{"slug":"tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1","id":"latin:ogl-pl:tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1","title":"In Categorias Aristotelis Libri Quatuor","title_source":"In Categorias Aristotelis Libri Quatuor","author":"Boethius. Severinus","genre":"treatise","date":"","tradition":"latin","coverage":"not-located","coverage_claim":{"status":"not-located","text":"No English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed."},"publication":{"status":"machine-draft","reviewed_by":null,"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash:floor","provider":"Wafer","generated":"2026-11-15T23:52:24Z","cost_usd":0.06411},"source":{"registry_id":"latin:ogl-pl:tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1","work_id":"tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1","edition":"ogl-pl","language":"","license":"Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License","url":"https://github.com/OpenGreekAndLatin/patrologia_latina-dev/blob/master/data/tmp1023/tmp1023/tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1.xml"},"stats":{"passages":343,"english_words":81946,"coptic_letters":0,"source_letters":328208,"commentary_units":0,"commentary_kinds":0,"derived_notes":2,"ambiguities":0,"work_notes":0,"external_links":0,"timeline":0},"summary":{},"links":[{"kind":"source","label":"Open Greek and Latin Patrologia Latina","url":"https://github.com/OpenGreekAndLatin/patrologia_latina-dev/blob/master/data/tmp1023/tmp1023/tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1.xml"}],"checks":{"work":"tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1","status":"pass","blocking":[],"warnings":[],"stats":{"passages":343,"translated":343,"commentary_passages":0,"commentary_units":0,"english_words":81946,"source_letters":327155,"commentary_kinds":0},"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash:floor"},"work_notes":[],"derived_work_notes":[{"kind":"coverage","severity":"info","text":"No English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed."},{"kind":"limit","severity":"caution","text":"The English is a machine draft produced passage by passage from the transcribed Latin; no human has verified it. The commentary is model-written and cites only keys the pipeline could resolve."},{"kind":"register","severity":"info","text":"Register: treatise in Latin; the English keeps the liturgical formulae and the vocatives rather than normalising them."},{"kind":"structure","severity":"info","text":"Passages: 343 narrative."},{"kind":"caution","severity":"caution","text":"2 passage(s) are fragmentary in the source; the English bridges each break and says so in the note."},{"kind":"source","severity":"info","text":"Source edition: ogl-pl."},{"kind":"source","severity":"info","text":"Licence: Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License"}],"derived_structure":{"narrative":343},"term_index":[],"citations":{},"segments":[{"i":1,"ref":"p1","source":"AN. MANL. SEV. BOETH IN CATEGORIAS ARISTOTELIS LIBRI QUATUOR.\n\nLIBER PRIMUS.\n\nExpeditis his quae ad praedicamenla Aristotelis Porphyrii institutione digesta sunt,hos quoque commentarios in prasdicamenta perscribens mediocris styli seriem persecutus, nihil de altiorum quaestionum tractationepermiscui,seddilucidandi moderatione servata, nec angere lectorem brevitate volui, nec dilatatione confundere. Quare prius breviter hujus operis aperiendavideturintentio, quae est hu. jusmodi: Rebus praejacentibus, et in propria principaliter naturae constitutione manentibus,humanum solum genus exstitit, quod rebus nomina posset imponere. Unde factum est ut sigillatim omnia prosecutus hominis animis singulis vocabula rebus aptaret. Et hoc quidem, verbi gratia, corpus, hominem vocavit,iJlud vero, lapidem,aliud lignum,aliudvero colorem. Et rursus quicunque ea se alium genuisset, pars vocabulo nuncupavit. Mensuram quoque magnitudinis proprii forma nominis terminavit,ut diceret bipedale esse, aut tripedale, et in aliis eodem modo.Omnibus ergo nominibus ordinatis,ad ipsorum rursus vocabulorum proprietates figurasque reversus est, et hujusmodi vocabuli formam, quae inflecti casibus possit, nomen vocavit; qua? vero temporibus distribui, verbum. Prima igitur illa fuit nominum positio,per quam vel intellectui subjecta vel sensibus designaret.","english":"THE FOUR BOOKS OF ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS ON THE CATEGORIES OF ARISTOTLE.\n\nBOOK ONE.\n\nNow that those matters which were set forth in Porphyry's introduction to Aristotle's Predicaments have been dealt with, I too, in writing out these commentaries on the Predicaments, have followed a course of modest style, and have mixed in nothing of the treatment of loftier questions, but, preserving a moderation that aims at clarity, I have wished neither to vex the reader by brevity nor to confound him by expansion. Wherefore it seems that the intent of this work should first be briefly set out, which is as follows: With things lying before us and remaining principally in the constitution of their own nature, the human race alone came into being, which could impose names upon things. Hence it came about that, having gone through all things one by one, man fitted individual words to individual things in the minds of men. And this, for example, he called body, that man, another stone, another wood, and another color. And again, whatever had begotten these as another kind, he named by the word part. He also bounded the measure of magnitude by the form of its own name, so as to say that it is two feet long or three feet long, and in the same way in other cases. When, therefore, all names had been ordered, he turned again to the properties and figures of the words themselves, and he called that form of a word which can be inflected by cases a noun; but that which is distributed by tenses, a verb. That, then, was the first imposition of names, through which he designated either things subject to the intellect or things subject to the senses.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":2,"ref":"p2","source":"Secunda consideralio, qua singulas proprietates nominum figurasque perspicerent,ita ut primum nomen sit ipsum rei vocabulum: ut, verbi gratia, cum quaelibet res homo dicatur. Quod autem ipsum vocabulum, id est homo, nomen vocatur,non ad significationem nominis ipsius refertur, sed ad figuram, idcirco quod possit casibus inflecti. Ergo prima positio nominis secundum significationem vocabuli facta est, secunda vero secundum figuram: et est prima positio, ut nomina rebus imponerentur, secunda vero ut aliis nominibus ipsa nomina designarentur.Nam cum homo vocabulumsitsubjectaesubstant-iae, id quod dicitur homo, nomen est bominis, quod ipsius nominis appellatio est. Dicimus enim, Qnale vocabulum est homo?et proprie respondetur, nomen. In hoc igitur opere hæc intentio est, de primis rerum nominibus, et devocibus res significantibus disputare, non in eo quod secundum aliquam proprietatem figuramque formantur, sed in eo quod significantes sunt. Nam quodcunque de substantia vel facere vel pati dicitur, non ita tractatur, quasi unum eorum casibus inflectipOBsit, aliud vero temparibus permutari, sed quasi aut hominem, aut equum,autindividuum aliquod,aut,speciem genusve significet.Estigitur hujus operis intentio de vocibus ressignificantibus,ineo quod significantes sunt pertractare.","english":"The second consideration is that by which they discern the individual properties and forms of names, such that the first name is the very word for a thing: for example, when any thing whatsoever is called man. But that the very word itself, that is man, is called a name, is not referred to the signification of the name itself, but to its form, for the reason that it can be inflected by cases. Therefore the first positing of a name was made according to the signification of the word, but the second according to its form: and the first positing is that names be imposed on things, the second that names themselves be designated by other names. For since man is the word for an underlying substance, that which is called man is the name of man, which is the appellation of the name itself. For we say, Of what sort of word is man? and the proper answer is, A name. In this work, therefore, the intention is to dispute concerning the first names of things, and concerning the utterances that signify things, not insofar as they are formed according to some property and form, but insofar as they are significative. For whatever is said of substance, whether to do or to suffer, is not treated as though one of them could be inflected by cases, while another is changed by tenses, but as though it signifies either a man, or a horse, or some individual, or a species or a genus. The intention of this work, therefore, is to treat thoroughly of utterances that signify things, insofar as they are significative.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":3,"ref":"p3","source":"Haec quidem est tempori introductionis, et simplicis expositionis apta sententia,quam nosnunc Porphyrium sequentes, quod videbatur expeditior esse planiorque digessimus.Est vero in mente deintentione, utilitate et ordine, tribus quaestionibus disputare,videlicetin alio commentario quem componere proposui de eisdem categoriis ad doctiores, quarum una est quid prædicamentorum velitintentio, ibique numeratis diversorum sententiis, docebimus cui nostrum quoque accedat arbitrium, quod nemo huic in praesentia sententiae repugnare miretur,cum videatquanto ilia sit altior cujus non nimium ingredientium mentes capaces esse potuissent,adquosmediocriter imbuendos ista conscripsimus. Afficiendi ergo,etquodam modo disponendi mediocri expositione aun in ipsi quasi disciplinae hujus forifcus,quos ad hanc paramus scientiam admittere.","english":"This indeed is a suitable account for the time of introduction and for simple exposition, which we have now set out following Porphyry, since it seemed more expedient and clearer. But it is a matter of deeper intention, utility, and order to dispute three questions—namely, in another commentary that I have proposed to compose on the same Categories, for the more learned. One of these is what the intention of the predicaments wants; and there, having enumerated the opinions of various thinkers, we shall teach which judgment our own also accedes to. No one should wonder that this conflicts with the present account, since he sees how much loftier that one is, whose depths the minds of those entering upon it could not have sufficiently grasped—those whom we have written these things to imbue in a moderate way. Therefore, they are to be affected and in a certain manner disposed by a moderate exposition, so that they may be admitted, as it were, into the very forum of this discipline, whom we are preparing for this knowledge.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":4,"ref":"p4","source":"Hanc igitur causammutatae sententiae utriusque operis lector agnoscat, quod illic ad scientiam Pythagoricam perfectamque doctrinam,hic ad simplices introducendorum motus expositionis sit accommodata sententia;sed nunc ad propositum revertamur, sitque in praesens praedicamentorum intentio, quae superius est comprehensa, id est,de primis vocibus significantibus prima rerum genera, in eo quod significantes sunt disputare: et quoniam res infinitae sunt, infinitas quoque voces, quae significent eas esse necesseest: sed infinitorum nulla cognitio est,infinita namque; animo comprehendi nequeunt.Quod autem ratione mentis circumdari non potest, nullius scientiae fine concluditur, quare infinitorum scientia nulla est: sed hicAristotelas non de infinitis rerum significationibus tractat, sed decem praedicamenta constituens, ad quae ipsa infinita multitudo significantium vocum referri debeat, terminavit: ut, verbi gratia, cum dico homo, lignum, lapis, equus, animal, plumbum,stannum, argentum, aurum, et alia hujusmodi quae nimirum infinitum sunt,haec omnia ad unum substantiæ vocabulum deducantur.Hæc namque, etsi qua sunt alia quae certae sunt infinita vocabula unum substantiae nomen includit.Rursus cum dico bipedale,tripedale, sex, quatuor, decem, lineam superficiem, solid itatem, et quæcunque alia ex eodem genere quae iniinita sunt, uno quantitas nomine continentur, ut haec omnia sub","english":"Let the reader therefore recognize this cause of the changed intention in each work: that in the one, the exposition is accommodated to Pythagorean knowledge and perfect doctrine, while in the other, to the simple motions of those being introduced. But now let us return to the proposed subject, and let the intention of the Categories for the present be what was comprehended above, namely, to dispute concerning first words signifying the first genera of things, insofar as they are signifying. And since things are infinite, the words that signify them must also be infinite. But of infinite things there is no knowledge, for infinite things cannot be comprehended by the mind. Moreover, what cannot be encompassed by the reasoning of the mind is concluded by the boundary of no science; wherefore there is no knowledge of infinite things. But here Aristotle does not treat of the infinite significations of things, but, establishing the ten categories, he has bounded them, to which that infinite multitude of signifying words ought to be referred. So that, for example, when I say man, wood, stone, horse, animal, lead, tin, silver, gold, and other things of this kind, which are undoubtedly infinite, all these are brought down to the one word substance. For these, and whatever other words there are that are certainly infinite, the one name of substance includes. Again, when I say two-footed, three-footed, six, four, ten, line, surface, solidity, and whatever other things from the same genus that are infinite, they are contained by the one name of quantity, so that all these under","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":5,"ref":"p5","source":"quantitate ponantur. Rursus cum dico album, vel scientiam, vel bonum, vel malum, vel alia hujusmodi, quaeque in hoc quoque genere infinlta sunt,unum tamen nomen concludens omnia qualitatis occurrit,et de aliis quoque similiter.Rerum ergo diversarum indeterminatam infinitamque multitudinem,decem prædicamentorum paucissima numerositate concludit,ut ea quae infinita sub scientiam cadere non poterant,decem propriis generibus diffinita scientiae comprehensione claudantur.Ergo decem prædicamenta quae dicimus, infinitarum in vocibus significationum genera sunt, sed quoniam omnis vocum significatio de rebus est, quæ voce significantur in eo quod significantes sunt,genera rerum necessario significabunt.Utigiturconcludenda sit intentio, dicendum est in hoc libro de primis vocibus, prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod significantes sunt,dispositum esse tractatum. Sed quoniam de intentione dictum est, breviter hujus operis utilitas explicanda est.","english":"are placed in quantity. Again, when I say white, or knowledge, or good, or evil, or other things of this sort, which in this genus too are infinite, one name nevertheless occurs that encloses all of quality, and similarly concerning other things. Therefore the indeterminate and infinite multitude of diverse things he confines within the smallest number of the ten predicaments, so that those things which, being infinite, could not fall under knowledge might be enclosed by the comprehension of knowledge, defined by ten proper genera. Therefore the ten predicaments which we speak of are the genera of infinite significations in words, but since every signification of words is about things, which are signified by a word insofar as they are signifying, they will necessarily signify the genera of things. Therefore, to conclude the intention, it must be said that in this book a treatise has been set out concerning primary words, which signify the primary genera of things insofar as they are signifying. But since the intention has been discussed, the usefulness of this work must briefly be explained.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":6,"ref":"p6","source":"Nam cum res infinit-e inGnitis quoque vocibus significarentur,et (ut dictum est) sub scientiam venire non possent, hac definitione,qua decem prædicamentorum divisio facta est,cunctarum rerum et vocum significantium acquirimus disciplinam.Hinc est quod ad logicum tendentibus primus hic liber legendus occurrit,idcirco quod cum omnis logica syllogismorum ratione sit constituta syllogismi vero propositionibus jungantur, propositiones vero sermonibus constent, prima est utilitas quid quisque sermo significet,propriæ scientiae diffinitione cognoscere. Haec quoque nobis de decem prædicamentis inspectio,et in physica Aristotelis doctrina,et in moralis philosophiæ cognitione perutilis est,quod per singula currentibus magis liquebit. Quocirca de ordine quoque libri hujus eadem ratio est.Nam quoniam res simplices compositis natura priores sunt,quæ enim composita sunt,ex simplicibus componuntur. Hic quoniam de simplicibus vocibus res significentibus disputatur, secundum ipsius simplicitatis principalem naturam, primus hic Aristotelisliberinchoantibusaddiscitur.","english":"For since things infinite were signified by infinite words as well, and (as has been said) could not come under knowledge, by this definition, by which the division of the ten categories was made, we acquire the understanding of all things and of the words that signify them. Hence it is that for those tending toward logic this book is the first to be read, for the reason that since all logic is constituted by the reasoning of syllogisms, and syllogisms are joined together from propositions, and propositions consist of words, it is of primary utility to know by the definition of its proper science what each word signifies. This inspection of the ten categories is also very useful to us both in Aristotle's physical doctrine and in the knowledge of moral philosophy, which will become clearer as we run through the individual points. Wherefore the same reasoning holds also concerning the order of this book. For since simple things are by nature prior to composite things — for composite things are composed of simple ones — and since here there is discussion of simple words signifying things, according to the principal nature of simplicity itself, this book of Aristotle is learned first by those beginning.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":7,"ref":"p7","source":"Nec illud fere dubium est,ad quam partem pbilosophiae hujus libri ducatur intentio, idcirco quoniam qui de significativis vocibustractat,derebusquoque est aliquatenus tractaturus.Res etenim et rerum significatio juncta est, sed principalior erit illa disputatio quae de sermonibus est: secundo vero loco illa quæ de rerum ratione formatur. Quare quoniam omnis ars logica de oratione est,et in hoc opere de vocibus principaliter tractatur (quanquam enim sit hujus libri relatio ad caeteras quoque philosophiae partes) principaliter tamen refertur ad logicam,de cujus quodammodo simplicibus elementis,id est, de sermonibus in eo principaliter disputavi.Aristotelis vero neque ullius alterius liber est,idcirco quod in omni philosophia sibi ipse de hujus operis disputatione consentit,et brevitas ipsa atque subtilitas ab Aristotele non discrepat,alioqui interruptum imperfectumque opus edidissevidereturqui desyllogismis scriberet,si aut de propositionibus praetermisisset, aut de primis vocibus tractatum, quibus ipsae propositiones continentur,omitteret.Quanquam exstet alter Aristotelis liber de eisdem disputans, eadem fere continens, cum Sit oratione diversus; sed hic proprietatis liber calculum coepit.","english":"Nor is it generally doubtful to which part of philosophy the intention of this book leads, since one who treats of significant words will also to some extent have to treat of things. For a thing and the signification of a thing are joined, but that disputation which concerns words will be more principal; in the second place, however, is that which is formed concerning the rational account of things. Wherefore, since every logical art concerns speech, and in this work there is principal treatment of words (for although this book has a relation to the other parts of philosophy as well), it is principally referred to logic, of whose, so to speak, simple elements—that is, of words—I have principally disputed in it. But the book is Aristotle's and no other's, for the reason that in all philosophy he is consistent with himself concerning the disputation of this work, and its very brevity and subtlety do not disagree with Aristotle; otherwise he would seem to have published an interrupted and imperfect work, who, writing about syllogisms, had either passed over propositions or omitted a treatment of the first words, by which the propositions themselves are contained. Although there exists another book of Aristotle disputing about the same matters, containing nearly the same things, though different in style; but this book began the reckoning of its own peculiar character.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":8,"ref":"p8","source":"Archites etiam d']oscomposuit libros quos inscripsit, quorum in primo haec decem praedicamenta disposuit.Unde posteriores quidam non esse Aristotelem hujus divisionis inventorem suspicati sunt,quod Pythagoricus vir eadem conscripsisset, in qua sententia Jamblicus philosophus est non ignobilis,cui non consentit Themistius,neque concediteum fuisse Architem,qui Pythagoricus Tarentinusque esset,quique cum Platone aliquantulum vixisset, sed peripateticum aliquem Architem,qui novo operi auctoritatemvetustate nominis conderet,sed de bisalias. Restatinscriptio quaevariafuit. Inscripsere namque - *x alii de rebus, alii de generibus rerum, quos eadem similisque culpa confudit. Namque (ut docuimus) non de rerum generibus,neque de rebus, sed de ser.","english":"Archytas also composed books on the subject, to which he gave the title, and in the first of these he set out these ten categories. Hence certain later thinkers suspected that Aristotle was not the inventor of this division, because a Pythagorean man had written on the same subjects. In this opinion Jamblichus, a philosopher not undistinguished, stands, with whom Themistius does not agree, nor does he concede that it was that Archytas who was a Pythagorean and a Tarentine, and who had lived for some little time with Plato, but rather a certain Peripatetic Archytas, who sought to lend authority to a new work by the antiquity of the name. But of these matters elsewhere. There remains the title, which was varied. For some entitled it On Things, others On the Genera of Things, whom the same or a similar fault of confusion misled. For (as we have taught) it is not about the genera of things, nor about things, but about meanings.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":9,"ref":"p9","source":"monibus rerum genera significantibus in hoc opere tractatus habetur, hoc vero Aristoteles ipse declarat cum dicit: Eorum quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur, singulum aut substantiam significat,aut quantitatem.Quod si de rebus divisionem faceret,non dixisset significat; res enim significatur, non ipsa significat.IIlud quoque maximo argumento est Aristotelem non de rebus, sed de sermonibus res significantibus speculari,quod ait: Singulum igitur eorum que dicta sunt,ipsum quidem secundum se in nulla affirmatione dicitur,horum antem ad seinvicem complexione affirmatio fit.Resenim sijungantur,affirmationem nullo modo perficiunt,affirmatio namque in oratione est.Quocirca si prædicamenta juncta faciunt affirmationem (affirmatiovero non nisi in oratione est,quae autem junguntur ut affirmatio fiat,hae suntrerumsignificantesvoces)praedicamentorumtractatus non de rebus,sed de vocibus est;male igitur vel de rebus vel rerum generibus inscripserunt.Annotant alii bunc librum legendum ante Topica,quod nimis absurdum est. Cur enim non magis ante Physica? quasi vero minor hujus sit libri usus in Physicis, cum primi ReHulotorii ante Topica!egantur,etante primos ResuloLorios Perihermenias liber ad cognitionem veniatinchoantis,curnon magis hunc librum vel ante Perihermenias,vel ante Resolutorios inscripserunt?","english":"In this work the treatment concerns the genera of things that signify, and Aristotle himself declares this when he says: \"Of those things which are said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity.\" But if he were making a division concerning things, he would not have said \"signifies\"; for a thing is signified, it does not itself signify. That too is the greatest argument that Aristotle is examining not things but words that signify things, which he says: \"Each therefore of those things which have been said, is indeed said in itself in no affirmation, but from the combination of these with one another an affirmation comes about.\" For things, if they are joined, in no way complete an affirmation, for an affirmation is in speech. Wherefore if the categories joined make an affirmation (but an affirmation is only in speech, and those things which are joined so that an affirmation may come about are words signifying things), the treatment of the categories is not concerning things but concerning words; therefore they have wrongly entitled it either concerning things or concerning the genera of things. Others note that this book should be read before the Topics, which is excessively absurd. For why not rather before the Physics? As if indeed the use of this book in the Physics were less, when the first Analytics are read before the Topics, and before the first Analytics the book On Interpretation comes for the knowledge of a beginner, why did they not rather inscribe this book either before the On Interpretation or before the Analytics?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":10,"ref":"p10","source":"Quare repudianda est inscriptionis istius quoque ipsa sententia,dicendumque est: Quoniam rerum prima decem genera sunt,necesse fuit decem quoque esse simplices voces, quae de subjectis rebus dicerentur: omne enim quod significat de illa re dicitur quam significat,ergo inscribendus liber est de decem Prsedicamentis.Sed forte quis dicat,si de significantibus rerum vocibus ipsa disputatio est,cur de ipsis disputat rebus? Dicendum est,quoniam res semper cum propria significatione conjunctae sunt, et quidquid in res venit,'hoc quidem in rerum vocabulis invenitur: quare recte de vocabulis disputans, proprietatem significantium vocum de his quae significabantur, id est de rebus assumpsit. Erit alia quoque fortasse quaestio: Cur enim hic orationem in decem praedicamenta sit partitu3,in Perihermenias libro in duas tantum partes divisionem fecit,in verbum videlicet et nomen?","english":"Therefore the very meaning of that title must also be rejected, and it must be said: Since there are ten primary genera of things, there necessarily had to be ten simple words as well, which are predicated of the underlying things. For everything that signifies is said of that thing which it signifies. Therefore the book must be titled On the Ten Categories. But perhaps someone may say: if the discussion itself concerns words that signify things, why does it discuss the things themselves? It must be said that things are always joined with their proper signification, and whatever applies to things is also found in the words for things. Therefore, in rightly discussing words, he took up the property of significant words from those things which were signified, that is, from things. There will perhaps be another question as well: Why did he here divide discourse into ten categories, while in the book On Interpretation he made a division into only two parts, namely the verb and the noun?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":11,"ref":"p11","source":"Sed hoc interest quod illic figuras vocabulorum dividit,in hoc de significationibus tractat,quare non est sibi ipse contrarius.InPerihermenias enim libro de nomine et verbo considerat quae secundum figuram quamdam vocabuli sunt,quod illud inflecti casibus potest,illud variari per tempora: hic vero non secundum has figuras, aed in eo quod voces significantes sunt disputatur: quare diversam in diversis rebus atque tractatibus faciendo divisionem, nulla contrarietate notabitur, neque nunc orationem dividit,sed ad multitudinem generumnominaipsadisperlit: namquoniam decem rerum genera sunt non secundum orationem, sed secundum rerum significationem in decem praedicamenta voces dividit, deque bis tractat.","english":"But there is this difference: that in the former work he divides the forms of words, while in this one he treats of significations; wherefore he is not contradicting himself. For in the book On Interpretation he considers the noun and the verb according to a certain form of the word—that the one can be inflected by cases, the other varied by tenses; here, however, he disputes not according to these forms, but insofar as words are significant. Wherefore, by making a different division in different matters and treatises, he will be marked by no contradiction; nor does he now divide speech, but distributes the names themselves according to the multitude of genera. For since there are ten genera of things, he divides words into ten categories not according to speech, but according to the signification of things, and treats of these.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":12,"ref":"p12","source":"Atque ideo necesse fuit quodammodo disputationem de rebus quoque misceri,ita (ut dictum est) ut non aliter nisi ex rebus proprietates in sermonibus apparerent,atque ita non de rebus proprie, sed de praedicamentis, id est,de ipsis rerum significativis vocibusin eo quod significantes sunt,seriem disputationis orditur.Cur autem,si de praedicamentis disputat, de aequivocis, vel univocis,vel denominativis primus illi tractatus est?Idcirconimirum quod quaedam semper a disputantibus praemittuntur,quibus positis facilior de sequentibus possit esse doctrina: ut in geometria, prius termini praeponuntur,post theorematum ordo conteritur.Itaquoque hic quidquid ad prædicamentorum disputationem possitesseutile,priusquam ad I ipsa prædicamentaveniret,exposuit: quare quoniam quae prædicenda erant exp!icavi,nunc ad ipsius disputationis seriem textumque veniamus.Quid autem aequivoca vel univoca vel denominativa utilitatis habeant, secundum ipsas singulorum rationesdiffinitionesque tractabitur.","english":"And therefore it was necessary that the discussion be in a certain way mixed with things as well, so (as has been said) that the properties of things could not appear in words except from things, and thus he begins the series of his discussion not properly about things, but about the categories, that is, about the very words significant of things insofar as they are significant. But why, if he is disputing about the categories, is his first treatment of equivocals, univocals, or denominatives? For this reason, surely, that certain things are always premised by disputants, which, once posited, may make the teaching about what follows easier: as in geometry, the terms are first set out, then the order of theorems is unfolded. So too here, whatever could be useful for the discussion of the categories, he set forth before he came to the categories themselves. Wherefore, since I have explained what had to be explained, let us now come to the series and text of the discussion itself. But what usefulness equivocals, univocals, or denominatives have will be treated according to the individual accounts and definitions of each.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":13,"ref":"p13","source":"DE ÆQUIVOCIS.\n\nÆquivoca dicuntur quorum solum nomen commune estysecundum nomen vero substantiæ ratio diversa,ut animal, homo et quod pingitur. Horum enim solum nomen commune est,secundum nomen vero substantiæ ratio diversa.Si quis enim assignet quid sit utrumque eorum,quo sint animalia,propriam assignabit utrisque rationem.\n\nOmnis res aut nomine autdiffinitionemonstratur: namque subjectam rem aut proprio nomine vocamus, aut diffinitione quid sit ostendimus.Ut verbi gratia, quamdam substantiam vocamus hominis nomine, et ejusdem definitionem damus dicentes esse hominem animal rationale,mortale; ergo quoniam res omnis aut diffinitione autnominedeclaratur,exhisduobus, nomine scilicet et deffinitione,diversitates quatuor procreantur.Omnes namque res aut eodem nomine et eadem definitione junguntur,ut homo etanimal, utraque enim animalia dici possunt, et utraque una diffinitione junguntur.Est namque animal substantia animata sensibilis,et homo rursus substantia animata sensibilis,et haeo vocantur univoca. Alia vero quae neque nominibus nequediffinitionibusconjungunlur: ut ignis, lapis, color, et qaae propriae substantiae natura discreta sunt,hæc autem vocanturdiversivoca.","english":"ON EQUIVOCALS.\n\nEquivocals are said to be those of which only the name is common, but according to the name the account of substance is different, as animal, man, and that which is painted. For of these only the name is common, but according to the name the account of substance is different. For if anyone assigns what each of them is, in that they are animals, he will assign a proper account to each.\n\nEvery thing is made known either by name or by definition: for we either call the underlying thing by its proper name, or we show by definition what it is. For example, a certain substance we call by the name of man, and we give the definition of the same, saying that man is a rational, mortal animal; therefore, since every thing is declared either by definition or by name, from these two, namely name and definition, four differences are produced. For all things are either joined by the same name and the same definition, as man and animal—for both can be called animals, and both are joined by one definition. For animal is an animated, sensible substance, and man again is an animated, sensible substance, and these are called univocals. But others which are joined neither by names nor by definitions, as fire, stone, color, and those which are distinguished by the proper nature of their substance—these are called diversivocals.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":14,"ref":"p14","source":"Alia vero quae diversis nominihus nuncupantur, et uni diffinitioni designationique subduntur, ut gladius,ensis; hæc enim multa sunt nomina,sed id quod significantunadiffinitionedeclaratur,elhoc vacatur multivocum.Alia vero quae nomine quidem congruunt,diffinitionibus discrepant: ut est homo vivens et homo pictus, nam utrumque vel animalia vel homines nuncupantur.Si vero quis velit picturam hominemquediffinire,diversas utrisque diffinitiones aptabit, et haec vocantur aequivoca. Quare quoniam quid sinl aequivoca dictum est, singulis Aristotelicae diffinitionis sententias persequamur. Æquivoca, inquit, dicitur res scilicet, quae per se ipsas aequivocae non sunt, nisi uno nomine prasdicentur; quare quoniam ut aequivoca sint, ex communi vocabulo trahunt,recteait,aequivocadicuntur. Non enim sunt aequivoca,sed dicuntur.","english":"But others which are called by different names and are brought under one definition and designation, as sword and blade; for these are many names, but what they signify is declared by one definition, and this is called multivocal. But others which agree in name yet differ in definitions, as is a living man and a painted man, for each is called either an animal or a man. But if anyone wishes to define a painting and a man, he will apply different definitions to each, and these are called equivocals. Therefore, since it has been said what equivocals are, let us follow the meanings of Aristotle's definition one by one. Equivocals, he says, are said—namely, things which are not in themselves equivocal unless they are predicated by one name; therefore, since they derive their being equivocal from a common term, he rightly says they are called equivocals. For they are not equivocals, but are called so.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":15,"ref":"p15","source":"Fit autem non solum in nominibus,sed etiam in verbis aequivocatio: utcum dico complector te,etcomplector a te.In quibus significationibus cum unum nomen sit complector, alia tamen faciendi ratio est, alia patiendi: atque ideo hic quoque aequivocatio est: unum enim nomen quod est complector,diversis faciendi et patiendi diffinitionibus terminatur.In præpositionibus quoque,et in conjunctionibus frequenter aequivocatio reperitur,atque ideo quod ait: Quorum nomen solum commune est, nomen accipiendum est omnis rerum per vocem significatio,id est,omne vocabulum non proprium solum,aut appellativum, quod ab illud tantum nomen pertinet quod casibus inflecti potest,sed ad nomen rerum significationem, qua rebus imposita vocabula prædicamus. Solum autem duobus modis dicitur: semel cum aliquid unum esse dicirnus, ut si dicamus solusest mundus, id est unus; alio vero modo cum dicimus ad quamdam ab altero divisionem,ut si quis dicat solam me habere tunicam,id eSI,non etiam togam,ad divisionem videlicet togae. Hic ergo Aristoteles posuit dil'ens,Solum nomen commune est,quasi hoc voluisset intelligi non etiam diffinitio, aequivoca enim jungunturnomine,sed diffinitione dissentiunt.Communequoquemultisdiciturmodis.Diciturcommune quod in partes dividitur,et non jam totumcommune est, sed partes ejus propriae singularum,ut domus.","english":"Equivocation, however, occurs not only in nouns but also in verbs: as when I say \"I embrace you\" and \"I am embraced by you.\" In these significations, although \"embrace\" is one name, one is a mode of doing and the other of undergoing; and therefore here too there is equivocation, for the one name \"embrace\" is delimited by different definitions of doing and of undergoing. In prepositions too, and in conjunctions, equivocation is frequently found. And therefore, when he says \"whose name alone is common,\" \"name\" must be understood as every signification of things through a word, that is, every word—not only a proper or appellative noun, which belongs to that name alone which can be inflected by cases, but [extending] to the signification of things, by which we predicate words imposed on things. \"Alone,\" moreover, is said in two ways: first, when we say that something is one, as if we should say \"the world is alone,\" that is, one; in another way, when we speak with respect to some division from another, as if someone should say \"I have only a tunic,\" that is, not also a toga—evidently with respect to the division of the toga. Here, therefore, Aristotle set down \"alone\": \"the name alone is common,\" as if he wished this to be understood, but not also the definition; for equivocals are joined by name but disagree in definition. \"Common\" also is said in many ways. That is called common which is divided into parts, and is no longer common as a whole, but its parts are proper to individuals, as a house.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":16,"ref":"p16","source":"Dicitur commune quod id partes non dividitnr,sed vicissim in usus habentium transit, ut servus communis vel equus.Dicitur etiam commune quod utendo cujusque fit proprium,post usum vero in commune remittitur,ut est theatrum,uamcum eo utor,meum est,cum inde discedo, in commune remisi.Dicitur quoque commune,quod ipsum quidem nullis divisum parLibus,totum uno tempore in singulos venit. ut vox vel sermo ad multorum aures uno eodemque tempore totus atque integer pervenit. Secundum hanc igitur ultimam communis significationem Aristoteles putat aequivocis rebus commune esse vocabulum.Namque in homine picto et in homine vivo totum in utrisque vocabulum dicitur animalis,secundum nomen vero substantiæ ratio diversa,hoc hac significatione praemittit,ut si aliter reddanturdiffinitiones quam secundum nomen,statim tota diffinitio labet ac titubet.Ac primumde diffinitionisproprietale dicendum est.Illae enim certa; diffinitiones sunt quæ convertuntur, ut si dicas,Quid est bono? animal rationale mortale?homo,hoc quoqueverum est.At vero si ita quis dicat,Quid est homo?substantia animata sensibilis. verum est;quid substantia animata sensibilis? homo,hoc non modisomnibusverum est,idcirco quod equus quoque est substantia animata sensibilis, sed bomo non est. Ergo illas constat esse diffinitiones integras quæ converti possunt.","english":"A thing is called common which does not divide its parts, but passes in turn into the uses of those who have it, as a common slave or horse. A thing is also called common which, by use, becomes one's own, but after use is returned to the common, as a theater: when I use it, it is mine; when I leave it, I have returned it to the common. A thing is also called common which, though divided by no parts, comes whole at one time into individuals, as a voice or speech comes whole and entire to the ears of many at one and the same time. According to this last signification of common, therefore, Aristotle thinks that the word is common to equivocal things. For in a painted man and in a living man the word \"animal\" is said to be whole in both, but according to the name the account of substance is different. He premises this with this signification, so that if definitions are rendered otherwise than according to the name, the whole definition immediately slips and falters. And first, concerning the property of definition, it must be said. For those definitions are certain which are convertible, as if you say, \"What is man? A mortal rational animal,\" and this also is true: \"A mortal rational animal? Man.\" But if someone says thus, \"What is man? An animated sensible substance,\" it is true; \"What is an animated sensible substance? Man,\" this is not true in all ways, for the reason that a horse also is an animated sensible substance, but is not a man. Therefore it is agreed that those definitions are complete which can be converted.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":17,"ref":"p17","source":"Sed hoc fit in iis quae non de communi, sed uno tantum,ut cum de hominis nomineredduntur, verbi gratia.Animal est commune nomen,si dixerit quis,Homo est substantia animata sensibilis,procedi: si non convertatur; quia de communi nomine reddita est diffinitiojsin vero de uno nomine redditur, tunc de ipso nomine facienda est diffinitiojsic tamen est recta facienda, ut hominis diffinitio sit animal rationale mortale, non substantia animata sensibilis,illa enim secundum hominis nomen,ista secundum animalis est reddita. Idem etiam in his nominibus quae de duabus rebus communiter prædicantur, si secundum nomen substantiae ratio non reddatur,potest aliquoties fieri,utexunivocisaequivoca sint, et ex aequivocis univoca; namque homo atqueequuscum secundum nomen animalis univoca I sint, possunt esse aequivoca, si secundum nomen minime diffinita sunt.Homo namque et equus communi nomine animalia nuncupatur, si quis ergo hominis reddat diffinitionem dicens,aninal rationale mortale, et equi,animal irrationale hinnibile, diversas reddidit diffinitiones,et:erunt res univocsein aequivocas permutatæ.","english":"But this happens in those things which are not predicated from something common, but from one only, as when definitions are given from the name of man, for example. Animal is a common name; if someone says, Man is a substance animate and sensible, he has not proceeded correctly, because the definition has been given from a common name. But if the definition is given from one name, then the definition must be made from that name itself. Yet it must be made correctly in such a way that the definition of man is rational mortal animal, not animate sensible substance; for the latter has been given according to the name of man, the former according to that of animal. The same holds also in those names which are predicated in common of two things: if the account of the substance is not given according to the name, it can sometimes happen that univocals become equivocals, and equivocals become univocals. For man and horse, although they are univocal according to the name of animal, can be equivocal if they are not defined according to the name. For man and horse are called animals by a common name; if, therefore, someone gives the definition of man, saying, rational mortal animal, and of horse, irrational neighing animal, he has given different definitions, and things that were univocal will have been changed into equivocals.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":18,"ref":"p18","source":"Hoc autem idcirco evenit, quoddiffinitiones non secundum animalis nomen redditsesunt,quod eorumcommunevocabulumest, sed secundum hominis atque equi.Nam si secundum commune nomen quod est animal diffinitio redderetur,ita fieret,homo est substantia animata sensibilis, secundum nomen scilicet animalis; et rursus, equus est substantia animata sensibilis, secundum nomen rursus animalis, secundum idem namque animalis vocabulum equus atque homo univoce prædicantur.Rursusexequivocis univoca fiunt hoc modo;siquisPyrrbum Achillis filium et Pyrrhum Epiroten dicat esseunivocos,idcirco quod uno nomine et Pyrrhi dicantur, et sint animalia rationabilia atque mortalia.Hic secundum nomen hominisredditadiffinitio, ex aequivocis fecit univoca. Quod si secundum nomen Pyrrbi diffinitionis ratio jungeretur vel a parentibus vel a patria,diversis eos oporteret diffinitionibus terminari.Recte igitur additum est,secundum nomen,idcirco quod si aliter facta sit diffinitio, stabilis esse non poterit, et frequenterdiversos secum ducit errores. Ratio quoque multimodo dicitur. Est enim ratio animae, et est ratio computandi,est ratio naturae,ipsa nimirum similitudo nascentium,est ratio quae in diffinitionibusvel descriptionibusredditur.Et quoniam generalissima genera genere carent,individuavero nulla substantiali diffe.","english":"But this happens for this reason, that definitions are not given according to the name of animal, which is their common term, but according to the name of man and of horse. For if a definition were given according to the common name which is animal, it would come about thus: Man is a substance animated, sensible, that is, according to the name of animal; and again, Horse is a substance animated, sensible, again according to the name of animal; for according to the same term animal, horse and man are predicated univocally. Again, from equivocals univocals are made in this way: if someone says that Pyrrhus the son of Achilles and Pyrrhus the Epirote are univocals, for the reason that they are called by the one name of Pyrrhus, and are rational and mortal animals. Here the definition given according to the name of man has made univocals out of equivocals. But if the account of the definition were joined according to the name of Pyrrhus, either from his parents or from his homeland, they would have to be delimited by different definitions. Rightly, therefore, \"according to the name\" was added, for the reason that if the definition is made otherwise, it cannot be stable, and often brings with it various errors. \"Ratio\" also is said in many ways. For there is the ratio of the soul, and there is the ratio of calculating, there is the ratio of nature, namely the very likeness of things being born, and there is the ratio which is given in definitions or descriptions. And since the most general genera lack a genus, but individuals lack any substantial difference.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":19,"ref":"p19","source":"rentia discrepant, diffinitio vero ex genere et differentia trahitur,neque generalissimorum generum, neque individuorum ulla potest diffinitio reperiri. Subalternorum vera generum, quoniam et differentias habent et genera, diffinitiones esse possunt.At vero quorum diffinitiones reddi nequeunt,illa tantum descriptionibus terminantur.Descriptio autem est, quae quamlibet rem propria quadam proprietate designat. Sive ergo diffinitio sit sive descriptio,utraque rationem substantiæ designat.Quare cum substantiae rationem dixit,et diffinitionis et descriptionis nomen inclusit. Æquivocorum alia sunt casu, alia consilio. Casu, ut Alexander Priami filius et Alexander Magnus.Casus enim id egit,ut idem utrique nomen poneretur.Consilio vero, ea quaecunque hominum voluntate sunt posita. Horum autem alia sunt secundum sirnilitudinem, ut homo pictus et homo verus quo nunc utitur Aristoteles exemplo: alia secundum proportionem, ut principium est in numero unitas,in lineis punctus.Et haec aequivocatio secundum proportionem esse dicitur. Aliavero suntquae ab uno descendunt, ut medicinale ferramentum;medicinale pigmentum,ab una enim medicinacequivocatio ista descendit.Alia quæ ad unum referuntur,utsi quisdicat salutaris veclatioest,salutaris esca est, haec scilicet idcirco sunt aequivoca, quod ad salutis unum vocabulum referuntur. Cur autem prius de æquivocis post de univocis tractat?","english":"they differ, but a definition is drawn from genus and differentia, no definition of either the most general genera or of individuals can be found. But definitions of subaltern genera can exist, since they have both differentiae and genera. Yet those things whose definitions cannot be rendered are delimited only by descriptions. A description, moreover, is that which designates any thing by some proper characteristic. Whether, therefore, it is a definition or a description, each designates the account of substance. Wherefore, when he spoke of the account of substance, he included both the name of definition and of description. Of equivocals, some are by chance, others by design. By chance, as Alexander the son of Priam and Alexander the Great. For chance brought it about that the same name was applied to both. By design, however, are all those which are imposed by human will. Of these, moreover, some are according to similarity, as a painted man and a true man, which is the example Aristotle now uses; others according to proportion, as the principle in number is the unit, in lines the point. And this equivocation is said to be according to proportion. Others, however, are those which descend from one thing, as a medical tool, a medical ointment; for this equivocation descends from one thing, medicine. Others are those which are referred to one thing, as if someone should say that a healthy walk is, a healthy food is; these, namely, are equivocal for this reason, that they are referred to the one term of health. Why, moreover, does he treat of equivocals before univocals?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":20,"ref":"p20","source":"Idcircoquod ipsa decem prasdicamenta cum diffinitionibus diversa sint, uno praedicationis vocabulo nuncupantur; cuncta enim praedicamenta dicimus, ipsa vero prædicamenta quoniam rerum genera sunl,de subjectis rebus univoce praedicantur.Omne enim genus de speciebus propriis univoce dicitur, quare rectius primodeomnibuspraedicamentorum communi vocabulo tractat,quasidehincquemadmodum singula de speciebus propriis prædicarentur, exprimeret.At si (ut dictum est) non de rebus,sed de nominibus libri hujus intentio est.Cur de aequivocis et non de aequivocatione tractavit? æquivocæae namque res sunt, aequivocatio vero vocabulum. Idcirco. quomam ipsum nomen nibil in se retinet,,; æquivocationis,nisi diversæ sint res de quibus illud vocabulum prædicetur.Quare inde substantiam ipsa aequivocatio trahit, de ipsis dignus inchoatum est. Videtur autem alius esse modus æqui vocationis quem Aristoteiesomnino non recipit.Namsicutdiciturpes hominis,ilaquoquedicitur pes navis,et pes montis,, quae hujusmodi omniasecundumtranslationemdicuntur. Translatio vero nullius proprietatis est.","english":"For this reason, because the ten categories themselves are distinct in their definitions, they are called by the single term of predication; for we call them all categories. But the categories themselves, since they are the genera of things, are predicated univocally of the subjects beneath them. For every genus is said univocally of its own species. Therefore he more rightly treats first of what is common to all the categories by a shared term, as if he would then express how each single one is predicated of its own species. But if (as has been said) the intention of this book is not about things but about names, why did he treat of equivocals and not of equivocation? For equivocal things are things, but equivocation is a word. For this reason, because the name itself retains nothing in itself of equivocation unless the things of which that word is predicated are diverse. Wherefore equivocation draws its substance from thence, and it was fitting to begin from those things themselves. But there appears to be another mode of equivocation which Aristotle does not admit at all. For just as the foot of a man is spoken of, so too the foot of a ship and the foot of a mountain are spoken of, all of which are spoken of in this way according to transference. But transference belongs to no property.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":21,"ref":"p21","source":"Quare secundum translationem cequivocanunquam sunt,nisi propriis et immutabilibus subjectæ res vocalubis appellentur.Estautem taliseorum universalis inspeclio.Neque enim omnis translatio abaequi-, vocatione sejungitur,sed ea tantum cum ad res habentes positum vocabulum, ab aliajam nominata re nomenornatuscausatransfertur,utquiajam dicitur quidam auriga, dicitur etiam gubernator, si quis ornatusgratiacumquigubernatorestdicataurigam, non erit auriga nomen sequivocum,licet diversa,id est,moderatorem currus navisque significet.Sed quoties res quidem vocabulo eget,ab alia vero re quaevocabulum sumit,tuncistatranslatio aequivocationis retinet proprietatem,ut ex homine vivo ad picturam nomen hominis dictum est.Et de aequivocis hactenus; nunc de univocis pertractemus.\n\nDE UNIVOCIS.\n\nUnivoca vero dicuntur quorum nomen commune est, et secundum nomen eadem ratio substantiæ,ut animal, homo atque bos,communi enim nomine utraque animalianuncupantur,et est substantiæ ratio eadem.Si quis enim assignet utriusque rationem quidulrumque sit, quo sint animalia, eamdem assignabit rationem.","english":"Wherefore according to transfer they are never equivocal, unless things are called by their own and immutable words. But such is the universal consideration of them. For not every transfer is separated from equivocation, but only that when the word applied to things having it is transferred from another thing already named for the sake of ornament, as because someone is already called a charioteer, he is also called a helmsman, if anyone for the sake of ornament, together with the one who is a helmsman, is called a charioteer, the name charioteer will not be equivocal, although it signifies different things, that is, the driver of a chariot and of a ship. But whenever a thing indeed needs a word, but from another thing which takes the word, then that transfer retains the property of equivocation, as from a living man the name man was applied to a picture. And about equivocals thus far; now let us treat of univocals.\n\nON UNIVOCALS.\n\nBut univocals are said to be those whose name is common, and according to the name the same account of substance, as animal, man and ox; for by the common name both are called animals, and the account of substance is the same. For if anyone assigns the account of each, what each is, in that they are animals, he will assign the same account.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":22,"ref":"p22","source":"Post aequivocorum diffinitionem ad univocorum terminum transitum fecit,in quibus nihil aliud discrepat, nisi quod aequivoca diffinitione disjuncta sunt,univoca ipso quoque termino conjunguntur,sed cætera omnia quæ cunque in æquivocorum diffinitione dicta sunt,in hac quoque univocorum designatione conveniunt.Nam quemadmodum in gequivocissecundum nomen aequivocarum rerum diffinitio fiebat,ita quoque in univocis secundumnomensubstantiaeratio assignabitur.Suntautemunivocaaut genera speciebus, aut species speciebus, genera speciebus,ut animal atque bomo. Nam cum hominis genus sit animal,dicitur homo animal,ergo et animal et homo animalia nuncupantur.Secundum igitur commune nomen si utrosque diffinias,dicis animal esse subatantiam animatam atque'sensibiJem,hominem quoque secundum id quod animal est, si substantiam animatam sensibilem dixeris,nihn in eo falsitatis in. venies. Species vero speciebus univocae sunt, quæ uno atque eodem genere continentur, ut homo, equus atque bos,his commune genus est animal,et communi nomineanimalia nominantur.Ergo secundum nomen unum quod illis commune estanimalis, una illius ratio diffinitionis aptabitur,omnia enim suntsubslantiae animataeatquesensibiles.Secundum igitur posteriorem univocationisdesignationem Aristoteles qua speciebus species univocae sunt,ut homo et bos, quae sub eodem sunt genere, sumpsit exemplum.","english":"After the definition of equivocals he made a transition to the term of univocals, in which nothing else differs except that equivocals are separated by definition, while univocals are joined also by the term itself; but all other things whatsoever that were said in the definition of equivocals also apply in this designation of univocals. For just as in equivocals the definition of equivocal things was made according to the name, so too in univocals the account of substance will be assigned according to the name. Now univocals are either genera in relation to species, or species in relation to species: genera in relation to species, as animal and man. For since animal is the genus of man, man is called an animal; therefore both animal and man are called animals. Therefore, if you define both according to the common name, you say that animal is an animated and sensible substance; and if you say that man also, according to the fact that he is an animal, is an animated and sensible substance, you will find nothing false in this. But species are univocal in relation to species which are contained under one and the same genus, as man, horse, and ox: their common genus is animal, and they are named animals by the common name. Therefore, according to the one name of animal that is common to them, one account of its definition will be fitted, for all are animated and sensible substances. Therefore, according to the latter designation of univocation, by which species are univocal in relation to species, as man and ox, which are under the same genus, Aristotle took an example.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":23,"ref":"p23","source":"DE DENOMINATIVIS.\n\nDenominativa vero dicuntur quæcunque ab aliquo solo differentia casu secundum nomen habent appellationem, ut a grammatica grammaticus, et a tortitudine fortis.\n\nHaec quoque diffinitio nihil habet obscurum.Casus enim antiqui nominabantaliquasnominumtransfigurationes, ut a justitia justus, a fortitudine tortis,etc.Haec igitur nominis transfiguratio,casus ab antiquioribus vocabatur.Atque ideo quotiescunque aliqua res alia participat, ipsa participatione sicut rem,ita quoque nomenadipiscitur,utquidamhomo, quiajustitia participat et rem quoque inde trahitet nomen, dicitur enim justus.Ergodonominativavocantur quaecunque a principalinominesolocasu,id est sola transfiguratione discrepant. Nam cum sit nomen principalejustitia,ab hoc transfiguratum nomen justus efficitur. Ergo illa sunt denominativa quaecunque a principali nomine solo casus id est sola nominis discrepantia,secundum principalenomen habent appellationem.Tria sunt autem necessaria,ut denominativa vocabula constituantur:prius ut re participet, post ut nomine, postremo ut sit quaedam noministransfiguratio,ul cum aliquis dicitur a fortitudine fortis,est enim quaedam fortitudo qua fortis ille participet,habet quoque nominis participationem,fortis enim dicitur.At vero est quaedam transfiguratio, fortis enim et fortitudo non eisdem syllabis terminantur.","english":"ON DENOMINATIVES.\n\nDenominatives, however, are said to be whatever things have their appellation from something else, differing only in case according to the name, as from grammar a grammarian, and from crookedness a crooked one.\n\nThis definition too has nothing obscure. For the ancients called cases certain transformations of names, as from justice a just one, from fortitude a brave one, etc. This transformation of a name, therefore, was called a case by the more ancient writers. And for this reason, whenever some thing participates in another, by that participation it acquires both the thing and the name, as a certain man, because he participates in justice, derives both the thing and the name from it; for he is called just. Therefore those are called denominatives, whatever things differ from a principal name by case alone, that is, by transformation alone. For since the principal name is justice, from it the transformed name just is produced. Therefore those are denominatives, whatever things have their appellation from a principal name by case alone, that is, by the discrepancy of the name alone, according to the principal name. But three things are necessary for denominative terms to be constituted: first, that it participate in the thing; second, that it participate in the name; and finally, that there be a certain transformation of the name, as when someone is called brave from fortitude. For there is a certain fortitude in which that brave person participates, and he also has a participation in the name, for he is called brave. But there is also a certain transformation, for brave and fortitude do not terminate in the same syllables.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":24,"ref":"p24","source":"Si quid vero sit quod re non participet, neque nomine participare potest. Quare quaecunque re non participant,denominativa esse non possunt. Rursusquoque,quaere quidem participant, nomine vero minime, ipsa quoque adenominativorum natura discreta sunt, ut si quis,cumsit virtus, virtute ipsa participet, nullo cum alio nomine nisi sapientem vocamus.Sedvirtus et sapientia nomine ipso disjunctasunt,hicergorequidemparticipat,nomineverominime.Quare sapiens a virtute denominatus esse nondicitur,sed a sapientia,qua scilicet et participat, et nomine jungitur,et transfiguratione diversus est; rursus si transfiguratio non sit,utquaedam mulier musica,participat quidem ipsa musicas disciplina,et dicitur musica.Hæ igitur appellatio non est denominativa,sed æquivoca,uno enim nomine et disciplina et ipsa mulier musica dicitur. Quoniam ergo similis terminus syllabarum est, et nomen simile,et nulla transfiguratio,denominativa essenon poterunt,quare quidquid denominativaesse non poterunt,quare quidquid denominativum esse dicitur,illud et re participabit et nomine, et aliqua transfiguratione vocabuli discrepabit.","english":"But if there is anything that does not participate in the thing, it cannot participate in the name either. Therefore, whatever things do not participate in the thing cannot be denominatives. Again, in turn, whatever things do participate in the thing but not at all in the name, these too are distinct from the nature of denominatives, as if someone, since virtue exists, participates in virtue itself, yet we call him by no other name than wise. But virtue and wisdom are distinct in their very name. He, therefore, participates in the thing but not at all in the name. Therefore, a wise man is not said to be denominated from virtue, but from wisdom, in which he both participates and is joined in name, and is different by a change of form. Again, if there is no change of form, as a certain woman is musical, she indeed participates in the discipline of music and is called musical. This appellation, therefore, is not denominative but equivocal, for by one name both the discipline and the woman herself are called musical. Since, therefore, the ending of the syllables is similar, and the name is similar, and there is no change of form, they cannot be denominatives. Wherefore, whatever is said to be a denominative will both participate in the thing and in the name, and will differ by some change of the word.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":25,"ref":"p25","source":"Hæc igitur quæ ad praedicamenta necessaria credidit,præmisit.Multivocavero etdiversivocarespuit,quod ad praesentem tractatum utilianonputavit Brevitertarren utraque dfffinienda sunt.Multivoca sunt quorum plura nomina una diffinitio est,ut est scutum,clypeus: his enim pluranomina.seduna diffinitio est;etMarcus Porcius Cato,his enim tot nominibusres una subjecta est.Diversificasuntquorum nequenomen idem est, neque eadem diffinitio,ut homo, color, et quidquid omnino a se et nominis nuncupatione etdiffinitionis ratione discretum est.\n\nEorum quæ dicuntur alia quidem secundum complexionem dicuntur alia vero sine complexione, et ea quæ secundum complexionem dicuntur sunt, ut homo currit, homo vincit: ea vero quæ sine complexione dicuntur sunt, ut homo, bos, currit, vincit.\n\nPostquam de conjunctionediffinitionumatquenominum quantum ad praesens attinebat opus,sufficienter exposuit quoniam de primis nominibus prima rerum genera significantibus divisio facienda est,non j nomine, sed genere discrepantibus, nunc ostendit quid sit sine complexione cujuslibet vocabuli facta prolatio.Sine complexione enim dicuntur quæcnnque secundum simplicem sonum nominis proferuntur,ut homo, equus: his enim extra nihil adjunctum est.","english":"He therefore first set out these things that he believed necessary for the Categories. But he rejected multivocals and diversivocals, because he did not think them useful for the present treatise. Briefly, however, both must be defined. Multivocals are those that have several names but one definition, as is a scutum, a clypeus: for these have several names, but one definition; and Marcus Porcius Cato, for to him one thing is subject under so many names. Diversivocals are those of which neither the name is the same nor the definition, as man, color, and whatever altogether is distinguished from another both by the naming of the name and by the account of the definition.\n\nOf things that are said, some are said according to combination, others without combination. And those that are said according to combination are, as man runs, man conquers; but those that are said without combination are, as man, ox, runs, conquers.\n\nAfter he sufficiently expounded, as far as pertained to the work at hand, concerning the conjunction of definition and names—since the division must be made concerning primary names that signify the primary genera of things, differing not in name but in genus—he now shows what the utterance of any word made without combination is. For those things are said without combination, whatever are brought forth according to the simple sound of a name, as man, horse: for to these nothing is added from outside.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":26,"ref":"p26","source":"Secundumcomplexionerodicunturqusecunquealiqua conjunctione copulantur,ut aut Socrales aut Plato, vel quaecunque secundnm aliquod accidens conjunguntur.Namquia,verbigratia,inSocratem venitambulatio,dicimus: Socrates ambulat, et est prolatio istasecundumcomplexionem,idcirco quia cumdico Socrates ambulat,Socratem sum cum ambulatione complexus.Quod autem ait: Eorum quae dicuntur, nihil aliud demonstrare vult nisi de primis rerum vocabulis hujus libelli disposuisse tractatum.Rerum = enim vocabula sunt quas dicuntur,ipsa enim proprie nominamus.\n\nEorum quæ sunt alia de subjecto quodam dicuntur, in subjecto vero nullo sunt: ut homo de subjecto quidem dicitur aliquo homine,in subjecto autem nullo est. Alia in subjecto quidem sunt,de subjecto autem nullo dicuntur. In subjecto autem esse dico, quod cum in aliquo non sicut quædam pars sit, impossibile est sine eo esse in quo est: ut quædam grammatica in subjecto quidem est, in anima,de subiecto autem nullo dicitur, et quoddam album in subjecto est corpore (omnis enim color in corpore est), de subjecto autem nullo dicitur. Alia et de subjecto quodam dicuntur, et in subjecto sunt: ut scientiæ in subjecto quidem est in anima, de subjecto autem dicitur, ut de hac grammatica. Alia neque in subjecto sunt neque de subjeclo dicuntur, ut aliquis homo, vel aliquis equus: nullum enim horum neque in subjecto est, neque de subjecto dicitur.","english":"Those things are said according to combination, whatever are joined by some conjunction, as either Socrates or Plato, or whatever are joined according to some accident. For because, for example, walking comes to Socrates, we say: Socrates walks, and that utterance is according to combination, for the reason that when I say Socrates walks, I have combined Socrates with walking. But what he says, Of those things which are said, he wishes to demonstrate nothing other than that the treatise of this little book has been set out concerning the first words of things. For the words of things are those which are said, for we properly name the things themselves.\n\nOf those things which are, some are said of some subject, but are in no subject: as man is said of some subject, indeed of some man, but is in no subject. Others are in a subject, but are said of no subject. But I say to be in a subject, that which, when it is in something not as a certain part, is impossible to be without that in which it is: as a certain grammar is in a subject, in the soul, but is said of no subject, and a certain white is in a subject, in a body (for every color is in a body), but is said of no subject. Others both are said of some subject and are in a subject: as knowledge is in a subject, in the soul, but is said of a subject, as of this grammar. Others neither are in a subject nor are said of a subject, as some man, or some horse: for none of these is either in a subject, or is said of a subject.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":27,"ref":"p27","source":"Simpliciter autem quæ sunt individua et numero singularia, de nullo subjecto dicuntur: in subjecto autem nihil prohibet horum aliqua esse,quædam enim grammalica in subjecto est, de subjecto autem nullo dicitur.\n\nHic Aristoteles sermonum omnium multitudinem in parvissimam colligit divisionem.Nam quod rerum vocabula in decem prædicamenta distribuit,major hac divisione non potest inveniri,nihil enim esse poterit quod huic divisioni undecimum adjici queat.Omnis enim res aut substantia est, aut quantitas,aut qualitas,aut ad aliquid,aut facere, aut pati,aut quando, aut ubi, aut habere, aut situs; quocirca tot erunt. etiam sermones qui ista significent,et haec est maxima divisio,cui ultra nihil possit adjungi: parvissima vero est quae fit in quatuor,in substantiam et accidens,et universale et particulare. Omnis enim res aut substantia est,aut accidens,autuniversalis, aut particularis.Sicut ergo decem superioribus nihil addi poterat,ita ex his quatuor nihil demi.","english":"But those things which are individual and singular in number are said without qualification of no subject; yet nothing prevents some of these from being in a subject. For a certain grammatical knowledge is in a subject, but is said of no subject.\n\nHere Aristotle gathers the whole multitude of all statements into a very small division. For in that he distributes the names of things into ten categories, no greater division than this can be found; for there will be nothing that could be added to this division as an eleventh. For every thing is either substance, or quantity, or quality, or relation, or doing, or undergoing, or when, or where, or having, or position; and therefore there will be just so many statements also that signify these things, and this is the greatest division, to which nothing further can be added; but the smallest is that which is made into four: substance and accident, universal and particular. For every thing is either substance or accident, either universal or particular. Therefore, just as nothing could be added to the ten above, so from these four nothing can be taken away.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":28,"ref":"p28","source":"Nam neque minor ulla divisio his quatuor fieri potest,nec major quam si denario limite praedicamenta claudantur.Cum autem in his quatuor divisio facta est, paucis exponam.Prima quidem rerum est omnium divisio in substantiamatqueaccidens.Sed quoniam substantia proferri non potest nisi aut universaliter autparticulariterintelligatur: nam cum dico homo, rem dixi universalem, idcirco quod nomen hoc de multis individuis praedicatur: cum vero dico Socrates vel Plato,rem dixi particularem; quoniam Socrates de nudo subjecto dicitur et accidens quoque eodem modo; nam cum dixero scientiam,rem protuli universalem,idcirco quod scientia et de grammatica et de rhetorica, et de aliis omnibus sub se positis prædicatur; sivero dixero Platonis scientiam,quoniam omne accidens quod individua venit individuum fit,particularem scientiam dico,namque Platonisscientia,sicutipsePlato,particularis est: igitur quoniam nequesubstantianequeaccidens ullomodo proferri potest, nisi in suo nomine aut universalitatis vim,aut particularitatis induat, recte in quatuor divisio facta est, ut si omnis res aut substantia. aut accidens,et horum aut universaJi, aut particularis. Ex his igitur quatuor fiunt complexiones.Nam cum venerit universalitas in substantiam,fil universalis substantia, ut est homo vel animal.","english":"For no smaller division of these four can be made, nor any greater than if the predicaments were enclosed within the tenfold boundary. But when the division into these four has been made, I shall set it forth briefly. The first division of all things is into substance and accident. But since substance cannot be brought forward unless it is understood either universally or particularly — for when I say \"man,\" I have stated a universal thing, for the reason that this name is predicated of many individuals; but when I say \"Socrates\" or \"Plato,\" I have stated a particular thing, since Socrates is said of a bare subject — and accident likewise in the same way; for when I have said \"knowledge,\" I have brought forward a universal thing, for the reason that knowledge is predicated both of grammar and of rhetoric and of all other things placed under it; but if I have said \"Plato's knowledge,\" since every accident that comes to individuals becomes individual, I call it particular knowledge, for Plato's knowledge, just like Plato himself, is particular. Therefore, since neither substance nor accident can be brought forward in any way unless in its own name it puts on either the force of universality or that of particularity, the division into four has rightly been made, so that every thing is either substance or accident, and of these either universal or particular. From these four, therefore, combinations are made. For when universality comes to substance, there comes to be universal substance, as is man or animal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":29,"ref":"p29","source":"Universale autem est quod aptum est de pluribus praedicari.Particulare vero quod de nullo subjecto prædicatur. Ergo es una complexio universalitatis et subsfantiae, ut sit substantia universalis. Si vero particularis substantiæ copulatur,fit substantia particularis,ut est Socrates vel Plato,et quidquid in substantia individuum reperitur.Atcum miscetur universalitasaccidenti,fit accidens universale,ut scientia,quæ cum sit accidens, et praeteranimam cui accidit esse non possit, tamen universalis est,quod;desubjecta grammaticavelaliis speciebus praedicari poteat.Cum vero particularitas accidenti conjungitur, fit accidens particulare, ut Platonis vel Aristotelis scientia. Fiunt enim quatuor com plexiones,substantia universalis,substantia particularis,accidens universale, accidens particulare, Ut autem accidens iu substantiae naturam transeat, vel substantia in accidens,fieri nullo modo potest,et accidens quidem venit in substantiam, sed non ut substantia fiat: neque enim quoniam color,quod est accidens venitin substantiam,idcirco color jam substantia est. Nec quoniam substantia suscipit colorem idcirco color jam substantia fit.","english":"But a universal is what is capable of being predicated of many things. A particular, however, is what is predicated of no subject. Therefore there is one combination of universality and substance, so that there is universal substance. But if it is joined to particular substance, there comes to be particular substance, as is Socrates or Plato, and whatever is found to be an individual in substance. And when universality is mixed with accident, there comes to be universal accident, as knowledge, which although it is an accident, and cannot exist apart from the soul to which it is an accident, is nevertheless universal, because it can be predicated of underlying grammar or other species. But when particularity is joined to accident, there comes to be particular accident, as the knowledge of Plato or Aristotle. For four combinations come to be: universal substance, particular substance, universal accident, particular accident. But that an accident should pass over into the nature of substance, or a substance into an accident, can in no way happen; and an accident indeed comes into a substance, but not so as to become a substance: for it is not because color, which is an accident, comes into a substance, that color is therefore now a substance. Nor is it because a substance receives color that color therefore now becomes a substance.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":30,"ref":"p30","source":"Quare neque substantia in accidentis,neque accidens in substantiae naturam transit.At vero nec particularitas, nec universalitas in se transeunt.Namque universalitas potest de particularitate prædicari, ut animal de Socrate vel Platone,et particularitas suscipiet universalitatis praedicationem,sed non ut universalitas sit particularitas, nec rursus ut quod particulare est universalitas fiat. Ergo quatuor complexiones, universalem substantiam,universale accidens,particularem substantiam,particulare accidens Aristoteles disponere cupiens,non dorum nomina, sed descriptiones apposuit.Etquoniam generalissimorum generam diffinitiones non poterat invenire, discriptionibus usus est his, id substantiam esse dicens quod in subjecto non esset,accidens vero quod in subjecto esset.Omne namque accidens in subjecto est, ut colore in corpore,scientia in anima,etsubjectam habet substantiam omne accidens. Si quis enim substantiam lollat,accidens non ent. Quare substantia locusquidam est ubi accidentis valeat natura consistere.Ipsa vero substantia per se constat,atque ideo dicitur substantia,nec ullo subjecto alio nititur,sed cunctis ipsa substantia est. Alioqui si substantia in ullo subjecto esse posset,esset accidens.Omne enim accidens in subjecto est,et quidquid in subjecto est, illud est accidens.","english":"Therefore neither does substance pass into the nature of an accident, nor an accident into that of a substance. But neither do particularity and universality pass into each other. For universality can be predicated of particularity, as animal of Socrates or Plato, and particularity will receive the predication of universality, but not so that universality becomes particularity, nor again so that what is particular becomes universality. Therefore, since Aristotle wished to set out four combinations—universal substance, universal accident, particular substance, particular accident—he supplied not the names of two of these, but descriptions. And because he could not find definitions of the most general genera, he used these descriptions, saying that substance is what is not in a subject, and accident what is in a subject. For every accident is in a subject, as color in a body, knowledge in a soul, and every accident has substance as its subject. For if anyone removes substance, the accident will not exist. Therefore substance is a kind of place where the nature of an accident can subsist. But substance itself stands by itself, and for that reason is called substance, and it rests upon no other subject, but is itself the subject for all things. Otherwise, if substance could be in any subject, it would be an accident. For every accident is in a subject, and whatever is in a subject is an accident.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":31,"ref":"p31","source":"Quod si substantia essetinaliquo subjecto, continuo fieret accidens, sed substantia accidens esse non potest, sicut supra docuimus. Quare quoniam accidens in subjectoest,substantia vero accidens non est, substantia in subjecto non est. Universalitatis vero descriptio est, de subjecto praedicari.Omnis namque universalitas de subjectis particularibus prædicatur,nam quoniam universale est animal,vel homo,de Socrates praedicatur et Platone.Dicitur enim Socrates animal atque homo. Et quoniam universale est accidens scientia,di0i!ur de subjecta grammalica,grammalica enim scientia est.Particularitas vero quoniam ipsa est rerum ultimael nihil est illi subjectum,de nullo subjecto prsedicatur; nam quoniam universalitas de:subjecto prsdicatur, particularitas vero universalitas non est. particularitas de subjecto non prasdicabitur. Ubi enim res discrepant,et definitio discrepabit;ita quoque in his,nam quoniam discrepat substantia et accidens,diffinitiones quoque eorum discrepabunt.Ut quoniam est accidens in subjecto, erit substantia non in subjecto. Et quoniam universalitas de subjecto praedicatur, particularitas autem ab universalitate discrepat,de subjecto non praedicatur. Has igitur hujusmodi descriptiones Aristoteles itapermiscuit dicens: Eorum quae sunt, alia de subjecto quodam diountur, in subjecto vero nullo sunt, volens scilicet universalem substantiam demonstrare.","english":"But if substance were in some subject, it would immediately become an accident; but substance cannot be an accident, as we taught above. Therefore, since an accident is in a subject, but substance is not an accident, substance is not in a subject. But the description of universality is to be predicated of a subject. For every universality is predicated of particular subjects; for since animal or man is universal, it is predicated of Socrates and Plato. For Socrates is said to be an animal and a man. And since knowledge is a universal accident, it is said of the subject grammar, for grammar is knowledge. But particularity, since it is itself the last of things and has nothing as its subject, is predicated of no subject; for since universality is predicated of a subject, but particularity is not universality, particularity will not be predicated of a subject. For where things differ, the definition will also differ; so too in these cases, for since substance and accident differ, their definitions also will differ. Thus, since an accident is in a subject, substance will not be in a subject. And since universality is predicated of a subject, but particularity differs from universality, it is not predicated of a subject. Therefore Aristotle intermingled descriptions of this kind in this way, saying: Of the things that are, some are said of a certain subject, but are in no subject, wishing, of course, to demonstrate universal substance.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":32,"ref":"p32","source":"Nam quod dixit de subjecto dicuntur,universaleest, quod vero ait. in subjecto nullo sunt, substantia: ergo quod ait quædam de subjecto dici,in subjecto vero nullo esse, universalem substantiam demonstrare contendit: ut enim Saepius dictum est, quod de subjecto dicitur, universale est; quod in nullo suhjecto est,substantia. Hrecjuncta, id est de subjecto quodam dici,et in subjecto nullo esse,universalem substantiam damonstrant. Post universalem substantiam particulare accidens posuitdicens:Alia autem in subjecto quidem sunt, de subjecto autem nullo dicuntur.Nam quod ait in subjecto sunt, accidens monstrat,quod vero addidit,desubjectoautem nullo dicuntur, particulare. Accidens enim in subjecto est, particularitas de nullo subjecto praedicatur. Ergo quæcunque res ipsa quidem in subjecto est,sed si de nullo subjecto prædicatur, accidens est particulare,utest de quaedamgrammatica,id est Aristarchi,vel alicujus hominis individua grammatica: illa enim quoniam individui hominis, ipsa quoque facta est individua et particularis; ergo quoniam quaedam'grammatica in anima est, accidens est, et quoniam de nullo subjecto praedicatur, particularis est; quemadmodum enim ipse Aristarchus de nullo subjecto dicitur,ita quoque ejus grammatica de nullo subjecto praedicatur.","english":"For what he said, \"are said of a subject,\" is universal; but what he said, \"are in no subject,\" is substance. Therefore what he said, that certain things are said of a subject but are in no subject, he maintains demonstrates universal substance. For, as has been said rather often, what is said of a subject is universal; what is in no subject is substance. These joined together, that is, to be said of a certain subject and to be in no subject, demonstrate universal substance. After universal substance he placed particular accident, saying: \"But others are in a subject and are said of no subject.\" For what he said, \"are in a subject,\" shows an accident; but what he added, \"are said of no subject,\" shows a particular. For an accident is in a subject, and particularity is predicated of no subject. Therefore whatever thing is itself in a subject but is predicated of no subject is a particular accident, as is a certain grammar, that is, the individual grammar of Aristarchus or of some man; for that grammar, since it belongs to an individual man, has itself also become individual and particular. Therefore, since a certain grammar is in the soul, it is an accident; and since it is predicated of no subject, it is particular. For just as Aristarchus himself is said of no subject, so too his grammar is predicated of no subject.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":33,"ref":"p33","source":"Non autem dicit quod ipsa grammaticaparticularis est, sed quod quaedam grammatica,id est alicujus hominis individui grammatica,quam scilicet homo particularis propria retinet cognitione.Et quoniam incorporale accidens posuit quod animæ accideret,id est grammaticam, quæ esset in anima,ponit quoque aliud exemplum corporale; ait enim et quoddam album in subjecto est corpore, omnis enim color est in corpore: hic quoque non omne album dicit esse particulare,sed quod ad individuum corpus album venit. Probatur quoque particulare album in subjecto esse hoc modo, nam color quod genus est albi vel cujusdam albiin corpore est, et est in subjecto. Quare cujus genus In subjecto est, ipsum quoque in subjecto est. Omnes enim species vel individua;propria genere continentur,et ejusdem habent naturam. Quoniam vero esse in aliquo multis dicitur modis, qui velit Aristoteles ostendere esse insubjecto,paucisabsolvam. Dicitur enim esse aliquid in aliquo novem modis, dicimus enim esse aliquid in loco,ut in foro vel in theatro.Dicimus quoque esse in aliquo, ut in aliquo vase,ut triticum in modio.Dicitur etiam esse in aliquo velut pars in toto, ut manus in corpore.Dicitur esse in aliquo,velut totum in partibus,ut corpus in omnibus suis partibus.Rursus velut in genere species,ut in animali homo,vel genus in speciebus suis.","english":"But he does not say that grammar itself is particular, but that a certain grammar, that is, the grammar of some individual man, which namely a particular man retains by his own cognition. And since he posited an incorporeal accident that befalls the soul, that is, grammar, which would be in the soul, he also posits another corporeal example; for he says that a certain white is also in a subject, namely in a body, for every color is in a body. Here too he does not say that every white is particular, but that which comes to an individual body. It is also proved that a particular white is in a subject in this way: for color, which is the genus of white or of a certain white, is in a body and is in a subject. Wherefore, that whose genus is in a subject, is itself also in a subject. For all species or individuals are contained by their own genus and have its nature. But since \"to be in something\" is said in many ways, I shall briefly explain what Aristotle wishes to show by \"to be in a subject.\" For something is said to be in something in nine ways. For we say something is in a place, as in the forum or in the theater. We also say something is in something as in a vessel, as wheat in a measure. It is also said to be in something as a part in a whole, as a hand in a body. It is said to be in something as a whole in parts, as a body in all its parts. Again, as a species in a genus, as man in animal, or a genus in its species.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":34,"ref":"p34","source":"Dicimus quoque esse in aliquo, velut aliquid in fine esse, ut quoniam bonæ vitae finis beatitudo est, si quis sit beatus; in fine est,scilicet bonae vitai.Oicimus quoque esse in aliquo ut in quolibet potente,ut in imperatore esse regimen civitatis.Dicimus quoque velutformamin materia,utsimilitudinem Achillis in £ere vel in marmore. Novem igitur modis aliquid in aliquo esse dicitur, ut in loco,ut in vase, ut pars in toto,ut totum in partibus,ut in genere species, ut in speciebus genus, ut in fine, ut in imperatores,utinmateriaforma.Horum igiturAristoteles tria sola commemorat,sed duo in unum conjuncta, aliud seperatum.Ait enim: In subjecto autem esse dico quod,cum in aliquo sit,non sicut quædam pars, impossibileestessesine eo in quo est. Sensus autem talis est: Hoc, inquit, dico esse accidens, quod sit in subjecto,id est quod ita sit in altero,ut pars ejus non sit et sine aliquo subjecto esse non possit, ut, verbi gratia,coJor cum in corpore nulla pars corporis est,et si color a corpore separatur,colornusquam est. Omnis enim color in solo corpore est. Ergo illud est accidens quod semper ita in subjecto est altero, ut ejus pars non sit,ut cum ab eo in quo est separatur, ad nihilum redigatur, ut per se sine alterius subjecto esse non possit.","english":"We also say that something is in something, as something is in an end, for instance, since beatitude is the end of the good life, if anyone is blessed, he is in the end, that is, of the good life. We also say that something is in something as in any powerful person, as the governance of a city is in the emperor. We also say [something is] as a form in matter, as the likeness of Achilles is in bronze or in marble. Therefore, something is said to be in something in nine modes: as in a place, as in a vessel, as a part in a whole, as a whole in parts, as a species in a genus, as a genus in species, as in an end, as in an emperor, as a form in matter. Of these, therefore, Aristotle mentions only three, but two joined into one, and another separately. For he says: \"But I say that to be in a subject is what, when it is in something, is not as a certain part, and it is impossible for it to be without that in which it is.\" But the sense is this: This, he says, I call an accident, that it is in a subject, that is, that it is in another in such a way that it is not a part of it and cannot be without some subject, as, for example, color, when it is in a body, is no part of the body, and if color is separated from a body, color is nowhere. For every color is in a body alone. Therefore, that is an accident which is always in another as in a subject in such a way that it is not a part of it, so that when it is separated from that in which it is, it is reduced to nothing, so that it cannot be through itself without the subject of another.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":35,"ref":"p35","source":"Quod autem ait ut non sit sicut aliqua pars, ab ea scilicet significatione in aliquo consistendi dividere voluit, secundum quam partes in toto esse dicimus,non enim tale est subjectum, ut ejus accidens pars sit. Quod vero dicit, impossibile est esse sine eo in quo est, ab ea scilicet significatione divisit, quae est esse aliquid in vase vel in loeo;quod enim in vase vel in loco est a vase j vel loco poterit separari, ut triticum quod in modio est, potest a modio segregari, et homo a theatro discedere:accidens vero ab eo in quo est segregari non potest.Quare solas tres posuitsignificationes,id est secundum quam in vase,vel in loco dicitur esse, et secundum quam pars in toto est. Sed ut in vase et ut in loco una sententia distribuit dicens, impossibile est esse sine eo in quo est. Sed fortasse quis dicat non esse diffinitionem veram,illa esse in subjecto quæ sic sint in alio non ut sint partes,et sine eo in quo sint esse non posaint, Socrates enim vel homo quilibet cum accidens non sit,tamen semper in loco est et sine loco esse non potest. Quibus respondendum est quod Socrates loca poterit permutare,et esse præter locum in quo fuit:et postremo si intelligentia capiamus,per se subsistit,accidentia vero per se ipsa non constant.","english":"But when he says \"as not being like some part,\" he wished to distinguish this from that signification of consisting in something according to which we say that parts are in a whole; for the subject is not such that its accident is a part. But when he says \"it is impossible for it to be without that in which it is,\" he distinguished it from that signification which is to be something in a vessel or in a place; for what is in a vessel or in a place can be separated from the vessel or the place, as wheat that is in a measure can be separated from the measure, and a man can depart from the theater; but an accident cannot be separated from that in which it is. Wherefore he posited only three significations, that is, according to which something is said to be in a vessel or in a place, and according to which a part is in a whole. But \"as in a vessel\" and \"as in a place\" he treats under one statement, saying \"it is impossible for it to be without that in which it is.\" But perhaps someone may say that the definition is not true—that those things are in a subject which are in another in such a way as not to be parts, and cannot be without that in which they are—for Socrates, or any man, since he is not an accident, is nevertheless always in a place and cannot be without a place. To these it must be answered that Socrates will be able to change places and to exist apart from the place in which he was; and finally, if we grasp it by understanding, he subsists through himself, whereas accidents do not stand through themselves.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":36,"ref":"p36","source":"Sed si quis quoque objiciat posse locum accidentia permutare, malum namque si in manu teneatur,manus mali odore completur, adeo odor quod est accidens, in aliud subjectum transire potest.Sed non hoc ait Aristoteles, quoniam mutare accidens locum non potest,nec ita dixit impossibile esse sine eo in quo erat, sed sine eo in quo est, hoc enim significat mutare quidem posse locum, sed sine aliquo subjecto non posse subsistere. Quare recta est atque integra diffinitio ejus quod in subjecto est,quod ita sint in altero non sicut quædam pars,et impossibile sit esse sine eo in quo est,secundum autem illam significationem dictum est secundum quam formam in materia esse dicimus.Namque forma,si in materia sit,per seipsam nulla ratione consistit.Postquam igitur particulare accidens quid esset ostendit dicens,quod in subjecto est et de subjecto non praedicatur, et in subjecto consistentis reidiffinitionemredditdicens,quodcum in aliquo sit non sicut quædam pars,impossibileest esse sine eo in quo est.","english":"But if anyone objects that accidents can change their place—for a disease, if it is held in the hand, fills the hand with the odor of the disease, so that the odor, which is an accident, can pass over into another subject—Aristotle does not say this, since an accident cannot change its place, nor did he say that it is impossible for it to be without that in which it was, but without that in which it is. For this means that it can indeed change its place, but cannot subsist without some subject. Therefore the definition of that which is in a subject is correct and complete: that they are in another not as some part, and that it is impossible for them to be without that in which they are; but this was said according to that signification according to which we say that form is in matter. For form, if it is in matter, by itself in no way subsists. Therefore, after he showed what a particular accident is by saying that it is in a subject and is not predicated of a subject, he also gives the definition of that which consists in a subject, saying that when it is in something not as some part, it is impossible for it to be without that in which it is.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":37,"ref":"p37","source":"Ad universale accidens continenti disputatione revertitur quod definit hoc modo.Namque post ejus rei quæ in subjecto estdiffinitionem,et post particularis accidentis exempla, ad universaleaccidenstransitumfecitjinquiens alia esse quae in subjecto sint,et de subjecto prædicentur,quod scilicet accidens universale signiticel:nam quoniam de subjecto dicitur, universale est, quoniam in subjecto est, accidens; in subjecto ergo esse,et de subjecto praedicari, universale accidens monstrat.Hujus quoque complexionis convenientia proponit exempla: ait enim scientiam in subjecto esse,in anima:nam nisi anima sit in qua scit,scientia nulla est,idcirco quod scientia actus est animæ, nam ea quae sunt inanimata nihil sciunt. Hinc sequitur substantiæ particularis propositio,quam scilicet ita declarat,quod neque in subjecto sit, neque de subjecto prædicetur, nam quod in subjecto non est,substantia est, et quod de subjecto non praedicatur,parLicularitas. Utraque igitur res de subjecto non prædicariJet in subjecto non esse, particularis est substantia.Res igitur quatuor cum propria complexione non secundum propria nomina,sed secundum proprias rationes diffinitionesque contexuit. Nam pro substantia universali posuit, quod in subjecto non est,et de subjecto prædicatur: pro accidenti particulari dixit, quod in subjecto est, et de subjecto non prædicatur.","english":"He returns to universal accident in the immediately following discussion, which he defines in this way. For after the definition of that thing which is in a subject, and after the examples of particular accident, he made a transition to universal accident, saying that there are other things which are in a subject and are predicated of a subject—namely, what signifies universal accident. For since it is said of a subject, it is universal; since it is in a subject, it is an accident. Therefore to be in a subject and to be predicated of a subject indicates universal accident. He also sets forth examples suited to this combination: for he says that knowledge is in a subject, in the soul; for unless there is a soul in which one knows, there is no knowledge, because knowledge is an act of the soul, for inanimate things know nothing. From this follows the proposition of particular substance, which he sets forth as follows: that it is neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject. For what is not in a subject is substance, and what is not predicated of a subject is particularity. Therefore both things—not to be predicated of a subject and not to be in a subject—belong to particular substance. He thus wove together the four things with their proper combination, not according to their proper names but according to their proper accounts and definitions. For in place of universal substance he put what is not in a subject and is predicated of a subject; in place of particular accident he said what is in a subject and is not predicated of a subject.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":38,"ref":"p38","source":"Accidens vero universale per hoc designavit quod ait,quod et in subjecto est, et de subjecto dicitur.Pro'particulari substantia interposuit,quod nec in subjecto est,nec de subjecto praedicatur: simpliciter autem quae sunt individua et numero singularia de subjecto nullo dicuntur;in subjecto autem nibil eaprohibetesse,quaedam enim grammatica in subjecto est. Omnis particularitas aut substantia erit aut accidens;nam cum dico Socratem,individuam et particularem significavi substantiam; cum dico quamdam grammaticam, individuum et particulare accidens dixi.Individua autem sunt quæ neque in alias species dividi possunt,neque in aliaindividua.Nam quemadmodum animal dividitur in species,hominem atque equum, homo autem in singulos homines, id est in Socratem et Platonem et cæteros,sic Plato et Socrates non dividuntur in alios. Atque hoc idem de accidentibus dici convenit:nam quemadmodum scientia dividitur in species,grammaticam et rethoricam.grammatica vero ipsa in particulares grammaticas,quas scilicet particulares homines norunt, sic ipsa particularis grammatica in particulares grammaticas non secatur. Ergo individua suut quaecunque sunt numero singularia, et in nullas alias multitudines secundum species vel secundum individua dividuntur.","english":"But he designated universal accident through this, that he said it is both in a subject and is said of a subject. In place of particular substance he put that which is neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject. But simply those things which are individuals and singular in number are said of no subject; yet nothing prevents them from being in a subject, for a certain grammar is in a subject. Every particularity will be either substance or accident; for when I say Socrates, I have signified an individual and particular substance; when I say a certain grammar, I have spoken of an individual and particular accident. But individuals are those which can be divided neither into other species nor into other individuals. For just as animal is divided into species, man and horse, while man is divided into individual men, that is into Socrates and Plato and the rest, so Plato and Socrates are not divided into others. And the same must be said of accidents: for just as knowledge is divided into species, grammar and rhetoric, while grammar itself is divided into particular grammars, namely those which particular men know, so that particular grammar is not cut into particular grammars. Therefore individuals are whatever things are singular in number, and are divided into no other multitudes either according to species or according to individuals.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":39,"ref":"p39","source":"Omne individuum, quoniam particulare est, de subjecto non praedicatur; omne autem quoa de subjecto non praedicatur, aut substantia erit, ut Plato,aut accidens,ut quædam grammatica. Ex his ergo particularibus substantia scilicet atque accidenti quae de subjecto non prædicantur,substantia quidem nec in subjecto est, accidens vero in subjecto est. Ita illa individua quae substantiae Bunt in subjecto essenon poterunt,aliavero individua quæ secundum accidentisnaturamdicuntur,illain subjecto esse nihilprohibet.Atquehocestquodait:Simpliciterautem qua sunt individua et numero singularia, de nullo subjecto dicunlurin subjecto autem ea nihil prohibet eorum aliqua esse. Quaedam enim grammatica in subjecto est, de subjecto autem nullo dicitur. Hocenim maluit demonstrare, et accidentibus substantiis particularibus hoc esse commune,quod de subjecto non prsedicantur.xiocenim dixit: Simpliciter autem quae sunt individua et numero singularia, de nullo subjecto dicuntur. Subaudiendo, scilicet sive substantiae sint sive accidentia,sed non omnia individua non sunt in subjecto.Individua enim accidentia in subjecto esse nihil prohibet. Quaedam enim grammatica cum sit individua et de subjecto non prædicetur,tamen in subjecto est, id est in anima.","english":"Every individual, since it is particular, is not predicated of a subject; but everything that is not predicated of a subject will be either a substance, like Plato, or an accident, like a certain piece of grammar. From these particulars, then—namely substance and accident, which are not predicated of a subject—substance indeed is not in a subject, but accident is in a subject. Thus those individuals which are substances will not be able to be in a subject, but other individuals which are spoken of according to the nature of accident, nothing prevents those from being in a subject. And this is what he says: But simply those which are individuals and singular in number are said of no subject, but nothing prevents some of them from being in a subject. For a certain piece of grammar is in a subject, but is said of no subject. For he preferred to demonstrate this, that it is common to accidents and particular substances that they are not predicated of a subject. For he said this: But simply those which are individuals and singular in number are said of no subject. By understanding, namely, whether they be substances or accidents, but not all individuals are not in a subject. For nothing prevents individual accidents from being in a subject. For a certain piece of grammar, since it is individual and is not predicated of a subject, is nevertheless in a subject, that is, in the soul.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":40,"ref":"p40","source":"Sed ut congregatim dicatur,sensus hujusmodi est, omnia quidem quaecunquesuntindividua,desubjecto quidem nullo dicuntur,sed non omnia non sunt in subjecto.Nam cum particularis substantiain subjecto non sit,ut Plato,particulare tamen accidens in subjecto est, ut quaedam grammatica in anima. Illud quoquem agna attentione notandum est,quis sit hujus ordo propositi.Namcum sint quatuor complexiones, factæ ex quatuor rebus,quarum duas natura discrepant,ut substantia et accidens, dux quantitate, ut particularitas et universalitas conjunctis compositisque his quatuor omnibus, dissentientem lateribus dispositionem fecit.Posuit enim prius substantiam universalem dicens,quod in subjecto non est et de subjecto dicitur.Post hanc primam positionem totis discrepantem rebus,rem subdiL,id eat accidens particulare,quod in subjecto esset, et de subjecto non praedicatur.","english":"But to speak in summary, the sense of this is as follows: all things whatsoever that are individuals are indeed said of no subject, but not all of them are not in a subject. For while a particular substance is not in a subject, as Plato, yet a particular accident is in a subject, as a certain piece of grammar is in the soul. This too must be noted with great attention: what the order of this proposition is. For since there are four combinations, made from four things, of which two differ in nature, as substance and accident, and two in quantity, as particularity and universality, when all these four are joined and combined, it has produced a disposition that disagrees on both sides. For it placed universal substance first, saying that it is not in a subject and is said of a subject. After this first position, wholly disagreeing in its terms, it subjoined the thing opposed to it, that is, a particular accident, which is in a subject and is not predicated of a subject.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":41,"ref":"p41","source":"Nam cum accidens dixit, a substantia disgregavit, quod particulare addidit ab universali disjunxit.Rursus ex alio latere disposuit in divisione accidens universale,dicens quod in subjecto est, et de subjecto praedicatur;etultimo substantiam particularem contrariarnsuperiori accidenti dixit, quod neque in subjectoest,nequedesubjectoprsedicatursubstantiai particularitem universalitati accidentis opponens.Sed utplaniusquoddicimussit,figuramdescriptionemque subjecimus in qua superius latus substantia accidentique notavimus,reliquum particularitatis et universalitatis titulo inscripsimus,Arisiotelicam complexionem angulariter et per latera desinantes.\n\nQuando alterum de altero prædicatur ut desubjecto,quæcunque de eo quod prædicalur dicuntur,omnia etiam de subjecto dicunlur, ut homo prædicatur de quodam homine. animal vero de homine, ergo et de quodam homine animal prædzcabitur, quidam enim homo, et homo est et animal.","english":"For when he said \"accident,\" he separated it from substance; and in adding \"particular,\" he disjoined it from the universal. Again, from the other side, in the division he set down universal accident, saying that it is in a subject and is predicated of a subject; and lastly he called particular substance the contrary of the superior accident, because it is neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject, opposing the particularity of substance to the universality of accident. But so that what we say may be clearer, we have appended a figure and description, in which we marked the upper side with \"substance\" and \"accident,\" and inscribed the remaining side with the title of particularity and universality, terminating the Aristotelian combination at the angles and along the sides.\n\nWhen one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, whatever things are said of that which is predicated are all also said of the subject; for example, man is predicated of a certain man, and animal of man; therefore animal will also be predicated of a certain man. For a certain man is both a man and an animal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":42,"ref":"p42","source":"Cum superius de his quæ in subjecto sunt,id est de accidentibus loqueretur,diffinitionem constitutae in subjecto rei,et praeter subjectum nullo modo permanentis, in media tractatione disposuit, dicens illud esse quod neque pars esset alicujus, nec sine subjecto posset ullo modo permanere.Patefacto igitur quid sit esse in subjecto,nunc quid sit prædicari de subjecto declarat. Duobus enim modis praedicationes fiunt,uno secundum accidens,alio de subjecto: de homine namque praedicatur album,dicitur enim homo albus,rursus de eodem homiReprsedicaturanimal,dicitur enim homo animal.Sed illa prior prasdicatio,quæ est, Homo albus est, secundum accidens est,namque accidens, quod est album, de subjecto homine prædicatur,sed non in eo quod quid sit,nam cum album sit accidens,homo snbstantia, accidens de substantia in eo quod quid sit praedicari non potest,ergo ista praedicatio secundum accidens dicitur.","english":"When above he was speaking about the things that are in a subject, that is, about accidents, he set out in the middle of the discussion the definition of a thing constituted in a subject and in no way remaining apart from a subject, saying that it is that which is neither a part of anything nor can in any way remain without a subject. Since, therefore, it has been made clear what it is to be in a subject, he now declares what it is to be predicated of a subject. For predications are made in two ways: one according to accident, the other of a subject. For \"white\" is predicated of man—for man is said to be white—and again \"animal\" is predicated of the same man—for man is said to be an animal. But the former predication, which is \"Man is white,\" is according to accident; for the accident, which is white, is predicated of the subject man, but not in respect of what it is. For since white is an accident and man a substance, an accident cannot be predicated of a substance in respect of what it is. Therefore that predication is called according to accident.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":43,"ref":"p43","source":"De subjecto vero praedicare est, quoties altera res de altera in ipsa substantia praedicatur,ut animal de homine;nam quoniam animal et substantia est,et genus hominis,idcirco in eo quod quid sit de homine praedicatur.Quare illasola de subjectopraedicari dicunturquaecunque in cujuslibetrei substantia et in diffinitione ponuntur; ergo quotiescunque hujusmodi fuerit prædicatio,ut alterum de altero ut de subjecto praedicetur,id est ut de ejus substantia dicatur, ut animal de homine, hanc proprietatem evenire necesse est, ut si de eo quod prædicatur, quidpiam ut de subjeeto,id est ejus substantia,praedicetur necessario idem hoc quod de praedicatu dicitur, dicatur etiam de praedicati subjecto, ut bomo praedicatur quidem de Socrate in eo quod quid sit. Interrogantibus enim quid sit Socrates, hominem respondemus. At vero de ipso homine in eo quod quid sit animal dicitur, in substantia enim hominis animal praedicatur,atqueita fit utanimalquidem de homine, homo vero de Socrate in eo quod quid sit,ut de subjecto praedicentur. Ergo quoniam ista consequentia,etanimal de Socrate in eo quod quid sit praedicabitur.","english":"To be predicated of a subject is whenever one thing is predicated of another in its very substance, as animal of man; for since animal is both a substance and the genus of man, for that reason it is predicated of man in respect of what it is. Wherefore those things alone are said to be predicated of a subject, whatever are placed in the substance of any thing and in its definition; therefore, whenever there is a predication of this kind, such that one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, that is, is said of its substance, as animal of man, this property must necessarily result: that if anything is predicated of that which is predicated, as of a subject, that is, of its substance, then necessarily the same thing that is said of the predicate is also said of the subject of the predicate, as man is indeed predicated of Socrates in respect of what it is. For when asked what Socrates is, we answer man. But of man himself animal is said in respect of what it is, for animal is predicated in the substance of man, and so it comes about that animal is predicated of man, and man of Socrates, in respect of what it is, as of a subject. Therefore, since this consequence holds, animal will also be predicated of Socrates in respect of what it is.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":44,"ref":"p44","source":"Potest enim dici interrogantibus quid estSocrates,animal.Ergo manifestum est quod si qua res de alia ut de subjecto praedicetur,uthomo de Socrate, de eadem vero re quae praedicatur, de homine scilicet, alia rursus superior,ut de subjecto prædicetur,ut animal necesse erit et hanc eamdem de subjecto ejus de quo ipsum dicitur praidicari,ut animal de Socrate, Socrates namque subjectus est homini,de quo animal praedicatur.Ergo constathujusmodi diffinitio quæ dicit, quoties alterum de allero praedicatur ut de subjecto, si quid sit quod de eo quod praedicatur in eo quod quid sit dici possit,hoc idem ipsum de eo quod prius subjectum erat possit praedicari.Sed fortassequisquamdicatminimeverua] esse quod dictum est,nam cum homo de Socrate praedicetur. Socrates enim homo est, de homine vero species,homo enim species esl,Socrates speciesesse non dicitur.Et rursus cum animal de homine praedicetur,de animali vero genus,animal enim enus est. homo generis vocabulo caret,non enim dicitur homo esse genus, homo enim genus non est, sed tantum species.","english":"For when people ask what Socrates is, he can be called an animal. Therefore it is clear that if some thing is predicated of another as of a subject, as man of Socrates, and again something else higher is predicated of that same thing which is predicated—namely, of man—as of a subject, as animal, then it will be necessary that this same thing also be predicated of the subject of that of which it is itself said, as animal of Socrates. For Socrates is subject to man, of whom animal is predicated. Therefore the definition of this sort stands, which says: whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, if there is something that can be said of that which is predicated in respect of what it is, this same thing can also be predicated of that which was previously the subject. But perhaps someone may say that what has been said is not at all true; for when man is predicated of Socrates—for Socrates is a man—and of man, in turn, species is predicated—for man is a species—Socrates is not said to be a species. And again, when animal is predicated of man, and of animal, in turn, genus is predicated—for animal is a genus—man lacks the designation of genus; for man is not said to be a genus, since man is not a genus but only a species.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":45,"ref":"p45","source":"His dicendum est quod minus adverterint illam esse diffinitionem de subjecto praedicationis, quae in eo quod quid sit unumquodque et in ejus substantia praedicaretur,nunc autem species de homine non in eo quod quid sit preedicatur.Neque enim Bi quishominis diffinitionem reddat speciem nominavit,sed designativum nomen est tantum, utrum de pluribus speciei differentibus pra'dicatur hoc nomen quod esthomo,an certe tantum de solis individuis. Nam quoniam de individuissolis homo prædicetur, idcirco species dicitur,et quoniam despeciedifferentibus animal dicitur,idcirco animal genus vocamus. Et sunt quodammodo nominum nomina.Quareneque genus de animali, neque species de homine, in eo quod quid sit praedicatur, sed tantum designant, quomodo homo et animal de subjectis ( ut dictum est) propriis prædicentur. Ergo non est mirandum si ad eorum subjectum qusedesubjecto dicunturejus praedicati quod de subjecto non dicitur prædicatio perveniri non potest.","english":"It must be said to these people that they have paid too little attention to the fact that that definition concerns a predicate of a subject, which is predicated in respect of what something is and in respect of its substance; but now species is not predicated of man in respect of what something is. For neither did he who gives the definition of man name the species, but it is only a designative name, whether this name which is man is predicated of several things differing in species, or indeed only of individuals alone. For since man is predicated of individuals alone, for that reason it is called a species, and since animal is said of things differing in species, for that reason we call animal a genus. And they are in a certain way names of names. Wherefore neither is genus predicated of animal, nor species of man, in respect of what something is, but they only designate how man and animal are predicated of their proper subjects, as has been said. Therefore it is not to be wondered at if the predication of that predicate which is not said of a subject cannot reach their subject, which are said of a subject.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":46,"ref":"p46","source":"Diversorum generum et non subalternatim positorum,diversæ secundum speciem sunt differentiæ fat animalis et scientiæ,animalis siquidem differentiæ sunt,ut gressibile,volatile, bipes et aquatile,scientiæ veronulla harum est, neque enim scientia a scientia differt in eo quod est bipes. Subalternorum vero generum nihil prohibet easdem esse differentias, superiora enim de inferioribus prædicantur, quare quæcunque fuerint prædicati differentiæ erunt eædem et subjecti.\n\nCum multis modis genus dicatur, solum quod -nunc tractari convenit assumamus. Dicitur enim genus quodde pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod quid sit praedicatur, ut animal praedicatur de homine, et de equo, et de cane, et de bove, et de caeteris, quæ omnia specie ipsa a se discreta sunt. Species vero estquoddepluribusnumero differentibusin eo quod quidJsit prædicatur, ut homo praedicatur de Catone, Socrate, Platone, Virgilio, Cicerone, et de singulis hominibus, qui specie ipsa non differunt, sed tantum a se numero distant. Pifferentia vero est quae sub eodem genere positas species propria qualitate disterminat,namcum equusethomoquantumad genus unum sint (uterque enim animal est), differentia rationalis et irrationalis utrosque disjungit ac discernit. Qualitate enim quadam rationabilitatis et irra- I tionabilitalis uterque a propriae substantiæ diffinitione dissentiunt.","english":"Of different genera that are not placed under one another subordinately, the differentiae are different in species, as of animal and of knowledge. For the differentiae of animal are, for instance, walking, flying, two-footed, and aquatic; of knowledge, however, none of these is a differentia; for knowledge does not differ from knowledge in that it is two-footed. But of subalternate genera nothing prevents the same differentiae from belonging to them; for the superior genera are predicated of the inferior, and therefore whatever differentiae belong to the predicate will be the same also for the subject.\n\nSince genus is said in many ways, let us assume only that which it is fitting to treat now. For genus is said to be that which is predicated of several things differing in species in respect of what something is, as animal is predicated of man, and of horse, and of dog, and of ox, and of the rest, all of which are distinguished from one another by their very species. But species is that which is predicated of several things differing in number in respect of what something is, as man is predicated of Cato, Socrates, Plato, Virgil, Cicero, and of individual men, who do not differ in their very species, but are distant from one another only in number. But a differentia is that which distinguishes species placed under the same genus by a proper quality; for since horse and man are one as regards genus (for each is an animal), the differentia rational and irrational separates and discerns both. For by a certain quality of rationality and irrationality each differs from the definition of its own substance.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":47,"ref":"p47","source":"Ergo differentia est quae de pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod quale sit praedicatur. Namque haec ipsa iifferentia quæ est irrationabilitas demultis specie differentibus praedicatur, ut de cygno, etequo, et pisce, quae omniaa secum specie ipsa dissentiant, irrationabilitatis tamen qualitate conju ncta sunt. Sed non in omnibus differentia de pluribus specie differentibus praedicatur. Sunt enim quaedam quae non nisi de una specie praedicantur, ut gravitas de sola terra, levitas de solo igne, proprie dicitur. At vero nec species semper de pluribus numero differentibus praedicatur; mundi enim species de uno solo mundo dicitur, et phcenicis species de una tantum phcenice, sed idcirco ita diffinita est, quod frequentius differentia de pluribus specie differentibus praedicatur quam de uno. Eodemque modo et species frequentius invenitur de pluribus numero differentibus praedicari, quam de una tantum re ac singulari. His ita positis, sunt quaedam genera, quae generalissima nuncupantur, quibus genus inveniri non possit,sunt species quibub alias subjectas species nullus inveniet. Inter utraque autem sunt alia quæ subalterna genera nominantur, quæ superiorum quidem species sunt, posteriorum vero genera ut substantia genus quidem est generalissimum, ut ejus genus inveniri non possit, homo vero species est, ut ejus species alia reperiri non valeat.","english":"Therefore a differentia is what is predicated of several things differing in species in respect of what sort of thing it is. For this very differentia which is irrationality is predicated of several things differing in species, as of the swan, the horse, and the fish, all of which differ from one another in their very species, yet are joined by the quality of irrationality. But a differentia is not in all cases predicated of several things differing in species. For there are certain ones that are predicated of one species only, as heaviness is properly said of earth alone, lightness of fire alone. But neither is a species always predicated of several things differing in number; for the species of the world is said of one world only, and the species of the phoenix of one phoenix only. But for this reason it has been so defined, because a differentia is more frequently predicated of several things differing in species than of one. And in the same way a species is found more frequently to be predicated of several things differing in number than of one thing only and singular. These things being so posited, there are certain genera which are called most general, for which no genus can be found; there are species under which no one will find other species subordinated. Between both, however, there are others which are named subaltern genera, which are species of the higher ones and genera of the lower: as substance is indeed a most general genus, so that no genus of it can be found; but man is a species, so that no other species of it can be discovered.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":48,"ref":"p48","source":"Animal vero ad substantiam quidem species est, ad hominem vero genus. Decem igitur praedicamentorum significatio nihil aliud demonstrat nisi rerum decem genera quae generaiissimanominamus.Ergo quoties genera generalissima discrepant,eorum quoque species discrepabunt; et quoties species discrepant, quoniam differentiis disjunguntur atque informantur, differentiae quoque diversarum specierum discrepabunt. Animal namque et scientia, quoniam est animal substantia, scientia vero ad aliquid, quoniamquegenus animalis est substantia, et genus scientiae est ad aliquid, omni substantiae a se ratione discreta sunt, et differentiae quoque scientiæ atque animalis omnibus qualitatibus disjunguntur.Edtnamque differentia animalis, bipes et quadrupes, animal enim ab alio animali differt, quod hoc quidem bipes sit, ut homo vel avis, illud vero quaarupes, ut equus atque bos; illud vero mUltipes, ut formica vel apis. Sed scientia differentias hujusmodi non habet, neque enim scientia a scientia differt in eo quod bipes est. Quare constat quoties diversa sunt genera, specierum quoque differentias esse discretas. At boc est quod ait. Diversorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diversas secundum speciem differentias esse. Et hoc exempli adjectione firmavit dicens: Animalis et scientiae diversas esse differentias, nam cum sit bipes animalis differentia, scientiae non est.","english":"But animal is a species in respect of substance, and a genus in respect of man. Therefore the signification of the ten categories demonstrates nothing other than the ten genera of things which we call most general. Therefore, as often as the most general genera differ, their species also will differ; and as often as species differ, since they are distinguished and informed by differentiae, the differentiae of diverse species also will differ. For animal and knowledge, since animal is substance and knowledge is in relation to something, and since the genus of animal is substance and the genus of knowledge is in relation to something, they are distinguished from one another by every account of substance, and the differentiae of knowledge and of animal are also disjoined by all qualities. For the differentiae of animal are biped and quadruped; for animal differs from another animal in that this one is biped, as man or bird, that one quadruped, as horse and ox, and another many-footed, as ant or bee. But knowledge does not have differentiae of this sort; for knowledge does not differ from knowledge in that it is biped. Wherefore it is evident that as often as the genera are diverse, the differentiae of the species are also distinct. And this is what he says: that of diverse genera and those not placed under one another alternately, the differentiae are diverse in species. And he confirmed this by adding an example, saying: the differentiae of animal and of knowledge are diverse, for while biped is a differentia of animal, it is not of knowledge.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":49,"ref":"p49","source":"Et hoc quidem de diversis generibus dictum est, id est, quae subalterna non sunt. Quod si subalterna sunt genera, nihil prohibet alias easdem esse differentias, alias diversas, ut avis est species animalis, et rursusest genus corvi, et est subalternum genus, avis. Sed animalis differentiae sunt rationalis atque irrationalis, avis vero differentia rationalis non est. Nulla enim avis ab alia avi differt, quod sit rationalis; ergo hoc loco non eunt eaedem subalternorum generum differentiae. Si quis vero has generis, id estanimalis differentias dicat, ut animalium alia sunt quae pascantur herbis, alia quæ seminibus, alia quæ carnihus, hæ differentiæ conveniunt in subalterno genere, videlicet in avi; namque avium sunt aliae quae seminibus vescuntur, aliae quae herbis, aliae quae carnibus, ut vultur et milvus; ergo in subalternis generibus nihil prohibet easdem esse differentias, et iterum discrepare; hoc autem idcirco evenit, quia quae de praedicato dicuntur,possunt de subjecto praedicari. Quare quod dicitur de genere, potest etiam dici de specie, atque hoc est quod ait: Subaiteraorumvero generum nihil prohibet easdem esse differentias.","english":"And this indeed has been said concerning different genera, that is, those which are not subaltern. But if they are subaltern genera, nothing prevents some of the same differentiae from being the same and others different, as bird is a species of animal, and again is a genus of crow, and bird is a subaltern genus. But the differentiae of animal are rational and irrational, whereas rational is not a differentia of bird. For no bird differs from another bird in being rational; therefore in this case the differentiae of subaltern genera are not the same. But if someone calls these differentiae of the genus, that is, of animal, such that some animals feed on grasses, others on seeds, others on flesh, these differentiae do belong to a subaltern genus, namely to bird; for of birds, some feed on seeds, others on grasses, others on flesh, as the vulture and the kite. Therefore in subaltern genera nothing prevents the same differentiae from belonging and again from being absent. But this happens for the reason that things which are said of a predicate can be predicated of a subject. Wherefore what is said of a genus can also be said of a species, and this is what he says: But of subaltern genera nothing prevents the same differentiae from belonging.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":50,"ref":"p50","source":"Superiora enim de inferioribusgeneribus prasdicantur; sed cum diceret nihil prohibeteasdem esse differentias, hoc quodam modo voluit de monstrare esselquasdam easdem differentias, alias vero posse esse diversas, cui rem contrariam intulisse videtur, cum dicit Quare quaecunque prædicati differentiae fuerint, eaedem erunt etiam subjecti: nam cum illic dixisset, nihil prohibet esse easdem differentias generum subalternorum, hic omnes easdem esse declarat, dicit enim: Quaecunque fuerint differentiae praedicati, easdem etiam subjecti esse; atque haec res plures maximis illigavit erroribus, ut emendandum crederent locum non ut esset ita. Quare quaecunque praedicati differentiæ fuerint, eaedem eruntetiam subjecti, sed ut hoc modo. Quare quaecunque subjecti differentiae fuerint, easdem erunt etiam praedicati. Sed hoc adjiciendum est, neque enim fieri potest ut in rem superiorem prædicatio posterioris redundet. Nam cum dicitur, quascunque subjecti fuerint differentiæ, eaedem erunt praedicati, hoc scilicet significatur, ut praedicatio subjecti redeat, in praedicatum, quod fieri non potest. Sed dicendum est quod sunt aliae differentias quae dicuntur completiva? praedicati et cujuslibet illius speciem informantes,quæ communi nomine specificæ nominantur. Nam cum dico animatum et sensibile, si substantiae conjungantur, diffinitionem et speciem mox animalis efficiunt.","english":"For superior genera are predicated of inferior genera. But when he said that nothing prevents the same differentiae from being the same, he meant in a certain way to show that some differentiae are the same, while others can be different. Yet he seems to have introduced something contrary to this when he says: \"Wherefore, whatever differentiae belong to the predicate, the same will also belong to the subject.\" For whereas there he had said that nothing prevents the differentiae of subaltern genera from being the same, here he declares that all are the same; for he says: \"Whatever differentiae belong to the predicate, the same also belong to the subject.\" And this matter has entangled many in the greatest errors, so that they believed the passage must be emended so as not to read as it does: \"Wherefore, whatever differentiae belong to the predicate, the same will also belong to the subject,\" but rather in this way: \"Wherefore, whatever differentiae belong to the subject, the same will also belong to the predicate.\" But this must be added: for it cannot happen that the predication of the latter redounds upon the superior. For when it is said, \"Whatever differentiae belong to the subject, the same will belong to the predicate,\" this is certainly meant: that the predication of the subject returns into the predicate, which cannot happen. But it must be said that there are other differentiae which are called completive of the predicate and which inform the species of anything whatsoever, and these are called by the common name \"specific.\" For when I say \"animate\" and \"sensible,\" if they are joined to \"substance,\" they immediately produce the definition and species of \"animal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":51,"ref":"p51","source":"Animal enim est substantia animata sensibilis, atque hæ differentiae dicuntur specificæ et completivae. Sunt autem aliae qum ipsæ quidem nihil complent, nec ullam speciem reddunt, sed genus tantum dividunt, ut rationale et irrationale, hæc enim dividunt genus, id est animal, Animal enim rationali differentia irrationalique dividitur. Ergo illae quae sunt generis divisivse differentiae possunt aliquoties eaedem esse,possunt aliquoties non eædem, ut animalis, quoniam divisibilis est differentia quae est rationale, potest eam non habere avis, quae est subalternum genus. Et rursus easdem divisibiles habere potest, ut easdem quas superius diximus. Nam cum dividant animal differentiae, quae carnibus, herbis, et seminibus vescuntur, eaedem possunt esse subalterni generis, id est avis; ergo hee divisibiles possuntetiam esse diversæ.Illæ vero quæ completivæ et specificæ sunt, aliquando non praedicari de subjecto non possunt. Ut quoniam animal habet differentias completivas et suae speciei effectivas, sensi. bile scilicet et animatum, hae differentiae de homine quod est subjectum animalis non prædicari non possunt.","english":"For animal is a substance, animate and sensible, and these differentiae are called specific and completive. But there are others which themselves complete nothing, nor produce any species, but only divide the genus, such as rational and irrational; for these divide the genus, that is, animal. For animal is divided by the differentia rational and irrational. Therefore those which are divisive differentiae of a genus can sometimes be the same, sometimes not the same, as of animal, since the differentia which is rational is divisible, a bird, which is a subaltern genus, can fail to have it. And again it can have the same divisive differentiae, such as those we mentioned above. For since the differentiae which feed on flesh, herbs, and seeds divide animal, the same can belong to a subaltern genus, that is, to bird; therefore these divisive differentiae can also be diverse. But those which are completive and specific cannot sometimes fail to be predicated of a subject. For since animal has completive differentiae and those which effect its species, namely sensible and animate, these differentiae cannot fail to be predicated of man, who is a subject of animal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":52,"ref":"p52","source":"Omnes enim specificae differentiae de his praedicantur, quorum speciem complent, ut de animali praedicatur sensibile et animatum, et hoc ut de subjecto.In substantia enim animalis utraque prædicantur,sed animal prædicatur de homine, ut de subjecto; necesse est ergo animatum ae homine praedicariutdesubjecto.Hocest, euim quod superius praemisit cum diceret: Quando alterum de altero praedicatur ut de subjecto, quaecunque de eo quod praedicatur dicuntur,omnia etiam de subjecto dicuntur; atque noc ommbus generibus recte constat intelligi. Ergo divisibiles differentiae possunt aliquando cum subjectisessecommunes,aliquando diversae, specificae vero et completivae cum subjectis communes non esse non possunt. ergoAristoteles ait, Subalternorum generumnihilprohibereeasdem esse differentias, divisibiles differentias easdem esse nihil prohibere putandum est,qua e possunt esse etiam diversae.Quod ait vero: Quæcunque praedicati differentiae fuerint, eaedem erunt etiam subjecti, de specificis intelligendum est: quae cum speciem cujuslibet in forment, et de eo quod informant, ut de subjecto,prædicentur,ad quodcunque ut subjecto prædicaturillud quod ipsae differentiæ informant, de eo ut desubjectopraedicabuntur,etdeeo nonpraedicarinon possunt. Quare nihil est in hujusmodi theoremate quod ullo modo debeat emendari.","english":"For all specific differentiae are predicated of those things whose species they complete, as sensible and animate are predicated of animal, and this as of a subject. For both are predicated in the substance of animal, but animal is predicated of man as of a subject; therefore it is necessary that animate also be predicated of man as of a subject. This is, moreover, what he premised above when he said: When one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, whatever things are said of that which is predicated, all are also said of the subject; and this holds rightly to be understood in all genera. Therefore divisible differentiae can sometimes be common with their subjects, sometimes diverse; but specific and completive differentiae cannot fail to be common with their subjects. Therefore Aristotle says that nothing prevents the same differentiae from belonging to subaltern genera; and it must be thought that nothing prevents divisible differentiae from being the same, which can also be diverse. But what he says: Whatever differentiae belong to the predicate, the same will also belong to the subject, is to be understood of specific differentiae: since when they inform the species of anything, and are predicated of that which they inform as of a subject, then whatever that which these differentiae inform is predicated of as of a subject, of that they will be predicated as of a subject, and cannot not be predicated of it. Wherefore there is nothing in a theorem of this kind that ought in any way to be amended.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":53,"ref":"p53","source":"Eorum quidem quæ secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur, singulum aut substantiam significat, aut quantitatem, aut qualitatem, aut ad aliquid, aut ubi, aut quando, aut situm, aut habere, aut facere, aut pati. Est autem substantia ut figuraliter dicatur, ut homo, equus. Quantitas, ut bicubitum, tricubitum. Qualitas, ut album, grammaticum. Ad aliquid, ut duplum, dimidium, majus, minus. Ubi, ut in lyceo, in foro. Quando, ut heri, superiori anno. Situm, ut sedet,jacet. Habere, ut calceatus, armatus. Facere, ut secare, urere. Pati, ut secarx, uri. Singula igitur eorum quæ dicta sunt, •• i I •** ipsa quidem secunaum se in nulla affirmatione dicuntur, aut negalione, horum autem ad invicem affirmatio vel negatio fit complexione. Videtur autemomnis at. firmatio vel negatio, vel vera vel falsa esse: eorum autem quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur, singula neque vera, neque falsa sunt, ut homo, album, currit, vincit.","english":"Of those things that are said without any combination, each signifies either substance, or quantity, or quality, or relation, or where, or when, or position, or having, or doing, or being affected. Substance is, to speak figuratively, as man, horse. Quantity, as two cubits, three cubits. Quality, as white, grammatical. Relation, as double, half, greater, less. Where, as in the Lyceum, in the forum. When, as yesterday, last year. Position, as sits, lies. Having, as shod, armed. Doing, as to cut, to burn. Being affected, as to be cut, to be burned. Each of the things that have been said, then, in itself is said in no affirmation or negation, but affirmation or negation of these comes about by combination with one another. Every affirmation or negation seems to be either true or false; but of those things that are said without any combination, each is neither true nor false, as man, white, runs, conquers.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":54,"ref":"p54","source":"Post parvissimam in quatuor enumerationem, id est in substantiam, accidens, universalitatem, particularitatem, nunc est de partitione maxima tractaturus, quai fit in decem; hac enim enumeratione major non potest inveniri, neque enim undecim prsdicamenta poterunt inveniri, nec ultra decem ullo modo aliquod genus recte excogitari potest quare facit.bujusmodienumerationem.sed non divisionem. Divisio namque fere est generis in species; prsedicamentorum vero, quoniam genus unum non habent, divisio esse non potest, sed potius enumeratio est. Sunt vero quidam qui contendunt recte enumerationem non esse dispositam, alii namque ut supervacuaquaedam demunt, alii ut curto operi addunt, alii vero permutant, quosnimirumnon recte sentirealio nobis opere dicendum est; ait autem: Eorum quae secundumnullamcomplexionem diountur. Adeo non de rebus, sed de vocibus tractaturus est, ut diceret Dicuntur. Res enim proprie non dicuntur, sed voces: et quod addidit,singulum aut substantium significat, late patet eum de vocibus disputare; non enim res, sed voces significant, significantur autem res. Sine complexione vero dicuntur(ut dictum est)quæcunque singulariintellectu et voce proferuntur; secundum complexionem vero quaecunque aliquaconjunctione vel accidentia copulatione miscentur.","english":"After the briefest enumeration into four, that is, into substance, accident, universality, and particularity, he is now about to treat of the greatest division, which is made into ten; for no greater enumeration than this can be found, nor can eleven categories be found, nor beyond ten can any genus be rightly conceived in any way. Wherefore he makes an enumeration of this kind, but not a division. For a division is generally of a genus into species; but of the categories, since they do not have one genus, there cannot be a division, but rather an enumeration. There are some, however, who contend that the enumeration has not been rightly arranged: for some remove certain things as superfluous, others add to the work as though it were deficient, and others change things; that they evidently do not think rightly must be discussed by us in another work. But he says: Of those things which are said according to no combination. He is about to treat not of things, but of words, to such an extent that he says \"are said.\" For things are not properly said, but words; and what he added, \"each signifies either substance,\" makes it abundantly clear that he is disputing about words; for not things but words signify, and things are signified. But those things are said without combination (as has been said) whatever are uttered by a single act of understanding and voice; but according to combination, whatever are mixed by some conjunction or by the copulation of accidents.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":55,"ref":"p55","source":"Sed quid ex iis quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur efficitur, ipse demonstrat cum dicit: Singula igitur eorum quae dicta sunt, ipsa quidem secundum se in nullaaffirmationedicuntur, horum autem ad se invicem complexioneaffirmatio fit; videturenim omnis affirmatio vel falsa esse vel vera. Eorum autem quæ secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur, neque verum quidquam, neque falsum est, ut homo, album, currit, vincit. Significat ergo et hic ea quae sine ulla complexione dicuntur affirmationis vim non obtinere. Si quiR enim dicat homo, vel album; vel dei cem, vel quidlibet simplici modo, in eo neque verum aliquid inveniet,neque falsum,sed omnis affirmatio vel vera vel falsa est. Igitur universaliter pronuntiat praedicamenta affirmationis ratione penitus non teneri: sed haec eadem si cum quadam complexione conjuncta sint, fieri propositiones necesse est, quae in se verum falsumve contineant. Sed non omnis complexio propositionem facit,nec si dixero, Socrates in foro, idcirco jam propositio est; sed si quis dicat, Socrates in foro ambulat, tunc fit propositio, quae autaffirmatio est aut negatio. Affirmationesautem et negationes, vel verævidentur esse vel falsae: atque ideo quodcunque neque verum neque falsum est, illud propositio non est.","english":"But what is produced from those things which are said without any combination, he himself demonstrates when he says: Each of those things which have been said, then, is itself indeed said in no affirmation according to itself, but from the combination of these with one another an affirmation comes about; for every affirmation seems either to be false or true. But of those things which are said without any combination, nothing is either true or false, as man, white, runs, conquers. He signifies therefore here also that those things which are said without any combination do not obtain the force of an affirmation. For if anyone says man, or white, or runs, or anything at all in a simple manner, in it he will find nothing true or false, but every affirmation is either true or false. Therefore he pronounces universally that the categories are not at all held by the nature of an affirmation; but if these same things are joined with some combination, propositions must come about, which contain in themselves something true or false. But not every combination makes a proposition, nor if I say, Socrates in the forum, is it for that reason already a proposition; but if anyone says, Socrates walks in the forum, then a proposition comes about, which is either an affirmation or a negation. But affirmations and negations seem either to be true or false; and therefore whatever is neither true nor false, that is not a proposition.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":56,"ref":"p56","source":"Ergo quadam complexione exuis quaesecundum nullam complexionem dicuntur veritas falsitasque conficitur.Affirmationem autem solam nunc Aristoteles interposuit, idcirco quod omnis affirmatio prior est; hoc enim negatio tollit, quod affirmatio ante constituit: prius quidem secundum significationem, sed non secundum genus, quod alio liquebit loco. Maxime autem monstrat Aristoteles se non de rebus, sed de vocibus tractaturum,quod ait: Horum autem ad se invicem complexione affirmatio fit; non enin: rerum complexione fit affirmatio vel negatio, sed sermonum, nec in rebus est veritas et falsitas, sed in intellectibus atque opinionibus, et post hæc in vocibus atque sermonibus. Atque hæc hactenus. Secundum complexionem ergo sunt quaecunque ex integris compositis fiunt, ut Socrates ambulat, nam et Socrates et ambulat uterque integer sermo est, et conjunctus affirmationem facit.At vero si quis dicat flammiger, vel multisonus,vel fluctivagus,secundum complexionem non erit ista prolatio, idcicco quod ex neutris integris factum est. Horum autem decem prædicameutorumdiffinitionesinveneri nonpossunt,idcirco quod ea quæ significant generalissima sunt.Substantia enim et quantitas,etqualitas nulli unquam generi videntur esse subjecta.","english":"Therefore by a certain combination, from things which are said according to no combination, truth and falsehood are produced. But Aristotle has now interposed affirmation alone, for the reason that every affirmation is prior; for negation removes what affirmation first established: prior indeed according to signification, but not according to genus, which will be made clear in another place. But Aristotle especially shows that he will treat not of things but of words, when he says: From the combination of these with one another affirmation comes about; for it is not from the combination of things that affirmation or negation comes about, but of words, nor is truth and falsehood in things, but in intellects and opinions, and after these in words and speeches. And thus far on these matters. According to combination, therefore, are whatever things come about from complete components, as Socrates walks; for both Socrates and walks are each a complete expression, and joined together make an affirmation. But if anyone should say flame-bearing, or many-sounding, or wave-wandering, this utterance will not be according to combination, for the reason that it is made from neither complete part. But the definitions of these ten predicaments cannot be found, for the reason that the things which they signify are most general. For substance and quantity and quality seem never to be subject to any genus.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":57,"ref":"p57","source":"Quare quoniam diffinitio omnis a genere ducitur,genus quod alii generi subjectum non est a diffinitione relinquitur.Sed nunc quidem omnium praedicamentorum convenientia dixit exempla, post vero latius de unoquoque tractabitur: et quoniam diffinitio inveniri nulla potest, quibusdam proprietatibusinformantur,quare quoniam de his dictum est plene, ad tractatum subs- J tantiae transeamus.\n\nDE SUBSTANTIA.\n\nSubstantia autem quæ proprie et principaliter et maxime dicitur,est quæ neque de subjectodicitur,neque in subjecto est,ut aliquis homo, vel aliquis equus. Secundae autem substantiæ dicuntur species, in quibus illæ quæ principalitersubsiantim dicuntur, insunt. Et hæ quidem et harum specierum genera, ul aliquis homo, in specie quidem est in homine,genus vero speciei,animal esl.Secundæ ergo substantiæ hæ dicuntur, ut est homo atque animaL","english":"Wherefore, since every definition is derived from a genus, the genus which is not subject to another genus is left out of definition. But for now he has given examples of the agreement of all the categories; afterwards, however, there will be a fuller treatment of each one. And since no definition can be found, they are informed by certain properties. Wherefore, since these things have been fully discussed, let us pass on to the treatment of substance.\n\nON SUBSTANCE.\n\nSubstance, however, which is properly and primarily and most of all called substance, is that which is neither said of a subject nor is in a subject, as some man or some horse. Secondary substances, however, are called the species in which those things that are primarily called substances are present. And these, and the genera of these species—as some man is in the species man, and the genus of the species is animal. Therefore these are called secondary substances, as is man and animal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":58,"ref":"p58","source":"Quaeritur cur prædicamentorum tractatum a substantiis inchoaverit,nam quoniam omnis res aut in subjecto est, aut subjecto non est, quidquidinsubjectoest, eget subjecto,quoniam in propriis natura non potest consistere: et quoniam rebus omnibus substantia subjecta est, nibil eorum quæ sunt in subjecto praeter substantiam poterit permanere.Sed prior illa natura est, sine qua alia esse non possunt, quocirca prior naturaliter videtur esse substantia; non absurde igitur in disputatione quod prius per naturam fuit, prius etiam sumpsit, et diffinitionem quidem substantiae proferre non potuit, sed post exemplum superius datum descriptionem quamdam profert qua quid sit ipsa substantia queamus agnoscere: hoc est autem,non esse in subjectojsubstantia enim in subjecto non est. Facit autem quamdam substantiarum divisionem cum dicit,alias primas esse substantias, alias secundas: primas vocans individuas,secundas vero individuarum speciesel genera: Ergo cum primis secundisque subtantiis commune sit non esse in subjecto,additum primis substantiis, de subjectis non prædicari, primas substantias a secundis substantiis separat;substantia enim ind ividua, in eo quod est substantia, in subjecto non est: quod autem individua est, de subjecto non prædicatur.","english":"It is asked why he began the treatment of the categories from substances. For since every thing either is in a subject or is not in a subject, whatever is in a subject needs a subject, because it cannot consist in its own nature; and since substance is underlying all things, nothing of those things which are in a subject will be able to remain without substance. But that nature is prior, without which other things cannot exist; wherefore substance seems to be prior by nature. Not unreasonably, therefore, in the discussion he took up first what was first by nature, and indeed he was unable to set forth a definition of substance, but after the example given above he sets forth a certain description by which we may recognize what substance itself is: that is, not to be in a subject; for substance is not in a subject. He also makes a certain division of substances when he says that some are primary substances, others secondary: calling the individual ones primary, but the species or genera of individuals secondary. Therefore, since it is common to primary and secondary substances not to be in a subject, there is added to primary substances that they are not predicated of subjects, which separates primary substances from secondary substances; for an individual substance, in that it is substance, is not in a subject; but in that it is individual, it is not predicated of a subject.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":59,"ref":"p59","source":"Sunt ergo primae substantiæ quae neque in subjecto sunt, neque de subjecto dicuntur, ut est Socrates vel Plato.Hienim quoniam substantiae sunt, in subjecto nullo sunt. Quoniam vero particulares individuique sunt, ne nullo subjecto prædicantur. Secundae vero substantiæ sunt, quibus commune est cum primis substantiis, quod in subjecto non sunt, proprium vero quod de subjecto prædicantur, quae secundae substantiae sunt universales, ut est homo atqueanimal; homunamque etanimal in nullo sunt subjecto, sed de subjecto aliquo prædicantur.Sunt igitur prima? substantiae particulares,secundæ universales.Proprie autem substantias individuas dicit, quod hominem quidem idem ipsam speciem,etanimal, quod est genus, non nisi ex individuorum cognitione colligimus.Quare quoniam ex singulorum sensibus generalitas intellecta est, merito proprias substantiae individua et singulanominantur.Principaliter vero individuas substantias dictae sunt, quod omne accidens prius in individua, post vero in secundassubstantias venit Nam quoniam Aristarchus grammaticus est homo vero est Aristarchus, est homogrammaticus: itapriusomne accidensinindividuum venit, secundo vero loco etiam in species generaque substantiarum accidens illud venire putabitur. Recte igitur quod prius subjectum est, hoc substantia principaliter appellatur.","english":"Therefore the primary substances are those which are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, as is Socrates or Plato. For in that they are substances, they are in no subject. But in that they are particular and individual, they are predicated of no subject. Secondary substances, however, are those which have this in common with primary substances, that they are not in a subject, but have this as their own property, that they are predicated of a subject; these secondary substances are universals, as is man and animal; and man and animal are in no subject, but are predicated of some subject. Therefore the primary substances are particular, the secondary universal. But he properly calls individual substances [primary], because man indeed, that is the species itself, and animal, which is the genus, we gather only from the cognition of individuals. Wherefore, since generality is understood from the senses of singulars, individuals and singulars are rightly called proper substances. But individual substances are said to be principal, because every accident comes first in individuals, and afterward in secondary substances. For since Aristarchus is a grammarian, and Aristarchus is a man, and a man is a grammarian: so every accident comes first in the individual, but in the second place that accident will be thought to come also in the species and genera of substances. Rightly, therefore, that which is the prior subject is called substance principally.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":60,"ref":"p60","source":"Maxime autem substantia prima dicitur, idcirco quod quae maxime subjecta est rebus aliis, ea maxime substantia dici potest: maxime autem subjecta est prima substantia; omnia enim de primis substantiis dicuntur,aut primis substantiis insunt, ut generaetspecies: namque et genera et species praedicantur de propriis individuis, ut animal atque homo praedicantur de Socrate, id est secundæ substantiæ de primis: sin vero sint accidentia, in primis substantiis principaliter sunt. Quare quoniam et accidentia in primis substantiis principaliter sunt,et secundæ substantiae de primis substantiis praedicantur,prima' substantiae secundissubstantiisaccidentibusquesubjectae sunt. Quare quoniam istae maxime subjectae sunt et accidentium subsistentice,et secundarum substantiarum prædicationi,idcirco maxime substantias nuncupantur. Dicit autem non omnis species neque omnia genera, secundas esse substantias, sed eas tantum quae primas substantias continerent, ut est homo atque animal; homo namque continet Socratem, id est aliquam individuam substantiam.","english":"But primary substance is most of all called substance, for the reason that what is most of all subject to other things can most of all be called substance; and primary substance is most of all subject; for all things are either said of primary substances or are in primary substances, as genera and species: for both genera and species are predicated of their own individuals, as animal and man are predicated of Socrates, that is, secondary substances of primary substances; but if they are accidents, they are principally in primary substances. Wherefore, since both accidents are principally in primary substances, and secondary substances are predicated of primary substances, primary substances are subject to secondary substances and to accidents. Wherefore, since these are most of all subject both to the subsistence of accidents and to the predication of secondary substances, for that reason they are called most of all substances. But he says that not every species nor all genera are secondary substances, but only those which contain primary substances, as is man and animal; for man contains Socrates, that is, some individual substance.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":61,"ref":"p61","source":"Animal vero continet individuum speciemque,id est bominem et aliquem hominem.Quare genera et species quas de primissubstantiispraedicantur,ipsassecundas putat ■ esse substantias; hoc autem hoc modo ait: Secundae autem substantiae dicuntur in quibus speciebus illæ quae principalitersubstantia e dicuntur insunt: baeo et harum specierum genera, et inde convenientia ponit exempla, ac si diceret: Non omnia genera neque omnes substantias dico,sed eas tantum species in quibus iridividua illa, id est primae substantiae sunt, et harum specierum,id estquae continent pri. mas substantias, genera. Hoc autem idcirco dictum videtur, ne quis colorem quod genus est, vel album quod est species, secundas putet. esse substantias, isia enim primas sub se non continent: Sed dicat aliquis quemadmodum primaepoteruntessesubstantiæ individuæ,cum omne quod prius est sublatum auferat id quod est posterius,posterioribus vero sublatis priora non pereant?homo namque si pereat, Socrates quoque sit continuo periturus; si vero Socrates interierit, homo continuo non peribit.Si igitur,sublatis generibuset speciebus, individua perimuntur, sublatis individuis, generas, speciesque permanent, magisprimassubstantiasspeciesetgenera nominari dignum fuit.Sed hoc modo individuorum natura non recte accipitur. Neque enim cuncta individuorum substantia in uno Socrate est, vel quolibet uno homine, sed in omnibus singulis.","english":"But \"animal\" contains both the individual and the species, that is, man and some particular man. Wherefore he thinks that the genera and species which are predicated of primary substances are themselves secondary substances; and this he states in this way: \"Secondary substances are said to be those in which the species that are called primary substances are present, and the genera of these species.\" And from this he sets down fitting examples, as if he were saying: I do not mean all genera nor all substances, but only those species in which those individuals, that is, primary substances, are present, and the genera of these species, that is, of those which contain the primary substances. But this seems to have been said for the reason that no one should think that color, which is a genus, or white, which is a species, are secondary substances; for these do not contain primary substances under themselves. But someone may say: how can individual things be primary substances, since everything that is prior, when removed, takes away what is posterior, but when posterior things are removed, prior things do not perish? For if man perishes, Socrates too will immediately perish; but if Socrates dies, man will not immediately perish. If, therefore, when genera and species are removed, individuals are destroyed, but when individuals are removed, genera and species remain, then species and genera would more deservedly have been called primary substances. But in this way the nature of individuals is not rightly understood. For the whole substance of individuals is not in one Socrates, or in any one man, but in all and each singly.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":62,"ref":"p62","source":"Genera namque et species non exuno singulo intollecta sunt, sed ex omnibus singulis individuis,mentis ratione concepta. Semper etiam quæ sensibus propinquiora sunt; ea etiam proxime nuncupanda vocabulis arbitramur. Qui enim primus hominem dixit, non illum qui ex singulis hominibus conficitur, concepit, sed animo quemdam singularem atqueindividuum cuihominis nomen imponeret.Ergo,sublatis singulis hominibus, homo non remanet,et,sublatis singulis animalibus, animal interibit. Quocirca quoniam in hoc libro de vocabulorum significatione tractatus hahetur, ea quibus vocabula prius posita sunt, merito primas substantias nuncupavit: prius autem illis vocabula suntindita,quæpriu5 subsensibuscaderepotuerunt. Sensibus vero objiciuntur prima individua, merito igitur ea prima in divisione posuit. Eodem quoque modo illaquaestio solviturquæ dicit Cum naturaliter primæ intellectibiles sint substantiæ,ut Deus et animus,curnon hasprimassubstantias nuncupaverit? Quoniam hic de nominibus tractatus habetur, nomina autem primo illis indita sunt quae principaliter sensibus fuere subjecta, posteriora vero in nominibus ponendis putantur quaecunque ad in.","english":"For genera and species are not understood from one single individual, but are conceived by the mind's reason from all individual instances. Moreover, we always judge that those things which are closer to the senses are also to be named first by words. For the one who first called something \"man\" did not conceive that man which is composed from individual men, but rather a certain singular and individual being in his mind, to which he would assign the name \"man.\" Therefore, with individual men removed, man does not remain, and with individual animals removed, animal will perish. Wherefore, since in this book the discussion concerns the signification of words, those things to which words were first applied he rightly called primary substances; but words were first imposed on those things which could first fall under the senses. But primary individuals are presented to the senses; rightly, therefore, he placed them first in the division. In the same way, that question is also resolved which asks: Since naturally the primary intelligible substances are, such as God and mind, why did he not call these primary substances? Because here the discussion concerns names, and names were first imposed on those things which were principally subject to the senses, while whatever things pertain to the intelligible are thought to be later in the assigning of names.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":63,"ref":"p63","source":"telligibilem pertinent incorporalitatem; quare quoniam in hoc opera principaliter de nominibustractatus est, de individuis vero substantiis quae primae sensibus subjacent prima sunt dicta vocabula in opere quo de vocabulis tractabatur, merito individuae sensibilesque substantiae primæ substantiae sunt positae. Cum autem tres substaotiae sint, materia, species, et quae ex utriusque conficitur undique composita et compacta substantia, hic neque de sola specie, neque de sola materia, sed de utrisque mistis compositisque proposuit. Partes autem substantiæ incompositæ et simplices sunt,ex qui bus ipsa substantiaconficitur,species etmateria, quas postpertransitum nominat dicens,substantiarum partes et ipsa esse substantias, atque hæc hactenus. Nunc expositionis cursum ad sequentia convertamus.\n\nManifestum est autem ex iis quse dicta sunt quoniam eorum quæ de subjecto dicunturjiecesse est et nomen et rationem de subjecto prædicari, ut homo de subjecto aliquo homine prædicatur: prædicatur quoque nomen ipsius,hominem enim de aliquo homine prædicabis. Ratio quoque hominis de subjecto aliquo homine prædicabitur: quidam enim homo et homo est et animal, quare etnomen et ratio prædicabitur de subjecto. Eorum vero quae in subjecto sunt, in pluribus quidem neque nomen de subjecto neque razo prædicabitur.","english":"to intelligible incorporeality. Wherefore, since in this work the discussion is principally about names, but about individual substances, which are primary and lie beneath the senses, the first words were spoken in the work in which names were discussed, rightly individual and sensible substances have been posited as primary substances. But since there are three substances—matter, species, and the substance composed and compacted from both on every side—he here proposed to treat neither of species alone nor of matter alone, but of both mixed and composed together. Now the parts of an uncompounded and simple substance are those from which the substance itself is made, namely species and matter, which after the transition he names, saying that the parts of substances are themselves also substances. And so much for this. Now let us turn the course of exposition to what follows.\n\nIt is evident, moreover, from what has been said that of those things which are said of a subject, both the name and the definition must necessarily be predicated of the subject, as man is predicated of some subject man; his name also is predicated, for you will predicate man of some man. The definition also of man will be predicated of some subject man; for a certain man is both man and animal, wherefore both the name and the definition will be predicated of the subject. But of those things which are in a subject, in most cases neither the name nor the definition will be predicated of the subject.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":64,"ref":"p64","source":"In aliquibus autem nomen quidem nihil prohibet interdum prædicari de subjeclo; rationem vero impossibile est prædicari, ut album, cum in subjecto sit in corpore, prædicatur de subjecto: dicitur enim corpus album, ratio veroalbinunquam de corpore prædicabitur. Alia autem omnia aut de subjectis dicuntur principalibus substantiis, aut in subjectis eisdem sunt: hoc autem manifestum est ex his quae per singula proponentur, ut animal de homine praedicatur, ergo de aliquo homine; nam si de nullo aliquorum hominum, neque omnino de homine. Rursus color in corpore est, ergo et in aliquo corpore; nam si non in aliquo singulorum,nec omnino in corpore. Quare alia omnia aut de subjectis principalibus subslantiis dicuntur, aut in subjectis eisdem sunt. Non existentibus ergo primis substantiis impossibile est esse aliquid aliorum.\n\nOmnia quæcunquedictasunt vel ill subjecto sunt, vel de subjecto praedicantur, sed non omnia quaecunque in subjecto sunt,desubjectis propriis dicuntur, namque quod in subjecto aliquo est,deproprio subjecto praedicatur: ut album de corpore praedicatur,diciturenimcorpusalbum.Sed quoniam secundæ suhstantiae primarum substantiarum vel species vel genera sunt iSocratis enim species homo est,et animal genus),genus autem de subjectis speciebus et individuis univoce prædicatur,secundæ substantiae de subjectis speciebus univoca prædicatione dicuntur.","english":"In some cases, however, nothing prevents a name from sometimes being predicated of a subject, but it is impossible for the definition to be predicated, as white, since it is in a subject in a body, is predicated of a subject: for a body is said to be white, but the definition of white will never be predicated of a body. All other things, however, are either said of the primary substances as subjects, or are in the same things as subjects. This is clear from what will be set out in each individual case: for animal is predicated of man, therefore of some man; for if of no one of men, neither of man at all. Again, color is in a body, therefore also in some body; for if not in some one of individual bodies, neither in body at all. Wherefore all other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects, or are in the same things as subjects. Therefore, if the primary substances did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist.\n\nAll things whatsoever that have been mentioned are either in a subject or are predicated of a subject, but not all things whatsoever that are in a subject are said of their own subjects; for what is in some subject is predicated of its own subject: as white is predicated of a body, for a body is said to be white. But since the secondary substances are either the species or the genera of the primary substances (for man is the species of Socrates, and animal the genus), the genus, however, is predicated univocally of the species and individuals that are its subjects, the secondary substances are said of the species that are their subjects by univocal predication.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":65,"ref":"p65","source":"Convenit namque primarum et secundarum substantiarum si sit una facta, diffinitio. Namque,animal et homo et Socrates una diffinitione jungitur, quod substantiae animatæ atque sensibiles sunt. Igitur secundæ substantiæ ita de subjectis prædicantur propriis,id estde primis substantiis,ut univoce praedicentur.lllorum vero quæ sunt in subjecto aliquoties quidem neque nomen ipsum desubjectodicitur.Nam virtus in anima est,sed virtus de animo minime prædicatur; aliquoties autem denominative dicitur, ut grammatica, quoniam est in homine,denominative grammaticus a grammatica dicitur.","english":"For it is agreed that there is a definition of both primary and secondary substances, if one is made. For animal and man and Socrates are joined by one definition, because they are animate and sensible substances. Therefore secondary substances are predicated of their own subjects, that is, of primary substances, in such a way that they are predicated univocally. But of those things that are in a subject, sometimes not even the name itself is said of the subject. For virtue is in the soul, but virtue is by no means predicated of the soul; sometimes, however, it is said denominatively, as grammar, since it is in man, denominatively a grammarian is said from grammar.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":66,"ref":"p66","source":"Saepe autem ipsum nomen de subjecto praedicatur, ut quoniam album est in corpore, corpus album dicitur, sed sive nomen non prædicetur, sive denominative dicatur, sive proprio nomine praedicatio sit, diffinitio ejus quod est in subjecto de proprio subjecto nunquam praedicabitur ut album,quoniam estin subjecto corpore, praedicatur quidem aibi nomen de corpore, diffinitio vero albi ad corpus nullo modo dicitur, albumnairque velcorpusunarationeutraquediffiniri non possunt.Amplius,si omne accidens in subjecto est,et substantia subjectum est,differtabaccidente substantia,differt etiam diffinitio substantiæ atque accidentis, quod cadem diffinitio subjecti et ejus quod est in subjecto esse non potest.Atque hoc est quod ait:Eorum vero quae sunt in subjecto, in pluribus quidem neque nomen de subjecto neque ratio prædicatur,ut virtus in anima.Addidit quoque: In aliquibusautem nomenquidem nihil prohibetinterdum preedicari,et in aliis quidem denominative, in aliis vero recto nomine fit prædicatio.","english":"Often, moreover, the name itself is predicated of a subject, as when, since white is in a body, the body is called white; but whether the name is not predicated, or is predicated denominatively, or the predication is by a proper name, the definition of what is in a subject will never be predicated of its own subject. For example, white, since it is in a body as in a subject, its name is indeed predicated of the body, but the definition of white is in no way said of the body; for white and body cannot be defined by one and the same account. Furthermore, if every accident is in a subject, and substance is a subject, substance differs from accident, and the definition of substance differs from that of accident, because the same definition cannot belong to a subject and to what is in a subject. And this is what he says: Of those things which are in a subject, in most cases neither the name nor the account is predicated of the subject, as virtue is in the soul. He adds also: In some cases, however, nothing prevents the name from sometimes being predicated, and in some cases the predication is denominative, in others by a direct name.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":67,"ref":"p67","source":"De secundis i vero substantiis semper ad primas substantias prædicatio pervenit.Nam si quidam homo, et homo est et animal, et caetera, una diffinitio animalis et ad hominem et ad quemdam hominem convenienter aptabitur.Magis tamen esse substantias individuas et parlicularesipse significantius monstrat.Namcum omnis res aut substantia sit aut accidens, et substantiarum aliae sint primae, aliae secundae,fit trina partitio, ita ut omnis res, aut accidens sit, aut secunda substantia,aut prima. Horum autem ut sub descriptione divisio fiat,hcc modo dicimus:Omnisres autinsubjectoest,autinsubjectononest; eorum quae in subjecto sunt,alia prædicantur de subjecto, alia minime;eorum quæ in subjecto non sunt,alia de nullo subjecto praedicantur, alia vero praedicantur. Ergo i omnis res aut in subjecto est,aut in subjecto non est. Aut in subjecto est et de subjecto praedicatur, aut in subjecto est et de nullo subjecto praedicatur, aut in subjecto non est,et de subjecto praedicatur,aut in subjecto non est, et de nullo subjecto praedicatur. His igitur sumptis,si primas substantias separemus, remanent secundae substantiae atque accidentia.Sed secundae substantiae sunt quae in subjecto non sunt et de subjecto prædicantur.Ergo esse suum,nisi in hoc quod de aliquo praedicantur,non retinent.","english":"But the predication of secondary substances always reaches down to primary substances. For if a certain man is both a man and an animal, and so on, one definition of animal will be fittingly applied both to man and to a certain man. Yet he shows more significantly that individual and particular substances are more truly substances. For since every thing is either a substance or an accident, and of substances some are primary and some secondary, a threefold division results, such that every thing is either an accident, or a secondary substance, or a primary substance. But so that the division of these may be made under a description, we speak in this way: every thing is either in a subject or is not in a subject; of those which are in a subject, some are predicated of a subject, others not at all; of those which are not in a subject, some are predicated of no subject, others truly are predicated. Therefore every thing is either in a subject or is not in a subject. Either it is in a subject and is predicated of a subject, or it is in a subject and is predicated of no subject, or it is not in a subject and is predicated of a subject, or it is not in a subject and is predicated of no subject. These things then having been assumed, if we separate primary substances, secondary substances and accidents remain. But secondary substances are those which are not in a subject and are predicated of a subject. Therefore they do not retain their being except in this, that they are predicated of something.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":68,"ref":"p68","source":"Prædicantur autem secundae substantiae de primis,ergo ut secundæ substantiae sint, praedicatio de primis substantiis causa est.Nonenim essentsecundaesubstantiæ,nisi de primis substantiis,prædicarentur, illa vero quæ in subjecto sunt penitus consistere non valerent,nisi fundamenti quodammodo loco primis substantiis niterentur.Ergo omnia quaecunquesunt praeter primas substantias,aut secundo substantiae erunt aut accidentia. Sed secundæ substantiae de primis substantiispraedicantur,accidentiain primis substantiis sunt.Quocirca omnia aut de primissubstantiis prædicantur, ut secundae substantiae, aut in primis substantiis sunt,ut accidentia,quod Aristoteles proposuit hoc modo: Alia autem omnia aut de subjectis dicuntur principalibus substantiis, aut in subjectis eisdem sunt,bic quoque verissima sumit exempla. Ait enim: Si accidens in nullo subjecto corpore esset,nec in corpore esset omnino. Nam si in nullo singulorum,in nullo generaliter esse diceretur.Et item animal nisi de singularibus atque individuis hominibus praedicaretur, nec de homine praedicaretur omnino.Quare quoniam idcircoprsedicantur secundae suLstantiæ,quoniam sunt primae,et idcirco sunt aliquid accidentia, quoniam eisdem primæ substantiæ subjectaesunt,siprimosubstantiae non sint, neque quae de his praedicantur mansura sunt,neque quae in his subjectis permanebunt.","english":"But secondary substances are predicated of primary substances; therefore, in order that there be secondary substances, predication of primary substances is the cause. For there would not be secondary substances unless they were predicated of primary substances, and those things which are in a subject could not wholly subsist unless they were supported, in a way, by primary substances as by a foundation. Therefore all things whatsoever that exist besides primary substances will be either secondary substances or accidents. But secondary substances are predicated of primary substances, and accidents are in primary substances. Wherefore all things are either predicated of primary substances, as secondary substances, or are in primary substances, as accidents, which Aristotle set forth in this way: \"But all other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects, or are in the same as subjects.\" Here too he takes most true examples. For he says: If an accident were in no subject body, it would not be in body at all. For if it were said to be in none of the singulars, it would be said to be in none generally. And likewise, unless animal were predicated of singular and individual men, it would not be predicated of man at all. Wherefore, since secondary substances are predicated for this reason, that there are primary substances, and accidents are something for this reason, that they are subject to the same primary substances, if there were no primary substances, neither those things which are predicated of them would remain, nor those things which remain in these as subjects.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":69,"ref":"p69","source":"Secundarum vero substantiarum magis substantia est species quam gentis, propinquior enim est primae substantiæ. Si quis enim assignet primam substantiam quid est,evidentius et convenientius assignabit speciem proferens quamgenus,utquemdamhominem assignans, manifestius assignabit hominem quam animal assignando.lllud enim proprium est magis alicuju.s hom nis,hnc autem communius. Et cum aliquam arborem reddideris,manifestius assignabil,cum arborem reddideris, quam plantam.\n\nConstat individuas substantias primas et maxime et proprie esse substantias. Secundae vero subslantiae,id est genera et species, sicut non aequaliter a prima substantia distant,ita non aequalitersubstantiae sunt;nam quoniam propinquiorest species primae substantiae quamgenus,idcircomagis estsubstantia species quam proprium genus,ut homo propinquior est Socrati quam animal,atque ideo magis est homo substantia.Animal vero quanquam etipsum substantia sit,minus tamen homine; hocautem idcirco evenit, quod in omni diffinitione convenientis species ad primam substantiam dintur,quamgenus.Namsi quid sit Socrates aliquis velit ostendere,propinquius substantiamSocratis proprietatemque monstrnbit,si dixerit eum esse hominem, quam si animal. Quod enim animal estSocrates.communeest cumc;eteris qui homines non sunt,id est cum equo atque bove.","english":"But of secondary substances, species is more a substance than genus, for it is nearer to primary substance. For if anyone assigns what primary substance is, he will assign it more evidently and more fittingly by bringing forward the species than the genus, as when assigning some particular man, he will assign man more manifestly than by assigning animal. For the former is more proper to some man, but the latter is more common. And when you have rendered some tree, you will assign it more manifestly when you have rendered tree than plant.\n\nIt is agreed that individual substances are primary and are substances in the highest degree and properly. But secondary substances, that is, genera and species, just as they are not equally distant from primary substance, so they are not equally substances; for since species is nearer to primary substance than genus, for that reason species is more a substance than its own genus, as man is nearer to Socrates than animal, and therefore man is more a substance. But animal, although it too is a substance, is nevertheless less so than man; and this happens for the reason that in every definition of what is fitting, species is given closer to primary substance than genus. For if anyone wishes to show what Socrates is, he will show the substance and property of Socrates more closely if he says that he is a man than if he says animal. For that Socrates is an animal is common with the rest who are not men, that is, with a horse and an ox.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":70,"ref":"p70","source":"Quod vero homo est,cum nullo alio est commune, nisi cum his qui sub eadem speciebominis continentur. Quocirca propinquior erit ad significationem disignatio,cum individuo species redditur,quam si generis vocabulum praedicetur. Rursus si quamlibet individuam arborem designare aliquis volens,arborem dicat,propinquius designabit quid sit id quod diffinivit, quam si plantam nominet: planta autem genus est arboris; praedicatur enim planta et de iis. quæ arbores nonsunt,utde caulibus atquelactucisi quare constat species magis esse substantias, eo quod sint primis etmaximesubstantiis propinquiores.Et quod in eo quod quid sit, assignata species convenientibus et evidentius assignet,genus vero longinquius atque communius.\n\nAmplius principales substantiæ eo quod aliis omnibus subjectae sunt,et alia omnia aut de his prædicantur,aut in eis sint,ideo maxime dicuntur substantiæ. Sicut autem principales subsfanlia7 ad alia omnia se habent,sic et species ad genus se habet,subjacet enim species generi,genera enim de speciebus praedicantur, species autem de generibus non convertuntur. Quare et ex his manifestum est speciem magis genere substnatiam esse.","english":"But that it is a man is common to it with no other thing, except with those which are contained under the same species of man. Wherefore the designation will be nearer to the signification, when the species is given back with the individual, than if the name of the genus were predicated. Again, if anyone wishing to designate any individual tree says \"tree,\" he will designate more nearly what that thing is which he has defined, than if he names it \"plant\"; but plant is the genus of tree, for plant is predicated also of those things which are not trees, as of stalks and lettuces. Wherefore it is established that species are more substances, in that they are nearer to primary and most of all substances. And that in the question of what something is, the species assigned assigns more fittingly and more evidently, but the genus more remotely and more commonly.\n\nMoreover, the principal substances, in that they are subject to all other things, and all other things are either predicated of them or are in them, are for this reason said most of all to be substances. But as the principal substances are related to all other things, so also is species related to genus; for species is subject to genus, for genera are predicated of species, but species are not converted of genera. Wherefore from these too it is manifest that species is more a substance than genus.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":71,"ref":"p71","source":"Magis esse substantias species validiori rursus argumentatione confirmat, per similitudinem nam que hoeitaesse declarat.Nam cum omnessubstantiae aut primæ sint autsecundæ,secundarum autem aut genera aut species,specierum atque generum quidquid similius primis substantiis invenitur,hoc magis substantia merito putabitur.Sed primae substantiae idcirco maximae substantiae dicuntur,quod omnibus ita subjectæ sunt,ut aut in ipsis sint caetera ut accidentia, aut de ipsis alia prædicentur ut substantiae secundæ.Quod ergo in primas substantias, hoc idem in species venit.Namquespeciesetcunctissubjaeent accidentibus, et de speciebus genera prædicantur, de generibus vero species non praedicantur. Quare non similiter generasubjacent,quemadmodumspecies. Non enim de generibus species praedicantur. Ergo sicut primæ substantiæ subjectaesunt secundis substa ntiis el accidentibus,ita species subjecta: sunt et accidentibus et generibus. Genera vero quanquam subjecta sint accidentibus,speciebus tamen ipsa non subjacent.","english":"He confirms again with a stronger argument that species are more truly substances, and he declares that this is so by way of likeness. For since all substances are either primary or secondary, and of secondary substances some are genera and some are species, whatever of species and genera is found to be more like the primary substances will deservedly be thought to be more a substance. But primary substances are for this reason called greatest substances, because they are so subject to all things that either the rest are in them as accidents, or other things are predicated of them as secondary substances. Therefore what applies to primary substances applies also to species. For species are subject to all accidents, and genera are predicated of species, but species are not predicated of genera. Wherefore genera are not subject in the same way as species. For species are not predicated of genera. Therefore, just as primary substances are subject to secondary substances and to accidents, so species are subject both to accidents and to genera. But genera, although they are subject to accidents, are nevertheless not themselves subject to species.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":72,"ref":"p72","source":"Quocircamajor est similitudo speciei ad primas substantias,quam generis,quod si major est similitudo specierum admaximas substantias,ipsæ erunt magis substantiae.Sed ne quis non arbitretur dicere quod ea quæ sunt genera species esse non possunt, sed in eo quod sunt genera, species esse non possunt.Nam in eo quod species est,de superioribus non prædicatur, sed in eo quod genus, de eo prædicabitur cujus est genus.Quocirca genera ipsa quorum sunt genera his subjacere non possunt,species vero quorum sunt species, de his praedicarinon possunt.\n\nIpsarum verospecierum quæcunque non sunt genera, nihil magis alterum altero substantia est, nihil enim familiarius assignabis de aliquo homine,homlnem assignando,quam de aliquo equo,equum.Similiter autem et principalium substantiarum nihil magis alterum altero substantia est, nihil enim magis aliquis homo substantia est,quam aliquis bos.","english":"Wherefore there is a greater likeness of species to primary substances than of genus, and if there is a greater likeness of species to the greatest substances, they themselves will be more truly substances. But let no one think that we are saying that those things which are genera cannot be species, but in that in which they are genera, they cannot be species. For in that in which it is a species, it is not predicated of things above it, but in that in which it is a genus, it will be predicated of that of which it is the genus. Wherefore the genera themselves cannot be subject to those things of which they are genera, but the species cannot be predicated of those things of which they are species.\n\nBut of the species themselves, whichever are not genera, nothing is more a substance than another; for you will not assign anything more closely related concerning some man by assigning man, than concerning some horse by assigning horse. Similarly also, of primary substances, nothing is more a substance than another; for no man is more a substance than some ox.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":73,"ref":"p73","source":"Prædictum est quoque,ut Porphyrius in libro de generibus, speciebus, differentiis, propriis, atque accidentibus planissime docuit, alia esse solumgenera,quorum genus inveniri non posset,alia solum species,quae in alias species dividi non valerent. Hae autem sunt quae de pluribus numero differentibus in eo quod quid sit praedicantur, ut homo de singulis hominibus dicitur,et equus de singulis equis,etbos de singulis bobus, qui sub propria specie pnsiti a seipsis propriae naturæ figura non discrepant. Ergo hujusmodi species, ut est bomo atque equus, quae solis individuis praesunt, quoniam genera esse non possunt,aequaliLer semper substantiæ sunt.Nam tam propinque redditur de quolibet individuo equo,nomen equi, quam de quolibet individuo homine,bominis nomen.Quocirca ei aequaliter species hæ,quæ genera non sunt,ad primas substantias sunt,aequaliter esse substantiaa merito putabuntur; hocautem dicit non quod omnes species aqualiter substantiae sint,sed quæ aequaliter a primis substantiis distant. Potest enim fieri utcujuslibet superiorisgenerisuna quaelibet species sit, quæ comparata ad propriam speciem minus illa superior videaturessesubstantia: utanimalis si quis dicat speciem esse avem,ejusdem quoque speciem hominem,avis et homo non aequaliter substantiae sunt,idcirco quod avis homine superiorest.Homo namque in alias species non dividitur, est enim magis species.","english":"It has also been stated beforehand, as Porphyrius most plainly taught in his book On Genera, Species, Differentiae, Properties, and Accidents, that some things are only genera, whose genus cannot be found, and others are only species, which cannot be divided into other species. These latter, moreover, are those which are predicated of many things differing in number in respect of what a thing is, as man is said of individual men, and horse of individual horses, and ox of individual oxen, which, placed under their own species, do not differ from themselves in the figure of their proper nature. Therefore species of this kind, as are man and horse, which preside over individuals alone, since they cannot be genera, are always equally substances. For the name of horse is predicated of any individual horse no less closely than the name of man is predicated of any individual man. Wherefore these species, which are not genera, stand equally in relation to primary substances, and will deservedly be thought to be equally substance. But he says this not because all species are equally substances, but because they are equally distant from primary substances. For it can happen that of any superior genus there is some one species which, compared to its own species, seems less a substance than that superior one: as, if someone were to say that bird is a species of animal, and also that man is a species of the same, bird and man are not equally substances, for the reason that bird is superior to man. For man is not divided into other species; he is rather a species.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":74,"ref":"p74","source":"Avis autem potest in alias dividispecies.ut in accipitrem et vulturem,quæ quanquam aves sunt specie.tamenipsae dissentiunt. Proprie autem species accipere ac vulturest,hi enim solis individuis praesunt.Quare homoatque accipiter aequaliter a primissubstantiisdistant,et sunt æqualiter substantiæ.Homo vsro atque avis,quoniamsuperior est avis homine, non æqualiter substantiae sunt, magis enim substantia homo est. Ergo quæcunque species aequaliter a suis individuis distant, aequaliter substantiæ sunt.Quod quoniam species hæ quas genera mn suntaequaliter aprimis substantiis absunt,aequaliter substantiae dicuntur.Pbnum autem est, ut expositione non egeat, primas quoque substantias Eequaliteressesubstantias,aliquis homo enim atque aliquis equus,quoniam sunt individua, principaliter substantiæ sunt,et propriae et maximæ. Quocirca in maximis substantiis, neque minus, neque magis substantia poterit inveniri. Individua igitur cequaliter substantiae sunt.","english":"A bird, however, can be divided into other species, as into the hawk and the vulture, which although they are birds in species, nevertheless differ among themselves. Properly, however, to take species are the hawk and the vulture, for these preside over only individuals. Wherefore man and hawk are equally distant from primary substances, and are equally substances. But man and bird, since bird is superior to man, are not equally substances, for man is more a substance. Therefore, whatever species are equally distant from their individuals are equally substances. Since these species which are not genera are equally distant from primary substances, they are said to be equally substances. It is clear, moreover, so that it needs no exposition, that primary substances too are equally substances; for some man and some horse, since they are individuals, are primarily substances, and properly and maximally so. Wherefore in maximal substances, neither less nor more substance can be found. Individuals, therefore, are equally substances.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":75,"ref":"p75","source":"Merito igitur post principales wbstantias,sola aliorum species et genera dicuntur esse secundæ substantiæ. Eorum enim prædicantur, principalem substantiam solahsecindicant. Aliquem enim hominem si quis assignaverit quidsit,speciem quidem vel genus assignans, familiariter assignabit et man'festus faciet hominem vel animal assignans.Aliorum vero quidquid assgnaverit quilibet assignabit extraneæ, velut album, aut currit, aut quæcunque talium reddens, ergo merito lex solæ aliorum,secundæ substantiæ dicuntur.\n\nOrdine et convenienter post primas substantias,id est individua,genera et species secundas esse substantias constitutas monstrat Aristoteles, quae est firmaatque expedita probatio; ait enim:Post primas substantiasrecte genera etspecies secundas substantias esse nominatas.In diffinitionibus enim ubi sub. stantia cujuslibet ostenditur,nihil aliud primas sub-, stantias monstrat, nisi genus et species.Socrates namque,si quis quid sit interroget,dicitur homo,vel animal,et in eo quod quid sit Socrates interrogatus, recte hominem vel animal esse respondet.","english":"Therefore, rightly, after the primary substances, only the species and genera of others are said to be secondary substances. For they are predicated of them, and they alone indicate the primary substance. For if someone assigns what a particular man is, by assigning the species or the genus, he will assign it familiarly and make it manifest, by assigning man or animal. But whatever else anyone assigns of other things, he will assign something extraneous, such as white, or runs, or rendering any such things. Therefore, rightly, only these are said to be secondary substances of others.\n\nIn order and fittingly, after the primary substances, that is, individuals, Aristotle shows that genera and species are established as secondary substances, which is a firm and ready proof; for he says: After the primary substances, rightly genera and species are named secondary substances. For in definitions, where the substance of anything is shown, nothing else indicates the primary substances except genus and species. For Socrates, if anyone asks what he is, is said to be a man, or an animal, and when asked in respect of what Socrates is, he rightly responds that he is a man or an animal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":76,"ref":"p76","source":"Quare quid sint primae substantias secundae monstrant, quod si quis praeter secundas substantias in interrogatione quid sit prima substantia dicat,id alienissime profert,ut si quid sit Socrates interroganti aliquis respondeat album,vel currit,vel aliquid hujusmodi,quod secunda substantia non sit,nihil convenienter unquam profert,si quid de prima substantia praeter secundas substantias dicat. Quare quoniam nihil eorum quae non sunt secundae substantiæ, quid sit prima substantia declarat, secundas autem substantiæ genera et species sunt, recte post primas substantias species et genera secundæ dicuntur esse substantiae.\n\nAmpliu.s principales substantiæ eo quod alias omnibus subjaceant, et alia omnia de ipsis prsedicantur aut in ipsis sunt, idcirco proprise substantiæ dicuntur.Sicutautem primae. substantiæ ad omnia alia sese hubent,ita principalium substantiarum genera et species adomnia reliqua sese habent. De his enim omnia reliqua prædicantur, aliquem enim hominem dicis grammaticum esse, ergo et hominem et animat grammaticum dicis,similiter aulem et in aliis.","english":"Therefore, the secondary substances show what the primary substances are. But if anyone, in answer to the question what a primary substance is, should state something besides secondary substances, he produces something entirely out of place—as if, when someone asks what Socrates is, one should answer white, or runs, or some other such thing that is not a secondary substance. He never produces anything fitting if he says anything about a primary substance besides secondary substances. Therefore, since none of those things which are not secondary substances declares what a primary substance is, and the secondary substances are genera and species, rightly, after the primary substances, species and genera are said to be secondary substances.\n\nMoreover, primary substances, because they underlie all others and all other things are predicated of them or are in them, are for that reason properly called substances. And just as primary substances are related to all other things, so the genera and species of primary substances are related to all the rest. For all the rest are predicated of these. For you say that some man is grammatical; therefore you also say that both man and animal are grammatical, and similarly in other cases as well.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":77,"ref":"p77","source":"Haec quoque est de eadem re probatio,qua recte post primas substantias genera et species esse posttas verissima ratione confirmat.Namque individua idcirco primaedicunturessesubstantise,et quod aliis cunctissubjaceant.Nam quoniam secundis substantiis ad prædicationem suppositae sunt,et de his secundaesubstantiae dicuntur,et quoniam accidentibus ut possint esse accidentia subdunlur,idcirco primæ substantiae sunt.Et sicut primae substantiae cunctis subjacent accidentibus, sic etiam secundae. Nam quoniam aliquis homo accidentibus subjacet,et homo et animal accidenti supponitur,et quoniam est quidam homo grammaticus,id est Aristarchus,est homo grammaticus, est etiam animal grammaticum. Quocirca accidentibus primae substantiae principaliter subduntur,secundae vero secundo loco,et quemadmodum primæ substantiae et accidentibus et secundis substantiis subjacent,sicsecundaesubstantiae accidentibus supponuntur,sed secundae substantiae species et genera sunt.Recte igitur post primas substantias species et genera secundas substantias esse proposuit.","english":"This too is a proof concerning the same matter, by which he confirms with most true reasoning that genera and species are rightly placed after the primary substances. For individuals are called primary substances for this reason, that they underlie all others. For since they are subject to the secondary substances with respect to predication, and the secondary substances are said of them, and since they are subordinated to accidents so that accidents can exist, for this reason they are primary substances. And just as the primary substances underlie all accidents, so also do the secondary substances. For since some man underlies accidents, both man and animal are subject to an accident, and since a certain man is grammatical, that is, Aristarchus, man is grammatical, and animal is also grammatical. Wherefore the primary substances are subordinated to accidents principally, but the secondary substances in the second place, and just as the primary substances underlie both accidents and the secondary substances, so the secondary substances are subject to accidents, but the secondary substances are species and genera. Rightly, therefore, after the primary substances did he propose that species and genera are secondary substances.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":78,"ref":"p78","source":"Commune est autem omni substantiæ in subjecto non esseyprincipahs enim substantia neque de subjecto aliquodicitur,negue in subjecto est.Secundæ vero substantiæ sic etiam constant, quia nulla est insubjecto.Etenim homo de subjecto aliquo homine dicitur, in subjecto autem nullo est, neque enim in aliquo homine homo est. Similiter animal de subjecto quidem dicitur aliquo homine,non est autem animal in aliquo homine.\n\nPost enumerationem substantiarum et divisionem in qua alias primas,alias secundas esse proposuit, quoniam substantiae diffinitio nulla est reddita,idcirco,quia generalissimum genus diffinitionibus non tenetur, proprietatem quamdam cupit exquirere, quasi signum aliquod quo substantiam queamus agnoscere,priusquequidipbissubstantiis communiter possit evenire proponit;post vero quid illis proprium sit quaerit, sed idcirco ista praemittit, ut ad illud verum proprium sine ullo errore perveniat,et quod vere est substantiarum proprium ultimum dicat.","english":"It is common to every substance not to be in a subject. For primary substance is neither said of any subject nor is it in a subject. Secondary substances, however, also hold together in this way, because none of them is in a subject. For man is said of some subject, namely some man, but is in no subject; for man is not in some man. Similarly, animal is said of some subject, namely some man, but animal is not in some man.\n\nAfter the enumeration of substances and the division in which he proposed that some are primary and others secondary, since no definition of substance has been given—because the most general genus is not grasped by definitions—he wishes to seek out a certain property, as a kind of sign by which we may recognize substance. And first he sets forth what can commonly happen to substances themselves; afterwards he asks what is proper to them. But he premises these things for this reason, that he may arrive at that true property without any error, and may state last what is truly the property of substances.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":79,"ref":"p79","source":"Tribus autem modis proprium significatur.Est enim proprium quod alicui speciei omrii evenit et non solijUt homini bipedem esse.Omnis enim homo bipes est,sed non solus, aves namque et ipsae sunt bipedes.Aut soli et non omni,ut eidem homini evenit ut sit grammaticus,sed non omni homini,neque enim omnis homo grammaticus est.Aut vero tertia proprii significatio est,quae omni et soli et semper, ut risibile.Omnis enim homo risibilis est,et solum est animal homo quod rideat.Ex his igitur ilia duo superiora quae diximus, ubi omni et non soli, aut soli et non omni,esse quaedam propria dicebamus, quae a propriorum veritate esse videntur aliena.Hoc vero tertium quod omni inest et soli, hoc vere est proprium,illaautem superiora consequentia quidem dicuntur, non tamen vere propria, hoc autem ultimum vere est proprium.Quæcunque ergo taliapropria Aristoteles invenerit,quæ aut solis etnonorrnibussubstantiis,automnibuset nonsoliseveniant,velutnonverein naturacujuslibetconstituta repudiat. Illud vero ultimum ponit quod et omni substantiae et soli valeat evenire.lllaenim sunt propria quæ convertuntur,ut si quid luent nomo, risibile esc, si quid est risibile, homo estihaec autem solum converti possunt, quae omni solique contingunt, nam neque ulli alii magis, neque ulli minus evenienl; quare his praedictis ad loci ipsius orationem expositionemque veniamus.","english":"But \"property\" is signified in three ways. For a property is that which belongs to every member of some species and not to it alone, as for man to be biped. For every man is biped, but not man alone, for birds too are themselves biped. Or it belongs to it alone and not to every member, as for the same man to be grammatical, but not to every man, for not every man is grammatical. Or truly the third signification of property is that which belongs to every member and to it alone and always, as being capable of laughter. For every man is capable of laughter, and man alone is the animal that laughs. From these, therefore, those two former ones which we mentioned, where we said that certain properties belong to every member and not to it alone, or to it alone and not to every member, appear to be alien from the truth of properties. But this third, which belongs to every member and to it alone, this is truly a property; those former ones are indeed called consequent, yet not truly properties, but this last is truly a property. Whatever therefore Aristotle has found to be such properties, which either belong to substances alone and not to all, or to all and not to them alone, he rejects as not truly established in the nature of anything. But that last one he posits which is able to belong both to every substance and to it alone. For those are properties which are convertible, as: if anything is a man, it is capable of laughter; if anything is capable of laughter, it is a man. But those alone can be converted which belong to every member and to it alone, for they will belong neither to any other more, nor to any less; wherefore, with these things having been set forth, let us come to the exposition and explanation of the topic itself.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":80,"ref":"p80","source":"Quod ergo dicit hoc est, omnibus substantiis commune est, ut in subjecto non sint,namque primae substanliae,id est individua in subjecto non sunt,qnod planissime his demonstratur. Nunquam enim particularis substantia alicui accidens esse potest,secundæ vero substantiae habent quamdam imaginem quod sint in subjecto,videntur enim secundae substantiae in subjectis,id est primis substantiis esse, sed falso, nam secundae substantiæ de primis substantiis solum prædicantur, non in ipsis sunt.Animal enim dequodam homine tantum dicitur,non etiam in aliquo homine consistit, ut in subjecto.Hoc autem illa res probat.quod omnia quaecunque in subjecto sunt,eorum quoque individua in subjecto sunt,color quoniam in subjecto corporeest,etquidamcolor subjecto corpore nititur, in hocvero quoniam primae substanliæ,id estindividua in subjecto non sunt,nec eorum universalia, id est secundae substantiae, quae genera speciesque sunt, possunt aliquo niti subjecto.","english":"Therefore what he says here, namely that it is common to all substances not to be in a subject, is most clearly demonstrated by these considerations. For a primary substance, that is, an individual, is not in a subject. For a particular substance can never be an accident of anything. But secondary substances have a certain likeness of being in a subject; for secondary substances appear to be in subjects, that is, in primary substances, but falsely so. For secondary substances are predicated only of primary substances, not in them. For animal is said only of some man, not also does it consist in some man as in a subject. But this fact proves it: that all things whatsoever that are in a subject, their individuals also are in a subject. Color, since it is in a subject body, and a certain color rests upon a subject body. But in this case, since primary substances, that is, individuals, are not in a subject, neither can their universals, that is, secondary substances, which are genera and species, rest upon any subject.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":81,"ref":"p81","source":"Quare secundae substantiæ primas substantias ad prædicationem tantum subjectas habent, non etiam ut ipsae primis substantiis accidant.Illud quoque maximum argumentum est secundas substantias non esse in subjecto, quoniam omne quod in subjecto est potest mutari,illa quoe subjecta est non mutatur,ut color qui est in corpore, eodem corpore manente potest mutari,ut niger fiat ex albo.Manentibus autem substantiis primis,secundæ substantias non mutantur. Quam vero ipse Aristoteles posuit probationem,secundas substantias non esse in subjecto,hujusmodi est, prædocuit enim quorumdam quæ sunt in subjecto nomen de subjectis posse prædicari,rationem vero nunquam. Album enim cum sit in corpore,dicitur corpus album,et praedicatur albedo de corpore,sed alia est diffinitio albedinis, alia corporis. Secundas verosubstantiaedeprimissubstantiisetnomineprEedicantur, et diffinitione junguntur. Nam quidam homo animal est et homn,sed quidam homo,et hominis,el animalis rationediffinitur.Etutveracisaime sententia concludatur, omne quod est in subjecto, aequivoce de subjecto dicitur.Secundæ vero substantiae de primis non æquivoce,sed univoce nuncupantur,idcirco quod (ut dictum est) et nomine et diffinitione consentiunt.","english":"Therefore secondary substances have primary substances subject to them only for predication, not also so that they themselves accrue to primary substances. That too is the greatest argument that secondary substances are not in a subject: because everything that is in a subject can change, while that which is a subject does not change—as color, which is in a body, can change while the same body remains, so that it becomes black from white. But while primary substances remain, secondary substances are not changed. Moreover, the proof that Aristotle himself set down that secondary substances are not in a subject is of this sort: for he first taught that of certain things which are in a subject, the name can be predicated of the subjects, but the definition never. For white, since it is in a body, is said of the body as a white body, and whiteness is predicated of the body, but one is the definition of whiteness, another of body. But secondary substances are predicated of primary substances both in name and are joined in definition. For a certain man is an animal and a man, but a certain man is defined by the definition of man and of animal. And so that the true and most firm judgment may be concluded: everything that is in a subject is said of the subject equivocally. But secondary substances are named of primary substances not equivocally but univocally, for the reason that (as was said) they agree both in name and in definition.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":82,"ref":"p82","source":"Quare quemadmodum primæ substantiæ in subjecto non sunt,sic secundæ subjecto carebunt.Commune est igitur omnibus substantiis, et secundis et primis in subjecto non esse,et quodcunque substantia fuerit,consequens est ut in nullo subjecto sit.Sed quaBriturutrumhoc soli substantiæ insit an etiam al iis, nam si soli substantiee inest,quoniam omni substantias hoc inesse monstravimus, quod in subjecto non sit, verum proprium dicilur esse substantiae, non esse in subjecto.Huc enim dictum est esse maxime proprium,quod omnibus inesset et solis,sed hoc non esse substantiae proprium verissima Aristotelea probatione confirmat dicens:\n\nAmplius eorum quæsunt in subjecto nomen quidem de subjecto aliquando nihil prohibet prædicari, rationem vero impossibile est. Secunda rum vero substantiarum et nomen de subjectis et ratio prædicabitur, rationem enim hominis et animalis de aliquo homine prædicabis.Quare non erit substantia eorum quæ sunt in subjecto. Non est autem hoc proprium substantiae, namque et differentia eorum est, qua in subjecto non sunt, bipes enim et gressibile de subjecto quidem homine dicitur,in subjecto autem nullo est,non enim in homine est bipes,neque gl'essibile.Ratio quoque differenticB de illo dicitur de quo ipsa differentia prædicatur,ut si gressibile de homine dicitur,et ratio gressi- J bilis de homine prædicabitur,est enimhomogressibilis.","english":"Therefore, just as primary substances are not in a subject, so secondary substances will lack a subject. It is therefore common to all substances, both secondary and primary, not to be in a subject, and whatever is a substance, it follows that it is in no subject. But the question is raised whether this belongs to substance alone or also to other things. For if it belongs to substance alone, since we have shown that this belongs to every substance—namely, not to be in a subject—then it is truly said to be a property of substance: not to be in a subject. For it was said above to be most properly a property, because it belongs to all and only substances. But that this is not a property of substance he confirms by a most true Aristotelian proof, saying:\n\nMoreover, of things that are in a subject, nothing prevents the name from sometimes being predicated of the subject, but the definition is impossible. But of secondary substances both the name and the definition will be predicated of subjects; for you will predicate the definition of man and of animal of some particular man. Therefore it will not be a substance of things that are in a subject. But this is not a property of substance, for it is also a property of difference that it is not in a subject. For biped and capable of walking are said of a subject, man, but are in no subject; for biped is not in man, nor is capable of walking. The definition also of difference is said of that of which the difference itself is predicated, as if capable of walking is said of man, the definition of capable of walking will also be predicated of man; for man is capable of walking.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":83,"ref":"p83","source":"Non esse proprium hoc substantiae dicit, idcirco quod in differentiis idem sit,in nullo enim differentia subjecto est,ad illud namque recurritur. Si differentia in subjecto esset,nominetantum de subjecto praedicaretur,non etiam ratione. Differentia vero de eo de quo dicitur univoce prædicatur, ut si quis dicatgressibilem differentiam de homine,ipsius differentiae diffinitio quoque homini convenienter aptabitur.Gressibile namque est quod per terram pedibusambulat,et homo est quod per terram pedibus ambulat, ita differentiae et ejus de quo ipsa differentia dicitur una poterit esse ratio substantise,id est unius possunt et nominis nuncupatione,et diffinitionis determinatione conjungi.Quod si in subjecto essetdifferentia,nequaquam de subjecto sibi univoce praedicaretur. Quare non proprium est substantiae quod retinet etiam differentia, differentia namque substantia non est.Esset enim proprium substantiae in subjecto non esse.Non estaulem diJferentiaaccidens,esset enim in subjecto. Omnis autem res aut accidens est, aut substantia, id est aut in subjecto est,aut in subjecto non est,et sunt accidentia quaecunque in substantiam subjecti non veniunt, quæque permutata naturam substantiae non perimunt.","english":"He says that this is not a property of substance, for the reason that the same holds in the case of differentiae; for a differentia is in no subject, since recourse is had to that. If a differentia were in a subject, it would be predicated of the subject in name only, and not also in definition. But a differentia is predicated univocally of that of which it is said, so that if someone calls \"capable of walking\" a differentia of man, the definition of that differentia itself will also be fittingly applied to man. For \"capable of walking\" is what walks on the ground by means of feet, and man is what walks on the ground by means of feet. Thus there can be one account of substance for the differentia and for that of which the differentia itself is said, that is, they can be joined both by the naming of one name and by the determination of one definition. But if a differentia were in a subject, it would by no means be predicated univocally of the subject. Therefore it is not a property of substance that a differentia also retains, for a differentia is not a substance. For it would be a property of substance not to be in a subject. But a differentia is not an accident, for then it would be in a subject. Now every thing is either an accident or a substance, that is, it is either in a subject or not in a subject; and accidents are whatever do not come into the substance of a subject, and which, when changed, do not destroy the nature of the substance.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":84,"ref":"p84","source":"Si quibus vero peremptis subjecta interimantur, illa proprie accidentia non vocamus,differentia vero est quas de pluribusspeciedifferentibusineo quod quale sit praedicatur.Sed differentia substantia non est, idcirco quod si esset substantia non in eo quod quale sit de subjecto,sed in eo quod quid sit prædicaretur. Qualitas vero solum non est,esset enim accidens et in subjecto.An magis ex substantia et qualitate differentia ipsa conficitur,ita ut illud de quo praedicatur, perempta differentia simul interimatur, ut calor,cum estin aqua,perempto calore,potest aqua in sua substantia permanere, et est calor in subjecta aqna,quo interempto,aqua non peribit.Idem tamen calor estin igne,sed peremptocalore,ignem interire necesse est. Quare hæc qualitas caloris substantialiter inest igni,et est propria differentia,id est substantiajis.Concludendom est igitur differentiam,neque solum substantiam esse,neque solum qualitatem, sed quod ex utrisque conficitur substantialem qualitatem,quæ permanet in natura subjecti,atque ideo quoniam substantia participat, accidens non est, quoniam qualitas est,a substantia relinquitur.","english":"But if, when certain things are destroyed, their subjects are destroyed, we do not properly call those accidents. A differentia, however, is what is predicated of many things differing in species in respect of what sort of thing it is. But a differentia is not substance, for the reason that if it were substance, it would not be predicated of a subject in respect of what sort of thing it is, but in respect of what it is. Nor is it quality alone, for then it would be an accident and in a subject. Or rather, is the differentia itself compounded from substance and quality, so that when the differentia is destroyed, that of which it is predicated is at the same time destroyed? For example, when heat is in water, once the heat is destroyed, the water can remain in its own substance, and the heat is in the underlying water; when this is destroyed, the water will not perish. Yet the same heat is in fire, but once the heat is destroyed, the fire must perish. Wherefore this quality of heat is present in fire substantially, and is a proper differentia, that is, substantial. Therefore, by way of conclusion, a differentia is neither substance alone nor quality alone, but what is compounded from both, a substantial quality, which remains in the nature of the subject; and therefore, since it participates in substance, it is not an accident, and since it is a quality, it is left over from substance.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":85,"ref":"p85","source":"Sed quoddam medium est inter substantiam et qualitatem,quae quoniam in subjecto non estetsubstantia non est,proprium substantiæ non est non esse in subjecto.Post hoc illuc quoque dicit non deberenos conturbari, ne forte substantiarum partes,quae ita sunt in toto quasi in aliquo subjecto,aliquando cogamur non substantias confiteri.Substantiarum partes in subjecLO sunt,sed nou ut accidentia, videmus enim quasdam partes substantiarum ita esse in toto quasi sint in subjecto,ut caput in toto corpore est, et manus in toto corpore est,forma quoque et materia quae sunt partes compositae substantiae in iDsa composita substantia sunt. Ne forte ergo cogamur aliquando partes substantiarum, quoniam sunt in subjecto, suspicari non esse substantias, sed accidentia, praemonet dicens:\n\nNon conturbent autem nos substantiarum partes,ut quæ ita sint in toto, quasi in subjecto, ne forte cogamur confiteri eas non esse substantias, non enim sic dicebamus ea esse qws sunt in subjecto,ut quasi partes essent in aliquo.","english":"But there is a certain middle ground between substance and quality, which, since it is not in a subject and is not a substance, is not the peculiar property of substance—namely, not to be in a subject. After this, he also says there that we ought not to be disturbed lest we be at some point compelled to admit that the parts of substances, which are in a whole as in some subject, are not substances. The parts of substances are in a subject, but not as accidents; for we see that certain parts of substances are in a whole as if they were in a subject, as the head is in the whole body, and the hand is in the whole body; likewise form and matter, which are parts of a composite substance, are in the composite substance itself. Therefore, lest we be at some point compelled to suspect that the parts of substances, because they are in a subject, are not substances but accidents, he warns us beforehand, saying:\n\nBut let not the parts of substances disturb us, that they are in a whole as in a subject, lest we be compelled to admit that they are not substances; for we did not mean that those things which are in a subject are so in it as if they were parts in something.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":86,"ref":"p86","source":"Hoc enim rationis affert cur ista accidentia esse aliquis suspicari non debeat. Illa enim accidentia esse diffinita sunt in objecto, quae non essent ut quaedam pars,hoc enim superius ait.In subjecto autem essedico,quod cum in aliquo sit,non aicut quæ dam pars et impossible est esse sine eo in quo est. Quocirca quoniam accidentia ita sunt in subjecto, ut subjecti partes non sint,5ubstantiarum vero partes in toto ita sunt, ut in subjecto non sint, partes substantiarum,partes accidentium esse nullus recte suspicari potest.\n\nInest autem substantiis et differentiis ex his omnia univoce prædicari.Omnia enim quæ ab his prædicata suntyaut de individuis prædicantur,aut de speciebus; a prima namque substantia nulla est prædicatio,de nullo enim subjecto dicitur.Secundarum vern substantiarum species quidem de individuo prædicatur,genus antem et despecieet deindividuo.Similver autem et difterentiæ de speciebus, et de individuis prdedicantur. Rutionetn etiam suscipiunt primæ substantiæ specierum et generum,et species generis,quæcunque enim de prædicato dicuntur9eadem et de subjecto dicuntur. Similiter autem et differentiarum rationem suscipiunt et species, et individua, univoca autem erant, quorum, et nomen commune et ratio eadem est.Quare omnia quæ a substantiis et differentiis sunt,univoce dicuntur.","english":"For this reasoning shows why no one should suspect that these are accidents. For those things have been defined as accidents in the subject which would not be as a kind of part—for he says this above. But I say that to be in a subject is what, when it is in something, is not as a kind of part and cannot be without that in which it is. Wherefore, since accidents are in a subject in such a way that they are not parts of the subject, but the parts of substances are in the whole in such a way that they are not in a subject, no one can rightly suspect that the parts of substances are parts of accidents.\n\nMoreover, it belongs to substances and differences that all things derived from them are predicated univocally. For all things that are predicated from these are predicated either of individuals or of species; for from a primary substance there is no predication, since it is said of no subject. But of secondary substances, the species is indeed predicated of the individual, while the genus is predicated both of the species and of the individual. Similarly also differences are predicated of species and of individuals. And primary substances also admit the definition of species and genera, and the species admits the definition of the genus; for whatever things are said of a predicate are also said of the subject. Similarly, both species and individuals admit the definition of differences. But univocals were those of which both the name is common and the definition is the same. Wherefore all things that derive from substances and differences are said univocally.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":87,"ref":"p87","source":"Quoniam in subjecto non esse differentiis et substantiiscommunemonstravit,aliam rursus communitatem substantiarum differentiarumque proposuit.Nam cum substantiarum alix sint primae, aliæ secundæ,et primæ substantiæ sint individuae, quoniam nihil individua possunt habere subjectum,ab individuis nulla prædicatio est.Secundae verosubstantise de individuis, id est de primis substantiis, prædicantur, et de his univoce dicuntur. Secundarum enim substantiarum nomen de individuis prædicatur et ratio. Ac de individuo quidem et species prædicatur et genus,ut de Platone,id est de aliquo homine,ethomo dicitur,et animai,aliquis enim homo est,et animal,et utriusque de individuo praedicatur ratio.Dicimus enim aliquem hominem animal esse rationale mortale, quae est speciei diffinitio, id est hominis.Et rursus aliquem hominem dicimus esse substantiam animatam atque sensibilem,quæ generis est diffinitio,id est animalis.Species vero generis sui et diffinitionem suscipitetvocabulum,de homine emin animal prædicatur,dicitur eniin homo animal est,et idem ipse rursus homo rationem suscipit animalis.Dicimus enim esse hominem substantiam animatam atque sensibilem.","english":"Since he has demonstrated that differences and substances are not in a subject, he next proposed another commonality of substances and differences. For since of substances some are primary, others secondary, and the primary substances are individuals—since individuals can have nothing as a subject, from individuals there is no predication. But secondary substances are predicated of individuals, that is, of primary substances, and are said of them univocally. For the name and the definition of secondary substances are predicated of individuals. And indeed both species and genus are predicated of an individual, as of Plato, that is, of some man, both man is said and animal—for some man is both a man and an animal—and the definition of each is predicated of the individual. For we say that some man is a rational mortal animal, which is the definition of the species, that is, of man. And again we say that some man is a substance animate and sensible, which is the definition of the genus, that is, of animal. But the species receives both the definition and the name of its genus—for animal is predicated of man, for man is said to be an animal—and the same man again receives the definition of animal. For we say that man is a substance animate and sensible.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":88,"ref":"p88","source":"Constat ergo quoniam et genera et species de individuis,et genera de speciebus univoce praedicantur, id est in omni praedicatione secundae substantiæ univoca appellatione de subjectisdicuntur,quod his cumdifferentiacommune est.Differenlia namque de specie de qua dicitur, etde ejus individuo ipsa quoque univoce prædicatur. Nam cum sit gressibilis differentia de aliquo homine prsedicatur,dicitur enim quidam homo gressibilis, ut Plato et Cicero,sed et diffinitionem differentias suscipiunt individua,de quibus illa differentia praedicatur.Gressibile namque est quod per terram pedibus ambulare potest.Etquemdamhominem possis ita secundum nomen differentiae diffinire, ut dicas Platonem esse quod per terram pedibus ambulare possit. Et hoc idem evenit de specie cujusdam hominis,id est de homine: homo namque,id est ipsa species,cum sit gressiblis, potest diffiniri. Homo est quod per terram pedibus ambulare possit.","english":"It is therefore established that both genera and species are predicated univocally of individuals, and genera of species, that is, in every predication of secondary substance they are said of subjects with a univocal appellation, which is common to them along with difference. For difference too is predicated univocally of the species of which it is said, and of the individual of that species. For since \"capable of walking\" is a difference, it is predicated of some man—for a certain man is said to be capable of walking, as Plato and Cicero—but individuals of which that difference is predicated also receive the definition of the difference. For \"capable of walking\" is that which can walk on the ground by means of feet. And you could define a certain man according to the name of the difference, so as to say that Plato is that which can walk on the ground by means of feet. And the same thing happens in the case of the species of a certain man, that is, of man: for man, that is, the species itself, since it is capable of walking, can be defined. Man is that which can walk on the ground by means of feet.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":89,"ref":"p89","source":"Ergo et differentiæ de his de quibus pradicantur,univocedicuntur.Quocirca quoniam et secundae substantiæ de his de quibus prædicantur univoce dicuntur,et differentias eodem modo,quæcunque a substantiis vel differentiis praedicationes fuerint,haec et de subjectis univoce prædicabuntur.Quæ autem causa sit ut secundae substantiæ de primis substantiis univoce prædicentur,illa quam supra docuit Aristoteles nos admonens dixit,omnia enim quaecunque de prædicato dicuntur,eadern etiam dicentur de subjecto.Omnes enim difrerentiæ quæ sunt specifica? generis praedicantur et de specie et de individuo, ut quoniam animal efficiunt differentiæ animatum atque sensibile, eadem et de specie, id est homine, et de individuo, id est aliquo homine,prædicabuntur; quod cum superius dictum est,nunc quantum expositionis brevitas postulat, dixisse sufficiat.","english":"Therefore, also the differentiae are predicated univocally of those things of which they are predicated. Wherefore, since both secondary substances are predicated univocally of those things of which they are predicated, and differentiae in the same way, whatever predications there are from substances or differentiae, these too will be predicated univocally of their subjects. But what the cause is that secondary substances are predicated univocally of primary substances, Aristotle taught above when he said, admonishing us: for all things whatsoever that are said of a predicate will also be said of the subject. For all differentiae that are specific of a genus are predicated both of the species and of the individual, as, since the differentiae animate and sensible make it an animal, the same will be predicated both of the species, that is, man, and of the individual, that is, some man; and since this was said above, it suffices now to have said it insofar as the brevity of the exposition demands.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":90,"ref":"p90","source":"Omnis autem substantia videtur hocatiquidsignificare,atquein pnmis quidem substantiis indubitabileel verum est,quoniam hoc aliquid significant. Individuum enim et unum numero est quod significatur.In secundis vero substantiis,videtur quidem similiter appellationis figura hoc aLiquid signilicare,quando quis dixerit vel hominem, vel animal, non tamen verum est, sed magis quale aliquid significat; neque enim est unum quod subjectum est,qucmadmodum prima substantia, sed de pluribus homo dicitur et animal. Non autem simpliciter quale quid significat,quemadmodum album, nihil enim atbum aliud significat quam qualitatem,genus aulem et species circa substantiam qualitatem determinant,qualem enim quamdam substantiam significant plusautem in genere quam in specie determinatio fit, dicens enim animal plus complectitur quam hominem.","english":"Every substance, however, seems to signify this something, and in the case of primary substances it is undoubtedly true that they signify this something; for what is signified is an individual and one in number. In the case of secondary substances, however, the form of the appellation seems likewise to signify this something, when one says either man or animal, yet it is not true, but rather it signifies a sort of quality; for that which is the subject is not one, as a primary substance is, but man and animal are predicated of many things. But it does not signify a sort of quality simply, as white does—for white signifies nothing other than a quality—but genus and species determine a quality in relation to substance; for they signify a certain sort of substance. And the determination is made more in the case of genus than in the case of species; for in saying animal one comprehends more than man.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":91,"ref":"p91","source":"Postquam superius geminas dixit substantiae consequentias, id est in subjecto non esse, et cuncta ab his univoce praedicari, et eas a maximæ proprio substantiæ separavit,idcirco quod differentiis etiam videntur esse communes, aliud adjicit quod idcirco substantiae proprium non sit, quod non sit in omni substantia.Nam quemadmodum quantitas,quantum signiticat,et qualitas quale,sicetiam substantia videtur hoc aliquid signiticare.Nam cum dico Socrates vel Plato vel aliquam individuam substantiam nomino,hoc aliquid significo,sed omnibus hoc substantiis non inest.Individuisnamque quoniamparticularia sunt et numero singularia,verum est hoc aliquid a substantiis significari. In secundis vero substantiis non idem est.Namque secundæ substantiae non sunt unæ,nec numero singulares,sed species intra se plurima individua continent,et multas intra se species genus includit,quocirca cum dico homo, non hoc aliquid significavi,neque enim singulare est hominis nomen,idcirco quod de pluribus individuis prædicatur, sed potius quale quiddam; qualis enim substantia sit demonstratur,cum dicitur homo.Qualitas autem hæc circa substantiam termi- A natur,namsicut individuaqualitas species et genera qualitatis habet,etsicut singulas quantitates quantitas speciebus et generibusclaudit,ita quoque individuarum substantiarum species et genera secundæ substantiae sunt.","english":"After he said above that there are two consequences of substance—namely, not being in a subject, and all things being predicated of them univocally—and separated them from what is most proper to substance, for the reason that they also seem to be common to differences, he adds another point: that it is not proper to substance for the reason that it is not in every substance. For just as quantity signifies how much, and quality of what sort, so too substance seems to signify this something. For when I say Socrates or Plato or name some individual substance, I signify this something, but this is not present in all substances. For in the case of individuals, since they are particular and singular in number, it is true that this something is signified by substances. But in the case of secondary substances it is not the same. For secondary substances are not one, nor singular in number, but a species contains within itself many individuals, and a genus includes within itself many species. Therefore, when I say man, I have not signified this something—for the name of man is not singular, for the reason that it is predicated of many individuals—but rather of what sort something is; for it is shown of what sort a substance is when man is said. But this quality is bounded around substance; for just as individual quality has species and genera of quality, and just as quantity encloses single quantities by species and genera, so too the species and genera of individual substances are secondary substances.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":92,"ref":"p92","source":"Ergo cum dico homo, talem substantiam significo, quae de pluribus numero differentibus in eo quod quid sit prædicatur,qualem ergo quamdam substantiam significo,cum hominem dixi, talem scilicet quae individuis nominetur,idem quoquedegenere est.Nam cum dico animal,talemsubstantiam significo quae de pluribus speciebus dicatur.Est igitur qualitas,ut album,quae semper sit in substantia,sed non ut ipsam substantiam interimat, idcirco quod proprietatem substantiæ albedo non habet. Qualitas vero haec quae de substantiis dicitur, circa substantiam qualitatem determinat, qualis sit enim illa substantia demonstrat.Nam si homo est rationalis,et substantia erit rationalis,sed rationalis qualitasest.Qualem ergosubstantiammonstrant secundae substantiae. Quocirca non est hoc proprium substantiae, hoc aliquid significare. Secundae enim substantiae non hoc aliquid, sed quale aliquid (ut dictum est) monstrant,ita tamen quale aliquid monstrant,utipsam qualitatem circa substantias determinent.Qualitasenim secundarum substautiarum in individuis est,de ipsis enim naturaliter praedicatur quæ ipsa individuse substantiae sunt.Qualitas igitur secundarum substantiarum circa individua, id est quæ prima sunt terminatur.","english":"Therefore, when I say \"man,\" I signify a substance of such a kind as is predicated of several things differing in number in respect of what it is. Therefore I signify a certain kind of substance when I say \"man\"—namely, such a one as is named of individuals. The same holds also for genus. For when I say \"animal,\" I signify a substance of such a kind as is said of several species. There is, then, a quality, such as white, which is always in a substance, but not such as to destroy the substance itself, for the reason that whiteness does not have the property of substance. But this quality which is said of substances determines quality with respect to substance; for it shows of what sort that substance is. For if man is rational, the substance will also be rational, but rational is a quality. Of what sort, therefore, do secondary substances show the substance? Wherefore this is not a property of substance—to signify a particular thing. For secondary substances do not show a particular thing, but of what sort something is (as has been said); yet they show of what sort something is in such a way that they determine the quality itself with respect to substances. For the quality of secondary substances is in individuals; for it is naturally predicated of those things which are the individual substances themselves. The quality, therefore, of secondary substances is terminated at individuals, that is, at those things which are primary.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":93,"ref":"p93","source":"Determinatio vero quoties ipse terminus multa concludit, major est, et minorquotiespauciora,quocircagenus plurima col- I ligit, species vero non tam pIurima.Nam cum dico animal, etiam hominem bovemque, et alia cuncta animalia hoc uno nomine clausi.Cum vero dico homo,solos homines individuos hac nominis significationeconclusi,quocirca major fit determinatio pergenus quam per speciem,et fit determinatio circa substantiam qualitatis, vel quod substantialis qualitas in genere et specie est, vel quod secundum quamdam communionem subjectorum dicitur. Sed perse qualitas,utalbum,neque ullius substantiam siguificat,neque ullam communionem,sicut genus specierum suarum,etindividuorum species,ostendit.Quocirca aliud substantiæ proprium requirendum est.\n\nInest autemsubstantiis etiam nihil ipsis esse contrarium, primæ enim substantiæ quid erit contrarium, ut alicui homini vel alicui animali,nihil enim est contrarium, at vero nec homini nec animali aliquid est contrarium;non est autem hoc substanliæ proprium, sed etiam multorum aliorum,ut quantitatis: bicubito enim vel tricubito nihil est contrarium,at vero nec decem nec alicui talium.Nisi quis forte mulla paucis dicat esse contraria,vel magnum pravo,determinatarum vero quantitatum nullum ulli est contrarium.","english":"But the definition is greater whenever the term itself encompasses many things, and smaller whenever it encompasses fewer; wherefore a genus collects very many things, but a species not so many. For when I say \"animal,\" I have enclosed in this one name even man and ox and all other animals. But when I say \"man,\" I have enclosed by the signification of this name only individual men; wherefore the definition becomes greater through genus than through species, and the definition concerns the substance of a quality, either because a substantial quality is in genus and species, or because it is predicated according to a certain community of subjects. But quality in itself, as white, signifies neither the substance of anything nor any community, as a genus shows the community of its species and of individuals, and a species shows that of individuals. Wherefore another property of substance must be sought.\n\nIt also belongs to substances that nothing is contrary to them. For what will be contrary to a primary substance, as to some man or to some animal? For nothing is contrary to it. But neither is anything contrary to man nor to animal. Yet this is not a property of substance, but also of many other things, as of quantity; for nothing is contrary to a two-cubit length or a three-cubit length, but neither to ten nor to any such things. Unless perhaps someone should say that many are contrary to few, or the great to the small; but of determinate quantities, none is contrary to any.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":94,"ref":"p94","source":"Adjecit quoque aliud substantiæ proprium dicens substantiae nihil esse conlrarium,hoc autem ex ea quae sigillatim fit inducLione confirmat. Homo enim homini vel equo, vel alicui alii animalium non est contrarius.Sed si quis forsitan dicat,cum ignis atque aqua substantiae sint,ignem aquae ease contrarium, mentietur.Non enim ignis aquae contrarius est,sed qualitates ignis qualitatibus aquæ opponuntur.Calor enim et frigus contraria sunt,et humor et siccitas, quae qualitates cum aliae sint in igne, alix in aqua, ipsassubstantias contrarias facere videntur,sed non sunt; hoc autem ex omnibus aliis substantiis potest probari, in quibus nibil quisquam poterit invenire contrarium.Sed hoc solius substantiae proprium non est, namque et quantitas definita contrariis caret. Nam neque duo tribus contraria sunt, nec duobus quatuor, nec aliquid hujusmodi: nam si dicamus tres duobus esse contrarios,cur non his duobus etiam quatuorvel quinque contrarios esse ponamus?nulla enim afferri ratio potest, cum tres duobus contrarii sint,cur quatuor vel quinque duobus contrarii non sint.","english":"He also added another property of substance, saying that nothing is contrary to substance, and he confirms this by the induction that is made of individual cases. For man is not contrary to man, nor to a horse, nor to any other of animals. But if perhaps someone should say that, since fire and water are substances, fire is contrary to water, he will be mistaken. For fire is not contrary to water, but the qualities of fire are opposed to the qualities of water. For heat and cold are contraries, and moisture and dryness, which qualities, since some are in fire and others in water, seem to make the substances themselves contrary, but they are not; and this can be proved from all other substances, in which no one will be able to find anything contrary. But this is not a property of substance alone, for quantity also, when definite, lacks contraries. For neither are two contrary to three, nor four to two, nor anything of this sort; for if we say that three are contrary to two, why should we not posit that four or five are also contrary to these two? For no reason can be brought why, when three are contrary to two, four or five are not contrary to two.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":95,"ref":"p95","source":"Quod si hoc est, vel quatuor,vel tres, vel quinque,vel quicunque a duobus distant numeri, contrarii fiant duobus, et erunt uni rei multa contraria, quod fieri non potest.Non est igitur contrarium aliquid quantitati.Sed si quis dicat magnum pravo vel multae paucis esse contraria, haec quidem etiamsi quis quantitates esse confirmat,tamen diffinitæ quantitates non sunt,quantum enim sit magnum vel quantum parvum,non definit qui loquitur, eodem modo, etiam de multis atque paucis.","english":"But if this is so, either four or three or five or whatever numbers are distant from two would become contrary to two, and there will be many contraries to one thing, which cannot happen. Therefore nothing is contrary to quantity. But if anyone says that the great is contrary to the base or many things to few things, even if someone affirms that these are quantities, nevertheless they are not definite quantities; for the speaker does not define how great the great is or how small the small is, and in the same way also concerning many things and few things.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":96,"ref":"p96","source":"Quare si quis hæc quantitates esse dicat,indeterminatas indefinilasque esse confitebitur.Dicit autem Aristoteles terminatae quantitati nihiiessecontrarium,utduobusveltribus vel lineae vel superficiei.Quod si etiam aliae quantitates habent contraria,aliee vero non habent,nihil omnino impedit ad hoc quod dicitur, proprium non esse substantiæ,idcirco quod constat quasdam quantitates non habere contraria.Quod si hoc et in quantitatibus evenitnon esse contrarium,substantiarum proprium non est.Atque hæc quidem si quis magnum velparvum in quantitatibus ponat, manifestum est (ut ipse est posterius monstraturus) hæc non esse quantitates,sed ad aliquid,magnumenimad parvum dicitur;sed cum ad ea loca venerimus, propositi ordinem loci diligentius exsequemur.Nunc quoniam declaratum est et substantiæ nihil esse contrarium, et hoc ei proprium non esse,quoniam idem etiam in quantitatibus consideratur,ad sequens proprium expositionis semitam convertamus.","english":"Therefore, if anyone says that these are quantities, he will admit that they are indeterminate and undefined. But Aristotle says that nothing is contrary to a determinate quantity, as to two or three or a line or a surface. But even if other quantities have contraries and others do not, nothing at all prevents what is said from being a property of substance, for the reason that it is evident that certain quantities do not have contraries. But if this also happens in quantities—that nothing is contrary—then it is not a property of substances. And indeed, if anyone places the great or the small among quantities, it is clear (as he himself will show later) that these are not quantities but relatives, for the great is said in relation to the small; but when we come to those places, we shall follow the order of the proposed passage more carefully. Now, since it has been declared both that nothing is contrary to substance and that this is not its property, because the same is also observed in quantities, let us turn to the next property in the path of our exposition.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":97,"ref":"p97","source":"Videtur autem substantia non suscipere magis et minuSjdico autem hoc non quod substantia a substantia non sit magis etminus substantia, hoc enim dictum est, quia est,sed quoniam unaquæque substantia, hoc ipsum quod est,non dicitur magis etminus,utsi est haec substantza,homo,non est magis aut minus homo,nec ipse seipso,nec alter altero9non est enim alter altero magis homo, sicut est album alterum altero magis albumtet bonum alterum altero magis honum.Sed et ipsum se magis el minus dicitur:utcorpus cumsitalbum9magis album esse dicitur nunc quam prius; etcu1n calidum sit, magis et minus calidum dicitur. Substantia vero non dicitur magis aut minus substantia, non enim homo magis nunc homo quam prius dicitur, nec aliorum, quidquam quæ substantiæ sunt, qua propter nec recipit substantia magis et minus.\n\nHoc proprium non simpliciter dicitur, sed cum aliqua distinctione: ait enim substantiam neque magis recipere,neque minus,non hoc dicens,quoniam substantianon est magis ab alia subslantia.Namque quidam homo cum sit substantia,magis est substantia ab homine,id est ab specie,et homo ab animali, id est a genere.","english":"But substance seems not to receive more and less. I say this, not that substance is not more and less substance than substance—for this has been said, that it is—but because each substance, that very thing which it is, is not said to be more and less; as, if this substance is man, it is not more or less man, neither than itself nor than another. For one is not more man than another, as one white thing is more white than another, and one good thing is more good than another. But even the same thing is said to be more and less of itself: as when a body is white, it is said to be more white now than before; and when it is warm, it is said to be more and less warm. But substance is not said to be more or less substance; for a man is not said to be more man now than before, nor is any of the other things which are substances. Wherefore substance does not receive more and less.\n\nThis property is not stated without qualification, but with some distinction. For he says that substance receives neither more nor less, not saying this: that substance is not more from another substance. For a certain man, since he is a substance, is more a substance than man, that is, than the species, and man than animal, that is, than the genus.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":98,"ref":"p98","source":"Ergo non hoc dicit, quoniam non inveniuntur substantiæ quæ a substantiismagissubstantiæ sint, hoc enim dictum est, quoniam est, id est quoniam inveniuntur.Ait enim superius primas substantias,id est individuas,maxime esse substantias, in secundis vere substantiis, magis esse substantias species quam genera. Ergo non dicit,quoniam nulla substantia ab alia substantia magis substantia est, sed hoc ipsum quod est, quaslibet illa substantia non dicitur magis et minus substantia,ut si est substantia homo,non dicitquoniam homo non est magis et minus substantia,individuus enim homo magis est substantia,species vero minus siad primam,id est individuam,substantiam referatur.","english":"Therefore he does not say this because substances are not found to be more substance than substances—for this has been said, because it is, that is, because they are found. For he says above that primary substances, that is, individuals, are most of all substances, but in secondary substances, species are more substance than genera. Therefore he does not say that no substance is more substance than another substance, but this very thing which it is—whatever substance it may be—is not said to be more and less substance; as, if man is a substance, he does not say that man is not more and less substance, for the individual man is more substance, but the species less, if it is referred to the primary, that is, the individual, substance.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":99,"ref":"p99","source":"Sed hoc dicit,boc ipsum quod est,id est,homo non erit magis homo vel minus homo; quocirca non dicit quoniam homo non est magis substantia vel minus, sed quoniam homo, hoc ipsum quod est,non est magis vel minus homo,non est enim aliqnis homo magis et minus homo; et hoc idem in ejusdem comparatione convenit speculari.Nam ipse homo a seipso non est plus homo,at vera nee si ad alterum conteratur,ad alterum vero ita,ut sub eadem conjunctione sint,ut quidam homo individuus ad aliquem individuum hominem comparatus,non erit magiset minus homo,et ipsa species seipsa non erit magis et minus homo; sed hoc palam est in substantiis,in'qualitatibus vero potest esso magis et mmus, album enim potest fieri magis album seipsu,et suscipere magis et minus, ut magis album et minus album; potest et alio albo plus esse album,ut lilium lana; et alio albo minus esse album, ut lana lilio, et cygnus nive, atque idem in aliis qualitatibus, ut bono et calido.","english":"But he says this, this very thing that it is, that is, a man will not be more a man or less a man; wherefore he does not say that a man is not more a substance or less, but that a man, this very thing that he is, is not more or less a man, for no man is more and less a man; and this same point it is fitting to examine in comparison of the same thing. For a man himself is not more a man than himself, but truly not even if he is compared to another, but to another in such a way that they fall under the same conjunction, as when some individual man is compared to some individual man, he will not be more and less a man, and the species itself will not be more and less a man than itself; but this is evident in substances, whereas in qualities there can be more and less, for a white thing can become more white than itself, and receive more and less, as more white and less white; it can also be more white than another white thing, as a lily than wool; and be less white than another white thing, as wool than a lily, and a swan than snow, and the same in other qualities, as in the good and the hot.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":100,"ref":"p100","source":"Namque hæc possunt temporibus permutari, et in plus minusve transduci, fit enim aliquoties bono melius et deterius, et calido ferventius et tepidius: homo vero quod est substantia, neque nunc plus erit homo quam fuit antea,neque post magis aut minus erit homo quam nunc est.Quocirca cum substantia non suscipiat magis et minus,tamen proprium ejus hoc non erit.Sed cur non sit proprium ipse Aristoteles velut notum conticuit; nos autem addimus, quoniam non solum substantias non suscipiunt magis et minus,sed et alia multa; circulus enim alio circulc non erit magis circulus aut minus,nec duplum magis duplumvel minus; aequaliter enim duplus est quaternarius: ad binarium,et denarius ad quinarium comparatus,quocirca quoniam etiam in aliis idem est, hoc substantiæ proprium non esseputandum est.Sedhæc quidem omnia quaecunquesunt in substantiis omnibus, propria tamen substantiæ non sunt,eo quod etiam in alus sint, consequentia suustantiæ appellantur.Hæcenim omniasubstantias consequuntur, ut ubicunque fuerit substantia, ea quae dicta sunt inveniantur, id est in subjecto non esse, et praedicationes ab his univoce fieri, et quod hoc aliquid significet,et quod nihil sit illis contrarium,et quod non suscipiant magis et minus: illa vero quae non omnibus substantiis insunt accidentia sunt substantiis,quocirca propria non sunt.Quod si propria non sunt,nondum quale sit substantia demonstrant.Quare","english":"For these things can be changed by times, and be led into more and less; for it sometimes happens that a good is better and worse, and a hot thing is more fervent and more tepid. But a man, in that he is a substance, will not now be more a man than he was before, nor afterward will he be more or less a man than he is now. Wherefore, since substance does not admit of more and less, yet this will not be its property. But why it is not a property, Aristotle himself passed over in silence as though it were known; we, however, add that not only do substances not admit of more and less, but many other things as well. For a circle will not be more a circle or less than another circle, nor will a double be more a double or less; for four is equally a double in comparison to two, and ten in comparison to five. Wherefore, since this is the same also in other things, it must not be thought to be a property of substance. But all these things, whatever they are that are in all substances, are nevertheless not properties of substance, because they are also in other things; they are called consequences of substance. For these follow upon all substances, so that wherever a substance is, those things that have been said are found, namely, not to be in a subject, and that predications are made from them univocally, and that it signifies this something, and that nothing is contrary to it, and that they do not admit of more and less. But those things that are not in all substances are accidents of substances; wherefore they are not properties. But if they are not properties, they do not yet demonstrate of what sort substance is. Wherefore","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":101,"ref":"p101","source":"ut substantiae qualitatem proprie cognoscamus, talis est huic requirenda proprietas, quae et solis substantiis insit at omnibus,haec autem hujusmodi est, quam ipse proposuit.\n\nMaxime vero substantiae proprium esse videtur,cum unum et idem numero sit,contrariorum suscepUbilem esse, et in aliis qmdem non habebit quisquam quid proferat quæcunque non sunt substantiæ, quod cum sit unum numero,susceptibile contrariorum sit,velut color quod est unum et idem numerotnon erit album et nigrum, neque eadem actio et una numero erit prava et studiosa.Similiter autem et in aliis quae substantiæ non sunt.Substantia enim cum unum etidem numero sit, capax contrariorum est, ut aliquis homo eum unas et idem numero sit, aliquando quidem ntger, aliquando autem fit albus7et calidus et frig irius,et pravus et sludiosus.!n nullis autem aliis aliquid tale videMur, nisi quis forsitan instet,dicens orationem et opinionem contrurio, rum esse susceptibilia,eadem enim oratiovera et falsa esse videturtveluti si vera sit oratio sedere quemdam, surgente eO,illa eadem oralio fatsa erit,similiter au. tem et de opinatione. Si quis enim vere putat sedere aliquemtsurgenie eO,ille idem falsa putabit, eamdem haaens de eodem opinionem.","english":"But in order that we may properly recognize the quality of substance, such a property must be sought for it as belongs to substances alone and to all of them; and this is of the sort that he himself proposed.\n\nBut it seems to be most properly the property of substance that, while it is one and the same in number, it is capable of receiving contraries. And in other things, indeed, no one will have anything to bring forward—whatever things are not substances—to show that while it is one in number it is capable of contraries. For example, a color that is one and the same in number will not be both white and black, nor will the same action, one in number, be both base and honorable. And similarly also in other things that are not substances. For a substance, while it is one and the same in number, is capable of contraries, as some man, while he is one and the same in number, sometimes becomes black, sometimes white, and hot and cold, and base and honorable. But in no other things does anything of this sort appear, unless perhaps someone insists, saying that a speech and an opinion are capable of contraries; for the same speech seems to be both true and false—as, if the speech that someone is sitting is true, when he has stood up, that same speech will be false. And similarly also concerning opinion. For if someone truly thinks that someone is sitting, when he has stood up, that same person will think falsely, having the same opinion concerning the same thing.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":102,"ref":"p102","source":"Sed et si quis hoc suscipiat, tamen modo differt, nam ea quae in substantiis sunt,ipsa mutatasusceptibilia sunt contrariorum; fri* gidum enim de calido factum mutatum est,alteratum enim est,et nigrum ex alboyet studiosum ex pravo.Similiter autem et in aliis, unumquodque ipsorummutationem suscipiens,est susceptibile contrariorum.Ora.tio autem etopinio ipsa quidem immobilia omnino perseverant,cum vera res movetur,contrarium circa ea fit, oratio namque permanet eadem,sedere aliquem, cum vero res mota sit, aliquando quidem vera, aliquanda autem alsa fit, similiter autem et in opinione. Quapropter quo admodum saltem substantiæ proprium est, eo quod secundum mutationem suam captabilis est contrariorum, si quis recipiat placitum et orationem susceptibilia esse contrariorum.\n\nAitmaximepropriumessesubstantiae,quodeadem et una numero contrariorum susceptiva sit, nihil contrarium superioribus dicens. Illic enim dixerat substantias substantiis non essecontrarias,hic vero dicit non substantias substantiis esse contrarias,sed res in se contrarias posse suscipere, ut unus atque idemhomo,nuncquidem sit sanus,alio vero tempore sit æger,ægritudo autem et sanitas contraria sunt.","english":"But even if someone accepts this, it nevertheless differs only in this way: for the things that are in substances are themselves susceptible to changed contraries; for what has become cold from hot has been changed, for it has been altered, and black from white, and studious from wicked. Similarly also in other cases, each one of them, in undergoing change, is susceptible to contraries. But oratio and opinio themselves indeed remain altogether immovable, while the true state of affairs is moved, and a contrary comes about regarding them; for the oratio remains the same, that someone is sitting, but when the state of affairs has been moved, it becomes sometimes true, sometimes false; and similarly also in the case of opinio. Wherefore, in whatever way at least it is proper to substance, in that according to its own change it is capable of contraries, if one accepts the position that oratio and opinio are also susceptible to contraries.\n\nHe says that it is most proper to substance that the same and one in number is receptive of contraries, saying nothing contrary to the foregoing. For there he had said that substances are not contrary to substances; but here he says that it is not that substances are contrary to substances, but that things contrary in themselves can be received, as one and the same man is now indeed healthy, but at another time is sick, and sickness and health are contraries.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":103,"ref":"p103","source":"iam declaratum est suhslanLiam posse contraria suscipere,demonstrandum est quemadmodum hoc solis substantiis insit; hoc enim in nullis aliisinvenitur,namque in qualitate qualitas non erit eadem,neque una numero contrariorumsusceptiva, idem enim et unum numero non erit album atque nigrum,cum album fuerit etpost in nigrum vertitur, tota qualitatis species permutatur,et non erit unum atque idem numero quod contrarium est,sed diversum.","english":"It has now been declared that substance can receive contraries; it must be shown how this belongs to substances alone. For this is found in no other things. For in quality there will not be the same quality, nor will one in number be receptive of contraries. For the same and one in number will not be both white and black; when it has been white and afterwards is turned into black, the whole species of quality is changed, and it will not be one and the same in number that is contrary, but different.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":104,"ref":"p104","source":"At vero et actio eadem et una numero non erit bona atque mala,sed fortasse una bona, alia mala, ita ut diversae sint,non eaedem numero, hoc etiam in aliis reperitur.Ipsaverosubstantia cum una sit et numero singalaris,contraria suscipil,ut idem atque unus homo cum fuerit candidus atque albus a sole tactus nigrescit,et album in nigrum convertitur,et i in contrarium permutatur,utrasqueres in se contrarias suscipiens.NuIli igitur alii in esse hoc nisi solis substantiis,satis superiora demonstrant SiquisauteJ3 opponat orationem et opinionem unam atque eamdem contrariorum essesusceptibilem,ideo quod cum dico Cicero sedet,vel eum sedere opinor, cum vere sedet, vera est et oratio de eodem et opinio quod sedet; cum vera surrexit ille,eadem permanet opinio vel oratio quas dicit vel arbitratur Cicero sedet, sed falsa est, quod non sedet, videtur opinio atque oratio eadem et una numero nunc quidem esse vera, nunc autem falsa,et contraria ipsa auscipere,sed hoc falsumest,quodoratioetopiniocontrarianonrecipiunt: nam si quis hoc recipiatquod etiam oratioatqueopinio contrariorum susceptiva sint,non tamen eodem modo quo substantia.Nam substantia ipsa contraria suscipiens permutatur, Cicero namque ipse in se aegritudinem suscipiens ex sano factus est æger,et mutatus ipse contraria suscipit;sermo vero vel opinio ipsa quidem immutata permanent,sed cum rebus de quibus dicuntur permutatis ips£ e","english":"But neither will the same action, one in number, be both good and bad; but perhaps one is good, another bad, so that they are different, not the same in number. This too is found in other things. But substance itself, since it is one and singular in number, receives contraries, as the same and one man, when he has been bright and white, touched by the sun becomes black, and white is converted into black, and is changed into the contrary, receiving both contrary things in itself. Therefore that this belongs to no other things except substances alone, the foregoing arguments sufficiently demonstrate. But if anyone objects that speech and opinion, one and the same, are capable of contraries, for the reason that when I say \"Cicero sits,\" or I opine that he sits, when he truly sits, both the speech about the same thing and the opinion that he sits are true; when he has truly stood up, the same opinion or speech remains which states or judges that Cicero sits, but it is false, because he does not sit — it seems that opinion and speech, the same and one in number, are now true, now false, and that they themselves receive contraries. But this is false, that speech and opinion do not receive contraries; for if anyone accepts this, that speech and opinion are also capable of contraries, yet not in the same way as substance. For substance itself, receiving contraries, is changed; for Cicero himself, receiving sickness in himself, has been made sick from healthy, and being changed he himself receives contraries. But speech or opinion itself indeed remains unchanged, but with the things about which they are spoken being changed, they themselves","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":105,"ref":"p105","source":"inveniuntur falsae esse vel verae.Et substantia quidem ipsa cum iis quae suscipit contrariis permutatur; oratio vero et opinio, eo quod res de qui bus dicuntur vel arbitrantur permutentur, ipsa; videntur falsae esse vel verae. Nam cum dico Cicero sedet,si ille surrexit,oratio quidem ipsa nihil passa est,sed res de qua fuit ipsa oratio mota est.Qui enim sedebat surrexit, idcirco ex vera oratione facta est falsa.Quocircasubstantiaipsasuscipiens (ut dictum est) contraria permutatur,oratio vero vel opinio non mutatur,sed re circa eas mota ipsae veras vel falsae sunt.Quarepropriumsubstantiae ita esse putabitur contrariorum susceptibile,ut ipsa permutata contraria suscipiat, non ut, re mutata, ipsaimpermutataimmutabilisquepermaneat. Atque hoc dictum est, si quis orationem atque opinionem contrariorum susceptibiles putet, non autem esse orationem atque opinionem contrariorum susceptibiles. Ipse rursus adjecit.","english":"They are found to be false or true. And substance itself is indeed changed along with the contraries it receives; but speech and opinion, because the things of which they speak or judge are changed, themselves seem to be false or true. For when I say \"Cicero is sitting,\" if he has stood up, the speech itself has undergone nothing, but the thing about which the speech was made has been moved. For he who was sitting has stood up, and for that reason the speech has been made false from true. Wherefore substance itself, receiving contraries (as has been said), is changed, but speech or opinion is not changed; rather, with the thing concerning them moved, they themselves are true or false. Therefore it will be thought to be proper to substance thus to be capable of contraries, in such a way that, itself changed, it receives contraries, not in such a way that, with the thing changed, it itself remains unchanged and immutable. And this has been said, if anyone thinks speech and opinion capable of contraries, but that speech and opinion are not capable of contraries. He himself again added:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":106,"ref":"p106","source":"Non est autem hoc verum; oratio namque et opinio non in eo quod ipsa aliquid recipiant contrariorum susceptibilia esse dicuntur,sed in eo quod circa alterum aliqua passio facta sit; nam quo res est bel non est,eo etiam oratio vera aut falsa esse dicitur,non eo quod ipsa sit susceptibilis contrariorum.Simpliciter enim a nullo nec oratio mooeturfnec opinio. Quapropter non erunt susceptibilia contrariorum,cum nulla in eis contrariorum passio facta sit. At substantia eo quod ipsa contraria recipiat hoc susceptibilis dicitur contrariorum esse.Languorem enim et sanitatem suscipit,candorem et nigredinem,et unumquodque talium ipsa suscipiendo, coutrariorum esse susceptibilis dicitur. Quare proprium erit substantiæ,cum idem et unum sit numero,contrariorum esse susceptibilem cum permutatione sui ipsius. Ac de substantia quidem dicta sufficiant.","english":"But this is not true; for speech and opinion are not said to be susceptible of contraries in that they themselves receive something of contraries, but in that some affection has been produced around another thing; for by the fact that the thing is or is not, by that same fact speech is also said to be true or false, not by the fact that it is itself susceptible of contraries. For, simply speaking, neither speech nor opinion is moved by anything. Wherefore they will not be susceptible of contraries, since no affection of contraries has been produced in them. But substance, in that it itself receives contraries, is said to be susceptible of contraries. For it receives sickness and health, whiteness and blackness, and by receiving each such thing itself, it is said to be susceptible of contraries. Wherefore it will be proper to substance, when it is the same and one in number, to be susceptible of contraries with a change of itself. And concerning substance, indeed, let what has been said suffice.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":107,"ref":"p107","source":"Ait enim orationem atqueopinionem ipsoquidem contrarii nullius esse susceptibila, neque enim falsitas veritasque in oratione vel opinione insita est, sed ideirco videntur contrariorum esse susceptibilia,quod (utipse ait) circa alteram quamdam passionem sint, hocesL circa hoc esse opinionem vel orationem.Nam circa sedere et non sedere, quæ sunt contraria,est sedendi aliquem et non sedendi opinio vel oratio, atque ideo quoniam circa alias res sunt quae sibi sunt contrarias, illis permutatis, ista videntur esse contraria, non quod ipsa suscipiant contraria, sed quod circa contrarias passiones rerum sint.","english":"For he says that speech and opinion are not in themselves susceptible of any contrary, for neither falsity nor truth is situated in speech or opinion, but they seem to be susceptible of contraries because (as he himself says) they are concerned with some other affection, that is, opinion or speech is about this. For about sitting and not sitting, which are contraries, there is the opinion or speech of someone's sitting and not sitting, and therefore, since they are about other things which are contrary to each other, when those are changed, these seem to be contrary, not because they themselves receive contraries, but because they are concerned with contrary affections of things.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":108,"ref":"p108","source":"Nam neque oratio neque opinio permutatur,sed sola tantum de quibus est oratio atque opinio, id est sedere et non sedere.Quocirca quoniam nullam ipsa oratio vel opinio suscipiunt passionem, nec quidquam in eis fit,atque evenit contrarium, contrariorum esse susceptibilia non videntur.At substantia eo quod ipsa suscipiatcontrarium,contrariorum dicitur essesusceptibilis.Cicero enim suscipiens sanitatem sanus fit, et suscipiens ægritudinem fitæger.Oratiovero atque opinio(utdictumest)contrarianonsuscipiunt.Quare erit hoc proprium substantiae contrariorum esse susceptibilem.Sed si quis forsitan dicat cur cum ignis calidus,sit nunquam frigus suscipiat,et cur cum aqua sit humida nunquam suscipiat siccitatem.His enim oppositis,videtur non omnis substantia contrariorum esse susceptibilis,et substantiae hoc proprium infirmabitur,cum non sit in omnibus substantiis.Sed dicendum estquoniam ea contraria suscipere videntur substantiae quae sunt in ejus natura non insita,alioqui non suscipit quidquidillisubslantialiter adest. Suscipere enim dicimus aliquid de rebus extrinsecus positiset praetersubstantiam constitutis: quoniam igitur in substantia ignis in est calidum esse,ignis calorem non suscipit; quocirca neque est ignis caloris susceplibilis, neque frigoris.","english":"For neither speech nor opinion is changed, but only the things about which the speech or opinion is, that is, sitting and not sitting. Wherefore, since speech or opinion itself undergoes no affection, nor does any contrary come to be or happen in them, they do not seem to be susceptible of contraries. But substance, in that it itself receives a contrary, is said to be susceptible of contraries. For Cicero, receiving health, becomes healthy, and receiving sickness, becomes sick. But speech and opinion, as has been said, do not receive contraries. Wherefore this will be a property of substance: to be susceptible of contraries. But if perhaps someone should say: why, since fire is hot, does it never receive cold, and why, since water is wet, does it never receive dryness? For in these opposites, not every substance seems to be susceptible of contraries, and this property of substance will be weakened, since it is not in all substances. But it must be said that those substances seem to receive contraries which are not implanted in their nature; otherwise it does not receive whatever is substantially present to it. For we say that something receives things placed extrinsically and constituted beyond the substance. Since, therefore, being hot is in the substance of fire, fire does not receive heat; wherefore fire is not susceptible of heat, nor of cold.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":109,"ref":"p109","source":"Calorem quidem non suscipit,idcircoquodejusnaturae substantiæque immutabiliter adhaesit.Frigus enim non suscipit,quoniam caloris natura ipsius ignis contrarium sponte repudiat.Quocirca si quid est quod suscipiat ignis, id est extrinsecus positum,accipiat necesse est ejus quoque contrarium, ipse unus permanens ac singularis.Idem quoque de aqua dicendum est: ilIa enim sicut ignis calorem, sic non suscipit humiditatem, sed est quodammodo et ipsi humiditas naturaliter insita; atque ideo calor ignis, vel humiditas aquae non solum qualitates dicuntur,sed etiam substantales ignietaqueequalitates;namque aquaquoniam, in se neque fri\"us neque calorem substantialiter habet,susceptibilis et frigoris et caloris esse dicitur.Quocircauondehiscontraritsloquiturquaesubslantialiter insunt,sed his quae potest suscipere unaquaeque substantia, id est quod potest extrinsecus adhiberi: hoc autem in omnibus esse substantiis manifestumest:nam quoniam Cicero sanus et aeger est, homo sanusetæger est;et si homo sanus et aeger est,animalsanum atqueægrotum est.","english":"It does not receive heat, for this reason, because it adheres immutably to its own nature and substance. For it does not receive cold, since the nature of its own fire spontaneously rejects the contrary of heat. Wherefore, if there is anything that fire receives, that is, something placed externally, it must also receive its contrary, while it itself remains one and singular. The same must also be said of water: for just as fire does not receive heat, so it does not receive moisture, but moisture is in a certain way naturally implanted in it as well; and therefore the heat of fire, or the moisture of water, are called not only qualities but also substantial qualities of fire and water; for water, since it does not have cold or heat substantially in itself, is said to be susceptible of both cold and heat. Wherefore it is not about these contraries that are present substantially that it speaks, but about those which each substance can receive, that is, what can be applied externally. And this is manifest in all substances: for since Cicero is healthy and sick, man is healthy and sick; and if man is healthy and sick, animal is healthy and sick.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":110,"ref":"p110","source":"Sed cum duobus modis animalatquehomo spectentur, uno quod de pluribus prædicenlur,altero quodsubstantiæ sint, in eo quod de pluribus praedicantur contrariorum susceptiva non sunt: ut animal in eo quod de speciebus dicitur, neque sapiensest,nequeinsipiens,et homo in eo quod deindividuisdicitur,neque sanus est,neque æger;in eo veru quod substantiaesunt,et quod individuis substantiis praesunt,contrariorum susceptibileasunt.Quocircaerithocsolius proprium substantiæ, contrarium esse susceptibilem. Haec de substantia dicta sufficiant.Secundi vero voluminis series ab expositione inchoabitur quantitatis.\n\nLIBER SECUNDUS.\n\nEt si nos curae officii consularis impediunt quo: minus in his studiis omne otium plenamque operam consumimus pertineretamen videtur hoc ad aliquam reipublicæ,curam,elucubratæ rei doctrina cives instruere. Nec male de civibus meis merear, si cum prisca hominum virtus urbium caeterarum ad hanc unam rempublicam, dominationem, imperiumque transtulerit,ego id saltemquod reliquum est,Graecae sapientiae artibus mores nostræ civitatis instruxero. Quare ne hoc quidem ipsumconsulis vacat officio, cum Romani semper fuerit moris quod ubicunque gentium pulchrum esset atquelaudabile,id magis ac magis imitatione honestare.Aggrediar igituretpropositi sententiam operis ordinemque contexam.","english":"But since animal and man are considered in two ways, one in that they are predicated of many, the other in that they are substances, in that they are predicated of many they are not receptive of contraries: for animal, in that it is said of species, is neither wise nor foolish, and man, in that he is said of individuals, is neither healthy nor sick; but in that they are substances, and in that they preside over individual substances, they are receptive of contraries. Wherefore it will be the property of substance alone to be receptive of contraries. Let these things said about substance suffice. But the series of the second volume will begin from the exposition of quantity.\n\nBOOK TWO.\n\nAnd although the cares of the consular office hinder us from consuming all our leisure and full effort in these studies, it would nevertheless pertain to some care of the state to instruct citizens in a thoroughly elaborated doctrine. Nor would I deserve ill of my citizens if, when the ancient virtue of men has transferred the dominion and empire of the other cities to this one state, I should at least instruct the morals of our city in the arts of Greek wisdom, which is what remains. Wherefore not even this is foreign to the office of consul, since it has always been the Roman custom to honor more and more by imitation whatever is beautiful and praiseworthy among any peoples. I shall therefore undertake and weave together the meaning of the proposed work and its order.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":111,"ref":"p111","source":"DE QUANTITATE.\n\nQuantitatis autem,aliud quidem est discretum,aliud autem continuum,et aliud quidem ex habentibus positionem ad se invicem suis partibus constat:aliud autem ex non habentibus positionem.Est autem discreta quantitas, ut numerus et oratio. Continua uero, ut linea, supercifiesy corpus. Amplius autem et præter hæc est tempus et locus.Partim etenim numeri nullus est communis terminus, ad quem copulenturparticulæ ejus:ut quinque si adderem sunt particulæ,ad nullum communem terminumcopulantur quinque et quinque, sed semper discreta sunt et separata. Sic et tria et septem ad nullum communem terminum conjunguntur, omnino autem non habeas in numero accipere communem terminum partium, sed semper discretæ et separatæ sunt.Quapropter numerus quidem discretorum est, similiter autem et oratio discretorum est. Quod autem oratio quantitas sit manitestum est,menBuratur enim syllaba brevi et longa.Dico autem orationem cum voce factam, ad nullum enim, communem terminum particulae ejuscopulantur.Non enim est communis terminus ad quem syllabae copulentur, sed unaquæque divisa est, ipsa secundum seipsam.","english":"On Quantity.\n\nOf quantity, one kind is discrete, another continuous; and one kind consists of parts that have position relative to one another, another of parts that have no position. Discrete quantity is, for example, number and speech. Continuous, for example, line, surface, body. Further, besides these there is also time and place. For no part of a number has a common boundary at which its parts are joined: for if five are added, its parts are five and five, they are not joined at any common boundary, but are always discrete and separate. So too three and seven are not conjoined at any common boundary; and in no way can you find in number a common boundary of the parts, but they are always discrete and separate. Wherefore number is of discrete things, and similarly speech is of discrete things. That speech is a quantity is evident, for it is measured by a short and a long syllable. I mean speech made with the voice, for its parts are not joined at any common boundary. For there is no common boundary at which syllables are joined, but each one is divided, itself by itself.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":112,"ref":"p112","source":"Postsubstantiae tractatum cur de quantitate potius ac non de qualitateproposuerithaeccausa est, quod omnia quaecunque sunt,simul atquesunL in numerum cadunt. Omnis enim res aut est una, aut plures: unum vero velpluresquantitatis scientiacolliguntur. Sed non omnis res simul atque est aliquam accipit qualitatem,ipsa enim materia sub quantitatis quidem principium cadit, quod una est sub qualitatem vera minime;ipsa enim cunctis est interim qualitatibus absoluta, superaddita vero forma quadam afffcitur qualitate:per seautem numeroquidemunaest,qualitate vero nulla:quocirca si resomnis simulatque est cadit in numerum, non autem omnis res mox ut est statim suscipit qualitatem,recte prius de quantitateproposuit.Est quoque alia causa cur prius de quantitatis rationepertractet.Omneenim corpus ut sit, tribus dimensionibus constat,longitudine,latitudine, altitudine:ut vero sit corpus cum qualitate, tuncerit aut album,autnigrum,aut quodlibet aliud; et quoniam prius estessecorpus,postvero essecorpus album,priuseritcorporitribus constaredimensionibus quam esse album. Sed tres dimensiones et numero et continuatione spatii quantitates sunt.Longitudo enim et latitudoet altitudo in quantitatibus numerantur, album vero qualitatis est:quocirca si prius est ex tribus constare dimensionibus quam esse album,prior erit quantitas qualitate,quocirca recte est tractatus de quantitate propositus.","english":"After the treatise on substance, the reason he proposed to treat of quantity rather than of quality is this: that all things whatsoever, as soon as they exist, fall into number. For every thing is either one or many; and one or many are gathered under the science of quantity. But not every thing, as soon as it exists, receives some quality. For matter itself falls under the principle of quantity, in that it is one, but by no means falls under quality; for it is for the time being devoid of all qualities, and it is when form is superadded that it is affected by a certain quality. By itself, then, it is one in number, but in quality nothing. Wherefore, if every thing, as soon as it exists, falls into number, but not every thing, as soon as it exists, immediately receives quality, he was right to treat of quantity first. There is also another reason why he deals first with the account of quantity. For every body, in order to exist, consists of three dimensions: length, breadth, and height; but in order to be a body with quality, it will then be either white or black or any other such thing. And since it is prior to be a body, and later to be a white body, it will be prior for a body to consist of three dimensions than to be white. But the three dimensions are quantities both in number and in the continuity of space. For length and breadth and height are numbered among quantities, but white belongs to quality. Wherefore, if it is prior to consist of three dimensions than to be white, quantity will be prior to quality; and for that reason the treatise on quantity was rightly proposed.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":113,"ref":"p113","source":"Item alia causa,quod quantitas plura habetsubstantiaeconsimilia:nam quemadmodum substantiae nihilestcontrarium,et substantia non recipit magis etminus,sic etiamquantitas: quantitati enim nihil est contrarium,nec quantitas recipit magis et minus,utpaulo post docebimus;qualitasveroetcontrariasuscipit,ut album etnigrum,et magis et minus, ut candidiuset nigrius, et candidissimum et nigerrimum;id enim sumit intentionem quod potest sumere diminutionem.Quod si substantiae similior quantitas est,recte postsubstantiam de quantitate proposuit. Quantitatis autem dicit esse differentias duas: quantitatis namquealiadiscretaest disgregata, alia vero continua.Post hanc rursus divisionem alio modo partitus est quantitatem:dicit enim quantitatis aliam quae constat exhabentibuspositionemadse invicemsuis partibus;aliam vero ex non habentibus positionem. Unam vero rem diverse possedividimanifestumest, hoc modo,ut si quisdividat animaldicens: Animalium alia suntrationabilia,aliairrationabilia;etrursus eamdem ipsam rem alia modo partiamur,utest, Animalium alia sunt gressibilia,alia non gressibilia, eorumque animalium rursus,alia sunt carnibusvescentia, aliaherhis, alia seminibus.","english":"There is also another reason: that quantity has more points of resemblance to substance. For just as nothing is contrary to substance, and substance does not admit of more and less, so too quantity: for nothing is contrary to quantity, nor does quantity admit of more and less, as we shall teach a little later. But quality both admits of contraries, such as white and black, and of more and less, such as more white and more black, and most white and most black; for that takes on increase which can take on decrease. But if quantity is more like substance, he was right to treat of quantity after substance. Now he says that there are two differences of quantity: for of quantity one kind is discrete and disgregated, another is continuous. After this division, he again divided quantity in another way: for he says that of quantity one kind consists of parts that have position relative to one another, another of parts that do not have position. But that one and the same thing can be divided in different ways is evident, in this manner: as if someone divides animal, saying: of animals some are rational, others irrational; and again we divide the very same thing in another way, as: of animals some are capable of walking, others not capable of walking, and again of those animals, some eat flesh, others grass, others seeds.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":114,"ref":"p114","source":"Hic ergo una eademque res diversoordinemodoque divisaest.Ita igitur Aristoteles unum idemque quantitatis nomen diverse partitus est, in ea scilicet quaediscretaessent, et quae continua, et in ea quae haberent positionem partium,et quae non baberent.Sed de secunda divisione posterius dicendum est,nunc prima tractetur. Ait enim de prima divisione hoc modo:Quantitatis aliud estcontinuum,aliud disgregatum. Disgregatum est cujus partes nullo communi termino conjungunlur.Continuumverocujus parteshabent aliquem communem terminum,ad quem videanturesse conjunctæ. Discretarum namque quantitatum ipseexempla ponitetspecies.Oratio enim discreta est quantitas, eodemque modo et numerus,et numerum esse quantitatem nemodubitat.Discreta veroest,quoniamdenarius numerus cum constet ex quinque et quinque, quae res quinarium ad quinarium jungat ut. faciat denarii cerpus, non potest inveniri. Nam si tres et septem quis dixerit, quo communi termino tres et septem conjungantur, ut denarii reddatur unum integrum corpus,nullus inveniet,atque hoc quidem in omni numero speculari licet. Nullus enim numerus ita partes habet,uteas aliquiscommunis terminusjungat, sed semper partes ipsæ disjunctae atque discretae sunt, et hujusmodi vocatur quantitas discreta.Numerus ergo discreta quantitas est, orationem vero quantitatem esse dicit,idcirco quod omnisoratioex nomine constet et verbo,sed haec syllabis constant.","english":"Here, therefore, one and the same thing is divided in a different order and manner. Thus Aristotle divided the one and same name of quantity in different ways: namely, into those things that are discrete and those that are continuous, and into those that have position of parts and those that do not. But the second division must be discussed later; now let the first be treated. For he speaks of the first division in this way: of quantity, one kind is continuous, another is discrete. Discrete is that whose parts are joined by no common boundary. Continuous, however, is that whose parts have some common boundary, at which they appear to be joined. For of discrete quantities he himself gives examples and species. For speech is a discrete quantity, and in the same way number also, and no one doubts that number is a quantity. But it is discrete because, when the number ten consists of five and five, no means can be found by which the five is joined to the five so as to make the body of ten. For if someone says three and seven, no one will find by what common boundary three and seven are joined so that ten is rendered one whole body, and this indeed may be observed in every number. For no number has parts in such a way that some common boundary joins them, but always the parts themselves are disjoined and discrete, and a quantity of this kind is called discrete. Number, therefore, is a discrete quantity; but he says that speech is a quantity, for the reason that every speech consists of a noun and a verb, but these consist of syllables.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":115,"ref":"p115","source":"I Omnis autem syllaba vel longa vel brevis est. Longum vero vel breve sine ulla dubitatione quantitas est,quocirca quod ex quantitatibus constat, id quantitatem essequis dubitet?At vero oratio ipsa cum sit quantitas, ilia quoque discreta est. Cum enim dico Cicero,quod orationis est pars, partes hujus nominis ci et ce etro nullo communi termino conjunguntur. Nonenimreperiemusquocommuni terminojungatur ci syllaba ad ce syllabam, vel rursuscesyllaba ad ro syllabam. Quocirca etiam oratio quantitas videtur esse discreta.Sed si quis fortasse dicat hunc eorum esse communem terminum,quo itajunguntur,utaliquid significent,ut in hoc ipso nomine Cicero communis syllabarum terminus ipsa significatio sit.Si enim ce syllaba,quae media est,prima ponatur,etro, quae ultima est,media, et ci,quae prima est,ultima, nomen quoderatantea,idest Cicero, transversis per locasyllabis nihil significabit.Illi dicendum est quoniam quaecunque in quadam oratione proferuntur, sive significent, sive nihil significent, syllabarum communis terminus nullus est. Nam si quis dicat, permutatis syllabis,quod est Cicero,ceroci significationem quidem amisit,sed aequalitersyllabae ad nullum communem terminum conjunguntur. Quod si quis hunc quidem ipsum sermonem aliquid significare posuerit,uthoc ipsumCicero aliquid significat, significatioquidemadditaest,nullus tamen syllabis terminus appositus.","english":"Every syllable, however, is either long or short. But a long or short syllable is without any doubt a quantity; therefore, who would doubt that what is composed of quantities is a quantity? But indeed, since speech itself is a quantity, it too is discrete. For when I say \"Cicero,\" which is a part of speech, the parts of this name—\"ci\" and \"ce\" and \"ro\"—are joined by no common boundary. For we shall not find any point at which the syllable \"ci\" is joined to the syllable \"ce\" by a common boundary, or again the syllable \"ce\" to the syllable \"ro.\" Therefore speech also seems to be a discrete quantity. But if perhaps someone should say that this is their common boundary, by which they are so joined as to signify something—as in this very name \"Cicero\" the common boundary of the syllables is the signification itself—for if the syllable \"ce,\" which is in the middle, were placed first, and \"ro,\" which is last, in the middle, and \"ci,\" which is first, last, the name that existed before, that is \"Cicero,\" with its syllables transposed through the positions, will signify nothing. To him it must be said that whatever syllables are uttered in any speech, whether they signify or signify nothing, there is no common boundary of the syllables. For if someone should say that, with the syllables transposed, what is \"Cicero\" has become \"ceroci\" and has indeed lost its signification, nevertheless the syllables are equally joined to no common boundary. But if someone should posit that this very speech signifies something, as this very \"Cicero\" signifies something, the signification has indeed been added, yet no boundary has been applied to the syllables.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":116,"ref":"p116","source":"Quare sive significet, sive nihil significet nomen, partes ejus discretæ atque disjunctæ sunt,et nullo communiterminoconjunguntur;quoniam vero Graeca orationeXoYocdicituretiam animi cogitatio, et intra se ratiocinatio, quoque et oratiodicitur,nequisAristotelem cum diceret Xoyov, id est orationem,quantitatem esse discretam,de eo putaret dicere quem quisque,id estrationem, in propria cogitatione disponeret,boc addidi. Dico autem illam quæ fit cum voceorationem.Apud Ramanam namquelinguam discretasuntvocabulaorationis atque rationis. Graeca vero oratio utriusque vocabulum et rationis et orationis appellat. Quare ne quid mendax translatio culparetur,idcirco hoc quoque addidi:Dico veroillamquasfitcumvoce orationem, apud Latinos enim nulla alia oratio est praeterhancsolam quæ fitcum voce orationem.Apud Graecos vero est alius qui fit in animi cogitatione. Quocirca nequid deesset,etiam hoc quod Latinam orationem minusesset conveniens, transtuli. Quod quare ita fecerim, hac expositione patefeci, atque hæc quidem de discreta quantitate sufficiant. Continua vero quantitas est (ut dictum est) cujus quantitatis partium communis terminus invenitur, ut est linea, superficies, corpus, et præter hæc,tempus, et locus, quod ipse Aristoteles designat his verbis:","english":"Therefore, whether a name signifies something or signifies nothing, its parts are discrete and disjoined, and are not connected by any common boundary. But since in the Greek language logos means both the thought of the mind and reasoning within oneself, and also speech, lest anyone think that Aristotle, when he said logos, that is, speech, is a discrete quantity, was speaking about that which each person arranges in his own thought, that is, reason, I added this: \"But I mean that speech which is produced with the voice.\" For in the Roman tongue the words for speech and reason are distinct. But the Greek language calls both reason and speech by one term. Therefore, lest a misleading translation be blamed, for that reason I also added this: \"But I mean that speech which is produced with the voice.\" For among the Latins there is no other speech besides this one alone which is produced with the voice. But among the Greeks there is another which is produced in the thought of the mind. Wherefore, lest anything be lacking, I also translated this point, which was less suited to the Latin language. Why I did so, I have made clear in this exposition. And let these remarks about discrete quantity suffice. Continuous quantity, however, is (as has been said) that quantity whose parts are found to have a common boundary, as is a line, a surface, a body, and besides these, time and place, which Aristotle himself designates in these words:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":117,"ref":"p117","source":"Linea vero continuaest,est enimsumere communem terminum ad quem particulæ ejus copulantur, punctum,et superficiei, lineam, plani namque ad quemdam communem terminumparticulse copulantur.Similiter autem et in corpore poteris sumere communem terminum, lineam vel superficiem, ad quem copulantur corporis particulæ.\n\nPostquam de discretis explicuit, transiit ad species continuæ quantitatis. Continuae autem quantitates sunt. (ut dictum est in quarum partibus quidam communis est terminus,ut linea.Si quis enim dividat lineam, quae est longitudo sinelatitudine, duas in utraque divisione lineas facit,et utriusque ex divisione lineae singula in extremitatibus puncta redduntur.Lineæ enimterminipunctasunt.Quocirca cum ilia linea divisa non esset, utraque puncta quæ inutrisquelinearum capitibus post divisionem appareut, simul antea fuisse intelliguntur,quae sunt in divisione separata. Intelligitur ergo partium lineae communis terminus,punctum,id est quoddam parvissimum quod in partes dividi secarique non possit: Superficies quoque, quæ est latitudo sie altitudine, communem terminum habet in partibus, lineam, corpus verosolidum,spuerficiem.Eodemenim modo divisa superficies duas per singulas partes lineas efficiet,quemadmodum et in lineadivisaduopuncta altrinsecus reddebantur.","english":"A line, however, is continuous, for it is possible to take a common boundary at which its parts are joined, namely a point; and for a surface, a line; for a plane, likewise, the parts are joined at a certain common boundary. Similarly, in the case of a body too, you will be able to take a common boundary, a line or a surface, at which the parts of the body are joined.\n\nAfter he explained discrete quantity, he passed on to the species of continuous quantity. Continuous quantities are those in whose parts there is a certain common boundary, as has been said, for example a line. For if anyone divides a line, which is length without breadth, he makes two lines in each division, and from the division of the line single points are produced at the extremities of each. For the boundaries of a line are points. Therefore, when that line had not been divided, both points which appear at the ends of each line after the division are understood to have existed together beforehand, and these are separated in the division. Therefore the common boundary of the parts of a line is understood to be a point, that is, a certain very small thing which cannot be divided and cut into parts. A surface also, which is breadth without height, has as its common boundary in its parts a line; and a solid body, a surface. For in the same way a divided surface will produce two lines through each of its parts, just as in a divided line two points were also produced on either side.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":118,"ref":"p118","source":"Corpus quoque solidum cum diviseris,duas in utrisque divLsioriis partibus superficies facies, quae cumconjunctasint atque indivisa, punctum quidem partium lineae intelligitur communis terminus. Linea vero superficiei,superfi. cies autem solidi corporis.Est autem signum continui corporis, si una pars mota sit, totum corpus n]overi;et si totumcorpus movetur,certe simulaliae partes vicinae movebuntur,ut sijaceat virgula vel ex aere, vel ex ligno,vel ex quolibet alio metallo, si quis unumejuscaputvelquamlibet ejus partem moveat, tota mox virgula commovetur. Hoc autem idcirco evenit quod ejus partes quodam communi termino conjunguntur, et ille communis terminus una parte mota cæteras movet. Hoc vero in discretis non est. In numero namque cum sint decem, si unum movero, caeteri non moventur,immoti enim permanent novem; et si plenustriticositmodius, si unum tritici granum movero,non omnia continuo grana commovebuntur, idcirco quod discreta est multitudo, nec granum grano ullo communi terminovidetur implicitum. At vero si ipsius grani pars una sit mota, totum corpus grani moveatur necesse est. Non autem nunc hoc dicitur, quod linea constet ex punctis, aut superficies ex lineis, aut solidum corpus ex superficiebus, sed quod et lineae termini puncta sunt, et superficiei lineee,etsolidi corporis superficies,nullaque res suis terminis constat.","english":"When you divide a solid body as well, you will make two surfaces in the two divided parts; and when these are joined and undivided, a point is understood as the common boundary of the parts of a line, a line of a surface, and a surface of a solid body. Now it is a mark of a continuous body that if one part is moved, the whole body is moved; and if the whole body is moved, certainly the other neighboring parts will be moved at the same time. For example, if a rod lies before us, whether of bronze or of wood or of any other metal, if someone moves one of its ends or any part of it, the whole rod is presently set in motion. This happens for the reason that its parts are joined by a certain common boundary, and that common boundary, when one part is moved, moves the rest. But this is not the case in discrete things. For in a number, when there are ten, if I move one, the rest are not moved; for the nine remain unmoved. And if a measure is full of wheat, if I move one grain of wheat, not all the grains will be immediately moved, for the reason that the multitude is discrete, nor does one grain appear to be entangled with another grain by any common boundary. But if one part of the grain itself is moved, the whole body of the grain must be moved. However, it is not being said here that a line consists of points, or a surface of lines, or a solid body of surfaces, but that the boundaries of a line are points, of a surface lines, and of a solid body surfaces, and no thing consists of its boundaries.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":119,"ref":"p119","source":"Quocirca punctum Iineae non erit pars, sed communis terminus partium. Superficiei linea, et superficies solidi corporis non erunt partes, sed partium termini communes. Constatigitur, et lineam et superficiem, et solidi corporis crassitudinem essecontinuam quantitatem. His alia rursus apponit.\n\nTalium est autem et tempus et locus, praesens enim tempus et præteritum et futurum copulat. Rursus locus continuorum est, locum euim quemdam corporis particulse obtinent,quæ ad quemdam communem terminum copulantur, igitur et loci particulæ quæ obfinent singulas corporis partes, ad eumdem terminum copulantur,ad quem corporisparticulge.Quapropter continuus erit locus. Ad unum enim terminum communemcopulantur ejus particulæ.\n\nTempus quoque et locum continuae quantitatis esse pronuntiat. Tempus namque esse quantitatem resillademonstrat, quod in spatio, id est in longitudine et in brevitate,consideratur.Conlinuum vero esse res illa demonstrat quod partes temporis habeant aliquem communem terminum ac medium,ad quem conjungantur extrema. Nam cum sint partes temporis praeteritum et futurum, horum præsens tempus communis est terminus, hujus namque finis esl, illius initium. Locus quoque continuorum est.","english":"Wherefore a point will not be a part of a line, but the common boundary of the parts. A line is the boundary of a surface, and a surface of a solid body, not parts, but the common boundaries of parts. It is established, therefore, that both a line and a surface and the thickness of a solid body are continuous quantity. To these he again adds other things.\n\nOf this kind also are time and place; for the present time joins together both the past and the future. Again, place is of continuous things, for the particles of a body occupy a certain place, which are joined together at a certain common boundary; therefore the particles of place also, which occupy the individual parts of a body, are joined together at the same boundary at which the particles of the body are joined. Wherefore place will be continuous. For its particles are joined together at one common boundary.\n\nHe also declares that time and place are of continuous quantity. For he demonstrates that time is quantity from the fact that it is considered in extension, that is, in length and in brevity. But that it is continuous, that fact demonstrates it, because the parts of time have some common boundary and middle, to which the extremes are joined. For since the parts of time are the past and the future, the present time is the common boundary of these; for it is the end of the one and the beginning of the other. Place also is of continuous things.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":120,"ref":"p120","source":"Locum vero dicimus quodcunque illud sit quod partes corporis tenet, sive supra, sive a latere, seu subter sit.Quod si cunctae partes corporis locum aliquem tenent, et qui circa corpus est locus, per omne corporis spatium partesque diffunditur,omnes corporis partes a loci partibus occupabuntur. Quod si ita est, qui communis terminus conjungebat corporis partes, ejus termini locus ilia quoqueloca quaesunt corporis partium jungit, et esteodem modo locus de continua quantitate, quemadmodum etcorpus.Ita enim communis terminus invenitur in loco partium quemadmodum et corporis, idcirco quod corporis locus, per corpus omne diffunditur.Quod autem dixit: cunt autem taliumet locus ettempus, quoniam superius de continuis loquebatur, tempus quoque et locum continuis addidit dicens: Sunt autem talium et tempus etlocus, id est continuorum, sed post continuae discretrequequantitatisdivisionem aliam a principio rursus orditur.","english":"We say that place is whatever holds the parts of a body, whether it be above, to the side, or beneath. But if all the parts of a body hold some place, and the place that is around the body is diffused through the whole extent and parts of the body, then all the parts of the body will be occupied by the parts of the place. And if this is so, the common boundary that joined the parts of the body—the place of that boundary also joins those places wherever they are of the parts of the body, and place is in the same way from continuous quantity as the body is. For the common boundary is found in the place of the parts just as it is in the body, for the reason that the place of the body is diffused through the whole body. But what he said: \"of such things there is both place and time,\" since above he was speaking of continuous things, he also added time and place to continuous things, saying: \"Of such things there are both time and place,\" that is, of continuous things, but after the division of continuous and discrete quantity he begins again another division from the beginning.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":121,"ref":"p121","source":"Amplius autem aliae. quidem constant ex particulis quæ in eis sunt, positionem ad se invicem habentibus, aliæ autem ex non habentibus positionem, ut lineæ quidem parliculæ positionem habent ad se invicem. Singulum enim eorum situm est ulicubi,et habes unde sumas et assignes unumquodque ubi situm est in plano, et ad qnam particulamreliquarumcoputatur: srmiliter autem et particulæ plani habent quamdam positionem, simititernamqucunumquodque ostenditur ubijacet, et quæ ad se invicem copulentur, solidi quoque et loci si. militer.\n\nRursus digerit quantitatis differentias. Sunt enim quantitatis aliae quidem quae ex habentibus positionem ad se invicem suis partibus constant, aliæ vero quae nullam partium habent positionem.Positionem vero partium retinere dicuntur, quarum triplex ista natura est. primum ut ejus partes ałicubisint, deinde ne pereant, tertio veroutsese partes ipsæ conjungant et propria se ordinatione continuent, ut est linea. Posita enim lineain superficie possis agnoscere ubi partesipsius sint,caputquidem lineae esse ac dexteram,medium medio loco,extremitatem vero ad sinistram,et hæc manentibus ipsis partibus dicuntur, partes enim lineæ non pereunt, sed in loco in quo sunt permanent.","english":"Further, some [quantities] consist of the particles within them having a position relative to one another, while others consist of those not having position, as the particles of a line have a position relative to one another. For each of them is situated somewhere, and you have the means to take and assign where each is situated on a plane, and to which of the remaining particles it is reckoned; similarly also the particles of a plane have a certain position, and likewise each is shown where it lies and which are joined to one another, and similarly for a solid and for place.\n\nAgain he sets out the differences of quantity. For some quantities are those that consist of their parts having a position relative to one another, while others have no position of their parts. Those are said to retain a position of parts whose nature is this threefold: first, that its parts be somewhere; second, that they not perish; third, that the parts themselves be joined together in order and continue in their proper arrangement, as is the case with a line. For once a line is placed on a surface, you can recognize where its parts are: the head and right of the line, the middle in the middle place, and the extremity at the left; and these things are said while the parts themselves remain, for the parts of a line do not perish but remain in the place in which they are.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":122,"ref":"p122","source":"Possis quoque monstrare quiB pars lineæ cui parti continuentur,id est ad quam partem caput alterius partis extremitasque conjungitur, ut dicas haec pars, verbi gratia medietas,lineaehic finitur, locum ubi desinat monstrans, alia rursus pars lineae totius hic incipit. Ergo linea posita in superficie qualibet et locum aliquem partes ejus retinent, et partes ipsas non pereunt,etposset quilibetagnoscere ubi extremitas partium conjungatur, et quo ad se invicem loco continuentur. Hoc quoque idem in superficieevenit,partesenim superficiei inaliquo loco sunt, et ipsae quoque non pereunt, et ubi pars parti' conjungatur ostenditur,idem quoque soliditas habet, et loci quoque partes continuantur ad eas scilicet partes ad quas corporis partes sibimetcontinuantur, sicut jam supra dictum est. Quocirca ejusdem naturae erit et locus, cujus tota soliditas erit. Ergo et locus ex eodem genere quantitatis est, quo est et soliditas, id est ex habentibus ad se invicem positinnem suis partibus constans. Locus igitur et ipse ex habentibus suis partibus positionem ad se invicem constat.","english":"You could also show which part of a line is continuous with which part, that is, to which part the head and the extremity of another part is joined, so that you may say: this part, for example the middle of the line, ends here, pointing out the place where it stops, and again another part of the whole line begins here. Therefore a line placed on any surface both has its parts retaining some location, and the parts themselves do not perish, and anyone could recognize where the extremity of the parts is joined, and in what location they are continuous with one another. The same also occurs in a surface; for the parts of a surface are in some location, and they themselves also do not perish, and where a part is joined to a part is shown. Solidity has the same as well, and the parts of a place too are continuous with those parts with which the parts of a body are continuous with one another, just as has already been said above. Wherefore a place will be of the same nature as that whose whole solidity it is. Therefore a place too is of the same genus of quantity as solidity is, that is, consisting of things whose parts have a position relative to one another. A place, therefore, itself also consists of its parts having a position relative to one another.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":123,"ref":"p123","source":"Ergo tria haec(sicut supra dictum est) consideranda sunt, ut ad se invicem positionem partes habere videantur, id est locum in quo partes ipsae sint positae, ut partes illae non pereant, ut sit partium continentia atque continuatio.Quod si quis dicat hanc rem loco deesse, eo quod iri loco non sit, in loco enim cunctasunt, locus autem in loco esse ipse non poterit.Dicendum est quoniam idcirco superficies et soliditas et linea habere positionem partium dicuntur, quod in loco sint, et pa.rtespermaneant,etsint continuæ. Quare multo magis ipse locus, cujus neque partes pereunt,et sibi perpetue continuatimqueconjunctae sunt, habere positionem partium dicitur. Et de his quidem quæ ex habentibus positionem ad se invicem suis partibus constant haec dicta sint; quas vero non habent positionem ipse rursus adjecit.\n\nIn numero autem non poterit quisquam ostendere quemadmodum particulæ ejus positionemaliquam ad se inuicem habeant,aut ubisitæ sint, aut qum particulæ ejus ad se invicem nectantur. Sed neque illæ quæ temporis sunt,non enim permanent particulæ temporis, quod autem non est permanens,quomodo positionem aliquam habebit, sed magis quemdam ordinem particularum tempus habere dzces,ut aliquid quidem prius sit temporis,aliud vero posterius.","english":"Therefore these three things, as was said above, must be considered, so that the parts seem to have position in relation to one another: namely the place in which the parts themselves are situated, that those parts do not perish, and that there be a containing and continuity of the parts. But if anyone should say that this matter is lacking in place, because it is not in a place — for all things are in a place, but place itself cannot be in a place — it must be said that for this reason surface, solidity, and line are said to have position of their parts, because they are in a place, and their parts remain and are continuous. Wherefore much more is place itself said to have position of its parts, since its parts neither perish and are perpetually and continuously joined to one another. And concerning those things which consist of parts having position in relation to one another, let these things be said; but those which do not have position, he in turn adds.\n\nIn number, however, no one could show how its parts have any position in relation to one another, or where they are, or how its parts are linked to one another. But neither do those which belong to time; for the parts of time do not remain, and what does not remain, how will it have any position? But rather you will say that time has a certain order of its parts, so that one part of time is prior and another posterior.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":124,"ref":"p124","source":"Sed et de numero similiter, eo quod priusnumeratur uuum quam duo,et duo quam tria, et ita habebunt quidem quemdam ordinem, positionem vero non multum accipies.Sed et oratio similiter,non enim permanent parliculæ ejus, sed et dictum est et non amplius sumi hoc, quapropter non erit positioparticutarum ejus,siquidem nihil permanent. Alia itaque constant ex particulis quæ in cissuntpositionem adse invicem habentibus,atia autem ex nonhabentibus positionem.\n\nHaec scilicet idcirco nullam positionem ad se invicem partium retinent,quod his aliquid de supradiclis rebus deesse manifestum est. Numerus enim ipse discretus est,nec partes ejus ad se invicem conjuni guntur,sed omnino discretsesunt.Atque idcirco non est ex iis quæ habent ad se invicem aliquam partium positionem,nec vero possisostendere qui numerus quo loco jaceat: habere autem positionem dicitur, quod(ut dictum est) et in loco aliquo positum est, et ipsa positio manentibus partibus constat,etad se invicem conjunctiscontinuatisque, ut ubiqusequejaceat, et quae ad quam continuetur possit ostendi; in numero vero nihil horum est. Nam neque in aliquo loco esse positus demonstratur,nec ejus partes conjunctae sunt.Quocirca numero ex tribus his quae diximus dua?","english":"But also concerning number similarly, because one is counted before two, and two before three, and so they will indeed have a certain order, but you will not much find position. But also speech similarly, for its parts do not remain, but it is both spoken and no longer taken up, wherefore there will be no position of its parts, since nothing remains. Some things, therefore, consist of parts that have position in relation to one another, others of parts that do not have position.\n\nThese, of course, for this reason retain no position of parts in relation to one another, because it is manifest that something from the things said above is lacking in them. For number itself is discrete, nor are its parts joined to one another, but are altogether discrete. And for this reason it is not among those things that have some position of parts in relation to one another, nor indeed could you point out which number lies in what place. But to have position is said of that which (as was said) is both placed in some location, and the position itself consists in parts that remain and are joined and continuous with one another, so that where each lies, and which is continuous with which, can be pointed out. In number, however, none of these things is present. For neither is it shown to be placed in any location, nor are its parts joined. Wherefore, from these three things that we have said, two?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":125,"ref":"p125","source":"res desunt, loci positio et partium continuatio, tempus etiam quanquam sint ejus partes continuse,tamen quoniam non permanent, sed semper moventur, semperque prætereunt,habere positionem partium non dicitur.Semper enim veloci agitatione torquetur, et currentis aquæ more in nulla unquam statione consistit,quodquiapartes ejus non permanent,ex habentibus ad se invicem positionem suis partibus constare non dicitur.Sed hoec quanquam positionem partium habere non possunt,tamen habent ordinem quemdam, quem praeter positionem partium tantum retinent.Dicim us enim priorem esse binarium quamternarium,atque hunc quam quaternarium,etintemporenimirumidem ordo revertitur. Posterius enim futurum præsente, præsensque praeterito.","english":"But these things lack place, the position of a place and the continuity of parts; time also, although its parts are continuous, nevertheless, since they do not remain but are always moving and always passing away, is not said to have position of parts. For it is always whirled about with swift agitation, and in the manner of running water it never stands still in any station; and because its parts do not remain, it is not said to consist of parts that have position in relation to one another. But these things, although they cannot have position of parts, nevertheless have a certain order, which they retain apart from the position of parts. For we say that two is prior to three, and this to four, and in time likewise the same order returns. For the future is posterior to the present, and the present to the past.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":126,"ref":"p126","source":"Quocirca etsi hæc non habent aliquam partium positionem,retinent tamen ordinem.Quodvero dicit, positionem vero non multo accipies, tales est ac si diceret,penitus non accipias.Multum enim pro omnino videturadjunotum,ac si diceret positionem vero non omnino accipies,idcirco quod ipsaquidem continuatio dat aliquam imaginem, quod possit habere aliquam partium positionem, sed hoc minime est,idcirco quod quamvis sint continuae quantitates, si tamen uno careant ex his quae superius dicta sunt, positionem partium habere non possunt.Nam aqua quam fistula evomit, dum cadit quidem retinetpositionem; cum vero jam effusae undae se miscuerit, positionem partium perdit: etfluvius quoque quando in pelagus fluit,et positionem videtur haberepartium et esse continuus, cum nondum marinas aquae fluvii superficies ipsa permistaest; cum vero extremitas amnis marina alluvione contingitur,totam sine dubio positionem videtur amittere.Oratio quoque similiter sese habet; nam nec ipsa ullo loco posita est, nec ejus partes ad aliquam conjunguntur, sed a se invicem illae discretse sunt, nec cum ejus partes dictae sunt, permanent,atque hoc est quod ait.Sed dictum est, et non est ultra boc sumi. Mox enim dicitur sermo, mox præterit, nec ulla ratione poterit permanere,quare mox ut aliquid dictum sit, ejus partes ostendi et demonstratione sumi non possunt.","english":"Wherefore, even if these things do not have any position of parts, they nevertheless retain order. But what he says, \"but you will not take position in many respects,\" is as if he were to say, \"you will not take it at all.\" For \"much\" seems to be added for \"altogether,\" as if he were to say, \"but you will not take position altogether,\" for the reason that continuity itself gives some image that it can have some position of parts, but this is by no means the case, for the reason that although they are continuous quantities, if they nevertheless lack one of those things which were said above, they cannot have position of parts. For the water which a pipe spews out, while it falls indeed retains position; but when it has already mingled with the poured waves, it loses the position of its parts. And a river too, when it flows into the sea, seems both to have position of parts and to be continuous, while the surface of the river is not yet mingled with the sea's waters; but when the extremity of the stream is touched by the sea's influx, it seems without doubt to lose all position. A sentence likewise behaves in the same way; for it is itself placed in no location, nor are its parts joined to any place, but those parts are separated from one another, nor when its parts have been spoken do they remain, and this is what he says: \"But it has been said, and it is not possible to take it further.\" For as soon as a word is spoken, it immediately passes away, nor can it remain by any principle; wherefore as soon as something has been said, its parts cannot be shown and taken by demonstration.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":127,"ref":"p127","source":"Constat igitur orationem quoque ex his esse quae positionem partium non habent,de ordine vero dubium est. Nam si quis sermo aliquid significet, ut est Cicero, est in eo quidam ordo quod ci syllaba primum dicitur,secunda vero ce, tertia ro, et potius ex significatione ordinem sumit; si vero nihil significet,nec ordinem dicitur habere,ut scindapsus nihil quidem significat; sed sive secundam syllabam primam ponas, sive ultimam primam, sive quomodolibet sylla. barum ordinemseriemquepermisceas,idemerit: in significativis enim vocibus idcirco esse dicitur,quod illo ordine permutato vis significationis evertitur, hic vero, ubi nulla est significatio, nihil interest quomodolibet jaceant partes. Quare oratio in aliquibus quidem habet ordinem partium,in aliis vero nec ordo ipse poterit inveniri. An fortasseoratio dici non potest quae nihil significat, et nulla est oratio, quae ordinem non babeat?Ergo secundumpriorem quantitatis divisionem,ubi dicebatur quantitatis alia esse continua,aliavero discreta, quinque sunt continua, duo vero discreta. Continua quidem linea, superficies,soliditas, locus, tempus. Discreta vero numerus et oratio.","english":"It is therefore established that speech also consists of things that do not have a position of parts, but concerning order it is doubtful. For if some speech signifies something, as \"Cicero\" does, there is in it a certain order, in that the syllable \"ci\" is spoken first, \"ce\" second, and \"ro\" third, and it rather takes its order from the signification. But if it signifies nothing, it is said to have no order either, as \"scindapsus\" signifies nothing; but whether you put the second syllable first, or the last first, or in whatever way you confound the order and sequence of the syllables, it will be the same. For in significant utterances it is said to be for this reason, that when that order is changed the force of the signification is overturned; but here, where there is no signification, it makes no difference in whatever way the parts lie. Wherefore speech in some cases has an order of parts, in others no order at all can be found. Or perhaps that which signifies nothing cannot be called speech, and there is no speech that does not have order? Therefore, according to the earlier division of quantity, where it was said that of quantity some is continuous and some discrete, there are five continuous and two discrete. Continuous: line, surface, solid, place, time. Discrete: number and speech.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":128,"ref":"p128","source":"In hac vero secunda divisione qua dicit alias quantitates ex habentibus ad se invicem positionem constarepartibus,quatuorquidem sunt quæ retinent positionem,id est linea, superficies, corpus, locus; tria vero quae positionem non habent, sed ex his duo semper ordinem retinent, tempus scilicet et numerus. Oratio vero si quid significet, habet ordinem; si vero nihil significet,inordinataest; si tamen oratio nihil significane dici possit, his dictis ipse concludit dicens: Igitur alia ex habentibus ad se invicem partibus positionem constant, alia vero ex non habentibus positionem. Hac igitur divisione finita transit ad cætera monstrans quae proprie quantitates nuncupatur quae secundum accidens.\n\nPropriæ autem quantitates hæ solae dicuntur quas diximus,alia vero omnia secundum accidens, ad hæc enim aspicientes et alia dicimus quantitates,ut multum dicitur album, eo quod superficies multa sil, et actio longa, eo quod tempus multum sit, et motus multas,neque enim horum singulum per se quantum dicitur, ut si quis assignet quanta sit aliqua actio, tempore di(finiet,anni mensuram uel sic aliquo modo assignans.Et album quantum sit assignans, superficie diffiniet.Quantum enim superficies fuerit, tantum esse album dicet. Quare solæ propriæ et secundum seipsas quantitates dicuntur quæ dictæ sunt,aliorum vero nihil per se, sed per accidens.","english":"In this second division, however, by which he says that some quantities consist of parts having a position relative to one another, there are four that retain position, namely line, surface, body, and place; but three that do not have position, yet of these two always retain order, namely time and number. But speech, if it signifies something, has order; if it signifies nothing, it is without order. If, however, speech that signifies nothing can be said, having stated these things he himself concludes, saying: Therefore some consist of parts having a position relative to one another, while others consist of parts not having position. With this division finished, he passes to the rest, showing which things are properly called quantities and which are quantities according to accident.\n\nBut those alone are called proper quantities which we have mentioned; all others, however, are quantities according to accident. For it is with regard to these that we also call other things quantities, as white is said to be much because the surface is much, and an action is long because the time is much, and motion is much; for none of these is said to be a quantity in itself, as if someone were to assign how great some action is, he will define it by time, assigning the measure of a year or in some such way. And in assigning how great white is, he will define it by surface. For he will say that white is as great as the surface is. Wherefore only those things that have been mentioned are called proper and in themselves quantities, but none of the others is a quantity in itself, but only according to accident.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":129,"ref":"p129","source":"Principaliter aliquid esse dicitur,quod persetale est quale esse demonstratur. Secundam accidens vero illud quod non per se, sed per aliud tale est quale esse dicitur,ut albedini per se inest color:secundum naturam enim aIm. color esse dicitur albedo;cum vero homo dicitur coloratus, non per se dicitur,idcirco quod homo in eo quod homo est,culor non est, sed quoniam habet colorem, idcirco dicitur coloratus. Ergo quemadmodum album idcirco color est per se quoniam color naturale quoddam est genus,homo vero idcirco coloratus dicitur quoniam habet colorem; et dicitur album quidem per se et principaliter color,homo vero secundum accidens coloratus. Ita quoque et quantitates; hæc enim omnia quae dicta sunt, id est linea, superficies, corpus, numerus, oratio, tempus, per seet secundum etpropriam naturam quantitatesdi- I cuntur.","english":"Something is said to be primarily because it is such per se, as is demonstrated. But a secondary accident is that which is such not per se but through another, as color belongs per se to whiteness; for by nature whiteness is said to be color. But when a man is said to be colored, he is not said to be so per se, because color is not in man insofar as he is man, but because he has color, he is therefore said to be colored. Therefore, just as white is color per se because color is a certain natural genus, but a man is said to be colored because he has color; and white is said to be color per se and primarily, but a man is colored according to accident. So too with quantities; for all these things that have been mentioned, that is, line, surface, body, number, speech, time, are said to be quantities per se and according to their own proper nature.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":130,"ref":"p130","source":"Si qua vero alia dicuntur secundum aliquam quantitatem, non per se,aed secundum accidens nominantur:ut album dicitur multum,non idcirco quod albedo sit quantitas,sed quoniam multa sit superficies,in quo illud albumsit.Si enim multum spatium fuerit in quo album sit, multum erit album; quocirca non quoniam ipsa albedo per se aliquam quantitatem habet,sed quoniam in aliqua quantitate est constituta,id est in superficie,idcirco secundum superficiem quod estquantitas quae scilicet per se multa est,album multum dicitur,non secundum se,atque ideo album non per se,nec principaliter, sed secundum accidens multum dicitur. Actio quoque ideo dicitur longa, quod multo tempore acta sit;multam vero ægritudinem idcirco di-. cimus,si eadem multo sit tempore;et motum multum idcirco, quod multo tempore factus sit, ut si quis multo tempore currat. Si quis vero multum cursum illum dicat esse qui sit velocissimus, ille convenienter sermone non utitur. Velocitas enim non quantitas, sed potius qualitas est,quales enim secundum eam dicimur,id est veloces, non quanti.","english":"If, however, any other things are said according to some quantity, they are named not per se but according to accident: as white is said to be much, not for the reason that whiteness is a quantity, but because the surface in which that white is is much. For if there is a large space in which white is, the white will be much; wherefore not because whiteness itself has some quantity per se, but because it is established in some quantity, that is, in a surface, for that reason according to the surface—which is a quantity that is of course per se much—white is said to be much, not according to itself, and therefore white is said to be much not per se nor primarily, but according to accident. Action also is for that reason said to be long, because it has been done in much time; but we say an illness is much for the reason that the same illness is of much time; and a motion is much for the reason that it has been made in much time, as if someone runs for much time. If, however, someone says that that running is much which is very swift, he does not use the expression appropriately. For swiftness is not a quantity, but rather a quality; for according to it we are said to be of such a sort, that is, swift, not of how much.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":131,"ref":"p131","source":"Secundum quantitatem vero multum dicitur, hoc autem monstrat ipsa rerum diffinitio; si quis enim album multum monstrare desideret,et proprio termino rationis includere, illi dicendum est multum esse album quod in multa jaceat superficie,et molum atque actionem multam quæ longo tempore perficiaturjquare quoniamad proprias quantitatesaspicientes, atque ad eas res cæteras referentes, quantitates vocamus,ut album ad superficiem qua; vera esi quantitas,et cursum, et aliquem motum atque actionem ad tempus, quod ipsum vere quantitas est reducimus, hæc non per se quantitates, sed per eas quae proprie quantitates dictæ sunt nominantur. Quocirca quoniam quod per se non est, secundum accidens est,recte caetera omnia praeter ea quae superius in quantitate numerata sunt per accidens esse, non per se quantitates dicuntur. Solas igitur proprie et secundum se ipsae quantitates dicuntur. hse quae superius comprehensæ sunt.Alias vero per se quantitas non sunt, sed (ut ipse ait) forte per accidens. Post divisionem igitur continui atque discreti et habentis positionem partium et non habentis,et quae sunt per se principaliter, et rursus per accidens quantitates, solito more viam inveniendi quantitatum proprietas ingreditur.","english":"According to quantity, however, \"much\" is said, and the definition of the thing itself shows this. For if anyone wishes to show that something white is much and to include it within the proper boundary of its meaning, it must be said that white is much which lies upon a large surface, and much motion and action which is completed over a long time. Therefore, since we call quantities by looking to their proper quantities and referring other things to these, as we reduce white to surface, which is truly a quantity, and running and some motion and action to time, which itself is truly a quantity, these are not quantities per se, but are named through those things which are properly called quantities. Wherefore, since what is not per se is according to accident, rightly all other things besides those which were enumerated above under quantity are said to be quantities according to accident, not per se. Therefore only those quantities which were comprehended above are properly and according to themselves called quantities. Others, however, are not quantity per se, but (as he himself says) perhaps according to accident. After the division, therefore, of continuous and discrete, and of that which has position of parts and that which does not, and of those which are per se and principally, and again of quantities according to accident, in his usual manner he enters upon the path of discovering the properties of quantities.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":132,"ref":"p132","source":"Amplius quantitati nihil est contrarium, in definitis enim manifestum est quoniam nihil est contrarium: ut bicubito, vel tricubito, vel superficiei, vel alicui lalium,nihil enim ipsis est contrarium. Nisi forte quis multa pallris dicat esse contraria, vel magnum parvo, horum autem nihil est quantitas, sed magis ad aliquidynhil enim per seipsum parvum vel magnum dicitur, sed eo quod ad aliud refertur: nam mons quidem parvus dicitur, milium vero magnum, eo quod hoc quidem sui generis majus sit,illud vero minus sui generis; ergo ad aliud est eorum relatio nam si per seipsummagnum vel parvum diceretur, nunquam mons quidem parvus,milium vero magnum diceretur.Hursus in vico plures homines esse dicimus, in civitate paucos, cum tamen sint eis multo plures, et in domo quidem multos, in theatro vero paucos, cum tamen sint plures. Amplius bicubitum vet tricubitum et unumquodque talium quantitatem significat, magnum vero vel parvum non significat quantitatem,sed magis ad aliquid,quoniamad aliud spectatmagnumvelparvum, quare manifestum est quoniJm hæc ad aliquid sunt. Amplius sive ponat aliquis hæc esse quantitates, sive non ponat,nihil ipsis, contrarium est. Quod enim non potest sumi perseipsum,sed ad solam alterius relationem re{ertur,quomodo huic aliquid erit contrarium?","english":"Moreover, nothing is contrary to quantity. For in the cases already defined it is evident that nothing is contrary: as for instance to a two-cubit length, or a three-cubit length, or a surface, or any such thing, nothing is contrary to them. Unless perhaps someone should say that many is contrary to few, or great to small; but none of these is a quantity, but rather a relative. For nothing is said to be small or great in itself, but by being referred to something else. For a mountain is said to be small, and a grain of millet great, because the latter is greater than others of its kind, and the former less than others of its kind. Therefore their relation is to something else. For if great or small were said in itself, a mountain would never be called small, nor a grain of millet great. Again, we say that there are many men in a village, but few in a city, though they are much more numerous than those in the village; and many in a house, but few in a theater, though they are more numerous. Again, a two-cubit or three-cubit length and each such thing signifies a quantity, but great or small does not signify a quantity, but rather a relative, since great or small looks to something else. Wherefore it is evident that these are relatives. Again, whether someone posits these to be quantities or does not posit them, nothing is contrary to them. For that which cannot be taken in itself, but is referred to the relation of another alone, how will anything be contrary to it?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":133,"ref":"p133","source":"Amplius si erunt magnum et parvum contraria, continget ipsum idem simul contraria recipere,et ea ipsa sibimet esse contraria.Gontingit enim idem ipsum si.mul et parvum esse et magnum, est enim aliquid ad hoc quidem parvum, ad aliud vero hoc idem ipsum magnum. Quare idem parvum et magnum in eodem tempore esse contingit, quare contraria simul suscipiet.Sed nihil est quud videatur simul contraria posse suscipere;ut substantia susceptibitiscontrariorum quidem esse videtur,sed nullussimul etsanusest etæger, necalbuset niger simul est, nihilque aliud est quod simul contraria suscipiat. Et eadem sibiipsi contingit esse contraria,nam si est magnum parvo contrarium ipsum autem idem simul est et parvum et magnum, ipsum sibi erit contrarium. Sed impossibile est idem, sibi esse contrarium, non est igitur magnum parvo contrarium, nec multa pauci. Quare etiamsi non relativorum hæc aliquis dical,seil quantitatis,nihil habebunt contrarium.","english":"Moreover, if large and small are contraries, it will follow that the same thing simultaneously receives contraries, and that these very things are contrary to themselves. For it happens that the same thing is at the same time both small and large; for something is small in relation to one thing, but this same thing is large in relation to another. Therefore it happens that the same thing is small and large at the same time, and so it will receive contraries simultaneously. But there is nothing that appears able to receive contraries at the same time; for instance, substance seems capable of receiving contraries, but no one is simultaneously healthy and sick, nor is anything simultaneously white and black, nor is there anything else that simultaneously receives contraries. And it follows that the same things are contrary to themselves; for if large is contrary to small, but the same thing is simultaneously both small and large, it will be contrary to itself. But it is impossible for the same thing to be contrary to itself; therefore large is not contrary to small, nor are many to few. Wherefore, even if someone says these belong not to relatives but to quantity, they will have nothing contrary.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":134,"ref":"p134","source":"Definita quantitas est quæ alicujus termino numeri coercetur,ut sunt duo,vel tres,et quæ ad hunc modum dicunt'lr,ac si dicas bicubitum,tricubitum, et caetera.Etquae aliquid propria significatione definita sunt,ut est superficies et soliditas,quid enimetquce quantitates dicantur,agnoscitur: quocirca barum, quoniam sunt diffinitæ,nulJa ulli contraria est; neque enim bicubito tricubitum contrarium est,sicut neque numerus ulli numenl,al vero nec superficies soliditati,nec aliquid borum.Sed quoniam quaedam indefinitaimaginem quamdam quantitatisostendunt; ut magnum et parvum,quae videntur esse contraria, hæc sibi Aristoteles opponit dicens non esse quantitates,sed magis ad aliquid, quod ipsius sermonibus astruan:us.Sed non est hoc proprium quantitatis non habere contraria,nonenimomnis quantitas contrariis caret,sed nobis persingula quaaquecurrentibus quae quantitatis species contraria non habeant, quæve habeant,considerandumestLineaquidem contrario caret, linea enim lienaa contraria non est;sed si quis dicatrectamlineamcurvaelineae esse contrariam, fallitur.Non enim in eo quod linea est, curva linea rectae lineae contraria est, sed in eo quod curva est, et in his non lineae videntur esse contrariæ, sed ipsa rectitudo et curvitas.Quarenon in eo quod quantitas est, linea curva rectae lineae contraria est,sed in eo quod qualis.","english":"Definite quantity is that which is confined by the limit of some number, as are two or three, and whatever things are spoken of in this way, as if you were to say two-cubit, three-cubit, and the rest. And those which are definite in some proper signification, as surface and solidity; for it is recognized what things are called quantities. Wherefore, since these are definite, none of them is contrary to any other; for neither is three-cubit contrary to two-cubit, just as no number is contrary to any number, nor indeed is surface contrary to solidity, nor any of these. But since certain indefinite things display a certain image of quantity, as large and small, which appear to be contraries, Aristotle sets these against themselves, saying that they are not quantities but rather relatives, which we shall establish from his own words. But it is not a property of quantity to have no contraries; for not every quantity lacks contraries, but as we run through each individual species of quantity, we must consider which have contraries and which do not. A line indeed lacks a contrary, for a line is not contrary to a line; but if anyone should say that a straight line is contrary to a curved line, he is mistaken. For a curved line is not contrary to a straight line in that it is a line, but in that it is curved, and in these it seems to be not the lines that are contrary, but straightness itself and curvature. Wherefore a curved line is not contrary to a straight line in that it is a quantity, but in that it is of such a quality.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":135,"ref":"p135","source":"Nam quoniam curvitas et rectitudo contraria sunt, secundum id quod curva et recta est linea, non secundum quod lineas sunt,suscipiunt contrarietatem; quocircalinea in eo quod linea est contrario caret. At vero nec superficies superficiei contraria est. Sed fortedicat aliquis albamsuperficieinnigraesuperficiei esse contrariam; cui similiter occurrendum est,in eo quod superficies sunt non esse contraria,sed in eo quod est in his albedo atque nigredo,quæ contraria esse quis dubitat?Eadem quoque modo et lenetuetasperam superficiem si quis contrarias dixerit, refellitur, quod non secundum quantitatem superficiei, sed secundum qualitatem asperitatis lenitAtisque ipsaesuperficiescontrarium tenent.Atvero nee corpori quidquam ullo modo contrarietatis opponitur, cui si qui dicat incorporale esse contrarium, refutabitur,quod omnis contrarietas propriis nominibus dicitur,ut bonum malum,album nigrum;corporalevero et incorporale non secundum contrarietatem,sedsecundum privationem habitumqueproferuntur.Incorporale enim corporis est privatio.Nec tempori quoque quidquam contrarium est,sed si nox diei videtur opposita,non in eo quod tempus esi, sed in eo quod dies est aer lucidus, nox aer obscurus. Aer vero neque tempus neque quantitasest,lumen quoque et obscuritas qualitates suntet non quantitates. Oratio etiam quanquam videatur haberecontrarium.","english":"For since curvature and straightness are contraries, it is according to that in which a line is curved or straight, not according as they are lines, that they receive contrariety; wherefore a line, in that it is a line, lacks a contrary. But neither is a surface contrary to a surface. But perhaps someone may say that a white surface is contrary to a black surface; and he must be met in like manner, that in that they are surfaces they are not contraries, but in that there is in them whiteness and blackness, which no one doubts to be contraries. In the same way also, if someone says that a smooth and a rough surface are contraries, he is refuted, because it is not according to the quantity of the surface, but according to the quality of roughness and smoothness, that the surfaces themselves hold a contrary. But neither is anything opposed to body by way of contrariety in any way; and if anyone says that the incorporeal is contrary to it, he will be refuted, because every contrariety is expressed by its own names, as good and evil, white and black; but corporeal and incorporeal are put forward not according to contrariety, but according to privation and habit. For the incorporeal is the privation of body. Nor is anything contrary to time either; but if night seems opposed to day, it is not in that it is time, but in that day is bright air, night is dark air. But air is neither time nor quantity; light also and darkness are qualities and not quantities. Speech also, although it seems to have a contrary.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":136,"ref":"p136","source":"tamen contrariam non habet oppositionem,videtur etiam vera oratio esse et falsa, quae sunt contraria, sed oratio vera et falsa in significatione est. Cum enim quod est oratio significat,vera est; cum vero quod non est designat, tunc falsa est. Oratio vero non secundum id quod significal in quantitate numeratur,sed secundum id quod profertur. Secundum enim id quod proferimus orationem, longa syllaba brevique componitur, quæ omnem orationem non secundum id quod ipsa significat, sed secundum id quod ad prolationem est, metiuntur. Illud quoque manifestum est in numero non esse contraria, duo enim tribus,vel tres quaternario contrarii non sunt, nec ultus alter numerus cuilibet alii numero contrarius est. Locus vero habet aliquam contrarietatem, sursum enim et deorsum contrarium est.Sed quidam volunt non esse quantitatis quod sureum dicitur et deorsum, sed potius habitudines,quasGraeci vocanl:quae enim pars ad caput nostrum est, hanc sursum vocamus; quae pars pedibus subjacet, illa deorsum dicitur; quocirca secundum habitudinem quamdam quodammodo ad nos ipsos relata sursum deorsumque prædicamus. Herminius quoque ait sursum et deorsum non esse loca,sed quamdam quodammodo positionem loci.Est enim res sursum atque deorsum,non est autem idem esse aliquid loci, quod locum,loci enim est positio in loco,locus vero ipse positio non est.","english":"Nevertheless, it does not have a contrary opposition. True and false speech also seem to be contraries, but true and false speech consists in signification. For when speech signifies what is, it is true; when it designates what is not, then it is false. But speech is not counted in quantity according to what it signifies, but according to what is uttered. For according to what we utter in speech, it is composed of long and short syllables, which measure all speech not according to what it itself signifies, but according to what pertains to utterance. It is also evident that contraries are not in number; for two is not contrary to three, nor three to four, nor is any other number contrary to any other number. Place, however, has a certain contrariety, for up and down are contraries. But some hold that what is called up and down does not belong to quantity, but rather to relations, which the Greeks call habits; for the part that is toward our head we call up; the part that lies beneath our feet is called down. Therefore, according to a certain relation, in a way we predicate up and down in relation to ourselves. Herminus also says that up and down are not places, but a certain position of place. For a thing is up and down, but it is not the same for something to be of a place as to be a place; for position is of a thing in a place, but place itself is not position.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":137,"ref":"p137","source":"Sed si quis omnem mundi respiciatfiguram,quomodu rerum omnium formam sphaerae ambitus amplectitur,et terra media est,in sphaera vero nihil estullimum,nisi quod ejusdem terminum medietatis obtinuit,quidquid fn extremo coeli convexitatis est,illud sursum esse dicet, quod vero est medium,illud deorsum.Quocircasunt secundumlocum sursum deorsumque contraria, sursum in cælo, deorsum in terra,idcirco quod a se longe disjuncta sunt, unde post quoque contraria hoc modo sunt diffinita.Contraria sunt quaecunque a se longissime distant:hinc est videlicet tracta diffinitio,quod quoniam coelum terraque distant,longissime distare videbantu, et illud esse sursum, hasc vero deorsum, quoniam deorsum atque sursum non ob aliam causam contraria dicuntur,nisi quod a se longe disjuncta sunt, quod esse contrarium longissime distare diffiniunt,quod Aristoteles hoe modo pronuntiat.","english":"But if one considers the whole figure of the world, how the sphere's circumference embraces the form of all things, and the earth is in the middle, and in a sphere nothing is lowest except what has obtained the limit of its middle, whatever is at the extremity of the convexity of the heaven, that he will call up, but what is in the middle, that he will call down. Wherefore according to place up and down are contraries: up in the heaven, down in the earth, for the reason that they are far separated from each other; whence afterward contraries were in this way defined: Contraries are whatever are most distant from each other. Hence clearly this definition was drawn, because since heaven and earth are distant, they seemed to be most distant, and that to be up, but this down; since down and up are said to be contraries for no other reason than that they are far separated from each other, they define being contrary as being most distant, which Aristotle pronounces in this way.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":138,"ref":"p138","source":"Maxime autem circa locum videtur esse contrarietas quantitatis, sursum enim ad id quod est deorsum contranum ponunt, locum qui est in medio deorsum dicentes,ea quod multa distantia medii ad terminos mundi sit, videntur autem et aliorum contrariorum diffinilionem ab his proferre, quæ enim a se invicem multum distant eorum quæ sub eodem genere suut contraria determinant.\n\nIn omni enim sphaera media terra est,quod ipsa astrorum demonstrat ordinata vertigo,adjecit quoque causamcurhujusmodi loca contrariadicantur, quod multa distantia est medietatis ad mundi terminos.Terminos vero mundi cæli ultimam convexitatem dicit;ex hac igitur loci contrarietate et caetera definita esse contraria sic demonstrat. Videntur,autem et aliorum contrariorum diffinitionem ab his proferre, quae enim multum a se distant in eodem genere contraria esse diffiniunt. Sed quoniam ne ordo contrarietate quantitatis impediretur, idcirco superioribus, in quibus singulis quantitatibus nihil esse contrarium dicebamus, has loci contrarietates adjecimus, et quaedam in medio praetermissa sunt, rurBUS ad superioraredeamus, ut expositionis ordo sese ipse continuet.","english":"But contrariety of quantity seems especially to concern place; for they set \"up\" as contrary to \"down,\" calling the place that is in the middle \"down,\" because there is a great distance from the middle to the boundaries of the world. They also seem to derive the definition of other contraries from these; for they determine those things that are contrary which are within the same genus and are much distant from one another.\n\nFor in every sphere the earth is in the middle, which the ordered revolution of the stars itself demonstrates. He also added the reason why places of this kind are called contrary: because there is a great distance from the middle to the boundaries of the world. By \"boundaries of the world\" he means the outermost convexity of the heaven. From this contrariety of place, then, he shows that the other contraries are also defined. \"They also seem,\" he says, \"to derive the definition of other contraries from these,\" for they define as contrary those things that are much distant from one another within the same genus. But since the order of contrariety of quantity should not be hindered, for that reason, to the earlier points in which we were saying that there is nothing contrary to individual quantities, we have added these contrarieties of place; and certain things having been passed over in the middle, let us return again to the earlier points, so that the order of the exposition may continue itself.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":139,"ref":"p139","source":"Ait enim superius, cum quantitati nibilessecontrarium proponeret, bicubito, vel tricubito, vel superficiei, vel aliqui talium nihil posse esse contrarium.Diffinitis enim bis quantitatibus,contrarium nihil esse videtur, ut duobus vel tribus, sed quaedam cum sintindefinita, nec quantitates etcontraria videantur, haec rursus adjecit. Nisi multa paucis dicat quis esse contraria, vel magnum parvo. Horum autem nihil est quantitas, sed ad aliquid, nihil enim per seipsum magnum diciturvel parvum, sed ad aliquid refertur. Nam mons quidem parvus dicitur, milium vero magnum, eo quod hoc quidem sui generis majus sit, illud vero sui generis minus. Ergo ad aliud est eorum relatio, nam si per seipsum parvum vel magnum diceretur, nunquam mons quidem aliquando parvus, milium vero nunquam magnum diceretur. Rursus in vico quidem plures homines esse dicimus, in civitate vero paucos, cum tamen sint eis multo plures, et in domo quidem multos, in theatro vero paucos, cum sint plures. Amplius bicubitum et tricubitum et unumquodque talium quantitatemsignificat.magnum vero vel parvum non significatquantitatem,sedmagis ad aliquid,quoniam ad aliquid spectaturmagnumet parvum;quare manifestum est quod haec ad aliquid sunt.","english":"For he said above, when he proposed that nothing is contrary to quantity, that nothing can be contrary to a two-cubit or three-cubit magnitude, or to a surface, or to any such thing. For when quantities are defined, nothing seems to be contrary to them, as to two or three; but since some are indefinite, they do not even seem to be quantities and contraries, and so he added these points again. Unless someone says that many is contrary to few, or great to small. But none of these is a quantity, but a relative; for nothing is called great or small in itself, but is referred to something else. For a mountain is called small, and a millet seed great, because the one is greater than others of its kind, and the other less than others of its kind. Therefore their relation is to another; for if great or small were said in itself, a mountain would never be called small, nor a millet seed great. Again, we say that there are many men in a village, but few in a city, though they are much more numerous there; and many in a house, but few in a theater, though they are more numerous. Furthermore, two-cubit and three-cubit and each such thing signify quantity, but great or small do not signify quantity, but rather a relative, since great and small are viewed in relation to something; wherefore it is clear that these are relatives.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":140,"ref":"p140","source":"Quemadmodum diffinitæ quantitates contrariis non tenentur, ipse superius comprobavit dicens bien bito vel superficiei nihil esse contrarium, indefinitae vero, ut est magnumetparvum, multaet pauca, dant imaginem contrarietatis. Sed illud occurrit, has non esse quantitates. Omnis enim quantitas per se dicitur,bicubitum enim et tricubitum, et duo, ettres,et superficies ad nihil aliud refertur,'magnum vero vel parvum sinealiis dici non possunt.Cum enim dicis magnum, ad aliou.ius alteriuscomparationematque aequationem refertur. Eodem quoque modo et parvum,quod ipsa Aristotelica probat inductio. Si enim magnum et parvum per se dicerentur et non ad alterius relationem, nunquam diceremus montem parvum et milium magnum.Sienim magnum parvumque non adlrelationem alterius diceretur, mons semper magnus, semperque parvum milium diceretur.Sed aliquem collem ad Atlantis altitudinem conferenles, dicimus parvum montem, et rursus milium ad minora alia grana miIii conferentes, magnum milium nominanus,et simpliciter quidquid magnum vel parvum dicitur ad ejusdem generis speciem referentes, magnum par. vumquenominanus,ut monti montem comparamus, miliumveromilio, et alia hujusmodi.Multaetpauca eodem modo dicuntur; dicimus enim, si fuerint bomines centum in vico, puresesse homines. At vero si in civitate sint, paucosdicimus, nunc ad parvitatem vicorum, nunc ad magnitudinem civitatum conferentes.","english":"Just as he proved above that definite quantities are not subject to contraries, saying that nothing is contrary to a two-cubit magnitude or to a surface, while indefinite ones, such as large and small, many and few, present an image of contrariety—yet this objection arises: that these are not quantities. For every quantity is said per se; a two-cubit and a three-cubit magnitude, and two and three, and surfaces, are referred to nothing else, but large or small cannot be said without other things. For when you say large, it is referred to the comparison and equalization of some other thing. In the same way also small, which Aristotle's own induction proves. For if large and small were said per se and not in relation to another, we would never say that a mountain is small and a millet seed large. For if large and small were not said in relation to another, a mountain would always be called large, and a millet seed always small. But when we compare some hill to the height of Atlas, we say the mountain is small, and again comparing a millet seed to other smaller grains, we call the millet seed large, and simply whatever is called large or small, referring it to the species of the same genus, we call it large or small, as when we compare a mountain to a mountain, a millet seed to a millet seed, and other such things. Many and few are said in the same way; for we say, if there are a hundred men in a village, that there are many men. But if they are in a city, we say there are few, comparing now to the smallness of villages, now to the greatness of cities.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":141,"ref":"p141","source":"Rursussisint in domo quinquaginto, multi sunt, si in theatro pauci, ideo quod tunc in theatro esse paucos dicimus cum ad eos qnanti in theatro essedebebantcomparamus.Amplius,quoniam consistit magnum parvumque referri semper ad alterum, singulas vero quantitates nihil ad aliud comparantes, suas ac proprias nominanus, ut tres, duo, quator, lineam, superficiem, magnum parvumque,multaet pauca, a quantitatis divisione disjuncta sunt. Sunt enim ista non quantitates, sed potius relativa. Amplius, sive aliquis ponateas esse quantitates, sive non ponat, nihil illiserit contrarium, quod enim non est sumere per seipsum, sed ad solamalterius:relationem, quomodo huic aliquid erit contrarium. Hoc quoque validissimo argumento probaturquantitatibus his quae prædictæ sunt nihil esse contrarium, nisi soli forsitan loco. Nam si quis magnum et parvum, vel multa et paucainquanlitatibusponal,etiam hoc si concedatur, tamen quoniam semper referuntur ad aliud, contrariis non tenentur.","english":"Again, if there are fifty in a house, they are many; if few in a theater, for the reason that we then say there are few in the theater when we compare them to those who ought to have been in the theater. Moreover, since it holds that large and small are always referred to another, but we name individual quantities as their own and proper, comparing them to nothing else—as three, two, four, a line, a surface—large and small, many and few are separated from the division of quantity. For these are not quantities, but rather relatives. Moreover, whether someone posits them to be quantities or does not, nothing will be contrary to them, for how will anything be contrary to that which does not exist to be taken through itself, but only in relation to another? By this also, with a most valid argument, it is proved that nothing is contrary to these quantities which have been mentioned, except perhaps to place alone. For if someone posits large and small, or many and few, among quantities, even if this is conceded, nevertheless, since they are always referred to another, they are not held by contraries.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":142,"ref":"p142","source":"Omne enim contrarium per seconsistit,neillud ad alterius comparationem relationemque profertur,utbonum non dicitur mali bonum, nec rursus malum boni malum, sed ipsum in propria natura et prolatione consistit.Quaecunquesunt contraria, eodem modo sunt.Magnum vero et parvum quoniam non per se constant,sed ad alterius relationem referuntur, contraria esse non possunt.Amplius,si suntmagnumetparvumcontraria,contingitidem simul contraria suscipereeteaipsasibiessecontraria.Contingitenim simul idem parvum esse et magnum.Est enim aliquid ad hoc quidem parvum, ad aliud verohocidem ipsum magnum.Quare idem parvum el magnum et eodem tempore esse contingit,quare simul contraria suscipiet,sed nihil estquod vidcatursimulcontraria possesuscipere, ut substantia, susoeptibilis quidem contrariorum videturesse,sed non suscipitinunoeodem lempore,nam nullus simul estsanus et æger, nec albus et nigersimul,nihilque aliud simul contraria suscipiet.Eteadem sibi ipsi contingit esse contraria. Nam si est magnumparvocontrarium,ipsumautemidem simul est parvum et magnum,ipwum sibi eritcontrarium, sedimpossibile esl ipsum sibi esse contrarium.Non est igitur magnum parvocontrarium.Constalhoc et immutabile in propria rationeconsistit, unam eamdemque rem uno eodemque tempore contraria non posse susci pere, ut substantia susceptibilis quidem contrariorum est.","english":"For every contrary is self-consistent, nor is it brought forth in comparison and relation to another, as good is not said to be the good of evil, nor again evil the evil of good, but it consists in its own nature and utterance. Whatever things are contraries are in the same manner. But great and small, since they do not stand by themselves, but are referred to the relation of another, cannot be contraries. Moreover, if great and small are contraries, it happens that the same thing simultaneously receives contraries and that those very things are contrary to themselves. For it happens that the same thing is simultaneously small and great. For something is small in relation to this, but the same thing is great in relation to another. Wherefore it happens that the same thing is small and great at the same time, wherefore it will simultaneously receive contraries, but there is nothing that seems able to receive contraries simultaneously, as substance indeed seems to be capable of contraries, but does not receive them at one and the same time, for no one is simultaneously healthy and sick, nor simultaneously white and black, nor will anything else simultaneously receive contraries. And it happens that the same things are contrary to themselves. For if great is contrary to small, but the same thing is simultaneously small and great, it will be contrary to itself, but it is impossible for it to be contrary to itself. Therefore great is not contrary to small. This stands firm and immutable, consisting in its own rationale, that one and the same thing cannot receive contraries at one and the same time, as substance is indeed capable of contraries.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":143,"ref":"p143","source":"Homo namque cum substantia eit, etægritudinem suscipiet etsalutem,sed non eodem tempore, et albedinem etnigredinemcapit,sedalioatque alio tempore,utverounoeodemque tempore contraria utraque suscipiat, fieri nequit, quod si magnum parvoaliquiscontrariumponat,evenietquoddamimpossibile, ut una atque eadem res eodem tempore utrasque suscipiat contrarietates, et eadem ipsa sibi possint esse contraria.Ponamusenim magnum parvo esse contrarium,sed una atque eadem res,uno,eodemque tempore potest magna esse et parva,ut si sit decem pedum mensura collata ad duorum pedum magnitudinem, magnaestad centum vero cubitorum magnitudinem mensuramque collata, eadem parva est, Potest ergo eadem res eodem tempore et magnitudinis esse susceptibilis et parvitatis. Eadem enim res uno eodemque tempore ad majorem minoremque collata eadem magna et parva est. Quod si magnum parvo contrarium est, eadem vero res eodemtempore etmagnitudinemsuscipitetparvitatem, eodem tempore contingit ut eadem res contraria utraque suscipiat, sed hoc impossibile est. Quocirca quoniam res eadem eodem tempore contrariorum susceptibilia non est, potest vero una atque eadem res magnitudinem parvitatemquesuscipere, magnitudo et parvitas contraria non sunt. At vero si quis magnum parvo contrarium ponat, eadem ratione unameamdemquerem sibi ipsi dicit esse contrariam.","english":"For since man is a substance, he will also receive sickness and health, but not at the same time, and he takes on whiteness and blackness, but at one time and another; yet that he should receive both contraries at the same time cannot happen. But if someone posits the great as contrary to the small, a certain impossibility will result: that one and the same thing at the same time receives both contrarieties, and that the same things can be contrary to themselves. For let us posit that the great is contrary to the small. But one and the same thing can at one and the same time be great and small: for instance, if a measure of ten feet is compared to a magnitude of two feet, it is great; but compared to a magnitude and measure of a hundred cubits, the same is small. Therefore the same thing can at the same time be susceptible of greatness and of smallness. For the same thing at one and the same time, compared to a greater and a lesser, is the same great and small. But if the great is contrary to the small, and the same thing at the same time receives greatness and smallness, it happens that at the same time the same thing receives both contraries; but this is impossible. Wherefore, since the same thing is not at the same time susceptible of contraries, but one and the same thing can receive greatness and smallness, greatness and smallness are not contraries. But if someone posits the great as contrary to the small, by the same reasoning he says that one and the same thing is contrary to itself.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":144,"ref":"p144","source":"Nam si parvum magno est contrarium, eadem vero res(utdocui)parvaetmagnapotestessead aliud et ad aliud scilicet comparata. Res qua; parva et magna est, eadem sibi potestesse contraria, parvum enim et magnum contrarium dictum est, sed est impossibile. Quocirca parvum et magnum contraria non sunt. Post hujusmodi vero rationem et argumentationisfirmissimsepropositionemdecontrarietatedisserit loci, de qua superius jam diximus, quocirca praetereunda est, ne repetitae expositionis iteratio, fastidio sit potius quam doctrina.\n\nNon videlurautem quantitas suscipere magis et minus, ut bicubitum, neque enim est aliudaliomagisbicubitum,neque in numero, ut ternarius quinario: nihil enim magis tria dicenturquam quinque,nec tria potius quam tria, neque tempus ahud alio magis et minus dicitur, nec inhitt quæ dicta. sunt, magiset minusomnino dicitur. Quare et quantitas non suscipit magis et minus.","english":"For if small is contrary to large, but the same thing (as I taught) can be small and large in relation to different things, namely when compared to one thing and to another. A thing which is small and large, the same thing can be contrary to itself; for small and large have been called contraries, but this is impossible. Wherefore small and large are not contraries. But after a reasoning of this kind and the establishment of a most firm argumentation, he discusses the topic of contrariety, about which we have already spoken above; wherefore it must be passed over, lest a repetition of an exposition already given be a source of annoyance rather than of instruction.\n\nBut quantity does not seem to admit of more and less, as two cubits; for one thing is not more two cubits than another, nor in number, as the number three is not more than five; for things will not be called more three than five, nor three rather than three; nor is one time said to be more and less than another, nor in the things which have been mentioned is more and less said at all. Wherefore quantity also does not admit of more and less.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":145,"ref":"p145","source":"Aliud proprium rursus apposuit quod quamvis qaantitatis proprium non sit, cur tamen non sit ipse reticuit,nobis tamen est demonstrandum;quod autem dicit tale est: quantitas magis et minus non suscipit, nullus enim numerus alio numero necmagis nec minus est numerus. Nam ternartus siquinariocomparetur, nec magis nec minus est numerus, et rursus ipsi tres sibiipsis comparati, nec magis nec minus sunt tres, nec tempus quoque habet aliquid magis et minus, ut magis aliud tempus sit alio tempore,IOn-l gius quidem tempus tempore esse potest,utvero dicatur magis tempusalio tempore vel minus fierinequit. Hocquoqueetiam in substantiademonstratum est, homo nanque alio homine non est magis homo, nec minus. Idem quoque eveniteliam in quantitate. Quod quia etiam in substantia est, proprium quantitatis hoc non est, habet hoc quoque quantitas ut in sequenti ordine ipse monstravit. Quocirca quoniam prius hoc de substantia dixerat, nunc vero idem de quantitate proposuit, idcirco non esse hoc proprium quantitatis, commemorare neglexit. Cujus enim esset alterius non suscipere magis et minus, tunc dixit cum de substantia disputaret. Ait enim quod substantia nunquam magis minusve suscipient,quocira ad maxima propria solita constituendi rationeregressus est.","english":"He next added another property, which, although it is not a property of quantity, he nevertheless passed over in silence as to why it is not itself [a property of quantity]; yet it must be demonstrated by us. What he says is of this sort: quantity does not admit more and less. For no number is more or less a number than another number. For if three is compared to five, it is neither more nor less a number; and again, three compared to itself is neither more nor less three. Nor does time have anything of more and less, such that one time is more than another time; for a longer time can indeed be a time than a time, but it cannot be said that a time becomes more or less a time than another time. This too has also been demonstrated in substance: for a man is not more a man than another man, nor less. The same also happens in quantity. But because this is also in substance, this is not a property of quantity; yet quantity also has this, as he himself showed in the following order. Wherefore, since he had said this earlier about substance, but now proposed the same about quantity, for that reason he neglected to mention that this is not a property of quantity. For he said then, when he was disputing about substance, whose property it was not to admit more and less. For he says that substance never admits more or less; wherefore he returned to the usual method of establishing the greatest properties.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":146,"ref":"p146","source":"Proprium autem maximce quantitatis esty quod et æquale et inæquale dicitur: Singulum enim earum quæ dictæ sunt quantitatum tequale dicitur et in æquale, ut corpus etsequale et inæquale dicitur, et tempus æquale et inæquale dicitur, et numerus arguatis et inæqualis dicitur, et oratio æqualis et inæqualis. Similiter autem et in aliis quæ dicta sunt, singulum et æquale et inæQuale dicitur. In cæteris vero quæ quantitates non sunt, non multum videbitur æquale et inæquale dici, nam affectio et dispositio aequalis et inæqualis non multum dicitur, sed magis similis et dissimilis, et album æquale et inæquale non multum dicitur, sed simile. Quare quantitatis maximæ est proprium aequate et inæquale dici.\n\nQuantitatis proprium apertissime designat esse, quod secundumquantitatem æqualitas et inqualitas nuncupatur.Singulseenim quantilatessequalesatque inaequales dicuntur, utasqualis linealineae, et rursus inaequalis, et superficiei superficies aequalis atque inaequalis dicitur, et corpus æquale et inaequale dicitur. Numerus quoque et tempus et locus aequalis atque inæqualis dicitur. In aliis autem quæ quantitates non sunt, non est facile ut aequalitas vel inaequalitas nominetur,dispositiones ergo qua?","english":"But the most proper property of quantity is that it is called both equal and unequal. For each of the things that have been called quantities is said to be equal and unequal: for instance, body is said to be equal and unequal, time is said to be equal and unequal, number is said to be equal and unequal, and speech is equal and unequal. Similarly also in the other things that have been mentioned, each is said to be both equal and unequal. But in the remaining things that are not quantities, equal and unequal will not seem to be said much; for affection and disposition are not much said to be equal and unequal, but rather similar and dissimilar, and white is not much said to be equal and unequal, but similar. Therefore it is the property of quantity most of all to be called equal and unequal.\n\nHe most clearly designates it to be a property of quantity that equality and inequality are predicated according to quantity. For individual quantities are said to be equal and unequal, as a line is equal to a line, and again unequal, and a surface is said to be equal and unequal to a surface, and a body is said to be equal and unequal. Number too, and time, and place are said to be equal and unequal. But in other things that are not quantities, it is not easy for equality or inequality to be named; dispositions, therefore, which...","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":147,"ref":"p147","source":"affectiones appellantur, non dicuntur æquales vel inasquales,sed magis similes et dissimiles.Dispositio autem vel affectio est ad aliquam rem accommodatio et applicatio, ut si quis grammaticam legens, qui nondum perdidicit, habet ad eam aliquam dispositionem, id est, ea affectus est, et habet aliquid accommodatum, etquasi propinquum. Possunt autem similiter esse duo dispositi et affecti, aequaliter vero minime, ut duosimiliteressealbi,xequaliterveronon.Namsiquis deduobus similiter albis aequaliter esse albos dicat,recta nominis nunc usurpatione non utitur. Omne enim æquale et inæquale, in mensura et in quantitate perficitu r.Simile vero etdissimile quemadmodum de quantitatenon dicitur,itanecdealia qualibet re nisi de quantitate, recte aequalitaset inaequalitas nuncupantur. Quare proprium est quantitatis æquale et inæquale nominari,sed quoniam de quantitate dictum est, ad relativorum ordinem transeamus.Post quantitatis tractatum tertium praedicamentam de relativis ingreditur,quarerelativa hoc modo diffinit.","english":"They are called affections, and are not said to be equal or unequal, but rather similar and dissimilar. But disposition or affection is an adaptation and application to some thing, as if someone reading grammar, who has not yet fully learned it, has some disposition toward it, that is, is affected by it, and has something adapted and, as it were, near. But two things can similarly be disposed and affected, yet not equally, as for two to be similarly white, but not equally. For if someone says that two similarly white things are equally white, he does not use the proper employment of the name. For everything equal and unequal is perfected in measure and in quantity. But just as similar and dissimilar are not said of quantity, so neither of any other thing except quantity; rightly are equality and inequality spoken of. Wherefore it is proper to quantity to be called equal and unequal. But since quantity has been discussed, let us pass to the order of relatives. After the treatment of quantity, he enters upon the third category, concerning relatives, which he defines as follows.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":148,"ref":"p148","source":"DE RELATIVIS.\n\nAd aliquid vero talia dicuntur, quæcunque hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum esse dicuntur,velquomodolibet aliter ad aliud., ut majus id quod est alterius dicitur, aliquo enim majus dicitur, et duplum alterius dicitur hoc ipsum quod est, alicujus enim duplum dicitu1'.Similiter autem et alia quæcunque sun! hujusmodi.\n\nCur autem de his quæ sunt ad aliquid disserat, omisso interim de qualitate tractatu, hoec causa est, quod posiia quantitate magis minusve esse necesse est.","english":"ON RELATIVES.\n\nThose things are said to be relative which, whatever they are, are said to be of others, or in whatever other way are referred to another: as the greater is said to be what it is of another — for it is said to be greater than something — and the double is said to be what it is of another, for it is said to be the double of something. And similarly also whatever other things are of this sort.\n\nBut why he discusses these things which are relative, having for the meantime omitted the treatment of quality, this is the reason: that once quantity has been posited, it is necessary that there be more and less.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":149,"ref":"p149","source":"Quare cum quantitatem continuo ad aliquid consequatur, recte post quantitatem relativorum series ordinata est.Illudquoqueestincausa,quodsuperius, cum de quantitate tractaret,relativorum mentio facta est,cum de magno parvoque diceretur,ut ergo contin ens et non esset operis interrupta distinctio, ideo quantitate finita de relatione,proposuit.Quod autem ait,ad aliquid vero talia dicuntur,boc monstrat,quod non sicut quantitas per se etsingulariter intelligipotest,eodem quoque modo substantia et qualitas, et unumquodquealiorum praedicamentorum,sicut per se oonstat,ita etiam per se et singulariter intelligitur: sic ad aliquid per se et singulariter capi intellectu non potest,ut dicamus esse ad aliquid singulariter.Quidquid enim in natura relationisagnoscitur, id cum alio necesse est consideretur; cum enim dico dominus,per seipsum nihil est,si servus dicit, Quocirca cum unius relativi nuncupatio mox secum etiax aliud trahat ad aliquid,unum esse per se non potest, atque ideo non dixit Aristoteles: Ad aliquid verotale dicitur,sed,pluralinumero,talia dicuntur,inquit,demonstrans relativorum intelligentiam non in simplicitate,sed in pluralitate consistere; non esse autem quamdam per se relativorum naturam sine conjunctione aliqua alterius subsistente, ipse Aristoteles monstrat,qui dicit ea esse relativa,quæcu nque hoc ipsum quodsuntaliorum dicuntur.Docetenim aliqua conjunctione alterius","english":"Therefore, since quantity is immediately followed by relation, the series of relatives has rightly been arranged after quantity. This too is the reason why, as was mentioned above, when he was treating of quantity, mention was made of relatives, when the great and the small were being discussed — so that, therefore, the treatment might be continuous and the distinction of the work not interrupted, and so after quantity was finished he set forth concerning relation. But what he says, \"but relatives are said to be such,\" shows this: that not as quantity can be understood per se and singly, and in the same way substance and quality and each of the other categories, as it stands per se, so also is it understood per se and singly; thus a relative cannot be grasped per se and singly by the intellect, so that we might say that a relative exists singly. For whatever is recognized in the nature of relation, that must necessarily be considered together with another. For when I say \"master,\" it is nothing per se, if \"slave\" is not said. Wherefore, since the naming of one relative immediately draws another along with it, it cannot be one per se. And for this reason Aristotle did not say, \"but a relative is said to be such,\" but, in the plural number, \"such things are said,\" demonstrating that the understanding of relatives consists not in simplicity but in plurality. But that there is no nature of relatives per se subsisting without some conjunction of another, Aristotle himself shows, who says that those things are relative, whatever are said to be this very thing that they are of others. For he teaches that by some conjunction of another","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":150,"ref":"p150","source":"relativa formari, hoc ipsum enim quod sunt aliorum dicuntur.Quodenimest dominus,hoc alterius dicitur,id est servi. Sive autem relativa dicamus,sive ad aliquid,nihil interest. Ad aliquid enim dicitur quod ipsum quidem cum perse nihil sit, relatum tamen ad aliud constat,ut dominus,sit desit id ad quod dicitur,id est,servus, noni est,dicitur enim ad servum; manifestum ergo est si servus desit,dominum dici non posse, quare dominus ad aliquiddicitur,id est ad servum.Relativa quoque dicuntur idcirco,quodeorum nuncupatio semper ad aliquid reteratur,ut domini ad servum,quare nihil interest quolibet modo dicatur. Hujusmodi autem diffinitio Platonis esse creditur, quae ab Aristotele paulo posterius emendatur.Relativorum autem alia eisdem casibus referuntur, alia diversis, alia vero omni sunt casu carentia. Quod scilicet monstrans addidit,vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud.Quid autem est, ipsius pene textus sermone monstratur. Cum enim dico dominus servi dominus,ad genitivum casum reddidi nominativum,et rursus ad eumdem si convertero. Dico enim servus domini servus,et hic quoque nominativus ad genitivum relatus est.","english":"Relatives are formed, for this very fact that they are is said of others. For what is a master is said of another, that is, of a slave. But whether we call them relatives or \"to something,\" it makes no difference. For \"to something\" is said of that which, while in itself it is nothing, is established as related to another, as a master, if that to which it is said is lacking, that is, a slave, is not; for it is said in relation to a slave. It is evident, therefore, that if a slave is lacking, a master cannot be said. Wherefore a master is said in relation to something, that is, to a slave. They are also called relatives for this reason, that their designation is always referred to something, as that of a master to a slave. Wherefore it makes no difference in whatever way it is said. A definition of this kind is believed to be Plato's, which is corrected by Aristotle a little later. But of relatives, some are referred by the same cases, others by different ones, and others are entirely lacking in case. Showing this, he added, \"or in any other way whatever to another.\" What this is is shown almost by the wording of the text itself. For when I say \"a master of a slave,\" I have rendered a nominative in relation to a genitive, and again if I convert it to the same. For I say \"a slave of a master,\" and here too the nominative has been related to a genitive.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":151,"ref":"p151","source":"Eodem quoque modo sese habet pater filii pater, et filius patris filius,et magister discipuli magister,et discipulus magistri discipulus, hæc ergo id quod sunt,similiter aliorum dicuntur.Nam quod aliorum dicuntur secundum gentiivum redditur casum, alia vero non secundum eumdem casum consequentiam reddunt.Sensus enim ad aliquid est,sensibilis enim rei est sensus. Quod enim sensibile est sentiri potest, quod sentiri potest, sensibile est, et nunc quidem sensus sensibilis rei sensus genitivo accommodatus est. Hujus enim rei sensibilis dictum est,at si convertas, fiet. Sensibilis res sensu sensibilis est. Sed cum sic casui septimo redditur nominativus in hac relatione,quae dicit sensibile sensu sensibile est,non eodem casu quo superius dictum est convertitur.Dicimus enim sensus sensibilis rei sensus est, et hic nominativus redditur ad genitivum. Hæc enim relatio ad septimum casum se aptari non patitur.Scientia quoque scibilis rei scientia est,siquidem hoc scitur quod sciri potest et quod sciripotest,scibile est,sed non eadem ratione, nec ad eumdem casum relatio ista convertitur. Dicimus enim scibilis res scientia scibilis est. Est enim prima relatio ad genitivum,secunda conversio ad septimum.","english":"In the same way too a father is the father of a son, and a son is the son of a father, and a master is the master of a disciple, and a disciple is the disciple of a master. These therefore, that which they are, are similarly said of others. For what are said of others are rendered by the genitive case, but others do not produce their consequence according to the same case. For sense is of something, for sense is of a sensible thing. For what is sensible can be perceived, and what can be perceived is sensible, and now indeed sense is the sense of a sensible thing, fitted to the genitive. For it has been said of this sensible thing, but if you convert it, it will become: a sensible thing is sensible by sense. But when the nominative is thus rendered to the seventh case in this relation which says a sensible thing is sensible by sense, it is not converted in the same case as was said above. For we say sense is the sense of a sensible thing, and here the nominative is rendered to the genitive. For this relation does not allow itself to be fitted to the seventh case. Knowledge also is the knowledge of a knowable thing, since that is known which can be known, and what can be known is knowable, but not by the same account, nor is that relation converted to the same case. For we say a knowable thing is knowable by knowledge. For the first relation is to the genitive, the second conversion to the seventh.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":152,"ref":"p152","source":"Hæc quoque relatio secundum eosdem convertitur casus,cum dicimus majus minore esse majus3et minus majore esse minus.Duplum quoque et medium relativa sunt,sed et eisdem casibus convertuntur.Duplum namquedimidii duplum est,dimidium vero dupli dimidium est. Sunt autem alia quoque relativa quae ipse sic addidit.\n\nAt vero sunt etiam et hæc adaliquid,ut habitus,affectus, scientia, sensus, positio: hæc enim omnia quae dicta sunt,hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum esse dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ad alivd,et non aliud aliquid; habitus enim alicujus habitus dicitur,et disciplina alicujus disciplina, et positio alicujus positio. Similiter autem et alia.\n\nDe sensu quidem et scientia dictum est superius, nunc vero de habitu,dispositione,et positione dicendum est. Dispositio est ad aEquam rem mobilis applicatio,ut si quisquam flammae propinquus calcat, ille dispositus dicitur ad calorem,id est,habens aliquam applicationem conjunctionemque ad calorem.","english":"These too, as a relation, are converted according to the same cases, when we say that the greater is greater than the lesser and the lesser is lesser than the greater. Double and half are also relatives, but they too are converted by the same cases. For double is the double of a half, and half is the half of a double. But there are also other relatives which he himself added in this way.\n\nBut indeed these too are toward something, such as habit, affection, knowledge, sensation, position; for all these things that have been said are said to be of others with respect to this very thing that they are, or in some other way whatever in relation to another, and not something else; for habit is said to be the habit of someone, and discipline the discipline of someone, and position the position of someone. Similarly also the others.\n\nConcerning sensation and knowledge, indeed, it was said above; but now concerning habit, disposition, and position it must be said. Disposition is the application of a movable thing to a suitable thing, as if anyone standing near a flame is said to be disposed to heat, that is, having some application and conjunction to heat.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":153,"ref":"p153","source":"Idem veroest affectio quod dispositio,ne novo nomine error oriatur: etideo dispositio cum sit quaedam ad aliam rem conjunctio, vel ab alia affectio, facile mobilis est,celerius etenim permutatur.Habitus autem est dispositionis vel aiTectionis firmaetnon facilepermutabilis accessio,ut si quisquam in sole ambulans fusciorfiat,dispositusad nigredinem dicitur et nigredine affectus.Sin autem illa nigredo fortius et immutabiliter corpus infecerit, habitus nominatur: quocirca habitus estinveterata affectio.Unde omnis habitus dispositio vel affectio est,non autem omnis dispositio vel affectio habitus. Et ne multa dicenda sint,hoc quoque constat in habitu et dispositione, quod habitus immutabilis passio est.dispositio vero non similiter, sed affectio quaedam est,et ad aliquam remconjunctio,quae potest facile permutari.Positio vero est alicujus rei collocatio,ut est statio,sessio, inciinatio,accubatio,et alia hujusmodi. Nam et qui stat quodammodo positus esse dicitur et collocatus, et qui sedet,et qui accumbit, et qui secundum caeteras positiones est positus appellatur. Quocirca et statio et sessio et aceubatio positiones erunt.","english":"The same thing is affection as disposition, lest error arise from a new name; and therefore disposition, since it is a certain conjunction to another thing, or affection from another, is easily movable, for it is changed more swiftly. But habit is the firm and not easily changeable addition of a disposition or affection, as if someone walking in the sun becomes darker, he is said to be disposed to blackness and affected by blackness. If, however, that blackness has more strongly and immutably stained the body, it is called a habit; wherefore habit is an inveterate affection. Hence every habit is a disposition or affection, but not every disposition or affection is a habit. And lest many things must be said, this too is evident in habit and disposition, that habit is an immutable passion, but disposition is not similarly so, but is a certain affection and a conjunction to some thing, which can easily be changed. Position, however, is the placement of some thing, as is standing, sitting, leaning, reclining, and other things of this kind. For he who stands is said in some way to be positioned and placed, and he who sits, and he who reclines, and he who is in accordance with the other positions is called positioned. Wherefore both standing and sitting and reclining will be positions.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":154,"ref":"p154","source":"Sed quoniam quid essent dictum est,nunc si sunt ad aliquid videamus,habitum relative dici ea res probat, quae aliis quoquerebusdocumento fuit esse relativis, ut est in sensu atque in scientia.Idcirco enim dictum est sensum sensibilis rei esse sensum,quod res sen-, sibilis est quae sentiri potesl; est ergo habitus habilis rei habitus Habilisenim res est quæ haberi potest, illius enim rei habitus est quæ haberi potest.Quocirca erit habitus habilis rei habilus,sed res quoque habilis habitu erit habilis,ipso enim habitu res quas haberi possunt habemus.Dispositio quoque eodem modo. Disposi tio namquedispositas rei dispositio est, et disposita res dispositione disposita est. Caloris enim dispositio calentis,id est,ad calorem dispositi, dispositio est. Eodem modo dispositus ad calorem caloris dispositione dispositus est: velutsi hoc modo sit dictum.omnis affectio affecti affectio est,et omne affectum affectione affectum est.Et calor calentis fit calor, et calens calore fit calidum. Positio quoque relativa est, nam positio positse rei positio ast, et posita res positione posita est,et hoc intelligi convenit secundum priorem habitus et dispositionis modum.IlIa quoque res probat positionem esse ad aliquid, quod ejus species relativæ sunt; statio enim - stantis rei statio est, et qui stat statione stet; etde sessione quidem et de accubitu idem dici; potest.","english":"But since it has been stated what they are, now let us see whether they are relative. The fact that habit is spoken of relatively is proved by that same thing which has also served as evidence for other things being relative, as is the case with sensation and knowledge. For sensation was said to be the sensation of a sensible thing for this reason, that the sensible thing is what can be sensed; therefore habit is the habit of a thing capable of being had. For a thing capable of being had is one that can be had, for it is the habit of that thing which can be had. Wherefore habit will be the habit of a thing capable of being had, but a thing capable of being had will also be capable of being had by habit; for by habit itself we have the things that can be had. Disposition also is in the same way. For disposition is the disposition of a disposed thing, and a disposed thing is disposed by disposition. For the disposition of heat is the disposition of a thing that is warm, that is, of a thing disposed to heat. In the same way, a thing disposed to heat is disposed by the disposition of heat: as if it were said in this way: every affection is the affection of something affected, and everything affected is affected by affection. And heat becomes the heat of a thing that is warm, and a warm thing becomes warm by heat. Position also is relative, for position is the position of a positioned thing, and a positioned thing is positioned by position, and this it is fitting to understand according to the earlier mode of habit and disposition. That fact also proves that position is relative, that its species are relative; for standing is the standing of a standing thing, and one who stands stands by standing; and the same can be said about sitting and reclining.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":155,"ref":"p155","source":"Quocirca et habitus et dispositio vel affectio,et positio relativa sunt, et haec omnia vel similibus vel dissimilibus convenientibus tamen prædicationi casibus convertuntur. Eorum autem quae secundum casus convertuntur, alia sunt quae eodem nomine praedicantur,alia vero quae dispari: cum enim dico simile simili simile est,et aequale aequali aequale est, et dissimile dissimili dissimile est,eisdem vocabulis eisdemquenominibus tota fit prædicatio. Cum autem diro duplum medii duplum, vel majus minore majus, disparibus vocabulis facta est praedicatio.Quoniam verorelativorum diffinitionem ita proposuit,ut diceret: ad aliquid vero talia dicuntur quaecunque hoc ipsumquod sunt aliorum dicuntur,vel quomodolibet, aliter ad aliud;quid esset hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum dicuntur, jam diximus nunc quid sit; quod ait, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud,requirendum est. Quod ipse Aristoteles convenientibus in ordine probat exemplis; ait enim.","english":"Wherefore both habit and disposition or affection, and position are relative, and all these are converted either with like or unlike terms, provided the predication fits the cases. But of those which are converted according to cases, some are predicated with the same name, others with a different one: for when I say that like is like to like, and equal is equal to equal, and unlike is unlike to unlike, the whole predication is made with the same words and the same names. But when I say that double is double of half, or greater is greater than lesser, the predication is made with different words. But since he proposed the definition of relatives in such a way as to say: \"Those things are said to be relative whichsoever are said to be of others, or in any other way to another, this very thing which they are\" — what it means that \"this very thing which they are they are said to be of others,\" we have already said; now what it is that he says, \"or in any other way to another,\" must be examined. And this Aristotle proves with fitting examples in order; for he says:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":156,"ref":"p156","source":"Ad a liquid ergo sunt quæcunque id quod suntaliorum esse dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud, ut mons magnus dicitur ad alium Magnum enim ad aliquid dicitur, et simile aliqui simile dicitur, et omnia talia similiter ad aliquid dicuntur.Sunt autem et accubitus et s'atio et sessio,posiliones qusedam; positio vero ad aliquid dicitur.Accumbere autem,vel stare vel sedere, ipsa quidem non sunt posiliones,denominative vero dicuntur ab iis quæ dictæ sunt positionibus.","english":"Therefore all those things are relative, whatever things are said to be of others with respect to what they are, or in any other way to another, as a mountain is called great in relation to another; for great is said in relation to something, and a similar thing is said to be similar to something, and all such things are similarly said in relation to something. But also reclining and standing and sitting are certain positions; and position is said in relation to something. But to recline, or to stand, or to sit, are not themselves positions, but are denominated from those things which have been called positions.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":157,"ref":"p157","source":"Quoniam accubitus et statio et sessio positiones dicuntur,et quoniam omnis positio ad aliquid est, sufficienter superius comprehensum est.Nuncvero quid sit quod ait,vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud, expediemus, in relatione per quam dicimus filius patris filius, nulla conjunctio mista est,nisi tantum solacasuum vis prædicationis hujus membra conjungil.Cum autem dico montem magnum,ad alium referens parvum,ita propono,mons magnus,ad montem parvum,et mons parvus ad magnum,hic nullo rum casuum vis: quanquam enim accusativus videtur esse permislus,lamen ille bujus relationis vim nontenet,sed praepositio quae ad accusativum datur; cum enim dico,mons magnus ad parvum montem, praepositiosolaestquae vim hujuscontinetrelationis, utsi quis dicatmagnus mons parvum montem,nihil significet definitum.Quocirca quamvis accusativus casus in hac propositione sit, non tamen hic vim casus tenet,sed praepositio; atque hoc est quod ait, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud,ut quoniam superius secandum casus relationes fieri dixerat,erant autem quaedam relationes quae nullis casibus tenerentur,adjecit hoc, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud, ac si diceret: Omnis relatio aut casibus fit, quod per hoc demonstravit quod ait,quaecunque id quod sunt aliorum dicuntur,aut praeter casus sunt,quod hæc sententia docet, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud, atque haec bactenus.Sed cum positio sit ad aliquid, et sint","english":"Since lying down and standing and sitting are called positions, and since every position is relative, this has been sufficiently comprehended above. But now we shall explain what it is that he says, or in any other way to another. In the relation by which we say that a son is the son of a father, no conjunction is mixed in, except that only the force of the case joins the members of this predication. But when I say \"a great mountain,\" referring it to another, a small one, I set it forth thus: \"a great mountain\" in relation to \"a small mountain,\" and \"a small mountain\" in relation to \"a great one.\" Here there is no force of any case; for although the accusative seems to be admitted, nevertheless it does not hold the force of this relation, but the preposition which is given with the accusative. For when I say \"a great mountain in relation to a small mountain,\" the preposition alone is what contains the force of this relation, so that if someone says \"a great mountain a small mountain,\" it signifies nothing definite. Wherefore, although the accusative case is in this proposition, nevertheless it does not here hold the force of the case, but the preposition. And this is what he says, or in any other way to another, since above he had said that relations are made according to cases, but there were certain relations that were not held by any cases, he added this, or in any other way to another, as if he were saying: Every relation either comes about through cases, which he demonstrated through this that he said, whatever things are said to be of others with respect to what they are, or they are apart from cases, which this statement teaches, or in any other way to another. And thus far these things. But since position is relative, and there are","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":158,"ref":"p158","source":"species ejus relativae (sessio enim et statio relativa sunt),sedere et stare nulla relatio est. Stare namque et sedere de statione et sessione denominative dicuntur.Omnis autem denominatio non est id quod est ea res de qua nominatur, ut grammaticus, non enim idem est quod grammatica de qua nominatus est.Quocirca si sedere de sessione,et stare de statione denominativum est, sessio vero et stati relativa sunt,sedere et stare, quæ a relativis denominativa sunt,relativorum genere non tenentur.Et universaliter, quidquid ex quibuslibet positionibus denominatur,illud non ad relativa,sed ad praedicationem quae situs dicitur reduci potest.\n\nInest autem et contrarietas in relatione, ut virtus vitio contraria est, cum sit utrumque ad aliquid, et scientia inscientiæ. Non autem omnibus relativis inest contrarietas, duplici enim nihil est contrarium, neque triplici, nec talium ulli.","english":"The species of relatives (for sitting and standing are relative), but to sit and to stand are not a relation. For to stand and to sit are denominatively said from standing and sitting. But every denomination is not that which the thing is from which it is named, as a grammarian, for he is not the same as the grammar from which he is named. Wherefore if to sit is denominative from sitting, and to stand from standing, but sitting and standing are relative, to sit and to stand, which are denominative from relatives, are not held by the genus of relatives. And universally, whatever is denominated from any positions whatsoever, that can be reduced not to relatives but to the predication which is called situation.\n\nBut contrariety is also present in relation, as virtue is contrary to vice, since each is relative, and knowledge to ignorance. But contrariety is not present in all relatives, for there is nothing contrary to double, nor to triple, nor to any such thing.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":159,"ref":"p159","source":"Quemadmodum in substantia vel quantitate si eorum esset proprium contraria suscipere rimatus est, ita quoque nunc in relativis de contrarietate considerat,utrum relativorum sit proprium contraria posse suscipere,et quoniam virtus et vitia utraque sunt habitus,virtus enim est mentis affectio in bonam partem,et difficile commutabilis,vitium affectio in malam partem,ipsa quoque difficile mobilis et diuturnitate perdurans: quoniam igitur et vitium et virtus habitus sunt, omnis autem habitus a anquid esse monstratus est (habilis enim rei habitus est)erunt virtus atqne vitium relaliva,sed haec contraria sunt,igilur relativa contraria suscipere non recusant.Sed si dicat quis; quid causae est ut virtutem atque vitium ipsumque habitum paulo post inter qualitates numeret?","english":"Just as in substance or quantity, if it were their property to receive contraries, he examined the matter, so too now in the case of relatives he considers contrariety, whether it is the property of relatives to be able to receive contraries. And since virtue and vices are both habits — for virtue is an affection of the mind toward the good, and difficult to change, while vice is an affection toward the bad, itself also difficult to move and enduring through long continuance — since, therefore, both vice and virtue are habits, and every habit has been shown to be a relative (for a habit is a habit of something), virtue and vice will be relatives. But these are contraries; therefore relatives do not refuse to receive contraries. But if someone should say: what is the reason that he shortly afterward numbers virtue and vice, and habit itself, among qualities?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":160,"ref":"p160","source":"Atqui ut alia significatione una res diversis generibus supponatur, nihil prohibet, Socrates namque in eo quod est Socrates substantia est,in eo quod pater vel filius ada aliquid; ita ad aliud atque ad aliud ducta prædicatione eamdem rem sub diverso genere nihil poni prohibet.Habitus quoque et virtus et vitium eodem modo est.Potest enim in qualitate poni habitus quod ex eo quales.homines DUn cupentur,hahentes enim dicimus aliquos rei habitus retinentes.Virtus quoque qualitas est idcirco quod exeo boni hominesdicunturetsecundumillam qualitatem,id est bonitatem,quales homines,id est bonos homines nuncupamus; similiter autem et vitium.Ipse quoque habitus ad aliam prædicationem dictus fil iterum relalivus: quod enim habi tus habilis rei habitus est, ad aliquid est; et quod alicujus virtus est,ad aliquid virtus est, et quod alicujus vitium est, ad aliquid quoqueipsum est. Ergo nihil impedit easdem res ad aliud atque aliud versasdiversae praedicationi substitui.Ipsumvero ad aliquid præter ullum aliud praedicamentum intelligere non possumus,ut patrem et filium, dominum et servum secundum substantiam consideramus.Nam et qui dominus et qui servus est, substantia est. Duplum et triplum secundum quantitatem5haecenim in quantitate consistunt, scientia vero et inscientia secundum qualitatem.","english":"But nothing prevents one and the same thing from being placed under different categories according to a different signification. For Socrates, in that he is Socrates, is a substance, but in that he is a father or a son, he is a relative. Thus, when predication is drawn now to one thing and now to another, nothing prevents the same thing from being placed under a different category. Habit also, and virtue and vice, are in the same way. For habit can be placed in quality, because from it men are said to be of a certain sort; for we say that some are \"having\" when they retain a habit of a thing. Virtue also is a quality, because from it men are said to be good, and according to that quality, that is, goodness, we call men of a certain sort, that is, good men; and similarly also vice. But habit itself, when spoken in relation to another predication, will again be relative; for the habit of a thing is the habit of something habitable, and is relative; and because virtue is of someone, virtue is relative; and because vice is of someone, it too is relative. Therefore nothing prevents the same things, turned now to one thing and now to another, from being placed under a different predication. But we cannot understand \"relative\" itself apart from any other category, as when we consider father and son, master and slave according to substance. For he who is master and he who is slave is a substance. Double and triple are according to quantity; for these consist in quantity. Knowledge, however, and ignorance are according to quality.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":161,"ref":"p161","source":"Secundum enim has quales dicimur, scientes scilicet atque inscii.Quocirca quoniam praeter aliud praedicamentum per se relativa nullus intelliget,secundum ea praedicamenta de quibus intelligitur relatio,secundumeadiciturcontrariapossesuscipere: ut Socrates ipsequidemsubstantiaest,sed substantia contrarium non recipit. Pater vero atque filius secundum substantiam praedicatur, non est enim pater atque filius nisi in substantia sit. Quocirca quoniam secundum substantiam dicitur, contrarietate caret.Rureuaduplumveldimidium secundum quantitatem dicitur,quantitas vero contraria non habere monstrata est; igitur nec du plum atque dimidium contrariis pugnat.Qualitas vero recipit contrarietatem; bonum enim et malum secundum qualitatem opponuntur,bonum igitur et malum contrariis non carent. Igitur secundum quæ prcedicamenta relativa dicuntur, si illa suscipiunt contraria,et relatio suscipit.","english":"For according to these we are called such, namely knowing and unknowing. Wherefore, since no one will understand relatives by themselves apart from another category, according to those categories through which relation is understood, it is said that they can receive contraries: for Socrates himself is indeed a substance, but substance does not receive a contrary. But father and son are predicated according to substance, for one is not father and son unless he be in substance. Wherefore, since it is said according to substance, it lacks contrariety. Again, double or half is said according to quantity, but quantity has been shown to have no contrary; therefore neither does double and half contend with contraries. But quality does receive contrariety; for good and evil are opposed according to quality, therefore good and evil do not lack contraries. Therefore, according to those categories in which relatives are said, if they receive contraries, relation also receives them.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":162,"ref":"p162","source":"Sin vero ilia prius repudiant contrarietatem, nec illud ad aliquid quod secundum ea dicitur ulla Unquam contrarietate dividitur.Quare habere contraria relationis proprium non est,Dam neque in sola relatione est (habet enim hoc quoque qualitas),nec in omnibus ad aliquid considerari potest.Quae enim secundum talia praedicamenta dicuntur ad aliquid quae nonrecipiunt contrarietatem,Utsecundumsubstantiam pater et filius,vel secundum quantitatem duplumetmedium,in talibus relativis contraria nullo modo reperiuntur.Quod vero neque soli neque omnibus inest, hoc proprium non est; non est igilur proprium relationis habere contraria.\n\nVidentur autem magis et minus relativa suscipere: simile enim et dissimile magis et minus dicitur, et æquale et inæquale magis et minus diciturycum utrumque sit relativum,simile enim alicui simile diciturtet inæquale alicui inæquale. Non autem omnia relativa suscipiunt magis et minus, duplex enim non dicitur magis et minus, duplex, nec talium ullum.","english":"But if those categories previously rejected contrariety, neither is that which is said in relation to something according to them ever divided by any contrariety. Wherefore to have contraries is not a property of relation, since it is not in relation alone (for quality also has this), nor can it be considered in all relatives. For those things which are said in relation to something according to such categories as do not receive contrariety—as according to substance father and son, or according to quantity double and half—in such relatives contraries are in no way found. But what is present neither in relation alone nor in all relatives, this is not a property; therefore to have contraries is not a property of relation.\n\nBut relatives seem rather to admit more and less: for like and unlike are said more and less, and equal and unequal are said more and less, since each is a relative; for like is said to be like to something, and unequal unequal to something. But not all relatives admit more and less; for double is not said more and less double, nor is any such thing.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":163,"ref":"p163","source":"Quaeritur nunc an relationis sitpropriumsuscipere magis minuti; sed in hoc ilIa ratio servatur,quemadmodum in contrariis dictum est. Quoniam quaecunque secundum ea dicuntur quae contraria non recipiunt, insa quoque contrariis carent.In hoc vera cum secundum quantitatem dicatur aequale etinaequale,suscipit et magis etminus.Diciturenim magis æquale et minus aequale.Eodem modo et simile,magis simile et minus simile dicitur.Sed si forte quis dicat: cur cum quantitatissitdici æquale et inæquale, etquantitas magis atque minus non suscipiat,sequale et inæquale et intensione crescat et remissione minuatur? Dicendum estquoniam quemadmodum substantia ipsa per se in eo quod substantia est non est proprium,ipsi tamen proprium est contraria posse suscipere, ita etin quantitate consideratur,proprium enim est, non hoc ipsum cujus est proprium, sed quaedam alia extrinsecus qualitaspassioque.Passio enim qualitatis est, et quasdam qualitas aequale et • inaequale dici potest: quod quomam non est laem proprium quod estillud cujus est proprium, et æquale vel inaequale dici, non est quantitas cujus est proprium, sed quædam qualitas et passio quantitatis. Haec'autem dicitur ad aliquid,ipsum enim quod est alteriusdicitur,aequaleenim aequali æquale dicimus, et similiter simile similis simile.","english":"It is asked now whether it is a property of relation to admit of more and less; but in this the same principle is preserved as was stated in the case of contraries. For whatever things are said according to those things which do not receive contraries, these things themselves also lack contraries. But in this case, since equal and unequal are said according to quantity, it admits of more and less. For more equal and less equal are said. In the same way also similar, more similar and less similar are said. But if perhaps someone should say: why, since equal and unequal are said according to quantity, does quantity not admit of more and less, while equal and unequal increase by intensification and diminish by remission? It must be said that just as substance itself through itself, in that which it is substance, is not a property, yet it is a property of it to be able to receive contraries, so also it is considered in quantity; for it is a property, not this very thing of which it is a property, but a certain other extrinsic quality and affection. For it is an affection of quality, and according to a certain quality equal and unequal can be said; which, since it is not the same property as that of which it is a property, so also to be called equal or unequal is not quantity, of which it is a property, but a certain quality and affection of quantity. But these are said in relation to something; for that which is of another is itself said, for we say equal is equal to equal, and similarly similar is similar to similar.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":164,"ref":"p164","source":"Sed non capiunt omnia relativa magis et minus.Nullus enim potest dicere magis et minus duplum esse aliquid: nam sive denarius ad quinarium comparetur, sive quaternarius ad binarium,aequeuterque duplus est,aeque uterque medietas. Qualitas quoque recipit magis et minus, dicimus enim magis album et minus album.Quare quoniam nequeomni relationi nequesoli inest suscipere magis et minus, et per qualitatem relatio suscipit et magis et minus,reJationis proprium non est suscipere magis et minus.\n\nOmnia autem relativa ad convertentia dicuntur, ut servus domini, et dominus servi dominus, et duplum dimidii duplum,et dimidium dupli dimidium, et majus minoremajus,et minus majore minus, similiter autem et in aliis. Sed cusu aliquoties differunt secundum locutionem, ut scientia scibilis rei scientia dicitur,et scibile scientia scibile, et sensus sensibilis sensus,et sensibile sensu sensibile.","english":"But not all relatives admit of more and less. For no one can say that something is more or less double; for whether a ten is compared to a five, or a four to a two, each is equally double, each equally a half. Quality also admits of more and less, for we say more white and less white. Therefore, since it belongs neither to every relation nor to relation alone to admit of more and less, and relation admits of more and less through quality, it is not a property of relation to admit of more and less.\n\nBut all relatives are said in relation to correlatives, as slave to master, and master to slave, and double to half, and half to double, and greater to lesser, and lesser to greater, and similarly in other cases. But sometimes they differ in mode of expression, as knowledge is said to be knowledge of a knowable thing, and a knowable thing is knowable by knowledge, and perception is perception of a perceptible thing, and a perceptible thing is perceptible by perception.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":165,"ref":"p165","source":"Clara haec est proponentis et non involuta sententia.Dicit enim omnia relativa ad convertentia dici, quod ipse propriis patefecit exemplis.Omne enim ad aliquid ita ad aliud praedicatur.utillud ad quod praedicatur videatur posse converti,et hoc est quod ait: Omnia relativa ad convertenlia dicuntur.","english":"This is the clear and straightforward opinion of the one who proposes it. For he says that all relatives are spoken of in relation to things that convert, which he himself made evident by his own examples. For everything that is said in relation to something is predicated of another in such a way that that to which it is predicated seems able to be converted, and this is what he says: all relatives are spoken of in relation to things that convert.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":166,"ref":"p166","source":"Lonverti autem est,ut si prima res dicitur ad secundam,secunda rursus dicatur ad primam.Ponatur enim primus pater,secundus filius,et dicatur hoc modo,pater filii pater est; id rursus converti potest, ut prius ponamus filium,et talis sit praadicatio.filius patris filius.Ergopaterad talem dicitur,id est ad filium qui convertitur: et filius qui dicitur ad patrem, ad talem rem dicitur,quae ipsa quoque convertitur,ut de filio praedicetur.Omniaque relativa hoc modo sunt,omne enimrelativumadtalealiquid praedicaturquodipsum in praedicatione converti possit.Sed necomniadicuntur secundum eamdem vocis prolationem.Alia enini, sunt quae eisdem casibus convertuntur, ut dictum est, pater enim filii pater est,et filius patris filius est.Aliavero quae non eisdem,ut scientia scibilis rei scientia est: hic genitivus est medius.Scibile aulem scientia scibile est: hic septimus praedicationem tenet.Alia vero nullo (ut supra dictum est) casu conjuncta sibimet convertuntur, ut mons magnus ad parvum dicitur,et parvus ad magnum.Ergo omnia relativa ad convertentia dicuntur,quamvis non eisdem casibus convertantur,quod ipse ait dicens: Sed casu aliquoties differunt secundum locutionem. Quod vero addidit nimis diligenter adjectum est.","english":"To convert, however, is when the first thing is said in relation to the second, and the second in turn is said in relation to the first. For let the first be placed as father, the second as son, and let it be said in this way: the father is father of the son; this in turn can be converted, so that we place the son first, and the predication is such: the son is son of the father. Therefore the father is said in relation to such a thing, that is, to the son, which converts; and the son, who is said in relation to the father, is said in relation to such a thing, which itself also converts, so that it is predicated of the son. And all relatives are in this way, for every relative is predicated in relation to something such that it can itself be converted in predication. But they are not all said according to the same pronunciation of the word. For some are converted with the same cases, as was said: for the father is father of the son, and the son is son of the father. Others, however, are not converted with the same cases, as knowledge is knowledge of a knowable thing: here the genitive is in the middle. But the knowable is knowable by knowledge: here the seventh case holds the predication. Others, however, are converted when joined to each other by no case, as was said above: as a mountain is said to be great in relation to a small one, and small in relation to a great one. Therefore all relatives are said in relation to things that convert, although they are not converted with the same cases, which he himself says when he states: But sometimes they differ in case according to the manner of speaking. But what he added has been added with excessive care.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":167,"ref":"p167","source":"At veru aliquoties non videbitur converti, nisiconvenienter ad quod dicitur assignetur. Si peccet is qui ossignat, ut ala si assignetur avis, non convertitur avis alæ, neque enim prius convenienterassignatum est,alaavis;■ neque enim in eo quod avis est,in eo avis ala dicitur, sed in eo quod alata est. Multorum enim aliorum alæ sunt,quæ non sunt aues: quare si assignetur conveniell' ter,convertitur,ut ala alati ala,et alatum ala alatum. Aliquoties autem forsitan et nomina fingere necesse erit, si non fuerit positum nomen, et ad quod convenienter assignetur,ut remus, si navis assignetur,non erit conveniens assignatio.Neque enim in eo quod est navis,in eo ejus remus dicitur, sunt enim naves quarum remi non sunt: quare non convertitur,navis enim non dicitur remi navis.Sed forte convenientior assignatio erit,si sic quodammoqo assignetue,remus remitae rei remus,aut aliquo modo aliter: nomen enim non est positum;convertitur autem si convenienter assignetut, remilum enim remo remitum est. Similiter autem et in aliis,ut caput, convenientius assignatur capitati,quam si animalisassignetur;neque enim in eo quodanimal est, caput habet, multa enim sunt animalia quae capita non habent.","english":"But sometimes it will not seem to convert unless it is assigned in relation to something fitting. If the one who assigns makes a mistake, as if wing is assigned to bird, bird does not convert with wing; for wing was not fittingly assigned to bird in the first place. For it is not insofar as it is a bird that wing is said of it, but insofar as it is winged. For there are wings of many other things that are not birds. Therefore, if it is assigned fittingly, it converts, as wing of a winged thing, and winged thing of wing. But sometimes it will perhaps even be necessary to coin names, if no name has been established, and for that to which it may be fittingly assigned. For example, if oar is assigned to ship, the assignment will not be fitting. For it is not insofar as it is a ship that oar is said of it; for there are ships that have no oars. Therefore it does not convert, for ship is not said to be ship of oar. But perhaps the assignment will be more fitting if it is assigned somehow thus: oar of an oared thing, or in some other way. For no name has been established. But it converts if it is assigned fittingly; for an oared thing is oared by an oar. Similarly also in other cases, as head is more fittingly assigned to a headed thing than if it is assigned to animal. For it is not insofar as it is an animal that it has a head, for many animals are without heads.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":168,"ref":"p168","source":"Supra jam de relativorum conversione proposuit, dixitque quidquid est ad aliquid,vel eisdem casibus vel dissimilibus,tamen ad convertentiadici:hocvero idcircoevenit quod omne ad aliquid esse suum ex alteriushabitudineetcomparationetrabit;quodsi utraque secundum ad aliquid sint opposita,ad aliquid nuncu panturæ quam vim vocabuli nuncu pationemque sortita.Mam si pater et filius utrique ad aliquid sunt, si pater ad filium praedicatur,quoniam ad aliquid est, filius quoque, quia ad aliquid est,ad quoddam aliud Draedicabitur.sed nullius est filius nisi patris. Ergo X ' hæc vocabula ex alterutra nuncupatione principium sumunt.Quocirca quae sibi invicem substantiam donant,recte ad se invicem praedicantur,ethoc quidem in omnibus relativis constatintelligi.Sed hujusmodi conversio non uno modo, nec quomodolibet fieri potest; nisi enim convenienter quaelibet iila res ad id quod dicitur prsedicetur,hujusmodi conversio nulla ratione convertitur. Cum enim dicaturcaputanimalis caput dici non potest,antmal capitis animal.Ergo ita redditum nulla ratione convertitur. Atque hoc est quod ait,non videri in omnibus relativis posse converti,nisi convenienter ad quod dicitur assignetur.","english":"He has already set forth above concerning the conversion of relatives, and said that whatever is in relation to something is predicated as convertible either with the same cases or with dissimilar ones. But this happens for the reason that every being in relation draws its existence from the condition and comparison of another. But if both are opposites according to relation, they are called relatives no less than the force and naming of the word has allotted. For if father and son are both relatives, if father is predicated in relation to son, since he is a relative, son also, since he is a relative, will be predicated in relation to something else. But he is no one's son except his father's. Therefore these terms take their beginning from the naming of each other. Wherefore those things which grant substance to each other are rightly predicated in relation to each other, and this indeed holds to be understood in all relatives. But conversion of this kind cannot come about in one way, nor in any chance manner; for unless any given thing is predicated fittingly in relation to that to which it is said, conversion of this kind is in no way converted. For when head of an animal is said, animal of a head cannot be said. Therefore, thus rendered back, it is in no way converted. And this is what he says: that it does not seem possible in all relatives to convert, unless it is assigned fittingly in relation to that to which it is said.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":169,"ref":"p169","source":"Si enim peccet is qui assignat, ut non convenientem prædicationem faciat,conversio non procedit; quæ tamen estpsa convenientia qua possint semper rel ativa converti, hujusmodi est.-Cum enim dico alam avis esse alam,non convertitur, ut avis alae sit avis, idcirco quod non est convenienter facta praedicatio: non enim in eo quod avis est,in eo habet aiam;multa. enim suntquae habent alam,aves tamen nullo modo nominantur,ut apes sunt et vespertiliones, et quidquid est aliud tale,habere quidem dicimus alas, eas tamen aves non dicimus.Quare non in eo quod avis est, in eo est ejus ala, sed in eo quod alata est; idcirco enim alamhabet,quoniam alataest:etquidquid fuerit alatum,alas habebit.Quare ita facta praedicatio illam conversionem retinet atque custodit, ala enim alati ala est, et alatum ala alatum est. Eodem quoque modo de capite: si quis dicat caput animalis est caput,non convenienter vim praedicationis aptabit; non enim in eo quod animal est,in eo habet caput,multa enim sunt animalia quae capite carenl,ut ostrea,et conchylia,et caetera hujusmodi.Igitur dicendum estcaputcapilatas rei esse caput,et capitatam rem capite esse capilatam.Videsne quemadmodum conveniens praedicatio alternam in se vocabuli conversionem reversionemque reddiderit? Ita quoque speculandum est et de alio exemplo quod ipse proposuit.","english":"For if he who assigns it errs, so as to make a predication that is not fitting, the conversion does not proceed; yet the very fittingness by which relatives can always be converted is of this sort. For when I say that a wing is a bird's wing, it is not converted so that a bird is a wing's bird, for the reason that the predication has not been made fittingly; for in that it is a bird, it does not have a wing. For there are many things that have a wing, yet are in no way called birds, as bees are, and bats, and whatever else is of this sort; we say indeed that they have wings, yet we do not call them birds. Wherefore it is not in that it is a bird that it has its wing, but in that it is winged; for it has a wing because it is winged, and whatever is winged will have wings. Wherefore a predication made in this way retains and preserves that conversion: for a wing is the wing of a winged thing, and a winged thing is winged by a wing. In the same way also concerning the head: if someone says that a head is the head of an animal, he will not fittingly adapt the force of the predication; for it is not in that it is an animal that it has a head, for many animals are without a head, as oysters, and shellfish, and others of this sort. Therefore it must be said that a head is the head of a headed thing, and that a headed thing is headed by a head. Do you see how a fitting predication has rendered the alternate conversion and reversion of the term within itself? In this way too one must consider also the other example that he himself proposed.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":170,"ref":"p170","source":"Remus enim si navis remus dicatur, nullo modo convertitur,ut navis remi navis esse nominetur.Sunt enim quaedam naves quae remis penitus non utuntur,ut lintres quas solo subigunt conto, et idcirco non convertitur. Dicendum est igitur remum remitae rei esse remum,et remitam rem remo esse remitam.Necesse quoque erit nomen fingere, si positum non sit:nam quemadmodum filius patris filius, et pater filii pater,reciproca conversione praedicantur,et utrumque nomen in usu est, sic, si defuerit nomen,ipse tibi aliquid debebis effingere, ut in eo quod est,ala alati ala;alatum enim noviter factum est,et nunquam antedictum. Quo autem modo possimusnominaipsaconfingere,quoniam necessarium esse posuimus, artem quoquecomponendisequenti ordine demonstremus. Sed hoc faciendum est, si prius illud purgavero,quod quidam contra Aristotelem culpandi studio ponunt. Aiunt enim non esse solius relationis ad convertentiam dici Si quis enim sic dicat: cum sol super terram est,dies est,et cum dies est super terram,sol est, recipiunt haec quoque conversionem, quae confessae a relativorum definitione segregata sunt.Non igitur in solis relativis,inquiunt,caditista conversio.Sed Jaroblicusduashujus rei protulit solutiones,unam pervacuam,aliam vero perforem.","english":"For if an oar is called the oar of a ship, it is in no way converted, so that the ship is said to be the ship of the oar. For there are certain ships that do not use oars at all, such as skiffs which they propel with a pole alone, and for this reason it is not converted. It must therefore be said that an oar is the oar of a thing oared, and that a thing oared is oared by an oar. It will also be necessary to coin a name, if one has not been established; for just as a son is called the son of a father, and a father the father of a son, by reciprocal conversion, and each name is in use, so, if a name is lacking, you will yourself have to fashion something for yourself, as in the case of a wing: the wing of a winged thing; for \"winged\" has been newly made and was never said before. But in what way we can coin the names themselves, since we have laid down that it is necessary, let us also demonstrate the art of composing them in the following order. But this must be done if I first clear away that objection which certain people, out of a zeal for finding fault, raise against Aristotle. For they say that conversion does not belong to relation alone. For if someone says thus: when the sun is above the earth, it is day, and when it is day, the sun is above the earth, these too admit of conversion, which are admittedly separated from the definition of relatives. Therefore, they say, this conversion does not fall only under relatives. But Iamblichus brought forth two solutions of this matter, one altogether worthless, the other truly sound.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":171,"ref":"p171","source":"Ait enim nihil officere ad Aristotelis sententiam, si et alia convertantur; non enim inquit Aristoteles solis hoc relativis esse,sed,omnibus namque hoc relativis inest,nec ulla ratione negari potest: quocirca quoniam non dixiL Aristoteles solis hoc inesse relativis,illorum quæstio hujus praeclari philosophi sententiam non moratur. Sed hoc potius accidentis est quam natune, et ad aliud quodammodo refugium concurrentis potius quamexipsaAristotelis auctoritate dictorum ejus aliquod propugnacu- lum comparantis.Aliam vero attulit causam prorsus gravem: a:t enim proprium esse hoc relativorum, non secundum suamnuncupationem,sed secundum aliquamhabitudinem,eodem modoconverti.Quienim dicit cum sol est super terram,dies est,et cum dies est, sol est superterram: nullam habitudinem monstrat,sed tantummodo consequentiam ostendit.Consequiturenim super terram solem esse cum dies est, etcum sol superterram cursus agat,diem esse;cum vero aliquis dicit filius patris filius,et pater filii pater, habitudinem et comparationem et quodammodo continentia mutrorumque declarat.Atque hoc quoque in alia quavis relatione spectare Iicet.Quocirca quoniam omnia ad aliquid secundum quamdam ad se invicem habitudinem continentiamque dicuntur,se-. cundum continentiam quoque ethabitudinern eorum conversio facienda est,qua in re nos quoque graviter dicentis Jamblici auctoritati concedimus.","english":"For he says that it makes no difference to Aristotle's view if other things are also converted; for Aristotle, he says, did not say that this belongs to relatives alone, but it belongs to all relatives, nor can it be denied on any account. Wherefore, since Aristotle did not say that this belongs to relatives alone, their question does not hinder the view of this most illustrious philosopher. But this is rather a matter of accident than of nature, and one who has recourse somehow to another refuge, rather than from the authority of Aristotle himself, is seeking some defense from his words. But he brought forward another thoroughly weighty cause: for he says that it is proper to relatives to be converted in the same way, not according to their own designation, but according to some relation. For one who says, when the sun is above the earth, it is day, and when it is day, the sun is above the earth, shows no relation, but only displays a consequence. For it follows that the sun is above the earth when it is day, and when the sun runs its course above the earth, that it is day. But when someone says that a son is the son of a father, and a father is the father of a son, he declares a relation and a comparison and, in a certain way, a mutual containment. And this too one may observe in any other relation whatsoever. Wherefore, since all things that are said in relation to something are said according to a certain relation and containment toward each other, the conversion of them must also be made according to containment and relation. In this matter we too yield weightily to the authority of Iamblichus, who says this.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":172,"ref":"p172","source":"Nunc vero quaesitars fingendi nomina sicubi desunt,dicendum videtur,quam ipse Aristoteles his verbis tradit.\n\nSic autem fortasse quis facile sumet in quibus nomen est positum, si ab his quæ prima sunt his ad quæ convertuntur nomina ponat, ut in his quæ dicta sunt, ab ala alatum, a remo remitum. Omnia ergo quæ ad aliquid dicuntur, si convenienter assignentur, ad conver tentiam dicuntur.\n\nQuoniam sunt quae ita dicuntur ad aliquid,ut nisi convenienteraptenturconversio nulla sit,in omnibus autem ad aliquid conversionem exspectari necesse est,quae sit hæc convenientia, et quemadmodum assignari relationes oporteat,ipse demonstrat. Si quid enimdicitur ad aliquid quod converti non possit,ab ipso quod dicitur si denominatio fit,mox convertitur: utaladicitur avis,etrectaquidemesth ahæc prædicatio, sed ad naturamrelationisincongrua.Nuncigiturquoniam ici non potest avis alæ,dicitur autem ala avis, ab ipsa praedicatione,quae ad aliud praedicatur,si denominatio fit, mox redit consueta conversio relativis. Nam cum dicitur ala avis, ut dicatur avis alæ,inconveniens est; si vero ex ala fiat denominatio,ut dicatur ala alati,sic conversio manet. Alatum enim ala alatum esse dicimus,sicut alam alati esse alam.","english":"But now, if at any point names for forming [relations] are lacking, it seems we must say what Aristotle himself hands down in these words.\n\nPerhaps, then, one may easily supply [a name] in those cases where a name has been posited, if from the things that are primary he assigns names to those to which they are converted, as in the cases already mentioned: from wing, winged; from oar, oared. Therefore all things that are said in relation to something, if they are assigned appropriately, are said in relation to a convertible.\n\nSince there are things that are said in relation to something in such a way that, unless they are fitted appropriately, there is no conversion, yet in all relatives a conversion must be expected, he himself shows what this appropriateness is and how relations ought to be assigned. For if anything is said in relation to something that cannot be converted, and a denomination is made from that very thing which is said, it is at once converted: for example, a bird is said [to be] of a wing, and this predication is indeed correct, but incongruous with the nature of the relation. Now, therefore, since a bird cannot [be said] of a wing, but a wing is said [to be] of a bird, if a denomination is made from that very predication which is predicated in relation to another, the customary conversion for relatives at once returns. For when a wing is said [to be] of a bird, it is incongruous that a bird be said [to be] of a wing; but if a denomination is made from wing, so that it be said \"wing of a winged thing,\" thus the conversion remains. For we say that a winged thing is winged by a wing, just as we say that a wing is the wing of a winged thing.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":173,"ref":"p173","source":"Et hoc idem in remo evenit.Nam quoniam remus navis dicitur, et remi navis ut sit ulla ratione convertitur,si ex remo sitdenominatio,statim reddit ex more conversio.Dicimus enim esse remum remitas rei esse remum,ethocilli convertitur.Remita enimres remo remita est. Ergo ex eo quod prius dicitur, nomen fingendum est, sicut ex eo quod est ala, quoniam prius ad avem non dicitur, quia avis ad alam non convertitur,denominatio facta est, ut diceretur alatum. Atque hoc est quod ait, si ab his quae prima sunt his ad quae convertuntur nomina ponantur. Prima namque praedicatio est ab ala.Dicimus enim alam avis, et hoc quaerimus ut ad alam praedicatio convertatur. Ergo ab eo quod prius dicitur, illi ad quod convertitur nomen fingendum est, ut ea quae prius dicitur ala, rei ad quam convertitur sic ut convenienter aptetur,fingendum est nomen alatum, quod ipsum ex ala denominatum est,atque hoc idem et in cæteris relativis licet intelligi.","english":"And the same thing happens in the case of the oar. For since an oar is said to be of a ship, and it is converted in some way so that the ship is of the oar, if the denomination is from the oar, the conversion is immediately rendered according to custom. For we say that an oar is an oar-thing of the thing that is an oar, and this is converted to it. For a thing that is oar-related is oar-related by an oar. Therefore, from that which is said prior, a name must be fashioned, just as from that which is a wing, since it is not said prior in relation to a bird, because a bird is not converted to a wing, a denomination has been made, so that it might be called winged. And this is what he says: if names are assigned from those things which are first to those to which they are converted. For the predication is first from the wing. For we say a wing of a bird, and this we seek, that the predication be converted to the wing. Therefore, from that which is said prior, a name must be fashioned for that to which it is converted, so that for that which is said prior, namely the wing, a name must be fashioned, namely winged, so that it may be suitably fitted to the thing to which it is converted, which itself is denominated from the wing, and this same thing may also be understood in the other relatives.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":174,"ref":"p174","source":"Nam si ad quodlibet aliud assignentur, et non ad illud ad quod dicitur, non convertuntur. Dico autem quoniam nec eorum quæ indubitanter convertibilia dicuntur,etquibusnomina posita sunt,ullum convertitur, si ad aliquid eorum quæ sunt accidentia assignentur,et non ad ea ad quas dicuntur: ut servus, si domini non assignetur servus, sedhominis,vel bipedisyaut alicujus taliumtnon convertitur. Non enim et conveniens assignatio.\n\nAliud quoque argumentum dedit, si relatione convenienter non reddantur, non posse converti. Fortasse enim quis dicat alam et caput non esse ad ahquid: quod si quis hoc quoque concedat,illud tamen nuJlus negare poterit,quin servus aut filiussemper ad aliud praedicentur. Ergo in hac quoque re, quae confessae relativa est, perit relationis propria conversio, si non convenienter et ad illud ad quod proprie dicitur assignetur.Nam cum sit ad aliquid servus,nisi domini reddatur, id est, ad id ad quod convenienter diciturjnullahacratione conversio est. Dicatur ergo servus hominis,vel servus bipedis, non convertitur, ut dicat quis bipedem esse servi, aut hominem esse servi. Eodem quoque modo de filio. Ergo quaecunque sunt extrinsecus, si ad ea id quod est ad aliquid praedicetur, nulla conversio est.","english":"For if they are assigned to anything else whatever, and not to that to which they are said [to belong], they are not converted. I say, moreover, that not even of those things which are said to be indisputably convertible, and for which names have been assigned, is any one converted, if they are assigned to any of those things which are accidents, and not to those to which they are said [to belong]: as a slave, if a slave is not assigned to a master, but to a man, or to a biped, or to some such thing, is not converted. For neither is the assignment fitting.\n\nHe also gave another argument, that if relatives are not rendered fittingly, they cannot be converted. For perhaps someone might say that a wing and a head are not relative. But even if someone grants this too, nevertheless no one will be able to deny that a slave or a son is always predicated in relation to something else. Therefore in this matter too, which is admittedly relative, the proper conversion of relation is lost, if it is not assigned fittingly and to that to which it is properly said [to belong]. For since a slave is relative, unless he is rendered as of a master, that is, in relation to that to which he is fittingly said [to belong], by no reasoning is there conversion here. Let a slave, then, be called of a man, or a slave of a biped: it is not converted, so that someone may say that a biped is of a slave, or that a man is of a slave. In the same way also concerning a son. Therefore, whatever things are external, if that which is relative is predicated of them, there is no conversion.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":175,"ref":"p175","source":"Quod autem ait accidentia,non quod homo sit accidens,aut bipes,differentia hominis accidenter insit, sed interdum consuetudinis Aristotelicae estuae secundo loco et extrinsecus praedicantur, dicere secundum accidens prædicari. Servus autem prius ad hominem est, secundo vero loco ad hominem. Idcirco enim quod dominus homo est,ideo servus ad hominem dicitur. Et idcirco quia dominus bipes est, ideo servus bipedis dicitur. Ergo secundum accidens dixit secundo loco, volens ostendere extraneam et non convenientem fieri praedicationem,si quis ad hominem vel hipedem servum et non ad dominum referat.Manifestumigitur est quoniam in his quoque quae confessae sunt ad aliquid, et in quibus nomina sunt. Nomen enim et servi et domini in usu est,non quemadmodum in remo aut in ala, ubi neque alatum neque remitum nomen fuit, nisi ipse fingeret Aristoteles. Cum ergo hæc ita sint, manifestum est quoniam si non convenienter aptarentur, conversionem praedicatio non teneret.","english":"But what he says about accidents—not that man is an accident, or that biped, a differentia of man, inheres in man accidentally, but that sometimes, by the usage of Aristotle, things are predicated in the second place and extrinsically, he calls being predicated according to accident. Now a slave is first in relation to man, but in the second place in relation to man. For because the master is a man, therefore a slave is said [to be] of a man. And because the master is biped, therefore a slave is said [to be] of a biped. Therefore he said \"according to accident\" and \"in the second place,\" wishing to show that the predication becomes extraneous and unsuitable if one refers a slave to man or to biped and not to the master. It is evident, therefore, that this holds also in those things which are confessed to be relative, and in which there are names. For the name of both slave and master is in use, not as in the case of the oar or the wing, where neither \"winged\" nor \"oared\" was a name, unless Aristotle himself coined it. Since these things are so, it is evident that if they were not suitably fitted together, the predication would not hold its conversion.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":176,"ref":"p176","source":"Amplius si convenienter assignetur id ad quod dicitur, omnibus aliis circum scriptis quæcunque accidentia sunt relicto solo illo ad quod assignatum est, semper ad ipsum convenienter dicitur ut si servus dicatur ad dominum. circumscriptis aliis omnibus quæsunt accidentiadomino,ul esse bipedem,lJel scientiæ susceptibilem, vel hominemjreliciosolo domino,semper servus dicetur ad ipsum, servus enim domini servus dicitur.Si autem non convenienter reddatur id ad quod dicitur, circumscriptis omnibus aliis, relictoque illo solo ad quod redditum est, non dicetur ad aliud: assignetur enim servus hominis, et ala avis, circum scribaturque ab homine esse dominum, non amplius servus ad hominem dicetur, cum enim dominus non sit, servus non est. Similiter autem et de ave: adimatur ab ea alatam esse, non erit arnplius ala ad aliquid, cum enim non [sit alatum, nec ala erit alicujus. Quare oportet assignare id ad quod convenienter dicitur. Ac si sit nomen positum, facilis erit assignatio; sin autem non sil, fortasse erit necessarium fingere nomen; si sic autem redduntur, manifestum est, quoniam omnia relativa conversim dicentur.","english":"Furthermore, if that to which something is said to be related is assigned appropriately, then when all other things are excluded, whatever accidents there are, with only that to which it has been assigned left remaining, it is always said appropriately in relation to it—as if a slave is said to be related to a master. When all other things that are accidents of the master have been excluded—such as being biped, or capable of knowledge, or a human being—with only the master left remaining, a slave will always be said in relation to him; for a slave is said to be the slave of a master. But if that to which it is said to be related is not rendered appropriately, then when all other things have been excluded and only that to which it has been rendered is left remaining, it will not be said in relation to another. For let a slave be assigned to a human being, and a wing to a bird, and let being a master be excluded from the human being: a slave will no longer be said in relation to a human being, for when there is no master, there is no slave. Similarly also concerning the bird: let being winged be taken away from it, and a wing will no longer be relative to something, for when it is not winged, neither will a wing be anyone's. Therefore one must assign that to which something is appropriately said to be related. And if a name has been established, the assignment will be easy; but if not, perhaps it will be necessary to invent a name. If these things are rendered in this way, however, it is clear that all relatives will be spoken of by conversion.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[{"kind":"lacuna","severity":"caution","text":"The source is fragmentary here: the edition marks a break or an editorial bracket, and the English carries across it. Treat the bridge as supplied, not translated."}]},{"i":177,"ref":"p177","source":"Aliud quoque validum addidit argumentum in omni secundum ad aliquid,prxedicatione solam esse assignationis convenientiam requirendam.Quo enim permanente cunctis aliis pereuntibus relativorum praedicatio constat,et quo pereunte cunctis aliis permanentibus,ad aliquid praedicatio non manet,illud estad quod convenienter nominis relatio referatur. Qui enim dominus est,idem ei homo est, idemque bipes,idem quoque scientiæ perceptibilis. Ad quodlibet igitur horam servus non prædicabitur,si dominus non sit; quod si dominus sit,etiamsi quodlibet horum pereat,nihil impeditpraedicationem. Prædicetur enim servus ad dominum,et ab eo caetera perimantur. Pereant enim ab eo quod esl homo, ac bipes,quod scientiae perceptibilis, his omnibus pereuntibus,dominus solus permaneat; caeteris igitur pereuntibus, servus tamen nihilominus dicitur ad dominum, ad hominem vero non dicitur, pereunte enim domini nomine,servi ad hominem nulla prædicatio est,quod si ad dominum servus non referatur,pereatque domini nomen,omnibus aliis manen. ' tibus,non erit praedicatio. Auferatur enim dominus et maneat homo, et bipes,et scienliae perceptibilis, non potest dici servus hominis, vel servus bipedie.","english":"He also adds another strong argument: in every predication relative to something, only the appropriateness of the assignment is to be required. For that, while it remains and all other things perish, keeps the predication of relatives standing, and when it perishes while all other things remain, the predication relative to something does not remain—that is what the relation of the name is appropriately referred to. For he who is a master is the same as a human being, the same as a biped, the same as one capable of knowledge. Therefore a slave will not be predicated in relation to any of these, if there is no master; but if there is a master, even if any of these perishes, nothing hinders the predication. For let a slave be predicated in relation to a master, and let the rest be removed from him. For let human being, biped, and capable of knowledge be removed from him; with all these perishing, let the master alone remain. Therefore, with the rest perishing, a slave is nonetheless said in relation to a master, but is not said in relation to a human being; for when the name of master perishes, there is no predication of a slave in relation to a human being. But if a slave is not referred to a master, and the name of master perishes while all other things remain, there will be no predication. For let the master be removed and let human being, biped, and capable of knowledge remain: a slave cannot be said to be of a human being, or a slave of a biped.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":178,"ref":"p178","source":"Domino enim non manente servusinterit:quare manente domino ad quod servus convenienteraptatur, cuneUs aliis pereuntibus.prædicatio manet; sublato vero domino, ad quem est conveniens praedicatio, cunctis aliis manentibus prædicatio non est.Eodem modo etiam de ala; nisi enim ad alatum referatur, cunctis aliis manentibus integra praedicatio non est. Adeo non solum non convertitur,sed nec prædicatio ulla erit,nisi relatio ei ad quod convenienter dicitur assignetur.","english":"For if the master does not remain, the slave perishes; therefore, while the master remains, that to which the slave is fittingly assigned, though all other things perish, the predication remains. But if the master is removed, to whom the predication is fittingly directed, while all other things remain, there is no predication. In the same way also concerning the wing: for unless it is referred to the winged creature, while all other things remain, the predication is not complete. To such an extent is it not only not convertible, but there will not even be any predication, unless the relation to that to which it is fittingly said is assigned.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":179,"ref":"p179","source":"Simul etiam hæc quoque ars est et via noscendi,cum in natura multa sunt,ad quod potissimum relatio praedicetur.Nam cum in domino sit,et homo,et animal, etdisciplinse perceptibile,et bipes, in servo quoque idem, ad quod horum aut domini nomen aut servi referre possimus,sic ostenditur.Qua enim re manente sublatis cæteris praedicatio valet, et qua re sublata caeteris manentibus, intercipitur praedicatio.adillud relatio reclissime'prædicatur.His igitur positis totius argumenti vim sententiamque concludit, ait enim: omnia quæcunque ad aliquid sunt aequa praedicatione converti hoc autem hujusmodi est.Qusecunque enim ad se invicem aequaliter praedicantur,et conversione facta retorquentur, illa aequali natura et dimensione fundata sunt, ut sunt propria et species.Relativa quoque ut convertantur, aequalia esse oportet.Nam si una res amplior, alia fuerit minor,conversionem non habent, nam in eo quod est ala avis, minuo est avis ala, multa enim sunt quæ alas habent, et aves non sunt, atque ideo conversio non fit. Et in eo quod est remus navis, major est navis remo, multæ enim naves sunt quarum remi non sunt; quare in his nulla potest esse conversio. Si vero sint aequalia ut filius at-que pater, conversio non fugit. Nunquam enim est filius nisi patris,et rursus nunquam pater est nisi filii. Quocirca aequalia esse oportet quæcunque ad aliquid praedicantur.","english":"At the same time this is also an art and a way of knowing, since there are many things in nature, to which of them relation is most especially predicated. For since in a master there is both man and animal and capable of discipline and biped, and the same in a slave, it is shown to which of these we can refer either the name of master or of slave. For that thing, while it remains and all others are removed, the predication holds, and when that thing is removed while the others remain, the predication is cut off, relation is most rightly predicated to that. With these things therefore posited, he concludes the force and meaning of the whole argument, for he says: all things whatsoever that are relative are converted by an equal predication. But this is of the following sort. For whatever things are predicated equally of each other and, with conversion made, are turned back, those are founded on an equal nature and dimension, as are property and species. Relatives also, in order that they be converted, must be equal. For if one thing is greater and another lesser, they do not have conversion; for in that which is the wing of a bird, the bird is less than the wing, for there are many things that have wings and are not birds, and therefore conversion does not occur. And in that which is the oar of a ship, the ship is greater than the oar, for there are many ships of which there are no oars; wherefore in these there can be no conversion. But if they are equal, as son and father, conversion does not escape. For there is never a son except of a father, and again there is never a father except of a son. Wherefore whatever things are predicated relatively must be equal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":180,"ref":"p180","source":"Horum vero si nomen sit positum, positis nominibus uti oportet.Si vero nomen positum.:: non sit, ex his quae in prima praedicatione sunt (ut; superius dictum est) nomen oportet effigere. Quod, si ila reddantur ut omne ad aliquid convenienterad quod dicitur praedicetur, et aequalis ent prædicatio, et mox conversionis reciproca natura subsequitur. Cone tat igitur omnia relativa ad convertentia dici. His aliud proprium jungit.\n\nVidentur autem ad aliquid simul esse natura, et in pluribus quidem verum est.In aliquibus autem verum non est: simul enim duplum est, et dimidium, et cum sit dimidium,duplurn est; et cum sit dominus, seruus est; et cum sit seruus,dominusest.Similiter autem his et alia,simul etiam auferunt hæc sese invicem.Si enim non sit duplum,non est dimidium,et si non est dimidium,non est duplum3simihter autem et in aliis quæcunque talia sunt.","english":"But if a name has been assigned to these, one ought to use the assigned names. If, however, no name has been assigned, it is necessary to fashion a name from those things which are in the first predication, as was said above. But if they are rendered such that everything relative is predicated in a fitting way to what it is said in relation to, the predication will also be equal, and the reciprocal nature of conversion immediately follows. It is agreed, therefore, that all relatives are said in relation to things that convert. To these he joins another property.\n\nRelative things also seem to exist simultaneously by nature, and in many cases this is true. In some cases, however, it is not true: for simultaneously there is double and half, and when there is half, there is double; and when there is master, there is slave; and when there is slave, there is master. Similarly in these and other cases, they also mutually remove each other. For if there is no double, there is no half, and if there is no half, there is no double; similarly also in other cases of this sort.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":181,"ref":"p181","source":"Illa simul esse dicuntur quaecunque talia sunt,ut uno posito quolibet aliud necessario subsequatur,et uno quolibet perempto aliud modis omnibus interimatur,ut pater et filius. Nam cum pater est, filium quoque esse necesse est; cum sit filius, pater est. Rursus si pereat filius,patrem quoque perire manifestum est, non quod pareat ipsa substantia,ut pereunte Hectore Priamus pereat,sed perit ipsa relatio. Ergo quoniam vel interempto patris nomine,fiJii nomen perit,sublato quoque filii nomine nomen patris perit. Posito etiam patre in subslantiaque constituto, filii quoque nomen infertur, et posito filii nomine sequitur patris et a patris nominenuoquam separatur,idcirco pater et filius simul esse dicuntur. Ergo simul ea sunt quae se invicem vel interimunt vel inferunt,et de his quidem ipse posterius tractat. Nunc autem hoc quoque inesse relativis exposuit,dicens retativis quoque esse ut simul sint; nam cum duplum sit, dimidium est, etcumdimidium, duplum.Hujus autem argumentum est, quod interempto duplo dimidium perit.Rursus quoque duplo constituto, dimidium constituitur. Igitur quoniam duplum atque dimidium relativa sunt, et haec simul sunt natura, id est ipsa essentia, et hoc manifestum est quoque relativis accidere, ut simul natura esse videantur. Idem quoque est in eo quod est servus et dominus.","english":"Those things are said to be simultaneous, whatever are of such a kind that, when any one is posited, another necessarily follows, and when any one is destroyed, the other is in every way done away with, as father and son. For when the father exists, the son must also exist; when the son exists, the father exists. Again, if the son perishes, it is manifest that the father also perishes—not that the substance itself perishes, as when Hector perishes Priam perishes, but the relation itself perishes. Therefore, since when the name of the father is done away with, the name of the son perishes, and when the name of the son is removed, the name of the father also perishes. And when the father is posited and established in substance, the name of the son is also brought in, and when the name of the son is posited, the father's follows and is never separated from the name of the father; for this reason father and son are said to be simultaneous. Therefore those things are simultaneous which mutually either destroy or imply one another, and concerning these he treats later. But now he has set forth that this also belongs to relatives, saying that it is proper to relatives also to be simultaneous; for when the double exists, the half exists, and when the half exists, the double. And the proof of this is that, when the double is done away with, the half perishes. Again, when the double is established, the half is established. Therefore, since the double and the half are relatives, and these are simultaneous by nature, that is, in their very essence, it is also manifest that this happens to relatives, so that they seem to be simultaneous by nature. The same also holds in the case of slave and master.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":182,"ref":"p182","source":"Nam quoniam alterutris interemptis uterque deperit, et alterutro constituto uterque subsistit, constat servum atque dominum cum sint ad aliquid simul esse natura. Sed haecita sunt, ut sint quidem in relativis, sed omnibus his quae sunt ad aliquid non aequentur. Sunt enim quaedam relativa quorum unum prius natura sit, quod ipse rursus adjecit.\n\nNon autem in omnibus relativis verum videtur esse ut sint simul natura. Scibile enim scientia prius naturaliter esse videtUl. Namque ut plurimum prius rebus subsistentibus scientias accepimus. In paucis vero vel nullis hoc quis reperiet, simul cumscibiliscientiam esse factam.\n\nProposuit non in omnibus relativis esse hoc, ut videantur simul esse natura; hoc autem probat ex his,quod quoniam scientia ad aliquid est (scibilis enim rei scientia dicitur), non poterit esse scientia, nisi sit res aliqua quae sciri possit.Hanc autem primam esse necesse est, ut in matheseos disciplina. Scimus enim triangulumtresinteriores angulos duobus recti!! angulis æquos habere. Unde necesse est prius fuisse quod sciri posset, postea vero ad hanc rem aptam fuisse notitiam. Atque hoc est quod ait: Namque in pluribus subsistentibus rebus scientias accipimus.priusenimrebusconstitutiset quasi praepositis scientiae ratio sequitur.Quare non est in omnibus relativis simul esse natura.Nam cum scientia et scibile relativa sint, antiquius est scibile quam scientia.","english":"For since, when either of the two is destroyed, both perish, and when either is established, both subsist, it is evident that slave and master, since they are relatives, are simultaneous by nature. But these things are so that they are indeed among relatives, yet are not on a par with all those things which are relatives. For there are certain relatives of which one is prior by nature, which he himself again added.\n\nBut it does not seem to be true in all relatives that they are simultaneous by nature. For the knowable is naturally seen to be prior to knowledge. For for the most part we receive sciences when things already subsist. But in few cases, or none, will anyone find that knowledge was made simultaneously with the knowable.\n\nHe proposed that it is not the case in all relatives that they seem to be simultaneous by nature; and he proves this from the fact that, since knowledge is a relative (for knowledge is said of a knowable thing), knowledge cannot exist unless there is some thing which can be known. And this must be first, as in the discipline of mathematics. For we know that a triangle has its three interior angles equal to two right angles. Hence it is necessary that what could be known existed first, and afterwards that the cognition was fitted to this thing. And this is what he says: For in most cases we receive sciences when things already subsist. For the account of knowledge follows upon things already constituted and, as it were, placed before it. Wherefore it is not the case in all relatives that they are simultaneous by nature. For since knowledge and the knowable are relatives, the knowable is more ancient than knowledge.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":183,"ref":"p183","source":"Quod vero interposuit, in paucis enim vel nullis bocquis perspiciet simulcum scibili scientiam factam,tale est.Quasdam namque res animus sibi ipse confingit,utchimeram,vel centaurum, vel alia hujusmodi, quæ tunc sciuntur,cum ea sibi animus finxerit.Tunc autem esse incipiunt,quando primum in opinione versantur. Tunc igitur sciuntur, cum in I opinione versata sint, et haec simul habent esso et sciri. Nam quoniam in opinione nascuntur,mox esse incipiunt, sed cum in rationesunt,tunc eorum scientia capitur.Igitur mox ut fuerint, mox sciuntur, et esteorumscientiacumeorumdemessentia conj uncta.Namque antequam chimera fingeretur, sicut ipsa in nullaopinione t'uerat, ita quoque ej us scientia nun erat. Postquam vero ipsa animarum imaginatione constituta est, ejus quoque cum ipsa imaginatione scientia consecuta est: atque ideo ait in paucis hoc posse perspici, ut simul cum scientia scibile sit, ut in hac eadem chimera, quae cum sit scibilis, cum scientia nata est.","english":"But what he interposed, \"for in few or in no cases will anyone perceive that knowledge is made simultaneously with the knowable,\" is of this sort. For the mind itself fabricates certain things for itself, such as a chimera, or a centaur, or other things of this kind, which are then known when the mind has fabricated them for itself. But they begin to exist when they first come to be held in opinion. They are therefore known then, when they have been held in opinion, and these have both their being and their being known simultaneously. For since they are born in opinion, they immediately begin to exist, but when they are in reason, then knowledge of them is grasped. Therefore as soon as they have come into being, they are immediately known, and the knowledge of them is joined with their essence. For before the chimera was fabricated, just as it itself was in no opinion, so too was knowledge of it nonexistent. But after it was established by the imagination of minds, knowledge of it also followed along with that same imagination; and therefore he says that this can be perceived in few cases, that the knowable is simultaneous with knowledge, as in this same chimera, which, since it is knowable, was born together with knowledge.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":184,"ref":"p184","source":"Sed quoniam nihil quod in substantia non permanet, neque in veritate consistit, sciri potest (scientia enim est rerum quae sunt comprehensio veritatis), et quidquid sibi animus fingit, vel imaginatione reperit, cum in substantia atque veritateconstitutum non sit, illud posse sciri non dicitur, atque ideo non est eorum scientia ulla quae sola imaginatione subsistullt.Idcirco itaque dubitans dixit,in paucis enim vel nuliis.Haecenim ipsa pauca ita quisque reperiet, ut si ad veram rationem examinationemque contenderit, nulla esse perpendat. Quod siquisquamchimerse aliqua esse sciendam dicat,quaa non est, quanquam hoc falsum sit, tamen hoc quoque concesso pauca erunt in quibus scientia cum scibili simul natura sit. Multis enim antepositis et constitutis scientia nascitur.Quocirca non q.; •. 'ili/ imffiI._•r in omnibus relativis verum est,ut simul esse natura dicantur;et sicut falsum illud est,in nullis hoc esse relativis,ita falsum est rursus in omnibus.Sed hunc tractatum longius texit.","english":"But since nothing that does not remain in substance, nor consists in truth, can be known (for knowledge is the comprehension of the truth of things that are), and whatever the mind fabricates for itself, or discovers by imagination, since it is not established in substance and truth, is said not to be able to be known, and therefore there is no knowledge of those things which subsist by imagination alone. For this reason, therefore, hesitating, he said, \"for in few or in no cases.\" For each person will find these very few such that, if he strives toward true reasoning and examination, he perceives that they are none. But if anyone should say that some things are knowable which are not, although this is false, yet with this also granted, they will be few in which knowledge is simultaneous by nature with the knowable. For with many things placed before and established, knowledge is born. Wherefore it is not true in all relatives that they are said to be simultaneous by nature; and just as that is false, that this is the case in no relatives, so again it is false in all. But he has woven this treatise at too great length.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":185,"ref":"p185","source":"Amplius scibile quidem sublatum simul aufert scientiam, scientia vero simul non aufert scibile. Nam si scibile non sit, non est scientia; scientia vei o si non sit, nihil prohibet esse scibile, velut circuli quadratura si modo est scibilis, scientia siquidem ejus nondum est ipsa vero scibilis est.\n\nDiximusillaessesimul, quaecunque alterutro con. stituto, velalterutro interempto, simul utraque constituerentur, vel etiam perimerentur. Constituto enim ut sit pater, constituetur esse filius, et pater simul infert substantiam filii.Eodem quoque modo filius simul infert vocabulum patris, non est enim filius nisi patris. Eodem quoque modo altero interempto utrumque perire necesse est, alterum autem altero priusmultisdiciturmodis;sed quod nunc quaerimus tale est. Nam prioraillaesse dicuntur, quæ ipsa quidem peremptares alias tollunt, ipsa vero illataatque constituta simul res alias non inferunt, utest unus atque duo. Interempto enim uno, duo quoque pereunt.Unde enim est unius in duobus geminatio, si unus intereat? Constituto vero atque posito ut situnus, nondumduo sunt- Nondum est enim facta unius geminalio.","english":"Moreover, if the knowable is removed, it simultaneously takes away knowledge, but knowledge does not simultaneously take away the knowable. For if the knowable does not exist, there is no knowledge; but if knowledge does not exist, nothing prevents the knowable from existing—for instance, if the squaring of the circle is knowable, its knowledge does not yet exist, yet it itself is knowable.\n\nWe said that those things are simultaneous, whatever, when either one is established or either one is destroyed, would both be established together or even destroyed together. For when it is established that a father exists, it will be established that a son exists, and a father simultaneously implies the substance of a son. In the same way, a son simultaneously implies the designation of a father, for there is no son except of a father. In the same way, when one is destroyed, both must perish. But one thing is said to be prior to another in many ways; yet what we are now asking about is of this sort. For those things are said to be prior which, when they themselves are destroyed, take away the others, but when they themselves are brought in and established, do not simultaneously bring in the other things—as is the case with one and two. For when one is destroyed, two also perish. For whence comes the doubling of one into two, if one perishes? But when it is established and posited that one exists, two do not yet exist—for the doubling of one has not yet been made.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":186,"ref":"p186","source":"Ergo dicuntur illa priora esse, quæcunque alia simul quidem illata non inferunt, sed perimunt interempta.Scibile ergoet scientiam non esse simul illa res probat, quod si quis rem scibilem tollat, scienliam quoque sustulerit.Nulla potestenim scientia permanere, si res quae sciri possit intereat.Atsi scibile esse constituas,non omnino scientia consequitur.Infantibus enim ea nobis quæ nunc novimus erant, et in sua: naturae substantia permanebant,sed eorum apud nos scientia non erat. Multae quoque sunt artes,quas esse quidem in suas naturae ratione perspicimus, quarum neglectus soientiam sustulit. Multumque ego ipse jam metuo ne hoc verissime de omnibus studiis liberalibus dicatur.Quocirca si et scientiam sublatum scibile perimit,et illatum scibile scientiam non infert,neque constituit, prius est id quod sciri potest quam illud quod comprehendere videlicet atque complecti notitia. Ipse autem ad hanc rem obscurissimum commodavit exemplum. Solet enim in geometria hujusmodi esse propositio.Jubemur enim proposito quatuor laterum spatio, aequale triangulum constituere, et facimus hoc modo. Sit quatuor laterum spatium a b, oportet ergo a spatio aequale triangulum constituere,et ut sit duplum a spatio e spatium.","english":"Therefore those things are said to be prior, whatever things, when brought in together, do not bring in the others, but when destroyed destroy them. That the knowable, therefore, and knowledge do not exist simultaneously, that matter itself proves, because if anyone removes a knowable thing, he will also have removed knowledge. For no knowledge can remain if the thing that can be known perishes. But if you establish that the knowable exists, knowledge does not altogether follow. For those things that we now know were present to us as infants, and were persisting in the substance of their nature, but there was no knowledge of them in us. There are also many arts that we perceive indeed to exist in the principle of their nature, the neglect of which has removed knowledge of them. And I myself now greatly fear lest this be most truly said of all liberal studies. Wherefore, if both the knowable when removed destroys knowledge, and when brought in does not bring in or establish knowledge, that which can be known is prior to that which evidently comprehends and embraces it by acquaintance. But he himself has supplied a very obscure example for this matter. For in geometry a proposition of this sort is customary. For we are commanded, with a four-sided area proposed, to construct an equal triangle, and we do this in the following way. Let the four-sided area be ab; therefore it is necessary to construct a triangle equal to the area ab, and that the area e be double the area a.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":187,"ref":"p187","source":"Ducatur angularis /, dico quoniamc triangulum aequale est a spatio,quoniam cde spatium duplum est a spatio:ab igitur cd e spatii medietas est, angularis enim fc totum cdef spatium medium dividit.Quae autem ejusdem sunt media, sibi æqualia sunt, igitur et e /' triangulum a spatio aequale est. Proposito igitur spatio a b, aequum triangulum constitutum est f, quod oportebat facere.Eodem quoque modo quaesitum est si sit propositum oirculo aequum fieri quadratum.Quadratum ergo est quod æqualibus lateribus omnesquatuoranguloseequoshabet,id est rectos, et Aristotelis quidem temporibus non fuisse inventum vi detur. Post vero repertum est, cuj us quoniam longa demonstratio est, prætermittenda est.Atque huc est, quod ait, velut circuli quadratura: nam sicut manente quadrato, linea per obliquum ducta triangula figura producilur; itM circulo non mutato circumpositis angulis,qui et ipsius circuli laleribus;æqualiter diriguntur, quadrati forma consurgit, quod(ut potuimus) conjecturadepinximus.Cum enim alicui circulo æquum quadratum constiLuitur,in quadraturam circuli illius mensura redigitur. Nunc ergo hoc est quoddicit,utcirculi quadratura,id estaequi quadrati ad circulum constitutio si fieri potest, et si res est quae sciri possit, scientia quidem ejus nondum inventa est.","english":"Let the diagonal be drawn, and I say that the triangle is equal to the space, since the space is double the space; therefore is half of the space, for the diagonal divides the whole space in half. But things that are halves of the same thing are equal to each other; therefore the triangle is also equal to the space. With the space therefore proposed, an equal triangle has been constructed, which was what was required to do. In the same way too it has been asked whether, if a circle is proposed, it is possible to make a square equal to it. A square therefore is that which has all four angles equal on equal sides, that is, right angles, and in Aristotle's time it seems not to have been discovered. Afterwards, however, it was found, but since its demonstration is long, it must be passed over. And to this refers what he says, \"as the squaring of the circle\"; for just as, while the square remains, a line drawn obliquely produces a triangular figure, so too, with the circle unchanged, when angles are placed around it which are also directed equally to its sides, the form of a square arises, which, as best we could, we have depicted by conjecture. For when a square equal to some circle is constructed, it is reduced in measurement to the squaring of that circle. Now therefore this is what he says, \"as the squaring of the circle,\" that is, the construction of a square equal to a circle, if it can be done, and if it is a thing that can be known, its knowledge has not yet been discovered.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":188,"ref":"p188","source":"Nondum enim quisquam sub Aristotele aequum quadratum circulo constituerat.Quod si est aliqua ejus scientia quæ nondum reperta est,certe prius est quod sciri possit,post vero scientia.Nam cum posset Aristotele vivo sciri circuli quadratura, nulla tamen adhuc ejus scientia reperta est, atque ideopriuseratquodsciri posset,quam ipsius rei ulla notitia.\n\nAmplius, animali quidem sublato, non est scientia, scibilium uero plurima esse contingit.\n\nAddit aliud validius argumentum, prius esse scibile scientia.lllud enim notum estsiperdesidiam disciplinadepereat,interire quidem scientiam, sed scibile permanere.Scibile autem dico quod sciri possit. Quod si omnino animal non sit,cum quis scire possit omnino non fuerit, scientia quidem ipsa funditus interibit: nihil tamen probibet esse ea quae permanente animali possit inquirentis animus scientiæ ratione complecti.","english":"For no one before Aristotle had yet squared the circle. But if there is some knowledge of it that has not yet been discovered, certainly that which can be known is prior, and knowledge comes afterward. For although the squaring of the circle could have been known while Aristotle was alive, no knowledge of it had yet been discovered, and for that reason that which could be known was prior to any awareness of the thing itself.\n\nMoreover, when an animal is destroyed, knowledge does not exist, yet it happens that very many things are knowable.\n\nHe adds another, stronger argument: the knowable is prior to knowledge. For it is well known that if a discipline perishes through idleness, knowledge indeed perishes, but the knowable remains. By \"knowable\" I mean that which can be known. But if there were no animal at all, since there could be no one to know, knowledge itself would utterly perish; nevertheless nothing prevents those things from existing which, while an animal remains, the mind of the inquirer can grasp by the reasoning of knowledge.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":189,"ref":"p189","source":"Similiter his sese habent et ea quæ de sensu sunt, sensile enim prius quam sensus videtur esse. Sublato enim sensili simul aufertur sensus:sensus vero sensile non simul aufert. Sensus enim circa corpus et in corpore sunt,sensibili autem perempto, peremptum est et corpus, sensile enim est et corpus; cum vero corpus non sit9sublatus est et sensus. Quare simul aufert sensile sensum, sensus vero sensile non tollit. Animali enim perempto,sensus quidem peremptus est,sensibile autem nOn,est autem sensile,ut corpus caldum, dulce, amarum et alia omnia quæcunque sensilia sunt.\n\nId namque proponit sensibus inveniri. Dicit enim sensu prius esse sensibile, quod communi priorum diffinitione probabile esse constituit. Dictum est namque illa esse priora quae simul quidem interempta perimerent,non autem simul aliis interemptis ipsa deperire,ut orbem solis prius dicimus proprio lumine,sublatoenimorbe,lumenillud quod abeoestpenitus non manebit;sublatolumine solis,orbis manebit.","english":"The things that pertain to sensation are related in a similar way. For the sensible object seems to be prior to the sense. For when the sensible object is removed, the sense is removed at the same time; but the sense does not remove the sensible object at the same time. For the senses are around the body and in the body, but when the sensible object is destroyed, the body is also destroyed; for the body too is a sensible object. But when the body does not exist, the sense is also removed. Therefore the sensible object removes the sense at the same time, but the sense does not remove the sensible object. For when the animal is destroyed, the sense is indeed destroyed, but the sensible object is not; yet it is a sensible object, such as a hot body, a sweet thing, a bitter thing, and all other things whatsoever that are sensible.\n\nFor he proposes that this is found by the senses. For he says that the sensible object is prior to the sense, which he establishes as probable by the common definition of prior things. For it has been said that those things are prior which, when they are destroyed at the same time, destroy [the others], but do not themselves perish when the others are destroyed at the same time; as we say that the orb of the sun is prior to its own light. For when the orb is removed, that light which is from it will not remain at all; but when the light of the sun is removed, the orb will remain.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":190,"ref":"p190","source":"Ita quoqne nunc in sensibilibus,atque in ipso sensu esse proposuit, sublato quod sentiri possit, sensus omninosublatusest.Neque enimessepoteritsensus, cum quod possit sentire non invenit.Quod si sensus omnino depereat,sensibile permanebit; et hoc evidentibus firmat exemplis.Nam cum ea quae sunt in rebus, vel incorporea sint, vel certe corporea, et quidquid ad corporis materiam referri potest, hoc sensuum varietatisubjaceat,quidquid ad incorporalia intellectus ratione et speculatione teneatur.Cum sit sensus omnis in corpore,si corpus intereal,cum omnino corpus non sit, quoniam quæ sunt incorporea sentiri non possunt,et quae sentiri poterant interempta sunt,omnino sensus evertitur.Sed si sensus auferatur,sensibilia permanebunt: et quoniam sensus animalium effectivus est,sequa est utrorumque perditio;sive enim sustulerisanimal,sensus peribit,sive sensusevertantur,animaliaquoquesublatasunt.Sed eversis atque interemptis animalibus cum propriis sensibus,permanent corporaquae anima non utuntur,quodsisublatisanimalibussensibusquedeperditis,corpora inanimata subsistunt,cum corpora sint quassentiri possunt,animalia quæ sentire valeant si interempta sint, manente sensibili sensus eversus est.","english":"Thus also now in the case of sensible things and in sense itself he has proposed that, with the removal of what can be sensed, sense is altogether removed. For sense cannot exist when it does not find what it can sense. But if sense perishes altogether, the sensible will remain; and this he confirms with evident examples. For since the things that are in reality are either incorporeal or certainly corporeal, and whatever can be referred to the matter of body is subject to the variety of the senses, whatever is held by the reason and contemplation of the intellect pertains to incorporeals. Since all sense is in the body, if the body meanwhile is removed, since it is altogether not body—because incorporeal things cannot be sensed, and the things that could be sensed have been destroyed—sense is altogether overturned. But if sense is taken away, sensible things will remain; and since sense is productive of animals, the destruction of both is equal; for whether you remove the animal, sense will perish, or whether sense is overturned, animals too are taken away. But with animals destroyed and removed along with their own senses, there remain bodies that do not use a soul; so if, with animals taken away and senses lost, inanimate bodies subsist, since they are bodies that can be sensed, while the animals that are able to sense have been destroyed, with the sensible remaining, sense has been overturned.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":191,"ref":"p191","source":"Non igitur sicut sensibilis interemptio sensus interimit,sic sensuum perditionem exstinctio sensibilium comitatur.Id vero etiam hoc probabitur argumento, anteenim quam actu ipso aliquid sentiamus, sensus non est.Nam priusquam dulce aliquid degustemus, gustatio ipsa dulcedinis non est; quod autemgustari possit,id est, mel,vel quodlibet aliud propriæ naturae ratione consistit. Quocirca prius esse quod sentiri possit,post vero sensus Aristotele auctore firmatur.\n\nAmplius sensus quidem simul cum sensato fit, simul enim et animal fit et sensus. Sensile autem ante est quam sensus esset. Ignis enim et aqua et alia hujusmodi,ex quibus ipsum animal constat, ante sunt quam animal sit omnino,vel sensus. Quare prius sensile quam sensus esse videtur.\n\nIn compositis rebus atque ex aliis junctis priores sunt hae res quae componunt aliquid ipsa substantia quam componunt.Namque cum corpus animalis sit ex igne,aere, aqua et terra,priora haec esse necesse est quam ipsum sit animal quod illa elementa conjungunt. Hoc quoque etiam in aliis patet,nam cum sit liber ex versibus,prior est versuum natura quam libri. Cumque versus constet verbis atque nominibus,et caeteris quas grammatici partes orationis vocant,hsec ex quibus ipse versus constat versu ipso priora esse necesse est.Quocirca sensusquoqueipsis, jam compositis animalibus supervenit.","english":"Therefore it is not the case that, just as the destruction of what is sensible destroys sense, so the extinction of sensible things accompanies the loss of senses. But this too will be proved by the following argument: before we actually sense anything by the act itself, sense does not exist. For before we taste something sweet, the tasting of that sweetness itself does not exist; but what can be tasted, that is, honey or anything else, exists by the principle of its own proper nature. Wherefore it is established, with Aristotle as author, that what can be sensed exists first, and sense afterward.\n\nMoreover, sense certainly comes to be simultaneously with what is sensed, for simultaneously both the animal comes to be and sense. But what is sensible exists before sense would exist. For fire and water and other such things, from which the animal itself consists, exist before the animal exists at all, or sense. Therefore what is sensible seems to exist before sense.\n\nIn composite things and things joined from others, those things which compose something are prior in their very substance to what they compose. For since the body of an animal is from fire, air, water, and earth, these must be prior to the animal itself which those elements join together. This is evident also in other cases, for since a book consists of verses, the nature of the verses is prior to the book. And since a verse consists of words and names and the other things which grammarians call the parts of speech, these things of which the verse itself consists must be prior to the verse itself. Wherefore sense also comes upon animals already composed.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":192,"ref":"p192","source":"Nam cum animal constet ex quatuor elementis, et cum sensus semper naturam animalium comitetur, cum ipsis animalibus sensus fieri at nasci necesse est. Quod si cum animalibus, id est compositis rebus, sensus nascitur,sicutanimali propria sunt ea ex quibusipsumanimaiconstat,sicquoquesensuquicumanimaIi nascitur,illapriorasunt,exquibusanimalisnatura conjungitur.Conjungitur autem animalatquecomponitur ex quatuor elementis. Quatuor igitur elementa sensu priorasunt,sedquatuorelementacorpara sunt,corpus vero omne sensibile est. Prius igitur sensibile quam sensus est. Sensus enim cum re composita nascitur,illa vero quae componunt etsensibilia sunt,et priora ipso composito.","english":"For since an animal consists of the four elements, and since sense always accompanies the nature of animals, sense must come to be and be born together with the animals themselves. But if sense is born together with animals, that is, with composite things, then just as those things from which the animal itself consists are proper to the animal, so too, since sense is born together with the animal, those things from which the nature of the animal is compounded are prior. But an animal is compounded and composed of the four elements. Therefore the four elements are prior to sense, but the four elements are bodies, and every body is sensible. Therefore the sensible is prior to sense. For sense is born together with the composite thing, but those things which compose it are both sensible and prior to the composite thing itself.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":193,"ref":"p193","source":"Universaliter enim si quae duae res sintsimul,cum quaelibet res una earum prior sit,et altera prior erit, ut animal atque sensus, cum utraque simul sunt, simulque nascuntur,cumquatuor elementaquae sunt sensibilia priora sint quam animal, sensu quoque esse priora necesse est,quocirca conclusit dicens: Quare prius quam sensus sensibile esse videtur.Sed quidam,quorum Porphyrius quoque unus est,astruunt in omnibus verum esse relativis,ut simul natura sint,veluti ipsum quoque sensum et scientiam non praecedere scibile atque sensibile, sed simul esse, quam quoniam brevis est oratio,non gravabor opponere.Ait enim: Si cujuslibet scientia non sit,ipsum quod per se poterit permanere scibile esse non poterit, ut si formarum scientia pereat,ipsae fortasse formae permaneant,atquein priore natura consistant,scibiles vera non sint.Cum enim scientia quae illud compreben. derepossit,nonsit,ipsaquoque sciri non potest res. Namque omnis res scientia scitur, quae si non sit, sciri non possit.Porro autem res quæ sciri non potest scibilis non est.","english":"For universally, if any two things are simultaneous, and one of them is prior to something, the other will also be prior, as with animal and sense: since both are simultaneous and are born together, and since the four elements, which are perceptible, are prior to the animal, sense must also be prior. Therefore he concluded, saying: Hence the perceptible seems to be prior to sense. But certain thinkers, of whom Porphyrius is one, assert that in all relatives the truth is that they are simultaneous by nature, as for instance that sense itself and knowledge do not precede the knowable and the perceptible, but are simultaneous. Since the argument is brief, I shall not hesitate to object. For he says: If there is no knowledge of anything, that thing which could otherwise persist in itself cannot be knowable; for example, if knowledge of forms perishes, the forms themselves perhaps persist and remain in their prior nature, but they are not knowable. For since the knowledge which could comprehend that thing does not exist, the thing itself also cannot be known. For every thing is known by knowledge, and if knowledge does not exist, it cannot be known. Moreover, a thing which cannot be known is not knowable.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":194,"ref":"p194","source":"Hoc idem de sensu gustantis: si gustus enim pereat, mel forsitan permanebit,gustabile autem non erit.llaquoque omnino si sensus pereat,res quidem quae sentiri poterant sint, sensibiles vero non sint sensu pereunte.Et fortasse neque scientia neque sensus secundum sentientes speculandus est, sed secundum ipsam naturam quae sensu valeatcomprehendi.Namque res quæcunque per naturam sensibilisest,eam quoque in natura sua,proprium sensum quo sentiri possit, babere necesse est. Et quodcunque sciri potest per naturam,nunquam possit addisci, nisi quaedam ejus in natura scientiaversaretur.HascPorpbyrius.Sed nos ad Aristotelis ordinem textumque veniamus. Namque ille adjecit quoque alias quaestiones.\n\nHabet autem quæstionem, utrum nulla substantia ad aliquid dicatur, quemadmodum videtur, si hoc contingat secundum quasdam secundas substantias; nam in primis substantiis verum est,unamneque totaneque partes ad aliquid dicuntur, uam aliquis homo non dicitur alicujus aliquishomotneque aliquis bos,alicujus aliquis bos. Similiter autem et partes: quædam enim manus non dicitur alicujus quædam manus, sed alicujus manus, et quoddam caput: non dicitur alicujus quoddam caput, sed alicujus caput. Similiter autem et in secundis substaniiisyatque hocquldem in pluribus, ut homo non dicitur alicujus homo, nec bos allcujus bos, nec lignum alicujus lignum,sed alicujus possessio dicitur.","english":"The same point applies to the sense of taste: for if the taste perishes, the honey will perhaps remain, but it will not be tasteable. Likewise, if sense perishes entirely, the things that could be sensed may exist, but they will not be sensible, since sense has perished. And perhaps neither knowledge nor sense should be considered in relation to those who perceive, but in relation to the very nature that can be comprehended by sense. For whatever is sensible by nature, it is also necessary that it have in its own nature a proper sense by which it can be sensed. And whatever can be known by nature could never be learned, unless some knowledge of it were present in its nature. Thus Porphyry. But let us come to Aristotle's order and text. For he added also other questions.\n\nHe raises the question whether no substance is said in relation to something, as it seems, if this happens with respect to certain secondary substances; for in primary substances it is true that neither the whole nor the parts are said in relation to something, since some man is not said to be of someone, nor some man of some man, nor some ox of some ox. Similarly also with the parts: for a certain hand is not said to be of someone a certain hand, but a hand of someone, and a certain head: it is not said to be of someone a certain head, but a head of someone. Similarly also in secondary substances, and this indeed in many cases, as man is not said to be of someone a man, nor ox of someone an ox, nor wood of someone wood, but it is said to be someone's possession.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":195,"ref":"p195","source":"In hujusmodi ergo manifestum est quoniam non est ad aLiquid.ln aliquibus vero secundis substantiis habet aliquam dubitationemyut caput alicujus caput diciMur, et manus alicujus manus dicitur, et singula hujusmodi. Quare hæc fortasse ad aliquid esse videntur.\n\nContra eaquaesuperiusdisputatasunthujusmodi nudum quaestionis opposuit,quoniam enim prima diffinitio relativorum fuerat,illaesse relativa quæcunque hoc ipsumquod essent aliorum dicerentur. secundumhanc diffinitionem possunt quædam substanliæ videri esse relativae:quod si sit, substantiæae in diffinitionem accidentium transeunt. Nam cum sint accidentia relativa, si quas substantias rei ativas esse concedimus,in accidentium numero ponendas esse censebimus,sed hoc contrarium est.Si enim substantia in subjecto non est,accidens autem in subjecto est,quifieri potest ut idem et in subjecto sit et in subjecto non sit?Utrumautem possit.","english":"In this kind of case, therefore, it is clear that it is not in relation to something. But in some secondary substances there is some doubt, as when the head of someone is said to be a head, and the hand of someone is said to be a hand, and each such thing individually. Therefore these perhaps seem to be in relation to something.\n\nAgainst those things that were disputed above, he set forth the bare question of this kind of opposition. For since the first definition of relatives had been that those things are relative whatever are said to be of others with respect to this very thing that they are, according to this definition certain substances can seem to be relative. But if this is so, substances pass over into the definition of accidents. For since relatives are accidents, if we concede that certain substances are relative, we will judge that they must be placed in the number of accidents. But this is contrary. For if substance is not in a subject, but accident is in a subject, how can it happen that the same thing is both in a subject and not in a subject? But whether it can.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":196,"ref":"p196","source":"quædam substantiaaccidentium suscipere rationem, hocmodo quærendum est.Primæ namquesubstantiseipsae quidem ad aliquid non dicuntur,neque partes primarum substantiarum quas ipsas quoque in primis substantiis numeramus.Socrates enim non dicitur alicujus aliquis Socrates, nec homo alicujus aliquis homo,nec bos alicujus aliquisbos,neque partes primarumsubstantiarum quasipsaequoquesunt primae substantiae.Caput enim non dicituralicujus aliquod caput,sed tantum alicujuscaput,etmanus non dicitur alicujus aliqua manus,sedtantum alicujusmanus. Quare neque primæ substantiae, neque primarum substantiarum partes ad relationem dici poterunt.Quod si secundas quoque substantias speculemur,nec ipsae quoque ad aliquid dicentur.Neque enim dicitur animal alicujus esse animal, aut homo alicujus esse homo. Quod si quis dicat posse esse animal alicujus, ut equum meum,vel quodlibetaliud, non in eo quod animal est,sed in eo quod est possesaio dicituralicujus,etsic non dicitur animal alicujus animal,sed animalis possessio,alicujus possessio.Ergo neque primæ substantiae,neque partes primarum substantiarum, neque secundæ substantiæ ada liquid dicuntur.Partes autemsecundarum substantiarum ad aliquid hoc ipsum quod sunt dicuntur.","english":"For a certain substance to admit the account of accidents, it must be investigated in this way. For primary substances themselves are not said in relation to something, nor are the parts of primary substances, which we also count among primary substances themselves. For Socrates is not said to be someone's Socrates, nor is man someone's man, nor is ox someone's ox, nor are the parts of primary substances, which are themselves also primary substances. For a head is not said to be someone's certain head, but only someone's head, and a hand is not said to be someone's certain hand, but only someone's hand. Wherefore neither primary substances nor the parts of primary substances can be said in relation. But if we examine secondary substances as well, neither are they themselves said in relation to something. For an animal is not said to be someone's animal, nor is man said to be someone's man. But if someone says that an animal can be someone's, as my horse, or any other such thing, it is not said in respect of its being an animal, but in respect of its being possessed by someone, and thus it is not said that an animal is someone's animal, but the possession of an animal is someone's possession. Therefore neither primary substances, nor the parts of primary substances, nor secondary substances are said in relation to something. But the parts of secondary substances are said in relation to something in respect of that very thing which they are.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":197,"ref":"p197","source":"Caput enim alicujus caputdicitur,si quidem capitati caput dicernus,et manus alicujus manus.Si quidem ex manu nomen fingerevolumus,ad quod manus referri possit, sicutcaputad capitatum,et in aliis quidem rebus eodem modo.Sedsipartessecundarumsubstantiarum accidentes sint, et ipsæ secundæ substantiæ accidenteserunt,autsihoc non placet, constabuntsecundae substantiæ ex partibus accidentibus, quod fieri nequit. Quid igitur dicendum est? aut enim diffinitio relativorum reprehendenda est,aut aliter solvenda dubietas.Sed posita atque constituta priori diffinitione, quae dicit illa esse relativa quæ id quod sunt aliorum dicuntur,hic quaestionis nodus solvi non poterit,quod ipse Aristoteles hac adjunctione testatur.\n\nSi igitur sufficienter eorum quæ sunt ad aliquid diffinitio assignata est, aut nimis difficile, aut impossibile est ostendere,quoniam nulla substantia ad aliquid dzcitur.Si autem non sufficienter, sed sunt ad aUquidsquibus hoc ipsum esse, est ad aliquid quodammodo se habere, fortasse aliquid ad ista dicetur. Prior vera diffinitio sequitur quidem omnia relativa, non tamen quod ipsa sint ad aliquid est hoc quod ea ipsa sunt quæ aliorum esse dicuntur.","english":"For the head of someone is called a head, if indeed we call it the head of a head-possessing thing, and the hand of someone a hand. If indeed we wish to form a name from \"hand,\" to which \"hand\" can be referred, just as \"head\" to \"head-possessing thing,\" and in other matters in the same way. But if the parts of secondary substances are accidents, then the secondary substances themselves will also be accidents, or if this is not acceptable, secondary substances will consist of accidental parts, which cannot happen. What then is to be said? For either the definition of relatives must be criticized, or the difficulty must be resolved in another way. But with the earlier definition posited and established, which says that those things are relative which are said to be of others with respect to what they are, the knot of this question cannot be resolved, as Aristotle himself testifies by this addition.\n\nIf therefore the definition of those things which are in relation to something has been assigned sufficiently, it is either too difficult or impossible to show that no substance is said in relation to something. But if it has not been sufficiently assigned, but there are certain things in relation to something for which this very being is to be disposed in some way toward something, perhaps something will be said against these. The earlier definition indeed follows all relatives, yet it is not because they are in relation to something that they are this very thing which they are said to be of others.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":198,"ref":"p198","source":"Proposita ergo atque firmata priore relativorum diffinitionedifficile defendi poterit, aut fortassenunquam,quasdam substantias non esse relativas.Nam si ad aliquid illa sunt, quæcunque idquodsuntaliorum dicuntur,ut id quod est caput capitati dicitur caput,habebit igitur substantia quæ est caput ad aliquid relationem, et ita erit substantia relativa atqucaccidens,quod est impossibile.Quarequoniam proposita atque constituta priore diffinitione hæc incommoditas indispositioneconsequitur, ut constet ratio non integrae diffinitionis,assignatio permutetur. Ait enim non esse integram diffinitionem quæ supra sit reddila,nec magis ilIa esse ad aliquid,quae id quod suntaliorum dicuntur,potius quam eaquibus ipsum esse est ad aliquid quodammodo sehabere. Sed fortasse videatur quibusdam inconsulte legentibus et minimeconsiderautibus,id quoddiffiniri oportuerat, hoc in diffinitione esse sumptum, quod est vitiosissimum. Si enim idcirco diffinitio sumitur,ut res de qua quæritur assignetur, quæ magis est apertior dilfinitio,si reipsaquam diffinit.in assignatione diffinitionis utatur?","english":"Therefore, once the earlier definition of relatives has been set forth and confirmed, it will be difficult—or perhaps never possible—to defend the claim that certain substances are not relative. For if those things are \"in relation to something\" which, whatever they are, are said of other things—as what is a head is called the head of a head-possessing thing—then a substance that is a head will have a relation to something, and so substance will be relative and also an accident, which is impossible. Wherefore, since with the earlier definition set forth and established this inconvenience follows from its unsoundness, so that it is evident that the definition is not complete, the assignment is changed. For he says that the definition given above is not complete, and that those things are not more \"in relation to something\" which, whatever they are, are said of other things, than those whose very being is in some way to be disposed toward something. But perhaps it may seem to some who read carelessly and consider too little that what ought to have been defined has been assumed in the definition, which is most faulty. For if a definition is assumed for the purpose of assigning the thing about which inquiry is made, how is the definition more clear if it uses in the assignment of the definition the very thing it defines?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":199,"ref":"p199","source":"Diffinitio namque idcirco redditur,ut res de cujus quidem esse dubitatur,diffinilione patefiat.Quod si rem ipsam quam diffinit,in diffinitione protulerit,nihilo planior diffinitio sit,utsi quis hominem diffinire volens dicat, hocipsum esse hominem quod hominem.Ita quoque non considerantibus,Aristoteles relativorum diffinitionem reddidisse videbitur.Aitenim esseadaliquid, quibus hoc ipsum esse est ad aliquid quodammodo se habere,ac si diceret:Ea sunt ad aliquid, quae se ad aliquid quodammodohabent.Sed minutius atque scutius considerantibus, vis integrae diffinitionis T prompte atque veraciter apparebit;non enim ineo quod est dici, ad aliquid consideramus, sed in eo quod est esse;ea namque sunt relativa,quae inquadam comparatione etrelationishabitudine consideramus,ut quaternarius numerus,et hocipsum quod est esse dicitur,id eslquatuor,etaliud quoddam,id est duplum,ut si ad binariumconferatur.Sed quod dequaternario numero dicimus, quaternarium hoc ad ipsius quaternarii numeri naturam refertur.Quod vero duplum, non est hoc quaternarii,sed duorum ad quodduplumdicitur,etadquodpropriarelatione duplum est. Binarius quoque numerus et binarius est, et medietas,binarius quidem secundum suam naturam,medietasverosecundumquaternariusrelationem.","english":"For a definition is given for this reason, that the thing about whose being there is doubt may be made clear by the definition. But if it brings forth in the definition the very thing that it defines, the definition will be no clearer, as if someone wishing to define man should say that this very thing is man, which is man. Thus too, to those not considering carefully, Aristotle will seem to have given a definition of relatives. For he says that those things are \"in relation to something\" for which this very being is to be related in some way to something, as if he were saying: Those things are in relation to something which are related in some way to something. But to those considering more minutely and carefully, the force of the complete definition will appear readily and truthfully; for we do not consider \"in relation to something\" in that which is \"to be said,\" but in that which is \"to be\"; for those things are relative which we consider in a certain comparison and relation of a state, as the number four, and this very thing that is said to be, that is, four, and something else, that is, double, if it be compared to the number two. But what we say about the number four, \"four,\" this is referred to the nature of the number four itself. But \"double\" is not this of the four, but of the two in relation to which it is called double, and to which it is double by its proper relation. The number two also is both two and a half; two indeed according to its own nature, but a half according to its relation to four.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":200,"ref":"p200","source":"Quocirca in comparationequadam atque in habitudineeaquse sunt ad aliquid speculamur;qua ternarius enim in eo quod quaternarius est ad aliquid non dicitur,in eo vero quod est duplus,duorum relativus est, scilicet ad binarium comparatus.Binarius quoque in eo quod sunt duo,ad aliquid non refertur, sed in eo quod est medietas, scilicet ad quaternarium comparatus.Ergo, ut sitduplus quaternarius, non duobus,sed medietate eget,ut simedietas binarius,non quaternario,sed duplo opus est. Videsne ut habitudine quadam et comparatione res aliud in naturaretinentes,aliud tamen ad se invicem sint? et hoc non ex propria, sed ex invicem natura mutuentur, nam quod est duplus numerus ex medio trabit.quod est medietas ex dupio.atque hoc iis quae sunt ad aliquid extraevenit,etideonihil patientibus neque permutatis ipsis quae ad aliquid referuntur, ipsaadaliquid fiunt,nihil enim permutato de quater. nario duplus ipse est,sit ad binarium referatur, et nihil de binario permutato,medietas est binarius,si ad quaternarium dicitur. Ergo relativorum hoc est esse,id est hæc eorum natura atque substantia est, ut id quod sunt ad aliquid referantur,id est non solum referri dicantur, sed etiam referantur.","english":"Wherefore we observe in a certain comparison and relation those things which are relative. For the ternary, in that it is a quaternary, is not said to be relative; but in that it is double, it is relative to two, namely, compared to the binary. The binary also, in that they are two, is not referred to something else, but in that it is a half, namely, compared to the quaternary. Therefore, in order that the quaternary be double, it does not need two, but a half; and in order that the binary be a half, it does not need the quaternary, but the double. Do you see how by a certain relation and comparison things retain one thing in nature, yet are another in relation to each other? And this they borrow not from their own nature, but from each other. For the number that is double draws from the half, and that which is a half from the double. And this happens to those things which are relative over and above, and for this reason, with nothing undergoing change and with the things themselves that are referred to something not being changed, they themselves become relative. For with the quaternary unchanged, it is itself double if it is referred to the binary; and with the binary unchanged, the binary is a half if it is said in relation to the quaternary. Therefore, this is the being of relatives, that is, this is their nature and substance, that what they are they refer to something, that is, they are not only said to be referred, but are also referred.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":201,"ref":"p201","source":"Atque hoc est quod ait, sed sunt ad aliquid quibus hoc ipsum esse est ad aliquid quodammodo se habere, ac si diceret quorum substantia est ad aliquidaliud referri,et quae ita sunt ut ipsa id quod sunt ad aliud referantur,etesse eorum sit ad aliquid aliud referri, sed non omnia uae dicuntur ad aliud.et esse de alio mutuantur.Illa namque diffinitio prior, majus est, diffinitionem namque relativorum supergressa est, includit enim ea quoque quæ relativa non sunt, et quemadmodum hominem cum dico,mortalem eum esse necesse est, cum dico mortalem, non necesse est esse hominem, ita quoque ea quae hoc ipsum quod sunt ex altero trahunt,et essehabent ad alterius relationem, et esse suum ad alterius referunt nuncupat:onem.Quæ vero ad aliud tantum dicuntur, non necesse est,ut esse suum ad aliquid habeant relatum,quo posteriorem diffinitionem suscipiant, et ista sententia breviter includatur, ut quæcunque hanc diffinitionem susceperint,uthocipsum esse sit ad aliquid quodammodo se habere, habeant eam quoque diffinitionem, quæ est relativaesse qnaecunque id quod sunt aliorum dicuntur, quæ vero hanc habuerint diffinitionem illam non necessario habeant, ut ea quæ sunt ad aliquid,etiam ad aliquid dicantur.","english":"And this is what he says: but those things are relative to something for which this very being is in some way to be related to something, as if he were saying: whose substance it is to be referred to something else, and which are such that they themselves are what they are by being referred to another, and their being is to be referred to something else, but not all things which are said in relation to another also borrow their being from another. For that earlier definition, \"greater,\" has surpassed the definition of relatives, for it includes even those things which are not relatives. And just as, when I say \"man,\" it is necessary that he be mortal, but when I say \"mortal,\" it is not necessary that he be a man, so too he designates those things which draw this very thing that they are from another, and have their being in relation to another, and refer their being to another. But those things which are only said in relation to another do not necessarily have their being referred to something, so as to receive the later definition. And let this view be briefly encompassed: that whatever things have received this definition, so that this very being is in some way to be related to something, also have that definition which is \"to be relative\" — whatever things are said to be of others in respect of what they are. But those things which have had this definition do not necessarily have that one, so that those things which are relative to something are also said in relation to something.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":202,"ref":"p202","source":"Sedeaquædicuntur adaliquid, non omninoad aliquid sint,quod si ista diffinitio posterior recipiatur, quaediciteaessead aliquid,quibushoc ipsumesseest ad aliquid quodammodo se habere,poterit superior solvi dubitatio,quod dicamus id quod ipse posteriore disputatione secutus est. Quod autem ait:Priorvero diffinitio sequitur quidem omnia relativa,non tamen hoc eis est esse,quod sint ad aliquid,quod ea ipsa quae sunt aliorum dicuntur,hoc est quod non idcirco aliquid relativum esse dicitur,quoniam alterius esse dicitur.Sed tunc merito res aliqua relationis nomine continebitur, quoties non solum ad aliquid dicitur, sed hoc ipsum esse ejus ad aliquid est quodammodo se habere. Quare quid hanc diffinitionem proprium consequatur, ipse addidit.\n\nEx his ergo manifestum est qnod si quis aliquid eorum quæ sunt ad aliquid diffinite sciet, et illud ad;quod dicitur diffinite sciturus est.Si enim quis nouit aliquid quod est eorum quæ sunt aliquid (estaulem esse eorum qua: suntad aliquid idem quod ad aliquid quodammodo se habere), et illud novit ad quod hoc quodammodo se habet.","english":"But those things which are said to be relative to something are not in every way relative to something. For if that later definition is accepted, by which they say that those things are relative to something for which this very being is to be related in some way to something, the earlier doubt can be resolved, so that we say that which he himself followed in the later discussion. But as for what he says: the earlier definition indeed applies to all relatives, yet it is not for them this very being, that they are relative to something, namely that those very things which exist are said to be of others — this means that something is not for that reason said to be relative, because it is said to be of another. But then a thing will deservedly be included under the name of relation, whenever it is not only said to be relative to something, but this very being of it is to be related in some way to something. Wherefore he himself added what properly follows from this definition.\n\nFrom these things, therefore, it is clear that if anyone knows definitively something of those things which are relative to something, he will also know definitively that to which it is said to be related. For if anyone knows something which is of those things which are relative to something (and to be of those things which are relative to something is the same as to be related in some way to something), he also knows that to which this is related in some way.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":203,"ref":"p203","source":"Proprium relativis secundum eam quæ superius dicta est diffinitionem hoc esse confirmat, quod si quis id quod est ad aliquid diffinite scit, quoniam relativum est,et illud ad quod referri potestdiffinite sciturus est quid sit,nam relativa easunt quibus boc est esse ad aliquidquodammodosebabere,quoniam ut sit quaternarius duplum a binario trahit. Si quis novit esse quaternarium numerum duplum,et binarium necessario sciturus est esse dimidium,ad quem quaternarius duplus est fieri; enim nullo modo potest, ut cum quis noverit aliquam rem esse relativam diffinite,non illud quoque sciat ad quod illa res dicitur diffinite;hujus autem rei una probatio est quae ex diffinitione venit. Diffinita enim sunt illa esse ad aliquid,quorum ea esset substantia, ut quodammodo se ad aliquid haberent,quod si scio quaternarium numerum esse duplum, eo quod ad binarium quodammodo conjungatur, nullus quaternarium duplum esse potent scire, nisi qui sciet medietatem esse bi- I narium,et hoc quidem in omnibus consideretur. Nam si nesciat quis ad quid aliquid referatureorum quæ relativa sunt, illud quoque ignorabit,utrurn ommino ad aliquid referatur,quod his verbisAristoteles dicit:","english":"He confirms that this is a property of relatives according to the definition stated above, because if anyone knows definitively that something is relative, since it is a relative, he will also know definitively what that is to which it can be referred. For relatives are those whose very being is to be related in some way to something, since in order for a quaternary to be a double, it derives this from a binary. If anyone knows that the number four is a double, he will necessarily also know that the binary is a half, in relation to which the quaternary becomes a double; for it can in no way happen that when someone knows definitively that some thing is relative, he does not also know that to which that thing is said to be definitively related. Now there is one proof of this matter, which comes from the definition. For those things are defined as being relative whose substance is such that they are related in some way to something. So if I know that the number four is a double, in that it is joined in some way to a binary, no one will be able to know that four is a double unless he knows that the binary is a half. And this should be considered in all cases. For if someone does not know that to which something among relatives is referred, he will also be ignorant whether it is referred to something at all, which Aristotle states in these words:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":204,"ref":"p204","source":"Si enim id non noverit omnino, ad quod hoc quodammodo se habetynec si ad aliquid quodammodo se habet sciturus est, sed in singulis palam hoc est: Ut hoc si quis novit diffinite quod est duplum, et cujus duplum est, moxdiffinite novit, si vero nullius diffinite novit, zpsum duplum, neque si est duplum omnino novit.Similiter autem et hoc aliquid, si novit aliquis quod melius est diffinite, et quo melius est, necessarium est nosse. Indiffinite autem non sciet quod hoc est pejore melius, opinio enim id quidem sit, non disciplina, non enim sciet exacte quod est pejore mehus, si enim sic contingit, nihil est pejus eo. Quapropter palam est quod si noverit quis aliquid relatiuorum diffinite necessarium est et illud ad quod dicitur diffinite nosse.\n\nHujus quoque rei exempla persequitur dicens: Si duplum ad aliquid esse novimus, scimus quoque id cujus duplum est; quod si nescirnusid cujus est duplum, duplum autem esse cujuslibet rei ex hoc est, quod ei sit medietas, ipsam quoque rem quae dupla sit, utrum dupla sit scire non possumus. Si igitur diffinite novimus quamlibet illam rem esse duplam, etiam cujus dupla est diffinite nos scire necesse est.","english":"For if he does not know at all that to which this bears a certain relation, neither will he know that it bears a relation to something, but in individual cases this is clear: for instance, if someone knows definitively that something is double, he also immediately knows definitively of what it is double; but if he knows definitively of nothing, he does not know the double itself, nor even that it is double at all. Similarly also in this case: if someone knows definitively that something is better, it is also necessary to know that than which it is better. But indefinitely he will not know that this is better than a worse thing; for that would be an opinion, not knowledge, for he will not know exactly that it is better than a worse thing, since if this were so, nothing would be worse than it. Wherefore it is clear that if anyone knows one of the relatives definitively, it is also necessary that he know definitively that to which it is said to be related.\n\nHe also pursues examples of this matter, saying: If we know that something is double in relation to something, we also know that of which it is double; but if we do not know that of which it is double, and it is double by virtue of the fact that it has a half, then we cannot know the thing itself which is double, whether it is double. If therefore we know definitively that any given thing is double, it is also necessary that we know definitively of what it is double.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":205,"ref":"p205","source":"Ut si novit quis Anchisem patrem diffinite esse Æneæ, et Æneam diffinite filium esse agnoscet, vel si indiffinite novit quoniam pater est, indiffinite etiam sciturus est quoniam filii pater est.Et rursus si tEneam quis indiffinite novit quoniam filius est, sciturus quoque est indiffinite quoniam patris est filius.Manifestum est ergo quoniam ea quæ sunt ad aliquid, si diffinite ad aliquid esse sciantur, etiam illud diffinite sciendum est ad quod illa referuntur. Quod in substantiis non eodem modo esse Aristotele probamus auctore, qui hujus quaestionis seriem ita concludit.\n\nCaput vero, et manus, et horum singula quae substantiæ sunt,hoc ipsum quod sunt est scire diffinite, Ad quod autem dicantur, non est necessarium scire. Cujus enim caput hoc, vel cujus manus sit, non est scire diffinite, quare non erunt hæc ad aliquid. Si vero non sunt hæc relativa verum erit dicere quod nulla substantia relativorum est.","english":"For if someone knows definitively that Anchises is the father of Aeneas, he will also recognize definitively that Aeneas is the son; or if he knows indefinitely that he is a father, he will also know indefinitely that he is the father of a son. And again, if someone knows indefinitely that Aeneas is a son, he will also know indefinitely that he is the son of a father. It is evident, therefore, that in the case of relatives, if they are known to be related to something definitively, that to which they are referred must also be known definitively. But that this is not so in the case of substances we prove on the authority of Aristotle, who concludes the sequence of this question as follows.\n\nBut a head, and a hand, and each of these individual things which are substances—to know definitively this very thing that they are; but to what they are said [to belong], it is not necessary to know. For whose head this is, or whose hand it is, it is not necessary to know definitively; wherefore these will not be relatives. But if these are not relatives, it will be true to say that no substance is among relatives.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":206,"ref":"p206","source":"In capite, inquit,etin manu, et in aliis substantiis non est verum, quoniam si quis aliquid horum alicujus esse novit, et ad aliquid aliud referri, idcirco et ad quam referatur diffinite sciturus est. Si quis enim operto capite atque omnibus membris manum foras exerat, manifestum est quoniam manus illa alicujus manus est, cujus autem manus sit, dici diffinite non potest. Similiter quoque opertis oculis, facieque velata si cujuslibet caput aspicias, illud quidem caputalicujus esse non dubitas,cujusautem sit diftinitenon proferes.Quare quoniam haec hujusmodi sunt, ut si quis ea diffinite sciat esse alicujus, cujus sint, diffinite scire non poterit,a relativorum diffinitione, quorum si una res quælibet diffinile sciatur esse ad aliquid, illa quoque res ad quam dicitur, diffinite scitur, substantiæ segregantur. Subjiciendum tamen est illud quoque,quod omnino verum est, in diffinitionibus rem ipsam quae diffinitur sumi non oportere. Multa enimsunt quæ aliter proferuntur et diffiniuntur, et aliter accipiuntur, ut si quis dicat album esse colorem nigro contrarium, potest hoc et in corpore accipi, namque et color album dicitur, et corpus quod albo participat,album nominatur. Quocirca ne quis putet tale album esse diffinitum, quod ad participationem albi etcorporis referatur,ita dicendum est: Album est quod cum in aliquibus est, tum color nigro contrarium.","english":"In the case of a head, he says, and a hand, and in other substances, this is not true, because if someone knows that one of these belongs to something, and is also referred to something else, he will for that reason also know definitively to what it is referred. For if someone with his head covered and all his limbs concealed puts forth his hand, it is evident that that hand is someone's hand, but whose hand it is cannot be stated definitively. Similarly also, with eyes covered and face veiled, if you look at anyone's head, you do not doubt that that head belongs to someone, but you will not state definitively whose it is. Therefore, since these are of such a sort that if someone knows definitively that they belong to something, he cannot know definitively whose they are, they are separated from the definition of relatives, of which, if any one thing is known definitively to be relative to something, that thing also to which it is said to be related is known definitively. Nevertheless, this too must be added, which is altogether true: in definitions, the thing itself that is being defined ought not to be assumed. For there are many things that are expressed and defined in one way and understood in another, as if someone were to say that white is a color contrary to black; this can also be understood in the case of a body, for both a color is called white, and a body that participates in white is called white. Wherefore, lest anyone think that such a white has been defined as that which is referred to the participation of white and of a body, it must be stated thus: White is that which, when it is in certain things, is then a color contrary to black.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":207,"ref":"p207","source":"Atque ita rem ipsam in sua diffinitione sumimus, quod scilicet Aristoteles, id est rem ipsam quæ diffinitur in diffinitione sumi non oportere, inter verisimilia topicorum posuit argumenta. Nunc autem post relativorum disputationem, ad majorem nos de his rebus tractatum studiosus doctor hortatur, dicens:\n\nFortasse diffinite est de hujusmodi rebus confidenter declarare, nisi sæpe pertractata sint, dubitasse autem de his singulis non erit inutile.\n\nQuod scilicet nunquam diceret, nisi nos ad majorem acuminisexercitationemconsiderationemque revocaret. Quod quoniam ejus est adhortatio, nos quoque in aliis de his rebus dubitationes solutionesque ponere minimo gravabimur.\n\nLIBER TERTIUS.\n\nConsueta in principio quæstio est cur post relationis praedicamentum disputationem qualitatis aggressus est, quod nimis curiosum est. Mirabile enim fuerat cur post quantitatis ordinem non statim de qualitate coepisset, sed quoniam quantitati quædam relationis admiscuit, et disputationem de relatione continuavit,idcirco non est mirabile post expeditam relationis interpositionem ad qualitatis eum ordinem revertisse, quanquam etiam ex hoc quoque recta sit series. Nam post magnum parvumque statim proportio et quædam ad aliud comparatio consequitur, ut sit aut majus autminus,autaequale vel inaequale, quaesunt ad aliquid.","english":"And thus we take the thing itself in its definition, namely that Aristotle—that is, that the thing itself which is defined ought not to be taken in the definition—placed among the probable arguments of the Topics. But now, after the discussion of relatives, the diligent teacher urges us to a fuller treatment of these matters, saying:\n\nPerhaps it is the mark of a settled mind to declare confidently about such matters, unless they have often been thoroughly examined; but to have doubted about each of these will not be useless.\n\nWhich he would certainly never say unless he were recalling us to greater sharpness of exercise and consideration. And since this is his exhortation, we too shall not be reluctant to set down in other places our doubts and solutions concerning these matters.\n\nBOOK THREE.\n\nThe customary question at the beginning is why, after the discussion of the category of relation, he undertook the discussion of quality—which is excessively curious. For it would have been remarkable why, after the order of quantity, he did not immediately begin on quality; but since he mixed certain things of relation into quantity, and continued the discussion of relation, for that reason it is not remarkable that after finishing the interposition of relation he returned to the order of quality, although from this too the sequence is correct. For after great and small, proportion and a certain comparison to another immediately follows, so that there is either more or less, or equal or unequal, which are relatives.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":208,"ref":"p208","source":"Post haec autem innasci quasque necesse est passiones, quae a qualitatis natura non discrepant, ut albuin, vel nigrum, vel calidum vel frigidum, vel quaecunque his sunt consimilia, quae praedicatio qualitatis includit. Est vero titulus hujus propositi de quali et de qualitate. Quaeritur enim cur ei non aut de quali dixisse, aut de qualitate suffecerit, quod hoc modo solvitur. Dicimus enim quale non uno modo, qualitatem vero simpliciter. Quale enim dicimus et ipsam qualitatem,et illam rem quae qualitate illa participat, ut albedo quidem qualitas est, qui vero participat albedinem albus dicitur. Sed et albedinem ipsam communiter quale dicimus, id est ipsam proprie qualitatem, et album dicimus quale, illud scilicet quod superius comprehensa qualitate participat.Ita ergo et ipsam qualitatem et rem quae qualitate participat. qualia communiter appellamus, qualitas vero simpliciter dicitur. Res enim ipsa quae participari potest, sola qualitas nominatur. Res vero quae participat, qualitatis vocabulo non tenetur, ut, albedo qualitas quidem est, albus vero qualitas non est. Differunt ergo hoc quod dicimus quale et qualitas, quod illud dupliciter, illa simpliciter appellatur.","english":"After these things, however, it is necessary that certain affections arise in each case, which do not differ from the nature of quality, such as white, or black, or hot or cold, or whatever things are similar to these, which the predication of quality includes. The title of this proposition is \"On the Qualified\" and \"On Quality.\" For it is asked why it would not have sufficed for him to have spoken either of \"the qualified\" or of \"quality,\" which is resolved in this way. For we say \"qualified\" in more than one way, but \"quality\" simply. For we call both quality itself and that thing which participates in that quality \"qualified,\" as whiteness is indeed a quality, but he who participates in whiteness is called white. But we also commonly call whiteness itself \"qualified,\" that is, quality itself properly, and we call white \"qualified,\" namely that which participates in the quality understood above. Thus, therefore, we commonly call both quality itself and the thing which participates in quality \"qualified,\" but \"quality\" is said simply. For the thing itself which can be participated in is alone called quality. But the thing which participates is not held by the name of quality, as whiteness is indeed a quality, but white is not a quality. They differ, therefore, in this: that we say \"qualified\" and \"quality,\" because the former is spoken of in two ways, the latter simply.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":209,"ref":"p209","source":"Quocirca quanquamquidam negent hunc titulum Aristotelis esse, idemque confirment posteriores adjectione signatum, nos tamen dicimus propter quamdam nominum similitudinemdemonstrandam utrumqueposuisse,ut nihil distare videatur utrum quale an qualitas, id quod appositum est prædicamentum dioatur; quale enim ipsam aliquoties rem (ut diximus) qualitatemque significat. Sit ergo ex rebus sumpta diffinitio qualitatis.Quod vero inquam diffinitionem,quodque superius in aliis quoque praedicamentis, eodem sumus usi vocabulo,nullus arbitretur generalem me; diffinitionem voluisse signare, sed diffinitionis nomen in rem descriptionis accipiat.In his enim quae generalissima genera sunt, diffinitio quaeri non de. bet, sed descriptio quaedam naturae, non enim potest inveniri diffinitio ejus rei quae genus ipsa sit, et quae genus nullum habeat. Quocirca his propositis, atque antea constitutis, incipiendum est de qualitate.","english":"Wherefore, although certain people deny that this title is Aristotle's, and affirm that it was marked by later addition, we nevertheless say that he posited both on account of a certain similarity of names to be demonstrated, so that it seems to make no difference whether quale or qualitas is said of that which is put forward as the category; for quale sometimes signifies the thing itself, as we have said, and sometimes quality. Let the definition of quality, then, be taken from things themselves. But as to my saying \"definition,\" and my having used the same word above in the other categories as well, let no one suppose that I wished to indicate a general definition, but let him take the word \"definition\" in the sense of a description. For in the case of those things which are most general genera, a definition must not be sought, but a certain description of the nature; for a definition cannot be found for that thing which is itself a genus, and which has no genus. Wherefore, with these matters set forth and established beforehand, we must begin on quality.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":210,"ref":"p210","source":"DE QUALITATE.\n\nQualitatem autem dico,secundum quamquales quidam dicuntur.\n\nHic quæritur cur omnium in disceptatione doctissimus tam culpabili qualitatem termino diffinitionis incluserit. Volentibus enim nobis quid sit qualitas scire, illa respondet: qualitas est secundum quam qualesquidam dicuntur.Nihilenim minuseritobscurius atque ignorabilius, quod ait, secundum quam quales dicuntur, quam si de ipsa sola qualitate dixisset. Nam si illi sunt quales, qui qualitatem habent, ut sciantur quales,prius qualitas cognoscenda est. Amplius quoque nihil differt dixisse eam qualitatem secundum quam quales quidem dicuntur,tanquam si diceret eam esse qualitatem quæ qualitas sit. Nam sic qualitatem diffinire volens ait: SecunQum quam quales quidam sunt. Rursus si quis quales aliquos diffinire voluerit, eodem modo dicere poterit, qui in se retinent aliquam qualitatem. Quod si qualitas quidem quid sit per quale, quid autem sit quale, superiore qualitate monstratur, nihil intererit dicere qualitatem esse, qualitatem,quam qualitatem esse, secundum quam quales dicuntur.Sed siordinatadiffinitiogeneralisetin hoc generalissimo genere poni potuisset, recte culpabilis determinatio videretur.Nunc autem frustra contenditur,cum jam (ut saepe dictum est) descriptionis potius loco hunc terminum quam alicujus diffinitionisaddiderit.Quo.","english":"ON QUALITY.\n\nBut I call quality that according to which certain things are said to be of such a sort.\n\nHere it is asked why the most learned of all in disputation included quality within so culpable a term of definition. For when we wish to know what quality is, he answers: quality is that according to which certain things are said to be of such a sort. For nothing would have been more obscure and more unknowable than what he says, \"according to which they are said to be of such a sort,\" than if he had spoken about quality alone by itself. For if those are of such a sort who have quality, in order that they may be known to be of such a sort, quality must first be known. Furthermore, it makes no difference to have said that it is quality according to which certain things are said to be of such a sort, than as if he were to say that it is that quality which is quality. For in this way, wishing to define quality, he says: \"According to which certain things are of such a sort.\" Again, if anyone wishes to define certain things as being of such a sort, he will be able in the same way to say that they are those which retain some quality in themselves. But if what quality indeed is is shown through \"of such a sort,\" and what \"of such a sort\" is is shown through the superior quality, it will make no difference to say that quality is quality, than to say that quality is that according to which they are said to be of such a sort. But if an ordered general definition could also have been placed in this most general genus, the determination would rightly seem culpable. Now, however, it is contended in vain, since already (as has often been said) he added this term in the place of a description rather than of any definition. Wherefore.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":211,"ref":"p211","source":"circa si designatio tantum quædam, etquodammodo adumbratio rei ejus de qua quaeritur, et non diffinitio est, absurda calumnia est, rebus notioribus res ignotiores probantem non ante perspecta descriptionis ratione culpare.Illud autem quis dubitet notiores esse eos qui quales sunt, illa ipsa ex qua quales dicuntur qualitate, ut quilibet albus notior est ipsa albedine? Nam si albedo qualitas est,albusvero ab albedine, id est a qualitate, denominatus est, albus erit qualis nominatus ab albedine qualitate. Quod si, ut dictum est, notior albus est albedine, qualis notior erit qualitate, sicut grammaticus quoque notior est grammatica. Grammaticus quoque qualis est denominatus, scilicet a grammatica qualitate. Omnia enim quae sensibus subjecta sunt notiora sunt nobis quam ea quae sensibus non tenentur. Quare nihil impedit describentem et quodammodo naturam rei ejus de qua quaeritur designantem, res ignoliorea notioribus approbare.","english":"In this connection, if it is only a certain designation and in a way a sketch of the thing about which inquiry is made, and not a definition, the accusation is absurd—to find fault with one who proves less known things by more known things, without having first examined the principle of the description. But who would doubt that those things which are of such a sort are more known than that very quality from which they are said to be of such a sort—as, for example, any white thing is more known than whiteness itself? For if whiteness is a quality, but a white thing is denominated from whiteness, that is, from a quality, then a white thing will be called \"of such a sort\" from the quality whiteness. But if, as has been said, a white thing is more known than whiteness, then \"of such a sort\" will be more known than quality, just as a grammarian too is more known than grammar. A grammarian too is called \"of such a sort,\" namely from the quality grammar. For all things that are subject to the senses are more known to us than those that are not grasped by the senses. Wherefore nothing prevents one who describes and in a way designates the nature of the thing about which inquiry is made from establishing less known things by means of more known things.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":212,"ref":"p212","source":"Estautem qualitas eorum quxmuuiphciterdicuntur, el una quidemspecies qualitatis habitus etdispositio dicitur. Differt autem habitus a dispositione, quod permanentior et diuturnior est. Tales aulem sunt scientiae et virtutes,. scientiæ enzm videtur esse permanentium et eorum quæ difficillime moveanturisiquis vel mediocriter sumat scientiam, nisi forte grandis permutatio facta sit, vel ab ægritudine, vel ab aliquo hujusmodi. Simililer autem et virtus, ut justitia et temperantia et singula talium non videntur posse facile amoveri, neque facile permutari.Affectiones vero dicuntur quæ suntfacite mobiles etcito permutabiles, ut calor et frigiditas, sanitas et ægritudo, et alia hujusmodi.A(ficitur enim circaeashomoquodammodoycitoque permutaiur,et ex calido frigidus fit, et ex sanitate in ægritudinem transit. Similiterautem in aliiq,nisitortein his quoque contingat propter temporis longitudinem in naturam cujusque transferri, ut insanabilis,vel difficile mobilis existat affectus, quem jam quilibet habitudinem vocet.","english":"But quality is one of the things that are spoken of in many ways, and one species of quality is called habit and disposition. Now habit differs from disposition in that it is more permanent and longer-lasting. Such, moreover, are the sciences and the virtues; for knowledge seems to belong to the class of things that are permanent and most difficult to move, if one takes up knowledge even to a moderate degree, unless perhaps a great change has occurred, either from illness or from something of this sort. Similarly also virtue, as justice and temperance and each of such things, does not seem able to be easily removed or easily changed. But affections are called those things that are easily movable and quickly changeable, such as heat and cold, health and sickness, and other things of this sort. For a man is affected in relation to these in a certain way and is quickly changed, and from hot becomes cold, and passes from health into sickness. Similarly, moreover, in other cases, unless perhaps in these too it happens, on account of length of time, that they are transferred into the nature of each thing, so that the affection becomes incurable or difficult to move, which now anyone would call a habit.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":213,"ref":"p213","source":"Proponit qualitatem multipliciter dici, quae res traxit aliquos in errorem, ut eis suspicio nasceretur Aristotelem credere qualitatem aequivoce nominari. Nam si omnisaequivocatio multipliciter dicitur,qualitas autem secundum Aristotelem ipsa quoque multipliciter appellatur, secundum Aristotelem nomen qualitatisaequivocum est. Nos vero defendimus multipliciter dici, esse non una tantum significatione nominari. Dicitur enim aliquid multipliciter dici, cum et aequivoce dicitur, et diverso modo de suis speciebus multipliciter praedicatur.Etcommunisest multiplex appellatio, etiam in bis nominibus quae veluti genera de speciebus dicuntr, velut aequivoca desubjectis.Namqueetanimal multipliciterdicitur. Nam si multae sint species quæ animali subjectae sunt,ipsum quoquemultipliciterquodammodonorrinatur. Istam autem muttiplicationem, non ad æquivocationem retulisse Aristotelem, sed potius ut qualitatem genus esse proponeret, illa res monstrat, quod ait, at una quidem species qualitatis habitus affectioquedicitur. Nam qui speciem dicit esse qualitatis habitum et affectionem, quis eum dubitet ipsam qualitatem vim obtinere generis arbitrari? Cur vero dicit unam speciem esse qualitatis, cum geminasproposuerit,habitudinemsciiicetetaffectionem, quæritur.","english":"He sets forth that quality is spoken of in many ways, a matter which drew some into error, so that the suspicion arose in them that Aristotle believed quality to be named equivocally. For if every equivocation is spoken of in many ways, but quality according to Aristotle is itself also called in many ways, then according to Aristotle the name of quality is equivocal. But we maintain that to be spoken of in many ways is not to be named with one meaning only. For something is said to be spoken of in many ways both when it is said equivocally and when it is predicated in many ways of its species in a different manner. And the multiple appellation is common also in those names which are spoken of species as it were as genera, just as equivocals are spoken of subjects. For animal too is spoken of in many ways. For if there are many species which are subject to animal, it too is in a certain way named in many ways. But that Aristotle did not refer this multiplicity to equivocation, but rather proposed quality to be a genus, is shown by the fact that he says, and one species of quality is called habit and disposition. For when he says that habit and disposition are a species of quality, who would doubt that he considers quality itself to obtain the force of a genus? But why he says that one species of quality is a species, when he has proposed two, namely habit and disposition, is a question.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":214,"ref":"p214","source":"Nam si unum idemque sit habitus et aflectio, superflua est ejusdem rei repetita propositio, sin vero differant, quare differant investigandum est. Genere enim ne distent, illa res prævenit, quod utraque sub qualitate constituit. Restat ergo ut aut specie discrepent, aut numero; sed si specie discreparent, non ab Aristotele pro una specie ponerentur. Reliquum est;igiturea nequegenere neque specie differre, sed numero. Habitus namque dispositio idem est secundum speciem, sed numero tantum et propria quadam qualitate dissentiunt. Dispositionem vero indiscrete idem quod affectionem voco. Nam sicut Socrates a Platone nihil quidem secundum ipsam humanitatis speciem discrepat, sola tamen propriae personæ qualitate disjuncti sunt, ita quoque dispositio atque habitus, nee potius hoc modo distant; sed quemadmodum ipse Socrates dum esset parvulus, post vero pubescens a seipso distabat, eodem quoque modo habitus etdispositio: namque habitus firma est dispositio, affectio infirmus est habitus, ut quemadmodum distat albus color ab albo colore, si in pictura hic quidem permaneat, ille vero statim periturus sit, nisi quod is qui permanentior est, in habitu est, ille vero qui facile periturus est, in affectione, ita nihil aliud interest inter habitum atque dispositionem. Nam quamvis permanentior sit habitus, facile vero mobilis dispositio, non nisi tantum diuturnitate differunt permanendi.","english":"For if habit and affection are one and the same, the repeated statement of the same thing is superfluous; but if they differ, why they differ must be investigated. For that they do not differ in genus, the following consideration prevents: that both are placed under quality. It remains, therefore, that they differ either in species or in number; but if they differed in species, they would not be posited by Aristotle as one species. It remains, therefore, that they differ neither in genus nor in species, but in number. For habit is the same as disposition in species, but they differ only in number and by a certain proper quality. But I call disposition without distinction the same as affection. For just as Socrates differs from Plato in no respect according to the very species of humanity, yet they are separated by the sole quality of their own person, so too disposition and habit—nor do they differ in this way any more; but just as Socrates himself, while he was a little boy, afterward as a youth differed from himself, in the same way also habit and disposition: for habit is a firm disposition, affection is a weak habit, so that just as white color differs from white color, if in a painting one remains and the other is about to perish at once, except that the one which is more permanent is in habit, while the one which is easily about to perish is in affection, so nothing else differs between habit and disposition. For although habit is more permanent and disposition easily changeable, they differ only in the duration of their permanence.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":215,"ref":"p215","source":"Unde fit ut genere et specie habitus a dispositione non discrepet. Quocirca recte quae numero solo distabant, non specie sub unius speciei nuncupatione utraque sunt ab Aristotele proposita, sed est horum propria differentia, quod habitus diutissime permanentes dispositiones sunt. Dispositio autem facile mobilis habitus, sed si horum exempla quaeramus, haec poterunt inveniri. Habitudines sunt ut artes, disciplinae, virtutes. Nam ars non facile mobilis videtur et diutissime permanet. Hoc enim ars ipsa meditatur ut usu atque exercitatione non pereat. Quis enim est qui sciens recte grammaticam nulla vi interveniente validioris passionis amisit? Fertur enim quidam summus orator aegritudine febribusque decoctus, omnem litterarum amisisse doctrinam, in aliis vero rebus sanus ac sibi constans et in omni re vegetus permansisse. Disciplina quoque etiam ipsa est in permutatione difficilis. Quis enim scienstriangulum,duobusdirectisangulis,tres interiores similes habere angulos, bane scientiam praeter vim (ut dictum est) fortioris passionis amisit? Virtutes quoque in eodem genere ponendæ sunt. Virtus enim nisi difficile mutHbilis non est, neque enim quod semeljuste judicat justusest, neque qui semel adulterium facit, est adulter, sed cum ista voluntas cogitatioque permanserit.Aristoteles enim virtutes non putat scientias, ut Socrates, sed habitus in Ethicis suis esse declarat.","english":"Hence it comes about that in genus and species habit does not differ from disposition. Therefore, correctly, those things which differed only in number, not in species, were both set forth by Aristotle under the name of one species, but their proper difference is this, that habits are dispositions that persist for a very long time. A disposition, however, is a habit easily changeable, but if we seek examples of these, they can be found. Habits are such things as arts, disciplines, virtues. For an art does not seem easily changeable and persists for a very long time. For the art itself aims at this, that it not perish through use and exercise. For who is there who, knowing grammar correctly, has lost it with no force of a stronger passion intervening? For it is reported that a certain most eminent orator, wasted away by illness and fevers, lost all his learning of letters, yet in other matters remained sound and consistent with himself and vigorous in every respect. Discipline too is itself difficult to change. For who is there who, knowing that a triangle has three interior angles equal to two right angles, has lost this knowledge apart from the force (as has been said) of a stronger passion? Virtues too must be placed in the same genus. For virtue is not virtue unless it is difficult to change, for neither is one who judges justly once just, nor is one who commits adultery once an adulterer, but when this will and thought have persisted. For Aristotle does not think virtues are sciences, as Socrates did, but declares in his Ethics that they are habits.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":216,"ref":"p216","source":"Quocirca constat esse habitus stabiliter permanentes, difficileque mutabiles, hoc tantum excepto, ut non eas vis aliqua major alicujus permutationis impellat et destruat. Affectionis vero species sunt, ut calet'actio atque perfrictio, et aegritudo atque sanitas,cum ad eas quodammodo sit homo dispositus atque affectus,non tamenimmutabiliterautcaloris qualitatem habeataut frigoris, sicut nec perpetuo sanitatis aut perpetuo aegritudinis. Quin etiam si qua sunt quae per longi temporis aegritudinem corporibus immutabiliter indurantur, ut ea jam in naturam quodammodo corporis cujusque transierint, ut si quis percussus cicatricem faciat insanabilem, illi ex dispesitione et affectione quidam factus est habitus. Quocirca recte dictum est dispositiones inveteratas habitus facere. Nam cum quaelibet dispositio permanens et difficile mobilis facta sit, ilia jam non dispositio autaffectio, sed habitus vocandus est.","english":"Wherefore it is evident that habits are stably permanent and difficult to change, with this sole exception, that no greater force of any alteration drives and destroys them. But the species of affection are, for instance, the action of heat and chill, and sickness and health, since in relation to these a man is in some way disposed and affected, yet he does not immutably possess either the quality of heat or of cold, just as neither does he perpetually possess health or perpetually sickness. Indeed, even if there are some things which through long sickness of the body are immutably hardened, so that they have already passed in some way into the nature of each body, as if someone struck should make an incurable scar, for that person a certain habit has been produced out of disposition and affection. Wherefore it has rightly been said that inveterate dispositions make habits. For when any disposition has become permanent and difficult to move, it must now be called not a disposition or affection, but a habit.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":217,"ref":"p217","source":"Manifestumest autem quoniam hæc volunt habitudines nominari,quæsunt diuturniora et difficile mobilia. Namque in disciplinisnon multum retinentes sed facile mohiles, non div-untur habitum habere, quamvis sint ad disciplinas pejus vel melius dispositi. Quare differt habitus a dispositione,quod hoc quidem facile mobile est, iltud vero diuturnius et difficile mobile.\n\nHabitus esse qualitates difficile mobiles et diuturnissimepermallentes hoc argumento confirmat,quod eos quibus quaelibet scientia traditur,si ab eis non fortiter addiscatur,ejus rei quam discunthabitum retinere non dicimus. Qui euim litteras discens nondum soluto cursu sermonis, sed syllabatim quodammodo atque intercise per imperitiam legerit, eum quidem dispositum esse atque affectum dicimus ad scieutiam litterarum,non tamen adhuc illum habitum retinere. Quare idem quoque est in aliis rebus. Omnesenim quicunque ad aliquam rem dispositi, ejus rei qua sunt aliquomodoaffecti5nondiuturnam in se receptionem habent, eos ad illam rem dispositos quidem esse arbitramur, habitum vero habere non dicimus. Recte igitur habitus diuturnior,el permanentior, dispositio vero facile mobilis deque perdurabilis ab Aristotele proponitur.","english":"It is evident, however, that these wish to be called habits which are more lasting and difficult to change. For in the case of disciplines, those who do not retain much but are easily changeable are not said to have a habit, even though they are disposed worse or better toward the disciplines. Wherefore a habit differs from a disposition in that the latter is easily changeable, while the former is more lasting and difficult to change.\n\nThat habits are qualities difficult to change and most lastingly permanent, he confirms by this argument: those to whom any science is handed down, if it is not strongly learned by them, we do not say that they retain the habit of the thing which they are learning. For one who is learning letters, not yet with the fluent course of speech, but reading syllable by syllable, as it were, and in a broken manner through inexperience—we say that he is indeed disposed and affected toward the knowledge of letters, yet he does not as yet retain that habit. Wherefore the same holds also in other matters. For all who are disposed toward some thing, having no lasting reception within themselves of the thing by which they are in some way affected, we judge them indeed to be disposed toward that thing, but we do not say that they have a habit. Rightly, therefore, habit is set forth by Aristotle as more lasting and more permanent, but disposition as easily changeable and not enduring.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":218,"ref":"p218","source":"Suntautem habitus etiam dispositiones, dispositiones vero non necesse est habitus esse, qui enim retinent habitus et quodammodo dispositi sunt per. eos qui autem dispositi sunt non umnino retinent habitum.\n\nSensus quidem talis est, quod omnis quicunque habeat habitum, habet quoque in eodem habitu dispositionem. Si quis vero habeat dispositionem, non necesse sit eum etiam habitum retinere. Habitus ab habendodictus est. Idcirco quod ab aliquo immutabiliter vel difficile immutabilitur habeatur, ut glauci oculi, vel adunca? nares, vel alicujus artis scientia atque doctrina, quæ si quis habeat, etiam dispositus adeaessedicitur.Si quisautemdispositusadaliquam rem sit, non eum necesse est etiam habitum habere, ut si quis negligentius opertus algore quatiatur, dispositus quidem tunc ad frigus est, non tamen ejus retinet habitum. Videturautem eamdem similitudinem servare genus. Nam genus amplius prædicatur, at ubicunque species sit, mox quoque nomengeneris praesto est. Ubi autem sit genus, non necessario speciei vocabulum consequitur, ut si quis est homo,eum animal esse necesse est. Si quis est animal, non sta. lim homo dicitur.","english":"But habits are also dispositions, yet dispositions are not necessarily habits. For those who retain habits are in a certain way disposed through them; but those who are disposed do not altogether retain a habit.\n\nThe sense is indeed such that whoever has a habit also has a disposition in that same habit. But if anyone has a disposition, it is not necessary that he also retain a habit. Habit is so called from having. Therefore, because it is had by someone immutably or with difficulty changed, as grey eyes, or curved nostrils, or the knowledge and teaching of some art, which if anyone has, he is also said to be disposed toward those things. But if anyone is disposed toward something, it is not necessary that he also have a habit, as if someone carelessly covered is shaken by cold, he is indeed then disposed toward cold, yet he does not retain a habit of it. But the genus seems to preserve this same likeness. For genus is predicated more widely, and wherever a species is, the name of the genus is immediately present too. But where the genus is, the term of the species does not necessarily follow, as if someone is a man, it is necessary that he be an animal. If someone is an animal, he is not immediately called a man.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":219,"ref":"p219","source":"Quocirca cum quidquid est habitus,dispositio sit,quidquid dispositio non omnino sit habitus,videtur genus esse quoddam habitus disposilio,sed illud verius, ubi inten' e, est alqueremissio, genus intentionis, remissione:;on posse.Nam sicut in eo quod est album et magis album, magis albi genus album esse non potest, idem namque est album et magis album, nisi torte quod sola discrepant intentione,quod magis album quadam quasi intentione augmentoque crescit atque porrigitur, sic eliam habitus atque dispositio cum idem sint, utraque sola differunt intentione, quod auctior quodam. modo,et incremento quodam permanentior firmiorque est habitusdispositione; quocirca dispositio habitus genus non est, eodem quoque modo nec dispositionis species,habitus.Sed nuncquidam itaesthabitus, ut non per dispositionem creverit, neque per aliquam nondum durabilem qualitatem ad perfectum venerit statum,ut est nasi curvitas,vel cæcitas oculorum, si subita facta sit.Haec enim ab ipso haDitu nulla praecedente dispositione cceperunt; forte enim nunquam ad ea dispositus fuit aliquis,qui adhuc non haberet.Alii vera habitus intentione fiunt atque inveterationedispositionis,ut ea quæ in artibus doctrinisque versantur.","english":"Therefore, since whatever is a habit is a disposition, but whatever is a disposition is not entirely a habit, disposition seems to be a kind of genus of habit. But that view is more true: where there is intensity, there is also some remission, and the genus of intensity cannot consist in remission. For just as in the case of what is white and more white, white cannot be the genus of more white — for white and more white are the same, except perhaps that they differ only in intensity, in that more white grows and extends, as it were, by a certain intensity and increase — so too habit and disposition, since they are the same, differ only in intensity, because habit is in a certain way richer and by a certain increase more lasting and firmer than disposition. Wherefore disposition is not the genus of habit, and in the same way neither is habit a species of disposition. But now some habit is such that it has not grown through a disposition, nor has it come to its perfect state through some quality not yet lasting, as for example the curvature of a nose, or blindness of the eyes, if it has come about suddenly. For these have begun from the habit itself with no preceding disposition; for perhaps no one was ever disposed toward them who did not yet have them. But other habits come about by the intensity and inveteration of a disposition, such as those that are occupied with arts and doctrines.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":220,"ref":"p220","source":"Prius enim quis ad ea dispositus est, post vero habitum capit,alia vero non intentione, sed quadam permutatione ad habitum veniunt,ut lac quod ex liquido defigilur et constipatur in caseum,etvinum quod ex dulci atque suavi in acidum gustum saporemque convertitur; neque enim plus tunc vinum est quam fuit ante cum esset suave, sed cum quadam permutatione in aliam qualitatem habitudinemque transgressum est. Ac de prima quidem qualitatis specie sufficienter est dictum.\n\nAliud uero genus qualitatis est, secundum quod pugillatortis vet cursores, vel salubres vel insalubres dicimus, et simpliciter quæcunque secundum potentiam naturalem vel impolentiam dicuntur. Non enim quoniam sunt dipositi aliquo modo,unumquodque hujusmodi dicilur,sed quod habent potentiam naturalem vel impotentiam facere quiddam facile uel nihil pati, ut pugillatores vel cursores dicunturtnon quod sint dispositi aliquo modo, sed quod habeant potentiam naturalem hoc facile faciendi.Salubl'es autem dicuntur, eo quod habeant potentiam naturalem,ut nihil a quibuslibet accidentibus facile patiantur, insalubres uero eo quod habeant impotentiam naturalem non facile patiendi. Similiter autem his et molle et durum se habent, durum enim dicitur quia habeat potentiam non facile secari, molle vero quod habeat ejusdem ipsius impotentiam.","english":"For first someone is disposed toward these things, and afterward receives the habit; but others come to a habit not by intensification but by a kind of change, as milk, which from liquid is thickened and compacted into cheese, and wine, which from sweet and pleasant is turned into a sharp taste and flavor; for it is not then more wine than it was before when it was sweet, but by a kind of change it has passed over into another quality and condition. And concerning the first species of quality, enough has been said.\n\nBut there is another genus of quality, according to which we call boxers or runners healthy or unhealthy, and simply whatever things are said according to natural power or impotence. For each thing of this sort is not said to be such because it is disposed in some way, but because it has a natural power or impotence to do something easily or to undergo nothing, as boxers or runners are said [to be such] not because they are disposed in some way, but because they have a natural power of doing this easily. But they are called healthy because they have a natural power to undergo nothing easily from any accidents, and unhealthy because they have a natural impotence of not easily undergoing. And soft and hard are related similarly to these; for a thing is called hard because it has the power of not easily being cut, but soft because it has the impotence of this same thing.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":221,"ref":"p221","source":"Secundam vero speciem qualitatis esse commemo ■ rat,quee ex quadam naturalipotentia impotentiaque proveniat; hoc autem hujusmodi est,ut cum aliquos validi corporis intuemur nondum pugiles,neque hujusperitiaartisimbutos,sedsic eos pugillatores dicimus, non in eo quodjamsint pugiles,sed eo quod esse possint, et si quorum leve corpus aspicimus,surasque non magnas,eos facile moveri cursuque veloces existimamus, quanquam nondum ad cursus certamen aspirE.nt,nec sint cursores, eos tamen cursores secundum potentiamnominamus,nonquodjamcurrant, sed quod possint currere,non absurde vocabimus. Eodem quoque modo eos vocamus salubres vel insalubres, quos valenti corpore vel fragiliore, vel ad sanitatem aptos, vel ad ægritudinem credimus.","english":"He records that the second species of quality is that which arises from a certain natural capacity or incapacity. This is of the following sort: when we look upon certain people of strong body who are not yet boxers, nor imbued with the skill of this art, but we nonetheless call them boxers—not in that they already are boxers, but in that they can be—and if we look upon certain people of light body and not large calves, we think them easily moved and swift in running, although they do not yet aspire to the contest of running, nor are they runners, we nonetheless call them runners according to capacity, not because they already run, but because they can run, we shall not absurdly call them so. In the same way we call those healthy or unhealthy whom we believe to have a strong or more fragile body, or to be fit for health or for sickness.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":222,"ref":"p222","source":"Unde fit utquosdam aegrotos possimus salubres vocare, quosdam vero sanos insalubres dicere: non enim, quod jam actu vel sani vel a'groti sint, salubres vel insalubres dicuntur,sed quod vel sani diutius esse possint vel aegroti.Sed quaestio est cur cum de qualitatis speciebus propositum sit, secundum genus dixerit qualitatis et non speciem; ita enim ait: Aliud vero genus qualitatis est seeundum quod pugillatores vel cursores, vel salubres et insalubres dicimus.Sed qui hoc quærunt ignorarevidenlurillud esse solum genus, quod super se aliud genus non habeat.Illud veros sol um speciem,quod sub se nullas species claudat, illa vero quae inter genera generalissiæa speciesque specialissimas sunt, communi posse generis et specieinominenuncupari.","english":"From this it comes about that we can call certain sick people healthy, and certain sound people unhealthy. For they are not called healthy or unhealthy because they are already actually sound or sick, but because they can either remain sound for a longer time or be sick. But the question is why, when the plan was to discuss the species of quality, he spoke according to the genus of quality and not the species. For he says: \"But another genus of quality is that according to which we call people boxers or runners, or healthy and unhealthy.\" But those who ask this seem not to know that only that is a genus which has no other genus above it. But that alone is a species which encloses no species under it. Those things, however, which are between the most general genera and the most special species can be called by the common name of both genus and species.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":223,"ref":"p223","source":"Quocirca quoniam de ea specie qualitatis Aristoteles tractat, quae nondum sit species specialissima, sed magis generis prima species, et hujusmodi species quæ possit esse et genus,nihil absurdum esteamdem et speciei et generis loco ponere.Sed ut sunt quædam qualitates, a quibus denominatione quadam facta quaelibet illa res dicitur, ut ab albedine album,vel a luxuria luxuriosum,vel quidquid hujusmodi est, in his quaesunt secundum potentiam naturalem non ita est.Ars enim ipsa pugillatoria non est proposita, a qua pugillatores dicamus.Pugillatores enim non dicuntur ab eo quod usum pugillatoriæ artis exerceant,sed ab eo quod ad eam secundum potentiam naturalem affecti sunt;quocirca quos dicimus pugillatores a pugillatoria dicti non sunt,neque ab ea denominari possunt, sed magis a pugillatoria arte pugiles appellantur. Pugilis enim est qui pugillatoria arte utitur,atque hoc idem in cæteris licet videre. In his ergo nullacerta qualitas est a qua cætera nominentur.Sed si quatamen invenienda atque exprimenda sit,talis est quam ipse Aristoteles hoc modo denuntiat,quae sit secundum potentiam aliquid faciendi,veJ impotentiam aliquid patiendi.Pugillatores enim et cursores idcirco dicimus,quod habeant potentiam faciendi,id est currere atque esse pugiles.","english":"Wherefore, since Aristotle treats of that species of quality which is not yet a most specific species, but rather the first species of a genus, and a species of such a kind as can also be a genus, there is nothing absurd in placing the same thing in the position both of a species and of a genus. But whereas there are certain qualities from which, by a kind of denomination, any given thing is named—as white from whiteness, or luxurious from luxury, or whatever else is of this sort—in those which are according to natural potential it is not so. For the art of boxing itself is not what is set forth, from which we call people boxers. For they are not called boxers from the fact that they exercise the use of the art of boxing, but from the fact that they are disposed toward it according to natural potential; wherefore those whom we call boxers are not named from the art of boxing, nor can they be denominated from it, but rather from the art of boxing they are called pugilists. For a pugilist is one who uses the art of boxing, and the same may be seen in other cases. In these, therefore, there is no definite quality from which the rest are named. But if one must nonetheless find and express one, it is such as Aristotle himself declares in this way: that which is according to the potential for doing something, or the incapacity for suffering something. For we call people boxers and runners for the reason that they have the potential for doing, that is, for running and for being boxers.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":224,"ref":"p224","source":"Salubres vero denominamus, quod el ipsi habeant aliquamquodammodoimpotentiamaliquid patiendi; qui enim minus ab extrinsecus accidentibus patitur, hic de sanitatesecurus est,etqui de sanitate securus est, illum salubrem esse re vera possumus prcedicare.Alia vero est qualitas quae secundum nihil patiendi impotentiam dicitur,ut eos quos insalubres vocamus;hi enim impotentiam habent nihil patiendi, id circo quod habeant potentiam aliquid cito patiendi: quod si quis estqui abextrinsecus accidentibusaliquid facile patiatur,ille potens est facillime aegritudini subjacere,secundum quam potentiam insalubresdicimus,etiamsi sint sani.Eodem quoque modo durum dicitur et molle.Durum enim est quod habet potentiam non citius secari,quod enim durum est, difficillime aliqua sectione dividitur. Molle autem quod habeatimpotentiam difficilius secari,quod quoniam molle secatur facile, secundum impotentiam difficilius secari molle dicimus.Et haec est secunda species qualitatis. Nunc transeamus ad tertiam.","english":"We call healthy, however, those who themselves have in some way a certain incapacity for suffering anything; for he who is less affected by external accidents is secure concerning health, and he who is secure concerning health we can truly proclaim to be healthy. But there is another quality which is spoken of according to an incapacity for suffering nothing, as those whom we call unhealthy; for these have an incapacity for suffering nothing, for the reason that they have a capacity for quickly suffering something; for if there is anyone who is easily affected in some way by external accidents, he is capable of most easily being subject to sickness, according to which capacity we call them unhealthy, even if they are healthy. In the same way also hard and soft are spoken of. For hard is that which has a capacity for not being quickly cut, for what is hard is divided by some section with the greatest difficulty. But soft is that which has an incapacity for being cut with difficulty, because since what is soft is cut easily, according to the incapacity for being cut with difficulty we call it soft. And this is the second species of quality. Now let us pass to the third.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":225,"ref":"p225","source":"Tertia vero species qualitatis estpassibilesqualita- J tes et passiones; sunt autem hujusmodi, ut dulcedo,ama. ritudo, austeritas, et omnia his cognata. Amplius, et calor: et frigus, et albedo,et nigredo. Et quoniam hæ qualitates sunt manifestum est, quæcunque enim ista susceperint,qualia dicuntur secundum ea,ut mel quoniam dulcedinem suscepit,dulce dicitur, et corpus album, eo quod albedinem suscepit.Similiter autem. sese habent et in cæleris.\n\nTertium genus qualitatis proponit,quod nos in partem qualitatis speciemque convertimus passibiles qualitates et passiones. Haec autem a se plurimum distant,tamen cum utraque qualitates sint,utraque prius docet,post vero quae eorum distantia esse videatur edisserit,et prius eorum convenientia proponit exempla.Nam quid sint passibiles qualitates docens ait.ut dulcedo vel amaritudo, calor et frigus, nigredo et albedo,et alia his cognata,hæc quæ superius comprehensa sunt qualitates esse illa ratione confirmat,quam in primordio de qualitatis disputatione ipsius qualitatis esse reddiderat.Diffinitionem enim qualitatis esse praedixerat, secundum quam quales vocamur.Quod si secundum qualitatis quales vocamur,ab amaritudine vero vel a dulcedine amarum vel dulce dicitur.","english":"The third species of quality, however, is passible qualities and passions; and they are of this sort, such as sweetness, bitterness, harshness, and all things akin to these. Furthermore, also heat and cold, and whiteness and blackness. And since these are qualities, it is manifest; for whatever things have received these are said to be qualified according to them, as honey, because it has received sweetness, is said to be sweet, and a body is said to be white because it has received whiteness. And similarly they hold in the other cases.\n\nHe sets forth the third genus of quality, which we have turned into a part and species of quality: passible qualities and passions. These, however, differ greatly from one another; yet since both are qualities, he first teaches both, then afterwards explains what their difference appears to be, and first sets forth examples of their agreement. For teaching what passible qualities are, he says: such as sweetness or bitterness, heat and cold, blackness and whiteness, and other things akin to these. He confirms that these things, which were comprehended above, are qualities by that reasoning which he had given at the beginning of the discussion of quality as belonging to quality itself. For he had stated beforehand that there is a definition of quality according to which we are called qualified. But if according to quality we are called qualified, then from bitterness or sweetness something is called bitter or sweet.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":226,"ref":"p226","source":"A nigredine atque albedine nigrum atque album, quis dubitet has esse qualitates in quibus qualitatis convenitdiffinitio?lllaenim semperejusdem naturaeessecreduntur,qu xecunqueejusdem descriptionis finibus term:nantur,ut si qua res diffinitionem hanc,quae est animal rationale mortale susceperit.eam hominem esse manifestum est.Quocirca si hae quas passibiles qualitates vel passiones dixerat,suscipiunt qualitatis diffinilionem,eo quod qualia dicuntur quas illa susceperint,has etiam constat esse qualitates.\n\nPossibiles vero qualitates dicuntur, non quod haec quæ illas susceperint qualitates,aliquid patiantul',neque enim mel quod aliquid passum sit, idcirco dicifur dulce,nec aliquid aliud hujusmodi. Similiter autem his et calor et frigus passibiles qualitates dicuntur, non quod ipsa quæ eas suscipiunt,aliquid passa sint. sed quoniam singulaeorum quæ dicta sunt, secundum sensuum qualitatem passionis perfectiva sunt, passibiles qualitates dicuntur, dulcedo enim quamdam passionem secundum gustum efficit, et calor secundum tactum, similiter autem et alia.","english":"From blackness and whiteness, black and white—who would doubt that these are qualities to which the definition of quality applies? For they are always believed to be of the same nature, whatever things are bounded by the limits of the same description; just as, if any thing has received this definition, which is \"a rational mortal animal,\" it is manifest that it is a man. Wherefore, if these which he had called passible qualities or passions receive the definition of quality, in that they are called qualified by virtue of the qualities they have received, it is evident that these too are qualities.\n\nBut they are called passible qualities, not because the things that have received these qualities undergo something; for honey is not called sweet because it has undergone something, nor anything else of this sort. Similarly to these, both heat and cold are called passible qualities, not because the things that receive them have undergone something, but because each of the things mentioned, in accordance with the quality of the senses, is productive of a passion; they are called passible qualities. For sweetness produces a certain passion in respect of taste, and heat in respect of touch, and similarly also the others.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":227,"ref":"p227","source":"Passibilium qualitatum exemplaconstituerat dulcedinemvel amaritudinem,frigus atque calorem,albedinem atque nigredinem,quæ cum passibiles qualitates sint, non tamen uno eodemque modo passimles qualitates dicuntur; sed longe distant rationes quibus hæc omnia qualitates passibiles appellantur, ut rrius dulcedo vel amariLudo,calor et frigus passibiles qualitates dicuntur, non quod ea quæ sunt dulcia aliquid extrinseous patiantur, nee quod ea quae suut amara,exaliqua passione saporem asperum amaritudinemque susceperint. Neque enim mel aliquid passum est, ut ei dulcedo esset ill natura,nec vero absinthium ab ulla aliqua extrinsecus passione amaritudinis horror infecit; quocirca hæc atque his similia non idcirco dicuntur esse passibiles qualitates, quod ipsae aliquid passæsint,sed quod ex his passiones quaedam in sensibus dimittantur. Namque ex melle quod dulce est,dulcedo quædam in gustu relinquitur,simulque etiam calor et frigus passionem quamdam sensibus faciunt. Patimur dulcedinem, cum aliquid dulce gustamus, simulque secundum caloris et frigoris qualitatem,talium sensuum passionem subimus. Quocirca calor et frigus,amaritudo atque dulcedo, idcirco passibilesqualitates dicuntur,quod secundum sensuum qualitatem, aliquam in nobis efficiunt passionem, non quod ipsa extrinse-, cus aliquid patiantur.","english":"He had set forth as examples of passible qualities sweetness or bitterness, cold and heat, whiteness and blackness. Although these are passible qualities, they are not however called passible qualities in one and the same way; but the accounts by which all these are called passible qualities differ greatly. For sweetness or bitterness, heat and cold are called passible qualities not because the things that are sweet undergo something from without, nor because the things that are bitter have received their harsh and bitter taste from some passion. For neither has honey undergone anything for sweetness to be in it by nature, nor has wormwood been infected with the horror of bitterness by any passion from without. Therefore these and similar things are not said to be passible qualities because they themselves have undergone something, but because from them certain passions are transmitted to the senses. For from honey, which is sweet, a certain sweetness is left in the taste, and likewise heat and cold produce a certain passion in the senses. We undergo sweetness when we taste something sweet, and at the same time, according to the quality of heat and cold, we submit to a passion of such senses. Therefore heat and cold, bitterness and sweetness, are for this reason called passible qualities, because according to the quality of the senses they produce some passion in us, not because they themselves undergo something from without.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":228,"ref":"p228","source":"Albedo aulem et nigredo et alii colores non similiter his quæ dicta sunt passibiles qualiiates dicuntur, sed hoc quod hæ ipsæ qualitates ab aliquibus passicnibus innascuntur.\n\nQuoniam vero passibiles qualitates eliam colores esse dicunlur,id est albedo et nigredo.Non autem eodemmodopassibilesqualitatesdicuntur,quemadmodum amaritudo atque dulcedo, calor et frigus, nunc quæ eorum distantiae esse possint, exponit. Amaritudo enim atque dulcedo non quod ipsa aliquid extrinsecus paterentur,sed quod ipsaefticerent passiones,passibiles qualitates vocabantur,albedo vero et nigredo contrariae.Non enim quod ipsae aliquas sensibus passiones importent, sed quod ex aliis qui-. busdam passionibusinnascantur.Hoc autem videtur Aristoteles eo quodammodo considerasse,quod post proposuit hoc modo:\n\nQuoniam ergo fiunt per aliquam passionem multae colorum mutationes manifestum eat, rubescens enim aliquis rubeus jactus est,et timens pallidus,et unumquodque talium.","english":"But whiteness and blackness and the other colors are not similarly called passible qualities as those which have been mentioned, but in that these very qualities are born in from certain passions.\n\nBut since colors too are said to be passible qualities, that is whiteness and blackness, yet they are not called passible qualities in the same way as bitterness and sweetness, heat and cold, he now sets forth what their differences can be. For bitterness and sweetness were called passible qualities not because they themselves underwent something from outside, but because they themselves produce passions; whiteness however and blackness are contraries. For it is not because they themselves import certain passions to the senses, but because they are born in from certain other passions. But Aristotle seems to have considered this in a certain way, in that he afterward proposed it in this manner:\n\nSince therefore many changes of colors come about through some passion, it is evident; for someone blushing has been made red, and one fearing, pale, and each one of such things.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":229,"ref":"p229","source":"Hoc autem ex non longi temporis passionibus ad passibiles qualitates et diutissime permanentes,acutissima consideratione transfertur,fit enim rationis probabilitas hoc modo.Monstrantur enim colorum qualitates ex passionibus nasci,quod cumverecundia passio quaedam sit,ex ea rubor exoritur, el.cum timor loco passionis habeatur, ab ea pallor metuentis vultum atque ora detigit.Quare quoniam hi colores ex quadam passione videntur innasci,etiam in naturali colore eamdem verisimile estevenisse rationem.Nam quoniam cum verecundia fit,in os omnis sanguis egreditur,et velutdelictum tecturuseIfunditur,ita quoque fit rubor ex sanguinis progressione, atque in apertum eIfusione.Quocirca si hoc ex innaturali passione contigerit, naturali facies rubore perfunditur. Pallor vero fit,quoties a facie sanguis ad prsecordiorum interiora ingreditur.Quod si hæc quoque naturalis passio det,verisimile est eodem infectumcalore procreari. Quocirca sive per aegritudinem pallor fit,quod naturale non rst, sive per aliquem naturalem eventum passiunis accidat, cæteraque ad eumdem modum, passibiles qualitates dicuntur,eo quod ex aliquibus passionibus sint,quod ipse Aristoteles hac voce testatur: I","english":"But this is transferred from passions of no long duration to passible qualities that persist for a very long time, with the most acute consideration; for the plausibility of the account comes about in this way. For the qualities of colors are shown to be born from passions, because since shame is a certain passion, blushing arises from it, and since fear is regarded as a passion, pallor from it covers the face and countenance of the one who fears. Wherefore, since these colors seem to be born from a certain passion, it is also likely that the same account holds in the case of natural color. For since when shame occurs, all the blood goes out into the face and, as if covered by a veil, spreads over it, so too blushing comes about from the advance of the blood and its pouring out into the open. Therefore, if this has happened from an unnatural passion, the face is suffused with a natural blush. Pallor, however, occurs whenever the blood withdraws from the face to the inner parts of the praecordia. But if a natural passion also gives this, it is likely that it is produced by the same infused heat. Wherefore, whether pallor occurs through sickness, which is not natural, or happens through some natural event of passion, and the rest in the same manner, they are called passible qualities because they arise from certain passions, which Aristotle himself testifies with this word:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":230,"ref":"p230","source":"Quare et quis naturahteraliquid talium passus est, similem colorem oportet eum habere.Quæ enim affectio nunc ad verecundiam circa corpus facta est, et secundum naturalem passioner;, eadem fiet affectio, ut naturalis color sit similis.\n\nNam sive aliquis vel nondum natus aliquid patiatur,quo faciem sanguis relinquat,sive quolibet alio modo sanguis ex infantis vultu ad interiora migravit, faciem naturalis infecit pallor,et quæ nunc non naturales passiones dispositionesque sunt,ut cum hi colores faciem vel totum corpus inficiunt,hi si naturaliter contigerint eisdem, similibus signatus coloribus vultus aspicietur.Nunc enim cum æstus in superficie vultus sanguinem impositum decoxerii, nigredinis perusti sanguinis rubor reddit colorem. Quod si idem aliqua passione in faciem nondum geniti infantis acciderit, eamdem verisimile est all'ectionem coloris corpus suscipientis inficere. Quare quæ in coloribus sunt idcirco passibiles qualitates dicuntur,non quod ipsæ aliquid patiantur,sed quod ex aliquibus passionibus in cujuslibet corpus atque ora proveniunt.","english":"Therefore, whoever has naturally suffered something of this kind must have a similar color. For the affection that now occurs in relation to shame around the body, and according to a natural passion, the same affection will come about, so that the natural color is similar.\n\nFor whether someone not yet born suffers something by which blood leaves the face, or in any other way blood has migrated from the infant's face to the interior, a natural pallor stains the face; and the things that are now non-natural passions and dispositions—as when these colors stain the face or the whole body—if these should occur naturally in the same persons, the face will be seen marked with similar colors. For now, when heat on the surface of the face has boiled the blood that has been brought to it, the redness of the burnt blood gives the color of blackness. But if the same thing should happen by some passion to the face of an infant not yet born, it is plausible that the same affection of color stains the body that receives it. Therefore the things that are in colors are for this reason called passible qualities, not because they themselves suffer anything, but because they come about from certain passions in anyone's body and face.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":231,"ref":"p231","source":"Quæcunque ergo tatium casuum ab aliquibus passionibus difficile mobilibus et permanentibus principium sumpserint, passibiles qualitates dicuntur; sive enim secundum naturalem substantiam pallor aut nigredo [acta est,qualitates dicuntur. Quales enim etsecundumeasdicimurtsive propter ægritudinem longam vel xstum aliquid tale conlingit, nigredo vel pallor,et non facile prælerit,vel in vita permanet,qualitates et istaz dicuntur. Similiter enim quales et secundum eas dicimur.\n\nvat quoddam signum quo perspecto valeamus agnoscere, quas harum omnium quae supradiotae sunt, qualitates oporteat appellari. Si enim ita vel casu aliquo,vel natura hae qualitates evenerint, ut eorum sit tardus exitus permutatioque difficilis, qualitates vocantur. Si quis enim vel per aegritudinem, vel per naturam pallidusfiat.,sitquein ejus corpore permanens pallor, tunc qualitas appellatur, et hoc non in corporalibus solum vitiis,sed etiam in animi quoque affectionibus invenitur. Si quis enim vel per naturam,vel quolibet alio postea casu assi. duis c;omessationibus delectetur,et hoc illi quodammodo in ipsa mentis dissolutione per maneat,abeoque difficile moveatur, passibilis qualitas effecta est, idcirco quod secundum eam quales dicuntur quibus illa provenerit.","english":"Therefore, whatever instances of such cases have taken their beginning from certain affections that are difficult to move and permanent, are called passible qualities. For whether pallor or blackness has come about according to natural substance, they are called qualities; for we are said to be of such a sort also according to them. Or whether on account of long illness or heat something of this kind happens, blackness or pallor, and it does not easily pass away, or remains for life, these too are called qualities. For similarly we are said to be of such a sort also according to them.\n\nBut there is a certain sign by which, once it has been examined, we can recognize which of all these qualities mentioned above ought to be called qualities. For if these qualities have come about either by some chance or by nature in such a way that their departure is slow and their change difficult, they are called qualities. For if anyone becomes pale either through illness or through nature, and the pallor remains in his body, then it is called a quality, and this is found not only in bodily defects but also in the affections of the mind as well. For if anyone, either by nature or by any other chance afterward, takes delight in continual feasting, and this remains in him in a certain way even in the very dissolution of the mind, and is moved from it with difficulty, a passible quality has been effected, for the reason that according to it those to whom it has befallen are said to be of such a sort.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[{"kind":"lacuna","severity":"caution","text":"The source is fragmentary here: the edition marks a break or an editorial bracket, and the English carries across it. Treat the bridge as supplied, not translated."}]},{"i":232,"ref":"p232","source":"Niger enim dicitur in quo nigredo permanseritjcomessator,cui voluptas perpetuo comessandi est.Est ergo signum in passibilibus qualitatibus hoc eas esse immobiles et permanentes. Quae autem hujusmodi sunt quae facillime permutantur, et temporali statu sunt, de his talis Aristotelis videtur esse sententia.\n\nQuæcunque vero ex his fiunt quæ facite solvuntul',et cito transeunt,passiones dicuntur,qualitates vero minirne,nonenim dicimur secundum eas quales, neque enim qui propter verecundiam rubeus factus est,rubeus dicitur, nec cui pauorpropier umorem venit, pallidus est, sed magis quia aliquid passus sit, quare passiones hujusmodi dicuntur,qualitates vera minime.Similiterhis et secundum animam passiones et passibiles qualitates dicuntur.Qusecunque enim mox innascendo ab aliqui-bus passionibus difficile mobilibus fiunt,qualitales dicuntur, ut et dementia, et ira, et alia hujusmodi, quales enim secundum eas dicirnur,id est et iracundi; et dementes.Simiiiter autem et quascunque alix alienationes non natura les, sed ab aliquibus casibus factæ sunt, difficile prætereuntes vel etiam omnino immobiles, et hujusmodi aliæ qualitates sunt, quales enim et secundum eas dicimur. Quæcunque vero ex his quae facile et citius praetereunt fiunt, passiones dicuntur, ut si quis contristatus iracundior fit; non enim iracundus dicitur,qui in hujusmodi passione iracundior est, sed magis aliquid passus.","english":"For a person is called black in whom blackness has remained, a glutton to whom the pleasure of feasting is perpetual. There is therefore a sign in passible qualities that these are immovable and permanent. But those which are of such a kind as are most easily changed, and are in a temporal state, concerning these the opinion of Aristotle seems to be as follows.\n\nBut whatever come to be from those things which are easily dissolved and quickly pass away are called passions, but by no means qualities; for we are not said to be of such a sort according to them. For neither is one who has become red on account of shame called red, nor is one to whom pallor has come on account of fear pale, but rather because he has suffered something; wherefore such things are called passions, but by no means qualities. Similarly to these, both passions and passible qualities are spoken of in relation to the soul. For whatever come to be immediately by inborn nature from certain passions that are difficult to move are called qualities, such as madness, and anger, and other such things; for we are said to be of such a sort according to them, that is, both irascible and mad. And similarly also whatever other alienations are not natural, but have been produced by certain accidents, passing away with difficulty or even altogether immovable, these too are qualities of this sort; for we are also said to be of such a sort according to them. But whatever come to be from those things which pass away easily and quickly are called passions, as if someone becomes more irascible when saddened; for one who is more irascible in a passion of this sort is not called irascible, but rather has suffered something.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":233,"ref":"p233","source":"Quare passiones quidem hujusmodi dicuntur, qualitates vero minime.\n\nQuid de his affectionibus judicaret,quæ ad praesens tempus atque ad momentum animis vel corporibus inbaererent, ipse non obscura oratione vulgavit. Nam cum priuseasessepassibiles qualitatespronuntiaret,quæ ex aliquibus passionibus gignerentur,et tamen in subjectis immutabiliter permanerent,nunc illas affectiones quae ita sunt in subjectis ut cito praetereant, non qualitates, sed passiones vocat. Si quis enim propter verecundiam rubore infectus est, quoniam rubor ille non permaDet,rubeus non vocatur;qui si rubeus discerelur,esset quoque ipse rubor passibilis qualitas,quoniam insubjecto corpore diutissimepermaneret.Nuncautemquoniam nullomodo rubeus dicitur,cui a verecundia rubor venit,qualitates autem sunt secundum quas quales vocamur, verecundiae rubor non qualitas,sed quaedam passio est; nam si esset qualitas,ab eo rubore rubei dicerentur,id est quales, sed hoc non ita est. Non igitur hujusmodi affectiones quae haud multo durant tempore qualitates vocantur,sed potius passiones. Passusenimaliquid dicitur,quipropterverecundiam rubeus fit.Eadem ratio est etiam in animi passionibus. Nam si ad momentum quis iratus est,non idcircoeumjurealiquisiracundum vocet,sed sibujusmodi vitiunjincujuslibetaniiDoconstanterinhaeserit.","english":"Therefore such things are called passions, but not at all qualities.\n\nWhat he judged about those affections that adhere to minds or bodies for the present time and for a moment, he himself made known in speech that is not obscure. For whereas previously he pronounced those to be passible qualities which are generated from certain passions and yet remain immutably in their subjects, now those affections which are in their subjects in such a way that they quickly pass away he calls not qualities but passions. For if someone has been stained with redness on account of shame, since that redness does not remain, he is not called red; but if he were said to be red, that redness would also itself be a passible quality, since it would remain in the subject body for a very long time. Now, however, since he is in no way called red to whom redness comes from shame, and qualities are those according to which we are called such, the redness of shame is not a quality but a certain passion; for if it were a quality, from that redness people would be called red, that is, such, but this is not so. Therefore affections of this kind, which do not last for much time, are not called qualities, but rather passions. For someone is said to have suffered something who becomes red on account of shame. The same reasoning applies also to the passions of the mind. For if someone is angry for a moment, no one for that reason rightly calls him irascible, but if this kind of vice has adhered to him constantly for any length of time.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":234,"ref":"p234","source":"Nam si quis vel per naturam vel per ægritudinem sit i laesus corpore, ut vel perpetuam dementiam, vel immobilem incurrat iracundiam,ille vel demens vel iracundus dicitur. Et quæcunque alienationes (ut ipse ait) vel secundum naturam, vel per casum permanentes fuerint,illae in passibili qualitate numeractur,idcirco quod secundum eas quales dicimur.Quag autem (ut dictum est)nonpermanent,sed facile transeunt,eas non qualitates, sed solum vocamus passiones.Sed quoniam tres species qualitatis enur:.eravit,unam secundum quam habitus dispositionesquedicerentur,alteram secundum quam naturalie potentia vel impotentia ad aliquid faciendum vel patiendum subjectarum rerum naturas pararet,tertiam secundum quam passibiles qualitates dicerentur, et hanc tali duplicitate partitus est,ut alias idcirco di- I ceret passibiles esse qualitates, quod ipsae aliquas gignerent passiones, alias vero quod ab aliquibus ipsae passionibus nascerentur.","english":"For if someone is injured in body either through nature or through sickness, so that he incurs either permanent madness or an immovable irascibility, he is called either mad or irascible. And whatever alienations (as he himself says) are permanent either according to nature or through chance, those are counted in passive quality, for the reason that according to them we are said to be of such a sort. But those which (as has been said) are not permanent, but easily pass away, we call not qualities but only passions. But since he enumerated three species of quality—one according to which habits and dispositions are spoken of, another according to which natural potentiality or impotentiality prepares the natures of underlying things for doing or undergoing something, a third according to which they are called passible qualities—he also divided this one by such a twofold distinction, so that he said some are passible qualities for the reason that they themselves generate certain passions, while others are so because they themselves are born from certain passions.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":235,"ref":"p235","source":"Quæri potest quomodobaequoquepassibilesqualitates distenta prima illa specie qualitatis,quæ secundum habitum dispositionemque posita est.Nam si quis calorem frigusque persenserit,habetquidem qualitatem passibilem, sed tamen in ejusdem ipsius dispositione atque affectione versatur; dispositus namque est ad eumdem calorem atque frigus,quem sumpsit atque habuit, quod scilicet ipse Aristoteles videns calorem frigusque in utraque specie numeravit; namque et dispositionem dixit calorem atque frigus, et passibilem qualitatem.Hujus quaestionis talis solutio est. Nihil impedit,secundum aliam scilicet atque aliam causam, unam eamdemque rem gemino generi speciei suae supponere,ut Socrates in eo quod pater est ad aliquid dicitur,in eo quod homo, substantia est,sic in calore atque frigore, in eo quod quis secundum ea videtur esse dispositus, in dispositione numerata sunt; secundum vero quod ex aliquibus passionibus innascuntur,passibiles qualitates dictae sunt. Ipsae vero ab habitu distan',id est passibiles qualitates, quod in plurimis ad habitus rebus per artes atque scientias pervenitur,ita ut ipse habitusordineet filo quodam perficiatur.","english":"It can be asked how passible qualities differ from that first species of quality which is placed under habit and disposition. For if someone has perceived heat and cold, he indeed has a passible quality, but nevertheless he is engaged in the disposition and affection of that same thing; for he is disposed toward the same heat and cold which he took on and had, which Aristotle, seeing this, certainly counted heat and cold under both species; for he called heat and cold both a disposition and a passible quality. The solution of this question is as follows. Nothing prevents one and the same thing, according to one cause and another, from being placed under a twofold genus of its own species, just as Socrates, in that he is a father, is said in relation to something, and in that he is a man, is a substance. So too in the case of heat and cold: in that someone appears to be disposed according to them, they are counted under disposition; but in that they are born from certain passions, they are called passible qualities. But they differ from habit—that is, passible qualities—in that in very many things habit is reached through arts and sciences, so that habit itself is perfected by a certain order and thread.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":236,"ref":"p236","source":"Passibiles vero qualitates eo modo minime.Quo vero distent hae passibiles qualitates a secunda specie, quae secundum naturalem potentiam vel impotentiam dicitur,quæritur, cujus perplana distantia est.Dicimus enim secundum potentias naturalis speciem aliquid dici, non secundum praesentem actum,sed secundum id quod ad hoc esse potest; frigus vero calorque, et dulcedo vel amaritudo non secundum quod possil esse,sed secundum id quod jam sit consideratur; quocirca distat hæc tertia species a secunda,quod hic secundum possibilitatem dicitur,tertia vero secundum actum. Sed quod dudum promiscue passiones affectionum nomine vocabamus, haec quoque non longa quaestio alia est. Sic enim inveniemus quod passio ab affectionibus discrepare videatur.Si qua enim corpora ita calefacta sint,ut ex se quoque ipsa aliquem calorem emittere valeant,illa ad calorem affecta nuncupantur. Si qua vero tantum calorem momento susceperint, passiones dicimus,et ab affectionibus segregamus,ut hic sit integrum passionum affectionumqueethabitusaugmentum,utamplificatapassio in affectionem transeat,augmentata affectio in habitum permutetur. Et haec quidem de tertia specie qualitatis pronuntiasse sufficiat; nunc quarte speciei vim naturamque veracissima disputatione confirm at usquequo progressa qualitatis distributioconquiescit. Nobis quoque disputationum prolixitas moderanda est.","english":"But passible qualities are not so in that way. It is asked, however, how these passible qualities differ from the second species, which is called according to natural capacity or incapacity, and its distinction is very plain. For we say that something is said according to capacities to belong to the species of natural power, not according to present act, but according to what can be for this; but cold and heat, and sweetness or bitterness, are considered not according to what can be, but according to what already is. Wherefore this third species differs from the second in that the latter is said according to possibility, but the third according to act. But what we a little while ago called passiones and affectiones indiscriminately, this too is another question not long to be discussed. For thus we shall find that passio seems to differ from affectiones. For if some bodies are so heated that they can also emit some heat from themselves, they are called affected toward heat. But if some have merely received heat for a moment, we call them passiones, and we separate them from affectiones, so that here there may be a complete increase of passiones and affectiones and habitus, so that an amplified passio passes over into an affectio, and an increased affectio is changed into a habitus. And concerning the third species of quality let it suffice to have declared these things; now let him confirm the force and nature of the fourth species with a most truthful disputation, until the distribution of quality, having progressed thus far, comes to rest. We too must moderate the prolixity of our disputations.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":237,"ref":"p237","source":"Providendum quoque est ut sufficiens brevitas ordini expositionis adhibeatur,ne autbrevitatem comitetur obscuritas,aut planitiem minus moderata oratio, odioso fastidio et longinquitate deformet.\n\nQuartum vero genus qualitatis est figura, et circa unumquodque constans forma. Amplius ad hæc rectitudo et curvitas. et si quid simile est his; secundum enim unumquodque eorum quale quid dicitur, triangulum enim vel quadrangulum esse quale quid dicitur, et reclum aut curvum.Et secundum formam unumquodque Quale dicitur.\n\nQuartaest speciesqualitatis quæ secundum unamquamque formam figuramque perspicitur.Esl autem figura, ut triangu!um vel quadratum, forma autem ipsius figurae quaedam qualitas est,ut figura quidem est triangulum vel quadratum,forma autem ipsius trianguli vel quadrati quaedam qualitaa,undeetiam formosos hominesdicimus.Figuraenimquaedam vel pulchrior,vel mediocris,vel alio quodammodo con-, stituta,qualitas formaquc nominatur.Has autem esse qualitatesnullusdubitat.Siquidem et a figura dicitur figuratus, et a forma formosus.","english":"Care must also be taken that sufficient brevity be applied to the order of exposition, lest either obscurity accompany brevity, or a speech less moderated in plainness deform the work with hateful fastidiousness and length.\n\nBut the fourth genus of quality is figure, and the form that is constant in each individual thing. Further, in addition to these, straightness and curvedness, and whatever is similar to these; for in accordance with each of these, something is said to be of a certain quality: for to be a triangle or a quadrilateral is said to be of a certain quality, and to be straight or curved. And in accordance with form, each thing is said to be of a certain quality.\n\nThe fourth species of quality is that which is observed in accordance with each form and figure. Now figure is, as it were, a triangle or a square; but form is a certain quality of the figure itself: for instance, a triangle or a square is a figure, but the form of the triangle or square itself is a certain quality, whence we also call men handsome. For a certain figure, either more beautiful, or mediocre, or constituted in some other way, is named quality and form. But that these are qualities, no one doubts. Since indeed from figure something is called figured, and from form, handsome.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":238,"ref":"p238","source":"Amplius quoque triangulum etiam a triangulatione denominatum est, et quadratum a quadratura.Quod si illae sunt qualitates,secundum quas quale aliquid appelletur, non est qui dubitet formam figuramque esse qualitates, quoniam omnia quas his participant ex ipsis qualia nominantur, sed quoniam in continua; quantitatis speciebus et triangulum et superficies enumerata est, ipsa quidem superficies quantitas est, ipsius vero superficiei compositio qualitas,est enim figura (ut geometrici diffiniunt) quae sub aliquo vel aliquibus terminis continetur.Sub aliquo quidem, ut circulus,sub aliquibus vero, ut triangulus vel quadratus.Quare spatium quidem ipsum,quod a supra dictis lineis continetur,superficies dicitur, quae est quantitas.Superficies namque quoniam in dilatione quadam et spatio constat,quantitas est, sed compositio ipsius superficiei,qualitas.Nam quoniam tres lineae convenienterin se junctis terminis unumspatium conclusere,quod tribus angulis a tribus lineis continetur,hoc ipsum spatium quod concludunt ad quantitatem referri potest, quod vero tribuslineis, hoc est qualitas,figura enim est triangula.Hoc idem quoque dici potest etiam in linea: nam quoniam longitudo sine latitudine est, quantitas dicitur, quod recta sive curva est,redditur rursus ad qualitatem.","english":"Furthermore, a triangle is also named from triangulation, and a square from squaring. But if those are qualities according to which something is called qualified, no one doubts that form and figure are qualities, since all things that participate in these are named qualified from them. But since in the species of continuous quantity both triangle and surface are enumerated, the surface itself is indeed a quantity, but the composition of the surface itself is a quality. For a figure is, as the geometers define it, that which is contained by some term or terms. By some term, as a circle; by some terms, as a triangle or a square. Wherefore the space itself, which is contained by the aforementioned lines, is called a surface, which is a quantity. For a surface, since it consists in a certain extension and space, is a quantity, but the composition of the surface itself is a quality. For since three lines, joined at their endpoints, have enclosed one space, which is contained by three angles from three lines, that very space which they enclose can be referred to quantity; but that it is by three lines, this is a quality, for the figure is triangular. This same thing can also be said in the case of a line: for since length is without breadth, it is called a quantity; that it is straight or curved is again referred to quality.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":239,"ref":"p239","source":"Rarum vero et spissum, asperum et lene putabuntur quidem qualitatem significare, sed aliena hujusmodi j putantur esse a dispositione quæ circa qualitatem est. Quamdam enim positionem magis videtur utrumque partium significarejpissum quidem est eo quod partes sibi ipsæ propinquæ sint9rarum vero eo quod distent a se invicem, et lene quidem quod in rectum sibi partes jaceant,asperum vero quod hæc quidem pars superet, illa vero sit inferior. Et fortasse alii quoque apparebunt qualitatis modi, sed qui maxime dicunturjere lot sunt. Qualitates itaque sunt quæ prædicta sunt,qualia vero sunt, quæ secundum hæc denominativæ dicunturtvet quomodolibet aliter ab his.","english":"Rare and dense, rough and smooth, will indeed be thought to signify quality, but things of this sort are thought to be foreign to the disposition that concerns quality. For each of the two seems rather to signify a certain position of the parts: dense, because its parts are close to one another; rare, because they are distant from each other; smooth, because its parts lie in a straight line; rough, because one part rises above and another lies lower. And perhaps other modes of quality will also appear, but those which are most spoken of are nearly these. Therefore the things that have been stated are qualities, while the things that are called denominatively according to these, or in any other way from them, are qualified.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":240,"ref":"p240","source":"Quaedam sunt quae videntur esse qualitates,quoniam ex his aliqua denominative dicuntur, ut lene quoniam dicitur alenitate,et asperum quoniam dicitur ab asperitate,spissum quoque et rarum a raritate et spissitate nominantur; videntur ergo haec quoque in qualitatibus posse numerari.Sed rectam rationem perspicientibus nec solum auribusquae dicuntur,sed etiam mente atque animo judicantibus, in qualitatibus haec poni non oportere manifestum est.Nam quod dicimus rarum,positio quaedam partium est, non qualitas.Nam quia ita partes a se separatsedistant,ut inter eas alieni generis corpus possit admitti,ideorarum vocatur,ut spongiaepumicesque, quoniamineorumcavernissurculus vel aliud aliquid immitti potest,ita ut inter rimas partium sit,idcirco rarum dicitur. Porro autem spissum, quoniam ita sibi partes vicinae sunt atque ad se invicom strictæ, ut inter eas nullum corpus possit incidere,atque ideo spissum vocatur,ut est ferrum vel adamas.Positio ergo quædam partium his inest, non qualitas, nec vero illud quoque distat, quod dicitur lene. Nam quoniam partes ita sunt posita3,et neutra superet, neutra sit minor, sed æqualibus extremitatibus junctae sunt,idcirco quasdam lenitas est,ut adducta manusillam quæ ex æqualitate junctis partibus nata est, sentiat lenitatem, ut est argentum.","english":"There are certain things that seem to be qualities, since some things are spoken of denominatively from them, as smooth, because it is said from smoothness, and rough, because it is said from roughness; dense also and rare are named from rarity and density. These, therefore, seem able to be numbered among qualities. But to those who perceive right reason and judge not only with the ears what is said but also with mind and soul, it is manifest that these ought not to be placed among qualities. For what we call rare is a certain position of parts, not a quality. For because the parts are so separated and distant from one another that a body of another kind can be admitted between them, for that reason it is called rare, as a sponge and pumice stone, because something can be sent into their hollows, a little channel or something else, so that it is between the gaps of the parts; for that reason it is called rare. But dense, because its parts are so close to one another and bound together mutually, that no body can fall between them, and for that reason it is called dense, as is iron or adamant. Therefore a certain position of parts is present in these, not a quality. Nor indeed does that which is called smooth differ in this respect. For because the parts are so positioned, and neither prevails, nor is either smaller, but they are joined with equal extremities, for that reason there is a certain smoothness, as when a hand is drawn over it, it perceives that smoothness which is born from the equality of joined parts, as is silver.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":241,"ref":"p241","source":"Asperitas vero est partium non æqualis positio,sed aliarum eminentium,aliarum vero depressarum,ut lima cujus alix partes eminent, aliae vero depressae sunt. Ergo secundum unamquamque partium positionem,vel raritas,vel spissitudo, vel asperitas, vel lenitas, corparibus est. Non igitur hæc secundum qualitatem dicuntur,sed potius secundum positionem. Positio autem in reiatioms genere nominata est. Non iguur hae qualitates,sed potius relativa sunt,et enumerationes quidem specierum qualitatis Aristoteles hic terminat.Nun sunt tamen putandae solum esse qualitates quas supra posuit. Ipse enim testatur esse quoque alias qualitates,quas modo omnes enumerare neglexit,sed cur neglexeritmultx sunt causse.Prima quod elementi vicem hic obtinet liber, nec perfectam scientiam tradit,sed tantummodo aditus atque pons quidam in altiora philosophiae introitum pandit. Quocircasi hoc ita est, tantum dicere oportuit,quantum ingredientibus satis esset,ne eorum animos nondum ad scientiam firmos multiplici doctrinae subtilitate confunderet. Quae vero hic desunt in libris qui Msta puatxa inscribuntur apposuit.Perfectis namque opus illud non ingredientibus praeparabitur.","english":"Roughness, however, is an unequal positioning of parts, with some raised and others lowered, as a file, some of whose parts are raised and others lowered. Therefore, according to the position of each of the parts, either rarity or density or roughness or smoothness belongs to bodies. These things, then, are not spoken of according to quality, but rather according to position. Position, however, has been named in the genus of relation. These things, therefore, are not qualities, but rather relatives. And indeed Aristotle here terminates the enumeration of the species of quality. Yet they are not to be thought to be the only qualities that he set down above. For he himself testifies that there are also other qualities, which he has now neglected to enumerate all; but there are many causes why he neglected this. The first is that this book serves as an element, and does not hand down perfect knowledge, but merely opens a kind of approach and bridge into the higher reaches of philosophy. Wherefore, if this is so, it was fitting to say only as much as would suffice for beginners, lest it confuse their minds, not yet firm in knowledge, with the manifold subtlety of doctrine. But the things that are lacking here he supplied in the books that are inscribed Meta ta physica. For that work is prepared for the perfect, not for beginners.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":242,"ref":"p242","source":"Est quoque alia causa ut nos ad exquirendas alias qualitates, non solum propriorum doctorum, sed etiam nostrorum aliquid inveniendi incitator,admitteret.Quocirca concludit eas quae maxime dicerentur,quas supra proposuit,esse qualitates; illa vero dici qualia,quae secundum praedictas qualitates dicerentur: sed quoniam addidit,vel quomodolibet ab his quae sit hujusce propositionis sententia,prius appositis Aristotelis verbis sequens expositionis ordo contexit.\n\nIn pluribus quidem et pene in omnibus denominative dicunturyut ab albedine albus,et a grammatica grammaticus,et a justitia, justus, similiter aulem el in aliis. In aliquibus vero eo quod non sint posita qualitatibus nomina, non contingit ab eis denominative dici,ut eursor aut,pugillator qui secundum aptitudinem naturalem dicunlur,a nulla qualitate denominative dicuntur. Non enim posita sunt nomina aptitudinibus secundum quas isti quales dicuntur,sicut in disciplinis,secundum quas vel pugillatores vel palœstrici secundum affectionem dicuntur. Pugillatoria enim ad palæstrica disciplina dicitur,quales vero ab his denominative hi qui ab eis afficiuntur, dicuntur. Aliquando autem et posito nomine denominative non dicitur id quod secundum ipsum quale dicituryut a virtute studiosus dicitur.Virtutem enim habendo studiosusdicitar, sed non denominative dicitur a, virtute.","english":"There is also another cause that might admit us to investigating other qualities, an inciter not only of the proper teachers but also of our own discovering something. Wherefore he concludes that those things which are most properly called qualities are the ones he set forth above; but those things are called qualified which are spoken of according to the aforesaid qualities. But since he added \"or in whatever way,\" the sense of this proposition, with Aristotle's words first set down, is then woven together by the following order of exposition.\n\nIn many cases, and in nearly all, things are spoken of denominatively, as white from whiteness, and grammatical from grammar, and just from justice, and similarly in other cases. In some cases, however, because names have not been assigned to the qualities, it does not happen that they are spoken of denominatively from them, as a runner or a boxer, who are spoken of according to a natural aptitude, are not denominated from any quality. For names have not been assigned to the aptitudes according to which these are called qualified, as in the case of the disciplines according to which boxers or wrestlers are spoken of according to an affection. For boxing is called a discipline in relation to wrestling, and those who are affected by them are spoken of denominatively as qualified from them. Sometimes, however, even when a name has been assigned, that which is called qualified according to it is not spoken of denominatively, as a studious person is spoken of from virtue. For a studious person is spoken of as having virtue, but he is not spoken of denominatively from virtue.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":243,"ref":"p243","source":"Non autem in pluribus hoc tale est; quæ autem dicuntur qualza, aut denominative, aprædiclis qualitatibus dicuntur, aut aliquo modo aliter ab his.\n\nMultæ, inquit, sunt qualitates, quibus positis et proprio nominenuncupatis,abhis alia denominative dicuntur, ut eaquse ipse planissimeadjecitexempla. Nam cum albedo cujusdam nomen sit qualitatis, ab eo dicituralbus.Eodem quoque modo etgrammatica, cum rei sit nomen, ab ipso quales dicuntur. Grammaticienim a grammatica nominantur, atque hoc est in pluribus, ut posito nomine si quid secundum ipsas qualitates quale dicitur,exhis ipsis qualitatibus appellatio derivetur. Aliae vero qualitates sunt, in quibuscum nomen positum non sit,tamen quales dicuntur, quales quidem quia alia qualitate participant, sed non secundum eam qualitatem quales dicuntur,exqua si his esset qualitatibus nomen impositum poterant appellari, ut in ea qualitate quaesecundum potentiam naturalem dicitur.Illi enim quanquam quales dicantur, hi qui secundum ipsam potentiam nominantur,ipsitamen(utdictum est) nullo proprio nomine nuncupautur.Nam qui pugiles appellantur ab arte pugillatoria, idcirco ab ea pugiles dicuntur,quod ad eamdem ipsam artem pugillatoriam quodammodo affecti sunt. Hi enim pugiles ab arte pugillatoria praedicantur.","english":"This sort of thing is not the case in most instances; but those things that are called \"of what sort,\" or denominatively, are said either from the aforementioned qualities or in some other way from them.\n\nThere are, he says, many qualities, and when these have been posited and called by their own proper names, other things are said denominatively from them, as those examples that he himself most plainly adds. For since whiteness is the name of a certain quality, from it something is called white. In the same way also \"grammatical\" — since it is the name of a thing — from it things are said to be \"of what sort.\" For grammarians are named from grammar, and this is the case in most instances: when a name has been posited, if anything is said to be \"of what sort\" according to those qualities, the appellation is derived from those very qualities. But there are other qualities under which no name has been posited, and yet things are said to be \"of what sort\" — \"of what sort\" indeed because they participate in some other quality, but they are not said to be \"of what sort\" according to that quality from which, if a name had been imposed on these qualities, they could have been named, as in the case of that quality which is spoken of according to natural capacity. For although those things are said to be \"of what sort,\" those which are named according to that capacity itself are nevertheless (as has been said) called by no proper name. For those who are called boxers are called boxers from the art of boxing for this reason, that they are in some way affected toward that same art of boxing. For these are predicated as boxers from the art of boxing.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":244,"ref":"p244","source":"Qui vero nondum pugiles sunt, sed esse possunt,non secundum ipsam artem, id estpugillatoriam,sed secundum potentiam pugillatoriae artis, pugillatores vocantur. Ipsi autem potenti£ nomen proprium positum non est.Nam quemadmodum a cursu cursores, a palaestrapalaestrici, a pugillatoriapugiles,distinctis qualitatum vocabulis, appellantur, non eodem modo est etiam in uniuscujusque rei potentia naturali, cursus enim potentia naturalis secundum quam cursores vocamus,et rursus potentia pugillandi, vel potentia palsestrizandi, suo nomine distincta nonest.Cur enim dicitur cursor,si interrogemur de eo quinondum est cursor? dicimus secundum potentiam naturalem. Cur palæstricus? eodem quoque modo naturalem potentiam respondemus.Quare pugillatorquinondum est pugillis,ab eadem quoque potentia naturali nominatur. Si igitur haberethfecnaturalispotentiapropriumnomen, ita, distinctisvocabulis,appellaretur,ut in his qualitatibusinquibusproprienomenestpositum,utincursu, palaestra et arte pugillatoria, et hoc est quod ait. In aliquibus vero propterea quod qualitatibus nomina non sunt posita, impossibile est ab his aliquid denominative dici. Ut hoc scilicet demonstraret cursorem quidem qui jam curreret a cursu esse dictum, cursorem vero qui secundum potentiam currendidiceretur non vocari a cursu, sed tantum a potentia, cujus potentiæ nomen proprium non esset positum.","english":"But those who are not yet boxers, but can be, are called boxers not according to the art itself, that is, the boxing art, but according to the potentiality of the boxing art. Yet no proper name has been assigned to this potentiality itself. For just as runners are named from running, wrestlers from wrestling, boxers from boxing, with distinct words for the qualities, it is not the same way even in the natural potentiality of each thing; for the natural potentiality of running, according to which we call people runners, and again the potentiality of boxing, or the potentiality of wrestling, is not distinguished by its own name. For why is someone called a runner, if we are asked about one who is not yet a runner? We say it is according to a natural potentiality. Why a wrestler? In the same way too we answer that it is a natural potentiality. Therefore one who is not yet a boxer is also named a boxer from the same natural potentiality. If, then, this natural potentiality had a proper name, it would be called by distinct words, as in those qualities in which a proper name has been assigned, as in running, wrestling, and the boxing art, and this is what he says. But in some cases, because names have not been assigned to the qualities, it is impossible for anything to be said denominatively from them. That is, to show this: that a runner who is already running is said to be so from running, but a runner who is said to be so according to the potentiality of running is not called so from running, but only from the potentiality, to which potentiality no proper name has been assigned.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":245,"ref":"p245","source":"Quare haer omnia quæ secundum potentiam naturalem dicuntur, a nulla qualitate denominativa sunt. Idcirco quod hae qualitates a quibus denominari possunt, propriis nominibus carent, quæ vero ita sint, ut non ex potentia, sed ex affectione dicantur,ab his qualitatibas ad quas sese aliquomodohabent,denominative dicuntur, quod Aristoteles hoc protulit modo dicens: Non ita esse secundum potentiam naturalem, quemadmodum etiam in disciplinis secundum quas, vel pugillatores,vel palæstrici secundum affectionemdicuntur.Pugillatoriaenimdisciplinadicitur et palæstrica,quales vero ab his denominative, qui ad eas sunt continentes, dicuntur.Docuit igitur omnia quæ a quibusdam qualitatibus dici putarentur, vero quoque a qualitatibus non prædicari,ut in his qualitatibus quibus nomen proprium non est.Illud quoque monstravit hoc in pluribus evenire, ut de propositis qualitatibusqualiadenominativedicerentur. Restat ergo, quod reliquum est, ut dicat esse quasdam qualitates,quarum cum nomen sit positum, ab hisipsistamen quæ illarum rerum participantdenominative non dici, ut virtus; nam cum virtus qualitas sit (est enim habitus quidam, omnisvero habitus qualitas), ergo quicunque virtute participat,non secundum eamdenominative dicitur. In denominationeenimquaerendumest utsemperidempermaneat nomen.","english":"Therefore all these things which are spoken of according to natural potentiality are not denominated from any quality. For this reason, because these qualities from which they can be denominated lack proper names, but those which are such that they are spoken of not from potentiality but from affection, are denominated from those qualities to which they somehow hold themselves, which Aristotle brought forward in this way, saying: that it is not so according to natural potentiality, just as also in the disciplines according to which either boxers or wrestlers are spoken of according to affection. For it is called the boxing discipline and the wrestling discipline, but those who are such are denominated from these, who are devoted to them. He taught, therefore, that all things which were thought to be spoken of from certain qualities are not also truly predicated from qualities, as in those qualities which have no proper name. He also showed that this happens in many cases, that concerning the proposed qualities those who are such are denominated from them. It remains, therefore, what is left, that he say that there are certain qualities, when a name has been assigned to them, yet those who participate in those things are not denominated from them, as virtue; for since virtue is a quality (for it is a certain habit, and every habit is a quality), therefore whoever participates in virtue is not denominated according to it. For in denomination it must always be sought that the name remain throughout.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":246,"ref":"p246","source":"In eo autem qui virtute participat,nullavirtutis denominatio est, ut qui bonitate participatbonus dicitur, quijustitia, justus, et alia hujusmodi. Quivero virtute participat,aut probus nominatur,aut sapiens; sed neque probus, neque sapiens a virtute denominativa sunt,idcircoquod utrumquenomena virtute longe dissimile est, quod ipse sic ait: Aliquando autem posito nomine denominative non diciturid quod secundum ipsum qualedicitur.Etejusrei proponere non omisitexemplum, sed hoc in multis non potestinveniri, pauca enim sunt (ut ipse ait) in quibus posito qualitatis nomine quae his participant, a superiori qualitate qualia non dicantur.Datautem his qualitatibus pluralitatis calculum,ex quibus qualia nominantur ea quae his participant.Nam (ut ipse ait superius)in pluribus et pene in omnibus denominative dicuntur.Quocirca recta diffinitio est et proprio ordine constituta. Namque in principio hoc solum dictumest,esse qualitatem secundum quam qualia dicerentur.","english":"But in the case of one who participates in virtue, there is no denomination from virtue, as one who participates in goodness is called good, one who participates in justice, just, and other such cases. But one who participates in virtue is either called upright or wise; yet neither upright nor wise are denominative from virtue, for the reason that each name is far dissimilar from virtue, as he himself says: Sometimes, however, when a name has been posited, that which is said according to it as a quality is not said denominatively. And he did not omit to set forth an example of this matter, but this cannot be found in many cases, for there are few (as he himself says) in which, when the name of a quality has been posited, those which participate in these are not said to be of such a quality from the superior quality. But he has given to those qualities a reckoning of plurality, from which those things that participate in them are denominated as of such a quality. For (as he himself says above) in more cases and in nearly all, they are spoken of denominatively. Wherefore the definition is correct and established in its proper order. For in the beginning this alone was said, that there is a quality according to which things are said to be of such a quality.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":247,"ref":"p247","source":"Sed quoniam sunt quaedam quorum qualitates ipsae propriis nominibuscarent5quse vero his participant suis vocabulis appellantur, ut in naturali potentia.Et rursus sunt quædam quæ in qualitatibus quidem habeant propria nomina,in his vero quae ad eas ipsas qualitates essent affecta, nulla ex propositis qualitatibus denominatio fierel,hoc addidit, hb omnibus qualitatibus aut denominative dici qualia, quae illis qualitatibus participaret, aut quomodolibet, aliter, id est sive posito nomine qualitatis de eo non dicerentur,quae illa participarent,ut in eo quod est virtus, sive ipsi qualitati positum nomen non esset, utin eo quod est potentianaturalis.Quare quoniam in his duabus qualitatis, in quibus vel posito nomine non secundum nomen quæ sunt,qualia denominative dicuntur, vel cum ipsis qualitatibus nomen positum non sit, neutra ipsorum prædicatio denominative fit. Ad concludendum omnem terminum qualitatis ait, aut denominative qualia a qualitatibus appellari,aut quomodolibetaliter ab ipsis,ut non denominative,sed aliquoties quidem secundum potentiam,aliquoties vero secundum eamdem qualitatem virtutis; eamdem enim qualitas est virtutis et sapientias. Quocirca concludit, ita qualia dici quaerunqueex his qualitatibus denominativedicerentur, vel quomodolibet alio ab ipsis modo.","english":"But since there are certain things whose qualities themselves lack proper names, while those which participate in them are called by their own designations, as in the case of natural power. And again, there are certain things which in their qualities indeed have proper names, but in those which are disposed toward those very qualities, no denomination from the proposed qualities is made. He added this: that all qualities either are said denominatively to be such as participate in those qualities, or in some other way, that is, whether with the name of the quality posited they are not said of that which participates in them, as in the case of virtue, or whether no name is posited for the quality itself, as in the case of natural power. Wherefore, since in these two cases of quality—in which either, with the name posited, those things which are such are not denominatively called according to the name, or, when no name has been posited for the qualities themselves—the predication of neither of them is made denominatively. To conclude, he says that every term of quality either is called denominatively such from qualities, or in some other way from them, so as not denominatively, but sometimes according to power, sometimes according to the same quality of virtue; for the same quality is of virtue and of wisdom. Therefore he concludes that things are said to be such in whatever way they are denominatively called from these qualities, or in any other way from them.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":248,"ref":"p248","source":"Digestis inordine prius omnibus qualitatibus et eorum conclusione reperta, consueto ordine unaquaeque proprietas vestigatur.\n\nInestautem et contrarietas secundum qua te, utjustilia injustitlæ contraria est, et albedo nigredi,et alia, similiter autem et ea quæ secundum eas qualia dicuntur, ut justum injusto,et album nigro, nou. autem in omnibus hoc est, rubro enim uel pallido aut mediis hujusmodi coloribus nihil contrarium est qualitatibus existentibus.\n\nDicit in qualitatibus quaedam essecontraria,atque hoc probat exemplis,albedo namque et nigredo contrariasunt,etquaecunquealbedinenigredinequeparticipant; hoc est enim quod ait, et secundum eas qualiaqusedicunturjnam sicut albedo nigredini contraria est,ita quoque albus nigro; sed hoc qualitatis proprium non est, nam cum rubrum et pallidum qualitates sint, aliique etiam colores hujusmodi, in hiscontrarium non est; nullus enim dicit aliquid rubro vel pallido esse contrarium: nam quoniam album et nigrum extremitates quaedam colorum sunt, et longissime a se distant, contraria sunt, medietates vero contrarianonhabent.Namsiquisponat rubrum nigro esse contrarium, longissimeque distant quas sunt contraria, longissime igitur nigredo a rubore distabit, et rursus albedo a nigredineplurimum distat; igitur nigredini rubor estatquealbedo contraria, uniusque rei duo contraria inveniuntur, quod fieri non potest.","english":"Once all qualities have been set out in order and their conclusion established, each property is investigated in the customary order.\n\nBut contrariety is also present in quality, as justice is contrary to injustice, and whiteness to blackness, and others likewise; and similarly also the things that are called qualified according to these, as just to unjust, and white to black. But this is not the case in all: for to red or pale or the intermediate colors of this sort nothing is contrary, though they are qualities.\n\nHe says that in qualities certain things are contrary, and he proves this by examples: for whiteness and blackness are contrary, and whatever participate in whiteness and blackness; for this is what he says, \"and the things that are called qualified according to these,\" for just as whiteness is contrary to blackness, so too is white to black. But this is not proper to quality, for since red and pale are qualities, and other colors of this sort as well, in these there is no contrary; for no one says that anything is contrary to red or pale. For since white and black are certain extremes of colors and are very far distant from each other, they are contrary, but the intermediates do not have a contrary. For if anyone should suppose that red is contrary to black, and things that are contrary are very far distant, therefore blackness will be very far distant from red; and again whiteness is very far distant from blackness; therefore red will be contrary to blackness and also to whiteness, and two contraries are found for one thing, which cannot happen.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":249,"ref":"p249","source":"Non est igitur nigredi contrarius rubor.Similiter autem monstrabimus etin aliis mediiscolorihus contrarium non esse.Quocirca si hujusmodicoloribuscontrarium nihil est, non in omni qualitate contrarietas reperietur; quod si ita est,suacipere contraria qualitatis proprium non est.Atvero nec in ipsis quoque formis quæ manifeste qualitates Bunt, contrarietas invenitur; nam neque circulus quadrato, neque quadratus triangulo,necullafigura ulli figurae potest esse contraria. Quocirca manifestum est, suscipere contrarium non esse proprium qualitatis. Sed quoniam sunt quaedam in qualitate quae sibimet videantur esse contraria, uljustitia et injustitia, hinc quasdam quaestio solet oriri.","english":"Therefore red is not contrary to black. In like manner we shall show that in the other intermediate colors there is no contrary. Wherefore, if nothing is contrary to colors of this kind, contrariety will not be found in every quality; but if this is so, it is not proper to quality to admit contraries. But neither, indeed, is contrariety found in the very shapes which are manifestly qualities; for neither is a circle contrary to a square, nor a square to a triangle, nor can any figure be contrary to any figure. Wherefore it is evident that to admit a contrary is not proper to quality. But since there are certain things in quality which appear to be contrary to one another, as justice and injustice, from this a question is wont to arise.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":250,"ref":"p250","source":"Dicunt enim quidam justitiæ injustitiam non essecontrarian:, putantenim quod dicitur injustitia privationem esse justitiae, non tamen contrarielatem.Contraria enim propriis nominibus, non contrarii privatione nominari,ut album nigro,haberetamenj ustitiam aliquam contrarietatem,cujus'adhuc proprium nomen non sit inventum,quod omnino falsum est.Multae enim habitudines privationis vocabuloproferuntur,utilliberalilas et imprudentia, quae nunquam virtutibusopponerentur, quæ sunt habitus, nisi ipsae quoque habitus essent, et in animis habentium immulabiliter permanerent.At vero neque illud verum est, omnes privationes negatione proferri.Surditas enim,cum sit auditus privatio, sine negatione profertur; eodem quoque modo caecitas. Nullus enim dicit inauditio, neque invisio, nec aliquid hujusmodi, sed tantum surditas cæcitasque nominantur propriis nominibus, cum sint illa in habitu, visus, auditus, ilia in privatione ponenda.Igitur justitia injustitiæ contraria est. Tradit ergo regulam, ea quae contraria sunt, sub quo genere convenienter aptentur, quam regulam his verbis ipse praescribit:","english":"For some say that injustice is not contrary to justice, for they think that what is called injustice is a privation of justice, not however a contrariety. For contraries are named by their own proper names, not by the privation of a contrary, as white by black; yet they think that justice has some contrariety whose proper name has not yet been discovered, which is altogether false. For many dispositions are brought forth by the word of privation, such as illiberality and imprudence, which would never be opposed to the virtues, which are habits, unless they themselves were also habits and remained immutably in the minds of those who possess them. But neither is that true, that all privations are brought forth by negation. For deafness, since it is a privation of hearing, is brought forth without negation; in the same way also blindness. For no one says inaudition, nor invisio, nor anything of this kind, but only deafness and blindness are named by their own proper names, since those things are to be placed in the habit, sight and hearing, those in privation. Therefore justice is contrary to injustice. He therefore hands down a rule, that those things which are contraries are fittingly assigned under which genus, which rule he himself prescribes in these words:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":251,"ref":"p251","source":"Amplius si ex contrariis unum fueritquale, et reliquum erit quale. Hoc autem palam est proponenti ex singulis alia prædicamenta,ut si est justitia injustitiae contrarium; quale autem est justitia, quale igitur est injustitia. Nullum enim aliorum praedicamentorum aptabitur injustitiæ,nec quanlitas, nec ad aliquid, nec ubi,nec omnino tatium aliud,nisi quale; sic autem et in aliis quæ sunt secundum quale contraria sunt.\n\nSi ex duobus, inquit, contrariis manifestum fuerit unum eorum contrariorum sub qualitate poni, simul manifestum erit quod etiam ejus contrarium convenienter qualitati supponatur, siæulque demonstrat injustitiam esse qualitatem. Nam si justitia:apertissime qualitas est idcirco quod neque qualitas, neque ad aliquid, neque ubi, nec quando, nec aliud ullum praedicanientum est, nec sub ullo alio genere poni potest, nisi sub sola qualitate,cum ei contraria sit injustitia, non est dubium injustitiam quoque qualitati subnecti,quod ipse quoniam planius dixit, et ipsa exemplorum luce vulgavit, ad aliud nobis est transeundum.","english":"Moreover, if one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a quality. This is clear to one who sets out the other categories from individual instances: for example, if justice is contrary to injustice, and justice is a quality, then injustice is also a quality. For none of the other categories will fit injustice—not quantity, not relation, not place, nor altogether any other such thing except quality. And so it is also in other cases where things are contraries according to quality.\n\nIf, he says, it becomes evident that one of two contraries is placed under quality, it will at the same time be evident that its contrary is also suitably placed under quality, and he shows in each case that injustice is a quality. For if justice is most plainly a quality—for the reason that it is neither quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor time, nor any other category, nor can it be placed under any other genus except quality alone—since injustice is contrary to it, there is no doubt that injustice too is subjoined to quality. Since he has stated this more plainly and made it clear by the light of examples, we must pass on to another point.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":252,"ref":"p252","source":"Suscipit autem qualitas magis et minus, albumenim magis etminus alterum altero dicitur,et justum alterum altero magis et minus dicitur. Sed et ipsa crementum suscipiunt; cum candidum namque sil, amplius contingit candidum fieri,non tamen omnia,sed plura. Justilia namque a justitia si dicatur, magis et minus potest aliquis ambigere. Similiter et in aliis affectibus: quidam enim de talibus dubitant,justitiam namque a justitia non multum aiunt magis et minus dici, nec sanitalem a sanitate.Minus autem alterum altero habere sanitatem aiunt,et justitiam minus alterum altero habere,szcautem et grammaticam, et alios affectus.Alia igitur quæ secundum eos affectus dicuntur qualia, indubitanter recipiunt magis et minus. Grammaticior enim alter altero dicitur, et justior, et sanior; similiter et in aliis.\n\nAliud quoque proprium protulit,quod tractata ratione ab integra proprietate qualitatis exclusit. Ait enim qualitates posse vel intendi vel minui. Posse enim dicitalterum altero plus album appellari,ut nix argento,et qua'candidiora sunt marmora,et justum alterum altero magis et minus dicimus.Namque justius aliquid factum,nec non etiam justissimum est.","english":"Quality admits of more and less: for one thing is said to be more and another less white, and one thing is said to be more and another less just. But these very things also admit of increase; for when something is white, it can become more white—not all things, however, but many. For if justice is said to be more and less than justice, someone may be in doubt. The same holds in other dispositions as well: for some people are doubtful about such things, saying that justice is not said to be much more and less than justice, nor health than health. But they say that one person has less health than another, and that one person has less justice than another—and likewise grammar and other dispositions. Therefore other things that are said to be qualities according to these dispositions undeniably admit of more and less. For one person is said to be more grammatical than another, and more just, and more healthy; and similarly in other cases.\n\nHe also brought forward another property, which, having been treated by reasoning, he excluded from the complete property of quality. For he says that qualities can be intensified or diminished. For he says that one thing can be called more white than another, as snow is more white than silver, and marbles that are whiter, and we say that one thing is more and less just than another. For something has been done more justly, and indeed also most justly.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":253,"ref":"p253","source":"In quibus autem comparationes sunt, in his magis minusque dici manifestum est; hoc quoque modo ipsum album, vel alia qualitas non solum contra alterum ejusdem specieicomparataintentionecrescit, et relaxatione minuitur, sed etiam a seipsa recipit comparationem:Dicitur enim nunc quidem argentum candidius esse quam anlea,cum fuerit detersum.Sed cum hæc ita sint,non est magis minusque suscipere proprium qualitatis;nequeenim sola qualitas magis minusque suscipit,hæc enim intentio et relaxatio in his quoque quae sunt ad aliquid invenitur,ut in eo quod est aequale et inaequale possumus dicere plus aequale vel minus,etin caeteris hujusmodi; nec vero omnes qualitates suscipiunt magis et minus,quod ipse sic ponit:Non autem in omnibus hoc est, sed in pluribus.Dubitabit enim quis an justitia magis esse justitia dicatur,similiter autem et in ali is afFectionibus.","english":"In those things in which there are comparisons, it is manifest that more and less are said; in this way also whiteness itself, or another quality, not only grows in relation to another of the same species by intention and is diminished by relaxation, but also receives comparison from itself. For silver is now said to be whiter than before, when it has been polished. But since these things are so, it is not proper to quality to admit more and less; for quality alone does not admit more and less, since this intention and relaxation is found also in those things which are relative, as in the equal and the unequal we can say more equal or less, and in other such things; nor indeed do all qualities admit more and less, which he himself sets down thus: But this is not in all, but in most. For one may doubt whether justice is said to be more justice, and similarly also in other affections.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":254,"ref":"p254","source":"Quidam vero in hoc dubitant.dicuntenim justitiam justitia non magis vel minus dici,nec sanitatem sanitatejminus autem habere alterum altero sanitatem dicunt,et justitiam minus alterum altero habere.In hoc tres fuere sententias.Quidam namque dicebant, in omnibus secundum materiæ habitudinem reperiri posse magis et minus,Proprium namque esse materiae corporumque intentione crescere et minui relaxatione.quae quorumdam Platonicorum sententia fuit.Aliavero quaesecunaum certissimas verissimasque artes atque virtutes non diceret esse magis et minua,secundum autem medias dici posse,ut haec ipsa grammatica atque justitia non dicitur magis grammatica neque magis justitia. Esse autem quasdam alias mediocres artes,in quibusidipsum posset evenire. Tertia est de qua Aristoteles loquitur, quod ipsas quidem habitudinesnullaintentione crescere, nec diminutione decrescere putat,sed eorum participantes posse sub examine compositionis venire,ut de his magis minusve dicatur. Sanitatem namque ipsam al justitiam, alteram altera magis minusve non esse. Neque enim quispiam dicit magis esse sanitatem alia sanitate.Sed hoc solum dicere possumus magis habere sanitatem aliquem, id est esse saniorem,et magis sanum,et minus sanum.Dicimus ergo quod ipsae quidem qualitates non suscipiunt magis etminus.Qui vero secundum eas quales dicuntur,ipsi sub comparatione cadunt, ut justior,et sanior, et grammaticior.","english":"Some, however, are in doubt about this. For they say that justice is not said to be more or less than justice, nor health than health; but they say that one person has less health than another, and that one person has less justice than another. On this point there have been three opinions. For some said that in all things, according to the condition of matter, more and less can be found; for it is proper to matter and to bodies to grow by intention and to diminish by relaxation. This was the opinion of certain Platonists. But another opinion held that the most certain and truest arts and virtues are not said to be more and less, but that this can be said according to intermediate ones, as grammar itself and justice are not said to be more grammar or more justice. But there are certain other intermediate arts in which this same thing could occur. The third is the one about which Aristotle speaks, that the conditions themselves do not grow by any intention nor decrease by diminution, but that those which participate in them can come under examination of combination, so that more or less may be said of them. For health itself and justice itself are not more or less, the one than the other. For no one says that one health is more than another health. But this alone we can say, that someone has more health, that is, is healthier, and more healthy, and less healthy. We say, therefore, that the qualities themselves do not receive more and less. But those who are said to be of such a sort according to them, these fall under comparison, as more just, and healthier, and more grammatical.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":255,"ref":"p255","source":"Namque ipsa grammatica,id est litteratura,non suscipit magis et minus,nullus enim dicit alteram altera magis esse grammaticam, sed eum qui grammatica ipsa participat. Decimus litteratum,quem a litteratura scilicet denominamus lilteratus autem suscipit magis et minus, ut Donatus grammaticus plus erat aetate jam provecta grammaticus,id est litteratus,quam cum primum ad hujusmodi studia devenisset. Sed quanquam se haec ita habeant,tamen invenimus aliquas qualitates quibus indubitate comparatio inveniri non possit, ut sunt quas ipse supposuit.\n\nTriangulus vero et quadrangulus non videtur magis et minus suscipere, nec aliqua aliarum figurarum.\n\nHaec enim quae ex quarta specie qualitatis dicta sunt,magis minusve nulla ratione suscipiunt,nullus enim dicit plus esse alium circulum quam alium,nec magis esse illud triangulum quamillud,dicitquefortasse majorem,magis autem non dicit.Hujus autem rei hæc ratio est, ut cum sit trianguli diffinitio, figura quai sub tribus rectis lineis continetur,si qua sunt quas hanc diffinitionem in se suscipiant, ut et ipsa tribus rectis lineis contineantur,proprie triangulae formae sunt, eodem quoque modo et circulus ita diffinitur: Circulus est figura plana,quae sub una linea continetur, ad quam ex uno puncto qui intra ipsam est, omnes quae exeunt lineae aequae sibi sunt.","english":"For grammar itself, that is, literature, does not admit of more and less; for no one says that one grammar is more grammar than another, but rather that a person participates in grammar itself. We call someone literate from literature, but a literate person does admit of more and less, as Donatus the grammarian was more a grammarian, that is, literate, in his advanced age than when he had first come to studies of this kind. But although these things are so, nevertheless we find certain qualities in which comparison can undoubtedly be found, as are those which he himself set down.\n\nBut a triangle and a quadrilateral do not seem to admit of more and less, nor does any of the other figures.\n\nFor these things which were spoken of from the fourth species of quality admit of more and less in no way; for no one says that one circle is more than another, nor that that triangle is more than that one, and perhaps he says it is larger, but he does not say more. The reason for this is that, since the definition of a triangle is a figure which is contained by three straight lines, if there are any things which receive this definition in themselves, so that they too are contained by three straight lines, they are properly of triangular form; and in the same way a circle is also defined thus: a circle is a plane figure which is contained by one line, to which, from one point which is within it, all the lines which extend out are equal to one another.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":256,"ref":"p256","source":"Rursus quadrati diffinitio talis est: Quadratum est quod quatuor aequalibus lineis et quatuor rectis angulis continetur. Quaecunque igitur vel circuli diffinitionem suscipiunt,vel quadrati,aequaliter vel circuli vel quadratae formae sunt; si qua vero non suscipiunt,nullo modosunt.Si quaverosuntquaeneque quadrati suscipiunt diffinitionem,neque circuli,neque quadrati sunt, neque circuli ut est ugura quae parte altera longior dicitur.Illa enim ita diffinitur, parte altera longior figura est quae sub quatuor Iineis continetur, rectisque angulis, quam quatuor lineæ aequae sibi quidem non sunt,contra se vero positæ binæ sibi æquæ sUnl.Ergo quia hujusmodi figura neque circuli diffinitionem capit, neque quadrati aequaliter, neque circulus, neque quadratus est. Si qua enim cujuslibet formadiffinitionem suscipiunt, omnino eadem sunt.Ut qui circuli circulus,qui quadrati quadratus, qui trianguli triangulus,qui parte altera longioris, parte altera longior, et in caeteris eodem modo.Si qua vero non suscipiunt, ut triangulum,circuli diffinitionem non capit neque omnino circulus est, nee potest dici inter quadratum ettriangulum, quoniam utraque circuli diffinitionem non capiunt, quadratum quidem plus esse circulum, triangulum vero minus,omnino enim utraque a circuli ratione disjuncta sunt, quod his verbis ab Aristotele tractatur:","english":"Again, the definition of a square is as follows: A square is that which is contained by four equal lines and four right angles. Therefore, whatever things admit of the definition of a circle or of a square are equally either circles or square-shaped; but whatever things do not admit of it are in no way such. If, however, some things are such as neither admit of the definition of a square nor of a circle, they are neither squares nor circles, as is the figure called oblong. For that is defined thus: an oblong figure is one that is contained by four lines and right angles, whose four lines are not equal to one another, but two set opposite each other are equal to each other. Therefore, because a figure of this kind admits neither the definition of a circle nor equally that of a square, it is neither a circle nor a square. For if any things admit of the definition of any form whatever, they are altogether the same: as what is of a circle is a circle, what is of a square is a square, what is of a triangle is a triangle, what is of an oblong is an oblong, and in the rest in the same way. But if any things do not admit of it, as a triangle does not admit of the definition of a circle and is in no way a circle, neither can it be said between a square and a triangle, since both do not admit of the definition of a circle, that a square is more a circle and a triangle less; for both are altogether separated from the account of a circle. This is treated by Aristotle in these words:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":257,"ref":"p257","source":"Quæcunque enim diffinitionem trianguli suscipiunt et circuli, omnia similiter trianguli vel circuli sunt. Eorum vero quæ non suscipiunt, nihil magis alterum altero dicitur; nihilenim quadratum magis quam parte alleru longior forma, circulus est, nullum enim ipsorum recipit circuli rationem.Simpliciter autem in utraque non recipiunt propositi rationem,non dicetur alterum altero magis; non ergo omnia qualia recipiunt magis et minus. Horum itaque quae prædicta sunt,nihil est proprium qualitatis.\n\nNam si hoc diffiniLio facil,ut domonstret rationem cujusque substantiæ,quæcunque diffinitione discrepant,illaetiamipsa natura substantiæ discrepabunt. Recte igitur si quae cujuslibet rei propositae sive trianguli,sive quadrati diffinitionem non capiunt,ab ejusdem natura disjuncta sunt.Quocirca neque triangulum, neque quadratum, neque circulus, neque quidquid horum est,suscipiunt magis et minus.Sed cum haec qualitates sint,non omnes qualitates æquæ magis minusve suscipiunt. Quod si neque in omni qualitate intentio diminutioque provenit, neque in sola,quod hæc eadem in relatione reperias,non est magis minusve suscipere proprium qualitatis. Quodnam igitur qualitatis proprium esse dicendum est, id ipse planissime subterposuit.","english":"For whatever things admit of the definition of a triangle or of a circle, all are similarly triangles or circles. But of those things that do not admit of it, nothing is said to be more one than the other; for nothing is a circle more than a form longer on one side than another, since none of them receives the definition of a circle. But simply, in the case of both, they do not receive the definition of the proposed thing, and neither will be said to be more than the other; therefore not all such things as receive it admit of more and less. Of these things, then, which have been stated above, nothing is proper to quality.\n\nFor if this definition makes it easy to demonstrate the definition of each substance, whatever things differ in definition will also themselves differ in the nature of their substance. Rightly, therefore, if any things do not receive the definition of whatever proposed thing, whether of a triangle or of a square, they are separated from its nature. Wherefore neither a triangle, nor a square, nor a circle, nor whatever of these there is, admit of more and less. But since these are qualities, not all qualities equally admit of more and less. But if intention and diminution occur neither in every quality nor in it alone—because you may find these same things in relation—then to admit of more and less is not proper to quality. What, then, should be said to be proper to quality, he himself has most plainly set out below.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":258,"ref":"p258","source":"Similia vero tt dissimilia secundum solas dicuntur qualitates. Simileenim alterum alteri non esse secundum aliud quidquam,quam secundum illud qucd quale est. Quare proprium erit qualitatis, secundam eam simile et dissimile dici.\n\nSimile inquitet dissimile solae retinent qualitates. Nam quamvis simile ad aliquid sit,tamen hocipsum quod dicimus,simile non dicimus, nisi quod quale est.Nam si eadem qualitas sit in duobus,inain quibus est similia sunt, nec est aliud praedicamentum quod secundum simile et dissimile dici possit,etde aliis quidem omnibus notum est,quoniam de nullo dicitur. Quod si quis de quantitate affirmet, dici posse secundum eam simile atque dissimile,monstratum est secundum quantitatem non simile etdissimile; sed æquale et inæquale praedicari. Quocirca quoniam per singula quaeque pergentibus,et in oirnibus idem qualitatibus invenitur, et in nullo alio prædicamento esse perspicitur,recte hoc proprium qualitatis esse firmavit.","english":"But similar and dissimilar are said according to qualities alone. For one thing is not similar to another according to anything other than that which is of such a sort. Therefore it will be proper to quality that similar and dissimilar be said according to it.\n\nSimilar, he says, and dissimilar, only qualities retain. For although similar is relative to something, nevertheless this very thing that we call similar we do not call similar except insofar as it is of such a sort. For if the same quality is in two things, in those in which it is they are similar, nor is there any other category according to which similar and dissimilar can be said, and concerning all other things indeed it is known that it is said of none. But if anyone should affirm concerning quantity that similar and dissimilar can be said according to it, it has been shown that according to quantity not similar and dissimilar but equal and unequal are predicated. Wherefore, since in going through each individual case, and in all qualities the same thing is found, and it is perceived to be in no other category, he rightly established that this is proper to quality.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":259,"ref":"p259","source":"Sed quoniam cum de his quae referuntur ad aliquid tractaretur,affectusatque habitus in his quæ sunt ad aliquid numeravit,uunc vero eosdem quoque qualitati supposuit, ipse sibi quamdam objecit quæstionem, cur si prius sub iis quas ad aliquid referuntur, ista subjecerit,nunc sub qualitatibus ea ipsa posuerit.Superius namque monstravit ea quae essent a se diversa, easdem species habere non posse,cum dicit diversorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diversae species et I difTerentiaesunt.Quocircacum relatio atque qualitas diversa sint genera,easdem utrique supponi species non oportet, hoc est enim quod dicit:\n\nAt vero non decet conturbari, ne quis nos dicat de qualitate propositionem facientes, multa de relativis interposuisse, habitus enim; dispositiones eorum quæ sunt ad aliquid esse dicebamus, pene enim in omnibus qualitatibus genera ad a liquid dicuntur, non autem aliquid eorum quæ singula sunt.Nam cum disciplina genus sitjioc ipsum quod est alterius dicilur,alicujus enim disciplina dicitur. Eorum vero quæ singula sunt, nihil ipsum quod est alterius dicitur,ut grammatica non dicitur alicujus grammaticatnec musica alicujus musica nisi forte secundum genus,et hac ad aliquid dicuntur. ut grammatica dicitur alicujus disciplina, non alicujus grammatica, et musica alicujus disciplina non alicujus musica. Quapropter quæ quidem singularia sunt, non sunt ad aliquid.","english":"But since, when the things that are referred to something were being treated, he numbered affection and habit among those that are relative, and now he has also subordinated the same things to quality, he raised a certain question against himself: why, if he had previously placed these under the things referred to something, he now placed these same things under qualities. For above he showed that things which are diverse from one another cannot have the same species, when he says that of diverse genera and those not placed subalternately the species and differences are diverse. Wherefore, since relation and quality are diverse genera, it is not fitting that the same species be subordinated to both. For this is what he says:\n\nBut truly it is not fitting to be disturbed, lest anyone say that we, in making a proposition about quality, have interposed many things about relatives. For we were saying that habits and dispositions are of the things that are relative, for in nearly all qualities the genera are said relative to something, but not any of the things that are individual. For since discipline is a genus, this very thing that it is is said of another; for it is said to be someone's discipline. But of the things that are individual, nothing itself that it is is said of another, as grammar is not said to be someone's grammar, nor music someone's music, except perhaps according to the genus, and in this way they are said relative to something, as grammar is said to be someone's discipline, not someone's grammar, and music someone's discipline, not someone's music. Wherefore the things that are individual are not relative.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":260,"ref":"p260","source":"Quam quaestionem validissima argumentatione dissolvit,his scilicet verbis: Pene enim ea quæ sunt in omnibus his generibus ad aliquid dicuntur.Eorum vero quae sunt singulatim, id est species, nihil hujusmodi sunt. Haec enim est argumentatio quam Graeci vocant.In hujusmodi affectionibus atque habitudinibus, quas inter ea sunt genera, eas solas ad aliquid posse reduci, quae vero species essent illorum generum posse in relativis, sed in qualitatibus numerari, ut scientia cum sit habitudo habet sub se alias habitudines,grammaticam et geometriam.In noc igitur scientia ipsa quod genus est, ad aliquid semper refertur,dicimus enim scientiam alicujus scientiam. Grammaticam vero quae ejus species est, nullus dicit alicujusesse grammaticam; dicaturenim sifieripotest grammaticam,Aristarchi esse grammaticam.Sed omnia quaecunque dicuntur ad aliquid,convertuntur.Dicitur ergo etAristarchus, grammaticae Aristarchus,quod fieri non potest. Non igitur grammatica Aristarchi,ut ad aliquid dicitur.","english":"He resolves this question with a very strong argument, namely in these words: For nearly all the things that are in all these genera are said in relation to something. But of those that are individual, that is, the species, nothing is of this sort. For this is the argumentation that the Greeks call [a certain name]. In affections and habits of this sort, which are among those genera, only those can be reduced to something relative which are genera; but the species of those genera can indeed be among relatives, yet are counted among qualities, as knowledge, since it is a habit, has under itself other habits, grammar and geometry. In these, therefore, knowledge itself, insofar as it is a genus, is always referred to something; for we say knowledge of something is knowledge. But grammar, which is its species, no one says is grammar of something; for if it can be said, grammar would be said to be grammar of Aristarchus. But all things whatsoever that are said in relation to something are converted. Therefore Aristarchus is also said, Aristarchus of grammar, which cannot happen. Grammar, therefore, is not of Aristarchus, as it is said in relation to something.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":261,"ref":"p261","source":"Est etiam argumentum, non species, sed hujusmodi genera, ad aliquid appellari, ut cum ipsae quidem species ad aliquid non dicantur,ut grammatica non dicitur alicujus grammatica,si quando tamen est ut species ad aliquid raferatur,id non secundum,sesed secundum genus,utgrammaticæ quoniam genus est scientiae quae relativa est, si quis grammaticam ad aliquid referre contendat,non potest secundum ipsam grammaticam, eam ad aliquid praedicare, sed secundum scientiam,id est secundum genus suum. Noa euim dicitur grammatica alicujus grammatica, sed fortasse grammatica alicujus scientia.Non ergo grammatica secundum grammaticam ad aliquid dicitur, sed secundum scientiam.Et hoc est quod ait, ut grammatica non dicitur alicujus grammatica,nec musica,sed fortasse secundum genus proprium istae dicuntur alicujus, ut grammatica alicujus dicitur scientia,non alicujus grammatica.Ergo singularum specierum nihil est quod aliqua relatione praedicetur. Genera vero harum specierum relativa sunt, quae paulo superius dixi; quod enim ait: Pene enim in oJmibus qualitatibus genera ad aliquid dicuntur,non autem aliquid eorum quae sunt singula,hoc demonstrare voluit, genera ipsa habitudinem dispositionumque esse relativa, species vero generum quas singulatim esse dixit,ad aliquid nullo modo praedicari.","english":"There is also an argument that not the species but genera of this kind are called relative, as when the species themselves are not said to be relative—for example, grammar is not said to be grammar of something—yet if it ever happens that a species is referred to something, this is not according to itself but according to its genus; for example, since grammar is a genus of knowledge, which is relative, if anyone contends that grammar is referred to something, he cannot predicate it as relative according to grammar itself, but according to knowledge, that is, according to its genus. For grammar is not said to be grammar of something, but perhaps grammar is the knowledge of something. Grammar, therefore, is not said to be relative according to grammar, but according to knowledge. And this is what he says: that grammar is not said to be grammar of something, nor music, but perhaps according to their proper genus these are said to be of something, as grammar is said to be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of something. Therefore, of the individual species there is nothing that is predicated by any relation. But the genera of these species are relative, which I mentioned a little earlier; for what he says: For nearly in all qualities the genera are said to be relative, but not any of those which are individual—he wished to demonstrate this: that the genera themselves have a relation and disposition of relatives, but the species of the genera, which he said to be individual, are in no way predicated as relative.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":262,"ref":"p262","source":"Quas idcirco esse singulatim vocavit, quia grammatica una est,et rursus musica una; scientia vero non una.Recte igitur species scientiae singulatim esse nominavit. Constat igitur quod genera hujusmodi habitudinem dicantur ad aliquid, species vero ad nihil aliud propria praedicatione referantur. Quocirca quoniam hujusmodi species relativas non esse demonstravit, nunc quod reliquum est qualitates esse confirmat.\n\nDicitur autem secundum singula quales. Hæc enim et habemus.Scientes enim dicimur,quod habemus singulas scientias aliquas. Quare hæc erunt etiam quatitates, quæ singularia sunt,secundum quas etiam quales dicimur. Hæc autem non sunt eorum quae sunt ad aliquid.\n\nIllas esse qualitates superius confirmatum est ex quibus aliqui quales vocarentur,nos autem idcirco grammatici dicimur, non quod universalem scientiam,sed quod ipsam grammaticam habeamus, et hoc vere dicitur,idcirco nos dici scientes,quia grammaticisumns,potiusquamidcircogrammaticosquod aliquamscientiam retinemus.Nullusenimagenerali scientia grammaticus, aut sciens,nisi a singulatim scientia Bciens,grammaticusque perhibetur. Igitur quoniam exhis habitudinem speciebus quales vocamur, ipsas species in qualitate numeraudse sunt. Sed cum quis grammatica participat, de ea etiam genus dicitur,etsecundum eam non solum ad gran' maticam,sed ad scientiam quoqueconjungitur.","english":"He called these \"individually\" for the reason that grammar is one, and again music is one; but knowledge is not one. Therefore he rightly named the species of knowledge to be individually. It is agreed, then, that genera of this kind are said to be relative, but that species are referred to nothing else by their own predication. Wherefore, since he has demonstrated that species of this kind are not relative, he now confirms that what remains are qualities.\n\nBut they are called \"of what sort\" according to individual things. For we have these. For we are said to be knowing because we have certain individual sciences. Wherefore these will also be qualities, which are individual, according to which we are also said to be of what sort. But these are not among those which are relative.\n\nThat those are qualities from which certain people are called of what sort was confirmed above; but we are called grammarians for the reason that we have not universal knowledge but grammar itself, and this is truly said: we are called knowing because we are grammarians, rather than grammarians because we retain some knowledge. For no one is a grammarian or knowing by general knowledge, unless he is called knowing and a grammarian by individual knowledge. Therefore, since it is from these species that we are called of what sort, the species themselves must be numbered in quality. But when someone participates in grammar, its genus is also predicated of him, and according to it he is joined not only to grammar but also to knowledge.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":263,"ref":"p263","source":"Diciturenimidcirco sciens.Ergo quoniam habens grammaticam,et sciens,et grammaticus dicitur, non potest ulla scientia participare, qui singulas non habuerit. Qui enim cunctis speciebus caret, illi quoque genere ipso carendum est. Quare quoniam has species habemus,et secundum eas quales dicimur, a grammatica scientes et grammatici nuncupamur, has autem ipsas species monstratum est ad aliquid non referri.Recteigitur hujusmodi habitudines quae in alterius relativis species sunt,in qualitate numeratae sunt.Quod si quis hoc quoque invitus accipiat, aliud addit quo totum quæstionis vinculum solvetur;ait enim:\n\nAmplius si contingat hoc ipsum et quale relativum esse, nihil est inconvenieus in utrisque hæc generibus etlUmerare.","english":"For this reason he is called knowledgeable. Therefore, since one who has grammar is both called knowledgeable and a grammarian, no one who does not possess the individual species can participate in any knowledge. For one who lacks all the species must also lack the genus itself. Wherefore, since we possess these species, and according to them we are called such, we are named knowledgeable and grammarians from grammar, and it has been shown that these very species are not referred to something else. Rightly, therefore, dispositions of this kind, which are relative species in another, have been counted under quality. But if anyone accepts this unwillingly, he adds another point by which the whole knot of the question will be loosed; for he says:\n\nFurther, if it should happen that this very thing is both a relative and a quality, there is nothing inconvenient in counting these under both genera.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":264,"ref":"p264","source":"Nam cum sit verum unam eademque rem duobus diversis generibus suppositam essenon posse, illud tamen convenit secundum aliud atque aliud unam eamdemque speciem duobuB generibus posse subnecti,ut in eo quod supra jam dictum est,cum Socrates substantia sit, pater vero ad aliquid,cumque substantia discrepet atque relatio, nihil tamen est inconveniens eumdem ipsum Socratem in eo quod homo est, substantiae supponi, in eo quod habet filium,relationi.Quocirca si secundum aliam atque aliam rem duobus generibus eadem res quaelibet diversissimis supponatur, nihil inconveniens cadit.tt.a quoque et habitudlnes in eo quod alicujusreihabitudines sunt,in relatione ponuntur, in eo quod secundum eas quales aliquid dicuntur,in qualitatenumerantur,Quare nihil est inconveniens unam atque eamdem rem, secundum diversas natura: suae potentias,geminisetsi contingatpluribus,annumerare generibus.Quocirca quoniam de qualitate tractatum est, nos quoque orationis cursum ad reliqua praedicamenta vertamus.","english":"For since it is true that one and the same thing cannot be placed under two different genera, yet it is agreed that one and the same species can be attached to two genera according to different respects, as in what has already been said above: since Socrates is a substance, but a father is a relative, and since substance and relation differ, it is nevertheless not incongruous that the same Socrates, in that he is a man, be placed under substance, and in that he has a son, under relation. Wherefore if according to one thing and another, any same thing whatsoever is placed under two most diverse genera, nothing incongruous results. Likewise also habits, in that they are habits of something, are placed in relation; in that according to them something is said to be of such a sort, they are counted in quality. Wherefore it is not incongruous to enumerate one and the same thing, according to the diverse natures of its potencies, under two, even if it should happen to be more, genera. Wherefore, since quality has been treated, let us also turn the course of our discourse to the remaining categories.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":265,"ref":"p265","source":"DE FACERE ET PATI.\n\nSuscipit autem facereet pati contrarietatem,et magis et minusMalefacere enim et (rigetacere contraria sunt,et calefieri et frigefieri,et delectari ac contristari. Quare suscipit contrarietatem et magis et minus,calefacere enim dicitur magis et minus,et calefieri magis et minus,et contristari magis et minus,suscipit igitur magis et minus,facere et pati;de his itaque tanta dicantur.\n\nDecursis quatuor prasdicamentis quae aliqua quaestione et consideratione ergo videbantur, tenuiter cætera breviterque perstringit.Et de facere quidem et pati nihil in hoc libro,nisi quod contraria suscipiant, et intentionem imminutionemque ab Aristotele est disputatum,in aliis vero ejus operibus plene ab eo perfecteque tractata sunt, ut hoc ipsum de facere et pati in his libris quos xat inscripsit,de aliis quoque praedicamentis non illi minor in aliis operibus disputatio fuit,ut de eo quod est ubi et quando in physicis, et de omnibus quidem altius subtiliusquc in libris quos vocavit, exquiritur. Ac de fecere quidem et pati ipse planissime posuit posse ea suscipere contrarietates.Dicimus enim ignem calefacere et frigefacere,quod scilicet ad faciendum refertur.Dicimus aquam calefieri et frigefieri, quod nihilominus ad patiendi ducitur prsedicamentum.Magis quoque et minus suscipere,apertissimis demonstrat exemplis.","english":"ON DOING AND SUFFERING.\n\nDoing and suffering also admit of contrariety, and of more and less. For to do evil and to do good are contraries, and to be warmed and to be cooled, and to be delighted and to be saddened. Therefore they admit of contrariety and of more and less; for to warm is said more and less, and to be warmed more and less, and to be saddened more and less. Therefore doing and suffering admit of more and less. And let this much be said concerning these.\n\nHaving run through the four categories which seemed to require some inquiry and consideration, he touches upon the rest briefly and lightly. And indeed concerning doing and suffering nothing has been disputed by Aristotle in this book except that they admit of contraries and of intensification and diminution; but in his other works these things have been fully and perfectly treated by him, as this very matter concerning doing and suffering in those books which he entitled On Generation and Corruption, and concerning the other categories too his disputation in other works was no less, as concerning where and when in the Physics, and concerning all of them indeed more deeply and more subtly in the books which he called Metaphysics. And concerning doing and suffering he himself most plainly laid down that they can admit of contrarieties. For we say that fire warms and cools, which of course is referred to doing. We say that water is warmed and cooled, which nonetheless is brought under the category of suffering. That they also admit of more and less he demonstrates by the most evident examples.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":266,"ref":"p266","source":"Sic enim magis calefacere et minus, et magis calefieri et minus dicitur.Atque haec hactenus,ipse enim haec apertissime posuit.Est autem horum descriptio talis,quod in faciendo quidem,actus quidam aquolibst in aliam rem veniens, consideratur a quo veniat. In patiendo autem in eo ille actus consideratur,in quem venit. Actus enim et passio simul in physicis esse monstrata sunt.Ac de facere quidem ac pati,ad praesens tempus haec dicta sufficiant.\n\nDictum est autem et de situm esse, in his quæ ad aliquid sunt,quod denominative a positionibus dicitur de reliquis autem quando, et ubi, et habere, eo quod manifesta sunt,nihil de his ultra dicitur, quam quod in principio dictum est,quia habere quidem significat calceatum esse,armatum esse, ubi autem, ut in lyceo in loro,quando,ut heri.Et alia quæ de his dicta sunt. De propositis itaque generibus, sufficiant quæ autem suat.","english":"For thus it is said to heat more and less, and to be heated more and less. And these matters up to this point; for he himself set these forth most openly. But the description of these is such: that in doing, indeed, a certain act coming from some source into another thing is considered with respect to whence it comes. In suffering, however, that act is considered with respect to that into which it comes. For act and passion have been shown to exist simultaneously in physical things. And concerning doing and suffering, let these things said suffice for the present time.\n\nIt has also been said concerning being situated, in those things which are relative, that it is denominatively said from positions. But concerning the rest — when, and where, and having — because they are manifest, nothing further is said about them than what was said at the beginning: that having indeed signifies being shod, being armed; where, as in the Lyceum, in the forum; when, as yesterday. And the other things which have been said about these. Concerning the proposed genera, therefore, let what has been said suffice.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":267,"ref":"p267","source":"DE SITU ET POSITIONE.\n\nPositio quidem quoniam ipsa est alicujus, in iis quæ sunt ad aliquid, numerata est, sed quoniam omnis res quae ab alio denominatur,aliud est quam idipsum a quo denominata est,ut aliud est,qui est grammaticus,atque grammatica,quamvis grammaticus a grammatica denominelur.Ita cum sit positio relativa,quidquid denominative a positionibua dicitur,hoc relativorum genere non tenetur.Positio autem ipsa relativa est, positum vero est a positione denominatum. Statio enim cujusdam statio est. Stare vero quoniam a statione denominatum est, non ponitur in eo genere in quo statio fuit. Quare sub relatione hoc praedicamentum non invenitur. Sed quoniam nihil est ad quod hoc reducere genus atque aptare possimus, dicendum est suum esse genus.Ut accumbere ab accubitu, stare a statione, et caetera quidem quae idcirco se Aristotelea exsequidenegat,quoniam planissima sunt;ait enim: De reliquis vero id est, quando, et ubi, et habere; propterea quia manifesta sunt, nihil de his ultra dicitur, quam quod in principio dictum est, et eorum praedicta ponit exempla.","english":"On Position and Posture.\n\nPosition, indeed, since it is itself of something, has been counted among those things which are relative; but since every thing which is denominated from another is other than that very thing from which it is denominated—as one who is grammatical is other than grammar, although the grammatical is denominated from grammar—so, since position is relative, whatever is said denominatively from positions is not held in this genus of relatives. But position itself is relative, whereas what is positioned is denominated from position. For a standing is the standing of something. But to stand, since it is denominated from standing, is not placed in that genus in which standing was. Wherefore this predicament is not found under relation. But since there is nothing to which we can reduce and adapt this genus, it must be said to be its own genus. As to recline is from reclining, to stand from standing, and the rest indeed which Aristotle refrains from pursuing for this reason, because they are most plain; for he says: But concerning the rest—that is, when, and where, and to have—for the reason that they are manifest, nothing further is said about them than what was said at the beginning, and he sets down the examples of them previously stated.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":268,"ref":"p268","source":"DE UBI ET QUANDO\n\nDicendum autem est breviter de praedicatione quae est ubi et quando. Sicut ipsum ad aliquid per se esse non potest, nisi ex alio aliquo naturam trahat, ita et quando et ubi, esse non potest, nisi locus ac tempus fuerit. Locum enim ubi, tempus vero quando, comitatur. Non est autem idem tempus, et quando, nec ubi et locus, sed proposito prius loco si qua res in eo sit posita,ubi esse dicitur. Rursus si certa res in tempore est,quando esse perhibetur,ut Apollinares ludi,cum sint. in tempore, quando eos esse dicimus. Habent autem haec quoque proprias diversitates,ubi quidem,quod aliquoties infinite dicitur.Alicubienirr: esse dicimus aliquem,ut Socratem,aliquotiesautem diffinite,ut in lyceo vel in academia. Habet quoque ubi,secundum ipsum locum in quoest,aliquascontrarietates.Sursum enim esse,et deorsum ubi esse dicitur. Temporum quoque varietates in eo praedicamento,quod est quando,esse manifestum est.Futuraenimet praesentia praeteritaque in quando praedicamento veniunt.Dicimus enim fuisse aliquando Scipionem consulem Romanum,nunc esse Orientis imperalorem,qui nunc Anastasius appellatur.Futurum autem esse aliquem, quae scilicet secundum quando praedicamentum dicuntur.","english":"On Where and When\n\nWe must speak briefly about the predication that is where and when. Just as relation itself cannot exist per se unless it draws its nature from something else, so too when and where cannot exist unless there be place and time. For where accompanies place, and when accompanies time. But time is not the same as when, nor is where the same as place; rather, when a place has been posited first, if some thing is situated in it, it is said to be where. Again, if a certain thing is in time, it is said to be when, as the Apollinarian games, since they are in time, we say are when. These also have their own proper diversities: in the case of where, it is sometimes said indefinitely — for we say someone is somewhere, as Socrates — and sometimes definitely, as in the Lyceum or in the Academy. Where also has certain contrarieties according to the very place in which it is: for to be up and to be down are said to be where. The varieties of times also in that predicament which is when are manifestly present. For future, present, and past things come under the predicament of when. For we say that Scipio was once consul of the Romans, and that there now is an emperor of the East, who is now called Anastasius. And that someone will be in the future — these things, of course, are said according to the predicament of when.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":269,"ref":"p269","source":"DE HABERE.\n\nHabere autem est quoddam extrinsecus veniens, neque innatum ei aquo habetur,aliudque quam est illud ipsum a quo habetur, in se retinere, ut armatum esse vel vestitum esse.Habere enim est vestes atque arma tenere,quae cum eo nata non sunt,neque aliqua cum eo qui habet,communi natura proprietateque junguntur; sed quoniam de his Aristoteles tacuit,nobis quoque nunc eorum longior tractatus omittendus est.\n\nLIBER QUARTUS-\n\nExpeditis omnibus prædicamentis,cur præter propositum operis in hanc oppositorum disputationem sit ingressus, a multis ante quaesitum est, sed Andronicus hanc esse adjectionem Aristotelis non putat, simulque illud arbitratur, idcirco ab eo fortasse hanc adjectionem de oppositis,et de his quae simul sunt,et de priore,et de motu et de æquivocatione,habendi non esse factam,quod hunclibellum ante Topica scripserit, quodque haec ad illud opus non necessariaesse putaverit, sicut ipse Categoriae possunt ad sensum Topicorum, non ignorans scilicet quod sufficienter in Topicis,quantumad argumenta pertinebat, et de his omnibus quae adjecta sunt,etdepraedicamentis fuisse propositum.Sed hæc Andronicus.Porphyrius vero hanc adjectionem vacare et carere ratione non putat.Cujus hanc prodidit causam.","english":"ON HAVING.\n\nTo have, however, is a certain thing coming from outside, not innate in that from which it is had, and retaining in itself something other than that very thing from which it is had, as to be armed or to be clothed. For to have is to hold garments and arms, which were not born with him, nor are they joined to him who has them by any common nature and property; but since Aristotle was silent about these things, we too must now omit a longer treatment of them.\n\nBOOK FOUR\n\nWhen all the categories had been set out, why, contrary to the plan of the work, he entered into this disputation about opposites has been asked by many before, but Andronicus does not think this is an addition by Aristotle, and at the same time he judges that for this reason perhaps this addition concerning opposites, and concerning things that are simultaneous, and concerning the prior, and concerning motion and equivocation, was not made by him, because he wrote this little book before the Topics, and because he thought these things were not necessary for that work, just as the Categories themselves can be understood in the sense of the Topics, not unaware, of course, that in the Topics, as far as pertained to arguments, it had been sufficiently proposed concerning all these things that were added and concerning the categories. But this is what Andronicus says. Porphyry, however, does not think this addition is empty and devoid of reason. He has set forth this as its cause.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":270,"ref":"p270","source":"Ut enim multa sunt quae quod communibus animi conceptionibus esse suggererent,in hujus libri principiis ab Aristotele praedicta sunt,ut de æquivocis,et univocis,et denominativis,etde his omnibus, quaecunque usque ad substantiae disputationem ad ipsorum praedicamentorum utilitatem cognitionemque praedicta sunt, ita quaedam fuisse quae essent quidem in communibus sensibus, egerent tamen subtilioris divisionis modo,hæc diligenter supposita sunt,ut quid essent proprie teneretur, ne falsis opinionibus traductus non firmus animus luderetur.Docet autem hoc,inquit, etiam ipse ordo congruus rationique conveniens titulorum,hanc adjectionem fuisse perutilem atque necessariam.Prius enim de oppositis,post vero de his quae simul sunt, et de his quae posteriora sunt.Post autem de motu,ad postremum de habendi aequivocatione sermonem faciens,libri seriemterminavit.Idcirco quod in omnibus quidem prædicamentis ante quaesivit, utrum possint habere contraria. In his vero quae sunt ad aliquid,dixit magnum parvo non posse esse contrarium,sed oppositum.Quid vero esse oppositum dicere praetermisit, ne ordo disputandi continuus rumperetur. Hic igitur recte quod illic praetermiserat,prius edocuit.In relativis quoque de his quæ sunt prius,quæ que simul natura gignuntur,strictim tetigu, quod nunc diligenter explicat.","english":"For just as there are many things which, because they suggested existence by common conceptions of the mind, were stated by Aristotle in the beginnings of this book—as concerning equivocals, univocals, and denominatives, and concerning all those things which up to the discussion of substance were stated for the utility and knowledge of the categories themselves—so there were certain things which were indeed within common perceptions, yet required a more subtle mode of division; these have been carefully added, so that what they properly are might be firmly grasped, lest the mind, led astray by false opinions, be made unsteady and mocked. He teaches this, he says, and the very order of the titles, harmonious and fitting to reason, shows that this addition was most useful and necessary. For first he spoke concerning opposites, then concerning things that are simultaneous, and concerning things that are posterior. After that, concerning motion, and finally, making his discourse on the equivocation of having, he ended the series of the book. For this reason, because in all the categories he first asked whether they can have contraries. But in those which are relative, he said that the great cannot be contrary to the small, but opposed. What however it is to be opposed he omitted to say, lest the continuous order of disputation be broken. Here therefore he rightly taught first what he had omitted there. In relatives too, concerning things that are prior and things that are naturally generated together, he touched briefly, which he now explains diligently.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":271,"ref":"p271","source":"Faciendi Jvero patiendique praedicamenta sunt, in quibus quidam quasi motus agitatioque consideratur;necesse igitur fuit motu dicere,qui naturam faciendi atque patiendi vellet ostendere. Quis autem dubitet cujuslibet sermonis aequivocationem monstrare,esse perutile?Quare quoniam habere quoque praedicamentum est, non fuit inconveniens neque perfluum de habendi aequivocatione tractasse.\n\nDE OPPOSITIS.\n\nDe oppositis autem quoties solent opponi dicendum est.Dicltur autem alterum alteri opponi quadrupliciter3aut ut ad aliquid,aut ut contraria, aut ut habitus et privatioMut ut affirmatio et negatio:opponitur atem unumquodque istorum, ut figura dicam relativa qaidem,ut duplum dimidio. Contraria autem ut malo bonum,secundum privationem et habitum, utccecitas visui,secundum affirmationem et negationemsut sedet non sedet.\n\nIllud quoque quæritur utrum oppositionis nomen aequivoce prædicetur.Dicimus euim quatuor modis opponi,aut ut contraria, aut ut aliquid,aut ut habitum et privationem,aut ut affirmationem at negationem.","english":"The categories of doing and undergoing are those in which a kind of motion and activity is considered; it was necessary, therefore, to speak of motion, since one wished to show the nature of doing and undergoing. But who would doubt that to demonstrate the equivocation of any word whatsoever is very useful? Wherefore, since having is also a category, it was neither incongruous nor superfluous to have treated the equivocation of having.\n\nON OPPOSITES.\n\nNow it must be said in how many ways opposites are wont to be opposed. But one thing is said to be opposed to another in four ways: either as relatives, or as contraries, or as habit and privation, or as affirmation and negation. Each of these is opposed, as I may say by way of example, as relatives indeed, as double to half; as contraries, as good to evil; according to privation and habit, as blindness to sight; according to affirmation and negation, as he sits, he does not sit.\n\nThis too is asked: whether the name of opposition is predicated equivocally. For we say that things are opposed in four ways: either as contraries, or as relatives, or as habit and privation, or as affirmation and negation.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":272,"ref":"p272","source":"Hic ergo contenditur utrum aequivocatio quaedam circa has quatuor diversitates sit, an idipsum quod dicimus oppositum generis vice prædicetur,ut situnivocum.Sed in hoc Stoicorum Peripateticorumque diversa sententia fuit,et ut ipsi inter se Peripatetici,diverse sectati sunt.Stoicorum quoniam longa sententia est,praetermittatur,aliis autem Peripateticis placet nomen hoc oppositi de subjectis aequivoce praedicari,ita affirmantibus,quoniam Aristoteles ita dixit: De oppositis quoties solent opponi dicendum est hoc, id est quoties ad multiplicitatem pertinet aequivocationis.Sed qui meliusjudicavere, hi oppositionis nomen generis loco dicunt debere praedicari, idcirco quod cum nomen opposilionis de subjectis quatuor oppositionibus praedicetur, ab his quoque diffinitio non oberret. Sunt enim opposita quas in eodem, secundum idem, in eodem tempore, circa unam eamdemquerem,simul esse non posunt,quod per singula quaeque pergentibus in singulis oppositis invenitur. Namque album et nigrum, quæ sunt contraria,unu eodemque tempore circa unum idemque corpus partemque corporis simul esse non possunt, nec servus atque dominus ejusdem, eodem tempore idem servus idem dominus est,nec habitus et privatio;quis enim dicat in eodem oculo uno eodemque tempore et visum posse esse et caecitatem?","english":"Here, then, the dispute is whether there is a certain equivocation with respect to these four diversities, or whether that very thing which we call opposed is predicated in place of a genus, so that it is univocal. But on this point the Stoics and the Peripatetics held differing opinions, and the Peripatetics themselves followed different views among themselves. Since the Stoic opinion is lengthy, let it be passed over; but it pleases other Peripatetics that this name of \"opposed\" is predicated equivocally of its subjects, affirming this because Aristotle said so: \"Concerning opposites, one must speak as often as they are customarily opposed,\" that is, as often as it pertains to the multiplicity of equivocation. But those who judged better say that the name of opposition ought to be predicated in place of a genus, for the reason that, since the name of opposition is predicated of the four oppositions as its subjects, their definition also does not stray from them. For opposites are those which cannot be simultaneously in the same thing, according to the same respect, at the same time, in relation to one and the same thing — which is found in each of the opposites as one proceeds through them individually. For white and black, which are contraries, cannot be simultaneously at one and the same time in one and the same body and part of a body; nor can a slave and his master be at the same time the same slave and the same master; nor habit and privation; for who would say that in the same eye, at one and the same time, both sight and blindness can exist?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":273,"ref":"p273","source":"Jam vero affirmatio et negatio quam repugnantes sint,quamque in eodem simul esse non possint,nulli dubium eat.Quare si eaquae sub oppositione ponuntur oppositionis nomen diffinitionemque suscipiunt,quid est dubium oppositionem non aequivoce praedicari? His igitur positis, ad eorum distantias differentiasque veniamus.\n\nQuæcunque igitur ut relativa opponuntur, ea ipsa quæ sunt oppositorum dicuntur,aut quomodolibelaliter ad ea,ut duplum dimidii ipsum quod est, alterius dicitur duplum, alicujus enim duplum,sed et scientia scibili tanquam retativa opposita est,et dicilur scientia hoc ipsum quod est scibiLis, et scibile hoc ipsum quod est ad oppositum dicitur, id est ad scientiam. Scibile euim aliquo dicimus scibile,id est scientia.Quæeunque ergo opposita sunt tanquam ad aliquid, ipsa, quæ sunt aliorum dicuntur, aut quomodocunque ad se invicem.","english":"Now truly, how repugnant affirmation and negation are, and how they cannot be in the same thing at the same time, is doubtful to no one. Wherefore, if those things which are placed under opposition receive the name and definition of opposition, what doubt is there that opposition is not predicated equivocally? With these things therefore established, let us come to their distances and differences.\n\nWhatever things, therefore, are opposed as relatives, those very things which are of the opposites are said, or in whatever way they are related to them, as the double is said to be the double of the half itself which it is, and is said to be the double of something; for it is the double of something. But also knowledge is opposed to the knowable as a relative, and knowledge is said to be that very thing which it is, namely of the knowable, and the knowable is said to be that very thing which it is in relation to the opposite, that is, to knowledge. For we say the knowable is knowable of something, that is, by knowledge. Whatever things, therefore, are opposed as relatives, those very things which are of others are said, or in whatever way they are related to one another.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":274,"ref":"p274","source":"Ea quidem hujus oppositionis qu'C secundum relationem dicuntur,et per seipsa plana atque vulgata sunt.et superiori relationis disputatione jam cognita.Illaenim suntadaliquid quæcunque id quod sunt aliorum dicuntur,vel quomodolibet aliter ad ea,ut servus domini servus,et dominus servi dominus,et magnum ad parvum dicitur, et rursus parvum refertur ad magnum.Quod si hoc in relativis omnibus invenitur,nulla est dubitatio quin etiam in his hoc deprehendi possit,quæ secundum ad aliquid opponuntur,ut ea ipsa id quod sunt oppositorum dicantur vel quomodolibet aliter ad opposita, nt si est servus domino oppositus,dominus servi dicatur,id est oppositi sui,et rursus si dominus servo oppositus est,domini servus dicatur.Parvum vero ad magnum,et magnum ad parvum, id est ad oppositum sibi. Atque hoc quidem in omnibus secundum ad aliquid oppositionibus inveniri necesseest.Quocirca sit hæc proprietas eorum quae secundum ad aliquid opponuntur,quodea ipsaquæ sunt ad opposita referuntur,et ipsorum esse dicuntur. His ergo ante constituti,; docet differentiam,qua inter se ea quae secundum contrarietatem dicuntur,vel ea quae secundum ad aliquid,discrepant atque dissentiunt; ait enim:","english":"Now these things of this opposition which are said according to relation are both in themselves clear and commonly known, and already known from the earlier discussion of relation. For those things are said to be in relation to something, whatever are said to be of others with respect to what they are, or in any other way are referred to them, as a slave is the slave of a master, and a master is the master of a slave, and a large thing is said in relation to a small thing, and again a small thing is referred to a large thing. But if this is found in all relatives, there is no doubt that it can also be discovered in those things which are opposed according to relation, namely that those very things are said to be of their opposites with respect to what they are, or in any other way are referred to their opposites; for instance, if a slave is opposed to a master, he is said to be the slave of a master, that is, of his opposite; and again, if a master is opposed to a slave, he is said to be the master of a slave. But a small thing is referred to a large thing, and a large thing to a small thing, that is, to its opposite. And this indeed must be found in all oppositions according to relation. Wherefore let this be the property of those things which are opposed according to relation: that those very things which they are are referred to their opposites, and are said to be of them. These things therefore having been established beforehand, he teaches the difference by which those things which are said according to contrariety, or those which are according to relation, differ and disagree among themselves; for he says:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":275,"ref":"p275","source":"Itta vero quae ut contraria opponuntur,ipsa quidem quae suntnullo modo adseinvicem dicuntur,contraria vero sibi invicem dicuntur,neque enim bonum mali dicitur bonum,sed contrarium,nec album nigri album, sed conlrarlumsquaredifferunt a se invicem hæ oppositiones.\n\nDictum est inhis quae secundum ad aliquid opponuntur,quod ea ipsaid quod suntad id quod sibi est oppositum dicerentur. Contrariavero etipsa quidem opponuntur sibi,sed id quod sunt ad opposita non dicuntur,contraria autem dicuntur.Hoc autem hujusmodi est.Bonum malo contrarium dicimusesse, et rursus malum bono.Nigrum quoque albo contrariumputamus,nihilominus quoque album nigro.Sed cum hoc arbitramur,non tamen dicimus ea id quod suntesseoppositorum.Sienim diceremus ea id quod est bonum esse oppositi sui, non diceretur bonum malo essecontrarium,sedBbonum esse mali bonum. Nec ila praedicationem quis faceret nigrum albo esse contrarium,sed nigrum albi esse nigrum. Hoc est enim id quod est nigrum dici ad oppositum suum,si quis dicat nigrum albi esse nigrum;quod quoniam non dicitur,ea ipsa quae suntnon dicuntur oppositorum,ea scilicet quae sibi ut contraria videntur opponi. Sed quoniam dicimus bonum malo contrarium,etinigrum albocontrarium,quanquam id quod sunt oppositorum non dicantur,tamen ad opposita ut contraria nominantur.Atque hoc est quod ait:Ipsa quidem quae sunt nullo modo ad seinvicem dicuntur.","english":"But those things which are opposed as contraries—the things themselves which they are are in no way said in relation to each other, but they are said to be contrary to each other. For good is not said to be the good of evil, but its contrary; nor is white said to be the white of black, but its contrary. In this respect these oppositions differ from each other.\n\nIt has been said in the case of those things which are opposed according to relation that the things themselves, in respect of what they are, are said in relation to that which is opposed to them. But contraries are indeed opposed to each other, yet they are not said, in respect of what they are, in relation to their opposites, but they are said to be contraries. This is as follows: we say that good is contrary to evil, and again evil to good. We also think black to be contrary to white, and nonetheless white to black. But when we judge this, we do not however say that they, in respect of what they are, belong to their opposites. For if we were to say that good, in respect of what it is, belongs to its opposite, good would not be said to be contrary to evil, but good would be the good of evil. Nor would anyone make the statement that black is contrary to white, but that black is the black of white. For this is to say what black is in relation to its opposite, if one says that black is the black of white. Since this is not said, those things which they are are not said to belong to their opposites—namely, those things which appear to be opposed to each other as contraries. But since we say that good is contrary to evil, and black contrary to white, although they are not said, in respect of what they are, to belong to their opposites, they are nonetheless named in relation to their opposites as contraries. And this is what he says: the things themselves, in respect of what they are, are in no way said in relation to each other.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":276,"ref":"p276","source":"Contraria vero sibi invicem dicuntur.Non enim dicitur bonum mali bonum, hoc est enim id quod est oppositi praedicare,sed dicimus bonum malo contrarium.Quocirca differunt ea quae similiter ad aliquid opponuntur his quæ secundum contrarietatem sibi sunt opposita,quod eaquidem quae secundum relationem opposita sunt id quod sunt oppositorum dicuntur. Illa vero quae ut contraria, ipsa quidem quod suntoppositorum nomine minime,sed tantum contraria prædicantur, ut bonum contrarium esse dicatur oppositi sui non boni.Dicimus enim bonum malocontrarium,cum non dicamus bonum mali honum.Sed quoniam differentiam secundum ad aliquid oppositionis contrariorumque monstravit, ipsorum inter se contrariorum differentiam discrepantiamque persequitur.\n\nQuæcunque vero contrariorum talia sunt,ut in?uibus nata sunt fieri, vel de quibus prædicantur, necessarium sit alterum zpsorum inesse,nihil horum est medzum.Quorum vero non necessarium est alterum inesse, horum aliquid est medium omnino, ut languor et sanitas in corpore animalisnaturahabent fi,eritet necessarium est alterum esse animalis in corpore. vel lanauorem vel sanitatem;par quoque et impar de numero prsedicanturtet necessarium est alterum in numero esse aut impar aut par,et nihil est medio eorum3neque inter languorem et sanitatem, neque inter par et impar.","english":"But contraries are said in relation to each other. For good is not said to be the good of evil—for that is to predicate what belongs to its opposite—but we say that good is contrary to evil. Wherefore those things which are opposed in relation to something differ from those which are opposed to each other according to contrariety, in that those which are opposed according to relation are said to be what they are of their opposites. But those which are opposed as contraries are themselves predicated by no means by the name of their opposites, but only as contraries, so that good is said to be contrary to its opposite, which is not good. For we say that good is contrary to evil, whereas we do not say that good is the good of evil. But since he has shown the difference between opposition according to relation and that of contraries, he next pursues the difference and discrepancy among the contraries themselves.\n\nNow whatever contraries are such that, in the things in which they are naturally produced, or of which they are predicated, it is necessary that one of them be present, none of these has a middle. But those of which it is not necessary that one be present, of these there is some middle. For example, sickness and health have their natural production in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that one of them be in the body of the animal, either sickness or health. Likewise odd and even are predicated of number, and it is necessary that one of them be in the number, either odd or even, and there is no middle of them, neither between sickness and health, nor between odd and even.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":277,"ref":"p277","source":"Quorum vero non est necessarium alterum inesse,horum est aliquod medium, ut nigrum et album in corpore natura habent fieri,et non est necessarium alterum horum inesse corpori,non enim omne corpus aut album, aut nigrum est.Pravum quoque et studiosum prædicantur quidem de homine,et de aliis multis, sed non est necessarium alterum horum inesse illis de quibus prædicanlursnon enim omnia vet prava,vel studiosa sunt: sed est horum medium atiquid,ut albi quidemel nigri fuscum et pallidum, et quicunque alii colores, pravi uero et studiosi,quod neque pravum,neque studiosum est. ln aliquibus itaque nomina posita sun tis, quæ media sunt,ut albi et nigri, fuscum et pallidum,et alii colores.ln aliquibus autem nomina quidem medio assignarepromptum non est,sed per utrarumque extremorum negationem quod medium est determinatur, ut neque bonum, neque malum, neque justumyneque injustum.","english":"But those things of which it is not necessary that one of the two be present have some middle, as black and white in a body are naturally able to come to be, and it is not necessary that one of these be present in a body; for not every body is either white or black. Wicked and virtuous are also predicated of man and of many other things, but it is not necessary that one of these be present in those things of which they are predicated; for not all things are either wicked or virtuous. But there is some middle of these, as of white and black there is tawny and pale, and whatever other colors there are; and of wicked and virtuous, that which is neither wicked nor virtuous. In some cases, then, names have been assigned to the things that are middles, as to the middle of white and black, tawny and pale and the other colors. In some cases, however, it is not easy to assign a name to the middle, but the middle is determined by the negation of each of the extremes, as neither good nor evil, neither just nor unjust.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":278,"ref":"p278","source":"Brevis contrariorum partitio hoc modo facienda est. Contrariorum alia sunt habentia medietatem, alia vero non habenlia,et eorum quorum est aliquid medium,in aliis plures medietates,in aliis vero una tantum medietas invenitur.Atque horum aliquae medietales propriis nominibus appellantur in aliqnibus vero ipsaequidemmedietatespropriis appellationibus carent.contrariorum vero negatione signantur.Sed hæc quæ dicta sunt,a primordio repetentes propriis probemus exemplis.IIla vero contraria quae medio carent talia sunt,utnecesse sit alterum eorum proprio inesse subjecto,ut est ægritudo etsanitas.Omne enim corpus in quo ægritudo sanitasque versatur, autaegrumautsanum est.Atque ideo quoniam ægritudo et sanitas medietate carent,alterutrum eorum inerit ei subjecto,in quo utraque nata sunt fieri,et da quo prædicantur.","english":"A brief division of contraries must be made in this way. Of contraries, some have a middle, others do not; and of those of which there is some middle, in some several middles are found, in others only one middle. And some of these middles are called by their own names, while in some cases the middles themselves lack proper appellations. But they are marked out by the negation of the contraries. But let us prove these things that have been said by proper examples, repeating from the beginning. Those contraries which lack a middle are such that it is necessary that one of them be present in its own subject, as is sickness and health. For every body in which sickness and health are involved is either sick or healthy. And therefore, since sickness and health lack a middle, one of the two will be present in the subject in which both are naturally able to come to be, and of which they are predicated.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":279,"ref":"p279","source":"Nam quoniam in corpore animalis sanitas et ægritudo fieri nata est.id est ita fieri soJet,et ita omne natum est animal, at aul sanum esse possit aut aegrum.Et quoniam de animalis corpore aut sanum,aut aegrum prasdicatur,necesse est quoniam hæc medio carent in omni corpore ani malis aut ægritudinem,aut sanitatem esse.Quocirca eorum quae medio carent,necesse alterum interesse subjecto,et quaecunque talia sunt,ut alterum ipsorum subjecto inesse necesse sit,nulla inter ea medietas clauditur.llla vero contraria in quibus aliqua medietas est non sunt talia,ut eorum necesse sitalterum inessesubjecto.Nam inillisquae mediocarent.idcirco alterutrum subjecto inesse necesse est, quod eorum medietas nulla est quae possit interea subjectce inesse substantiae,ut in numero quoniam paritas et imparitas medium nihil habentlomnis enim numerus aut par aut impar est nec est quod propterea numero in esse possit),ideo omnis numerus aut par autimpar est.In his vero quae inter se medietatem aliquam complectuntur,non est necesse semper alterum contrariorum namque inessemedietas,utin colore,quoniam album atque nigrum contrarietatis vice diversa sunt,habent autem medium quod est rubrum vel pallidum,idcirco non omne corpus vel album vel nigrum est,quoniam potest aliqnando in subjectis corporibus albi atque nigri medietas inveniri.","english":"For since health and sickness are born to occur in the body of an animal — that is, they are accustomed to occur thus, and every animal is born either to be able to be healthy or sick — and since healthy or sick is predicated of the body of an animal, it is necessary, because these lack a middle, that in every body of an animal there be either sickness or health. Wherefore, of those things that lack a middle, it is necessary that one of the two be present in the subject, and whatever things are such that one of them must necessarily be present in the subject, no middle is enclosed between them. But those contraries in which there is some middle are not such that one of them must necessarily be present in the subject. For in those things that lack a middle, for this reason one or the other must necessarily be present in the subject, because there is no middle of them that could be present between them in the underlying substance — as in number, since evenness and oddness have no middle (for every number is either even or odd, nor is there anything that could for that reason be present in number), therefore every number is either even or odd. But in those things that encompass some middle between themselves, it is not necessary that one of the contraries always be present; for there is a middle, as in color, since white and black are opposed by way of contrariety, yet they have a middle, which is red or pale; therefore not every body is either white or black, since sometimes a middle between white and black can be found in underlying bodies.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":280,"ref":"p280","source":"Videmus namque rubrum corpus, ut rosam multosque praeterea f1ores,quos verni temporisclementia parturit.Recte igitur dictum est,eorum quorum non sunt aliquae medietates, alterum semper inesse subjectis, et in quibus necesse est alterum inesse,fieri non posse quin illic medietas ulla sit.Eodem quoque modo et quae medietates habent, non cecessario alterutra subjectis inesse,et quae non est necesse alterutra subjectis inesse,non est dubium quin illic quaedam possit esse medietas,sed in aliquibus quidam plures,in aliquibus autem una est medietas, ut in colore inter album alque nigrum plures medietates sunt.Est enim(utdictum est)rubrum, et quoque pallidum,eodem quoque modo venetum, et multa praeterea hujusmodi.In calido vero atque frigido una medietas est,qua3 dicitur tepor.Horum autem quibus una medietas est,in aliis nomen est positum,in allis non.Et positum quidem nomen est, utintercalidum frigidumque,hancenim medietatem tepidum esse praedicamus.Non est vero positum in eo quod Aristoteles ipse sic dixit:Improbi vero et probi, quod neque probum est, neque improbum. Nam quoniam bonum atque malum sibi sunt contraria, non autem necesse est omne quod boni malive susceptibile est,vel bonum esse vel malum,idcirco dixit bonum malumque,cum sintcontraria,babere quamdam medietatem,cui nomen positum quidem non sit,sed nihilominus eam quis inter bas contrariorum naturas inveniet.","english":"For we see a red body, as a rose and many other flowers, which the mildness of the spring season brings forth. Rightly, therefore, it has been said that of those things of which there are no intermediates, one of the two is always present in the subjects, and in those things in which it is necessary that one of the two be present, it cannot happen that there be any intermediate there. In the same way also, those things which have intermediates do not necessarily have one or the other present in their subjects, and those things in which it is not necessary that one or the other be present in their subjects, there is no doubt that some intermediate can be there. But in some cases there are several intermediates, in others there is one intermediate, as in color between white and black there are several intermediates. For there is, as has been said, red, and also pale, and likewise blue, and many other such things. But in hot and cold there is one intermediate, which is called tepidness. Of those things, however, which have one intermediate, in some a name has been assigned, in others not. And a name has indeed been assigned, as between hot and cold — for we declare this intermediate to be tepid. But it has not been assigned in the case which Aristotle himself stated thus: \"the wicked and the good, that which is neither good nor wicked.\" For since good and evil are contraries to each other, but it is not necessary that everything which is capable of good or evil be either good or evil, for that reason he said that good and evil, since they are contraries, have a certain intermediate, to which a name has indeed not been assigned, but nevertheless one will find it among these natures of contraries.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":281,"ref":"p281","source":"Nam quod dictum est a posterioribusinterbonum malumqueesseeaquas dicantur indifferentia, ut interest virtutem atque turpi. tudinem,quæ utraque sibi sunt contraria,divitiae et pulchritudo,quæ(ut Stoici putant) neque mala, neque bona sunt,atque idcirco indifferentia nominavere,sed hoc ipsum quod dicimus indifferens apud priores nomen non erat,et aposterioribusinventum est.Aristoteles autem qui hoc nomine usus nunquam est,ait probum atqueimprobumhaberequidem aliquam medietatem,verumtamen eam nullo nomine nuncupari,sed eam utriusque contrarii negotiatione diffinivit.Ait enim medietatem probi atque improbi esse,quod neque probum esset neque improbum,ut justi atque injusti medietasest,quod nequejustum, neque injustum est. Sed ne videatur inconveniens aliquid negationibus diffiniri,ipse ait:In aliquibus verononestnomineassignaremedietatem,utriusque vero negatione diffinitur.Namque ubi est una medietas,si utraque contraria sint remota,sola tantum medietas permanebit, ut in eo quod est bonum et malum,quoniam his una medietas est,sublato bono atque malo, solum quod neque bonum, neque malum est relinquitur. Quocirca tota rursus divisio breviter assumenda est.Eorum quæ sunt contraria quorum necesse est semperalteruminessein his,in • quibus ea secundum propriam naturam messe contingunt,ea nullam inter seretinent medietatem,utin corpore sanitas et segritudo,innumeroparitas atque imparitas.","english":"For what was said by later thinkers—that between good and evil there are things called indifferent, as between virtue and baseness, which are contrary to each other, there are riches and beauty, which (as the Stoics think) are neither evil nor good, and for that reason were named indifferent—but this very thing that we call indifferent was not a name among earlier thinkers, and was invented by later ones. Aristotle, however, who never used this name, says that the honorable and the base do indeed have some mean, but that it is called by no name, and he defined it by the negation of each of the contraries. For he says that the mean of the honorable and the base is that which is neither honorable nor base, as the mean of the just and the unjust is that which is neither just nor unjust. But lest it seem in some way unsuitable for something to be defined by negations, he himself says: In some cases it is not possible to assign a name to the mean, but it is defined by the negation of both. For where there is a single mean, if both contraries are removed, only the mean will remain, as in the case of good and evil, since there is one mean for them: with good and evil removed, only that which is neither good nor evil is left. Wherefore the whole division must again be briefly taken up. Of those things which are contrary, of which it is necessary that one always be present in those things in which they occur according to their own nature, they hold no mean between themselves, as in the body health and sickness, in number evenness and oddness.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":282,"ref":"p282","source":"Quaecunque vero in his in quibus esse possunt,non ita sunt,ut eorum necesse si alterum inesse,hæc aliquam inter se qualitatem medietatis amplectuntur,ut albedo atque nigredo,rubrum,fri. gidum atque calidum teporem. Horum autem alia sunt quae unam solam continent medietatem,aliavero quae multas,et multas,ut interaibum atquenigrum, pallidum,venetum,quae medietates sunt.Inter calidum atquo frigidum una sola est medietas, tepor, Horum autem quæ unam retinent medietatem, in, aliis nomina sunt posita,ut in eo ipso calore ac frigore.Est enim tepor medietas caloris atque frigoris. In aliquibus vero nomen positum non est,ut in eo quod est bonum alquemalum,justum atque injustum. In his enim medietas nomen positum nonhabet, sed utrorumque eontrariorum negationibus diffinitur, ut dicamus eam esse boni atque mali medietatem, quod neque bonum est malum, eamque esse justi et injusti medietatem, quae utraque contrarietate summota, utrorumque negatione relinquitur, ut est neque justum, neque injustum.","english":"But whatever things are in those subjects in which they can exist, not in such a way that one of them must necessarily be present in them, these embrace some quality of mediation between themselves, as whiteness and blackness, red, cold and hot, warmth. Of these, moreover, some contain one single mean, others many, and many, as between white and black, pale, violet, which are means. Between hot and cold there is one single mean, warmth. Of those, however, which retain one mean, in some cases names have been assigned, as in the case of heat and cold themselves. For warmth is the mean of heat and cold. In some cases, however, no name has been assigned, as in the case of good and evil, just and unjust. For in these the mean does not have a name assigned to it, but is defined by the negations of both contraries, so that we say that it is the mean of good and evil, that which is neither good nor evil, and that it is the mean of just and unjust, which, with each contrariety removed, is left by the negation of both, as is neither just nor unjust.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":283,"ref":"p283","source":"Privatioautem et habitus dicitur quadem quæ habent fieri circa idem aliquid, ut visio et caecitas circa oculum. Universaliter autem dicendo,in quo natus est habiMus fieri,circa hoc idem dicitur utrumque horum.\n\nOrdine tertiam speciem propositae oppositionis exsequitur eam quae secundum habitum privationemque dicitur, atque in ea unam similitudinem posuit quai illi est cum contrarietate conjuncta. Nam sicut ea quæ sunt contraria circa idem sunt,ut album,quoniam semper in corpore est; nigrum quoque semper est in corpore,et justitia,quoniam semper animo inserta est, injustitia quoque mentis est vitium, ita quoque ea quae secundum privationem habitumque dicuntur, circa idem semper necesse est inveniri, ut quoniam visus habitus est (habemus enim visum)et visus est in oculoetcircaoculum, caecitas quoque,quae privatio visus est, præter oculum non est.Auditus etiam,qui habitus est,quoniam circa aures est, ejus quoque privatio quæ surditas dicitur,ab auribus non recp,dit;ita quoque et circa quod fuerit habitus,circaidem ipsumillius habitus privatio consideratur.Atque hinc regulam dat.Universaliter enim dicit in quo sit in eo fieri privationem.Quid vero sit privari, continuata dispositione subjunxit:","english":"But privation and habit are said of certain things that have come to be around the same thing, as sight and blindness around the eye. And speaking universally, in whatever thing a habit is naturally able to come to be, around this same thing each of these is said.\n\nIn the third place in order he treats the third species of the proposed opposition, that which is called according to habit and privation, and in it he sets down one similarity that it has in common with contrariety. For just as things that are contrary are around the same thing, as white, since it is always in a body; black also is always in a body, and justice, since it is always implanted in the mind, injustice also is a vice of the mind, so too those things that are said according to privation and habit must always be found around the same thing, as since sight is a habit (for we have sight) and sight is in the eye and around the eye, blindness also, which is the privation of sight, is not apart from the eye. Hearing also, which is a habit, since it is around the ears, its privation also, which is called deafness, does not depart from the ears; so too also, around whatever thing a habit has been, around this same thing the privation of that habit is considered. And from this he gives a rule. For he says universally that in whatever thing a privation is, it comes to be in that thing. But what it is to be deprived, he adds in a continued arrangement:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":284,"ref":"p284","source":"Privari autem tunc dicimus unumquodque susceptibilium habitus, quando id quod natum est habere,et quando natum est habere, nullo modo habet.\n\nQuid sit privatio hac Aristoteles diffinitione conclusit. Neque enim quaecunque non habent visum, caeca dicuntur,nec vero surdum est omne quod non sentit auditum,nemo enim neque parietem caecum dixerit, nec surdum lapidem,nec quidquid hujusmodi est. Sed ea sola privari dicimus habitu,quaecunque aut habuere habitum eoque caruere,authabere potuere et non habent.Parietem autem idcirco non dicimus caecum, quod in eo visus naturali lor venire non potuit.Parvos vero catulos quibus visus non est, non satis digne aliquis caecos esse pronuntiet.Eo enim tempore nondum naturalitervisum habere possunt.Si vero exhaustis diebus quibus his oculi patefieri et lucem haurire naturaliter possunt, non habeant visum,eos caecos esse manifestum est. At vero neque ostrea dicuntur edentula, quoniam naturaliter non habeint dentes, sed nec infantulos quibus adhuc nondum hujusmodi aetas est,ut habeant dentes, vocamus edentulos,sed si aut is qui ante habuit, dentes amiserit, aut quo jam tempore habere naturaliter debet, dentes non habet. ut si quis puerorum septimo anno omnino nullum creaverit, illos jure edentulos appellamus, atque hoc est, quod ait:","english":"We say that each of those things capable of a habit is deprived of it when that which is naturally able to have it, and when it is naturally able to have it, in no way has it.\n\nWhat privation is, Aristotle concluded by this definition. For not all things that do not have sight are called blind, nor is everything that does not perceive sound deaf; for no one would call a wall blind, or a stone deaf, or anything of this sort. But we say that only those things are deprived of a habit, whatever either had the habit and lost it, or were able to have it and do not have it. But for this reason we do not call a wall blind, because sight could not naturally come to be in it. But as for small puppies that do not have sight, no one would pronounce them blind with sufficient justification. For at that time they are not yet naturally able to have sight. But if, when the days have been exhausted in which their eyes can naturally be opened and drink in the light, they do not have sight, it is manifest that they are blind. But neither are oysters called toothless, since they do not naturally have teeth; nor do we call little infants toothless, for whom there is not yet an age of this sort, such that they have teeth; but if either one who previously had teeth has lost them, or at the time when he ought naturally to have them, he does not have teeth—as if one of the boys in his seventh year has produced none at all—we rightly call them toothless. And this is what he says:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":285,"ref":"p285","source":"Edentulum enim dicimus non qui nou habet dentes, nec cæcum qui non habet visum,sed quando qui debuit habere non habet.Quædam enim a generatione neque dentes,nequ6visum habent,sed non dicuntur edentula neque casca.\n\nHoc est, non omne quod non videt cæcum, nec quod dentes non habet edentulum appellamus.Plura enim sunt quae automnino aut certo tempore naturaliter haec habere non possunt,sed est illa privatio quoties si habitum nonhabet,quihabere naturaliter potest, et eo tempore cum jam per naturam illius esse compos habitus possit,vel si habens quis retinensque habitum,illum cujuslibet incursione casus amiserit, ut in pueris jam adultis si non habeant dentes.Nam quoniam homines sunt,possunt habere;quod si habentes amiserint,edentuli dicuntur;si vero omnino non creverint dentes, quoniam jam pueris atque adultis ut dentes haberent,naturaliter poterat evenire, id quo casu aliquo vel aegritudine officiente factum est, eos edentulos et habitu denlium privatos esse nominamus.","english":"For we call a person toothless not merely one who does not have teeth, nor blind one who does not have sight, but when one who ought to have them does not have them. For certain beings neither have teeth nor sight from birth, yet they are not called toothless or blind.\n\nThat is, we do not call everything that does not see blind, nor everything that does not have teeth toothless. For there are many things that by nature cannot have these at all or at a certain time; but privation occurs whenever one who is naturally able to have a habit does not have it, and at that time when by nature it is already capable of possessing that habit, or if someone having and retaining the habit has lost it through the onset of some accident, as in the case of boys already grown up if they do not have teeth. For since they are human beings, they are able to have them; but if, having had them, they have lost them, they are called toothless; if however their teeth have not grown at all, since for boys and adults it was naturally possible for teeth to come about, what has happened through some accident or through the agency of illness—we call them toothless and deprived of the habit of teeth.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":286,"ref":"p286","source":"Privari vero et habere habitum, non est habitus et privatiOyhabitus enim est visus.Privatio vera cæcitas, habere autem visum, non est visus, nec caecum esse, eæcitas;privatio emm quaedam estcsecitas, cæcum vero esse privari et non privatio est.\n\nHic verissima ratione monstratur utrum ea qum sub privatione atque habitu cadant privationes sint atque habilus,an minime: nam quoniam habitus est visus,privatio vero cæcitas,sub habitu vero est habere visum, et sub privatione esse cæcum, utrum habere visum idem sit quod ipse qui habetur visus, et utrum idem sit caecum esse quod caecitas,perspicaciter intuent;bus aliud quoddam est habere aliquid quod habetur. Tres namque res sunt in eo in quo est habitus,is qui habet ea res quae habetur,ethabere, ut est is qui videt,et ipse visus,et hoc ipsum quod ex utrisque,fit ex eo scilicet qui videt et visu,quod est videre.Distat autem et videre ab eo qui videt,et hoc ipsum videre rursus a visu.","english":"But to be deprived and to have a habit is not [the same as] a habit and a privation. For a habit is sight. But privation is blindness; and to have sight is not sight, nor is to be blind blindness. For blindness is a certain privation, but to be blind is to be deprived, and not a privation.\n\nHere by the truest reasoning it is shown whether those things which fall under privation and habit are privations and habits, or not. For since habit is sight, but privation is blindness, and under habit is to have sight, and under privation is to be blind, whether to have sight is the same as the sight itself which is had, and whether to be blind is the same as blindness—for those who look keenly, to have something is something other than that which is had. For there are three things in that in which a habit is: the one who has, the thing which is had, and to have—as there is the one who sees, and sight itself, and this very thing which comes to be from both, namely from the one who sees and from sight, which is to see. But to see differs from the one who sees, and this very to see again differs from sight.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":287,"ref":"p287","source":"Aliud est enim id quod fit quam is quifacit.Videreautemvidens operatur,aliud est igiturvidere quam videns.Distatautem videre etiam a visu, aliud namque est id quod fit quam id per quod aliquid geritur, videre autem per visumfit.Distatergo videre abeo ipso(qui ipsum videre efficit) visu, sed videre visum habere est, visum autem habere habitum retinere est, et visus habitus est.Non est igitur idem habitus et quid est sub habitu, id est quemlibet habitum retinere.Eodem quoque modo etiam in privatione,et illic quoque res suntres,isqui privatur,hoc ipsum quod fit,idest privari, et ipsum quo quis privatur,id est ipsa privatio. Quod si distatis qui habet eo ipso quod est habitum habere, distat et is qui privatur eo quod est priva ri.Quod sietiamdistatquod est haberehabitumillo ipso habitu qui habetur.Distat necessario j id quod est privati illa ipsa scilicet privatione qua quisque privatur.Quare nequeid quod sub habitu est habitus appellari potest,neque id quod sub privatione privatio. Recte igitur dictum est habitum habere non essehabitum,privariquenon esse privationem: cui rei aliqua quaedam validior vis argumentationis adjungitur, quam Aristoteles ita pronuntiat.","english":"For that which is produced is one thing, and that which produces is another. But to see is what the one seeing performs; therefore to see is one thing, and the one seeing another. But to see also differs from sight, for that which is produced is one thing, and that through which something is brought about is another; but seeing is brought about through sight. Therefore to see differs from sight itself, which effects the seeing itself. But to see is to have sight; and to have sight is to retain a habit, and sight is a habit. Therefore a habit is not the same as that which is under a habit, that is, for anyone to retain a habit. In the same way also in privation, and there too the matters are distinct: the thing, the one who is deprived, this very thing which is produced, that is, to be deprived, and that itself by which someone is deprived, that is, privation itself. But if the one who has differs from this very thing which is to have a habit, the one who is deprived also differs from this which is to be deprived. But if also to have a habit differs from that very habit which is had, then necessarily that which is to be deprived differs from that very privation by which each one is deprived. Wherefore neither can that which is under a habit be called a habit, nor that which is under a privation be called a privation. Rightly therefore has it been said that to have a habit is not a habit, and to be deprived is not a privation. To this matter a certain stronger force of argumentation is added, which Aristotle pronounces thus.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":288,"ref":"p288","source":"Amplius si idem essetcæcitas et cæcumesse, utrumque de eodem prædicaretur. Sed caecus dicitur homo, csecitasvero nullo modo homo dicitur.\n\nSiidem inquit esset caecitas quod est esse caecum, de quocunque caecum eese diceretur, de eo quoque caecitas praedicaretur, sed caecum dicimus essehominem,ca?citatem vero ipsum hominem nullus dicit: quare quoniam in utrisqued:versa est prædicatio,et de quo caecitas dicitur, non de eo dicitur caecum, rursumque de quo cæcum esse praedicatur,is caecitas dici non potest, non est dubium quin aliud sit caecum esse quam cæcitas, id est privationem esse aliudquamprivari: sed quamvis distent,aequalitamen oppositionis vice funguntur, quod ipse loquitur sic.\n\nOpposita vero etium hæc videntur esse, privari et habitum habere,sicut privatio et habitus, modus enim oppositionis idem est,nam sicut cæcitas visui opposita est, sic cæcum esse ad risum habere oppositum est.","english":"Moreover, if blindness and to be blind were the same, both would be predicated of the same thing. But a man is said to be blind, yet blindness is in no way said to be a man.\n\nIf, he says, blindness were the same as to be blind, of whatever thing being blind were said, of that thing blindness would also be predicated; but we say that a man is blind, yet no one says that blindness itself is a man. Therefore, since in both cases the predication is reversed—for of the thing of which blindness is said, being blind is not said of it, and again, of the thing of which being blind is predicated, blindness cannot be said of it—there is no doubt that to be blind is one thing and blindness another, that is, to be in privation is one thing and to be deprived another. But although they differ, they nevertheless serve in the role of an equal opposition, as he himself says thus.\n\nBut these also seem to be opposites: to be deprived and to have a habit, just as privation and habit; for the mode of opposition is the same. For just as blindness is opposed to sight, so to be blind is opposed to having sight.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":289,"ref":"p289","source":"Æqua namqueproportione sibi privatio atque babitus opponunlur, et ea quae sub privatione habituque clauduntur.Cur enim si privatioatquehabitus, id est visus et caecitas sibi sunt opposita,non etiam videre atque essecaecum eodem modo invicem sibimet opponantur. Quare quanquam haec distent,tamen modus in his oppositionis aequalis est.\n\nNon est autem neque id quod sub afjirmatione et negatione jacet,affirmatio et negatio,affirmatio namque orario est affirmativa,negatio autem oratio negativa, horum vero quæ sub affirmatione et negatione sunt, nultumest oratio, sed res ipsse Dicuntur autem etiam haec esse opposita alterutris, sicut affirmatio et negatio,nam in his modus oppositionis est idem.Sicut enim affirmatio adversus negationem opposita est, ut quas sedet eiqux non sedet,sic et res quæ sub utroque posiUe sunt, sedere quempiam et non sedere.","english":"For by an equal proportion privation and habit are opposed to each other, and also the things enclosed under privation and habit. For why, if privation and habit, that is, sight and blindness, are opposed to each other, are not seeing and being blind also opposed to each other in the same way? Wherefore, although these differ, nevertheless the mode of opposition in them is equal.\n\nBut neither is that which lies under affirmation and negation itself affirmation and negation. For affirmation is an affirmative statement, and negation a negative statement; but of the things that are under affirmation and negation, none is a statement, but the things themselves. Yet these too are said to be opposed to one another, just as affirmation and negation; for in them the mode of opposition is the same. For just as affirmation is opposed to negation, as \"he sits\" to \"he does not sit,\" so also the things that are placed under each, for someone to sit and not to sit.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":290,"ref":"p290","source":"Ad quartamoppositionis speciem transitum fecit, quæ secundum affirmationem negationemque dicitur. Affirmatio autem est quae aliquam rem alicui quadam participatione conjungit. Negatio vero quae aliquam rem ab aliqua re quadam separatione disjungit, ut est Omnis homo est animal,animal enim ad hominem haec oratio jungit. Participat enim homo proprio genere, scilicet animal,negatiovero, homo lapis non est.Disjungitenim naturam lapidis ab humanitate qui negat,sed multa de hie in lib.de interpretatione dicenda sunt.Quare plenior horum disputatio in tempus aliud differatur.Aristoteles veras implicissime et pene incuriose propter eos qui instituunturdiffinitiones affirmationis negationisque signavit,dicens negationem affirmationemque, affirmativas esse negativasque orationes.Quod si exam inatius ac subtilius definisset,affirmationem peraffirmativam orationem non diffiniret.","english":"He made the transition to the fourth species of opposition, which is called opposition according to affirmation and negation. Now affirmation is what joins some thing to something by a certain participation. Negation, however, is what separates some thing from something by a certain separation, as in \"Every man is an animal,\" for this statement joins animal to man. For man participates in his own genus, namely animal. But the negation \"man is not a stone\" separates the nature of stone from humanity, which it denies. But many things must be said about these in the book On Interpretation. Wherefore the fuller discussion of these matters is deferred to another time. Aristotle, however, marked out the definitions of affirmation and negation very incompletely and almost carelessly, on account of those who are being instructed, saying that negation and affirmation are affirmative and negative statements. But if he had defined them more exactly and more subtly, he would not define affirmation through an affirmative statement.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":291,"ref":"p291","source":"Nam si dubium est quid sit affirmatio, nihilo magis clarum atque perspicuum est quid sit affirmativa oratio.Idcirco quodsi quis nescit quid sit affirmatio,idem sinedubio nesciturus est quid oratio sit affirmativa.Sed idcirco hic indulgentius terminavit, quod in libro Hepi £lat utriusque veram plenamque vim diffinitionis aptavit.Eadem quoque in his ratio est quæ sunt sub affirmatione et negatione,quae in his quæ sub privatione atque habitu ponebantur,nam sicut non est idem habitus atque privatio quod habere habitum atque privari,ita non idem est affirmationem et negationem esse quod est sub affirmatione et negatione. Affirmatio est, verbi gratia,sedetSocrates, negatio vero, non sedet Socrates.Sub afrmatione autem hoc ipsum sedere Socratem, id est hoc quod sub affirmatione dicit facere. Sub negatione vero non sedere Socratem, id est non facere id quod negatiosubmovet.Hocautem ita probatur, quod omnis affirmatio omnisque negatio oraticnes sunt,sicut eorum supradicta diffinitio determinatioque monstravit.Sedere autem et non sedere, id est facere et non facere, orationes non sunt, quod si affirmatio et negatio orationessunt,dicitur id quod sub affirmatione et negatione est,ea ipsa affirmatione et negatione distare.Sed in hoc servant illam quoque similitudinem quod eaipsa sim sunt opposita, quae secundum affirmationem negationemque dicuntur.","english":"For if it is doubtful what affirmation is, it is no more clear and evident what an affirmative statement is. Therefore, if anyone does not know what affirmation is, he will without doubt likewise not know what an affirmative statement is. But for this reason he defined it here more indulgently, because in the book On Interpretation he fitted the true and full force of the definition to both. The same reasoning also holds in the case of those things that are under affirmation and negation, as in those that were placed under privation and habit. For just as habit and privation are not the same as to have a habit and to be deprived, so it is not the same for affirmation and negation to exist as for what is under affirmation and negation. For example, affirmation is \"Socrates sits,\" but negation is \"Socrates does not sit.\" Under affirmation, however, is this very thing, that Socrates sits, that is, to do this which the affirmation says. Under negation, however, is that Socrates does not sit, that is, not to do what the negation removes. But this is proved thus: that every affirmation and every negation are statements, as their above-stated definition and determination showed. But to sit and not to sit, that is, to do and not to do, are not statements. But if affirmation and negation are statements, that which is under affirmation and negation is said to differ from affirmation and negation themselves. But in this they also preserve that likeness, that those very things are opposites which are said according to affirmation and negation.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":292,"ref":"p292","source":"Sicut enim ipsa affirmatio quae dicit, sedet Socrates, et quai dicit, non sedet Socrates, ita quoque idipsum quod est sedere Socratem, et non sedere, certa ratione similitudinisopponuntur.Sed quoniam quatuor species oppositionis dictae sunt, nunc Aristotelis vestigia persequentes,earum diffe. rentias colligamus,quae sunt numero sex: nam si quae res sint quatuor,easque differre a se ac distare volumus, sex solas differentias invenimus. Cum enim primam differre a secunda ac tertia atque quarta ponimus, tres sunt differentiae.Item secundam rem a prima re differreostendere atque demonstrare superfluum est. Cum enim primae rei ad secundam distantiam colligeremus, quid secundadistaret a prima docuimus. Relicta igitur primae ad secundam rem differentia, secundæ et tertias, item i■m.x1Jsecundae quartaeque Qmerentlæ monstrabuntur,quæ sunt duac,quae tribus superioribus junctae quinque solas efficiunt. Restat tertiae rei quartaeque distantia.Nam primae aj secundam atquetertiamdemonstrata est discrepantia, cum prima a secunda distaret, atque eodem modo a tertia monstrabamus. Idhis probalurexemplis.Nam cum oppositio ea quae est secundum ad aliquid,abhis oppositionibusquae sunt secundum contrarietatem, privationem atque habitum,atque affirmationem et negationem,distare proponitur, tres sunt differentiae.","english":"For just as the affirmation itself which says \"Socrates sits,\" and the one which says \"Socrates does not sit,\" so also the very fact of Socrates' sitting and not sitting are opposed by a definite relation of similarity. But since four species of opposition have been stated, now, following in Aristotle's footsteps, let us gather their differences, which are six in number; for if there are four things, and we wish them to differ and be distinct from one another, we find only six differences. For when we posit that the first differs from the second, third, and fourth, there are three differences. Again, to show and demonstrate that the second thing differs from the first is superfluous. For when we gathered the distance of the first thing from the second, we showed what the second differed from the first by. Therefore, leaving aside the difference of the first from the second thing, the differences of the second from the third, and likewise of the second from the fourth, will be shown, which are two; joined to the three above, they make only five. There remains the distance of the third thing from the fourth. For the discrepancy of the first from the second and third has been demonstrated, when the first differed from the second, and in the same way we showed it from the third. Let this be proved by examples. For when the opposition which is according to relation is proposed to differ from those oppositions which are according to contrariety, privation and habit, and affirmation and negation, there are three differences.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":293,"ref":"p293","source":"Cum vero ea quae secundum privationem atque habitum oppositio est, a contrariis et ab affirmatione negationeque discrepat, duae sunt differentiae, quae junctas superioribus quinque perficiunt. Idcirco enim quid distaret habitus atque privatio, ea oppositione quae relativa est praetermisimus, quoniam prius monstravimus quid relativa oppositio ab habitu privationeque differret; non est enim dubium aequam esse in utrisque differentiam, cum una ab alia discrepaverit. Restat una sola differentia, quae est contrariorum adaffirmationem scilicetet negationem; praetermissanamque est contrariornm differentia, de relativa scilicet et secundum habitum privationemque oppositione, quid haec superius a contrarietate distaret, monstratum est. Quare quoniam quot sunt horum differentiae cognitum est, ad sequentis operis ordinem veniamus.\n\nQuod autem privatio et habitus non sic opponuntur ut ad aliquid, manifestum est; neque enim dicitur hor. ipsum quod est oppositi, visus enim non est cæcitatis visus, nec alio nullo modo ad ipsum dicitur. Similiter autem neque caecitas, sed privatio quidem visus cæcitas dicitur, caecitas vero visus non dicitur. A mplius ad aliquid omnia, reciproce dicuntur, quare et cæcitas si esset eorum quat ad alequid sunt, utique converteretur ad illud ad quod dicitur, sed non convertitur, neque enim visus dicitur cæcitatis visus.","english":"But since the opposition that is according to privation and habit differs from contraries and from affirmation and negation, there are two differences which, joined to the five above, complete the number. For on that account we passed over in silence, in the case of the opposition that is relative, what distinguished habit and privation, because we showed earlier what the relative opposition differed from habit and privation; for there is no doubt that the difference in both cases is equal, since the one has been distinguished from the other. There remains one single difference, namely that of contraries in relation to affirmation and negation; for the difference of contraries has been passed over, since it has been shown above, concerning relative opposition and that according to habit and privation, how this differed from contrariety. Wherefore, since it is known how many differences there are of these, let us come to the order of the following work.\n\nBut that privation and habit are not opposed as relatives is manifest; for the very thing that is opposed is not said of something. For sight is not the sight of blindness, nor is it in any other way said in relation to it. Similarly, neither is blindness, but blindness is indeed said to be the privation of sight, while blindness is not said to be of sight. Moreover, all relatives are said reciprocally; wherefore, if blindness were among those things that are said in relation to something, it would certainly be converted to that in relation to which it is said, but it is not converted; for sight is not said to be the sight of blindness.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":294,"ref":"p294","source":"Et caetera quidem quae sunt differentia perspicue superius in contrariorum differentia relativaoppositione ante praemissa surt. Unam namque differentiam contrariorum relativorumque dixit esse, quod contraria non ita ut ea quae sunt ad aliquid converterentur. Neque enim quis pronuntiat malitiam bonitatis esse malitiam, neque bonitatem malitiae esse bonitatem, velut filium patris esse filium, rursusque patrem filii patrem. Eadem quoque et in his quae secundum privationem habitumque redduntur, dicitur differentia. Nam sicut ea quas sunt ad aliquid opposita, adversum semetipsa redduntur, et omnia ad opposita praedicantur, non eodem modo in habitu atque privatione est. Nullus enim dicit caecitatis esse visum, nec rursus visus esse caecitatem. Quocirca si ea quae sunt relativa ad opposita praedicantur, conversimque dicuntur( cum enim sit oppositus filio pater, pater filii dicitur, scilicet ad oppositum, rursusque convertitur ut patris filius appelletur) quoniam hoc in his quae sunt secundum privationem et habitum non dicitur. Neque enim cum sit visus oppositus caecitati, secundum privationem atque habitum dicitur visus caecitatis, id est nunquam secundum bane oppositionem aliquid oppositi praedicatur nequeconvertilur, neque enim diciturcaecitasvisus, recte privatio atque habitus non in eadem qua relatin, sed in alia specie numerata sunt.","english":"And the other differences that exist have been set out clearly above in the discussion of the difference between contraries and relative opposition. For he said that one difference between contraries and relatives is that contraries are not converted to one another as those things that are said in relation to something are. For no one pronounces malice to be the malice of goodness, nor goodness to be the goodness of malice, as a son is said to be the son of a father and again a father the father of a son. The same difference is also stated in those things that are rendered according to privation and habit. For just as opposed relatives are converted toward one another, and all are predicated in relation to their opposites, it is not the same way in habit and privation. For no one says that sight is the sight of blindness, nor again that sight is blindness. Wherefore, if relatives are predicated in relation to their opposites and are spoken convertibly (for since a father is opposed to a son, the father is said to be of the son, namely in relation to the opposite, and again it is converted so that he is called the father of the son), since this is not said in those things that are according to privation and habit — for neither, since sight is opposed to blindness, is sight said to be of blindness according to privation and habit, that is, nothing of the opposite is ever predicated or converted according to this opposition, nor is blindness said to be of sight — rightly privation and habit have been counted not in the same species as relatives, but in another.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":295,"ref":"p295","source":"Quod autem neque ut contraria opponuntur ea, quæ secundum pnvationem et habitum dicuntur, ex his manifestum est. Quorum enim contrariorum nihil est medium, necesse est in quibus nata sunt fieri, aut de quibus prædicantur, alterum ipsorum inesse semper, horum enim nihil frat mdium, quorum alterum necessarium erat inesse susceptibili, ut Languorem et sanitatem, et impar et par. Quorum vero aliquod est medium, nunquam necessitas est omni susceptibili inesse alterum, neque enim necesse est omne susceptibile candidum vel nigrum esse, neque frigidum, neque calidum, horum enim medium aliquid nihil prohibet esse, horum etiam erat aliquid medium, quorum non erat necessarium alterum inesse susceptibili, præterilla quibusnaturaliter unum inest, ut igni calidum esse, et nivi candidum. In his enim determinate necessarium est alterum inesse et non alterutrum, non enim possibile est ignem frigidum esse, neque nivem nigram. Quare omni quidem susceptibili non est necessarium Olerum eorum inesse, sed solum quibus naturaliter unum inest, his determinate unum, non alterutrum inesse contingit.","english":"That those things which are said according to privation and habit are not opposed as contraries is clear from this. For of those contraries of which there is no mean, it is necessary that one of them always be present in those things in which they are naturally able to come to be, or of which they are predicated; for of these there is no mean, one of which was necessarily present in the capable subject, as sickness and health, and odd and even. But of those of which there is some mean, there is never a necessity that one be present in every capable subject; for it is not necessary that every capable subject be white or black, nor cold nor hot, for nothing prevents there being some mean of these; and there was also some mean of those of which it was not necessary that one be present in the capable subject, except for those in which one is present naturally, as for fire to be hot and for snow to be white. For in these it is determinately necessary that one be present and not either one of the two; for it is not possible for fire to be cold, nor for snow to be black. Wherefore it is not necessary that one of these be present in every capable subject, but only in those in which one is present naturally; for these it happens that one determinately, not either one of the two, is present.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":296,"ref":"p296","source":"Prolixitatem textus idcirco contraxi quod et. ea ipsa quae dicuntur supra jamdictasunt, nec longior ordo possit aliquod creare fastidium, quod nos hac textus divisione sejunximus. Et prius quidem proponit ante oculos omnes inter se contrariorum differentias, quas ipse quantum potero brevissime commemorabo; ait enim contrariorum quae mediis carent semper alterum inesse ei quod illas contrarietates suscipere potest, ut aegritudo et sanitas, quoniam semper in animalis corpore repentur, et ea sine ullo est adversus suum contrarium medio. Idcirca omne corpus animalis semper aut aegrotat, aut sanum est, et semper alterum aut sanitatis aut ægritudinis inest ei quod has susoipitcontrarietates. Eorum vero contrariorum quae habent aliquam medietatem, non necesse est semper alterum inesse ei cui accidunt, ut album atque nigrum, cum sint utraquecontraria, quoniam habentaliquam medietatem, ut rubrum, veniunt autem semper in corpora, non necesse est omne corpus fieri, aut album aut nigrum, quoniam potest aliquandocontingere ut illa eorum medietas corpori cuilibet eveniat. Atque hoc ita est in iis quae medio non carent, quae ipsa mediata vocamus, exceptis his quibus una contrarietas est insita per naturam, ut nix alba est, ignis calidus. In his enim unam semper necesse est evenire non aliam, nec utrumlibet, sed diffinite unam.","english":"I have therefore compressed the prolixity of the text because those very things which are said have already been stated above, and a longer order could not create any weariness, which we have separated by this division of the text. And first indeed he sets before the eyes all the differences among contraries, which I myself shall recount as briefly as I can; for he says that of contraries which lack means, one is always present in that which can receive those contrarieties, as sickness and health, since they are always found in the body of an animal, and this is without any mean against its contrary. Therefore every body of an animal is always either sick or healthy, and always one of either health or sickness is present in that which receives these contrarieties. But of those contraries which have some mean, it is not necessary that one always be present in that to which they happen, as white and black, since both are contraries, because they have some mean, as red, and they always come upon bodies, yet it is not necessary that every body become either white or black, since it can sometimes happen that the mean between them befalls any body. And this is so in those which do not lack a mean, which we call mediate, except for those in which one contrary is implanted by nature, as snow is white, fire is hot. For in these it is always necessary that one occur and not the other, nor either one at random, but definitely one.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":297,"ref":"p297","source":"Id enim non venit in ignem, ut aliquando sit calidum, aliquando frigidum, aliquando vero quod horum medietas est tepidum, sed semper naturali calore succenditur; nec nix aliquando fit nigra, neo rursus rubea, nec ullis aliis coloribus permutatur, sed solum semper alba est. Cum haec ita sint, ea quae secundum habitum privationemque opponuntur, si et ab his contrariis distare monstrata sint quae mediis carent, et ab his quæ intra se quamdam medietatem qualitatis includunt, et ab his quoque quæ, cum mediata sint, tamen diffinite alicui insunt, perfecte, monstratum est ea quæ secundum habitum et privationem sunt a contrariis discrepare. Quare quid distent Aristotele teneamus auctore.\n\nIn privatione vero et habitu neutrum horurn quæ dicta sunt, verum est, neque enim semper susceptibili necessarium est alterum inesse corum. Quod enim nondum naturam habet ad videndum, neque cæcum, neque visum habens dicitur. Ideoque non erunt hæc talium contrariorum, quomm nihil est medium, sed neque quorum est medium, necessarium enim est omni susceptibili allerurn istorum inesse. Quando enim jam natumfueril ad habendum visum, tunc aut cæcum, aut habens visum dicetur, et horum non determinate alierum, sed alterufrum contingit,nonenimnecessarium est, vel cæcum, vel habens visum esae, sed quod contingit.","english":"For fire does not come to be such that it is sometimes hot, sometimes cold, and sometimes indeed tepid, which is the middle between these, but it is always kindled with its natural heat; nor does snow ever become black, nor again red, nor is it changed by any other colors, but is always only white. Since these things are so, those things which are opposed according to habit and privation, if it has been shown that they differ both from those contraries which lack middles, and from those which include within themselves a certain middle of quality, and also from those which, although they are mediated, nevertheless inhere definitely in some one thing, it has been perfectly shown that those things which are according to habit and privation differ from contraries. Wherefore let us hold, with Aristotle as author, in what way they differ.\n\nBut in privation and habit, neither of the things which have been said is true; for it is not necessary that one of them always be present in the susceptible subject. For what does not yet have the nature for seeing is said to be neither blind nor having sight. And therefore these will not belong to such contraries of which nothing is a middle, but neither to those of which there is a middle; for it is necessary that one of them be present in every susceptible subject. For when it has already been born to have sight, then it will be called either blind or having sight, and not one of these definitely, but either one happens to occur; for it is not necessary that it be either blind or having sight, but whatever happens.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":298,"ref":"p298","source":"In contrariis autem quibus medium est, nunquam necessarium fuit omni susceptibili alterum inesse, sed quibusdam, et his determinate unum, sed non quodcontingit, unde palam est quod secundumneutrum modum tanquam contraria, opposita sunt hæc, quas secundum privationem et habitum opponuntur.\n\nDat primo differentias quibus ea quae sunt secundum habitum et privationem opposita, ab iis quae sunt immediata contrariis distent. In his enim contrariis quas medium non habent, semper necesse est ipsorum alterum inesse ei quod his ipsis subjectum est. In habitu vero et privatione non ita est. Non enim semper quaelibet res aut habitum habet aut privationem, sed est tempus quando utrumque non habeat, ut catuli quibus nondum per naturam oculi patent. Illos enim nec habere habitum dicimus, quoniam non vident, nec privatos visu, quoniam parvuli adhuc visum per naturam habere non possunt Igitur horum quae sibi secundum privationem habitumquesunt opposita,non semperalterum subjecto inest eorum. Sed eorum quae sunt contraria immediata, id est medio carentia, semper alterum susceptibili inest. Distat igitureaquaesecundumhabitum et privationem est oppositio,iis quae secundum contraria putantur opponi. Sed quoniam sunt quaedam contraria quæ insunt alicui pernaturam, ut nivi album, igni calidum, corvo nigruta etiam ab his discrepat oppositio privationi:: habitus.","english":"In the case of contraries, however, which have a middle, it was never necessary that one of the two be present in every subject capable of receiving them, but [only] in certain ones, and in these determinately one, but not whichever happens. Hence it is clear that in neither way are these opposed as contraries, which are opposed according to privation and habit.\n\nHe first gives the differences by which those things that are opposed according to habit and privation differ from those that are immediate contraries. For in those contraries that have no middle, it is always necessary that one of them be present in that which is subject to these same contraries. In habit, however, and privation it is not so. For not always does any given thing either have a habit or have a privation, but there is a time when it has neither, as with puppies whose eyes are not yet open by nature. For we say that they neither have the habit, since they do not see, nor are they deprived of sight, since as little ones they cannot yet have sight by nature. Therefore, of those things that are opposed to each other according to privation and habit, one of them is not always present in the subject. But of those that are immediate contraries, that is, lacking a middle, one is always present in the subject capable of receiving it. Therefore the opposition that is according to habit and privation differs from those that are thought to be opposed according to contraries. But since there are certain contraries that are present in something by nature, as white in snow, hot in fire, black in a raven, the opposition of privation and habit differs also from these.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":299,"ref":"p299","source":"Ea enim quae pernaturam insunt, diffinita sunt,et nullo modo permutantur, ut est album nivi. Non enim nix aut alba aut nigra est, sed tantum alba, et corvus non aut albus aut niger, sed solum niger. In privatione vero et habitu una res esse non potest diffinita, sed semper aut privatio contingit, aut habitus, et hoc est quod ait, et horum non diffinite alterum, sed sut hoc, aut illud. Neque enim necesse est aui caecum esse, aut habentem visum diffinite subaudicndum est, catulus enim qui pernaturam nondum videt, aut habitum habiturus est, id est visum, aut eo privandus est, ut sit cæcus, sed non diffinite unum, sed aut hoc aut illud indiffinite contingit. Distat igitur haec oppositio his contrariis quae aliquibus per naturam immutabiliter accidunt. Restat igitur ut his contrariis quae mediata sunt hanc oppositionem differre doceamus. In illis enim non semper necesse erit contraria inesse subjecto, idcirco quod eorum medietates possint subjectis evenire substantiis, ut album vel nigrum quod non est alicui per naturam, sed tantum secundum accidens. Possunt enim utraque non esse in corporibus, quoniam his vel rubrum vel pallidum, quae sunt eorum medietates eveniunt. In privatione vero id et habitu non est. Quando enim poterit per naturam habere habitum, utrisque quæ ea suscipiunt, carere non possunt.","english":"For those things which are present by nature are determinate and are in no way changed, as being white is for snow. For snow is not either white or black, but only white, and a raven is not either white or black, but only black. In the case of privation and habit, however, a single determinate thing cannot exist, but always either privation or habit befalls, and this is what he says: and of these, not one determinately, but either this or that. For it is not necessary that one be blind or have sight—this must be understood as determinate—for a puppy that by nature does not yet see will either have the habit, that is sight, or be deprived of it, so as to be blind, but not determinately one, but either this or that falls out indeterminately. This opposition, therefore, differs from those contraries which befall certain things by nature immutably. It remains, then, that we show that this opposition differs from those contraries which have a middle. For in the case of those, it will not always be necessary that the contraries be present in the subject, for the reason that their middles can come to be in the underlying substances, as white or black, which is not for anything by nature, but only according to accident. For both can be absent from bodies, since red or pale, which are their middles, come to be in them. In the case of privation and habit, however, this is not so. For when it will be able by nature to have the habit, those things which receive them cannot lack both.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":300,"ref":"p300","source":"Catulus enim cum per naturam videre potuerit, aut habitum habere dicitur, et est videns, aut privationem, si fuerit caecus. Ita semper ab eo tempore quo illi per naturam utrumlibet habere concessum est, alterutrum retinebit, idest aut privationem retine, aut habitum.Quocirca si in hiscontrariis quae medio non carent, potest fieri ut utraque contraria in subjecto non sint, in privatione vero et habitu ab eo tempore quo per naturam potest utrumque retinere, fieri non potest nisi eorum habeat alterum,distant haec quoque mediata ab his quae secundum vim privalionisatqua habitus opponuntur. Sed ante monstratum est et his contrariis quae per naturam essent, et iis quae medio carerent, hanc oppositionem esse dissimilem. Recte igitur positum est privationis atque habitus oppositionem ab his quae opponuntur ut contraria, discrepare.\n\nAmplius in contrariis quidem existente susceptibili, possibile est in alterutrum. fieri mutationem, nisi alterum alicuinaturaliter insit, ut igni calidum esse: namque possibile est quod sanum est, languere, et candidum, nigrum fieri, et ex studioso, pravum, et ex pravo, studiosum possibile est fieri. Pravus enim ad meliores consuetudines deductus, et ad doctrinas, et si modicum aliquid proficiat ut melior sit. Si vero semet vel modicum crementum sumpserit, palam est quod aut perfecte mutabitur, aut satis mullum incrementum sumet.","english":"For a puppy, since it is able by nature to see, is said either to have a state and is seeing, or to have a privation, if it has been blinded. Thus always, from that time when it was granted to it by nature to have either one, it will retain one or the other, that is, it will retain either the privation or the state. Wherefore, if in those contraries which do not lack a middle term it can happen that both contraries are not in a subject, yet in privation and state, from that time when it is able by nature to retain either, it cannot happen that it does not have one of them, these mediate cases also differ from those which are opposed according to the force of privation or of state. But it was shown earlier that this opposition is dissimilar both to those contraries which are by nature and to those which lack a middle term. Rightly, therefore, it has been laid down that the opposition of privation and state differs from those which are opposed as contraries.\n\nFurthermore, in the case of contraries, when the subject is capable, a change into either one is possible, unless one of them is naturally present in something, as being hot is in fire. For what is healthy is able to fall sick, and what is white is able to become black, and from being studious one is able to become depraved, and from being depraved one is able to become studious. For a depraved person, when led to better habits and to teachings, even if he makes only a little progress, becomes better. But if he has taken even a little increase, it is clear that he will either be changed perfectly, or will take a sufficiently great increase.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":301,"ref":"p301","source":"Semper enim bene mobilior ad virtutem fiet, vel quodcunque crementum sumpserit Za principio. Quare verisimile est amplius eum sumere crementum, et hoc dum semper fit, perfecte in contrarium habitum restituetur, nisi forte tempore suspensum sit. Verum in privatione et habitu impossibile estmutationem in alterutrum fieri, sed ex habitu quidem in privationem fit mutatio, a privatione vero in habitum impossibile est neque enim qui cæcus factus est, rursus vidit, neque cum esset calvus, rursus comatus est factus, nec cum esset sine dentibus, dentes iterum orti sunt.\n\nAliam rursus contrariorum et hujus oppositionis quae secundum habitum privationemque dicitur, discrepantiam ponit. Ea enim quæ contraria sunt, possunt in alterna variatis vicibus permutari. Quod enim calidum est potest effici frigidum, rursusque quod frigidum est potest in caloris verti qualitatem. His tamen (ut dictum est) solis exceptis, quibus una quælibet res contrariorum naturaliter insita est, in his enim solis fieri non potest alterna mutatio: in his vero quae accidenter et non per naturam subjectis eveniunt,fit semper in contraria permutatio, ut ex sano aegrum, ex segro rursus sanum corpus efficitur animalis.","english":"For it will always become more readily changeable toward virtue, or whatever increase it has taken from the beginning. Wherefore it is likely that it takes a further increase, and while this continually happens, it will be perfectly restored into the contrary state, unless perhaps it has been suspended in time. But in privation and state it is impossible for a change to occur into either one of the two, but from state indeed a change occurs into privation, yet from privation into state is impossible; for neither did he who has become blind see again, nor when he was bald did he become hairy again, nor when he was without teeth did teeth grow again.\n\nHe again sets out another discrepancy of contraries and of this opposition which is called according to state and privation. For those things which are contraries can be changed into one another by alternating turns. For what is hot can be made cold, and again what is cold can be turned into the quality of heat. With these alone, however (as has been said), excepted, to which any one of the contraries is naturally implanted in a thing, for in these alone an alternating change cannot occur; but in those which happen accidentally and not by nature to their subjects, a change into contraries always occurs, as from healthy a sick body of a living being is made, and from sick again healthy.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":302,"ref":"p302","source":"Jam vero illud verum est, ex bono proclivior semper semita videtur ad malum, et facillima esse exprobitate admalitiampermutatio, quod Terentiano docetur exemplo: A labore proclivom ad libidinem.Sed quanquam difficilis sit transitus ad virtutes a turpitudine vitiorum,Aristoteles tamen fieri posse hunc transitum confirmat.Hujua enim philosopbi sententia est, virtutes non esse scientias,ut Socrates ait,neque ut Stoici naturaliter eas esse,sed discibiles, et per quamdam boni consueludinem hominum mentibus inseriri.Atque ideo si quis sit quibuslibet prioribus vitiis obnoxius, si eum melior sermo susceperit,etsapientium consuetudine confabulationeque comatur,aliquid ex ante actis vitiorum illecebris emendabitur, et sese aliquantulum exuet, et paululum liberior ad meliora procedet.Ita ut sit primo quidem minus malus, post vero non malus, deinde jam jamque aliquantulum bonus.Cuisi hujusmodiintensiofrequentissimefiat, nec parvitate temporis præveniatur,aut ei terminus mortis offecerit, non est dubium illum ex pessimo perprobasconsuetudiDesconfabulationesquesapientum,in perfectam virtutis habitudinem permutari.","english":"Now indeed that is true, that from good the path always seems more inclined toward evil, and that the change from uprightness to malice is very easy, as is taught by the example of Terence: from toil, prone to lust. But although the passage from the baseness of vices to virtues is difficult, Aristotle nevertheless confirms that this passage can come about. For it is the opinion of this philosopher that virtues are not forms of knowledge, as Socrates says, nor, as the Stoics hold, naturally present, but teachable, and implanted in human minds through a certain habituation to good. And therefore if anyone is liable to any former vices whatsoever, if a better discourse takes him up, and he is cultivated by the company and conversation of the wise, he will be corrected somewhat from the allurements of the vices previously committed, and will strip himself of them to some extent, and proceed a little more free toward better things. Thus he is at first indeed less evil, afterward not evil, then already and at length somewhat good. If an intensification of this kind occurs very frequently, and is not forestalled by shortness of time, or cut off by the limit of death, there is no doubt that he is changed from the worst, through the excellent habits and conversations of the wise, into a perfect state of virtue.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":303,"ref":"p303","source":"Est igitur ex bono in malum, et ex malo in bonum rursus permulatio,atque hoc quidem fit in contrariis.In habitu vero et privatione non fit, est namque permutatio,sed haec una tantum,nulla ratione sese convertens; ait enim: Ab habitu ad privationem permutatio,a privatione vero ad habitum impossibile est. Et hoc planissime docet exemplis. Quis enim unquam ex caeco factus est videns? quis aliquando calvus crinitus efficitur? cui amissis ætate dentibus rursus alii procreantur? Quare si in contrariis fit alterna mutatio,in privatione vero atque habitu non fit, distat haec oppositio ab ea scilicet oppositione quæ fit secundum contrarias qualitates.","english":"There is therefore a change from good to evil, and again from evil to good, and this indeed occurs in contraries. But in habit and privation it does not occur; for there is change, but this is only one way, in no way reversing itself. For he says: from habit to privation there is change, but from privation to habit it is impossible. And he teaches this most plainly by examples. For who was ever made seeing from blind? Who at any time becomes hairy from bald? For whom, when teeth are lost by age, are others again produced? Wherefore, if in contraries there is an alternating change, but in privation and habit there is not, this opposition differs from that opposition which occurs according to contrary qualities.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":304,"ref":"p304","source":"Quæcunque vero tanquam afftrmatio et negatio oppositasunt,palam est quod nullo prædictorum modorum opposita sunt In solis enim isti necessarium est semper aliud quidem eorum verum,aliud autem falsum esse,neque enim in contrariis necessarium est semper, alterum verum esse,alterum falsum,neque in ias quæ sunt ad aliquid,neque in habitu et privatione, ut sanitas et languor contraria sunt,et neutrum neque verum neque falsum est.Similiter duplum et dimidium tan-; quam relativa opposita sunt,et nOn est eorum alterum, neque verum,neque falsum,sed neque ea quæ secundum privationem et habitum dicuntur, sicut visus et cæcitas.Omnino autem eorum quæ secundum complexionem ullam dicuntur,nihil neque verum,neque falsum est porro, autem quae dicta sunt, sine complexione dicuntur.","english":"But whatever things are opposed as affirmation and negation, it is clear that they are opposed in none of the aforesaid ways. For in these alone it is necessary that one of them is always true and the other false. For neither in contraries is it necessary that one is always true and the other false, nor in those which are relative, nor in habit and privation, as health and sickness are contraries, and neither is true or false. Similarly, double and half are opposed as relatives, and neither of them is true or false; but neither are those which are said according to privation and habit, such as sight and blindness. In general, moreover, of those which are said according to any combination, nothing is true or false; but further, the things which have been said are said without combination.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":305,"ref":"p305","source":"Expositis his differentiis quibus vel contrariis relativa, vel privatio et habitus relativis, vel rursus privatio et habitus contrariis discreparent.,nunc sequitur quid his omnibus secundum affirmationem negationemque opposita distent,et dat signum proprium affirmationis et negationis, ut eas semper quæramus agnoscere,ut si qua sint quae hoc signo minime teneantur, ilia ab affirmationis negationisque oppositione differre dicamus.In affirmatione enim et negatione fieri non potest, ut si affirmatio vera sit, statim falsa negatio non sit; si negatio vera, aftirmatio mendacii nota carere possit,ut si quis dicat, Socrates ambulat, Socrates non ambulat. Si verum est Socratem ambulare,falsum est non ambulare, et rursus siverum est non ambulare,falsum est ambulare.Elanc autem veri falsique divisionem nullus unquam in aliis opp ositionibus poterit invenire.Namin his quai sunt ad aliquid non solum non est necesse oppositionem ipsam sibi verum falsumque dividere,sed in his nulla omnino neque veritas, neque falsitas invenitur.Si quis enim dicat hoc tantum, pater, vel rursus,filius, neque verum aliquid neque falsum pronuntiat. Et in contrariis quoque idem est,nam cum bono malum sit contrarium, si quis nominet bonum, et si quis rursus simpliciter pronuntiet malum,nulla in hac prædicatione neque falsitas, neque veritas est.","english":"These differences having been set out, by which either relatives are distinguished from contraries, or privation and habit from relatives, or again privation and habit from contraries, there now follows what those things opposed according to affirmation and negation differ in from all these, and he gives the proper mark of affirmation and negation, so that we always seek to recognize them, so that if there are any things that are not held by this mark, we may say that they differ from the opposition of affirmation and negation. For in affirmation and negation it cannot happen that if the affirmation is true, the negation is not immediately false; if the negation is true, the affirmation can be free of the mark of falsehood—as if someone says, Socrates walks, Socrates does not walk. If it is true that Socrates walks, it is false that he does not walk; and again, if it is true that he does not walk, it is false that he walks. But this division of true and false no one will ever be able to find in other oppositions. For in those things that are relative, not only is it not necessary that the opposition itself divide true and false between them, but in these no truth at all, nor falsehood, is found. For if someone says only this, father, or again, son, he pronounces nothing either true or false. And the same holds in contraries as well, for since evil is contrary to good, if someone names good, and if someone again simply pronounces evil, there is in this predication neither falsehood nor truth.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":306,"ref":"p306","source":"Eodem quoque se modo habet etiam in his quae secundum habitum privationemque dicuntur.Similiter enim nihil neque verum, neque falsum est, si quis visum nominet vel caecitatem,hoc autem idcirco evenit, quia omnia, quaecunque sunt, in quibus aut falsitas,aut veritas invenitur,secundum aliquam complexionem dicuntur. Ea vero quae simpliciter proferuntur, veri atque falsi prolatione carent,ut ipse ait,cum in principio omnia prædicamenta numeraret, dicens singula eorum quæ essent dicta in nulla affirmatione dici, quadam vero complexione inter se horum praedicamentorum veritatem falsitatemque gigni,de quibus Aristoteles edocuit præter complexionem aliquam in sermonibus veritatem falsitatemque inveniri non posse. Si quidam exemplo quoque hoc manifestum est. Si enim dixero, Socrates homo est, aut verum aut falsum est.Quod si boc tantum dicam Socrates, aut rursus, homo, nihil in eo neque veritatis neque falsitatisest.Quocircaquoniam omnis affirmatio cum complexione profertur, potest in ea, aut veritas, aut falsitas inveniri. Ea vero quae sunt ad aliquid simpliciter et sine ulla complexione dicuntur.Similiter autem et contraria,et ea quae sunt secundum habitum privationemque sibimet opposita, ut est pater filius,bonum malum,visus caecitas,qua; quomam sine complexione dicuntur (ubi autem complexio non est, illic nec falsitas neque veritas est.","english":"It is related in the same way also in those things which are spoken of according to habit and privation. For similarly nothing is either true or false, if someone names sight or blindness. This happens for the reason that all things whatsoever, in which either falsity or truth is found, are spoken of according to some combination. But those things which are uttered simply lack the expression of true and false, as he himself says, when at the beginning he enumerated all the categories, saying that each of them which were spoken is said in no affirmation, but by a certain combination of these categories among themselves truth and falsehood are generated, concerning which Aristotle taught that apart from some combination in words truth and falsehood cannot be found. If someone wishes, this is also made clear by an example. For if I say, Socrates is a man, it is either true or false. But if I say only Socrates, or again, man, there is in it nothing of either truth or falsehood. Wherefore, since every affirmation is brought forth with combination, in it either truth or falsity can be found. But those things which are relative are said simply and without any combination. Similarly also contraries, and those which are opposed to one another according to habit and privation, as are father and son, good and evil, sight and blindness, which, because they are said without combination (and where there is no combination, there is neither falsity nor truth).","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":307,"ref":"p307","source":"In affirmationibus vero solis et negationibus quas secundum complexionem dicuntur,aut veritas, aut falsitas reperitur, secundum affirmationem et negationem oppositio a cunctis aliis superioribus distat.\n\nSed maxime videbitur hoc tale contingere in his quæ secundum complexionem contraria dicuntur. Sanum namque esse Socratem,ad languere Socratem contrarium est, sed neque in his necessarium est alterum semper verum, alterum autem falsum esse,cum enim Socrates sit,erit illud qui'lem verum, illud vero falsum; cum vero non sit,arnbo falsa sunt, neque enim languere, neque sanum esse, verum est, cum non sit ipse Socrates omnino. In privatione vero et habitu cum non sit,neutrum verum est; cum vero sit,non semper erit alterum verum, alterum autem falsum. Habere namque visum Socratem ad id quod est Socratem crecum esse oppositum est, sicut privatio et habitus. Et cum sit, necessarium non est alterum verum vel falsum esse,cum enim nondum natus est habere,utraque falsa sunt; et cum non sit omnino Sor.rates,sic quoque falsa sunt ulraque,et visum eum habere,et cæcum esse.","english":"But in affirmations alone and negations which are called according to combination, either truth or falsity is found; the opposition according to affirmation and negation differs from all other superior oppositions.\n\nBut this sort of thing will seem to occur especially in those things which are called contraries according to combination. For Socrates to be healthy is contrary to Socrates to be sick, but not even in these is it necessary that one always be true and the other false. For when Socrates exists, the one will indeed be true and the other false; but when he does not exist, both are false, for neither to be sick nor to be healthy is true, since Socrates himself does not exist at all. In privation and habit, however, when he does not exist, neither is true; but when he exists, it will not always be that one is true and the other false. For Socrates to have sight is opposed to Socrates to be blind, as privation and habit. And when he exists, it is not necessary that one be true or false; for when he has not yet been born, both are false; and when Socrates does not exist at all, both are likewise false, both that he has sight and that he is blind.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":308,"ref":"p308","source":"Quoniam videntur quædam contraria secundum complexionem dici,in quibus aut falsitas reperitur aut veritas, sed neque ut affirmatio sit neque ut negatio,de his quoque dicit, quid distent his complexionibus, quae secundum affirmationem negationemque dicuntur. Nam sicut aegritudo est contraria sanitati, ita quoque aegrotum esse Socratem, ei quod est sanum esse contrarium est. Oratio quoque quae dicit Socrates sanus est, contraria est ei quae pronuntiat Socrates aegrotat. In his ergo et veritas invenituret falsitas.Quod igitur haec distant ea oppositione quae secundum vim affirmationis aut negationis opponitur,boc scilicet quod subsistente re,de qua utraque dicuntur,utrumlibet eorum verum est, si tamen ea contraria praedicantur,quae mediis carent, nam vivente et subsistente Socrate,quoniam aegritudo et sanitas immediata contraria sunt,si quis de Socrate dicat: Socrates sanus est, rursusque alius pronuntiet: Socrates cegrotat, unam veram, unam falsam esse necesse est.","english":"Since certain contraries seem to be spoken of according to combination, in which either falsity or truth is found, but neither so as to be an affirmation nor a negation, he also speaks about these, namely in what way they differ from those combinations which are spoken of according to affirmation and negation. For just as sickness is contrary to health, so too for Socrates to be sick is contrary to his being healthy. Also the statement which says \"Socrates is healthy\" is contrary to the one which declares \"Socrates is sick.\" In these, therefore, both truth and falsity are found. But that these differ from the opposition which is opposed according to the force of affirmation or negation is clear from this, namely that when the thing of which both are said subsists, either one of them is true, if only those contraries are predicated which lack intermediates. For while Socrates lives and subsists, since sickness and health are immediate contraries, if someone says of Socrates \"Socrates is healthy,\" and again another declares \"Socrates is sick,\" one must be true and the other false.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":309,"ref":"p309","source":"Socrates enim vivens aut aegrotataut sanus est,et si verum esteum ægrotare,sanum esse falsumest,et si falsum esteegrotare, sanum esse verum est; si vero Socrates ipse non subsistat nequeomnino sit,utrumque de eo falsum est dicere,quoniam aegrotat et sanus est.Qui enim omnino non est,neque omnino poterit aegrotus esse nec sanus.Ergo in contrariis subsistente re de quapraedicantur,semperunapraedicatio veraest,alia falsa,in his scilicet contrariic nrp ppcundum complexionem dicuntur et carri: •':: subsistente autem re, contrarietates utræque sunt falsæ. Illa vero quae secundum privationem habitumquedicuntur, si cum complexione praedicentur, et subsistat res,non necesse est aliam veram esse,aliam falsam, et cum res omnino non sit,utræque sunt falsæ.Socrates enim cum sit jam in suæ matris alvo,et nondum sit genitus in lucem quidem editus non est,ipse tamen est atque vivit,sed tunc neque videns est neque cæcus,et videns quidem non est; quoniam nondum in lucem est editus. Caecus vero idcirco non dicitur, quoniam adhuc videre non poterat. Ergo cum siL alque subsistat res de qua habitua et privatio prædicantur, potest fieri ut de ea falsa utraque praedicentur; si vero res de qua dicitur non sit,omnino utrasque falsas esse necesse est,ut cum Socrates omnino non est, falsum est eum dicere vel videntem esse vel caecum.","english":"For if Socrates is alive, he is either sick or healthy; and if it is true that he is sick, it is false that he is healthy; and if it is false that he is sick, it is true that he is healthy. But if Socrates himself does not subsist or exist at all, it is false to say either of him, since he is sick and healthy. For one who does not exist at all can neither be sick nor healthy at all. Therefore, in the case of contraries, when the thing of which they are predicated subsists, one predication is always true and the other false—namely, in those contraries which are spoken of according to combination. But when the thing does not subsist, both contrarieties are false. However, those things which are spoken of according to privation and habit, if they are predicated with combination and the thing subsists, it is not necessary that one be true and the other false; and when the thing does not exist at all, both are false. For when Socrates is already in his mother's womb and has not yet been brought forth into the light—indeed, he has not been born—he nevertheless exists and lives, but at that time he is neither seeing nor blind; and he is not seeing, because he has not yet been brought forth into the light. But he is not called blind for the reason that he was not yet able to see. Therefore, even if the thing of which habit and privation are predicated subsists, it can happen that both are predicated falsely of it; but if the thing of which it is said does not exist, it is entirely necessary that both be false, as when Socrates does not exist at all, it is false to say that he is either seeing or blind.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":310,"ref":"p310","source":"Ille enim videt atque caecus est qui vivit atque subsistit, cum vero de quo diciturnon sit omnino,utraque de eo falso dicuntur. In catulis quoqueidem est,nam cum jam sunt editi, subsistunt quidem; sed neque cæci sunt neque videntes, quia nondum per naturam visum habere potuerunt. Sin vero omnino non sint, rursus falsum est de his utrumque prædicari.In affirmatione vero et negatione non ita est, ut ipse pronuntiat.\n\nIn affirmatione vero etnegationesemper siue sil,sive non sit, aliud quidem verum erit, aliud vero falsum, languere namque Socratem et non languere Socratem, cum ipse sit palamest,quia alterum eorum verum,alterum vero falsum est, et cum non sit, simitiler; languere enim cum non sit,falsum est,non languere aulem uerum. Quare in his solis proprium erit, semper alterum eorum verum, alterum falsum esse,quæcunque tanquam affirmatio et negatio opposita sunt.","english":"For he who lives and subsists both sees and is blind, but when that of which it is predicated does not exist at all, both are said falsely of it. The same holds in the case of puppies, for when they have already been born, they indeed subsist; but they are neither blind nor seeing, because they have not yet been able by nature to have sight. But if they do not exist at all, again it is false that either is predicated of them. In affirmation and negation, however, it is not so, as he himself declares.\n\nIn affirmation and negation, always, whether it exists or does not exist, one will be true and the other false. For that Socrates is sick and that Socrates is not sick, when he himself is evident, is clear, because one of them is true and the other false; and when he does not exist, similarly: for that he is sick, when he does not exist, is false, but that he is not sick is true. Wherefore in these alone it will be proper that always one of them is true and the other false, whatever are opposed as affirmation and negation.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":311,"ref":"p311","source":"In affirmatione,inquil,et negationesiveressubjecta subsistat,sive non sit omnino,semper in una veritas,in aJiafalsitas inveniuntur.Non esseenim idem dicere aegrotare aliquem quod non esse sanum,nec idem caecum esse quod non videre perspicacissime docet. Nam qui segrotat nisi subsistat non potest eegrotare. Non esse autem sanum,non ita est, nam etiamsi non sit omnino aliquis,potest de eo qui non est haec negatio praedicari. Quod enim omnino non est,sanum esse non potest,quodsanumessenon potest non est utique sanum.Eodem quoque modo est et de caecitate et de visu, neque enim idem est dicere cæcum esse aliquem quod non videre; qui enim cæcus est, subsistit vivitque, ut sit caecus, non videre vero eLiam de omnino non subsistente dici potest. Qui enim non subsistit omnino videre non potest,et qui videre non potest non videt.Quocircain affirmatione et negatione sive sit de quo dicitur, sive non sit, una semper vera est,altera falsa. Nam cum sit Socrates et vivat, si de eo verum est dicere, quoniam videt,falsum est dicere,quoniam non videt, et si de eo verum est dicere, quoniam sanus est, falsum est dicere de eo quoniam non. est sanus. 6i negationes verae sunt, falsae sunt affirmationes. Si vero res subjecta non subsistat omnino, de ea quidem affirmatio falsa est, negatio semper vera.","english":"In affirmation, he says, and in negation, whether the subject subsists or does not exist at all, one is always found to be true and the other false. For he teaches most clearly that to say someone is sick is not the same as to say he is not healthy, nor is to be blind the same as not to see. For one who is sick cannot be sick unless he subsists. But not to be healthy is not so, for even if someone does not exist at all, this negation can be predicated of him who does not exist. For what does not exist at all cannot be healthy, and what cannot be healthy is certainly not healthy. In the same way it holds also concerning blindness and sight, for to say someone is blind is not the same as not to see; for one who is blind subsists and lives, so that he may be blind, but not to see can be said even of one who does not subsist at all. For one who does not subsist at all cannot see, and one who cannot see does not see. Wherefore in affirmation and negation, whether that of which it is said exists or does not exist, one is always true and the other false. For when Socrates exists and lives, if it is true to say of him that he sees, it is false to say that he does not see, and if it is true to say of him that he is healthy, it is false to say of him that he is not healthy. If the negations are true, the affirmations are false. But if the subject does not subsist at all, the affirmation concerning it is indeed false, and the negation is always true.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":312,"ref":"p312","source":"Nostro enim tempore cum Socrates non est neque subsistit, si quis dicat Socrates videt, et alius dicat Socrates non videt, laisum quidem est de eo dicere, quoniam videt, verum autem quoniam non videt. Qui enim omnino non est, videre non potest,qui videre non potest,non videt. Ita firmum immutabileque semper manet in affirmationibus et negationibus alteram semper veram,alteram falsam in praedicatione constitui.Quocirca quoniam in contrariisetin iisquae secundum privationem babitumque sunt,si cum complexione utraque dicantur de re non subsistente,falsasunt utraquequaepraedicantur.Cum hoc idem in affirmationibus et negationibus non sit,omnes cæteræ oppositiones ab affirmatione etnegatione dissentiunt.Monstratgesuntigituroppostiones quatuor et sex differentiae: una quidem contrariorum et ejus quæ est ad aliquid; secunda contrariorum et eorum quæ sunt secundum babitum et privationem; tertia contrariorum et ejus oppositionis quas est secundum affirmationem et negationem; quarta relativorum et ejus quae est secundum habitum et privationem; quintarelativorum et ejus quæ est affirmationisetnegationis; sexta privationis et habitus ad negationem etaffirmationem.Sed post has oppositionum differentias quaedam decontrariis ad multasproficientia quaestionesabAristoteles traduntur.","english":"For in our time, when Socrates does not exist and does not subsist, if one person says \"Socrates sees\" and another says \"Socrates does not see,\" it is false indeed to say of him that he sees, but true that he does not see. For he who does not exist at all cannot see, and he who cannot see does not see. Thus it remains firm and immutable that in affirmations and negations one is always true and the other false in predication. Wherefore, since in contraries and in those things which are according to privation and habit, if both are said with combination concerning a thing that does not subsist, both of the things predicated are false. Since this is not the same in affirmations and negations, all the other oppositions differ from affirmation and negation. There are therefore, he shows, four oppositions and six differences: one indeed of contraries and of that which is relative; the second of contraries and of those which are according to habit and privation; the third of contraries and of that opposition which is according to affirmation and negation; the fourth of relatives and of that which is according to habit and privation; the fifth of relatives and of that which is of affirmation and negation; the sixth of privation and habit in relation to negation and affirmation. But after these differences of oppositions, certain things concerning contraries, useful for many questions, are handed down by Aristotle.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":313,"ref":"p313","source":"Contrarium autem est bono quidem ex necessitate malum, hoc autem palam est persinguloruminductionem,ut sanitati languor,etjustitiæ injustitia,et fortitudini timiditas, similiter autem et in aliis.Malo autem aliquando bonum quidem est contrariumyaliquando autem malum, egestati enim, cum sit malum superabundantia contraria est, cum etiam ipsa sit malum. Similiter autem et mediocritas contraria utrique cum sit, bonum est, sed in paucis hoc tale quispiam inspiciet, in pluribus vero semper malo bonum contrarium est.\n\nHoc loco monstratur quod omne bonum semper malo contrarium est, non autem omni malo semper bonum, nam quodcunque fuerit bonum, solum illi malum contrarium est,malo autem et bonum potest esse contrarium et malum. Sanitati enim quaebona est, aegritudo quae est mala, contraria est. Rursus felicitati quae est bona, infelicitas quae ipsa quoque est mala, contraria est. Est autem invenire malum quod duashabetcontrarietates, boni scilicet alterius mali.","english":"But to good, evil is necessarily contrary, and this is evident by induction in individual cases, as sickness to health, injustice to justice, and cowardice to courage, and similarly in other cases. But to evil, sometimes good is contrary and sometimes evil; for to poverty, since it is evil, abundance is contrary, since it too is evil. Similarly also the mean, since it is contrary to both, is good, but in few cases will anyone observe such a thing, whereas in most cases good is always contrary to evil.\n\nIn this place it is shown that every good is always contrary to evil, but not to every evil is good always contrary; for whatever good there is, only evil is contrary to it, but to evil both good can be contrary and evil. For to health, which is good, sickness, which is evil, is contrary. Again, to happiness, which is good, unhappiness, which is itself also evil, is contrary. But it is possible to find an evil that has two contrarieties, namely of another good and of another evil.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":314,"ref":"p314","source":"Nam cum ea sunt contraria quae a se plurimum distent,cum sit timiditas habitus animi pessimus,duas habet contrarielates, temeritatem scilicet et fortitudinem,nam qui omnia timetetest timidus, et qui nibil timet omnino in quo esttemeritas,longe a sese distant et discrepant, quocirca sibi contraria sunt, cum utraque sint mala.Rursus quoniam bonum malo contrarium, et fortitudo bona est, timiditas mala erit, et erit fortitudini contraria oppositaque timiditas.Duæ igitur contrarietates opponuntur timiditati, temeritas et fortitudo; sed temeritas contraria estsecundum Jongissimam distantiam quantitatemque discrepantis habitus atque contrarii. Timiditas vero fortitudini videtur opposita,secundum qualitatem bonitatis atque malitiae. Quare sufficienter est demonstratum bona semper malis esse contraria, mala vero etiam malis. Inductio autem est singulorum exemplorum collectio, etaduniversalem per ea cognitionem collectionemque reductio, ut si quis dicat qui musicam novit musicus est,et ab ea denominatur, et medicus qui medicinam,rursus qui grammaticam grammaticus,et ex his singulis rebuscolligat universaliter,etquicunquealiquamartem novit ejusdem denominatione signatur. uta grammatica grammaticus, a medicina medicus, et caetera hujusmodi. Quocirca hoc quod supra diximus de contrariis, Aristoteles exemplorum planissima inductione firmavit.","english":"For since those things are contrary which differ most from each other, and since cowardice is the worst habit of mind, it has two contrarieties, namely rashness and courage. For the one who fears everything is cowardly, and the one who fears nothing at all, in whom there is rashness, are far distant and different from each other; wherefore they are contrary to each other, since both are evil. Again, since good is contrary to evil, and courage is good, cowardice will be evil, and cowardice will be contrary and opposed to courage. Therefore two contrarieties are opposed to cowardice, rashness and courage; but rashness is contrary according to the longest distance and the quantity of a differing and contrary habit. But cowardice seems opposed to courage according to the quality of goodness and malice. Wherefore it has been sufficiently demonstrated that good things are always contrary to evil things, but evil things also to evil things. But induction is the collection of individual examples, and a reduction to universal knowledge and collection through them, as if someone should say that the one who knows music is a musician, and is denominated from it, and a physician who knows medicine, again a grammarian who knows grammar, and from these individual things he should collect universally that whoever knows any art is designated by its denomination, as a grammarian from grammar, a physician from medicine, and other such things. Wherefore what we said above about contraries, Aristotle confirmed by the clearest induction of examples.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":315,"ref":"p315","source":"Illud quoque addidit mala posse malis esse contraria,in paucissimis inveniri, semper autom mala bonis esse contraria.Nam et in hie ipsis in quibus mala malis contraria sunt, inest tamen ut etiam simul bonis contraria esse videantur,uttimiditas, quoniam temeritati contraria est, simul est etiam fortitudini contraria. Sed non necesse est, ut quodcunquemalum bonoest contrarium,mox etiam mali esse contrarium, ut aegritudo sanitati quidem, quod est bonum contraria est, alii vero malo contraria non est. Recte igitur dictum est, malum malo contrarium in paucioribus inveniri.\n\nAmplius contrarium non necessarium est,si alterum sit, et reliquum esse. Sanis namque omnibus, sanitas quidemerit, languor vero non erit.Similiter autem si omnes albi sint, albedo quidem erit, nigredo vero non erit. Amplius si Socratem esse sanum, ad id quoa est Socratem languere contrarium est, cum non sit possibile utrumque eidem inesse simul, non erit possibile, cum alterum contrarium sit, et reliquum esse; cum enim hocalterumcontrariumsityet reliquum esse; cum enim hoc sit,Socratem sanum esse,non erit illud languere Socratem.","english":"He also added this: that evils can be contrary to evils is found in very few cases, but that evils are always contrary to goods. For even in those very cases in which evils are contrary to evils, it is nevertheless inherent that they also seem at the same time to be contrary to goods, as timidity, since it is contrary to rashness, is at the same time also contrary to courage. But it is not necessary that whatever evil is contrary to a good should presently also be contrary to an evil, as sickness is indeed contrary to health, which is a good, but is not contrary to another evil. Rightly, therefore, it was said that an evil is found to be contrary to an evil in fewer cases.\n\nMoreover, it is not necessary that if one contrary exists, the other also exists. For if all are healthy, health indeed will exist, but sickness will not. Similarly, if all are white, whiteness indeed will exist, but blackness will not. Moreover, if Socrates is healthy, to this, that Socrates is healthy, being sick is contrary, since it is not possible for both to be present in the same thing at the same time; it will not be possible, when one contrary exists, for the other also to exist; for when this one contrary exists, that Socrates is healthy, that other, that Socrates is sick, will not exist.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":316,"ref":"p316","source":"Dictum est in relatione, quaedam relativa simul esse naturaliter, ut cum sit filius, pater est, cum verositpater,sine filio esse non posse. Quocirca simul semper sunt pater et filius,hoc vero in contrariis non est. Ait enim non necesse est simul semper esse contraria. Si enim nullus aegrotet et sint omnes sani, cum sit sanitas, non erit ægritudo,et una contranetate manente, alia omnino non ent, ut si quis hoc idem dicat de cygnis, etenim omnes cygni sunt albi, in cygnis nigredo non erit.Atque hoc idem ad universalia referendum est.Nam si omnia quae sunt alba sunt, omnino nigredo non erit. Tractum autem hoc videturessesigillatimapartibus.Nam quod duo contraria in eodem uno eodemque tempore esse non possunl,ut Socrates cum sanus est,ægrotus non est, et cum sanus est, manente sanitate, non esse poterit aegritudo. Et non erit necessarium uno contrario posito,moxsubsequi alterum. Nam si necesse esset uno contrario constituto, mox aliquid sequi,posset idem Socrates uno eodemque tempore, et sanus esse et aeger, quod fieri non potest. Non est igitur necesse cum sit una contrarietas mox aliam sequi. Quocirca fieri potest ut cum unum contrarium sit, aliud non sit. Idque in singularlbus etiam necesse est, ut in eo quod est Socratem esse sanum, non est Socratem aegrotare, quod Socratis sanitati est contrarium.","english":"It was said in the discussion of relation that certain relatives are naturally simultaneous, as when there is a son, there is a father, and when there is a father, he cannot be without a son. Therefore father and son are always simultaneous, but this is not the case with contraries. For he says that it is not necessary for contraries always to be simultaneous. For if no one is sick and all are healthy, while health exists, sickness will not exist, and with one contrary remaining, the other will not exist at all, as if someone should say the same thing about swans: for all swans are white, so in swans there will be no blackness. And this same point must be referred to universals. For if all things that exist are white, there will be no blackness at all. But this seems to be drawn from particular parts. For two contraries cannot be in the same one and the same time, as when Socrates is healthy, he is not sick, and when he is healthy, with health remaining, sickness cannot exist. And it will not be necessary that when one contrary is posited, the other immediately follows. For if it were necessary that when one contrary is established, something immediately follow, the same Socrates could at one and the same time be both healthy and sick, which cannot happen. Therefore it is not necessary that when one contrariety exists, another immediately follows. Wherefore it can happen that while one contrary exists, the other does not. And in singulars this is even necessary, as in the case that Socrates is healthy, Socrates is not sick, which is contrary to Socrates' health.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":317,"ref":"p317","source":"Socrates enim quanquam contrariorum susceptibilis sit,quoniam substantiaest,tamen uno eodemque tempore contraria utraque non suscipit.\n\nPalam vero est quod et circa idem aut specie aut genere natura habent fieri contraria: langiiornamque et sanitas in corpore animalis natura habent fieri,albedo autem et nigredo simpliciter in corpore.justitia vero in anima hominis et injustitia.\n\nDocet circa quae semper possint esse contraria. Ait enim circa eas res quae aut genere eadem sint, aut specie, ut est corpus quidem animalis unum secundum genus, omnium enim animalium unum genus est, et circa hoc ægritudo vel sanitas invenitur. Similiter et circa corpus omne indiscrete, vel anim alis vel inanimati, albedo et nigredo est, quod scilicet omne corpus etipsum secundum genus est,unum, namque his genus est substantia.Justitia quoque et injustitia in anima est. Omnis autem anima quae justitiam injustiliamque suscipit,rationalis est,id est hominis; sed omnes homines idem sunt secundum speciem,omnes igituranimae eædem secundum speciem sunt; justitia ergo et injustitia circa easdem res secundum speciem reperiuntur. Quocirca recte jam conclusum est, omnia contraria circa easdem res vel secundum genus, vel secundum speciem inveniri.","english":"For although Socrates is capable of receiving contraries, since he is a substance, nevertheless he does not receive both contraries at one and the same time.\n\nBut it is clear that contraries naturally come to be also around the same thing either in species or in genus: for sickness and health naturally come to be in the body of an animal, while whiteness and blackness come to be simply in body; but justice and injustice in the soul of a man.\n\nHe teaches around what things contraries can always exist. For he says that they are around those things which are either the same in genus or the same in species, as the body of an animal is indeed one according to genus—for there is one genus of all animals—and around this sickness or health is found. Similarly, also around every body without distinction, whether animate or inanimate, there is whiteness and blackness, inasmuch as every body is also itself one according to genus, for substance is their genus. Justice also and injustice are in the soul. But every soul that receives justice and injustice is rational, that is, the soul of a man; but all men are the same according to species, therefore all souls are the same according to species; justice therefore and injustice are found around the same things according to species. Wherefore it has now been rightly concluded that all contraries are found around the same things either according to genus or according to species.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":318,"ref":"p318","source":"Necessarium est autem omnia contrariavelin eodem generefesse, vel in contrariis generibus esse vel ipsa genera esse. Album enim et nigrum in eodem genere sunt,cotor enim genus eorum est; justitia vero et injustitia in contrariis generibus, illius enim virtus,hujus autem nequitia genus est. Bonum vero et malum non sunt in genere, sed ipsa sunt genera aliquorum existentia.\n\nMonstrat id quod reliquum est, id est ubi possunt semper contraria vestigari, omnia enim quae sunt contraria, aut sub eodem genere sunt,aut sub contrariis generibus, aut ipsa sunt genera. Sub eodem genere sunt contraria, ut album et nigrumsub uno genere, id est colore, color enim albedinis et nigredinis est genus.Hæc igitur sub uno sunt genere.Alia vero contraria in contrariis generibus inveniuntur, ut justitia et injustitia. Justitias enim genus est bonum, injustitiae vero malum, malum vero bono contrarium est, justitiæ ergo et injustitiasub contrariis generibus sunt. Rursus alia ipsa sunt genera,ut bonum et malum,utraquesuntgenera sub se malorum bonorumque positorum,et non hoc nunc dicitur quod bonitas et malitia nulIi alii generi subduntur,ponuntur enim sub qualitate. Sed particularium bonorum et malorum non essealiagenera, nisi ipsum bonum et malum generaliter.","english":"It is necessary, however, that all contraries be either in the same genus, or in contrary genera, or themselves be genera. For white and black are in the same genus, for color is their genus; but justice and injustice are in contrary genera, for virtue is the genus of the one, and wickedness of the other. But good and evil are not in a genus, but are themselves genera, existing as genera of certain things.\n\nHe shows what remains, that is, where contraries can always be traced. For all things that are contraries are either under the same genus, or under contrary genera, or are themselves genera. Contraries are under the same genus, as white and black under one genus, that is, color, for color is the genus of whiteness and blackness. These, therefore, are under one genus. But other contraries are found in contrary genera, as justice and injustice. For the genus of justice is good, but of injustice, evil; and evil is contrary to good. Justice and injustice, therefore, are under contrary genera. Again, others are themselves genera, as good and evil, both of which are genera placed under themselves of evils and goods. And it is not said here that goodness and malice are subject to no other genus, for they are placed under quality. But [it is said] that there are no other genera of particular goods and evils except good and evil itself in general.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":319,"ref":"p319","source":"Recte igitur bonum et malum aliorumparticulariumbonorum,malorumquegenera sunt numerata.Quare rectissime dictum est omnia contraria, aut sub eodem esse genere, ut album at nigrum sub colore, aut in contrariis generibus, ut justitia atqueinjustitia sub bono et malo, aut ipsa esse gcnera,ut est ipsum bonum et malum,quaegenera justitiae atque injustitiae numerata sunt.\n\nDE MODIS PRIORIS.\n\nPrius autem alterum altero dicitur quadrupliciter: primo quidem et maxime proprie secundum tempus, secundum quod antiquius alterum altero et senius dicitur,in eo enim quod tempus amplius est, et antiquius, et senius dicitur.\n\nPostquam vero deoppositis disputationem quantum ad praesens tempus attinebat explicavit, nunc. quae priora dici possint, quae posteriora disserit. Et ait,primo quidem et proprie, et quod in usu prius dicimus, hoc est quando aliquam rem alia res tempore præcedit, et superat, et dum proprie loquimur secundum temporis præcessionem,aliud antiquius dicimus, aliud senius. Antiquius quidem in iis quae inanimata sunt, ut Porphyriu placet, se.nius vero in iis quae anima non carent: ut si quis dicat antiquius fuisse bellum Thebanorum atque Graecorum Trojae excidio, idcirco quod tempore praecedat,fnii namque ducum qui Thebano perire prælio, TrojaB praeliis interfuerunt, ut Diomedes Tydaei filius, et Stenelus filius Capanei.","english":"Rightly, therefore, good and evil are counted as the genera of the other particular goods and evils. Wherefore it has been most rightly said that all contraries are either under the same genus, as white and black under color, or in contrary genera, as justice and injustice under good and evil, or are themselves genera, as good itself and evil itself, which have been counted as the genera of justice and injustice.\n\nON THE MODES OF THE PRIOR.\n\nBut one thing is said to be prior to another in four ways: first indeed and most properly according to time, according to which one thing is said to be more ancient and older than another; for in that which has more time, it is said to be both more ancient and older.\n\nAfter he has explained the discussion concerning opposites, as far as pertained to the present time, he now discusses what things can be called prior and what posterior. And he says, first indeed and properly, and what we call prior in usage, that is, when one thing precedes and surpasses another in time, and while we speak properly according to precedence of time, we call one thing more ancient, another older. More ancient indeed in those things which are inanimate, as it pleases Porphyry, but older in those things which are not deprived of life: as if someone should say that the war of the Thebans was more ancient than the destruction of Troy, for the reason that it precedes in time; for the sons of the leaders who perished in the Theban war were present at the Trojan wars, as Diomedes the son of Tydeus, and Sthenelus the son of Capaneus.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":320,"ref":"p320","source":"Atque hoc quidem ita, quoniamest etin rebus inanimatis quod antiquius dicitur,utcum dicimus antiquiorem esse dominationem regum in civitate Romana,quam consulum et magistratuum.In rebus vero animatis penius vocamus. Seniorem namque dicimus Pytbagoram Socrate, Socratem Aristotele,idcirco quod se temporibusantecedant.Ergoprius alterum altero dicitur proprie secundum tempus, prioris autem quatuor fuere distantiae, ut ipse Aristoteles dicit, cum ait:Priusalterum altero dicitur quadrupliciter. Easque sigillatim breviter enumerat, ad quas ipse addidit quintam, quae priscis philosophis esset incognita. Et quoniam de primo prioris modo dictum est, de secundo dicemus.\n\nSecundo autem quod non convertitur secundum subsistendi consequentiam, ut unum duobus prius est: duobus enim existentibus, mox consequens est unum esse, uno autem existente, non est necessarium duo esse. Idcirco non convertitur ab uno consequentia, ut sit reliquum,prius autem videtur illud esse a quo non convertitur essendi consequentia.","english":"And this is so, since even in inanimate things there is what is called prior, as when we say that the rule of kings in the Roman state is prior to that of consuls and magistrates. But in animate things we call it older. For we say that Pythagoras is older than Socrates, and Socrates than Aristotle, for the reason that they precede in time. Therefore one thing is said to be prior to another properly according to time; but of the prior there were four differences, as Aristotle himself says, when he states: One thing is said to be prior to another in four ways. And he briefly enumerates them one by one, to which he himself added a fifth, which was unknown to the earlier philosophers. And since we have spoken of the first mode of prior, we shall speak of the second.\n\nIn the second mode, that which is not convertible according to consequence of existence, as one is prior to two: for when two exist, it immediately follows that one is, but when one exists, it is not necessary that two be. Therefore the consequence is not convertible from one, so that the other follows; but that seems to be prior from which the consequence of being is not convertible.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":321,"ref":"p321","source":"Secunda, inquit, significatio prioris est, quae non tempore intelligitur, sed natura, et hoc ait a quo non convertitur subsistendi consequentia. Nam si duae res ita sint oppositae, ut si una sit, necesse sit esse aliam, et si alia sit, non necesse sit esse aliam, illa prior est qua posita ut sit, non est aliam esse necesse, et hoc quidem universaliter dictum est. Planius vero his fiet exemplis.Binarius enim uumerus et unitas eam retinet naturam, ut si quis duo esse proponat, unum quoque esse monstraverit, unum enim in ipsis duobus concluditur,nec praeter duasunitatespoteritessebinarius.Quocirca si quis binarium numerum esse posuerit,unum quoque esse consequitur, idcirco binarius ut sit indiget unitate. Atvero si quis ponat esse uDltatem,nondum necesse est esse binarium. Ergo ab unitate subsistendi consequentia non convertitur. Posita enim unitatenecesse non fuit binarii numeri subsequi quantitatem, idcirco quod binario non indiget unitas,\"sicut indigens erat unitate binarius. Quare prior est unitas binario: quod si ita est, et quidquid ita fuerit, ut ab eo subsistendi consequentia non convertatur,prius Aristoteleauctoreprobabitur,utin eoquod est homo et animal.Cumdicohominem, moxdixianimal; cum animal dixero, nihil adhuc de homine dictum est. Omnis enim homo animal est, non omne animal homo.","english":"The second meaning of prior, he says, is that which is understood not by time but by nature, and this he says is that from which the consequence of existing is not convertible. For if two things are so opposed that, if one exists, the other must also exist, and if the other exists, the one need not exist, that is prior by whose positing the other need not exist, and this indeed has been stated universally. But it will become clearer by these examples. For the number two and unity retain this nature, that if anyone proposes that two exist, he will also have shown that one exists; for one is included in the two themselves, nor can the number two exist apart from two unities. Wherefore if anyone has posited that the number two exists, it follows that one also exists; therefore, in order that it be, the number two needs unity. But on the other hand, if anyone posits that unity exists, it is not yet necessary that the number two exist. Therefore, from unity the consequence of existing is not convertible. For with unity posited, it was not necessary that the quantity of the number two follow, because unity does not need the number two, as the number two was in need of unity. Wherefore unity is prior to the number two. But if this is so, whatever is such that from it the consequence of existing is not converted, will be proved prior by the authority of Aristotle, as in the case of man and animal. When I say man, I immediately also said animal; when I have said animal, nothing has yet been said about man. For every man is an animal, but not every animal is a man.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":322,"ref":"p322","source":"Tertio vero secundum ordinem quemdam prius dicitur,quemadmodum et in disciplinis et in orationibus, nam et in demonstrativis diJciplinis est prius et posterius perordinem,elementa enim in gpometriapriora Sunt iis qucediscribunlur per ord.inem.Principia enim priora sunt theoremullbus ordine, et in grammatica elementa priore sunt syllabis,et in orationibus similiter proæmium prius est narratione, ordine.\n\nPonit tertiam prioris significationem, ut in geometria priora sunt, inquit,elementa descriptionibus Elementa vero ait quos terminos appellamus,id est ubi quid punctum sit, quid linea,quid figura praedi. citur.His enim cognitis et fideliter animo appreben sis, postea omnes geometriae descriptiones fiunt, quae problemata et theoremata nuncupantur. Ergo quoniam prius discuntur elementa, post ad descriptiones est transitus, priora sunt elementa descriptionibus, ordine scilicet, quoniam ut descriptio possit intelligi,prius elementa traduntur,etingrammaticaquoquepriussingulaetraduntur litteræ quam quae ex his syllabae conjungitur, quocirca ipso quoque ordine priores sunt syllabis. Rhetores vero non saepe a narratione, sed ab exordio agere causas incipiunt, ideo quod exordia narrationibus priora sunt ordine, quare tertius modus prioris iste est qui secundum nexum cujusdam ordinis in qualibet arte est constitutus.","english":"Third, however, prior is said according to a certain order, as also in the disciplines and in speeches; for even in demonstrative disciplines there is a prior and a posterior by order. For the elements in geometry are prior to the things that are described in order. For the principles are prior to the theorems in order, and in grammar the elements are prior to the syllables, and in speeches likewise the proem is prior to the narration, in order.\n\nHe sets down the third signification of prior, as in geometry the elements, he says, are prior to the descriptions. But by elements he means what we call terms, that is, where it is stated what a point is, what a line is, what a figure is. For when these are known and faithfully grasped in the mind, afterward all the descriptions of geometry are made, which are called problems and theorems. Therefore, since the elements are learned first, and afterward there is a transition to the descriptions, the elements are prior to the descriptions, namely in order, since in order that a description may be understood, the elements are handed down first; and in grammar also the individual letters are handed down first before the syllable that is compounded from them, and for that reason they are also prior to syllables in order itself. But rhetoricians often begin to plead causes not from the narration but from the exordium, for the reason that exordia are prior to narrations in order. Wherefore this third mode of prior is that which is established according to the connection of a certain order in any art whatsoever.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":323,"ref":"p323","source":"Amplius prseterea quæ dicta sunt, quod melius est et honorabilius prius naturaliter esse videtur,consueverunt enim et plurimi honorabiliores et magis asedilectos,priores dicere apud.se. Sed est pene alienissimu hic omnium modus,modi itaque qui dicti sunt de priore ferme isti sunt.\n\nDicit prius videri,quod neque secundum tempus aliquoties,neque secundum subsistendi consequentiam, nec secundum ordinem sit, sed quodcunque pretiosius fuerit, prius esse videatur, ut sol, luna prior est, et anima corpore, et animus anima. noc vero tali argumento probat,quod hi qui aliquos venerantur, et honorabiliores existimant, dicant eos apud se esse priores,et hi qui in rebus publicis p]urimum possunt,priores dicuntur ab his qui eos maxime venerantur. Sed ut ipse ait, alienissimus est a significatione prioris hic quartus in nunc est dictus modus, etenim de his melius dici potest,ut dicantur venerabiliores et honorabiles,ut vero priores dicantur,abusio potius quam ulla proprietas est. Quintus modus quem ipse addidit hujusmodi est.","english":"Moreover, in addition to what has been said, it seems that what is better and more honorable is naturally prior. For very many people are accustomed to call those who are more honorable and more beloved prior in their own estimation. But this mode is almost entirely foreign to all the others. And so the modes that have been stated concerning the prior are roughly these.\n\nHe says that the prior seems to be what is sometimes neither according to time, nor according to consequence of subsistence, nor according to order, but whatever is more precious seems to be prior, as the sun is prior to the moon, and the soul to the body, and the mind to the soul. And he proves this by the following argument: that those who reverence certain people and consider them more honorable say that they are prior in their own estimation, and those who have the most power in public affairs are called prior by those who reverence them most. But, as he himself says, this fourth mode now mentioned is most foreign to the signification of prior. For concerning these things it can better be said that they are called more venerable and honorable, but to call them prior is an abuse rather than any propriety. The fifth mode, which he himself added, is of this kind.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":324,"ref":"p324","source":"Videtur autem prjeter eos qui dicti sunt, alter esse prioris modus. Eorum enim quæ convertuntur secundum essentiae consequentiamjd quod alterius quolibet modo causa est,digne prius natura dicitur. Quod Jvero sunt quasdam hujusmodi palam est, esse namque hominem convertitur secundum essentiæ consequentiam ad veram orationem de se. Nam si est homo, vera est oratio quas dicitur, homo est,et si vera est oratio qua dicitur,homo est,consequitur esse hominem.Est autem quidem vera oratio nequaquam causa ut si res,verumamen videtur quodammodo res causa ut sit oratio uera. Ex eo enlm quod res est, vel non est,oratio uero aul faisa dicatur necesse est.Ideoque secundum quinQue modos prius alterum altero dicitur.\n\nNovimus quasdam res in praedicatione posse converti. Quod si una earum quae convertuntur alteri causa est,et veluti naturalem subsistentiam subministrat, ilia naturaliter prius esse perhibetur. Ipse autem aptissimo quod proposuitaffirmavitexemplo. Nam si est aliqua res,verum est de ea dicere, quoniam est.Hursus si de ea verum est dicere quoniam est, illam ipsam rem esse necesse est: ut quoniam est homo, verum est dicere quoniam est homo. Quod si verum est dicere quoniam est homo,nulla est dubitatio quin homo sit.","english":"But besides those modes of the prior which have been mentioned, there seems to be another. For of things that convert according to the consequence of essence, that which is in any way the cause of the other is reasonably said to be prior by nature. And that there are certain things of this sort is clear; for \"to be a man\" converts according to the consequence of essence with the true statement about him. For if a man exists, the statement is true by which it is said that he is a man; and if the statement is true by which it is said that he is a man, it follows that a man exists. But the true statement is in no way the cause of the thing's being, yet the thing seems in a certain way to be the cause of the true statement. For from the fact that the thing is or is not, the statement must be called true or false. And for this reason, according to the five modes, one thing is said to be prior to another.\n\nWe know that certain things can be converted in predication. But if one of those things that convert is the cause of the other and, as it were, supplies its natural subsistence, that one is said to be naturally prior. And he confirmed what he proposed with a most apt example. For if some thing exists, it is true to say of it that it exists. Again, if it is true to say of it that it exists, that very thing must exist: as, since a man exists, it is true to say that a man exists. But if it is true to say that a man exists, there is no doubt that a man exists.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":325,"ref":"p325","source":"Ergo quoniam duo haec sibimet convertuntur,respiciamus nunc quae sit barum causa alteri,ut subsistere valeal,atque ut esse possit.Video autem rem dictoverosobsistentiaedare principium, nam quio homo est, irJcirco verum est dicere de eo quoniam est, sed non idcirco homo est, quoniam de eo vere dici potest, quoniam est. Res enim ut veritas adsit, dicto principium est,sed non ut res subsistat,vero efficitur dicto. Quocirca prius est, esse hominem, posterius, verum de eo esse dictum. Idcirco quoniam quamvis convertantur, tamen una harum rerum alteri subsistendi causa est. Ait enim id esse prius inter ea quae convertuntursecundumessentiaeconsequentiam,quod alterius quomodolibet causa est. Ut in hoc ipso sermone de homine,convertuntur utraque quidem,sed homo ut sit sermo verus, causa est atquo principium. Quod Aristoteles ita ait: Est autem verus sermo nullo modo causa subsistendi rem.Res autem videtur quodammodo causa esse ut sermo verus sit. Neque enim idcirco res est, quoniam sermo est, sed idcirco verus est sermo, quoniam res ipsa subsistit. Quocirca quinque hi prioris modi sunt, quorum superius quatuor dixit,secundum tempus, scilicet secundum id quod non convertitur ad subsistendi consequentiam,secundum ordinem,secundum reverentiam,et secundum conversionem, cum altera res alii subsistendi causa est. Sed quoniam de priori dictum est. Nunc de his quae simul sunt incipit.","english":"Therefore, since these two convert with one another, let us now consider which of them is the cause of the other, so that it can subsist and so that it can be. But I see that the thing gives the principle of existence to the true statement. For because a man is, therefore it is true to say of him that he is; but it is not for this reason that he is a man, because it can truly be said of him that he is. For the thing is the principle for the truth to be present in the statement, but it is not by the true statement that the thing is brought about so as to subsist. Wherefore it is prior that a man be, and posterior that a true statement be made about him. For this reason, although they convert, nevertheless one of these things is the cause of the other's subsisting. For he says that that is prior among things that convert according to the consequence of essence, which is in any way the cause of the other. As in this very discourse about man, both indeed convert, but the man is the cause and principle that the statement be true. Aristotle says this as follows: But a true statement is in no way the cause of the thing's subsisting. But the thing seems in some way to be the cause that the statement be true. For it is not for this reason that the thing is, because the statement is, but for this reason the statement is true, because the thing itself subsists. Wherefore there are these five modes of the prior, of which he stated four above: according to time, namely according to that which does not convert to the consequence of subsisting, according to order, according to reverence, and according to conversion, when one thing is the cause of another's subsisting. But since it has been said about the prior, he now begins about things that are simultaneous.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":326,"ref":"p326","source":"DE MODIS SIMUL.\n\nSimul autEm dicuntur simplicil er et proprie quidem, _ quorum qenemtio est in eodemtempore,neutrum enim neqne prius neque posterius est eorum. Simul itaque hæc dicuntur secundum tempus.\n\nCum de prioribus disputaret, illa propria priora esse contenderat, quae secundum vim praecedentis temporis dicerentur, quare cum de his quae simul sunt. disputat, idem revocat, et recte. Nam si maximum modum prioris solum efficiet tempus, cur quoque non simul editam naturam tempus efficiet? Ait ergo,et simpliciter et proprie dici siir ul esse ea, quae unius temporis ortu prolata sint,ut si ilia sint antiquiora atque priora,qufecunque non æquali,sed præcedenti tempore proferuntur,quaesetemporibus non praecedunt, rectissime simul esse ponuntur. Quæ enim uno tempore edita atque prolata sunt, illa secundum tempus simul esae dicuntur, id est simul naturale principium substantiamque sortita, atque hæc quidem secundum tempus simul esse dicunlur.Secundumnaturam vero simul esse perhibentur, quaecunque invicem ad se convertuntur, cum altera res alteri subsistendi, neque causa sit, neque principium, ut sunt hujusmodi, duplum medium: nam cum sit duplum, medium est; cum rursus sit medium, duplum est. Servus quoque et dominus eodem modo sunt, filius quoque et pater. Haec enim quaecunque illata quidem inferunt alia.","english":"ON THE MODES OF SIMULTANEITY.\n\nThings are said to be simultaneous in a simple and proper sense when their coming into being occurs at the same time; for neither of them is prior or posterior to the other. These things, then, are said to be simultaneous according to time.\n\nWhen he was disputing about prior things, he had maintained that those things are properly prior which are said to be so according to the force of preceding time. Therefore, when he disputes about things that are simultaneous, he recalls the same point, and rightly so. For if time alone constitutes the greatest mode of the prior, why should time not also constitute the nature of the simultaneous? He says, therefore, that both simply and properly those things are said to be simultaneous which are brought forth by the rising of one time — just as those things are more ancient and prior which are produced not in equal but in preceding time. And those things which do not precede in time are most correctly held to be simultaneous. For those things which are brought forth and produced at one time are said to be simultaneous according to time, that is, they have obtained their natural beginning and substance at the same time; and these things indeed are said to be simultaneous according to time. But those things are said to be simultaneous according to nature which convert with one another, since neither thing is the cause or principle of the other's subsisting — as are things of this sort: double and half. For when it is double, it is half; and again, when it is half, it is double. Slave and master are also in the same way, and son and father. For all these things, when brought in, bring in the others.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":327,"ref":"p327","source":"sublata vero auferunt simul,sibimetsemper invicem convertuntur: nam si dicam patrem,filium quoque intelligi necesse est: si dixero filium,pater mox sub intelligentiam cadit. Quod si alterum sustulero, utraque perimo:: nam si tollam filium,pater non est; si patrem abstulero,filium quoque perire necesseest. Atque haec ita sibimet ipsa convertuntur, ut tamen altera res alteri causa penitus non sit: nam quoniam pater filio in praedicatione convertitur manifestum est,sed neque pater filio causa est ut sit, nec filius patri, hoc autem hujusmodi est. Si Æneas habuit Ascanium filium, non dicimus, quoniam non fuit Æneas causa ut esset Ascanius, sed non fuit pater causa ut esset filius. Nam quod dico Ascanius, quaedam propria substantia est, quod dico filius, esse non potest, nisi ad aliquid referatur, et cum Æneam nomino, substantiam dixi, si patrem appello,nulla ratione constat,nisi ad filium referatur. Igitur causa fuit Æneas ut esset Ascanius, sed non i est causa pater ut esset filius.Paternamque tuncfit cum filius fuerit.","english":"But when one is removed, they remove simultaneously and are always mutually convertible: for if I say father, son must also be understood; if I say son, father immediately falls under the understanding. But if I remove one, I destroy both: for if I remove the son, there is no father; if I remove the father, the son must also perish. And these are so mutually convertible that nevertheless one thing is not entirely the cause of the other: for since father is evidently convertible with son in predication, yet neither is the father the cause of the son's being, nor the son of the father's. This is of the following sort. If Aeneas had Ascanius as a son, we do not say that Aeneas was not the cause of Ascanius's being, but the father was not the cause of the son's being. For what I call Ascanius is a certain proper substance; what I call son cannot exist unless it is referred to something, and when I name Aeneas I have stated a substance; if I call him father, it holds by no account unless it is referred to the son. Therefore Aeneas was the cause of Ascanius's being, but he is not the cause, as father, of the son's being. And he becomes father when a son exists.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":328,"ref":"p328","source":"Quod si haec tempore ipso priora non sunt,causa autem cujuslibet rei prior est quam illa cujus causa est, ut oriatur,nulla dubitatio est, quin pater atque filius,quae utraeque praedicationes æquales sunt tempore, neutra neutri causa sit, cum tamen substantiae ipsae sibi ut sint,causa sint prædicationis.Nec ullo modo simile debet videri ei quod paulo ante dictum est de homine,esse verum de eo sermonem, scilicet quoniam est. Illic enim cum res esset, tunc poterat esse verus de ea sermo. Prius enim est ut sit aliquid, post vero ut de eo verum aliquid esse dicatur. Nunc vero non ita eat. ut prius aliquis sit pater, post vero (ilius.Mox enim ut pater est, filium esse necesse est, mox ut est filius, patris sine dubio praedicatio consequitur, ■ quemadmodum ergo iste modus fit, qui scilicet simul secundum naturam est, Aristoteles ita pronuntiat.","english":"But if these are not prior in time itself, and a cause of anything is prior to that of which it is the cause, so that it may arise, there is no doubt that father and son, which are both predications equal in time, are not the cause one of the other, although the substances themselves are the cause of the predication that they exist. Nor should it seem in any way similar to what was said a little earlier about man, that a statement about him is true, namely that he exists. For there, when the thing existed, then a true statement about it could exist. For it is prior that something exist, but afterward that something true be said about it. But now it is not so, that first someone be a father, and afterward a son. For as soon as he is a father, it is necessary that there be a son; as soon as there is a son, the predication of father follows without doubt. In what way, therefore, this mode comes about, which is of course simultaneous according to nature, Aristotle thus declares.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":329,"ref":"p329","source":"Naturaliter autem simul sunt, quaecunque con vertuntur quidem secundum quodest esse consequentiam. Sed nequaquam causa est alterum alteri ut sit, ut in duplo et dimidio.Convertuntur etenim hæc: nam cum sit duplum, est dimidium, et cum sit dimidium, est duplum, sed neutrum alteri causa est ut sit.\n\nIn his quæ ita priora esse dicebatur,ut converterenlur,quamvis secundum essentiam eorum conse. quentia esset, tamen quia in his alia res alii causa at'que principium est,hoc erat quod una prior esse videretur, ea quidem cujus oausa erat. Quod distat ab iis quae convertuntur, et se invicem auferunt, quae cum neutra neutri causa sit, et tamen convertuntur,digne simul naturaliter esseperhibentur.\n\nDicuntur etiam simul naturaliter et quæ ex eodem genere e diverso dividuntur a se invicem. E diverso autem dividuntur, quae secundum eamdem divisionem sunt, ut gressibile, volatile et aquatile, hæc enim e diverso diuidunturzqum sunt ex eadem genere secundum divisionem: animal namgue dividitur in hæc,in volatile,gressibile et aquatitetet nihil horum prius vel posterius est, sed simul per naturam haec esse videntur.","english":"But those things are naturally simultaneous, whatever are converted according to the consequence of their being. But in no way is one the cause of the other's being, as in the double and the half. For these are converted: for when the double exists, the half exists, and when the half exists, the double exists, but neither is the cause of the other's being.\n\nIn those things which were said to be prior in such a way that they are converted, although according to their essence there was a consequence, nevertheless because in these one thing is the cause and principle of another, this was what made one seem to be prior, namely that of which it was the cause. This differs from those things which are converted and mutually remove each other, which, since neither is the cause of either, and yet they are converted, are rightly said to be naturally simultaneous.\n\nThose things are also said to be naturally simultaneous which are divided from each other out of the same genus by opposite division. But they are divided by opposite division which are under the same division, as the walker, the flyer, and the swimmer; for these are divided by opposite division since they are from the same genus according to division: for animal is divided into these—into the flyer, the walker, and the swimmer—and none of these is prior or posterior, but they seem to be naturally simultaneous.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":330,"ref":"p330","source":"Tertium modum eorum quæ simul sunt hunc addidit,illa quoque simul esse, quae aequali divisione sub genere ponantur,ut si ponat quis animal genus hominis et equi,hominem vero et equum a genere, id est ab animali dividat, bomo vero et equus quoniam sub eodem genere sunt, simul esse natura dicuntur.Et conveniens regula est in omnibus qui, buscunquegeneribus; cum enimspecierum divisiones fiunt, illic species natura simul sunt, et et si sub his ipsis speciebus quaedam alia ponantur,inter se etiam ipsa simul esse natura dicuntur. Dividatur enim genus,idest animali in volatile atquegressibile, et quoniam sunt sub eodem genere, simul natura sunt.Et si quid horum in subjectas partes speciesque solvatur, ut volatile quidem in his avibus quae seminibus vescuntur,et in iis quaecarnibus,etin his quae herbis,hae tres species rursus,quae sub volatili sunt, simul esse naturaliterappellantur,quod Aristoteles ita dicit.","english":"He added this third mode of those things which are simultaneous: those things also are simultaneous which are placed under a genus by equal division, as if someone should posit animal as the genus of man and horse, and should divide man and horse from the genus, that is, from animal; but man and horse, since they are under the same genus, are said to be simultaneous by nature. And the rule is fitting in all genera whatsoever; for when divisions of species are made, there the species are simultaneous by nature, and even if certain other things are placed under these very species, those things too are said to be simultaneous by nature among themselves. For let the genus, that is, animal, be divided into winged and walking, and since they are under the same genus, they are simultaneous by nature. And if any of these is resolved into subject parts and species, as winged into those birds which feed on seeds, and into those which feed on flesh, and into those which feed on herbs, these three species again, which are under winged, are called simultaneous by nature, which Aristotle states thus.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":331,"ref":"p331","source":"Dividiturautem elsingulum horum etspeciesrursus, ut gressibile animal,et volatile,et aquatile. Erunt ergo et itla simul naturaliter quspcunque ex eodem genere secundum eamdem divisionem sunt.Genera verosemper speciebus priora sunt,neque enim convertuntur secundum essendi consequentiam: ut cum sit aliqu id aquatile quidem,est animal; cum vero sit animalsnon estnecesse ut sit aquatile. Simul ergo per naturam dicuntur quæcunque convertuntur quidem secundum essendi consequentiarn,sed nequaquam quidem causa est alterum alteri ut sit,et ea quae ex eodem generee diverso dividuntur ab invicem, et simpliciter simul sunt quorum generatio in eodem tempore est.\n\nAtque idcirco fieri non potest ut genus habeat unam speciem.Nam si quaecunque subgenere sunt, simul sunt.Simul autem nisi pluraesse non possunt, genus igitur subseunamspeciemhabere non potest. Si enim una fuerit, fieri non potest ut simul esse dicatur, quia illud est, quod sub eodem genere quaedam res solent quae simul sint naturaliter inveniri. Sed haec de speciebus. Genera autem semper priora sunt,non enim convertuntur secundam subsistentiæ consequentiam. Prioris unus modus est secundum quem illa priora esse dicerentur quaecunque ad subsistendum nullo modo converterentur, quod hoc idem in generibus cadit.Genera enim non convertuntur ad subsistentiae consequentiam hoc modo. Sit enim animal genus, bomo vero species.","english":"But the species of each of these is divided again, as animal capable of walking, capable of flying, and aquatic. Therefore all those things whatsoever that are from the same genus according to the same division will also naturally be simultaneous. But genera are always prior to species, for they are not converted according to the consequence of being: for when something is aquatic, it is indeed an animal; but when it is an animal, it is not necessary that it be aquatic. Therefore those things are said to be simultaneous by nature whatsoever are indeed converted according to the consequence of being, but in no way is the one the cause of the other that it be, and those things which from the same genus are divided from one another by a different division, and simply those are simultaneous whose generation is in the same time.\n\nAnd for this reason it cannot happen that a genus has one species. For if whatever things are under a genus are simultaneous. But simultaneous things cannot be unless they are plural; therefore a genus cannot have a single species under it. For if there were one, it cannot happen that it be said to be simultaneous, because that is what it is, that under the same genus certain things are customarily found which are naturally simultaneous. But this concerns species. Genera, however, are always prior, for they are not converted according to the consequence of subsistence. There is one mode of the prior according to which those things are said to be prior whatsoever would in no way be converted to subsisting, which same thing falls under genera. For genera are not converted to the consequence of subsistence in this way. For let animal be the genus, and man the species.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":332,"ref":"p332","source":"Cum vero dico hominem esse, animal quoque osse ■consequitur. Si animal dixero, ad bominem subsi, stentiae consequentia non convertitur. Potest enim esse animal, non tamen homo. Quocirca ab animali ad hominem non convertitur subsistentiae consequentia.Quod si posito homine animal constat,animali vero nominato non est necesse hominem esse, animal est prius homine. Illa quoque priorum descriptio est,quod ea quae sunt priora sublata quidem auferunt,illata non inferunt. Animal enim sublatum secum quoque hominem tollet,illatum vero ut dicatur esse animal, non secum statim hominem infert. Posteriora vero et diverso sunt. Illata enim simul inferunt,sublatanon auferunt.Dictusquidem homo, pimul secum animal infert, omnis namque homo animal est. Quod si homo substantialiter auferatur, non est necesse animal quoque auferri, quod hoc nomen animalis in pluribus speciebus valet aptari.' Quod si ita contingit, sublato homine permanebit animal. Quocirca concludit tres esse species eorum quae simul sunt secundum tempus,secundum naluram cum utraque ita convertuntur,ut neutra neutri causa sit. Tertium genus est secundum eamdem sub eodem generedivisionem.Quoniam in faciendo atque patiendo inerat quidam motus, facere autem et pati praedicamentis adjunxerat, idcirco nunc de motibus tractat, et sex numero esse pronuntiat.","english":"But when I say that a man is, it also follows that he is an animal. If I say animal, the consequence of subsistence does not convert to man. For it is possible to be an animal and yet not a man. Wherefore the consequence of subsistence does not convert from animal to man. But if, when man is posited, animal is established, while when animal is named it is not necessary that man be, then animal is prior to man. That also is the description of prior things: that when prior things are removed they remove, but when brought in they do not bring in. For animal, when removed, will also remove man with it; but when it is brought in, so that animal is said to be, it does not at once bring man in with it. Posterior things, however, are also of a different sort. For when brought in they bring in at the same time, but when removed they do not remove. For when man is said, he at once brings animal in with him, since every man is an animal. But if man is removed substantially, it is not necessary that animal also be removed, because the name of animal can be applied to many species. But if this is so, when man is removed animal will remain. Wherefore he concludes that there are three species of things that are simultaneous: according to time, according to nature when both are so converted that neither is the cause of the other. The third kind is according to the same division under the same genus. Since in doing and undergoing there was a certain motion, and he had added doing and undergoing to the categories, for that reason he now treats of motions, and declares that they are six in number.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":333,"ref":"p333","source":"DE SPECIEBUS MOTUS.\n\nMotus autem species sunt sex: genel'atio,corruptio, augmentum, diminutio, alteratio, et secundum locum mutatio. Alii itaquemotus palam est quia alii abinvicem sunt. Non cst enim generatio corruptio, neque augmentum diminutio, neque secundum locum mulatio. Similiter autem et in aliis.\n\nIn physicis Aristoteles motus species alia ratione partitus est. Ait enim aliud esse permutationem, aliud motum, et permutationis quidem duas esse species ait generationem et corruptionem. Motus vera tres secundum quantitatem,secundum qualitatem, secundum locum. Igitur, quoniam hic liber ad introductionem quodam modo factus est, noluit nimis divisionis attenuare rationem,ne ingredientium animos subtiliori divisione confunderet: facit igitur divisionem motus hoc modo. Est enim una species motus secundum substantiam,alia secundum quantitatem, alia secundum qualitatem, alia secundum locum. Et secundum substantiam quidem est generatio et corruptio, hæc enim utraque in substantia fiunt. Nam et secundum substantiam generatur aliquid, et secundum substantiam corrumpitur.Secundum quantitatem vero, ut crementum et diminutio. Etenim secundum quantitatem vel aucta crevisse, vel detracta diminuta esse dicuntur.Secundum qualitatem vero quae dicitur commutatio, secundum aliquas scilicet passiones,quas qualitates esse manifestum est.","english":"ON THE SPECIES OF MOTION.\n\nThere are six species of motion: generation, corruption, increase, decrease, alteration, and change in place. It is therefore evident that some motions are distinct from one another. For generation is not corruption, nor is increase decrease, nor is change in place any of these. The same holds likewise in the other cases.\n\nIn the Physics, Aristotle divided the species of motion by another account. For he says that permutation is one thing and motion another, and he says that there are two species of permutation, generation and corruption. But there are three motions: according to quantity, according to quality, and according to place. Therefore, since this book was made in a way for introduction, he was unwilling to attenuate the account of division too much, lest he confuse the minds of beginners by a more subtle division. He therefore makes the division of motion in this way. For one species of motion is according to substance, another according to quantity, another according to quality, another according to place. And according to substance there is generation and corruption, for both of these occur in substance. For something is generated according to substance, and something is corrupted according to substance. According to quantity, however, as increase and decrease. For things are said to have increased by addition according to quantity, or to have decreased by subtraction. According to quality, however, is what is called alteration, namely according to certain affections, which are manifestly qualities.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":334,"ref":"p334","source":"Secundum locum vero, ut intus in longitudinem,vel in curvaturam flexus;et intus quidem in longitudinem est ut a sursum in deorsum,a prioribus retrorsum,a dextra in sinistram;et rursus si haec convertas et in directum pergas, idem motus erunt. Illud quoque verum est has esse omnes species motus, nullo namque sibi participant,nisi solo generis nomine, quod motus dicuntur: nam neque generatio idem est quod corruptio,namque generatio est in substantia ingressus, corruptio vero ex substantia egressus. Nec diminutio idem quod crementum, nec secundum locum translatio alicui superiorum consimilis est. Commutatio autem habet forte aliquam dubitationem, quod non videatur a superioribus discrepare, quam quaestionem ita proposuit.\n\nIn alteratione vero habet quamdam quæstionem,ne forte necessarium sit id quod alteratur, per aliquam reliquarum motionum alterari; hoc autem non est verum. Nam pene secundum omnes passiones aut plures, alterari accidit, nulla aliarum motionumcommuMicante. Neque enim augeri necessarium est,quod per passionem movetur, neque minui.Similiter autem in aliis. Ideoque erit alia præter illos motus alleratio. Nam si eadem esset, oporteret id quod alteratur mox vel augeri, vel minui, vel aliquem aliorum motuum consequi; sed non est necesse. Similiter autem et quod augetur, aut alia aliqua motione movetur, alterari oportebat.","english":"With respect to place, as for instance inward along a length, or into a curve of bending; and inward along a length is as from above to below, from the front backward, from right to left; and again if you reverse these and proceed in a straight line, they will be the same motions. It is also true that these are all the species of motion, for they share in nothing with one another except the name of the genus alone, in that they are called motions. For neither is generation the same as corruption, since generation is an entrance into substance, while corruption is a departure from substance. Nor is decrease the same as increase, nor is change in place similar to any of the above. But change perhaps has some doubt, in that it does not seem to differ from the foregoing, which question he set out as follows.\n\nIn alteration, however, there is a certain question, lest perhaps it be necessary that what is altered be altered through some one of the remaining motions; but this is not true. For in nearly all affections, or more of them, it happens that a thing is altered, while none of the other motions shares in it. For it is not necessary that what is moved through an affection be increased, nor decreased. And similarly in the others. And for this reason alteration will be a motion other besides those. For if it were the same, it would be necessary that what is altered be presently either increased or decreased, or follow some one of the other motions; but it is not necessary. And similarly, what is increased, or is moved by some other motion, would have to be altered.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":335,"ref":"p335","source":"In commutatione veroestaliqua dubitatio,ne forte necesse sit quod commutatur secundum aliquem reliquorum motuum commutari.Namsi omne quod commutatur, aut generatur, aut corrumpitur, aut minuitur, aut crescit, aut id secundum locum transferri necesse est, dubium non est nihil a superioribus caeteris hanc differe speciem, quae secundum commutationem dicitur; quod Aristoteles respuit, dicens, Hoc autem non est verum. Sed quoniam quod commutatur non omnino neque generatur, neque corrumpitur: ut qui in sole diutius stetit,8i ex candido niger est factus, commutatus quidem secundum colorem dicitur, non tamen generatus est aut corruptus, nec vero illi aliquod vel crementum factum est vel diminutio, sed nec loci translatio nulla est, potest enim aliquis uno eodemque loco consistens, aliquibus extrinsecus venientibus passionibus permutari, potest quoque et crescereet decrescere, praeter qualitatis commutationem:quod ipse Aristoteles ita pronuntiat.","english":"But in the case of change there is some doubt, lest perhaps whatever changes must change according to one of the remaining motions. For if everything that changes is either generated or corrupted, or diminished or increased, or must be transferred according to place, there is no doubt that this species which is called according to change differs in no way from the other aforementioned ones; which Aristotle rejects, saying, \"But this is not true.\" But since what changes is not altogether either generated or corrupted: as one who has stood too long in the sun is made black from white, is said indeed to have changed according to color, yet is not generated or corrupted, nor has any increase or diminution occurred to him, but neither is there any change of place—for someone standing in one and the same place can be altered by certain passions coming from outside, and can also grow and diminish, beyond a change of quality—which Aristotle himself thus declares.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":336,"ref":"p336","source":"Sed sunt quædam crescentia quæ non alterantur, ut quadratum, circumposito gnomone, crevit quidem, alteratum uero nihil factum est: sic et in altis hujusmodi. Quare alii sunt motus a se invicem.\n\nQuod dicit tale est Si quadrato, inquit, addatur gnomo, crescit quidem quadratus, non tamen commutatur. Ideoque sublato gnomone quadratus diminuitur,sed non commutatur.Sienimquadratus a dy et ducatur ei angularis c, et dividantur quatuor latera a c, a b, d, a c, in aequalia e punctis, et ducantur h, f, e lineae. Divisus igitur quadratus a in quatuor quadratos qui sunt e g, g, e h, f, quorumlibet tres qui circa eamdem angularem sunt si demantur,figura ipsa gnomo vocatur. ut si quis tollat hos tres, e g, ft h, inveniturrii gnomo, qui gnomo separatur a e quadrato. j Totus quidem a quadratus imminutus est, qui ex tam magno factus est parvus, non tamen formam tetragoni commutavit.Quod si e A tetragonus solus sit, et ei circumponatur gnomo, qui est n, crevit quidem tetragonus, et major factus est, sed non commutatus est. Omnes enim tetragoni sibi sunt propria qualitate consimiles. Quod si commutatio hujusmodi motus esset, ut non omnino a superioribus separaretur, nulla esset dubitatio quin semper oporteret quidquid commutatur secundum aliquem priorum motuum modum commutari. Ita ut aut nasceretur,aut corrumperetur, aut micueretur, aut cresceret, aut secundum locum fieret aliqua permutatio.","english":"But there are certain things that grow without being altered, as a square, when a gnomon is placed around it, has indeed grown, but has become altered in no way; so too in other cases of this kind. Wherefore motions are distinct from one another.\n\nWhat he says is of this sort: If, he says, a gnomon is added to a square, the square indeed grows, yet it is not changed. And for this reason, when the gnomon is removed, the square is diminished, but is not changed. For if there is a square from dy and a diagonal c is drawn in it, and its four sides ac, ab, d, ac are divided into equal parts at points e, and the lines h, f, e are drawn. The square a is therefore divided into four squares which are eg, g, eh, f; if any three of these which are around the same diagonal are taken away, the figure itself is called a gnomon. As if someone takes away these three, eg, f, h, the gnomon is found, which gnomon is separated from the square ae. The whole square a has indeed been diminished, which from being so great has been made small, yet it has not changed the form of the tetragon. But if the tetragon A is alone, and a gnomon is placed around it, which is n, the tetragon has indeed grown and has been made larger, but has not been changed. For all tetragons are similar to one another in their own proper quality. But if a change of this kind were a motion, so that it were not altogether separated from the foregoing, there would be no doubt that whatever is changed must always be changed according to some mode of the prior motions. So that it would either be born, or be corrupted, or be mixed, or grow, or some alteration according to place would occur.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":337,"ref":"p337","source":"Quod quoniam non est, ab omnibussuperioribus motibus hæc motus ppeciesdistat.Sed monstratum superius est quinquesuperiores motus species a se omni ratione substantiae discrepare. Quocirca distant, se similiter hi sex motus, atque divers sunt.\n\nEst autem simpliciter quidem motui quies contrarium.Singulis vero singuli,generationi quidem corruptio, augmentationi autem dzminutio;secundum locum vero mutationi, secundum locum quies, maxime autem videtur oppositum esse in contrarium locum mutatio, ut quæ est inferius ei quæ est superius, et ea quæ est superius ei quae est inferius.\n\nNunc jam motuumcontrarietatesexsequitur,etipsi quidem generi, id est motui, dicit quietem esse contrariam,habet enim motus quietem contrariam. Singulis vero speciebus motuum motus ipsi contrarii sunt, ut generationi corruptio,et cum generatio sit motus atque corruptio,utraque tamen sibimet contraria sunt, cremento quoque diminutio contraria est. Quare diverso modo hae species motus contrarietatem habent, quam genus dudum habere monstravimus: motus enim ipse habet quietem contrariam. Specierum vero motibus non quies tantum, sed alii motus contrarii sunt, ut generationi corruptio et cremento diminutio, secundum vero locum translationis contrarietas similis est generi.","english":"Since this is not the case, this species of motion differs from all the superior motions. But it was shown above that the five superior species of motion differ from one another in every respect of substance. Wherefore these six motions also differ, and are diverse.\n\nNow, simply speaking, rest is contrary to motion. But to individual motions, individual motions are contrary: to generation, corruption; to increase, decrease; but to change in place, rest in place; yet motion into a contrary place seems most of all to be opposed, as that which is downward to that which is upward, and that which is upward to that which is downward.\n\nNow he next discusses the contrarieties of motions, and says that to the genus itself, that is, to motion, rest is contrary; for motion has rest as its contrary. But to the individual species of motion, motions themselves are contrary, as corruption is to generation; and since generation is a motion and corruption is a motion, yet both are contrary to each other; decrease also is contrary to increase. Wherefore these species of motion have contrariety in a different way from that in which we showed the genus to have it: for motion itself has rest as its contrary. But to the species of motion, not only rest but other motions are contrary, as corruption to generation and decrease to increase; but in the case of change in place, the contrariety is similar to the genus.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":338,"ref":"p338","source":"Nam et ipsa habet contrariam secundum locum quietem, contrarium namque est moveri de loco in locum, et non moveri, et est non moveri quidem secundum locum quies,moveri vero secun dum locum translatio. Maxime autem, inquit,secundum locum mutationi, contraria est in contrarium locum permutatio.Ut si qua res sursum sit atque ibi maneat,et sit quieta, postea sit ei motus talis, ut deorsum moveatur, quanquam ipsi superiori motui quies contraria sit, multo magis quidem hujusmodi motus, qui in contrariumfitlocum, illi superiori motui contrarius est. Atque hoc quidem et in aliis motibus accidit: ut si quis sit ad dexteram, si ei in sinistram motus sit,in contrarium locum factus dicitur motus.Atque hoc idem id aliis motibus licet videre; sed Aristoteles dubitat si reliquomotui,id estcommutationi,aliquid possit esse contrarium, quam quæstionem ita proponit:","english":"For it too has a contrary rest in respect of place; for to be moved from place to place is contrary to not being moved, and not being moved in respect of place is rest, while being moved in respect of place is change of place. But especially, he says, to change in respect of place, the change into the contrary place is contrary. As if some thing be above and remain there, and be at rest, and afterwards there be such motion for it that it is moved downward, although rest is contrary to that superior motion itself, much more indeed is a motion of this kind, which comes to be into the contrary place, contrary to that superior motion. And this indeed also happens in other motions: as if someone be on the right, if there be motion for him to the left, the motion is said to have come to be into the contrary place. And this same thing may be seen in other motions; but Aristotle doubts whether anything can be contrary to the remaining motion, that is, to change, which question he sets out thus:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":339,"ref":"p339","source":"Reliquo vero assignatorum motuum non facile est assignare quid sit cOnlrarium,videtur autem nihil ei contrarium esse, nisi quis ei in hoc secundum qualitatem quietem opponat, aut in contrariam qualitatis mutationem, sicut et in mutatione secundum locum, quietem secundum locum, aut in contrarium locum mutalionem. Est enim allerio secundum qualitatem mutatio.\n\nEx similitudine motuum contrarietates quoque colligimus. Nam quoniam superius motui secundum locum contrariam reperit secundum locum quietem, et quoniam omnis commutatio quae secundum aliquam passionem fit secundum qualitatem commutatur, motus ejus contrarietatem posuit secundum qualitatem quietem: ut si lapis cum frigidus est,si ita permaneat, qualitas illa mansit et quievit, quod si tepeat, qualitas illa commutat est, et est ipsa commutatio contraria, et factus est quidem motus, et in tepore lapidis secundum qualitatem facta est permutatio, fuit autem in frigore quies secundum eamdem qualitatem. Quocirca licet videaturhic motus quidem omnino contrarium non habere, tamen, sicut superius dictum est secundum locum translationi contrariam esse secundum locum quietem,cur non quoque secundum qualitatem commutationi dicatur quies secundum qualitatem esse contraria?","english":"For the remaining assigned motions, it is not easy to assign what is contrary to them. It seems, however, that nothing is contrary to it, unless one opposes to it in this respect rest according to quality, or change into a contrary quality, just as also in change according to place, rest according to place, or change into a contrary place. For alteration is change according to quality.\n\nFrom the similarity of motions we also gather contrarieties. For since above he found rest according to place contrary to motion according to place, and since every change that occurs according to some affection is changed according to quality, he posited rest according to quality as the contrariety of that motion: so that if a stone, when it is cold, remains so, that quality has remained and rested; but if it grows warm, that quality has been changed, and that change itself is contrary, and a motion has indeed come about, and in the warmth of the stone a change according to quality has occurred, while in the cold there was rest according to the same quality. Wherefore, although this motion may seem to have no contrary at all, nevertheless, just as was said above that rest according to place is contrary to translation according to place, why should rest according to quality not likewise be said to be contrary to change according to quality?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":340,"ref":"p340","source":"Definitio namque commutationis est translatio secundumqualitatem,cum enimqualitascujuslibetrei movetur,fit translatio,scilicet secundum qualitatem, Quod si maxime videatur secundum locum translaton esse contraria, non solum secundum locum quies, sed etiam in contrarium locum translatio, secundum qualitatem quoque mutationi non solum erit contraria secundum qualitatem quies, sed maxime in contrariam qualitatem commutatio:ut si quid cum est album, si rubrum fiat, quieti quidem ei quae in albo colore poterat permanere contraria fuit qualitatis ipsa mutatio, ut ex albo in rubrum mutaretur; si quid enim ex albo vertatur in nigrum, illud maxime permutatur, et iliud superiori mutationi contrarium est, quoniam permutatum est iu eontrariam qualitatem. Atque hoc est quod ait:\n\nQuapropter opposita erit secundum qualitatem mutationi secundum qualitatem quies,aut in contrarium mutatio qualitatis, ut album fieri ad id quod est nigrum fieri,alteralur enim in contrarium qualitatis mutatione facta.","english":"For the definition of change is alteration according to quality; for when the quality of any thing is moved, there comes about an alteration, namely according to quality. But if change according to place seems most of all to have contraries, not only rest according to place, but also change into the contrary place, then to change according to quality there will be contrary not only rest according to quality, but most of all change into the contrary quality: as if something, when it is white, becomes red, then to the rest which could have remained in the white color, the change of quality itself was contrary, so that it might be changed from white into red; for if anything is turned from white into black, that is most of all changed, and that is contrary to the former change, since it has been changed into the contrary quality. And this is what he says:\n\nWherefore opposed to change according to quality will be rest according to quality, or change into the contrary of the quality, as becoming white is opposed to becoming black; for it is altered into the contrary, the change of quality having taken place.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":341,"ref":"p341","source":"Id quoque apertissimo vulgatur exemplo. Quare quoniam de motibus expeditum est,habendi aequivocationem quae sequitur explicemus.\n\nDE MODIS HABERE.\n\nBabere autem multis modis dicitur, aut enim tan' quam habitum et affeectum,aut aliam quamlibet qualitatem, dicimur enim disciplinam aliquam habere atque virtutem.Aut tanquam quantitatem,ut contingit ei qui habet magnitudinem, dicitur enim tricubitam magnitudinem haberevelquadricubitum.Aut tanquam ea quæ circa corpus sunt, ut vestimentum vel tunicam.Aut tanquam in parle,ut in manu annulum. Aut tanquam partem,ut manu vel pedem.Aut tanquam in vaseyut in modio grana tritici, vel in lagena vinum, pinum enim babere fangena dicitur, et modios grana tritici, hasc ergo omnia haberi dicuntur, ut in vase. Aut tanquam possessionem, habere enim domum aut agrum dicimur. Dicitur eliam vir uxorem habere, et uxor virum.Sed videtur alienissimus qui nunc dictus est modus esse in eo quod est habere,nihil enim aliud per uxorem habere significamus, nisi quia cohabitant,forte tamen et alii quidam apparebunt modi de eo quod est habere. Sed qui consueverunt dici, pene omnes enumerati sunt.","english":"This too is made known by a most evident example. Therefore, since the discussion of motions has been set out, let us explain the equivocation of \"having\" that follows.\n\nON THE MODES OF HAVING.\n\nBut \"to have\" is said in many ways: for either as a habit and disposition, or any other quality whatsoever — for we are said to have some discipline or virtue. Or as a quantity, as it happens to the one who has magnitude; for he is said to have a magnitude of three cubits or four cubits. Or as things that are around the body, such as a garment or a tunic. Or as in a part, as a ring on the hand. Or as a part, as a hand or a foot. Or as in a vessel, as grain of wheat in a measure, or wine in a flask; for a measure is said to have grain, and measures have grain of wheat. All these, therefore, are said to be had as in a vessel. Or as a possession; for we are said to have a house or a field. A man is also said to have a wife, and a wife a husband. But the mode just mentioned seems most alien to what \"to have\" is; for by \"having a wife\" we signify nothing other than that they live together. Perhaps, however, certain other modes of \"having\" will appear. But those that are accustomed to be mentioned have nearly all been enumerated.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":342,"ref":"p342","source":"Æquivocum esse habendi modum manifestum est,habere enim ita multis dicitur modis,ut tamen aequivoce praedicetur.Dicimur enim habere aliquam qualita.tem,ut habitum vel dispositionem. Dicimur quoque habere scientiam vel virtutem;quantitatem quoque habere perhibemur,dicimur enim in mensura habere quinque vel quatuor pedes. Nec non etiam in ipsis partibus corporis aliquid,et ipsas partes habere prædicamur,dicimur enim et habere digitos,et in digito annulos Circa corpus quoque aliquid habere dicimur,uttunicam,vel quodlibetaliud vestimentum. Necnon etiam in vase haberi aliquid dicitur,ut triticum in modio,et vinum in dolio;haec, scilicet, ita haberi dicuntur, ut in vase. Dicitur etiam quis habere uxorem,quæ,scilicet significatio nulli supradictae communis est, sed (ut ipsi Aristoteli videtur) longe diversa est haec significatio ab habendi prædicamento;non enim proprie habemus uxores,sed quod habere quis dicatur uxorem, hoc significat habitare cum eo uxorern,habere enim habitare dicimus,ut est Socratem habent, id est cum Socrate habitant atque eum colunt.Quare ipse quoqueAristoteles inquit esse aliquos fortasse praeter eos qui dicantur habendi modos, hortaturque nos ad ulterioremaliquaminquisitionem,ut nos quoque quae ramus per quos,praeter priores dictos modos, alios possit habere praedicari.","english":"That the mode of having is equivocal is evident, for \"to have\" is said in so many ways that it is nevertheless predicated equivocally. For we are said to have some quality, such as a habit or disposition. We are also said to have knowledge or virtue; we are likewise asserted to have quantity, for we are said to have five or four feet in measure. And indeed also in the parts of the body themselves we are said to have something, and to have the parts themselves; for we are said both to have fingers and to have rings on a finger. Around the body too we are said to have something, such as a tunic or any other garment. And indeed something is also said to be had in a vessel, as wheat in a measure and wine in a cask; these, of course, are said to be had in such a way as in a vessel. Someone is also said to have a wife, which signification is of course common to none of those mentioned above, but (as it seems to Aristotle himself) this signification is far different from the predicament of having; for we do not properly have wives, but that someone is said to have a wife signifies that a wife dwells with him; for we say \"to have\" for \"to dwell,\" as it is \"they have Socrates,\" that is, they dwell with Socrates and cultivate him. Wherefore Aristotle himself also says that there are perhaps some modes of having beyond those that are spoken of, and he urges us to some further inquiry, so that we too may [see] by what paths, beyond the previously mentioned modes, others can be predicated of having.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":343,"ref":"p343","source":"Et de hac aequivocatione quidem habendi sufficienter dictum est.Sed forlequis dubitet cur cum habere superius in genere nominaverit,nunc idipsumaequivocum ponat,sedhæc quaestio ita solvitur. Non absurdum est idem praedicamentum nunc univoce, nunc aequivoce praedicari. Univoce quidem ut superius cum ejusdem specierum exempla proposuit, ut est calceatum esse vel armatum,horum enim talium genus est. Æquivoce vero ut in his modis quos superius exposuimus. Quod si et habet aliquas proprias species habendi praedicatio,diciturautem et ipsum nomen multioliciter, nihil est incongruum in genere numerari, sufficit enim ad demonstrandum genus esse et habendi praedicationem quod sub se aliquas partes speciesque contineat.","english":"And about this equivocation of having, enough has been said. But perhaps someone may doubt why, when he earlier named having as a genus, he now posits that same thing as equivocal. But this question is resolved as follows. It is not absurd for the same predicament to be predicated now univocally, now equivocally. Univocally, indeed, as above, when he set forth examples of the same species, as being shod or being armed; for of such things this is the genus. Equivocally, however, as in those modes which we set forth above. But if the predication of having also has some proper species of having, and the name itself is said in many ways, nothing is incongruous in its being counted in a genus; for it is sufficient to demonstrate that the predication of having is a genus, that it contains under itself some parts and species.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]}]}