ut substantiae qualitatem proprie cognoscamus, talis est huic requirenda proprietas, quae et solis substantiis insit at omnibus,haec autem hujusmodi est, quam ipse proposuit.
Maxime vero substantiae proprium esse videtur,cum unum et idem numero sit,contrariorum suscepUbilem esse, et in aliis qmdem non habebit quisquam quid proferat quæcunque non sunt substantiæ, quod cum sit unum numero,susceptibile contrariorum sit,velut color quod est unum et idem numerotnon erit album et nigrum, neque eadem actio et una numero erit prava et studiosa.Similiter autem et in aliis quae substantiæ non sunt.Substantia enim cum unum etidem numero sit, capax contrariorum est, ut aliquis homo eum unas et idem numero sit, aliquando quidem ntger, aliquando autem fit albus7et calidus et frig irius,et pravus et sludiosus.!n nullis autem aliis aliquid tale videMur, nisi quis forsitan instet,dicens orationem et opinionem contrurio, rum esse susceptibilia,eadem enim oratiovera et falsa esse videturtveluti si vera sit oratio sedere quemdam, surgente eO,illa eadem oralio fatsa erit,similiter au. tem et de opinatione. Si quis enim vere putat sedere aliquemtsurgenie eO,ille idem falsa putabit, eamdem haaens de eodem opinionem.
But in order that we may properly recognize the quality of substance, such a property must be sought for it as belongs to substances alone and to all of them; and this is of the sort that he himself proposed.
But it seems to be most properly the property of substance that, while it is one and the same in number, it is capable of receiving contraries. And in other things, indeed, no one will have anything to bring forward—whatever things are not substances—to show that while it is one in number it is capable of contraries. For example, a color that is one and the same in number will not be both white and black, nor will the same action, one in number, be both base and honorable. And similarly also in other things that are not substances. For a substance, while it is one and the same in number, is capable of contraries, as some man, while he is one and the same in number, sometimes becomes black, sometimes white, and hot and cold, and base and honorable. But in no other things does anything of this sort appear, unless perhaps someone insists, saying that a speech and an opinion are capable of contraries; for the same speech seems to be both true and false—as, if the speech that someone is sitting is true, when he has stood up, that same speech will be false. And similarly also concerning opinion. For if someone truly thinks that someone is sitting, when he has stood up, that same person will think falsely, having the same opinion concerning the same thing.
Sed et si quis hoc suscipiat, tamen modo differt, nam ea quae in substantiis sunt,ipsa mutatasusceptibilia sunt contrariorum; fri* gidum enim de calido factum mutatum est,alteratum enim est,et nigrum ex alboyet studiosum ex pravo.Similiter autem et in aliis, unumquodque ipsorummutationem suscipiens,est susceptibile contrariorum.Ora.tio autem etopinio ipsa quidem immobilia omnino perseverant,cum vera res movetur,contrarium circa ea fit, oratio namque permanet eadem,sedere aliquem, cum vero res mota sit, aliquando quidem vera, aliquanda autem alsa fit, similiter autem et in opinione. Quapropter quo admodum saltem substantiæ proprium est, eo quod secundum mutationem suam captabilis est contrariorum, si quis recipiat placitum et orationem susceptibilia esse contrariorum.
Aitmaximepropriumessesubstantiae,quodeadem et una numero contrariorum susceptiva sit, nihil contrarium superioribus dicens. Illic enim dixerat substantias substantiis non essecontrarias,hic vero dicit non substantias substantiis esse contrarias,sed res in se contrarias posse suscipere, ut unus atque idemhomo,nuncquidem sit sanus,alio vero tempore sit æger,ægritudo autem et sanitas contraria sunt.
But even if someone accepts this, it nevertheless differs only in this way: for the things that are in substances are themselves susceptible to changed contraries; for what has become cold from hot has been changed, for it has been altered, and black from white, and studious from wicked. Similarly also in other cases, each one of them, in undergoing change, is susceptible to contraries. But oratio and opinio themselves indeed remain altogether immovable, while the true state of affairs is moved, and a contrary comes about regarding them; for the oratio remains the same, that someone is sitting, but when the state of affairs has been moved, it becomes sometimes true, sometimes false; and similarly also in the case of opinio. Wherefore, in whatever way at least it is proper to substance, in that according to its own change it is capable of contraries, if one accepts the position that oratio and opinio are also susceptible to contraries.
He says that it is most proper to substance that the same and one in number is receptive of contraries, saying nothing contrary to the foregoing. For there he had said that substances are not contrary to substances; but here he says that it is not that substances are contrary to substances, but that things contrary in themselves can be received, as one and the same man is now indeed healthy, but at another time is sick, and sickness and health are contraries.
iam declaratum est suhslanLiam posse contraria suscipere,demonstrandum est quemadmodum hoc solis substantiis insit; hoc enim in nullis aliisinvenitur,namque in qualitate qualitas non erit eadem,neque una numero contrariorumsusceptiva, idem enim et unum numero non erit album atque nigrum,cum album fuerit etpost in nigrum vertitur, tota qualitatis species permutatur,et non erit unum atque idem numero quod contrarium est,sed diversum.
It has now been declared that substance can receive contraries; it must be shown how this belongs to substances alone. For this is found in no other things. For in quality there will not be the same quality, nor will one in number be receptive of contraries. For the same and one in number will not be both white and black; when it has been white and afterwards is turned into black, the whole species of quality is changed, and it will not be one and the same in number that is contrary, but different.
At vero et actio eadem et una numero non erit bona atque mala,sed fortasse una bona, alia mala, ita ut diversae sint,non eaedem numero, hoc etiam in aliis reperitur.Ipsaverosubstantia cum una sit et numero singalaris,contraria suscipil,ut idem atque unus homo cum fuerit candidus atque albus a sole tactus nigrescit,et album in nigrum convertitur,et i in contrarium permutatur,utrasqueres in se contrarias suscipiens.NuIli igitur alii in esse hoc nisi solis substantiis,satis superiora demonstrant SiquisauteJ3 opponat orationem et opinionem unam atque eamdem contrariorum essesusceptibilem,ideo quod cum dico Cicero sedet,vel eum sedere opinor, cum vere sedet, vera est et oratio de eodem et opinio quod sedet; cum vera surrexit ille,eadem permanet opinio vel oratio quas dicit vel arbitratur Cicero sedet, sed falsa est, quod non sedet, videtur opinio atque oratio eadem et una numero nunc quidem esse vera, nunc autem falsa,et contraria ipsa auscipere,sed hoc falsumest,quodoratioetopiniocontrarianonrecipiunt: nam si quis hoc recipiatquod etiam oratioatqueopinio contrariorum susceptiva sint,non tamen eodem modo quo substantia.Nam substantia ipsa contraria suscipiens permutatur, Cicero namque ipse in se aegritudinem suscipiens ex sano factus est æger,et mutatus ipse contraria suscipit;sermo vero vel opinio ipsa quidem immutata permanent,sed cum rebus de quibus dicuntur permutatis ips£ e
But neither will the same action, one in number, be both good and bad; but perhaps one is good, another bad, so that they are different, not the same in number. This too is found in other things. But substance itself, since it is one and singular in number, receives contraries, as the same and one man, when he has been bright and white, touched by the sun becomes black, and white is converted into black, and is changed into the contrary, receiving both contrary things in itself. Therefore that this belongs to no other things except substances alone, the foregoing arguments sufficiently demonstrate. But if anyone objects that speech and opinion, one and the same, are capable of contraries, for the reason that when I say "Cicero sits," or I opine that he sits, when he truly sits, both the speech about the same thing and the opinion that he sits are true; when he has truly stood up, the same opinion or speech remains which states or judges that Cicero sits, but it is false, because he does not sit — it seems that opinion and speech, the same and one in number, are now true, now false, and that they themselves receive contraries. But this is false, that speech and opinion do not receive contraries; for if anyone accepts this, that speech and opinion are also capable of contraries, yet not in the same way as substance. For substance itself, receiving contraries, is changed; for Cicero himself, receiving sickness in himself, has been made sick from healthy, and being changed he himself receives contraries. But speech or opinion itself indeed remains unchanged, but with the things about which they are spoken being changed, they themselves
inveniuntur falsae esse vel verae.Et substantia quidem ipsa cum iis quae suscipit contrariis permutatur; oratio vero et opinio, eo quod res de qui bus dicuntur vel arbitrantur permutentur, ipsa; videntur falsae esse vel verae. Nam cum dico Cicero sedet,si ille surrexit,oratio quidem ipsa nihil passa est,sed res de qua fuit ipsa oratio mota est.Qui enim sedebat surrexit, idcirco ex vera oratione facta est falsa.Quocircasubstantiaipsasuscipiens (ut dictum est) contraria permutatur,oratio vero vel opinio non mutatur,sed re circa eas mota ipsae veras vel falsae sunt.Quarepropriumsubstantiae ita esse putabitur contrariorum susceptibile,ut ipsa permutata contraria suscipiat, non ut, re mutata, ipsaimpermutataimmutabilisquepermaneat. Atque hoc dictum est, si quis orationem atque opinionem contrariorum susceptibiles putet, non autem esse orationem atque opinionem contrariorum susceptibiles. Ipse rursus adjecit.
They are found to be false or true. And substance itself is indeed changed along with the contraries it receives; but speech and opinion, because the things of which they speak or judge are changed, themselves seem to be false or true. For when I say "Cicero is sitting," if he has stood up, the speech itself has undergone nothing, but the thing about which the speech was made has been moved. For he who was sitting has stood up, and for that reason the speech has been made false from true. Wherefore substance itself, receiving contraries (as has been said), is changed, but speech or opinion is not changed; rather, with the thing concerning them moved, they themselves are true or false. Therefore it will be thought to be proper to substance thus to be capable of contraries, in such a way that, itself changed, it receives contraries, not in such a way that, with the thing changed, it itself remains unchanged and immutable. And this has been said, if anyone thinks speech and opinion capable of contraries, but that speech and opinion are not capable of contraries. He himself again added:
Non est autem hoc verum; oratio namque et opinio non in eo quod ipsa aliquid recipiant contrariorum susceptibilia esse dicuntur,sed in eo quod circa alterum aliqua passio facta sit; nam quo res est bel non est,eo etiam oratio vera aut falsa esse dicitur,non eo quod ipsa sit susceptibilis contrariorum.Simpliciter enim a nullo nec oratio mooeturfnec opinio. Quapropter non erunt susceptibilia contrariorum,cum nulla in eis contrariorum passio facta sit. At substantia eo quod ipsa contraria recipiat hoc susceptibilis dicitur contrariorum esse.Languorem enim et sanitatem suscipit,candorem et nigredinem,et unumquodque talium ipsa suscipiendo, coutrariorum esse susceptibilis dicitur. Quare proprium erit substantiæ,cum idem et unum sit numero,contrariorum esse susceptibilem cum permutatione sui ipsius. Ac de substantia quidem dicta sufficiant.
But this is not true; for speech and opinion are not said to be susceptible of contraries in that they themselves receive something of contraries, but in that some affection has been produced around another thing; for by the fact that the thing is or is not, by that same fact speech is also said to be true or false, not by the fact that it is itself susceptible of contraries. For, simply speaking, neither speech nor opinion is moved by anything. Wherefore they will not be susceptible of contraries, since no affection of contraries has been produced in them. But substance, in that it itself receives contraries, is said to be susceptible of contraries. For it receives sickness and health, whiteness and blackness, and by receiving each such thing itself, it is said to be susceptible of contraries. Wherefore it will be proper to substance, when it is the same and one in number, to be susceptible of contraries with a change of itself. And concerning substance, indeed, let what has been said suffice.
Ait enim orationem atqueopinionem ipsoquidem contrarii nullius esse susceptibila, neque enim falsitas veritasque in oratione vel opinione insita est, sed ideirco videntur contrariorum esse susceptibilia,quod (utipse ait) circa alteram quamdam passionem sint, hocesL circa hoc esse opinionem vel orationem.Nam circa sedere et non sedere, quæ sunt contraria,est sedendi aliquem et non sedendi opinio vel oratio, atque ideo quoniam circa alias res sunt quae sibi sunt contrarias, illis permutatis, ista videntur esse contraria, non quod ipsa suscipiant contraria, sed quod circa contrarias passiones rerum sint.
For he says that speech and opinion are not in themselves susceptible of any contrary, for neither falsity nor truth is situated in speech or opinion, but they seem to be susceptible of contraries because (as he himself says) they are concerned with some other affection, that is, opinion or speech is about this. For about sitting and not sitting, which are contraries, there is the opinion or speech of someone's sitting and not sitting, and therefore, since they are about other things which are contrary to each other, when those are changed, these seem to be contrary, not because they themselves receive contraries, but because they are concerned with contrary affections of things.
Nam neque oratio neque opinio permutatur,sed sola tantum de quibus est oratio atque opinio, id est sedere et non sedere.Quocirca quoniam nullam ipsa oratio vel opinio suscipiunt passionem, nec quidquam in eis fit,atque evenit contrarium, contrariorum esse susceptibilia non videntur.At substantia eo quod ipsa suscipiatcontrarium,contrariorum dicitur essesusceptibilis.Cicero enim suscipiens sanitatem sanus fit, et suscipiens ægritudinem fitæger.Oratiovero atque opinio(utdictumest)contrarianonsuscipiunt.Quare erit hoc proprium substantiae contrariorum esse susceptibilem.Sed si quis forsitan dicat cur cum ignis calidus,sit nunquam frigus suscipiat,et cur cum aqua sit humida nunquam suscipiat siccitatem.His enim oppositis,videtur non omnis substantia contrariorum esse susceptibilis,et substantiae hoc proprium infirmabitur,cum non sit in omnibus substantiis.Sed dicendum estquoniam ea contraria suscipere videntur substantiae quae sunt in ejus natura non insita,alioqui non suscipit quidquidillisubslantialiter adest. Suscipere enim dicimus aliquid de rebus extrinsecus positiset praetersubstantiam constitutis: quoniam igitur in substantia ignis in est calidum esse,ignis calorem non suscipit; quocirca neque est ignis caloris susceplibilis, neque frigoris.
For neither speech nor opinion is changed, but only the things about which the speech or opinion is, that is, sitting and not sitting. Wherefore, since speech or opinion itself undergoes no affection, nor does any contrary come to be or happen in them, they do not seem to be susceptible of contraries. But substance, in that it itself receives a contrary, is said to be susceptible of contraries. For Cicero, receiving health, becomes healthy, and receiving sickness, becomes sick. But speech and opinion, as has been said, do not receive contraries. Wherefore this will be a property of substance: to be susceptible of contraries. But if perhaps someone should say: why, since fire is hot, does it never receive cold, and why, since water is wet, does it never receive dryness? For in these opposites, not every substance seems to be susceptible of contraries, and this property of substance will be weakened, since it is not in all substances. But it must be said that those substances seem to receive contraries which are not implanted in their nature; otherwise it does not receive whatever is substantially present to it. For we say that something receives things placed extrinsically and constituted beyond the substance. Since, therefore, being hot is in the substance of fire, fire does not receive heat; wherefore fire is not susceptible of heat, nor of cold.
Calorem quidem non suscipit,idcircoquodejusnaturae substantiæque immutabiliter adhaesit.Frigus enim non suscipit,quoniam caloris natura ipsius ignis contrarium sponte repudiat.Quocirca si quid est quod suscipiat ignis, id est extrinsecus positum,accipiat necesse est ejus quoque contrarium, ipse unus permanens ac singularis.Idem quoque de aqua dicendum est: ilIa enim sicut ignis calorem, sic non suscipit humiditatem, sed est quodammodo et ipsi humiditas naturaliter insita; atque ideo calor ignis, vel humiditas aquae non solum qualitates dicuntur,sed etiam substantales ignietaqueequalitates;namque aquaquoniam, in se neque fri"us neque calorem substantialiter habet,susceptibilis et frigoris et caloris esse dicitur.Quocircauondehiscontraritsloquiturquaesubslantialiter insunt,sed his quae potest suscipere unaquaeque substantia, id est quod potest extrinsecus adhiberi: hoc autem in omnibus esse substantiis manifestumest:nam quoniam Cicero sanus et aeger est, homo sanusetæger est;et si homo sanus et aeger est,animalsanum atqueægrotum est.
It does not receive heat, for this reason, because it adheres immutably to its own nature and substance. For it does not receive cold, since the nature of its own fire spontaneously rejects the contrary of heat. Wherefore, if there is anything that fire receives, that is, something placed externally, it must also receive its contrary, while it itself remains one and singular. The same must also be said of water: for just as fire does not receive heat, so it does not receive moisture, but moisture is in a certain way naturally implanted in it as well; and therefore the heat of fire, or the moisture of water, are called not only qualities but also substantial qualities of fire and water; for water, since it does not have cold or heat substantially in itself, is said to be susceptible of both cold and heat. Wherefore it is not about these contraries that are present substantially that it speaks, but about those which each substance can receive, that is, what can be applied externally. And this is manifest in all substances: for since Cicero is healthy and sick, man is healthy and sick; and if man is healthy and sick, animal is healthy and sick.
Sed cum duobus modis animalatquehomo spectentur, uno quod de pluribus prædicenlur,altero quodsubstantiæ sint, in eo quod de pluribus praedicantur contrariorum susceptiva non sunt: ut animal in eo quod de speciebus dicitur, neque sapiensest,nequeinsipiens,et homo in eo quod deindividuisdicitur,neque sanus est,neque æger;in eo veru quod substantiaesunt,et quod individuis substantiis praesunt,contrariorum susceptibileasunt.Quocircaerithocsolius proprium substantiæ, contrarium esse susceptibilem. Haec de substantia dicta sufficiant.Secundi vero voluminis series ab expositione inchoabitur quantitatis.
LIBER SECUNDUS.
Et si nos curae officii consularis impediunt quo: minus in his studiis omne otium plenamque operam consumimus pertineretamen videtur hoc ad aliquam reipublicæ,curam,elucubratæ rei doctrina cives instruere. Nec male de civibus meis merear, si cum prisca hominum virtus urbium caeterarum ad hanc unam rempublicam, dominationem, imperiumque transtulerit,ego id saltemquod reliquum est,Graecae sapientiae artibus mores nostræ civitatis instruxero. Quare ne hoc quidem ipsumconsulis vacat officio, cum Romani semper fuerit moris quod ubicunque gentium pulchrum esset atquelaudabile,id magis ac magis imitatione honestare.Aggrediar igituretpropositi sententiam operis ordinemque contexam.
But since animal and man are considered in two ways, one in that they are predicated of many, the other in that they are substances, in that they are predicated of many they are not receptive of contraries: for animal, in that it is said of species, is neither wise nor foolish, and man, in that he is said of individuals, is neither healthy nor sick; but in that they are substances, and in that they preside over individual substances, they are receptive of contraries. Wherefore it will be the property of substance alone to be receptive of contraries. Let these things said about substance suffice. But the series of the second volume will begin from the exposition of quantity.
BOOK TWO.
And although the cares of the consular office hinder us from consuming all our leisure and full effort in these studies, it would nevertheless pertain to some care of the state to instruct citizens in a thoroughly elaborated doctrine. Nor would I deserve ill of my citizens if, when the ancient virtue of men has transferred the dominion and empire of the other cities to this one state, I should at least instruct the morals of our city in the arts of Greek wisdom, which is what remains. Wherefore not even this is foreign to the office of consul, since it has always been the Roman custom to honor more and more by imitation whatever is beautiful and praiseworthy among any peoples. I shall therefore undertake and weave together the meaning of the proposed work and its order.
DE QUANTITATE.
Quantitatis autem,aliud quidem est discretum,aliud autem continuum,et aliud quidem ex habentibus positionem ad se invicem suis partibus constat:aliud autem ex non habentibus positionem.Est autem discreta quantitas, ut numerus et oratio. Continua uero, ut linea, supercifiesy corpus. Amplius autem et præter hæc est tempus et locus.Partim etenim numeri nullus est communis terminus, ad quem copulenturparticulæ ejus:ut quinque si adderem sunt particulæ,ad nullum communem terminumcopulantur quinque et quinque, sed semper discreta sunt et separata. Sic et tria et septem ad nullum communem terminum conjunguntur, omnino autem non habeas in numero accipere communem terminum partium, sed semper discretæ et separatæ sunt.Quapropter numerus quidem discretorum est, similiter autem et oratio discretorum est. Quod autem oratio quantitas sit manitestum est,menBuratur enim syllaba brevi et longa.Dico autem orationem cum voce factam, ad nullum enim, communem terminum particulae ejuscopulantur.Non enim est communis terminus ad quem syllabae copulentur, sed unaquæque divisa est, ipsa secundum seipsam.
On Quantity.
Of quantity, one kind is discrete, another continuous; and one kind consists of parts that have position relative to one another, another of parts that have no position. Discrete quantity is, for example, number and speech. Continuous, for example, line, surface, body. Further, besides these there is also time and place. For no part of a number has a common boundary at which its parts are joined: for if five are added, its parts are five and five, they are not joined at any common boundary, but are always discrete and separate. So too three and seven are not conjoined at any common boundary; and in no way can you find in number a common boundary of the parts, but they are always discrete and separate. Wherefore number is of discrete things, and similarly speech is of discrete things. That speech is a quantity is evident, for it is measured by a short and a long syllable. I mean speech made with the voice, for its parts are not joined at any common boundary. For there is no common boundary at which syllables are joined, but each one is divided, itself by itself.
Postsubstantiae tractatum cur de quantitate potius ac non de qualitateproposuerithaeccausa est, quod omnia quaecunque sunt,simul atquesunL in numerum cadunt. Omnis enim res aut est una, aut plures: unum vero velpluresquantitatis scientiacolliguntur. Sed non omnis res simul atque est aliquam accipit qualitatem,ipsa enim materia sub quantitatis quidem principium cadit, quod una est sub qualitatem vera minime;ipsa enim cunctis est interim qualitatibus absoluta, superaddita vero forma quadam afffcitur qualitate:per seautem numeroquidemunaest,qualitate vero nulla:quocirca si resomnis simulatque est cadit in numerum, non autem omnis res mox ut est statim suscipit qualitatem,recte prius de quantitateproposuit.Est quoque alia causa cur prius de quantitatis rationepertractet.Omneenim corpus ut sit, tribus dimensionibus constat,longitudine,latitudine, altitudine:ut vero sit corpus cum qualitate, tuncerit aut album,autnigrum,aut quodlibet aliud; et quoniam prius estessecorpus,postvero essecorpus album,priuseritcorporitribus constaredimensionibus quam esse album. Sed tres dimensiones et numero et continuatione spatii quantitates sunt.Longitudo enim et latitudoet altitudo in quantitatibus numerantur, album vero qualitatis est:quocirca si prius est ex tribus constare dimensionibus quam esse album,prior erit quantitas qualitate,quocirca recte est tractatus de quantitate propositus.
After the treatise on substance, the reason he proposed to treat of quantity rather than of quality is this: that all things whatsoever, as soon as they exist, fall into number. For every thing is either one or many; and one or many are gathered under the science of quantity. But not every thing, as soon as it exists, receives some quality. For matter itself falls under the principle of quantity, in that it is one, but by no means falls under quality; for it is for the time being devoid of all qualities, and it is when form is superadded that it is affected by a certain quality. By itself, then, it is one in number, but in quality nothing. Wherefore, if every thing, as soon as it exists, falls into number, but not every thing, as soon as it exists, immediately receives quality, he was right to treat of quantity first. There is also another reason why he deals first with the account of quantity. For every body, in order to exist, consists of three dimensions: length, breadth, and height; but in order to be a body with quality, it will then be either white or black or any other such thing. And since it is prior to be a body, and later to be a white body, it will be prior for a body to consist of three dimensions than to be white. But the three dimensions are quantities both in number and in the continuity of space. For length and breadth and height are numbered among quantities, but white belongs to quality. Wherefore, if it is prior to consist of three dimensions than to be white, quantity will be prior to quality; and for that reason the treatise on quantity was rightly proposed.
Item alia causa,quod quantitas plura habetsubstantiaeconsimilia:nam quemadmodum substantiae nihilestcontrarium,et substantia non recipit magis etminus,sic etiamquantitas: quantitati enim nihil est contrarium,nec quantitas recipit magis et minus,utpaulo post docebimus;qualitasveroetcontrariasuscipit,ut album etnigrum,et magis et minus, ut candidiuset nigrius, et candidissimum et nigerrimum;id enim sumit intentionem quod potest sumere diminutionem.Quod si substantiae similior quantitas est,recte postsubstantiam de quantitate proposuit. Quantitatis autem dicit esse differentias duas: quantitatis namquealiadiscretaest disgregata, alia vero continua.Post hanc rursus divisionem alio modo partitus est quantitatem:dicit enim quantitatis aliam quae constat exhabentibuspositionemadse invicemsuis partibus;aliam vero ex non habentibus positionem. Unam vero rem diverse possedividimanifestumest, hoc modo,ut si quisdividat animaldicens: Animalium alia suntrationabilia,aliairrationabilia;etrursus eamdem ipsam rem alia modo partiamur,utest, Animalium alia sunt gressibilia,alia non gressibilia, eorumque animalium rursus,alia sunt carnibusvescentia, aliaherhis, alia seminibus.
There is also another reason: that quantity has more points of resemblance to substance. For just as nothing is contrary to substance, and substance does not admit of more and less, so too quantity: for nothing is contrary to quantity, nor does quantity admit of more and less, as we shall teach a little later. But quality both admits of contraries, such as white and black, and of more and less, such as more white and more black, and most white and most black; for that takes on increase which can take on decrease. But if quantity is more like substance, he was right to treat of quantity after substance. Now he says that there are two differences of quantity: for of quantity one kind is discrete and disgregated, another is continuous. After this division, he again divided quantity in another way: for he says that of quantity one kind consists of parts that have position relative to one another, another of parts that do not have position. But that one and the same thing can be divided in different ways is evident, in this manner: as if someone divides animal, saying: of animals some are rational, others irrational; and again we divide the very same thing in another way, as: of animals some are capable of walking, others not capable of walking, and again of those animals, some eat flesh, others grass, others seeds.
Hic ergo una eademque res diversoordinemodoque divisaest.Ita igitur Aristoteles unum idemque quantitatis nomen diverse partitus est, in ea scilicet quaediscretaessent, et quae continua, et in ea quae haberent positionem partium,et quae non baberent.Sed de secunda divisione posterius dicendum est,nunc prima tractetur. Ait enim de prima divisione hoc modo:Quantitatis aliud estcontinuum,aliud disgregatum. Disgregatum est cujus partes nullo communi termino conjungunlur.Continuumverocujus parteshabent aliquem communem terminum,ad quem videanturesse conjunctæ. Discretarum namque quantitatum ipseexempla ponitetspecies.Oratio enim discreta est quantitas, eodemque modo et numerus,et numerum esse quantitatem nemodubitat.Discreta veroest,quoniamdenarius numerus cum constet ex quinque et quinque, quae res quinarium ad quinarium jungat ut. faciat denarii cerpus, non potest inveniri. Nam si tres et septem quis dixerit, quo communi termino tres et septem conjungantur, ut denarii reddatur unum integrum corpus,nullus inveniet,atque hoc quidem in omni numero speculari licet. Nullus enim numerus ita partes habet,uteas aliquiscommunis terminusjungat, sed semper partes ipsæ disjunctae atque discretae sunt, et hujusmodi vocatur quantitas discreta.Numerus ergo discreta quantitas est, orationem vero quantitatem esse dicit,idcirco quod omnisoratioex nomine constet et verbo,sed haec syllabis constant.
Here, therefore, one and the same thing is divided in a different order and manner. Thus Aristotle divided the one and same name of quantity in different ways: namely, into those things that are discrete and those that are continuous, and into those that have position of parts and those that do not. But the second division must be discussed later; now let the first be treated. For he speaks of the first division in this way: of quantity, one kind is continuous, another is discrete. Discrete is that whose parts are joined by no common boundary. Continuous, however, is that whose parts have some common boundary, at which they appear to be joined. For of discrete quantities he himself gives examples and species. For speech is a discrete quantity, and in the same way number also, and no one doubts that number is a quantity. But it is discrete because, when the number ten consists of five and five, no means can be found by which the five is joined to the five so as to make the body of ten. For if someone says three and seven, no one will find by what common boundary three and seven are joined so that ten is rendered one whole body, and this indeed may be observed in every number. For no number has parts in such a way that some common boundary joins them, but always the parts themselves are disjoined and discrete, and a quantity of this kind is called discrete. Number, therefore, is a discrete quantity; but he says that speech is a quantity, for the reason that every speech consists of a noun and a verb, but these consist of syllables.
I Omnis autem syllaba vel longa vel brevis est. Longum vero vel breve sine ulla dubitatione quantitas est,quocirca quod ex quantitatibus constat, id quantitatem essequis dubitet?At vero oratio ipsa cum sit quantitas, ilia quoque discreta est. Cum enim dico Cicero,quod orationis est pars, partes hujus nominis ci et ce etro nullo communi termino conjunguntur. Nonenimreperiemusquocommuni terminojungatur ci syllaba ad ce syllabam, vel rursuscesyllaba ad ro syllabam. Quocirca etiam oratio quantitas videtur esse discreta.Sed si quis fortasse dicat hunc eorum esse communem terminum,quo itajunguntur,utaliquid significent,ut in hoc ipso nomine Cicero communis syllabarum terminus ipsa significatio sit.Si enim ce syllaba,quae media est,prima ponatur,etro, quae ultima est,media, et ci,quae prima est,ultima, nomen quoderatantea,idest Cicero, transversis per locasyllabis nihil significabit.Illi dicendum est quoniam quaecunque in quadam oratione proferuntur, sive significent, sive nihil significent, syllabarum communis terminus nullus est. Nam si quis dicat, permutatis syllabis,quod est Cicero,ceroci significationem quidem amisit,sed aequalitersyllabae ad nullum communem terminum conjunguntur. Quod si quis hunc quidem ipsum sermonem aliquid significare posuerit,uthoc ipsumCicero aliquid significat, significatioquidemadditaest,nullus tamen syllabis terminus appositus.
Every syllable, however, is either long or short. But a long or short syllable is without any doubt a quantity; therefore, who would doubt that what is composed of quantities is a quantity? But indeed, since speech itself is a quantity, it too is discrete. For when I say "Cicero," which is a part of speech, the parts of this name—"ci" and "ce" and "ro"—are joined by no common boundary. For we shall not find any point at which the syllable "ci" is joined to the syllable "ce" by a common boundary, or again the syllable "ce" to the syllable "ro." Therefore speech also seems to be a discrete quantity. But if perhaps someone should say that this is their common boundary, by which they are so joined as to signify something—as in this very name "Cicero" the common boundary of the syllables is the signification itself—for if the syllable "ce," which is in the middle, were placed first, and "ro," which is last, in the middle, and "ci," which is first, last, the name that existed before, that is "Cicero," with its syllables transposed through the positions, will signify nothing. To him it must be said that whatever syllables are uttered in any speech, whether they signify or signify nothing, there is no common boundary of the syllables. For if someone should say that, with the syllables transposed, what is "Cicero" has become "ceroci" and has indeed lost its signification, nevertheless the syllables are equally joined to no common boundary. But if someone should posit that this very speech signifies something, as this very "Cicero" signifies something, the signification has indeed been added, yet no boundary has been applied to the syllables.
Quare sive significet, sive nihil significet nomen, partes ejus discretæ atque disjunctæ sunt,et nullo communiterminoconjunguntur;quoniam vero Graeca orationeXoYocdicituretiam animi cogitatio, et intra se ratiocinatio, quoque et oratiodicitur,nequisAristotelem cum diceret Xoyov, id est orationem,quantitatem esse discretam,de eo putaret dicere quem quisque,id estrationem, in propria cogitatione disponeret,boc addidi. Dico autem illam quæ fit cum voceorationem.Apud Ramanam namquelinguam discretasuntvocabulaorationis atque rationis. Graeca vero oratio utriusque vocabulum et rationis et orationis appellat. Quare ne quid mendax translatio culparetur,idcirco hoc quoque addidi:Dico veroillamquasfitcumvoce orationem, apud Latinos enim nulla alia oratio est praeterhancsolam quæ fitcum voce orationem.Apud Graecos vero est alius qui fit in animi cogitatione. Quocirca nequid deesset,etiam hoc quod Latinam orationem minusesset conveniens, transtuli. Quod quare ita fecerim, hac expositione patefeci, atque hæc quidem de discreta quantitate sufficiant. Continua vero quantitas est (ut dictum est) cujus quantitatis partium communis terminus invenitur, ut est linea, superficies, corpus, et præter hæc,tempus, et locus, quod ipse Aristoteles designat his verbis:
Therefore, whether a name signifies something or signifies nothing, its parts are discrete and disjoined, and are not connected by any common boundary. But since in the Greek language logos means both the thought of the mind and reasoning within oneself, and also speech, lest anyone think that Aristotle, when he said logos, that is, speech, is a discrete quantity, was speaking about that which each person arranges in his own thought, that is, reason, I added this: "But I mean that speech which is produced with the voice." For in the Roman tongue the words for speech and reason are distinct. But the Greek language calls both reason and speech by one term. Therefore, lest a misleading translation be blamed, for that reason I also added this: "But I mean that speech which is produced with the voice." For among the Latins there is no other speech besides this one alone which is produced with the voice. But among the Greeks there is another which is produced in the thought of the mind. Wherefore, lest anything be lacking, I also translated this point, which was less suited to the Latin language. Why I did so, I have made clear in this exposition. And let these remarks about discrete quantity suffice. Continuous quantity, however, is (as has been said) that quantity whose parts are found to have a common boundary, as is a line, a surface, a body, and besides these, time and place, which Aristotle himself designates in these words:
Linea vero continuaest,est enimsumere communem terminum ad quem particulæ ejus copulantur, punctum,et superficiei, lineam, plani namque ad quemdam communem terminumparticulse copulantur.Similiter autem et in corpore poteris sumere communem terminum, lineam vel superficiem, ad quem copulantur corporis particulæ.
Postquam de discretis explicuit, transiit ad species continuæ quantitatis. Continuae autem quantitates sunt. (ut dictum est in quarum partibus quidam communis est terminus,ut linea.Si quis enim dividat lineam, quae est longitudo sinelatitudine, duas in utraque divisione lineas facit,et utriusque ex divisione lineae singula in extremitatibus puncta redduntur.Lineæ enimterminipunctasunt.Quocirca cum ilia linea divisa non esset, utraque puncta quæ inutrisquelinearum capitibus post divisionem appareut, simul antea fuisse intelliguntur,quae sunt in divisione separata. Intelligitur ergo partium lineae communis terminus,punctum,id est quoddam parvissimum quod in partes dividi secarique non possit: Superficies quoque, quæ est latitudo sie altitudine, communem terminum habet in partibus, lineam, corpus verosolidum,spuerficiem.Eodemenim modo divisa superficies duas per singulas partes lineas efficiet,quemadmodum et in lineadivisaduopuncta altrinsecus reddebantur.
A line, however, is continuous, for it is possible to take a common boundary at which its parts are joined, namely a point; and for a surface, a line; for a plane, likewise, the parts are joined at a certain common boundary. Similarly, in the case of a body too, you will be able to take a common boundary, a line or a surface, at which the parts of the body are joined.
After he explained discrete quantity, he passed on to the species of continuous quantity. Continuous quantities are those in whose parts there is a certain common boundary, as has been said, for example a line. For if anyone divides a line, which is length without breadth, he makes two lines in each division, and from the division of the line single points are produced at the extremities of each. For the boundaries of a line are points. Therefore, when that line had not been divided, both points which appear at the ends of each line after the division are understood to have existed together beforehand, and these are separated in the division. Therefore the common boundary of the parts of a line is understood to be a point, that is, a certain very small thing which cannot be divided and cut into parts. A surface also, which is breadth without height, has as its common boundary in its parts a line; and a solid body, a surface. For in the same way a divided surface will produce two lines through each of its parts, just as in a divided line two points were also produced on either side.
Corpus quoque solidum cum diviseris,duas in utrisque divLsioriis partibus superficies facies, quae cumconjunctasint atque indivisa, punctum quidem partium lineae intelligitur communis terminus. Linea vero superficiei,superfi. cies autem solidi corporis.Est autem signum continui corporis, si una pars mota sit, totum corpus n]overi;et si totumcorpus movetur,certe simulaliae partes vicinae movebuntur,ut sijaceat virgula vel ex aere, vel ex ligno,vel ex quolibet alio metallo, si quis unumejuscaputvelquamlibet ejus partem moveat, tota mox virgula commovetur. Hoc autem idcirco evenit quod ejus partes quodam communi termino conjunguntur, et ille communis terminus una parte mota cæteras movet. Hoc vero in discretis non est. In numero namque cum sint decem, si unum movero, caeteri non moventur,immoti enim permanent novem; et si plenustriticositmodius, si unum tritici granum movero,non omnia continuo grana commovebuntur, idcirco quod discreta est multitudo, nec granum grano ullo communi terminovidetur implicitum. At vero si ipsius grani pars una sit mota, totum corpus grani moveatur necesse est. Non autem nunc hoc dicitur, quod linea constet ex punctis, aut superficies ex lineis, aut solidum corpus ex superficiebus, sed quod et lineae termini puncta sunt, et superficiei lineee,etsolidi corporis superficies,nullaque res suis terminis constat.
When you divide a solid body as well, you will make two surfaces in the two divided parts; and when these are joined and undivided, a point is understood as the common boundary of the parts of a line, a line of a surface, and a surface of a solid body. Now it is a mark of a continuous body that if one part is moved, the whole body is moved; and if the whole body is moved, certainly the other neighboring parts will be moved at the same time. For example, if a rod lies before us, whether of bronze or of wood or of any other metal, if someone moves one of its ends or any part of it, the whole rod is presently set in motion. This happens for the reason that its parts are joined by a certain common boundary, and that common boundary, when one part is moved, moves the rest. But this is not the case in discrete things. For in a number, when there are ten, if I move one, the rest are not moved; for the nine remain unmoved. And if a measure is full of wheat, if I move one grain of wheat, not all the grains will be immediately moved, for the reason that the multitude is discrete, nor does one grain appear to be entangled with another grain by any common boundary. But if one part of the grain itself is moved, the whole body of the grain must be moved. However, it is not being said here that a line consists of points, or a surface of lines, or a solid body of surfaces, but that the boundaries of a line are points, of a surface lines, and of a solid body surfaces, and no thing consists of its boundaries.
Quocirca punctum Iineae non erit pars, sed communis terminus partium. Superficiei linea, et superficies solidi corporis non erunt partes, sed partium termini communes. Constatigitur, et lineam et superficiem, et solidi corporis crassitudinem essecontinuam quantitatem. His alia rursus apponit.
Talium est autem et tempus et locus, praesens enim tempus et præteritum et futurum copulat. Rursus locus continuorum est, locum euim quemdam corporis particulse obtinent,quæ ad quemdam communem terminum copulantur, igitur et loci particulæ quæ obfinent singulas corporis partes, ad eumdem terminum copulantur,ad quem corporisparticulge.Quapropter continuus erit locus. Ad unum enim terminum communemcopulantur ejus particulæ.
Tempus quoque et locum continuae quantitatis esse pronuntiat. Tempus namque esse quantitatem resillademonstrat, quod in spatio, id est in longitudine et in brevitate,consideratur.Conlinuum vero esse res illa demonstrat quod partes temporis habeant aliquem communem terminum ac medium,ad quem conjungantur extrema. Nam cum sint partes temporis praeteritum et futurum, horum præsens tempus communis est terminus, hujus namque finis esl, illius initium. Locus quoque continuorum est.
Wherefore a point will not be a part of a line, but the common boundary of the parts. A line is the boundary of a surface, and a surface of a solid body, not parts, but the common boundaries of parts. It is established, therefore, that both a line and a surface and the thickness of a solid body are continuous quantity. To these he again adds other things.
Of this kind also are time and place; for the present time joins together both the past and the future. Again, place is of continuous things, for the particles of a body occupy a certain place, which are joined together at a certain common boundary; therefore the particles of place also, which occupy the individual parts of a body, are joined together at the same boundary at which the particles of the body are joined. Wherefore place will be continuous. For its particles are joined together at one common boundary.
He also declares that time and place are of continuous quantity. For he demonstrates that time is quantity from the fact that it is considered in extension, that is, in length and in brevity. But that it is continuous, that fact demonstrates it, because the parts of time have some common boundary and middle, to which the extremes are joined. For since the parts of time are the past and the future, the present time is the common boundary of these; for it is the end of the one and the beginning of the other. Place also is of continuous things.
Locum vero dicimus quodcunque illud sit quod partes corporis tenet, sive supra, sive a latere, seu subter sit.Quod si cunctae partes corporis locum aliquem tenent, et qui circa corpus est locus, per omne corporis spatium partesque diffunditur,omnes corporis partes a loci partibus occupabuntur. Quod si ita est, qui communis terminus conjungebat corporis partes, ejus termini locus ilia quoqueloca quaesunt corporis partium jungit, et esteodem modo locus de continua quantitate, quemadmodum etcorpus.Ita enim communis terminus invenitur in loco partium quemadmodum et corporis, idcirco quod corporis locus, per corpus omne diffunditur.Quod autem dixit: cunt autem taliumet locus ettempus, quoniam superius de continuis loquebatur, tempus quoque et locum continuis addidit dicens: Sunt autem talium et tempus etlocus, id est continuorum, sed post continuae discretrequequantitatisdivisionem aliam a principio rursus orditur.
We say that place is whatever holds the parts of a body, whether it be above, to the side, or beneath. But if all the parts of a body hold some place, and the place that is around the body is diffused through the whole extent and parts of the body, then all the parts of the body will be occupied by the parts of the place. And if this is so, the common boundary that joined the parts of the body—the place of that boundary also joins those places wherever they are of the parts of the body, and place is in the same way from continuous quantity as the body is. For the common boundary is found in the place of the parts just as it is in the body, for the reason that the place of the body is diffused through the whole body. But what he said: "of such things there is both place and time," since above he was speaking of continuous things, he also added time and place to continuous things, saying: "Of such things there are both time and place," that is, of continuous things, but after the division of continuous and discrete quantity he begins again another division from the beginning.
Amplius autem aliae. quidem constant ex particulis quæ in eis sunt, positionem ad se invicem habentibus, aliæ autem ex non habentibus positionem, ut lineæ quidem parliculæ positionem habent ad se invicem. Singulum enim eorum situm est ulicubi,et habes unde sumas et assignes unumquodque ubi situm est in plano, et ad qnam particulamreliquarumcoputatur: srmiliter autem et particulæ plani habent quamdam positionem, simititernamqucunumquodque ostenditur ubijacet, et quæ ad se invicem copulentur, solidi quoque et loci si. militer.
Rursus digerit quantitatis differentias. Sunt enim quantitatis aliae quidem quae ex habentibus positionem ad se invicem suis partibus constant, aliæ vero quae nullam partium habent positionem.Positionem vero partium retinere dicuntur, quarum triplex ista natura est. primum ut ejus partes ałicubisint, deinde ne pereant, tertio veroutsese partes ipsæ conjungant et propria se ordinatione continuent, ut est linea. Posita enim lineain superficie possis agnoscere ubi partesipsius sint,caputquidem lineae esse ac dexteram,medium medio loco,extremitatem vero ad sinistram,et hæc manentibus ipsis partibus dicuntur, partes enim lineæ non pereunt, sed in loco in quo sunt permanent.
Further, some [quantities] consist of the particles within them having a position relative to one another, while others consist of those not having position, as the particles of a line have a position relative to one another. For each of them is situated somewhere, and you have the means to take and assign where each is situated on a plane, and to which of the remaining particles it is reckoned; similarly also the particles of a plane have a certain position, and likewise each is shown where it lies and which are joined to one another, and similarly for a solid and for place.
Again he sets out the differences of quantity. For some quantities are those that consist of their parts having a position relative to one another, while others have no position of their parts. Those are said to retain a position of parts whose nature is this threefold: first, that its parts be somewhere; second, that they not perish; third, that the parts themselves be joined together in order and continue in their proper arrangement, as is the case with a line. For once a line is placed on a surface, you can recognize where its parts are: the head and right of the line, the middle in the middle place, and the extremity at the left; and these things are said while the parts themselves remain, for the parts of a line do not perish but remain in the place in which they are.
Possis quoque monstrare quiB pars lineæ cui parti continuentur,id est ad quam partem caput alterius partis extremitasque conjungitur, ut dicas haec pars, verbi gratia medietas,lineaehic finitur, locum ubi desinat monstrans, alia rursus pars lineae totius hic incipit. Ergo linea posita in superficie qualibet et locum aliquem partes ejus retinent, et partes ipsas non pereunt,etposset quilibetagnoscere ubi extremitas partium conjungatur, et quo ad se invicem loco continuentur. Hoc quoque idem in superficieevenit,partesenim superficiei inaliquo loco sunt, et ipsae quoque non pereunt, et ubi pars parti' conjungatur ostenditur,idem quoque soliditas habet, et loci quoque partes continuantur ad eas scilicet partes ad quas corporis partes sibimetcontinuantur, sicut jam supra dictum est. Quocirca ejusdem naturae erit et locus, cujus tota soliditas erit. Ergo et locus ex eodem genere quantitatis est, quo est et soliditas, id est ex habentibus ad se invicem positinnem suis partibus constans. Locus igitur et ipse ex habentibus suis partibus positionem ad se invicem constat.
You could also show which part of a line is continuous with which part, that is, to which part the head and the extremity of another part is joined, so that you may say: this part, for example the middle of the line, ends here, pointing out the place where it stops, and again another part of the whole line begins here. Therefore a line placed on any surface both has its parts retaining some location, and the parts themselves do not perish, and anyone could recognize where the extremity of the parts is joined, and in what location they are continuous with one another. The same also occurs in a surface; for the parts of a surface are in some location, and they themselves also do not perish, and where a part is joined to a part is shown. Solidity has the same as well, and the parts of a place too are continuous with those parts with which the parts of a body are continuous with one another, just as has already been said above. Wherefore a place will be of the same nature as that whose whole solidity it is. Therefore a place too is of the same genus of quantity as solidity is, that is, consisting of things whose parts have a position relative to one another. A place, therefore, itself also consists of its parts having a position relative to one another.
Ergo tria haec(sicut supra dictum est) consideranda sunt, ut ad se invicem positionem partes habere videantur, id est locum in quo partes ipsae sint positae, ut partes illae non pereant, ut sit partium continentia atque continuatio.Quod si quis dicat hanc rem loco deesse, eo quod iri loco non sit, in loco enim cunctasunt, locus autem in loco esse ipse non poterit.Dicendum est quoniam idcirco superficies et soliditas et linea habere positionem partium dicuntur, quod in loco sint, et pa.rtespermaneant,etsint continuæ. Quare multo magis ipse locus, cujus neque partes pereunt,et sibi perpetue continuatimqueconjunctae sunt, habere positionem partium dicitur. Et de his quidem quæ ex habentibus positionem ad se invicem suis partibus constant haec dicta sint; quas vero non habent positionem ipse rursus adjecit.
In numero autem non poterit quisquam ostendere quemadmodum particulæ ejus positionemaliquam ad se inuicem habeant,aut ubisitæ sint, aut qum particulæ ejus ad se invicem nectantur. Sed neque illæ quæ temporis sunt,non enim permanent particulæ temporis, quod autem non est permanens,quomodo positionem aliquam habebit, sed magis quemdam ordinem particularum tempus habere dzces,ut aliquid quidem prius sit temporis,aliud vero posterius.
Therefore these three things, as was said above, must be considered, so that the parts seem to have position in relation to one another: namely the place in which the parts themselves are situated, that those parts do not perish, and that there be a containing and continuity of the parts. But if anyone should say that this matter is lacking in place, because it is not in a place — for all things are in a place, but place itself cannot be in a place — it must be said that for this reason surface, solidity, and line are said to have position of their parts, because they are in a place, and their parts remain and are continuous. Wherefore much more is place itself said to have position of its parts, since its parts neither perish and are perpetually and continuously joined to one another. And concerning those things which consist of parts having position in relation to one another, let these things be said; but those which do not have position, he in turn adds.
In number, however, no one could show how its parts have any position in relation to one another, or where they are, or how its parts are linked to one another. But neither do those which belong to time; for the parts of time do not remain, and what does not remain, how will it have any position? But rather you will say that time has a certain order of its parts, so that one part of time is prior and another posterior.
Sed et de numero similiter, eo quod priusnumeratur uuum quam duo,et duo quam tria, et ita habebunt quidem quemdam ordinem, positionem vero non multum accipies.Sed et oratio similiter,non enim permanent parliculæ ejus, sed et dictum est et non amplius sumi hoc, quapropter non erit positioparticutarum ejus,siquidem nihil permanent. Alia itaque constant ex particulis quæ in cissuntpositionem adse invicem habentibus,atia autem ex nonhabentibus positionem.
Haec scilicet idcirco nullam positionem ad se invicem partium retinent,quod his aliquid de supradiclis rebus deesse manifestum est. Numerus enim ipse discretus est,nec partes ejus ad se invicem conjuni guntur,sed omnino discretsesunt.Atque idcirco non est ex iis quæ habent ad se invicem aliquam partium positionem,nec vero possisostendere qui numerus quo loco jaceat: habere autem positionem dicitur, quod(ut dictum est) et in loco aliquo positum est, et ipsa positio manentibus partibus constat,etad se invicem conjunctiscontinuatisque, ut ubiqusequejaceat, et quae ad quam continuetur possit ostendi; in numero vero nihil horum est. Nam neque in aliquo loco esse positus demonstratur,nec ejus partes conjunctae sunt.Quocirca numero ex tribus his quae diximus dua?
But also concerning number similarly, because one is counted before two, and two before three, and so they will indeed have a certain order, but you will not much find position. But also speech similarly, for its parts do not remain, but it is both spoken and no longer taken up, wherefore there will be no position of its parts, since nothing remains. Some things, therefore, consist of parts that have position in relation to one another, others of parts that do not have position.
These, of course, for this reason retain no position of parts in relation to one another, because it is manifest that something from the things said above is lacking in them. For number itself is discrete, nor are its parts joined to one another, but are altogether discrete. And for this reason it is not among those things that have some position of parts in relation to one another, nor indeed could you point out which number lies in what place. But to have position is said of that which (as was said) is both placed in some location, and the position itself consists in parts that remain and are joined and continuous with one another, so that where each lies, and which is continuous with which, can be pointed out. In number, however, none of these things is present. For neither is it shown to be placed in any location, nor are its parts joined. Wherefore, from these three things that we have said, two?
res desunt, loci positio et partium continuatio, tempus etiam quanquam sint ejus partes continuse,tamen quoniam non permanent, sed semper moventur, semperque prætereunt,habere positionem partium non dicitur.Semper enim veloci agitatione torquetur, et currentis aquæ more in nulla unquam statione consistit,quodquiapartes ejus non permanent,ex habentibus ad se invicem positionem suis partibus constare non dicitur.Sed hoec quanquam positionem partium habere non possunt,tamen habent ordinem quemdam, quem praeter positionem partium tantum retinent.Dicim us enim priorem esse binarium quamternarium,atque hunc quam quaternarium,etintemporenimirumidem ordo revertitur. Posterius enim futurum præsente, præsensque praeterito.
But these things lack place, the position of a place and the continuity of parts; time also, although its parts are continuous, nevertheless, since they do not remain but are always moving and always passing away, is not said to have position of parts. For it is always whirled about with swift agitation, and in the manner of running water it never stands still in any station; and because its parts do not remain, it is not said to consist of parts that have position in relation to one another. But these things, although they cannot have position of parts, nevertheless have a certain order, which they retain apart from the position of parts. For we say that two is prior to three, and this to four, and in time likewise the same order returns. For the future is posterior to the present, and the present to the past.
Quocirca etsi hæc non habent aliquam partium positionem,retinent tamen ordinem.Quodvero dicit, positionem vero non multo accipies, tales est ac si diceret,penitus non accipias.Multum enim pro omnino videturadjunotum,ac si diceret positionem vero non omnino accipies,idcirco quod ipsaquidem continuatio dat aliquam imaginem, quod possit habere aliquam partium positionem, sed hoc minime est,idcirco quod quamvis sint continuae quantitates, si tamen uno careant ex his quae superius dicta sunt, positionem partium habere non possunt.Nam aqua quam fistula evomit, dum cadit quidem retinetpositionem; cum vero jam effusae undae se miscuerit, positionem partium perdit: etfluvius quoque quando in pelagus fluit,et positionem videtur haberepartium et esse continuus, cum nondum marinas aquae fluvii superficies ipsa permistaest; cum vero extremitas amnis marina alluvione contingitur,totam sine dubio positionem videtur amittere.Oratio quoque similiter sese habet; nam nec ipsa ullo loco posita est, nec ejus partes ad aliquam conjunguntur, sed a se invicem illae discretse sunt, nec cum ejus partes dictae sunt, permanent,atque hoc est quod ait.Sed dictum est, et non est ultra boc sumi. Mox enim dicitur sermo, mox præterit, nec ulla ratione poterit permanere,quare mox ut aliquid dictum sit, ejus partes ostendi et demonstratione sumi non possunt.
Wherefore, even if these things do not have any position of parts, they nevertheless retain order. But what he says, "but you will not take position in many respects," is as if he were to say, "you will not take it at all." For "much" seems to be added for "altogether," as if he were to say, "but you will not take position altogether," for the reason that continuity itself gives some image that it can have some position of parts, but this is by no means the case, for the reason that although they are continuous quantities, if they nevertheless lack one of those things which were said above, they cannot have position of parts. For the water which a pipe spews out, while it falls indeed retains position; but when it has already mingled with the poured waves, it loses the position of its parts. And a river too, when it flows into the sea, seems both to have position of parts and to be continuous, while the surface of the river is not yet mingled with the sea's waters; but when the extremity of the stream is touched by the sea's influx, it seems without doubt to lose all position. A sentence likewise behaves in the same way; for it is itself placed in no location, nor are its parts joined to any place, but those parts are separated from one another, nor when its parts have been spoken do they remain, and this is what he says: "But it has been said, and it is not possible to take it further." For as soon as a word is spoken, it immediately passes away, nor can it remain by any principle; wherefore as soon as something has been said, its parts cannot be shown and taken by demonstration.
Constat igitur orationem quoque ex his esse quae positionem partium non habent,de ordine vero dubium est. Nam si quis sermo aliquid significet, ut est Cicero, est in eo quidam ordo quod ci syllaba primum dicitur,secunda vero ce, tertia ro, et potius ex significatione ordinem sumit; si vero nihil significet,nec ordinem dicitur habere,ut scindapsus nihil quidem significat; sed sive secundam syllabam primam ponas, sive ultimam primam, sive quomodolibet sylla. barum ordinemseriemquepermisceas,idemerit: in significativis enim vocibus idcirco esse dicitur,quod illo ordine permutato vis significationis evertitur, hic vero, ubi nulla est significatio, nihil interest quomodolibet jaceant partes. Quare oratio in aliquibus quidem habet ordinem partium,in aliis vero nec ordo ipse poterit inveniri. An fortasseoratio dici non potest quae nihil significat, et nulla est oratio, quae ordinem non babeat?Ergo secundumpriorem quantitatis divisionem,ubi dicebatur quantitatis alia esse continua,aliavero discreta, quinque sunt continua, duo vero discreta. Continua quidem linea, superficies,soliditas, locus, tempus. Discreta vero numerus et oratio.
It is therefore established that speech also consists of things that do not have a position of parts, but concerning order it is doubtful. For if some speech signifies something, as "Cicero" does, there is in it a certain order, in that the syllable "ci" is spoken first, "ce" second, and "ro" third, and it rather takes its order from the signification. But if it signifies nothing, it is said to have no order either, as "scindapsus" signifies nothing; but whether you put the second syllable first, or the last first, or in whatever way you confound the order and sequence of the syllables, it will be the same. For in significant utterances it is said to be for this reason, that when that order is changed the force of the signification is overturned; but here, where there is no signification, it makes no difference in whatever way the parts lie. Wherefore speech in some cases has an order of parts, in others no order at all can be found. Or perhaps that which signifies nothing cannot be called speech, and there is no speech that does not have order? Therefore, according to the earlier division of quantity, where it was said that of quantity some is continuous and some discrete, there are five continuous and two discrete. Continuous: line, surface, solid, place, time. Discrete: number and speech.
In hac vero secunda divisione qua dicit alias quantitates ex habentibus ad se invicem positionem constarepartibus,quatuorquidem sunt quæ retinent positionem,id est linea, superficies, corpus, locus; tria vero quae positionem non habent, sed ex his duo semper ordinem retinent, tempus scilicet et numerus. Oratio vero si quid significet, habet ordinem; si vero nihil significet,inordinataest; si tamen oratio nihil significane dici possit, his dictis ipse concludit dicens: Igitur alia ex habentibus ad se invicem partibus positionem constant, alia vero ex non habentibus positionem. Hac igitur divisione finita transit ad cætera monstrans quae proprie quantitates nuncupatur quae secundum accidens.
Propriæ autem quantitates hæ solae dicuntur quas diximus,alia vero omnia secundum accidens, ad hæc enim aspicientes et alia dicimus quantitates,ut multum dicitur album, eo quod superficies multa sil, et actio longa, eo quod tempus multum sit, et motus multas,neque enim horum singulum per se quantum dicitur, ut si quis assignet quanta sit aliqua actio, tempore di(finiet,anni mensuram uel sic aliquo modo assignans.Et album quantum sit assignans, superficie diffiniet.Quantum enim superficies fuerit, tantum esse album dicet. Quare solæ propriæ et secundum seipsas quantitates dicuntur quæ dictæ sunt,aliorum vero nihil per se, sed per accidens.
In this second division, however, by which he says that some quantities consist of parts having a position relative to one another, there are four that retain position, namely line, surface, body, and place; but three that do not have position, yet of these two always retain order, namely time and number. But speech, if it signifies something, has order; if it signifies nothing, it is without order. If, however, speech that signifies nothing can be said, having stated these things he himself concludes, saying: Therefore some consist of parts having a position relative to one another, while others consist of parts not having position. With this division finished, he passes to the rest, showing which things are properly called quantities and which are quantities according to accident.
But those alone are called proper quantities which we have mentioned; all others, however, are quantities according to accident. For it is with regard to these that we also call other things quantities, as white is said to be much because the surface is much, and an action is long because the time is much, and motion is much; for none of these is said to be a quantity in itself, as if someone were to assign how great some action is, he will define it by time, assigning the measure of a year or in some such way. And in assigning how great white is, he will define it by surface. For he will say that white is as great as the surface is. Wherefore only those things that have been mentioned are called proper and in themselves quantities, but none of the others is a quantity in itself, but only according to accident.
Principaliter aliquid esse dicitur,quod persetale est quale esse demonstratur. Secundam accidens vero illud quod non per se, sed per aliud tale est quale esse dicitur,ut albedini per se inest color:secundum naturam enim aIm. color esse dicitur albedo;cum vero homo dicitur coloratus, non per se dicitur,idcirco quod homo in eo quod homo est,culor non est, sed quoniam habet colorem, idcirco dicitur coloratus. Ergo quemadmodum album idcirco color est per se quoniam color naturale quoddam est genus,homo vero idcirco coloratus dicitur quoniam habet colorem; et dicitur album quidem per se et principaliter color,homo vero secundum accidens coloratus. Ita quoque et quantitates; hæc enim omnia quae dicta sunt, id est linea, superficies, corpus, numerus, oratio, tempus, per seet secundum etpropriam naturam quantitatesdi- I cuntur.
Something is said to be primarily because it is such per se, as is demonstrated. But a secondary accident is that which is such not per se but through another, as color belongs per se to whiteness; for by nature whiteness is said to be color. But when a man is said to be colored, he is not said to be so per se, because color is not in man insofar as he is man, but because he has color, he is therefore said to be colored. Therefore, just as white is color per se because color is a certain natural genus, but a man is said to be colored because he has color; and white is said to be color per se and primarily, but a man is colored according to accident. So too with quantities; for all these things that have been mentioned, that is, line, surface, body, number, speech, time, are said to be quantities per se and according to their own proper nature.
Si qua vero alia dicuntur secundum aliquam quantitatem, non per se,aed secundum accidens nominantur:ut album dicitur multum,non idcirco quod albedo sit quantitas,sed quoniam multa sit superficies,in quo illud albumsit.Si enim multum spatium fuerit in quo album sit, multum erit album; quocirca non quoniam ipsa albedo per se aliquam quantitatem habet,sed quoniam in aliqua quantitate est constituta,id est in superficie,idcirco secundum superficiem quod estquantitas quae scilicet per se multa est,album multum dicitur,non secundum se,atque ideo album non per se,nec principaliter, sed secundum accidens multum dicitur. Actio quoque ideo dicitur longa, quod multo tempore acta sit;multam vero ægritudinem idcirco di-. cimus,si eadem multo sit tempore;et motum multum idcirco, quod multo tempore factus sit, ut si quis multo tempore currat. Si quis vero multum cursum illum dicat esse qui sit velocissimus, ille convenienter sermone non utitur. Velocitas enim non quantitas, sed potius qualitas est,quales enim secundum eam dicimur,id est veloces, non quanti.
If, however, any other things are said according to some quantity, they are named not per se but according to accident: as white is said to be much, not for the reason that whiteness is a quantity, but because the surface in which that white is is much. For if there is a large space in which white is, the white will be much; wherefore not because whiteness itself has some quantity per se, but because it is established in some quantity, that is, in a surface, for that reason according to the surface—which is a quantity that is of course per se much—white is said to be much, not according to itself, and therefore white is said to be much not per se nor primarily, but according to accident. Action also is for that reason said to be long, because it has been done in much time; but we say an illness is much for the reason that the same illness is of much time; and a motion is much for the reason that it has been made in much time, as if someone runs for much time. If, however, someone says that that running is much which is very swift, he does not use the expression appropriately. For swiftness is not a quantity, but rather a quality; for according to it we are said to be of such a sort, that is, swift, not of how much.
Secundum quantitatem vero multum dicitur, hoc autem monstrat ipsa rerum diffinitio; si quis enim album multum monstrare desideret,et proprio termino rationis includere, illi dicendum est multum esse album quod in multa jaceat superficie,et molum atque actionem multam quæ longo tempore perficiaturjquare quoniamad proprias quantitatesaspicientes, atque ad eas res cæteras referentes, quantitates vocamus,ut album ad superficiem qua; vera esi quantitas,et cursum, et aliquem motum atque actionem ad tempus, quod ipsum vere quantitas est reducimus, hæc non per se quantitates, sed per eas quae proprie quantitates dictæ sunt nominantur. Quocirca quoniam quod per se non est, secundum accidens est,recte caetera omnia praeter ea quae superius in quantitate numerata sunt per accidens esse, non per se quantitates dicuntur. Solas igitur proprie et secundum se ipsae quantitates dicuntur. hse quae superius comprehensæ sunt.Alias vero per se quantitas non sunt, sed (ut ipse ait) forte per accidens. Post divisionem igitur continui atque discreti et habentis positionem partium et non habentis,et quae sunt per se principaliter, et rursus per accidens quantitates, solito more viam inveniendi quantitatum proprietas ingreditur.
According to quantity, however, "much" is said, and the definition of the thing itself shows this. For if anyone wishes to show that something white is much and to include it within the proper boundary of its meaning, it must be said that white is much which lies upon a large surface, and much motion and action which is completed over a long time. Therefore, since we call quantities by looking to their proper quantities and referring other things to these, as we reduce white to surface, which is truly a quantity, and running and some motion and action to time, which itself is truly a quantity, these are not quantities per se, but are named through those things which are properly called quantities. Wherefore, since what is not per se is according to accident, rightly all other things besides those which were enumerated above under quantity are said to be quantities according to accident, not per se. Therefore only those quantities which were comprehended above are properly and according to themselves called quantities. Others, however, are not quantity per se, but (as he himself says) perhaps according to accident. After the division, therefore, of continuous and discrete, and of that which has position of parts and that which does not, and of those which are per se and principally, and again of quantities according to accident, in his usual manner he enters upon the path of discovering the properties of quantities.
Amplius quantitati nihil est contrarium, in definitis enim manifestum est quoniam nihil est contrarium: ut bicubito, vel tricubito, vel superficiei, vel alicui lalium,nihil enim ipsis est contrarium. Nisi forte quis multa pallris dicat esse contraria, vel magnum parvo, horum autem nihil est quantitas, sed magis ad aliquidynhil enim per seipsum parvum vel magnum dicitur, sed eo quod ad aliud refertur: nam mons quidem parvus dicitur, milium vero magnum, eo quod hoc quidem sui generis majus sit,illud vero minus sui generis; ergo ad aliud est eorum relatio nam si per seipsummagnum vel parvum diceretur, nunquam mons quidem parvus,milium vero magnum diceretur.Hursus in vico plures homines esse dicimus, in civitate paucos, cum tamen sint eis multo plures, et in domo quidem multos, in theatro vero paucos, cum tamen sint plures. Amplius bicubitum vet tricubitum et unumquodque talium quantitatem significat, magnum vero vel parvum non significat quantitatem,sed magis ad aliquid,quoniamad aliud spectatmagnumvelparvum, quare manifestum est quoniJm hæc ad aliquid sunt. Amplius sive ponat aliquis hæc esse quantitates, sive non ponat,nihil ipsis, contrarium est. Quod enim non potest sumi perseipsum,sed ad solam alterius relationem re{ertur,quomodo huic aliquid erit contrarium?
Moreover, nothing is contrary to quantity. For in the cases already defined it is evident that nothing is contrary: as for instance to a two-cubit length, or a three-cubit length, or a surface, or any such thing, nothing is contrary to them. Unless perhaps someone should say that many is contrary to few, or great to small; but none of these is a quantity, but rather a relative. For nothing is said to be small or great in itself, but by being referred to something else. For a mountain is said to be small, and a grain of millet great, because the latter is greater than others of its kind, and the former less than others of its kind. Therefore their relation is to something else. For if great or small were said in itself, a mountain would never be called small, nor a grain of millet great. Again, we say that there are many men in a village, but few in a city, though they are much more numerous than those in the village; and many in a house, but few in a theater, though they are more numerous. Again, a two-cubit or three-cubit length and each such thing signifies a quantity, but great or small does not signify a quantity, but rather a relative, since great or small looks to something else. Wherefore it is evident that these are relatives. Again, whether someone posits these to be quantities or does not posit them, nothing is contrary to them. For that which cannot be taken in itself, but is referred to the relation of another alone, how will anything be contrary to it?
Amplius si erunt magnum et parvum contraria, continget ipsum idem simul contraria recipere,et ea ipsa sibimet esse contraria.Gontingit enim idem ipsum si.mul et parvum esse et magnum, est enim aliquid ad hoc quidem parvum, ad aliud vero hoc idem ipsum magnum. Quare idem parvum et magnum in eodem tempore esse contingit, quare contraria simul suscipiet.Sed nihil est quud videatur simul contraria posse suscipere;ut substantia susceptibitiscontrariorum quidem esse videtur,sed nullussimul etsanusest etæger, necalbuset niger simul est, nihilque aliud est quod simul contraria suscipiat. Et eadem sibiipsi contingit esse contraria,nam si est magnum parvo contrarium ipsum autem idem simul est et parvum et magnum, ipsum sibi erit contrarium. Sed impossibile est idem, sibi esse contrarium, non est igitur magnum parvo contrarium, nec multa pauci. Quare etiamsi non relativorum hæc aliquis dical,seil quantitatis,nihil habebunt contrarium.
Moreover, if large and small are contraries, it will follow that the same thing simultaneously receives contraries, and that these very things are contrary to themselves. For it happens that the same thing is at the same time both small and large; for something is small in relation to one thing, but this same thing is large in relation to another. Therefore it happens that the same thing is small and large at the same time, and so it will receive contraries simultaneously. But there is nothing that appears able to receive contraries at the same time; for instance, substance seems capable of receiving contraries, but no one is simultaneously healthy and sick, nor is anything simultaneously white and black, nor is there anything else that simultaneously receives contraries. And it follows that the same things are contrary to themselves; for if large is contrary to small, but the same thing is simultaneously both small and large, it will be contrary to itself. But it is impossible for the same thing to be contrary to itself; therefore large is not contrary to small, nor are many to few. Wherefore, even if someone says these belong not to relatives but to quantity, they will have nothing contrary.
Definita quantitas est quæ alicujus termino numeri coercetur,ut sunt duo,vel tres,et quæ ad hunc modum dicunt'lr,ac si dicas bicubitum,tricubitum, et caetera.Etquae aliquid propria significatione definita sunt,ut est superficies et soliditas,quid enimetquce quantitates dicantur,agnoscitur: quocirca barum, quoniam sunt diffinitæ,nulJa ulli contraria est; neque enim bicubito tricubitum contrarium est,sicut neque numerus ulli numenl,al vero nec superficies soliditati,nec aliquid borum.Sed quoniam quaedam indefinitaimaginem quamdam quantitatisostendunt; ut magnum et parvum,quae videntur esse contraria, hæc sibi Aristoteles opponit dicens non esse quantitates,sed magis ad aliquid, quod ipsius sermonibus astruan:us.Sed non est hoc proprium quantitatis non habere contraria,nonenimomnis quantitas contrariis caret,sed nobis persingula quaaquecurrentibus quae quantitatis species contraria non habeant, quæve habeant,considerandumestLineaquidem contrario caret, linea enim lienaa contraria non est;sed si quis dicatrectamlineamcurvaelineae esse contrariam, fallitur.Non enim in eo quod linea est, curva linea rectae lineae contraria est, sed in eo quod curva est, et in his non lineae videntur esse contrariæ, sed ipsa rectitudo et curvitas.Quarenon in eo quod quantitas est, linea curva rectae lineae contraria est,sed in eo quod qualis.
Definite quantity is that which is confined by the limit of some number, as are two or three, and whatever things are spoken of in this way, as if you were to say two-cubit, three-cubit, and the rest. And those which are definite in some proper signification, as surface and solidity; for it is recognized what things are called quantities. Wherefore, since these are definite, none of them is contrary to any other; for neither is three-cubit contrary to two-cubit, just as no number is contrary to any number, nor indeed is surface contrary to solidity, nor any of these. But since certain indefinite things display a certain image of quantity, as large and small, which appear to be contraries, Aristotle sets these against themselves, saying that they are not quantities but rather relatives, which we shall establish from his own words. But it is not a property of quantity to have no contraries; for not every quantity lacks contraries, but as we run through each individual species of quantity, we must consider which have contraries and which do not. A line indeed lacks a contrary, for a line is not contrary to a line; but if anyone should say that a straight line is contrary to a curved line, he is mistaken. For a curved line is not contrary to a straight line in that it is a line, but in that it is curved, and in these it seems to be not the lines that are contrary, but straightness itself and curvature. Wherefore a curved line is not contrary to a straight line in that it is a quantity, but in that it is of such a quality.
Nam quoniam curvitas et rectitudo contraria sunt, secundum id quod curva et recta est linea, non secundum quod lineas sunt,suscipiunt contrarietatem; quocircalinea in eo quod linea est contrario caret. At vero nec superficies superficiei contraria est. Sed fortedicat aliquis albamsuperficieinnigraesuperficiei esse contrariam; cui similiter occurrendum est,in eo quod superficies sunt non esse contraria,sed in eo quod est in his albedo atque nigredo,quæ contraria esse quis dubitat?Eadem quoque modo et lenetuetasperam superficiem si quis contrarias dixerit, refellitur, quod non secundum quantitatem superficiei, sed secundum qualitatem asperitatis lenitAtisque ipsaesuperficiescontrarium tenent.Atvero nee corpori quidquam ullo modo contrarietatis opponitur, cui si qui dicat incorporale esse contrarium, refutabitur,quod omnis contrarietas propriis nominibus dicitur,ut bonum malum,album nigrum;corporalevero et incorporale non secundum contrarietatem,sedsecundum privationem habitumqueproferuntur.Incorporale enim corporis est privatio.Nec tempori quoque quidquam contrarium est,sed si nox diei videtur opposita,non in eo quod tempus esi, sed in eo quod dies est aer lucidus, nox aer obscurus. Aer vero neque tempus neque quantitasest,lumen quoque et obscuritas qualitates suntet non quantitates. Oratio etiam quanquam videatur haberecontrarium.
For since curvature and straightness are contraries, it is according to that in which a line is curved or straight, not according as they are lines, that they receive contrariety; wherefore a line, in that it is a line, lacks a contrary. But neither is a surface contrary to a surface. But perhaps someone may say that a white surface is contrary to a black surface; and he must be met in like manner, that in that they are surfaces they are not contraries, but in that there is in them whiteness and blackness, which no one doubts to be contraries. In the same way also, if someone says that a smooth and a rough surface are contraries, he is refuted, because it is not according to the quantity of the surface, but according to the quality of roughness and smoothness, that the surfaces themselves hold a contrary. But neither is anything opposed to body by way of contrariety in any way; and if anyone says that the incorporeal is contrary to it, he will be refuted, because every contrariety is expressed by its own names, as good and evil, white and black; but corporeal and incorporeal are put forward not according to contrariety, but according to privation and habit. For the incorporeal is the privation of body. Nor is anything contrary to time either; but if night seems opposed to day, it is not in that it is time, but in that day is bright air, night is dark air. But air is neither time nor quantity; light also and darkness are qualities and not quantities. Speech also, although it seems to have a contrary.
tamen contrariam non habet oppositionem,videtur etiam vera oratio esse et falsa, quae sunt contraria, sed oratio vera et falsa in significatione est. Cum enim quod est oratio significat,vera est; cum vero quod non est designat, tunc falsa est. Oratio vero non secundum id quod significal in quantitate numeratur,sed secundum id quod profertur. Secundum enim id quod proferimus orationem, longa syllaba brevique componitur, quæ omnem orationem non secundum id quod ipsa significat, sed secundum id quod ad prolationem est, metiuntur. Illud quoque manifestum est in numero non esse contraria, duo enim tribus,vel tres quaternario contrarii non sunt, nec ultus alter numerus cuilibet alii numero contrarius est. Locus vero habet aliquam contrarietatem, sursum enim et deorsum contrarium est.Sed quidam volunt non esse quantitatis quod sureum dicitur et deorsum, sed potius habitudines,quasGraeci vocanl:quae enim pars ad caput nostrum est, hanc sursum vocamus; quae pars pedibus subjacet, illa deorsum dicitur; quocirca secundum habitudinem quamdam quodammodo ad nos ipsos relata sursum deorsumque prædicamus. Herminius quoque ait sursum et deorsum non esse loca,sed quamdam quodammodo positionem loci.Est enim res sursum atque deorsum,non est autem idem esse aliquid loci, quod locum,loci enim est positio in loco,locus vero ipse positio non est.
Nevertheless, it does not have a contrary opposition. True and false speech also seem to be contraries, but true and false speech consists in signification. For when speech signifies what is, it is true; when it designates what is not, then it is false. But speech is not counted in quantity according to what it signifies, but according to what is uttered. For according to what we utter in speech, it is composed of long and short syllables, which measure all speech not according to what it itself signifies, but according to what pertains to utterance. It is also evident that contraries are not in number; for two is not contrary to three, nor three to four, nor is any other number contrary to any other number. Place, however, has a certain contrariety, for up and down are contraries. But some hold that what is called up and down does not belong to quantity, but rather to relations, which the Greeks call habits; for the part that is toward our head we call up; the part that lies beneath our feet is called down. Therefore, according to a certain relation, in a way we predicate up and down in relation to ourselves. Herminus also says that up and down are not places, but a certain position of place. For a thing is up and down, but it is not the same for something to be of a place as to be a place; for position is of a thing in a place, but place itself is not position.
Sed si quis omnem mundi respiciatfiguram,quomodu rerum omnium formam sphaerae ambitus amplectitur,et terra media est,in sphaera vero nihil estullimum,nisi quod ejusdem terminum medietatis obtinuit,quidquid fn extremo coeli convexitatis est,illud sursum esse dicet, quod vero est medium,illud deorsum.Quocircasunt secundumlocum sursum deorsumque contraria, sursum in cælo, deorsum in terra,idcirco quod a se longe disjuncta sunt, unde post quoque contraria hoc modo sunt diffinita.Contraria sunt quaecunque a se longissime distant:hinc est videlicet tracta diffinitio,quod quoniam coelum terraque distant,longissime distare videbantu, et illud esse sursum, hasc vero deorsum, quoniam deorsum atque sursum non ob aliam causam contraria dicuntur,nisi quod a se longe disjuncta sunt, quod esse contrarium longissime distare diffiniunt,quod Aristoteles hoe modo pronuntiat.
But if one considers the whole figure of the world, how the sphere's circumference embraces the form of all things, and the earth is in the middle, and in a sphere nothing is lowest except what has obtained the limit of its middle, whatever is at the extremity of the convexity of the heaven, that he will call up, but what is in the middle, that he will call down. Wherefore according to place up and down are contraries: up in the heaven, down in the earth, for the reason that they are far separated from each other; whence afterward contraries were in this way defined: Contraries are whatever are most distant from each other. Hence clearly this definition was drawn, because since heaven and earth are distant, they seemed to be most distant, and that to be up, but this down; since down and up are said to be contraries for no other reason than that they are far separated from each other, they define being contrary as being most distant, which Aristotle pronounces in this way.
Maxime autem circa locum videtur esse contrarietas quantitatis, sursum enim ad id quod est deorsum contranum ponunt, locum qui est in medio deorsum dicentes,ea quod multa distantia medii ad terminos mundi sit, videntur autem et aliorum contrariorum diffinilionem ab his proferre, quæ enim a se invicem multum distant eorum quæ sub eodem genere suut contraria determinant.
In omni enim sphaera media terra est,quod ipsa astrorum demonstrat ordinata vertigo,adjecit quoque causamcurhujusmodi loca contrariadicantur, quod multa distantia est medietatis ad mundi terminos.Terminos vero mundi cæli ultimam convexitatem dicit;ex hac igitur loci contrarietate et caetera definita esse contraria sic demonstrat. Videntur,autem et aliorum contrariorum diffinitionem ab his proferre, quae enim multum a se distant in eodem genere contraria esse diffiniunt. Sed quoniam ne ordo contrarietate quantitatis impediretur, idcirco superioribus, in quibus singulis quantitatibus nihil esse contrarium dicebamus, has loci contrarietates adjecimus, et quaedam in medio praetermissa sunt, rurBUS ad superioraredeamus, ut expositionis ordo sese ipse continuet.
But contrariety of quantity seems especially to concern place; for they set "up" as contrary to "down," calling the place that is in the middle "down," because there is a great distance from the middle to the boundaries of the world. They also seem to derive the definition of other contraries from these; for they determine those things that are contrary which are within the same genus and are much distant from one another.
For in every sphere the earth is in the middle, which the ordered revolution of the stars itself demonstrates. He also added the reason why places of this kind are called contrary: because there is a great distance from the middle to the boundaries of the world. By "boundaries of the world" he means the outermost convexity of the heaven. From this contrariety of place, then, he shows that the other contraries are also defined. "They also seem," he says, "to derive the definition of other contraries from these," for they define as contrary those things that are much distant from one another within the same genus. But since the order of contrariety of quantity should not be hindered, for that reason, to the earlier points in which we were saying that there is nothing contrary to individual quantities, we have added these contrarieties of place; and certain things having been passed over in the middle, let us return again to the earlier points, so that the order of the exposition may continue itself.
Ait enim superius, cum quantitati nibilessecontrarium proponeret, bicubito, vel tricubito, vel superficiei, vel aliqui talium nihil posse esse contrarium.Diffinitis enim bis quantitatibus,contrarium nihil esse videtur, ut duobus vel tribus, sed quaedam cum sintindefinita, nec quantitates etcontraria videantur, haec rursus adjecit. Nisi multa paucis dicat quis esse contraria, vel magnum parvo. Horum autem nihil est quantitas, sed ad aliquid, nihil enim per seipsum magnum diciturvel parvum, sed ad aliquid refertur. Nam mons quidem parvus dicitur, milium vero magnum, eo quod hoc quidem sui generis majus sit, illud vero sui generis minus. Ergo ad aliud est eorum relatio, nam si per seipsum parvum vel magnum diceretur, nunquam mons quidem aliquando parvus, milium vero nunquam magnum diceretur. Rursus in vico quidem plures homines esse dicimus, in civitate vero paucos, cum tamen sint eis multo plures, et in domo quidem multos, in theatro vero paucos, cum sint plures. Amplius bicubitum et tricubitum et unumquodque talium quantitatemsignificat.magnum vero vel parvum non significatquantitatem,sedmagis ad aliquid,quoniam ad aliquid spectaturmagnumet parvum;quare manifestum est quod haec ad aliquid sunt.
For he said above, when he proposed that nothing is contrary to quantity, that nothing can be contrary to a two-cubit or three-cubit magnitude, or to a surface, or to any such thing. For when quantities are defined, nothing seems to be contrary to them, as to two or three; but since some are indefinite, they do not even seem to be quantities and contraries, and so he added these points again. Unless someone says that many is contrary to few, or great to small. But none of these is a quantity, but a relative; for nothing is called great or small in itself, but is referred to something else. For a mountain is called small, and a millet seed great, because the one is greater than others of its kind, and the other less than others of its kind. Therefore their relation is to another; for if great or small were said in itself, a mountain would never be called small, nor a millet seed great. Again, we say that there are many men in a village, but few in a city, though they are much more numerous there; and many in a house, but few in a theater, though they are more numerous. Furthermore, two-cubit and three-cubit and each such thing signify quantity, but great or small do not signify quantity, but rather a relative, since great and small are viewed in relation to something; wherefore it is clear that these are relatives.
Quemadmodum diffinitæ quantitates contrariis non tenentur, ipse superius comprobavit dicens bien bito vel superficiei nihil esse contrarium, indefinitae vero, ut est magnumetparvum, multaet pauca, dant imaginem contrarietatis. Sed illud occurrit, has non esse quantitates. Omnis enim quantitas per se dicitur,bicubitum enim et tricubitum, et duo, ettres,et superficies ad nihil aliud refertur,'magnum vero vel parvum sinealiis dici non possunt.Cum enim dicis magnum, ad aliou.ius alteriuscomparationematque aequationem refertur. Eodem quoque modo et parvum,quod ipsa Aristotelica probat inductio. Si enim magnum et parvum per se dicerentur et non ad alterius relationem, nunquam diceremus montem parvum et milium magnum.Sienim magnum parvumque non adlrelationem alterius diceretur, mons semper magnus, semperque parvum milium diceretur.Sed aliquem collem ad Atlantis altitudinem conferenles, dicimus parvum montem, et rursus milium ad minora alia grana miIii conferentes, magnum milium nominanus,et simpliciter quidquid magnum vel parvum dicitur ad ejusdem generis speciem referentes, magnum par. vumquenominanus,ut monti montem comparamus, miliumveromilio, et alia hujusmodi.Multaetpauca eodem modo dicuntur; dicimus enim, si fuerint bomines centum in vico, puresesse homines. At vero si in civitate sint, paucosdicimus, nunc ad parvitatem vicorum, nunc ad magnitudinem civitatum conferentes.
Just as he proved above that definite quantities are not subject to contraries, saying that nothing is contrary to a two-cubit magnitude or to a surface, while indefinite ones, such as large and small, many and few, present an image of contrariety—yet this objection arises: that these are not quantities. For every quantity is said per se; a two-cubit and a three-cubit magnitude, and two and three, and surfaces, are referred to nothing else, but large or small cannot be said without other things. For when you say large, it is referred to the comparison and equalization of some other thing. In the same way also small, which Aristotle's own induction proves. For if large and small were said per se and not in relation to another, we would never say that a mountain is small and a millet seed large. For if large and small were not said in relation to another, a mountain would always be called large, and a millet seed always small. But when we compare some hill to the height of Atlas, we say the mountain is small, and again comparing a millet seed to other smaller grains, we call the millet seed large, and simply whatever is called large or small, referring it to the species of the same genus, we call it large or small, as when we compare a mountain to a mountain, a millet seed to a millet seed, and other such things. Many and few are said in the same way; for we say, if there are a hundred men in a village, that there are many men. But if they are in a city, we say there are few, comparing now to the smallness of villages, now to the greatness of cities.
Rursussisint in domo quinquaginto, multi sunt, si in theatro pauci, ideo quod tunc in theatro esse paucos dicimus cum ad eos qnanti in theatro essedebebantcomparamus.Amplius,quoniam consistit magnum parvumque referri semper ad alterum, singulas vero quantitates nihil ad aliud comparantes, suas ac proprias nominanus, ut tres, duo, quator, lineam, superficiem, magnum parvumque,multaet pauca, a quantitatis divisione disjuncta sunt. Sunt enim ista non quantitates, sed potius relativa. Amplius, sive aliquis ponateas esse quantitates, sive non ponat, nihil illiserit contrarium, quod enim non est sumere per seipsum, sed ad solamalterius:relationem, quomodo huic aliquid erit contrarium. Hoc quoque validissimo argumento probaturquantitatibus his quae prædictæ sunt nihil esse contrarium, nisi soli forsitan loco. Nam si quis magnum et parvum, vel multa et paucainquanlitatibusponal,etiam hoc si concedatur, tamen quoniam semper referuntur ad aliud, contrariis non tenentur.
Again, if there are fifty in a house, they are many; if few in a theater, for the reason that we then say there are few in the theater when we compare them to those who ought to have been in the theater. Moreover, since it holds that large and small are always referred to another, but we name individual quantities as their own and proper, comparing them to nothing else—as three, two, four, a line, a surface—large and small, many and few are separated from the division of quantity. For these are not quantities, but rather relatives. Moreover, whether someone posits them to be quantities or does not, nothing will be contrary to them, for how will anything be contrary to that which does not exist to be taken through itself, but only in relation to another? By this also, with a most valid argument, it is proved that nothing is contrary to these quantities which have been mentioned, except perhaps to place alone. For if someone posits large and small, or many and few, among quantities, even if this is conceded, nevertheless, since they are always referred to another, they are not held by contraries.
Omne enim contrarium per seconsistit,neillud ad alterius comparationem relationemque profertur,utbonum non dicitur mali bonum, nec rursus malum boni malum, sed ipsum in propria natura et prolatione consistit.Quaecunquesunt contraria, eodem modo sunt.Magnum vero et parvum quoniam non per se constant,sed ad alterius relationem referuntur, contraria esse non possunt.Amplius,si suntmagnumetparvumcontraria,contingitidem simul contraria suscipereeteaipsasibiessecontraria.Contingitenim simul idem parvum esse et magnum.Est enim aliquid ad hoc quidem parvum, ad aliud verohocidem ipsum magnum.Quare idem parvum el magnum et eodem tempore esse contingit,quare simul contraria suscipiet,sed nihil estquod vidcatursimulcontraria possesuscipere, ut substantia, susoeptibilis quidem contrariorum videturesse,sed non suscipitinunoeodem lempore,nam nullus simul estsanus et æger, nec albus et nigersimul,nihilque aliud simul contraria suscipiet.Eteadem sibi ipsi contingit esse contraria. Nam si est magnumparvocontrarium,ipsumautemidem simul est parvum et magnum,ipwum sibi eritcontrarium, sedimpossibile esl ipsum sibi esse contrarium.Non est igitur magnum parvocontrarium.Constalhoc et immutabile in propria rationeconsistit, unam eamdemque rem uno eodemque tempore contraria non posse susci pere, ut substantia susceptibilis quidem contrariorum est.
For every contrary is self-consistent, nor is it brought forth in comparison and relation to another, as good is not said to be the good of evil, nor again evil the evil of good, but it consists in its own nature and utterance. Whatever things are contraries are in the same manner. But great and small, since they do not stand by themselves, but are referred to the relation of another, cannot be contraries. Moreover, if great and small are contraries, it happens that the same thing simultaneously receives contraries and that those very things are contrary to themselves. For it happens that the same thing is simultaneously small and great. For something is small in relation to this, but the same thing is great in relation to another. Wherefore it happens that the same thing is small and great at the same time, wherefore it will simultaneously receive contraries, but there is nothing that seems able to receive contraries simultaneously, as substance indeed seems to be capable of contraries, but does not receive them at one and the same time, for no one is simultaneously healthy and sick, nor simultaneously white and black, nor will anything else simultaneously receive contraries. And it happens that the same things are contrary to themselves. For if great is contrary to small, but the same thing is simultaneously small and great, it will be contrary to itself, but it is impossible for it to be contrary to itself. Therefore great is not contrary to small. This stands firm and immutable, consisting in its own rationale, that one and the same thing cannot receive contraries at one and the same time, as substance is indeed capable of contraries.
Homo namque cum substantia eit, etægritudinem suscipiet etsalutem,sed non eodem tempore, et albedinem etnigredinemcapit,sedalioatque alio tempore,utverounoeodemque tempore contraria utraque suscipiat, fieri nequit, quod si magnum parvoaliquiscontrariumponat,evenietquoddamimpossibile, ut una atque eadem res eodem tempore utrasque suscipiat contrarietates, et eadem ipsa sibi possint esse contraria.Ponamusenim magnum parvo esse contrarium,sed una atque eadem res,uno,eodemque tempore potest magna esse et parva,ut si sit decem pedum mensura collata ad duorum pedum magnitudinem, magnaestad centum vero cubitorum magnitudinem mensuramque collata, eadem parva est, Potest ergo eadem res eodem tempore et magnitudinis esse susceptibilis et parvitatis. Eadem enim res uno eodemque tempore ad majorem minoremque collata eadem magna et parva est. Quod si magnum parvo contrarium est, eadem vero res eodemtempore etmagnitudinemsuscipitetparvitatem, eodem tempore contingit ut eadem res contraria utraque suscipiat, sed hoc impossibile est. Quocirca quoniam res eadem eodem tempore contrariorum susceptibilia non est, potest vero una atque eadem res magnitudinem parvitatemquesuscipere, magnitudo et parvitas contraria non sunt. At vero si quis magnum parvo contrarium ponat, eadem ratione unameamdemquerem sibi ipsi dicit esse contrariam.
For since man is a substance, he will also receive sickness and health, but not at the same time, and he takes on whiteness and blackness, but at one time and another; yet that he should receive both contraries at the same time cannot happen. But if someone posits the great as contrary to the small, a certain impossibility will result: that one and the same thing at the same time receives both contrarieties, and that the same things can be contrary to themselves. For let us posit that the great is contrary to the small. But one and the same thing can at one and the same time be great and small: for instance, if a measure of ten feet is compared to a magnitude of two feet, it is great; but compared to a magnitude and measure of a hundred cubits, the same is small. Therefore the same thing can at the same time be susceptible of greatness and of smallness. For the same thing at one and the same time, compared to a greater and a lesser, is the same great and small. But if the great is contrary to the small, and the same thing at the same time receives greatness and smallness, it happens that at the same time the same thing receives both contraries; but this is impossible. Wherefore, since the same thing is not at the same time susceptible of contraries, but one and the same thing can receive greatness and smallness, greatness and smallness are not contraries. But if someone posits the great as contrary to the small, by the same reasoning he says that one and the same thing is contrary to itself.
Nam si parvum magno est contrarium, eadem vero res(utdocui)parvaetmagnapotestessead aliud et ad aliud scilicet comparata. Res qua; parva et magna est, eadem sibi potestesse contraria, parvum enim et magnum contrarium dictum est, sed est impossibile. Quocirca parvum et magnum contraria non sunt. Post hujusmodi vero rationem et argumentationisfirmissimsepropositionemdecontrarietatedisserit loci, de qua superius jam diximus, quocirca praetereunda est, ne repetitae expositionis iteratio, fastidio sit potius quam doctrina.
Non videlurautem quantitas suscipere magis et minus, ut bicubitum, neque enim est aliudaliomagisbicubitum,neque in numero, ut ternarius quinario: nihil enim magis tria dicenturquam quinque,nec tria potius quam tria, neque tempus ahud alio magis et minus dicitur, nec inhitt quæ dicta. sunt, magiset minusomnino dicitur. Quare et quantitas non suscipit magis et minus.
For if small is contrary to large, but the same thing (as I taught) can be small and large in relation to different things, namely when compared to one thing and to another. A thing which is small and large, the same thing can be contrary to itself; for small and large have been called contraries, but this is impossible. Wherefore small and large are not contraries. But after a reasoning of this kind and the establishment of a most firm argumentation, he discusses the topic of contrariety, about which we have already spoken above; wherefore it must be passed over, lest a repetition of an exposition already given be a source of annoyance rather than of instruction.
But quantity does not seem to admit of more and less, as two cubits; for one thing is not more two cubits than another, nor in number, as the number three is not more than five; for things will not be called more three than five, nor three rather than three; nor is one time said to be more and less than another, nor in the things which have been mentioned is more and less said at all. Wherefore quantity also does not admit of more and less.
Aliud proprium rursus apposuit quod quamvis qaantitatis proprium non sit, cur tamen non sit ipse reticuit,nobis tamen est demonstrandum;quod autem dicit tale est: quantitas magis et minus non suscipit, nullus enim numerus alio numero necmagis nec minus est numerus. Nam ternartus siquinariocomparetur, nec magis nec minus est numerus, et rursus ipsi tres sibiipsis comparati, nec magis nec minus sunt tres, nec tempus quoque habet aliquid magis et minus, ut magis aliud tempus sit alio tempore,IOn-l gius quidem tempus tempore esse potest,utvero dicatur magis tempusalio tempore vel minus fierinequit. Hocquoqueetiam in substantiademonstratum est, homo nanque alio homine non est magis homo, nec minus. Idem quoque eveniteliam in quantitate. Quod quia etiam in substantia est, proprium quantitatis hoc non est, habet hoc quoque quantitas ut in sequenti ordine ipse monstravit. Quocirca quoniam prius hoc de substantia dixerat, nunc vero idem de quantitate proposuit, idcirco non esse hoc proprium quantitatis, commemorare neglexit. Cujus enim esset alterius non suscipere magis et minus, tunc dixit cum de substantia disputaret. Ait enim quod substantia nunquam magis minusve suscipient,quocira ad maxima propria solita constituendi rationeregressus est.
He next added another property, which, although it is not a property of quantity, he nevertheless passed over in silence as to why it is not itself [a property of quantity]; yet it must be demonstrated by us. What he says is of this sort: quantity does not admit more and less. For no number is more or less a number than another number. For if three is compared to five, it is neither more nor less a number; and again, three compared to itself is neither more nor less three. Nor does time have anything of more and less, such that one time is more than another time; for a longer time can indeed be a time than a time, but it cannot be said that a time becomes more or less a time than another time. This too has also been demonstrated in substance: for a man is not more a man than another man, nor less. The same also happens in quantity. But because this is also in substance, this is not a property of quantity; yet quantity also has this, as he himself showed in the following order. Wherefore, since he had said this earlier about substance, but now proposed the same about quantity, for that reason he neglected to mention that this is not a property of quantity. For he said then, when he was disputing about substance, whose property it was not to admit more and less. For he says that substance never admits more or less; wherefore he returned to the usual method of establishing the greatest properties.
Proprium autem maximce quantitatis esty quod et æquale et inæquale dicitur: Singulum enim earum quæ dictæ sunt quantitatum tequale dicitur et in æquale, ut corpus etsequale et inæquale dicitur, et tempus æquale et inæquale dicitur, et numerus arguatis et inæqualis dicitur, et oratio æqualis et inæqualis. Similiter autem et in aliis quæ dicta sunt, singulum et æquale et inæQuale dicitur. In cæteris vero quæ quantitates non sunt, non multum videbitur æquale et inæquale dici, nam affectio et dispositio aequalis et inæqualis non multum dicitur, sed magis similis et dissimilis, et album æquale et inæquale non multum dicitur, sed simile. Quare quantitatis maximæ est proprium aequate et inæquale dici.
Quantitatis proprium apertissime designat esse, quod secundumquantitatem æqualitas et inqualitas nuncupatur.Singulseenim quantilatessequalesatque inaequales dicuntur, utasqualis linealineae, et rursus inaequalis, et superficiei superficies aequalis atque inaequalis dicitur, et corpus æquale et inaequale dicitur. Numerus quoque et tempus et locus aequalis atque inæqualis dicitur. In aliis autem quæ quantitates non sunt, non est facile ut aequalitas vel inaequalitas nominetur,dispositiones ergo qua?
But the most proper property of quantity is that it is called both equal and unequal. For each of the things that have been called quantities is said to be equal and unequal: for instance, body is said to be equal and unequal, time is said to be equal and unequal, number is said to be equal and unequal, and speech is equal and unequal. Similarly also in the other things that have been mentioned, each is said to be both equal and unequal. But in the remaining things that are not quantities, equal and unequal will not seem to be said much; for affection and disposition are not much said to be equal and unequal, but rather similar and dissimilar, and white is not much said to be equal and unequal, but similar. Therefore it is the property of quantity most of all to be called equal and unequal.
He most clearly designates it to be a property of quantity that equality and inequality are predicated according to quantity. For individual quantities are said to be equal and unequal, as a line is equal to a line, and again unequal, and a surface is said to be equal and unequal to a surface, and a body is said to be equal and unequal. Number too, and time, and place are said to be equal and unequal. But in other things that are not quantities, it is not easy for equality or inequality to be named; dispositions, therefore, which...
affectiones appellantur, non dicuntur æquales vel inasquales,sed magis similes et dissimiles.Dispositio autem vel affectio est ad aliquam rem accommodatio et applicatio, ut si quis grammaticam legens, qui nondum perdidicit, habet ad eam aliquam dispositionem, id est, ea affectus est, et habet aliquid accommodatum, etquasi propinquum. Possunt autem similiter esse duo dispositi et affecti, aequaliter vero minime, ut duosimiliteressealbi,xequaliterveronon.Namsiquis deduobus similiter albis aequaliter esse albos dicat,recta nominis nunc usurpatione non utitur. Omne enim æquale et inæquale, in mensura et in quantitate perficitu r.Simile vero etdissimile quemadmodum de quantitatenon dicitur,itanecdealia qualibet re nisi de quantitate, recte aequalitaset inaequalitas nuncupantur. Quare proprium est quantitatis æquale et inæquale nominari,sed quoniam de quantitate dictum est, ad relativorum ordinem transeamus.Post quantitatis tractatum tertium praedicamentam de relativis ingreditur,quarerelativa hoc modo diffinit.
They are called affections, and are not said to be equal or unequal, but rather similar and dissimilar. But disposition or affection is an adaptation and application to some thing, as if someone reading grammar, who has not yet fully learned it, has some disposition toward it, that is, is affected by it, and has something adapted and, as it were, near. But two things can similarly be disposed and affected, yet not equally, as for two to be similarly white, but not equally. For if someone says that two similarly white things are equally white, he does not use the proper employment of the name. For everything equal and unequal is perfected in measure and in quantity. But just as similar and dissimilar are not said of quantity, so neither of any other thing except quantity; rightly are equality and inequality spoken of. Wherefore it is proper to quantity to be called equal and unequal. But since quantity has been discussed, let us pass to the order of relatives. After the treatment of quantity, he enters upon the third category, concerning relatives, which he defines as follows.
DE RELATIVIS.
Ad aliquid vero talia dicuntur, quæcunque hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum esse dicuntur,velquomodolibet aliter ad aliud., ut majus id quod est alterius dicitur, aliquo enim majus dicitur, et duplum alterius dicitur hoc ipsum quod est, alicujus enim duplum dicitu1'.Similiter autem et alia quæcunque sun! hujusmodi.
Cur autem de his quæ sunt ad aliquid disserat, omisso interim de qualitate tractatu, hoec causa est, quod posiia quantitate magis minusve esse necesse est.
ON RELATIVES.
Those things are said to be relative which, whatever they are, are said to be of others, or in whatever other way are referred to another: as the greater is said to be what it is of another — for it is said to be greater than something — and the double is said to be what it is of another, for it is said to be the double of something. And similarly also whatever other things are of this sort.
But why he discusses these things which are relative, having for the meantime omitted the treatment of quality, this is the reason: that once quantity has been posited, it is necessary that there be more and less.
Quare cum quantitatem continuo ad aliquid consequatur, recte post quantitatem relativorum series ordinata est.Illudquoqueestincausa,quodsuperius, cum de quantitate tractaret,relativorum mentio facta est,cum de magno parvoque diceretur,ut ergo contin ens et non esset operis interrupta distinctio, ideo quantitate finita de relatione,proposuit.Quod autem ait,ad aliquid vero talia dicuntur,boc monstrat,quod non sicut quantitas per se etsingulariter intelligipotest,eodem quoque modo substantia et qualitas, et unumquodquealiorum praedicamentorum,sicut per se oonstat,ita etiam per se et singulariter intelligitur: sic ad aliquid per se et singulariter capi intellectu non potest,ut dicamus esse ad aliquid singulariter.Quidquid enim in natura relationisagnoscitur, id cum alio necesse est consideretur; cum enim dico dominus,per seipsum nihil est,si servus dicit, Quocirca cum unius relativi nuncupatio mox secum etiax aliud trahat ad aliquid,unum esse per se non potest, atque ideo non dixit Aristoteles: Ad aliquid verotale dicitur,sed,pluralinumero,talia dicuntur,inquit,demonstrans relativorum intelligentiam non in simplicitate,sed in pluralitate consistere; non esse autem quamdam per se relativorum naturam sine conjunctione aliqua alterius subsistente, ipse Aristoteles monstrat,qui dicit ea esse relativa,quæcu nque hoc ipsum quodsuntaliorum dicuntur.Docetenim aliqua conjunctione alterius
Therefore, since quantity is immediately followed by relation, the series of relatives has rightly been arranged after quantity. This too is the reason why, as was mentioned above, when he was treating of quantity, mention was made of relatives, when the great and the small were being discussed — so that, therefore, the treatment might be continuous and the distinction of the work not interrupted, and so after quantity was finished he set forth concerning relation. But what he says, "but relatives are said to be such," shows this: that not as quantity can be understood per se and singly, and in the same way substance and quality and each of the other categories, as it stands per se, so also is it understood per se and singly; thus a relative cannot be grasped per se and singly by the intellect, so that we might say that a relative exists singly. For whatever is recognized in the nature of relation, that must necessarily be considered together with another. For when I say "master," it is nothing per se, if "slave" is not said. Wherefore, since the naming of one relative immediately draws another along with it, it cannot be one per se. And for this reason Aristotle did not say, "but a relative is said to be such," but, in the plural number, "such things are said," demonstrating that the understanding of relatives consists not in simplicity but in plurality. But that there is no nature of relatives per se subsisting without some conjunction of another, Aristotle himself shows, who says that those things are relative, whatever are said to be this very thing that they are of others. For he teaches that by some conjunction of another
relativa formari, hoc ipsum enim quod sunt aliorum dicuntur.Quodenimest dominus,hoc alterius dicitur,id est servi. Sive autem relativa dicamus,sive ad aliquid,nihil interest. Ad aliquid enim dicitur quod ipsum quidem cum perse nihil sit, relatum tamen ad aliud constat,ut dominus,sit desit id ad quod dicitur,id est,servus, noni est,dicitur enim ad servum; manifestum ergo est si servus desit,dominum dici non posse, quare dominus ad aliquiddicitur,id est ad servum.Relativa quoque dicuntur idcirco,quodeorum nuncupatio semper ad aliquid reteratur,ut domini ad servum,quare nihil interest quolibet modo dicatur. Hujusmodi autem diffinitio Platonis esse creditur, quae ab Aristotele paulo posterius emendatur.Relativorum autem alia eisdem casibus referuntur, alia diversis, alia vero omni sunt casu carentia. Quod scilicet monstrans addidit,vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud.Quid autem est, ipsius pene textus sermone monstratur. Cum enim dico dominus servi dominus,ad genitivum casum reddidi nominativum,et rursus ad eumdem si convertero. Dico enim servus domini servus,et hic quoque nominativus ad genitivum relatus est.
Relatives are formed, for this very fact that they are is said of others. For what is a master is said of another, that is, of a slave. But whether we call them relatives or "to something," it makes no difference. For "to something" is said of that which, while in itself it is nothing, is established as related to another, as a master, if that to which it is said is lacking, that is, a slave, is not; for it is said in relation to a slave. It is evident, therefore, that if a slave is lacking, a master cannot be said. Wherefore a master is said in relation to something, that is, to a slave. They are also called relatives for this reason, that their designation is always referred to something, as that of a master to a slave. Wherefore it makes no difference in whatever way it is said. A definition of this kind is believed to be Plato's, which is corrected by Aristotle a little later. But of relatives, some are referred by the same cases, others by different ones, and others are entirely lacking in case. Showing this, he added, "or in any other way whatever to another." What this is is shown almost by the wording of the text itself. For when I say "a master of a slave," I have rendered a nominative in relation to a genitive, and again if I convert it to the same. For I say "a slave of a master," and here too the nominative has been related to a genitive.
Eodem quoque modo sese habet pater filii pater, et filius patris filius,et magister discipuli magister,et discipulus magistri discipulus, hæc ergo id quod sunt,similiter aliorum dicuntur.Nam quod aliorum dicuntur secundum gentiivum redditur casum, alia vero non secundum eumdem casum consequentiam reddunt.Sensus enim ad aliquid est,sensibilis enim rei est sensus. Quod enim sensibile est sentiri potest, quod sentiri potest, sensibile est, et nunc quidem sensus sensibilis rei sensus genitivo accommodatus est. Hujus enim rei sensibilis dictum est,at si convertas, fiet. Sensibilis res sensu sensibilis est. Sed cum sic casui septimo redditur nominativus in hac relatione,quae dicit sensibile sensu sensibile est,non eodem casu quo superius dictum est convertitur.Dicimus enim sensus sensibilis rei sensus est, et hic nominativus redditur ad genitivum. Hæc enim relatio ad septimum casum se aptari non patitur.Scientia quoque scibilis rei scientia est,siquidem hoc scitur quod sciri potest et quod sciripotest,scibile est,sed non eadem ratione, nec ad eumdem casum relatio ista convertitur. Dicimus enim scibilis res scientia scibilis est. Est enim prima relatio ad genitivum,secunda conversio ad septimum.
In the same way too a father is the father of a son, and a son is the son of a father, and a master is the master of a disciple, and a disciple is the disciple of a master. These therefore, that which they are, are similarly said of others. For what are said of others are rendered by the genitive case, but others do not produce their consequence according to the same case. For sense is of something, for sense is of a sensible thing. For what is sensible can be perceived, and what can be perceived is sensible, and now indeed sense is the sense of a sensible thing, fitted to the genitive. For it has been said of this sensible thing, but if you convert it, it will become: a sensible thing is sensible by sense. But when the nominative is thus rendered to the seventh case in this relation which says a sensible thing is sensible by sense, it is not converted in the same case as was said above. For we say sense is the sense of a sensible thing, and here the nominative is rendered to the genitive. For this relation does not allow itself to be fitted to the seventh case. Knowledge also is the knowledge of a knowable thing, since that is known which can be known, and what can be known is knowable, but not by the same account, nor is that relation converted to the same case. For we say a knowable thing is knowable by knowledge. For the first relation is to the genitive, the second conversion to the seventh.
Hæc quoque relatio secundum eosdem convertitur casus,cum dicimus majus minore esse majus3et minus majore esse minus.Duplum quoque et medium relativa sunt,sed et eisdem casibus convertuntur.Duplum namquedimidii duplum est,dimidium vero dupli dimidium est. Sunt autem alia quoque relativa quae ipse sic addidit.
At vero sunt etiam et hæc adaliquid,ut habitus,affectus, scientia, sensus, positio: hæc enim omnia quae dicta sunt,hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum esse dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ad alivd,et non aliud aliquid; habitus enim alicujus habitus dicitur,et disciplina alicujus disciplina, et positio alicujus positio. Similiter autem et alia.
De sensu quidem et scientia dictum est superius, nunc vero de habitu,dispositione,et positione dicendum est. Dispositio est ad aEquam rem mobilis applicatio,ut si quisquam flammae propinquus calcat, ille dispositus dicitur ad calorem,id est,habens aliquam applicationem conjunctionemque ad calorem.
These too, as a relation, are converted according to the same cases, when we say that the greater is greater than the lesser and the lesser is lesser than the greater. Double and half are also relatives, but they too are converted by the same cases. For double is the double of a half, and half is the half of a double. But there are also other relatives which he himself added in this way.
But indeed these too are toward something, such as habit, affection, knowledge, sensation, position; for all these things that have been said are said to be of others with respect to this very thing that they are, or in some other way whatever in relation to another, and not something else; for habit is said to be the habit of someone, and discipline the discipline of someone, and position the position of someone. Similarly also the others.
Concerning sensation and knowledge, indeed, it was said above; but now concerning habit, disposition, and position it must be said. Disposition is the application of a movable thing to a suitable thing, as if anyone standing near a flame is said to be disposed to heat, that is, having some application and conjunction to heat.
Idem veroest affectio quod dispositio,ne novo nomine error oriatur: etideo dispositio cum sit quaedam ad aliam rem conjunctio, vel ab alia affectio, facile mobilis est,celerius etenim permutatur.Habitus autem est dispositionis vel aiTectionis firmaetnon facilepermutabilis accessio,ut si quisquam in sole ambulans fusciorfiat,dispositusad nigredinem dicitur et nigredine affectus.Sin autem illa nigredo fortius et immutabiliter corpus infecerit, habitus nominatur: quocirca habitus estinveterata affectio.Unde omnis habitus dispositio vel affectio est,non autem omnis dispositio vel affectio habitus. Et ne multa dicenda sint,hoc quoque constat in habitu et dispositione, quod habitus immutabilis passio est.dispositio vero non similiter, sed affectio quaedam est,et ad aliquam remconjunctio,quae potest facile permutari.Positio vero est alicujus rei collocatio,ut est statio,sessio, inciinatio,accubatio,et alia hujusmodi. Nam et qui stat quodammodo positus esse dicitur et collocatus, et qui sedet,et qui accumbit, et qui secundum caeteras positiones est positus appellatur. Quocirca et statio et sessio et aceubatio positiones erunt.
The same thing is affection as disposition, lest error arise from a new name; and therefore disposition, since it is a certain conjunction to another thing, or affection from another, is easily movable, for it is changed more swiftly. But habit is the firm and not easily changeable addition of a disposition or affection, as if someone walking in the sun becomes darker, he is said to be disposed to blackness and affected by blackness. If, however, that blackness has more strongly and immutably stained the body, it is called a habit; wherefore habit is an inveterate affection. Hence every habit is a disposition or affection, but not every disposition or affection is a habit. And lest many things must be said, this too is evident in habit and disposition, that habit is an immutable passion, but disposition is not similarly so, but is a certain affection and a conjunction to some thing, which can easily be changed. Position, however, is the placement of some thing, as is standing, sitting, leaning, reclining, and other things of this kind. For he who stands is said in some way to be positioned and placed, and he who sits, and he who reclines, and he who is in accordance with the other positions is called positioned. Wherefore both standing and sitting and reclining will be positions.
Sed quoniam quid essent dictum est,nunc si sunt ad aliquid videamus,habitum relative dici ea res probat, quae aliis quoquerebusdocumento fuit esse relativis, ut est in sensu atque in scientia.Idcirco enim dictum est sensum sensibilis rei esse sensum,quod res sen-, sibilis est quae sentiri potesl; est ergo habitus habilis rei habitus Habilisenim res est quæ haberi potest, illius enim rei habitus est quæ haberi potest.Quocirca erit habitus habilis rei habilus,sed res quoque habilis habitu erit habilis,ipso enim habitu res quas haberi possunt habemus.Dispositio quoque eodem modo. Disposi tio namquedispositas rei dispositio est, et disposita res dispositione disposita est. Caloris enim dispositio calentis,id est,ad calorem dispositi, dispositio est. Eodem modo dispositus ad calorem caloris dispositione dispositus est: velutsi hoc modo sit dictum.omnis affectio affecti affectio est,et omne affectum affectione affectum est.Et calor calentis fit calor, et calens calore fit calidum. Positio quoque relativa est, nam positio positse rei positio ast, et posita res positione posita est,et hoc intelligi convenit secundum priorem habitus et dispositionis modum.IlIa quoque res probat positionem esse ad aliquid, quod ejus species relativæ sunt; statio enim - stantis rei statio est, et qui stat statione stet; etde sessione quidem et de accubitu idem dici; potest.
But since it has been stated what they are, now let us see whether they are relative. The fact that habit is spoken of relatively is proved by that same thing which has also served as evidence for other things being relative, as is the case with sensation and knowledge. For sensation was said to be the sensation of a sensible thing for this reason, that the sensible thing is what can be sensed; therefore habit is the habit of a thing capable of being had. For a thing capable of being had is one that can be had, for it is the habit of that thing which can be had. Wherefore habit will be the habit of a thing capable of being had, but a thing capable of being had will also be capable of being had by habit; for by habit itself we have the things that can be had. Disposition also is in the same way. For disposition is the disposition of a disposed thing, and a disposed thing is disposed by disposition. For the disposition of heat is the disposition of a thing that is warm, that is, of a thing disposed to heat. In the same way, a thing disposed to heat is disposed by the disposition of heat: as if it were said in this way: every affection is the affection of something affected, and everything affected is affected by affection. And heat becomes the heat of a thing that is warm, and a warm thing becomes warm by heat. Position also is relative, for position is the position of a positioned thing, and a positioned thing is positioned by position, and this it is fitting to understand according to the earlier mode of habit and disposition. That fact also proves that position is relative, that its species are relative; for standing is the standing of a standing thing, and one who stands stands by standing; and the same can be said about sitting and reclining.
Quocirca et habitus et dispositio vel affectio,et positio relativa sunt, et haec omnia vel similibus vel dissimilibus convenientibus tamen prædicationi casibus convertuntur. Eorum autem quae secundum casus convertuntur, alia sunt quae eodem nomine praedicantur,alia vero quae dispari: cum enim dico simile simili simile est,et aequale aequali aequale est, et dissimile dissimili dissimile est,eisdem vocabulis eisdemquenominibus tota fit prædicatio. Cum autem diro duplum medii duplum, vel majus minore majus, disparibus vocabulis facta est praedicatio.Quoniam verorelativorum diffinitionem ita proposuit,ut diceret: ad aliquid vero talia dicuntur quaecunque hoc ipsumquod sunt aliorum dicuntur,vel quomodolibet, aliter ad aliud;quid esset hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum dicuntur, jam diximus nunc quid sit; quod ait, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud,requirendum est. Quod ipse Aristoteles convenientibus in ordine probat exemplis; ait enim.
Wherefore both habit and disposition or affection, and position are relative, and all these are converted either with like or unlike terms, provided the predication fits the cases. But of those which are converted according to cases, some are predicated with the same name, others with a different one: for when I say that like is like to like, and equal is equal to equal, and unlike is unlike to unlike, the whole predication is made with the same words and the same names. But when I say that double is double of half, or greater is greater than lesser, the predication is made with different words. But since he proposed the definition of relatives in such a way as to say: "Those things are said to be relative whichsoever are said to be of others, or in any other way to another, this very thing which they are" — what it means that "this very thing which they are they are said to be of others," we have already said; now what it is that he says, "or in any other way to another," must be examined. And this Aristotle proves with fitting examples in order; for he says:
Ad a liquid ergo sunt quæcunque id quod suntaliorum esse dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud, ut mons magnus dicitur ad alium Magnum enim ad aliquid dicitur, et simile aliqui simile dicitur, et omnia talia similiter ad aliquid dicuntur.Sunt autem et accubitus et s'atio et sessio,posiliones qusedam; positio vero ad aliquid dicitur.Accumbere autem,vel stare vel sedere, ipsa quidem non sunt posiliones,denominative vero dicuntur ab iis quæ dictæ sunt positionibus.
Therefore all those things are relative, whatever things are said to be of others with respect to what they are, or in any other way to another, as a mountain is called great in relation to another; for great is said in relation to something, and a similar thing is said to be similar to something, and all such things are similarly said in relation to something. But also reclining and standing and sitting are certain positions; and position is said in relation to something. But to recline, or to stand, or to sit, are not themselves positions, but are denominated from those things which have been called positions.
Quoniam accubitus et statio et sessio positiones dicuntur,et quoniam omnis positio ad aliquid est, sufficienter superius comprehensum est.Nuncvero quid sit quod ait,vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud, expediemus, in relatione per quam dicimus filius patris filius, nulla conjunctio mista est,nisi tantum solacasuum vis prædicationis hujus membra conjungil.Cum autem dico montem magnum,ad alium referens parvum,ita propono,mons magnus,ad montem parvum,et mons parvus ad magnum,hic nullo rum casuum vis: quanquam enim accusativus videtur esse permislus,lamen ille bujus relationis vim nontenet,sed praepositio quae ad accusativum datur; cum enim dico,mons magnus ad parvum montem, praepositiosolaestquae vim hujuscontinetrelationis, utsi quis dicatmagnus mons parvum montem,nihil significet definitum.Quocirca quamvis accusativus casus in hac propositione sit, non tamen hic vim casus tenet,sed praepositio; atque hoc est quod ait, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud,ut quoniam superius secandum casus relationes fieri dixerat,erant autem quaedam relationes quae nullis casibus tenerentur,adjecit hoc, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud, ac si diceret: Omnis relatio aut casibus fit, quod per hoc demonstravit quod ait,quaecunque id quod sunt aliorum dicuntur,aut praeter casus sunt,quod hæc sententia docet, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud, atque haec bactenus.Sed cum positio sit ad aliquid, et sint
Since lying down and standing and sitting are called positions, and since every position is relative, this has been sufficiently comprehended above. But now we shall explain what it is that he says, or in any other way to another. In the relation by which we say that a son is the son of a father, no conjunction is mixed in, except that only the force of the case joins the members of this predication. But when I say "a great mountain," referring it to another, a small one, I set it forth thus: "a great mountain" in relation to "a small mountain," and "a small mountain" in relation to "a great one." Here there is no force of any case; for although the accusative seems to be admitted, nevertheless it does not hold the force of this relation, but the preposition which is given with the accusative. For when I say "a great mountain in relation to a small mountain," the preposition alone is what contains the force of this relation, so that if someone says "a great mountain a small mountain," it signifies nothing definite. Wherefore, although the accusative case is in this proposition, nevertheless it does not here hold the force of the case, but the preposition. And this is what he says, or in any other way to another, since above he had said that relations are made according to cases, but there were certain relations that were not held by any cases, he added this, or in any other way to another, as if he were saying: Every relation either comes about through cases, which he demonstrated through this that he said, whatever things are said to be of others with respect to what they are, or they are apart from cases, which this statement teaches, or in any other way to another. And thus far these things. But since position is relative, and there are
species ejus relativae (sessio enim et statio relativa sunt),sedere et stare nulla relatio est. Stare namque et sedere de statione et sessione denominative dicuntur.Omnis autem denominatio non est id quod est ea res de qua nominatur, ut grammaticus, non enim idem est quod grammatica de qua nominatus est.Quocirca si sedere de sessione,et stare de statione denominativum est, sessio vero et stati relativa sunt,sedere et stare, quæ a relativis denominativa sunt,relativorum genere non tenentur.Et universaliter, quidquid ex quibuslibet positionibus denominatur,illud non ad relativa,sed ad praedicationem quae situs dicitur reduci potest.
Inest autem et contrarietas in relatione, ut virtus vitio contraria est, cum sit utrumque ad aliquid, et scientia inscientiæ. Non autem omnibus relativis inest contrarietas, duplici enim nihil est contrarium, neque triplici, nec talium ulli.
The species of relatives (for sitting and standing are relative), but to sit and to stand are not a relation. For to stand and to sit are denominatively said from standing and sitting. But every denomination is not that which the thing is from which it is named, as a grammarian, for he is not the same as the grammar from which he is named. Wherefore if to sit is denominative from sitting, and to stand from standing, but sitting and standing are relative, to sit and to stand, which are denominative from relatives, are not held by the genus of relatives. And universally, whatever is denominated from any positions whatsoever, that can be reduced not to relatives but to the predication which is called situation.
But contrariety is also present in relation, as virtue is contrary to vice, since each is relative, and knowledge to ignorance. But contrariety is not present in all relatives, for there is nothing contrary to double, nor to triple, nor to any such thing.
Quemadmodum in substantia vel quantitate si eorum esset proprium contraria suscipere rimatus est, ita quoque nunc in relativis de contrarietate considerat,utrum relativorum sit proprium contraria posse suscipere,et quoniam virtus et vitia utraque sunt habitus,virtus enim est mentis affectio in bonam partem,et difficile commutabilis,vitium affectio in malam partem,ipsa quoque difficile mobilis et diuturnitate perdurans: quoniam igitur et vitium et virtus habitus sunt, omnis autem habitus a anquid esse monstratus est (habilis enim rei habitus est)erunt virtus atqne vitium relaliva,sed haec contraria sunt,igilur relativa contraria suscipere non recusant.Sed si dicat quis; quid causae est ut virtutem atque vitium ipsumque habitum paulo post inter qualitates numeret?
Just as in substance or quantity, if it were their property to receive contraries, he examined the matter, so too now in the case of relatives he considers contrariety, whether it is the property of relatives to be able to receive contraries. And since virtue and vices are both habits — for virtue is an affection of the mind toward the good, and difficult to change, while vice is an affection toward the bad, itself also difficult to move and enduring through long continuance — since, therefore, both vice and virtue are habits, and every habit has been shown to be a relative (for a habit is a habit of something), virtue and vice will be relatives. But these are contraries; therefore relatives do not refuse to receive contraries. But if someone should say: what is the reason that he shortly afterward numbers virtue and vice, and habit itself, among qualities?
Atqui ut alia significatione una res diversis generibus supponatur, nihil prohibet, Socrates namque in eo quod est Socrates substantia est,in eo quod pater vel filius ada aliquid; ita ad aliud atque ad aliud ducta prædicatione eamdem rem sub diverso genere nihil poni prohibet.Habitus quoque et virtus et vitium eodem modo est.Potest enim in qualitate poni habitus quod ex eo quales.homines DUn cupentur,hahentes enim dicimus aliquos rei habitus retinentes.Virtus quoque qualitas est idcirco quod exeo boni hominesdicunturetsecundumillam qualitatem,id est bonitatem,quales homines,id est bonos homines nuncupamus; similiter autem et vitium.Ipse quoque habitus ad aliam prædicationem dictus fil iterum relalivus: quod enim habi tus habilis rei habitus est, ad aliquid est; et quod alicujus virtus est,ad aliquid virtus est, et quod alicujus vitium est, ad aliquid quoqueipsum est. Ergo nihil impedit easdem res ad aliud atque aliud versasdiversae praedicationi substitui.Ipsumvero ad aliquid præter ullum aliud praedicamentum intelligere non possumus,ut patrem et filium, dominum et servum secundum substantiam consideramus.Nam et qui dominus et qui servus est, substantia est. Duplum et triplum secundum quantitatem5haecenim in quantitate consistunt, scientia vero et inscientia secundum qualitatem.
But nothing prevents one and the same thing from being placed under different categories according to a different signification. For Socrates, in that he is Socrates, is a substance, but in that he is a father or a son, he is a relative. Thus, when predication is drawn now to one thing and now to another, nothing prevents the same thing from being placed under a different category. Habit also, and virtue and vice, are in the same way. For habit can be placed in quality, because from it men are said to be of a certain sort; for we say that some are "having" when they retain a habit of a thing. Virtue also is a quality, because from it men are said to be good, and according to that quality, that is, goodness, we call men of a certain sort, that is, good men; and similarly also vice. But habit itself, when spoken in relation to another predication, will again be relative; for the habit of a thing is the habit of something habitable, and is relative; and because virtue is of someone, virtue is relative; and because vice is of someone, it too is relative. Therefore nothing prevents the same things, turned now to one thing and now to another, from being placed under a different predication. But we cannot understand "relative" itself apart from any other category, as when we consider father and son, master and slave according to substance. For he who is master and he who is slave is a substance. Double and triple are according to quantity; for these consist in quantity. Knowledge, however, and ignorance are according to quality.
Secundum enim has quales dicimur, scientes scilicet atque inscii.Quocirca quoniam praeter aliud praedicamentum per se relativa nullus intelliget,secundum ea praedicamenta de quibus intelligitur relatio,secundumeadiciturcontrariapossesuscipere: ut Socrates ipsequidemsubstantiaest,sed substantia contrarium non recipit. Pater vero atque filius secundum substantiam praedicatur, non est enim pater atque filius nisi in substantia sit. Quocirca quoniam secundum substantiam dicitur, contrarietate caret.Rureuaduplumveldimidium secundum quantitatem dicitur,quantitas vero contraria non habere monstrata est; igitur nec du plum atque dimidium contrariis pugnat.Qualitas vero recipit contrarietatem; bonum enim et malum secundum qualitatem opponuntur,bonum igitur et malum contrariis non carent. Igitur secundum quæ prcedicamenta relativa dicuntur, si illa suscipiunt contraria,et relatio suscipit.
For according to these we are called such, namely knowing and unknowing. Wherefore, since no one will understand relatives by themselves apart from another category, according to those categories through which relation is understood, it is said that they can receive contraries: for Socrates himself is indeed a substance, but substance does not receive a contrary. But father and son are predicated according to substance, for one is not father and son unless he be in substance. Wherefore, since it is said according to substance, it lacks contrariety. Again, double or half is said according to quantity, but quantity has been shown to have no contrary; therefore neither does double and half contend with contraries. But quality does receive contrariety; for good and evil are opposed according to quality, therefore good and evil do not lack contraries. Therefore, according to those categories in which relatives are said, if they receive contraries, relation also receives them.
Sin vero ilia prius repudiant contrarietatem, nec illud ad aliquid quod secundum ea dicitur ulla Unquam contrarietate dividitur.Quare habere contraria relationis proprium non est,Dam neque in sola relatione est (habet enim hoc quoque qualitas),nec in omnibus ad aliquid considerari potest.Quae enim secundum talia praedicamenta dicuntur ad aliquid quae nonrecipiunt contrarietatem,Utsecundumsubstantiam pater et filius,vel secundum quantitatem duplumetmedium,in talibus relativis contraria nullo modo reperiuntur.Quod vero neque soli neque omnibus inest, hoc proprium non est; non est igilur proprium relationis habere contraria.
Videntur autem magis et minus relativa suscipere: simile enim et dissimile magis et minus dicitur, et æquale et inæquale magis et minus diciturycum utrumque sit relativum,simile enim alicui simile diciturtet inæquale alicui inæquale. Non autem omnia relativa suscipiunt magis et minus, duplex enim non dicitur magis et minus, duplex, nec talium ullum.
But if those categories previously rejected contrariety, neither is that which is said in relation to something according to them ever divided by any contrariety. Wherefore to have contraries is not a property of relation, since it is not in relation alone (for quality also has this), nor can it be considered in all relatives. For those things which are said in relation to something according to such categories as do not receive contrariety—as according to substance father and son, or according to quantity double and half—in such relatives contraries are in no way found. But what is present neither in relation alone nor in all relatives, this is not a property; therefore to have contraries is not a property of relation.
But relatives seem rather to admit more and less: for like and unlike are said more and less, and equal and unequal are said more and less, since each is a relative; for like is said to be like to something, and unequal unequal to something. But not all relatives admit more and less; for double is not said more and less double, nor is any such thing.
Quaeritur nunc an relationis sitpropriumsuscipere magis minuti; sed in hoc ilIa ratio servatur,quemadmodum in contrariis dictum est. Quoniam quaecunque secundum ea dicuntur quae contraria non recipiunt, insa quoque contrariis carent.In hoc vera cum secundum quantitatem dicatur aequale etinaequale,suscipit et magis etminus.Diciturenim magis æquale et minus aequale.Eodem modo et simile,magis simile et minus simile dicitur.Sed si forte quis dicat: cur cum quantitatissitdici æquale et inæquale, etquantitas magis atque minus non suscipiat,sequale et inæquale et intensione crescat et remissione minuatur? Dicendum estquoniam quemadmodum substantia ipsa per se in eo quod substantia est non est proprium,ipsi tamen proprium est contraria posse suscipere, ita etin quantitate consideratur,proprium enim est, non hoc ipsum cujus est proprium, sed quaedam alia extrinsecus qualitaspassioque.Passio enim qualitatis est, et quasdam qualitas aequale et • inaequale dici potest: quod quomam non est laem proprium quod estillud cujus est proprium, et æquale vel inaequale dici, non est quantitas cujus est proprium, sed quædam qualitas et passio quantitatis. Haec'autem dicitur ad aliquid,ipsum enim quod est alteriusdicitur,aequaleenim aequali æquale dicimus, et similiter simile similis simile.
It is asked now whether it is a property of relation to admit of more and less; but in this the same principle is preserved as was stated in the case of contraries. For whatever things are said according to those things which do not receive contraries, these things themselves also lack contraries. But in this case, since equal and unequal are said according to quantity, it admits of more and less. For more equal and less equal are said. In the same way also similar, more similar and less similar are said. But if perhaps someone should say: why, since equal and unequal are said according to quantity, does quantity not admit of more and less, while equal and unequal increase by intensification and diminish by remission? It must be said that just as substance itself through itself, in that which it is substance, is not a property, yet it is a property of it to be able to receive contraries, so also it is considered in quantity; for it is a property, not this very thing of which it is a property, but a certain other extrinsic quality and affection. For it is an affection of quality, and according to a certain quality equal and unequal can be said; which, since it is not the same property as that of which it is a property, so also to be called equal or unequal is not quantity, of which it is a property, but a certain quality and affection of quantity. But these are said in relation to something; for that which is of another is itself said, for we say equal is equal to equal, and similarly similar is similar to similar.
Sed non capiunt omnia relativa magis et minus.Nullus enim potest dicere magis et minus duplum esse aliquid: nam sive denarius ad quinarium comparetur, sive quaternarius ad binarium,aequeuterque duplus est,aeque uterque medietas. Qualitas quoque recipit magis et minus, dicimus enim magis album et minus album.Quare quoniam nequeomni relationi nequesoli inest suscipere magis et minus, et per qualitatem relatio suscipit et magis et minus,reJationis proprium non est suscipere magis et minus.
Omnia autem relativa ad convertentia dicuntur, ut servus domini, et dominus servi dominus, et duplum dimidii duplum,et dimidium dupli dimidium, et majus minoremajus,et minus majore minus, similiter autem et in aliis. Sed cusu aliquoties differunt secundum locutionem, ut scientia scibilis rei scientia dicitur,et scibile scientia scibile, et sensus sensibilis sensus,et sensibile sensu sensibile.
But not all relatives admit of more and less. For no one can say that something is more or less double; for whether a ten is compared to a five, or a four to a two, each is equally double, each equally a half. Quality also admits of more and less, for we say more white and less white. Therefore, since it belongs neither to every relation nor to relation alone to admit of more and less, and relation admits of more and less through quality, it is not a property of relation to admit of more and less.
But all relatives are said in relation to correlatives, as slave to master, and master to slave, and double to half, and half to double, and greater to lesser, and lesser to greater, and similarly in other cases. But sometimes they differ in mode of expression, as knowledge is said to be knowledge of a knowable thing, and a knowable thing is knowable by knowledge, and perception is perception of a perceptible thing, and a perceptible thing is perceptible by perception.
Clara haec est proponentis et non involuta sententia.Dicit enim omnia relativa ad convertentia dici, quod ipse propriis patefecit exemplis.Omne enim ad aliquid ita ad aliud praedicatur.utillud ad quod praedicatur videatur posse converti,et hoc est quod ait: Omnia relativa ad convertenlia dicuntur.
This is the clear and straightforward opinion of the one who proposes it. For he says that all relatives are spoken of in relation to things that convert, which he himself made evident by his own examples. For everything that is said in relation to something is predicated of another in such a way that that to which it is predicated seems able to be converted, and this is what he says: all relatives are spoken of in relation to things that convert.
Lonverti autem est,ut si prima res dicitur ad secundam,secunda rursus dicatur ad primam.Ponatur enim primus pater,secundus filius,et dicatur hoc modo,pater filii pater est; id rursus converti potest, ut prius ponamus filium,et talis sit praadicatio.filius patris filius.Ergopaterad talem dicitur,id est ad filium qui convertitur: et filius qui dicitur ad patrem, ad talem rem dicitur,quae ipsa quoque convertitur,ut de filio praedicetur.Omniaque relativa hoc modo sunt,omne enimrelativumadtalealiquid praedicaturquodipsum in praedicatione converti possit.Sed necomniadicuntur secundum eamdem vocis prolationem.Alia enini, sunt quae eisdem casibus convertuntur, ut dictum est, pater enim filii pater est,et filius patris filius est.Aliavero quae non eisdem,ut scientia scibilis rei scientia est: hic genitivus est medius.Scibile aulem scientia scibile est: hic septimus praedicationem tenet.Alia vero nullo (ut supra dictum est) casu conjuncta sibimet convertuntur, ut mons magnus ad parvum dicitur,et parvus ad magnum.Ergo omnia relativa ad convertentia dicuntur,quamvis non eisdem casibus convertantur,quod ipse ait dicens: Sed casu aliquoties differunt secundum locutionem. Quod vero addidit nimis diligenter adjectum est.
To convert, however, is when the first thing is said in relation to the second, and the second in turn is said in relation to the first. For let the first be placed as father, the second as son, and let it be said in this way: the father is father of the son; this in turn can be converted, so that we place the son first, and the predication is such: the son is son of the father. Therefore the father is said in relation to such a thing, that is, to the son, which converts; and the son, who is said in relation to the father, is said in relation to such a thing, which itself also converts, so that it is predicated of the son. And all relatives are in this way, for every relative is predicated in relation to something such that it can itself be converted in predication. But they are not all said according to the same pronunciation of the word. For some are converted with the same cases, as was said: for the father is father of the son, and the son is son of the father. Others, however, are not converted with the same cases, as knowledge is knowledge of a knowable thing: here the genitive is in the middle. But the knowable is knowable by knowledge: here the seventh case holds the predication. Others, however, are converted when joined to each other by no case, as was said above: as a mountain is said to be great in relation to a small one, and small in relation to a great one. Therefore all relatives are said in relation to things that convert, although they are not converted with the same cases, which he himself says when he states: But sometimes they differ in case according to the manner of speaking. But what he added has been added with excessive care.
At veru aliquoties non videbitur converti, nisiconvenienter ad quod dicitur assignetur. Si peccet is qui ossignat, ut ala si assignetur avis, non convertitur avis alæ, neque enim prius convenienterassignatum est,alaavis;■ neque enim in eo quod avis est,in eo avis ala dicitur, sed in eo quod alata est. Multorum enim aliorum alæ sunt,quæ non sunt aues: quare si assignetur conveniell' ter,convertitur,ut ala alati ala,et alatum ala alatum. Aliquoties autem forsitan et nomina fingere necesse erit, si non fuerit positum nomen, et ad quod convenienter assignetur,ut remus, si navis assignetur,non erit conveniens assignatio.Neque enim in eo quod est navis,in eo ejus remus dicitur, sunt enim naves quarum remi non sunt: quare non convertitur,navis enim non dicitur remi navis.Sed forte convenientior assignatio erit,si sic quodammoqo assignetue,remus remitae rei remus,aut aliquo modo aliter: nomen enim non est positum;convertitur autem si convenienter assignetut, remilum enim remo remitum est. Similiter autem et in aliis,ut caput, convenientius assignatur capitati,quam si animalisassignetur;neque enim in eo quodanimal est, caput habet, multa enim sunt animalia quae capita non habent.
But sometimes it will not seem to convert unless it is assigned in relation to something fitting. If the one who assigns makes a mistake, as if wing is assigned to bird, bird does not convert with wing; for wing was not fittingly assigned to bird in the first place. For it is not insofar as it is a bird that wing is said of it, but insofar as it is winged. For there are wings of many other things that are not birds. Therefore, if it is assigned fittingly, it converts, as wing of a winged thing, and winged thing of wing. But sometimes it will perhaps even be necessary to coin names, if no name has been established, and for that to which it may be fittingly assigned. For example, if oar is assigned to ship, the assignment will not be fitting. For it is not insofar as it is a ship that oar is said of it; for there are ships that have no oars. Therefore it does not convert, for ship is not said to be ship of oar. But perhaps the assignment will be more fitting if it is assigned somehow thus: oar of an oared thing, or in some other way. For no name has been established. But it converts if it is assigned fittingly; for an oared thing is oared by an oar. Similarly also in other cases, as head is more fittingly assigned to a headed thing than if it is assigned to animal. For it is not insofar as it is an animal that it has a head, for many animals are without heads.
Supra jam de relativorum conversione proposuit, dixitque quidquid est ad aliquid,vel eisdem casibus vel dissimilibus,tamen ad convertentiadici:hocvero idcircoevenit quod omne ad aliquid esse suum ex alteriushabitudineetcomparationetrabit;quodsi utraque secundum ad aliquid sint opposita,ad aliquid nuncu panturæ quam vim vocabuli nuncu pationemque sortita.Mam si pater et filius utrique ad aliquid sunt, si pater ad filium praedicatur,quoniam ad aliquid est, filius quoque, quia ad aliquid est,ad quoddam aliud Draedicabitur.sed nullius est filius nisi patris. Ergo X ' hæc vocabula ex alterutra nuncupatione principium sumunt.Quocirca quae sibi invicem substantiam donant,recte ad se invicem praedicantur,ethoc quidem in omnibus relativis constatintelligi.Sed hujusmodi conversio non uno modo, nec quomodolibet fieri potest; nisi enim convenienter quaelibet iila res ad id quod dicitur prsedicetur,hujusmodi conversio nulla ratione convertitur. Cum enim dicaturcaputanimalis caput dici non potest,antmal capitis animal.Ergo ita redditum nulla ratione convertitur. Atque hoc est quod ait,non videri in omnibus relativis posse converti,nisi convenienter ad quod dicitur assignetur.
He has already set forth above concerning the conversion of relatives, and said that whatever is in relation to something is predicated as convertible either with the same cases or with dissimilar ones. But this happens for the reason that every being in relation draws its existence from the condition and comparison of another. But if both are opposites according to relation, they are called relatives no less than the force and naming of the word has allotted. For if father and son are both relatives, if father is predicated in relation to son, since he is a relative, son also, since he is a relative, will be predicated in relation to something else. But he is no one's son except his father's. Therefore these terms take their beginning from the naming of each other. Wherefore those things which grant substance to each other are rightly predicated in relation to each other, and this indeed holds to be understood in all relatives. But conversion of this kind cannot come about in one way, nor in any chance manner; for unless any given thing is predicated fittingly in relation to that to which it is said, conversion of this kind is in no way converted. For when head of an animal is said, animal of a head cannot be said. Therefore, thus rendered back, it is in no way converted. And this is what he says: that it does not seem possible in all relatives to convert, unless it is assigned fittingly in relation to that to which it is said.
Si enim peccet is qui assignat, ut non convenientem prædicationem faciat,conversio non procedit; quæ tamen estpsa convenientia qua possint semper rel ativa converti, hujusmodi est.-Cum enim dico alam avis esse alam,non convertitur, ut avis alae sit avis, idcirco quod non est convenienter facta praedicatio: non enim in eo quod avis est,in eo habet aiam;multa. enim suntquae habent alam,aves tamen nullo modo nominantur,ut apes sunt et vespertiliones, et quidquid est aliud tale,habere quidem dicimus alas, eas tamen aves non dicimus.Quare non in eo quod avis est, in eo est ejus ala, sed in eo quod alata est; idcirco enim alamhabet,quoniam alataest:etquidquid fuerit alatum,alas habebit.Quare ita facta praedicatio illam conversionem retinet atque custodit, ala enim alati ala est, et alatum ala alatum est. Eodem quoque modo de capite: si quis dicat caput animalis est caput,non convenienter vim praedicationis aptabit; non enim in eo quod animal est,in eo habet caput,multa enim sunt animalia quae capite carenl,ut ostrea,et conchylia,et caetera hujusmodi.Igitur dicendum estcaputcapilatas rei esse caput,et capitatam rem capite esse capilatam.Videsne quemadmodum conveniens praedicatio alternam in se vocabuli conversionem reversionemque reddiderit? Ita quoque speculandum est et de alio exemplo quod ipse proposuit.
For if he who assigns it errs, so as to make a predication that is not fitting, the conversion does not proceed; yet the very fittingness by which relatives can always be converted is of this sort. For when I say that a wing is a bird's wing, it is not converted so that a bird is a wing's bird, for the reason that the predication has not been made fittingly; for in that it is a bird, it does not have a wing. For there are many things that have a wing, yet are in no way called birds, as bees are, and bats, and whatever else is of this sort; we say indeed that they have wings, yet we do not call them birds. Wherefore it is not in that it is a bird that it has its wing, but in that it is winged; for it has a wing because it is winged, and whatever is winged will have wings. Wherefore a predication made in this way retains and preserves that conversion: for a wing is the wing of a winged thing, and a winged thing is winged by a wing. In the same way also concerning the head: if someone says that a head is the head of an animal, he will not fittingly adapt the force of the predication; for it is not in that it is an animal that it has a head, for many animals are without a head, as oysters, and shellfish, and others of this sort. Therefore it must be said that a head is the head of a headed thing, and that a headed thing is headed by a head. Do you see how a fitting predication has rendered the alternate conversion and reversion of the term within itself? In this way too one must consider also the other example that he himself proposed.
Remus enim si navis remus dicatur, nullo modo convertitur,ut navis remi navis esse nominetur.Sunt enim quaedam naves quae remis penitus non utuntur,ut lintres quas solo subigunt conto, et idcirco non convertitur. Dicendum est igitur remum remitae rei esse remum,et remitam rem remo esse remitam.Necesse quoque erit nomen fingere, si positum non sit:nam quemadmodum filius patris filius, et pater filii pater,reciproca conversione praedicantur,et utrumque nomen in usu est, sic, si defuerit nomen,ipse tibi aliquid debebis effingere, ut in eo quod est,ala alati ala;alatum enim noviter factum est,et nunquam antedictum. Quo autem modo possimusnominaipsaconfingere,quoniam necessarium esse posuimus, artem quoquecomponendisequenti ordine demonstremus. Sed hoc faciendum est, si prius illud purgavero,quod quidam contra Aristotelem culpandi studio ponunt. Aiunt enim non esse solius relationis ad convertentiam dici Si quis enim sic dicat: cum sol super terram est,dies est,et cum dies est super terram,sol est, recipiunt haec quoque conversionem, quae confessae a relativorum definitione segregata sunt.Non igitur in solis relativis,inquiunt,caditista conversio.Sed Jaroblicusduashujus rei protulit solutiones,unam pervacuam,aliam vero perforem.
For if an oar is called the oar of a ship, it is in no way converted, so that the ship is said to be the ship of the oar. For there are certain ships that do not use oars at all, such as skiffs which they propel with a pole alone, and for this reason it is not converted. It must therefore be said that an oar is the oar of a thing oared, and that a thing oared is oared by an oar. It will also be necessary to coin a name, if one has not been established; for just as a son is called the son of a father, and a father the father of a son, by reciprocal conversion, and each name is in use, so, if a name is lacking, you will yourself have to fashion something for yourself, as in the case of a wing: the wing of a winged thing; for "winged" has been newly made and was never said before. But in what way we can coin the names themselves, since we have laid down that it is necessary, let us also demonstrate the art of composing them in the following order. But this must be done if I first clear away that objection which certain people, out of a zeal for finding fault, raise against Aristotle. For they say that conversion does not belong to relation alone. For if someone says thus: when the sun is above the earth, it is day, and when it is day, the sun is above the earth, these too admit of conversion, which are admittedly separated from the definition of relatives. Therefore, they say, this conversion does not fall only under relatives. But Iamblichus brought forth two solutions of this matter, one altogether worthless, the other truly sound.
Ait enim nihil officere ad Aristotelis sententiam, si et alia convertantur; non enim inquit Aristoteles solis hoc relativis esse,sed,omnibus namque hoc relativis inest,nec ulla ratione negari potest: quocirca quoniam non dixiL Aristoteles solis hoc inesse relativis,illorum quæstio hujus praeclari philosophi sententiam non moratur. Sed hoc potius accidentis est quam natune, et ad aliud quodammodo refugium concurrentis potius quamexipsaAristotelis auctoritate dictorum ejus aliquod propugnacu- lum comparantis.Aliam vero attulit causam prorsus gravem: a:t enim proprium esse hoc relativorum, non secundum suamnuncupationem,sed secundum aliquamhabitudinem,eodem modoconverti.Quienim dicit cum sol est super terram,dies est,et cum dies est, sol est superterram: nullam habitudinem monstrat,sed tantummodo consequentiam ostendit.Consequiturenim super terram solem esse cum dies est, etcum sol superterram cursus agat,diem esse;cum vero aliquis dicit filius patris filius,et pater filii pater, habitudinem et comparationem et quodammodo continentia mutrorumque declarat.Atque hoc quoque in alia quavis relatione spectare Iicet.Quocirca quoniam omnia ad aliquid secundum quamdam ad se invicem habitudinem continentiamque dicuntur,se-. cundum continentiam quoque ethabitudinern eorum conversio facienda est,qua in re nos quoque graviter dicentis Jamblici auctoritati concedimus.
For he says that it makes no difference to Aristotle's view if other things are also converted; for Aristotle, he says, did not say that this belongs to relatives alone, but it belongs to all relatives, nor can it be denied on any account. Wherefore, since Aristotle did not say that this belongs to relatives alone, their question does not hinder the view of this most illustrious philosopher. But this is rather a matter of accident than of nature, and one who has recourse somehow to another refuge, rather than from the authority of Aristotle himself, is seeking some defense from his words. But he brought forward another thoroughly weighty cause: for he says that it is proper to relatives to be converted in the same way, not according to their own designation, but according to some relation. For one who says, when the sun is above the earth, it is day, and when it is day, the sun is above the earth, shows no relation, but only displays a consequence. For it follows that the sun is above the earth when it is day, and when the sun runs its course above the earth, that it is day. But when someone says that a son is the son of a father, and a father is the father of a son, he declares a relation and a comparison and, in a certain way, a mutual containment. And this too one may observe in any other relation whatsoever. Wherefore, since all things that are said in relation to something are said according to a certain relation and containment toward each other, the conversion of them must also be made according to containment and relation. In this matter we too yield weightily to the authority of Iamblichus, who says this.
Nunc vero quaesitars fingendi nomina sicubi desunt,dicendum videtur,quam ipse Aristoteles his verbis tradit.
Sic autem fortasse quis facile sumet in quibus nomen est positum, si ab his quæ prima sunt his ad quæ convertuntur nomina ponat, ut in his quæ dicta sunt, ab ala alatum, a remo remitum. Omnia ergo quæ ad aliquid dicuntur, si convenienter assignentur, ad conver tentiam dicuntur.
Quoniam sunt quae ita dicuntur ad aliquid,ut nisi convenienteraptenturconversio nulla sit,in omnibus autem ad aliquid conversionem exspectari necesse est,quae sit hæc convenientia, et quemadmodum assignari relationes oporteat,ipse demonstrat. Si quid enimdicitur ad aliquid quod converti non possit,ab ipso quod dicitur si denominatio fit,mox convertitur: utaladicitur avis,etrectaquidemesth ahæc prædicatio, sed ad naturamrelationisincongrua.Nuncigiturquoniam ici non potest avis alæ,dicitur autem ala avis, ab ipsa praedicatione,quae ad aliud praedicatur,si denominatio fit, mox redit consueta conversio relativis. Nam cum dicitur ala avis, ut dicatur avis alæ,inconveniens est; si vero ex ala fiat denominatio,ut dicatur ala alati,sic conversio manet. Alatum enim ala alatum esse dicimus,sicut alam alati esse alam.
But now, if at any point names for forming [relations] are lacking, it seems we must say what Aristotle himself hands down in these words.
Perhaps, then, one may easily supply [a name] in those cases where a name has been posited, if from the things that are primary he assigns names to those to which they are converted, as in the cases already mentioned: from wing, winged; from oar, oared. Therefore all things that are said in relation to something, if they are assigned appropriately, are said in relation to a convertible.
Since there are things that are said in relation to something in such a way that, unless they are fitted appropriately, there is no conversion, yet in all relatives a conversion must be expected, he himself shows what this appropriateness is and how relations ought to be assigned. For if anything is said in relation to something that cannot be converted, and a denomination is made from that very thing which is said, it is at once converted: for example, a bird is said [to be] of a wing, and this predication is indeed correct, but incongruous with the nature of the relation. Now, therefore, since a bird cannot [be said] of a wing, but a wing is said [to be] of a bird, if a denomination is made from that very predication which is predicated in relation to another, the customary conversion for relatives at once returns. For when a wing is said [to be] of a bird, it is incongruous that a bird be said [to be] of a wing; but if a denomination is made from wing, so that it be said "wing of a winged thing," thus the conversion remains. For we say that a winged thing is winged by a wing, just as we say that a wing is the wing of a winged thing.
Et hoc idem in remo evenit.Nam quoniam remus navis dicitur, et remi navis ut sit ulla ratione convertitur,si ex remo sitdenominatio,statim reddit ex more conversio.Dicimus enim esse remum remitas rei esse remum,ethocilli convertitur.Remita enimres remo remita est. Ergo ex eo quod prius dicitur, nomen fingendum est, sicut ex eo quod est ala, quoniam prius ad avem non dicitur, quia avis ad alam non convertitur,denominatio facta est, ut diceretur alatum. Atque hoc est quod ait, si ab his quae prima sunt his ad quae convertuntur nomina ponantur. Prima namque praedicatio est ab ala.Dicimus enim alam avis, et hoc quaerimus ut ad alam praedicatio convertatur. Ergo ab eo quod prius dicitur, illi ad quod convertitur nomen fingendum est, ut ea quae prius dicitur ala, rei ad quam convertitur sic ut convenienter aptetur,fingendum est nomen alatum, quod ipsum ex ala denominatum est,atque hoc idem et in cæteris relativis licet intelligi.
And the same thing happens in the case of the oar. For since an oar is said to be of a ship, and it is converted in some way so that the ship is of the oar, if the denomination is from the oar, the conversion is immediately rendered according to custom. For we say that an oar is an oar-thing of the thing that is an oar, and this is converted to it. For a thing that is oar-related is oar-related by an oar. Therefore, from that which is said prior, a name must be fashioned, just as from that which is a wing, since it is not said prior in relation to a bird, because a bird is not converted to a wing, a denomination has been made, so that it might be called winged. And this is what he says: if names are assigned from those things which are first to those to which they are converted. For the predication is first from the wing. For we say a wing of a bird, and this we seek, that the predication be converted to the wing. Therefore, from that which is said prior, a name must be fashioned for that to which it is converted, so that for that which is said prior, namely the wing, a name must be fashioned, namely winged, so that it may be suitably fitted to the thing to which it is converted, which itself is denominated from the wing, and this same thing may also be understood in the other relatives.
Nam si ad quodlibet aliud assignentur, et non ad illud ad quod dicitur, non convertuntur. Dico autem quoniam nec eorum quæ indubitanter convertibilia dicuntur,etquibusnomina posita sunt,ullum convertitur, si ad aliquid eorum quæ sunt accidentia assignentur,et non ad ea ad quas dicuntur: ut servus, si domini non assignetur servus, sedhominis,vel bipedisyaut alicujus taliumtnon convertitur. Non enim et conveniens assignatio.
Aliud quoque argumentum dedit, si relatione convenienter non reddantur, non posse converti. Fortasse enim quis dicat alam et caput non esse ad ahquid: quod si quis hoc quoque concedat,illud tamen nuJlus negare poterit,quin servus aut filiussemper ad aliud praedicentur. Ergo in hac quoque re, quae confessae relativa est, perit relationis propria conversio, si non convenienter et ad illud ad quod proprie dicitur assignetur.Nam cum sit ad aliquid servus,nisi domini reddatur, id est, ad id ad quod convenienter diciturjnullahacratione conversio est. Dicatur ergo servus hominis,vel servus bipedis, non convertitur, ut dicat quis bipedem esse servi, aut hominem esse servi. Eodem quoque modo de filio. Ergo quaecunque sunt extrinsecus, si ad ea id quod est ad aliquid praedicetur, nulla conversio est.
For if they are assigned to anything else whatever, and not to that to which they are said [to belong], they are not converted. I say, moreover, that not even of those things which are said to be indisputably convertible, and for which names have been assigned, is any one converted, if they are assigned to any of those things which are accidents, and not to those to which they are said [to belong]: as a slave, if a slave is not assigned to a master, but to a man, or to a biped, or to some such thing, is not converted. For neither is the assignment fitting.
He also gave another argument, that if relatives are not rendered fittingly, they cannot be converted. For perhaps someone might say that a wing and a head are not relative. But even if someone grants this too, nevertheless no one will be able to deny that a slave or a son is always predicated in relation to something else. Therefore in this matter too, which is admittedly relative, the proper conversion of relation is lost, if it is not assigned fittingly and to that to which it is properly said [to belong]. For since a slave is relative, unless he is rendered as of a master, that is, in relation to that to which he is fittingly said [to belong], by no reasoning is there conversion here. Let a slave, then, be called of a man, or a slave of a biped: it is not converted, so that someone may say that a biped is of a slave, or that a man is of a slave. In the same way also concerning a son. Therefore, whatever things are external, if that which is relative is predicated of them, there is no conversion.
Quod autem ait accidentia,non quod homo sit accidens,aut bipes,differentia hominis accidenter insit, sed interdum consuetudinis Aristotelicae estuae secundo loco et extrinsecus praedicantur, dicere secundum accidens prædicari. Servus autem prius ad hominem est, secundo vero loco ad hominem. Idcirco enim quod dominus homo est,ideo servus ad hominem dicitur. Et idcirco quia dominus bipes est, ideo servus bipedis dicitur. Ergo secundum accidens dixit secundo loco, volens ostendere extraneam et non convenientem fieri praedicationem,si quis ad hominem vel hipedem servum et non ad dominum referat.Manifestumigitur est quoniam in his quoque quae confessae sunt ad aliquid, et in quibus nomina sunt. Nomen enim et servi et domini in usu est,non quemadmodum in remo aut in ala, ubi neque alatum neque remitum nomen fuit, nisi ipse fingeret Aristoteles. Cum ergo hæc ita sint, manifestum est quoniam si non convenienter aptarentur, conversionem praedicatio non teneret.
But what he says about accidents—not that man is an accident, or that biped, a differentia of man, inheres in man accidentally, but that sometimes, by the usage of Aristotle, things are predicated in the second place and extrinsically, he calls being predicated according to accident. Now a slave is first in relation to man, but in the second place in relation to man. For because the master is a man, therefore a slave is said [to be] of a man. And because the master is biped, therefore a slave is said [to be] of a biped. Therefore he said "according to accident" and "in the second place," wishing to show that the predication becomes extraneous and unsuitable if one refers a slave to man or to biped and not to the master. It is evident, therefore, that this holds also in those things which are confessed to be relative, and in which there are names. For the name of both slave and master is in use, not as in the case of the oar or the wing, where neither "winged" nor "oared" was a name, unless Aristotle himself coined it. Since these things are so, it is evident that if they were not suitably fitted together, the predication would not hold its conversion.
Amplius si convenienter assignetur id ad quod dicitur, omnibus aliis circum scriptis quæcunque accidentia sunt relicto solo illo ad quod assignatum est, semper ad ipsum convenienter dicitur ut si servus dicatur ad dominum. circumscriptis aliis omnibus quæsunt accidentiadomino,ul esse bipedem,lJel scientiæ susceptibilem, vel hominemjreliciosolo domino,semper servus dicetur ad ipsum, servus enim domini servus dicitur.Si autem non convenienter reddatur id ad quod dicitur, circumscriptis omnibus aliis, relictoque illo solo ad quod redditum est, non dicetur ad aliud: assignetur enim servus hominis, et ala avis, circum scribaturque ab homine esse dominum, non amplius servus ad hominem dicetur, cum enim dominus non sit, servus non est. Similiter autem et de ave: adimatur ab ea alatam esse, non erit arnplius ala ad aliquid, cum enim non [sit alatum, nec ala erit alicujus. Quare oportet assignare id ad quod convenienter dicitur. Ac si sit nomen positum, facilis erit assignatio; sin autem non sil, fortasse erit necessarium fingere nomen; si sic autem redduntur, manifestum est, quoniam omnia relativa conversim dicentur.
Furthermore, if that to which something is said to be related is assigned appropriately, then when all other things are excluded, whatever accidents there are, with only that to which it has been assigned left remaining, it is always said appropriately in relation to it—as if a slave is said to be related to a master. When all other things that are accidents of the master have been excluded—such as being biped, or capable of knowledge, or a human being—with only the master left remaining, a slave will always be said in relation to him; for a slave is said to be the slave of a master. But if that to which it is said to be related is not rendered appropriately, then when all other things have been excluded and only that to which it has been rendered is left remaining, it will not be said in relation to another. For let a slave be assigned to a human being, and a wing to a bird, and let being a master be excluded from the human being: a slave will no longer be said in relation to a human being, for when there is no master, there is no slave. Similarly also concerning the bird: let being winged be taken away from it, and a wing will no longer be relative to something, for when it is not winged, neither will a wing be anyone's. Therefore one must assign that to which something is appropriately said to be related. And if a name has been established, the assignment will be easy; but if not, perhaps it will be necessary to invent a name. If these things are rendered in this way, however, it is clear that all relatives will be spoken of by conversion.
Aliud quoque validum addidit argumentum in omni secundum ad aliquid,prxedicatione solam esse assignationis convenientiam requirendam.Quo enim permanente cunctis aliis pereuntibus relativorum praedicatio constat,et quo pereunte cunctis aliis permanentibus,ad aliquid praedicatio non manet,illud estad quod convenienter nominis relatio referatur. Qui enim dominus est,idem ei homo est, idemque bipes,idem quoque scientiæ perceptibilis. Ad quodlibet igitur horam servus non prædicabitur,si dominus non sit; quod si dominus sit,etiamsi quodlibet horum pereat,nihil impeditpraedicationem. Prædicetur enim servus ad dominum,et ab eo caetera perimantur. Pereant enim ab eo quod esl homo, ac bipes,quod scientiae perceptibilis, his omnibus pereuntibus,dominus solus permaneat; caeteris igitur pereuntibus, servus tamen nihilominus dicitur ad dominum, ad hominem vero non dicitur, pereunte enim domini nomine,servi ad hominem nulla prædicatio est,quod si ad dominum servus non referatur,pereatque domini nomen,omnibus aliis manen. ' tibus,non erit praedicatio. Auferatur enim dominus et maneat homo, et bipes,et scienliae perceptibilis, non potest dici servus hominis, vel servus bipedie.
He also adds another strong argument: in every predication relative to something, only the appropriateness of the assignment is to be required. For that, while it remains and all other things perish, keeps the predication of relatives standing, and when it perishes while all other things remain, the predication relative to something does not remain—that is what the relation of the name is appropriately referred to. For he who is a master is the same as a human being, the same as a biped, the same as one capable of knowledge. Therefore a slave will not be predicated in relation to any of these, if there is no master; but if there is a master, even if any of these perishes, nothing hinders the predication. For let a slave be predicated in relation to a master, and let the rest be removed from him. For let human being, biped, and capable of knowledge be removed from him; with all these perishing, let the master alone remain. Therefore, with the rest perishing, a slave is nonetheless said in relation to a master, but is not said in relation to a human being; for when the name of master perishes, there is no predication of a slave in relation to a human being. But if a slave is not referred to a master, and the name of master perishes while all other things remain, there will be no predication. For let the master be removed and let human being, biped, and capable of knowledge remain: a slave cannot be said to be of a human being, or a slave of a biped.
Domino enim non manente servusinterit:quare manente domino ad quod servus convenienteraptatur, cuneUs aliis pereuntibus.prædicatio manet; sublato vero domino, ad quem est conveniens praedicatio, cunctis aliis manentibus prædicatio non est.Eodem modo etiam de ala; nisi enim ad alatum referatur, cunctis aliis manentibus integra praedicatio non est. Adeo non solum non convertitur,sed nec prædicatio ulla erit,nisi relatio ei ad quod convenienter dicitur assignetur.
For if the master does not remain, the slave perishes; therefore, while the master remains, that to which the slave is fittingly assigned, though all other things perish, the predication remains. But if the master is removed, to whom the predication is fittingly directed, while all other things remain, there is no predication. In the same way also concerning the wing: for unless it is referred to the winged creature, while all other things remain, the predication is not complete. To such an extent is it not only not convertible, but there will not even be any predication, unless the relation to that to which it is fittingly said is assigned.
Simul etiam hæc quoque ars est et via noscendi,cum in natura multa sunt,ad quod potissimum relatio praedicetur.Nam cum in domino sit,et homo,et animal, etdisciplinse perceptibile,et bipes, in servo quoque idem, ad quod horum aut domini nomen aut servi referre possimus,sic ostenditur.Qua enim re manente sublatis cæteris praedicatio valet, et qua re sublata caeteris manentibus, intercipitur praedicatio.adillud relatio reclissime'prædicatur.His igitur positis totius argumenti vim sententiamque concludit, ait enim: omnia quæcunque ad aliquid sunt aequa praedicatione converti hoc autem hujusmodi est.Qusecunque enim ad se invicem aequaliter praedicantur,et conversione facta retorquentur, illa aequali natura et dimensione fundata sunt, ut sunt propria et species.Relativa quoque ut convertantur, aequalia esse oportet.Nam si una res amplior, alia fuerit minor,conversionem non habent, nam in eo quod est ala avis, minuo est avis ala, multa enim sunt quæ alas habent, et aves non sunt, atque ideo conversio non fit. Et in eo quod est remus navis, major est navis remo, multæ enim naves sunt quarum remi non sunt; quare in his nulla potest esse conversio. Si vero sint aequalia ut filius at-que pater, conversio non fugit. Nunquam enim est filius nisi patris,et rursus nunquam pater est nisi filii. Quocirca aequalia esse oportet quæcunque ad aliquid praedicantur.
At the same time this is also an art and a way of knowing, since there are many things in nature, to which of them relation is most especially predicated. For since in a master there is both man and animal and capable of discipline and biped, and the same in a slave, it is shown to which of these we can refer either the name of master or of slave. For that thing, while it remains and all others are removed, the predication holds, and when that thing is removed while the others remain, the predication is cut off, relation is most rightly predicated to that. With these things therefore posited, he concludes the force and meaning of the whole argument, for he says: all things whatsoever that are relative are converted by an equal predication. But this is of the following sort. For whatever things are predicated equally of each other and, with conversion made, are turned back, those are founded on an equal nature and dimension, as are property and species. Relatives also, in order that they be converted, must be equal. For if one thing is greater and another lesser, they do not have conversion; for in that which is the wing of a bird, the bird is less than the wing, for there are many things that have wings and are not birds, and therefore conversion does not occur. And in that which is the oar of a ship, the ship is greater than the oar, for there are many ships of which there are no oars; wherefore in these there can be no conversion. But if they are equal, as son and father, conversion does not escape. For there is never a son except of a father, and again there is never a father except of a son. Wherefore whatever things are predicated relatively must be equal.
Horum vero si nomen sit positum, positis nominibus uti oportet.Si vero nomen positum.:: non sit, ex his quae in prima praedicatione sunt (ut; superius dictum est) nomen oportet effigere. Quod, si ila reddantur ut omne ad aliquid convenienterad quod dicitur praedicetur, et aequalis ent prædicatio, et mox conversionis reciproca natura subsequitur. Cone tat igitur omnia relativa ad convertentia dici. His aliud proprium jungit.
Videntur autem ad aliquid simul esse natura, et in pluribus quidem verum est.In aliquibus autem verum non est: simul enim duplum est, et dimidium, et cum sit dimidium,duplurn est; et cum sit dominus, seruus est; et cum sit seruus,dominusest.Similiter autem his et alia,simul etiam auferunt hæc sese invicem.Si enim non sit duplum,non est dimidium,et si non est dimidium,non est duplum3simihter autem et in aliis quæcunque talia sunt.
But if a name has been assigned to these, one ought to use the assigned names. If, however, no name has been assigned, it is necessary to fashion a name from those things which are in the first predication, as was said above. But if they are rendered such that everything relative is predicated in a fitting way to what it is said in relation to, the predication will also be equal, and the reciprocal nature of conversion immediately follows. It is agreed, therefore, that all relatives are said in relation to things that convert. To these he joins another property.
Relative things also seem to exist simultaneously by nature, and in many cases this is true. In some cases, however, it is not true: for simultaneously there is double and half, and when there is half, there is double; and when there is master, there is slave; and when there is slave, there is master. Similarly in these and other cases, they also mutually remove each other. For if there is no double, there is no half, and if there is no half, there is no double; similarly also in other cases of this sort.
Illa simul esse dicuntur quaecunque talia sunt,ut uno posito quolibet aliud necessario subsequatur,et uno quolibet perempto aliud modis omnibus interimatur,ut pater et filius. Nam cum pater est, filium quoque esse necesse est; cum sit filius, pater est. Rursus si pereat filius,patrem quoque perire manifestum est, non quod pareat ipsa substantia,ut pereunte Hectore Priamus pereat,sed perit ipsa relatio. Ergo quoniam vel interempto patris nomine,fiJii nomen perit,sublato quoque filii nomine nomen patris perit. Posito etiam patre in subslantiaque constituto, filii quoque nomen infertur, et posito filii nomine sequitur patris et a patris nominenuoquam separatur,idcirco pater et filius simul esse dicuntur. Ergo simul ea sunt quae se invicem vel interimunt vel inferunt,et de his quidem ipse posterius tractat. Nunc autem hoc quoque inesse relativis exposuit,dicens retativis quoque esse ut simul sint; nam cum duplum sit, dimidium est, etcumdimidium, duplum.Hujus autem argumentum est, quod interempto duplo dimidium perit.Rursus quoque duplo constituto, dimidium constituitur. Igitur quoniam duplum atque dimidium relativa sunt, et haec simul sunt natura, id est ipsa essentia, et hoc manifestum est quoque relativis accidere, ut simul natura esse videantur. Idem quoque est in eo quod est servus et dominus.
Those things are said to be simultaneous, whatever are of such a kind that, when any one is posited, another necessarily follows, and when any one is destroyed, the other is in every way done away with, as father and son. For when the father exists, the son must also exist; when the son exists, the father exists. Again, if the son perishes, it is manifest that the father also perishes—not that the substance itself perishes, as when Hector perishes Priam perishes, but the relation itself perishes. Therefore, since when the name of the father is done away with, the name of the son perishes, and when the name of the son is removed, the name of the father also perishes. And when the father is posited and established in substance, the name of the son is also brought in, and when the name of the son is posited, the father's follows and is never separated from the name of the father; for this reason father and son are said to be simultaneous. Therefore those things are simultaneous which mutually either destroy or imply one another, and concerning these he treats later. But now he has set forth that this also belongs to relatives, saying that it is proper to relatives also to be simultaneous; for when the double exists, the half exists, and when the half exists, the double. And the proof of this is that, when the double is done away with, the half perishes. Again, when the double is established, the half is established. Therefore, since the double and the half are relatives, and these are simultaneous by nature, that is, in their very essence, it is also manifest that this happens to relatives, so that they seem to be simultaneous by nature. The same also holds in the case of slave and master.
Nam quoniam alterutris interemptis uterque deperit, et alterutro constituto uterque subsistit, constat servum atque dominum cum sint ad aliquid simul esse natura. Sed haecita sunt, ut sint quidem in relativis, sed omnibus his quae sunt ad aliquid non aequentur. Sunt enim quaedam relativa quorum unum prius natura sit, quod ipse rursus adjecit.
Non autem in omnibus relativis verum videtur esse ut sint simul natura. Scibile enim scientia prius naturaliter esse videtUl. Namque ut plurimum prius rebus subsistentibus scientias accepimus. In paucis vero vel nullis hoc quis reperiet, simul cumscibiliscientiam esse factam.
Proposuit non in omnibus relativis esse hoc, ut videantur simul esse natura; hoc autem probat ex his,quod quoniam scientia ad aliquid est (scibilis enim rei scientia dicitur), non poterit esse scientia, nisi sit res aliqua quae sciri possit.Hanc autem primam esse necesse est, ut in matheseos disciplina. Scimus enim triangulumtresinteriores angulos duobus recti!! angulis æquos habere. Unde necesse est prius fuisse quod sciri posset, postea vero ad hanc rem aptam fuisse notitiam. Atque hoc est quod ait: Namque in pluribus subsistentibus rebus scientias accipimus.priusenimrebusconstitutiset quasi praepositis scientiae ratio sequitur.Quare non est in omnibus relativis simul esse natura.Nam cum scientia et scibile relativa sint, antiquius est scibile quam scientia.
For since, when either of the two is destroyed, both perish, and when either is established, both subsist, it is evident that slave and master, since they are relatives, are simultaneous by nature. But these things are so that they are indeed among relatives, yet are not on a par with all those things which are relatives. For there are certain relatives of which one is prior by nature, which he himself again added.
But it does not seem to be true in all relatives that they are simultaneous by nature. For the knowable is naturally seen to be prior to knowledge. For for the most part we receive sciences when things already subsist. But in few cases, or none, will anyone find that knowledge was made simultaneously with the knowable.
He proposed that it is not the case in all relatives that they seem to be simultaneous by nature; and he proves this from the fact that, since knowledge is a relative (for knowledge is said of a knowable thing), knowledge cannot exist unless there is some thing which can be known. And this must be first, as in the discipline of mathematics. For we know that a triangle has its three interior angles equal to two right angles. Hence it is necessary that what could be known existed first, and afterwards that the cognition was fitted to this thing. And this is what he says: For in most cases we receive sciences when things already subsist. For the account of knowledge follows upon things already constituted and, as it were, placed before it. Wherefore it is not the case in all relatives that they are simultaneous by nature. For since knowledge and the knowable are relatives, the knowable is more ancient than knowledge.
Quod vero interposuit, in paucis enim vel nullis bocquis perspiciet simulcum scibili scientiam factam,tale est.Quasdam namque res animus sibi ipse confingit,utchimeram,vel centaurum, vel alia hujusmodi, quæ tunc sciuntur,cum ea sibi animus finxerit.Tunc autem esse incipiunt,quando primum in opinione versantur. Tunc igitur sciuntur, cum in I opinione versata sint, et haec simul habent esso et sciri. Nam quoniam in opinione nascuntur,mox esse incipiunt, sed cum in rationesunt,tunc eorum scientia capitur.Igitur mox ut fuerint, mox sciuntur, et esteorumscientiacumeorumdemessentia conj uncta.Namque antequam chimera fingeretur, sicut ipsa in nullaopinione t'uerat, ita quoque ej us scientia nun erat. Postquam vero ipsa animarum imaginatione constituta est, ejus quoque cum ipsa imaginatione scientia consecuta est: atque ideo ait in paucis hoc posse perspici, ut simul cum scientia scibile sit, ut in hac eadem chimera, quae cum sit scibilis, cum scientia nata est.
But what he interposed, "for in few or in no cases will anyone perceive that knowledge is made simultaneously with the knowable," is of this sort. For the mind itself fabricates certain things for itself, such as a chimera, or a centaur, or other things of this kind, which are then known when the mind has fabricated them for itself. But they begin to exist when they first come to be held in opinion. They are therefore known then, when they have been held in opinion, and these have both their being and their being known simultaneously. For since they are born in opinion, they immediately begin to exist, but when they are in reason, then knowledge of them is grasped. Therefore as soon as they have come into being, they are immediately known, and the knowledge of them is joined with their essence. For before the chimera was fabricated, just as it itself was in no opinion, so too was knowledge of it nonexistent. But after it was established by the imagination of minds, knowledge of it also followed along with that same imagination; and therefore he says that this can be perceived in few cases, that the knowable is simultaneous with knowledge, as in this same chimera, which, since it is knowable, was born together with knowledge.
Sed quoniam nihil quod in substantia non permanet, neque in veritate consistit, sciri potest (scientia enim est rerum quae sunt comprehensio veritatis), et quidquid sibi animus fingit, vel imaginatione reperit, cum in substantia atque veritateconstitutum non sit, illud posse sciri non dicitur, atque ideo non est eorum scientia ulla quae sola imaginatione subsistullt.Idcirco itaque dubitans dixit,in paucis enim vel nuliis.Haecenim ipsa pauca ita quisque reperiet, ut si ad veram rationem examinationemque contenderit, nulla esse perpendat. Quod siquisquamchimerse aliqua esse sciendam dicat,quaa non est, quanquam hoc falsum sit, tamen hoc quoque concesso pauca erunt in quibus scientia cum scibili simul natura sit. Multis enim antepositis et constitutis scientia nascitur.Quocirca non q.; •. 'ili/ imffiI._•r in omnibus relativis verum est,ut simul esse natura dicantur;et sicut falsum illud est,in nullis hoc esse relativis,ita falsum est rursus in omnibus.Sed hunc tractatum longius texit.
But since nothing that does not remain in substance, nor consists in truth, can be known (for knowledge is the comprehension of the truth of things that are), and whatever the mind fabricates for itself, or discovers by imagination, since it is not established in substance and truth, is said not to be able to be known, and therefore there is no knowledge of those things which subsist by imagination alone. For this reason, therefore, hesitating, he said, "for in few or in no cases." For each person will find these very few such that, if he strives toward true reasoning and examination, he perceives that they are none. But if anyone should say that some things are knowable which are not, although this is false, yet with this also granted, they will be few in which knowledge is simultaneous by nature with the knowable. For with many things placed before and established, knowledge is born. Wherefore it is not true in all relatives that they are said to be simultaneous by nature; and just as that is false, that this is the case in no relatives, so again it is false in all. But he has woven this treatise at too great length.
Amplius scibile quidem sublatum simul aufert scientiam, scientia vero simul non aufert scibile. Nam si scibile non sit, non est scientia; scientia vei o si non sit, nihil prohibet esse scibile, velut circuli quadratura si modo est scibilis, scientia siquidem ejus nondum est ipsa vero scibilis est.
Diximusillaessesimul, quaecunque alterutro con. stituto, velalterutro interempto, simul utraque constituerentur, vel etiam perimerentur. Constituto enim ut sit pater, constituetur esse filius, et pater simul infert substantiam filii.Eodem quoque modo filius simul infert vocabulum patris, non est enim filius nisi patris. Eodem quoque modo altero interempto utrumque perire necesse est, alterum autem altero priusmultisdiciturmodis;sed quod nunc quaerimus tale est. Nam prioraillaesse dicuntur, quæ ipsa quidem peremptares alias tollunt, ipsa vero illataatque constituta simul res alias non inferunt, utest unus atque duo. Interempto enim uno, duo quoque pereunt.Unde enim est unius in duobus geminatio, si unus intereat? Constituto vero atque posito ut situnus, nondumduo sunt- Nondum est enim facta unius geminalio.
Moreover, if the knowable is removed, it simultaneously takes away knowledge, but knowledge does not simultaneously take away the knowable. For if the knowable does not exist, there is no knowledge; but if knowledge does not exist, nothing prevents the knowable from existing—for instance, if the squaring of the circle is knowable, its knowledge does not yet exist, yet it itself is knowable.
We said that those things are simultaneous, whatever, when either one is established or either one is destroyed, would both be established together or even destroyed together. For when it is established that a father exists, it will be established that a son exists, and a father simultaneously implies the substance of a son. In the same way, a son simultaneously implies the designation of a father, for there is no son except of a father. In the same way, when one is destroyed, both must perish. But one thing is said to be prior to another in many ways; yet what we are now asking about is of this sort. For those things are said to be prior which, when they themselves are destroyed, take away the others, but when they themselves are brought in and established, do not simultaneously bring in the other things—as is the case with one and two. For when one is destroyed, two also perish. For whence comes the doubling of one into two, if one perishes? But when it is established and posited that one exists, two do not yet exist—for the doubling of one has not yet been made.
Ergo dicuntur illa priora esse, quæcunque alia simul quidem illata non inferunt, sed perimunt interempta.Scibile ergoet scientiam non esse simul illa res probat, quod si quis rem scibilem tollat, scienliam quoque sustulerit.Nulla potestenim scientia permanere, si res quae sciri possit intereat.Atsi scibile esse constituas,non omnino scientia consequitur.Infantibus enim ea nobis quæ nunc novimus erant, et in sua: naturae substantia permanebant,sed eorum apud nos scientia non erat. Multae quoque sunt artes,quas esse quidem in suas naturae ratione perspicimus, quarum neglectus soientiam sustulit. Multumque ego ipse jam metuo ne hoc verissime de omnibus studiis liberalibus dicatur.Quocirca si et scientiam sublatum scibile perimit,et illatum scibile scientiam non infert,neque constituit, prius est id quod sciri potest quam illud quod comprehendere videlicet atque complecti notitia. Ipse autem ad hanc rem obscurissimum commodavit exemplum. Solet enim in geometria hujusmodi esse propositio.Jubemur enim proposito quatuor laterum spatio, aequale triangulum constituere, et facimus hoc modo. Sit quatuor laterum spatium a b, oportet ergo a spatio aequale triangulum constituere,et ut sit duplum a spatio e spatium.
Therefore those things are said to be prior, whatever things, when brought in together, do not bring in the others, but when destroyed destroy them. That the knowable, therefore, and knowledge do not exist simultaneously, that matter itself proves, because if anyone removes a knowable thing, he will also have removed knowledge. For no knowledge can remain if the thing that can be known perishes. But if you establish that the knowable exists, knowledge does not altogether follow. For those things that we now know were present to us as infants, and were persisting in the substance of their nature, but there was no knowledge of them in us. There are also many arts that we perceive indeed to exist in the principle of their nature, the neglect of which has removed knowledge of them. And I myself now greatly fear lest this be most truly said of all liberal studies. Wherefore, if both the knowable when removed destroys knowledge, and when brought in does not bring in or establish knowledge, that which can be known is prior to that which evidently comprehends and embraces it by acquaintance. But he himself has supplied a very obscure example for this matter. For in geometry a proposition of this sort is customary. For we are commanded, with a four-sided area proposed, to construct an equal triangle, and we do this in the following way. Let the four-sided area be ab; therefore it is necessary to construct a triangle equal to the area ab, and that the area e be double the area a.
Ducatur angularis /, dico quoniamc triangulum aequale est a spatio,quoniam cde spatium duplum est a spatio:ab igitur cd e spatii medietas est, angularis enim fc totum cdef spatium medium dividit.Quae autem ejusdem sunt media, sibi æqualia sunt, igitur et e /' triangulum a spatio aequale est. Proposito igitur spatio a b, aequum triangulum constitutum est f, quod oportebat facere.Eodem quoque modo quaesitum est si sit propositum oirculo aequum fieri quadratum.Quadratum ergo est quod æqualibus lateribus omnesquatuoranguloseequoshabet,id est rectos, et Aristotelis quidem temporibus non fuisse inventum vi detur. Post vero repertum est, cuj us quoniam longa demonstratio est, prætermittenda est.Atque huc est, quod ait, velut circuli quadratura: nam sicut manente quadrato, linea per obliquum ducta triangula figura producilur; itM circulo non mutato circumpositis angulis,qui et ipsius circuli laleribus;æqualiter diriguntur, quadrati forma consurgit, quod(ut potuimus) conjecturadepinximus.Cum enim alicui circulo æquum quadratum constiLuitur,in quadraturam circuli illius mensura redigitur. Nunc ergo hoc est quoddicit,utcirculi quadratura,id estaequi quadrati ad circulum constitutio si fieri potest, et si res est quae sciri possit, scientia quidem ejus nondum inventa est.
Let the diagonal be drawn, and I say that the triangle is equal to the space, since the space is double the space; therefore is half of the space, for the diagonal divides the whole space in half. But things that are halves of the same thing are equal to each other; therefore the triangle is also equal to the space. With the space therefore proposed, an equal triangle has been constructed, which was what was required to do. In the same way too it has been asked whether, if a circle is proposed, it is possible to make a square equal to it. A square therefore is that which has all four angles equal on equal sides, that is, right angles, and in Aristotle's time it seems not to have been discovered. Afterwards, however, it was found, but since its demonstration is long, it must be passed over. And to this refers what he says, "as the squaring of the circle"; for just as, while the square remains, a line drawn obliquely produces a triangular figure, so too, with the circle unchanged, when angles are placed around it which are also directed equally to its sides, the form of a square arises, which, as best we could, we have depicted by conjecture. For when a square equal to some circle is constructed, it is reduced in measurement to the squaring of that circle. Now therefore this is what he says, "as the squaring of the circle," that is, the construction of a square equal to a circle, if it can be done, and if it is a thing that can be known, its knowledge has not yet been discovered.
Nondum enim quisquam sub Aristotele aequum quadratum circulo constituerat.Quod si est aliqua ejus scientia quæ nondum reperta est,certe prius est quod sciri possit,post vero scientia.Nam cum posset Aristotele vivo sciri circuli quadratura, nulla tamen adhuc ejus scientia reperta est, atque ideopriuseratquodsciri posset,quam ipsius rei ulla notitia.
Amplius, animali quidem sublato, non est scientia, scibilium uero plurima esse contingit.
Addit aliud validius argumentum, prius esse scibile scientia.lllud enim notum estsiperdesidiam disciplinadepereat,interire quidem scientiam, sed scibile permanere.Scibile autem dico quod sciri possit. Quod si omnino animal non sit,cum quis scire possit omnino non fuerit, scientia quidem ipsa funditus interibit: nihil tamen probibet esse ea quae permanente animali possit inquirentis animus scientiæ ratione complecti.
For no one before Aristotle had yet squared the circle. But if there is some knowledge of it that has not yet been discovered, certainly that which can be known is prior, and knowledge comes afterward. For although the squaring of the circle could have been known while Aristotle was alive, no knowledge of it had yet been discovered, and for that reason that which could be known was prior to any awareness of the thing itself.
Moreover, when an animal is destroyed, knowledge does not exist, yet it happens that very many things are knowable.
He adds another, stronger argument: the knowable is prior to knowledge. For it is well known that if a discipline perishes through idleness, knowledge indeed perishes, but the knowable remains. By "knowable" I mean that which can be known. But if there were no animal at all, since there could be no one to know, knowledge itself would utterly perish; nevertheless nothing prevents those things from existing which, while an animal remains, the mind of the inquirer can grasp by the reasoning of knowledge.
Similiter his sese habent et ea quæ de sensu sunt, sensile enim prius quam sensus videtur esse. Sublato enim sensili simul aufertur sensus:sensus vero sensile non simul aufert. Sensus enim circa corpus et in corpore sunt,sensibili autem perempto, peremptum est et corpus, sensile enim est et corpus; cum vero corpus non sit9sublatus est et sensus. Quare simul aufert sensile sensum, sensus vero sensile non tollit. Animali enim perempto,sensus quidem peremptus est,sensibile autem nOn,est autem sensile,ut corpus caldum, dulce, amarum et alia omnia quæcunque sensilia sunt.
Id namque proponit sensibus inveniri. Dicit enim sensu prius esse sensibile, quod communi priorum diffinitione probabile esse constituit. Dictum est namque illa esse priora quae simul quidem interempta perimerent,non autem simul aliis interemptis ipsa deperire,ut orbem solis prius dicimus proprio lumine,sublatoenimorbe,lumenillud quod abeoestpenitus non manebit;sublatolumine solis,orbis manebit.
The things that pertain to sensation are related in a similar way. For the sensible object seems to be prior to the sense. For when the sensible object is removed, the sense is removed at the same time; but the sense does not remove the sensible object at the same time. For the senses are around the body and in the body, but when the sensible object is destroyed, the body is also destroyed; for the body too is a sensible object. But when the body does not exist, the sense is also removed. Therefore the sensible object removes the sense at the same time, but the sense does not remove the sensible object. For when the animal is destroyed, the sense is indeed destroyed, but the sensible object is not; yet it is a sensible object, such as a hot body, a sweet thing, a bitter thing, and all other things whatsoever that are sensible.
For he proposes that this is found by the senses. For he says that the sensible object is prior to the sense, which he establishes as probable by the common definition of prior things. For it has been said that those things are prior which, when they are destroyed at the same time, destroy [the others], but do not themselves perish when the others are destroyed at the same time; as we say that the orb of the sun is prior to its own light. For when the orb is removed, that light which is from it will not remain at all; but when the light of the sun is removed, the orb will remain.
Ita quoqne nunc in sensibilibus,atque in ipso sensu esse proposuit, sublato quod sentiri possit, sensus omninosublatusest.Neque enimessepoteritsensus, cum quod possit sentire non invenit.Quod si sensus omnino depereat,sensibile permanebit; et hoc evidentibus firmat exemplis.Nam cum ea quae sunt in rebus, vel incorporea sint, vel certe corporea, et quidquid ad corporis materiam referri potest, hoc sensuum varietatisubjaceat,quidquid ad incorporalia intellectus ratione et speculatione teneatur.Cum sit sensus omnis in corpore,si corpus intereal,cum omnino corpus non sit, quoniam quæ sunt incorporea sentiri non possunt,et quae sentiri poterant interempta sunt,omnino sensus evertitur.Sed si sensus auferatur,sensibilia permanebunt: et quoniam sensus animalium effectivus est,sequa est utrorumque perditio;sive enim sustulerisanimal,sensus peribit,sive sensusevertantur,animaliaquoquesublatasunt.Sed eversis atque interemptis animalibus cum propriis sensibus,permanent corporaquae anima non utuntur,quodsisublatisanimalibussensibusquedeperditis,corpora inanimata subsistunt,cum corpora sint quassentiri possunt,animalia quæ sentire valeant si interempta sint, manente sensibili sensus eversus est.
Thus also now in the case of sensible things and in sense itself he has proposed that, with the removal of what can be sensed, sense is altogether removed. For sense cannot exist when it does not find what it can sense. But if sense perishes altogether, the sensible will remain; and this he confirms with evident examples. For since the things that are in reality are either incorporeal or certainly corporeal, and whatever can be referred to the matter of body is subject to the variety of the senses, whatever is held by the reason and contemplation of the intellect pertains to incorporeals. Since all sense is in the body, if the body meanwhile is removed, since it is altogether not body—because incorporeal things cannot be sensed, and the things that could be sensed have been destroyed—sense is altogether overturned. But if sense is taken away, sensible things will remain; and since sense is productive of animals, the destruction of both is equal; for whether you remove the animal, sense will perish, or whether sense is overturned, animals too are taken away. But with animals destroyed and removed along with their own senses, there remain bodies that do not use a soul; so if, with animals taken away and senses lost, inanimate bodies subsist, since they are bodies that can be sensed, while the animals that are able to sense have been destroyed, with the sensible remaining, sense has been overturned.
Non igitur sicut sensibilis interemptio sensus interimit,sic sensuum perditionem exstinctio sensibilium comitatur.Id vero etiam hoc probabitur argumento, anteenim quam actu ipso aliquid sentiamus, sensus non est.Nam priusquam dulce aliquid degustemus, gustatio ipsa dulcedinis non est; quod autemgustari possit,id est, mel,vel quodlibet aliud propriæ naturae ratione consistit. Quocirca prius esse quod sentiri possit,post vero sensus Aristotele auctore firmatur.
Amplius sensus quidem simul cum sensato fit, simul enim et animal fit et sensus. Sensile autem ante est quam sensus esset. Ignis enim et aqua et alia hujusmodi,ex quibus ipsum animal constat, ante sunt quam animal sit omnino,vel sensus. Quare prius sensile quam sensus esse videtur.
In compositis rebus atque ex aliis junctis priores sunt hae res quae componunt aliquid ipsa substantia quam componunt.Namque cum corpus animalis sit ex igne,aere, aqua et terra,priora haec esse necesse est quam ipsum sit animal quod illa elementa conjungunt. Hoc quoque etiam in aliis patet,nam cum sit liber ex versibus,prior est versuum natura quam libri. Cumque versus constet verbis atque nominibus,et caeteris quas grammatici partes orationis vocant,hsec ex quibus ipse versus constat versu ipso priora esse necesse est.Quocirca sensusquoqueipsis, jam compositis animalibus supervenit.
Therefore it is not the case that, just as the destruction of what is sensible destroys sense, so the extinction of sensible things accompanies the loss of senses. But this too will be proved by the following argument: before we actually sense anything by the act itself, sense does not exist. For before we taste something sweet, the tasting of that sweetness itself does not exist; but what can be tasted, that is, honey or anything else, exists by the principle of its own proper nature. Wherefore it is established, with Aristotle as author, that what can be sensed exists first, and sense afterward.
Moreover, sense certainly comes to be simultaneously with what is sensed, for simultaneously both the animal comes to be and sense. But what is sensible exists before sense would exist. For fire and water and other such things, from which the animal itself consists, exist before the animal exists at all, or sense. Therefore what is sensible seems to exist before sense.
In composite things and things joined from others, those things which compose something are prior in their very substance to what they compose. For since the body of an animal is from fire, air, water, and earth, these must be prior to the animal itself which those elements join together. This is evident also in other cases, for since a book consists of verses, the nature of the verses is prior to the book. And since a verse consists of words and names and the other things which grammarians call the parts of speech, these things of which the verse itself consists must be prior to the verse itself. Wherefore sense also comes upon animals already composed.
Nam cum animal constet ex quatuor elementis, et cum sensus semper naturam animalium comitetur, cum ipsis animalibus sensus fieri at nasci necesse est. Quod si cum animalibus, id est compositis rebus, sensus nascitur,sicutanimali propria sunt ea ex quibusipsumanimaiconstat,sicquoquesensuquicumanimaIi nascitur,illapriorasunt,exquibusanimalisnatura conjungitur.Conjungitur autem animalatquecomponitur ex quatuor elementis. Quatuor igitur elementa sensu priorasunt,sedquatuorelementacorpara sunt,corpus vero omne sensibile est. Prius igitur sensibile quam sensus est. Sensus enim cum re composita nascitur,illa vero quae componunt etsensibilia sunt,et priora ipso composito.
For since an animal consists of the four elements, and since sense always accompanies the nature of animals, sense must come to be and be born together with the animals themselves. But if sense is born together with animals, that is, with composite things, then just as those things from which the animal itself consists are proper to the animal, so too, since sense is born together with the animal, those things from which the nature of the animal is compounded are prior. But an animal is compounded and composed of the four elements. Therefore the four elements are prior to sense, but the four elements are bodies, and every body is sensible. Therefore the sensible is prior to sense. For sense is born together with the composite thing, but those things which compose it are both sensible and prior to the composite thing itself.
Universaliter enim si quae duae res sintsimul,cum quaelibet res una earum prior sit,et altera prior erit, ut animal atque sensus, cum utraque simul sunt, simulque nascuntur,cumquatuor elementaquae sunt sensibilia priora sint quam animal, sensu quoque esse priora necesse est,quocirca conclusit dicens: Quare prius quam sensus sensibile esse videtur.Sed quidam,quorum Porphyrius quoque unus est,astruunt in omnibus verum esse relativis,ut simul natura sint,veluti ipsum quoque sensum et scientiam non praecedere scibile atque sensibile, sed simul esse, quam quoniam brevis est oratio,non gravabor opponere.Ait enim: Si cujuslibet scientia non sit,ipsum quod per se poterit permanere scibile esse non poterit, ut si formarum scientia pereat,ipsae fortasse formae permaneant,atquein priore natura consistant,scibiles vera non sint.Cum enim scientia quae illud compreben. derepossit,nonsit,ipsaquoque sciri non potest res. Namque omnis res scientia scitur, quae si non sit, sciri non possit.Porro autem res quæ sciri non potest scibilis non est.
For universally, if any two things are simultaneous, and one of them is prior to something, the other will also be prior, as with animal and sense: since both are simultaneous and are born together, and since the four elements, which are perceptible, are prior to the animal, sense must also be prior. Therefore he concluded, saying: Hence the perceptible seems to be prior to sense. But certain thinkers, of whom Porphyrius is one, assert that in all relatives the truth is that they are simultaneous by nature, as for instance that sense itself and knowledge do not precede the knowable and the perceptible, but are simultaneous. Since the argument is brief, I shall not hesitate to object. For he says: If there is no knowledge of anything, that thing which could otherwise persist in itself cannot be knowable; for example, if knowledge of forms perishes, the forms themselves perhaps persist and remain in their prior nature, but they are not knowable. For since the knowledge which could comprehend that thing does not exist, the thing itself also cannot be known. For every thing is known by knowledge, and if knowledge does not exist, it cannot be known. Moreover, a thing which cannot be known is not knowable.
Hoc idem de sensu gustantis: si gustus enim pereat, mel forsitan permanebit,gustabile autem non erit.llaquoque omnino si sensus pereat,res quidem quae sentiri poterant sint, sensibiles vero non sint sensu pereunte.Et fortasse neque scientia neque sensus secundum sentientes speculandus est, sed secundum ipsam naturam quae sensu valeatcomprehendi.Namque res quæcunque per naturam sensibilisest,eam quoque in natura sua,proprium sensum quo sentiri possit, babere necesse est. Et quodcunque sciri potest per naturam,nunquam possit addisci, nisi quaedam ejus in natura scientiaversaretur.HascPorpbyrius.Sed nos ad Aristotelis ordinem textumque veniamus. Namque ille adjecit quoque alias quaestiones.
Habet autem quæstionem, utrum nulla substantia ad aliquid dicatur, quemadmodum videtur, si hoc contingat secundum quasdam secundas substantias; nam in primis substantiis verum est,unamneque totaneque partes ad aliquid dicuntur, uam aliquis homo non dicitur alicujus aliquishomotneque aliquis bos,alicujus aliquis bos. Similiter autem et partes: quædam enim manus non dicitur alicujus quædam manus, sed alicujus manus, et quoddam caput: non dicitur alicujus quoddam caput, sed alicujus caput. Similiter autem et in secundis substaniiisyatque hocquldem in pluribus, ut homo non dicitur alicujus homo, nec bos allcujus bos, nec lignum alicujus lignum,sed alicujus possessio dicitur.
The same point applies to the sense of taste: for if the taste perishes, the honey will perhaps remain, but it will not be tasteable. Likewise, if sense perishes entirely, the things that could be sensed may exist, but they will not be sensible, since sense has perished. And perhaps neither knowledge nor sense should be considered in relation to those who perceive, but in relation to the very nature that can be comprehended by sense. For whatever is sensible by nature, it is also necessary that it have in its own nature a proper sense by which it can be sensed. And whatever can be known by nature could never be learned, unless some knowledge of it were present in its nature. Thus Porphyry. But let us come to Aristotle's order and text. For he added also other questions.
He raises the question whether no substance is said in relation to something, as it seems, if this happens with respect to certain secondary substances; for in primary substances it is true that neither the whole nor the parts are said in relation to something, since some man is not said to be of someone, nor some man of some man, nor some ox of some ox. Similarly also with the parts: for a certain hand is not said to be of someone a certain hand, but a hand of someone, and a certain head: it is not said to be of someone a certain head, but a head of someone. Similarly also in secondary substances, and this indeed in many cases, as man is not said to be of someone a man, nor ox of someone an ox, nor wood of someone wood, but it is said to be someone's possession.
In hujusmodi ergo manifestum est quoniam non est ad aLiquid.ln aliquibus vero secundis substantiis habet aliquam dubitationemyut caput alicujus caput diciMur, et manus alicujus manus dicitur, et singula hujusmodi. Quare hæc fortasse ad aliquid esse videntur.
Contra eaquaesuperiusdisputatasunthujusmodi nudum quaestionis opposuit,quoniam enim prima diffinitio relativorum fuerat,illaesse relativa quæcunque hoc ipsumquod essent aliorum dicerentur. secundumhanc diffinitionem possunt quædam substanliæ videri esse relativae:quod si sit, substantiæae in diffinitionem accidentium transeunt. Nam cum sint accidentia relativa, si quas substantias rei ativas esse concedimus,in accidentium numero ponendas esse censebimus,sed hoc contrarium est.Si enim substantia in subjecto non est,accidens autem in subjecto est,quifieri potest ut idem et in subjecto sit et in subjecto non sit?Utrumautem possit.
In this kind of case, therefore, it is clear that it is not in relation to something. But in some secondary substances there is some doubt, as when the head of someone is said to be a head, and the hand of someone is said to be a hand, and each such thing individually. Therefore these perhaps seem to be in relation to something.
Against those things that were disputed above, he set forth the bare question of this kind of opposition. For since the first definition of relatives had been that those things are relative whatever are said to be of others with respect to this very thing that they are, according to this definition certain substances can seem to be relative. But if this is so, substances pass over into the definition of accidents. For since relatives are accidents, if we concede that certain substances are relative, we will judge that they must be placed in the number of accidents. But this is contrary. For if substance is not in a subject, but accident is in a subject, how can it happen that the same thing is both in a subject and not in a subject? But whether it can.
quædam substantiaaccidentium suscipere rationem, hocmodo quærendum est.Primæ namquesubstantiseipsae quidem ad aliquid non dicuntur,neque partes primarum substantiarum quas ipsas quoque in primis substantiis numeramus.Socrates enim non dicitur alicujus aliquis Socrates, nec homo alicujus aliquis homo,nec bos alicujus aliquisbos,neque partes primarumsubstantiarum quasipsaequoquesunt primae substantiae.Caput enim non dicituralicujus aliquod caput,sed tantum alicujuscaput,etmanus non dicitur alicujus aliqua manus,sedtantum alicujusmanus. Quare neque primæ substantiae, neque primarum substantiarum partes ad relationem dici poterunt.Quod si secundas quoque substantias speculemur,nec ipsae quoque ad aliquid dicentur.Neque enim dicitur animal alicujus esse animal, aut homo alicujus esse homo. Quod si quis dicat posse esse animal alicujus, ut equum meum,vel quodlibetaliud, non in eo quod animal est,sed in eo quod est possesaio dicituralicujus,etsic non dicitur animal alicujus animal,sed animalis possessio,alicujus possessio.Ergo neque primæ substantiae,neque partes primarum substantiarum, neque secundæ substantiæ ada liquid dicuntur.Partes autemsecundarum substantiarum ad aliquid hoc ipsum quod sunt dicuntur.
For a certain substance to admit the account of accidents, it must be investigated in this way. For primary substances themselves are not said in relation to something, nor are the parts of primary substances, which we also count among primary substances themselves. For Socrates is not said to be someone's Socrates, nor is man someone's man, nor is ox someone's ox, nor are the parts of primary substances, which are themselves also primary substances. For a head is not said to be someone's certain head, but only someone's head, and a hand is not said to be someone's certain hand, but only someone's hand. Wherefore neither primary substances nor the parts of primary substances can be said in relation. But if we examine secondary substances as well, neither are they themselves said in relation to something. For an animal is not said to be someone's animal, nor is man said to be someone's man. But if someone says that an animal can be someone's, as my horse, or any other such thing, it is not said in respect of its being an animal, but in respect of its being possessed by someone, and thus it is not said that an animal is someone's animal, but the possession of an animal is someone's possession. Therefore neither primary substances, nor the parts of primary substances, nor secondary substances are said in relation to something. But the parts of secondary substances are said in relation to something in respect of that very thing which they are.
Caput enim alicujus caputdicitur,si quidem capitati caput dicernus,et manus alicujus manus.Si quidem ex manu nomen fingerevolumus,ad quod manus referri possit, sicutcaputad capitatum,et in aliis quidem rebus eodem modo.Sedsipartessecundarumsubstantiarum accidentes sint, et ipsæ secundæ substantiæ accidenteserunt,autsihoc non placet, constabuntsecundae substantiæ ex partibus accidentibus, quod fieri nequit. Quid igitur dicendum est? aut enim diffinitio relativorum reprehendenda est,aut aliter solvenda dubietas.Sed posita atque constituta priori diffinitione, quae dicit illa esse relativa quæ id quod sunt aliorum dicuntur,hic quaestionis nodus solvi non poterit,quod ipse Aristoteles hac adjunctione testatur.
Si igitur sufficienter eorum quæ sunt ad aliquid diffinitio assignata est, aut nimis difficile, aut impossibile est ostendere,quoniam nulla substantia ad aliquid dzcitur.Si autem non sufficienter, sed sunt ad aUquidsquibus hoc ipsum esse, est ad aliquid quodammodo se habere, fortasse aliquid ad ista dicetur. Prior vera diffinitio sequitur quidem omnia relativa, non tamen quod ipsa sint ad aliquid est hoc quod ea ipsa sunt quæ aliorum esse dicuntur.
For the head of someone is called a head, if indeed we call it the head of a head-possessing thing, and the hand of someone a hand. If indeed we wish to form a name from "hand," to which "hand" can be referred, just as "head" to "head-possessing thing," and in other matters in the same way. But if the parts of secondary substances are accidents, then the secondary substances themselves will also be accidents, or if this is not acceptable, secondary substances will consist of accidental parts, which cannot happen. What then is to be said? For either the definition of relatives must be criticized, or the difficulty must be resolved in another way. But with the earlier definition posited and established, which says that those things are relative which are said to be of others with respect to what they are, the knot of this question cannot be resolved, as Aristotle himself testifies by this addition.
If therefore the definition of those things which are in relation to something has been assigned sufficiently, it is either too difficult or impossible to show that no substance is said in relation to something. But if it has not been sufficiently assigned, but there are certain things in relation to something for which this very being is to be disposed in some way toward something, perhaps something will be said against these. The earlier definition indeed follows all relatives, yet it is not because they are in relation to something that they are this very thing which they are said to be of others.
Proposita ergo atque firmata priore relativorum diffinitionedifficile defendi poterit, aut fortassenunquam,quasdam substantias non esse relativas.Nam si ad aliquid illa sunt, quæcunque idquodsuntaliorum dicuntur,ut id quod est caput capitati dicitur caput,habebit igitur substantia quæ est caput ad aliquid relationem, et ita erit substantia relativa atqucaccidens,quod est impossibile.Quarequoniam proposita atque constituta priore diffinitione hæc incommoditas indispositioneconsequitur, ut constet ratio non integrae diffinitionis,assignatio permutetur. Ait enim non esse integram diffinitionem quæ supra sit reddila,nec magis ilIa esse ad aliquid,quae id quod suntaliorum dicuntur,potius quam eaquibus ipsum esse est ad aliquid quodammodo sehabere. Sed fortasse videatur quibusdam inconsulte legentibus et minimeconsiderautibus,id quoddiffiniri oportuerat, hoc in diffinitione esse sumptum, quod est vitiosissimum. Si enim idcirco diffinitio sumitur,ut res de qua quæritur assignetur, quæ magis est apertior dilfinitio,si reipsaquam diffinit.in assignatione diffinitionis utatur?
Therefore, once the earlier definition of relatives has been set forth and confirmed, it will be difficult—or perhaps never possible—to defend the claim that certain substances are not relative. For if those things are "in relation to something" which, whatever they are, are said of other things—as what is a head is called the head of a head-possessing thing—then a substance that is a head will have a relation to something, and so substance will be relative and also an accident, which is impossible. Wherefore, since with the earlier definition set forth and established this inconvenience follows from its unsoundness, so that it is evident that the definition is not complete, the assignment is changed. For he says that the definition given above is not complete, and that those things are not more "in relation to something" which, whatever they are, are said of other things, than those whose very being is in some way to be disposed toward something. But perhaps it may seem to some who read carelessly and consider too little that what ought to have been defined has been assumed in the definition, which is most faulty. For if a definition is assumed for the purpose of assigning the thing about which inquiry is made, how is the definition more clear if it uses in the assignment of the definition the very thing it defines?
Diffinitio namque idcirco redditur,ut res de cujus quidem esse dubitatur,diffinilione patefiat.Quod si rem ipsam quam diffinit,in diffinitione protulerit,nihilo planior diffinitio sit,utsi quis hominem diffinire volens dicat, hocipsum esse hominem quod hominem.Ita quoque non considerantibus,Aristoteles relativorum diffinitionem reddidisse videbitur.Aitenim esseadaliquid, quibus hoc ipsum esse est ad aliquid quodammodo se habere,ac si diceret:Ea sunt ad aliquid, quae se ad aliquid quodammodohabent.Sed minutius atque scutius considerantibus, vis integrae diffinitionis T prompte atque veraciter apparebit;non enim ineo quod est dici, ad aliquid consideramus, sed in eo quod est esse;ea namque sunt relativa,quae inquadam comparatione etrelationishabitudine consideramus,ut quaternarius numerus,et hocipsum quod est esse dicitur,id eslquatuor,etaliud quoddam,id est duplum,ut si ad binariumconferatur.Sed quod dequaternario numero dicimus, quaternarium hoc ad ipsius quaternarii numeri naturam refertur.Quod vero duplum, non est hoc quaternarii,sed duorum ad quodduplumdicitur,etadquodpropriarelatione duplum est. Binarius quoque numerus et binarius est, et medietas,binarius quidem secundum suam naturam,medietasverosecundumquaternariusrelationem.
For a definition is given for this reason, that the thing about whose being there is doubt may be made clear by the definition. But if it brings forth in the definition the very thing that it defines, the definition will be no clearer, as if someone wishing to define man should say that this very thing is man, which is man. Thus too, to those not considering carefully, Aristotle will seem to have given a definition of relatives. For he says that those things are "in relation to something" for which this very being is to be related in some way to something, as if he were saying: Those things are in relation to something which are related in some way to something. But to those considering more minutely and carefully, the force of the complete definition will appear readily and truthfully; for we do not consider "in relation to something" in that which is "to be said," but in that which is "to be"; for those things are relative which we consider in a certain comparison and relation of a state, as the number four, and this very thing that is said to be, that is, four, and something else, that is, double, if it be compared to the number two. But what we say about the number four, "four," this is referred to the nature of the number four itself. But "double" is not this of the four, but of the two in relation to which it is called double, and to which it is double by its proper relation. The number two also is both two and a half; two indeed according to its own nature, but a half according to its relation to four.
Quocirca in comparationequadam atque in habitudineeaquse sunt ad aliquid speculamur;qua ternarius enim in eo quod quaternarius est ad aliquid non dicitur,in eo vero quod est duplus,duorum relativus est, scilicet ad binarium comparatus.Binarius quoque in eo quod sunt duo,ad aliquid non refertur, sed in eo quod est medietas, scilicet ad quaternarium comparatus.Ergo, ut sitduplus quaternarius, non duobus,sed medietate eget,ut simedietas binarius,non quaternario,sed duplo opus est. Videsne ut habitudine quadam et comparatione res aliud in naturaretinentes,aliud tamen ad se invicem sint? et hoc non ex propria, sed ex invicem natura mutuentur, nam quod est duplus numerus ex medio trabit.quod est medietas ex dupio.atque hoc iis quae sunt ad aliquid extraevenit,etideonihil patientibus neque permutatis ipsis quae ad aliquid referuntur, ipsaadaliquid fiunt,nihil enim permutato de quater. nario duplus ipse est,sit ad binarium referatur, et nihil de binario permutato,medietas est binarius,si ad quaternarium dicitur. Ergo relativorum hoc est esse,id est hæc eorum natura atque substantia est, ut id quod sunt ad aliquid referantur,id est non solum referri dicantur, sed etiam referantur.
Wherefore we observe in a certain comparison and relation those things which are relative. For the ternary, in that it is a quaternary, is not said to be relative; but in that it is double, it is relative to two, namely, compared to the binary. The binary also, in that they are two, is not referred to something else, but in that it is a half, namely, compared to the quaternary. Therefore, in order that the quaternary be double, it does not need two, but a half; and in order that the binary be a half, it does not need the quaternary, but the double. Do you see how by a certain relation and comparison things retain one thing in nature, yet are another in relation to each other? And this they borrow not from their own nature, but from each other. For the number that is double draws from the half, and that which is a half from the double. And this happens to those things which are relative over and above, and for this reason, with nothing undergoing change and with the things themselves that are referred to something not being changed, they themselves become relative. For with the quaternary unchanged, it is itself double if it is referred to the binary; and with the binary unchanged, the binary is a half if it is said in relation to the quaternary. Therefore, this is the being of relatives, that is, this is their nature and substance, that what they are they refer to something, that is, they are not only said to be referred, but are also referred.