum a substantiis inchoaverit,nam quoniam omnis res aut in subjecto est, aut subjecto non est, quidquidinsubjectoest, eget subjecto,quoniam in propriis natura non potest consistere: et quoniam rebus omnibus substantia subjecta est, nibil eorum quæ sunt in subjecto praeter substantiam poterit permanere.Sed prior illa natura est, sine qua alia esse non possunt, quocirca prior naturaliter videtur esse substantia; non absurde igitur in disputatione quod prius per naturam fuit, prius etiam sumpsit, et diffinitionem quidem substantiae proferre non potuit, sed post exemplum superius datum descriptionem quamdam profert qua quid sit ipsa substantia queamus agnoscere: hoc est autem,non esse in subjectojsubstantia enim in subjecto non est. Facit autem quamdam substantiarum divisionem cum dicit,alias primas esse substantias, alias secundas: primas vocans individuas,secundas vero individuarum speciesel genera: Ergo cum primis secundisque subtantiis commune sit non esse in subjecto,additum primis substantiis, de subjectis non prædicari, primas substantias a secundis substantiis separat;substantia enim ind ividua, in eo quod est substantia, in subjecto non est: quod autem individua est, de subjecto non prædicatur.

English

It is asked why he began the treatment of the categories from substances. For since every thing either is in a subject or is not in a subject, whatever is in a subject needs a subject, because it cannot consist in its own nature; and since substance is underlying all things, nothing of those things which are in a subject will be able to remain without substance. But that nature is prior, without which other things cannot exist; wherefore substance seems to be prior by nature. Not unreasonably, therefore, in the discussion he took up first what was first by nature, and indeed he was unable to set forth a definition of substance, but after the example given above he sets forth a certain description by which we may recognize what substance itself is: that is, not to be in a subject; for substance is not in a subject. He also makes a certain division of substances when he says that some are primary substances, others secondary: calling the individual ones primary, but the species or genera of individuals secondary. Therefore, since it is common to primary and secondary substances not to be in a subject, there is added to primary substances that they are not predicated of subjects, which separates primary substances from secondary substances; for an individual substance, in that it is substance, is not in a subject; but in that it is individual, it is not predicated of a subject.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:59 · narrative
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Sunt ergo primae substantiæ quae neque in subjecto sunt, neque de subjecto dicuntur, ut est Socrates vel Plato.Hienim quoniam substantiae sunt, in subjecto nullo sunt. Quoniam vero particulares individuique sunt, ne nullo subjecto prædicantur. Secundae vero substantiæ sunt, quibus commune est cum primis substantiis, quod in subjecto non sunt, proprium vero quod de subjecto prædicantur, quae secundae substantiae sunt universales, ut est homo atqueanimal; homunamque etanimal in nullo sunt subjecto, sed de subjecto aliquo prædicantur.Sunt igitur prima? substantiae particulares,secundæ universales.Proprie autem substantias individuas dicit, quod hominem quidem idem ipsam speciem,etanimal, quod est genus, non nisi ex individuorum cognitione colligimus.Quare quoniam ex singulorum sensibus generalitas intellecta est, merito proprias substantiae individua et singulanominantur.Principaliter vero individuas substantias dictae sunt, quod omne accidens prius in individua, post vero in secundassubstantias venit Nam quoniam Aristarchus grammaticus est homo vero est Aristarchus, est homogrammaticus: itapriusomne accidensinindividuum venit, secundo vero loco etiam in species generaque substantiarum accidens illud venire putabitur. Recte igitur quod prius subjectum est, hoc substantia principaliter appellatur.

English

Therefore the primary substances are those which are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, as is Socrates or Plato. For in that they are substances, they are in no subject. But in that they are particular and individual, they are predicated of no subject. Secondary substances, however, are those which have this in common with primary substances, that they are not in a subject, but have this as their own property, that they are predicated of a subject; these secondary substances are universals, as is man and animal; and man and animal are in no subject, but are predicated of some subject. Therefore the primary substances are particular, the secondary universal. But he properly calls individual substances [primary], because man indeed, that is the species itself, and animal, which is the genus, we gather only from the cognition of individuals. Wherefore, since generality is understood from the senses of singulars, individuals and singulars are rightly called proper substances. But individual substances are said to be principal, because every accident comes first in individuals, and afterward in secondary substances. For since Aristarchus is a grammarian, and Aristarchus is a man, and a man is a grammarian: so every accident comes first in the individual, but in the second place that accident will be thought to come also in the species and genera of substances. Rightly, therefore, that which is the prior subject is called substance principally.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:60 · narrative
Source · Latin

Maxime autem substantia prima dicitur, idcirco quod quae maxime subjecta est rebus aliis, ea maxime substantia dici potest: maxime autem subjecta est prima substantia; omnia enim de primis substantiis dicuntur,aut primis substantiis insunt, ut generaetspecies: namque et genera et species praedicantur de propriis individuis, ut animal atque homo praedicantur de Socrate, id est secundæ substantiæ de primis: sin vero sint accidentia, in primis substantiis principaliter sunt. Quare quoniam et accidentia in primis substantiis principaliter sunt,et secundæ substantiae de primis substantiis praedicantur,prima' substantiae secundissubstantiisaccidentibusquesubjectae sunt. Quare quoniam istae maxime subjectae sunt et accidentium subsistentice,et secundarum substantiarum prædicationi,idcirco maxime substantias nuncupantur. Dicit autem non omnis species neque omnia genera, secundas esse substantias, sed eas tantum quae primas substantias continerent, ut est homo atque animal; homo namque continet Socratem, id est aliquam individuam substantiam.

English

But primary substance is most of all called substance, for the reason that what is most of all subject to other things can most of all be called substance; and primary substance is most of all subject; for all things are either said of primary substances or are in primary substances, as genera and species: for both genera and species are predicated of their own individuals, as animal and man are predicated of Socrates, that is, secondary substances of primary substances; but if they are accidents, they are principally in primary substances. Wherefore, since both accidents are principally in primary substances, and secondary substances are predicated of primary substances, primary substances are subject to secondary substances and to accidents. Wherefore, since these are most of all subject both to the subsistence of accidents and to the predication of secondary substances, for that reason they are called most of all substances. But he says that not every species nor all genera are secondary substances, but only those which contain primary substances, as is man and animal; for man contains Socrates, that is, some individual substance.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:61 · narrative
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Animal vero continet individuum speciemque,id est bominem et aliquem hominem.Quare genera et species quas de primissubstantiispraedicantur,ipsassecundas putat ■ esse substantias; hoc autem hoc modo ait: Secundae autem substantiae dicuntur in quibus speciebus illæ quae principalitersubstantia e dicuntur insunt: baeo et harum specierum genera, et inde convenientia ponit exempla, ac si diceret: Non omnia genera neque omnes substantias dico,sed eas tantum species in quibus iridividua illa, id est primae substantiae sunt, et harum specierum,id estquae continent pri. mas substantias, genera. Hoc autem idcirco dictum videtur, ne quis colorem quod genus est, vel album quod est species, secundas putet. esse substantias, isia enim primas sub se non continent: Sed dicat aliquis quemadmodum primaepoteruntessesubstantiæ individuæ,cum omne quod prius est sublatum auferat id quod est posterius,posterioribus vero sublatis priora non pereant?homo namque si pereat, Socrates quoque sit continuo periturus; si vero Socrates interierit, homo continuo non peribit.Si igitur,sublatis generibuset speciebus, individua perimuntur, sublatis individuis, generas, speciesque permanent, magisprimassubstantiasspeciesetgenera nominari dignum fuit.Sed hoc modo individuorum natura non recte accipitur. Neque enim cuncta individuorum substantia in uno Socrate est, vel quolibet uno homine, sed in omnibus singulis.

English

But "animal" contains both the individual and the species, that is, man and some particular man. Wherefore he thinks that the genera and species which are predicated of primary substances are themselves secondary substances; and this he states in this way: "Secondary substances are said to be those in which the species that are called primary substances are present, and the genera of these species." And from this he sets down fitting examples, as if he were saying: I do not mean all genera nor all substances, but only those species in which those individuals, that is, primary substances, are present, and the genera of these species, that is, of those which contain the primary substances. But this seems to have been said for the reason that no one should think that color, which is a genus, or white, which is a species, are secondary substances; for these do not contain primary substances under themselves. But someone may say: how can individual things be primary substances, since everything that is prior, when removed, takes away what is posterior, but when posterior things are removed, prior things do not perish? For if man perishes, Socrates too will immediately perish; but if Socrates dies, man will not immediately perish. If, therefore, when genera and species are removed, individuals are destroyed, but when individuals are removed, genera and species remain, then species and genera would more deservedly have been called primary substances. But in this way the nature of individuals is not rightly understood. For the whole substance of individuals is not in one Socrates, or in any one man, but in all and each singly.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:62 · narrative
Source · Latin

Genera namque et species non exuno singulo intollecta sunt, sed ex omnibus singulis individuis,mentis ratione concepta. Semper etiam quæ sensibus propinquiora sunt; ea etiam proxime nuncupanda vocabulis arbitramur. Qui enim primus hominem dixit, non illum qui ex singulis hominibus conficitur, concepit, sed animo quemdam singularem atqueindividuum cuihominis nomen imponeret.Ergo,sublatis singulis hominibus, homo non remanet,et,sublatis singulis animalibus, animal interibit. Quocirca quoniam in hoc libro de vocabulorum significatione tractatus hahetur, ea quibus vocabula prius posita sunt, merito primas substantias nuncupavit: prius autem illis vocabula suntindita,quæpriu5 subsensibuscaderepotuerunt. Sensibus vero objiciuntur prima individua, merito igitur ea prima in divisione posuit. Eodem quoque modo illaquaestio solviturquæ dicit Cum naturaliter primæ intellectibiles sint substantiæ,ut Deus et animus,curnon hasprimassubstantias nuncupaverit? Quoniam hic de nominibus tractatus habetur, nomina autem primo illis indita sunt quae principaliter sensibus fuere subjecta, posteriora vero in nominibus ponendis putantur quaecunque ad in.

English

For genera and species are not understood from one single individual, but are conceived by the mind's reason from all individual instances. Moreover, we always judge that those things which are closer to the senses are also to be named first by words. For the one who first called something "man" did not conceive that man which is composed from individual men, but rather a certain singular and individual being in his mind, to which he would assign the name "man." Therefore, with individual men removed, man does not remain, and with individual animals removed, animal will perish. Wherefore, since in this book the discussion concerns the signification of words, those things to which words were first applied he rightly called primary substances; but words were first imposed on those things which could first fall under the senses. But primary individuals are presented to the senses; rightly, therefore, he placed them first in the division. In the same way, that question is also resolved which asks: Since naturally the primary intelligible substances are, such as God and mind, why did he not call these primary substances? Because here the discussion concerns names, and names were first imposed on those things which were principally subject to the senses, while whatever things pertain to the intelligible are thought to be later in the assigning of names.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:63 · narrative
Source · Latin

telligibilem pertinent incorporalitatem; quare quoniam in hoc opera principaliter de nominibustractatus est, de individuis vero substantiis quae primae sensibus subjacent prima sunt dicta vocabula in opere quo de vocabulis tractabatur, merito individuae sensibilesque substantiae primæ substantiae sunt positae. Cum autem tres substaotiae sint, materia, species, et quae ex utriusque conficitur undique composita et compacta substantia, hic neque de sola specie, neque de sola materia, sed de utrisque mistis compositisque proposuit. Partes autem substantiæ incompositæ et simplices sunt,ex qui bus ipsa substantiaconficitur,species etmateria, quas postpertransitum nominat dicens,substantiarum partes et ipsa esse substantias, atque hæc hactenus. Nunc expositionis cursum ad sequentia convertamus.

Manifestum est autem ex iis quse dicta sunt quoniam eorum quæ de subjecto dicunturjiecesse est et nomen et rationem de subjecto prædicari, ut homo de subjecto aliquo homine prædicatur: prædicatur quoque nomen ipsius,hominem enim de aliquo homine prædicabis. Ratio quoque hominis de subjecto aliquo homine prædicabitur: quidam enim homo et homo est et animal, quare etnomen et ratio prædicabitur de subjecto. Eorum vero quae in subjecto sunt, in pluribus quidem neque nomen de subjecto neque razo prædicabitur.

English

to intelligible incorporeality. Wherefore, since in this work the discussion is principally about names, but about individual substances, which are primary and lie beneath the senses, the first words were spoken in the work in which names were discussed, rightly individual and sensible substances have been posited as primary substances. But since there are three substances—matter, species, and the substance composed and compacted from both on every side—he here proposed to treat neither of species alone nor of matter alone, but of both mixed and composed together. Now the parts of an uncompounded and simple substance are those from which the substance itself is made, namely species and matter, which after the transition he names, saying that the parts of substances are themselves also substances. And so much for this. Now let us turn the course of exposition to what follows.

It is evident, moreover, from what has been said that of those things which are said of a subject, both the name and the definition must necessarily be predicated of the subject, as man is predicated of some subject man; his name also is predicated, for you will predicate man of some man. The definition also of man will be predicated of some subject man; for a certain man is both man and animal, wherefore both the name and the definition will be predicated of the subject. But of those things which are in a subject, in most cases neither the name nor the definition will be predicated of the subject.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:64 · narrative
Source · Latin

In aliquibus autem nomen quidem nihil prohibet interdum prædicari de subjeclo; rationem vero impossibile est prædicari, ut album, cum in subjecto sit in corpore, prædicatur de subjecto: dicitur enim corpus album, ratio veroalbinunquam de corpore prædicabitur. Alia autem omnia aut de subjectis dicuntur principalibus substantiis, aut in subjectis eisdem sunt: hoc autem manifestum est ex his quae per singula proponentur, ut animal de homine praedicatur, ergo de aliquo homine; nam si de nullo aliquorum hominum, neque omnino de homine. Rursus color in corpore est, ergo et in aliquo corpore; nam si non in aliquo singulorum,nec omnino in corpore. Quare alia omnia aut de subjectis principalibus subslantiis dicuntur, aut in subjectis eisdem sunt. Non existentibus ergo primis substantiis impossibile est esse aliquid aliorum.

Omnia quæcunquedictasunt vel ill subjecto sunt, vel de subjecto praedicantur, sed non omnia quaecunque in subjecto sunt,desubjectis propriis dicuntur, namque quod in subjecto aliquo est,deproprio subjecto praedicatur: ut album de corpore praedicatur,diciturenimcorpusalbum.Sed quoniam secundæ suhstantiae primarum substantiarum vel species vel genera sunt iSocratis enim species homo est,et animal genus),genus autem de subjectis speciebus et individuis univoce prædicatur,secundæ substantiae de subjectis speciebus univoca prædicatione dicuntur.

English

In some cases, however, nothing prevents a name from sometimes being predicated of a subject, but it is impossible for the definition to be predicated, as white, since it is in a subject in a body, is predicated of a subject: for a body is said to be white, but the definition of white will never be predicated of a body. All other things, however, are either said of the primary substances as subjects, or are in the same things as subjects. This is clear from what will be set out in each individual case: for animal is predicated of man, therefore of some man; for if of no one of men, neither of man at all. Again, color is in a body, therefore also in some body; for if not in some one of individual bodies, neither in body at all. Wherefore all other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects, or are in the same things as subjects. Therefore, if the primary substances did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist.

All things whatsoever that have been mentioned are either in a subject or are predicated of a subject, but not all things whatsoever that are in a subject are said of their own subjects; for what is in some subject is predicated of its own subject: as white is predicated of a body, for a body is said to be white. But since the secondary substances are either the species or the genera of the primary substances (for man is the species of Socrates, and animal the genus), the genus, however, is predicated univocally of the species and individuals that are its subjects, the secondary substances are said of the species that are their subjects by univocal predication.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:65 · narrative
Source · Latin

Convenit namque primarum et secundarum substantiarum si sit una facta, diffinitio. Namque,animal et homo et Socrates una diffinitione jungitur, quod substantiae animatæ atque sensibiles sunt. Igitur secundæ substantiæ ita de subjectis prædicantur propriis,id estde primis substantiis,ut univoce praedicentur.lllorum vero quæ sunt in subjecto aliquoties quidem neque nomen ipsum desubjectodicitur.Nam virtus in anima est,sed virtus de animo minime prædicatur; aliquoties autem denominative dicitur, ut grammatica, quoniam est in homine,denominative grammaticus a grammatica dicitur.

English

For it is agreed that there is a definition of both primary and secondary substances, if one is made. For animal and man and Socrates are joined by one definition, because they are animate and sensible substances. Therefore secondary substances are predicated of their own subjects, that is, of primary substances, in such a way that they are predicated univocally. But of those things that are in a subject, sometimes not even the name itself is said of the subject. For virtue is in the soul, but virtue is by no means predicated of the soul; sometimes, however, it is said denominatively, as grammar, since it is in man, denominatively a grammarian is said from grammar.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:66 · narrative
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Saepe autem ipsum nomen de subjecto praedicatur, ut quoniam album est in corpore, corpus album dicitur, sed sive nomen non prædicetur, sive denominative dicatur, sive proprio nomine praedicatio sit, diffinitio ejus quod est in subjecto de proprio subjecto nunquam praedicabitur ut album,quoniam estin subjecto corpore, praedicatur quidem aibi nomen de corpore, diffinitio vero albi ad corpus nullo modo dicitur, albumnairque velcorpusunarationeutraquediffiniri non possunt.Amplius,si omne accidens in subjecto est,et substantia subjectum est,differtabaccidente substantia,differt etiam diffinitio substantiæ atque accidentis, quod cadem diffinitio subjecti et ejus quod est in subjecto esse non potest.Atque hoc est quod ait:Eorum vero quae sunt in subjecto, in pluribus quidem neque nomen de subjecto neque ratio prædicatur,ut virtus in anima.Addidit quoque: In aliquibusautem nomenquidem nihil prohibetinterdum preedicari,et in aliis quidem denominative, in aliis vero recto nomine fit prædicatio.

English

Often, moreover, the name itself is predicated of a subject, as when, since white is in a body, the body is called white; but whether the name is not predicated, or is predicated denominatively, or the predication is by a proper name, the definition of what is in a subject will never be predicated of its own subject. For example, white, since it is in a body as in a subject, its name is indeed predicated of the body, but the definition of white is in no way said of the body; for white and body cannot be defined by one and the same account. Furthermore, if every accident is in a subject, and substance is a subject, substance differs from accident, and the definition of substance differs from that of accident, because the same definition cannot belong to a subject and to what is in a subject. And this is what he says: Of those things which are in a subject, in most cases neither the name nor the account is predicated of the subject, as virtue is in the soul. He adds also: In some cases, however, nothing prevents the name from sometimes being predicated, and in some cases the predication is denominative, in others by a direct name.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:67 · narrative
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De secundis i vero substantiis semper ad primas substantias prædicatio pervenit.Nam si quidam homo, et homo est et animal, et caetera, una diffinitio animalis et ad hominem et ad quemdam hominem convenienter aptabitur.Magis tamen esse substantias individuas et parlicularesipse significantius monstrat.Namcum omnis res aut substantia sit aut accidens, et substantiarum aliae sint primae, aliae secundae,fit trina partitio, ita ut omnis res, aut accidens sit, aut secunda substantia,aut prima. Horum autem ut sub descriptione divisio fiat,hcc modo dicimus:Omnisres autinsubjectoest,autinsubjectononest; eorum quae in subjecto sunt,alia prædicantur de subjecto, alia minime;eorum quæ in subjecto non sunt,alia de nullo subjecto praedicantur, alia vero praedicantur. Ergo i omnis res aut in subjecto est,aut in subjecto non est. Aut in subjecto est et de subjecto praedicatur, aut in subjecto est et de nullo subjecto praedicatur, aut in subjecto non est,et de subjecto praedicatur,aut in subjecto non est, et de nullo subjecto praedicatur. His igitur sumptis,si primas substantias separemus, remanent secundae substantiae atque accidentia.Sed secundae substantiae sunt quae in subjecto non sunt et de subjecto prædicantur.Ergo esse suum,nisi in hoc quod de aliquo praedicantur,non retinent.

English

But the predication of secondary substances always reaches down to primary substances. For if a certain man is both a man and an animal, and so on, one definition of animal will be fittingly applied both to man and to a certain man. Yet he shows more significantly that individual and particular substances are more truly substances. For since every thing is either a substance or an accident, and of substances some are primary and some secondary, a threefold division results, such that every thing is either an accident, or a secondary substance, or a primary substance. But so that the division of these may be made under a description, we speak in this way: every thing is either in a subject or is not in a subject; of those which are in a subject, some are predicated of a subject, others not at all; of those which are not in a subject, some are predicated of no subject, others truly are predicated. Therefore every thing is either in a subject or is not in a subject. Either it is in a subject and is predicated of a subject, or it is in a subject and is predicated of no subject, or it is not in a subject and is predicated of a subject, or it is not in a subject and is predicated of no subject. These things then having been assumed, if we separate primary substances, secondary substances and accidents remain. But secondary substances are those which are not in a subject and are predicated of a subject. Therefore they do not retain their being except in this, that they are predicated of something.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:68 · narrative
Source · Latin

Prædicantur autem secundae substantiae de primis,ergo ut secundæ substantiae sint, praedicatio de primis substantiis causa est.Nonenim essentsecundaesubstantiæ,nisi de primis substantiis,prædicarentur, illa vero quæ in subjecto sunt penitus consistere non valerent,nisi fundamenti quodammodo loco primis substantiis niterentur.Ergo omnia quaecunquesunt praeter primas substantias,aut secundo substantiae erunt aut accidentia. Sed secundæ substantiae de primis substantiispraedicantur,accidentiain primis substantiis sunt.Quocirca omnia aut de primissubstantiis prædicantur, ut secundae substantiae, aut in primis substantiis sunt,ut accidentia,quod Aristoteles proposuit hoc modo: Alia autem omnia aut de subjectis dicuntur principalibus substantiis, aut in subjectis eisdem sunt,bic quoque verissima sumit exempla. Ait enim: Si accidens in nullo subjecto corpore esset,nec in corpore esset omnino. Nam si in nullo singulorum,in nullo generaliter esse diceretur.Et item animal nisi de singularibus atque individuis hominibus praedicaretur, nec de homine praedicaretur omnino.Quare quoniam idcircoprsedicantur secundae suLstantiæ,quoniam sunt primae,et idcirco sunt aliquid accidentia, quoniam eisdem primæ substantiæ subjectaesunt,siprimosubstantiae non sint, neque quae de his praedicantur mansura sunt,neque quae in his subjectis permanebunt.

English

But secondary substances are predicated of primary substances; therefore, in order that there be secondary substances, predication of primary substances is the cause. For there would not be secondary substances unless they were predicated of primary substances, and those things which are in a subject could not wholly subsist unless they were supported, in a way, by primary substances as by a foundation. Therefore all things whatsoever that exist besides primary substances will be either secondary substances or accidents. But secondary substances are predicated of primary substances, and accidents are in primary substances. Wherefore all things are either predicated of primary substances, as secondary substances, or are in primary substances, as accidents, which Aristotle set forth in this way: "But all other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects, or are in the same as subjects." Here too he takes most true examples. For he says: If an accident were in no subject body, it would not be in body at all. For if it were said to be in none of the singulars, it would be said to be in none generally. And likewise, unless animal were predicated of singular and individual men, it would not be predicated of man at all. Wherefore, since secondary substances are predicated for this reason, that there are primary substances, and accidents are something for this reason, that they are subject to the same primary substances, if there were no primary substances, neither those things which are predicated of them would remain, nor those things which remain in these as subjects.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:69 · narrative
Source · Latin

Secundarum vero substantiarum magis substantia est species quam gentis, propinquior enim est primae substantiæ. Si quis enim assignet primam substantiam quid est,evidentius et convenientius assignabit speciem proferens quamgenus,utquemdamhominem assignans, manifestius assignabit hominem quam animal assignando.lllud enim proprium est magis alicuju.s hom nis,hnc autem communius. Et cum aliquam arborem reddideris,manifestius assignabil,cum arborem reddideris, quam plantam.

Constat individuas substantias primas et maxime et proprie esse substantias. Secundae vero subslantiae,id est genera et species, sicut non aequaliter a prima substantia distant,ita non aequalitersubstantiae sunt;nam quoniam propinquiorest species primae substantiae quamgenus,idcircomagis estsubstantia species quam proprium genus,ut homo propinquior est Socrati quam animal,atque ideo magis est homo substantia.Animal vero quanquam etipsum substantia sit,minus tamen homine; hocautem idcirco evenit, quod in omni diffinitione convenientis species ad primam substantiam dintur,quamgenus.Namsi quid sit Socrates aliquis velit ostendere,propinquius substantiamSocratis proprietatemque monstrnbit,si dixerit eum esse hominem, quam si animal. Quod enim animal estSocrates.communeest cumc;eteris qui homines non sunt,id est cum equo atque bove.

English

But of secondary substances, species is more a substance than genus, for it is nearer to primary substance. For if anyone assigns what primary substance is, he will assign it more evidently and more fittingly by bringing forward the species than the genus, as when assigning some particular man, he will assign man more manifestly than by assigning animal. For the former is more proper to some man, but the latter is more common. And when you have rendered some tree, you will assign it more manifestly when you have rendered tree than plant.

It is agreed that individual substances are primary and are substances in the highest degree and properly. But secondary substances, that is, genera and species, just as they are not equally distant from primary substance, so they are not equally substances; for since species is nearer to primary substance than genus, for that reason species is more a substance than its own genus, as man is nearer to Socrates than animal, and therefore man is more a substance. But animal, although it too is a substance, is nevertheless less so than man; and this happens for the reason that in every definition of what is fitting, species is given closer to primary substance than genus. For if anyone wishes to show what Socrates is, he will show the substance and property of Socrates more closely if he says that he is a man than if he says animal. For that Socrates is an animal is common with the rest who are not men, that is, with a horse and an ox.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:70 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod vero homo est,cum nullo alio est commune, nisi cum his qui sub eadem speciebominis continentur. Quocirca propinquior erit ad significationem disignatio,cum individuo species redditur,quam si generis vocabulum praedicetur. Rursus si quamlibet individuam arborem designare aliquis volens,arborem dicat,propinquius designabit quid sit id quod diffinivit, quam si plantam nominet: planta autem genus est arboris; praedicatur enim planta et de iis. quæ arbores nonsunt,utde caulibus atquelactucisi quare constat species magis esse substantias, eo quod sint primis etmaximesubstantiis propinquiores.Et quod in eo quod quid sit, assignata species convenientibus et evidentius assignet,genus vero longinquius atque communius.

Amplius principales substantiæ eo quod aliis omnibus subjectae sunt,et alia omnia aut de his prædicantur,aut in eis sint,ideo maxime dicuntur substantiæ. Sicut autem principales subsfanlia7 ad alia omnia se habent,sic et species ad genus se habet,subjacet enim species generi,genera enim de speciebus praedicantur, species autem de generibus non convertuntur. Quare et ex his manifestum est speciem magis genere substnatiam esse.

English

But that it is a man is common to it with no other thing, except with those which are contained under the same species of man. Wherefore the designation will be nearer to the signification, when the species is given back with the individual, than if the name of the genus were predicated. Again, if anyone wishing to designate any individual tree says "tree," he will designate more nearly what that thing is which he has defined, than if he names it "plant"; but plant is the genus of tree, for plant is predicated also of those things which are not trees, as of stalks and lettuces. Wherefore it is established that species are more substances, in that they are nearer to primary and most of all substances. And that in the question of what something is, the species assigned assigns more fittingly and more evidently, but the genus more remotely and more commonly.

Moreover, the principal substances, in that they are subject to all other things, and all other things are either predicated of them or are in them, are for this reason said most of all to be substances. But as the principal substances are related to all other things, so also is species related to genus; for species is subject to genus, for genera are predicated of species, but species are not converted of genera. Wherefore from these too it is manifest that species is more a substance than genus.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:71 · narrative
Source · Latin

Magis esse substantias species validiori rursus argumentatione confirmat, per similitudinem nam que hoeitaesse declarat.Nam cum omnessubstantiae aut primæ sint autsecundæ,secundarum autem aut genera aut species,specierum atque generum quidquid similius primis substantiis invenitur,hoc magis substantia merito putabitur.Sed primae substantiae idcirco maximae substantiae dicuntur,quod omnibus ita subjectæ sunt,ut aut in ipsis sint caetera ut accidentia, aut de ipsis alia prædicentur ut substantiae secundæ.Quod ergo in primas substantias, hoc idem in species venit.Namquespeciesetcunctissubjaeent accidentibus, et de speciebus genera prædicantur, de generibus vero species non praedicantur. Quare non similiter generasubjacent,quemadmodumspecies. Non enim de generibus species praedicantur. Ergo sicut primæ substantiæ subjectaesunt secundis substa ntiis el accidentibus,ita species subjecta: sunt et accidentibus et generibus. Genera vero quanquam subjecta sint accidentibus,speciebus tamen ipsa non subjacent.

English

He confirms again with a stronger argument that species are more truly substances, and he declares that this is so by way of likeness. For since all substances are either primary or secondary, and of secondary substances some are genera and some are species, whatever of species and genera is found to be more like the primary substances will deservedly be thought to be more a substance. But primary substances are for this reason called greatest substances, because they are so subject to all things that either the rest are in them as accidents, or other things are predicated of them as secondary substances. Therefore what applies to primary substances applies also to species. For species are subject to all accidents, and genera are predicated of species, but species are not predicated of genera. Wherefore genera are not subject in the same way as species. For species are not predicated of genera. Therefore, just as primary substances are subject to secondary substances and to accidents, so species are subject both to accidents and to genera. But genera, although they are subject to accidents, are nevertheless not themselves subject to species.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:72 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quocircamajor est similitudo speciei ad primas substantias,quam generis,quod si major est similitudo specierum admaximas substantias,ipsæ erunt magis substantiae.Sed ne quis non arbitretur dicere quod ea quæ sunt genera species esse non possunt, sed in eo quod sunt genera, species esse non possunt.Nam in eo quod species est,de superioribus non prædicatur, sed in eo quod genus, de eo prædicabitur cujus est genus.Quocirca genera ipsa quorum sunt genera his subjacere non possunt,species vero quorum sunt species, de his praedicarinon possunt.

Ipsarum verospecierum quæcunque non sunt genera, nihil magis alterum altero substantia est, nihil enim familiarius assignabis de aliquo homine,homlnem assignando,quam de aliquo equo,equum.Similiter autem et principalium substantiarum nihil magis alterum altero substantia est, nihil enim magis aliquis homo substantia est,quam aliquis bos.

English

Wherefore there is a greater likeness of species to primary substances than of genus, and if there is a greater likeness of species to the greatest substances, they themselves will be more truly substances. But let no one think that we are saying that those things which are genera cannot be species, but in that in which they are genera, they cannot be species. For in that in which it is a species, it is not predicated of things above it, but in that in which it is a genus, it will be predicated of that of which it is the genus. Wherefore the genera themselves cannot be subject to those things of which they are genera, but the species cannot be predicated of those things of which they are species.

But of the species themselves, whichever are not genera, nothing is more a substance than another; for you will not assign anything more closely related concerning some man by assigning man, than concerning some horse by assigning horse. Similarly also, of primary substances, nothing is more a substance than another; for no man is more a substance than some ox.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:73 · narrative
Source · Latin

Prædictum est quoque,ut Porphyrius in libro de generibus, speciebus, differentiis, propriis, atque accidentibus planissime docuit, alia esse solumgenera,quorum genus inveniri non posset,alia solum species,quae in alias species dividi non valerent. Hae autem sunt quae de pluribus numero differentibus in eo quod quid sit praedicantur, ut homo de singulis hominibus dicitur,et equus de singulis equis,etbos de singulis bobus, qui sub propria specie pnsiti a seipsis propriae naturæ figura non discrepant. Ergo hujusmodi species, ut est bomo atque equus, quae solis individuis praesunt, quoniam genera esse non possunt,aequaliLer semper substantiæ sunt.Nam tam propinque redditur de quolibet individuo equo,nomen equi, quam de quolibet individuo homine,bominis nomen.Quocirca ei aequaliter species hæ,quæ genera non sunt,ad primas substantias sunt,aequaliter esse substantiaa merito putabuntur; hocautem dicit non quod omnes species aqualiter substantiae sint,sed quæ aequaliter a primis substantiis distant. Potest enim fieri utcujuslibet superiorisgenerisuna quaelibet species sit, quæ comparata ad propriam speciem minus illa superior videaturessesubstantia: utanimalis si quis dicat speciem esse avem,ejusdem quoque speciem hominem,avis et homo non aequaliter substantiae sunt,idcirco quod avis homine superiorest.Homo namque in alias species non dividitur, est enim magis species.

English

It has also been stated beforehand, as Porphyrius most plainly taught in his book On Genera, Species, Differentiae, Properties, and Accidents, that some things are only genera, whose genus cannot be found, and others are only species, which cannot be divided into other species. These latter, moreover, are those which are predicated of many things differing in number in respect of what a thing is, as man is said of individual men, and horse of individual horses, and ox of individual oxen, which, placed under their own species, do not differ from themselves in the figure of their proper nature. Therefore species of this kind, as are man and horse, which preside over individuals alone, since they cannot be genera, are always equally substances. For the name of horse is predicated of any individual horse no less closely than the name of man is predicated of any individual man. Wherefore these species, which are not genera, stand equally in relation to primary substances, and will deservedly be thought to be equally substance. But he says this not because all species are equally substances, but because they are equally distant from primary substances. For it can happen that of any superior genus there is some one species which, compared to its own species, seems less a substance than that superior one: as, if someone were to say that bird is a species of animal, and also that man is a species of the same, bird and man are not equally substances, for the reason that bird is superior to man. For man is not divided into other species; he is rather a species.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:74 · narrative
Source · Latin

Avis autem potest in alias dividispecies.ut in accipitrem et vulturem,quæ quanquam aves sunt specie.tamenipsae dissentiunt. Proprie autem species accipere ac vulturest,hi enim solis individuis praesunt.Quare homoatque accipiter aequaliter a primissubstantiisdistant,et sunt æqualiter substantiæ.Homo vsro atque avis,quoniamsuperior est avis homine, non æqualiter substantiae sunt, magis enim substantia homo est. Ergo quæcunque species aequaliter a suis individuis distant, aequaliter substantiæ sunt.Quod quoniam species hæ quas genera mn suntaequaliter aprimis substantiis absunt,aequaliter substantiae dicuntur.Pbnum autem est, ut expositione non egeat, primas quoque substantias Eequaliteressesubstantias,aliquis homo enim atque aliquis equus,quoniam sunt individua, principaliter substantiæ sunt,et propriae et maximæ. Quocirca in maximis substantiis, neque minus, neque magis substantia poterit inveniri. Individua igitur cequaliter substantiae sunt.

English

A bird, however, can be divided into other species, as into the hawk and the vulture, which although they are birds in species, nevertheless differ among themselves. Properly, however, to take species are the hawk and the vulture, for these preside over only individuals. Wherefore man and hawk are equally distant from primary substances, and are equally substances. But man and bird, since bird is superior to man, are not equally substances, for man is more a substance. Therefore, whatever species are equally distant from their individuals are equally substances. Since these species which are not genera are equally distant from primary substances, they are said to be equally substances. It is clear, moreover, so that it needs no exposition, that primary substances too are equally substances; for some man and some horse, since they are individuals, are primarily substances, and properly and maximally so. Wherefore in maximal substances, neither less nor more substance can be found. Individuals, therefore, are equally substances.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:75 · narrative
Source · Latin

Merito igitur post principales wbstantias,sola aliorum species et genera dicuntur esse secundæ substantiæ. Eorum enim prædicantur, principalem substantiam solahsecindicant. Aliquem enim hominem si quis assignaverit quidsit,speciem quidem vel genus assignans, familiariter assignabit et man'festus faciet hominem vel animal assignans.Aliorum vero quidquid assgnaverit quilibet assignabit extraneæ, velut album, aut currit, aut quæcunque talium reddens, ergo merito lex solæ aliorum,secundæ substantiæ dicuntur.

Ordine et convenienter post primas substantias,id est individua,genera et species secundas esse substantias constitutas monstrat Aristoteles, quae est firmaatque expedita probatio; ait enim:Post primas substantiasrecte genera etspecies secundas substantias esse nominatas.In diffinitionibus enim ubi sub. stantia cujuslibet ostenditur,nihil aliud primas sub-, stantias monstrat, nisi genus et species.Socrates namque,si quis quid sit interroget,dicitur homo,vel animal,et in eo quod quid sit Socrates interrogatus, recte hominem vel animal esse respondet.

English

Therefore, rightly, after the primary substances, only the species and genera of others are said to be secondary substances. For they are predicated of them, and they alone indicate the primary substance. For if someone assigns what a particular man is, by assigning the species or the genus, he will assign it familiarly and make it manifest, by assigning man or animal. But whatever else anyone assigns of other things, he will assign something extraneous, such as white, or runs, or rendering any such things. Therefore, rightly, only these are said to be secondary substances of others.

In order and fittingly, after the primary substances, that is, individuals, Aristotle shows that genera and species are established as secondary substances, which is a firm and ready proof; for he says: After the primary substances, rightly genera and species are named secondary substances. For in definitions, where the substance of anything is shown, nothing else indicates the primary substances except genus and species. For Socrates, if anyone asks what he is, is said to be a man, or an animal, and when asked in respect of what Socrates is, he rightly responds that he is a man or an animal.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:76 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quare quid sint primae substantias secundae monstrant, quod si quis praeter secundas substantias in interrogatione quid sit prima substantia dicat,id alienissime profert,ut si quid sit Socrates interroganti aliquis respondeat album,vel currit,vel aliquid hujusmodi,quod secunda substantia non sit,nihil convenienter unquam profert,si quid de prima substantia praeter secundas substantias dicat. Quare quoniam nihil eorum quae non sunt secundae substantiæ, quid sit prima substantia declarat, secundas autem substantiæ genera et species sunt, recte post primas substantias species et genera secundæ dicuntur esse substantiae.

Ampliu.s principales substantiæ eo quod alias omnibus subjaceant, et alia omnia de ipsis prsedicantur aut in ipsis sunt, idcirco proprise substantiæ dicuntur.Sicutautem primae. substantiæ ad omnia alia sese hubent,ita principalium substantiarum genera et species adomnia reliqua sese habent. De his enim omnia reliqua prædicantur, aliquem enim hominem dicis grammaticum esse, ergo et hominem et animat grammaticum dicis,similiter aulem et in aliis.

English

Therefore, the secondary substances show what the primary substances are. But if anyone, in answer to the question what a primary substance is, should state something besides secondary substances, he produces something entirely out of place—as if, when someone asks what Socrates is, one should answer white, or runs, or some other such thing that is not a secondary substance. He never produces anything fitting if he says anything about a primary substance besides secondary substances. Therefore, since none of those things which are not secondary substances declares what a primary substance is, and the secondary substances are genera and species, rightly, after the primary substances, species and genera are said to be secondary substances.

Moreover, primary substances, because they underlie all others and all other things are predicated of them or are in them, are for that reason properly called substances. And just as primary substances are related to all other things, so the genera and species of primary substances are related to all the rest. For all the rest are predicated of these. For you say that some man is grammatical; therefore you also say that both man and animal are grammatical, and similarly in other cases as well.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:77 · narrative
Source · Latin

Haec quoque est de eadem re probatio,qua recte post primas substantias genera et species esse posttas verissima ratione confirmat.Namque individua idcirco primaedicunturessesubstantise,et quod aliis cunctissubjaceant.Nam quoniam secundis substantiis ad prædicationem suppositae sunt,et de his secundaesubstantiae dicuntur,et quoniam accidentibus ut possint esse accidentia subdunlur,idcirco primæ substantiae sunt.Et sicut primae substantiae cunctis subjacent accidentibus, sic etiam secundae. Nam quoniam aliquis homo accidentibus subjacet,et homo et animal accidenti supponitur,et quoniam est quidam homo grammaticus,id est Aristarchus,est homo grammaticus, est etiam animal grammaticum. Quocirca accidentibus primae substantiae principaliter subduntur,secundae vero secundo loco,et quemadmodum primæ substantiae et accidentibus et secundis substantiis subjacent,sicsecundaesubstantiae accidentibus supponuntur,sed secundae substantiae species et genera sunt.Recte igitur post primas substantias species et genera secundas substantias esse proposuit.

English

This too is a proof concerning the same matter, by which he confirms with most true reasoning that genera and species are rightly placed after the primary substances. For individuals are called primary substances for this reason, that they underlie all others. For since they are subject to the secondary substances with respect to predication, and the secondary substances are said of them, and since they are subordinated to accidents so that accidents can exist, for this reason they are primary substances. And just as the primary substances underlie all accidents, so also do the secondary substances. For since some man underlies accidents, both man and animal are subject to an accident, and since a certain man is grammatical, that is, Aristarchus, man is grammatical, and animal is also grammatical. Wherefore the primary substances are subordinated to accidents principally, but the secondary substances in the second place, and just as the primary substances underlie both accidents and the secondary substances, so the secondary substances are subject to accidents, but the secondary substances are species and genera. Rightly, therefore, after the primary substances did he propose that species and genera are secondary substances.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:78 · narrative
Source · Latin

Commune est autem omni substantiæ in subjecto non esseyprincipahs enim substantia neque de subjecto aliquodicitur,negue in subjecto est.Secundæ vero substantiæ sic etiam constant, quia nulla est insubjecto.Etenim homo de subjecto aliquo homine dicitur, in subjecto autem nullo est, neque enim in aliquo homine homo est. Similiter animal de subjecto quidem dicitur aliquo homine,non est autem animal in aliquo homine.

Post enumerationem substantiarum et divisionem in qua alias primas,alias secundas esse proposuit, quoniam substantiae diffinitio nulla est reddita,idcirco,quia generalissimum genus diffinitionibus non tenetur, proprietatem quamdam cupit exquirere, quasi signum aliquod quo substantiam queamus agnoscere,priusquequidipbissubstantiis communiter possit evenire proponit;post vero quid illis proprium sit quaerit, sed idcirco ista praemittit, ut ad illud verum proprium sine ullo errore perveniat,et quod vere est substantiarum proprium ultimum dicat.

English

It is common to every substance not to be in a subject. For primary substance is neither said of any subject nor is it in a subject. Secondary substances, however, also hold together in this way, because none of them is in a subject. For man is said of some subject, namely some man, but is in no subject; for man is not in some man. Similarly, animal is said of some subject, namely some man, but animal is not in some man.

After the enumeration of substances and the division in which he proposed that some are primary and others secondary, since no definition of substance has been given—because the most general genus is not grasped by definitions—he wishes to seek out a certain property, as a kind of sign by which we may recognize substance. And first he sets forth what can commonly happen to substances themselves; afterwards he asks what is proper to them. But he premises these things for this reason, that he may arrive at that true property without any error, and may state last what is truly the property of substances.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:79 · narrative
Source · Latin

Tribus autem modis proprium significatur.Est enim proprium quod alicui speciei omrii evenit et non solijUt homini bipedem esse.Omnis enim homo bipes est,sed non solus, aves namque et ipsae sunt bipedes.Aut soli et non omni,ut eidem homini evenit ut sit grammaticus,sed non omni homini,neque enim omnis homo grammaticus est.Aut vero tertia proprii significatio est,quae omni et soli et semper, ut risibile.Omnis enim homo risibilis est,et solum est animal homo quod rideat.Ex his igitur ilia duo superiora quae diximus, ubi omni et non soli, aut soli et non omni,esse quaedam propria dicebamus, quae a propriorum veritate esse videntur aliena.Hoc vero tertium quod omni inest et soli, hoc vere est proprium,illaautem superiora consequentia quidem dicuntur, non tamen vere propria, hoc autem ultimum vere est proprium.Quæcunque ergo taliapropria Aristoteles invenerit,quæ aut solis etnonorrnibussubstantiis,automnibuset nonsoliseveniant,velutnonverein naturacujuslibetconstituta repudiat. Illud vero ultimum ponit quod et omni substantiae et soli valeat evenire.lllaenim sunt propria quæ convertuntur,ut si quid luent nomo, risibile esc, si quid est risibile, homo estihaec autem solum converti possunt, quae omni solique contingunt, nam neque ulli alii magis, neque ulli minus evenienl; quare his praedictis ad loci ipsius orationem expositionemque veniamus.

English

But "property" is signified in three ways. For a property is that which belongs to every member of some species and not to it alone, as for man to be biped. For every man is biped, but not man alone, for birds too are themselves biped. Or it belongs to it alone and not to every member, as for the same man to be grammatical, but not to every man, for not every man is grammatical. Or truly the third signification of property is that which belongs to every member and to it alone and always, as being capable of laughter. For every man is capable of laughter, and man alone is the animal that laughs. From these, therefore, those two former ones which we mentioned, where we said that certain properties belong to every member and not to it alone, or to it alone and not to every member, appear to be alien from the truth of properties. But this third, which belongs to every member and to it alone, this is truly a property; those former ones are indeed called consequent, yet not truly properties, but this last is truly a property. Whatever therefore Aristotle has found to be such properties, which either belong to substances alone and not to all, or to all and not to them alone, he rejects as not truly established in the nature of anything. But that last one he posits which is able to belong both to every substance and to it alone. For those are properties which are convertible, as: if anything is a man, it is capable of laughter; if anything is capable of laughter, it is a man. But those alone can be converted which belong to every member and to it alone, for they will belong neither to any other more, nor to any less; wherefore, with these things having been set forth, let us come to the exposition and explanation of the topic itself.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:80 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod ergo dicit hoc est, omnibus substantiis commune est, ut in subjecto non sint,namque primae substanliae,id est individua in subjecto non sunt,qnod planissime his demonstratur. Nunquam enim particularis substantia alicui accidens esse potest,secundæ vero substantiae habent quamdam imaginem quod sint in subjecto,videntur enim secundae substantiae in subjectis,id est primis substantiis esse, sed falso, nam secundae substantiæ de primis substantiis solum prædicantur, non in ipsis sunt.Animal enim dequodam homine tantum dicitur,non etiam in aliquo homine consistit, ut in subjecto.Hoc autem illa res probat.quod omnia quaecunque in subjecto sunt,eorum quoque individua in subjecto sunt,color quoniam in subjecto corporeest,etquidamcolor subjecto corpore nititur, in hocvero quoniam primae substanliæ,id estindividua in subjecto non sunt,nec eorum universalia, id est secundae substantiae, quae genera speciesque sunt, possunt aliquo niti subjecto.

English

Therefore what he says here, namely that it is common to all substances not to be in a subject, is most clearly demonstrated by these considerations. For a primary substance, that is, an individual, is not in a subject. For a particular substance can never be an accident of anything. But secondary substances have a certain likeness of being in a subject; for secondary substances appear to be in subjects, that is, in primary substances, but falsely so. For secondary substances are predicated only of primary substances, not in them. For animal is said only of some man, not also does it consist in some man as in a subject. But this fact proves it: that all things whatsoever that are in a subject, their individuals also are in a subject. Color, since it is in a subject body, and a certain color rests upon a subject body. But in this case, since primary substances, that is, individuals, are not in a subject, neither can their universals, that is, secondary substances, which are genera and species, rest upon any subject.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:81 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quare secundae substantiæ primas substantias ad prædicationem tantum subjectas habent, non etiam ut ipsae primis substantiis accidant.Illud quoque maximum argumentum est secundas substantias non esse in subjecto, quoniam omne quod in subjecto est potest mutari,illa quoe subjecta est non mutatur,ut color qui est in corpore, eodem corpore manente potest mutari,ut niger fiat ex albo.Manentibus autem substantiis primis,secundæ substantias non mutantur. Quam vero ipse Aristoteles posuit probationem,secundas substantias non esse in subjecto,hujusmodi est, prædocuit enim quorumdam quæ sunt in subjecto nomen de subjectis posse prædicari,rationem vero nunquam. Album enim cum sit in corpore,dicitur corpus album,et praedicatur albedo de corpore,sed alia est diffinitio albedinis, alia corporis. Secundas verosubstantiaedeprimissubstantiisetnomineprEedicantur, et diffinitione junguntur. Nam quidam homo animal est et homn,sed quidam homo,et hominis,el animalis rationediffinitur.Etutveracisaime sententia concludatur, omne quod est in subjecto, aequivoce de subjecto dicitur.Secundæ vero substantiae de primis non æquivoce,sed univoce nuncupantur,idcirco quod (ut dictum est) et nomine et diffinitione consentiunt.

English

Therefore secondary substances have primary substances subject to them only for predication, not also so that they themselves accrue to primary substances. That too is the greatest argument that secondary substances are not in a subject: because everything that is in a subject can change, while that which is a subject does not change—as color, which is in a body, can change while the same body remains, so that it becomes black from white. But while primary substances remain, secondary substances are not changed. Moreover, the proof that Aristotle himself set down that secondary substances are not in a subject is of this sort: for he first taught that of certain things which are in a subject, the name can be predicated of the subjects, but the definition never. For white, since it is in a body, is said of the body as a white body, and whiteness is predicated of the body, but one is the definition of whiteness, another of body. But secondary substances are predicated of primary substances both in name and are joined in definition. For a certain man is an animal and a man, but a certain man is defined by the definition of man and of animal. And so that the true and most firm judgment may be concluded: everything that is in a subject is said of the subject equivocally. But secondary substances are named of primary substances not equivocally but univocally, for the reason that (as was said) they agree both in name and in definition.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:82 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quare quemadmodum primæ substantiæ in subjecto non sunt,sic secundæ subjecto carebunt.Commune est igitur omnibus substantiis, et secundis et primis in subjecto non esse,et quodcunque substantia fuerit,consequens est ut in nullo subjecto sit.Sed quaBriturutrumhoc soli substantiæ insit an etiam al iis, nam si soli substantiee inest,quoniam omni substantias hoc inesse monstravimus, quod in subjecto non sit, verum proprium dicilur esse substantiae, non esse in subjecto.Huc enim dictum est esse maxime proprium,quod omnibus inesset et solis,sed hoc non esse substantiae proprium verissima Aristotelea probatione confirmat dicens:

Amplius eorum quæsunt in subjecto nomen quidem de subjecto aliquando nihil prohibet prædicari, rationem vero impossibile est. Secunda rum vero substantiarum et nomen de subjectis et ratio prædicabitur, rationem enim hominis et animalis de aliquo homine prædicabis.Quare non erit substantia eorum quæ sunt in subjecto. Non est autem hoc proprium substantiae, namque et differentia eorum est, qua in subjecto non sunt, bipes enim et gressibile de subjecto quidem homine dicitur,in subjecto autem nullo est,non enim in homine est bipes,neque gl'essibile.Ratio quoque differenticB de illo dicitur de quo ipsa differentia prædicatur,ut si gressibile de homine dicitur,et ratio gressi- J bilis de homine prædicabitur,est enimhomogressibilis.

English

Therefore, just as primary substances are not in a subject, so secondary substances will lack a subject. It is therefore common to all substances, both secondary and primary, not to be in a subject, and whatever is a substance, it follows that it is in no subject. But the question is raised whether this belongs to substance alone or also to other things. For if it belongs to substance alone, since we have shown that this belongs to every substance—namely, not to be in a subject—then it is truly said to be a property of substance: not to be in a subject. For it was said above to be most properly a property, because it belongs to all and only substances. But that this is not a property of substance he confirms by a most true Aristotelian proof, saying:

Moreover, of things that are in a subject, nothing prevents the name from sometimes being predicated of the subject, but the definition is impossible. But of secondary substances both the name and the definition will be predicated of subjects; for you will predicate the definition of man and of animal of some particular man. Therefore it will not be a substance of things that are in a subject. But this is not a property of substance, for it is also a property of difference that it is not in a subject. For biped and capable of walking are said of a subject, man, but are in no subject; for biped is not in man, nor is capable of walking. The definition also of difference is said of that of which the difference itself is predicated, as if capable of walking is said of man, the definition of capable of walking will also be predicated of man; for man is capable of walking.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:83 · narrative
Source · Latin

Non esse proprium hoc substantiae dicit, idcirco quod in differentiis idem sit,in nullo enim differentia subjecto est,ad illud namque recurritur. Si differentia in subjecto esset,nominetantum de subjecto praedicaretur,non etiam ratione. Differentia vero de eo de quo dicitur univoce prædicatur, ut si quis dicatgressibilem differentiam de homine,ipsius differentiae diffinitio quoque homini convenienter aptabitur.Gressibile namque est quod per terram pedibusambulat,et homo est quod per terram pedibus ambulat, ita differentiae et ejus de quo ipsa differentia dicitur una poterit esse ratio substantise,id est unius possunt et nominis nuncupatione,et diffinitionis determinatione conjungi.Quod si in subjecto essetdifferentia,nequaquam de subjecto sibi univoce praedicaretur. Quare non proprium est substantiae quod retinet etiam differentia, differentia namque substantia non est.Esset enim proprium substantiae in subjecto non esse.Non estaulem diJferentiaaccidens,esset enim in subjecto. Omnis autem res aut accidens est, aut substantia, id est aut in subjecto est,aut in subjecto non est,et sunt accidentia quaecunque in substantiam subjecti non veniunt, quæque permutata naturam substantiae non perimunt.

English

He says that this is not a property of substance, for the reason that the same holds in the case of differentiae; for a differentia is in no subject, since recourse is had to that. If a differentia were in a subject, it would be predicated of the subject in name only, and not also in definition. But a differentia is predicated univocally of that of which it is said, so that if someone calls "capable of walking" a differentia of man, the definition of that differentia itself will also be fittingly applied to man. For "capable of walking" is what walks on the ground by means of feet, and man is what walks on the ground by means of feet. Thus there can be one account of substance for the differentia and for that of which the differentia itself is said, that is, they can be joined both by the naming of one name and by the determination of one definition. But if a differentia were in a subject, it would by no means be predicated univocally of the subject. Therefore it is not a property of substance that a differentia also retains, for a differentia is not a substance. For it would be a property of substance not to be in a subject. But a differentia is not an accident, for then it would be in a subject. Now every thing is either an accident or a substance, that is, it is either in a subject or not in a subject; and accidents are whatever do not come into the substance of a subject, and which, when changed, do not destroy the nature of the substance.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:84 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si quibus vero peremptis subjecta interimantur, illa proprie accidentia non vocamus,differentia vero est quas de pluribusspeciedifferentibusineo quod quale sit praedicatur.Sed differentia substantia non est, idcirco quod si esset substantia non in eo quod quale sit de subjecto,sed in eo quod quid sit prædicaretur. Qualitas vero solum non est,esset enim accidens et in subjecto.An magis ex substantia et qualitate differentia ipsa conficitur,ita ut illud de quo praedicatur, perempta differentia simul interimatur, ut calor,cum estin aqua,perempto calore,potest aqua in sua substantia permanere, et est calor in subjecta aqna,quo interempto,aqua non peribit.Idem tamen calor estin igne,sed peremptocalore,ignem interire necesse est. Quare hæc qualitas caloris substantialiter inest igni,et est propria differentia,id est substantiajis.Concludendom est igitur differentiam,neque solum substantiam esse,neque solum qualitatem, sed quod ex utrisque conficitur substantialem qualitatem,quæ permanet in natura subjecti,atque ideo quoniam substantia participat, accidens non est, quoniam qualitas est,a substantia relinquitur.

English

But if, when certain things are destroyed, their subjects are destroyed, we do not properly call those accidents. A differentia, however, is what is predicated of many things differing in species in respect of what sort of thing it is. But a differentia is not substance, for the reason that if it were substance, it would not be predicated of a subject in respect of what sort of thing it is, but in respect of what it is. Nor is it quality alone, for then it would be an accident and in a subject. Or rather, is the differentia itself compounded from substance and quality, so that when the differentia is destroyed, that of which it is predicated is at the same time destroyed? For example, when heat is in water, once the heat is destroyed, the water can remain in its own substance, and the heat is in the underlying water; when this is destroyed, the water will not perish. Yet the same heat is in fire, but once the heat is destroyed, the fire must perish. Wherefore this quality of heat is present in fire substantially, and is a proper differentia, that is, substantial. Therefore, by way of conclusion, a differentia is neither substance alone nor quality alone, but what is compounded from both, a substantial quality, which remains in the nature of the subject; and therefore, since it participates in substance, it is not an accident, and since it is a quality, it is left over from substance.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:85 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed quoddam medium est inter substantiam et qualitatem,quae quoniam in subjecto non estetsubstantia non est,proprium substantiæ non est non esse in subjecto.Post hoc illuc quoque dicit non deberenos conturbari, ne forte substantiarum partes,quae ita sunt in toto quasi in aliquo subjecto,aliquando cogamur non substantias confiteri.Substantiarum partes in subjecLO sunt,sed nou ut accidentia, videmus enim quasdam partes substantiarum ita esse in toto quasi sint in subjecto,ut caput in toto corpore est, et manus in toto corpore est,forma quoque et materia quae sunt partes compositae substantiae in iDsa composita substantia sunt. Ne forte ergo cogamur aliquando partes substantiarum, quoniam sunt in subjecto, suspicari non esse substantias, sed accidentia, praemonet dicens:

Non conturbent autem nos substantiarum partes,ut quæ ita sint in toto, quasi in subjecto, ne forte cogamur confiteri eas non esse substantias, non enim sic dicebamus ea esse qws sunt in subjecto,ut quasi partes essent in aliquo.

English

But there is a certain middle ground between substance and quality, which, since it is not in a subject and is not a substance, is not the peculiar property of substance—namely, not to be in a subject. After this, he also says there that we ought not to be disturbed lest we be at some point compelled to admit that the parts of substances, which are in a whole as in some subject, are not substances. The parts of substances are in a subject, but not as accidents; for we see that certain parts of substances are in a whole as if they were in a subject, as the head is in the whole body, and the hand is in the whole body; likewise form and matter, which are parts of a composite substance, are in the composite substance itself. Therefore, lest we be at some point compelled to suspect that the parts of substances, because they are in a subject, are not substances but accidents, he warns us beforehand, saying:

But let not the parts of substances disturb us, that they are in a whole as in a subject, lest we be compelled to admit that they are not substances; for we did not mean that those things which are in a subject are so in it as if they were parts in something.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:86 · narrative
Source · Latin

Hoc enim rationis affert cur ista accidentia esse aliquis suspicari non debeat. Illa enim accidentia esse diffinita sunt in objecto, quae non essent ut quaedam pars,hoc enim superius ait.In subjecto autem essedico,quod cum in aliquo sit,non aicut quæ dam pars et impossible est esse sine eo in quo est. Quocirca quoniam accidentia ita sunt in subjecto, ut subjecti partes non sint,5ubstantiarum vero partes in toto ita sunt, ut in subjecto non sint, partes substantiarum,partes accidentium esse nullus recte suspicari potest.

Inest autem substantiis et differentiis ex his omnia univoce prædicari.Omnia enim quæ ab his prædicata suntyaut de individuis prædicantur,aut de speciebus; a prima namque substantia nulla est prædicatio,de nullo enim subjecto dicitur.Secundarum vern substantiarum species quidem de individuo prædicatur,genus antem et despecieet deindividuo.Similver autem et difterentiæ de speciebus, et de individuis prdedicantur. Rutionetn etiam suscipiunt primæ substantiæ specierum et generum,et species generis,quæcunque enim de prædicato dicuntur9eadem et de subjecto dicuntur. Similiter autem et differentiarum rationem suscipiunt et species, et individua, univoca autem erant, quorum, et nomen commune et ratio eadem est.Quare omnia quæ a substantiis et differentiis sunt,univoce dicuntur.

English

For this reasoning shows why no one should suspect that these are accidents. For those things have been defined as accidents in the subject which would not be as a kind of part—for he says this above. But I say that to be in a subject is what, when it is in something, is not as a kind of part and cannot be without that in which it is. Wherefore, since accidents are in a subject in such a way that they are not parts of the subject, but the parts of substances are in the whole in such a way that they are not in a subject, no one can rightly suspect that the parts of substances are parts of accidents.

Moreover, it belongs to substances and differences that all things derived from them are predicated univocally. For all things that are predicated from these are predicated either of individuals or of species; for from a primary substance there is no predication, since it is said of no subject. But of secondary substances, the species is indeed predicated of the individual, while the genus is predicated both of the species and of the individual. Similarly also differences are predicated of species and of individuals. And primary substances also admit the definition of species and genera, and the species admits the definition of the genus; for whatever things are said of a predicate are also said of the subject. Similarly, both species and individuals admit the definition of differences. But univocals were those of which both the name is common and the definition is the same. Wherefore all things that derive from substances and differences are said univocally.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:87 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quoniam in subjecto non esse differentiis et substantiiscommunemonstravit,aliam rursus communitatem substantiarum differentiarumque proposuit.Nam cum substantiarum alix sint primae, aliæ secundæ,et primæ substantiæ sint individuae, quoniam nihil individua possunt habere subjectum,ab individuis nulla prædicatio est.Secundae verosubstantise de individuis, id est de primis substantiis, prædicantur, et de his univoce dicuntur. Secundarum enim substantiarum nomen de individuis prædicatur et ratio. Ac de individuo quidem et species prædicatur et genus,ut de Platone,id est de aliquo homine,ethomo dicitur,et animai,aliquis enim homo est,et animal,et utriusque de individuo praedicatur ratio.Dicimus enim aliquem hominem animal esse rationale mortale, quae est speciei diffinitio, id est hominis.Et rursus aliquem hominem dicimus esse substantiam animatam atque sensibilem,quæ generis est diffinitio,id est animalis.Species vero generis sui et diffinitionem suscipitetvocabulum,de homine emin animal prædicatur,dicitur eniin homo animal est,et idem ipse rursus homo rationem suscipit animalis.Dicimus enim esse hominem substantiam animatam atque sensibilem.

English

Since he has demonstrated that differences and substances are not in a subject, he next proposed another commonality of substances and differences. For since of substances some are primary, others secondary, and the primary substances are individuals—since individuals can have nothing as a subject, from individuals there is no predication. But secondary substances are predicated of individuals, that is, of primary substances, and are said of them univocally. For the name and the definition of secondary substances are predicated of individuals. And indeed both species and genus are predicated of an individual, as of Plato, that is, of some man, both man is said and animal—for some man is both a man and an animal—and the definition of each is predicated of the individual. For we say that some man is a rational mortal animal, which is the definition of the species, that is, of man. And again we say that some man is a substance animate and sensible, which is the definition of the genus, that is, of animal. But the species receives both the definition and the name of its genus—for animal is predicated of man, for man is said to be an animal—and the same man again receives the definition of animal. For we say that man is a substance animate and sensible.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:88 · narrative
Source · Latin

Constat ergo quoniam et genera et species de individuis,et genera de speciebus univoce praedicantur, id est in omni praedicatione secundae substantiæ univoca appellatione de subjectisdicuntur,quod his cumdifferentiacommune est.Differenlia namque de specie de qua dicitur, etde ejus individuo ipsa quoque univoce prædicatur. Nam cum sit gressibilis differentia de aliquo homine prsedicatur,dicitur enim quidam homo gressibilis, ut Plato et Cicero,sed et diffinitionem differentias suscipiunt individua,de quibus illa differentia praedicatur.Gressibile namque est quod per terram pedibus ambulare potest.Etquemdamhominem possis ita secundum nomen differentiae diffinire, ut dicas Platonem esse quod per terram pedibus ambulare possit. Et hoc idem evenit de specie cujusdam hominis,id est de homine: homo namque,id est ipsa species,cum sit gressiblis, potest diffiniri. Homo est quod per terram pedibus ambulare possit.

English

It is therefore established that both genera and species are predicated univocally of individuals, and genera of species, that is, in every predication of secondary substance they are said of subjects with a univocal appellation, which is common to them along with difference. For difference too is predicated univocally of the species of which it is said, and of the individual of that species. For since "capable of walking" is a difference, it is predicated of some man—for a certain man is said to be capable of walking, as Plato and Cicero—but individuals of which that difference is predicated also receive the definition of the difference. For "capable of walking" is that which can walk on the ground by means of feet. And you could define a certain man according to the name of the difference, so as to say that Plato is that which can walk on the ground by means of feet. And the same thing happens in the case of the species of a certain man, that is, of man: for man, that is, the species itself, since it is capable of walking, can be defined. Man is that which can walk on the ground by means of feet.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:89 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ergo et differentiæ de his de quibus pradicantur,univocedicuntur.Quocirca quoniam et secundae substantiæ de his de quibus prædicantur univoce dicuntur,et differentias eodem modo,quæcunque a substantiis vel differentiis praedicationes fuerint,haec et de subjectis univoce prædicabuntur.Quæ autem causa sit ut secundae substantiæ de primis substantiis univoce prædicentur,illa quam supra docuit Aristoteles nos admonens dixit,omnia enim quaecunque de prædicato dicuntur,eadern etiam dicentur de subjecto.Omnes enim difrerentiæ quæ sunt specifica? generis praedicantur et de specie et de individuo, ut quoniam animal efficiunt differentiæ animatum atque sensibile, eadem et de specie, id est homine, et de individuo, id est aliquo homine,prædicabuntur; quod cum superius dictum est,nunc quantum expositionis brevitas postulat, dixisse sufficiat.

English

Therefore, also the differentiae are predicated univocally of those things of which they are predicated. Wherefore, since both secondary substances are predicated univocally of those things of which they are predicated, and differentiae in the same way, whatever predications there are from substances or differentiae, these too will be predicated univocally of their subjects. But what the cause is that secondary substances are predicated univocally of primary substances, Aristotle taught above when he said, admonishing us: for all things whatsoever that are said of a predicate will also be said of the subject. For all differentiae that are specific of a genus are predicated both of the species and of the individual, as, since the differentiae animate and sensible make it an animal, the same will be predicated both of the species, that is, man, and of the individual, that is, some man; and since this was said above, it suffices now to have said it insofar as the brevity of the exposition demands.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:90 · narrative
Source · Latin

Omnis autem substantia videtur hocatiquidsignificare,atquein pnmis quidem substantiis indubitabileel verum est,quoniam hoc aliquid significant. Individuum enim et unum numero est quod significatur.In secundis vero substantiis,videtur quidem similiter appellationis figura hoc aLiquid signilicare,quando quis dixerit vel hominem, vel animal, non tamen verum est, sed magis quale aliquid significat; neque enim est unum quod subjectum est,qucmadmodum prima substantia, sed de pluribus homo dicitur et animal. Non autem simpliciter quale quid significat,quemadmodum album, nihil enim atbum aliud significat quam qualitatem,genus aulem et species circa substantiam qualitatem determinant,qualem enim quamdam substantiam significant plusautem in genere quam in specie determinatio fit, dicens enim animal plus complectitur quam hominem.

English

Every substance, however, seems to signify this something, and in the case of primary substances it is undoubtedly true that they signify this something; for what is signified is an individual and one in number. In the case of secondary substances, however, the form of the appellation seems likewise to signify this something, when one says either man or animal, yet it is not true, but rather it signifies a sort of quality; for that which is the subject is not one, as a primary substance is, but man and animal are predicated of many things. But it does not signify a sort of quality simply, as white does—for white signifies nothing other than a quality—but genus and species determine a quality in relation to substance; for they signify a certain sort of substance. And the determination is made more in the case of genus than in the case of species; for in saying animal one comprehends more than man.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:91 · narrative
Source · Latin

Postquam superius geminas dixit substantiae consequentias, id est in subjecto non esse, et cuncta ab his univoce praedicari, et eas a maximæ proprio substantiæ separavit,idcirco quod differentiis etiam videntur esse communes, aliud adjicit quod idcirco substantiae proprium non sit, quod non sit in omni substantia.Nam quemadmodum quantitas,quantum signiticat,et qualitas quale,sicetiam substantia videtur hoc aliquid signiticare.Nam cum dico Socrates vel Plato vel aliquam individuam substantiam nomino,hoc aliquid significo,sed omnibus hoc substantiis non inest.Individuisnamque quoniamparticularia sunt et numero singularia,verum est hoc aliquid a substantiis significari. In secundis vero substantiis non idem est.Namque secundæ substantiae non sunt unæ,nec numero singulares,sed species intra se plurima individua continent,et multas intra se species genus includit,quocirca cum dico homo, non hoc aliquid significavi,neque enim singulare est hominis nomen,idcirco quod de pluribus individuis prædicatur, sed potius quale quiddam; qualis enim substantia sit demonstratur,cum dicitur homo.Qualitas autem hæc circa substantiam termi- A natur,namsicut individuaqualitas species et genera qualitatis habet,etsicut singulas quantitates quantitas speciebus et generibusclaudit,ita quoque individuarum substantiarum species et genera secundæ substantiae sunt.

English

After he said above that there are two consequences of substance—namely, not being in a subject, and all things being predicated of them univocally—and separated them from what is most proper to substance, for the reason that they also seem to be common to differences, he adds another point: that it is not proper to substance for the reason that it is not in every substance. For just as quantity signifies how much, and quality of what sort, so too substance seems to signify this something. For when I say Socrates or Plato or name some individual substance, I signify this something, but this is not present in all substances. For in the case of individuals, since they are particular and singular in number, it is true that this something is signified by substances. But in the case of secondary substances it is not the same. For secondary substances are not one, nor singular in number, but a species contains within itself many individuals, and a genus includes within itself many species. Therefore, when I say man, I have not signified this something—for the name of man is not singular, for the reason that it is predicated of many individuals—but rather of what sort something is; for it is shown of what sort a substance is when man is said. But this quality is bounded around substance; for just as individual quality has species and genera of quality, and just as quantity encloses single quantities by species and genera, so too the species and genera of individual substances are secondary substances.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:92 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ergo cum dico homo, talem substantiam significo, quae de pluribus numero differentibus in eo quod quid sit prædicatur,qualem ergo quamdam substantiam significo,cum hominem dixi, talem scilicet quae individuis nominetur,idem quoquedegenere est.Nam cum dico animal,talemsubstantiam significo quae de pluribus speciebus dicatur.Est igitur qualitas,ut album,quae semper sit in substantia,sed non ut ipsam substantiam interimat, idcirco quod proprietatem substantiæ albedo non habet. Qualitas vero haec quae de substantiis dicitur, circa substantiam qualitatem determinat, qualis sit enim illa substantia demonstrat.Nam si homo est rationalis,et substantia erit rationalis,sed rationalis qualitasest.Qualem ergosubstantiammonstrant secundae substantiae. Quocirca non est hoc proprium substantiae, hoc aliquid significare. Secundae enim substantiae non hoc aliquid, sed quale aliquid (ut dictum est) monstrant,ita tamen quale aliquid monstrant,utipsam qualitatem circa substantias determinent.Qualitasenim secundarum substautiarum in individuis est,de ipsis enim naturaliter praedicatur quæ ipsa individuse substantiae sunt.Qualitas igitur secundarum substantiarum circa individua, id est quæ prima sunt terminatur.

English

Therefore, when I say "man," I signify a substance of such a kind as is predicated of several things differing in number in respect of what it is. Therefore I signify a certain kind of substance when I say "man"—namely, such a one as is named of individuals. The same holds also for genus. For when I say "animal," I signify a substance of such a kind as is said of several species. There is, then, a quality, such as white, which is always in a substance, but not such as to destroy the substance itself, for the reason that whiteness does not have the property of substance. But this quality which is said of substances determines quality with respect to substance; for it shows of what sort that substance is. For if man is rational, the substance will also be rational, but rational is a quality. Of what sort, therefore, do secondary substances show the substance? Wherefore this is not a property of substance—to signify a particular thing. For secondary substances do not show a particular thing, but of what sort something is (as has been said); yet they show of what sort something is in such a way that they determine the quality itself with respect to substances. For the quality of secondary substances is in individuals; for it is naturally predicated of those things which are the individual substances themselves. The quality, therefore, of secondary substances is terminated at individuals, that is, at those things which are primary.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:93 · narrative
Source · Latin

Determinatio vero quoties ipse terminus multa concludit, major est, et minorquotiespauciora,quocircagenus plurima col- I ligit, species vero non tam pIurima.Nam cum dico animal, etiam hominem bovemque, et alia cuncta animalia hoc uno nomine clausi.Cum vero dico homo,solos homines individuos hac nominis significationeconclusi,quocirca major fit determinatio pergenus quam per speciem,et fit determinatio circa substantiam qualitatis, vel quod substantialis qualitas in genere et specie est, vel quod secundum quamdam communionem subjectorum dicitur. Sed perse qualitas,utalbum,neque ullius substantiam siguificat,neque ullam communionem,sicut genus specierum suarum,etindividuorum species,ostendit.Quocirca aliud substantiæ proprium requirendum est.

Inest autemsubstantiis etiam nihil ipsis esse contrarium, primæ enim substantiæ quid erit contrarium, ut alicui homini vel alicui animali,nihil enim est contrarium, at vero nec homini nec animali aliquid est contrarium;non est autem hoc substanliæ proprium, sed etiam multorum aliorum,ut quantitatis: bicubito enim vel tricubito nihil est contrarium,at vero nec decem nec alicui talium.Nisi quis forte mulla paucis dicat esse contraria,vel magnum pravo,determinatarum vero quantitatum nullum ulli est contrarium.

English

But the definition is greater whenever the term itself encompasses many things, and smaller whenever it encompasses fewer; wherefore a genus collects very many things, but a species not so many. For when I say "animal," I have enclosed in this one name even man and ox and all other animals. But when I say "man," I have enclosed by the signification of this name only individual men; wherefore the definition becomes greater through genus than through species, and the definition concerns the substance of a quality, either because a substantial quality is in genus and species, or because it is predicated according to a certain community of subjects. But quality in itself, as white, signifies neither the substance of anything nor any community, as a genus shows the community of its species and of individuals, and a species shows that of individuals. Wherefore another property of substance must be sought.

It also belongs to substances that nothing is contrary to them. For what will be contrary to a primary substance, as to some man or to some animal? For nothing is contrary to it. But neither is anything contrary to man nor to animal. Yet this is not a property of substance, but also of many other things, as of quantity; for nothing is contrary to a two-cubit length or a three-cubit length, but neither to ten nor to any such things. Unless perhaps someone should say that many are contrary to few, or the great to the small; but of determinate quantities, none is contrary to any.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:94 · narrative
Source · Latin

Adjecit quoque aliud substantiæ proprium dicens substantiae nihil esse conlrarium,hoc autem ex ea quae sigillatim fit inducLione confirmat. Homo enim homini vel equo, vel alicui alii animalium non est contrarius.Sed si quis forsitan dicat,cum ignis atque aqua substantiae sint,ignem aquae ease contrarium, mentietur.Non enim ignis aquae contrarius est,sed qualitates ignis qualitatibus aquæ opponuntur.Calor enim et frigus contraria sunt,et humor et siccitas, quae qualitates cum aliae sint in igne, alix in aqua, ipsassubstantias contrarias facere videntur,sed non sunt; hoc autem ex omnibus aliis substantiis potest probari, in quibus nibil quisquam poterit invenire contrarium.Sed hoc solius substantiae proprium non est, namque et quantitas definita contrariis caret. Nam neque duo tribus contraria sunt, nec duobus quatuor, nec aliquid hujusmodi: nam si dicamus tres duobus esse contrarios,cur non his duobus etiam quatuorvel quinque contrarios esse ponamus?nulla enim afferri ratio potest, cum tres duobus contrarii sint,cur quatuor vel quinque duobus contrarii non sint.

English

He also added another property of substance, saying that nothing is contrary to substance, and he confirms this by the induction that is made of individual cases. For man is not contrary to man, nor to a horse, nor to any other of animals. But if perhaps someone should say that, since fire and water are substances, fire is contrary to water, he will be mistaken. For fire is not contrary to water, but the qualities of fire are opposed to the qualities of water. For heat and cold are contraries, and moisture and dryness, which qualities, since some are in fire and others in water, seem to make the substances themselves contrary, but they are not; and this can be proved from all other substances, in which no one will be able to find anything contrary. But this is not a property of substance alone, for quantity also, when definite, lacks contraries. For neither are two contrary to three, nor four to two, nor anything of this sort; for if we say that three are contrary to two, why should we not posit that four or five are also contrary to these two? For no reason can be brought why, when three are contrary to two, four or five are not contrary to two.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:95 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod si hoc est, vel quatuor,vel tres, vel quinque,vel quicunque a duobus distant numeri, contrarii fiant duobus, et erunt uni rei multa contraria, quod fieri non potest.Non est igitur contrarium aliquid quantitati.Sed si quis dicat magnum pravo vel multae paucis esse contraria, haec quidem etiamsi quis quantitates esse confirmat,tamen diffinitæ quantitates non sunt,quantum enim sit magnum vel quantum parvum,non definit qui loquitur, eodem modo, etiam de multis atque paucis.

English

But if this is so, either four or three or five or whatever numbers are distant from two would become contrary to two, and there will be many contraries to one thing, which cannot happen. Therefore nothing is contrary to quantity. But if anyone says that the great is contrary to the base or many things to few things, even if someone affirms that these are quantities, nevertheless they are not definite quantities; for the speaker does not define how great the great is or how small the small is, and in the same way also concerning many things and few things.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:96 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quare si quis hæc quantitates esse dicat,indeterminatas indefinilasque esse confitebitur.Dicit autem Aristoteles terminatae quantitati nihiiessecontrarium,utduobusveltribus vel lineae vel superficiei.Quod si etiam aliae quantitates habent contraria,aliee vero non habent,nihil omnino impedit ad hoc quod dicitur, proprium non esse substantiæ,idcirco quod constat quasdam quantitates non habere contraria.Quod si hoc et in quantitatibus evenitnon esse contrarium,substantiarum proprium non est.Atque hæc quidem si quis magnum velparvum in quantitatibus ponat, manifestum est (ut ipse est posterius monstraturus) hæc non esse quantitates,sed ad aliquid,magnumenimad parvum dicitur;sed cum ad ea loca venerimus, propositi ordinem loci diligentius exsequemur.Nunc quoniam declaratum est et substantiæ nihil esse contrarium, et hoc ei proprium non esse,quoniam idem etiam in quantitatibus consideratur,ad sequens proprium expositionis semitam convertamus.

English

Therefore, if anyone says that these are quantities, he will admit that they are indeterminate and undefined. But Aristotle says that nothing is contrary to a determinate quantity, as to two or three or a line or a surface. But even if other quantities have contraries and others do not, nothing at all prevents what is said from being a property of substance, for the reason that it is evident that certain quantities do not have contraries. But if this also happens in quantities—that nothing is contrary—then it is not a property of substances. And indeed, if anyone places the great or the small among quantities, it is clear (as he himself will show later) that these are not quantities but relatives, for the great is said in relation to the small; but when we come to those places, we shall follow the order of the proposed passage more carefully. Now, since it has been declared both that nothing is contrary to substance and that this is not its property, because the same is also observed in quantities, let us turn to the next property in the path of our exposition.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:97 · narrative
Source · Latin

Videtur autem substantia non suscipere magis et minuSjdico autem hoc non quod substantia a substantia non sit magis etminus substantia, hoc enim dictum est, quia est,sed quoniam unaquæque substantia, hoc ipsum quod est,non dicitur magis etminus,utsi est haec substantza,homo,non est magis aut minus homo,nec ipse seipso,nec alter altero9non est enim alter altero magis homo, sicut est album alterum altero magis albumtet bonum alterum altero magis honum.Sed et ipsum se magis el minus dicitur:utcorpus cumsitalbum9magis album esse dicitur nunc quam prius; etcu1n calidum sit, magis et minus calidum dicitur. Substantia vero non dicitur magis aut minus substantia, non enim homo magis nunc homo quam prius dicitur, nec aliorum, quidquam quæ substantiæ sunt, qua propter nec recipit substantia magis et minus.

Hoc proprium non simpliciter dicitur, sed cum aliqua distinctione: ait enim substantiam neque magis recipere,neque minus,non hoc dicens,quoniam substantianon est magis ab alia subslantia.Namque quidam homo cum sit substantia,magis est substantia ab homine,id est ab specie,et homo ab animali, id est a genere.

English

But substance seems not to receive more and less. I say this, not that substance is not more and less substance than substance—for this has been said, that it is—but because each substance, that very thing which it is, is not said to be more and less; as, if this substance is man, it is not more or less man, neither than itself nor than another. For one is not more man than another, as one white thing is more white than another, and one good thing is more good than another. But even the same thing is said to be more and less of itself: as when a body is white, it is said to be more white now than before; and when it is warm, it is said to be more and less warm. But substance is not said to be more or less substance; for a man is not said to be more man now than before, nor is any of the other things which are substances. Wherefore substance does not receive more and less.

This property is not stated without qualification, but with some distinction. For he says that substance receives neither more nor less, not saying this: that substance is not more from another substance. For a certain man, since he is a substance, is more a substance than man, that is, than the species, and man than animal, that is, than the genus.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:98 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ergo non hoc dicit, quoniam non inveniuntur substantiæ quæ a substantiismagissubstantiæ sint, hoc enim dictum est, quoniam est, id est quoniam inveniuntur.Ait enim superius primas substantias,id est individuas,maxime esse substantias, in secundis vere substantiis, magis esse substantias species quam genera. Ergo non dicit,quoniam nulla substantia ab alia substantia magis substantia est, sed hoc ipsum quod est, quaslibet illa substantia non dicitur magis et minus substantia,ut si est substantia homo,non dicitquoniam homo non est magis et minus substantia,individuus enim homo magis est substantia,species vero minus siad primam,id est individuam,substantiam referatur.

English

Therefore he does not say this because substances are not found to be more substance than substances—for this has been said, because it is, that is, because they are found. For he says above that primary substances, that is, individuals, are most of all substances, but in secondary substances, species are more substance than genera. Therefore he does not say that no substance is more substance than another substance, but this very thing which it is—whatever substance it may be—is not said to be more and less substance; as, if man is a substance, he does not say that man is not more and less substance, for the individual man is more substance, but the species less, if it is referred to the primary, that is, the individual, substance.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:99 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed hoc dicit,boc ipsum quod est,id est,homo non erit magis homo vel minus homo; quocirca non dicit quoniam homo non est magis substantia vel minus, sed quoniam homo, hoc ipsum quod est,non est magis vel minus homo,non est enim aliqnis homo magis et minus homo; et hoc idem in ejusdem comparatione convenit speculari.Nam ipse homo a seipso non est plus homo,at vera nee si ad alterum conteratur,ad alterum vero ita,ut sub eadem conjunctione sint,ut quidam homo individuus ad aliquem individuum hominem comparatus,non erit magiset minus homo,et ipsa species seipsa non erit magis et minus homo; sed hoc palam est in substantiis,in'qualitatibus vero potest esso magis et mmus, album enim potest fieri magis album seipsu,et suscipere magis et minus, ut magis album et minus album; potest et alio albo plus esse album,ut lilium lana; et alio albo minus esse album, ut lana lilio, et cygnus nive, atque idem in aliis qualitatibus, ut bono et calido.

English

But he says this, this very thing that it is, that is, a man will not be more a man or less a man; wherefore he does not say that a man is not more a substance or less, but that a man, this very thing that he is, is not more or less a man, for no man is more and less a man; and this same point it is fitting to examine in comparison of the same thing. For a man himself is not more a man than himself, but truly not even if he is compared to another, but to another in such a way that they fall under the same conjunction, as when some individual man is compared to some individual man, he will not be more and less a man, and the species itself will not be more and less a man than itself; but this is evident in substances, whereas in qualities there can be more and less, for a white thing can become more white than itself, and receive more and less, as more white and less white; it can also be more white than another white thing, as a lily than wool; and be less white than another white thing, as wool than a lily, and a swan than snow, and the same in other qualities, as in the good and the hot.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:100 · narrative
Source · Latin

Namque hæc possunt temporibus permutari, et in plus minusve transduci, fit enim aliquoties bono melius et deterius, et calido ferventius et tepidius: homo vero quod est substantia, neque nunc plus erit homo quam fuit antea,neque post magis aut minus erit homo quam nunc est.Quocirca cum substantia non suscipiat magis et minus,tamen proprium ejus hoc non erit.Sed cur non sit proprium ipse Aristoteles velut notum conticuit; nos autem addimus, quoniam non solum substantias non suscipiunt magis et minus,sed et alia multa; circulus enim alio circulc non erit magis circulus aut minus,nec duplum magis duplumvel minus; aequaliter enim duplus est quaternarius: ad binarium,et denarius ad quinarium comparatus,quocirca quoniam etiam in aliis idem est, hoc substantiæ proprium non esseputandum est.Sedhæc quidem omnia quaecunquesunt in substantiis omnibus, propria tamen substantiæ non sunt,eo quod etiam in alus sint, consequentia suustantiæ appellantur.Hæcenim omniasubstantias consequuntur, ut ubicunque fuerit substantia, ea quae dicta sunt inveniantur, id est in subjecto non esse, et praedicationes ab his univoce fieri, et quod hoc aliquid significet,et quod nihil sit illis contrarium,et quod non suscipiant magis et minus: illa vero quae non omnibus substantiis insunt accidentia sunt substantiis,quocirca propria non sunt.Quod si propria non sunt,nondum quale sit substantia demonstrant.Quare

English

For these things can be changed by times, and be led into more and less; for it sometimes happens that a good is better and worse, and a hot thing is more fervent and more tepid. But a man, in that he is a substance, will not now be more a man than he was before, nor afterward will he be more or less a man than he is now. Wherefore, since substance does not admit of more and less, yet this will not be its property. But why it is not a property, Aristotle himself passed over in silence as though it were known; we, however, add that not only do substances not admit of more and less, but many other things as well. For a circle will not be more a circle or less than another circle, nor will a double be more a double or less; for four is equally a double in comparison to two, and ten in comparison to five. Wherefore, since this is the same also in other things, it must not be thought to be a property of substance. But all these things, whatever they are that are in all substances, are nevertheless not properties of substance, because they are also in other things; they are called consequences of substance. For these follow upon all substances, so that wherever a substance is, those things that have been said are found, namely, not to be in a subject, and that predications are made from them univocally, and that it signifies this something, and that nothing is contrary to it, and that they do not admit of more and less. But those things that are not in all substances are accidents of substances; wherefore they are not properties. But if they are not properties, they do not yet demonstrate of what sort substance is. Wherefore

Citation. Tergwame, “In Categorias Aristotelis Libri Quatuor”, tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:1, machine-draft, 2026. https://naxiai.com/christian/works/tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1#s1
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