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Latin · Treatises ·

In Categorias Aristotelis Libri Quatuor

Boethius. Severinus · ogl-pl

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machine-draft · no human review 343 passages · 81,946 words translation only — commentary and dossier not yet generated

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0 commentary units 2 derived notes 0 open questions 343 narrative
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  • coverageNo English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed.
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  • structurePassages: 343 narrative.
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tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:301 · narrative
Source · Latin

Semper enim bene mobilior ad virtutem fiet, vel quodcunque crementum sumpserit Za principio. Quare verisimile est amplius eum sumere crementum, et hoc dum semper fit, perfecte in contrarium habitum restituetur, nisi forte tempore suspensum sit. Verum in privatione et habitu impossibile estmutationem in alterutrum fieri, sed ex habitu quidem in privationem fit mutatio, a privatione vero in habitum impossibile est neque enim qui cæcus factus est, rursus vidit, neque cum esset calvus, rursus comatus est factus, nec cum esset sine dentibus, dentes iterum orti sunt.

Aliam rursus contrariorum et hujus oppositionis quae secundum habitum privationemque dicitur, discrepantiam ponit. Ea enim quæ contraria sunt, possunt in alterna variatis vicibus permutari. Quod enim calidum est potest effici frigidum, rursusque quod frigidum est potest in caloris verti qualitatem. His tamen (ut dictum est) solis exceptis, quibus una quælibet res contrariorum naturaliter insita est, in his enim solis fieri non potest alterna mutatio: in his vero quae accidenter et non per naturam subjectis eveniunt,fit semper in contraria permutatio, ut ex sano aegrum, ex segro rursus sanum corpus efficitur animalis.

English

For it will always become more readily changeable toward virtue, or whatever increase it has taken from the beginning. Wherefore it is likely that it takes a further increase, and while this continually happens, it will be perfectly restored into the contrary state, unless perhaps it has been suspended in time. But in privation and state it is impossible for a change to occur into either one of the two, but from state indeed a change occurs into privation, yet from privation into state is impossible; for neither did he who has become blind see again, nor when he was bald did he become hairy again, nor when he was without teeth did teeth grow again.

He again sets out another discrepancy of contraries and of this opposition which is called according to state and privation. For those things which are contraries can be changed into one another by alternating turns. For what is hot can be made cold, and again what is cold can be turned into the quality of heat. With these alone, however (as has been said), excepted, to which any one of the contraries is naturally implanted in a thing, for in these alone an alternating change cannot occur; but in those which happen accidentally and not by nature to their subjects, a change into contraries always occurs, as from healthy a sick body of a living being is made, and from sick again healthy.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:302 · narrative
Source · Latin

Jam vero illud verum est, ex bono proclivior semper semita videtur ad malum, et facillima esse exprobitate admalitiampermutatio, quod Terentiano docetur exemplo: A labore proclivom ad libidinem.Sed quanquam difficilis sit transitus ad virtutes a turpitudine vitiorum,Aristoteles tamen fieri posse hunc transitum confirmat.Hujua enim philosopbi sententia est, virtutes non esse scientias,ut Socrates ait,neque ut Stoici naturaliter eas esse,sed discibiles, et per quamdam boni consueludinem hominum mentibus inseriri.Atque ideo si quis sit quibuslibet prioribus vitiis obnoxius, si eum melior sermo susceperit,etsapientium consuetudine confabulationeque comatur,aliquid ex ante actis vitiorum illecebris emendabitur, et sese aliquantulum exuet, et paululum liberior ad meliora procedet.Ita ut sit primo quidem minus malus, post vero non malus, deinde jam jamque aliquantulum bonus.Cuisi hujusmodiintensiofrequentissimefiat, nec parvitate temporis præveniatur,aut ei terminus mortis offecerit, non est dubium illum ex pessimo perprobasconsuetudiDesconfabulationesquesapientum,in perfectam virtutis habitudinem permutari.

English

Now indeed that is true, that from good the path always seems more inclined toward evil, and that the change from uprightness to malice is very easy, as is taught by the example of Terence: from toil, prone to lust. But although the passage from the baseness of vices to virtues is difficult, Aristotle nevertheless confirms that this passage can come about. For it is the opinion of this philosopher that virtues are not forms of knowledge, as Socrates says, nor, as the Stoics hold, naturally present, but teachable, and implanted in human minds through a certain habituation to good. And therefore if anyone is liable to any former vices whatsoever, if a better discourse takes him up, and he is cultivated by the company and conversation of the wise, he will be corrected somewhat from the allurements of the vices previously committed, and will strip himself of them to some extent, and proceed a little more free toward better things. Thus he is at first indeed less evil, afterward not evil, then already and at length somewhat good. If an intensification of this kind occurs very frequently, and is not forestalled by shortness of time, or cut off by the limit of death, there is no doubt that he is changed from the worst, through the excellent habits and conversations of the wise, into a perfect state of virtue.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:303 · narrative
Source · Latin

Est igitur ex bono in malum, et ex malo in bonum rursus permulatio,atque hoc quidem fit in contrariis.In habitu vero et privatione non fit, est namque permutatio,sed haec una tantum,nulla ratione sese convertens; ait enim: Ab habitu ad privationem permutatio,a privatione vero ad habitum impossibile est. Et hoc planissime docet exemplis. Quis enim unquam ex caeco factus est videns? quis aliquando calvus crinitus efficitur? cui amissis ætate dentibus rursus alii procreantur? Quare si in contrariis fit alterna mutatio,in privatione vero atque habitu non fit, distat haec oppositio ab ea scilicet oppositione quæ fit secundum contrarias qualitates.

English

There is therefore a change from good to evil, and again from evil to good, and this indeed occurs in contraries. But in habit and privation it does not occur; for there is change, but this is only one way, in no way reversing itself. For he says: from habit to privation there is change, but from privation to habit it is impossible. And he teaches this most plainly by examples. For who was ever made seeing from blind? Who at any time becomes hairy from bald? For whom, when teeth are lost by age, are others again produced? Wherefore, if in contraries there is an alternating change, but in privation and habit there is not, this opposition differs from that opposition which occurs according to contrary qualities.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:304 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quæcunque vero tanquam afftrmatio et negatio oppositasunt,palam est quod nullo prædictorum modorum opposita sunt In solis enim isti necessarium est semper aliud quidem eorum verum,aliud autem falsum esse,neque enim in contrariis necessarium est semper, alterum verum esse,alterum falsum,neque in ias quæ sunt ad aliquid,neque in habitu et privatione, ut sanitas et languor contraria sunt,et neutrum neque verum neque falsum est.Similiter duplum et dimidium tan-; quam relativa opposita sunt,et nOn est eorum alterum, neque verum,neque falsum,sed neque ea quæ secundum privationem et habitum dicuntur, sicut visus et cæcitas.Omnino autem eorum quæ secundum complexionem ullam dicuntur,nihil neque verum,neque falsum est porro, autem quae dicta sunt, sine complexione dicuntur.

English

But whatever things are opposed as affirmation and negation, it is clear that they are opposed in none of the aforesaid ways. For in these alone it is necessary that one of them is always true and the other false. For neither in contraries is it necessary that one is always true and the other false, nor in those which are relative, nor in habit and privation, as health and sickness are contraries, and neither is true or false. Similarly, double and half are opposed as relatives, and neither of them is true or false; but neither are those which are said according to privation and habit, such as sight and blindness. In general, moreover, of those which are said according to any combination, nothing is true or false; but further, the things which have been said are said without combination.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:305 · narrative
Source · Latin

Expositis his differentiis quibus vel contrariis relativa, vel privatio et habitus relativis, vel rursus privatio et habitus contrariis discreparent.,nunc sequitur quid his omnibus secundum affirmationem negationemque opposita distent,et dat signum proprium affirmationis et negationis, ut eas semper quæramus agnoscere,ut si qua sint quae hoc signo minime teneantur, ilia ab affirmationis negationisque oppositione differre dicamus.In affirmatione enim et negatione fieri non potest, ut si affirmatio vera sit, statim falsa negatio non sit; si negatio vera, aftirmatio mendacii nota carere possit,ut si quis dicat, Socrates ambulat, Socrates non ambulat. Si verum est Socratem ambulare,falsum est non ambulare, et rursus siverum est non ambulare,falsum est ambulare.Elanc autem veri falsique divisionem nullus unquam in aliis opp ositionibus poterit invenire.Namin his quai sunt ad aliquid non solum non est necesse oppositionem ipsam sibi verum falsumque dividere,sed in his nulla omnino neque veritas, neque falsitas invenitur.Si quis enim dicat hoc tantum, pater, vel rursus,filius, neque verum aliquid neque falsum pronuntiat. Et in contrariis quoque idem est,nam cum bono malum sit contrarium, si quis nominet bonum, et si quis rursus simpliciter pronuntiet malum,nulla in hac prædicatione neque falsitas, neque veritas est.

English

These differences having been set out, by which either relatives are distinguished from contraries, or privation and habit from relatives, or again privation and habit from contraries, there now follows what those things opposed according to affirmation and negation differ in from all these, and he gives the proper mark of affirmation and negation, so that we always seek to recognize them, so that if there are any things that are not held by this mark, we may say that they differ from the opposition of affirmation and negation. For in affirmation and negation it cannot happen that if the affirmation is true, the negation is not immediately false; if the negation is true, the affirmation can be free of the mark of falsehood—as if someone says, Socrates walks, Socrates does not walk. If it is true that Socrates walks, it is false that he does not walk; and again, if it is true that he does not walk, it is false that he walks. But this division of true and false no one will ever be able to find in other oppositions. For in those things that are relative, not only is it not necessary that the opposition itself divide true and false between them, but in these no truth at all, nor falsehood, is found. For if someone says only this, father, or again, son, he pronounces nothing either true or false. And the same holds in contraries as well, for since evil is contrary to good, if someone names good, and if someone again simply pronounces evil, there is in this predication neither falsehood nor truth.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:306 · narrative
Source · Latin

Eodem quoque se modo habet etiam in his quae secundum habitum privationemque dicuntur.Similiter enim nihil neque verum, neque falsum est, si quis visum nominet vel caecitatem,hoc autem idcirco evenit, quia omnia, quaecunque sunt, in quibus aut falsitas,aut veritas invenitur,secundum aliquam complexionem dicuntur. Ea vero quae simpliciter proferuntur, veri atque falsi prolatione carent,ut ipse ait,cum in principio omnia prædicamenta numeraret, dicens singula eorum quæ essent dicta in nulla affirmatione dici, quadam vero complexione inter se horum praedicamentorum veritatem falsitatemque gigni,de quibus Aristoteles edocuit præter complexionem aliquam in sermonibus veritatem falsitatemque inveniri non posse. Si quidam exemplo quoque hoc manifestum est. Si enim dixero, Socrates homo est, aut verum aut falsum est.Quod si boc tantum dicam Socrates, aut rursus, homo, nihil in eo neque veritatis neque falsitatisest.Quocircaquoniam omnis affirmatio cum complexione profertur, potest in ea, aut veritas, aut falsitas inveniri. Ea vero quae sunt ad aliquid simpliciter et sine ulla complexione dicuntur.Similiter autem et contraria,et ea quae sunt secundum habitum privationemque sibimet opposita, ut est pater filius,bonum malum,visus caecitas,qua; quomam sine complexione dicuntur (ubi autem complexio non est, illic nec falsitas neque veritas est.

English

It is related in the same way also in those things which are spoken of according to habit and privation. For similarly nothing is either true or false, if someone names sight or blindness. This happens for the reason that all things whatsoever, in which either falsity or truth is found, are spoken of according to some combination. But those things which are uttered simply lack the expression of true and false, as he himself says, when at the beginning he enumerated all the categories, saying that each of them which were spoken is said in no affirmation, but by a certain combination of these categories among themselves truth and falsehood are generated, concerning which Aristotle taught that apart from some combination in words truth and falsehood cannot be found. If someone wishes, this is also made clear by an example. For if I say, Socrates is a man, it is either true or false. But if I say only Socrates, or again, man, there is in it nothing of either truth or falsehood. Wherefore, since every affirmation is brought forth with combination, in it either truth or falsity can be found. But those things which are relative are said simply and without any combination. Similarly also contraries, and those which are opposed to one another according to habit and privation, as are father and son, good and evil, sight and blindness, which, because they are said without combination (and where there is no combination, there is neither falsity nor truth).

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:307 · narrative
Source · Latin

In affirmationibus vero solis et negationibus quas secundum complexionem dicuntur,aut veritas, aut falsitas reperitur, secundum affirmationem et negationem oppositio a cunctis aliis superioribus distat.

Sed maxime videbitur hoc tale contingere in his quæ secundum complexionem contraria dicuntur. Sanum namque esse Socratem,ad languere Socratem contrarium est, sed neque in his necessarium est alterum semper verum, alterum autem falsum esse,cum enim Socrates sit,erit illud qui'lem verum, illud vero falsum; cum vero non sit,arnbo falsa sunt, neque enim languere, neque sanum esse, verum est, cum non sit ipse Socrates omnino. In privatione vero et habitu cum non sit,neutrum verum est; cum vero sit,non semper erit alterum verum, alterum autem falsum. Habere namque visum Socratem ad id quod est Socratem crecum esse oppositum est, sicut privatio et habitus. Et cum sit, necessarium non est alterum verum vel falsum esse,cum enim nondum natus est habere,utraque falsa sunt; et cum non sit omnino Sor.rates,sic quoque falsa sunt ulraque,et visum eum habere,et cæcum esse.

English

But in affirmations alone and negations which are called according to combination, either truth or falsity is found; the opposition according to affirmation and negation differs from all other superior oppositions.

But this sort of thing will seem to occur especially in those things which are called contraries according to combination. For Socrates to be healthy is contrary to Socrates to be sick, but not even in these is it necessary that one always be true and the other false. For when Socrates exists, the one will indeed be true and the other false; but when he does not exist, both are false, for neither to be sick nor to be healthy is true, since Socrates himself does not exist at all. In privation and habit, however, when he does not exist, neither is true; but when he exists, it will not always be that one is true and the other false. For Socrates to have sight is opposed to Socrates to be blind, as privation and habit. And when he exists, it is not necessary that one be true or false; for when he has not yet been born, both are false; and when Socrates does not exist at all, both are likewise false, both that he has sight and that he is blind.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:308 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quoniam videntur quædam contraria secundum complexionem dici,in quibus aut falsitas reperitur aut veritas, sed neque ut affirmatio sit neque ut negatio,de his quoque dicit, quid distent his complexionibus, quae secundum affirmationem negationemque dicuntur. Nam sicut aegritudo est contraria sanitati, ita quoque aegrotum esse Socratem, ei quod est sanum esse contrarium est. Oratio quoque quae dicit Socrates sanus est, contraria est ei quae pronuntiat Socrates aegrotat. In his ergo et veritas invenituret falsitas.Quod igitur haec distant ea oppositione quae secundum vim affirmationis aut negationis opponitur,boc scilicet quod subsistente re,de qua utraque dicuntur,utrumlibet eorum verum est, si tamen ea contraria praedicantur,quae mediis carent, nam vivente et subsistente Socrate,quoniam aegritudo et sanitas immediata contraria sunt,si quis de Socrate dicat: Socrates sanus est, rursusque alius pronuntiet: Socrates cegrotat, unam veram, unam falsam esse necesse est.

English

Since certain contraries seem to be spoken of according to combination, in which either falsity or truth is found, but neither so as to be an affirmation nor a negation, he also speaks about these, namely in what way they differ from those combinations which are spoken of according to affirmation and negation. For just as sickness is contrary to health, so too for Socrates to be sick is contrary to his being healthy. Also the statement which says "Socrates is healthy" is contrary to the one which declares "Socrates is sick." In these, therefore, both truth and falsity are found. But that these differ from the opposition which is opposed according to the force of affirmation or negation is clear from this, namely that when the thing of which both are said subsists, either one of them is true, if only those contraries are predicated which lack intermediates. For while Socrates lives and subsists, since sickness and health are immediate contraries, if someone says of Socrates "Socrates is healthy," and again another declares "Socrates is sick," one must be true and the other false.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:309 · narrative
Source · Latin

Socrates enim vivens aut aegrotataut sanus est,et si verum esteum ægrotare,sanum esse falsumest,et si falsum esteegrotare, sanum esse verum est; si vero Socrates ipse non subsistat nequeomnino sit,utrumque de eo falsum est dicere,quoniam aegrotat et sanus est.Qui enim omnino non est,neque omnino poterit aegrotus esse nec sanus.Ergo in contrariis subsistente re de quapraedicantur,semperunapraedicatio veraest,alia falsa,in his scilicet contrariic nrp ppcundum complexionem dicuntur et carri: •':: subsistente autem re, contrarietates utræque sunt falsæ. Illa vero quae secundum privationem habitumquedicuntur, si cum complexione praedicentur, et subsistat res,non necesse est aliam veram esse,aliam falsam, et cum res omnino non sit,utræque sunt falsæ.Socrates enim cum sit jam in suæ matris alvo,et nondum sit genitus in lucem quidem editus non est,ipse tamen est atque vivit,sed tunc neque videns est neque cæcus,et videns quidem non est; quoniam nondum in lucem est editus. Caecus vero idcirco non dicitur, quoniam adhuc videre non poterat. Ergo cum siL alque subsistat res de qua habitua et privatio prædicantur, potest fieri ut de ea falsa utraque praedicentur; si vero res de qua dicitur non sit,omnino utrasque falsas esse necesse est,ut cum Socrates omnino non est, falsum est eum dicere vel videntem esse vel caecum.

English

For if Socrates is alive, he is either sick or healthy; and if it is true that he is sick, it is false that he is healthy; and if it is false that he is sick, it is true that he is healthy. But if Socrates himself does not subsist or exist at all, it is false to say either of him, since he is sick and healthy. For one who does not exist at all can neither be sick nor healthy at all. Therefore, in the case of contraries, when the thing of which they are predicated subsists, one predication is always true and the other false—namely, in those contraries which are spoken of according to combination. But when the thing does not subsist, both contrarieties are false. However, those things which are spoken of according to privation and habit, if they are predicated with combination and the thing subsists, it is not necessary that one be true and the other false; and when the thing does not exist at all, both are false. For when Socrates is already in his mother's womb and has not yet been brought forth into the light—indeed, he has not been born—he nevertheless exists and lives, but at that time he is neither seeing nor blind; and he is not seeing, because he has not yet been brought forth into the light. But he is not called blind for the reason that he was not yet able to see. Therefore, even if the thing of which habit and privation are predicated subsists, it can happen that both are predicated falsely of it; but if the thing of which it is said does not exist, it is entirely necessary that both be false, as when Socrates does not exist at all, it is false to say that he is either seeing or blind.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:310 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ille enim videt atque caecus est qui vivit atque subsistit, cum vero de quo diciturnon sit omnino,utraque de eo falso dicuntur. In catulis quoqueidem est,nam cum jam sunt editi, subsistunt quidem; sed neque cæci sunt neque videntes, quia nondum per naturam visum habere potuerunt. Sin vero omnino non sint, rursus falsum est de his utrumque prædicari.In affirmatione vero et negatione non ita est, ut ipse pronuntiat.

In affirmatione vero etnegationesemper siue sil,sive non sit, aliud quidem verum erit, aliud vero falsum, languere namque Socratem et non languere Socratem, cum ipse sit palamest,quia alterum eorum verum,alterum vero falsum est, et cum non sit, simitiler; languere enim cum non sit,falsum est,non languere aulem uerum. Quare in his solis proprium erit, semper alterum eorum verum, alterum falsum esse,quæcunque tanquam affirmatio et negatio opposita sunt.

English

For he who lives and subsists both sees and is blind, but when that of which it is predicated does not exist at all, both are said falsely of it. The same holds in the case of puppies, for when they have already been born, they indeed subsist; but they are neither blind nor seeing, because they have not yet been able by nature to have sight. But if they do not exist at all, again it is false that either is predicated of them. In affirmation and negation, however, it is not so, as he himself declares.

In affirmation and negation, always, whether it exists or does not exist, one will be true and the other false. For that Socrates is sick and that Socrates is not sick, when he himself is evident, is clear, because one of them is true and the other false; and when he does not exist, similarly: for that he is sick, when he does not exist, is false, but that he is not sick is true. Wherefore in these alone it will be proper that always one of them is true and the other false, whatever are opposed as affirmation and negation.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:311 · narrative
Source · Latin

In affirmatione,inquil,et negationesiveressubjecta subsistat,sive non sit omnino,semper in una veritas,in aJiafalsitas inveniuntur.Non esseenim idem dicere aegrotare aliquem quod non esse sanum,nec idem caecum esse quod non videre perspicacissime docet. Nam qui segrotat nisi subsistat non potest eegrotare. Non esse autem sanum,non ita est, nam etiamsi non sit omnino aliquis,potest de eo qui non est haec negatio praedicari. Quod enim omnino non est,sanum esse non potest,quodsanumessenon potest non est utique sanum.Eodem quoque modo est et de caecitate et de visu, neque enim idem est dicere cæcum esse aliquem quod non videre; qui enim cæcus est, subsistit vivitque, ut sit caecus, non videre vero eLiam de omnino non subsistente dici potest. Qui enim non subsistit omnino videre non potest,et qui videre non potest non videt.Quocircain affirmatione et negatione sive sit de quo dicitur, sive non sit, una semper vera est,altera falsa. Nam cum sit Socrates et vivat, si de eo verum est dicere, quoniam videt,falsum est dicere,quoniam non videt, et si de eo verum est dicere, quoniam sanus est, falsum est dicere de eo quoniam non. est sanus. 6i negationes verae sunt, falsae sunt affirmationes. Si vero res subjecta non subsistat omnino, de ea quidem affirmatio falsa est, negatio semper vera.

English

In affirmation, he says, and in negation, whether the subject subsists or does not exist at all, one is always found to be true and the other false. For he teaches most clearly that to say someone is sick is not the same as to say he is not healthy, nor is to be blind the same as not to see. For one who is sick cannot be sick unless he subsists. But not to be healthy is not so, for even if someone does not exist at all, this negation can be predicated of him who does not exist. For what does not exist at all cannot be healthy, and what cannot be healthy is certainly not healthy. In the same way it holds also concerning blindness and sight, for to say someone is blind is not the same as not to see; for one who is blind subsists and lives, so that he may be blind, but not to see can be said even of one who does not subsist at all. For one who does not subsist at all cannot see, and one who cannot see does not see. Wherefore in affirmation and negation, whether that of which it is said exists or does not exist, one is always true and the other false. For when Socrates exists and lives, if it is true to say of him that he sees, it is false to say that he does not see, and if it is true to say of him that he is healthy, it is false to say of him that he is not healthy. If the negations are true, the affirmations are false. But if the subject does not subsist at all, the affirmation concerning it is indeed false, and the negation is always true.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:312 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nostro enim tempore cum Socrates non est neque subsistit, si quis dicat Socrates videt, et alius dicat Socrates non videt, laisum quidem est de eo dicere, quoniam videt, verum autem quoniam non videt. Qui enim omnino non est, videre non potest,qui videre non potest,non videt. Ita firmum immutabileque semper manet in affirmationibus et negationibus alteram semper veram,alteram falsam in praedicatione constitui.Quocirca quoniam in contrariisetin iisquae secundum privationem babitumque sunt,si cum complexione utraque dicantur de re non subsistente,falsasunt utraquequaepraedicantur.Cum hoc idem in affirmationibus et negationibus non sit,omnes cæteræ oppositiones ab affirmatione etnegatione dissentiunt.Monstratgesuntigituroppostiones quatuor et sex differentiae: una quidem contrariorum et ejus quæ est ad aliquid; secunda contrariorum et eorum quæ sunt secundum babitum et privationem; tertia contrariorum et ejus oppositionis quas est secundum affirmationem et negationem; quarta relativorum et ejus quae est secundum habitum et privationem; quintarelativorum et ejus quæ est affirmationisetnegationis; sexta privationis et habitus ad negationem etaffirmationem.Sed post has oppositionum differentias quaedam decontrariis ad multasproficientia quaestionesabAristoteles traduntur.

English

For in our time, when Socrates does not exist and does not subsist, if one person says "Socrates sees" and another says "Socrates does not see," it is false indeed to say of him that he sees, but true that he does not see. For he who does not exist at all cannot see, and he who cannot see does not see. Thus it remains firm and immutable that in affirmations and negations one is always true and the other false in predication. Wherefore, since in contraries and in those things which are according to privation and habit, if both are said with combination concerning a thing that does not subsist, both of the things predicated are false. Since this is not the same in affirmations and negations, all the other oppositions differ from affirmation and negation. There are therefore, he shows, four oppositions and six differences: one indeed of contraries and of that which is relative; the second of contraries and of those which are according to habit and privation; the third of contraries and of that opposition which is according to affirmation and negation; the fourth of relatives and of that which is according to habit and privation; the fifth of relatives and of that which is of affirmation and negation; the sixth of privation and habit in relation to negation and affirmation. But after these differences of oppositions, certain things concerning contraries, useful for many questions, are handed down by Aristotle.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:313 · narrative
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Contrarium autem est bono quidem ex necessitate malum, hoc autem palam est persinguloruminductionem,ut sanitati languor,etjustitiæ injustitia,et fortitudini timiditas, similiter autem et in aliis.Malo autem aliquando bonum quidem est contrariumyaliquando autem malum, egestati enim, cum sit malum superabundantia contraria est, cum etiam ipsa sit malum. Similiter autem et mediocritas contraria utrique cum sit, bonum est, sed in paucis hoc tale quispiam inspiciet, in pluribus vero semper malo bonum contrarium est.

Hoc loco monstratur quod omne bonum semper malo contrarium est, non autem omni malo semper bonum, nam quodcunque fuerit bonum, solum illi malum contrarium est,malo autem et bonum potest esse contrarium et malum. Sanitati enim quaebona est, aegritudo quae est mala, contraria est. Rursus felicitati quae est bona, infelicitas quae ipsa quoque est mala, contraria est. Est autem invenire malum quod duashabetcontrarietates, boni scilicet alterius mali.

English

But to good, evil is necessarily contrary, and this is evident by induction in individual cases, as sickness to health, injustice to justice, and cowardice to courage, and similarly in other cases. But to evil, sometimes good is contrary and sometimes evil; for to poverty, since it is evil, abundance is contrary, since it too is evil. Similarly also the mean, since it is contrary to both, is good, but in few cases will anyone observe such a thing, whereas in most cases good is always contrary to evil.

In this place it is shown that every good is always contrary to evil, but not to every evil is good always contrary; for whatever good there is, only evil is contrary to it, but to evil both good can be contrary and evil. For to health, which is good, sickness, which is evil, is contrary. Again, to happiness, which is good, unhappiness, which is itself also evil, is contrary. But it is possible to find an evil that has two contrarieties, namely of another good and of another evil.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:314 · narrative
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Nam cum ea sunt contraria quae a se plurimum distent,cum sit timiditas habitus animi pessimus,duas habet contrarielates, temeritatem scilicet et fortitudinem,nam qui omnia timetetest timidus, et qui nibil timet omnino in quo esttemeritas,longe a sese distant et discrepant, quocirca sibi contraria sunt, cum utraque sint mala.Rursus quoniam bonum malo contrarium, et fortitudo bona est, timiditas mala erit, et erit fortitudini contraria oppositaque timiditas.Duæ igitur contrarietates opponuntur timiditati, temeritas et fortitudo; sed temeritas contraria estsecundum Jongissimam distantiam quantitatemque discrepantis habitus atque contrarii. Timiditas vero fortitudini videtur opposita,secundum qualitatem bonitatis atque malitiae. Quare sufficienter est demonstratum bona semper malis esse contraria, mala vero etiam malis. Inductio autem est singulorum exemplorum collectio, etaduniversalem per ea cognitionem collectionemque reductio, ut si quis dicat qui musicam novit musicus est,et ab ea denominatur, et medicus qui medicinam,rursus qui grammaticam grammaticus,et ex his singulis rebuscolligat universaliter,etquicunquealiquamartem novit ejusdem denominatione signatur. uta grammatica grammaticus, a medicina medicus, et caetera hujusmodi. Quocirca hoc quod supra diximus de contrariis, Aristoteles exemplorum planissima inductione firmavit.

English

For since those things are contrary which differ most from each other, and since cowardice is the worst habit of mind, it has two contrarieties, namely rashness and courage. For the one who fears everything is cowardly, and the one who fears nothing at all, in whom there is rashness, are far distant and different from each other; wherefore they are contrary to each other, since both are evil. Again, since good is contrary to evil, and courage is good, cowardice will be evil, and cowardice will be contrary and opposed to courage. Therefore two contrarieties are opposed to cowardice, rashness and courage; but rashness is contrary according to the longest distance and the quantity of a differing and contrary habit. But cowardice seems opposed to courage according to the quality of goodness and malice. Wherefore it has been sufficiently demonstrated that good things are always contrary to evil things, but evil things also to evil things. But induction is the collection of individual examples, and a reduction to universal knowledge and collection through them, as if someone should say that the one who knows music is a musician, and is denominated from it, and a physician who knows medicine, again a grammarian who knows grammar, and from these individual things he should collect universally that whoever knows any art is designated by its denomination, as a grammarian from grammar, a physician from medicine, and other such things. Wherefore what we said above about contraries, Aristotle confirmed by the clearest induction of examples.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:315 · narrative
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Illud quoque addidit mala posse malis esse contraria,in paucissimis inveniri, semper autom mala bonis esse contraria.Nam et in hie ipsis in quibus mala malis contraria sunt, inest tamen ut etiam simul bonis contraria esse videantur,uttimiditas, quoniam temeritati contraria est, simul est etiam fortitudini contraria. Sed non necesse est, ut quodcunquemalum bonoest contrarium,mox etiam mali esse contrarium, ut aegritudo sanitati quidem, quod est bonum contraria est, alii vero malo contraria non est. Recte igitur dictum est, malum malo contrarium in paucioribus inveniri.

Amplius contrarium non necessarium est,si alterum sit, et reliquum esse. Sanis namque omnibus, sanitas quidemerit, languor vero non erit.Similiter autem si omnes albi sint, albedo quidem erit, nigredo vero non erit. Amplius si Socratem esse sanum, ad id quoa est Socratem languere contrarium est, cum non sit possibile utrumque eidem inesse simul, non erit possibile, cum alterum contrarium sit, et reliquum esse; cum enim hocalterumcontrariumsityet reliquum esse; cum enim hoc sit,Socratem sanum esse,non erit illud languere Socratem.

English

He also added this: that evils can be contrary to evils is found in very few cases, but that evils are always contrary to goods. For even in those very cases in which evils are contrary to evils, it is nevertheless inherent that they also seem at the same time to be contrary to goods, as timidity, since it is contrary to rashness, is at the same time also contrary to courage. But it is not necessary that whatever evil is contrary to a good should presently also be contrary to an evil, as sickness is indeed contrary to health, which is a good, but is not contrary to another evil. Rightly, therefore, it was said that an evil is found to be contrary to an evil in fewer cases.

Moreover, it is not necessary that if one contrary exists, the other also exists. For if all are healthy, health indeed will exist, but sickness will not. Similarly, if all are white, whiteness indeed will exist, but blackness will not. Moreover, if Socrates is healthy, to this, that Socrates is healthy, being sick is contrary, since it is not possible for both to be present in the same thing at the same time; it will not be possible, when one contrary exists, for the other also to exist; for when this one contrary exists, that Socrates is healthy, that other, that Socrates is sick, will not exist.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:316 · narrative
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Dictum est in relatione, quaedam relativa simul esse naturaliter, ut cum sit filius, pater est, cum verositpater,sine filio esse non posse. Quocirca simul semper sunt pater et filius,hoc vero in contrariis non est. Ait enim non necesse est simul semper esse contraria. Si enim nullus aegrotet et sint omnes sani, cum sit sanitas, non erit ægritudo,et una contranetate manente, alia omnino non ent, ut si quis hoc idem dicat de cygnis, etenim omnes cygni sunt albi, in cygnis nigredo non erit.Atque hoc idem ad universalia referendum est.Nam si omnia quae sunt alba sunt, omnino nigredo non erit. Tractum autem hoc videturessesigillatimapartibus.Nam quod duo contraria in eodem uno eodemque tempore esse non possunl,ut Socrates cum sanus est,ægrotus non est, et cum sanus est, manente sanitate, non esse poterit aegritudo. Et non erit necessarium uno contrario posito,moxsubsequi alterum. Nam si necesse esset uno contrario constituto, mox aliquid sequi,posset idem Socrates uno eodemque tempore, et sanus esse et aeger, quod fieri non potest. Non est igitur necesse cum sit una contrarietas mox aliam sequi. Quocirca fieri potest ut cum unum contrarium sit, aliud non sit. Idque in singularlbus etiam necesse est, ut in eo quod est Socratem esse sanum, non est Socratem aegrotare, quod Socratis sanitati est contrarium.

English

It was said in the discussion of relation that certain relatives are naturally simultaneous, as when there is a son, there is a father, and when there is a father, he cannot be without a son. Therefore father and son are always simultaneous, but this is not the case with contraries. For he says that it is not necessary for contraries always to be simultaneous. For if no one is sick and all are healthy, while health exists, sickness will not exist, and with one contrary remaining, the other will not exist at all, as if someone should say the same thing about swans: for all swans are white, so in swans there will be no blackness. And this same point must be referred to universals. For if all things that exist are white, there will be no blackness at all. But this seems to be drawn from particular parts. For two contraries cannot be in the same one and the same time, as when Socrates is healthy, he is not sick, and when he is healthy, with health remaining, sickness cannot exist. And it will not be necessary that when one contrary is posited, the other immediately follows. For if it were necessary that when one contrary is established, something immediately follow, the same Socrates could at one and the same time be both healthy and sick, which cannot happen. Therefore it is not necessary that when one contrariety exists, another immediately follows. Wherefore it can happen that while one contrary exists, the other does not. And in singulars this is even necessary, as in the case that Socrates is healthy, Socrates is not sick, which is contrary to Socrates' health.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:317 · narrative
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Socrates enim quanquam contrariorum susceptibilis sit,quoniam substantiaest,tamen uno eodemque tempore contraria utraque non suscipit.

Palam vero est quod et circa idem aut specie aut genere natura habent fieri contraria: langiiornamque et sanitas in corpore animalis natura habent fieri,albedo autem et nigredo simpliciter in corpore.justitia vero in anima hominis et injustitia.

Docet circa quae semper possint esse contraria. Ait enim circa eas res quae aut genere eadem sint, aut specie, ut est corpus quidem animalis unum secundum genus, omnium enim animalium unum genus est, et circa hoc ægritudo vel sanitas invenitur. Similiter et circa corpus omne indiscrete, vel anim alis vel inanimati, albedo et nigredo est, quod scilicet omne corpus etipsum secundum genus est,unum, namque his genus est substantia.Justitia quoque et injustitia in anima est. Omnis autem anima quae justitiam injustiliamque suscipit,rationalis est,id est hominis; sed omnes homines idem sunt secundum speciem,omnes igituranimae eædem secundum speciem sunt; justitia ergo et injustitia circa easdem res secundum speciem reperiuntur. Quocirca recte jam conclusum est, omnia contraria circa easdem res vel secundum genus, vel secundum speciem inveniri.

English

For although Socrates is capable of receiving contraries, since he is a substance, nevertheless he does not receive both contraries at one and the same time.

But it is clear that contraries naturally come to be also around the same thing either in species or in genus: for sickness and health naturally come to be in the body of an animal, while whiteness and blackness come to be simply in body; but justice and injustice in the soul of a man.

He teaches around what things contraries can always exist. For he says that they are around those things which are either the same in genus or the same in species, as the body of an animal is indeed one according to genus—for there is one genus of all animals—and around this sickness or health is found. Similarly, also around every body without distinction, whether animate or inanimate, there is whiteness and blackness, inasmuch as every body is also itself one according to genus, for substance is their genus. Justice also and injustice are in the soul. But every soul that receives justice and injustice is rational, that is, the soul of a man; but all men are the same according to species, therefore all souls are the same according to species; justice therefore and injustice are found around the same things according to species. Wherefore it has now been rightly concluded that all contraries are found around the same things either according to genus or according to species.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:318 · narrative
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Necessarium est autem omnia contrariavelin eodem generefesse, vel in contrariis generibus esse vel ipsa genera esse. Album enim et nigrum in eodem genere sunt,cotor enim genus eorum est; justitia vero et injustitia in contrariis generibus, illius enim virtus,hujus autem nequitia genus est. Bonum vero et malum non sunt in genere, sed ipsa sunt genera aliquorum existentia.

Monstrat id quod reliquum est, id est ubi possunt semper contraria vestigari, omnia enim quae sunt contraria, aut sub eodem genere sunt,aut sub contrariis generibus, aut ipsa sunt genera. Sub eodem genere sunt contraria, ut album et nigrumsub uno genere, id est colore, color enim albedinis et nigredinis est genus.Hæc igitur sub uno sunt genere.Alia vero contraria in contrariis generibus inveniuntur, ut justitia et injustitia. Justitias enim genus est bonum, injustitiae vero malum, malum vero bono contrarium est, justitiæ ergo et injustitiasub contrariis generibus sunt. Rursus alia ipsa sunt genera,ut bonum et malum,utraquesuntgenera sub se malorum bonorumque positorum,et non hoc nunc dicitur quod bonitas et malitia nulIi alii generi subduntur,ponuntur enim sub qualitate. Sed particularium bonorum et malorum non essealiagenera, nisi ipsum bonum et malum generaliter.

English

It is necessary, however, that all contraries be either in the same genus, or in contrary genera, or themselves be genera. For white and black are in the same genus, for color is their genus; but justice and injustice are in contrary genera, for virtue is the genus of the one, and wickedness of the other. But good and evil are not in a genus, but are themselves genera, existing as genera of certain things.

He shows what remains, that is, where contraries can always be traced. For all things that are contraries are either under the same genus, or under contrary genera, or are themselves genera. Contraries are under the same genus, as white and black under one genus, that is, color, for color is the genus of whiteness and blackness. These, therefore, are under one genus. But other contraries are found in contrary genera, as justice and injustice. For the genus of justice is good, but of injustice, evil; and evil is contrary to good. Justice and injustice, therefore, are under contrary genera. Again, others are themselves genera, as good and evil, both of which are genera placed under themselves of evils and goods. And it is not said here that goodness and malice are subject to no other genus, for they are placed under quality. But [it is said] that there are no other genera of particular goods and evils except good and evil itself in general.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:319 · narrative
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Recte igitur bonum et malum aliorumparticulariumbonorum,malorumquegenera sunt numerata.Quare rectissime dictum est omnia contraria, aut sub eodem esse genere, ut album at nigrum sub colore, aut in contrariis generibus, ut justitia atqueinjustitia sub bono et malo, aut ipsa esse gcnera,ut est ipsum bonum et malum,quaegenera justitiae atque injustitiae numerata sunt.

DE MODIS PRIORIS.

Prius autem alterum altero dicitur quadrupliciter: primo quidem et maxime proprie secundum tempus, secundum quod antiquius alterum altero et senius dicitur,in eo enim quod tempus amplius est, et antiquius, et senius dicitur.

Postquam vero deoppositis disputationem quantum ad praesens tempus attinebat explicavit, nunc. quae priora dici possint, quae posteriora disserit. Et ait,primo quidem et proprie, et quod in usu prius dicimus, hoc est quando aliquam rem alia res tempore præcedit, et superat, et dum proprie loquimur secundum temporis præcessionem,aliud antiquius dicimus, aliud senius. Antiquius quidem in iis quae inanimata sunt, ut Porphyriu placet, se.nius vero in iis quae anima non carent: ut si quis dicat antiquius fuisse bellum Thebanorum atque Graecorum Trojae excidio, idcirco quod tempore praecedat,fnii namque ducum qui Thebano perire prælio, TrojaB praeliis interfuerunt, ut Diomedes Tydaei filius, et Stenelus filius Capanei.

English

Rightly, therefore, good and evil are counted as the genera of the other particular goods and evils. Wherefore it has been most rightly said that all contraries are either under the same genus, as white and black under color, or in contrary genera, as justice and injustice under good and evil, or are themselves genera, as good itself and evil itself, which have been counted as the genera of justice and injustice.

ON THE MODES OF THE PRIOR.

But one thing is said to be prior to another in four ways: first indeed and most properly according to time, according to which one thing is said to be more ancient and older than another; for in that which has more time, it is said to be both more ancient and older.

After he has explained the discussion concerning opposites, as far as pertained to the present time, he now discusses what things can be called prior and what posterior. And he says, first indeed and properly, and what we call prior in usage, that is, when one thing precedes and surpasses another in time, and while we speak properly according to precedence of time, we call one thing more ancient, another older. More ancient indeed in those things which are inanimate, as it pleases Porphyry, but older in those things which are not deprived of life: as if someone should say that the war of the Thebans was more ancient than the destruction of Troy, for the reason that it precedes in time; for the sons of the leaders who perished in the Theban war were present at the Trojan wars, as Diomedes the son of Tydeus, and Sthenelus the son of Capaneus.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:320 · narrative
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Atque hoc quidem ita, quoniamest etin rebus inanimatis quod antiquius dicitur,utcum dicimus antiquiorem esse dominationem regum in civitate Romana,quam consulum et magistratuum.In rebus vero animatis penius vocamus. Seniorem namque dicimus Pytbagoram Socrate, Socratem Aristotele,idcirco quod se temporibusantecedant.Ergoprius alterum altero dicitur proprie secundum tempus, prioris autem quatuor fuere distantiae, ut ipse Aristoteles dicit, cum ait:Priusalterum altero dicitur quadrupliciter. Easque sigillatim breviter enumerat, ad quas ipse addidit quintam, quae priscis philosophis esset incognita. Et quoniam de primo prioris modo dictum est, de secundo dicemus.

Secundo autem quod non convertitur secundum subsistendi consequentiam, ut unum duobus prius est: duobus enim existentibus, mox consequens est unum esse, uno autem existente, non est necessarium duo esse. Idcirco non convertitur ab uno consequentia, ut sit reliquum,prius autem videtur illud esse a quo non convertitur essendi consequentia.

English

And this is so, since even in inanimate things there is what is called prior, as when we say that the rule of kings in the Roman state is prior to that of consuls and magistrates. But in animate things we call it older. For we say that Pythagoras is older than Socrates, and Socrates than Aristotle, for the reason that they precede in time. Therefore one thing is said to be prior to another properly according to time; but of the prior there were four differences, as Aristotle himself says, when he states: One thing is said to be prior to another in four ways. And he briefly enumerates them one by one, to which he himself added a fifth, which was unknown to the earlier philosophers. And since we have spoken of the first mode of prior, we shall speak of the second.

In the second mode, that which is not convertible according to consequence of existence, as one is prior to two: for when two exist, it immediately follows that one is, but when one exists, it is not necessary that two be. Therefore the consequence is not convertible from one, so that the other follows; but that seems to be prior from which the consequence of being is not convertible.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:321 · narrative
Source · Latin

Secunda, inquit, significatio prioris est, quae non tempore intelligitur, sed natura, et hoc ait a quo non convertitur subsistendi consequentia. Nam si duae res ita sint oppositae, ut si una sit, necesse sit esse aliam, et si alia sit, non necesse sit esse aliam, illa prior est qua posita ut sit, non est aliam esse necesse, et hoc quidem universaliter dictum est. Planius vero his fiet exemplis.Binarius enim uumerus et unitas eam retinet naturam, ut si quis duo esse proponat, unum quoque esse monstraverit, unum enim in ipsis duobus concluditur,nec praeter duasunitatespoteritessebinarius.Quocirca si quis binarium numerum esse posuerit,unum quoque esse consequitur, idcirco binarius ut sit indiget unitate. Atvero si quis ponat esse uDltatem,nondum necesse est esse binarium. Ergo ab unitate subsistendi consequentia non convertitur. Posita enim unitatenecesse non fuit binarii numeri subsequi quantitatem, idcirco quod binario non indiget unitas,"sicut indigens erat unitate binarius. Quare prior est unitas binario: quod si ita est, et quidquid ita fuerit, ut ab eo subsistendi consequentia non convertatur,prius Aristoteleauctoreprobabitur,utin eoquod est homo et animal.Cumdicohominem, moxdixianimal; cum animal dixero, nihil adhuc de homine dictum est. Omnis enim homo animal est, non omne animal homo.

English

The second meaning of prior, he says, is that which is understood not by time but by nature, and this he says is that from which the consequence of existing is not convertible. For if two things are so opposed that, if one exists, the other must also exist, and if the other exists, the one need not exist, that is prior by whose positing the other need not exist, and this indeed has been stated universally. But it will become clearer by these examples. For the number two and unity retain this nature, that if anyone proposes that two exist, he will also have shown that one exists; for one is included in the two themselves, nor can the number two exist apart from two unities. Wherefore if anyone has posited that the number two exists, it follows that one also exists; therefore, in order that it be, the number two needs unity. But on the other hand, if anyone posits that unity exists, it is not yet necessary that the number two exist. Therefore, from unity the consequence of existing is not convertible. For with unity posited, it was not necessary that the quantity of the number two follow, because unity does not need the number two, as the number two was in need of unity. Wherefore unity is prior to the number two. But if this is so, whatever is such that from it the consequence of existing is not converted, will be proved prior by the authority of Aristotle, as in the case of man and animal. When I say man, I immediately also said animal; when I have said animal, nothing has yet been said about man. For every man is an animal, but not every animal is a man.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:322 · narrative
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Tertio vero secundum ordinem quemdam prius dicitur,quemadmodum et in disciplinis et in orationibus, nam et in demonstrativis diJciplinis est prius et posterius perordinem,elementa enim in gpometriapriora Sunt iis qucediscribunlur per ord.inem.Principia enim priora sunt theoremullbus ordine, et in grammatica elementa priore sunt syllabis,et in orationibus similiter proæmium prius est narratione, ordine.

Ponit tertiam prioris significationem, ut in geometria priora sunt, inquit,elementa descriptionibus Elementa vero ait quos terminos appellamus,id est ubi quid punctum sit, quid linea,quid figura praedi. citur.His enim cognitis et fideliter animo appreben sis, postea omnes geometriae descriptiones fiunt, quae problemata et theoremata nuncupantur. Ergo quoniam prius discuntur elementa, post ad descriptiones est transitus, priora sunt elementa descriptionibus, ordine scilicet, quoniam ut descriptio possit intelligi,prius elementa traduntur,etingrammaticaquoquepriussingulaetraduntur litteræ quam quae ex his syllabae conjungitur, quocirca ipso quoque ordine priores sunt syllabis. Rhetores vero non saepe a narratione, sed ab exordio agere causas incipiunt, ideo quod exordia narrationibus priora sunt ordine, quare tertius modus prioris iste est qui secundum nexum cujusdam ordinis in qualibet arte est constitutus.

English

Third, however, prior is said according to a certain order, as also in the disciplines and in speeches; for even in demonstrative disciplines there is a prior and a posterior by order. For the elements in geometry are prior to the things that are described in order. For the principles are prior to the theorems in order, and in grammar the elements are prior to the syllables, and in speeches likewise the proem is prior to the narration, in order.

He sets down the third signification of prior, as in geometry the elements, he says, are prior to the descriptions. But by elements he means what we call terms, that is, where it is stated what a point is, what a line is, what a figure is. For when these are known and faithfully grasped in the mind, afterward all the descriptions of geometry are made, which are called problems and theorems. Therefore, since the elements are learned first, and afterward there is a transition to the descriptions, the elements are prior to the descriptions, namely in order, since in order that a description may be understood, the elements are handed down first; and in grammar also the individual letters are handed down first before the syllable that is compounded from them, and for that reason they are also prior to syllables in order itself. But rhetoricians often begin to plead causes not from the narration but from the exordium, for the reason that exordia are prior to narrations in order. Wherefore this third mode of prior is that which is established according to the connection of a certain order in any art whatsoever.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:323 · narrative
Source · Latin

Amplius prseterea quæ dicta sunt, quod melius est et honorabilius prius naturaliter esse videtur,consueverunt enim et plurimi honorabiliores et magis asedilectos,priores dicere apud.se. Sed est pene alienissimu hic omnium modus,modi itaque qui dicti sunt de priore ferme isti sunt.

Dicit prius videri,quod neque secundum tempus aliquoties,neque secundum subsistendi consequentiam, nec secundum ordinem sit, sed quodcunque pretiosius fuerit, prius esse videatur, ut sol, luna prior est, et anima corpore, et animus anima. noc vero tali argumento probat,quod hi qui aliquos venerantur, et honorabiliores existimant, dicant eos apud se esse priores,et hi qui in rebus publicis p]urimum possunt,priores dicuntur ab his qui eos maxime venerantur. Sed ut ipse ait, alienissimus est a significatione prioris hic quartus in nunc est dictus modus, etenim de his melius dici potest,ut dicantur venerabiliores et honorabiles,ut vero priores dicantur,abusio potius quam ulla proprietas est. Quintus modus quem ipse addidit hujusmodi est.

English

Moreover, in addition to what has been said, it seems that what is better and more honorable is naturally prior. For very many people are accustomed to call those who are more honorable and more beloved prior in their own estimation. But this mode is almost entirely foreign to all the others. And so the modes that have been stated concerning the prior are roughly these.

He says that the prior seems to be what is sometimes neither according to time, nor according to consequence of subsistence, nor according to order, but whatever is more precious seems to be prior, as the sun is prior to the moon, and the soul to the body, and the mind to the soul. And he proves this by the following argument: that those who reverence certain people and consider them more honorable say that they are prior in their own estimation, and those who have the most power in public affairs are called prior by those who reverence them most. But, as he himself says, this fourth mode now mentioned is most foreign to the signification of prior. For concerning these things it can better be said that they are called more venerable and honorable, but to call them prior is an abuse rather than any propriety. The fifth mode, which he himself added, is of this kind.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:324 · narrative
Source · Latin

Videtur autem prjeter eos qui dicti sunt, alter esse prioris modus. Eorum enim quæ convertuntur secundum essentiae consequentiamjd quod alterius quolibet modo causa est,digne prius natura dicitur. Quod Jvero sunt quasdam hujusmodi palam est, esse namque hominem convertitur secundum essentiæ consequentiam ad veram orationem de se. Nam si est homo, vera est oratio quas dicitur, homo est,et si vera est oratio qua dicitur,homo est,consequitur esse hominem.Est autem quidem vera oratio nequaquam causa ut si res,verumamen videtur quodammodo res causa ut sit oratio uera. Ex eo enlm quod res est, vel non est,oratio uero aul faisa dicatur necesse est.Ideoque secundum quinQue modos prius alterum altero dicitur.

Novimus quasdam res in praedicatione posse converti. Quod si una earum quae convertuntur alteri causa est,et veluti naturalem subsistentiam subministrat, ilia naturaliter prius esse perhibetur. Ipse autem aptissimo quod proposuitaffirmavitexemplo. Nam si est aliqua res,verum est de ea dicere, quoniam est.Hursus si de ea verum est dicere quoniam est, illam ipsam rem esse necesse est: ut quoniam est homo, verum est dicere quoniam est homo. Quod si verum est dicere quoniam est homo,nulla est dubitatio quin homo sit.

English

But besides those modes of the prior which have been mentioned, there seems to be another. For of things that convert according to the consequence of essence, that which is in any way the cause of the other is reasonably said to be prior by nature. And that there are certain things of this sort is clear; for "to be a man" converts according to the consequence of essence with the true statement about him. For if a man exists, the statement is true by which it is said that he is a man; and if the statement is true by which it is said that he is a man, it follows that a man exists. But the true statement is in no way the cause of the thing's being, yet the thing seems in a certain way to be the cause of the true statement. For from the fact that the thing is or is not, the statement must be called true or false. And for this reason, according to the five modes, one thing is said to be prior to another.

We know that certain things can be converted in predication. But if one of those things that convert is the cause of the other and, as it were, supplies its natural subsistence, that one is said to be naturally prior. And he confirmed what he proposed with a most apt example. For if some thing exists, it is true to say of it that it exists. Again, if it is true to say of it that it exists, that very thing must exist: as, since a man exists, it is true to say that a man exists. But if it is true to say that a man exists, there is no doubt that a man exists.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:325 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ergo quoniam duo haec sibimet convertuntur,respiciamus nunc quae sit barum causa alteri,ut subsistere valeal,atque ut esse possit.Video autem rem dictoverosobsistentiaedare principium, nam quio homo est, irJcirco verum est dicere de eo quoniam est, sed non idcirco homo est, quoniam de eo vere dici potest, quoniam est. Res enim ut veritas adsit, dicto principium est,sed non ut res subsistat,vero efficitur dicto. Quocirca prius est, esse hominem, posterius, verum de eo esse dictum. Idcirco quoniam quamvis convertantur, tamen una harum rerum alteri subsistendi causa est. Ait enim id esse prius inter ea quae convertuntursecundumessentiaeconsequentiam,quod alterius quomodolibet causa est. Ut in hoc ipso sermone de homine,convertuntur utraque quidem,sed homo ut sit sermo verus, causa est atquo principium. Quod Aristoteles ita ait: Est autem verus sermo nullo modo causa subsistendi rem.Res autem videtur quodammodo causa esse ut sermo verus sit. Neque enim idcirco res est, quoniam sermo est, sed idcirco verus est sermo, quoniam res ipsa subsistit. Quocirca quinque hi prioris modi sunt, quorum superius quatuor dixit,secundum tempus, scilicet secundum id quod non convertitur ad subsistendi consequentiam,secundum ordinem,secundum reverentiam,et secundum conversionem, cum altera res alii subsistendi causa est. Sed quoniam de priori dictum est. Nunc de his quae simul sunt incipit.

English

Therefore, since these two convert with one another, let us now consider which of them is the cause of the other, so that it can subsist and so that it can be. But I see that the thing gives the principle of existence to the true statement. For because a man is, therefore it is true to say of him that he is; but it is not for this reason that he is a man, because it can truly be said of him that he is. For the thing is the principle for the truth to be present in the statement, but it is not by the true statement that the thing is brought about so as to subsist. Wherefore it is prior that a man be, and posterior that a true statement be made about him. For this reason, although they convert, nevertheless one of these things is the cause of the other's subsisting. For he says that that is prior among things that convert according to the consequence of essence, which is in any way the cause of the other. As in this very discourse about man, both indeed convert, but the man is the cause and principle that the statement be true. Aristotle says this as follows: But a true statement is in no way the cause of the thing's subsisting. But the thing seems in some way to be the cause that the statement be true. For it is not for this reason that the thing is, because the statement is, but for this reason the statement is true, because the thing itself subsists. Wherefore there are these five modes of the prior, of which he stated four above: according to time, namely according to that which does not convert to the consequence of subsisting, according to order, according to reverence, and according to conversion, when one thing is the cause of another's subsisting. But since it has been said about the prior, he now begins about things that are simultaneous.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:326 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE MODIS SIMUL.

Simul autEm dicuntur simplicil er et proprie quidem, _ quorum qenemtio est in eodemtempore,neutrum enim neqne prius neque posterius est eorum. Simul itaque hæc dicuntur secundum tempus.

Cum de prioribus disputaret, illa propria priora esse contenderat, quae secundum vim praecedentis temporis dicerentur, quare cum de his quae simul sunt. disputat, idem revocat, et recte. Nam si maximum modum prioris solum efficiet tempus, cur quoque non simul editam naturam tempus efficiet? Ait ergo,et simpliciter et proprie dici siir ul esse ea, quae unius temporis ortu prolata sint,ut si ilia sint antiquiora atque priora,qufecunque non æquali,sed præcedenti tempore proferuntur,quaesetemporibus non praecedunt, rectissime simul esse ponuntur. Quæ enim uno tempore edita atque prolata sunt, illa secundum tempus simul esae dicuntur, id est simul naturale principium substantiamque sortita, atque hæc quidem secundum tempus simul esse dicunlur.Secundumnaturam vero simul esse perhibentur, quaecunque invicem ad se convertuntur, cum altera res alteri subsistendi, neque causa sit, neque principium, ut sunt hujusmodi, duplum medium: nam cum sit duplum, medium est; cum rursus sit medium, duplum est. Servus quoque et dominus eodem modo sunt, filius quoque et pater. Haec enim quaecunque illata quidem inferunt alia.

English

ON THE MODES OF SIMULTANEITY.

Things are said to be simultaneous in a simple and proper sense when their coming into being occurs at the same time; for neither of them is prior or posterior to the other. These things, then, are said to be simultaneous according to time.

When he was disputing about prior things, he had maintained that those things are properly prior which are said to be so according to the force of preceding time. Therefore, when he disputes about things that are simultaneous, he recalls the same point, and rightly so. For if time alone constitutes the greatest mode of the prior, why should time not also constitute the nature of the simultaneous? He says, therefore, that both simply and properly those things are said to be simultaneous which are brought forth by the rising of one time — just as those things are more ancient and prior which are produced not in equal but in preceding time. And those things which do not precede in time are most correctly held to be simultaneous. For those things which are brought forth and produced at one time are said to be simultaneous according to time, that is, they have obtained their natural beginning and substance at the same time; and these things indeed are said to be simultaneous according to time. But those things are said to be simultaneous according to nature which convert with one another, since neither thing is the cause or principle of the other's subsisting — as are things of this sort: double and half. For when it is double, it is half; and again, when it is half, it is double. Slave and master are also in the same way, and son and father. For all these things, when brought in, bring in the others.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:327 · narrative
Source · Latin

sublata vero auferunt simul,sibimetsemper invicem convertuntur: nam si dicam patrem,filium quoque intelligi necesse est: si dixero filium,pater mox sub intelligentiam cadit. Quod si alterum sustulero, utraque perimo:: nam si tollam filium,pater non est; si patrem abstulero,filium quoque perire necesseest. Atque haec ita sibimet ipsa convertuntur, ut tamen altera res alteri causa penitus non sit: nam quoniam pater filio in praedicatione convertitur manifestum est,sed neque pater filio causa est ut sit, nec filius patri, hoc autem hujusmodi est. Si Æneas habuit Ascanium filium, non dicimus, quoniam non fuit Æneas causa ut esset Ascanius, sed non fuit pater causa ut esset filius. Nam quod dico Ascanius, quaedam propria substantia est, quod dico filius, esse non potest, nisi ad aliquid referatur, et cum Æneam nomino, substantiam dixi, si patrem appello,nulla ratione constat,nisi ad filium referatur. Igitur causa fuit Æneas ut esset Ascanius, sed non i est causa pater ut esset filius.Paternamque tuncfit cum filius fuerit.

English

But when one is removed, they remove simultaneously and are always mutually convertible: for if I say father, son must also be understood; if I say son, father immediately falls under the understanding. But if I remove one, I destroy both: for if I remove the son, there is no father; if I remove the father, the son must also perish. And these are so mutually convertible that nevertheless one thing is not entirely the cause of the other: for since father is evidently convertible with son in predication, yet neither is the father the cause of the son's being, nor the son of the father's. This is of the following sort. If Aeneas had Ascanius as a son, we do not say that Aeneas was not the cause of Ascanius's being, but the father was not the cause of the son's being. For what I call Ascanius is a certain proper substance; what I call son cannot exist unless it is referred to something, and when I name Aeneas I have stated a substance; if I call him father, it holds by no account unless it is referred to the son. Therefore Aeneas was the cause of Ascanius's being, but he is not the cause, as father, of the son's being. And he becomes father when a son exists.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:328 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod si haec tempore ipso priora non sunt,causa autem cujuslibet rei prior est quam illa cujus causa est, ut oriatur,nulla dubitatio est, quin pater atque filius,quae utraeque praedicationes æquales sunt tempore, neutra neutri causa sit, cum tamen substantiae ipsae sibi ut sint,causa sint prædicationis.Nec ullo modo simile debet videri ei quod paulo ante dictum est de homine,esse verum de eo sermonem, scilicet quoniam est. Illic enim cum res esset, tunc poterat esse verus de ea sermo. Prius enim est ut sit aliquid, post vero ut de eo verum aliquid esse dicatur. Nunc vero non ita eat. ut prius aliquis sit pater, post vero (ilius.Mox enim ut pater est, filium esse necesse est, mox ut est filius, patris sine dubio praedicatio consequitur, ■ quemadmodum ergo iste modus fit, qui scilicet simul secundum naturam est, Aristoteles ita pronuntiat.

English

But if these are not prior in time itself, and a cause of anything is prior to that of which it is the cause, so that it may arise, there is no doubt that father and son, which are both predications equal in time, are not the cause one of the other, although the substances themselves are the cause of the predication that they exist. Nor should it seem in any way similar to what was said a little earlier about man, that a statement about him is true, namely that he exists. For there, when the thing existed, then a true statement about it could exist. For it is prior that something exist, but afterward that something true be said about it. But now it is not so, that first someone be a father, and afterward a son. For as soon as he is a father, it is necessary that there be a son; as soon as there is a son, the predication of father follows without doubt. In what way, therefore, this mode comes about, which is of course simultaneous according to nature, Aristotle thus declares.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:329 · narrative
Source · Latin

Naturaliter autem simul sunt, quaecunque con vertuntur quidem secundum quodest esse consequentiam. Sed nequaquam causa est alterum alteri ut sit, ut in duplo et dimidio.Convertuntur etenim hæc: nam cum sit duplum, est dimidium, et cum sit dimidium, est duplum, sed neutrum alteri causa est ut sit.

In his quæ ita priora esse dicebatur,ut converterenlur,quamvis secundum essentiam eorum conse. quentia esset, tamen quia in his alia res alii causa at'que principium est,hoc erat quod una prior esse videretur, ea quidem cujus oausa erat. Quod distat ab iis quae convertuntur, et se invicem auferunt, quae cum neutra neutri causa sit, et tamen convertuntur,digne simul naturaliter esseperhibentur.

Dicuntur etiam simul naturaliter et quæ ex eodem genere e diverso dividuntur a se invicem. E diverso autem dividuntur, quae secundum eamdem divisionem sunt, ut gressibile, volatile et aquatile, hæc enim e diverso diuidunturzqum sunt ex eadem genere secundum divisionem: animal namgue dividitur in hæc,in volatile,gressibile et aquatitetet nihil horum prius vel posterius est, sed simul per naturam haec esse videntur.

English

But those things are naturally simultaneous, whatever are converted according to the consequence of their being. But in no way is one the cause of the other's being, as in the double and the half. For these are converted: for when the double exists, the half exists, and when the half exists, the double exists, but neither is the cause of the other's being.

In those things which were said to be prior in such a way that they are converted, although according to their essence there was a consequence, nevertheless because in these one thing is the cause and principle of another, this was what made one seem to be prior, namely that of which it was the cause. This differs from those things which are converted and mutually remove each other, which, since neither is the cause of either, and yet they are converted, are rightly said to be naturally simultaneous.

Those things are also said to be naturally simultaneous which are divided from each other out of the same genus by opposite division. But they are divided by opposite division which are under the same division, as the walker, the flyer, and the swimmer; for these are divided by opposite division since they are from the same genus according to division: for animal is divided into these—into the flyer, the walker, and the swimmer—and none of these is prior or posterior, but they seem to be naturally simultaneous.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:330 · narrative
Source · Latin

Tertium modum eorum quæ simul sunt hunc addidit,illa quoque simul esse, quae aequali divisione sub genere ponantur,ut si ponat quis animal genus hominis et equi,hominem vero et equum a genere, id est ab animali dividat, bomo vero et equus quoniam sub eodem genere sunt, simul esse natura dicuntur.Et conveniens regula est in omnibus qui, buscunquegeneribus; cum enimspecierum divisiones fiunt, illic species natura simul sunt, et et si sub his ipsis speciebus quaedam alia ponantur,inter se etiam ipsa simul esse natura dicuntur. Dividatur enim genus,idest animali in volatile atquegressibile, et quoniam sunt sub eodem genere, simul natura sunt.Et si quid horum in subjectas partes speciesque solvatur, ut volatile quidem in his avibus quae seminibus vescuntur,et in iis quaecarnibus,etin his quae herbis,hae tres species rursus,quae sub volatili sunt, simul esse naturaliterappellantur,quod Aristoteles ita dicit.

English

He added this third mode of those things which are simultaneous: those things also are simultaneous which are placed under a genus by equal division, as if someone should posit animal as the genus of man and horse, and should divide man and horse from the genus, that is, from animal; but man and horse, since they are under the same genus, are said to be simultaneous by nature. And the rule is fitting in all genera whatsoever; for when divisions of species are made, there the species are simultaneous by nature, and even if certain other things are placed under these very species, those things too are said to be simultaneous by nature among themselves. For let the genus, that is, animal, be divided into winged and walking, and since they are under the same genus, they are simultaneous by nature. And if any of these is resolved into subject parts and species, as winged into those birds which feed on seeds, and into those which feed on flesh, and into those which feed on herbs, these three species again, which are under winged, are called simultaneous by nature, which Aristotle states thus.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:331 · narrative
Source · Latin

Dividiturautem elsingulum horum etspeciesrursus, ut gressibile animal,et volatile,et aquatile. Erunt ergo et itla simul naturaliter quspcunque ex eodem genere secundum eamdem divisionem sunt.Genera verosemper speciebus priora sunt,neque enim convertuntur secundum essendi consequentiam: ut cum sit aliqu id aquatile quidem,est animal; cum vero sit animalsnon estnecesse ut sit aquatile. Simul ergo per naturam dicuntur quæcunque convertuntur quidem secundum essendi consequentiarn,sed nequaquam quidem causa est alterum alteri ut sit,et ea quae ex eodem generee diverso dividuntur ab invicem, et simpliciter simul sunt quorum generatio in eodem tempore est.

Atque idcirco fieri non potest ut genus habeat unam speciem.Nam si quaecunque subgenere sunt, simul sunt.Simul autem nisi pluraesse non possunt, genus igitur subseunamspeciemhabere non potest. Si enim una fuerit, fieri non potest ut simul esse dicatur, quia illud est, quod sub eodem genere quaedam res solent quae simul sint naturaliter inveniri. Sed haec de speciebus. Genera autem semper priora sunt,non enim convertuntur secundam subsistentiæ consequentiam. Prioris unus modus est secundum quem illa priora esse dicerentur quaecunque ad subsistendum nullo modo converterentur, quod hoc idem in generibus cadit.Genera enim non convertuntur ad subsistentiae consequentiam hoc modo. Sit enim animal genus, bomo vero species.

English

But the species of each of these is divided again, as animal capable of walking, capable of flying, and aquatic. Therefore all those things whatsoever that are from the same genus according to the same division will also naturally be simultaneous. But genera are always prior to species, for they are not converted according to the consequence of being: for when something is aquatic, it is indeed an animal; but when it is an animal, it is not necessary that it be aquatic. Therefore those things are said to be simultaneous by nature whatsoever are indeed converted according to the consequence of being, but in no way is the one the cause of the other that it be, and those things which from the same genus are divided from one another by a different division, and simply those are simultaneous whose generation is in the same time.

And for this reason it cannot happen that a genus has one species. For if whatever things are under a genus are simultaneous. But simultaneous things cannot be unless they are plural; therefore a genus cannot have a single species under it. For if there were one, it cannot happen that it be said to be simultaneous, because that is what it is, that under the same genus certain things are customarily found which are naturally simultaneous. But this concerns species. Genera, however, are always prior, for they are not converted according to the consequence of subsistence. There is one mode of the prior according to which those things are said to be prior whatsoever would in no way be converted to subsisting, which same thing falls under genera. For genera are not converted to the consequence of subsistence in this way. For let animal be the genus, and man the species.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:332 · narrative
Source · Latin

Cum vero dico hominem esse, animal quoque osse ■consequitur. Si animal dixero, ad bominem subsi, stentiae consequentia non convertitur. Potest enim esse animal, non tamen homo. Quocirca ab animali ad hominem non convertitur subsistentiae consequentia.Quod si posito homine animal constat,animali vero nominato non est necesse hominem esse, animal est prius homine. Illa quoque priorum descriptio est,quod ea quae sunt priora sublata quidem auferunt,illata non inferunt. Animal enim sublatum secum quoque hominem tollet,illatum vero ut dicatur esse animal, non secum statim hominem infert. Posteriora vero et diverso sunt. Illata enim simul inferunt,sublatanon auferunt.Dictusquidem homo, pimul secum animal infert, omnis namque homo animal est. Quod si homo substantialiter auferatur, non est necesse animal quoque auferri, quod hoc nomen animalis in pluribus speciebus valet aptari.' Quod si ita contingit, sublato homine permanebit animal. Quocirca concludit tres esse species eorum quae simul sunt secundum tempus,secundum naluram cum utraque ita convertuntur,ut neutra neutri causa sit. Tertium genus est secundum eamdem sub eodem generedivisionem.Quoniam in faciendo atque patiendo inerat quidam motus, facere autem et pati praedicamentis adjunxerat, idcirco nunc de motibus tractat, et sex numero esse pronuntiat.

English

But when I say that a man is, it also follows that he is an animal. If I say animal, the consequence of subsistence does not convert to man. For it is possible to be an animal and yet not a man. Wherefore the consequence of subsistence does not convert from animal to man. But if, when man is posited, animal is established, while when animal is named it is not necessary that man be, then animal is prior to man. That also is the description of prior things: that when prior things are removed they remove, but when brought in they do not bring in. For animal, when removed, will also remove man with it; but when it is brought in, so that animal is said to be, it does not at once bring man in with it. Posterior things, however, are also of a different sort. For when brought in they bring in at the same time, but when removed they do not remove. For when man is said, he at once brings animal in with him, since every man is an animal. But if man is removed substantially, it is not necessary that animal also be removed, because the name of animal can be applied to many species. But if this is so, when man is removed animal will remain. Wherefore he concludes that there are three species of things that are simultaneous: according to time, according to nature when both are so converted that neither is the cause of the other. The third kind is according to the same division under the same genus. Since in doing and undergoing there was a certain motion, and he had added doing and undergoing to the categories, for that reason he now treats of motions, and declares that they are six in number.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:333 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE SPECIEBUS MOTUS.

Motus autem species sunt sex: genel'atio,corruptio, augmentum, diminutio, alteratio, et secundum locum mutatio. Alii itaquemotus palam est quia alii abinvicem sunt. Non cst enim generatio corruptio, neque augmentum diminutio, neque secundum locum mulatio. Similiter autem et in aliis.

In physicis Aristoteles motus species alia ratione partitus est. Ait enim aliud esse permutationem, aliud motum, et permutationis quidem duas esse species ait generationem et corruptionem. Motus vera tres secundum quantitatem,secundum qualitatem, secundum locum. Igitur, quoniam hic liber ad introductionem quodam modo factus est, noluit nimis divisionis attenuare rationem,ne ingredientium animos subtiliori divisione confunderet: facit igitur divisionem motus hoc modo. Est enim una species motus secundum substantiam,alia secundum quantitatem, alia secundum qualitatem, alia secundum locum. Et secundum substantiam quidem est generatio et corruptio, hæc enim utraque in substantia fiunt. Nam et secundum substantiam generatur aliquid, et secundum substantiam corrumpitur.Secundum quantitatem vero, ut crementum et diminutio. Etenim secundum quantitatem vel aucta crevisse, vel detracta diminuta esse dicuntur.Secundum qualitatem vero quae dicitur commutatio, secundum aliquas scilicet passiones,quas qualitates esse manifestum est.

English

ON THE SPECIES OF MOTION.

There are six species of motion: generation, corruption, increase, decrease, alteration, and change in place. It is therefore evident that some motions are distinct from one another. For generation is not corruption, nor is increase decrease, nor is change in place any of these. The same holds likewise in the other cases.

In the Physics, Aristotle divided the species of motion by another account. For he says that permutation is one thing and motion another, and he says that there are two species of permutation, generation and corruption. But there are three motions: according to quantity, according to quality, and according to place. Therefore, since this book was made in a way for introduction, he was unwilling to attenuate the account of division too much, lest he confuse the minds of beginners by a more subtle division. He therefore makes the division of motion in this way. For one species of motion is according to substance, another according to quantity, another according to quality, another according to place. And according to substance there is generation and corruption, for both of these occur in substance. For something is generated according to substance, and something is corrupted according to substance. According to quantity, however, as increase and decrease. For things are said to have increased by addition according to quantity, or to have decreased by subtraction. According to quality, however, is what is called alteration, namely according to certain affections, which are manifestly qualities.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:334 · narrative
Source · Latin

Secundum locum vero, ut intus in longitudinem,vel in curvaturam flexus;et intus quidem in longitudinem est ut a sursum in deorsum,a prioribus retrorsum,a dextra in sinistram;et rursus si haec convertas et in directum pergas, idem motus erunt. Illud quoque verum est has esse omnes species motus, nullo namque sibi participant,nisi solo generis nomine, quod motus dicuntur: nam neque generatio idem est quod corruptio,namque generatio est in substantia ingressus, corruptio vero ex substantia egressus. Nec diminutio idem quod crementum, nec secundum locum translatio alicui superiorum consimilis est. Commutatio autem habet forte aliquam dubitationem, quod non videatur a superioribus discrepare, quam quaestionem ita proposuit.

In alteratione vero habet quamdam quæstionem,ne forte necessarium sit id quod alteratur, per aliquam reliquarum motionum alterari; hoc autem non est verum. Nam pene secundum omnes passiones aut plures, alterari accidit, nulla aliarum motionumcommuMicante. Neque enim augeri necessarium est,quod per passionem movetur, neque minui.Similiter autem in aliis. Ideoque erit alia præter illos motus alleratio. Nam si eadem esset, oporteret id quod alteratur mox vel augeri, vel minui, vel aliquem aliorum motuum consequi; sed non est necesse. Similiter autem et quod augetur, aut alia aliqua motione movetur, alterari oportebat.

English

With respect to place, as for instance inward along a length, or into a curve of bending; and inward along a length is as from above to below, from the front backward, from right to left; and again if you reverse these and proceed in a straight line, they will be the same motions. It is also true that these are all the species of motion, for they share in nothing with one another except the name of the genus alone, in that they are called motions. For neither is generation the same as corruption, since generation is an entrance into substance, while corruption is a departure from substance. Nor is decrease the same as increase, nor is change in place similar to any of the above. But change perhaps has some doubt, in that it does not seem to differ from the foregoing, which question he set out as follows.

In alteration, however, there is a certain question, lest perhaps it be necessary that what is altered be altered through some one of the remaining motions; but this is not true. For in nearly all affections, or more of them, it happens that a thing is altered, while none of the other motions shares in it. For it is not necessary that what is moved through an affection be increased, nor decreased. And similarly in the others. And for this reason alteration will be a motion other besides those. For if it were the same, it would be necessary that what is altered be presently either increased or decreased, or follow some one of the other motions; but it is not necessary. And similarly, what is increased, or is moved by some other motion, would have to be altered.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:335 · narrative
Source · Latin

In commutatione veroestaliqua dubitatio,ne forte necesse sit quod commutatur secundum aliquem reliquorum motuum commutari.Namsi omne quod commutatur, aut generatur, aut corrumpitur, aut minuitur, aut crescit, aut id secundum locum transferri necesse est, dubium non est nihil a superioribus caeteris hanc differe speciem, quae secundum commutationem dicitur; quod Aristoteles respuit, dicens, Hoc autem non est verum. Sed quoniam quod commutatur non omnino neque generatur, neque corrumpitur: ut qui in sole diutius stetit,8i ex candido niger est factus, commutatus quidem secundum colorem dicitur, non tamen generatus est aut corruptus, nec vero illi aliquod vel crementum factum est vel diminutio, sed nec loci translatio nulla est, potest enim aliquis uno eodemque loco consistens, aliquibus extrinsecus venientibus passionibus permutari, potest quoque et crescereet decrescere, praeter qualitatis commutationem:quod ipse Aristoteles ita pronuntiat.

English

But in the case of change there is some doubt, lest perhaps whatever changes must change according to one of the remaining motions. For if everything that changes is either generated or corrupted, or diminished or increased, or must be transferred according to place, there is no doubt that this species which is called according to change differs in no way from the other aforementioned ones; which Aristotle rejects, saying, "But this is not true." But since what changes is not altogether either generated or corrupted: as one who has stood too long in the sun is made black from white, is said indeed to have changed according to color, yet is not generated or corrupted, nor has any increase or diminution occurred to him, but neither is there any change of place—for someone standing in one and the same place can be altered by certain passions coming from outside, and can also grow and diminish, beyond a change of quality—which Aristotle himself thus declares.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:336 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed sunt quædam crescentia quæ non alterantur, ut quadratum, circumposito gnomone, crevit quidem, alteratum uero nihil factum est: sic et in altis hujusmodi. Quare alii sunt motus a se invicem.

Quod dicit tale est Si quadrato, inquit, addatur gnomo, crescit quidem quadratus, non tamen commutatur. Ideoque sublato gnomone quadratus diminuitur,sed non commutatur.Sienimquadratus a dy et ducatur ei angularis c, et dividantur quatuor latera a c, a b, d, a c, in aequalia e punctis, et ducantur h, f, e lineae. Divisus igitur quadratus a in quatuor quadratos qui sunt e g, g, e h, f, quorumlibet tres qui circa eamdem angularem sunt si demantur,figura ipsa gnomo vocatur. ut si quis tollat hos tres, e g, ft h, inveniturrii gnomo, qui gnomo separatur a e quadrato. j Totus quidem a quadratus imminutus est, qui ex tam magno factus est parvus, non tamen formam tetragoni commutavit.Quod si e A tetragonus solus sit, et ei circumponatur gnomo, qui est n, crevit quidem tetragonus, et major factus est, sed non commutatus est. Omnes enim tetragoni sibi sunt propria qualitate consimiles. Quod si commutatio hujusmodi motus esset, ut non omnino a superioribus separaretur, nulla esset dubitatio quin semper oporteret quidquid commutatur secundum aliquem priorum motuum modum commutari. Ita ut aut nasceretur,aut corrumperetur, aut micueretur, aut cresceret, aut secundum locum fieret aliqua permutatio.

English

But there are certain things that grow without being altered, as a square, when a gnomon is placed around it, has indeed grown, but has become altered in no way; so too in other cases of this kind. Wherefore motions are distinct from one another.

What he says is of this sort: If, he says, a gnomon is added to a square, the square indeed grows, yet it is not changed. And for this reason, when the gnomon is removed, the square is diminished, but is not changed. For if there is a square from dy and a diagonal c is drawn in it, and its four sides ac, ab, d, ac are divided into equal parts at points e, and the lines h, f, e are drawn. The square a is therefore divided into four squares which are eg, g, eh, f; if any three of these which are around the same diagonal are taken away, the figure itself is called a gnomon. As if someone takes away these three, eg, f, h, the gnomon is found, which gnomon is separated from the square ae. The whole square a has indeed been diminished, which from being so great has been made small, yet it has not changed the form of the tetragon. But if the tetragon A is alone, and a gnomon is placed around it, which is n, the tetragon has indeed grown and has been made larger, but has not been changed. For all tetragons are similar to one another in their own proper quality. But if a change of this kind were a motion, so that it were not altogether separated from the foregoing, there would be no doubt that whatever is changed must always be changed according to some mode of the prior motions. So that it would either be born, or be corrupted, or be mixed, or grow, or some alteration according to place would occur.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:337 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod quoniam non est, ab omnibussuperioribus motibus hæc motus ppeciesdistat.Sed monstratum superius est quinquesuperiores motus species a se omni ratione substantiae discrepare. Quocirca distant, se similiter hi sex motus, atque divers sunt.

Est autem simpliciter quidem motui quies contrarium.Singulis vero singuli,generationi quidem corruptio, augmentationi autem dzminutio;secundum locum vero mutationi, secundum locum quies, maxime autem videtur oppositum esse in contrarium locum mutatio, ut quæ est inferius ei quæ est superius, et ea quæ est superius ei quae est inferius.

Nunc jam motuumcontrarietatesexsequitur,etipsi quidem generi, id est motui, dicit quietem esse contrariam,habet enim motus quietem contrariam. Singulis vero speciebus motuum motus ipsi contrarii sunt, ut generationi corruptio,et cum generatio sit motus atque corruptio,utraque tamen sibimet contraria sunt, cremento quoque diminutio contraria est. Quare diverso modo hae species motus contrarietatem habent, quam genus dudum habere monstravimus: motus enim ipse habet quietem contrariam. Specierum vero motibus non quies tantum, sed alii motus contrarii sunt, ut generationi corruptio et cremento diminutio, secundum vero locum translationis contrarietas similis est generi.

English

Since this is not the case, this species of motion differs from all the superior motions. But it was shown above that the five superior species of motion differ from one another in every respect of substance. Wherefore these six motions also differ, and are diverse.

Now, simply speaking, rest is contrary to motion. But to individual motions, individual motions are contrary: to generation, corruption; to increase, decrease; but to change in place, rest in place; yet motion into a contrary place seems most of all to be opposed, as that which is downward to that which is upward, and that which is upward to that which is downward.

Now he next discusses the contrarieties of motions, and says that to the genus itself, that is, to motion, rest is contrary; for motion has rest as its contrary. But to the individual species of motion, motions themselves are contrary, as corruption is to generation; and since generation is a motion and corruption is a motion, yet both are contrary to each other; decrease also is contrary to increase. Wherefore these species of motion have contrariety in a different way from that in which we showed the genus to have it: for motion itself has rest as its contrary. But to the species of motion, not only rest but other motions are contrary, as corruption to generation and decrease to increase; but in the case of change in place, the contrariety is similar to the genus.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:338 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam et ipsa habet contrariam secundum locum quietem, contrarium namque est moveri de loco in locum, et non moveri, et est non moveri quidem secundum locum quies,moveri vero secun dum locum translatio. Maxime autem, inquit,secundum locum mutationi, contraria est in contrarium locum permutatio.Ut si qua res sursum sit atque ibi maneat,et sit quieta, postea sit ei motus talis, ut deorsum moveatur, quanquam ipsi superiori motui quies contraria sit, multo magis quidem hujusmodi motus, qui in contrariumfitlocum, illi superiori motui contrarius est. Atque hoc quidem et in aliis motibus accidit: ut si quis sit ad dexteram, si ei in sinistram motus sit,in contrarium locum factus dicitur motus.Atque hoc idem id aliis motibus licet videre; sed Aristoteles dubitat si reliquomotui,id estcommutationi,aliquid possit esse contrarium, quam quæstionem ita proponit:

English

For it too has a contrary rest in respect of place; for to be moved from place to place is contrary to not being moved, and not being moved in respect of place is rest, while being moved in respect of place is change of place. But especially, he says, to change in respect of place, the change into the contrary place is contrary. As if some thing be above and remain there, and be at rest, and afterwards there be such motion for it that it is moved downward, although rest is contrary to that superior motion itself, much more indeed is a motion of this kind, which comes to be into the contrary place, contrary to that superior motion. And this indeed also happens in other motions: as if someone be on the right, if there be motion for him to the left, the motion is said to have come to be into the contrary place. And this same thing may be seen in other motions; but Aristotle doubts whether anything can be contrary to the remaining motion, that is, to change, which question he sets out thus:

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:339 · narrative
Source · Latin

Reliquo vero assignatorum motuum non facile est assignare quid sit cOnlrarium,videtur autem nihil ei contrarium esse, nisi quis ei in hoc secundum qualitatem quietem opponat, aut in contrariam qualitatis mutationem, sicut et in mutatione secundum locum, quietem secundum locum, aut in contrarium locum mutalionem. Est enim allerio secundum qualitatem mutatio.

Ex similitudine motuum contrarietates quoque colligimus. Nam quoniam superius motui secundum locum contrariam reperit secundum locum quietem, et quoniam omnis commutatio quae secundum aliquam passionem fit secundum qualitatem commutatur, motus ejus contrarietatem posuit secundum qualitatem quietem: ut si lapis cum frigidus est,si ita permaneat, qualitas illa mansit et quievit, quod si tepeat, qualitas illa commutat est, et est ipsa commutatio contraria, et factus est quidem motus, et in tepore lapidis secundum qualitatem facta est permutatio, fuit autem in frigore quies secundum eamdem qualitatem. Quocirca licet videaturhic motus quidem omnino contrarium non habere, tamen, sicut superius dictum est secundum locum translationi contrariam esse secundum locum quietem,cur non quoque secundum qualitatem commutationi dicatur quies secundum qualitatem esse contraria?

English

For the remaining assigned motions, it is not easy to assign what is contrary to them. It seems, however, that nothing is contrary to it, unless one opposes to it in this respect rest according to quality, or change into a contrary quality, just as also in change according to place, rest according to place, or change into a contrary place. For alteration is change according to quality.

From the similarity of motions we also gather contrarieties. For since above he found rest according to place contrary to motion according to place, and since every change that occurs according to some affection is changed according to quality, he posited rest according to quality as the contrariety of that motion: so that if a stone, when it is cold, remains so, that quality has remained and rested; but if it grows warm, that quality has been changed, and that change itself is contrary, and a motion has indeed come about, and in the warmth of the stone a change according to quality has occurred, while in the cold there was rest according to the same quality. Wherefore, although this motion may seem to have no contrary at all, nevertheless, just as was said above that rest according to place is contrary to translation according to place, why should rest according to quality not likewise be said to be contrary to change according to quality?

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:340 · narrative
Source · Latin

Definitio namque commutationis est translatio secundumqualitatem,cum enimqualitascujuslibetrei movetur,fit translatio,scilicet secundum qualitatem, Quod si maxime videatur secundum locum translaton esse contraria, non solum secundum locum quies, sed etiam in contrarium locum translatio, secundum qualitatem quoque mutationi non solum erit contraria secundum qualitatem quies, sed maxime in contrariam qualitatem commutatio:ut si quid cum est album, si rubrum fiat, quieti quidem ei quae in albo colore poterat permanere contraria fuit qualitatis ipsa mutatio, ut ex albo in rubrum mutaretur; si quid enim ex albo vertatur in nigrum, illud maxime permutatur, et iliud superiori mutationi contrarium est, quoniam permutatum est iu eontrariam qualitatem. Atque hoc est quod ait:

Quapropter opposita erit secundum qualitatem mutationi secundum qualitatem quies,aut in contrarium mutatio qualitatis, ut album fieri ad id quod est nigrum fieri,alteralur enim in contrarium qualitatis mutatione facta.

English

For the definition of change is alteration according to quality; for when the quality of any thing is moved, there comes about an alteration, namely according to quality. But if change according to place seems most of all to have contraries, not only rest according to place, but also change into the contrary place, then to change according to quality there will be contrary not only rest according to quality, but most of all change into the contrary quality: as if something, when it is white, becomes red, then to the rest which could have remained in the white color, the change of quality itself was contrary, so that it might be changed from white into red; for if anything is turned from white into black, that is most of all changed, and that is contrary to the former change, since it has been changed into the contrary quality. And this is what he says:

Wherefore opposed to change according to quality will be rest according to quality, or change into the contrary of the quality, as becoming white is opposed to becoming black; for it is altered into the contrary, the change of quality having taken place.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:341 · narrative
Source · Latin

Id quoque apertissimo vulgatur exemplo. Quare quoniam de motibus expeditum est,habendi aequivocationem quae sequitur explicemus.

DE MODIS HABERE.

Babere autem multis modis dicitur, aut enim tan' quam habitum et affeectum,aut aliam quamlibet qualitatem, dicimur enim disciplinam aliquam habere atque virtutem.Aut tanquam quantitatem,ut contingit ei qui habet magnitudinem, dicitur enim tricubitam magnitudinem haberevelquadricubitum.Aut tanquam ea quæ circa corpus sunt, ut vestimentum vel tunicam.Aut tanquam in parle,ut in manu annulum. Aut tanquam partem,ut manu vel pedem.Aut tanquam in vaseyut in modio grana tritici, vel in lagena vinum, pinum enim babere fangena dicitur, et modios grana tritici, hasc ergo omnia haberi dicuntur, ut in vase. Aut tanquam possessionem, habere enim domum aut agrum dicimur. Dicitur eliam vir uxorem habere, et uxor virum.Sed videtur alienissimus qui nunc dictus est modus esse in eo quod est habere,nihil enim aliud per uxorem habere significamus, nisi quia cohabitant,forte tamen et alii quidam apparebunt modi de eo quod est habere. Sed qui consueverunt dici, pene omnes enumerati sunt.

English

This too is made known by a most evident example. Therefore, since the discussion of motions has been set out, let us explain the equivocation of "having" that follows.

ON THE MODES OF HAVING.

But "to have" is said in many ways: for either as a habit and disposition, or any other quality whatsoever — for we are said to have some discipline or virtue. Or as a quantity, as it happens to the one who has magnitude; for he is said to have a magnitude of three cubits or four cubits. Or as things that are around the body, such as a garment or a tunic. Or as in a part, as a ring on the hand. Or as a part, as a hand or a foot. Or as in a vessel, as grain of wheat in a measure, or wine in a flask; for a measure is said to have grain, and measures have grain of wheat. All these, therefore, are said to be had as in a vessel. Or as a possession; for we are said to have a house or a field. A man is also said to have a wife, and a wife a husband. But the mode just mentioned seems most alien to what "to have" is; for by "having a wife" we signify nothing other than that they live together. Perhaps, however, certain other modes of "having" will appear. But those that are accustomed to be mentioned have nearly all been enumerated.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:342 · narrative
Source · Latin

Æquivocum esse habendi modum manifestum est,habere enim ita multis dicitur modis,ut tamen aequivoce praedicetur.Dicimur enim habere aliquam qualita.tem,ut habitum vel dispositionem. Dicimur quoque habere scientiam vel virtutem;quantitatem quoque habere perhibemur,dicimur enim in mensura habere quinque vel quatuor pedes. Nec non etiam in ipsis partibus corporis aliquid,et ipsas partes habere prædicamur,dicimur enim et habere digitos,et in digito annulos Circa corpus quoque aliquid habere dicimur,uttunicam,vel quodlibetaliud vestimentum. Necnon etiam in vase haberi aliquid dicitur,ut triticum in modio,et vinum in dolio;haec, scilicet, ita haberi dicuntur, ut in vase. Dicitur etiam quis habere uxorem,quæ,scilicet significatio nulli supradictae communis est, sed (ut ipsi Aristoteli videtur) longe diversa est haec significatio ab habendi prædicamento;non enim proprie habemus uxores,sed quod habere quis dicatur uxorem, hoc significat habitare cum eo uxorern,habere enim habitare dicimus,ut est Socratem habent, id est cum Socrate habitant atque eum colunt.Quare ipse quoqueAristoteles inquit esse aliquos fortasse praeter eos qui dicantur habendi modos, hortaturque nos ad ulterioremaliquaminquisitionem,ut nos quoque quae ramus per quos,praeter priores dictos modos, alios possit habere praedicari.

English

That the mode of having is equivocal is evident, for "to have" is said in so many ways that it is nevertheless predicated equivocally. For we are said to have some quality, such as a habit or disposition. We are also said to have knowledge or virtue; we are likewise asserted to have quantity, for we are said to have five or four feet in measure. And indeed also in the parts of the body themselves we are said to have something, and to have the parts themselves; for we are said both to have fingers and to have rings on a finger. Around the body too we are said to have something, such as a tunic or any other garment. And indeed something is also said to be had in a vessel, as wheat in a measure and wine in a cask; these, of course, are said to be had in such a way as in a vessel. Someone is also said to have a wife, which signification is of course common to none of those mentioned above, but (as it seems to Aristotle himself) this signification is far different from the predicament of having; for we do not properly have wives, but that someone is said to have a wife signifies that a wife dwells with him; for we say "to have" for "to dwell," as it is "they have Socrates," that is, they dwell with Socrates and cultivate him. Wherefore Aristotle himself also says that there are perhaps some modes of having beyond those that are spoken of, and he urges us to some further inquiry, so that we too may [see] by what paths, beyond the previously mentioned modes, others can be predicated of having.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:343 · narrative
Source · Latin

Et de hac aequivocatione quidem habendi sufficienter dictum est.Sed forlequis dubitet cur cum habere superius in genere nominaverit,nunc idipsumaequivocum ponat,sedhæc quaestio ita solvitur. Non absurdum est idem praedicamentum nunc univoce, nunc aequivoce praedicari. Univoce quidem ut superius cum ejusdem specierum exempla proposuit, ut est calceatum esse vel armatum,horum enim talium genus est. Æquivoce vero ut in his modis quos superius exposuimus. Quod si et habet aliquas proprias species habendi praedicatio,diciturautem et ipsum nomen multioliciter, nihil est incongruum in genere numerari, sufficit enim ad demonstrandum genus esse et habendi praedicationem quod sub se aliquas partes speciesque contineat.

English

And about this equivocation of having, enough has been said. But perhaps someone may doubt why, when he earlier named having as a genus, he now posits that same thing as equivocal. But this question is resolved as follows. It is not absurd for the same predicament to be predicated now univocally, now equivocally. Univocally, indeed, as above, when he set forth examples of the same species, as being shod or being armed; for of such things this is the genus. Equivocally, however, as in those modes which we set forth above. But if the predication of having also has some proper species of having, and the name itself is said in many ways, nothing is incongruous in its being counted in a genus; for it is sufficient to demonstrate that the predication of having is a genus, that it contains under itself some parts and species.

Citation. Tergwame, “In Categorias Aristotelis Libri Quatuor”, tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:1, machine-draft, 2026. https://naxiai.com/christian/works/tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1#s1
Colophon. Source: ogl-pl · licence: Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License · model: deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash:floor · provider: Wafer · cost: $0.0641 · generated 2026-11-15.