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In Categorias Aristotelis Libri Quatuor

Boethius. Severinus · ogl-pl

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machine-draft · no human review 343 passages · 81,946 words translation only — commentary and dossier not yet generated

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0 commentary units 2 derived notes 0 open questions 343 narrative
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tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:201 · narrative
Source · Latin

Atque hoc est quod ait, sed sunt ad aliquid quibus hoc ipsum esse est ad aliquid quodammodo se habere, ac si diceret quorum substantia est ad aliquidaliud referri,et quae ita sunt ut ipsa id quod sunt ad aliud referantur,etesse eorum sit ad aliquid aliud referri, sed non omnia uae dicuntur ad aliud.et esse de alio mutuantur.Illa namque diffinitio prior, majus est, diffinitionem namque relativorum supergressa est, includit enim ea quoque quæ relativa non sunt, et quemadmodum hominem cum dico,mortalem eum esse necesse est, cum dico mortalem, non necesse est esse hominem, ita quoque ea quae hoc ipsum quod sunt ex altero trahunt,et essehabent ad alterius relationem, et esse suum ad alterius referunt nuncupat:onem.Quæ vero ad aliud tantum dicuntur, non necesse est,ut esse suum ad aliquid habeant relatum,quo posteriorem diffinitionem suscipiant, et ista sententia breviter includatur, ut quæcunque hanc diffinitionem susceperint,uthocipsum esse sit ad aliquid quodammodo se habere, habeant eam quoque diffinitionem, quæ est relativaesse qnaecunque id quod sunt aliorum dicuntur, quæ vero hanc habuerint diffinitionem illam non necessario habeant, ut ea quæ sunt ad aliquid,etiam ad aliquid dicantur.

English

And this is what he says: but those things are relative to something for which this very being is in some way to be related to something, as if he were saying: whose substance it is to be referred to something else, and which are such that they themselves are what they are by being referred to another, and their being is to be referred to something else, but not all things which are said in relation to another also borrow their being from another. For that earlier definition, "greater," has surpassed the definition of relatives, for it includes even those things which are not relatives. And just as, when I say "man," it is necessary that he be mortal, but when I say "mortal," it is not necessary that he be a man, so too he designates those things which draw this very thing that they are from another, and have their being in relation to another, and refer their being to another. But those things which are only said in relation to another do not necessarily have their being referred to something, so as to receive the later definition. And let this view be briefly encompassed: that whatever things have received this definition, so that this very being is in some way to be related to something, also have that definition which is "to be relative" — whatever things are said to be of others in respect of what they are. But those things which have had this definition do not necessarily have that one, so that those things which are relative to something are also said in relation to something.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:202 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sedeaquædicuntur adaliquid, non omninoad aliquid sint,quod si ista diffinitio posterior recipiatur, quaediciteaessead aliquid,quibushoc ipsumesseest ad aliquid quodammodo se habere,poterit superior solvi dubitatio,quod dicamus id quod ipse posteriore disputatione secutus est. Quod autem ait:Priorvero diffinitio sequitur quidem omnia relativa,non tamen hoc eis est esse,quod sint ad aliquid,quod ea ipsa quae sunt aliorum dicuntur,hoc est quod non idcirco aliquid relativum esse dicitur,quoniam alterius esse dicitur.Sed tunc merito res aliqua relationis nomine continebitur, quoties non solum ad aliquid dicitur, sed hoc ipsum esse ejus ad aliquid est quodammodo se habere. Quare quid hanc diffinitionem proprium consequatur, ipse addidit.

Ex his ergo manifestum est qnod si quis aliquid eorum quæ sunt ad aliquid diffinite sciet, et illud ad;quod dicitur diffinite sciturus est.Si enim quis nouit aliquid quod est eorum quæ sunt aliquid (estaulem esse eorum qua: suntad aliquid idem quod ad aliquid quodammodo se habere), et illud novit ad quod hoc quodammodo se habet.

English

But those things which are said to be relative to something are not in every way relative to something. For if that later definition is accepted, by which they say that those things are relative to something for which this very being is to be related in some way to something, the earlier doubt can be resolved, so that we say that which he himself followed in the later discussion. But as for what he says: the earlier definition indeed applies to all relatives, yet it is not for them this very being, that they are relative to something, namely that those very things which exist are said to be of others — this means that something is not for that reason said to be relative, because it is said to be of another. But then a thing will deservedly be included under the name of relation, whenever it is not only said to be relative to something, but this very being of it is to be related in some way to something. Wherefore he himself added what properly follows from this definition.

From these things, therefore, it is clear that if anyone knows definitively something of those things which are relative to something, he will also know definitively that to which it is said to be related. For if anyone knows something which is of those things which are relative to something (and to be of those things which are relative to something is the same as to be related in some way to something), he also knows that to which this is related in some way.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:203 · narrative
Source · Latin

Proprium relativis secundum eam quæ superius dicta est diffinitionem hoc esse confirmat, quod si quis id quod est ad aliquid diffinite scit, quoniam relativum est,et illud ad quod referri potestdiffinite sciturus est quid sit,nam relativa easunt quibus boc est esse ad aliquidquodammodosebabere,quoniam ut sit quaternarius duplum a binario trahit. Si quis novit esse quaternarium numerum duplum,et binarium necessario sciturus est esse dimidium,ad quem quaternarius duplus est fieri; enim nullo modo potest, ut cum quis noverit aliquam rem esse relativam diffinite,non illud quoque sciat ad quod illa res dicitur diffinite;hujus autem rei una probatio est quae ex diffinitione venit. Diffinita enim sunt illa esse ad aliquid,quorum ea esset substantia, ut quodammodo se ad aliquid haberent,quod si scio quaternarium numerum esse duplum, eo quod ad binarium quodammodo conjungatur, nullus quaternarium duplum esse potent scire, nisi qui sciet medietatem esse bi- I narium,et hoc quidem in omnibus consideretur. Nam si nesciat quis ad quid aliquid referatureorum quæ relativa sunt, illud quoque ignorabit,utrurn ommino ad aliquid referatur,quod his verbisAristoteles dicit:

English

He confirms that this is a property of relatives according to the definition stated above, because if anyone knows definitively that something is relative, since it is a relative, he will also know definitively what that is to which it can be referred. For relatives are those whose very being is to be related in some way to something, since in order for a quaternary to be a double, it derives this from a binary. If anyone knows that the number four is a double, he will necessarily also know that the binary is a half, in relation to which the quaternary becomes a double; for it can in no way happen that when someone knows definitively that some thing is relative, he does not also know that to which that thing is said to be definitively related. Now there is one proof of this matter, which comes from the definition. For those things are defined as being relative whose substance is such that they are related in some way to something. So if I know that the number four is a double, in that it is joined in some way to a binary, no one will be able to know that four is a double unless he knows that the binary is a half. And this should be considered in all cases. For if someone does not know that to which something among relatives is referred, he will also be ignorant whether it is referred to something at all, which Aristotle states in these words:

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:204 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si enim id non noverit omnino, ad quod hoc quodammodo se habetynec si ad aliquid quodammodo se habet sciturus est, sed in singulis palam hoc est: Ut hoc si quis novit diffinite quod est duplum, et cujus duplum est, moxdiffinite novit, si vero nullius diffinite novit, zpsum duplum, neque si est duplum omnino novit.Similiter autem et hoc aliquid, si novit aliquis quod melius est diffinite, et quo melius est, necessarium est nosse. Indiffinite autem non sciet quod hoc est pejore melius, opinio enim id quidem sit, non disciplina, non enim sciet exacte quod est pejore mehus, si enim sic contingit, nihil est pejus eo. Quapropter palam est quod si noverit quis aliquid relatiuorum diffinite necessarium est et illud ad quod dicitur diffinite nosse.

Hujus quoque rei exempla persequitur dicens: Si duplum ad aliquid esse novimus, scimus quoque id cujus duplum est; quod si nescirnusid cujus est duplum, duplum autem esse cujuslibet rei ex hoc est, quod ei sit medietas, ipsam quoque rem quae dupla sit, utrum dupla sit scire non possumus. Si igitur diffinite novimus quamlibet illam rem esse duplam, etiam cujus dupla est diffinite nos scire necesse est.

English

For if he does not know at all that to which this bears a certain relation, neither will he know that it bears a relation to something, but in individual cases this is clear: for instance, if someone knows definitively that something is double, he also immediately knows definitively of what it is double; but if he knows definitively of nothing, he does not know the double itself, nor even that it is double at all. Similarly also in this case: if someone knows definitively that something is better, it is also necessary to know that than which it is better. But indefinitely he will not know that this is better than a worse thing; for that would be an opinion, not knowledge, for he will not know exactly that it is better than a worse thing, since if this were so, nothing would be worse than it. Wherefore it is clear that if anyone knows one of the relatives definitively, it is also necessary that he know definitively that to which it is said to be related.

He also pursues examples of this matter, saying: If we know that something is double in relation to something, we also know that of which it is double; but if we do not know that of which it is double, and it is double by virtue of the fact that it has a half, then we cannot know the thing itself which is double, whether it is double. If therefore we know definitively that any given thing is double, it is also necessary that we know definitively of what it is double.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:205 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ut si novit quis Anchisem patrem diffinite esse Æneæ, et Æneam diffinite filium esse agnoscet, vel si indiffinite novit quoniam pater est, indiffinite etiam sciturus est quoniam filii pater est.Et rursus si tEneam quis indiffinite novit quoniam filius est, sciturus quoque est indiffinite quoniam patris est filius.Manifestum est ergo quoniam ea quæ sunt ad aliquid, si diffinite ad aliquid esse sciantur, etiam illud diffinite sciendum est ad quod illa referuntur. Quod in substantiis non eodem modo esse Aristotele probamus auctore, qui hujus quaestionis seriem ita concludit.

Caput vero, et manus, et horum singula quae substantiæ sunt,hoc ipsum quod sunt est scire diffinite, Ad quod autem dicantur, non est necessarium scire. Cujus enim caput hoc, vel cujus manus sit, non est scire diffinite, quare non erunt hæc ad aliquid. Si vero non sunt hæc relativa verum erit dicere quod nulla substantia relativorum est.

English

For if someone knows definitively that Anchises is the father of Aeneas, he will also recognize definitively that Aeneas is the son; or if he knows indefinitely that he is a father, he will also know indefinitely that he is the father of a son. And again, if someone knows indefinitely that Aeneas is a son, he will also know indefinitely that he is the son of a father. It is evident, therefore, that in the case of relatives, if they are known to be related to something definitively, that to which they are referred must also be known definitively. But that this is not so in the case of substances we prove on the authority of Aristotle, who concludes the sequence of this question as follows.

But a head, and a hand, and each of these individual things which are substances—to know definitively this very thing that they are; but to what they are said [to belong], it is not necessary to know. For whose head this is, or whose hand it is, it is not necessary to know definitively; wherefore these will not be relatives. But if these are not relatives, it will be true to say that no substance is among relatives.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:206 · narrative
Source · Latin

In capite, inquit,etin manu, et in aliis substantiis non est verum, quoniam si quis aliquid horum alicujus esse novit, et ad aliquid aliud referri, idcirco et ad quam referatur diffinite sciturus est. Si quis enim operto capite atque omnibus membris manum foras exerat, manifestum est quoniam manus illa alicujus manus est, cujus autem manus sit, dici diffinite non potest. Similiter quoque opertis oculis, facieque velata si cujuslibet caput aspicias, illud quidem caputalicujus esse non dubitas,cujusautem sit diftinitenon proferes.Quare quoniam haec hujusmodi sunt, ut si quis ea diffinite sciat esse alicujus, cujus sint, diffinite scire non poterit,a relativorum diffinitione, quorum si una res quælibet diffinile sciatur esse ad aliquid, illa quoque res ad quam dicitur, diffinite scitur, substantiæ segregantur. Subjiciendum tamen est illud quoque,quod omnino verum est, in diffinitionibus rem ipsam quae diffinitur sumi non oportere. Multa enimsunt quæ aliter proferuntur et diffiniuntur, et aliter accipiuntur, ut si quis dicat album esse colorem nigro contrarium, potest hoc et in corpore accipi, namque et color album dicitur, et corpus quod albo participat,album nominatur. Quocirca ne quis putet tale album esse diffinitum, quod ad participationem albi etcorporis referatur,ita dicendum est: Album est quod cum in aliquibus est, tum color nigro contrarium.

English

In the case of a head, he says, and a hand, and in other substances, this is not true, because if someone knows that one of these belongs to something, and is also referred to something else, he will for that reason also know definitively to what it is referred. For if someone with his head covered and all his limbs concealed puts forth his hand, it is evident that that hand is someone's hand, but whose hand it is cannot be stated definitively. Similarly also, with eyes covered and face veiled, if you look at anyone's head, you do not doubt that that head belongs to someone, but you will not state definitively whose it is. Therefore, since these are of such a sort that if someone knows definitively that they belong to something, he cannot know definitively whose they are, they are separated from the definition of relatives, of which, if any one thing is known definitively to be relative to something, that thing also to which it is said to be related is known definitively. Nevertheless, this too must be added, which is altogether true: in definitions, the thing itself that is being defined ought not to be assumed. For there are many things that are expressed and defined in one way and understood in another, as if someone were to say that white is a color contrary to black; this can also be understood in the case of a body, for both a color is called white, and a body that participates in white is called white. Wherefore, lest anyone think that such a white has been defined as that which is referred to the participation of white and of a body, it must be stated thus: White is that which, when it is in certain things, is then a color contrary to black.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:207 · narrative
Source · Latin

Atque ita rem ipsam in sua diffinitione sumimus, quod scilicet Aristoteles, id est rem ipsam quæ diffinitur in diffinitione sumi non oportere, inter verisimilia topicorum posuit argumenta. Nunc autem post relativorum disputationem, ad majorem nos de his rebus tractatum studiosus doctor hortatur, dicens:

Fortasse diffinite est de hujusmodi rebus confidenter declarare, nisi sæpe pertractata sint, dubitasse autem de his singulis non erit inutile.

Quod scilicet nunquam diceret, nisi nos ad majorem acuminisexercitationemconsiderationemque revocaret. Quod quoniam ejus est adhortatio, nos quoque in aliis de his rebus dubitationes solutionesque ponere minimo gravabimur.

LIBER TERTIUS.

Consueta in principio quæstio est cur post relationis praedicamentum disputationem qualitatis aggressus est, quod nimis curiosum est. Mirabile enim fuerat cur post quantitatis ordinem non statim de qualitate coepisset, sed quoniam quantitati quædam relationis admiscuit, et disputationem de relatione continuavit,idcirco non est mirabile post expeditam relationis interpositionem ad qualitatis eum ordinem revertisse, quanquam etiam ex hoc quoque recta sit series. Nam post magnum parvumque statim proportio et quædam ad aliud comparatio consequitur, ut sit aut majus autminus,autaequale vel inaequale, quaesunt ad aliquid.

English

And thus we take the thing itself in its definition, namely that Aristotle—that is, that the thing itself which is defined ought not to be taken in the definition—placed among the probable arguments of the Topics. But now, after the discussion of relatives, the diligent teacher urges us to a fuller treatment of these matters, saying:

Perhaps it is the mark of a settled mind to declare confidently about such matters, unless they have often been thoroughly examined; but to have doubted about each of these will not be useless.

Which he would certainly never say unless he were recalling us to greater sharpness of exercise and consideration. And since this is his exhortation, we too shall not be reluctant to set down in other places our doubts and solutions concerning these matters.

BOOK THREE.

The customary question at the beginning is why, after the discussion of the category of relation, he undertook the discussion of quality—which is excessively curious. For it would have been remarkable why, after the order of quantity, he did not immediately begin on quality; but since he mixed certain things of relation into quantity, and continued the discussion of relation, for that reason it is not remarkable that after finishing the interposition of relation he returned to the order of quality, although from this too the sequence is correct. For after great and small, proportion and a certain comparison to another immediately follows, so that there is either more or less, or equal or unequal, which are relatives.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:208 · narrative
Source · Latin

Post haec autem innasci quasque necesse est passiones, quae a qualitatis natura non discrepant, ut albuin, vel nigrum, vel calidum vel frigidum, vel quaecunque his sunt consimilia, quae praedicatio qualitatis includit. Est vero titulus hujus propositi de quali et de qualitate. Quaeritur enim cur ei non aut de quali dixisse, aut de qualitate suffecerit, quod hoc modo solvitur. Dicimus enim quale non uno modo, qualitatem vero simpliciter. Quale enim dicimus et ipsam qualitatem,et illam rem quae qualitate illa participat, ut albedo quidem qualitas est, qui vero participat albedinem albus dicitur. Sed et albedinem ipsam communiter quale dicimus, id est ipsam proprie qualitatem, et album dicimus quale, illud scilicet quod superius comprehensa qualitate participat.Ita ergo et ipsam qualitatem et rem quae qualitate participat. qualia communiter appellamus, qualitas vero simpliciter dicitur. Res enim ipsa quae participari potest, sola qualitas nominatur. Res vero quae participat, qualitatis vocabulo non tenetur, ut, albedo qualitas quidem est, albus vero qualitas non est. Differunt ergo hoc quod dicimus quale et qualitas, quod illud dupliciter, illa simpliciter appellatur.

English

After these things, however, it is necessary that certain affections arise in each case, which do not differ from the nature of quality, such as white, or black, or hot or cold, or whatever things are similar to these, which the predication of quality includes. The title of this proposition is "On the Qualified" and "On Quality." For it is asked why it would not have sufficed for him to have spoken either of "the qualified" or of "quality," which is resolved in this way. For we say "qualified" in more than one way, but "quality" simply. For we call both quality itself and that thing which participates in that quality "qualified," as whiteness is indeed a quality, but he who participates in whiteness is called white. But we also commonly call whiteness itself "qualified," that is, quality itself properly, and we call white "qualified," namely that which participates in the quality understood above. Thus, therefore, we commonly call both quality itself and the thing which participates in quality "qualified," but "quality" is said simply. For the thing itself which can be participated in is alone called quality. But the thing which participates is not held by the name of quality, as whiteness is indeed a quality, but white is not a quality. They differ, therefore, in this: that we say "qualified" and "quality," because the former is spoken of in two ways, the latter simply.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:209 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quocirca quanquamquidam negent hunc titulum Aristotelis esse, idemque confirment posteriores adjectione signatum, nos tamen dicimus propter quamdam nominum similitudinemdemonstrandam utrumqueposuisse,ut nihil distare videatur utrum quale an qualitas, id quod appositum est prædicamentum dioatur; quale enim ipsam aliquoties rem (ut diximus) qualitatemque significat. Sit ergo ex rebus sumpta diffinitio qualitatis.Quod vero inquam diffinitionem,quodque superius in aliis quoque praedicamentis, eodem sumus usi vocabulo,nullus arbitretur generalem me; diffinitionem voluisse signare, sed diffinitionis nomen in rem descriptionis accipiat.In his enim quae generalissima genera sunt, diffinitio quaeri non de. bet, sed descriptio quaedam naturae, non enim potest inveniri diffinitio ejus rei quae genus ipsa sit, et quae genus nullum habeat. Quocirca his propositis, atque antea constitutis, incipiendum est de qualitate.

English

Wherefore, although certain people deny that this title is Aristotle's, and affirm that it was marked by later addition, we nevertheless say that he posited both on account of a certain similarity of names to be demonstrated, so that it seems to make no difference whether quale or qualitas is said of that which is put forward as the category; for quale sometimes signifies the thing itself, as we have said, and sometimes quality. Let the definition of quality, then, be taken from things themselves. But as to my saying "definition," and my having used the same word above in the other categories as well, let no one suppose that I wished to indicate a general definition, but let him take the word "definition" in the sense of a description. For in the case of those things which are most general genera, a definition must not be sought, but a certain description of the nature; for a definition cannot be found for that thing which is itself a genus, and which has no genus. Wherefore, with these matters set forth and established beforehand, we must begin on quality.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:210 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE QUALITATE.

Qualitatem autem dico,secundum quamquales quidam dicuntur.

Hic quæritur cur omnium in disceptatione doctissimus tam culpabili qualitatem termino diffinitionis incluserit. Volentibus enim nobis quid sit qualitas scire, illa respondet: qualitas est secundum quam qualesquidam dicuntur.Nihilenim minuseritobscurius atque ignorabilius, quod ait, secundum quam quales dicuntur, quam si de ipsa sola qualitate dixisset. Nam si illi sunt quales, qui qualitatem habent, ut sciantur quales,prius qualitas cognoscenda est. Amplius quoque nihil differt dixisse eam qualitatem secundum quam quales quidem dicuntur,tanquam si diceret eam esse qualitatem quæ qualitas sit. Nam sic qualitatem diffinire volens ait: SecunQum quam quales quidam sunt. Rursus si quis quales aliquos diffinire voluerit, eodem modo dicere poterit, qui in se retinent aliquam qualitatem. Quod si qualitas quidem quid sit per quale, quid autem sit quale, superiore qualitate monstratur, nihil intererit dicere qualitatem esse, qualitatem,quam qualitatem esse, secundum quam quales dicuntur.Sed siordinatadiffinitiogeneralisetin hoc generalissimo genere poni potuisset, recte culpabilis determinatio videretur.Nunc autem frustra contenditur,cum jam (ut saepe dictum est) descriptionis potius loco hunc terminum quam alicujus diffinitionisaddiderit.Quo.

English

ON QUALITY.

But I call quality that according to which certain things are said to be of such a sort.

Here it is asked why the most learned of all in disputation included quality within so culpable a term of definition. For when we wish to know what quality is, he answers: quality is that according to which certain things are said to be of such a sort. For nothing would have been more obscure and more unknowable than what he says, "according to which they are said to be of such a sort," than if he had spoken about quality alone by itself. For if those are of such a sort who have quality, in order that they may be known to be of such a sort, quality must first be known. Furthermore, it makes no difference to have said that it is quality according to which certain things are said to be of such a sort, than as if he were to say that it is that quality which is quality. For in this way, wishing to define quality, he says: "According to which certain things are of such a sort." Again, if anyone wishes to define certain things as being of such a sort, he will be able in the same way to say that they are those which retain some quality in themselves. But if what quality indeed is is shown through "of such a sort," and what "of such a sort" is is shown through the superior quality, it will make no difference to say that quality is quality, than to say that quality is that according to which they are said to be of such a sort. But if an ordered general definition could also have been placed in this most general genus, the determination would rightly seem culpable. Now, however, it is contended in vain, since already (as has often been said) he added this term in the place of a description rather than of any definition. Wherefore.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:211 · narrative
Source · Latin

circa si designatio tantum quædam, etquodammodo adumbratio rei ejus de qua quaeritur, et non diffinitio est, absurda calumnia est, rebus notioribus res ignotiores probantem non ante perspecta descriptionis ratione culpare.Illud autem quis dubitet notiores esse eos qui quales sunt, illa ipsa ex qua quales dicuntur qualitate, ut quilibet albus notior est ipsa albedine? Nam si albedo qualitas est,albusvero ab albedine, id est a qualitate, denominatus est, albus erit qualis nominatus ab albedine qualitate. Quod si, ut dictum est, notior albus est albedine, qualis notior erit qualitate, sicut grammaticus quoque notior est grammatica. Grammaticus quoque qualis est denominatus, scilicet a grammatica qualitate. Omnia enim quae sensibus subjecta sunt notiora sunt nobis quam ea quae sensibus non tenentur. Quare nihil impedit describentem et quodammodo naturam rei ejus de qua quaeritur designantem, res ignoliorea notioribus approbare.

English

In this connection, if it is only a certain designation and in a way a sketch of the thing about which inquiry is made, and not a definition, the accusation is absurd—to find fault with one who proves less known things by more known things, without having first examined the principle of the description. But who would doubt that those things which are of such a sort are more known than that very quality from which they are said to be of such a sort—as, for example, any white thing is more known than whiteness itself? For if whiteness is a quality, but a white thing is denominated from whiteness, that is, from a quality, then a white thing will be called "of such a sort" from the quality whiteness. But if, as has been said, a white thing is more known than whiteness, then "of such a sort" will be more known than quality, just as a grammarian too is more known than grammar. A grammarian too is called "of such a sort," namely from the quality grammar. For all things that are subject to the senses are more known to us than those that are not grasped by the senses. Wherefore nothing prevents one who describes and in a way designates the nature of the thing about which inquiry is made from establishing less known things by means of more known things.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:212 · narrative
Source · Latin

Estautem qualitas eorum quxmuuiphciterdicuntur, el una quidemspecies qualitatis habitus etdispositio dicitur. Differt autem habitus a dispositione, quod permanentior et diuturnior est. Tales aulem sunt scientiae et virtutes,. scientiæ enzm videtur esse permanentium et eorum quæ difficillime moveanturisiquis vel mediocriter sumat scientiam, nisi forte grandis permutatio facta sit, vel ab ægritudine, vel ab aliquo hujusmodi. Simililer autem et virtus, ut justitia et temperantia et singula talium non videntur posse facile amoveri, neque facile permutari.Affectiones vero dicuntur quæ suntfacite mobiles etcito permutabiles, ut calor et frigiditas, sanitas et ægritudo, et alia hujusmodi.A(ficitur enim circaeashomoquodammodoycitoque permutaiur,et ex calido frigidus fit, et ex sanitate in ægritudinem transit. Similiterautem in aliiq,nisitortein his quoque contingat propter temporis longitudinem in naturam cujusque transferri, ut insanabilis,vel difficile mobilis existat affectus, quem jam quilibet habitudinem vocet.

English

But quality is one of the things that are spoken of in many ways, and one species of quality is called habit and disposition. Now habit differs from disposition in that it is more permanent and longer-lasting. Such, moreover, are the sciences and the virtues; for knowledge seems to belong to the class of things that are permanent and most difficult to move, if one takes up knowledge even to a moderate degree, unless perhaps a great change has occurred, either from illness or from something of this sort. Similarly also virtue, as justice and temperance and each of such things, does not seem able to be easily removed or easily changed. But affections are called those things that are easily movable and quickly changeable, such as heat and cold, health and sickness, and other things of this sort. For a man is affected in relation to these in a certain way and is quickly changed, and from hot becomes cold, and passes from health into sickness. Similarly, moreover, in other cases, unless perhaps in these too it happens, on account of length of time, that they are transferred into the nature of each thing, so that the affection becomes incurable or difficult to move, which now anyone would call a habit.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:213 · narrative
Source · Latin

Proponit qualitatem multipliciter dici, quae res traxit aliquos in errorem, ut eis suspicio nasceretur Aristotelem credere qualitatem aequivoce nominari. Nam si omnisaequivocatio multipliciter dicitur,qualitas autem secundum Aristotelem ipsa quoque multipliciter appellatur, secundum Aristotelem nomen qualitatisaequivocum est. Nos vero defendimus multipliciter dici, esse non una tantum significatione nominari. Dicitur enim aliquid multipliciter dici, cum et aequivoce dicitur, et diverso modo de suis speciebus multipliciter praedicatur.Etcommunisest multiplex appellatio, etiam in bis nominibus quae veluti genera de speciebus dicuntr, velut aequivoca desubjectis.Namqueetanimal multipliciterdicitur. Nam si multae sint species quæ animali subjectae sunt,ipsum quoquemultipliciterquodammodonorrinatur. Istam autem muttiplicationem, non ad æquivocationem retulisse Aristotelem, sed potius ut qualitatem genus esse proponeret, illa res monstrat, quod ait, at una quidem species qualitatis habitus affectioquedicitur. Nam qui speciem dicit esse qualitatis habitum et affectionem, quis eum dubitet ipsam qualitatem vim obtinere generis arbitrari? Cur vero dicit unam speciem esse qualitatis, cum geminasproposuerit,habitudinemsciiicetetaffectionem, quæritur.

English

He sets forth that quality is spoken of in many ways, a matter which drew some into error, so that the suspicion arose in them that Aristotle believed quality to be named equivocally. For if every equivocation is spoken of in many ways, but quality according to Aristotle is itself also called in many ways, then according to Aristotle the name of quality is equivocal. But we maintain that to be spoken of in many ways is not to be named with one meaning only. For something is said to be spoken of in many ways both when it is said equivocally and when it is predicated in many ways of its species in a different manner. And the multiple appellation is common also in those names which are spoken of species as it were as genera, just as equivocals are spoken of subjects. For animal too is spoken of in many ways. For if there are many species which are subject to animal, it too is in a certain way named in many ways. But that Aristotle did not refer this multiplicity to equivocation, but rather proposed quality to be a genus, is shown by the fact that he says, and one species of quality is called habit and disposition. For when he says that habit and disposition are a species of quality, who would doubt that he considers quality itself to obtain the force of a genus? But why he says that one species of quality is a species, when he has proposed two, namely habit and disposition, is a question.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:214 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam si unum idemque sit habitus et aflectio, superflua est ejusdem rei repetita propositio, sin vero differant, quare differant investigandum est. Genere enim ne distent, illa res prævenit, quod utraque sub qualitate constituit. Restat ergo ut aut specie discrepent, aut numero; sed si specie discreparent, non ab Aristotele pro una specie ponerentur. Reliquum est;igiturea nequegenere neque specie differre, sed numero. Habitus namque dispositio idem est secundum speciem, sed numero tantum et propria quadam qualitate dissentiunt. Dispositionem vero indiscrete idem quod affectionem voco. Nam sicut Socrates a Platone nihil quidem secundum ipsam humanitatis speciem discrepat, sola tamen propriae personæ qualitate disjuncti sunt, ita quoque dispositio atque habitus, nee potius hoc modo distant; sed quemadmodum ipse Socrates dum esset parvulus, post vero pubescens a seipso distabat, eodem quoque modo habitus etdispositio: namque habitus firma est dispositio, affectio infirmus est habitus, ut quemadmodum distat albus color ab albo colore, si in pictura hic quidem permaneat, ille vero statim periturus sit, nisi quod is qui permanentior est, in habitu est, ille vero qui facile periturus est, in affectione, ita nihil aliud interest inter habitum atque dispositionem. Nam quamvis permanentior sit habitus, facile vero mobilis dispositio, non nisi tantum diuturnitate differunt permanendi.

English

For if habit and affection are one and the same, the repeated statement of the same thing is superfluous; but if they differ, why they differ must be investigated. For that they do not differ in genus, the following consideration prevents: that both are placed under quality. It remains, therefore, that they differ either in species or in number; but if they differed in species, they would not be posited by Aristotle as one species. It remains, therefore, that they differ neither in genus nor in species, but in number. For habit is the same as disposition in species, but they differ only in number and by a certain proper quality. But I call disposition without distinction the same as affection. For just as Socrates differs from Plato in no respect according to the very species of humanity, yet they are separated by the sole quality of their own person, so too disposition and habit—nor do they differ in this way any more; but just as Socrates himself, while he was a little boy, afterward as a youth differed from himself, in the same way also habit and disposition: for habit is a firm disposition, affection is a weak habit, so that just as white color differs from white color, if in a painting one remains and the other is about to perish at once, except that the one which is more permanent is in habit, while the one which is easily about to perish is in affection, so nothing else differs between habit and disposition. For although habit is more permanent and disposition easily changeable, they differ only in the duration of their permanence.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:215 · narrative
Source · Latin

Unde fit ut genere et specie habitus a dispositione non discrepet. Quocirca recte quae numero solo distabant, non specie sub unius speciei nuncupatione utraque sunt ab Aristotele proposita, sed est horum propria differentia, quod habitus diutissime permanentes dispositiones sunt. Dispositio autem facile mobilis habitus, sed si horum exempla quaeramus, haec poterunt inveniri. Habitudines sunt ut artes, disciplinae, virtutes. Nam ars non facile mobilis videtur et diutissime permanet. Hoc enim ars ipsa meditatur ut usu atque exercitatione non pereat. Quis enim est qui sciens recte grammaticam nulla vi interveniente validioris passionis amisit? Fertur enim quidam summus orator aegritudine febribusque decoctus, omnem litterarum amisisse doctrinam, in aliis vero rebus sanus ac sibi constans et in omni re vegetus permansisse. Disciplina quoque etiam ipsa est in permutatione difficilis. Quis enim scienstriangulum,duobusdirectisangulis,tres interiores similes habere angulos, bane scientiam praeter vim (ut dictum est) fortioris passionis amisit? Virtutes quoque in eodem genere ponendæ sunt. Virtus enim nisi difficile mutHbilis non est, neque enim quod semeljuste judicat justusest, neque qui semel adulterium facit, est adulter, sed cum ista voluntas cogitatioque permanserit.Aristoteles enim virtutes non putat scientias, ut Socrates, sed habitus in Ethicis suis esse declarat.

English

Hence it comes about that in genus and species habit does not differ from disposition. Therefore, correctly, those things which differed only in number, not in species, were both set forth by Aristotle under the name of one species, but their proper difference is this, that habits are dispositions that persist for a very long time. A disposition, however, is a habit easily changeable, but if we seek examples of these, they can be found. Habits are such things as arts, disciplines, virtues. For an art does not seem easily changeable and persists for a very long time. For the art itself aims at this, that it not perish through use and exercise. For who is there who, knowing grammar correctly, has lost it with no force of a stronger passion intervening? For it is reported that a certain most eminent orator, wasted away by illness and fevers, lost all his learning of letters, yet in other matters remained sound and consistent with himself and vigorous in every respect. Discipline too is itself difficult to change. For who is there who, knowing that a triangle has three interior angles equal to two right angles, has lost this knowledge apart from the force (as has been said) of a stronger passion? Virtues too must be placed in the same genus. For virtue is not virtue unless it is difficult to change, for neither is one who judges justly once just, nor is one who commits adultery once an adulterer, but when this will and thought have persisted. For Aristotle does not think virtues are sciences, as Socrates did, but declares in his Ethics that they are habits.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:216 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quocirca constat esse habitus stabiliter permanentes, difficileque mutabiles, hoc tantum excepto, ut non eas vis aliqua major alicujus permutationis impellat et destruat. Affectionis vero species sunt, ut calet'actio atque perfrictio, et aegritudo atque sanitas,cum ad eas quodammodo sit homo dispositus atque affectus,non tamenimmutabiliterautcaloris qualitatem habeataut frigoris, sicut nec perpetuo sanitatis aut perpetuo aegritudinis. Quin etiam si qua sunt quae per longi temporis aegritudinem corporibus immutabiliter indurantur, ut ea jam in naturam quodammodo corporis cujusque transierint, ut si quis percussus cicatricem faciat insanabilem, illi ex dispesitione et affectione quidam factus est habitus. Quocirca recte dictum est dispositiones inveteratas habitus facere. Nam cum quaelibet dispositio permanens et difficile mobilis facta sit, ilia jam non dispositio autaffectio, sed habitus vocandus est.

English

Wherefore it is evident that habits are stably permanent and difficult to change, with this sole exception, that no greater force of any alteration drives and destroys them. But the species of affection are, for instance, the action of heat and chill, and sickness and health, since in relation to these a man is in some way disposed and affected, yet he does not immutably possess either the quality of heat or of cold, just as neither does he perpetually possess health or perpetually sickness. Indeed, even if there are some things which through long sickness of the body are immutably hardened, so that they have already passed in some way into the nature of each body, as if someone struck should make an incurable scar, for that person a certain habit has been produced out of disposition and affection. Wherefore it has rightly been said that inveterate dispositions make habits. For when any disposition has become permanent and difficult to move, it must now be called not a disposition or affection, but a habit.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:217 · narrative
Source · Latin

Manifestumest autem quoniam hæc volunt habitudines nominari,quæsunt diuturniora et difficile mobilia. Namque in disciplinisnon multum retinentes sed facile mohiles, non div-untur habitum habere, quamvis sint ad disciplinas pejus vel melius dispositi. Quare differt habitus a dispositione,quod hoc quidem facile mobile est, iltud vero diuturnius et difficile mobile.

Habitus esse qualitates difficile mobiles et diuturnissimepermallentes hoc argumento confirmat,quod eos quibus quaelibet scientia traditur,si ab eis non fortiter addiscatur,ejus rei quam discunthabitum retinere non dicimus. Qui euim litteras discens nondum soluto cursu sermonis, sed syllabatim quodammodo atque intercise per imperitiam legerit, eum quidem dispositum esse atque affectum dicimus ad scieutiam litterarum,non tamen adhuc illum habitum retinere. Quare idem quoque est in aliis rebus. Omnesenim quicunque ad aliquam rem dispositi, ejus rei qua sunt aliquomodoaffecti5nondiuturnam in se receptionem habent, eos ad illam rem dispositos quidem esse arbitramur, habitum vero habere non dicimus. Recte igitur habitus diuturnior,el permanentior, dispositio vero facile mobilis deque perdurabilis ab Aristotele proponitur.

English

It is evident, however, that these wish to be called habits which are more lasting and difficult to change. For in the case of disciplines, those who do not retain much but are easily changeable are not said to have a habit, even though they are disposed worse or better toward the disciplines. Wherefore a habit differs from a disposition in that the latter is easily changeable, while the former is more lasting and difficult to change.

That habits are qualities difficult to change and most lastingly permanent, he confirms by this argument: those to whom any science is handed down, if it is not strongly learned by them, we do not say that they retain the habit of the thing which they are learning. For one who is learning letters, not yet with the fluent course of speech, but reading syllable by syllable, as it were, and in a broken manner through inexperience—we say that he is indeed disposed and affected toward the knowledge of letters, yet he does not as yet retain that habit. Wherefore the same holds also in other matters. For all who are disposed toward some thing, having no lasting reception within themselves of the thing by which they are in some way affected, we judge them indeed to be disposed toward that thing, but we do not say that they have a habit. Rightly, therefore, habit is set forth by Aristotle as more lasting and more permanent, but disposition as easily changeable and not enduring.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:218 · narrative
Source · Latin

Suntautem habitus etiam dispositiones, dispositiones vero non necesse est habitus esse, qui enim retinent habitus et quodammodo dispositi sunt per. eos qui autem dispositi sunt non umnino retinent habitum.

Sensus quidem talis est, quod omnis quicunque habeat habitum, habet quoque in eodem habitu dispositionem. Si quis vero habeat dispositionem, non necesse sit eum etiam habitum retinere. Habitus ab habendodictus est. Idcirco quod ab aliquo immutabiliter vel difficile immutabilitur habeatur, ut glauci oculi, vel adunca? nares, vel alicujus artis scientia atque doctrina, quæ si quis habeat, etiam dispositus adeaessedicitur.Si quisautemdispositusadaliquam rem sit, non eum necesse est etiam habitum habere, ut si quis negligentius opertus algore quatiatur, dispositus quidem tunc ad frigus est, non tamen ejus retinet habitum. Videturautem eamdem similitudinem servare genus. Nam genus amplius prædicatur, at ubicunque species sit, mox quoque nomengeneris praesto est. Ubi autem sit genus, non necessario speciei vocabulum consequitur, ut si quis est homo,eum animal esse necesse est. Si quis est animal, non sta. lim homo dicitur.

English

But habits are also dispositions, yet dispositions are not necessarily habits. For those who retain habits are in a certain way disposed through them; but those who are disposed do not altogether retain a habit.

The sense is indeed such that whoever has a habit also has a disposition in that same habit. But if anyone has a disposition, it is not necessary that he also retain a habit. Habit is so called from having. Therefore, because it is had by someone immutably or with difficulty changed, as grey eyes, or curved nostrils, or the knowledge and teaching of some art, which if anyone has, he is also said to be disposed toward those things. But if anyone is disposed toward something, it is not necessary that he also have a habit, as if someone carelessly covered is shaken by cold, he is indeed then disposed toward cold, yet he does not retain a habit of it. But the genus seems to preserve this same likeness. For genus is predicated more widely, and wherever a species is, the name of the genus is immediately present too. But where the genus is, the term of the species does not necessarily follow, as if someone is a man, it is necessary that he be an animal. If someone is an animal, he is not immediately called a man.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:219 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quocirca cum quidquid est habitus,dispositio sit,quidquid dispositio non omnino sit habitus,videtur genus esse quoddam habitus disposilio,sed illud verius, ubi inten' e, est alqueremissio, genus intentionis, remissione:;on posse.Nam sicut in eo quod est album et magis album, magis albi genus album esse non potest, idem namque est album et magis album, nisi torte quod sola discrepant intentione,quod magis album quadam quasi intentione augmentoque crescit atque porrigitur, sic eliam habitus atque dispositio cum idem sint, utraque sola differunt intentione, quod auctior quodam. modo,et incremento quodam permanentior firmiorque est habitusdispositione; quocirca dispositio habitus genus non est, eodem quoque modo nec dispositionis species,habitus.Sed nuncquidam itaesthabitus, ut non per dispositionem creverit, neque per aliquam nondum durabilem qualitatem ad perfectum venerit statum,ut est nasi curvitas,vel cæcitas oculorum, si subita facta sit.Haec enim ab ipso haDitu nulla praecedente dispositione cceperunt; forte enim nunquam ad ea dispositus fuit aliquis,qui adhuc non haberet.Alii vera habitus intentione fiunt atque inveterationedispositionis,ut ea quæ in artibus doctrinisque versantur.

English

Therefore, since whatever is a habit is a disposition, but whatever is a disposition is not entirely a habit, disposition seems to be a kind of genus of habit. But that view is more true: where there is intensity, there is also some remission, and the genus of intensity cannot consist in remission. For just as in the case of what is white and more white, white cannot be the genus of more white — for white and more white are the same, except perhaps that they differ only in intensity, in that more white grows and extends, as it were, by a certain intensity and increase — so too habit and disposition, since they are the same, differ only in intensity, because habit is in a certain way richer and by a certain increase more lasting and firmer than disposition. Wherefore disposition is not the genus of habit, and in the same way neither is habit a species of disposition. But now some habit is such that it has not grown through a disposition, nor has it come to its perfect state through some quality not yet lasting, as for example the curvature of a nose, or blindness of the eyes, if it has come about suddenly. For these have begun from the habit itself with no preceding disposition; for perhaps no one was ever disposed toward them who did not yet have them. But other habits come about by the intensity and inveteration of a disposition, such as those that are occupied with arts and doctrines.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:220 · narrative
Source · Latin

Prius enim quis ad ea dispositus est, post vero habitum capit,alia vero non intentione, sed quadam permutatione ad habitum veniunt,ut lac quod ex liquido defigilur et constipatur in caseum,etvinum quod ex dulci atque suavi in acidum gustum saporemque convertitur; neque enim plus tunc vinum est quam fuit ante cum esset suave, sed cum quadam permutatione in aliam qualitatem habitudinemque transgressum est. Ac de prima quidem qualitatis specie sufficienter est dictum.

Aliud uero genus qualitatis est, secundum quod pugillatortis vet cursores, vel salubres vel insalubres dicimus, et simpliciter quæcunque secundum potentiam naturalem vel impolentiam dicuntur. Non enim quoniam sunt dipositi aliquo modo,unumquodque hujusmodi dicilur,sed quod habent potentiam naturalem vel impotentiam facere quiddam facile uel nihil pati, ut pugillatores vel cursores dicunturtnon quod sint dispositi aliquo modo, sed quod habeant potentiam naturalem hoc facile faciendi.Salubl'es autem dicuntur, eo quod habeant potentiam naturalem,ut nihil a quibuslibet accidentibus facile patiantur, insalubres uero eo quod habeant impotentiam naturalem non facile patiendi. Similiter autem his et molle et durum se habent, durum enim dicitur quia habeat potentiam non facile secari, molle vero quod habeat ejusdem ipsius impotentiam.

English

For first someone is disposed toward these things, and afterward receives the habit; but others come to a habit not by intensification but by a kind of change, as milk, which from liquid is thickened and compacted into cheese, and wine, which from sweet and pleasant is turned into a sharp taste and flavor; for it is not then more wine than it was before when it was sweet, but by a kind of change it has passed over into another quality and condition. And concerning the first species of quality, enough has been said.

But there is another genus of quality, according to which we call boxers or runners healthy or unhealthy, and simply whatever things are said according to natural power or impotence. For each thing of this sort is not said to be such because it is disposed in some way, but because it has a natural power or impotence to do something easily or to undergo nothing, as boxers or runners are said [to be such] not because they are disposed in some way, but because they have a natural power of doing this easily. But they are called healthy because they have a natural power to undergo nothing easily from any accidents, and unhealthy because they have a natural impotence of not easily undergoing. And soft and hard are related similarly to these; for a thing is called hard because it has the power of not easily being cut, but soft because it has the impotence of this same thing.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:221 · narrative
Source · Latin

Secundam vero speciem qualitatis esse commemo ■ rat,quee ex quadam naturalipotentia impotentiaque proveniat; hoc autem hujusmodi est,ut cum aliquos validi corporis intuemur nondum pugiles,neque hujusperitiaartisimbutos,sedsic eos pugillatores dicimus, non in eo quodjamsint pugiles,sed eo quod esse possint, et si quorum leve corpus aspicimus,surasque non magnas,eos facile moveri cursuque veloces existimamus, quanquam nondum ad cursus certamen aspirE.nt,nec sint cursores, eos tamen cursores secundum potentiamnominamus,nonquodjamcurrant, sed quod possint currere,non absurde vocabimus. Eodem quoque modo eos vocamus salubres vel insalubres, quos valenti corpore vel fragiliore, vel ad sanitatem aptos, vel ad ægritudinem credimus.

English

He records that the second species of quality is that which arises from a certain natural capacity or incapacity. This is of the following sort: when we look upon certain people of strong body who are not yet boxers, nor imbued with the skill of this art, but we nonetheless call them boxers—not in that they already are boxers, but in that they can be—and if we look upon certain people of light body and not large calves, we think them easily moved and swift in running, although they do not yet aspire to the contest of running, nor are they runners, we nonetheless call them runners according to capacity, not because they already run, but because they can run, we shall not absurdly call them so. In the same way we call those healthy or unhealthy whom we believe to have a strong or more fragile body, or to be fit for health or for sickness.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:222 · narrative
Source · Latin

Unde fit utquosdam aegrotos possimus salubres vocare, quosdam vero sanos insalubres dicere: non enim, quod jam actu vel sani vel a'groti sint, salubres vel insalubres dicuntur,sed quod vel sani diutius esse possint vel aegroti.Sed quaestio est cur cum de qualitatis speciebus propositum sit, secundum genus dixerit qualitatis et non speciem; ita enim ait: Aliud vero genus qualitatis est seeundum quod pugillatores vel cursores, vel salubres et insalubres dicimus.Sed qui hoc quærunt ignorarevidenlurillud esse solum genus, quod super se aliud genus non habeat.Illud veros sol um speciem,quod sub se nullas species claudat, illa vero quae inter genera generalissiæa speciesque specialissimas sunt, communi posse generis et specieinominenuncupari.

English

From this it comes about that we can call certain sick people healthy, and certain sound people unhealthy. For they are not called healthy or unhealthy because they are already actually sound or sick, but because they can either remain sound for a longer time or be sick. But the question is why, when the plan was to discuss the species of quality, he spoke according to the genus of quality and not the species. For he says: "But another genus of quality is that according to which we call people boxers or runners, or healthy and unhealthy." But those who ask this seem not to know that only that is a genus which has no other genus above it. But that alone is a species which encloses no species under it. Those things, however, which are between the most general genera and the most special species can be called by the common name of both genus and species.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:223 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quocirca quoniam de ea specie qualitatis Aristoteles tractat, quae nondum sit species specialissima, sed magis generis prima species, et hujusmodi species quæ possit esse et genus,nihil absurdum esteamdem et speciei et generis loco ponere.Sed ut sunt quædam qualitates, a quibus denominatione quadam facta quaelibet illa res dicitur, ut ab albedine album,vel a luxuria luxuriosum,vel quidquid hujusmodi est, in his quaesunt secundum potentiam naturalem non ita est.Ars enim ipsa pugillatoria non est proposita, a qua pugillatores dicamus.Pugillatores enim non dicuntur ab eo quod usum pugillatoriæ artis exerceant,sed ab eo quod ad eam secundum potentiam naturalem affecti sunt;quocirca quos dicimus pugillatores a pugillatoria dicti non sunt,neque ab ea denominari possunt, sed magis a pugillatoria arte pugiles appellantur. Pugilis enim est qui pugillatoria arte utitur,atque hoc idem in cæteris licet videre. In his ergo nullacerta qualitas est a qua cætera nominentur.Sed si quatamen invenienda atque exprimenda sit,talis est quam ipse Aristoteles hoc modo denuntiat,quae sit secundum potentiam aliquid faciendi,veJ impotentiam aliquid patiendi.Pugillatores enim et cursores idcirco dicimus,quod habeant potentiam faciendi,id est currere atque esse pugiles.

English

Wherefore, since Aristotle treats of that species of quality which is not yet a most specific species, but rather the first species of a genus, and a species of such a kind as can also be a genus, there is nothing absurd in placing the same thing in the position both of a species and of a genus. But whereas there are certain qualities from which, by a kind of denomination, any given thing is named—as white from whiteness, or luxurious from luxury, or whatever else is of this sort—in those which are according to natural potential it is not so. For the art of boxing itself is not what is set forth, from which we call people boxers. For they are not called boxers from the fact that they exercise the use of the art of boxing, but from the fact that they are disposed toward it according to natural potential; wherefore those whom we call boxers are not named from the art of boxing, nor can they be denominated from it, but rather from the art of boxing they are called pugilists. For a pugilist is one who uses the art of boxing, and the same may be seen in other cases. In these, therefore, there is no definite quality from which the rest are named. But if one must nonetheless find and express one, it is such as Aristotle himself declares in this way: that which is according to the potential for doing something, or the incapacity for suffering something. For we call people boxers and runners for the reason that they have the potential for doing, that is, for running and for being boxers.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:224 · narrative
Source · Latin

Salubres vero denominamus, quod el ipsi habeant aliquamquodammodoimpotentiamaliquid patiendi; qui enim minus ab extrinsecus accidentibus patitur, hic de sanitatesecurus est,etqui de sanitate securus est, illum salubrem esse re vera possumus prcedicare.Alia vero est qualitas quae secundum nihil patiendi impotentiam dicitur,ut eos quos insalubres vocamus;hi enim impotentiam habent nihil patiendi, id circo quod habeant potentiam aliquid cito patiendi: quod si quis estqui abextrinsecus accidentibusaliquid facile patiatur,ille potens est facillime aegritudini subjacere,secundum quam potentiam insalubresdicimus,etiamsi sint sani.Eodem quoque modo durum dicitur et molle.Durum enim est quod habet potentiam non citius secari,quod enim durum est, difficillime aliqua sectione dividitur. Molle autem quod habeatimpotentiam difficilius secari,quod quoniam molle secatur facile, secundum impotentiam difficilius secari molle dicimus.Et haec est secunda species qualitatis. Nunc transeamus ad tertiam.

English

We call healthy, however, those who themselves have in some way a certain incapacity for suffering anything; for he who is less affected by external accidents is secure concerning health, and he who is secure concerning health we can truly proclaim to be healthy. But there is another quality which is spoken of according to an incapacity for suffering nothing, as those whom we call unhealthy; for these have an incapacity for suffering nothing, for the reason that they have a capacity for quickly suffering something; for if there is anyone who is easily affected in some way by external accidents, he is capable of most easily being subject to sickness, according to which capacity we call them unhealthy, even if they are healthy. In the same way also hard and soft are spoken of. For hard is that which has a capacity for not being quickly cut, for what is hard is divided by some section with the greatest difficulty. But soft is that which has an incapacity for being cut with difficulty, because since what is soft is cut easily, according to the incapacity for being cut with difficulty we call it soft. And this is the second species of quality. Now let us pass to the third.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:225 · narrative
Source · Latin

Tertia vero species qualitatis estpassibilesqualita- J tes et passiones; sunt autem hujusmodi, ut dulcedo,ama. ritudo, austeritas, et omnia his cognata. Amplius, et calor: et frigus, et albedo,et nigredo. Et quoniam hæ qualitates sunt manifestum est, quæcunque enim ista susceperint,qualia dicuntur secundum ea,ut mel quoniam dulcedinem suscepit,dulce dicitur, et corpus album, eo quod albedinem suscepit.Similiter autem. sese habent et in cæleris.

Tertium genus qualitatis proponit,quod nos in partem qualitatis speciemque convertimus passibiles qualitates et passiones. Haec autem a se plurimum distant,tamen cum utraque qualitates sint,utraque prius docet,post vero quae eorum distantia esse videatur edisserit,et prius eorum convenientia proponit exempla.Nam quid sint passibiles qualitates docens ait.ut dulcedo vel amaritudo, calor et frigus, nigredo et albedo,et alia his cognata,hæc quæ superius comprehensa sunt qualitates esse illa ratione confirmat,quam in primordio de qualitatis disputatione ipsius qualitatis esse reddiderat.Diffinitionem enim qualitatis esse praedixerat, secundum quam quales vocamur.Quod si secundum qualitatis quales vocamur,ab amaritudine vero vel a dulcedine amarum vel dulce dicitur.

English

The third species of quality, however, is passible qualities and passions; and they are of this sort, such as sweetness, bitterness, harshness, and all things akin to these. Furthermore, also heat and cold, and whiteness and blackness. And since these are qualities, it is manifest; for whatever things have received these are said to be qualified according to them, as honey, because it has received sweetness, is said to be sweet, and a body is said to be white because it has received whiteness. And similarly they hold in the other cases.

He sets forth the third genus of quality, which we have turned into a part and species of quality: passible qualities and passions. These, however, differ greatly from one another; yet since both are qualities, he first teaches both, then afterwards explains what their difference appears to be, and first sets forth examples of their agreement. For teaching what passible qualities are, he says: such as sweetness or bitterness, heat and cold, blackness and whiteness, and other things akin to these. He confirms that these things, which were comprehended above, are qualities by that reasoning which he had given at the beginning of the discussion of quality as belonging to quality itself. For he had stated beforehand that there is a definition of quality according to which we are called qualified. But if according to quality we are called qualified, then from bitterness or sweetness something is called bitter or sweet.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:226 · narrative
Source · Latin

A nigredine atque albedine nigrum atque album, quis dubitet has esse qualitates in quibus qualitatis convenitdiffinitio?lllaenim semperejusdem naturaeessecreduntur,qu xecunqueejusdem descriptionis finibus term:nantur,ut si qua res diffinitionem hanc,quae est animal rationale mortale susceperit.eam hominem esse manifestum est.Quocirca si hae quas passibiles qualitates vel passiones dixerat,suscipiunt qualitatis diffinilionem,eo quod qualia dicuntur quas illa susceperint,has etiam constat esse qualitates.

Possibiles vero qualitates dicuntur, non quod haec quæ illas susceperint qualitates,aliquid patiantul',neque enim mel quod aliquid passum sit, idcirco dicifur dulce,nec aliquid aliud hujusmodi. Similiter autem his et calor et frigus passibiles qualitates dicuntur, non quod ipsa quæ eas suscipiunt,aliquid passa sint. sed quoniam singulaeorum quæ dicta sunt, secundum sensuum qualitatem passionis perfectiva sunt, passibiles qualitates dicuntur, dulcedo enim quamdam passionem secundum gustum efficit, et calor secundum tactum, similiter autem et alia.

English

From blackness and whiteness, black and white—who would doubt that these are qualities to which the definition of quality applies? For they are always believed to be of the same nature, whatever things are bounded by the limits of the same description; just as, if any thing has received this definition, which is "a rational mortal animal," it is manifest that it is a man. Wherefore, if these which he had called passible qualities or passions receive the definition of quality, in that they are called qualified by virtue of the qualities they have received, it is evident that these too are qualities.

But they are called passible qualities, not because the things that have received these qualities undergo something; for honey is not called sweet because it has undergone something, nor anything else of this sort. Similarly to these, both heat and cold are called passible qualities, not because the things that receive them have undergone something, but because each of the things mentioned, in accordance with the quality of the senses, is productive of a passion; they are called passible qualities. For sweetness produces a certain passion in respect of taste, and heat in respect of touch, and similarly also the others.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:227 · narrative
Source · Latin

Passibilium qualitatum exemplaconstituerat dulcedinemvel amaritudinem,frigus atque calorem,albedinem atque nigredinem,quæ cum passibiles qualitates sint, non tamen uno eodemque modo passimles qualitates dicuntur; sed longe distant rationes quibus hæc omnia qualitates passibiles appellantur, ut rrius dulcedo vel amariLudo,calor et frigus passibiles qualitates dicuntur, non quod ea quæ sunt dulcia aliquid extrinseous patiantur, nee quod ea quae suut amara,exaliqua passione saporem asperum amaritudinemque susceperint. Neque enim mel aliquid passum est, ut ei dulcedo esset ill natura,nec vero absinthium ab ulla aliqua extrinsecus passione amaritudinis horror infecit; quocirca hæc atque his similia non idcirco dicuntur esse passibiles qualitates, quod ipsae aliquid passæsint,sed quod ex his passiones quaedam in sensibus dimittantur. Namque ex melle quod dulce est,dulcedo quædam in gustu relinquitur,simulque etiam calor et frigus passionem quamdam sensibus faciunt. Patimur dulcedinem, cum aliquid dulce gustamus, simulque secundum caloris et frigoris qualitatem,talium sensuum passionem subimus. Quocirca calor et frigus,amaritudo atque dulcedo, idcirco passibilesqualitates dicuntur,quod secundum sensuum qualitatem, aliquam in nobis efficiunt passionem, non quod ipsa extrinse-, cus aliquid patiantur.

English

He had set forth as examples of passible qualities sweetness or bitterness, cold and heat, whiteness and blackness. Although these are passible qualities, they are not however called passible qualities in one and the same way; but the accounts by which all these are called passible qualities differ greatly. For sweetness or bitterness, heat and cold are called passible qualities not because the things that are sweet undergo something from without, nor because the things that are bitter have received their harsh and bitter taste from some passion. For neither has honey undergone anything for sweetness to be in it by nature, nor has wormwood been infected with the horror of bitterness by any passion from without. Therefore these and similar things are not said to be passible qualities because they themselves have undergone something, but because from them certain passions are transmitted to the senses. For from honey, which is sweet, a certain sweetness is left in the taste, and likewise heat and cold produce a certain passion in the senses. We undergo sweetness when we taste something sweet, and at the same time, according to the quality of heat and cold, we submit to a passion of such senses. Therefore heat and cold, bitterness and sweetness, are for this reason called passible qualities, because according to the quality of the senses they produce some passion in us, not because they themselves undergo something from without.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:228 · narrative
Source · Latin

Albedo aulem et nigredo et alii colores non similiter his quæ dicta sunt passibiles qualiiates dicuntur, sed hoc quod hæ ipsæ qualitates ab aliquibus passicnibus innascuntur.

Quoniam vero passibiles qualitates eliam colores esse dicunlur,id est albedo et nigredo.Non autem eodemmodopassibilesqualitatesdicuntur,quemadmodum amaritudo atque dulcedo, calor et frigus, nunc quæ eorum distantiae esse possint, exponit. Amaritudo enim atque dulcedo non quod ipsa aliquid extrinsecus paterentur,sed quod ipsaefticerent passiones,passibiles qualitates vocabantur,albedo vero et nigredo contrariae.Non enim quod ipsae aliquas sensibus passiones importent, sed quod ex aliis qui-. busdam passionibusinnascantur.Hoc autem videtur Aristoteles eo quodammodo considerasse,quod post proposuit hoc modo:

Quoniam ergo fiunt per aliquam passionem multae colorum mutationes manifestum eat, rubescens enim aliquis rubeus jactus est,et timens pallidus,et unumquodque talium.

English

But whiteness and blackness and the other colors are not similarly called passible qualities as those which have been mentioned, but in that these very qualities are born in from certain passions.

But since colors too are said to be passible qualities, that is whiteness and blackness, yet they are not called passible qualities in the same way as bitterness and sweetness, heat and cold, he now sets forth what their differences can be. For bitterness and sweetness were called passible qualities not because they themselves underwent something from outside, but because they themselves produce passions; whiteness however and blackness are contraries. For it is not because they themselves import certain passions to the senses, but because they are born in from certain other passions. But Aristotle seems to have considered this in a certain way, in that he afterward proposed it in this manner:

Since therefore many changes of colors come about through some passion, it is evident; for someone blushing has been made red, and one fearing, pale, and each one of such things.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:229 · narrative
Source · Latin

Hoc autem ex non longi temporis passionibus ad passibiles qualitates et diutissime permanentes,acutissima consideratione transfertur,fit enim rationis probabilitas hoc modo.Monstrantur enim colorum qualitates ex passionibus nasci,quod cumverecundia passio quaedam sit,ex ea rubor exoritur, el.cum timor loco passionis habeatur, ab ea pallor metuentis vultum atque ora detigit.Quare quoniam hi colores ex quadam passione videntur innasci,etiam in naturali colore eamdem verisimile estevenisse rationem.Nam quoniam cum verecundia fit,in os omnis sanguis egreditur,et velutdelictum tecturuseIfunditur,ita quoque fit rubor ex sanguinis progressione, atque in apertum eIfusione.Quocirca si hoc ex innaturali passione contigerit, naturali facies rubore perfunditur. Pallor vero fit,quoties a facie sanguis ad prsecordiorum interiora ingreditur.Quod si hæc quoque naturalis passio det,verisimile est eodem infectumcalore procreari. Quocirca sive per aegritudinem pallor fit,quod naturale non rst, sive per aliquem naturalem eventum passiunis accidat, cæteraque ad eumdem modum, passibiles qualitates dicuntur,eo quod ex aliquibus passionibus sint,quod ipse Aristoteles hac voce testatur: I

English

But this is transferred from passions of no long duration to passible qualities that persist for a very long time, with the most acute consideration; for the plausibility of the account comes about in this way. For the qualities of colors are shown to be born from passions, because since shame is a certain passion, blushing arises from it, and since fear is regarded as a passion, pallor from it covers the face and countenance of the one who fears. Wherefore, since these colors seem to be born from a certain passion, it is also likely that the same account holds in the case of natural color. For since when shame occurs, all the blood goes out into the face and, as if covered by a veil, spreads over it, so too blushing comes about from the advance of the blood and its pouring out into the open. Therefore, if this has happened from an unnatural passion, the face is suffused with a natural blush. Pallor, however, occurs whenever the blood withdraws from the face to the inner parts of the praecordia. But if a natural passion also gives this, it is likely that it is produced by the same infused heat. Wherefore, whether pallor occurs through sickness, which is not natural, or happens through some natural event of passion, and the rest in the same manner, they are called passible qualities because they arise from certain passions, which Aristotle himself testifies with this word:

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:230 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quare et quis naturahteraliquid talium passus est, similem colorem oportet eum habere.Quæ enim affectio nunc ad verecundiam circa corpus facta est, et secundum naturalem passioner;, eadem fiet affectio, ut naturalis color sit similis.

Nam sive aliquis vel nondum natus aliquid patiatur,quo faciem sanguis relinquat,sive quolibet alio modo sanguis ex infantis vultu ad interiora migravit, faciem naturalis infecit pallor,et quæ nunc non naturales passiones dispositionesque sunt,ut cum hi colores faciem vel totum corpus inficiunt,hi si naturaliter contigerint eisdem, similibus signatus coloribus vultus aspicietur.Nunc enim cum æstus in superficie vultus sanguinem impositum decoxerii, nigredinis perusti sanguinis rubor reddit colorem. Quod si idem aliqua passione in faciem nondum geniti infantis acciderit, eamdem verisimile est all'ectionem coloris corpus suscipientis inficere. Quare quæ in coloribus sunt idcirco passibiles qualitates dicuntur,non quod ipsæ aliquid patiantur,sed quod ex aliquibus passionibus in cujuslibet corpus atque ora proveniunt.

English

Therefore, whoever has naturally suffered something of this kind must have a similar color. For the affection that now occurs in relation to shame around the body, and according to a natural passion, the same affection will come about, so that the natural color is similar.

For whether someone not yet born suffers something by which blood leaves the face, or in any other way blood has migrated from the infant's face to the interior, a natural pallor stains the face; and the things that are now non-natural passions and dispositions—as when these colors stain the face or the whole body—if these should occur naturally in the same persons, the face will be seen marked with similar colors. For now, when heat on the surface of the face has boiled the blood that has been brought to it, the redness of the burnt blood gives the color of blackness. But if the same thing should happen by some passion to the face of an infant not yet born, it is plausible that the same affection of color stains the body that receives it. Therefore the things that are in colors are for this reason called passible qualities, not because they themselves suffer anything, but because they come about from certain passions in anyone's body and face.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:231 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quæcunque ergo tatium casuum ab aliquibus passionibus difficile mobilibus et permanentibus principium sumpserint, passibiles qualitates dicuntur; sive enim secundum naturalem substantiam pallor aut nigredo [acta est,qualitates dicuntur. Quales enim etsecundumeasdicimurtsive propter ægritudinem longam vel xstum aliquid tale conlingit, nigredo vel pallor,et non facile prælerit,vel in vita permanet,qualitates et istaz dicuntur. Similiter enim quales et secundum eas dicimur.

vat quoddam signum quo perspecto valeamus agnoscere, quas harum omnium quae supradiotae sunt, qualitates oporteat appellari. Si enim ita vel casu aliquo,vel natura hae qualitates evenerint, ut eorum sit tardus exitus permutatioque difficilis, qualitates vocantur. Si quis enim vel per aegritudinem, vel per naturam pallidusfiat.,sitquein ejus corpore permanens pallor, tunc qualitas appellatur, et hoc non in corporalibus solum vitiis,sed etiam in animi quoque affectionibus invenitur. Si quis enim vel per naturam,vel quolibet alio postea casu assi. duis c;omessationibus delectetur,et hoc illi quodammodo in ipsa mentis dissolutione per maneat,abeoque difficile moveatur, passibilis qualitas effecta est, idcirco quod secundum eam quales dicuntur quibus illa provenerit.

English

Therefore, whatever instances of such cases have taken their beginning from certain affections that are difficult to move and permanent, are called passible qualities. For whether pallor or blackness has come about according to natural substance, they are called qualities; for we are said to be of such a sort also according to them. Or whether on account of long illness or heat something of this kind happens, blackness or pallor, and it does not easily pass away, or remains for life, these too are called qualities. For similarly we are said to be of such a sort also according to them.

But there is a certain sign by which, once it has been examined, we can recognize which of all these qualities mentioned above ought to be called qualities. For if these qualities have come about either by some chance or by nature in such a way that their departure is slow and their change difficult, they are called qualities. For if anyone becomes pale either through illness or through nature, and the pallor remains in his body, then it is called a quality, and this is found not only in bodily defects but also in the affections of the mind as well. For if anyone, either by nature or by any other chance afterward, takes delight in continual feasting, and this remains in him in a certain way even in the very dissolution of the mind, and is moved from it with difficulty, a passible quality has been effected, for the reason that according to it those to whom it has befallen are said to be of such a sort.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:232 · narrative
Source · Latin

Niger enim dicitur in quo nigredo permanseritjcomessator,cui voluptas perpetuo comessandi est.Est ergo signum in passibilibus qualitatibus hoc eas esse immobiles et permanentes. Quae autem hujusmodi sunt quae facillime permutantur, et temporali statu sunt, de his talis Aristotelis videtur esse sententia.

Quæcunque vero ex his fiunt quæ facite solvuntul',et cito transeunt,passiones dicuntur,qualitates vero minirne,nonenim dicimur secundum eas quales, neque enim qui propter verecundiam rubeus factus est,rubeus dicitur, nec cui pauorpropier umorem venit, pallidus est, sed magis quia aliquid passus sit, quare passiones hujusmodi dicuntur,qualitates vera minime.Similiterhis et secundum animam passiones et passibiles qualitates dicuntur.Qusecunque enim mox innascendo ab aliqui-bus passionibus difficile mobilibus fiunt,qualitales dicuntur, ut et dementia, et ira, et alia hujusmodi, quales enim secundum eas dicirnur,id est et iracundi; et dementes.Simiiiter autem et quascunque alix alienationes non natura les, sed ab aliquibus casibus factæ sunt, difficile prætereuntes vel etiam omnino immobiles, et hujusmodi aliæ qualitates sunt, quales enim et secundum eas dicimur. Quæcunque vero ex his quae facile et citius praetereunt fiunt, passiones dicuntur, ut si quis contristatus iracundior fit; non enim iracundus dicitur,qui in hujusmodi passione iracundior est, sed magis aliquid passus.

English

For a person is called black in whom blackness has remained, a glutton to whom the pleasure of feasting is perpetual. There is therefore a sign in passible qualities that these are immovable and permanent. But those which are of such a kind as are most easily changed, and are in a temporal state, concerning these the opinion of Aristotle seems to be as follows.

But whatever come to be from those things which are easily dissolved and quickly pass away are called passions, but by no means qualities; for we are not said to be of such a sort according to them. For neither is one who has become red on account of shame called red, nor is one to whom pallor has come on account of fear pale, but rather because he has suffered something; wherefore such things are called passions, but by no means qualities. Similarly to these, both passions and passible qualities are spoken of in relation to the soul. For whatever come to be immediately by inborn nature from certain passions that are difficult to move are called qualities, such as madness, and anger, and other such things; for we are said to be of such a sort according to them, that is, both irascible and mad. And similarly also whatever other alienations are not natural, but have been produced by certain accidents, passing away with difficulty or even altogether immovable, these too are qualities of this sort; for we are also said to be of such a sort according to them. But whatever come to be from those things which pass away easily and quickly are called passions, as if someone becomes more irascible when saddened; for one who is more irascible in a passion of this sort is not called irascible, but rather has suffered something.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:233 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quare passiones quidem hujusmodi dicuntur, qualitates vero minime.

Quid de his affectionibus judicaret,quæ ad praesens tempus atque ad momentum animis vel corporibus inbaererent, ipse non obscura oratione vulgavit. Nam cum priuseasessepassibiles qualitatespronuntiaret,quæ ex aliquibus passionibus gignerentur,et tamen in subjectis immutabiliter permanerent,nunc illas affectiones quae ita sunt in subjectis ut cito praetereant, non qualitates, sed passiones vocat. Si quis enim propter verecundiam rubore infectus est, quoniam rubor ille non permaDet,rubeus non vocatur;qui si rubeus discerelur,esset quoque ipse rubor passibilis qualitas,quoniam insubjecto corpore diutissimepermaneret.Nuncautemquoniam nullomodo rubeus dicitur,cui a verecundia rubor venit,qualitates autem sunt secundum quas quales vocamur, verecundiae rubor non qualitas,sed quaedam passio est; nam si esset qualitas,ab eo rubore rubei dicerentur,id est quales, sed hoc non ita est. Non igitur hujusmodi affectiones quae haud multo durant tempore qualitates vocantur,sed potius passiones. Passusenimaliquid dicitur,quipropterverecundiam rubeus fit.Eadem ratio est etiam in animi passionibus. Nam si ad momentum quis iratus est,non idcircoeumjurealiquisiracundum vocet,sed sibujusmodi vitiunjincujuslibetaniiDoconstanterinhaeserit.

English

Therefore such things are called passions, but not at all qualities.

What he judged about those affections that adhere to minds or bodies for the present time and for a moment, he himself made known in speech that is not obscure. For whereas previously he pronounced those to be passible qualities which are generated from certain passions and yet remain immutably in their subjects, now those affections which are in their subjects in such a way that they quickly pass away he calls not qualities but passions. For if someone has been stained with redness on account of shame, since that redness does not remain, he is not called red; but if he were said to be red, that redness would also itself be a passible quality, since it would remain in the subject body for a very long time. Now, however, since he is in no way called red to whom redness comes from shame, and qualities are those according to which we are called such, the redness of shame is not a quality but a certain passion; for if it were a quality, from that redness people would be called red, that is, such, but this is not so. Therefore affections of this kind, which do not last for much time, are not called qualities, but rather passions. For someone is said to have suffered something who becomes red on account of shame. The same reasoning applies also to the passions of the mind. For if someone is angry for a moment, no one for that reason rightly calls him irascible, but if this kind of vice has adhered to him constantly for any length of time.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:234 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam si quis vel per naturam vel per ægritudinem sit i laesus corpore, ut vel perpetuam dementiam, vel immobilem incurrat iracundiam,ille vel demens vel iracundus dicitur. Et quæcunque alienationes (ut ipse ait) vel secundum naturam, vel per casum permanentes fuerint,illae in passibili qualitate numeractur,idcirco quod secundum eas quales dicimur.Quag autem (ut dictum est)nonpermanent,sed facile transeunt,eas non qualitates, sed solum vocamus passiones.Sed quoniam tres species qualitatis enur:.eravit,unam secundum quam habitus dispositionesquedicerentur,alteram secundum quam naturalie potentia vel impotentia ad aliquid faciendum vel patiendum subjectarum rerum naturas pararet,tertiam secundum quam passibiles qualitates dicerentur, et hanc tali duplicitate partitus est,ut alias idcirco di- I ceret passibiles esse qualitates, quod ipsae aliquas gignerent passiones, alias vero quod ab aliquibus ipsae passionibus nascerentur.

English

For if someone is injured in body either through nature or through sickness, so that he incurs either permanent madness or an immovable irascibility, he is called either mad or irascible. And whatever alienations (as he himself says) are permanent either according to nature or through chance, those are counted in passive quality, for the reason that according to them we are said to be of such a sort. But those which (as has been said) are not permanent, but easily pass away, we call not qualities but only passions. But since he enumerated three species of quality—one according to which habits and dispositions are spoken of, another according to which natural potentiality or impotentiality prepares the natures of underlying things for doing or undergoing something, a third according to which they are called passible qualities—he also divided this one by such a twofold distinction, so that he said some are passible qualities for the reason that they themselves generate certain passions, while others are so because they themselves are born from certain passions.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:235 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quæri potest quomodobaequoquepassibilesqualitates distenta prima illa specie qualitatis,quæ secundum habitum dispositionemque posita est.Nam si quis calorem frigusque persenserit,habetquidem qualitatem passibilem, sed tamen in ejusdem ipsius dispositione atque affectione versatur; dispositus namque est ad eumdem calorem atque frigus,quem sumpsit atque habuit, quod scilicet ipse Aristoteles videns calorem frigusque in utraque specie numeravit; namque et dispositionem dixit calorem atque frigus, et passibilem qualitatem.Hujus quaestionis talis solutio est. Nihil impedit,secundum aliam scilicet atque aliam causam, unam eamdemque rem gemino generi speciei suae supponere,ut Socrates in eo quod pater est ad aliquid dicitur,in eo quod homo, substantia est,sic in calore atque frigore, in eo quod quis secundum ea videtur esse dispositus, in dispositione numerata sunt; secundum vero quod ex aliquibus passionibus innascuntur,passibiles qualitates dictae sunt. Ipsae vero ab habitu distan',id est passibiles qualitates, quod in plurimis ad habitus rebus per artes atque scientias pervenitur,ita ut ipse habitusordineet filo quodam perficiatur.

English

It can be asked how passible qualities differ from that first species of quality which is placed under habit and disposition. For if someone has perceived heat and cold, he indeed has a passible quality, but nevertheless he is engaged in the disposition and affection of that same thing; for he is disposed toward the same heat and cold which he took on and had, which Aristotle, seeing this, certainly counted heat and cold under both species; for he called heat and cold both a disposition and a passible quality. The solution of this question is as follows. Nothing prevents one and the same thing, according to one cause and another, from being placed under a twofold genus of its own species, just as Socrates, in that he is a father, is said in relation to something, and in that he is a man, is a substance. So too in the case of heat and cold: in that someone appears to be disposed according to them, they are counted under disposition; but in that they are born from certain passions, they are called passible qualities. But they differ from habit—that is, passible qualities—in that in very many things habit is reached through arts and sciences, so that habit itself is perfected by a certain order and thread.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:236 · narrative
Source · Latin

Passibiles vero qualitates eo modo minime.Quo vero distent hae passibiles qualitates a secunda specie, quae secundum naturalem potentiam vel impotentiam dicitur,quæritur, cujus perplana distantia est.Dicimus enim secundum potentias naturalis speciem aliquid dici, non secundum praesentem actum,sed secundum id quod ad hoc esse potest; frigus vero calorque, et dulcedo vel amaritudo non secundum quod possil esse,sed secundum id quod jam sit consideratur; quocirca distat hæc tertia species a secunda,quod hic secundum possibilitatem dicitur,tertia vero secundum actum. Sed quod dudum promiscue passiones affectionum nomine vocabamus, haec quoque non longa quaestio alia est. Sic enim inveniemus quod passio ab affectionibus discrepare videatur.Si qua enim corpora ita calefacta sint,ut ex se quoque ipsa aliquem calorem emittere valeant,illa ad calorem affecta nuncupantur. Si qua vero tantum calorem momento susceperint, passiones dicimus,et ab affectionibus segregamus,ut hic sit integrum passionum affectionumqueethabitusaugmentum,utamplificatapassio in affectionem transeat,augmentata affectio in habitum permutetur. Et haec quidem de tertia specie qualitatis pronuntiasse sufficiat; nunc quarte speciei vim naturamque veracissima disputatione confirm at usquequo progressa qualitatis distributioconquiescit. Nobis quoque disputationum prolixitas moderanda est.

English

But passible qualities are not so in that way. It is asked, however, how these passible qualities differ from the second species, which is called according to natural capacity or incapacity, and its distinction is very plain. For we say that something is said according to capacities to belong to the species of natural power, not according to present act, but according to what can be for this; but cold and heat, and sweetness or bitterness, are considered not according to what can be, but according to what already is. Wherefore this third species differs from the second in that the latter is said according to possibility, but the third according to act. But what we a little while ago called passiones and affectiones indiscriminately, this too is another question not long to be discussed. For thus we shall find that passio seems to differ from affectiones. For if some bodies are so heated that they can also emit some heat from themselves, they are called affected toward heat. But if some have merely received heat for a moment, we call them passiones, and we separate them from affectiones, so that here there may be a complete increase of passiones and affectiones and habitus, so that an amplified passio passes over into an affectio, and an increased affectio is changed into a habitus. And concerning the third species of quality let it suffice to have declared these things; now let him confirm the force and nature of the fourth species with a most truthful disputation, until the distribution of quality, having progressed thus far, comes to rest. We too must moderate the prolixity of our disputations.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:237 · narrative
Source · Latin

Providendum quoque est ut sufficiens brevitas ordini expositionis adhibeatur,ne autbrevitatem comitetur obscuritas,aut planitiem minus moderata oratio, odioso fastidio et longinquitate deformet.

Quartum vero genus qualitatis est figura, et circa unumquodque constans forma. Amplius ad hæc rectitudo et curvitas. et si quid simile est his; secundum enim unumquodque eorum quale quid dicitur, triangulum enim vel quadrangulum esse quale quid dicitur, et reclum aut curvum.Et secundum formam unumquodque Quale dicitur.

Quartaest speciesqualitatis quæ secundum unamquamque formam figuramque perspicitur.Esl autem figura, ut triangu!um vel quadratum, forma autem ipsius figurae quaedam qualitas est,ut figura quidem est triangulum vel quadratum,forma autem ipsius trianguli vel quadrati quaedam qualitaa,undeetiam formosos hominesdicimus.Figuraenimquaedam vel pulchrior,vel mediocris,vel alio quodammodo con-, stituta,qualitas formaquc nominatur.Has autem esse qualitatesnullusdubitat.Siquidem et a figura dicitur figuratus, et a forma formosus.

English

Care must also be taken that sufficient brevity be applied to the order of exposition, lest either obscurity accompany brevity, or a speech less moderated in plainness deform the work with hateful fastidiousness and length.

But the fourth genus of quality is figure, and the form that is constant in each individual thing. Further, in addition to these, straightness and curvedness, and whatever is similar to these; for in accordance with each of these, something is said to be of a certain quality: for to be a triangle or a quadrilateral is said to be of a certain quality, and to be straight or curved. And in accordance with form, each thing is said to be of a certain quality.

The fourth species of quality is that which is observed in accordance with each form and figure. Now figure is, as it were, a triangle or a square; but form is a certain quality of the figure itself: for instance, a triangle or a square is a figure, but the form of the triangle or square itself is a certain quality, whence we also call men handsome. For a certain figure, either more beautiful, or mediocre, or constituted in some other way, is named quality and form. But that these are qualities, no one doubts. Since indeed from figure something is called figured, and from form, handsome.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:238 · narrative
Source · Latin

Amplius quoque triangulum etiam a triangulatione denominatum est, et quadratum a quadratura.Quod si illae sunt qualitates,secundum quas quale aliquid appelletur, non est qui dubitet formam figuramque esse qualitates, quoniam omnia quas his participant ex ipsis qualia nominantur, sed quoniam in continua; quantitatis speciebus et triangulum et superficies enumerata est, ipsa quidem superficies quantitas est, ipsius vero superficiei compositio qualitas,est enim figura (ut geometrici diffiniunt) quae sub aliquo vel aliquibus terminis continetur.Sub aliquo quidem, ut circulus,sub aliquibus vero, ut triangulus vel quadratus.Quare spatium quidem ipsum,quod a supra dictis lineis continetur,superficies dicitur, quae est quantitas.Superficies namque quoniam in dilatione quadam et spatio constat,quantitas est, sed compositio ipsius superficiei,qualitas.Nam quoniam tres lineae convenienterin se junctis terminis unumspatium conclusere,quod tribus angulis a tribus lineis continetur,hoc ipsum spatium quod concludunt ad quantitatem referri potest, quod vero tribuslineis, hoc est qualitas,figura enim est triangula.Hoc idem quoque dici potest etiam in linea: nam quoniam longitudo sine latitudine est, quantitas dicitur, quod recta sive curva est,redditur rursus ad qualitatem.

English

Furthermore, a triangle is also named from triangulation, and a square from squaring. But if those are qualities according to which something is called qualified, no one doubts that form and figure are qualities, since all things that participate in these are named qualified from them. But since in the species of continuous quantity both triangle and surface are enumerated, the surface itself is indeed a quantity, but the composition of the surface itself is a quality. For a figure is, as the geometers define it, that which is contained by some term or terms. By some term, as a circle; by some terms, as a triangle or a square. Wherefore the space itself, which is contained by the aforementioned lines, is called a surface, which is a quantity. For a surface, since it consists in a certain extension and space, is a quantity, but the composition of the surface itself is a quality. For since three lines, joined at their endpoints, have enclosed one space, which is contained by three angles from three lines, that very space which they enclose can be referred to quantity; but that it is by three lines, this is a quality, for the figure is triangular. This same thing can also be said in the case of a line: for since length is without breadth, it is called a quantity; that it is straight or curved is again referred to quality.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:239 · narrative
Source · Latin

Rarum vero et spissum, asperum et lene putabuntur quidem qualitatem significare, sed aliena hujusmodi j putantur esse a dispositione quæ circa qualitatem est. Quamdam enim positionem magis videtur utrumque partium significarejpissum quidem est eo quod partes sibi ipsæ propinquæ sint9rarum vero eo quod distent a se invicem, et lene quidem quod in rectum sibi partes jaceant,asperum vero quod hæc quidem pars superet, illa vero sit inferior. Et fortasse alii quoque apparebunt qualitatis modi, sed qui maxime dicunturjere lot sunt. Qualitates itaque sunt quæ prædicta sunt,qualia vero sunt, quæ secundum hæc denominativæ dicunturtvet quomodolibet aliter ab his.

English

Rare and dense, rough and smooth, will indeed be thought to signify quality, but things of this sort are thought to be foreign to the disposition that concerns quality. For each of the two seems rather to signify a certain position of the parts: dense, because its parts are close to one another; rare, because they are distant from each other; smooth, because its parts lie in a straight line; rough, because one part rises above and another lies lower. And perhaps other modes of quality will also appear, but those which are most spoken of are nearly these. Therefore the things that have been stated are qualities, while the things that are called denominatively according to these, or in any other way from them, are qualified.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:240 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quaedam sunt quae videntur esse qualitates,quoniam ex his aliqua denominative dicuntur, ut lene quoniam dicitur alenitate,et asperum quoniam dicitur ab asperitate,spissum quoque et rarum a raritate et spissitate nominantur; videntur ergo haec quoque in qualitatibus posse numerari.Sed rectam rationem perspicientibus nec solum auribusquae dicuntur,sed etiam mente atque animo judicantibus, in qualitatibus haec poni non oportere manifestum est.Nam quod dicimus rarum,positio quaedam partium est, non qualitas.Nam quia ita partes a se separatsedistant,ut inter eas alieni generis corpus possit admitti,ideorarum vocatur,ut spongiaepumicesque, quoniamineorumcavernissurculus vel aliud aliquid immitti potest,ita ut inter rimas partium sit,idcirco rarum dicitur. Porro autem spissum, quoniam ita sibi partes vicinae sunt atque ad se invicom strictæ, ut inter eas nullum corpus possit incidere,atque ideo spissum vocatur,ut est ferrum vel adamas.Positio ergo quædam partium his inest, non qualitas, nec vero illud quoque distat, quod dicitur lene. Nam quoniam partes ita sunt posita3,et neutra superet, neutra sit minor, sed æqualibus extremitatibus junctae sunt,idcirco quasdam lenitas est,ut adducta manusillam quæ ex æqualitate junctis partibus nata est, sentiat lenitatem, ut est argentum.

English

There are certain things that seem to be qualities, since some things are spoken of denominatively from them, as smooth, because it is said from smoothness, and rough, because it is said from roughness; dense also and rare are named from rarity and density. These, therefore, seem able to be numbered among qualities. But to those who perceive right reason and judge not only with the ears what is said but also with mind and soul, it is manifest that these ought not to be placed among qualities. For what we call rare is a certain position of parts, not a quality. For because the parts are so separated and distant from one another that a body of another kind can be admitted between them, for that reason it is called rare, as a sponge and pumice stone, because something can be sent into their hollows, a little channel or something else, so that it is between the gaps of the parts; for that reason it is called rare. But dense, because its parts are so close to one another and bound together mutually, that no body can fall between them, and for that reason it is called dense, as is iron or adamant. Therefore a certain position of parts is present in these, not a quality. Nor indeed does that which is called smooth differ in this respect. For because the parts are so positioned, and neither prevails, nor is either smaller, but they are joined with equal extremities, for that reason there is a certain smoothness, as when a hand is drawn over it, it perceives that smoothness which is born from the equality of joined parts, as is silver.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:241 · narrative
Source · Latin

Asperitas vero est partium non æqualis positio,sed aliarum eminentium,aliarum vero depressarum,ut lima cujus alix partes eminent, aliae vero depressae sunt. Ergo secundum unamquamque partium positionem,vel raritas,vel spissitudo, vel asperitas, vel lenitas, corparibus est. Non igitur hæc secundum qualitatem dicuntur,sed potius secundum positionem. Positio autem in reiatioms genere nominata est. Non iguur hae qualitates,sed potius relativa sunt,et enumerationes quidem specierum qualitatis Aristoteles hic terminat.Nun sunt tamen putandae solum esse qualitates quas supra posuit. Ipse enim testatur esse quoque alias qualitates,quas modo omnes enumerare neglexit,sed cur neglexeritmultx sunt causse.Prima quod elementi vicem hic obtinet liber, nec perfectam scientiam tradit,sed tantummodo aditus atque pons quidam in altiora philosophiae introitum pandit. Quocircasi hoc ita est, tantum dicere oportuit,quantum ingredientibus satis esset,ne eorum animos nondum ad scientiam firmos multiplici doctrinae subtilitate confunderet. Quae vero hic desunt in libris qui Msta puatxa inscribuntur apposuit.Perfectis namque opus illud non ingredientibus praeparabitur.

English

Roughness, however, is an unequal positioning of parts, with some raised and others lowered, as a file, some of whose parts are raised and others lowered. Therefore, according to the position of each of the parts, either rarity or density or roughness or smoothness belongs to bodies. These things, then, are not spoken of according to quality, but rather according to position. Position, however, has been named in the genus of relation. These things, therefore, are not qualities, but rather relatives. And indeed Aristotle here terminates the enumeration of the species of quality. Yet they are not to be thought to be the only qualities that he set down above. For he himself testifies that there are also other qualities, which he has now neglected to enumerate all; but there are many causes why he neglected this. The first is that this book serves as an element, and does not hand down perfect knowledge, but merely opens a kind of approach and bridge into the higher reaches of philosophy. Wherefore, if this is so, it was fitting to say only as much as would suffice for beginners, lest it confuse their minds, not yet firm in knowledge, with the manifold subtlety of doctrine. But the things that are lacking here he supplied in the books that are inscribed Meta ta physica. For that work is prepared for the perfect, not for beginners.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:242 · narrative
Source · Latin

Est quoque alia causa ut nos ad exquirendas alias qualitates, non solum propriorum doctorum, sed etiam nostrorum aliquid inveniendi incitator,admitteret.Quocirca concludit eas quae maxime dicerentur,quas supra proposuit,esse qualitates; illa vero dici qualia,quae secundum praedictas qualitates dicerentur: sed quoniam addidit,vel quomodolibet ab his quae sit hujusce propositionis sententia,prius appositis Aristotelis verbis sequens expositionis ordo contexit.

In pluribus quidem et pene in omnibus denominative dicunturyut ab albedine albus,et a grammatica grammaticus,et a justitia, justus, similiter aulem el in aliis. In aliquibus vero eo quod non sint posita qualitatibus nomina, non contingit ab eis denominative dici,ut eursor aut,pugillator qui secundum aptitudinem naturalem dicunlur,a nulla qualitate denominative dicuntur. Non enim posita sunt nomina aptitudinibus secundum quas isti quales dicuntur,sicut in disciplinis,secundum quas vel pugillatores vel palœstrici secundum affectionem dicuntur. Pugillatoria enim ad palæstrica disciplina dicitur,quales vero ab his denominative hi qui ab eis afficiuntur, dicuntur. Aliquando autem et posito nomine denominative non dicitur id quod secundum ipsum quale dicituryut a virtute studiosus dicitur.Virtutem enim habendo studiosusdicitar, sed non denominative dicitur a, virtute.

English

There is also another cause that might admit us to investigating other qualities, an inciter not only of the proper teachers but also of our own discovering something. Wherefore he concludes that those things which are most properly called qualities are the ones he set forth above; but those things are called qualified which are spoken of according to the aforesaid qualities. But since he added "or in whatever way," the sense of this proposition, with Aristotle's words first set down, is then woven together by the following order of exposition.

In many cases, and in nearly all, things are spoken of denominatively, as white from whiteness, and grammatical from grammar, and just from justice, and similarly in other cases. In some cases, however, because names have not been assigned to the qualities, it does not happen that they are spoken of denominatively from them, as a runner or a boxer, who are spoken of according to a natural aptitude, are not denominated from any quality. For names have not been assigned to the aptitudes according to which these are called qualified, as in the case of the disciplines according to which boxers or wrestlers are spoken of according to an affection. For boxing is called a discipline in relation to wrestling, and those who are affected by them are spoken of denominatively as qualified from them. Sometimes, however, even when a name has been assigned, that which is called qualified according to it is not spoken of denominatively, as a studious person is spoken of from virtue. For a studious person is spoken of as having virtue, but he is not spoken of denominatively from virtue.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:243 · narrative
Source · Latin

Non autem in pluribus hoc tale est; quæ autem dicuntur qualza, aut denominative, aprædiclis qualitatibus dicuntur, aut aliquo modo aliter ab his.

Multæ, inquit, sunt qualitates, quibus positis et proprio nominenuncupatis,abhis alia denominative dicuntur, ut eaquse ipse planissimeadjecitexempla. Nam cum albedo cujusdam nomen sit qualitatis, ab eo dicituralbus.Eodem quoque modo etgrammatica, cum rei sit nomen, ab ipso quales dicuntur. Grammaticienim a grammatica nominantur, atque hoc est in pluribus, ut posito nomine si quid secundum ipsas qualitates quale dicitur,exhis ipsis qualitatibus appellatio derivetur. Aliae vero qualitates sunt, in quibuscum nomen positum non sit,tamen quales dicuntur, quales quidem quia alia qualitate participant, sed non secundum eam qualitatem quales dicuntur,exqua si his esset qualitatibus nomen impositum poterant appellari, ut in ea qualitate quaesecundum potentiam naturalem dicitur.Illi enim quanquam quales dicantur, hi qui secundum ipsam potentiam nominantur,ipsitamen(utdictum est) nullo proprio nomine nuncupautur.Nam qui pugiles appellantur ab arte pugillatoria, idcirco ab ea pugiles dicuntur,quod ad eamdem ipsam artem pugillatoriam quodammodo affecti sunt. Hi enim pugiles ab arte pugillatoria praedicantur.

English

This sort of thing is not the case in most instances; but those things that are called "of what sort," or denominatively, are said either from the aforementioned qualities or in some other way from them.

There are, he says, many qualities, and when these have been posited and called by their own proper names, other things are said denominatively from them, as those examples that he himself most plainly adds. For since whiteness is the name of a certain quality, from it something is called white. In the same way also "grammatical" — since it is the name of a thing — from it things are said to be "of what sort." For grammarians are named from grammar, and this is the case in most instances: when a name has been posited, if anything is said to be "of what sort" according to those qualities, the appellation is derived from those very qualities. But there are other qualities under which no name has been posited, and yet things are said to be "of what sort" — "of what sort" indeed because they participate in some other quality, but they are not said to be "of what sort" according to that quality from which, if a name had been imposed on these qualities, they could have been named, as in the case of that quality which is spoken of according to natural capacity. For although those things are said to be "of what sort," those which are named according to that capacity itself are nevertheless (as has been said) called by no proper name. For those who are called boxers are called boxers from the art of boxing for this reason, that they are in some way affected toward that same art of boxing. For these are predicated as boxers from the art of boxing.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:244 · narrative
Source · Latin

Qui vero nondum pugiles sunt, sed esse possunt,non secundum ipsam artem, id estpugillatoriam,sed secundum potentiam pugillatoriae artis, pugillatores vocantur. Ipsi autem potenti£ nomen proprium positum non est.Nam quemadmodum a cursu cursores, a palaestrapalaestrici, a pugillatoriapugiles,distinctis qualitatum vocabulis, appellantur, non eodem modo est etiam in uniuscujusque rei potentia naturali, cursus enim potentia naturalis secundum quam cursores vocamus,et rursus potentia pugillandi, vel potentia palsestrizandi, suo nomine distincta nonest.Cur enim dicitur cursor,si interrogemur de eo quinondum est cursor? dicimus secundum potentiam naturalem. Cur palæstricus? eodem quoque modo naturalem potentiam respondemus.Quare pugillatorquinondum est pugillis,ab eadem quoque potentia naturali nominatur. Si igitur haberethfecnaturalispotentiapropriumnomen, ita, distinctisvocabulis,appellaretur,ut in his qualitatibusinquibusproprienomenestpositum,utincursu, palaestra et arte pugillatoria, et hoc est quod ait. In aliquibus vero propterea quod qualitatibus nomina non sunt posita, impossibile est ab his aliquid denominative dici. Ut hoc scilicet demonstraret cursorem quidem qui jam curreret a cursu esse dictum, cursorem vero qui secundum potentiam currendidiceretur non vocari a cursu, sed tantum a potentia, cujus potentiæ nomen proprium non esset positum.

English

But those who are not yet boxers, but can be, are called boxers not according to the art itself, that is, the boxing art, but according to the potentiality of the boxing art. Yet no proper name has been assigned to this potentiality itself. For just as runners are named from running, wrestlers from wrestling, boxers from boxing, with distinct words for the qualities, it is not the same way even in the natural potentiality of each thing; for the natural potentiality of running, according to which we call people runners, and again the potentiality of boxing, or the potentiality of wrestling, is not distinguished by its own name. For why is someone called a runner, if we are asked about one who is not yet a runner? We say it is according to a natural potentiality. Why a wrestler? In the same way too we answer that it is a natural potentiality. Therefore one who is not yet a boxer is also named a boxer from the same natural potentiality. If, then, this natural potentiality had a proper name, it would be called by distinct words, as in those qualities in which a proper name has been assigned, as in running, wrestling, and the boxing art, and this is what he says. But in some cases, because names have not been assigned to the qualities, it is impossible for anything to be said denominatively from them. That is, to show this: that a runner who is already running is said to be so from running, but a runner who is said to be so according to the potentiality of running is not called so from running, but only from the potentiality, to which potentiality no proper name has been assigned.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:245 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quare haer omnia quæ secundum potentiam naturalem dicuntur, a nulla qualitate denominativa sunt. Idcirco quod hae qualitates a quibus denominari possunt, propriis nominibus carent, quæ vero ita sint, ut non ex potentia, sed ex affectione dicantur,ab his qualitatibas ad quas sese aliquomodohabent,denominative dicuntur, quod Aristoteles hoc protulit modo dicens: Non ita esse secundum potentiam naturalem, quemadmodum etiam in disciplinis secundum quas, vel pugillatores,vel palæstrici secundum affectionemdicuntur.Pugillatoriaenimdisciplinadicitur et palæstrica,quales vero ab his denominative, qui ad eas sunt continentes, dicuntur.Docuit igitur omnia quæ a quibusdam qualitatibus dici putarentur, vero quoque a qualitatibus non prædicari,ut in his qualitatibus quibus nomen proprium non est.Illud quoque monstravit hoc in pluribus evenire, ut de propositis qualitatibusqualiadenominativedicerentur. Restat ergo, quod reliquum est, ut dicat esse quasdam qualitates,quarum cum nomen sit positum, ab hisipsistamen quæ illarum rerum participantdenominative non dici, ut virtus; nam cum virtus qualitas sit (est enim habitus quidam, omnisvero habitus qualitas), ergo quicunque virtute participat,non secundum eamdenominative dicitur. In denominationeenimquaerendumest utsemperidempermaneat nomen.

English

Therefore all these things which are spoken of according to natural potentiality are not denominated from any quality. For this reason, because these qualities from which they can be denominated lack proper names, but those which are such that they are spoken of not from potentiality but from affection, are denominated from those qualities to which they somehow hold themselves, which Aristotle brought forward in this way, saying: that it is not so according to natural potentiality, just as also in the disciplines according to which either boxers or wrestlers are spoken of according to affection. For it is called the boxing discipline and the wrestling discipline, but those who are such are denominated from these, who are devoted to them. He taught, therefore, that all things which were thought to be spoken of from certain qualities are not also truly predicated from qualities, as in those qualities which have no proper name. He also showed that this happens in many cases, that concerning the proposed qualities those who are such are denominated from them. It remains, therefore, what is left, that he say that there are certain qualities, when a name has been assigned to them, yet those who participate in those things are not denominated from them, as virtue; for since virtue is a quality (for it is a certain habit, and every habit is a quality), therefore whoever participates in virtue is not denominated according to it. For in denomination it must always be sought that the name remain throughout.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:246 · narrative
Source · Latin

In eo autem qui virtute participat,nullavirtutis denominatio est, ut qui bonitate participatbonus dicitur, quijustitia, justus, et alia hujusmodi. Quivero virtute participat,aut probus nominatur,aut sapiens; sed neque probus, neque sapiens a virtute denominativa sunt,idcircoquod utrumquenomena virtute longe dissimile est, quod ipse sic ait: Aliquando autem posito nomine denominative non diciturid quod secundum ipsum qualedicitur.Etejusrei proponere non omisitexemplum, sed hoc in multis non potestinveniri, pauca enim sunt (ut ipse ait) in quibus posito qualitatis nomine quae his participant, a superiori qualitate qualia non dicantur.Datautem his qualitatibus pluralitatis calculum,ex quibus qualia nominantur ea quae his participant.Nam (ut ipse ait superius)in pluribus et pene in omnibus denominative dicuntur.Quocirca recta diffinitio est et proprio ordine constituta. Namque in principio hoc solum dictumest,esse qualitatem secundum quam qualia dicerentur.

English

But in the case of one who participates in virtue, there is no denomination from virtue, as one who participates in goodness is called good, one who participates in justice, just, and other such cases. But one who participates in virtue is either called upright or wise; yet neither upright nor wise are denominative from virtue, for the reason that each name is far dissimilar from virtue, as he himself says: Sometimes, however, when a name has been posited, that which is said according to it as a quality is not said denominatively. And he did not omit to set forth an example of this matter, but this cannot be found in many cases, for there are few (as he himself says) in which, when the name of a quality has been posited, those which participate in these are not said to be of such a quality from the superior quality. But he has given to those qualities a reckoning of plurality, from which those things that participate in them are denominated as of such a quality. For (as he himself says above) in more cases and in nearly all, they are spoken of denominatively. Wherefore the definition is correct and established in its proper order. For in the beginning this alone was said, that there is a quality according to which things are said to be of such a quality.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:247 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed quoniam sunt quaedam quorum qualitates ipsae propriis nominibuscarent5quse vero his participant suis vocabulis appellantur, ut in naturali potentia.Et rursus sunt quædam quæ in qualitatibus quidem habeant propria nomina,in his vero quae ad eas ipsas qualitates essent affecta, nulla ex propositis qualitatibus denominatio fierel,hoc addidit, hb omnibus qualitatibus aut denominative dici qualia, quae illis qualitatibus participaret, aut quomodolibet, aliter, id est sive posito nomine qualitatis de eo non dicerentur,quae illa participarent,ut in eo quod est virtus, sive ipsi qualitati positum nomen non esset, utin eo quod est potentianaturalis.Quare quoniam in his duabus qualitatis, in quibus vel posito nomine non secundum nomen quæ sunt,qualia denominative dicuntur, vel cum ipsis qualitatibus nomen positum non sit, neutra ipsorum prædicatio denominative fit. Ad concludendum omnem terminum qualitatis ait, aut denominative qualia a qualitatibus appellari,aut quomodolibetaliter ab ipsis,ut non denominative,sed aliquoties quidem secundum potentiam,aliquoties vero secundum eamdem qualitatem virtutis; eamdem enim qualitas est virtutis et sapientias. Quocirca concludit, ita qualia dici quaerunqueex his qualitatibus denominativedicerentur, vel quomodolibet alio ab ipsis modo.

English

But since there are certain things whose qualities themselves lack proper names, while those which participate in them are called by their own designations, as in the case of natural power. And again, there are certain things which in their qualities indeed have proper names, but in those which are disposed toward those very qualities, no denomination from the proposed qualities is made. He added this: that all qualities either are said denominatively to be such as participate in those qualities, or in some other way, that is, whether with the name of the quality posited they are not said of that which participates in them, as in the case of virtue, or whether no name is posited for the quality itself, as in the case of natural power. Wherefore, since in these two cases of quality—in which either, with the name posited, those things which are such are not denominatively called according to the name, or, when no name has been posited for the qualities themselves—the predication of neither of them is made denominatively. To conclude, he says that every term of quality either is called denominatively such from qualities, or in some other way from them, so as not denominatively, but sometimes according to power, sometimes according to the same quality of virtue; for the same quality is of virtue and of wisdom. Therefore he concludes that things are said to be such in whatever way they are denominatively called from these qualities, or in any other way from them.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:248 · narrative
Source · Latin

Digestis inordine prius omnibus qualitatibus et eorum conclusione reperta, consueto ordine unaquaeque proprietas vestigatur.

Inestautem et contrarietas secundum qua te, utjustilia injustitlæ contraria est, et albedo nigredi,et alia, similiter autem et ea quæ secundum eas qualia dicuntur, ut justum injusto,et album nigro, nou. autem in omnibus hoc est, rubro enim uel pallido aut mediis hujusmodi coloribus nihil contrarium est qualitatibus existentibus.

Dicit in qualitatibus quaedam essecontraria,atque hoc probat exemplis,albedo namque et nigredo contrariasunt,etquaecunquealbedinenigredinequeparticipant; hoc est enim quod ait, et secundum eas qualiaqusedicunturjnam sicut albedo nigredini contraria est,ita quoque albus nigro; sed hoc qualitatis proprium non est, nam cum rubrum et pallidum qualitates sint, aliique etiam colores hujusmodi, in hiscontrarium non est; nullus enim dicit aliquid rubro vel pallido esse contrarium: nam quoniam album et nigrum extremitates quaedam colorum sunt, et longissime a se distant, contraria sunt, medietates vero contrarianonhabent.Namsiquisponat rubrum nigro esse contrarium, longissimeque distant quas sunt contraria, longissime igitur nigredo a rubore distabit, et rursus albedo a nigredineplurimum distat; igitur nigredini rubor estatquealbedo contraria, uniusque rei duo contraria inveniuntur, quod fieri non potest.

English

Once all qualities have been set out in order and their conclusion established, each property is investigated in the customary order.

But contrariety is also present in quality, as justice is contrary to injustice, and whiteness to blackness, and others likewise; and similarly also the things that are called qualified according to these, as just to unjust, and white to black. But this is not the case in all: for to red or pale or the intermediate colors of this sort nothing is contrary, though they are qualities.

He says that in qualities certain things are contrary, and he proves this by examples: for whiteness and blackness are contrary, and whatever participate in whiteness and blackness; for this is what he says, "and the things that are called qualified according to these," for just as whiteness is contrary to blackness, so too is white to black. But this is not proper to quality, for since red and pale are qualities, and other colors of this sort as well, in these there is no contrary; for no one says that anything is contrary to red or pale. For since white and black are certain extremes of colors and are very far distant from each other, they are contrary, but the intermediates do not have a contrary. For if anyone should suppose that red is contrary to black, and things that are contrary are very far distant, therefore blackness will be very far distant from red; and again whiteness is very far distant from blackness; therefore red will be contrary to blackness and also to whiteness, and two contraries are found for one thing, which cannot happen.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:249 · narrative
Source · Latin

Non est igitur nigredi contrarius rubor.Similiter autem monstrabimus etin aliis mediiscolorihus contrarium non esse.Quocirca si hujusmodicoloribuscontrarium nihil est, non in omni qualitate contrarietas reperietur; quod si ita est,suacipere contraria qualitatis proprium non est.Atvero nec in ipsis quoque formis quæ manifeste qualitates Bunt, contrarietas invenitur; nam neque circulus quadrato, neque quadratus triangulo,necullafigura ulli figurae potest esse contraria. Quocirca manifestum est, suscipere contrarium non esse proprium qualitatis. Sed quoniam sunt quaedam in qualitate quae sibimet videantur esse contraria, uljustitia et injustitia, hinc quasdam quaestio solet oriri.

English

Therefore red is not contrary to black. In like manner we shall show that in the other intermediate colors there is no contrary. Wherefore, if nothing is contrary to colors of this kind, contrariety will not be found in every quality; but if this is so, it is not proper to quality to admit contraries. But neither, indeed, is contrariety found in the very shapes which are manifestly qualities; for neither is a circle contrary to a square, nor a square to a triangle, nor can any figure be contrary to any figure. Wherefore it is evident that to admit a contrary is not proper to quality. But since there are certain things in quality which appear to be contrary to one another, as justice and injustice, from this a question is wont to arise.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:250 · narrative
Source · Latin

Dicunt enim quidam justitiæ injustitiam non essecontrarian:, putantenim quod dicitur injustitia privationem esse justitiae, non tamen contrarielatem.Contraria enim propriis nominibus, non contrarii privatione nominari,ut album nigro,haberetamenj ustitiam aliquam contrarietatem,cujus'adhuc proprium nomen non sit inventum,quod omnino falsum est.Multae enim habitudines privationis vocabuloproferuntur,utilliberalilas et imprudentia, quae nunquam virtutibusopponerentur, quæ sunt habitus, nisi ipsae quoque habitus essent, et in animis habentium immulabiliter permanerent.At vero neque illud verum est, omnes privationes negatione proferri.Surditas enim,cum sit auditus privatio, sine negatione profertur; eodem quoque modo caecitas. Nullus enim dicit inauditio, neque invisio, nec aliquid hujusmodi, sed tantum surditas cæcitasque nominantur propriis nominibus, cum sint illa in habitu, visus, auditus, ilia in privatione ponenda.Igitur justitia injustitiæ contraria est. Tradit ergo regulam, ea quae contraria sunt, sub quo genere convenienter aptentur, quam regulam his verbis ipse praescribit:

English

For some say that injustice is not contrary to justice, for they think that what is called injustice is a privation of justice, not however a contrariety. For contraries are named by their own proper names, not by the privation of a contrary, as white by black; yet they think that justice has some contrariety whose proper name has not yet been discovered, which is altogether false. For many dispositions are brought forth by the word of privation, such as illiberality and imprudence, which would never be opposed to the virtues, which are habits, unless they themselves were also habits and remained immutably in the minds of those who possess them. But neither is that true, that all privations are brought forth by negation. For deafness, since it is a privation of hearing, is brought forth without negation; in the same way also blindness. For no one says inaudition, nor invisio, nor anything of this kind, but only deafness and blindness are named by their own proper names, since those things are to be placed in the habit, sight and hearing, those in privation. Therefore justice is contrary to injustice. He therefore hands down a rule, that those things which are contraries are fittingly assigned under which genus, which rule he himself prescribes in these words:

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:251 · narrative
Source · Latin

Amplius si ex contrariis unum fueritquale, et reliquum erit quale. Hoc autem palam est proponenti ex singulis alia prædicamenta,ut si est justitia injustitiae contrarium; quale autem est justitia, quale igitur est injustitia. Nullum enim aliorum praedicamentorum aptabitur injustitiæ,nec quanlitas, nec ad aliquid, nec ubi,nec omnino tatium aliud,nisi quale; sic autem et in aliis quæ sunt secundum quale contraria sunt.

Si ex duobus, inquit, contrariis manifestum fuerit unum eorum contrariorum sub qualitate poni, simul manifestum erit quod etiam ejus contrarium convenienter qualitati supponatur, siæulque demonstrat injustitiam esse qualitatem. Nam si justitia:apertissime qualitas est idcirco quod neque qualitas, neque ad aliquid, neque ubi, nec quando, nec aliud ullum praedicanientum est, nec sub ullo alio genere poni potest, nisi sub sola qualitate,cum ei contraria sit injustitia, non est dubium injustitiam quoque qualitati subnecti,quod ipse quoniam planius dixit, et ipsa exemplorum luce vulgavit, ad aliud nobis est transeundum.

English

Moreover, if one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a quality. This is clear to one who sets out the other categories from individual instances: for example, if justice is contrary to injustice, and justice is a quality, then injustice is also a quality. For none of the other categories will fit injustice—not quantity, not relation, not place, nor altogether any other such thing except quality. And so it is also in other cases where things are contraries according to quality.

If, he says, it becomes evident that one of two contraries is placed under quality, it will at the same time be evident that its contrary is also suitably placed under quality, and he shows in each case that injustice is a quality. For if justice is most plainly a quality—for the reason that it is neither quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor time, nor any other category, nor can it be placed under any other genus except quality alone—since injustice is contrary to it, there is no doubt that injustice too is subjoined to quality. Since he has stated this more plainly and made it clear by the light of examples, we must pass on to another point.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:252 · narrative
Source · Latin

Suscipit autem qualitas magis et minus, albumenim magis etminus alterum altero dicitur,et justum alterum altero magis et minus dicitur. Sed et ipsa crementum suscipiunt; cum candidum namque sil, amplius contingit candidum fieri,non tamen omnia,sed plura. Justilia namque a justitia si dicatur, magis et minus potest aliquis ambigere. Similiter et in aliis affectibus: quidam enim de talibus dubitant,justitiam namque a justitia non multum aiunt magis et minus dici, nec sanitalem a sanitate.Minus autem alterum altero habere sanitatem aiunt,et justitiam minus alterum altero habere,szcautem et grammaticam, et alios affectus.Alia igitur quæ secundum eos affectus dicuntur qualia, indubitanter recipiunt magis et minus. Grammaticior enim alter altero dicitur, et justior, et sanior; similiter et in aliis.

Aliud quoque proprium protulit,quod tractata ratione ab integra proprietate qualitatis exclusit. Ait enim qualitates posse vel intendi vel minui. Posse enim dicitalterum altero plus album appellari,ut nix argento,et qua'candidiora sunt marmora,et justum alterum altero magis et minus dicimus.Namque justius aliquid factum,nec non etiam justissimum est.

English

Quality admits of more and less: for one thing is said to be more and another less white, and one thing is said to be more and another less just. But these very things also admit of increase; for when something is white, it can become more white—not all things, however, but many. For if justice is said to be more and less than justice, someone may be in doubt. The same holds in other dispositions as well: for some people are doubtful about such things, saying that justice is not said to be much more and less than justice, nor health than health. But they say that one person has less health than another, and that one person has less justice than another—and likewise grammar and other dispositions. Therefore other things that are said to be qualities according to these dispositions undeniably admit of more and less. For one person is said to be more grammatical than another, and more just, and more healthy; and similarly in other cases.

He also brought forward another property, which, having been treated by reasoning, he excluded from the complete property of quality. For he says that qualities can be intensified or diminished. For he says that one thing can be called more white than another, as snow is more white than silver, and marbles that are whiter, and we say that one thing is more and less just than another. For something has been done more justly, and indeed also most justly.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:253 · narrative
Source · Latin

In quibus autem comparationes sunt, in his magis minusque dici manifestum est; hoc quoque modo ipsum album, vel alia qualitas non solum contra alterum ejusdem specieicomparataintentionecrescit, et relaxatione minuitur, sed etiam a seipsa recipit comparationem:Dicitur enim nunc quidem argentum candidius esse quam anlea,cum fuerit detersum.Sed cum hæc ita sint,non est magis minusque suscipere proprium qualitatis;nequeenim sola qualitas magis minusque suscipit,hæc enim intentio et relaxatio in his quoque quae sunt ad aliquid invenitur,ut in eo quod est aequale et inaequale possumus dicere plus aequale vel minus,etin caeteris hujusmodi; nec vero omnes qualitates suscipiunt magis et minus,quod ipse sic ponit:Non autem in omnibus hoc est, sed in pluribus.Dubitabit enim quis an justitia magis esse justitia dicatur,similiter autem et in ali is afFectionibus.

English

In those things in which there are comparisons, it is manifest that more and less are said; in this way also whiteness itself, or another quality, not only grows in relation to another of the same species by intention and is diminished by relaxation, but also receives comparison from itself. For silver is now said to be whiter than before, when it has been polished. But since these things are so, it is not proper to quality to admit more and less; for quality alone does not admit more and less, since this intention and relaxation is found also in those things which are relative, as in the equal and the unequal we can say more equal or less, and in other such things; nor indeed do all qualities admit more and less, which he himself sets down thus: But this is not in all, but in most. For one may doubt whether justice is said to be more justice, and similarly also in other affections.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:254 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quidam vero in hoc dubitant.dicuntenim justitiam justitia non magis vel minus dici,nec sanitatem sanitatejminus autem habere alterum altero sanitatem dicunt,et justitiam minus alterum altero habere.In hoc tres fuere sententias.Quidam namque dicebant, in omnibus secundum materiæ habitudinem reperiri posse magis et minus,Proprium namque esse materiae corporumque intentione crescere et minui relaxatione.quae quorumdam Platonicorum sententia fuit.Aliavero quaesecunaum certissimas verissimasque artes atque virtutes non diceret esse magis et minua,secundum autem medias dici posse,ut haec ipsa grammatica atque justitia non dicitur magis grammatica neque magis justitia. Esse autem quasdam alias mediocres artes,in quibusidipsum posset evenire. Tertia est de qua Aristoteles loquitur, quod ipsas quidem habitudinesnullaintentione crescere, nec diminutione decrescere putat,sed eorum participantes posse sub examine compositionis venire,ut de his magis minusve dicatur. Sanitatem namque ipsam al justitiam, alteram altera magis minusve non esse. Neque enim quispiam dicit magis esse sanitatem alia sanitate.Sed hoc solum dicere possumus magis habere sanitatem aliquem, id est esse saniorem,et magis sanum,et minus sanum.Dicimus ergo quod ipsae quidem qualitates non suscipiunt magis etminus.Qui vero secundum eas quales dicuntur,ipsi sub comparatione cadunt, ut justior,et sanior, et grammaticior.

English

Some, however, are in doubt about this. For they say that justice is not said to be more or less than justice, nor health than health; but they say that one person has less health than another, and that one person has less justice than another. On this point there have been three opinions. For some said that in all things, according to the condition of matter, more and less can be found; for it is proper to matter and to bodies to grow by intention and to diminish by relaxation. This was the opinion of certain Platonists. But another opinion held that the most certain and truest arts and virtues are not said to be more and less, but that this can be said according to intermediate ones, as grammar itself and justice are not said to be more grammar or more justice. But there are certain other intermediate arts in which this same thing could occur. The third is the one about which Aristotle speaks, that the conditions themselves do not grow by any intention nor decrease by diminution, but that those which participate in them can come under examination of combination, so that more or less may be said of them. For health itself and justice itself are not more or less, the one than the other. For no one says that one health is more than another health. But this alone we can say, that someone has more health, that is, is healthier, and more healthy, and less healthy. We say, therefore, that the qualities themselves do not receive more and less. But those who are said to be of such a sort according to them, these fall under comparison, as more just, and healthier, and more grammatical.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:255 · narrative
Source · Latin

Namque ipsa grammatica,id est litteratura,non suscipit magis et minus,nullus enim dicit alteram altera magis esse grammaticam, sed eum qui grammatica ipsa participat. Decimus litteratum,quem a litteratura scilicet denominamus lilteratus autem suscipit magis et minus, ut Donatus grammaticus plus erat aetate jam provecta grammaticus,id est litteratus,quam cum primum ad hujusmodi studia devenisset. Sed quanquam se haec ita habeant,tamen invenimus aliquas qualitates quibus indubitate comparatio inveniri non possit, ut sunt quas ipse supposuit.

Triangulus vero et quadrangulus non videtur magis et minus suscipere, nec aliqua aliarum figurarum.

Haec enim quae ex quarta specie qualitatis dicta sunt,magis minusve nulla ratione suscipiunt,nullus enim dicit plus esse alium circulum quam alium,nec magis esse illud triangulum quamillud,dicitquefortasse majorem,magis autem non dicit.Hujus autem rei hæc ratio est, ut cum sit trianguli diffinitio, figura quai sub tribus rectis lineis continetur,si qua sunt quas hanc diffinitionem in se suscipiant, ut et ipsa tribus rectis lineis contineantur,proprie triangulae formae sunt, eodem quoque modo et circulus ita diffinitur: Circulus est figura plana,quae sub una linea continetur, ad quam ex uno puncto qui intra ipsam est, omnes quae exeunt lineae aequae sibi sunt.

English

For grammar itself, that is, literature, does not admit of more and less; for no one says that one grammar is more grammar than another, but rather that a person participates in grammar itself. We call someone literate from literature, but a literate person does admit of more and less, as Donatus the grammarian was more a grammarian, that is, literate, in his advanced age than when he had first come to studies of this kind. But although these things are so, nevertheless we find certain qualities in which comparison can undoubtedly be found, as are those which he himself set down.

But a triangle and a quadrilateral do not seem to admit of more and less, nor does any of the other figures.

For these things which were spoken of from the fourth species of quality admit of more and less in no way; for no one says that one circle is more than another, nor that that triangle is more than that one, and perhaps he says it is larger, but he does not say more. The reason for this is that, since the definition of a triangle is a figure which is contained by three straight lines, if there are any things which receive this definition in themselves, so that they too are contained by three straight lines, they are properly of triangular form; and in the same way a circle is also defined thus: a circle is a plane figure which is contained by one line, to which, from one point which is within it, all the lines which extend out are equal to one another.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:256 · narrative
Source · Latin

Rursus quadrati diffinitio talis est: Quadratum est quod quatuor aequalibus lineis et quatuor rectis angulis continetur. Quaecunque igitur vel circuli diffinitionem suscipiunt,vel quadrati,aequaliter vel circuli vel quadratae formae sunt; si qua vero non suscipiunt,nullo modosunt.Si quaverosuntquaeneque quadrati suscipiunt diffinitionem,neque circuli,neque quadrati sunt, neque circuli ut est ugura quae parte altera longior dicitur.Illa enim ita diffinitur, parte altera longior figura est quae sub quatuor Iineis continetur, rectisque angulis, quam quatuor lineæ aequae sibi quidem non sunt,contra se vero positæ binæ sibi æquæ sUnl.Ergo quia hujusmodi figura neque circuli diffinitionem capit, neque quadrati aequaliter, neque circulus, neque quadratus est. Si qua enim cujuslibet formadiffinitionem suscipiunt, omnino eadem sunt.Ut qui circuli circulus,qui quadrati quadratus, qui trianguli triangulus,qui parte altera longioris, parte altera longior, et in caeteris eodem modo.Si qua vero non suscipiunt, ut triangulum,circuli diffinitionem non capit neque omnino circulus est, nee potest dici inter quadratum ettriangulum, quoniam utraque circuli diffinitionem non capiunt, quadratum quidem plus esse circulum, triangulum vero minus,omnino enim utraque a circuli ratione disjuncta sunt, quod his verbis ab Aristotele tractatur:

English

Again, the definition of a square is as follows: A square is that which is contained by four equal lines and four right angles. Therefore, whatever things admit of the definition of a circle or of a square are equally either circles or square-shaped; but whatever things do not admit of it are in no way such. If, however, some things are such as neither admit of the definition of a square nor of a circle, they are neither squares nor circles, as is the figure called oblong. For that is defined thus: an oblong figure is one that is contained by four lines and right angles, whose four lines are not equal to one another, but two set opposite each other are equal to each other. Therefore, because a figure of this kind admits neither the definition of a circle nor equally that of a square, it is neither a circle nor a square. For if any things admit of the definition of any form whatever, they are altogether the same: as what is of a circle is a circle, what is of a square is a square, what is of a triangle is a triangle, what is of an oblong is an oblong, and in the rest in the same way. But if any things do not admit of it, as a triangle does not admit of the definition of a circle and is in no way a circle, neither can it be said between a square and a triangle, since both do not admit of the definition of a circle, that a square is more a circle and a triangle less; for both are altogether separated from the account of a circle. This is treated by Aristotle in these words:

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:257 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quæcunque enim diffinitionem trianguli suscipiunt et circuli, omnia similiter trianguli vel circuli sunt. Eorum vero quæ non suscipiunt, nihil magis alterum altero dicitur; nihilenim quadratum magis quam parte alleru longior forma, circulus est, nullum enim ipsorum recipit circuli rationem.Simpliciter autem in utraque non recipiunt propositi rationem,non dicetur alterum altero magis; non ergo omnia qualia recipiunt magis et minus. Horum itaque quae prædicta sunt,nihil est proprium qualitatis.

Nam si hoc diffiniLio facil,ut domonstret rationem cujusque substantiæ,quæcunque diffinitione discrepant,illaetiamipsa natura substantiæ discrepabunt. Recte igitur si quae cujuslibet rei propositae sive trianguli,sive quadrati diffinitionem non capiunt,ab ejusdem natura disjuncta sunt.Quocirca neque triangulum, neque quadratum, neque circulus, neque quidquid horum est,suscipiunt magis et minus.Sed cum haec qualitates sint,non omnes qualitates æquæ magis minusve suscipiunt. Quod si neque in omni qualitate intentio diminutioque provenit, neque in sola,quod hæc eadem in relatione reperias,non est magis minusve suscipere proprium qualitatis. Quodnam igitur qualitatis proprium esse dicendum est, id ipse planissime subterposuit.

English

For whatever things admit of the definition of a triangle or of a circle, all are similarly triangles or circles. But of those things that do not admit of it, nothing is said to be more one than the other; for nothing is a circle more than a form longer on one side than another, since none of them receives the definition of a circle. But simply, in the case of both, they do not receive the definition of the proposed thing, and neither will be said to be more than the other; therefore not all such things as receive it admit of more and less. Of these things, then, which have been stated above, nothing is proper to quality.

For if this definition makes it easy to demonstrate the definition of each substance, whatever things differ in definition will also themselves differ in the nature of their substance. Rightly, therefore, if any things do not receive the definition of whatever proposed thing, whether of a triangle or of a square, they are separated from its nature. Wherefore neither a triangle, nor a square, nor a circle, nor whatever of these there is, admit of more and less. But since these are qualities, not all qualities equally admit of more and less. But if intention and diminution occur neither in every quality nor in it alone—because you may find these same things in relation—then to admit of more and less is not proper to quality. What, then, should be said to be proper to quality, he himself has most plainly set out below.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:258 · narrative
Source · Latin

Similia vero tt dissimilia secundum solas dicuntur qualitates. Simileenim alterum alteri non esse secundum aliud quidquam,quam secundum illud qucd quale est. Quare proprium erit qualitatis, secundam eam simile et dissimile dici.

Simile inquitet dissimile solae retinent qualitates. Nam quamvis simile ad aliquid sit,tamen hocipsum quod dicimus,simile non dicimus, nisi quod quale est.Nam si eadem qualitas sit in duobus,inain quibus est similia sunt, nec est aliud praedicamentum quod secundum simile et dissimile dici possit,etde aliis quidem omnibus notum est,quoniam de nullo dicitur. Quod si quis de quantitate affirmet, dici posse secundum eam simile atque dissimile,monstratum est secundum quantitatem non simile etdissimile; sed æquale et inæquale praedicari. Quocirca quoniam per singula quaeque pergentibus,et in oirnibus idem qualitatibus invenitur, et in nullo alio prædicamento esse perspicitur,recte hoc proprium qualitatis esse firmavit.

English

But similar and dissimilar are said according to qualities alone. For one thing is not similar to another according to anything other than that which is of such a sort. Therefore it will be proper to quality that similar and dissimilar be said according to it.

Similar, he says, and dissimilar, only qualities retain. For although similar is relative to something, nevertheless this very thing that we call similar we do not call similar except insofar as it is of such a sort. For if the same quality is in two things, in those in which it is they are similar, nor is there any other category according to which similar and dissimilar can be said, and concerning all other things indeed it is known that it is said of none. But if anyone should affirm concerning quantity that similar and dissimilar can be said according to it, it has been shown that according to quantity not similar and dissimilar but equal and unequal are predicated. Wherefore, since in going through each individual case, and in all qualities the same thing is found, and it is perceived to be in no other category, he rightly established that this is proper to quality.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:259 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed quoniam cum de his quae referuntur ad aliquid tractaretur,affectusatque habitus in his quæ sunt ad aliquid numeravit,uunc vero eosdem quoque qualitati supposuit, ipse sibi quamdam objecit quæstionem, cur si prius sub iis quas ad aliquid referuntur, ista subjecerit,nunc sub qualitatibus ea ipsa posuerit.Superius namque monstravit ea quae essent a se diversa, easdem species habere non posse,cum dicit diversorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diversae species et I difTerentiaesunt.Quocircacum relatio atque qualitas diversa sint genera,easdem utrique supponi species non oportet, hoc est enim quod dicit:

At vero non decet conturbari, ne quis nos dicat de qualitate propositionem facientes, multa de relativis interposuisse, habitus enim; dispositiones eorum quæ sunt ad aliquid esse dicebamus, pene enim in omnibus qualitatibus genera ad a liquid dicuntur, non autem aliquid eorum quæ singula sunt.Nam cum disciplina genus sitjioc ipsum quod est alterius dicilur,alicujus enim disciplina dicitur. Eorum vero quæ singula sunt, nihil ipsum quod est alterius dicitur,ut grammatica non dicitur alicujus grammaticatnec musica alicujus musica nisi forte secundum genus,et hac ad aliquid dicuntur. ut grammatica dicitur alicujus disciplina, non alicujus grammatica, et musica alicujus disciplina non alicujus musica. Quapropter quæ quidem singularia sunt, non sunt ad aliquid.

English

But since, when the things that are referred to something were being treated, he numbered affection and habit among those that are relative, and now he has also subordinated the same things to quality, he raised a certain question against himself: why, if he had previously placed these under the things referred to something, he now placed these same things under qualities. For above he showed that things which are diverse from one another cannot have the same species, when he says that of diverse genera and those not placed subalternately the species and differences are diverse. Wherefore, since relation and quality are diverse genera, it is not fitting that the same species be subordinated to both. For this is what he says:

But truly it is not fitting to be disturbed, lest anyone say that we, in making a proposition about quality, have interposed many things about relatives. For we were saying that habits and dispositions are of the things that are relative, for in nearly all qualities the genera are said relative to something, but not any of the things that are individual. For since discipline is a genus, this very thing that it is is said of another; for it is said to be someone's discipline. But of the things that are individual, nothing itself that it is is said of another, as grammar is not said to be someone's grammar, nor music someone's music, except perhaps according to the genus, and in this way they are said relative to something, as grammar is said to be someone's discipline, not someone's grammar, and music someone's discipline, not someone's music. Wherefore the things that are individual are not relative.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:260 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quam quaestionem validissima argumentatione dissolvit,his scilicet verbis: Pene enim ea quæ sunt in omnibus his generibus ad aliquid dicuntur.Eorum vero quae sunt singulatim, id est species, nihil hujusmodi sunt. Haec enim est argumentatio quam Graeci vocant.In hujusmodi affectionibus atque habitudinibus, quas inter ea sunt genera, eas solas ad aliquid posse reduci, quae vero species essent illorum generum posse in relativis, sed in qualitatibus numerari, ut scientia cum sit habitudo habet sub se alias habitudines,grammaticam et geometriam.In noc igitur scientia ipsa quod genus est, ad aliquid semper refertur,dicimus enim scientiam alicujus scientiam. Grammaticam vero quae ejus species est, nullus dicit alicujusesse grammaticam; dicaturenim sifieripotest grammaticam,Aristarchi esse grammaticam.Sed omnia quaecunque dicuntur ad aliquid,convertuntur.Dicitur ergo etAristarchus, grammaticae Aristarchus,quod fieri non potest. Non igitur grammatica Aristarchi,ut ad aliquid dicitur.

English

He resolves this question with a very strong argument, namely in these words: For nearly all the things that are in all these genera are said in relation to something. But of those that are individual, that is, the species, nothing is of this sort. For this is the argumentation that the Greeks call [a certain name]. In affections and habits of this sort, which are among those genera, only those can be reduced to something relative which are genera; but the species of those genera can indeed be among relatives, yet are counted among qualities, as knowledge, since it is a habit, has under itself other habits, grammar and geometry. In these, therefore, knowledge itself, insofar as it is a genus, is always referred to something; for we say knowledge of something is knowledge. But grammar, which is its species, no one says is grammar of something; for if it can be said, grammar would be said to be grammar of Aristarchus. But all things whatsoever that are said in relation to something are converted. Therefore Aristarchus is also said, Aristarchus of grammar, which cannot happen. Grammar, therefore, is not of Aristarchus, as it is said in relation to something.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:261 · narrative
Source · Latin

Est etiam argumentum, non species, sed hujusmodi genera, ad aliquid appellari, ut cum ipsae quidem species ad aliquid non dicantur,ut grammatica non dicitur alicujus grammatica,si quando tamen est ut species ad aliquid raferatur,id non secundum,sesed secundum genus,utgrammaticæ quoniam genus est scientiae quae relativa est, si quis grammaticam ad aliquid referre contendat,non potest secundum ipsam grammaticam, eam ad aliquid praedicare, sed secundum scientiam,id est secundum genus suum. Noa euim dicitur grammatica alicujus grammatica, sed fortasse grammatica alicujus scientia.Non ergo grammatica secundum grammaticam ad aliquid dicitur, sed secundum scientiam.Et hoc est quod ait, ut grammatica non dicitur alicujus grammatica,nec musica,sed fortasse secundum genus proprium istae dicuntur alicujus, ut grammatica alicujus dicitur scientia,non alicujus grammatica.Ergo singularum specierum nihil est quod aliqua relatione praedicetur. Genera vero harum specierum relativa sunt, quae paulo superius dixi; quod enim ait: Pene enim in oJmibus qualitatibus genera ad aliquid dicuntur,non autem aliquid eorum quae sunt singula,hoc demonstrare voluit, genera ipsa habitudinem dispositionumque esse relativa, species vero generum quas singulatim esse dixit,ad aliquid nullo modo praedicari.

English

There is also an argument that not the species but genera of this kind are called relative, as when the species themselves are not said to be relative—for example, grammar is not said to be grammar of something—yet if it ever happens that a species is referred to something, this is not according to itself but according to its genus; for example, since grammar is a genus of knowledge, which is relative, if anyone contends that grammar is referred to something, he cannot predicate it as relative according to grammar itself, but according to knowledge, that is, according to its genus. For grammar is not said to be grammar of something, but perhaps grammar is the knowledge of something. Grammar, therefore, is not said to be relative according to grammar, but according to knowledge. And this is what he says: that grammar is not said to be grammar of something, nor music, but perhaps according to their proper genus these are said to be of something, as grammar is said to be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of something. Therefore, of the individual species there is nothing that is predicated by any relation. But the genera of these species are relative, which I mentioned a little earlier; for what he says: For nearly in all qualities the genera are said to be relative, but not any of those which are individual—he wished to demonstrate this: that the genera themselves have a relation and disposition of relatives, but the species of the genera, which he said to be individual, are in no way predicated as relative.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:262 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quas idcirco esse singulatim vocavit, quia grammatica una est,et rursus musica una; scientia vero non una.Recte igitur species scientiae singulatim esse nominavit. Constat igitur quod genera hujusmodi habitudinem dicantur ad aliquid, species vero ad nihil aliud propria praedicatione referantur. Quocirca quoniam hujusmodi species relativas non esse demonstravit, nunc quod reliquum est qualitates esse confirmat.

Dicitur autem secundum singula quales. Hæc enim et habemus.Scientes enim dicimur,quod habemus singulas scientias aliquas. Quare hæc erunt etiam quatitates, quæ singularia sunt,secundum quas etiam quales dicimur. Hæc autem non sunt eorum quae sunt ad aliquid.

Illas esse qualitates superius confirmatum est ex quibus aliqui quales vocarentur,nos autem idcirco grammatici dicimur, non quod universalem scientiam,sed quod ipsam grammaticam habeamus, et hoc vere dicitur,idcirco nos dici scientes,quia grammaticisumns,potiusquamidcircogrammaticosquod aliquamscientiam retinemus.Nullusenimagenerali scientia grammaticus, aut sciens,nisi a singulatim scientia Bciens,grammaticusque perhibetur. Igitur quoniam exhis habitudinem speciebus quales vocamur, ipsas species in qualitate numeraudse sunt. Sed cum quis grammatica participat, de ea etiam genus dicitur,etsecundum eam non solum ad gran' maticam,sed ad scientiam quoqueconjungitur.

English

He called these "individually" for the reason that grammar is one, and again music is one; but knowledge is not one. Therefore he rightly named the species of knowledge to be individually. It is agreed, then, that genera of this kind are said to be relative, but that species are referred to nothing else by their own predication. Wherefore, since he has demonstrated that species of this kind are not relative, he now confirms that what remains are qualities.

But they are called "of what sort" according to individual things. For we have these. For we are said to be knowing because we have certain individual sciences. Wherefore these will also be qualities, which are individual, according to which we are also said to be of what sort. But these are not among those which are relative.

That those are qualities from which certain people are called of what sort was confirmed above; but we are called grammarians for the reason that we have not universal knowledge but grammar itself, and this is truly said: we are called knowing because we are grammarians, rather than grammarians because we retain some knowledge. For no one is a grammarian or knowing by general knowledge, unless he is called knowing and a grammarian by individual knowledge. Therefore, since it is from these species that we are called of what sort, the species themselves must be numbered in quality. But when someone participates in grammar, its genus is also predicated of him, and according to it he is joined not only to grammar but also to knowledge.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:263 · narrative
Source · Latin

Diciturenimidcirco sciens.Ergo quoniam habens grammaticam,et sciens,et grammaticus dicitur, non potest ulla scientia participare, qui singulas non habuerit. Qui enim cunctis speciebus caret, illi quoque genere ipso carendum est. Quare quoniam has species habemus,et secundum eas quales dicimur, a grammatica scientes et grammatici nuncupamur, has autem ipsas species monstratum est ad aliquid non referri.Recteigitur hujusmodi habitudines quae in alterius relativis species sunt,in qualitate numeratae sunt.Quod si quis hoc quoque invitus accipiat, aliud addit quo totum quæstionis vinculum solvetur;ait enim:

Amplius si contingat hoc ipsum et quale relativum esse, nihil est inconvenieus in utrisque hæc generibus etlUmerare.

English

For this reason he is called knowledgeable. Therefore, since one who has grammar is both called knowledgeable and a grammarian, no one who does not possess the individual species can participate in any knowledge. For one who lacks all the species must also lack the genus itself. Wherefore, since we possess these species, and according to them we are called such, we are named knowledgeable and grammarians from grammar, and it has been shown that these very species are not referred to something else. Rightly, therefore, dispositions of this kind, which are relative species in another, have been counted under quality. But if anyone accepts this unwillingly, he adds another point by which the whole knot of the question will be loosed; for he says:

Further, if it should happen that this very thing is both a relative and a quality, there is nothing inconvenient in counting these under both genera.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:264 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam cum sit verum unam eademque rem duobus diversis generibus suppositam essenon posse, illud tamen convenit secundum aliud atque aliud unam eamdemque speciem duobuB generibus posse subnecti,ut in eo quod supra jam dictum est,cum Socrates substantia sit, pater vero ad aliquid,cumque substantia discrepet atque relatio, nihil tamen est inconveniens eumdem ipsum Socratem in eo quod homo est, substantiae supponi, in eo quod habet filium,relationi.Quocirca si secundum aliam atque aliam rem duobus generibus eadem res quaelibet diversissimis supponatur, nihil inconveniens cadit.tt.a quoque et habitudlnes in eo quod alicujusreihabitudines sunt,in relatione ponuntur, in eo quod secundum eas quales aliquid dicuntur,in qualitatenumerantur,Quare nihil est inconveniens unam atque eamdem rem, secundum diversas natura: suae potentias,geminisetsi contingatpluribus,annumerare generibus.Quocirca quoniam de qualitate tractatum est, nos quoque orationis cursum ad reliqua praedicamenta vertamus.

English

For since it is true that one and the same thing cannot be placed under two different genera, yet it is agreed that one and the same species can be attached to two genera according to different respects, as in what has already been said above: since Socrates is a substance, but a father is a relative, and since substance and relation differ, it is nevertheless not incongruous that the same Socrates, in that he is a man, be placed under substance, and in that he has a son, under relation. Wherefore if according to one thing and another, any same thing whatsoever is placed under two most diverse genera, nothing incongruous results. Likewise also habits, in that they are habits of something, are placed in relation; in that according to them something is said to be of such a sort, they are counted in quality. Wherefore it is not incongruous to enumerate one and the same thing, according to the diverse natures of its potencies, under two, even if it should happen to be more, genera. Wherefore, since quality has been treated, let us also turn the course of our discourse to the remaining categories.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:265 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE FACERE ET PATI.

Suscipit autem facereet pati contrarietatem,et magis et minusMalefacere enim et (rigetacere contraria sunt,et calefieri et frigefieri,et delectari ac contristari. Quare suscipit contrarietatem et magis et minus,calefacere enim dicitur magis et minus,et calefieri magis et minus,et contristari magis et minus,suscipit igitur magis et minus,facere et pati;de his itaque tanta dicantur.

Decursis quatuor prasdicamentis quae aliqua quaestione et consideratione ergo videbantur, tenuiter cætera breviterque perstringit.Et de facere quidem et pati nihil in hoc libro,nisi quod contraria suscipiant, et intentionem imminutionemque ab Aristotele est disputatum,in aliis vero ejus operibus plene ab eo perfecteque tractata sunt, ut hoc ipsum de facere et pati in his libris quos xat inscripsit,de aliis quoque praedicamentis non illi minor in aliis operibus disputatio fuit,ut de eo quod est ubi et quando in physicis, et de omnibus quidem altius subtiliusquc in libris quos vocavit, exquiritur. Ac de fecere quidem et pati ipse planissime posuit posse ea suscipere contrarietates.Dicimus enim ignem calefacere et frigefacere,quod scilicet ad faciendum refertur.Dicimus aquam calefieri et frigefieri, quod nihilominus ad patiendi ducitur prsedicamentum.Magis quoque et minus suscipere,apertissimis demonstrat exemplis.

English

ON DOING AND SUFFERING.

Doing and suffering also admit of contrariety, and of more and less. For to do evil and to do good are contraries, and to be warmed and to be cooled, and to be delighted and to be saddened. Therefore they admit of contrariety and of more and less; for to warm is said more and less, and to be warmed more and less, and to be saddened more and less. Therefore doing and suffering admit of more and less. And let this much be said concerning these.

Having run through the four categories which seemed to require some inquiry and consideration, he touches upon the rest briefly and lightly. And indeed concerning doing and suffering nothing has been disputed by Aristotle in this book except that they admit of contraries and of intensification and diminution; but in his other works these things have been fully and perfectly treated by him, as this very matter concerning doing and suffering in those books which he entitled On Generation and Corruption, and concerning the other categories too his disputation in other works was no less, as concerning where and when in the Physics, and concerning all of them indeed more deeply and more subtly in the books which he called Metaphysics. And concerning doing and suffering he himself most plainly laid down that they can admit of contrarieties. For we say that fire warms and cools, which of course is referred to doing. We say that water is warmed and cooled, which nonetheless is brought under the category of suffering. That they also admit of more and less he demonstrates by the most evident examples.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:266 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sic enim magis calefacere et minus, et magis calefieri et minus dicitur.Atque haec hactenus,ipse enim haec apertissime posuit.Est autem horum descriptio talis,quod in faciendo quidem,actus quidam aquolibst in aliam rem veniens, consideratur a quo veniat. In patiendo autem in eo ille actus consideratur,in quem venit. Actus enim et passio simul in physicis esse monstrata sunt.Ac de facere quidem ac pati,ad praesens tempus haec dicta sufficiant.

Dictum est autem et de situm esse, in his quæ ad aliquid sunt,quod denominative a positionibus dicitur de reliquis autem quando, et ubi, et habere, eo quod manifesta sunt,nihil de his ultra dicitur, quam quod in principio dictum est,quia habere quidem significat calceatum esse,armatum esse, ubi autem, ut in lyceo in loro,quando,ut heri.Et alia quæ de his dicta sunt. De propositis itaque generibus, sufficiant quæ autem suat.

English

For thus it is said to heat more and less, and to be heated more and less. And these matters up to this point; for he himself set these forth most openly. But the description of these is such: that in doing, indeed, a certain act coming from some source into another thing is considered with respect to whence it comes. In suffering, however, that act is considered with respect to that into which it comes. For act and passion have been shown to exist simultaneously in physical things. And concerning doing and suffering, let these things said suffice for the present time.

It has also been said concerning being situated, in those things which are relative, that it is denominatively said from positions. But concerning the rest — when, and where, and having — because they are manifest, nothing further is said about them than what was said at the beginning: that having indeed signifies being shod, being armed; where, as in the Lyceum, in the forum; when, as yesterday. And the other things which have been said about these. Concerning the proposed genera, therefore, let what has been said suffice.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:267 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE SITU ET POSITIONE.

Positio quidem quoniam ipsa est alicujus, in iis quæ sunt ad aliquid, numerata est, sed quoniam omnis res quae ab alio denominatur,aliud est quam idipsum a quo denominata est,ut aliud est,qui est grammaticus,atque grammatica,quamvis grammaticus a grammatica denominelur.Ita cum sit positio relativa,quidquid denominative a positionibua dicitur,hoc relativorum genere non tenetur.Positio autem ipsa relativa est, positum vero est a positione denominatum. Statio enim cujusdam statio est. Stare vero quoniam a statione denominatum est, non ponitur in eo genere in quo statio fuit. Quare sub relatione hoc praedicamentum non invenitur. Sed quoniam nihil est ad quod hoc reducere genus atque aptare possimus, dicendum est suum esse genus.Ut accumbere ab accubitu, stare a statione, et caetera quidem quae idcirco se Aristotelea exsequidenegat,quoniam planissima sunt;ait enim: De reliquis vero id est, quando, et ubi, et habere; propterea quia manifesta sunt, nihil de his ultra dicitur, quam quod in principio dictum est, et eorum praedicta ponit exempla.

English

On Position and Posture.

Position, indeed, since it is itself of something, has been counted among those things which are relative; but since every thing which is denominated from another is other than that very thing from which it is denominated—as one who is grammatical is other than grammar, although the grammatical is denominated from grammar—so, since position is relative, whatever is said denominatively from positions is not held in this genus of relatives. But position itself is relative, whereas what is positioned is denominated from position. For a standing is the standing of something. But to stand, since it is denominated from standing, is not placed in that genus in which standing was. Wherefore this predicament is not found under relation. But since there is nothing to which we can reduce and adapt this genus, it must be said to be its own genus. As to recline is from reclining, to stand from standing, and the rest indeed which Aristotle refrains from pursuing for this reason, because they are most plain; for he says: But concerning the rest—that is, when, and where, and to have—for the reason that they are manifest, nothing further is said about them than what was said at the beginning, and he sets down the examples of them previously stated.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:268 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE UBI ET QUANDO

Dicendum autem est breviter de praedicatione quae est ubi et quando. Sicut ipsum ad aliquid per se esse non potest, nisi ex alio aliquo naturam trahat, ita et quando et ubi, esse non potest, nisi locus ac tempus fuerit. Locum enim ubi, tempus vero quando, comitatur. Non est autem idem tempus, et quando, nec ubi et locus, sed proposito prius loco si qua res in eo sit posita,ubi esse dicitur. Rursus si certa res in tempore est,quando esse perhibetur,ut Apollinares ludi,cum sint. in tempore, quando eos esse dicimus. Habent autem haec quoque proprias diversitates,ubi quidem,quod aliquoties infinite dicitur.Alicubienirr: esse dicimus aliquem,ut Socratem,aliquotiesautem diffinite,ut in lyceo vel in academia. Habet quoque ubi,secundum ipsum locum in quoest,aliquascontrarietates.Sursum enim esse,et deorsum ubi esse dicitur. Temporum quoque varietates in eo praedicamento,quod est quando,esse manifestum est.Futuraenimet praesentia praeteritaque in quando praedicamento veniunt.Dicimus enim fuisse aliquando Scipionem consulem Romanum,nunc esse Orientis imperalorem,qui nunc Anastasius appellatur.Futurum autem esse aliquem, quae scilicet secundum quando praedicamentum dicuntur.

English

On Where and When

We must speak briefly about the predication that is where and when. Just as relation itself cannot exist per se unless it draws its nature from something else, so too when and where cannot exist unless there be place and time. For where accompanies place, and when accompanies time. But time is not the same as when, nor is where the same as place; rather, when a place has been posited first, if some thing is situated in it, it is said to be where. Again, if a certain thing is in time, it is said to be when, as the Apollinarian games, since they are in time, we say are when. These also have their own proper diversities: in the case of where, it is sometimes said indefinitely — for we say someone is somewhere, as Socrates — and sometimes definitely, as in the Lyceum or in the Academy. Where also has certain contrarieties according to the very place in which it is: for to be up and to be down are said to be where. The varieties of times also in that predicament which is when are manifestly present. For future, present, and past things come under the predicament of when. For we say that Scipio was once consul of the Romans, and that there now is an emperor of the East, who is now called Anastasius. And that someone will be in the future — these things, of course, are said according to the predicament of when.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:269 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE HABERE.

Habere autem est quoddam extrinsecus veniens, neque innatum ei aquo habetur,aliudque quam est illud ipsum a quo habetur, in se retinere, ut armatum esse vel vestitum esse.Habere enim est vestes atque arma tenere,quae cum eo nata non sunt,neque aliqua cum eo qui habet,communi natura proprietateque junguntur; sed quoniam de his Aristoteles tacuit,nobis quoque nunc eorum longior tractatus omittendus est.

LIBER QUARTUS-

Expeditis omnibus prædicamentis,cur præter propositum operis in hanc oppositorum disputationem sit ingressus, a multis ante quaesitum est, sed Andronicus hanc esse adjectionem Aristotelis non putat, simulque illud arbitratur, idcirco ab eo fortasse hanc adjectionem de oppositis,et de his quae simul sunt,et de priore,et de motu et de æquivocatione,habendi non esse factam,quod hunclibellum ante Topica scripserit, quodque haec ad illud opus non necessariaesse putaverit, sicut ipse Categoriae possunt ad sensum Topicorum, non ignorans scilicet quod sufficienter in Topicis,quantumad argumenta pertinebat, et de his omnibus quae adjecta sunt,etdepraedicamentis fuisse propositum.Sed hæc Andronicus.Porphyrius vero hanc adjectionem vacare et carere ratione non putat.Cujus hanc prodidit causam.

English

ON HAVING.

To have, however, is a certain thing coming from outside, not innate in that from which it is had, and retaining in itself something other than that very thing from which it is had, as to be armed or to be clothed. For to have is to hold garments and arms, which were not born with him, nor are they joined to him who has them by any common nature and property; but since Aristotle was silent about these things, we too must now omit a longer treatment of them.

BOOK FOUR

When all the categories had been set out, why, contrary to the plan of the work, he entered into this disputation about opposites has been asked by many before, but Andronicus does not think this is an addition by Aristotle, and at the same time he judges that for this reason perhaps this addition concerning opposites, and concerning things that are simultaneous, and concerning the prior, and concerning motion and equivocation, was not made by him, because he wrote this little book before the Topics, and because he thought these things were not necessary for that work, just as the Categories themselves can be understood in the sense of the Topics, not unaware, of course, that in the Topics, as far as pertained to arguments, it had been sufficiently proposed concerning all these things that were added and concerning the categories. But this is what Andronicus says. Porphyry, however, does not think this addition is empty and devoid of reason. He has set forth this as its cause.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:270 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ut enim multa sunt quae quod communibus animi conceptionibus esse suggererent,in hujus libri principiis ab Aristotele praedicta sunt,ut de æquivocis,et univocis,et denominativis,etde his omnibus, quaecunque usque ad substantiae disputationem ad ipsorum praedicamentorum utilitatem cognitionemque praedicta sunt, ita quaedam fuisse quae essent quidem in communibus sensibus, egerent tamen subtilioris divisionis modo,hæc diligenter supposita sunt,ut quid essent proprie teneretur, ne falsis opinionibus traductus non firmus animus luderetur.Docet autem hoc,inquit, etiam ipse ordo congruus rationique conveniens titulorum,hanc adjectionem fuisse perutilem atque necessariam.Prius enim de oppositis,post vero de his quae simul sunt, et de his quae posteriora sunt.Post autem de motu,ad postremum de habendi aequivocatione sermonem faciens,libri seriemterminavit.Idcirco quod in omnibus quidem prædicamentis ante quaesivit, utrum possint habere contraria. In his vero quae sunt ad aliquid,dixit magnum parvo non posse esse contrarium,sed oppositum.Quid vero esse oppositum dicere praetermisit, ne ordo disputandi continuus rumperetur. Hic igitur recte quod illic praetermiserat,prius edocuit.In relativis quoque de his quæ sunt prius,quæ que simul natura gignuntur,strictim tetigu, quod nunc diligenter explicat.

English

For just as there are many things which, because they suggested existence by common conceptions of the mind, were stated by Aristotle in the beginnings of this book—as concerning equivocals, univocals, and denominatives, and concerning all those things which up to the discussion of substance were stated for the utility and knowledge of the categories themselves—so there were certain things which were indeed within common perceptions, yet required a more subtle mode of division; these have been carefully added, so that what they properly are might be firmly grasped, lest the mind, led astray by false opinions, be made unsteady and mocked. He teaches this, he says, and the very order of the titles, harmonious and fitting to reason, shows that this addition was most useful and necessary. For first he spoke concerning opposites, then concerning things that are simultaneous, and concerning things that are posterior. After that, concerning motion, and finally, making his discourse on the equivocation of having, he ended the series of the book. For this reason, because in all the categories he first asked whether they can have contraries. But in those which are relative, he said that the great cannot be contrary to the small, but opposed. What however it is to be opposed he omitted to say, lest the continuous order of disputation be broken. Here therefore he rightly taught first what he had omitted there. In relatives too, concerning things that are prior and things that are naturally generated together, he touched briefly, which he now explains diligently.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:271 · narrative
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Faciendi Jvero patiendique praedicamenta sunt, in quibus quidam quasi motus agitatioque consideratur;necesse igitur fuit motu dicere,qui naturam faciendi atque patiendi vellet ostendere. Quis autem dubitet cujuslibet sermonis aequivocationem monstrare,esse perutile?Quare quoniam habere quoque praedicamentum est, non fuit inconveniens neque perfluum de habendi aequivocatione tractasse.

DE OPPOSITIS.

De oppositis autem quoties solent opponi dicendum est.Dicltur autem alterum alteri opponi quadrupliciter3aut ut ad aliquid,aut ut contraria, aut ut habitus et privatioMut ut affirmatio et negatio:opponitur atem unumquodque istorum, ut figura dicam relativa qaidem,ut duplum dimidio. Contraria autem ut malo bonum,secundum privationem et habitum, utccecitas visui,secundum affirmationem et negationemsut sedet non sedet.

Illud quoque quæritur utrum oppositionis nomen aequivoce prædicetur.Dicimus euim quatuor modis opponi,aut ut contraria, aut ut aliquid,aut ut habitum et privationem,aut ut affirmationem at negationem.

English

The categories of doing and undergoing are those in which a kind of motion and activity is considered; it was necessary, therefore, to speak of motion, since one wished to show the nature of doing and undergoing. But who would doubt that to demonstrate the equivocation of any word whatsoever is very useful? Wherefore, since having is also a category, it was neither incongruous nor superfluous to have treated the equivocation of having.

ON OPPOSITES.

Now it must be said in how many ways opposites are wont to be opposed. But one thing is said to be opposed to another in four ways: either as relatives, or as contraries, or as habit and privation, or as affirmation and negation. Each of these is opposed, as I may say by way of example, as relatives indeed, as double to half; as contraries, as good to evil; according to privation and habit, as blindness to sight; according to affirmation and negation, as he sits, he does not sit.

This too is asked: whether the name of opposition is predicated equivocally. For we say that things are opposed in four ways: either as contraries, or as relatives, or as habit and privation, or as affirmation and negation.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:272 · narrative
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Hic ergo contenditur utrum aequivocatio quaedam circa has quatuor diversitates sit, an idipsum quod dicimus oppositum generis vice prædicetur,ut situnivocum.Sed in hoc Stoicorum Peripateticorumque diversa sententia fuit,et ut ipsi inter se Peripatetici,diverse sectati sunt.Stoicorum quoniam longa sententia est,praetermittatur,aliis autem Peripateticis placet nomen hoc oppositi de subjectis aequivoce praedicari,ita affirmantibus,quoniam Aristoteles ita dixit: De oppositis quoties solent opponi dicendum est hoc, id est quoties ad multiplicitatem pertinet aequivocationis.Sed qui meliusjudicavere, hi oppositionis nomen generis loco dicunt debere praedicari, idcirco quod cum nomen opposilionis de subjectis quatuor oppositionibus praedicetur, ab his quoque diffinitio non oberret. Sunt enim opposita quas in eodem, secundum idem, in eodem tempore, circa unam eamdemquerem,simul esse non posunt,quod per singula quaeque pergentibus in singulis oppositis invenitur. Namque album et nigrum, quæ sunt contraria,unu eodemque tempore circa unum idemque corpus partemque corporis simul esse non possunt, nec servus atque dominus ejusdem, eodem tempore idem servus idem dominus est,nec habitus et privatio;quis enim dicat in eodem oculo uno eodemque tempore et visum posse esse et caecitatem?

English

Here, then, the dispute is whether there is a certain equivocation with respect to these four diversities, or whether that very thing which we call opposed is predicated in place of a genus, so that it is univocal. But on this point the Stoics and the Peripatetics held differing opinions, and the Peripatetics themselves followed different views among themselves. Since the Stoic opinion is lengthy, let it be passed over; but it pleases other Peripatetics that this name of "opposed" is predicated equivocally of its subjects, affirming this because Aristotle said so: "Concerning opposites, one must speak as often as they are customarily opposed," that is, as often as it pertains to the multiplicity of equivocation. But those who judged better say that the name of opposition ought to be predicated in place of a genus, for the reason that, since the name of opposition is predicated of the four oppositions as its subjects, their definition also does not stray from them. For opposites are those which cannot be simultaneously in the same thing, according to the same respect, at the same time, in relation to one and the same thing — which is found in each of the opposites as one proceeds through them individually. For white and black, which are contraries, cannot be simultaneously at one and the same time in one and the same body and part of a body; nor can a slave and his master be at the same time the same slave and the same master; nor habit and privation; for who would say that in the same eye, at one and the same time, both sight and blindness can exist?

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:273 · narrative
Source · Latin

Jam vero affirmatio et negatio quam repugnantes sint,quamque in eodem simul esse non possint,nulli dubium eat.Quare si eaquae sub oppositione ponuntur oppositionis nomen diffinitionemque suscipiunt,quid est dubium oppositionem non aequivoce praedicari? His igitur positis, ad eorum distantias differentiasque veniamus.

Quæcunque igitur ut relativa opponuntur, ea ipsa quæ sunt oppositorum dicuntur,aut quomodolibelaliter ad ea,ut duplum dimidii ipsum quod est, alterius dicitur duplum, alicujus enim duplum,sed et scientia scibili tanquam retativa opposita est,et dicilur scientia hoc ipsum quod est scibiLis, et scibile hoc ipsum quod est ad oppositum dicitur, id est ad scientiam. Scibile euim aliquo dicimus scibile,id est scientia.Quæeunque ergo opposita sunt tanquam ad aliquid, ipsa, quæ sunt aliorum dicuntur, aut quomodocunque ad se invicem.

English

Now truly, how repugnant affirmation and negation are, and how they cannot be in the same thing at the same time, is doubtful to no one. Wherefore, if those things which are placed under opposition receive the name and definition of opposition, what doubt is there that opposition is not predicated equivocally? With these things therefore established, let us come to their distances and differences.

Whatever things, therefore, are opposed as relatives, those very things which are of the opposites are said, or in whatever way they are related to them, as the double is said to be the double of the half itself which it is, and is said to be the double of something; for it is the double of something. But also knowledge is opposed to the knowable as a relative, and knowledge is said to be that very thing which it is, namely of the knowable, and the knowable is said to be that very thing which it is in relation to the opposite, that is, to knowledge. For we say the knowable is knowable of something, that is, by knowledge. Whatever things, therefore, are opposed as relatives, those very things which are of others are said, or in whatever way they are related to one another.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:274 · narrative
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Ea quidem hujus oppositionis qu'C secundum relationem dicuntur,et per seipsa plana atque vulgata sunt.et superiori relationis disputatione jam cognita.Illaenim suntadaliquid quæcunque id quod sunt aliorum dicuntur,vel quomodolibet aliter ad ea,ut servus domini servus,et dominus servi dominus,et magnum ad parvum dicitur, et rursus parvum refertur ad magnum.Quod si hoc in relativis omnibus invenitur,nulla est dubitatio quin etiam in his hoc deprehendi possit,quæ secundum ad aliquid opponuntur,ut ea ipsa id quod sunt oppositorum dicantur vel quomodolibet aliter ad opposita, nt si est servus domino oppositus,dominus servi dicatur,id est oppositi sui,et rursus si dominus servo oppositus est,domini servus dicatur.Parvum vero ad magnum,et magnum ad parvum, id est ad oppositum sibi. Atque hoc quidem in omnibus secundum ad aliquid oppositionibus inveniri necesseest.Quocirca sit hæc proprietas eorum quae secundum ad aliquid opponuntur,quodea ipsaquæ sunt ad opposita referuntur,et ipsorum esse dicuntur. His ergo ante constituti,; docet differentiam,qua inter se ea quae secundum contrarietatem dicuntur,vel ea quae secundum ad aliquid,discrepant atque dissentiunt; ait enim:

English

Now these things of this opposition which are said according to relation are both in themselves clear and commonly known, and already known from the earlier discussion of relation. For those things are said to be in relation to something, whatever are said to be of others with respect to what they are, or in any other way are referred to them, as a slave is the slave of a master, and a master is the master of a slave, and a large thing is said in relation to a small thing, and again a small thing is referred to a large thing. But if this is found in all relatives, there is no doubt that it can also be discovered in those things which are opposed according to relation, namely that those very things are said to be of their opposites with respect to what they are, or in any other way are referred to their opposites; for instance, if a slave is opposed to a master, he is said to be the slave of a master, that is, of his opposite; and again, if a master is opposed to a slave, he is said to be the master of a slave. But a small thing is referred to a large thing, and a large thing to a small thing, that is, to its opposite. And this indeed must be found in all oppositions according to relation. Wherefore let this be the property of those things which are opposed according to relation: that those very things which they are are referred to their opposites, and are said to be of them. These things therefore having been established beforehand, he teaches the difference by which those things which are said according to contrariety, or those which are according to relation, differ and disagree among themselves; for he says:

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:275 · narrative
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Itta vero quae ut contraria opponuntur,ipsa quidem quae suntnullo modo adseinvicem dicuntur,contraria vero sibi invicem dicuntur,neque enim bonum mali dicitur bonum,sed contrarium,nec album nigri album, sed conlrarlumsquaredifferunt a se invicem hæ oppositiones.

Dictum est inhis quae secundum ad aliquid opponuntur,quod ea ipsaid quod suntad id quod sibi est oppositum dicerentur. Contrariavero etipsa quidem opponuntur sibi,sed id quod sunt ad opposita non dicuntur,contraria autem dicuntur.Hoc autem hujusmodi est.Bonum malo contrarium dicimusesse, et rursus malum bono.Nigrum quoque albo contrariumputamus,nihilominus quoque album nigro.Sed cum hoc arbitramur,non tamen dicimus ea id quod suntesseoppositorum.Sienim diceremus ea id quod est bonum esse oppositi sui, non diceretur bonum malo essecontrarium,sedBbonum esse mali bonum. Nec ila praedicationem quis faceret nigrum albo esse contrarium,sed nigrum albi esse nigrum. Hoc est enim id quod est nigrum dici ad oppositum suum,si quis dicat nigrum albi esse nigrum;quod quoniam non dicitur,ea ipsa quae suntnon dicuntur oppositorum,ea scilicet quae sibi ut contraria videntur opponi. Sed quoniam dicimus bonum malo contrarium,etinigrum albocontrarium,quanquam id quod sunt oppositorum non dicantur,tamen ad opposita ut contraria nominantur.Atque hoc est quod ait:Ipsa quidem quae sunt nullo modo ad seinvicem dicuntur.

English

But those things which are opposed as contraries—the things themselves which they are are in no way said in relation to each other, but they are said to be contrary to each other. For good is not said to be the good of evil, but its contrary; nor is white said to be the white of black, but its contrary. In this respect these oppositions differ from each other.

It has been said in the case of those things which are opposed according to relation that the things themselves, in respect of what they are, are said in relation to that which is opposed to them. But contraries are indeed opposed to each other, yet they are not said, in respect of what they are, in relation to their opposites, but they are said to be contraries. This is as follows: we say that good is contrary to evil, and again evil to good. We also think black to be contrary to white, and nonetheless white to black. But when we judge this, we do not however say that they, in respect of what they are, belong to their opposites. For if we were to say that good, in respect of what it is, belongs to its opposite, good would not be said to be contrary to evil, but good would be the good of evil. Nor would anyone make the statement that black is contrary to white, but that black is the black of white. For this is to say what black is in relation to its opposite, if one says that black is the black of white. Since this is not said, those things which they are are not said to belong to their opposites—namely, those things which appear to be opposed to each other as contraries. But since we say that good is contrary to evil, and black contrary to white, although they are not said, in respect of what they are, to belong to their opposites, they are nonetheless named in relation to their opposites as contraries. And this is what he says: the things themselves, in respect of what they are, are in no way said in relation to each other.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:276 · narrative
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Contraria vero sibi invicem dicuntur.Non enim dicitur bonum mali bonum, hoc est enim id quod est oppositi praedicare,sed dicimus bonum malo contrarium.Quocirca differunt ea quae similiter ad aliquid opponuntur his quæ secundum contrarietatem sibi sunt opposita,quod eaquidem quae secundum relationem opposita sunt id quod sunt oppositorum dicuntur. Illa vero quae ut contraria, ipsa quidem quod suntoppositorum nomine minime,sed tantum contraria prædicantur, ut bonum contrarium esse dicatur oppositi sui non boni.Dicimus enim bonum malocontrarium,cum non dicamus bonum mali honum.Sed quoniam differentiam secundum ad aliquid oppositionis contrariorumque monstravit, ipsorum inter se contrariorum differentiam discrepantiamque persequitur.

Quæcunque vero contrariorum talia sunt,ut in?uibus nata sunt fieri, vel de quibus prædicantur, necessarium sit alterum zpsorum inesse,nihil horum est medzum.Quorum vero non necessarium est alterum inesse, horum aliquid est medium omnino, ut languor et sanitas in corpore animalisnaturahabent fi,eritet necessarium est alterum esse animalis in corpore. vel lanauorem vel sanitatem;par quoque et impar de numero prsedicanturtet necessarium est alterum in numero esse aut impar aut par,et nihil est medio eorum3neque inter languorem et sanitatem, neque inter par et impar.

English

But contraries are said in relation to each other. For good is not said to be the good of evil—for that is to predicate what belongs to its opposite—but we say that good is contrary to evil. Wherefore those things which are opposed in relation to something differ from those which are opposed to each other according to contrariety, in that those which are opposed according to relation are said to be what they are of their opposites. But those which are opposed as contraries are themselves predicated by no means by the name of their opposites, but only as contraries, so that good is said to be contrary to its opposite, which is not good. For we say that good is contrary to evil, whereas we do not say that good is the good of evil. But since he has shown the difference between opposition according to relation and that of contraries, he next pursues the difference and discrepancy among the contraries themselves.

Now whatever contraries are such that, in the things in which they are naturally produced, or of which they are predicated, it is necessary that one of them be present, none of these has a middle. But those of which it is not necessary that one be present, of these there is some middle. For example, sickness and health have their natural production in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that one of them be in the body of the animal, either sickness or health. Likewise odd and even are predicated of number, and it is necessary that one of them be in the number, either odd or even, and there is no middle of them, neither between sickness and health, nor between odd and even.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:277 · narrative
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Quorum vero non est necessarium alterum inesse,horum est aliquod medium, ut nigrum et album in corpore natura habent fieri,et non est necessarium alterum horum inesse corpori,non enim omne corpus aut album, aut nigrum est.Pravum quoque et studiosum prædicantur quidem de homine,et de aliis multis, sed non est necessarium alterum horum inesse illis de quibus prædicanlursnon enim omnia vet prava,vel studiosa sunt: sed est horum medium atiquid,ut albi quidemel nigri fuscum et pallidum, et quicunque alii colores, pravi uero et studiosi,quod neque pravum,neque studiosum est. ln aliquibus itaque nomina posita sun tis, quæ media sunt,ut albi et nigri, fuscum et pallidum,et alii colores.ln aliquibus autem nomina quidem medio assignarepromptum non est,sed per utrarumque extremorum negationem quod medium est determinatur, ut neque bonum, neque malum, neque justumyneque injustum.

English

But those things of which it is not necessary that one of the two be present have some middle, as black and white in a body are naturally able to come to be, and it is not necessary that one of these be present in a body; for not every body is either white or black. Wicked and virtuous are also predicated of man and of many other things, but it is not necessary that one of these be present in those things of which they are predicated; for not all things are either wicked or virtuous. But there is some middle of these, as of white and black there is tawny and pale, and whatever other colors there are; and of wicked and virtuous, that which is neither wicked nor virtuous. In some cases, then, names have been assigned to the things that are middles, as to the middle of white and black, tawny and pale and the other colors. In some cases, however, it is not easy to assign a name to the middle, but the middle is determined by the negation of each of the extremes, as neither good nor evil, neither just nor unjust.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:278 · narrative
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Brevis contrariorum partitio hoc modo facienda est. Contrariorum alia sunt habentia medietatem, alia vero non habenlia,et eorum quorum est aliquid medium,in aliis plures medietates,in aliis vero una tantum medietas invenitur.Atque horum aliquae medietales propriis nominibus appellantur in aliqnibus vero ipsaequidemmedietatespropriis appellationibus carent.contrariorum vero negatione signantur.Sed hæc quæ dicta sunt,a primordio repetentes propriis probemus exemplis.IIla vero contraria quae medio carent talia sunt,utnecesse sit alterum eorum proprio inesse subjecto,ut est ægritudo etsanitas.Omne enim corpus in quo ægritudo sanitasque versatur, autaegrumautsanum est.Atque ideo quoniam ægritudo et sanitas medietate carent,alterutrum eorum inerit ei subjecto,in quo utraque nata sunt fieri,et da quo prædicantur.

English

A brief division of contraries must be made in this way. Of contraries, some have a middle, others do not; and of those of which there is some middle, in some several middles are found, in others only one middle. And some of these middles are called by their own names, while in some cases the middles themselves lack proper appellations. But they are marked out by the negation of the contraries. But let us prove these things that have been said by proper examples, repeating from the beginning. Those contraries which lack a middle are such that it is necessary that one of them be present in its own subject, as is sickness and health. For every body in which sickness and health are involved is either sick or healthy. And therefore, since sickness and health lack a middle, one of the two will be present in the subject in which both are naturally able to come to be, and of which they are predicated.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:279 · narrative
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Nam quoniam in corpore animalis sanitas et ægritudo fieri nata est.id est ita fieri soJet,et ita omne natum est animal, at aul sanum esse possit aut aegrum.Et quoniam de animalis corpore aut sanum,aut aegrum prasdicatur,necesse est quoniam hæc medio carent in omni corpore ani malis aut ægritudinem,aut sanitatem esse.Quocirca eorum quae medio carent,necesse alterum interesse subjecto,et quaecunque talia sunt,ut alterum ipsorum subjecto inesse necesse sit,nulla inter ea medietas clauditur.llla vero contraria in quibus aliqua medietas est non sunt talia,ut eorum necesse sitalterum inessesubjecto.Nam inillisquae mediocarent.idcirco alterutrum subjecto inesse necesse est, quod eorum medietas nulla est quae possit interea subjectce inesse substantiae,ut in numero quoniam paritas et imparitas medium nihil habentlomnis enim numerus aut par aut impar est nec est quod propterea numero in esse possit),ideo omnis numerus aut par autimpar est.In his vero quae inter se medietatem aliquam complectuntur,non est necesse semper alterum contrariorum namque inessemedietas,utin colore,quoniam album atque nigrum contrarietatis vice diversa sunt,habent autem medium quod est rubrum vel pallidum,idcirco non omne corpus vel album vel nigrum est,quoniam potest aliqnando in subjectis corporibus albi atque nigri medietas inveniri.

English

For since health and sickness are born to occur in the body of an animal — that is, they are accustomed to occur thus, and every animal is born either to be able to be healthy or sick — and since healthy or sick is predicated of the body of an animal, it is necessary, because these lack a middle, that in every body of an animal there be either sickness or health. Wherefore, of those things that lack a middle, it is necessary that one of the two be present in the subject, and whatever things are such that one of them must necessarily be present in the subject, no middle is enclosed between them. But those contraries in which there is some middle are not such that one of them must necessarily be present in the subject. For in those things that lack a middle, for this reason one or the other must necessarily be present in the subject, because there is no middle of them that could be present between them in the underlying substance — as in number, since evenness and oddness have no middle (for every number is either even or odd, nor is there anything that could for that reason be present in number), therefore every number is either even or odd. But in those things that encompass some middle between themselves, it is not necessary that one of the contraries always be present; for there is a middle, as in color, since white and black are opposed by way of contrariety, yet they have a middle, which is red or pale; therefore not every body is either white or black, since sometimes a middle between white and black can be found in underlying bodies.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:280 · narrative
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Videmus namque rubrum corpus, ut rosam multosque praeterea f1ores,quos verni temporisclementia parturit.Recte igitur dictum est,eorum quorum non sunt aliquae medietates, alterum semper inesse subjectis, et in quibus necesse est alterum inesse,fieri non posse quin illic medietas ulla sit.Eodem quoque modo et quae medietates habent, non cecessario alterutra subjectis inesse,et quae non est necesse alterutra subjectis inesse,non est dubium quin illic quaedam possit esse medietas,sed in aliquibus quidam plures,in aliquibus autem una est medietas, ut in colore inter album alque nigrum plures medietates sunt.Est enim(utdictum est)rubrum, et quoque pallidum,eodem quoque modo venetum, et multa praeterea hujusmodi.In calido vero atque frigido una medietas est,qua3 dicitur tepor.Horum autem quibus una medietas est,in aliis nomen est positum,in allis non.Et positum quidem nomen est, utintercalidum frigidumque,hancenim medietatem tepidum esse praedicamus.Non est vero positum in eo quod Aristoteles ipse sic dixit:Improbi vero et probi, quod neque probum est, neque improbum. Nam quoniam bonum atque malum sibi sunt contraria, non autem necesse est omne quod boni malive susceptibile est,vel bonum esse vel malum,idcirco dixit bonum malumque,cum sintcontraria,babere quamdam medietatem,cui nomen positum quidem non sit,sed nihilominus eam quis inter bas contrariorum naturas inveniet.

English

For we see a red body, as a rose and many other flowers, which the mildness of the spring season brings forth. Rightly, therefore, it has been said that of those things of which there are no intermediates, one of the two is always present in the subjects, and in those things in which it is necessary that one of the two be present, it cannot happen that there be any intermediate there. In the same way also, those things which have intermediates do not necessarily have one or the other present in their subjects, and those things in which it is not necessary that one or the other be present in their subjects, there is no doubt that some intermediate can be there. But in some cases there are several intermediates, in others there is one intermediate, as in color between white and black there are several intermediates. For there is, as has been said, red, and also pale, and likewise blue, and many other such things. But in hot and cold there is one intermediate, which is called tepidness. Of those things, however, which have one intermediate, in some a name has been assigned, in others not. And a name has indeed been assigned, as between hot and cold — for we declare this intermediate to be tepid. But it has not been assigned in the case which Aristotle himself stated thus: "the wicked and the good, that which is neither good nor wicked." For since good and evil are contraries to each other, but it is not necessary that everything which is capable of good or evil be either good or evil, for that reason he said that good and evil, since they are contraries, have a certain intermediate, to which a name has indeed not been assigned, but nevertheless one will find it among these natures of contraries.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:281 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam quod dictum est a posterioribusinterbonum malumqueesseeaquas dicantur indifferentia, ut interest virtutem atque turpi. tudinem,quæ utraque sibi sunt contraria,divitiae et pulchritudo,quæ(ut Stoici putant) neque mala, neque bona sunt,atque idcirco indifferentia nominavere,sed hoc ipsum quod dicimus indifferens apud priores nomen non erat,et aposterioribusinventum est.Aristoteles autem qui hoc nomine usus nunquam est,ait probum atqueimprobumhaberequidem aliquam medietatem,verumtamen eam nullo nomine nuncupari,sed eam utriusque contrarii negotiatione diffinivit.Ait enim medietatem probi atque improbi esse,quod neque probum esset neque improbum,ut justi atque injusti medietasest,quod nequejustum, neque injustum est. Sed ne videatur inconveniens aliquid negationibus diffiniri,ipse ait:In aliquibus verononestnomineassignaremedietatem,utriusque vero negatione diffinitur.Namque ubi est una medietas,si utraque contraria sint remota,sola tantum medietas permanebit, ut in eo quod est bonum et malum,quoniam his una medietas est,sublato bono atque malo, solum quod neque bonum, neque malum est relinquitur. Quocirca tota rursus divisio breviter assumenda est.Eorum quæ sunt contraria quorum necesse est semperalteruminessein his,in • quibus ea secundum propriam naturam messe contingunt,ea nullam inter seretinent medietatem,utin corpore sanitas et segritudo,innumeroparitas atque imparitas.

English

For what was said by later thinkers—that between good and evil there are things called indifferent, as between virtue and baseness, which are contrary to each other, there are riches and beauty, which (as the Stoics think) are neither evil nor good, and for that reason were named indifferent—but this very thing that we call indifferent was not a name among earlier thinkers, and was invented by later ones. Aristotle, however, who never used this name, says that the honorable and the base do indeed have some mean, but that it is called by no name, and he defined it by the negation of each of the contraries. For he says that the mean of the honorable and the base is that which is neither honorable nor base, as the mean of the just and the unjust is that which is neither just nor unjust. But lest it seem in some way unsuitable for something to be defined by negations, he himself says: In some cases it is not possible to assign a name to the mean, but it is defined by the negation of both. For where there is a single mean, if both contraries are removed, only the mean will remain, as in the case of good and evil, since there is one mean for them: with good and evil removed, only that which is neither good nor evil is left. Wherefore the whole division must again be briefly taken up. Of those things which are contrary, of which it is necessary that one always be present in those things in which they occur according to their own nature, they hold no mean between themselves, as in the body health and sickness, in number evenness and oddness.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:282 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quaecunque vero in his in quibus esse possunt,non ita sunt,ut eorum necesse si alterum inesse,hæc aliquam inter se qualitatem medietatis amplectuntur,ut albedo atque nigredo,rubrum,fri. gidum atque calidum teporem. Horum autem alia sunt quae unam solam continent medietatem,aliavero quae multas,et multas,ut interaibum atquenigrum, pallidum,venetum,quae medietates sunt.Inter calidum atquo frigidum una sola est medietas, tepor, Horum autem quæ unam retinent medietatem, in, aliis nomina sunt posita,ut in eo ipso calore ac frigore.Est enim tepor medietas caloris atque frigoris. In aliquibus vero nomen positum non est,ut in eo quod est bonum alquemalum,justum atque injustum. In his enim medietas nomen positum nonhabet, sed utrorumque eontrariorum negationibus diffinitur, ut dicamus eam esse boni atque mali medietatem, quod neque bonum est malum, eamque esse justi et injusti medietatem, quae utraque contrarietate summota, utrorumque negatione relinquitur, ut est neque justum, neque injustum.

English

But whatever things are in those subjects in which they can exist, not in such a way that one of them must necessarily be present in them, these embrace some quality of mediation between themselves, as whiteness and blackness, red, cold and hot, warmth. Of these, moreover, some contain one single mean, others many, and many, as between white and black, pale, violet, which are means. Between hot and cold there is one single mean, warmth. Of those, however, which retain one mean, in some cases names have been assigned, as in the case of heat and cold themselves. For warmth is the mean of heat and cold. In some cases, however, no name has been assigned, as in the case of good and evil, just and unjust. For in these the mean does not have a name assigned to it, but is defined by the negations of both contraries, so that we say that it is the mean of good and evil, that which is neither good nor evil, and that it is the mean of just and unjust, which, with each contrariety removed, is left by the negation of both, as is neither just nor unjust.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:283 · narrative
Source · Latin

Privatioautem et habitus dicitur quadem quæ habent fieri circa idem aliquid, ut visio et caecitas circa oculum. Universaliter autem dicendo,in quo natus est habiMus fieri,circa hoc idem dicitur utrumque horum.

Ordine tertiam speciem propositae oppositionis exsequitur eam quae secundum habitum privationemque dicitur, atque in ea unam similitudinem posuit quai illi est cum contrarietate conjuncta. Nam sicut ea quæ sunt contraria circa idem sunt,ut album,quoniam semper in corpore est; nigrum quoque semper est in corpore,et justitia,quoniam semper animo inserta est, injustitia quoque mentis est vitium, ita quoque ea quae secundum privationem habitumque dicuntur, circa idem semper necesse est inveniri, ut quoniam visus habitus est (habemus enim visum)et visus est in oculoetcircaoculum, caecitas quoque,quae privatio visus est, præter oculum non est.Auditus etiam,qui habitus est,quoniam circa aures est, ejus quoque privatio quæ surditas dicitur,ab auribus non recp,dit;ita quoque et circa quod fuerit habitus,circaidem ipsumillius habitus privatio consideratur.Atque hinc regulam dat.Universaliter enim dicit in quo sit in eo fieri privationem.Quid vero sit privari, continuata dispositione subjunxit:

English

But privation and habit are said of certain things that have come to be around the same thing, as sight and blindness around the eye. And speaking universally, in whatever thing a habit is naturally able to come to be, around this same thing each of these is said.

In the third place in order he treats the third species of the proposed opposition, that which is called according to habit and privation, and in it he sets down one similarity that it has in common with contrariety. For just as things that are contrary are around the same thing, as white, since it is always in a body; black also is always in a body, and justice, since it is always implanted in the mind, injustice also is a vice of the mind, so too those things that are said according to privation and habit must always be found around the same thing, as since sight is a habit (for we have sight) and sight is in the eye and around the eye, blindness also, which is the privation of sight, is not apart from the eye. Hearing also, which is a habit, since it is around the ears, its privation also, which is called deafness, does not depart from the ears; so too also, around whatever thing a habit has been, around this same thing the privation of that habit is considered. And from this he gives a rule. For he says universally that in whatever thing a privation is, it comes to be in that thing. But what it is to be deprived, he adds in a continued arrangement:

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:284 · narrative
Source · Latin

Privari autem tunc dicimus unumquodque susceptibilium habitus, quando id quod natum est habere,et quando natum est habere, nullo modo habet.

Quid sit privatio hac Aristoteles diffinitione conclusit. Neque enim quaecunque non habent visum, caeca dicuntur,nec vero surdum est omne quod non sentit auditum,nemo enim neque parietem caecum dixerit, nec surdum lapidem,nec quidquid hujusmodi est. Sed ea sola privari dicimus habitu,quaecunque aut habuere habitum eoque caruere,authabere potuere et non habent.Parietem autem idcirco non dicimus caecum, quod in eo visus naturali lor venire non potuit.Parvos vero catulos quibus visus non est, non satis digne aliquis caecos esse pronuntiet.Eo enim tempore nondum naturalitervisum habere possunt.Si vero exhaustis diebus quibus his oculi patefieri et lucem haurire naturaliter possunt, non habeant visum,eos caecos esse manifestum est. At vero neque ostrea dicuntur edentula, quoniam naturaliter non habeint dentes, sed nec infantulos quibus adhuc nondum hujusmodi aetas est,ut habeant dentes, vocamus edentulos,sed si aut is qui ante habuit, dentes amiserit, aut quo jam tempore habere naturaliter debet, dentes non habet. ut si quis puerorum septimo anno omnino nullum creaverit, illos jure edentulos appellamus, atque hoc est, quod ait:

English

We say that each of those things capable of a habit is deprived of it when that which is naturally able to have it, and when it is naturally able to have it, in no way has it.

What privation is, Aristotle concluded by this definition. For not all things that do not have sight are called blind, nor is everything that does not perceive sound deaf; for no one would call a wall blind, or a stone deaf, or anything of this sort. But we say that only those things are deprived of a habit, whatever either had the habit and lost it, or were able to have it and do not have it. But for this reason we do not call a wall blind, because sight could not naturally come to be in it. But as for small puppies that do not have sight, no one would pronounce them blind with sufficient justification. For at that time they are not yet naturally able to have sight. But if, when the days have been exhausted in which their eyes can naturally be opened and drink in the light, they do not have sight, it is manifest that they are blind. But neither are oysters called toothless, since they do not naturally have teeth; nor do we call little infants toothless, for whom there is not yet an age of this sort, such that they have teeth; but if either one who previously had teeth has lost them, or at the time when he ought naturally to have them, he does not have teeth—as if one of the boys in his seventh year has produced none at all—we rightly call them toothless. And this is what he says:

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:285 · narrative
Source · Latin

Edentulum enim dicimus non qui nou habet dentes, nec cæcum qui non habet visum,sed quando qui debuit habere non habet.Quædam enim a generatione neque dentes,nequ6visum habent,sed non dicuntur edentula neque casca.

Hoc est, non omne quod non videt cæcum, nec quod dentes non habet edentulum appellamus.Plura enim sunt quae automnino aut certo tempore naturaliter haec habere non possunt,sed est illa privatio quoties si habitum nonhabet,quihabere naturaliter potest, et eo tempore cum jam per naturam illius esse compos habitus possit,vel si habens quis retinensque habitum,illum cujuslibet incursione casus amiserit, ut in pueris jam adultis si non habeant dentes.Nam quoniam homines sunt,possunt habere;quod si habentes amiserint,edentuli dicuntur;si vero omnino non creverint dentes, quoniam jam pueris atque adultis ut dentes haberent,naturaliter poterat evenire, id quo casu aliquo vel aegritudine officiente factum est, eos edentulos et habitu denlium privatos esse nominamus.

English

For we call a person toothless not merely one who does not have teeth, nor blind one who does not have sight, but when one who ought to have them does not have them. For certain beings neither have teeth nor sight from birth, yet they are not called toothless or blind.

That is, we do not call everything that does not see blind, nor everything that does not have teeth toothless. For there are many things that by nature cannot have these at all or at a certain time; but privation occurs whenever one who is naturally able to have a habit does not have it, and at that time when by nature it is already capable of possessing that habit, or if someone having and retaining the habit has lost it through the onset of some accident, as in the case of boys already grown up if they do not have teeth. For since they are human beings, they are able to have them; but if, having had them, they have lost them, they are called toothless; if however their teeth have not grown at all, since for boys and adults it was naturally possible for teeth to come about, what has happened through some accident or through the agency of illness—we call them toothless and deprived of the habit of teeth.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:286 · narrative
Source · Latin

Privari vero et habere habitum, non est habitus et privatiOyhabitus enim est visus.Privatio vera cæcitas, habere autem visum, non est visus, nec caecum esse, eæcitas;privatio emm quaedam estcsecitas, cæcum vero esse privari et non privatio est.

Hic verissima ratione monstratur utrum ea qum sub privatione atque habitu cadant privationes sint atque habilus,an minime: nam quoniam habitus est visus,privatio vero cæcitas,sub habitu vero est habere visum, et sub privatione esse cæcum, utrum habere visum idem sit quod ipse qui habetur visus, et utrum idem sit caecum esse quod caecitas,perspicaciter intuent;bus aliud quoddam est habere aliquid quod habetur. Tres namque res sunt in eo in quo est habitus,is qui habet ea res quae habetur,ethabere, ut est is qui videt,et ipse visus,et hoc ipsum quod ex utrisque,fit ex eo scilicet qui videt et visu,quod est videre.Distat autem et videre ab eo qui videt,et hoc ipsum videre rursus a visu.

English

But to be deprived and to have a habit is not [the same as] a habit and a privation. For a habit is sight. But privation is blindness; and to have sight is not sight, nor is to be blind blindness. For blindness is a certain privation, but to be blind is to be deprived, and not a privation.

Here by the truest reasoning it is shown whether those things which fall under privation and habit are privations and habits, or not. For since habit is sight, but privation is blindness, and under habit is to have sight, and under privation is to be blind, whether to have sight is the same as the sight itself which is had, and whether to be blind is the same as blindness—for those who look keenly, to have something is something other than that which is had. For there are three things in that in which a habit is: the one who has, the thing which is had, and to have—as there is the one who sees, and sight itself, and this very thing which comes to be from both, namely from the one who sees and from sight, which is to see. But to see differs from the one who sees, and this very to see again differs from sight.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:287 · narrative
Source · Latin

Aliud est enim id quod fit quam is quifacit.Videreautemvidens operatur,aliud est igiturvidere quam videns.Distatautem videre etiam a visu, aliud namque est id quod fit quam id per quod aliquid geritur, videre autem per visumfit.Distatergo videre abeo ipso(qui ipsum videre efficit) visu, sed videre visum habere est, visum autem habere habitum retinere est, et visus habitus est.Non est igitur idem habitus et quid est sub habitu, id est quemlibet habitum retinere.Eodem quoque modo etiam in privatione,et illic quoque res suntres,isqui privatur,hoc ipsum quod fit,idest privari, et ipsum quo quis privatur,id est ipsa privatio. Quod si distatis qui habet eo ipso quod est habitum habere, distat et is qui privatur eo quod est priva ri.Quod sietiamdistatquod est haberehabitumillo ipso habitu qui habetur.Distat necessario j id quod est privati illa ipsa scilicet privatione qua quisque privatur.Quare nequeid quod sub habitu est habitus appellari potest,neque id quod sub privatione privatio. Recte igitur dictum est habitum habere non essehabitum,privariquenon esse privationem: cui rei aliqua quaedam validior vis argumentationis adjungitur, quam Aristoteles ita pronuntiat.

English

For that which is produced is one thing, and that which produces is another. But to see is what the one seeing performs; therefore to see is one thing, and the one seeing another. But to see also differs from sight, for that which is produced is one thing, and that through which something is brought about is another; but seeing is brought about through sight. Therefore to see differs from sight itself, which effects the seeing itself. But to see is to have sight; and to have sight is to retain a habit, and sight is a habit. Therefore a habit is not the same as that which is under a habit, that is, for anyone to retain a habit. In the same way also in privation, and there too the matters are distinct: the thing, the one who is deprived, this very thing which is produced, that is, to be deprived, and that itself by which someone is deprived, that is, privation itself. But if the one who has differs from this very thing which is to have a habit, the one who is deprived also differs from this which is to be deprived. But if also to have a habit differs from that very habit which is had, then necessarily that which is to be deprived differs from that very privation by which each one is deprived. Wherefore neither can that which is under a habit be called a habit, nor that which is under a privation be called a privation. Rightly therefore has it been said that to have a habit is not a habit, and to be deprived is not a privation. To this matter a certain stronger force of argumentation is added, which Aristotle pronounces thus.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:288 · narrative
Source · Latin

Amplius si idem essetcæcitas et cæcumesse, utrumque de eodem prædicaretur. Sed caecus dicitur homo, csecitasvero nullo modo homo dicitur.

Siidem inquit esset caecitas quod est esse caecum, de quocunque caecum eese diceretur, de eo quoque caecitas praedicaretur, sed caecum dicimus essehominem,ca?citatem vero ipsum hominem nullus dicit: quare quoniam in utrisqued:versa est prædicatio,et de quo caecitas dicitur, non de eo dicitur caecum, rursumque de quo cæcum esse praedicatur,is caecitas dici non potest, non est dubium quin aliud sit caecum esse quam cæcitas, id est privationem esse aliudquamprivari: sed quamvis distent,aequalitamen oppositionis vice funguntur, quod ipse loquitur sic.

Opposita vero etium hæc videntur esse, privari et habitum habere,sicut privatio et habitus, modus enim oppositionis idem est,nam sicut cæcitas visui opposita est, sic cæcum esse ad risum habere oppositum est.

English

Moreover, if blindness and to be blind were the same, both would be predicated of the same thing. But a man is said to be blind, yet blindness is in no way said to be a man.

If, he says, blindness were the same as to be blind, of whatever thing being blind were said, of that thing blindness would also be predicated; but we say that a man is blind, yet no one says that blindness itself is a man. Therefore, since in both cases the predication is reversed—for of the thing of which blindness is said, being blind is not said of it, and again, of the thing of which being blind is predicated, blindness cannot be said of it—there is no doubt that to be blind is one thing and blindness another, that is, to be in privation is one thing and to be deprived another. But although they differ, they nevertheless serve in the role of an equal opposition, as he himself says thus.

But these also seem to be opposites: to be deprived and to have a habit, just as privation and habit; for the mode of opposition is the same. For just as blindness is opposed to sight, so to be blind is opposed to having sight.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:289 · narrative
Source · Latin

Æqua namqueproportione sibi privatio atque babitus opponunlur, et ea quae sub privatione habituque clauduntur.Cur enim si privatioatquehabitus, id est visus et caecitas sibi sunt opposita,non etiam videre atque essecaecum eodem modo invicem sibimet opponantur. Quare quanquam haec distent,tamen modus in his oppositionis aequalis est.

Non est autem neque id quod sub afjirmatione et negatione jacet,affirmatio et negatio,affirmatio namque orario est affirmativa,negatio autem oratio negativa, horum vero quæ sub affirmatione et negatione sunt, nultumest oratio, sed res ipsse Dicuntur autem etiam haec esse opposita alterutris, sicut affirmatio et negatio,nam in his modus oppositionis est idem.Sicut enim affirmatio adversus negationem opposita est, ut quas sedet eiqux non sedet,sic et res quæ sub utroque posiUe sunt, sedere quempiam et non sedere.

English

For by an equal proportion privation and habit are opposed to each other, and also the things enclosed under privation and habit. For why, if privation and habit, that is, sight and blindness, are opposed to each other, are not seeing and being blind also opposed to each other in the same way? Wherefore, although these differ, nevertheless the mode of opposition in them is equal.

But neither is that which lies under affirmation and negation itself affirmation and negation. For affirmation is an affirmative statement, and negation a negative statement; but of the things that are under affirmation and negation, none is a statement, but the things themselves. Yet these too are said to be opposed to one another, just as affirmation and negation; for in them the mode of opposition is the same. For just as affirmation is opposed to negation, as "he sits" to "he does not sit," so also the things that are placed under each, for someone to sit and not to sit.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:290 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ad quartamoppositionis speciem transitum fecit, quæ secundum affirmationem negationemque dicitur. Affirmatio autem est quae aliquam rem alicui quadam participatione conjungit. Negatio vero quae aliquam rem ab aliqua re quadam separatione disjungit, ut est Omnis homo est animal,animal enim ad hominem haec oratio jungit. Participat enim homo proprio genere, scilicet animal,negatiovero, homo lapis non est.Disjungitenim naturam lapidis ab humanitate qui negat,sed multa de hie in lib.de interpretatione dicenda sunt.Quare plenior horum disputatio in tempus aliud differatur.Aristoteles veras implicissime et pene incuriose propter eos qui instituunturdiffinitiones affirmationis negationisque signavit,dicens negationem affirmationemque, affirmativas esse negativasque orationes.Quod si exam inatius ac subtilius definisset,affirmationem peraffirmativam orationem non diffiniret.

English

He made the transition to the fourth species of opposition, which is called opposition according to affirmation and negation. Now affirmation is what joins some thing to something by a certain participation. Negation, however, is what separates some thing from something by a certain separation, as in "Every man is an animal," for this statement joins animal to man. For man participates in his own genus, namely animal. But the negation "man is not a stone" separates the nature of stone from humanity, which it denies. But many things must be said about these in the book On Interpretation. Wherefore the fuller discussion of these matters is deferred to another time. Aristotle, however, marked out the definitions of affirmation and negation very incompletely and almost carelessly, on account of those who are being instructed, saying that negation and affirmation are affirmative and negative statements. But if he had defined them more exactly and more subtly, he would not define affirmation through an affirmative statement.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:291 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam si dubium est quid sit affirmatio, nihilo magis clarum atque perspicuum est quid sit affirmativa oratio.Idcirco quodsi quis nescit quid sit affirmatio,idem sinedubio nesciturus est quid oratio sit affirmativa.Sed idcirco hic indulgentius terminavit, quod in libro Hepi £lat utriusque veram plenamque vim diffinitionis aptavit.Eadem quoque in his ratio est quæ sunt sub affirmatione et negatione,quae in his quæ sub privatione atque habitu ponebantur,nam sicut non est idem habitus atque privatio quod habere habitum atque privari,ita non idem est affirmationem et negationem esse quod est sub affirmatione et negatione. Affirmatio est, verbi gratia,sedetSocrates, negatio vero, non sedet Socrates.Sub afrmatione autem hoc ipsum sedere Socratem, id est hoc quod sub affirmatione dicit facere. Sub negatione vero non sedere Socratem, id est non facere id quod negatiosubmovet.Hocautem ita probatur, quod omnis affirmatio omnisque negatio oraticnes sunt,sicut eorum supradicta diffinitio determinatioque monstravit.Sedere autem et non sedere, id est facere et non facere, orationes non sunt, quod si affirmatio et negatio orationessunt,dicitur id quod sub affirmatione et negatione est,ea ipsa affirmatione et negatione distare.Sed in hoc servant illam quoque similitudinem quod eaipsa sim sunt opposita, quae secundum affirmationem negationemque dicuntur.

English

For if it is doubtful what affirmation is, it is no more clear and evident what an affirmative statement is. Therefore, if anyone does not know what affirmation is, he will without doubt likewise not know what an affirmative statement is. But for this reason he defined it here more indulgently, because in the book On Interpretation he fitted the true and full force of the definition to both. The same reasoning also holds in the case of those things that are under affirmation and negation, as in those that were placed under privation and habit. For just as habit and privation are not the same as to have a habit and to be deprived, so it is not the same for affirmation and negation to exist as for what is under affirmation and negation. For example, affirmation is "Socrates sits," but negation is "Socrates does not sit." Under affirmation, however, is this very thing, that Socrates sits, that is, to do this which the affirmation says. Under negation, however, is that Socrates does not sit, that is, not to do what the negation removes. But this is proved thus: that every affirmation and every negation are statements, as their above-stated definition and determination showed. But to sit and not to sit, that is, to do and not to do, are not statements. But if affirmation and negation are statements, that which is under affirmation and negation is said to differ from affirmation and negation themselves. But in this they also preserve that likeness, that those very things are opposites which are said according to affirmation and negation.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:292 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sicut enim ipsa affirmatio quae dicit, sedet Socrates, et quai dicit, non sedet Socrates, ita quoque idipsum quod est sedere Socratem, et non sedere, certa ratione similitudinisopponuntur.Sed quoniam quatuor species oppositionis dictae sunt, nunc Aristotelis vestigia persequentes,earum diffe. rentias colligamus,quae sunt numero sex: nam si quae res sint quatuor,easque differre a se ac distare volumus, sex solas differentias invenimus. Cum enim primam differre a secunda ac tertia atque quarta ponimus, tres sunt differentiae.Item secundam rem a prima re differreostendere atque demonstrare superfluum est. Cum enim primae rei ad secundam distantiam colligeremus, quid secundadistaret a prima docuimus. Relicta igitur primae ad secundam rem differentia, secundæ et tertias, item i■m.x1Jsecundae quartaeque Qmerentlæ monstrabuntur,quæ sunt duac,quae tribus superioribus junctae quinque solas efficiunt. Restat tertiae rei quartaeque distantia.Nam primae aj secundam atquetertiamdemonstrata est discrepantia, cum prima a secunda distaret, atque eodem modo a tertia monstrabamus. Idhis probalurexemplis.Nam cum oppositio ea quae est secundum ad aliquid,abhis oppositionibusquae sunt secundum contrarietatem, privationem atque habitum,atque affirmationem et negationem,distare proponitur, tres sunt differentiae.

English

For just as the affirmation itself which says "Socrates sits," and the one which says "Socrates does not sit," so also the very fact of Socrates' sitting and not sitting are opposed by a definite relation of similarity. But since four species of opposition have been stated, now, following in Aristotle's footsteps, let us gather their differences, which are six in number; for if there are four things, and we wish them to differ and be distinct from one another, we find only six differences. For when we posit that the first differs from the second, third, and fourth, there are three differences. Again, to show and demonstrate that the second thing differs from the first is superfluous. For when we gathered the distance of the first thing from the second, we showed what the second differed from the first by. Therefore, leaving aside the difference of the first from the second thing, the differences of the second from the third, and likewise of the second from the fourth, will be shown, which are two; joined to the three above, they make only five. There remains the distance of the third thing from the fourth. For the discrepancy of the first from the second and third has been demonstrated, when the first differed from the second, and in the same way we showed it from the third. Let this be proved by examples. For when the opposition which is according to relation is proposed to differ from those oppositions which are according to contrariety, privation and habit, and affirmation and negation, there are three differences.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:293 · narrative
Source · Latin

Cum vero ea quae secundum privationem atque habitum oppositio est, a contrariis et ab affirmatione negationeque discrepat, duae sunt differentiae, quae junctas superioribus quinque perficiunt. Idcirco enim quid distaret habitus atque privatio, ea oppositione quae relativa est praetermisimus, quoniam prius monstravimus quid relativa oppositio ab habitu privationeque differret; non est enim dubium aequam esse in utrisque differentiam, cum una ab alia discrepaverit. Restat una sola differentia, quae est contrariorum adaffirmationem scilicetet negationem; praetermissanamque est contrariornm differentia, de relativa scilicet et secundum habitum privationemque oppositione, quid haec superius a contrarietate distaret, monstratum est. Quare quoniam quot sunt horum differentiae cognitum est, ad sequentis operis ordinem veniamus.

Quod autem privatio et habitus non sic opponuntur ut ad aliquid, manifestum est; neque enim dicitur hor. ipsum quod est oppositi, visus enim non est cæcitatis visus, nec alio nullo modo ad ipsum dicitur. Similiter autem neque caecitas, sed privatio quidem visus cæcitas dicitur, caecitas vero visus non dicitur. A mplius ad aliquid omnia, reciproce dicuntur, quare et cæcitas si esset eorum quat ad alequid sunt, utique converteretur ad illud ad quod dicitur, sed non convertitur, neque enim visus dicitur cæcitatis visus.

English

But since the opposition that is according to privation and habit differs from contraries and from affirmation and negation, there are two differences which, joined to the five above, complete the number. For on that account we passed over in silence, in the case of the opposition that is relative, what distinguished habit and privation, because we showed earlier what the relative opposition differed from habit and privation; for there is no doubt that the difference in both cases is equal, since the one has been distinguished from the other. There remains one single difference, namely that of contraries in relation to affirmation and negation; for the difference of contraries has been passed over, since it has been shown above, concerning relative opposition and that according to habit and privation, how this differed from contrariety. Wherefore, since it is known how many differences there are of these, let us come to the order of the following work.

But that privation and habit are not opposed as relatives is manifest; for the very thing that is opposed is not said of something. For sight is not the sight of blindness, nor is it in any other way said in relation to it. Similarly, neither is blindness, but blindness is indeed said to be the privation of sight, while blindness is not said to be of sight. Moreover, all relatives are said reciprocally; wherefore, if blindness were among those things that are said in relation to something, it would certainly be converted to that in relation to which it is said, but it is not converted; for sight is not said to be the sight of blindness.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:294 · narrative
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Et caetera quidem quae sunt differentia perspicue superius in contrariorum differentia relativaoppositione ante praemissa surt. Unam namque differentiam contrariorum relativorumque dixit esse, quod contraria non ita ut ea quae sunt ad aliquid converterentur. Neque enim quis pronuntiat malitiam bonitatis esse malitiam, neque bonitatem malitiae esse bonitatem, velut filium patris esse filium, rursusque patrem filii patrem. Eadem quoque et in his quae secundum privationem habitumque redduntur, dicitur differentia. Nam sicut ea quas sunt ad aliquid opposita, adversum semetipsa redduntur, et omnia ad opposita praedicantur, non eodem modo in habitu atque privatione est. Nullus enim dicit caecitatis esse visum, nec rursus visus esse caecitatem. Quocirca si ea quae sunt relativa ad opposita praedicantur, conversimque dicuntur( cum enim sit oppositus filio pater, pater filii dicitur, scilicet ad oppositum, rursusque convertitur ut patris filius appelletur) quoniam hoc in his quae sunt secundum privationem et habitum non dicitur. Neque enim cum sit visus oppositus caecitati, secundum privationem atque habitum dicitur visus caecitatis, id est nunquam secundum bane oppositionem aliquid oppositi praedicatur nequeconvertilur, neque enim diciturcaecitasvisus, recte privatio atque habitus non in eadem qua relatin, sed in alia specie numerata sunt.

English

And the other differences that exist have been set out clearly above in the discussion of the difference between contraries and relative opposition. For he said that one difference between contraries and relatives is that contraries are not converted to one another as those things that are said in relation to something are. For no one pronounces malice to be the malice of goodness, nor goodness to be the goodness of malice, as a son is said to be the son of a father and again a father the father of a son. The same difference is also stated in those things that are rendered according to privation and habit. For just as opposed relatives are converted toward one another, and all are predicated in relation to their opposites, it is not the same way in habit and privation. For no one says that sight is the sight of blindness, nor again that sight is blindness. Wherefore, if relatives are predicated in relation to their opposites and are spoken convertibly (for since a father is opposed to a son, the father is said to be of the son, namely in relation to the opposite, and again it is converted so that he is called the father of the son), since this is not said in those things that are according to privation and habit — for neither, since sight is opposed to blindness, is sight said to be of blindness according to privation and habit, that is, nothing of the opposite is ever predicated or converted according to this opposition, nor is blindness said to be of sight — rightly privation and habit have been counted not in the same species as relatives, but in another.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:295 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod autem neque ut contraria opponuntur ea, quæ secundum pnvationem et habitum dicuntur, ex his manifestum est. Quorum enim contrariorum nihil est medium, necesse est in quibus nata sunt fieri, aut de quibus prædicantur, alterum ipsorum inesse semper, horum enim nihil frat mdium, quorum alterum necessarium erat inesse susceptibili, ut Languorem et sanitatem, et impar et par. Quorum vero aliquod est medium, nunquam necessitas est omni susceptibili inesse alterum, neque enim necesse est omne susceptibile candidum vel nigrum esse, neque frigidum, neque calidum, horum enim medium aliquid nihil prohibet esse, horum etiam erat aliquid medium, quorum non erat necessarium alterum inesse susceptibili, præterilla quibusnaturaliter unum inest, ut igni calidum esse, et nivi candidum. In his enim determinate necessarium est alterum inesse et non alterutrum, non enim possibile est ignem frigidum esse, neque nivem nigram. Quare omni quidem susceptibili non est necessarium Olerum eorum inesse, sed solum quibus naturaliter unum inest, his determinate unum, non alterutrum inesse contingit.

English

That those things which are said according to privation and habit are not opposed as contraries is clear from this. For of those contraries of which there is no mean, it is necessary that one of them always be present in those things in which they are naturally able to come to be, or of which they are predicated; for of these there is no mean, one of which was necessarily present in the capable subject, as sickness and health, and odd and even. But of those of which there is some mean, there is never a necessity that one be present in every capable subject; for it is not necessary that every capable subject be white or black, nor cold nor hot, for nothing prevents there being some mean of these; and there was also some mean of those of which it was not necessary that one be present in the capable subject, except for those in which one is present naturally, as for fire to be hot and for snow to be white. For in these it is determinately necessary that one be present and not either one of the two; for it is not possible for fire to be cold, nor for snow to be black. Wherefore it is not necessary that one of these be present in every capable subject, but only in those in which one is present naturally; for these it happens that one determinately, not either one of the two, is present.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:296 · narrative
Source · Latin

Prolixitatem textus idcirco contraxi quod et. ea ipsa quae dicuntur supra jamdictasunt, nec longior ordo possit aliquod creare fastidium, quod nos hac textus divisione sejunximus. Et prius quidem proponit ante oculos omnes inter se contrariorum differentias, quas ipse quantum potero brevissime commemorabo; ait enim contrariorum quae mediis carent semper alterum inesse ei quod illas contrarietates suscipere potest, ut aegritudo et sanitas, quoniam semper in animalis corpore repentur, et ea sine ullo est adversus suum contrarium medio. Idcirca omne corpus animalis semper aut aegrotat, aut sanum est, et semper alterum aut sanitatis aut ægritudinis inest ei quod has susoipitcontrarietates. Eorum vero contrariorum quae habent aliquam medietatem, non necesse est semper alterum inesse ei cui accidunt, ut album atque nigrum, cum sint utraquecontraria, quoniam habentaliquam medietatem, ut rubrum, veniunt autem semper in corpora, non necesse est omne corpus fieri, aut album aut nigrum, quoniam potest aliquandocontingere ut illa eorum medietas corpori cuilibet eveniat. Atque hoc ita est in iis quae medio non carent, quae ipsa mediata vocamus, exceptis his quibus una contrarietas est insita per naturam, ut nix alba est, ignis calidus. In his enim unam semper necesse est evenire non aliam, nec utrumlibet, sed diffinite unam.

English

I have therefore compressed the prolixity of the text because those very things which are said have already been stated above, and a longer order could not create any weariness, which we have separated by this division of the text. And first indeed he sets before the eyes all the differences among contraries, which I myself shall recount as briefly as I can; for he says that of contraries which lack means, one is always present in that which can receive those contrarieties, as sickness and health, since they are always found in the body of an animal, and this is without any mean against its contrary. Therefore every body of an animal is always either sick or healthy, and always one of either health or sickness is present in that which receives these contrarieties. But of those contraries which have some mean, it is not necessary that one always be present in that to which they happen, as white and black, since both are contraries, because they have some mean, as red, and they always come upon bodies, yet it is not necessary that every body become either white or black, since it can sometimes happen that the mean between them befalls any body. And this is so in those which do not lack a mean, which we call mediate, except for those in which one contrary is implanted by nature, as snow is white, fire is hot. For in these it is always necessary that one occur and not the other, nor either one at random, but definitely one.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:297 · narrative
Source · Latin

Id enim non venit in ignem, ut aliquando sit calidum, aliquando frigidum, aliquando vero quod horum medietas est tepidum, sed semper naturali calore succenditur; nec nix aliquando fit nigra, neo rursus rubea, nec ullis aliis coloribus permutatur, sed solum semper alba est. Cum haec ita sint, ea quae secundum habitum privationemque opponuntur, si et ab his contrariis distare monstrata sint quae mediis carent, et ab his quæ intra se quamdam medietatem qualitatis includunt, et ab his quoque quæ, cum mediata sint, tamen diffinite alicui insunt, perfecte, monstratum est ea quæ secundum habitum et privationem sunt a contrariis discrepare. Quare quid distent Aristotele teneamus auctore.

In privatione vero et habitu neutrum horurn quæ dicta sunt, verum est, neque enim semper susceptibili necessarium est alterum inesse corum. Quod enim nondum naturam habet ad videndum, neque cæcum, neque visum habens dicitur. Ideoque non erunt hæc talium contrariorum, quomm nihil est medium, sed neque quorum est medium, necessarium enim est omni susceptibili allerurn istorum inesse. Quando enim jam natumfueril ad habendum visum, tunc aut cæcum, aut habens visum dicetur, et horum non determinate alierum, sed alterufrum contingit,nonenimnecessarium est, vel cæcum, vel habens visum esae, sed quod contingit.

English

For fire does not come to be such that it is sometimes hot, sometimes cold, and sometimes indeed tepid, which is the middle between these, but it is always kindled with its natural heat; nor does snow ever become black, nor again red, nor is it changed by any other colors, but is always only white. Since these things are so, those things which are opposed according to habit and privation, if it has been shown that they differ both from those contraries which lack middles, and from those which include within themselves a certain middle of quality, and also from those which, although they are mediated, nevertheless inhere definitely in some one thing, it has been perfectly shown that those things which are according to habit and privation differ from contraries. Wherefore let us hold, with Aristotle as author, in what way they differ.

But in privation and habit, neither of the things which have been said is true; for it is not necessary that one of them always be present in the susceptible subject. For what does not yet have the nature for seeing is said to be neither blind nor having sight. And therefore these will not belong to such contraries of which nothing is a middle, but neither to those of which there is a middle; for it is necessary that one of them be present in every susceptible subject. For when it has already been born to have sight, then it will be called either blind or having sight, and not one of these definitely, but either one happens to occur; for it is not necessary that it be either blind or having sight, but whatever happens.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:298 · narrative
Source · Latin

In contrariis autem quibus medium est, nunquam necessarium fuit omni susceptibili alterum inesse, sed quibusdam, et his determinate unum, sed non quodcontingit, unde palam est quod secundumneutrum modum tanquam contraria, opposita sunt hæc, quas secundum privationem et habitum opponuntur.

Dat primo differentias quibus ea quae sunt secundum habitum et privationem opposita, ab iis quae sunt immediata contrariis distent. In his enim contrariis quas medium non habent, semper necesse est ipsorum alterum inesse ei quod his ipsis subjectum est. In habitu vero et privatione non ita est. Non enim semper quaelibet res aut habitum habet aut privationem, sed est tempus quando utrumque non habeat, ut catuli quibus nondum per naturam oculi patent. Illos enim nec habere habitum dicimus, quoniam non vident, nec privatos visu, quoniam parvuli adhuc visum per naturam habere non possunt Igitur horum quae sibi secundum privationem habitumquesunt opposita,non semperalterum subjecto inest eorum. Sed eorum quae sunt contraria immediata, id est medio carentia, semper alterum susceptibili inest. Distat igitureaquaesecundumhabitum et privationem est oppositio,iis quae secundum contraria putantur opponi. Sed quoniam sunt quaedam contraria quæ insunt alicui pernaturam, ut nivi album, igni calidum, corvo nigruta etiam ab his discrepat oppositio privationi:: habitus.

English

In the case of contraries, however, which have a middle, it was never necessary that one of the two be present in every subject capable of receiving them, but [only] in certain ones, and in these determinately one, but not whichever happens. Hence it is clear that in neither way are these opposed as contraries, which are opposed according to privation and habit.

He first gives the differences by which those things that are opposed according to habit and privation differ from those that are immediate contraries. For in those contraries that have no middle, it is always necessary that one of them be present in that which is subject to these same contraries. In habit, however, and privation it is not so. For not always does any given thing either have a habit or have a privation, but there is a time when it has neither, as with puppies whose eyes are not yet open by nature. For we say that they neither have the habit, since they do not see, nor are they deprived of sight, since as little ones they cannot yet have sight by nature. Therefore, of those things that are opposed to each other according to privation and habit, one of them is not always present in the subject. But of those that are immediate contraries, that is, lacking a middle, one is always present in the subject capable of receiving it. Therefore the opposition that is according to habit and privation differs from those that are thought to be opposed according to contraries. But since there are certain contraries that are present in something by nature, as white in snow, hot in fire, black in a raven, the opposition of privation and habit differs also from these.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:299 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ea enim quae pernaturam insunt, diffinita sunt,et nullo modo permutantur, ut est album nivi. Non enim nix aut alba aut nigra est, sed tantum alba, et corvus non aut albus aut niger, sed solum niger. In privatione vero et habitu una res esse non potest diffinita, sed semper aut privatio contingit, aut habitus, et hoc est quod ait, et horum non diffinite alterum, sed sut hoc, aut illud. Neque enim necesse est aui caecum esse, aut habentem visum diffinite subaudicndum est, catulus enim qui pernaturam nondum videt, aut habitum habiturus est, id est visum, aut eo privandus est, ut sit cæcus, sed non diffinite unum, sed aut hoc aut illud indiffinite contingit. Distat igitur haec oppositio his contrariis quae aliquibus per naturam immutabiliter accidunt. Restat igitur ut his contrariis quae mediata sunt hanc oppositionem differre doceamus. In illis enim non semper necesse erit contraria inesse subjecto, idcirco quod eorum medietates possint subjectis evenire substantiis, ut album vel nigrum quod non est alicui per naturam, sed tantum secundum accidens. Possunt enim utraque non esse in corporibus, quoniam his vel rubrum vel pallidum, quae sunt eorum medietates eveniunt. In privatione vero id et habitu non est. Quando enim poterit per naturam habere habitum, utrisque quæ ea suscipiunt, carere non possunt.

English

For those things which are present by nature are determinate and are in no way changed, as being white is for snow. For snow is not either white or black, but only white, and a raven is not either white or black, but only black. In the case of privation and habit, however, a single determinate thing cannot exist, but always either privation or habit befalls, and this is what he says: and of these, not one determinately, but either this or that. For it is not necessary that one be blind or have sight—this must be understood as determinate—for a puppy that by nature does not yet see will either have the habit, that is sight, or be deprived of it, so as to be blind, but not determinately one, but either this or that falls out indeterminately. This opposition, therefore, differs from those contraries which befall certain things by nature immutably. It remains, then, that we show that this opposition differs from those contraries which have a middle. For in the case of those, it will not always be necessary that the contraries be present in the subject, for the reason that their middles can come to be in the underlying substances, as white or black, which is not for anything by nature, but only according to accident. For both can be absent from bodies, since red or pale, which are their middles, come to be in them. In the case of privation and habit, however, this is not so. For when it will be able by nature to have the habit, those things which receive them cannot lack both.

tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:300 · narrative
Source · Latin

Catulus enim cum per naturam videre potuerit, aut habitum habere dicitur, et est videns, aut privationem, si fuerit caecus. Ita semper ab eo tempore quo illi per naturam utrumlibet habere concessum est, alterutrum retinebit, idest aut privationem retine, aut habitum.Quocirca si in hiscontrariis quae medio non carent, potest fieri ut utraque contraria in subjecto non sint, in privatione vero et habitu ab eo tempore quo per naturam potest utrumque retinere, fieri non potest nisi eorum habeat alterum,distant haec quoque mediata ab his quae secundum vim privalionisatqua habitus opponuntur. Sed ante monstratum est et his contrariis quae per naturam essent, et iis quae medio carerent, hanc oppositionem esse dissimilem. Recte igitur positum est privationis atque habitus oppositionem ab his quae opponuntur ut contraria, discrepare.

Amplius in contrariis quidem existente susceptibili, possibile est in alterutrum. fieri mutationem, nisi alterum alicuinaturaliter insit, ut igni calidum esse: namque possibile est quod sanum est, languere, et candidum, nigrum fieri, et ex studioso, pravum, et ex pravo, studiosum possibile est fieri. Pravus enim ad meliores consuetudines deductus, et ad doctrinas, et si modicum aliquid proficiat ut melior sit. Si vero semet vel modicum crementum sumpserit, palam est quod aut perfecte mutabitur, aut satis mullum incrementum sumet.

English

For a puppy, since it is able by nature to see, is said either to have a state and is seeing, or to have a privation, if it has been blinded. Thus always, from that time when it was granted to it by nature to have either one, it will retain one or the other, that is, it will retain either the privation or the state. Wherefore, if in those contraries which do not lack a middle term it can happen that both contraries are not in a subject, yet in privation and state, from that time when it is able by nature to retain either, it cannot happen that it does not have one of them, these mediate cases also differ from those which are opposed according to the force of privation or of state. But it was shown earlier that this opposition is dissimilar both to those contraries which are by nature and to those which lack a middle term. Rightly, therefore, it has been laid down that the opposition of privation and state differs from those which are opposed as contraries.

Furthermore, in the case of contraries, when the subject is capable, a change into either one is possible, unless one of them is naturally present in something, as being hot is in fire. For what is healthy is able to fall sick, and what is white is able to become black, and from being studious one is able to become depraved, and from being depraved one is able to become studious. For a depraved person, when led to better habits and to teachings, even if he makes only a little progress, becomes better. But if he has taken even a little increase, it is clear that he will either be changed perfectly, or will take a sufficiently great increase.

Citation. Tergwame, “In Categorias Aristotelis Libri Quatuor”, tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1:1, machine-draft, 2026. https://naxiai.com/christian/works/tmp1023.tmp1023.opp-lat1#s1
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