Haec enim ecclesia catholica per totum orbem ualide lateque diffusa omnibus errantibus utitur ad prouectus suos et ad eorum correctionem, cum euigilare uoluerint. utitur enim gentilibus ad materiam operationis suae, haereticis ad probationem doctrinae suae, schismaticis ad documentum stabilitatis suae, Iudaeis ad comparationem pulchritudinis suae. alios ergo inuitat, alios excludit, alios relinquit, alios antecedit; omnibus tamen gratiae dei participandae dat potestatem, siue illi formandi sint adhuc siue reformandi siue recolligendi siue admittendi. carnales autem suos, id est uiuentes aut sentientes carnaliter, tamquam paleas tolerat, quibus in area frumenta tutiora sunt, donec talibus tegminibus exuantur.
QVAM CONGRVE HOMINIBVS SAPIENTIA DEI CHRISTVS HVMANITATE SVBVENERIT. ITEM EX EODEM LIBRO DE VERA RELIGIONE.
Nullo modo beneficientius consuluit generi humano, quam cam ipsa dei sapientia, id est unicus filius consubstantialis patri et coaeternus, totum hominem suscipere dignatus est et uerbum caro factum est et habitauit in nobis. ita enim demonstrauit carnalibus et non ualentibus intueri mente ueritatem corporeisque sensibus deditis quam excelsum locum inter creaturas habeat humana natura, quod non solum uisibiliter — nam id poterat et in aliquo aetherio corpore ad nostrorum aspectuum tolerantiam temperato — sed hominibus in uero homine apparuit.
For this catholic Church, powerfully and widely diffused throughout the whole world, makes use of all who err for her own advancement and for their correction, when they wish to awaken. For she uses the pagans as material for her activity, heretics for the testing of her doctrine, schismatics for the proof of her stability, Jews for the comparison of her beauty. Some, then, she invites; some she excludes; some she leaves behind; some she precedes; yet to all she gives the power to share in the grace of God, whether they are still to be formed or reformed or gathered back or admitted. But her carnal members—that is, those who live or think carnally—she tolerates like chaff, by which the grain is kept safer on the threshing floor, until they are stripped of such coverings.
HOW FITTINGLY THE WISDOM OF GOD, CHRIST, HAS COME TO THE AID OF MEN BY HIS HUMANITY. ALSO FROM THE SAME BOOK, ON TRUE RELIGION.
In no way has he consulted more beneficently for the human race than that the very Wisdom of God, that is, the only Son, consubstantial with the Father and coeternal, deigned to take up the whole man, and the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us. For thus he demonstrated to carnal men, who are unable to behold the truth with the mind and are devoted to bodily senses, how exalted a place human nature holds among created things, in that he appeared to men in a true man, not only visibly—for that could also have been done in some ethereal body tempered to the endurance of our sight—but as a true man.
ipsa enim natura suscipienda erat quae liberanda. et ne quis forte sexus a suo creatore se contemtum putaret, uirum suscepit, natus ex femina est. nihil egit ui, sed omnia suadendo et monendo, [licet ementes et uendentes flagellando eiecerit e templo. sed quid hoc aut quantum est, quamuis et daemones nolentes ab hominibus non sermone suasionis, sed ui potestatis eiecerit?] uetere quippe seruitute transacta tempus libertatis inluxerat et opportune iam homini suadebatur atque salubriter quam libero esset creatus arbitrio. miraculis conciliauit fidem deo, qui erat, passione homini, quem gerebat. itaque loquens ad turbas ut deus nuntiatam sibi matrem negauit; et tamen, ut euangelium loquitur, puer parentibus subditus erat; doctrina enim deus apparebat, aetatibus homo. item aquam in uinum conuersurus ut deus dicit: recede a me, mulier; mihi et tibi quid est? nondum uenit hora mea. cum autem uenisset hora, qua ut homo moreretur, de cruce cognitam matrem commendauit discipulo, quem prae ceteris diligebat. satellites uoluptatum diuitias perniciose populi appetebant: pauper esse uoluit; honoribus et imperiis inhiabant: rex fieri noluit; carnales filios magnum bonum putabant: tale coniugium prolemque contemsit; contumelias superbissime horrebant: omne genus contumeliarum sustinuit; iniurias intolerabiles esse arbitrabantur: quae maior iniuria quam iustum innocentemque damnari?
For that very nature had to be received which was to be set free. And lest any sex should think itself despised by its Creator, He took a man, being born of a woman. He did nothing by force, but all things by persuading and admonishing [although He cast out those buying and selling from the temple with a whip. But what is this, or how great, when even demons, unwilling, He cast out from men not by the speech of persuasion, but by the force of power?]. For when the old slavery had passed, the time of freedom had dawned, and it was now being persuasively and wholesomely urged upon man how free he had been created by his free will. By miracles He reconciled faith to God, who He was, by His passion to man, whom He bore. And so, speaking to the crowds as God, He denied the mother announced to Him; and yet, as the Gospel says, the boy was subject to His parents; for by His teaching He appeared as God, by His ages as man. Likewise, about to turn water into wine as God, He says: Withdraw from me, woman; what is it to me and to you? My hour has not yet come. But when the hour had come in which He was to die as man, from the cross He commended His known mother to the disciple whom He loved before the others. The attendants of pleasures were ruinously craving the riches of the people: He willed to be poor; they were gaping after honors and commands: He refused to become a king; they thought carnal sons a great good: He despised such marriage and offspring; they most proudly shuddered at insults: He endured every kind of insult; they judged injuries to be intolerable: what injury is greater than that a just and innocent man be condemned?
dolores cOrporis execrabantur: flagellatus atque cruciatus est; mori metuebant: morte multatus est; ignominiosissimum mortis genus crucem putabant: crucifixus est; omnia quae habere cupientes non recte uiuebamus carendo uilefecit; omnia quae uitare cupientes ab studio deuiabamus (ueritatis) perpetiendo deiecit. non enim ullum peccatum committi potest nisi dum appetuntur ea quae ille contemsit aut fugiuntur quae ille sustinuit. tota itaque uita eius in terris per hominem, quem suscipere dignatus est, disciplina morum fuit. resurrectio uero eius a mortuis nihil hominis perire naturae, cum omnia salua sunt deo, satis indicauit, et quemadmodum cuncta seruiant creatori suo siue ad uindictam peccatorum siue ad hominis liberationem quamque facile corpus animae seruiat, cum ipsa subicitur deo. quibus perfectis non solum nulla substantia malum est, quod fieri numquam potest, sed etiam nullo malo afficitur, quod fieri per peccatum et uindictam potuit. et haec est disciplina naturalis christianis minus intellegentibus plena fide digna, intellegentibus autem omni errore purgata.
The pains of the body were held in horror: He was scourged and tortured; they feared to die: He was punished with death; they thought the most shameful kind of death to be the cross: He was crucified; all the things which, desiring them wrongly, we lived by lacking, He made worthless by doing without; all the things which, desiring to avoid them, we strayed from our purpose, He cast down by enduring them. For no sin can be committed except when those things are desired which He despised or those things are fled which He endured. His whole life, then, on earth, lived as a man whom He deigned to take up, was a training in morals. But His resurrection from the dead showed clearly enough that nothing of man's nature perishes, since all things are safe with God, and how all things serve their Creator, whether for the punishment of sins or for the liberation of man, and how easily the body serves the soul, since the soul itself is subject to God. When these things are accomplished, not only is no substance evil, which can never be, but it is not even affected by any evil, which could come about through sin and punishment. And this is the natural teaching, worthy of full faith for Christians of less understanding, but for those who understand, purged of every error.
Iam uero ipse totius doctrinae modus partim apertissimus partim similitudinibus in dictis, in factis, in sacramentis ad omnem animae instructionem exercitationemque accommodatus quid aliud quam rationalis disciplinae regulam impleuit? nam et mysteriorum expositio ad ea dirigitur quae apertissime dicta sunt; et si ea tantum essent quae facillime intelleguntur, nec studiose quaereretur nec suauiter inueniretur ueritas. neque si essent in scripturis sacramenta et in sacramentis non essent signacula ueritatis, satis cum cognitione actio conueniret. nunc uero quoniam pietas timore inchoatur, caritate perficitur, populus timore constrictus tempore seruitutis in uetere lege multis sacramentis onerabatur. hoc enim utile talibus erat ad desiderandam gratiam dei, quae per prophetas uentura canebatur. quae ubi uenit ab ipsa dei sapientia homine assumto et in libertatem uocati sumus, pauca sacramenta saluberrima constituta sunt, quae societatem christiani populi, hoc est sub uno deo liberae multitudinis continerent. multa uero quae populo Hebraeo, hoc est sub eodem uno deo compeditae multitudini imposita erant, ab actione remota sunt, in fide atque interpretatione manserunt; ita nec seruiliter alligant, sed exercent liberaliter animum.
Now indeed, the whole manner of his teaching—partly most open, partly conveyed in similitudes in words, in deeds, in sacraments—being adapted to every instruction and exercise of the soul, what else did it fulfill but the rule of rational discipline? For even the exposition of mysteries is directed toward those things which have been spoken most openly; and if there were only those things which are most easily understood, truth would neither be sought with zeal nor found with sweetness. Nor, if there were sacraments in the Scriptures and in the sacraments there were not the seals of truth, would action with knowledge be sufficiently in accord. But now, since piety begins with fear and is perfected by love, the people, constrained by fear in the time of servitude under the old law, were burdened with many sacraments. For this was useful to such people for desiring the grace of God, which was foretold as coming through the prophets. When it came from the very wisdom of God, with man assumed, and we were called into freedom, a few most healthful sacraments were established, which would hold together the fellowship of the Christian people, that is, of a free multitude under one God. But the many things which had been imposed upon the Hebrew people, that is, upon a multitude bound together under the same one God, were removed from action and remained in faith and interpretation; thus they neither bind servilely nor fail to exercise the mind liberally.
ARGVIT VOLVPTVOSOS, CVRIOSOS, SVPERBOS. EX EODEM LIBRO DE VERA RELIGIONE.
Nego esse quemquam istorum qui nihil colendum existimant, qui non aut carnalibus gaudiis subditus sit aut potentiam uanam foueat aut aliquo spectaculo delectatus insaniat. ita nescientes diligunt temporalia, ut inde beatitudinem expectent. his autem rebus, quibus quisque beatus uult effici, seruiat necesse est, uelit nolit; nam quocumque duxerint sequitur, et quisquis ea uisus fuerit auferre posse metuitur. possunt autem auferri ista et scintilla ignis et aliqua parua bestiola; postremo, ut omittam innumerabiles aduersitates, tempus ipsum auferat necesse est omnia transeuntia. itaque cum omnia temporalia mundus iste concludit, omnibus mundi partibus seruiunt qu?: propterea putant nihil colendum esse ne seruiant. uerum tamen quamquam in hac rerum extremitate miseri iaceant ut uitia sua sibi dominari patiantur uel libidine uel superbia uel curiositate damnati uel duobus horum uel omnibus: quamdiu sunt in hoc stadio uitae humanae, licet eis congredi et uincere, si prius credant quod intellegere nondum ualent et non diligant mundum; quoniam omne quod in mundo est, sicut diuinitus dictum est, concupiscentia carnis est et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitio saeculi.
He rebuked the pleasure-seekers, the curious, and the proud. From the same book, On True Religion.
I deny that any of those who think nothing is to be worshipped is not either subject to carnal pleasures, or cherishing empty power, or raving with delight in some spectacle. Thus, unknowing, they love temporal things so as to expect blessedness from them. But to those things by which each person wishes to be made blessed, he must necessarily be a slave, whether he wills or not; for wherever they lead, he follows, and whoever appears able to take them away is feared. Yet these things can be taken away by a spark of fire and by some tiny creature; finally, to omit countless adversities, time itself must carry away all passing things. And so, since this world encloses all temporal things, all who serve the parts of the world—for this reason they think nothing is to be worshipped, lest they serve. But yet, although in this extremity of things the wretched lie so low that they allow their vices to rule over them, condemned by lust or pride or curiosity, or by two of these, or by all: as long as they are in this course of human life, it is permitted them to engage and to conquer, if they first believe what they are not yet able to understand, and do not love the world; since everything that is in the world, as has been divinely said, is the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the eyes and the ambition of the world.
hoc modo tria illa sunt notata; nam concupiscentia carnis uoluptatis infimae amatores significat, concupiscentia oculorum curiosos, ambitio saeculi superbos. triplex etiam temtatio in homine, quem ueritas ipsa suscepit, cauenda monstrata est. dic, inquit temtator, lapidibus istis ut panes fiant. at ille unus et solus magister: non in pane solo uiuit homo, sed in omni uerbo dei. ita enim domitam docuit esse oportere cupiditatem uoluptatis, ut nec fami cedendum sit. sed forte dominationis temporalis fastu decipi poterat qui carnis uoluptate non potuit; omnia ergo mundi regna monstrata sunt ot dictum est: omnia tibi dabo, si prostratus adoraueris me. cui responsum est: dominum deum tuum adorabis et illi soli seruies. ita calcata superbia est. subiecta est autem extrema etiam curiositatis inlecebra; non enim ut se de fastigio templi praecipitaret urgebat nisi causa tantum aliquid experiendi. sed neque hic uictus est. et ideo sic respondit, ut intellegeremus non opus esse ad cognoscendum deum temtationibus uisibiliter diuina explorare molientibus: non temtabis, inquit, dominum deum tuum.
In this way those three things are noted; for the concupiscence of the flesh signifies the lovers of the lowest pleasure, the concupiscence of the eyes the curious, the ambition of the world the proud. The threefold temptation in the man whom Truth itself took up was also shown to be something to be guarded against. The tempter says, "Tell these stones to become bread." But he, the one and only master: "Man does not live on bread alone, but on every word of God." For he taught that the desire for pleasure ought to be so subdued that not even hunger is to be yielded to. But perhaps he who could not be overcome by the pleasure of the flesh could be deceived by the pomp of temporal dominion; therefore all the kingdoms of the world were shown to him and it was said: "All these I will give you, if you fall down and worship me." To which the answer was: "You shall worship the Lord your God, and him alone shall you serve." Thus pride was trampled underfoot. Then the last enticement, that of curiosity, was also subjected; for he was urging him to throw himself down from the height of the temple for no other reason than to experience something so great. But neither was he conquered here. And therefore he answered in such a way that we might understand that there is no need to test divine things by temptations, for those who visibly attempt to explore God: "You shall not tempt," he says, "the Lord your God.
quam ob rem quisquis intus dei uerbo pascitur, non quaerit in ista heremo uoluptatem; qui uni deo tantum subiectus est, non quaerit in monte, id est in terrena elatione iactantiam; quisquis aeterno spectaculo incommutabilis ueritatis adhaerescit, non per fastigium huius corporis, id est per oculos praecipitatur, ut temporalia et inferiora cognoscat.
QVOD MELIVS SIT AB HOMINE QVAM A VITIO VINCI. EX EODEM LIBRO DE VERA RELIGIONE.
Nos in terra laboramus et cum magno dedecore superamur ab omnibus quae nos commouere ac perturbare potuerint. itaque nolumus ab hominibus uinci et iram non possumus uinoere. qua turpitudine quid execrabilius dici potest? fatemur hominem hoc esse quod nos sumus, qui tametsi habeat uitia non est tamen ipse uitium. quanto igitur honestius homo nos uincit quam uitium? quis autem dubitet immane uitium esse inuidentiam? qua necesse est torqueatur et subiciatur qui non uult in rebus temporalibus uinci. melius est ergo ut homo nos uincat quam inuidentia uel quodlibet aliud uitium.
For this reason, whoever is fed within by the word of God does not seek pleasure in this desert; he who is subject to God alone does not seek vainglory on the mountain, that is, in earthly exaltation; whoever clings to the eternal spectacle of unchanging truth is not cast down headlong through the height of this body, that is, through the eyes, so as to know temporal and lower things.
THAT IT IS BETTER TO BE CONQUERED BY A MAN THAN BY A VICE. FROM THE SAME BOOK ON TRUE RELIGION.
We labor on earth and with great disgrace are conquered by all the things that have been able to move and disturb us. And so we do not wish to be conquered by men, yet we cannot conquer anger. What more accursed thing than this baseness can be spoken? We admit that the man is what we are, who, although he may have vices, is nevertheless not himself a vice. How much more honorable, then, is it for a man to conquer us than a vice? But who would doubt that envy is a monstrous vice? By it one must necessarily be tormented and subjected who does not wish to be conquered in temporal things. It is better, therefore, that a man conquer us than envy or any other vice whatsoever.
Sed nec ab homine uinci potest qui uitia sua uicerit. non enim uincitur nisi cui eripitur ab aduersario quod amat. qui ergo id amat solum quod amanti eripi non potest, ille indubitanter inuictus est nec ulla cruciatur inuidia. id enim diligit ad quod diligendum et percipiendum quanto plures uenerint, tanto eis uberius gratulatur. diligit enim deum ex toto corde et ex tota anima et ex tota mente; et diligit proximum tamquam se ipsum. non illi ergo inuidet ut sit quod ipse est; immo adiuuat etiam quantum potest. nec potest amittere proximum, quem diligit tamquam se ipsum, quia neque in se ipso ea diligit quae oculis subiacent aut ullis aliis corporis sensibus; ergo apud se ipsum habet quem diligit tamquam se ipsum. ea est autem regula dilectionis, ut quae sibi uult bona prouenire et illi uelit, quae accidere sibi mala non uult et illi nolit. hanc uoluntatem erga omnes homines seruat; nam erga neminem operandum est malum et dilectio proximi malum non operatur. diligamus ergo, ut praeceptum est, etiam inimicos nostros, si uere inuicti esse uolumus. non enim per se ipsum quisquam hominum inuictus est, sed per illam incommutabilem legem, cui quicumque seruiunt soli sunt liberi; sic enim eis quod diligunt auferri non potest; quae res una inuictos facit et perfectos uiros.
But neither can he be conquered by man who has conquered his own vices. For no one is conquered except when what he loves is snatched away from him by an adversary. Therefore whoever loves only that which cannot be snatched from one who loves it is undoubtedly unconquerable and is tormented by no envy. For he loves that which, the more people come to love and receive it, the more abundantly he rejoices on their behalf. For he loves God with his whole heart and with his whole soul and with his whole mind; and he loves his neighbor as himself. He does not therefore envy him that he may be what he himself is; indeed he even helps him as much as he can. Nor can he lose his neighbor, whom he loves as himself, because he does not love in himself those things which lie subject to the eyes or to any other senses of the body; therefore he has within himself the one whom he loves as himself. Moreover, this is the rule of love: that the good things which he wishes to come to himself, he also wishes for him, and the evils which he does not wish to befall himself, he does not wish for him. He keeps this will toward all men; for evil is to be done to no one, and the love of neighbor does no evil. Let us therefore love, as it is commanded, even our enemies, if we truly wish to be unconquerable. For no man is unconquerable by himself, but through that unchangeable law, to which whoever serve are alone free; for thus what they love cannot be taken from them; and this one thing makes men unconquerable and perfect.
nam si uel ipsum hominem homo dilexerit non tamquam se ipsum, sed tamquam iumentum aut balneas aut auiculam pictam uel garrulam, id est ut ex eo aliquid temporalis uoluptatis aut commodi capiat, seruiat necesse est non homini, sed, quod est turpius, tam foedo et detestabili uitio, quo non amat hominem sicut homo amandus est. quo uitio dominante usque ad extremam uitam uel potius mortem perducitur. sed ne sic quidem ab homine homo diligendus est, ut diliguntur carnales fratres uel filii uel coniuges uel quique cognati aut affines aut ciues; nam et ista dilectio temporalis est. itaque ad pristinam perfectamque naturam nos ipsa ueritas uocans praecipit ut carnali consuetudini resistamus, docens neminem aptum esse regno dei qui non istas carnales necessitudines oderit. neque hoc cuiquam inhumanum uideri debet. magis enim est inhumanum non amare in homine quod homo est, sed amare quod filius est; hoc est enim non in eo amare illud quod ad deum pertinet, sed amare illud quod ad se pertinet. quid ergo mirum, si ad regnum non peruenit qui non communem, sed priuatam rem diligit? immo utrumque, . ait quispiam; immo illud unum, dicit deus. dicit enim uerissime ueritas: nemo potest duobus dominis seruire; nemo enim potest perfecte diligere quo uocamur, nisi oderit unde reuocamur. uocamur autem ad perfectam naturam.
For if a man loves a man not as himself, but as a beast of burden or baths or a painted or chattering bird—that is, so as to derive from him some temporal pleasure or advantage—he must needs serve not the man, but, what is more shameful, so foul and detestable a vice, by which he does not love the man as a man ought to be loved. And when this vice rules, he is led on even to the utmost of life, or rather to death. But not even thus is a man to be loved by a man as carnal brothers or sons or spouses or any relatives or connections or fellow citizens are loved; for that love too is temporal. Therefore the truth itself, calling us back to our original and perfect nature, commands us to resist carnal custom, teaching that no one is fit for the kingdom of God who does not hate these carnal ties. Nor ought this seem inhuman to anyone. For it is more inhuman not to love in a man what a man is, but to love what a son is; for this is not to love in him what belongs to God, but to love what belongs to himself. What wonder, then, if he does not attain the kingdom who loves not the common good but his own private good? Nay, someone says, both; nay, that one thing only, says God. For the truth says most truly: No one can serve two masters; for no one can perfectly love that to which we are called unless he hates that from which we are recalled. But we are called to the perfect nature.
humanam, qualem ante peccatum nostrum deus fecit; reuocamur autem ab eius dilectione, quam peccando meruimus. quare oderimus oportet, unde ut liberemur optamus. oderimus ergo temporales necessitudines, si aeternitatis caritate flagramus. diligat homo proximum tamquam se ipsum. certe enim sibi ipse nemo est pater aut filius aut affinis aut aliquid huius modi, sed tantum homo. qui ergo diligit aliquem tamquam se ipsum, hoc in eo debet diligere quod sibi ipse est. corpora uero non sunt quod nos sumus; non ergo in homine corpus est expetendum aut desiderandum. ualet ad hoc etiam quod praeceptum est: ne concupiscas rem proximi tui. quapropter quisquis in proximo aliud diligit quam sibi ipse est, non eum diligit tamquam se ipsum. ipsa igitur natura humana sine carnali condicione diligenda est, siue sit perficienda siue perfecta. omnes sub uno deo patre cognati sunt qui eum diligunt et faciunt uoluntatem ipsius, et inuicem sibi sunt et patres, cum sibi consulunt, et filii, cum sibi obtemperant, et fratres maxime, quia eos unus pater testamento suo ad unam hereditatem uocat.
human nature, such as God made it before our sin; but we are recalled from the love of it, which we have deserved by sinning. Therefore we must hate that from which we desire to be freed. Let us therefore hate temporal ties, if we burn with love of eternity. Let a man love his neighbor as himself. For surely no one is to himself a father or a son or a relative or anything of that kind, but only a man. Whoever therefore loves someone as himself ought to love in him that which he himself is. But bodies are not what we are; therefore the body is not to be sought or desired in a man. To this end also applies the commandment: You shall not covet your neighbor's property. Wherefore whoever loves in his neighbor something other than what he himself is, does not love him as himself. Therefore human nature itself, apart from the condition of the flesh, is to be loved, whether it is to be perfected or is already perfect. All who love God the Father and do his will are kin under one God the Father, and they are to one another both fathers, when they care for one another, and sons, when they obey one another, and most especially brothers, because one Father calls them by his testament to one inheritance.
Quapropter cur iste non sit inuictus hominem diligendo, cum in eo nihil praeter hominem diligat, id est creaturam dei ad eius imaginem factam, nec ei possit deesse perfecta natura, quam diligit, cum ipse perfectus est? sicut enim uerbi gratia, si quisquam diligat bene cantantem, non hunc aut illum, sed tantum bene cantantem quemlibet, cum sit cantator ipse perfectus, ita uult omnes tales esse, ut tamen non ei desit quod diligit, quia ipse bene cantat. nam si cuiquam inuidet bene cantanti, non iam illud diligit, sed laudem aut aliquid aliud quo bene cantando uult peruenire, et potest ei minui uel auferri, si et alius bene oantauerit. qui ergo inuidet bene cantanti, non amat bene cantantem; sed rursus qui eo indiget, non cantat bene. quod multo accommodatius de bene uiuente dici potest, quia et inuidere nulli potest; quo enim perueniunt bene uiuentes, tantundem est omnibus nec minus fit, cum plures habuerint. et potest esse tempus, quo bonus cantator cantare non decenter queat et indigeat uoce alterius, qua sibi exhibeatur quod diligit; tamquam si alicubi conuiuetur ubi eum cantare turpe sit, sed deceat audire cantantem. bene uiuere autem semper decet. quare quisquis hoc diligit et facit, non solum non inuidet imitantibus, sed eis se praebet libentissime atque humanissime, quantum potest; nec eis tamen indiget. nam quod in illis diligit, in se ipso habet totum atque perfectum.
Wherefore why is he not invincible in loving a man, since in him he loves nothing but the man, that is, a creature of God made to his image, and the perfect nature which he loves cannot be lacking to him, since he himself is perfect? For just as, for example, if anyone loves a person who sings well, not this one or that one, but simply anyone who sings well, since he himself is a perfect singer, so he wishes all to be such, yet what he loves is not lacking to him, because he himself sings well. For if he envies anyone who sings well, he no longer loves that, but the praise or something else which he wishes to attain by singing well, and which can be diminished or taken from him if another also has sung well. Therefore he who envies one who sings well does not love one who sings well; but again, he who needs him does not sing well. This can be said much more fittingly of one who lives well, because he can envy no one; for the goal which those who live well attain is the same for all and is not made less when more have attained it. And there can be a time when a good singer cannot sing fittingly and needs another's voice, by which what he loves may be supplied to him; as if, for instance, he is at a banquet somewhere where it is shameful for him to sing, but fitting to hear one singing. But to live well is always fitting. Wherefore whoever loves this and does it not only does not envy those who imitate him, but shows himself to them most willingly and most kindly, as much as he can; nor does he need them. For what he loves in them, he has whole and perfect in himself.
ita cum diligat proximum tamquam se ipsum, non inuidet ei, quia nec sibi ipsi; praestat ei quod potest, quia et sibi ipsi; non eo indiget, quia nec se ipso; tantum deo indiget, cui adhaerendo beatus est. nemo autem illi eripit deum. ille ergo uerissime atque certissime inuictus homo est qui cohaeret deo, non ut ab eo aliquid boni extra mereatur, sed cui nihil aliud quam ipsum adhaerere deo bonum est. hic uir quamdiu est in hac uita, utitur amico ad rependendam gratiam, utitur inimico ad patientiam, utitur quibus potest ad beneficientiam, utitur omnibus ad beniuolentiam. et quamquam temporalia non diligat, ipse recte utitur temporalibus et pro eorum sorte hominibus consulit, si aequaliter non potest omnibus. quare si aliquem familiarium suorum promtius quam quemlibet alloquitur, non eum magis diligit, sed ad eum habet maiorem fiduciam et apertiorem temporis ianuam. tractat enim tempori deditos tanto melius, quanto ipse minus obligatus est tempore. cum itaque omnibus quos pariter diligit prodesse non possit, nisi coniunctioribus prodesse malit, iniustus est. animi autem coniunctio maior est quam locorum aut temporum, quibus in hoc corpore iungimur; sed ea maxima est quae omnibus praeualet. non ergo iste affligitur morte cuiusquam, quoniam qui toto animo deum diligit, nouit nec sibi perire quod deo non perit. deus autem dominus est et uiuorum et mortuorum.
Thus, since he loves his neighbor as himself, he does not envy him, because he does not envy himself either; he gives him what he can, because he also gives to himself; he does not need him, because he does not need himself either; he needs only God, by cleaving to whom he is blessed. But no one takes God away from him. Therefore that man is most truly and most certainly invincible who cleaves to God, not so that he may merit some good from him beyond God himself, but for whom nothing other than to cleave to God himself is good. This man, as long as he is in this life, uses a friend to return gratitude, uses an enemy for patience, uses those he can for beneficence, uses all for benevolence. And although he does not love temporal things, he himself rightly uses temporal things and consults for men according to their lot, if he cannot do so equally for all. Wherefore if he addresses one of his household more readily than anyone else, he does not love him more, but has greater confidence in him and a more open door of time. For he treats those devoted to time the better, the less he himself is bound by time. Since therefore he cannot benefit all whom he loves equally, unless he prefers to benefit those more closely joined to him, he is unjust. But the conjunction of minds is greater than that of places or times, by which we are joined in this body; but that conjunction is greatest which prevails over all. Therefore this man is not afflicted by anyone's death, since he who loves God with his whole mind knows that what does not perish for God does not perish for himself either. But God is the Lord both of the living and of the dead.
non cuiusquam miseria miser est, quia nec cuiusquam iniustitia fit iniustus. et ut nemo illi iustitiam et deum, sic nemo aufert beatitudinem. et si quando forte alicuius periculo uel errore uel dolore commouetur, usque ad illius auxilium aut correctionem aut consolationem, non usque ad suam subuersionem ualere patitur. in omnibus autem officiosis laboribus futurae quietis certa expectatione non frangitur. quid enim ei nocebit qui bene uti etiam inimico potest? eius enim praesidio atque munimento inimicitias non pertimescit, cuius praecepto et dono diligit inimicos. huic uiro in tribulationibus parum est non contristari, nisi etiam gaudeat, sciens quod tribulatio patientiam operatur, patientia probationem, probatio spem, spes autem non confundit; quoniam caritas dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. quis huic nocebit? quis hunc subiugabit? homo, qui prosperis rebus proficit, asperis quid profecerit discet. cum enim mutabilium bonorum adest copia, non eis confidit; sed cum subtrahuntur, agnoscitur utrum eum non ceperint, quia plerumque cum adsunt nobis putamus quod non ea diligamus; sed cum abesse coeperint, inuenimur qui simus. hoc enim sine amore nostro aderat, quod sine dolore discedit.
He is not made miserable by anyone's misery, because he is not made unjust by anyone's injustice. And just as no one takes justice and God from him, so no one takes beatitude from him. And if at times he is moved by someone's danger or error or pain, he allows this to extend only as far as help or correction or consolation for that person, not as far as his own overthrow. In all his dutiful labors, moreover, he is not broken by the certain expectation of future rest. For what will harm him who can make good use even of an enemy? For by the protection and defense of him whose command and gift it is to love enemies, he does not fear enmities. For this man, in tribulations, it is too little not to be saddened unless he also rejoices, knowing that tribulation produces patience, patience proven character, proven character hope, and hope does not disappoint, because the love of God has been poured out into our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us. Who will harm this man? Who will subjugate him? A man who prospers in favorable circumstances will learn what he has gained in harsh ones. For when an abundance of mutable goods is present, he does not trust in them; but when they are withdrawn, it is recognized whether they had not captured him, because for the most part, when they are present, we think that we do not love them; but when they begin to be absent, we are found to be what we are. For that was present without our love which departs without our grief.
uidetur ergo uincere cum uincatur qui superando ad id peruenit quod cum dolore amissurus est; et uincit cum uinci uideatur, quisquis cedendo ad id peruenit quod non amittit inuitus.
Quem delectat ergo libertas, ab amore mutabilium rerum liber esse appetat; et quem regnare delectat, uni omnium regnatori deo subditus haereat plus eum diligendo quam se ipsum. et haec est perfecta iustitia, qua potius potiora et minus minora diligimus; sapientem animam atque perfectam talem diligat qualem illam uidet, stultam non talem, sed quia esse perfecta et sapiens potest; quia nec se ipsum debet stultum diligere. nam qui se diligit stultum non proficit ad sapientiam; nec fiet quisque qualis cupit esse, nisi se oderit qualis est. sed donec ad sapientiam perfectionemque ueniatur, eo animo ferat stultitiam proximi, quo suam ferret, si stultus esset et amaret sapientiam. quapropter si et ipsa superbia uerae libertatis et ueri regni umbra est, etiam per ipsam nos commemorat diuina prouidentia quid significemus uitiosi et quo debeamus redire correcti. iam uero cuncta spectacula et omnis illa quae appellatur curiositas quid aliud quaerit quam de rerum cognitione laetitiam? quid ergo admirabilius, quid speciosius ipsa ueritate, ad quam spectator omnis peruenire se cupere confitetur, cum uehementer ne fallatur inuigilat?
He therefore seems to conquer when he is conquered, who by overcoming arrives at that which he will lose with grief; and he conquers when he seems to be conquered, whoever by yielding arrives at that which he does not lose against his will.
Let him who is delighted by liberty desire to be free from the love of mutable things; and let him who is delighted to reign cling in subjection to the one God, ruler of all, loving him more than himself. And this is perfect justice, by which we love the more worthy more and the less worthy less; let the wise and perfect soul love such a soul as it sees it to be, but not love a foolish soul as such, yet because it can become perfect and wise; for it ought not to love itself when foolish. For he who loves himself as foolish does not advance toward wisdom; nor will anyone become such as he desires to be unless he hates himself such as he is. But until one comes to wisdom and perfection, let him bear the foolishness of a neighbor with the spirit with which he would bear his own, if he were foolish and loved wisdom. Wherefore, if even pride itself is a shadow of true liberty and true reign, even through it divine providence reminds us what we signify in our vice and whither we ought to return when corrected. Now indeed all spectacles and all that which is called curiosity—what else does it seek than delight from the knowledge of things? What then is more wonderful, what more beautiful than truth itself, to which every spectator confesses that he desires to attain, when he watches intently lest he be deceived?
QVOD DEI LEX ALTA QVAEDAM DISCIPLINA SIT. EX LIBRO II DE ORDINE INTER CETERA ET AD LOCVM.
Cum omnes cernerem studiosissime ac pro suis quemque uiribus deum quaerere, sed ipsum de quo agebamus ordinem non tenere, quo ad illius ineffabilis maiestatis intellegentiam peruenitur, oro uos, inquam, si, ut uideo, multum diligitis ordinem, ne nos praeposteros et inordinatos esse patiamini. quamquam enim occultissima ratio se demonstraturam polliceatur nihil praeter diuinum ordinem fieri, tamen si quempiam ludi magistrum audiremus conantem docere puerum syllabas, quem prius litteras nemo docuisset, non dico ridendum tamquam stultum, sed uinciendum tamquam furiosum putaremus, non ob aliud, opinor, nisi quod docendi ordinem non teneret. at multa talia et imperitos, quae a doctis reprehendantur ac derideantur, et dementes homines, quae nec stultorum iudicium fugiunt, facere nemo ambigit; et tamen etiam ista omnia quae fatemur esse peruersa non esse praeter diuinum ordinem alta quaedam et a multitudinis uel suspicione remotissima disciplina se ita studiosis et deum atque animas tantum amantibus animis manifestaturam esse promittit, ut non nobis summae numerorum possint esse certiores.
THAT THE LAW OF GOD IS A CERTAIN HIGH DISCIPLINE. FROM BOOK II ON ORDER, AMONG OTHER THINGS, AND TO THE POINT.
Since I saw that all were most eagerly seeking God, each according to his own strength, but were not holding to that order by which one arrives at the understanding of that ineffable majesty, I beg you, I say, if, as I see, you greatly love order, do not allow us to be preposterous and disorderly. For although the most hidden reason promises that it will demonstrate that nothing is done except by divine order, yet if we were to hear some schoolmaster attempting to teach a boy syllables, when no one had first taught him letters, we would think him not merely to be laughed at as a fool, but to be bound as a madman—for no other reason, I think, than that he did not hold to the order of teaching. But no one doubts that unskilled people do many such things, which are censured and mocked by the learned, and that demented men do things which do not even escape the judgment of fools; and yet even all these things which we confess are perverse are not apart from divine order. That certain high discipline, most remote even from the suspicion of the multitude, promises that it will manifest itself so to studious minds and to minds that love only God and souls, that the highest truths of numbers could not be more certain to us.
Haec autem disciplina ipsa dei lex est, quae apud eum fixa et inconcussa semper manens in sapientes animas quasi transcribitur, ut tanto se sciant uiuere melius tantoque sublimius, quanto et perfectius eam contemplantur intellegendo et uiuendo custodiunt diligentius. haec igitur disciplina eis qui illam nosse desiderant simul geminum ordinem sequi iubet, cuius una pars uitae, altera eruditionis est. adulescentibus ergo studiosis eius ita uiuendum est, ut a ueneriis rebus, ab inlecebris uentris et gutturis, ab immodesto corporis cultu et ornatu, ab inanibus negotiis ludorum, a torpore somni atque pigritiae, ab aemulatione, obtrectatione, inuidentia, ab honorum potestatumque ambitionibus, ab ipsius etiam laudis immodica cupiditate se abstineant; amorem autem pecuniae totius suae spei certissimum uenenum esse credant; nihil eneruiter faciant, nihil audacter; in peccatis autem suorum uel pellant omnino iram uel ita frenent, ut sit pulsae similis; neminem oderint, nulla uitia non curare uelint; magnopere obseruent cum uindicant, ne nimium sit, cum ignoscunt, ne parum; nihil puniant quod non ualeat ad melius, nihil indulgeant quod uertat in peius; suos putent omnes in quos sibi potestas data fuerit; ita seruiant, ut eis dominari pudeat, ita dominentur, ut eis seruire delectet. in alienorum autem peccatis molesti non sint inuito.
But this discipline is itself the law of God, which, fixed in him and always remaining unshaken, is as it were transcribed into wise souls, so that they know they live better and more sublimely the more perfectly they contemplate it by understanding and guard it by living more diligently. This discipline, then, commands those who desire to know it to follow at once a twin order, one part of which is of life, the other of learning. Therefore young students of it must so live as to abstain from venereal matters, from the enticements of the belly and the throat, from immodest care and adornment of the body, from the empty business of games, from the torpor of sleep and sloth, from rivalry, disparagement, and envy, from ambitions for honors and powers, and even from an immoderate desire for praise itself; but let them believe that the love of money is the most certain poison of all their hope; let them do nothing effeminately, nothing boldly; but at the sins of their own people let them either drive out anger altogether or so bridle it that it be like one driven out; let them hate no one, let them wish to leave no vice uncured; let them greatly observe, when they punish, that it not be too much, when they forgive, that it not be too little; let them punish nothing that cannot lead to better, let them indulge nothing that turns to worse; let them consider all those their own over whom power has been given to them; let them so serve that they be ashamed to lord it over them, so lord it over them that it delight them to serve them. But in the sins of others let them not be troublesome against their will.
inimicitias uitent cautissime, ferant aequissime, finiant citissime. in omni uero contractu atque conuersatione cum hominibus satis est seruare unum hoc uulgare prouerbium: nemini faciant quod pati nolunt. rempublicam nolint administrare nisi perfecti. perfici autem uel intra aetatem senatoriam festinent uel certe intra iuuentutem. sed quisquis sero se ad ista conuerterit, non arbitretur nihil sibi esse praeceptum: nam ista utique facilius decocta aetate seruabit. in omni autem uita, loco, tempore amicos aut habeant aut habere instent. obsequantur dignis etiam non hoc expectantibus; superbos minus curent, minime sint. apte congruenterque uiuant; deum colant, cogitent, quaerant fide, spe, caritate subnixi; optent tranquillitatem atque certum cursum studiis suis omniumque sociorum et sibi quibusque possunt mentem bonam pacatamque uitam.
Let them avoid enmities most cautiously, bear them most equitably, end them most swiftly. But in every contract and dealings with men it is enough to observe this one common proverb: let them not do to anyone what they do not wish to suffer. Let them not undertake to administer the state unless they are perfect. But let them hasten to become perfect, either within the senatorial age or certainly within youth. But whoever has turned himself to these things late should not think that nothing has been commanded him; for he will surely observe these things more easily in a well-seasoned age. But in every life, place, and time, let them either have friends or strive to have them. Let them defer to the worthy even when these do not expect it; let them care less for the proud, and let them least of all be proud themselves. Let them live fittingly and harmoniously; let them worship God, think of him, seek him, supported by faith, hope, and charity; let them desire tranquility and a sure course for their own studies and for all their associates, and, as far as they can, a good mind and a peaceful life for themselves and for each person.
Sequitur ut dicam quomodo studiosi erudiri debeant, qui sicut dictum est uiuere instituerunt. ad discendum item necessario dupliciter ducimur, auctoritate atque ratione; tempore auctoritas, re autem ratio prior est. aliud est enim quod in agendo anteponitur, aliud quod pluris in appetendo aestimatur. itaque quamquam bonorum auctoritas imperitae multitudini uideatur esse salubrior, ratio uero aptior eruditis, tamen quia nullus hominum nisi ex imperito peritus fit, nullus autem imperitus nouit qualem se debeat praebere docentibus et quali uita esse docibilis possit, euenit ut omnibus bona magna et occulta discere cupientibus non aperiat nisi auctoritas ianuam. quam quisque ingressus sine ulla dubitatione uitae optimae praecepta sectatur, per quae cum docilis factus fuerit, tum demum discet et quanta ratione praedicta sint ea ipsa quae secutus est ante rationem, et quid sit ipsa ratio, quam post auctoritatis cunabula firmus et idoneus iam sequitur atque comprehendit; et quid intellectus, in quo uniuersa sunt, uel ipse potius uniuersa; et quid praeter uniuersa uniuersorum principium. ad quam cognitionem in hac uita peruenire pauci, ultra quam uero etiam post hanc uitam nemo progredi potest.
Next I must say how those eager to be instructed ought to be taught, who, as has been said, have resolved to live rightly. For learning, then, we are necessarily led in two ways: by authority and by reason. In time, authority comes first; in reality, reason is prior. For one thing is what takes precedence in action, another what is esteemed of greater worth in desiring. And so, although the authority of good men may seem more salutary to the unlearned multitude, while reason is more suited to the learned, yet because no man becomes learned except from being unlearned, and no unlearned man knows how he ought to present himself to those who teach, and by what manner of life he can be capable of being taught, it comes about that for all who desire to learn great and hidden good things, authority alone opens the door. Once anyone has entered by it, without any doubt he follows the precepts of the best life; and when through these he has become teachable, then at last he will learn both with how great reason those very things were foretold which he followed before reason, and what reason itself is, which after the cradle of authority he now, being firm and fit, follows and comprehends; and what understanding is, in which all things are, or rather which itself is all things; and what is, beyond all things, the principle of all things. To reach this knowledge in this life, few attain; but beyond it, even after this life, no one can advance.
qui autem sola auctoritate contenti bonis tantum moribus rectisque notis constanter operam dederint, aut contemnentes aut non ualentes disciplinis liberalibus atque optimis erudiri, beatos eos quidem, cum inter homines uiuunt, nescio quomodo appellem; tamen inconcusse credo, mox ut hoc corpus reliquerint, eos quo bene magis minusue uixerunt, eo facilius aut difficilius liberari. auctoritas autem partim diuina est partim humana; sed uera, firma, summa ea est quae diuina nominatur. in qua metuenda est aeriorum animalium mira fallacia, quae per rerum ad istos sensus corporis pertinentium quasdam diuinationes nonnullasque potentias decipere animas facillime consuerunt aut periturarum fortunarum curiosas aut fragilium cupidas potestatum aut inanium formidolosas miraculorum. illa ergo auctoritas diuina dicenda est, quae non solum in sensibilibus signis transcendit omnem humanam facultatem, sed et ipsum hominem agens ostendit ei quo usque se propter ipsum depresserit; et non teneri sensibus, quibus uidentur illa miranda, sed ad intellectum iubet euolare, simul demonstrans et quanta hic possit et cur haec faciat et quam parui pendat. doceat enim oportet et factis potestatem suam et humilitate clementiam et praeceptione naturam.
But those who, content with authority alone, have steadily devoted themselves only to good morals and right conduct, either despising or being unable to be instructed in the liberal and best disciplines—I do not know how to call them blessed, indeed, while they live among men; yet I firmly believe that, as soon as they leave this body, they are set free the more easily or the more difficulty in proportion as they have lived better or worse. Now authority is partly divine and partly human; but the true, firm, and highest authority is that which is called divine. In it one must fear the wondrous deceit of the aerial beings, which, through certain divinations and powers pertaining to things that reach these senses of the body, have been accustomed to deceive souls most easily—souls either curious about perishable fortunes, or desirous of fragile powers, or fearful of empty miracles. That authority, then, is to be called divine which not only surpasses every human faculty in sensible signs, but also, working upon man himself, shows him how far it has lowered itself for his sake; and it commands him not to be held fast by the senses, by which those wondrous things are seen, but to fly up to the intellect, at the same time demonstrating both how much it can do here, and why it does these things, and how little it values them. For it ought to teach its power by deeds, its clemency by humility, and its nature by precept.
quae omnia sacris quibus initiamur secretius firmiusque traduntur, in quibus bonorum uita facillime non disputationum ambagibus, sed mysteriorum auctoritate purgatur. humana uero auctoritas plerumque fallit; in eis tamen iure uidetur excellere qui, quantum imperitorum sensus capit, multa dant indicia doctrinarum suarum et non uiuunt aliter quam uiuendum esse praecipiunt. quibus si aliqua etiam fortunae munera accesserint, quorum appareant usu magni contemtuque maiores, difficillimum omnino est ut eis quisque uiuendi praecepta dantibus credens recte uituperetur.
QVOD AMORE SE SEQVENTIBVS DEVS AVCTORITATIS VIAM SEPTEMPLICITER MVNIVERIT. EX LIBRO DE MORIBVS ECCLE- SIAE CATHOLICAE.
Quaeramus quemadmodum sit homini uiuendum. beate certe omnes uiuere uolumus; beatus autem neque ille dici potest qui non habet quod amat, qualecumque sit, neque qui habet quod amat, si noxium sit, neque qui non amat quod habet, etiam si optimum sit. nam et qui appetit quod adipisci non potest cruciatur; et qui adeptus est quod appetendum non esset fallitur; et qui non appetit quod adipiscendum esset aegrotat. nihil autem istorum animo contingit sine miseria: nullus igitur illorum beatus est. quartum restat ubi beata uita inueniri queat, cum id quod est hominis optimum et amatur et habetur. quid est enim aliud quod dicimus frui nisi praesto habere quod diligis ?
All these things are handed down more secretly and more firmly in the sacred rites by which we are initiated, in which the life of good people is most easily cleansed, not by the roundabouts of disputations, but by the authority of the mysteries. Human authority, however, for the most part deceives; yet in those it rightly seems to excel who, as far as the understanding of the unlearned can grasp, give many indications of their teachings and do not live otherwise than they instruct that one ought to live. If some gifts of fortune also come to them, in the use of which they appear great and in the contempt of which greater, it is altogether most difficult that anyone who believes them as they give precepts of living should rightly be blamed.
THAT GOD, BY THE POWER OF AUTHORITY, HAS SEVENFOLD FORTIFIED THE WAY FOR THOSE WHO FOLLOW HIM IN LOVE. FROM THE BOOK ON THE MORALS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.
Let us ask how a man ought to live. Surely we all wish to live blessedly; but neither can that man be called blessed who does not have what he loves, whatever sort it is, nor he who has what he loves if it is harmful, nor he who does not love what he has, even if it is the best. For both he who desires what he cannot obtain is tormented, and he who has obtained what ought not to have been desired is deceived, and he who does not desire what ought to have been obtained is sick. But none of these things happens to the mind without misery; therefore none of them is blessed. A fourth remains, where the blessed life can be found, when that which is man's best is both loved and had. For what else do we call enjoying but to have at hand what you love?
praesto ergo esse nobis debet optimum nostrum, si beate uiuere cogitamus. nam quisquis quod se ipso est deterius sequitur, fit et ipse deterior. oportet autem omnem hominem id quod optimum est sequi; sed tale esse debet quod non amittat inuitus. quippe nemo potest confidere de tali bono quod sibi eripi posse sentit, etiam si retinere id amplectique uoluerit. quisquis autem de bono quo fruitur non confidit, in tanto timore amittendi beatus esse quis potest? quis uero dubitet hominem sapientem si sequi satis putauerimus, auferri nobis etiam repugnantibus posse? deus igitur restat, quem si sequimur, bene, si assequimur, non tantum bene sed etiam beate uiuimus. secutio ergo dei est beatitatis appetitus, consecutio ipsa beatitas. sed quo pacto sequimur quem non uidemus? aut quomodo uidemus, qui non solum homines sed etiam insipientes homines sumus? confugiendum est igitur ad eorum praecepta quos sapientes fuisse probabile est, ut in lucem ueritatis aciem titubantem uelut ramis humanitatis opacata inducat auctoritas. quam uiam nobis deus et patriarcharum segregatione et legis uinculo et prophetarum praesagio et suscepti hominis sacramento et apostolorum testimonio et martyrum sanguine et gentium occupatione muniuit; quare ratiunculas nostras diuinis submittamus affatibus.
Therefore our highest good ought to be at hand for us, if we think to live blessedly. For whoever follows what is worse than himself is himself made worse. But every man ought to follow what is best; yet it must be such that he does not lose it against his will. Indeed, no one can have confidence in a good which he feels can be taken from him, even if he wishes to retain and embrace it. But whoever does not have confidence in the good he enjoys—can he be blessed in such great fear of losing it? And who would doubt that a wise man, if we thought it sufficient to follow him, could be taken from us even against our resistance? God therefore remains; if we follow him, we live well; if we attain him, we live not only well but also blessedly. So the following of God is the desire for blessedness; the attainment itself is blessedness. But how do we follow one whom we do not see? Or how do we see him, who are not only men but even foolish men? We must therefore take refuge in the precepts of those who are likely to have been wise, so that authority, as it were shaded by the branches of humanity, may lead our tottering gaze into the light of truth. This way God has fortified for us both by the setting apart of the patriarchs and by the bond of the law and by the foretelling of the prophets and by the sacrament of the man he took up and by the testimony of the apostles and by the blood of the martyrs and by the occupation of the nations; wherefore let us submit our little reasonings to divine utterances.
Audiamus ergo quem finem bonorum nobis, Christe, praescribas, quo nos summo amore tendere iubes. diliges, inquit, dominum deum tuum ei toto corde tuo et ex tota anima tua et ex tota mente tua. quid uis amplius? et Paulus: diligentibus, inquit, deum omnia procedunt in bonum. dicit etiam ipse dilectionis modum: quis ergo nos separabit a caritate Christi? et cetera; et post pauca: certus sum enim quia neque mors neque uita et reliqua. si ergo nulla res ab eius caritate nos separat, quid esse non solum melius sed etiam certius hoc bono potest? nemo nos inde separat minando mortem; id ipsum enim quod diligimus deum mori non potest, nisi dum non diligit deum, cui mors ipsa est non diligere deum, quod nihil est aliud quam ei quicquam in diligendo atque sequendo praeponere. nemo inde separat pollicendo uitam; nemo enim ab ipso fonte separat aquam pollicendo. non separat angelus; non enim est angelus, cum inhaeremus deo, nostra mente potentior. non separat uirtus; si illa uirtus hic nominata est, quae aliquam potestatem in hoc mundo tenet, toto mundo est omnino sublimior mens inhaerens deo; sin illa uirtus dicta est, quae ipsius animi nostri rectissima affectio est, si in alio est, fauet ut coniungamur deo; si in nobis est, ipsa coniungit. non separant instantes molestiae; hoc enim leuiores eas sentimus, quo ei a quo nos separare moliuntur artius inhaeremus.
Let us therefore hear, O Christ, what end of goods you prescribe for us, toward which you command us to strive with the greatest love. "You shall love," he says, "the Lord your God with your whole heart and with your whole soul and with your whole mind." What more do you want? And Paul says: "For those who love God, all things work together for good." He also states the measure of love itself: "Who then shall separate us from the love of Christ?" and the rest; and after a little: "For I am certain that neither death nor life," and the rest. If, therefore, no thing separates us from his love, what can be not only better but also more certain than this good? No one separates us from it by threatening death; for that very thing which we love, God, cannot die—unless while it does not love God, to whom death itself is not to love God, which is nothing other than to prefer anything whatever to him in loving and following him. No one separates us from it by promising life; for no one separates water from its very fountain by promising it. An angel does not separate us; for when we cleave to God, an angel is not more powerful than our mind. Virtue does not separate us; if that virtue is meant which holds some power in this world, the mind cleaving to God is altogether more sublime than the whole world; but if that virtue is called which is the most upright affection of our own soul, if it is in another, it favors our being joined to God; if it is in us, it itself joins us. Pressing troubles do not separate us; for we feel them the lighter the more closely we cleave to him from whom they strive to separate us.
non separat promissio futurorum; nam et quidquid boni futurum est, certius promittit deus et nihil est ipso deo melius, qui iam profecto bene sibi inhaerentibus praesens est.]
X. DE PRINCIPIO GENESIS. ITEM EX LIBRO CONFESSIONVM XII AD LOCVM.
Nemo iam mihi molestus sit dicendo mihi: non hoc sensit Moses quod tu dicis, sed hoc sensit quod ego dico. si enim mihi diceret: unde scis hoc sensisse Mosen quod de his uerbis eius eloqueris? aequo animo ferre deberem et responderem fortasse quae superius respondi uel aliquanto uberius, si esset durior. cum uero dicit: non hoc sensit ille quod tu dicis, sed quod ego dico, neque tamen negat quod uterque nostrum dicit utrumque uerum esse: o uita pauperum deus meus, in cuius sinu non est contradictio, plue mihi mitigationes in cor, ut patienter tales feram. qui non mihi hoc dicunt quia diuini sunt et in corde famuli tui uiderunt quod dicunt, sed quia superbi sunt nec nouerunt Mose sententiam, sed amant suam, non quia uera est, sed quia sua est. alioquin et aliam ueram pariter amarent, sicut ego amo quod dicunt, quando uerum dicunt, non quia ipsorum est, sed quia uerum est; et ideo iam nec ipsorum est, quia uerum est. si autem ideo ament illud quia uerum est, iam et ipsorum est et meum est, quoniam in commune omnium est ueritatis amatorum.
The promise of future things does not separate us; for whatever good is to come, God promises it more surely, and nothing is better than God himself, who is already present to those who cleave to him.
X. ON THE BEGINNING OF GENESIS. ALSO FROM BOOK XII OF THE CONFESSIONS, ON THIS PASSAGE.
Let no one now trouble me by saying to me: Moses did not mean this, which you say, but he meant this, which I say. For if he were to say to me: How do you know that Moses meant this, which you declare concerning these his words? I ought to bear it with a calm mind and perhaps reply with what I replied above, or somewhat more fully, if he were rather stubborn. But when he says: Moses did not mean this, which you say, but what I say, and yet does not deny that what each of us says is true: O God of the poor, my life, in whose bosom there is no contradiction, rain down gentleness upon my heart, that I may bear such people patiently. For they do not say this to me because they are divine men and have seen in the heart of your servant what they say, but because they are proud and have not known the meaning of Moses, but love their own, not because it is true, but because it is their own. Otherwise they would equally love another true meaning as well, just as I love what they say when they speak the truth, not because it is theirs, but because it is true; and therefore it is no longer theirs, because it is true. But if they love it for this reason, because it is true, then it is both theirs and mine, since it is common to all lovers of the truth.
illud autem quod contendunt non hoc sensisse Mosen quod ego dico, sed quod ipsi dicunt, nolo, non amo; quia etsi ita est, tamen ista temeritas non scientiae, sed audaciae est, nec uisus, sed typhus eam peperit. ideoque, domine, tremenda sunt indicia tua, quoniam ueritas tua nec mea est nec illius, sed omnium nostrum quos ad eius communionem publice uocas, terribiliter admonens nos ut eam nolimus habere priuatam, ne priuemur ea. nam quisquis id quod tu omnibus ad fruendum proponis sibi proprie uindicat et suum uult esse quod omnium est, a communi propellitur ad sua, hoc est a ueritate ad mendacium; qui enim loquitur in mendacium, de suo loquitur. attende, iudex optime deus, ipsa ueritas, attende quid dicam contradictori huic, attende; coram te enim dico et coram fratribus meis, qui legitime utuntur lege usque ad finem caritatis. attende et uide quid ei dicam, si placet tibi; hanc enim uocem huic refero fraternam et pacificam: si ambo uidemus uerum esse quod dicis et ambo uidemus uerum esse quod dico, ubi, quaeso, id uidemus? nec ego utique in te nec tu in me, sed ambo in ipsa quae supra mentes nostras est incommutabili ueritate.
But as for their contention that Moses did not mean what I say, but what they say—I do not want it, I do not love it; because even if it is so, this rashness is not of knowledge but of audacity, nor did sight give it birth, but pride. And therefore, O Lord, your judgments are to be feared, since your truth is neither mine nor his, but the truth of all of us whom you publicly call into communion with it, warning us terribly not to wish to hold it privately, lest we be deprived of it. For whoever claims for himself as his own what you set forth for all to enjoy, and wishes to be his own what belongs to all, is driven from the common to his own—that is, from truth to falsehood; for he who speaks falsehood speaks from his own. Attend, O God, best of judges, attend, O truth itself, attend to what I say to this objector, attend; for I speak before you and before my brothers, who use the law lawfully up to the end of charity. Attend and see what I say to him, if it pleases you; for I bring back to him this fraternal and peaceable word: if we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true, where, I ask, do we see it? Certainly not I in you, nor you in me, but both in the very unchangeable truth which is above our minds.
cum ergo de ipsa domini dei nostri luce non contendamus, cur de proximi cogitatione contendimus, quam sic uidere non possumus, ut uidetur incommutabilis ueritas, quando si ipse Moses apparuisset nobis atque dixisset: hoc cogitaui, nec sic eam uideremus, sed crederemus? non itaque supra quam scriptum est unus pro altero infletur aduersus alterum. diligamus dominum deum nostrum ex toto corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente nostra, et proximum nostrum sicut nosmet ipsos. propter duo praecepta caritatis sensisse Mosen quidquid in illis libris sensit nisi crediderimus, . mendacem faciemus dominum, cum de animo conserui aliter quam ille docuit opinamur. iam uide quam stultum sit in tanta copia uerissimarum sententiarum, quae de illis uerbis erui possunt, temere affirmare quam earum Moyses potissimum senserit et perniciosis contentionibus ipsam offendere caritatem, propter quam dixit omnia cuius dicta conamur exponere.
Since, then, we do not contend about the light of our Lord God himself, why do we contend about the thought of a neighbor, which we cannot see as the unchangeable truth is seen, when even if Moses himself had appeared to us and said, "This is what I thought," we would not see it even so, but would believe it? Therefore let not one be puffed up against another beyond what is written. Let us love the Lord our God with our whole heart, with our whole soul, with our whole mind, and our neighbor as ourselves. For unless we believe that Moses meant whatever he meant in those books because of the two commandments of love, we shall make the Lord a liar, when we think otherwise of the mind of his servant than he taught. Now see how foolish it is, amid such abundance of most true meanings that can be drawn from those words, to affirm rashly which of them Moses especially meant, and by pernicious contentions to offend that very love for the sake of which he said all that we are trying to expound.
XI. ITEM DE EODEM PRINCIPIO, QVOD MAGIS PROSIT MVLTIPLEX SENSWM PROLATIO, NON SIT CONTRA FIDEM. EX LIBRO CONFESSIONVM XII AD LOCVM.
Sicut enim fons in paruo loco uberior est pluribusque riuis in ampliora spatia fluxum ministrat quam quilibet eorum riuorum, qui per multa locorum ab eodem fonte deducitur, ita narratio dispensatoris tui sermocinaturis pluribus profutura paruo sermonis modulo scatet fluenta liquidae ueritatis, unde sibi quisque uerum quod de his rebus potest, hic illud, ille illud, per longiores loquellarum anfractus trahat. alii enim cum haec uerba legunt uel audiunt, cogitant deum quasi hominem aut quasi aliquam mole immensa praeditam potestatem nouo quodam et repentino placito extra se ipsum tamquam locis distantibus fecisse caelum et terram, duo magna corpora supra et infra, quibus omnia continerentur. et cum audiunt: "dixit deus: fiat illud, et factum est illud", cogitant uerba concepta, finita, sonantia temporibus atque transeuntia, post quorum transitum statim existere quod iussum est ut existeret; et si quid forte aliud hoc modo ex familiaritate carnis opinantur. in quibus adhuc paruulis animalibus, dum isto humillimo genere uerborum tamquam materno sinu eorum gestatur infirmitas, salubriter aedificatur fides, qua certum habeant et teneant deum fecisse omnes naturas, quas eorum sensus mirabili uarietate circuminspicit.
XI. Likewise concerning the same beginning, that the bringing forth of multiple meanings is more beneficial and is not contrary to the faith. From Book XII of the Confessions, at that place.
For just as a spring in a small place is more abundant and supplies its flow to more streams into wider spaces than any one of those streams which is drawn from the same spring through many places, so the narrative of your steward, destined to profit many who will converse about it, overflows from the small measure of its speech with streams of clear truth, from which each person may draw for himself the truth he can concerning these matters—this one one thing, that one another—through the longer windings of discussions. For some, when they read or hear these words, think of God as though a man, or as though some power endowed with immense bulk, who by some new and sudden decree made heaven and earth outside himself as though in distant places—two great bodies, above and below, by which all things were contained. And when they hear, "God said: let that be made, and it was made," they think of words conceived, finished, sounding in time and passing away, after whose passing there immediately came into being what was commanded to come into being; and whatever else of this sort they suppose from the familiarity of the flesh. Among these still little animals, while the weakness of these is carried in this most humble kind of words as in a mother's bosom, faith is healthfully built up, by which they may have and hold as certain that God made all natures, which their senses behold with wondrous variety.
quorum si quispiam quasi uilitatem dictorum aspernatus extra nutritorias cunas superba inbecillitate se extenderit, heu! cadet miser et, domine deus, miserere ne implumem pullum conculcent qui transeunt uiam, et mitte angelum tuum, qui eum reponat in nido, ut uiuat donec uolet.
Alii uero, quibus haec uerba non iam nidus, sed opacata frutecta sunt, uident in eis latentes fructus et uolitant laetantes et garriunt scrutantes et carpunt eos; uident enim, cum haec uerba legunt uel audiunt, tua, deus, aeterne stabili permansione cuncta praeterita et futura tempora superari nec tamen quicquam esse temporalis creaturae quod tu non feceris, cuius uoluntas, quia id est quod tu, nullo modo mutata uel quae antea non fuisset, exorta uoluntate fecisti omnia: non de te similitudinem tuam formam omnium, sed de nihilo dissimilitudinem informem, quae formaretur per similitudinem tuam recurrens in te unum pro captu ordinato, quantum cuique rerum in suo genere datum est, et fierent omnia bona ualde, siue maneant circa te siue gradatim remotiore distantia per tempora et locos pulchras uariationes faciant aut patiantur. uident haec et gaudent in luce ueritatis tuae, quantulum hic ualent. et alius eorum intendit in id quod dictum est: in principio fecit deus et resipiscit sapientiam principium, quia et loquitur ipsa nobis.
If any one of them, as if disdaining the lowliness of the words, stretches himself beyond the nourishing cradle in proud weakness, alas! he will fall miserably, and, Lord God, have mercy, lest those who pass by on the way trample the unfeathered chick, and send your angel to place him back in the nest, that he may live as long as he wills.
But others, to whom these words are not now a nest but shaded thickets, see hidden fruits in them and flit about rejoicing and chatter as they search and pluck them; for they see, when they read or hear these words, that all past and future times are surpassed by your eternal stable permanence, O God, and yet that there is nothing of temporal creation that you have not made, whose will, because it is what you are, in no way changed or having previously not been, you made all things by a will that arose: not from yourself the likeness of yourself, the form of all things, but from nothing the formless dissimilarity, which was to be formed through your likeness, returning into you, the one, according to an ordered capacity, as much as was given to each thing in its own kind, and all things were made very good, whether they remain near you or, by a more remote distance step by step, make or undergo beautiful variations through times and places. They see these things and rejoice in the light of your truth, as much as they are able here. And another of them directs his attention to what was said: In the beginning God made, and recollects that wisdom is the beginning, because it also speaks to us.
alius itidem intendit in eadem uerba et principium intellegit exordium rerum conditarum et sic accipit in principio fecit, ac si diceretur: primo fecit atque in eis qui intellegunt in principio quod in sapientia fecisti caelum et terram, alius eorum ipsum caelum et terram creabilem materiam caeli et terrae sic esse credit cognominatam, alius iam formatas distinctasque naturas, alius unam formatam eandemque spiritalem caeli nomine, aliam informem corporalis materiae terrae nomine. qui autem intellegunt in nominibus caeli et terrae adhuc informem materiam, de qua formaretur caelum et terra, nec ipsi uno modo intellegunt, sed alius unde consummaretur intellegibilis sensibilisque creatura, alius tantum unde sensibilis moles ista corporea sinu grandi continens perspicuas promtasque naturas; nec illi uno modo qui iam dispositas digestasque creaturas caelum et terram uocari hoc loco credunt, sed alius inuisibilem atque uisibilem, alius solam uisibilem, in qua luminosum caelum suspcimus et terram caliginosam quaeque in eis sunt.
Another likewise directs his attention to the same words and understands "the beginning" as the first origin of created things, and so takes "in the beginning he made" as if it were said, "first he made"; and in those who understand "in the beginning" to mean "in the wisdom" that you made heaven and earth. Another of them believes that heaven and earth themselves—the creatable matter of heaven and earth—are thus named. Another understands the natures already formed and distinct. Another understands one formed and spiritual nature under the name "heaven," and another unformed nature of corporeal matter under the name "earth." But those who understand by the names "heaven" and "earth" the still unformed matter from which heaven and earth were to be formed do not themselves understand it in one way only: one understands it as that from which the intelligible and sensible creature was to be completed, another only as that from which this bodily mass of the sensible world, containing in its vast bosom the clear and ready natures, was to be made. Nor do those who believe that heaven and earth are here called the already arranged and ordered creatures understand it in one way only: one understands the invisible and the visible, another only the visible, in which we gaze upon the luminous heaven and the dark earth and all that is in them.
At ille qui non aliter accipit in principio fecit quam si diceretur: primo fecit, non habet quomodo ueraciter intellegat caelum et terram, nisi materiam caeli et terrae intellegat, uidelicet uniuersae, id est intellegibilis corporalisque creaturae. si enim iam formatam uelit uniuersam, recte ab eo quaeri poterit, si hoc primo fecit deus, quid fecerit deinceps; et post uniuersitatem non inueniet ac per hoc audiet inuitus: quomodo illud primo, si postea nihil? cum uero dicit primo informem, deinde formatam, non est absurdus, si modo est idoneus discernere quid praecedat aeternitate, quid tempore, quid electione, quid origine: aeternitate, sicut deus omnia; tempore, sicut flos fructum; electione, sicut fructus florem; origine, sicut sonus cantum. in his quattuor primum et ultimum quae commemoraui difficillime intelleguntur, duo media facillime. namque rara uisio est et nimis ardua conspicere, domine, aeternitatem tuam incommutabiliter mutabilia facientem ac per hoc priorem. quis deinde sic acutum cernat animo, ut sine labore magno dinoscere ualeat quomodo prior sit sonus quam cantus? ideo quia cantus est formatus sonus et esse utique aliquid non formatum potest, formari autem quod non est non potest.
But he who takes "in the beginning he made" in no other sense than as if it were said, "first he made," has no way of truly understanding heaven and earth unless he understands the matter of heaven and earth, namely of the whole creation, both intelligible and corporeal. For if he wishes it to be the whole creation already formed, it may rightly be asked of him: if God made this first, what did he make afterward? And after the whole he will find nothing, and therefore he will unwillingly hear: how is that "first," if afterward there is nothing? But when he says that first it was unformed, then formed, he is not absurd, provided he is capable of discerning what precedes in eternity, what in time, what in choice, what in origin: in eternity, as God precedes all things; in time, as the flower precedes the fruit; in choice, as the fruit precedes the flower; in origin, as the sound precedes the song. Among these four, the first and last that I have mentioned are most difficult to understand, the two middle ones very easy. For it is a rare vision and exceedingly arduous to behold, O Lord, your eternity, which makes mutable things without being changed and is therefore prior. Then who perceives with his mind so keenly that he can, without great effort, distinguish how the sound is prior to the song? Because the song is a formed sound, and something unformed can indeed exist, but what does not exist cannot be formed.
sic est prior materies quam id quod ex ea fit: non ideo prior, quia ipsa efficit, cum potius fiat; nec prior interuallo temporis; neque enim priore tempore sonos edimus informes sine cantu et eos posteriore tempore in formam cantici coaptamus aut fingimus sicut ligna, quibus arca, uel argentum, quo uasculum fabricatur. tales quippe materiae tempore etiam praecedunt formas rerum, quae fiunt ex eis. at in cantu non ita est. cum enim cantatur, auditur sonus eius, non prius informiter sonat et deinde formatur in cantum. quod enim primo utcumque sonuerit, praeterit nec ex eo quicquam reperies quod resumtum arte componas; et ideo cantus in sono suo uertitur, qui sonus eius materies eius est. idem quippe formatur ut cantus sit, et ideo, sicut dicebam, prior materies sonandi quam forma cantandi: non per faciendi potentiam prior: neque enim sonus est cantandi artifex, sed cantanti animae subiacet ex corpore de quo cantum faciat; nec tempore prior: simul enim cum cantu editur; nec prior electione: non enim potior sonus quam cantus, quando quidem cantus est non tantum sonus uerum etiam speciosus sonus; sed prior est origine, quia non cantus formatur ut sonus sit, sed sonus formatur ut cantus sit.
Thus the matter is prior to that which is made from it: not prior because it itself effects, since it is rather made; nor prior by an interval of time; for we do not in an earlier time utter formless sounds without song and then in a later time fit or fashion them into the form of a song, as wood is for the ark, or silver for the vessel that is fashioned. For such matters even precede in time the forms of the things that are made from them. But in song it is not so. For when it is sung, its sound is heard; it does not first sound formlessly and then be formed into song. For whatever has first sounded in any way at all passes away, and you will find nothing from it that you may take up again and compose by art; and therefore the song is turned about in its sound, which sound is its matter. For the same sound is formed so that it may be a song, and therefore, as I was saying, the matter of sounding is prior to the form of singing: not prior by the power of making—for the sound is not the maker of the singing, but lies subject to the singing soul from the body, from which it may make a song; nor prior in time—for it is brought forth at the same time as the song; nor prior by choice—for the sound is not preferable to the song, since the song is not only sound but also beautiful sound; but it is prior in origin, because the song is not formed so that it may be a sound, but the sound is formed so that it may be a song.
hoc exemplo qui potest intellegat materiam rerum primo factam et appellatam caelum et terram, quia inde facta sunt caelum et terra; nec tempore primo factam, quia formae rerum egerunt tempora, illa autem erat informis iamque in temporibus simul animaduertitur; nec tamen de illa narrari aliquid potest nisi uelut tempore prior sit, cum pendatur extremior — quia profecto meliora sunt formata quam informia — et praecedatur aeternitate creatoris, ut esset de nihilo unde aliquid fieret.
In hac diuersitate sententiarum uerarum concordiam pariat ipsa ueritas et deus noster misereatur nostri, ut legitime lege utamur, praecepti fine, pura caritate. ac per hoc si quis quaerit ex me quid horum Moses tuus ille famulus senserit, non sunt hi sermones confessionum mearum; si tibi non confiteor, nescio; et scio tamen illas ueras esse sententias exceptis carnalibus, de quibus quantum existimaui locutus sum: quos tamen bonae spei paruulos haec bona uerba libri tui non territant, alta humiliter et pauca copiose.
By this example, let him who can understand that the matter of things was first made and called heaven and earth, because from it heaven and earth were made; nor was it made first in time, because the forms of things brought times into being, whereas that matter was formless and is now discerned only together with times; nor nevertheless can anything be said about it except as though it were prior in time, since it is weighed as the more extreme — because certainly things formed are better than things unformed — and it is preceded by the eternity of the creator, so that there might be from nothing that from which something should be made.
In this diversity of true opinions, let truth itself bring forth concord, and let our God have mercy on us, that we may use the law lawfully, with the end of the commandment, pure charity. And therefore, if anyone asks of me which of these your servant Moses felt, these are not the discourses of my confessions; if I do not confess to you, I do not know; and yet I know that those opinions are true, except the carnal ones, of which I have spoken as much as I have judged: yet little ones of good hope are not terrified by these good words of your book, lofty things humbly and few things copiously.
sed omnes, quos in eis uerbis uera cernere ac dicere fateor, diligamus nos inuicem pariterque diligamus te dominum deum nostrum, fontem ueritatis, si non uanam, sed ipsam sitimus; eundemque famulum tuum, scripturae huius dispensatorem, spiritu tuo plenum ita honoremus, ut hoc eum te reuelante cum haec scriberet attendisse credamus, quod in eis maxime et luce ueritatis et fruge utilitatis excellit.
lta cum alius dixerit: hoc sensit quod ego, et alius: immo illud quod ego, religiosius me arbitror dicere: cur non utrumque potius, si utrumque uerum est ? et si quid tertium et si quid quartum et si quid omnino aliud uerum quispiam in his uerbis uidet, cur non illa uidisse credatur per quem deus unus sacras litteras uera et diuersa uisuris multorum sensibus temperauit ? ego certe, quod intrepidus de meo corde pronuntio, si ad culmen auctoritatis aliquid scriberem, sic mallem scribere, ut quod ueri quisque de his rebus capere posset mea uerba resonarent, quam ut unam ueram sententiam ad hoc apertius ponerem, ut excluderem ceteras, quarum falsitas me non posset offendere. nolo itaque, deus meus, tam praeceps esse, ut hoc illum uirum de te meruisse non credam. sensit ille omnino in his uerbis atque cogitauit, cum ea scriberet, quidquid hic ueri potuimus inuenire et quidquid nos non potuimus aut nondum potuimus et tamen in eis inueniri potest.
But all those whom I acknowledge to see and speak the truth in those words, let us love one another, and together love you, O Lord our God, the fountain of truth, if we thirst not for vanity but for the truth itself; and let us so honor that same servant of yours, the dispenser of this scripture, filled with your Spirit, that we believe he attended, with you revealing it, when he wrote these things, to that which excels most in them both in the light of truth and in the fruit of usefulness.
And when one says: He understood this, which I also understand; and another: No, rather that which I understand; I think I speak more religiously: Why not rather both, if both are true? And if there is a third, and a fourth, and if anyone sees anything else at all true in these words, why should it not be believed that he saw all those things, through whom God, who is one, tempered the sacred writings to the senses of many, who were to see true and diverse things? I certainly, which I pronounce without fear from my own heart, if I were to write something to the summit of authority, I would prefer so to write that my words would echo whatever of truth each person could grasp concerning these matters, rather than to set forth one true meaning so openly as to exclude the rest, whose falsity could not offend me. I do not wish, therefore, my God, to be so rash as not to believe that that man merited this from you. He surely understood and thought, in these words, when he wrote them, whatever of truth we have been able to find here, and whatever we have not been able, or not yet been able, and yet can be found in them.
Postremo, domine, qui deus es et non caro et sanguis, si quid homo minus uidit, numquid et spiritum tuum bonum, qui deducet me in terram rectam, latere potuit quidquid eras in eis uerbis tu ipse reuelaturus legentibus posteris, etiam si ille per quem dicta sunt unam fortassis ei multis ueris sententiam cogitauit? quod si ita est, si igitur illa quam cogitauit ceteris excelsior, nobis autem, domine, aut ipsam demonstras aut quam placet alteram ueram, ut siue nobis hoc quod etiam illi homini tuo, siue aliud ex eorundem uerborum occasione patefacias, tu tamen pascas, non error inludat.
XII. ITEM DE PRINCIPIO LIBRI GENESIS. PRINCIPIVM LIBRI GEITESIS AD LITTERAM.
Omnis diuina scriptura bipertita est secundum id quod dominus significat dicens scribam eruditum in regno dei similem esse patri familias proferenti de thesauro suo noua et uetera, quae duo etiam testamenta dicuntur. in libris autem omnibus sanctis intueri oportet quae ibi aeterna intimentur, quae facta narrentur, quae futura praenuntientur, quae agenda praecipiantur uel moneantur. in narratione ergo rerum factarum quaeritur utrum omnia secundum figurarum tantummodo intellectum accipiantur an etiam secundum fidem rerum gestarum asserenda et defendenda sint.
Finally, O Lord, who are God and not flesh and blood, if a man has seen anything less than the whole, could even your good Spirit, who will lead me into the right land, have been unable to hide whatever you yourself were going to reveal in those words to readers in later times, even if the one through whom they were spoken perhaps intended one meaning among many true ones? But if this is so, if therefore that meaning which he intended is loftier than the others, yet to us, O Lord, you either show that very meaning or another true one that pleases you, so that whether you reveal to us this meaning, which you also revealed to that man of yours, or another on the occasion of the same words, you nonetheless feed us, and error does not mock us.
XII. Again, on the beginning of the book of Genesis. The beginning of the book of Genesis according to the letter.
All divine Scripture is twofold, according to what the Lord signifies when he says that the learned scribe in the kingdom of God is like a father of a household bringing forth from his treasury new things and old, which two are also called the two testaments. But in all the holy books it behooves us to consider what eternal things are indicated there, what deeds are narrated, what future things are foretold, what actions are commanded or urged. In the narration of deeds, then, the question is whether all things are to be taken only according to the understanding of figures, or whether they are also to be asserted and defended according to the belief that the events happened.
nam non esse accipienda figuraliter nullus christianus dicere audebit attendens apostolum dicentem: omnia autem haec in figura contingebant in illis, et illud quod in Genesi scriptum est: et erunt duo in carne una, magnum sacramentum commendantem in Christo et in ecclesia. si ergo utroque modo illa scriptura scrutanda est, quomodo dictum est praeter allegoricam significationem: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram? utrum in principio temporis, an quia primo omnium, an in principio, quod est uerbum dei unigenitus filius? et quomodo possit ostendi deum sine ulla sui commutatione operari mutabilia et temporalia? et quid significetur nomine caelum et terram, utrum spiritalis corporalisque creatura caeli et terrae uocabulum acceperit an tantummodo corporalis, ut in hoc libro de spiritali tacuisse intellegatur atque ita dixisse caelum et terram, ut omnem creaturam corpoream superiorem atque inferiorem significare uoluerit? an utriusque informis materia dicta est caelum et terra, spiritalis uidelicet uita sicuti esse potest in se, non conuersa ad creatorem — tali enim conuersione formatur atque perficitur; si autem non conuertatur, informis est — corporalis autem si possit intellegi per priuationem omnis corporeae qualitatis, quae apparet in materia formata, cum iam sunt species corporum siue uisu siue alio quolibet sensu corporis perceptibiles?
For no Christian will dare to say that these things are not to be taken figuratively, attending to the apostle saying, "But all these things happened to them in figure," and to that which is written in Genesis, "and the two shall be one flesh," commending a great sacrament in Christ and in the church. If, then, that scripture is to be searched in both ways, how is it said, beyond the allegorical signification, "In the beginning God made heaven and earth"? Whether in the beginning of time, or because first of all things, or in the beginning, which is the Word of God, the only-begotten Son? And how can it be shown that God works mutable and temporal things without any change of himself? And what is signified by the name "heaven and earth"—whether the spiritual and corporeal creature has received the name of heaven and earth, or only the corporeal, so that in this book he is understood to have been silent about the spiritual and to have said "heaven and earth" in such a way that he wished to signify every corporeal creature, higher and lower? Or is the formless matter of both called heaven and earth—namely, the spiritual life as it can be in itself, not turned toward the creator (for by such a turning it is formed and perfected; but if it is not turned, it is formless)—and the corporeal, if it can be understood by the privation of every corporeal quality which appears in formed matter, when the species of bodies are already perceptible either by sight or by any other sense of the body?
an caelum intellegendum est creatura spiritalis ab exordio quo facta est perfecta illa et beata semper, terra uero corporalis materies adhuc imperfecta? quia terra, inquit, erat inuisibilis et incomposita, et tenebrae erant super abyssum; quibus uerbis uidetur informitatem significare substantiae corporalis. an utriusque informitas his etiam posterioribus uerbis significatur, corporalis quidem eo quod dictum est: terra erat inuisibilis et incomposita; spiritalis autem eo quod dictum est: tenebrae erant super abyssum, ut translato uerbo tenebrosam abyssum intellegamus naturam uitae informem, nisi conuertatur ad creatorem, quo solo modo formari potest ut non sit abyssus, et inluminari ut non sit tenebrosa? et quomodo dictum est: tenebrae erant super abyssum? an quia non erat lux, quae si esset, utique super esset et tamquam superfunderetur, quod tunc fit in creatura spiritali, cum conuertitur ad incommutabile atque incorporale lumen, quod deus est?
Or is the heaven to be understood as the spiritual creation, perfect from the beginning when it was made, and always blessed, while the earth is bodily matter still imperfect? For, it says, the earth was invisible and unformed, and darkness was over the abyss—by which words it seems to signify the formlessness of bodily substance. Or is the formlessness of both signified by these later words as well: of the bodily, indeed, by what was said, "the earth was invisible and unformed"; of the spiritual, however, by what was said, "darkness was over the abyss," so that by a transferred term we understand the dark abyss as the formless nature of life, unless it is turned to the Creator, by which means alone it can be formed so as not to be an abyss, and be enlightened so as not to be dark? And how was it said, "darkness was over the abyss"? Is it because there was no light, which, if it had been, would surely have been above and, as it were, poured over it—which then happens in the spiritual creation when it is turned to the unchangeable and incorporeal light, which is God?
Et quomodo: et dixit deus: fiat lux? utrum temporaliter an in uerbi aeternitate? et si temporaliter, utique mutabiliter; quomodo ergo possit intellegi hoc dicere deus nisi per creaturam? ipse quippe est incommutabilis. et si per creaturam dixit deus: fiat lux, quomodo est prima creatura lux, si erat iam creatura, per quam deus diceret: fiat lux? an non est lux prima creatura, quia iam dictum erat: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram? et poterat per caelestem creaturam uox fieri temporaliter atque mutabiliter, qua diceretur: fiat lux. quod si ita est, corporalis lux facta est ista, quam corporeis oculis cernimus, dicente deo per creaturam spiritalem, quam deus iam fecerat, cum in principio fecit caelum et terram: fiat lux, eo modo, quo per talis creaturae interiorem et occultum motum diuinitus dici potuit: fiat lux. an etiam corporaliter sonuit uox dicentis dei: fiat lux, sicut corporaliter sonuit uox dicentis dei: tu es filius meus dilectus? et hoc per creaturam corporalem, quam fecerat deus, cum in principio fecit deus caelum et terram, antequam fieret lux, quae in hac sonante uoce facta est. et si ita est, qua lingua sonuit ista uox dicente deo: fiat lux? quia nondum erat linguarum diuersitas, quae postea facta est in aedificatione turris post diluuium.
And how is it: And God said: Let there be light? Was it temporally, or in the eternity of the Word? And if temporally, then certainly mutably; how then can it be understood that God says this except through a creature? For he himself is unchangeable. And if God said through a creature: Let there be light, how is light the first creature, if there was already a creature through which God would say: Let there be light? Or is light not the first creature, because it had already been said: In the beginning God made heaven and earth? And a voice could have been made temporally and mutably through a heavenly creature, by which it would be said: Let there be light. But if this is so, that light which we perceive with bodily eyes was made a bodily light, with God saying through a spiritual creature, which God had already made when in the beginning he made heaven and earth: Let there be light, in the manner in which it could be divinely said through the inner and hidden motion of such a creature: Let there be light. Or did the voice of God saying: Let there be light, also sound bodily, just as the voice of God saying: You are my beloved Son, sounded bodily? And this through a bodily creature, which God had made when in the beginning God made heaven and earth, before the light was made, which was made in this sounding voice. And if this is so, in what language did that voice sound when God said: Let there be light? Since there was not yet the diversity of languages, which was afterward made in the building of the tower after the flood.
quaenam lingua erat una et sola, qua deus locutus est: fiat lux, et quis erat quem oportebat audire atque intellegere, ad quem uox huius modi proferretur? an haec absurda carnalisque cogitatio est atque suspicio? quid ergo dicemus? an id quod intellegitur in sono uocis, cum dicitur: fiat lux, non autem ipse corporeus sonus, hoc bene accipitur esse uox dei? et utrum hoc ipsum ad naturam pertineat uerbi eius, de quo dicitur: in principio erat uerbum, et uerbum erat apud deum, et deus erat uerbum? cum enim de illo dicitur: omnia per ipsum facta sunt, satis ostenditur et lux per ipsum facta, cum dixit deus: fiat lux. quod si ita est, aeternum est quod ait deus: fiat lux, quia uerbum dei, deus apud deum, filius unicus dei, patri coaeternus est, quamuis deo haec in aeterno uerbo dicente creatura temporalis facta sit. cum enim uerba sint temporis, cum dicimus quando et aliquando, aeternum tamen est uerbo dei quando fieri aliquid debeat, et tunc fit quando fieri debuisse in illo uerbo est, in quo non est quando et aliquando, quoniam totum illud uerbum aeternum est.
What then was that one and only language in which God spoke: Let there be light, and who was it who needed to hear and understand it, to whom a voice of this kind was uttered? Or is this a absurd and carnal thought and suspicion? What then shall we say? Is it that which is understood in the sound of the voice, when it is said, Let there be light—but not the bodily sound itself—that is rightly accepted as the voice of God? And does this very thing pertain to the nature of his Word, of which it is said: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word? For when it is said of him: All things were made through him, it is sufficiently shown that light too was made through him, when God said: Let there be light. But if this is so, what God said—Let there be light—is eternal, because the Word of God, God with God, the only Son of God, is coeternal with the Father, although, while God says these things in his eternal Word, the creature was made temporal. For since words are of time, when we say when and at some time, yet for the Word of God it is eternal when anything ought to be made, and it is then made when it is in that Word that it ought to have been made, in which there is no when and at some time, since that whole Word is eternal.
Et quid est lux ipsa, quae facta est? utrum spiritale quid an corporale? si enim spiritale, potest ipsa esse prima creatura iam hoc dicto perfecta, quae primo caelum appellata est, cum dictum est: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram; ut quod dixit deus: fiat lux, et facta est lux, eam reuocante ad se creatore conuersio eius facta atque inluminata intellegatur. et cur ita dictum est: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram, et non dictum est: in principio dixit deus: fiat caelum et terra, et facta sunt caelum et terra, sicut de luce narratur: dixit deus, fiat lux, et facta est lux? utrum prius uniuersaliter nomine caeli et terrae comprehendendum erat et commendandum quod fecit deus, et deinde per partes exequendum quomodo fecit, cum per singula dicitur: dixit deus, id est quia per uerbum suum fecit quidquid fecit?
And what is that light itself which was made? Is it something spiritual or something corporeal? For if it is spiritual, it can itself be the first creature, already perfected by this utterance, which was first called heaven when it was said: In the beginning God made heaven and earth; so that what God said, Let there be light, and there was light, may be understood as its conversion, made and illuminated by the Creator recalling it to himself. And why was it said: In the beginning God made heaven and earth, and not said: In the beginning God said, Let there be heaven and earth, and there were heaven and earth, as it is told of the light: God said, Let there be light, and there was light? Was it that first, under the names of heaven and earth, what God made was to be comprehended and commended universally, and then, part by part, how he made it was to be set forth, when it is said of each individually: God said, that is, because by his Word he made whatever he made?
An cum primum fiebat informitas materiae siue spiritalis sine corporalis, non erat dicendum: dixit deus: fiat, quia formam uerbi semper patri cohaerentis, quo sempiterne dicit deus omnia, neque sono uocis neque cogitatione tempora sonorum uoluente, sed coaeterna sibi luce a se genitae sapientiae non imitatur imperfectio, cum dissimilis ab eo quod summe ac primitus est informitate quadam tendit ad nihilum; sed tunc imitatur uerbi formam semper atque incommutabiliter patri cohaerentem, cum et ipsa pro sui generis conuersione ad id quod uere ac semper est, id est ad creatorem suae substantiae, formam capit et fit perfecta creatura? ut in eo quod scriptura narrat: dixit deus: fiat, intellegamus dei dictum incorporeum [in natura uerbi eius coaeterni reuocantis ad se imperfectionem creaturae, ut non sit informis, sed formetur secundum singula, quae per ordinem exequitur? in qua conuersione et formatione, qua pro suo modo imitatur deum uerbum, hoc est dei filium semper patri cohaerentem plena similitudine et essentia pari, qua ipse et pater unum sunt, non autem imitatur hanc uerbi formam, si auersa a creatore informis et imperfecta remaneat, propterea filii commemoratio non ita fit, quia uerbum, sed tantum quia principium est, cum dicitur: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram; exordium quippe creaturae insinuatur adhuc in informitate imperfectionis.
Or when the formlessness of matter was first being made, whether spiritual or corporeal, should it not have been said: God said: Let it be made, because the imperfection does not imitate the form of the Word which always cleaves to the Father, by which God eternally says all things, neither with the sound of a voice nor with thought rolling out the times of sounds, but by the light coeternal with himself of the Wisdom begotten of himself, since, being dissimilar from that which is supremely and primarily, by a certain formlessness it tends toward nothing; but then it imitates the form of the Word always and immutably cleaving to the Father, when it too, by its own kind of conversion toward that which truly and always is, that is, toward the creator of its own substance, receives form and becomes a perfect creature? So that in what the Scripture narrates: God said: Let it be made, we may understand the incorporeal saying of God [in the nature of his coeternal Word recalling the imperfection of the creature to himself, so that it may not be formless but may be formed according to each thing, which it carries out in order? In which conversion and formation, by which in its own measure it imitates God the Word, that is, the Son of God always cleaving to the Father in full likeness and equal essence, by which he and the Father are one, it does not however imitate this form of the Word, if, turned away from the creator, it remains formless and imperfect; and for this reason the mention of the Son is not made as being the Word, but only as being the beginning, when it is said: In the beginning God made heaven and earth; for the beginning of the creature is suggested as still in the formlessness of imperfection.
fit autem filii commemoratio, quod etiam uerbum est, in eo quod scriptum est: dixit deus: fiat, ut per id quod principium est insinuet exordium creaturae existentis ab illo adhuc imperfectae, per id autem quod uerbum est insinuet perfectionem creaturae reuocatae ad eum, ut formaretur inhaerendo creatori et pro suo genere imitando formam sempiterne atque incommutabiliter inhaerentem patri, a quo statu hoc est quod ille.
Non enim habet informem uitam uerbum filius, cui non solum hoc est esse quod uiuere sed etiam hoc est uiuere quod est sapienter ac beate uiuere. creatura uero quamquam spiritalis et intellectualis uel rationalis, quae uidetur esse illi uerbo propinquior, potest habere informem uitam: quia non sicut hoc est ei esse quod uiuere, ita hoc uiuere quod sapienter ac beate uiuere. auersa enim a sapientia incommutabili stulte ac misere uiuit, quae informitas est. formatur autem conuersa ad incommutabile lumen sapientiae, uerbum dei; a quo enim extitit ut sit utcumque ac uiuat, ad illum conuertitur ut sapienter ac beate uiuat. principium quippe creaturae intellectualis est aeterna sapientia; quod principium manens in se incommutabiliter nullo modo cessaret occulta inspiratione uocationis loqui ei creaturae, cui principium est, ut conuerteretur ad id ex quo esset, quod aliter formata ac perfecta esse non possit.
But the mention of the Son is also a word, in that which is written: God said: Let it be made, so that through that which is the beginning he may suggest the beginning of a creature existing from him and still imperfect, while through that which is the Word he may suggest the perfection of the creature recalled to him, so that it might be formed by cleaving to the Creator and, after its own kind, by imitating the form eternally and unchangeably cleaving to the Father, from whose state it is what he is.
For the Word, the Son, does not have a formless life, for whom not only is being what living is, but also living is what living wisely and blessedly is. But a creature, although spiritual and intellectual or rational, which seems to be closer to that Word, can have a formless life, because it is not the case that, just as for it being is what living is, so living is what living wisely and blessedly is. For turned away from unchangeable wisdom it lives foolishly and miserably, which is formlessness. But it is formed when turned to the unchangeable light of wisdom, the Word of God; for from him it came forth to be in some way and to live, and to him it is turned so that it may live wisely and blessedly. For the beginning of the intellectual creature is eternal wisdom; and this beginning, remaining in itself unchangeably, would in no way cease by a hidden inspiration of calling to speak to the creature for which it is the beginning, so that it might be turned to that from which it had its being, which otherwise it cannot be formed and perfect.
ideoque interrogatus quis esset respondit principium, quia et loquor uobis. quod autem filius loquitur, pater loquitur, quia patre loquente dicitur uerbum, quod filius est, aeterno more, si more dicendum est, loquente deo uerbum coaeternum. inest enim deo benignitas summa et sancta et iusta et quidam non ex indigentia, sed ex beneficientia ueniens amor in opera sua. propterea priusquam scriberetur: dixit deus: fiat lux, praecessit scriptura dicens: et spiritus dei superferebatur super aquam: quia riae aquae nomine appellare uotuit totam corporalem materiam, ut eo modo insinuaret unde facta et formam. sint omnia, quae in suis generibus iam dinoscere possumus, appellans aquam, quia ex humida natura uidemus omnia in terra per species uarias formari; atque concrescere ; siue spiritalem uitam quandam ante formam conuersionis quasi fluitantem: e superferebatur utique spiritus dei quia subiacebat scilicet bonae uoluntati, creatoris quidquid illud erat quod -formandum perficiendumque incheauerat; ut dicente deo in.] r uerbe suo fiat lux, in bona uoluntate hoc eat in beneplacito eius pro modo sui generis maneret quod factum est et ideo dictum est quod placuerit scriptura dicente :- et facta est lux; et uidit deus lucem quia bona est: ut quemadmodum in ipso exordio inchoatae creaturae quae caeli et terrae nomine i.
And therefore, when asked who he was, he answered, "The beginning, because I also speak to you." But what the Son speaks, the Father speaks, because when the Father speaks, the Word that is the Son is spoken—by eternal manner, if manner it must be called—with God speaking the coeternal Word. For in God there is the highest goodness, holy and just, and a certain love toward his works that comes not from need but from beneficence. For this reason, before it was written, "God said: Let there be light," the Scripture came first, saying, "And the Spirit of God was borne over the water," because by the name of water he wished to call all corporeal matter, so that in this way he might suggest whence it was made and received form—that all things might be, which we can now distinguish in their kinds, calling it water, because from the moist nature we see all things on earth formed into various species and coalescing; or a certain spiritual life, as it were, floating before the form of conversion: over it certainly the Spirit of God was borne, because whatever it was that he had begun to form and perfect was subject to the good will of the Creator; so that when God says in his Word, "Let there be light," in good will—that is, in his good pleasure—what was made should remain according to the measure of its kind, and therefore it was said that it pleased [him], with Scripture saying: "And light was made; and God saw the light, that it was good": so that, just as in the very beginning of the created creature begun, which [is called] by the name of heaven and earth...
propter id quod ( de illa perficiendum erat commemorata est trinitas insinuatur creatorisnam- ; di,.. cente. scriptura, in principio fecit deus caelum et terram, intellegimus patrem in dei nomine et filium in principii nomine, qui non patri, sed per se ipsum creatae primitus ac potissimum spiritali creaturae et consequenter etiam uniuersae creaturae principium est;,, dicente autem scriptura, et spiritus dei superferebatur super aquam, completam commemorationem trinitatis agnoscimus ita et in conuersione atque perfectione creaturae ut rerum species digerantur, eadem, trinitas insinuetur, uerbum dei scilicet et uerbi generatio, cum dicitur dixit. deus et sancta bonitas, in qua deo placet quidquid ei pro suae naturae modulo perfectum placet, cum dicitur: uidit deus quia bonum est.
Sed cur commemorata prius quamuis imperfecta creatura postea commemoratur spiritus dei, prius dicente scriptura: terra autem erat inuisibilis et incomposita et tenebrae erant super abyssum, ac deinde inferente: et spiritus dei superferebatur super aquam? an quia egenus atque indigus amor ita diligit, ut rebus quae diligit subiciatur, propterea cam commemoraretur spiritus dei, in quo sancta eius beniuolentia dilectioque intellegitur, superferri dictus est, ne facienda opera sua per indigentiae necessitatem potius quam per abundantiam beneficientiae deus amare putaretur?
Because of this—that the Trinity of the Creator is implied when that which was to be completed from it is mentioned—for when Scripture says, "In the beginning God made heaven and earth," we understand the Father in the name "God" and the Son in the name "beginning," who is the beginning not of the Father but, through himself, first and most especially of the created spiritual creature, and consequently also of the whole creation. But when Scripture says, "And the Spirit of God was borne over the water," we recognize the complete mention of the Trinity. Thus also in the conversion and perfection of the creature, so that the kinds of things may be set in order, the same Trinity is implied—namely, the Word of God and the generation of the Word, when it is said, "God said"; and the holy goodness, in which whatever is perfect for God according to the measure of its nature pleases God, when it is said, "God saw that it was good."
But why, after the creature—though imperfect—has first been mentioned, is the Spirit of God mentioned afterward, with Scripture first saying, "But the earth was invisible and unformed, and darkness was over the abyss," and then adding, "And the Spirit of God was borne over the water"? Is it because needy and indigent love so loves that it is subjected to the things it loves, and therefore, when the Spirit of God is mentioned—in whom his holy benevolence and love is understood—he is said to be borne over, lest God be thought to love his works to be made through the necessity of need rather than through the abundance of beneficence?
cuius rei memor apostolus dicturus de caritate supereminentem uiam demonstraturum se ait; et alio loco: supereminentem, inquit, scientiae caritatem Christi. cum ergo sic oporteret insinuare spiritum dei ut superferri diceretur, commodius factum est, ut prius insinuaretur aliquid inchoatum cui superferri diceretur; non enim loco, sed omnia superante ac praecellente potentia.
Ita etiam rebus ex illa inchoatione perfectis atque formatis uidit deus quia bonum est; placuit enim quod factum est in ea benignitate, qua placuit ut fieret. duo quippe sunt propter quae amat deus creaturam suam, ut sit et ut maneat. ut esset ergo quod maneret, spiritus dei ferebatur super aquam; ut autem maneret, uidit deus quia bonum est. et quod de luce dictum est, hoc et de omnibus: manent enim quaedam supergressa omnem temporalem uolubilitatem in amplissima sanctitate sub deo, quaedam uero secundum sui temporis modos, dum per decessionem successionemque retum temporalium saeculorum pulchritudo contexitur.
Mindful of this matter, the apostle, about to speak of love, says that he will show a more excellent way; and in another place he says, the surpassing love of the knowledge of Christ. Since, then, it was fitting to intimate the Spirit of God in such a way that it was said to be borne over, it was more fittingly arranged that something begun should first be intimated, over which it was said to be borne; for not in place, but by a power that surpasses and excels all things.
So too, when the things from that beginning had been perfected and formed, God saw that it was good; for what was made pleased him in that kindness by which it pleased him that it should be made. For there are two things on account of which God loves his creature: that it may exist, and that it may remain. That there might be, then, that which should remain, the Spirit of God was borne over the water; but that it might remain, God saw that it was good. And what was said of the light, this also of all things: for some things remain, having passed beyond all temporal mutability in the fullest holiness under God; others, however, according to the measures of their own time, while through the departure and succession of temporal things the beauty of the ages is woven together.
XIII. OOKTRA BO8 QVI DICVNT: NVMQVID IBI FVIT MOVSES, QVAHDO PBCIT DEVS CAELVM ET TBR&AM, VT CREDATVB EI? EX LIBRO DE CTVITATE DEI XI 1NTBB OETBBA ET AD LOCVM.
Visibilium omnium maximus mundus est, inuisibilium omnium maximus deus est; sed mundum esse conspicimus, deum esse credimus. quod autem deus fecerit. mundum nulli potius credimus quam ipsi deo. ubi eum audimus P nusquam interim nos melius quam in scripturis sanctis, ubi dixit propheta eius: in principio feoit deus caelum et terram. numquidnam ibi fuit iste propheta, quando fecit deus caelum et terram? non; sed ibi fuit sapientia dei, per quam facta sunt omnia, quae in animas etiam sanctas se transfert, amicos dei et prophetas constituit eisque opera sua sine strepitu intus enarrat. locuntur eis quoque angeli dei, qui semper uident faciem patris uoluntatemque eius quibus oportet annuntiant. ex his unus erat iste propheta, qui dixit et scripsit: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram; qui tam idoneus testis est, per quem deo credendum sit, ut eodem spiritu dei,
XIII. AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY: WAS MOSES THERE WHEN GOD MADE HEAVEN AND EARTH, THAT HE SHOULD BE BELIEVED? FROM THE BOOK OF THE CITY OF GOD, XI, AGAINST THE HERETICS, AND TO THE PLACE.
Of all visible things the world is the greatest; of all invisible things God is the greatest. But that the world exists we see; that God exists we believe. But that God made the world, we believe no one more readily than God himself. Where do we hear him? Nowhere in the meantime better than in the holy Scriptures, where his prophet said: In the beginning God made heaven and earth. Was that prophet there, then, when God made heaven and earth? No; but the wisdom of God was there, through which all things were made, which also transfers itself into holy souls, makes them friends of God and prophets, and inwardly tells them its works without noise. The angels of God also speak to them, who always see the face of the Father and announce his will to those to whom it is fitting. Of these was that prophet, who said and wrote: In the beginning God made heaven and earth; who is so suitable a witness, through whom God is to be believed, that by the same Spirit of God,
XIIII
Cum igitur unum mundum ' ingenti. quidem mole corporea, finitum tamen et loco' suo determinatum et operante \\deo factum esse dicant,' quod respondent de infinitis extra mundum locis cur in" eis eis opere deus cesset, hoc sihi respondeant de infinitis ante mundum temporibus cur in eis ab opere deus cessarit.' et sicut non est consequens ut fortuito potius quam ratione diuina deus non alio, sed, isto iii quo est loco mundum. constituerit cum pariter infinitis ubique patentibus nullo excellentiore merito posset hic eligi, quamuis eandem diuinam rationem qua id factum est nulla possit humana comprehendere I natura: ita non est consequens ut deo aliquid existi.[.. cum tempore autem factus est mundus, si in eius condicione factus est mutabilis motus, sicut uidetur se habere etiam ordo ille primorum sex uel septem dierum, in quibus mane et uespera nominantur, donec omnia quae his diebus fecit deus sexto perficiantur die septimoque in magno mysterio dei uacatio commendetur: qui dies cuius modi sint aut perdifficile nobis aut impossibile est cogitare, quanto magis dicere.
XIV
Since, then, they say that one world was made by the working of God, vast indeed in bodily mass, yet finite and bounded by its own place, let them answer themselves this: as they reply concerning the infinite places outside the world, why God ceases from work in them, so let them answer concerning the infinite times before the world, why God ceased from work in them. And just as it does not follow that God established the world in this place, rather than in another, by chance rather than by divine reason, since with infinitely many places lying open everywhere alike, this one could be chosen by no superior merit, although no human nature can comprehend that same divine reason by which it was done: so it does not follow that anything existed for God before time. But the world was made with time, if in its condition there was made a mutable motion, as that order of the first six or seven days also seems to hold, in which morning and evening are named, until all things that God made in those days are completed on the sixth day, and on the seventh day God's rest is commended in a great mystery. Of what kind those days are is either very difficult or impossible for us to think, much more to speak.
Videmus quippe istos dies notos non habere uesperam nisi de solis occasu nec mane nisi de solis exortu; illorum autem priorum tres dies sine sole peracti sunt. qui die quarto factus refertur. et primitus quidem lux dei uerbo facta atque inter ipsam et tenebras deus separasse narratur et eandem lucem uecasse diem, tenebras autem noctem. sed qualis illa sit lux et quo alternante motu qualemque uesperam et mane fecerit, remotum est a sensibus nostris nec ita ut est intellegi a nobis potest; quod tamen sine ulla haesitatione credendum est. aut enim aliqua lux corporea est siue in superioribus mundi partibus longe a conspectibus nostris siue unde sol postmodum accensus est, aut lucis nomine significata est sancta ciuitas in sanctis angelis et spiritibus beatis, de qua dicit apostolus: quae sursum est Hierusalem mater nostra aeterna in caelis; ait quippe et alio loco: omnes enim uos filii lucis estis et filii diei, non sumus noctis neque tenebrarum; si tamen et uesperam diei huius et mane aliquatenus congruenter intellegere ualeamus, quoniam scientia creaturae in comparationem scientiae creatoris quodam modo uesperascit itemque lucescit et mane fit, cum et ipsa refertur ad laudem dilectionemque creatoris, nec in noctem uergitur, ubi non creator creaturae dilectione relinquitur.
For we see that these days are not known to have an evening except from the setting of the sun, nor a morning except from the rising of the sun; but those first three days were passed without the sun, which is reported to have been made on the fourth day. And indeed light was first made by the word of God, and God is narrated to have separated between it and the darkness, and to have called the same light day, and the darkness night. But what kind of light that was, and by what alternating motion it made such an evening and morning, is remote from our senses and cannot be understood by us as it is; yet this must be believed without any hesitation. For either it is some corporeal light, whether in the higher parts of the world far from our sight, or from which the sun was afterward kindled, or by the name of light is signified the holy city in the holy angels and blessed spirits, of which the apostle says: which is above, Jerusalem our eternal mother in the heavens; for he says also in another place: for you are all sons of light and sons of the day, we are not of the night nor of darkness; if only we are able to understand to some extent, in a fitting manner, both the evening and the morning of this day, since the knowledge of the creature in comparison with the knowledge of the creator in a certain way grows evening, and likewise grows light and becomes morning, when it too is referred to the praise and love of the creator, nor is it turned into night, where the creator is not forsaken by the love of the creature.
denique scriptura cum illos dies dinumeraret ex ordine, nusquam interposuit uocabulum noctis; non enim ait alicubi: facta est nox, sed: facta est uespera et factum est mane, dies unus; ita dies secundus et ceteri. cognitio quippe creaturae in se ipsa decoloratior est, ut ita dicam, quam cum in dei sapientia cognoscitur uelut in arte qua facta est; ideo uespera, quae nox congruentius dici potest; quae tamen, ut dixi, cam ad laudandum et amandum refertur creatorem, recurrit in mane. et hoc cum facit in cognitione sui ipsius, dies unus est; cum in cognitione firmamenti, quod inter aquas inferiores et superiores caelum appellatum est, dies secundus; cum in cognitione terrae ac maris omniumque gignentium, quae radicibus continuata sunt terrae, dies tertius; cum in cognitione luminarium maioris et minoris omniumque siderum, dies quartus; cum in cognitione omnium ex aquis animalium natatilium atque uolatilium, dies quintus; cum in cognitione omnium animalium terrenorum atque ipsius hominis, dies sextus.
Finally, when Scripture enumerated those days in order, it nowhere inserted the word "night"; for it does not say anywhere, "night was made," but "evening was made and morning was made, one day"; thus the second day and the rest. For the knowledge of a creature in itself is, so to speak, more faded than when it is known in God's wisdom, as in the art by which it was made; hence the evening, which can more fittingly be called night; yet when, as I said, it is referred to the praise and love of the Creator, it returns to morning. And when it does this in the knowledge of itself, it is the first day; when in the knowledge of the firmament, which was called heaven between the lower and upper waters, it is the second day; when in the knowledge of the earth and sea and all things that spring forth, which are joined to the earth by roots, it is the third day; when in the knowledge of the greater and lesser lights and all the stars, it is the fourth day; when in the knowledge of all swimming and flying animals from the waters, it is the fifth day; when in the knowledge of all land animals and of man himself, it is the sixth day.
Cum uero in die septimo requiescit deus ab omnibus operibus suis et sanctificat eum, nequaquam est accipiendum pueriliter, tamquam deus laborauerit operando, qui dixit, et facta sunt, uerbo intellegibili et sempiterno, non sonabili et temporali. requies dei requiem significat eorum qui requiescunt in deo, sicut laetitia domus laetitiam significat eorum qui laetantur in domo, etiam si non eos domus ipsa, sed alia res aliqua laetos facit; quanto magis eadem domus pulchritudine sua faciat laetes habitatores, ut non solum eo loquendi modo laeta dicatur, quo significamus per id quod continet id quod continetur; sicut "theatra plaudunt" "prata mugiunt",cum in iliis homines plaudant, in his boues mugiant; sed etiam illo quo signifieatur per efficientem id quod efficitur, sicut laeta epistula dicitur, significans eerum laetitiam quos legentes efficit laetos. conuenientissime itaque, cum deum requieuisse prophetica narrat auctoritas, significatur requies eorum qui in illo requiescunt et quos facit ipse requiescere ; hoc etiam hominibus, quibus loquitur et propter quos utique conscripta est; promittente prophetia, quod etiam ipsi post bona opera, quae in eis per eos operatur deus, si ad illum prius in ista uita per fidem quodam modo accesserint illo habebunt requiem sempiternam; hoc enim et I sabbati . praecepto praecepto legis in ueteri dei populo figuratum est,-.-..
But when God rests on the seventh day from all his works and sanctifies it, this must by no means be taken in a childish way, as though God had labored in working, he who spoke and they were made by an intelligible and eternal word, not a word that can be sounded and is temporal. The rest of God signifies the rest of those who rest in God, just as the joy of a house signifies the joy of those who rejoice in the house, even if the house itself is not what makes them glad but something else; how much more does the same house by its own beauty make its inhabitants glad, so that it is called glad not only in that way of speaking by which we signify the container by the contained—as "the theaters applaud," "the meadows low," when in the former men applaud and in the latter oxen low—but also in that way by which the effect is signified by its cause, as a letter is called glad, signifying the gladness of those whom it makes glad by being read. Most fittingly, therefore, when the prophetic authority relates that God rested, there is signified the rest of those who rest in him and whom he himself makes to rest; this is also [signified] for the men to whom it speaks and for whose sake it was certainly written, the prophecy promising that even they, after the good works which God works in them through them, if they have first in this life in some way drawn near to him through faith, will have in him eternal rest; for this was also figured in the old people of God by the precept of the law concerning the sabbath.
XV. QVOD LVCIS NOMINE] ETIAM ANGKLI SIGNIFICATI ATQVE CREATI POSSINT INTELLEGI. EX EODEM LIBRO XI INTRA CETERA ET AD LOCVM.
Vbi de mundi constitutione sacrae litterae to:cuntur',' non euidenter dicitur utrum uel quo ordine creati sint angeli; sed si praetermissi non sunt, uel caeli nomine ubi dictum est: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram, uel potius lucis huius de qua loquor significati sunt. non autem esse praetermissos hinc existimo, quod scriptum est requieuisse deum in die septimo ab omnibus operibus suis quae fecit, ergo erant angeli, quando facta sunt sidera; facta sunt autem quarto die. numquidnam ergo die tertio factos esse dicemus? absit. in promtu est enim quid illo die factum sit: ab aquis utique terra discreta est et distinctas sui generis species duo ista elementa sumserunt et produxit terra quidquid ei radicitus inhaeret. numquidnam secundo? ne hoc quidem; tunc enim firmamentum factum est super aquas superiores caelumque appellatum est; in quo firmamento quarto die facta sunt sidera.
XV. THAT BY THE NAME OF LIGHT THE ANGELS ALSO CAN BE UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE BEEN SIGNIFIED AND CREATED. FROM THE SAME BOOK XI, AMONG OTHER THINGS, AND AT THE PLACE.
Where the sacred writings speak of the constitution of the world, it is not clearly stated whether or in what order the angels were created; but if they were not passed over, they were signified either by the name of heaven, where it is said: In the beginning God made heaven and earth, or rather by this light of which I speak. But that they were not passed over, I judge from this, that it is written that God rested on the seventh day from all his works which he made. Therefore the angels existed when the stars were made; but they were made on the fourth day. Shall we then say that they were made on the third day? Far be it. For it is plain what was made on that day: surely the earth was separated from the waters, and these two elements received distinct species of their own kind, and the earth brought forth whatever clings to it by its roots. Shall we say on the second day? Not this either; for then the firmament was made above the upper waters and was called heaven; in which firmament the stars were made on the fourth day.
nimirum ergo si ad istorum dierum opera dei pertinent angeli, ipsi sunt illa lux, quae diei nomen accepit, cuius unitas ut commendaretur, non est dictus dies primus, sed dies unus; nec alius est dies secundus aut tertius aut ceteri, sed idem ipse unus ad implendum senarium uel septenarium numerum repetitus est propter (senariam uel) septenariam cognitionem: senariam scilicet operum, quae fecit deus, at septimam quietis dei. cum enim dixit deus: fiat lux, facta est lux; si recte in hac luce creatio intellegitur angelorum, profecto facti sunt participes lucis aeternae, quod est ipsa incommutabilis sapientia dei, per quam facta sunt omnia, quem dicimus unigenitum dei filium, ut ea luce inluminati, qua creati, fierent lux et uocarentur dies participatione incommutabilis lucis et diei, quod est uerbum dei, per quod et ipsi et omnia facta sunt. lumen quippe uerum, quod inluminat omnem hominem uenientem in hunc mundum, hoc inluminat et omnem angelum mundum, ut sit lux non in se ipso, sed in deo: a quo si auertitur angelus, fit immundus, sicut sunt omnes qui uocantur immundi spiritus, nec iam lux in domino, sed in se ipsis tenebrae, priuati participatione lucis aeternae. mali enim nulla natura est, sed amissio boni mali nomen accepit.
Without doubt, then, if the angels belong among the works of God of those days, they are themselves that light which received the name of day; and to commend its unity, it was not called the first day but one day; nor is the second or third or the rest another day, but the same one day is repeated to complete the number six or seven, on account of a sixfold or sevenfold knowledge: sixfold, namely, of the works which God made, and the seventh of God's rest. For when God said, Let there be light, light was made; if in this light the creation of the angels is rightly understood, then surely they were made partakers of the eternal light, which is the very unchangeable wisdom of God, through whom all things were made, whom we call the only-begotten Son of God, so that, enlightened by that light by which they were created, they might become light and be called days by participation in the unchangeable light and day, which is the Word of God, through whom both they and all things were made. For the true light, which enlightens every man coming into this world, enlightens every clean angel also, so that he is light not in himself but in God; and if an angel turns away from him, he becomes unclean, as are all who are called unclean spirits, and now he is not light in the Lord but darkness in himself, deprived of participation in the eternal light. For evil has no nature; rather, the loss of good has received the name of evil.
XVI. CONTRA EOS QVI DICVNT OB HOC FACTVM ESSE MVNDVM, VT ANIMAE,QVAE PECCAVERANT PRIVS, IN EO INCLVDEBENTVB: VBI BT ORIGENEM ERRASSE PROBAT CONTRA LIBROS IPSIVS, QVI APPELLAKTVR TIEPI ' .EX EODEM LIBRO xi INTER CETERA BT AD LOCVM.
Sed multo est mirandum amplius, quod etiam quidam qui anum nobiscum credunt omnium rerum esse principium ullamque naturam, quae non est quod deus est, nisi ab illo conditore esse non posse, noluerunt tamen istam causam fabricandi mundi tam bonam ac simplicem bene ao simpliciter credere, at bonus deus conderet bona et essent post deum quae non essent quod est deus, bona tamen, quae non faceret nisi bonus deus. sed animas dicunt non quidem partes dei, sed factas a deo peccasse a conditore recedendo et diuersis progressibus pro diuersitate peccatorum a caelis usque ad terras diuersa •orpora quasi uincula meruisse; et hunc esse mundum eamque causam mundi fuisse faciendi, non ut conderentur bona, sed ut mala cohiberentur. hinc Origenes iure culpatur; in libris enim, quos appellat nequ , id est de principiis, hoc sensit, hoc scripsit.
XVI. Against those who say that the world was made for this reason, that souls which had previously sinned should be enclosed in it: where he also proves that Origen erred, against his own books, which are entitled Peri Archon. From the same book XI, among other things, also to the point.
But it is much more to be wondered at that certain men who believe with us that all things have their beginning from one source, and that no nature which is not what God is can exist except from him as creator, were nevertheless unwilling to believe this cause of the making of the world, so good and simple, in a good and simple manner—namely, that a good God would create good things, and that there should exist after God things which are not what God is, yet good, which none but a good God would make. But they say that souls, not indeed parts of God but made by God, sinned by departing from their creator, and by various advances, according to the diversity of their sins, from the heavens even to the earth, deserved various bodies as it were chains; and that this is the world, and that this was the cause of making the world—not that good things might be created, but that evil things might be restrained. Hence Origen is rightly blamed; for in the books which he calls Peri Archon, that is, On First Principles, he held this, he wrote this.
ubi plus quam dici potest miror hominem in ecclesiasticis litteris tam doctum et exercitatum non attendisse primum quam hoc esset contrarium scripturae huius tantae auctoritatis intentioni, quae per omnia opera dei subiungens: et uidit deus, quia bonum est, completisque omnibus inferens: et uidit deus omnia quae fecit, It ecce bona ualde, nullam aliam causam faciendi mundi intellegi uoluit, nisi ut bona fierent a bono deo. ubi si nemo peccasset, tantummodo naturis bonis esset mundus ornatus et plenus; et quia peccatum est, non ideo cuncta sunt impleta peccatis, cum bonorum maior numerus in caelestibus suae naturae ordinem seruet; nec. mala uoluntas quia naturae ordinem seruare noluit, ideo iusti dei leges omnia bene ordinantis effugit; quoniam sicut pictura cum colore nigro loco t.suo posito, ita uniuersitas rerum, si quis possit intueri, etiam ' cum peccatoribus pulchra est, quamuis per se ipsos consideratos sua deformitas turpet.
Here I marvel more than can be expressed that a man so learned and practiced in ecclesiastical literature did not first consider how contrary this was to the intention of Scripture of such great authority, which, attaching to all the works of God, "and God saw that it was good," and, when all things were completed, adding, "and God saw all things that he had made, and behold, they were very good," willed no other cause of making the world to be understood than that good things should be made by a good God. Where, if no one had sinned, the world would have been adorned and filled with good natures only; and because there is sin, all things are not therefore filled with sins, since a greater number of the good keep the order of their nature in the heavenly places; nor, because an evil will refused to keep the order of nature, does it therefore escape the laws of the just God who orders all things well; for just as a painting with black color placed in its own place, so the universe of things, if anyone could behold it, is beautiful even with sinners, although, considered in themselves, their own deformity disfigures them.
deinde uidere debuit Origenes et quicumque ita sapiunt, si haec opinio uera esset, mundum ideo factum ut animae pro meritis peccatorum suorum tamquam ergastula, quibus poenaliter includerentur, corpora acciperent, superiora et leuiora' quae minus,1 inferiora uero et grauiora quae amplius peccauerunt, daemones, quibus deterius nihil est, terrena corpora, quibus inferius et grauius nihil est, potius quam homines etiam bonos habere debuisse.nunc uero ut intellegeremus animarum merita non qualitatibus corporum esse pensanda, aerium pessimus daemon; homo autem, et nunc licet malus' longe minoris mitiorisque malitiae et certe ante -peccatum, tamen luteum corpus accepit. autem autem stultius dici potest quam istum solem, ut in uno mundo unus esset; non decori pulchritudinis uel etiam saluti rerum corporalium consuluisse artificem deum, sed hoc potius euenisse, quia non duea sic peccauerat tali corpore mereretur includi? ac per hoc si contigisset ut non una, sed duae, immo non duae, sed decem uel centum similiter aequaliterque peccassent centum soles haberet hic mundus? quod ut non fieret, non opificis prouisione mirabili ad rerum corporalium salutem decoremque consultum est, sed contigit potius tanta unius animae progressione peccantis,, ut sola corpus tale mereretur.
Then Origen and whoever think this way ought to have seen that, if this opinion were true—that the world was made for this reason, that souls, in accordance with the merits of their sins, might receive bodies as prisons in which they would be shut up as a punishment, the higher and lighter bodies those who had sinned less, but the lower and heavier those who had sinned more—then demons, than whom nothing is worse, ought to have had earthly bodies, than which nothing is lower and heavier, rather than even good men. But as it is, so that we might understand that the merits of souls are not to be weighed by the qualities of bodies, the worst demon has an airy body; but man, even now though wicked, has a body of far lesser and gentler wickedness, and certainly before sin he received a body of clay. But what can be said more foolishly than that this sun, so that there should be one in one world, did not come about by the craftsman God's providing for the beauty of comeliness or even for the well-being of corporeal things, but rather happened because one soul had so sinned that it deserved to be enclosed in such a body? And by this reasoning, if it had happened that not one, but two, or rather not two, but ten or a hundred had sinned similarly and equally, this world would have a hundred suns? And so that this would not happen was provided for, not by the wonderful foresight of the craftsman, for the well-being and beauty of corporeal things, but it rather happened by such great advancement of one soul sinning that it alone deserved such a body.
non plane animarum quibus nesciunt quid loquantur, sed corum ipsorum qui talia sapiunt multum longe a ueritate et metite est cohercenda progressio.
XVII. DEM DE EODEM ERRORE ET DE IGNE AETERNO EN LIBRO RESPONSIONIS AD CONSVLTAOROSI PRESBVTERI INTER CETERA ET AD LOCVM.IIJ" -
Vsque adeo igitur in eo! quod ex nihilo ,!fecit' uoluntas non nihil dicitur, ut ipsa praecipue commendetur. nam cui dicitur: subest tibi enim cum uoles posse, siue adsit unde fiat siue non adsit, sat est uoluntas ubi summa est potestas. fiat siue non adsit, sat est uoluntas creatur, uoluntas creantis nihil esse perhibetur, cum propterea de nihilo creari aliquid possit, quia uoluntas creantis etiam sine materia sibi sufficit? quod si forte non solum animam, sed nullam omnino creaturam uolunt fateri ex nihilo factam, ideo quoniam quidquid deus fecit uoluntate fecit, quae uoluntas utique non est nihil, respiciant unde secundum corpus factus sit homo. certe enim, sicut scriptura testatur, cum de limo uel de puluere terrae deus fecit, uoluntate fecit, procul 'dubio uoluntate fecit; nec tamen uoluntas dei puluis ant limus est.
Not plainly the souls of those who do not know what they are saying, but the advance of those very men who hold such opinions, far removed from the truth and from worth, must be restrained.
XVII. THE SAME CONCERNING THE SAME ERROR AND CONCERNING ETERNAL FIRE, IN THE BOOK OF THE RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATIONS OF THE PRESBYTER OROSIUS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, AND TO THE PLACE.
To such a degree, then, is the will said to be not nothing in that which he made from nothing, that it is especially commended. For to whom it is said, "For to will is present with thee" — whether there be something from which it may be made, or whether there be not, the will is sufficient where the highest power is. Whether it be present or not present, the will is sufficient; the will of the creator is held to be nothing, when for this reason something can be created from nothing, because the will of the creator is sufficient for itself even without matter? But if perchance they wish to confess that not only the soul, but no creature at all, was made from nothing, for the reason that whatever God made he made by will, and that will assuredly is not nothing, let them consider from what man was made according to the body. For certainly, as the scripture testifies, when God made him from the mud or from the dust of the earth, he made him by will — without doubt he made him by will; and yet the will of God is not dust or mud.
sicut ergo in eo quod ei limo factum est, quamuis uoluntate sit factum, non est uoluntas limus, ita in e6''quiod ex nihilo factum est, quamuis uoluntate sit factum, non est uoluntas nihil.iam uero quod dolendum addidisti, ex Priscilliani haeresi ad errorem Origenis' apud uos homines fuisse delapsos nec ab illa peste potuisse sanari, nisi et ipsa medicina morbidum aliquid intulisset, non est quidem dolor iste culpandus; ueritas enim debuit, non falsitas pellere falsitatem; nam hoc mutare est malum, non euitare. uerum tamen quia de ipso deo, creaturarum omnium conditore, hoc est de ipsa coaeterna et incommutabili trinitate ab eis qui ad uos libros Origenis attulerant id traditum esse commemoras quod ueritas habet; contra quam ueritatem Priscillianus Sabellianum antiquum dogma restituit — ibi ipse pater, qui filius, qui et spiritus sanctus perhibetur — hoc iste peior, quod etiam de anima sentit, ut non eam propriam uelit habere naturam, sed de ipso deo tamquam particulam defluere et tam deformiter inquinari atque in deterius commutari cum Manichaeis audeat affirmare: non parum boni ex libris illis prouincia uestra percepit in ea re maxime, in qua capitaliter erratur: de creatore quippe, non de creatura tam falsa et tam nefaria sentiuntur.
Just as, therefore, in that which was made for him from mud, although it was made by will, the will is not mud, so in that which was made out of nothing, although it was made by will, the will is not nothing. But now, what you added as a matter for grief—that among you men had fallen from the Priscillianist heresy into the error of Origen, and could not be healed of that plague unless that very medicine had itself introduced something diseased—that grief is certainly not to be blamed; for truth, not falsehood, ought to drive out falsehood; for to change this is to exchange one evil for another, not to avoid it. Yet nevertheless, because concerning God himself, the creator of all creatures—that is, concerning the very coeternal and unchangeable Trinity—you recall that those who brought Origen's books to you handed down what truth holds; against which truth Priscillian restored the ancient Sabellian dogma—where the Father himself is said to be the Son and also the Holy Spirit—this man is worse, in that he even holds this opinion concerning the soul: that he does not wish it to have its own nature, but dares to affirm with the Manichaeans that it flows forth from God himself as a kind of particle and is so shamefully defiled and changed for the worse. Your province received no small good from those books, especially in that matter in which the error is capital: for it is concerning the creator, not the creature, that such false and such wicked things are held.
siue ergo in hanc fidem qui deuiauerant restituti sunt siue qui eam nondum nouerant illarum disputationum lectione didicerunt, hoc se gaudeant didicisse quod sanum est. quod autem et in eis erroris est quamquam te cognouisse iam uideam, tamen quemadmodum contra talia disseratur ibi melius discere poteris, ubi error ipse et olim exortus est et non olim proditus.
Quantum possum tamen etiam ego commoneo ut de diaboli angelorumque eius correptione et in pristinum statum reparatione sapere nihil audeas; non quia diabolo et daemoniis inuidemus et eo modo quasi uicem maliuolentiae rependimus, cum illi non ob aliud nisi inuidentiae stimulis agitati nostra itinera quibus in deum tendimus perturbare conentur; sed quia ultimae sententiae summi et ueracissimi iudicis ex nostra praesumtione nihil addere debemus. ipse enim se similibus eorum esse dicturum praedixit: ite in igne aeterno, qui paratus est diabolo et angelis eius; nec mouere debet ut hoc loco aeternum pro diuturno accipiamus quod alibi scriptum est: in aeternum et in saeculum saeculi. latinus quippe interpres noluit dicere: in aeternum et in aeternum aeterni; sed quoniam id quod graece dicitur et saeculum et aeternum interpretari potest, commodius alii interpretes transtulerunt: in saeculum et in saeculum saeculi.
Whether, then, those who had wandered astray have been restored to this faith, or those who did not yet know it have learned it by reading those disputations, let them rejoice that they have learned what is sound. But as for what is also erroneous in them—although I see that you have already understood it—nevertheless, how one should argue against such things you will be able to learn better there, where the error itself both arose long ago and was not long ago brought to light.
As far as I can, however, I also warn you not to dare to be wise about anything concerning the rebuke of the devil and his angels and their restoration to their former state; not because we envy the devil and the demons and in that way, as it were, repay them in kind for their ill will—since they, stirred by no other goads than those of envy, strive to disturb our paths by which we tend toward God—but because we ought to add nothing from our own presumption to the final sentence of the supreme and most truthful Judge. For he foretold that he would say to those like them: Go into the eternal fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels; nor should it move us that in this place we take "eternal" for "long-lasting," because it is written elsewhere: forever and unto the age of ages. For the Latin translator was unwilling to say "forever and unto the eternal of the eternal"; but since what is said in Greek can be interpreted both as "age" and as "eternal," other translators have more fittingly rendered it: unto the age and unto the age of ages.
sed non dictum est ubi dictum est: ite in ignem aeternum; non enim dictum est , sed .quod m a saeculo declinatum esset, saeculare latine diceretur, non asternum quod nemo umquam interpres ausus est dicere. quapropter licet latine saeculum cum aliquo fine intellegatur, aeternum uero nisi id quod sine fine est non soleat appellari, autem graece aliquando (aeternum, aliquando) saeculum significare intellegatur: tamen quod ex hoc nomine deriuatur et appellatur ipsi Graeci, quantum extimo, non solent intellegere nisi id quod non habet finem. nos autem siue siue non solemus dicere nisi aeternum; sed dicimus et saeculum, autem non nisi aeternum. quamuis quidam aeternum etiam aeternale audeant dicere, ne latinae linguae deesse uideatur ab eodem nomine deriuatio. et fortasse quidem secundum morem scripturarum inueniant isti aliquid etiam dictum quod sine fine non sit; sicut deus in libris ueteris testamenti assidue dicit: hoc uobis erit legitimum aeternum; quod graecus habet , cum de talibus sacramentis eo modo saepe praeciperet, quae finem fuerant ha-bitura.
But it is not said where it is said: Go into eternal fire; for it is not said, but what from the world would have been declined, in Latin would be called "saeculare," not "aeternum," which no interpreter has ever dared to say. Wherefore, although in Latin "saeculum" is understood with some end, but "aeternum" is not customarily called anything except what is without end, and the Greek word is understood sometimes to signify "aeternum," sometimes "saeculum": nevertheless, what is derived from this name and is called by the Greeks themselves, as I judge, they are not accustomed to understand except that which has no end. But we, whether [we say] this or that, are not accustomed to say anything except "aeternum"; but we also say "saeculum," yet not except "aeternum." Although certain people dare even to say "aeternale" for "aeternum," lest the Latin language seem to lack a derivation from the same name. And perhaps indeed according to the custom of the Scriptures those people find something even said that is not without end; just as God in the books of the Old Testament continually says: This shall be to you a legitimate eternal [statute]; which the Greek has, when he often commanded concerning such sacraments in that manner, which were going to have an end.
quae si diligentius dicta intellegantur, ea fortasse I quae illis sacramentis significabantur finem non erant babitura: ita «nim, ne longius ab eam, dioimus aeternum deum, non utique duas istas breuissimas syllabas, sed quod eis significatur; dixit apostolus tempora aeterna priera ei antiqua, quod: in graeco legitur ; ad Titum enim scribens ait: spem uitae aeternae, quam promisit non mendax deus ante tempora aeterna.cum autem retrorsum tempora a constitutione mundi habere uideautur initium, quomodo sunt aeterna, mi. quia aeterna, dixit quae ante ce non habent ullum tempus? sed quisquis prudenter aduertit quod dictum est: ite in ignem aeternum illud esse dictum quod non habet finem, a contrario probat eo ipso loco euangelico de uita aeterna quam iusti accepturi sunt; non enim ipsa habet finem. ita enim conclusit: sic ibunt illi in ambustionem aeternam iusti autem in uitam aeternam: in utroque graecus .si misericordia nos prouocat credere non futurum impiorum sine fine supplicium, quid de praemio iusterum credituri sumus, cum in utraque . parte eodem loco eadem sententia, - eodem uerbo praenuntietur aeternitas ? an iterum etiam iustos ex illa sanctificatione et uita aeterna in peccatorum immunditiam atque in mortem relapsuros esse dicemus? absit hoc a christianae fidei sanitate. utrumque igitur sine fine dictum est aeternum, hoc est , ne, cum diaboli poenas dolemus, et de.
If these words are understood with closer attention, perhaps those things which were signified by those sacraments were not going to have an end. For thus we say that God is eternal, not, of course, those two briefest syllables, but what is signified by them. The apostle said "eternal times" — before the ages and ancient — which in Greek is read as "aionion"; for writing to Titus he says: "the hope of eternal life, which the God who does not lie promised before eternal times." But since times seem to have their beginning backward from the foundation of the world, how are they eternal, unless he called "eternal" those things which have no time at all before them? But whoever prudently considers that what was said — "Go into eternal fire" — was said of that which has no end, proves it from the opposite, by that very Gospel passage concerning the eternal life which the righteous will receive; for that itself has no end. For thus he concluded: "So they will go into eternal burning, but the righteous into eternal life" — in both places the Greek has "aionion." If mercy urges us to believe that the punishment of the wicked will not be without end, what are we to believe about the reward of the righteous, when in both parts, in the same passage, by the same sentence, by the same word, eternity is foretold? Or shall we again say that the righteous too will relapse from that sanctification and eternal life into the uncleanness of sins and into death? Far be this from the soundness of the Christian faith. Both, therefore, are said to be eternal without end, that is, lest, while we grieve over the punishments of the devil, also concerning...
regno Christi dubitemus postremo si aeternum et aeternale hoc est et sub utroque intellectu in scripturis poni solet, aliquando sine fine, aliquando cum fine, quid de illis prophetae uerbis responsuri sumus ubi scriptum est: uermis eorum non morietur et ignis eorum non extinguetur?qualiscumque poena significata sit nomine uermis atque ignis, certe si non morietur nec extinguetur, sine fine praedicta est.
XVIII. QVOMODO ACCIPIENDVM SIT: OMNIS CREATVRA INGE- MESCIT ET PARTVRIT VSQVE ADHVC. EX EODEM LIBRO RESPONSIONIS AD OROSIVM PRESBVTERVM.
Porro de sole et luna ceterisque sideribus quod caelestia sint corpora uidemus, quod animata sint non uidemus. de diuinis hoc libris legatur, et credimus; nam testimonium ex apostoli epistula, quod ab eis dici solere posuisti, etiam de solis hominibus dici potest, quoniam in unoquoque homine omnis creatura non uniuersaliter, sicut est caelum et terra et omnia quae in eis sunt, sed generatim quodam modo: quia rationalis in illo est, quam uel probantur habere angeli uel creduntur, et ut ita dicam sensualis, qua et bestiae non carent; utuntur enim sensibus et sensualibus motibus ad appetenda utilia et uitanda contraria; et uitalis priuata sensu, qualis aduerti in arboribus potest. nam et in nobis sine sensu nostro fiunt corporis incrementa et capilli nec cum praeciduntur sentiunt, et tamen crescunt.
...we should doubt that the kingdom of Christ is eternal. Finally, if this is both eternal and age-lasting, and is customarily set down in the Scriptures under both understandings—sometimes without end, sometimes with an end—what shall we answer concerning those words of the prophet where it is written: Their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched? Whatever punishment is signified by the name of worm and fire, certainly if it shall not die nor be quenched, it has been foretold as without end.
XVIII. How it is to be understood: "Every creature groans and travails until now." From the same book of the Response to Orosius the Presbyter.
Furthermore, concerning the sun and moon and the other stars, we see that they are heavenly bodies; that they are animate we do not see. Let this be read in the divine books, and we believe it. For the testimony from the apostle's letter, which you said is customarily cited by them, can also be said of men alone, since in each individual man every creature is present—not universally, as is heaven and earth and all things that are in them, but in a certain generic manner: because in him is the rational [creature], which angels are either proved or believed to have, and, so to speak, the sensory, which even beasts are not lacking; for they use senses and sensory motions to seek what is useful and avoid what is contrary. And the vital [creature] deprived of sense, such as can be observed in trees. For even in us, without our sensing it, the body's growth takes place, and hairs do not feel it when they are cut, and yet they grow.
iam uero ipsa corporalis creatura euidentius apparet in nobis; quae licet ex terra facta atque formata sit, tamen illic ex omnibus huius corporei mundi elementis quaedam particulae ad temperiem ualetudinis. nam et calore membra uegitantur, qui est ab igne, cuius etiam lux per oculos emicat, et aere uenarum discursus, quas arterias uocant, atque spiramenta pulmonis implentur, et humor nisi esset, nulla sputamenta confluerent uitamque absumeret siccitas. nam et ipse sanguis humido lapsu alias uenas replens quasi riuis et fluminibus per cuncta diffunditur. ita nullum est creaturae genus, quod non in homine possit agnosci. ac sic omnis creatura in eo congemescit et dolet, reuelationem filiorum dei exspectans; quae per corporis etiam resurrectionem etsi non in omnibus hominibus, omnis tamen a corruptionis seruitute liberabitur, quia et singulis omnis est; et si quo alio modo melius potest idem locus apostolicarum litterarum intellegi: non tamen ex isdem uerbis consequens est ut solem et lunam et sidera congemescere credamus, donec in saeculi fine a corruptionis seruitute liberentur. sane quoniam dixi: "de diuinis legatur, et credimus", ne te forsitan fallat quod de libro sancti Iob proferre assolent qui haec asserunt; ubi scriptum est: quomodo erit homo iustus coram domino? uel quomodo se mundabit natus ex muliere?
Now indeed the bodily creation itself is more evidently apparent in us; and although it was made and formed from earth, nevertheless from all the elements of this corporeal world certain particles are drawn for the tempering of health. For our limbs are also quickened by heat, which comes from fire, whose light also shines forth through the eyes; and by air the coursing of the veins, which they call arteries, and the breathings of the lung are filled; and unless there were moisture, no spittle would flow together, and dryness would consume life. For the blood itself, replenishing other veins with its moist flow, is poured through all parts like streams and rivers. Thus there is no kind of creature that cannot be recognized in man. And so all creation groans together and labors in him, awaiting the revelation of the sons of God; and through the resurrection of the body, even if not in all men, all creation will nevertheless be freed from the servitude of corruption, because it is also all in each individual; and if that passage of the apostolic letters can be understood in some other better way, it still does not follow from those same words that we should believe the sun and moon and stars groan together until at the end of the world they are freed from the servitude of corruption. Of course, since I said, "let it be read from the divine books, and we believe," perhaps it may mislead you that those who assert these things are accustomed to bring forward from the book of holy Job, where it is written: How shall a man be just before the Lord? Or how shall one born of a woman cleanse himself?
si lunae praecepit, et non lucet, nec stellae sunt mundae ante eum: quanto magis homo putredo et filius hominis uermis. hinc enim uolunt intellegi et rationalem spiritum habere stellas et mundas non esse a peccato, sed ideo in caelis esse, quia maiorem uel meliorem locum minor culpa promeruerit. non pro auctoritate diuina istam sententiam recipiendam esse existimo; non enim ea ipse Iob enuntiauit, cui singulare quodam modo testimonium diuinitus perhibetur, quod non peccauerit labiis suis ante dominum, sed unus ex eis amicis, qui consolatores malorum dicti sunt omnes et diuina sententia reprobati. sicut autem in euangelio quamuis uerum sit omnino quod dicta sint, non tamen omnia quae dicta sunt uera esse creduntur, quoniam multa a Iudaeis falsa et impia dicta esse uerax euangelii scriptura testatur: sic in hoc libro, ubi multae personae locutae esse narrantur, non solum quid dicatur, sed a quo etiam dicatur considerandum est, ne passim quae in sancto libro quolibet scripta sunt recipientes cogamur fateri, quod absit, uera et iusta fuisse quae marito sancto mulier insipiens suggerebat, ut aliquid aduersum deum loquens ab illa intolerabili poena moriendo liberaretur. quod non ideo dixerim, quia illi amici a domino reprobati et ab ipso sancto dei seruo merito culpati nihil ueri loqui potuerunt, sed quia non omnia quae locuti sunt uera putanda sunt.
If he has commanded the moon, and it does not shine, and the stars are not pure before him: how much more is man rottenness and the son of man a worm. Hence they wish it to be understood that the stars also have a rational spirit and are not pure from sin, but are therefore in the heavens because a lesser guilt has merited a greater or better place. I do not think that this opinion is to be accepted on divine authority; for Job himself did not utter it, to whom a testimony is in a certain way uniquely given from on high, that he did not sin with his lips before the Lord, but one of those friends, who were all called comforters of the wicked and were reproved by divine sentence. But just as in the Gospel, although it is entirely true that the things were said, yet not all the things that were said are believed to be true, since the truthful writing of the Gospel testifies that many false and impious things were said by the Jews: so in this book, where many persons are narrated to have spoken, it must be considered not only what is said but also by whom it is said, lest, receiving indiscriminately the things written in any holy book whatever, we be compelled to confess—which be far from us—that the things which the foolish woman suggested to the holy husband were true and just, so that by speaking something against God he might be freed from that intolerable punishment by dying. I would not have said this because those friends, reproved by the Lord and rightly blamed by the holy servant of God himself, could speak nothing true, but because not all the things they spoke are to be thought true.
quamuis ergo aduersum Iob nihil uerum dixerint, potest tamen etiam ex eorum uerbis aliquam sanam sententiam in testimonium ueritatis assumere qui nouit sapienter dicta discernere. sed quando inquirentes probari nobis aliquid uolumus testimonio sanctorum eloquiorum, non nobis dicatur credendum esse etiam quod in euangelio scriptum est, si forte euangelista eum hoc dixisse commemorat cui fides habenda non est. nam dictum est illic a Iudaeis domino Christo: nonne uerum dicimus, quia Samaritanus es et daemonium habes? quam uocem tanto amplius detestamur, quanto nobis Christus est carior; emissam tamen esse a Iudaeis dubitare non possumus qui euangelicam narrationem uerissimam credimus: ita nec euangelistae derogamus fidem scribentis et Iudaei uocem blasphemantis horremus. nec solum impiis et nefandis hominibus, sed nec ipsis in fide paruulis atque adhuc rudibus et indoctis, qui forte ibi loquentes commemorantur, tamquam canonicae auctoritati accommodamus fidem. neque enim quia ille cuius caeci nati oculos dominus aperuerat ait: scimus quia peccatores deus non exaudit, ideo istam sententiam pro euangelica auctoritate sic debemus accipere, ut ipsis in euangelio uerbis domini resistamus, qui eum qui dixit: domine propitius esto mihi peccatori, magis iustificatum descendisse de templo quam pharisaeum iustitias suas commemorantem atque iactantem diuina uoce firmauit.
Although, therefore, they said nothing true against Job, yet even from their words one who knows how to discern wisely spoken things can also take some sound meaning as a testimony to the truth. But when, in our inquiries, we wish something to be proved to us by the testimony of the holy utterances, it should not be said to us that we must believe even what is written in the gospel, if perhaps the evangelist records that this was said by someone who is not to be believed. For it was said there by the Jews to the Lord Christ: Do we not speak the truth, that you are a Samaritan and have a demon? We detest this utterance all the more the dearer Christ is to us; yet we cannot doubt that it was uttered by the Jews, since we believe the gospel narrative to be most true. Thus we neither detract from the faith of the evangelist who wrote it, nor do we fail to shudder at the voice of the Jew who blasphemed. And we do not accord faith, as to canonical authority, not only to impious and wicked men, but not even to the little ones in the faith and those still unskilled and untaught, who perhaps are recorded as speaking there. For it is not because the man whose eyes, blind from birth, the Lord had opened said: We know that God does not hear sinners, that we ought therefore to accept this opinion as having gospel authority, so as to resist in the very words of the Lord in the gospel him who said: Lord, be merciful to me, a sinner, whom the divine voice confirmed to have gone down from the temple more justified than the Pharisee recounting and boasting of his own righteous deeds.
nec suscenseat iste recens illuminatus in carne, quod eum diximus in suae fidei tirocinio, quando adhuc quis esset qui eum sanauerat nesciebat, minus circuminspectam protulisse sententiam, quia peccatores deus non exaudit, cum ipsi apostoli prae ceteris electi et domini lateribus cohaerentes eiusque ore pendentes multa reperiantur improbanda dixisse quae commemorare prolixum est, ita ut beatus Petrus de quibusdam uerbis suis non solum reprehendi, sed etiam satanas appellari meruerit. quamquam in comparatione iustitiae dei, si nec sancti in caelis angeli iusti esse dicantur, non mihi uidetur importuna sententia; non quia ut hoc essent a iustitia lapsi sunt, sed quia facti sunt et deus non sunt tantumque spiritalis luminis habere non possunt, quantum habet ille a quo facti sunt. ibi enim summa iustitia, ibi summa sapientia: et hoc deus est, de quo dictum est: soli sapienti deo. sed alia quaestio est, quantum iustitiae ipsius capiant angeli quantumque non capiant; cuius enim participatione iusti sunt, eius comparatione nec iusti sunt. sed alia est, ut dixi, ista quaestio, alia de sideribus et sole et luna, utrum uel rationales habeant spiritus in his conspicuis corporibus lucidis; quae corpora qui dubitant, quid sit omnino corpus ignorant.
Nor should this man, so recently enlightened in the flesh, be angry with us for saying that in the infancy of his faith, when he did not yet know who it was that had healed him, he brought forth a less circumspect opinion—namely, that God does not hear sinners—since the apostles themselves, chosen above the rest and clinging to the Lord's side and hanging on his mouth, are found to have said many things deserving of reproof, which it would be tedious to recount, so that blessed Peter, for certain of his words, deserved not only to be rebuked but even to be called Satan. Although, in comparison with the righteousness of God, if not even the holy angels in heaven are said to be righteous, this opinion does not seem to me out of place; not because they fell from righteousness so as to be such, but because they were made and are not God, and they cannot have as much spiritual light as he has by whom they were made. For there is the highest righteousness, there the highest wisdom: and this is God, of whom it is said: to God alone who is wise. But that is another question—how much of his righteousness the angels receive and how much they do not receive; for those who are righteous by participation in him are not righteous in comparison with him. But that, as I said, is one question; another concerns the stars and the sun and the moon—whether they have rational spirits in those visible, shining bodies; and those who doubt these bodies do not know what a body altogether is.
neque ista multum ad nos pertinent, ut ea summo studio indagare curemus quae remota sunt a sensibus nostris et ab intellectu infirmitatis humanae nec in ipsis scripturis ita posita, ut nobis eorum sit mandata cognitio. immo uero ne praecipiti suspicione in fabulas sacrilegas irruamus, clamat scriptura diuina: altiora te ne quaesieris et fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris; sed quae tibi praecepit dominus, illa cogita semper: ut magis in istis temeraria praesumtio quam cauta ignoratio culpanda uideatur. certe ait apostolus: siue sedes siue dominationes siue principatus siue potestates; esse itaque sedes, dominationes, principatus, potestates in caelestibus apparatibus firmissime credo et differre inter se aliquid indubitata fide teneo. sed quo me contemnas, quem magnum putas esse doctorem, quaenam ista sint et quid inter se differant nescio; nec ea sane ignorantia periclitari me puto sicut inoboedientia, si domini praecepta neglexero; et ideo puto spiritu dei per auctores nostros, scriptores sanctorum eloquiorum, non tam exposita, sed raptim tacta atque perstricta, ut si cui forte tali quales nos non sumus, per altiorem reuelationem aliquid huius modi fuerit demonstratum, non se inferiores fuisse credat eos per quos nobis canonicarum scripturarum sancta praeconia ministrata sunt.
Nor do these matters much concern us, such that we should take care to investigate with the utmost zeal things that are removed from our senses and from the understanding of human weakness, and are not so set down even in the Scriptures themselves that the knowledge of them has been commanded to us. Indeed, rather, lest by rash suspicion we rush into sacrilegious fables, divine Scripture cries out: Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability; but the things that God hath commanded thee, think on them always—so that in these matters a rash presumption rather than a cautious ignorance may seem to be blamed. Certainly the apostle says: whether seats or dominions or principalities or powers; that there are therefore seats, dominions, principalities, powers in the heavenly hosts I most firmly believe, and that they differ from one another in some respect I hold with undoubted faith. But—so that you may not despise me, whom you consider a great teacher—what these things are and wherein they differ from one another, I do not know; nor do I think I am endangered by this ignorance as by disobedience, if I neglect the commandments of the Lord. And therefore I think that by the Spirit of God, through our authors, the writers of the holy utterances, these things were not so much expounded as touched upon and skimmed over in passing, so that if perchance to someone such as we are not, something of this kind should have been shown through a higher revelation, he should not believe that those through whom the sacred proclamations of the canonical Scriptures have been ministered to us were inferior.
quantum enim quisque sciendo profecerit, infra illas se litteras inueniet, quas deus tamquam firmamentum supra omnia humana corda constituit.
XVIIII EX LIBRO DE HAEKESIBVS. DE ERRORE ORIGENIS.
Alios autem Origenianos continuo subiciens Epiphanius: "Origeniani" inquit "alii, qui etiam et Adamanti tractatoris, qui et mortuorum resurrectionem repellunt, Christum autem creaturam et spiritum sanctum introducentes; paradisum autem et caelos et alia omnia alligorizantes." haec quidem de Origene Epiphanius; sed qui eum defendunt, unius eiusdemque substantiae esse dicunt docuisse patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum neque resurrectionem reppulisse mortuorum, quamuis eum et in istis conuincere studeant qui eius plura legerunt. sed sunt huius Origenis alia dogmata, quae catholica ecclesia omnino non recipit, in quibus nec ipsum falso arguit nec potest ab eius defensoribus falli: maxime de purgatione et liberatione ac rursus post longum tempus ad eadem mala reuolutione rationalis uniuersae creaturae.
For to whatever extent each person has advanced in knowledge, he will find himself beneath those letters which God established as a firmament above all human hearts.
XIX. FROM THE BOOK ON HERESIES. CONCERNING THE ERROR OF ORIGEN.
But Epiphanius, immediately adding the other Origenists, says: "There are other Origenists, who also follow Adamantius the commentator, and who reject the resurrection of the dead, and introduce Christ as a creature and the Holy Spirit as well; and they allegorize paradise and the heavens and all other things." This indeed is what Epiphanius says concerning Origen; but those who defend him say that he taught that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one and the same substance, and that he did not reject the resurrection of the dead, although those who have read more of his works strive to convict him even on these points. But there are other doctrines of this Origen which the catholic Church altogether does not receive, in which neither is he falsely accused nor can he be deceived by his defenders: especially concerning the purgation and liberation, and again after a long time the revolution of the whole rational creation back to the same evils.
quis enim catholicus christianus doctus uel indoctus non uehementer exhorreat eam quam dicit purgationem malorum, id est etiam eos qui hanc uitam in flagitiis et facinoribus et sacrilegiis atque impietatibus quamlibet maximis finierunt, ipsum etiam postremo diabolum et angelos eius quamuis post longissima tempora purgatos atque liberatos regno dei lucique restitui, et rursus post longissima tempora omnes, qui liberati sunt, ad haec mala denuo relabi et reuerti, et has uices alternantes beatitudinum et miseriarum rationabilis creaturae semper fuisse, semper fore? de qua uanissima impietate aduersum philosophos, a quibus ista didicit Origenes, in libris de ciuitate dei diligenstissime disputaui.
XX. CONTRA EOS QVI REVOLVTIONIS CIRCVITVS INDVXERVNT. EX LIBRO DE CTVITATE DEI XII INTER CETERA ET AD LOCVM.
Quapropter quod nos modo quaerimus post quinque milia et quod excurrit annorum, possent et posteri etiam post annorum sescenties milies eadem curiositate requirere, si in tantum haec mortalitas hominum exoriendo et obcubando et imperita perseueraret infirmitas. potuerunt et qui fuerunt ante nos ipsis recentibus hominis creati temporibus istam mouere quaestionem.
For what Catholic Christian, learned or unlearned, would not vehemently shudder at that purgation of evils which he speaks of—namely, that even those who have ended this life in shameful deeds and crimes and sacrileges and impieties, however great, and finally the devil himself and his angels, though after the longest periods of time, are purged and freed and restored to the kingdom of God and to the light, and again after the longest periods of time all who have been freed relapse and return anew to these evils, and that these alternating turns of blessedness and misery have always been and will always be for the rational creature? Concerning this most vain impiety, against the philosophers from whom Origen learned these things, I have argued most diligently in the books On the City of God.
XX. AGAINST THOSE WHO INTRODUCED THE CYCLES OF REVOLUTION. FROM THE TWELFTH BOOK ON THE CITY OF GOD, AMONG OTHER THINGS, AND TO THE POINT.
Wherefore what we are now asking after five thousand and more years, posterity also could ask even after six hundred thousand times as many years, with the same curiosity, if this mortality of men, by rising and falling and untaught weakness, were to persist so long. Those also who were before us, in the very recent times of man's creation, could have raised this same question.
ipse denique primus homo uel postridie uel eodem die, posteaquam factus est, potuit inquirere cur non ante sit factus; et quandocumque antea factus esset, non uires tunc alias et alias nunc uel etiam postea ista de initio rerum temporalium controuersia reperiret.
Hanc autem se philosophi mundi huius non aliter putauerunt posse uel debere dissoluere nisi ut circuitus temporum inducerent, quibus eadem semper fuisse nouata atque repetita in rerum natura atque ita deinceps fore sine cessatione asseuerarent uolumina uenientium et praetereuntium saeculorum, siue in mundo permanente isti circuitus fierent siue certis interuallis oriens et occidens mundus eadem semper quasi noua, quae transacta et uentura sunt, exhiberet. a quo ludibrio prorsus immortalem animam, etiam cum sapientiam perceperit, liberare non possunt euntem sine cessatione ad falsam beatitudinem et ad ueram miseriam sine cessatione redeuntem. quomodo enim uera beatitudo est, de cuius numquam aeternitate confiditur, dum anima uenturam miseriam aut imperitissime in ueritate nescit aut infelicissime in beatitudine pertimescit? at si ad miserias numquam ulterius reditura ex his ad beatitudinem pergit, fit ergo aliquid noui in tempore quod finem non habet temporis.
For even the first man himself, whether on the following day or on the same day after he was made, could have asked why he was not made before; and whenever he had been made before, he would not then have found other powers, and other powers now, or even afterwards, for this controversy about the beginning of temporal things.
But the philosophers of this world thought that this could not or should not be resolved in any other way than by introducing cycles of times, asserting that the same things have always been renewed and repeated in nature, and that thus from then on the volumes of ages coming and passing away would continue without cessation, whether these cycles took place in a world that remains, or whether at fixed intervals the world rising and setting would always bring forth the same things as if new, which have passed and are to come. From this mockery they absolutely cannot free the immortal soul, even when it has attained wisdom, as it goes without cessation to a false blessedness and returns without cessation to true misery. For how is that true blessedness, of whose eternity one is never confident, while the soul either most ignorantly does not know future misery in truth or most unhappily fears it in blessedness? But if it passes from these miseries to blessedness, never to return to miseries again, then something new comes to be in time that has no end of time.
cur non ergo et mundus, cur non et homo factus in mundo, ut illi nescio qui falsi circuitus a falsis sapientibus fallacibusque comperti in doctrina sana tramite recti itineris uitentur ? nam quidam et illud quod legitur in libro Salomonis, qui uocatur ecclesiastes: quid est quod fuit? ipsum quod erit. et quid est quod factum est? ipsum quod fiet; et non est omne recens sub sole. qui loquetur et dicet: ecce hoc nouum est: iam fuit in saeculis quae fuerunt ante nos, propter hos circuitus in eadem redeuntes et in eadem cuncta reuocantes dictum intellegi uolunt; quod ille aut de his rebus dixit, de quibus superius loquebatur, hoc est de generationibus aliis euntibus, aliis uenientibus, de solis anfractibus, de torrentium lapsibus, aut certe de omnium rerum generibus, quae oriuntur atque occidunt. fuerunt enim homines ante nos, sunt et nobiscum, erant et post nos; ita quaeque animantia uel arbusta. monstra quoque ipsa, quae inusitata nascuntur, quamuis inter se diuersa sint et quaedam eorum semel facta narrentur, tamen secundum id quod generaliter miracula et monstra sunt utique et fuerunt et erunt nec recens et nouum est, ut monstrum sub sole nascatur. quamuis haec uerba quidam sic intellexerunt, tamquam in praedestinatione dei iam facta fuisse omnia sapiens ille uoluisset intellegi et ideo nihil recens sub sole esse.
Why, then, should the world not also have been made, and man not also have been made in the world, so that those so-called cycles—I know not whose—discovered by false and deceitful wise men, might be avoided in sound doctrine by the straight path of the right way? For certain people wish the saying also to be understood as referring to these cycles that return to the same things and recall all things to the same state—the saying that is read in the book of Solomon called Ecclesiastes: What is it that has been? The same that will be. And what is it that has been made? The same that will be made; and there is nothing new under the sun. Who will speak and say: Behold, this is new: it has already been in the ages that were before us. But he said that either about the things he was speaking of above—that is, about generations, some passing away and others coming, about the circuits of the sun, about the fallings of torrents—or certainly about all kinds of things that rise and set. For there were men before us, there are men with us, and there will be men after us; and so too every kind of living creature or tree. Even monsters themselves, which are born contrary to custom, although they differ among themselves and some of them are reported to have been made only once, nevertheless, inasmuch as they are generally marvels and monsters, they certainly both have been and will be, nor is it new or recent that a monster is born under the sun. Although some have understood these words in such a way that the wise man wished it to be understood that all things had already been made in God's predestination, and that therefore nothing is new under the sun.
absit autem a recta fide ut his Salomonis uerbis illos circuitus significatos esse credamus, quibus illi putant sic eadem temporum temporaliumque rerum uolumina repeti, ut uerbi gratia sicut isto saeculo Plato philosophus in urbe Atheniensi et in ea schola quae Academia dicta est discipulos docuit, ita per innumerabilia retro saecula multum quidem prolixis interuallis, sed tamen certis et idem Plato et eadem ciuitas et eadem schola idemque discipuli repetiti et per innumerabilia deinde saecula repetendi sint. absit, inquam, ut nos ita credamus. semel enim Christus mortuus est pro peccatis nostris; surgens iam non moritur, mors ei ultra non dominabitur et nos post resurrectionem semper cum domino erimus, cui modo dicimus quod sacer admonet psalmus: tu, domine, seruabis nos et custodies nos a generatione hac et in aeternum. satis autem istis existimo conuenire quod sequitur: in circuitu impii ambulant, non quia per circulos, quos opinantur, eorum uita est recursura, sed quia modo talis est erroris eorum uia, id est falsa doctrina.
But far be it from right faith that we should believe those cycles are signified by these words of Solomon, by which they think that the same volumes of times and temporal things are thus repeated, so that, for example, just as in this age Plato the philosopher taught disciples in the city of Athens and in that school which was called the Academy, so through innumerable ages backward, at intervals indeed very long but nevertheless fixed, the same Plato and the same city and the same school and the same disciples should be repeated and are to be repeated through innumerable ages thereafter. Far be it, I say, that we should so believe. For once Christ died for our sins; rising again, he dies no more; death shall no longer have dominion over him, and we after the resurrection shall always be with the Lord, to whom we now say what the sacred psalm admonishes: You, Lord, will keep us and guard us from this generation and forever. But I think what follows sufficiently applies to them: The wicked walk in a circle, not because their life is to recur through the circles they imagine, but because such is now the way of their error, that is, false doctrine.
Quid autem mirum est, si in his circuitibus errantes nec aditum nec exitum inueniunt, quia genus humanum atque ista nostra mortalitas nec quo initio coepta sit sciunt nec quo fine claudatur? quando quidem altitudinem dei penetrare non possunt, qua, cum ipse sit aeternus et sine initio, ab aliquo tamen initio exorsus est tempora et hominem, quem numquam antea fecerat, fecit in tempore, non tamen nouo et repentino, sed immutabili aeternoque consilio. quis hanc ualeat altitudinem inuestigabilem inuestigare et inscrutabilem scrutari, secundum quam deus hominem temporalem, ante quem nemo umquam hominum fuit, non mutabili uoluntate in tempore condidit et genus humanum ex uno multiplicauit? quando quidem psalmus ipse cum praemisisset atque dixisset tu, domine, seruabis nos et custodies nos a generatione hac et in aeternum, ac deinde percussisset eos, in quorum stulta impiaque doctrina nulla liberationis et beatitudinis animae seruatur aeternitas, continuo subiciens: in circuitu impii ambulabunt-tamquamei diceretur: quid ergo tu credis, sentis, intellegis? numquidnam existimandum est subito placuisse hominem facere, quem numquam antea infinita retro aeternitate fecisset, cui nihil noui accidere potest, in quo mutabile aliquid non est? — continuo respondit ad ipsum deum loquens: secundum altitudinem tuam multiplicasti filios hominum.
But what wonder is it if, wandering in these circuits, they find neither entrance nor exit, since the human race and this our mortality neither know at what beginning it was begun nor at what end it is closed? Since indeed they cannot penetrate the depth of God, by which, although he himself is eternal and without beginning, he nevertheless from some beginning started times and made man in time, whom he had never made before, not however by a new and sudden counsel, but by an immutable and eternal counsel. Who can investigate this unsearchable depth and search out this inscrutable depth, according to which God created temporal man in time—before whom no man ever existed—not by a changeable will, and multiplied the human race from one? Since indeed the psalm itself, when it had first set forth and said, You, Lord, will save us and keep us from this generation and forever, and then had struck those in whose foolish and impious doctrine no eternity of liberation and blessedness is preserved for the soul, immediately adding: The impious walk in a circle—as if it were said to him: What then do you believe, feel, understand? Is it perhaps to be thought that it suddenly pleased him to make man, whom he had never made before through infinite eternity stretching back, to whom nothing new can happen, in whom there is nothing changeable?—immediately he answered, speaking to God himself: According to your height you have multiplied the sons of men.
sentiant, inquit, homines quod putant et quod eis placet opinentur et disputent: secundum altitudinem tuam, quam nullus hominum potest nosse, multiplicasti filios hominum. ualde quippe altum est et semper fuisse et hominem, quem numquam fecerat, ex aliquo tempore primum facere uoluisse nec consilium uoluntatemque mutasse.
XXII CONTRA ID QVOD DICITVR: VNDE DIABOLO PRIMVM VOLVNTAS MALA, CVM BONVS A DEO CREATVS ESSET? ITEM EX EODEM LIBRO DE CIVITATE DEI XII AD LOCVM.
Deus, qui summe est atque ob hoc ab illo facta est omnis essentia, quae non summe est — quia neque illi aequalis esse deberet, quae de nihilo facta esset, neque ullo modo esse posset, si ab illo facta non esset — nec ullorum uitiorum offensione uituperandus et omnium naturarum consideratione laudandus est.
Proinde causa beatitudinis angelorum bonorum ea uerissima reperitur, quod ei adhaerent qui summe est. cum uero causa miseriae malorum angelorum quaeritur, ea merito occurrit, quod ab illo qui summe est auersi ad se ipsos conuersi sunt qui non summe sunt: et hoc uitium quid aliud quam superbia nuncupatur? initium quippe omnis peccati superbia. noluerunt ergo ad illum custodire fortitudinem suam et qui magis essent, si ei qui summe est adhaererent, se illi praeferendo id quod minus est praetulerunt.
Let them, he says, think what they think, and let them hold and dispute opinions that please them: according to your height, which no man can know, you have multiplied the children of men. For it is indeed very high that both he always was and that he willed first from some time to make man, whom he had never made, and did not change his counsel and will.
XXII. AGAINST THE STATEMENT: WHENCE DID THE DEVIL FIRST HAVE AN EVIL WILL, WHEN HE WAS CREATED GOOD BY GOD? ALSO FROM THE SAME BOOK, THE CITY OF GOD, XII, TO THE PASSAGE.
God, who supremely is, and for that reason every essence that does not supremely is was made by him — since neither ought that which was made from nothing to be equal to him, nor could it in any way exist if it had not been made by him — is neither to be blamed for the offense of any vices nor to be praised for the consideration of all natures.
Accordingly, the cause of the blessedness of the good angels is found to be most true: that they cleave to him who supremely is. But when the cause of the misery of the evil angels is sought, it rightly occurs that, turned away from him who supremely is, they turned to themselves, who do not supremely are: and this vice, what else is it called but pride? For pride is the beginning of every sin. They were therefore unwilling to keep their strength unto him, and those who would be more if they cleaved to him who supremely is, by preferring themselves to him preferred that which is less.
hic primus defectus et prima inopia primumque uitium eius naturae, quae ita creata est, ut nec summe esset et tamen ad beatitudinem habendam eo qui summe est frui posset, a quo auersa non quidem nulla, sed tamen minus esset atque ob hoc misera fieret. huius porro malae uoluntatis causa efficiens si quaeratur, nihil inuenitur. quid eat enim quod facit uoluntatem malam, cum ipsa faciat opus malum ? ac per hoc mala uoluntas efficiens est operis mali, malae autem uoluntatis efficiens nihil est: quoniam si res aliqua est, aut habet aut non habet uoluntatem aliquam; si habet, aut bonam profecto habet aut malam: si bonam, quis ita desipiat ut dicat quod bona uoluntas faciat uoluntatem malam? erit enim, si ita est, bona uoluntas causa peccati, quo absurdius putari nihil potest. si autem res ista, quae putatur facere uoluntatem malam, ipsa quoque habet uoluntatem malam, etiam eam quae fecerit res consequenter interrogo atque, ut sit aliquis inquirendi modus, causam primae malae uoluntatis inquiro. non est enim prima uoluntas mala, quam fecit uoluntas mala, sed illa prima est quam nulla fecit. nam si praecessit qua fieret, illa prior est quae alteram fecit. si respondetur quod eam nulla res fecerit et ideo semper fuerit, quaero utrum in aliqua natura fuerit.
This is the first defect and the first poverty and the first fault of that nature which was so created that it was neither supreme and yet could enjoy the one who is supreme in order to possess blessedness, from whom when it turned away it was indeed not nothing, but was nevertheless less and on that account became miserable. But if the efficient cause of this evil will is sought, nothing is found. For what is it that makes the will evil, when the will itself makes the evil work? And by this, the evil will is the efficient cause of the evil work, but the efficient cause of the evil will is nothing: since if it is some thing, it either has or does not have some will; if it has, it certainly has either a good or an evil one: if a good one, who would be so foolish as to say that a good will makes the will evil? For if so, a good will will be the cause of sin, than which nothing can be thought more absurd. But if this thing, which is thought to make the evil will, itself also has an evil will, I ask in turn even about the thing that made it, and, so that there may be some limit to the inquiry, I seek the cause of the first evil will. For the first evil will is not the one that an evil will made, but that is first which nothing made. For if that by which it was made came first, that one which made the other is prior. If it is answered that no thing made it and therefore it always existed, I ask whether it existed in some nature.
si enim in nulla fuit, omnino non fuit; si autem in aliqua, uitiabat eam et corrumpebat eratque illi noxia ac per hoc bono priuabat: et ideo in mala natura uoluntas mala esse non poterat, sed in bona, mutabili tamen, cui uitium hoc nocere posset. si enim non nocuit, non utique uitium fuit: ac per hoc nec mala uoluntas fuisse dicenda est. porro si nocuit, bonum auferendo uel minuendo utique nocuit. non igitur esse potuit sempiterna uoluntas mala in ea re, in qua bonum naturale praecesserat, quod mala uoluntas nocendo posset adimere. si ergo non erat sempiterna, quis eam fecerit quaero. restat ut dicatur quod ea res fecerit malam uoluntatem, in qua nulla uoluntas fuit. haec utrum superior sit requiro an inferior an aequalis. sed superior utique melior: quomodo ergo nullius ac non potius bonae uoluntatis? hoc idem profecto et aequalis: duo quippe quamdiu sunt pariter uoluntatis bonae, non facit alter in altero uoluntatem malam. relinquitur ut inferior res, cui nulla uoluntas est, fecerit angelicae naturae, quae prima peccauit, uoluntatem malam. sed etiam res ipsa, quaecumque est inferior usque ad infimam terram, quoniam natura et essentia est, procul dubio bona est habens modum et speciem suam in genere atque ordine suo. quomodo ergo res bona efficiens est uoluntatis malae? quomodo, inquam, bonum est causa mali?
For if it was in nothing, it did not exist at all; but if it was in something, it was corrupting and spoiling it, and was harmful to it, and by this very fact was depriving it of good. And therefore a bad will could not exist in a bad nature, but in a good one, though mutable, which this defect could harm. For if it did not harm, it was certainly not a defect; and by this very fact it should not even be called a bad will. Furthermore, if it did harm, it certainly harmed by taking away or diminishing good. Therefore a bad will could not have been eternal in that thing in which natural good had preceded, which a bad will could remove by harming. If, then, it was not eternal, I ask who made it. It remains to be said that the thing made the bad will bad, in which there was no will. I ask whether this thing is superior or inferior or equal. But a superior thing is certainly better; how, then, is it of no will, and not rather of a good will? The same applies, to be sure, to an equal thing: for as long as two are equally of good will, the one does not produce a bad will in the other. It remains that an inferior thing, which has no will, made the bad will of the angelic nature, which sinned first. But even the thing itself, whatever it is, down to the lowest earth, since it is a nature and an essence, is beyond doubt good, having its measure and form in its own kind and order. How, then, is a good thing the efficient cause of a bad will? How, I say, is a good the cause of evil?
cum enim se uoluntas relicto superiore ad inferiora conuertit, efficitur mala, non quia malum est quo se conuertit, sed quia peruersa est ipsa conuersio: idcirco non res inferior uoluntatem malam facit, sed rem inferiorem praue atque inordinate, ipsa quia facta est, appetiuit. si enim aliqui duo aequaliter affecti animo et corpore uideant unius corporis pulchritudinem, qua uisa unus eorum ad inlicite fruendum moneatur, alter in uoluntate pudica stabilis perseueret, quid putamus esse causae ut in illo fiat, in illo non fiat uoluntas mala? quae illam res fecit in quo facta est? neque enim pulchritudo illa corporis; nam eam non fecit in ambobus, quando quidem amborum non dispariliter occurrit aspectibus. an caro intuentis causa est ? cur non et illius? an uero animus? cur non utriusque? ambos enim et animo et corpore aequaliter affectos praediximus. an dicendum est alterum eorum occulta maligni spiritus suggestione temtatum, quasi non eidem suggestioni et qualicumque suasioni propria uoluntate consenserit? hanc igitur consensionem, hanc malam quam male suadenti adhibuit uoluntatem quae in eo res fecerit quaerimus. nam ut hoc quoque impedimentum ab ista quaestione tollatur, si eadem temtatione ambo temtentur et unus ei cedat atque consentiat, alter idem qui fuerat perseueret, quid aliud apparet nisi unum noluisse, alterum uoluisse a castitate deficere?
For when the will turns away from what is higher and converts to what is lower, it is made evil, not because the thing to which it turns is evil, but because the turning itself is perverse. Therefore it is not the lower thing that makes the will evil, but the will itself, because it has been made such, wickedly and inordinately desired the lower thing. For if two people, equally disposed in soul and body, should see the beauty of one body, and on seeing it one of them is moved to enjoy it unlawfully, while the other persists steadfast in a chaste will, what do we suppose is the cause that a bad will arises in the one and not in the other? What thing made it in the one in whom it was made? Not that beauty of the body, surely; for it did not make it in both, since it met the eyes of both without difference. Is the flesh of the one who looks the cause? Why not also of the other? Or is it the soul? Why not of both? For we said beforehand that both were equally disposed in soul and body. Or must it be said that one of them was tempted by the hidden suggestion of an evil spirit, as if he did not consent to that same suggestion and whatever persuasion by his own will? Therefore we ask what thing made in him this consent, this evil will that he applied to the one who evilly persuaded him. For so that this obstacle too may be removed from this question, if both are tempted by the same temptation and one yields to it and consents, while the other persists as he had been, what else appears but that the one was unwilling and the other was willing to fall away from chastity?
unde nisi propria uoluntate, ubi eadem fuerat in utroque corporis et animi affectio, amborum oculis pariter uisa est eadem pulchritudo, ambobus pariter institit occulta temtatio P propriam igitur in uno eorum uoluntatem malam res quae fecerit scire uolentibus, si bene intueantur, nihil occurrit. si enim dixerimus quod ipse eam fecerit, quid erat ipse ante uoluntatem malam nisi natura bona, cuius auctor deus, qui est immutabile bonum? qui ergo dicit eum qui consensit temtanti atque suadenti, cui non consentit alius, ad inlicite utendum pulchro corpore, quod uidendo ambobus pariter affuit, cum ante illam uisionem ac temtationem similes ambo animo et corpore fuerint, ipsum sibi fecisse uoluntatem malam, quia utique bonus ante uoluntatem malam fuerit, quaerat cur eam fecerit, utrum quia natura est an quia ex nihilo facta est, et inueniet uoluntatem malam non ex eo esse incipere quod natura est, sed ex eo quod de nihilo facta natura est. nam si natura causa est uoluntatis malae, quid aliud cogimur dicere nisi a bono fieri malum et bonum esse causam mali ? si quidem natura bona fit uoluntas mala. quod unde fieri potest ut natura bona quamuis mutabilis, antequam habeat uoluntatem malam, faciat aliquid mali, hoc est ipsam uoluntatem malam?
Whence, if not from their own will? Where the same disposition of body and mind had been in both, the same beauty was seen equally by the eyes of both, and the same hidden temptation pressed equally upon both. Therefore, for those who wish to know what made the will of one of them evil, if they look well, nothing occurs. For if we say that he himself made it, what was he himself before the evil will but a good nature, whose author is God, who is the immutable good? He, then, who says that the one who consented to the tempter and persuader, to whom the other did not consent, so as to illicitly use a beautiful body, which was equally present to both in the seeing, when before that vision and temptation both had been alike in mind and body—he, I say, who says that this one made an evil will for himself, since he was certainly good before the evil will, should ask why he made it: whether because he is a nature, or because he was made from nothing. And he will find that the evil will did not begin to be in him from the fact that he is a nature, but from the fact that the nature was made from nothing. For if nature is the cause of the evil will, what else are we compelled to say but that evil is made by good, and that good is the cause of evil? Indeed, a good nature becomes an evil will. But how can it happen that a good nature, though mutable, before it has an evil will, should do something evil—that is, should make the evil will itself?
Nemo igitur quaerat efficientem causam malae uoluntatis: non enim est efficiens, sed deficiens, quia nec illa effectio, sed defectio. deficere namque ab eo quod summe est ad id quod minus est hoc est incipere habere uoluntatem malam. causas porro defectionum istarum, cum efficientes non sint, ut dixi, sed deficientes, uelle inuenire tale est, ac si quisquam uelit uidere tenebras uel audire silentium, quod tamen utrumque nobis notum est, neque illud nisi per oculos neque hoc nisi per aures, non sane in specie, sed in speciei priuatione. nemo ergo ex me scire quaerat quod me nescire scio, nisi forte ut nescire discat quod sciri non posse sciendum est. ea quippe quae non specie, sed in eius priuatione sciuntur, si dici aut intellegi potest, quodam modo nesciendo sciuntur, ut sciendo nesciantur. cum enim acies oculi corporalis currit per species corporales, nusquam tenebras uidet nisi ubi coeperit non uidere. ita etiam non ad aliquem alium sensum, sed ad solas aures pertinet sentire silentium, quod tamen nullo modo nisi non audiendo sentitur. sic species intellegibiles mens quidem nostra intellegendo conspicit, sed ubi deficiunt nesciendo condiscit: delicta enim quis intellegit? I
Let no one, therefore, seek the efficient cause of an evil will, for it is not efficient but deficient, since it is not a making but a failing. For to fail from that which is supremely to that which is less—this is to begin to have an evil will. Moreover, to wish to find the causes of these defections, since they are not efficient, as I said, but deficient, is like someone wishing to see darkness or hear silence, both of which are nevertheless known to us—the one only through the eyes, the other only through the ears—not indeed in a species, but in the privation of a species. Let no one, then, seek from me to know what I know that I do not know, unless perhaps that he may learn not to know what must be known cannot be known. For those things which are known not in a species but in its privation, if it can be said or understood, are in a certain way known by not knowing, so that by knowing they are not known. For when the keenness of the bodily eye runs through bodily species, it sees darkness nowhere except where it has begun not to see. So too it belongs not to any other sense but to the ears alone to perceive silence, which nevertheless is in no way perceived except by not hearing. Thus our mind indeed beholds intelligible species by understanding, but where they fail it learns by not knowing: for who understands transgressions?
Hoc scio, naturam dei numquam, nusquam, nulla ex parte posse deficere et ea posse deficere quae ex nihilo facta sunt. quae tamen quanto magis sunt et bona faciunt — tunc enim aliquid faciunt — causas habent efficientes; in quantum autem deficiunt et ex hoc mala faciunt — quid enim tunc faciunt nisi uana? — causas habent deficientes. itemque scio, in quo fit mala uoluntas, id in eo fieri quod si nollet non fieret, et ideo non necessarios, sed uoluntarios defectus iusta poena consequitur. deficitur enim non ad mala, sed male, id est non ad malas naturas, sed ideo male, quia contra ordinem naturarum ab eo quod summe est ad id quod minus est. neque enim auri uitium est auaritia, sed hominis peruerse amantis aurum iustitia derelicta, quae incomparabiliter auro debuit anteponi; nec luxuria uitium est pulchritudinis suauium corporum, sed animae peruerse amantis corporeas uoluptates neglecta temperantia, qua rebus spiritaliter pulchrioribus et incorruptibiliter suauioribus coaptamur; nec iactantia uitium est laudis humanae, sed animae peruerse amantis laudari ab hominibus spreto testimonio conscientiae; nec superbia uitium est dantis potestatem uel ipsius etiam potestatis, sed animae peruerse amantis potestatem suam potentioris iustiore contemta. ac per hoc qui peruerse amat cuiuslibet naturae bonum, etiam si adipiscatur, ipse fit in bono malus et miser meliore priuatus.
This I know, that the nature of God can never and nowhere and in no part fail, and that those things can fail which were made from nothing. Yet insofar as they more greatly are and do good things—for then they do something—they have efficient causes; but insofar as they fail and from this do evil things—for what do they then do except vain things?—they have deficient causes. Likewise I know that an evil will, in whatever it occurs in, occurs in it in such a way that if it were unwilling it would not occur, and therefore a just punishment follows upon defects that are not necessary but voluntary. For there is a failing, not toward evil things, but evilly, that is, not toward evil natures, but evilly for this reason, because against the order of natures it falls from that which is supremely to that which is less. For avarice is not a defect of gold, but of a man perversely loving gold while forsaking justice, which ought incomparably to have been preferred to gold; nor is luxury a defect of the beauty of pleasant bodies, but of a soul perversely loving bodily pleasures while neglecting temperance, by which we are fitted to things spiritually more beautiful and incorruptibly more pleasant; nor is boasting a defect of human praise, but of a soul perversely loving to be praised by men while despising the testimony of conscience; nor is pride a defect of the one giving power or even of power itself, but of a soul perversely loving its own power while contemning the more just power of a more powerful one. And through this, he who perversely loves the good of any nature whatsoever, even if he obtains it, is himself made evil in the good and miserable, deprived of the better.
Cum ergo malae uoluntatis efficiens naturalis uel, si dici potest, essentialis nulla sit causa — ab ipsa quippe incipit spirituum mutabilium malum, quo minuitur atque deriuatur naturae bonum, nec talem uoluntatem facit nisi defectio, qua deseritur deus, cuius defectionis etiam causa utique deficit —: si dixerimus nullam esse efficientem causam etiam uoluntatis bonae, cauendum est ne uoluntas bona bonorum angelorum non facta, sed deo coaeterna esse credatur. cum ergo ipsi facti sint, quomodo non illa facta esse dicetur? porro quia facta est, utrum cum ipsis facta est an sine illa fuerunt prius ? sed si cum ipsis, non dubium quod ab illo facta sit a quo et ipsi; simulque ut facti sunt, ei a quo facti sunt amore, cum quo facti sunt, adhaeserunt; eoque sunt isti ab illorum societate discreti, quod illi in eadem bona uoluntate manserunt, isti ab ea deficiendo mutati sunt mala scilicet uoluntate hoc ipso, quod a bona defecerunt, a qua non defecissent, nisi utique uoluissent. si autem boni angeli fuerunt prius sine uoluntate bona eamque in se ipsi deo non operante fecerunt, ergo meliores a se ipsis quam illo facti sunt? absit. quid enim erant sine bona uoluntate nisi mali? aut si propterea non mali, quia nec mala uoluntas eis inerat — neque enim ab ea quam nondum coeperant habere defecerant — certe nondum tales, nondum tam boni quam esse cum bona uoluntate coeperunt.
Since, therefore, there is no natural, or, if one may so put it, essential cause that produces an evil will—for the evil of mutable spirits begins from the will itself, by which the good of nature is diminished and diverted, and nothing makes such a will except the desertion by which God is forsaken, and of this desertion the cause itself assuredly fails—: if we say that there is no efficient cause even of a good will, we must beware lest the good will of the good angels be believed to be not made but coeternal with God. Since, then, they themselves were made, how is it not to be said that their will was made? Further, because it was made, was it made together with them, or were they previously without it? But if together with them, there is no doubt that it was made by him by whom they too were made; and at the same time as they were made, they clung in love to him by whom they were made, together with whom they were made; and in this they were separated from the fellowship of those others, that the former remained in the same good will, while the latter, by falling away from it, were changed—namely, by an evil will, in that very respect that they fell away from the good will, from which they would not have fallen away unless they had willed to. If, however, the good angels existed previously without a good will and themselves made it in themselves, with God not working it, then they made themselves better than he made them? Far be it. For what were they without a good will except evil? Or if for this reason they were not evil, because not even an evil will was in them—for they had not fallen away from that which they had not yet begun to have—certainly they were not yet such, not yet as good as they began to be when they had a good will.
at si non potuerant ae ipsos facere meliores quam ille eos fecerat quo nemo melius quicquam facit, profecto et bonam uoluntatem, qua meliores essent, nisi operante adiutorio creatoris habere non possent. et cum id egit eorum uoluntas bona at non ad ae ipsos qui minus erant, sed ad illam qui summa est conuerterentur eique adhaerentes magis essent eiusque participatione sapienter beateque uiuerent, quid aliud ostenditur nisi uoluntatem bonam quamlibet bonam inopem fuisse in solo desiderio remansuram, nisi ille qui bonam naturam ex nihilo sui capacem fecerat, ex se ipso faceret implendo meliorem, prius faciens excitando auidiorem? nam et hoc discutiendum est, si boni angeli ipsi in se fecerunt uoluntatem bonam, utrum aliqua eam an nulla uoluntate fecerunt. si nulla, utique nec fecerunt; si aliqua, utrum mala an bona? si mala, quomodo potuit esse mala uoluntas bonae uoluntatis effectrix? si bona, iam ergo habebant. et istam quis fecerat nisi ille qui eos cum bona uoluntate, id est cum amore casto, quo illi adhaerent, creauit, simul eis et condens naturam et largiens gratiam? unde nisi bona uoluntate, hoc est dei amore, numquam sanctos angelos fuisse credendum ' est.
But if they could not make themselves better than he who made them, than whom no one makes anything better, then certainly they could not have had the good will by which they would be better, except by the working aid of the creator. And when their good will accomplished this—that they turned not to themselves, who were less, but to that which is supreme, and, cleaving to it, were more, and by participation in it lived wisely and blessedly—what else is shown but that a good will, however good, would have remained poor in mere desire, unless he who had made a good nature capable of himself out of nothing had made it better by filling it from himself, first making it more eager by stirring it up? For this too must be discussed: if the good angels themselves made a good will in themselves, did they make it by some will or by no will? If by no will, then they did not make it at all; if by some will, was it evil or good? If evil, how could an evil will be the producer of a good will? If good, then they already had it. And who had made this will but he who created them with a good will, that is, with the chaste love by which they cleave to him, at once creating their nature and bestowing grace upon them? Hence it must be believed that the holy angels were never without a good will, that is, without the love of God.
isti autem qui cum boni creati essent, tamen mali sunt — mala propria uoluntate, quam bona natura non fecit, nisi cum a bono sponte defecit, ut mali causa non sit bonum, sed defectus a bono — aut minorem acceperunt amoris diuini gratiam quam illi qui in eadem perstiterunt aut, si utrique boni aequaliter creati sunt, istis mala uoluntate cadentibus illi amplius adiuti ad eam beatitudinis plenitudinem, unde se numquam casuros certissimi fierent, peruenerunt, sicut iam in libro quem sequitur iste tractauimus. confitendum est igitur cum debita laude creatoris non ad solos sanctos homines pertinere uerum etiam de sanctis angelis posse dici quod caritas dei diffusa sit in eis per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est eis; nec tantum hominum, sed primitus praecipueque angelorum bonum esse quod scriptum est: mihi autem adhaerere deo bonum est. hoc bonum quibus commune est, habent et cum illo cui adhaerent et inter se sanctam societatem et sunt una ciuitas dei eademque uiuum sacrificium eius uiuumque templum eius. cuius pars, quae coniungenda immortalibus angelis ex mortalibus hominibus congregatur, et nunc mortaliter peregrinatur in terris uel in eis qui morte obierunt secretis animarum receptaculis sedibusque requiescit.
But those who, though they were created good, are nevertheless evil—evil by their own will, which a good nature did not make, except insofar as it freely fell away from the good, so that the cause of evil is not the good but the falling away from the good—either received a lesser grace of divine love than those who persevered in it, or, if both were created equally good, then when these fell by an evil will, those were more greatly aided and attained to that fullness of blessedness, whence they became most certain that they would never fall; as we have already discussed in the book that follows this one. It must therefore be confessed, with the praise due to the Creator, that it is not only to holy men that it pertains, but that it can also be said of the holy angels that the love of God has been poured out in them through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to them; and that it is not only the good of men but primarily and especially of angels that is meant by what is written: But for me, to cling to God is good. This good, which is common to those who share it, they have both with him to whom they cling and among themselves as a holy fellowship, and they are one city of God and the same living sacrifice of his and living temple of his. The part of it which is gathered from mortal men to be joined to the immortal angels now sojourns mortally on earth, or rests in the secret receptacles and abodes of souls among those who have departed by death.
XXII. DE DIABOLVM AB IPSO PEIMORDIO CREATVRAE A SVO CREA- TOBE PER SVPERBIAM APOSTATASSE. EX LIBRO DE GENESI AD LITTERAM XI INTER CETERA ET AD LOCVM.
Quando ergo deiecerit superbia diabolum, ut naturam suam bonam praua uoluntate peruerteret, scriptura non dicit; ante tamen factum fuisse et ex hac eum homini inuidisse ratio manifesta declarat. in promtu est enim omnibus haec intuentibus non ex inuidentia superbiam nasci, sed ex superbia potius inuidentiam. non autem frustra putari potest ab initio temporis diabolum superbia cecidisse nec fuisse ullum antea tempus, quo cum angelis sanctis pacatus uixerit et beatus, sed ab ipso primordio creaturae a suo creatore apostatasse, ut illud quod dominus ait: ille homicida erat ab initio et in ueritate non stetit utrumque ab initio intellegamus, non solum quod homicida fuit sed etiam quod in ueritate non stetit. et homicida quidem ab illo initio, ex quo homo potuit occidi: non potuit autem occidi antequam esset qui occideretur. ab initio ergo homicida diabolus, quia ipse occidit hominem primum, ante quem nullus hominum fuit. in ueritate autem non stetit, et hoc ab initio, ex quo ipse creatus est, qui staret, si stare uoluisset.
XXII. That the devil apostatized from his creator by pride from the very beginning of creation. From the book On Genesis according to the Letter, XI, among other things, and to the passage.
When, then, pride cast down the devil, so that he perverted his good nature by a depraved will, Scripture does not say; yet manifest reason declares that he was made before this and that from this he envied man. For it is plain to all who consider these things that pride is not born from envy, but rather envy from pride. Nor can it be thought without reason that the devil fell by pride from the beginning of time, and that there was no time before this in which he lived peacefully and blessedly with the holy angels, but that from the very beginning of creation he apostatized from his creator, so that what the Lord says—"He was a murderer from the beginning, and did not stand in the truth"—we understand both as from the beginning: not only that he was a murderer, but also that he did not stand in the truth. He was a murderer, indeed, from that beginning from which man could be killed; but he could not be killed before there was one who could be killed. From the beginning, therefore, the devil was a murderer, because he himself killed the first man, before whom there was no man. But he did not stand in the truth, and this from the beginning, from which he himself was created—he who would have stood, if he had willed to stand.
XXIII. QVALITER INTELLEGENDVM SIT ILLVD ESAIAE: QVOMODO CECIDIT DE CAELO LVCIFEB ET CETERA. ITEM EX EODEM LIBRO XI.
Quod ergo putatur numquam diabolus in ueritate stetisse, numquam cum angelis beatam duxisse uitam, sed ab ipso suae condicionis initio cecidisse, non sic accipiendum est ut non propria uoluntate deprauatus, sed malus a bono deo creatus putetur: alioquin non ab initio cecidisse diceretur: neque enim cecidit, si talis factus. sed factus continuo se a luce ueritatis auertit superbia tumidus et propriae potestatis delectatione corruptus, unde beatae atque angelicae uitae dulcedinem non gustauit, quam non utique acceptam fastidiuit, sed nolendo aocipere deseruit et amisit. proinde nec sui casus praescius esse potuit, quoniam sapientia pietatis est fructus. ille autem continuo impias, consequenter et mente caecatus non ex eo quod acceperat cecidit, sed ex eo quod acciperet, si subdi uoluisset deo: quod profecto quia noluit, et ab eo quod accepturus erat cecidit et potestatem illius sub quo esse noluit non euasit factumque in illo est pondere meritorum ut nec iustitiae possit lumine delectari nec ab eius sententia liberari.
XXIII. How that passage of Isaiah is to be understood: "How has Lucifer fallen from heaven," and the rest. Likewise from the same book XI.
Therefore, the notion that the devil never stood in the truth, never led a blessed life with the angels, but fell from the very beginning of his condition, is not to be taken in such a way that he is thought to have been made evil by the good God rather than corrupted by his own will; otherwise he would not be said to have fallen from the beginning—for he would not have fallen if he had been made such. But having been made, he immediately turned himself away from the light of truth, swollen with pride and corrupted by delight in his own power; and hence he did not taste the sweetness of the blessed and angelic life, which he did not, indeed, disdain after receiving it, but by refusing to receive it he abandoned and lost it. Accordingly, he could not have foreknown his own fall, since wisdom is the fruit of piety. But he, immediately impious and consequently blinded in mind, did not fall from what he had received, but from what he would have received if he had been willing to be subject to God; and because he certainly refused this, he both fell from what he was to receive and did not escape the power of him to whom he refused to be subject; and it was brought about in him by the weight of his merits that he can neither delight in the light of righteousness nor be freed from its sentence.
Quod ergo per Esaiam prophetam in eum dicitur: quomodo cecidit de caelo lueifer mane oriens, contritus est in terram qui mittebat ad omnes gentes? tu autem dixisti sensu tuo: in caelum ascendam, super sidera caeli ponam thronum meum, sedebo in monte excelso super montes excelsos, qui sunt ad aquilonem; ascendam super nubes, ero similis altissimo; nunc autem ad inferos descendes et cetera, quae in figura regis uelut Babylonis in diabolum dicta intelleguntur, plura in eius corpus conueniunt, quod etiam de humano genere congregat, et in eos maxime qui ei per superbiam cohaerent apostatando a mandatis dei. sicut enim qui erat diabolus homo dictus est, ut in euangelio: inimicas homo hoc fecit, ita qui homo erat diabolus dictus est, ut rursus in euangelio: nonne ego uos duodecim elegi et unus ex nobis diabolus est?
Therefore what is said through the prophet Isaiah against him: "How has Lucifer, rising in the morning, fallen from heaven; he who sent to all nations is broken upon the earth? But you said in your own mind: I will ascend into heaven, I will set my throne above the stars of heaven, I will sit on the high mountain above the high mountains which are toward the north; I will ascend above the clouds, I will be like the Most High; now, however, you will descend to the underworld," and the rest which, in the figure of the king of Babylon as it were, are understood as spoken against the devil—many of these apply to his body, which he also gathers from the human race, and especially to those who cling to him through pride by apostatizing from the commandments of God. For just as he who was the devil was called a man, as in the Gospel: "An enemy man did this," so he who was a man was called the devil, as again in the Gospel: "Did I not choose you twelve, and one of you is a devil?
et sicut corpus Christi, quod est ecclesia, dicitur Christus — sicut illud est: uos Abrahae semen estis, cum paulo superius dixisset: Abrahae dictae sunt promissiones et semini eius; non dicit: et seminibus, tamquam in multis, sed tamquam in uno: et semini tuo, quod est Christus; et iterum: sicut enim corpus unum est et membra habet multa, omnia autem membra corporis, cum sint multa, unum est corpus, ita et Christus — eo modo etiam corpus diaboli, oui caput est diabolus, id est ipsa impiorum multitudo maximeque eorum qui a Christo uel de ecclesia sicut de caelo decidunt, dicitur diabolus et in ipsum corpus figurate multa dicuntur, quae non tam capiti quam corpori membrisque conueniant. itaque lucifer, qui mane oriebatur et cecidit, potest intellegi apostatarum genus uel a Christo uel ab ecclesia, quod ita conuertitur ad tenebras amissa luce, quam portabat, quemadmodum qui conuertuntur ad deum a tenebris ad lucem transeunt, id est qui fuerunt tenebrae fiunt lux.
And just as the body of Christ, which is the church, is called Christ—as in that passage: "You are the seed of Abraham," when a little earlier he had said, "The promises were made to Abraham and to his seed; he does not say, 'and to seeds,' as though in many, but as though in one, 'and to your seed,' which is Christ"; and again: "For just as the body is one and has many members, but all the members of the body, though they are many, are one body, so also is Christ"—in the same way also the body of the devil, whose head is the devil, that is, the very multitude of the wicked, and especially of those who fall away from Christ or from the church as from heaven, is called the devil, and many things are said figuratively to that body itself which apply not so much to the head as to the body and its members. And so the morning star, which rose in the morning and fell, can be understood as the race of apostates from Christ or from the church, which is thus turned to darkness when it has lost the light it bore, just as those who are turned to God pass from darkness to light, that is, those who were darkness become light.
Item in figura principis Tyri per Hiezechielem prophetam in diabolum diota intelleguntur: tu es signaculum similitudinis et corona decoris; in deliciis paradisi dei fuisti, omni lapide pretioso ornatus es et cetera, quae non tam in ipsum principem spiritum nequitiae quam in corpus eius dicta conueniunt. paradisus enim dicta est ecclesia, sicut legitur in cantico canticorum: hortus conclusus, fons signatus, puteus aquae uiuae, paradiSQV cum fructu pomorum. inde ceciderunt uel aperta et corporali separatione omnes haeretici, uel occulta et spiritali, quamuis in ea corporaliter esse uideantur, omnes conuersi ad uomitum suum, cum post remissionem peccatorum paululum ambulassent in uia iustitiae, in quibus facta sunt posteriora deteriora prioribus, et quibus expediebat non cognoscere uiam iustitiae quam cognoscentibus retrorsum reflecti a tradito sibi sancto mandato. hanc pessimam generationem dominus describit, cum dicit spiritum nequam exire ab homine et cum aliis septem redire, in domo quam mundatam iam inuenerat intrare, ut sint nouissima hominis illius peiora prioribus.
Likewise, in the figure of the prince of Tyre through the prophet Ezekiel, certain things are understood as spoken to the devil: "You are the seal of likeness and the crown of beauty; you were in the delights of the paradise of God, you were adorned with every precious stone," and the rest, which fit not so much the prince himself, the spirit of wickedness, as his body. For the church is called paradise, as it is read in the Song of Songs: "an enclosed garden, a sealed fountain, a well of living water, a paradise with the fruit of trees." From there all heretics have fallen, either by an open and bodily separation, or by a hidden and spiritual one, although they seem to be bodily in it—all turned back to their own vomit, when after the remission of sins they had walked a little while in the way of righteousness; in them the latter things have become worse than the former, and for whom it would have been better not to have known the way of righteousness than, having known it, to turn back from the holy commandment delivered to them. The Lord describes this most wicked generation when he says that an unclean spirit goes out from a man and returns with seven others, and enters into the house which he had found already cleansed, so that the last state of that man is worse than the first.
tali enim generi hominum, quod iam factum est corpus diaboli, possunt haec uerba congruere: a die qua creatus es tu cum cherub, id est cum sede dei, quae interpretatur multiplicata scientia; et posui te in monte sancto dei, hoc est in ecclesia — unde est: et exaudiuit me de monte sancto suo — fuisti in medio lapidum flammeorum, id est sanctorum spirituum feruentium, lapidum uiuorum; ambulasti sine uitio tu in diebus tuis, ex quo die creatus es tu, donec inuenta sunt delicta tua in te.
.XXIIII. CONTRA EOS QVI DICVNT, CVR CREAVERIT DEVS HOMINEM, QVEM PECCATVBVM ESSE PRAESCIEBAT. ITEM EX EODEM LIBRO XI DE GENESI AD LITTERAM.'
Si ergo quaeritur cur deus temtari permiserit hominem, quem temtatori consensurum esse praesciebat, altitudinem quidem consilii eius penetrare non possum et longe supra uires meas hoc esse profiteor. est ergo aliqua causa fortassis occultior, quae melioribus sanotioribusque reseratur illius gratia potius quam meritis eorum; sed tamen, quantum uel donat sapere uel sinit dicere, non mihi uidetur magnae laudis futurum fuisse hominem, si propterea posset bene uiuere, quia nemo male uiuere suaderet, cum et in natura posse et in potestate haberet uelle non consentire suadenti, adiuuante tamen illo qui superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam.
For to this kind of human beings, which has now been made the body of the devil, these words can apply: "From the day you were created with the cherub," that is, with the seat of God, which is interpreted as multiplied knowledge; "and I placed you on the holy mountain of God," that is, in the church—whence it is said: "and he heard me from his holy mountain"—"you were in the midst of fiery stones," that is, of burning holy spirits, living stones; "you walked without fault in your days, from the day you were created, until your offenses were found in you."
XXIV. AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY, WHY DID GOD CREATE MAN, WHOM HE FORESAW WOULD SIN. ALSO FROM THE SAME BOOK XI OF THE LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF GENESIS.
If, then, it is asked why God permitted man to be tempted, whom He foresaw would consent to the tempter, I confess that I cannot penetrate the depth of His counsel, and that this is far beyond my powers. There is, then, perhaps some more hidden reason, which is revealed to better and sounder men by His grace rather than by their merits; but nevertheless, as far as He grants to understand or allows to speak, it does not seem to me that it would have been a matter of great praise for man, if he could live well for the reason that no one persuaded him to live badly, since he had both the natural capacity and the power to be unwilling to consent to the one persuading, with the help, however, of Him who resists the proud but gives grace to the humble.
cur itaque temtari non sineret quem consensurum esse praesciebat, cum id facturus esset propria uoluntate per culpam et ordinandus esset illius aequitate per poenam, ut etiam sic ostenderet animae superbae ad eruditionem futurorum sanctorum, quam recte ipse uteretur animarum uoluntatibus etiam malis, cum illae peruerse uterentur naturis bonis?
Nec arbitrandum est quod esset hominem deiecturus iste temtator, nisi praecessisset in anima hominis quaedam elatio comprimenda, ut per humiliationem peccati quam de se falso praesumserit disceret. uerissime quippe dictum est: ante ruinam exaltatur cor et ante gloriam humiliatur; et huius forte hominis uox est in psalmo: ego dixi in abundantia mea: non mouebor in saeculum. deinde expertus iam quid mali habeat superba praesumtio propriae potestatis et quid boni adiutorium gratiae dei: domine, inquit, in uoluntate tua praestitisti decori meo uirtutem, auertisti autem faciem tuam, et factus sum conturbatus. sed siue illud de hoc homine siue de alio dictum est, extollenti se tamen animae et nimium tamquam' de propria uirtute praefidenti etiam experimento poenae fuerat demonstrandum quam bene non se habeat facta natura, si a faciente recesserit. hinc enim etiam maxime commendatur quale bonum sit deus, quando nulli ab eo recedenti bene est, '.
Why then would he not allow to be tempted the one whom he foreknew would consent, since he was going to do this by his own will through fault and was to be set in order by that one's equity through punishment, so that in this way too he might show, for the instruction of future saints, how rightly he himself makes use even of the evil wills of souls, when those souls perversely make use of good natures?
Nor is it to be thought that this tempter would have cast man down unless there had first preceded in the soul of man a certain elation that had to be suppressed, so that through the humiliation of sin he might learn what he had falsely presumed about himself. For it has been most truly said: Before ruin the heart is exalted, and before glory it is humbled; and perhaps this is the voice of this man in the psalm: I said in my abundance: I shall not be moved forever. Then, having now experienced what evil there is in the proud presumption of one's own power and what good there is in the aid of God's grace, he says: Lord, in your will you have given strength to my beauty; but you turned away your face, and I became troubled. But whether that was said of this man or of another, nevertheless to a soul exalting itself and trusting too much, as it were, in its own virtue, it had to be shown even by the experience of punishment how well a nature made by its maker does not fare if it has withdrawn from its maker. For from this especially is it also commended how great a good God is, since it is well for no one who withdraws from him.
, quia et qui gaudent in mortiferis uoluptatibus, esse sine dolorum timore non possunt, et qui omnino malum desertionis suae maiore superbiae stupore non sentiunt, miseriores prorsus apparent, ut, si nolunt recipere medicinam talia deuitandi, ualeant ad exemplum, quo possint talia deuitari. sicut enim apostolus Iacobus dicit: unusquisque temtatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et iniectus; deinde concupiscentia cum conceperit, parit peccatum; peccatum autem cum consummatum fuerit, generat mortem. unde sanato superbiae tumore resurgitur, uoluntas, quae ante experimentum defuit, ut permaneretur cum deo, saltem post experimentum adsit, ut redeatur ad deum.
Sic autem quidam mouentur de hac primi hominis temtatione, quod eam fieri permiserit deus, quasi nunc non uideant uniuersum genus humanum diaboli insidiis sine cessatione temtari. cur et hoc permittit deus ? an quia probatur et exercetur uirtus et est palma gloriosior non consensisse temtatum quam non potuisse temtari, cum etiam ipsi, qui deserto creatore eunt post temtatorem, magis magisque temtent eos qui in uerbo dei permanent praebeantque illis contra cupiditatem deuitationis exemplum et incutiant contra superbiam timorem pium? unde dicit apostolus: intendens te ipsum, ne et tu temteris.
since even those who rejoice in deadly pleasures cannot be without the fear of pains, and those who do not at all feel the evil of their own desertion through the greater stupor of pride appear altogether more wretched, so that, if they are unwilling to receive the medicine of avoiding such things, they may be of use as an example by which such things can be avoided. For as the apostle James says: Each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence; then concupiscence, when it has conceived, gives birth to sin; but sin, when it has been consummated, generates death. Hence, once the swelling of pride has been healed, there is a rising again: the will, which was lacking before the trial so that one might remain with God, may at least after the trial be present so that one may return to God.
But some are disturbed about this temptation of the first man, that God permitted it to happen, as if they did not now see the whole human race being tempted without ceasing by the snares of the devil. Why does God permit this too? Is it not because virtue is proved and exercised, and it is a more glorious palm not to have consented when tempted than not to have been able to be tempted, since even those who, having deserted the Creator, go after the tempter, tempt all the more those who remain in the word of God, and provide them an example of avoiding concupiscence, and strike into them a pious fear against pride? Hence the apostle says: Looking to yourself, lest you too be tempted.
mirum est enim quantum ista humilitas, qua subdimur creatori, ne tamquam eius adiutorio non egentes de nostris uiribus praesumamus per scripturas omnes diuinas cura continua commendatur. cum ergo etiam per iniustos iusti ac per impios pii proficiant, frustra dicitur: non orearet deus quos praesciebat malos futuros. cur enim non crearet quos praesciebat bonis profuturos, ut et utiles eorum bonis uoluntatibus exercendis admonendisque nascantur et iuste pro sua mala uoluntate puniantur?
Talem, inquiunt, faceret hominem, qui nollet omnino pec- . care. ecoe nos concedimus meliorem esse naturam, quae omnino peccare nolit. concedant et ipsi non esse malam naturam, quae sic facta est, ut posset non peccare, si nollet, et iustam esse sententiam, qua punita est quae uoluntate, non necessitate peccauit. sicut ergo ratio uera docet meliorem esse creaturam, quam prorsus nihil delectat inlicitum, ita ratio uera nihilo minus docet etiam illam bonam esse, quae habet in potestate inlicitam delectationem, si extiterit, ita cohibere, ut non solum de ceteris licitis recteque factis uerum etiam de ipsius prauae delectationis cohibitione laetetur. cum ergo haec natura bona sit, illa melior, cur illam solam et non utramque potius faceret deus? ac per hoc qui parati erant de illa sola deum laudare, uberius eum debent laudare de utraque; illa quippe est in sanctis angelis, haec in sanctis hominibus.
For it is a wonder how greatly that humility, by which we are made subject to the Creator so that we do not presume on our own strength as though we did not need his help, is commended throughout all the divine Scriptures by continual care. Since, then, even through the unjust the just profit, and through the impious the pious, it is said in vain: God would not create those whom he foreknew would be evil. For why should he not create those whom he foreknew would be of benefit to the good, so that they are born both to be useful for exercising and admonishing the good by their good wills, and are justly punished for their own evil will?
Such a man, they say, he should have made, who would altogether be unwilling to sin. Behold, we grant that the nature which is altogether unwilling to sin is better. Let them also grant that the nature which was so made that it could not sin if it were unwilling is not evil, and that the sentence is just by which that nature was punished which sinned by will, not by necessity. Just as, therefore, true reason teaches that the creature is better which is wholly not delighted by anything unlawful, so true reason no less teaches that that nature also is good which has it in its power so to restrain unlawful delight, if it should arise, that it rejoices not only in other lawful and right actions but also in the very restraint of depraved delight. Since, then, this nature is good and that one better, why should God make only that one and not rather both? And by this, those who were prepared to praise God for that one alone ought to praise him more abundantly for both; for the one is in the holy angels, the other in holy men.
qui autem sibi partes iniquitatis elegerunt laudabilemque naturam culpabili uoluntate deprauarunt, non quia praesciti sunt ideo creari minime debuerunt; habent enim et ipsi locum suum, quem in rebus impleant pro utilitate sanctorum. nam deus nec iustitia cuiusquam recti hominis eget; quanto minus iniquitate peruersi?
Quis autem sobria consideratione dicat: melius non crearet quem praesciebat ex alterius iniquitate posse corrigi, quam crearet etiam quem praesciebat pro sua iniquitate debere damnari? hoc eat enim dicere: melius non esset qui alterius malo bene utendo misericorditer coronaretur, quam esset etiam malus, qui. pro suo merito iuste puniretur. cum enim ratio certa demonstrat duo quaedam non aequalia bona, sed unum superius, alterum inferius, non intellegunt tardi corde, cum dicant: utrumque tale esset, nihil se aliud dicere quam: solum illud esset. ac sic cum aequare quaerunt genera bonorum, numerum minuunt et immoderate augendo unum genus alterum tollunt. quis autem hoc audiret, si dicerent: quoniam excellentior sensus est uidendi quam audiendi, quattuor oculi essent et aures non essent?
But those who have chosen for themselves the parts of iniquity and have depraved a praiseworthy nature by a blameable will—they ought not for that reason not to have been created at all because they were foreknown; for they too have their own place, which they fill among things for the benefit of the saints. For God has no need of the righteousness of any upright man; how much less of the iniquity of a perverse one?
But who in sober consideration would say: it would have been better not to create one whom he foreknew could be corrected by another's iniquity, than to create even one whom he foreknew must be damned for his own iniquity? For this is as much as to say: it would have been better that there should not be one who by using another's evil well might be mercifully crowned, than that there should be even a wicked one who by his own desert might be justly punished. For since sure reasoning demonstrates that two things are not equal goods, but one higher and the other lower, those slow of heart do not understand when they say: both would be such; they say nothing other than: only that one would exist. And so when they seek to make the kinds of goods equal, they diminish the number, and by immoderately increasing one kind they take away the other. But who would listen to this, if they said: since the sense of seeing is more excellent than that of hearing, there should be four eyes and no ears?
ita si excellentior est creatura illa rationalis, quae sine ullius poenae comparatione, sine ulla superbia deo subditur, alia uero in hominibus ita creata est, ut in se dei beneficium non possit agnoscere nisi alterius uidendo supplicium, ut non altum sapiat, sed timeat, id est non de se praefidat, sed confidat in deum: quis recte intellegens dicat: ntalis esset ista qualis ill nec uideat se nihil aliud dicere quam: "non esset ista, sed sola esset illa" ? quod si inerudite atque insipienter dicitur, cur ergo non crearet deus etiam quos malos futuros esse praesciebat, uolens ostendere iram et demonstrare potentiam suam et ob hoc sustinens in multa patientia uasa irae, quae perfecta sunt in perditionem, ut notas faceret diuitias gloriae suae in uasa misericordiae, quae praeparauit in gloriam? sio enim qui gloriatur non nisi in domino gloriatur, cum cognoscit non suum, sed illius esse non solum ut sit, uerum etiam ut non nisi ab illo bene sibi sit a quo habet ut sit. nimis itaque importune dicitur: non essent quibus deus tantam beneficientiam misericordiae suae tribueret, si aliter esse non possent, nisi essent et hi in quibus uindictae iustitiam demonstraret.
Thus if that rational creature is more excellent which, without comparison with any punishment and without any pride, is subject to God, while the other among human beings was so created that it cannot recognize God's benefit in itself except by seeing another's punishment, so that it may not be high-minded but fear—that is, not trust in itself but trust in God—who, rightly understanding, would say: "Let it be such as that one is," and not see that he is saying nothing other than: "Let this one not exist, but let that one alone exist"? But if this is said ignorantly and foolishly, why then should God not create even those whom he foreknew would be evil, willing to show his wrath and to demonstrate his power, and for this reason enduring with much patience vessels of wrath, which are perfected for perdition, so that he might make known the riches of his glory upon vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory? For thus he who glories glories only in the Lord, when he recognizes that it is not his own but his—not only that he exists, but also that it is well with him only from him from whom he has it that he exists. Therefore it is said most importunately: "Those would not exist to whom God would bestow so great a beneficence of his mercy, if they could not exist otherwise, unless there were also those in whom he would demonstrate the justice of his vengeance.
Cur enim non utrique potius essent, quando in utrisque et bonitas dei et aequalitas iure praedicatur? at enim si deus uellet, etiam isti boni essent. quanto melius hoc deus uoluit, ut quod uellent essent; sed boni infructuose, mali autem impune non essent et in eo ipso aliis utiles essent. sed praesciebat quod eorum futura esset uoluntas mala. praesciebat sane et, quia falli non potest eius praescientia, ideo non ipsius, sed eorum est uoluntas mala. our ergo eos creauit quos tales futuros esse praesciebat? quia sicut praeuidit quid mali essent facturi, sic etiam praeuidit de malefactis eorum quid boni esset ipse facturus. sic enim eos fecit, ut eis relinqueret unde et ipsi aliquid facerent quo, quidquid etiam culpabiliter eligerent, illum de se laudabiliter operantem inuenirent; a se quippe habent uoluntatem malam, ab illo autem et naturam bonam et iustam poenam, sibi debitam locum, aliis exercitationis adminiculum et timoris exemplum.
For why should they not rather both exist, since in both the goodness of God and equality are rightly proclaimed? But if God had willed it, even these would have been good. How much better did God will this: that they should be what they willed—but the good without fruitlessness, while the evil should not go unpunished, and in that very fact should be useful to others. But He foreknew that their will would be evil. He certainly foreknew it, and because His foreknowledge cannot be deceived, the evil will is therefore not His but theirs. Why, then, did He create those whom He foreknew would be such? Because just as He foresaw what evil they would do, so also He foresaw what good He Himself would do from their evil deeds. For He made them in such a way as to leave them room to do something themselves, so that whatever they chose even culpably, they would find Him working praiseworthily from it—for from themselves they have an evil will, but from Him both a good nature and a just punishment, a place due to themselves, and for others a support for training and an example of fear.
Sed posset, inquit, etiam ipsorum uoluntatem in bonum conuertere, quoniam omnipotens est. cur ergo non fecit? quia noluit, cur noluerit penes ipsum est; debemus enim non plus sapere quam oportet sapere. puto tamen paulo ante satis nos ostendisse non parui boni esse rationabilem creaturam etiam istam, quae malorum comparatione canet malum. quod genus bonae creaturae utique non esset, si omnium malas uoluntates in bonum deus conuertisset et nulli iniquitati poenam debitam infligeret; ac sic non esset nisi solum illud genus, quod nulla uel peccati uel supplicii malorum comparatione proficeret. ita uelut aucta numerositate excellentioris generis ipsorum generum bonorum numerus minueretur.
Ergo, inquiunt, est aliquid in operibus dei quod alterius malo indigeat, quo proficiat ad bonum? itane obsurduerunt et excaecati sunt homines nescio quo studio contentionis, ut non audiant uel uideant quibusdam punitis quam plurimi corrigantur? quis enim paganus, quis Iudaeus, quis haereticus non hoc in domo sua cotidie probet P uerum cum uenitur ad disputationem inquisitionemque ueritatis, nolunt aduertere sensus suos homines; ex quo opere diuinae prouidentiae in eos ueniat imponendae commotio disciplinae, ut, si non corriguntur qui puniuntur, eorum tamen exemplo ceteri metuant ualeatque ad eorum salutem iusta pernicies aliorum.
But, he says, God could also have converted their will to good, since he is omnipotent. Why, then, did he not do so? Because he did not will it; and why he did not will it rests with himself; for we ought not to be wise beyond what is proper to be wise. Yet I think we showed a little earlier clearly enough that it is no small good that even that rational creature exists which, by comparison with evils, sings of good. That kind of good creature would certainly not exist if God had converted the evil wills of all to good and had inflicted no deserved punishment on any iniquity; and thus there would be only that one kind which would profit by no comparison with the evils either of sin or of punishment. So, as it were, with the number of the more excellent kind increased, the number of those very kinds of goods would be diminished.
Therefore, they say, is there something in the works of God that needs the evil of another, by which it may profit toward good? Have men been so deafened and blinded by some zeal for contention, I know not what, that they do not hear or see how, when certain people are punished, very many are corrected? For what pagan, what Jew, what heretic does not prove this daily in his own house? But when it comes to disputation and the investigation of truth, men are unwilling to attend to their own senses; from which work of divine providence a disturbance of discipline to be imposed comes upon them, so that, even if those who are punished are not corrected, nevertheless the rest may fear by their example, and the just destruction of others may avail for their salvation.
num enim malitiae illorum uel nequitiae deus auctor est, de quorum iusta poena consulit, quibus hoc modo consulendum esse constituit? non utique; sed cum eos uitiis propriis malos futuros esse praesciret, non eos tamen creare destitit, utilitati deputans eorum quos in hoc genere creauit, ut ad bonum proficere nisi malorum comparatione non possent. si enim non essent, nulli rei utique prodessent. parumne boni actum est, ut sint qui certe illi generi utiles sint? quod genus quisquis non uult ut sit nihil aliud agit nisi ut ipse in eo non sit. magna opera domini, exquisita in omnes uoluntates eius. praeuidet bonos futuros et creat; praeuidet malos futuros et creat, se ipsum ad fruendum praebens bonis, multa munera suorum largiens et malis, misericorditer ignoscens, iuste ulciscens, itemque misericorditer ulciscens, iuste ignoscens, nihil metuens de cuiusquam malitia, nihil indigens de cuiusquam iustitia, nihil sibi consulens nec de operibus bonorum et bonis consulens etiam de poenis malorum. cur ergo non permitteret temtari hominem illa temtatione prodendum, conuincendum, puniendum, cum superba concupiscentia propriae potestetis quod conceperat pareret suoque fetu confunderetur iustoque supplicio a superbiae autem inoboedientiae malo posteros deterreret, quibus ea conscribenda et annuntianda parabantur ?
For is God the author of their malice or wickedness, whose just punishment he provides for, for whom he determined that provision should be made in this way? By no means. But since he foreknew that they would be evil through their own vices, he did not cease to create them, reckoning it to the benefit of those whom he created in this kind, so that they could not advance toward the good except by comparison with the evil. For if these did not exist, they would be of use to nothing at all. Is it too little good that has been done, that there should be those who are certainly useful to that kind? And whoever does not wish that kind to exist does nothing other than ensure that he himself is not in it. Great are the works of the Lord, exquisite in all his wills. He foresees that the good will be and creates them; he foresees that the evil will be and creates them, offering himself to the good for enjoyment, lavishing many gifts of his own even on the evil, mercifully forgiving, justly avenging, and likewise mercifully avenging, justly forgiving, fearing nothing from anyone's malice, needing nothing from anyone's justice, consulting nothing for himself, and consulting for the good even through the works of the good, and for the evil even through the punishments of the evil. Why, then, would he not permit man to be tempted by that temptation, to be exposed, convicted, and punished, when by his proud desire for his own power he would bring forth what he had conceived and be confounded by his own offspring, and by just punishment he would deter posterity from the evil of pride and disobedience, for whom these things were being prepared to be written down and proclaimed?
Si autem quaeritur cur potissimum per serpentem diabolus temtare permissus sit, iam hoc significandi gratia factum esse quem non admoneat scriptura tantae auctoritatis tantis diuinitatis documentis agens in prophetando, quantis effectis iam mundus impletus est? non quo diabolus aliquid ad instrustionem nostram significare uoluerit, sed cum accedere ad temtandum non posset nisi permissus, num per aliud posset nisi per quod permittebatur accedere? quidquid igitur serpens ille significauit, dei prouidentiae tribuendum est, sub qua et ipse diabolus suam quidem habet cupiditatem nocendi, facultatem autem non nisi quae datur uel ad subuertenda ac perdenda uasa irae uel ad humilianda siue probanda uasa misericordiae. natura itaque serpentis unde sit nouimus: produxit enim terra in uerbo dei omnia pecora et bestias et serpentes; quae uniuersa creatura habens in se animam uiuam, inrationabilem, uniuersae rationali creaturae siue bonae siue malae uoluntatis lege diuini ordinis subdita est. quid ergo mirum, si per serpentem aliquid agere permissus est diabolus, cum daemonia in porcos intrare Christus ipse permiserit?
But if it is asked why the devil was permitted to tempt most especially through a serpent, who would not be reminded by the Scripture of such great authority, which, dealing in prophecy with such great proofs of divinity, has already filled the world with so many accomplished things, that this too was done for the sake of signifying something? Not that the devil wished to signify anything for our instruction, but since he could not come to tempt unless permitted, could he come by any other means than that by which he was permitted? Whatever, therefore, that serpent signified is to be attributed to God's providence, under which even the devil himself has indeed his own desire to harm, but the ability only such as is given, either for overthrowing and destroying vessels of wrath, or for humbling or testing vessels of mercy. We know, then, whence the nature of the serpent is: for the earth brought forth, at the word of God, all cattle and beasts and serpents; and all this creation, having in itself a living, irrational soul, is subject by the law of the divine order to the whole rational creation, whether of good or of evil will. What wonder, then, if the devil was permitted to do something through a serpent, when Christ himself permitted demons to enter into swine?
Magis de ipsa natura diaboli scrupulosius quaeri solet; quam totam quidam haeretici offensi molestia malae uoluntatis eius alienare conantur a creatura summi et ueri dei et alterum ei dare principium, quod sit contra deum. non enim ualent intellegere omne quod est, in quantum aliqua substantia est, et bonum esse et nisi ab illo uero, a quo omne bonum est, esse non posse; malam uero uoluntatem inordinate moueri bona inferiora superioribus praeponendo; atque ita factum esse ut rationalis creaturae spiritus sua potestate propter excellentiam delectatus tumesceret superbia, per quam caderet a beatitudine spiritalis paradisi et inuidentia contabesceret. in quo tamen bonum est hoc ipsum, quod uiuit et uiuificat corpus siue aerium, sicut ipsius diaboli uel daemonum spiritus, siue terrenum, sicut hominis anima cuiusuis, etiam maligni atque peruersi. ita dum nolunt aliquid quod deus fecerit propria uoluntate peccare, ipsius dei substantiam dicunt primo necessitate et post ineipiabiliter uoluntate corruptam atque peruersam. sed de istorum dementissimo errore alias iam multa diximus.,
The question is more carefully raised concerning the very nature of the devil; certain heretics, offended by the burden of his evil will, attempt to alienate it entirely from the creature of the supreme and true God and to give it another origin, one that is against God. For they are unable to understand that everything which exists, insofar as it is some substance, is both good and cannot exist except from that true one from whom every good thing is; but that an evil will moves inordinately by preferring lower goods to higher ones; and that it thus came about that the spirit of a rational creature, delighted by its own power on account of its excellence, swelled with pride, through which it fell from the blessedness of the spiritual paradise and wasted away with envy. In this, however, this very thing is good, that it lives and gives life to a body, whether airy, as the spirit of the devil himself or of demons, or earthly, as the soul of any human being, even a malignant and perverse one. Thus, while they refuse to allow that anything God made sins by its own will, they say that the substance of God himself was first corrupted by necessity and afterward by an inescapable will, and made perverse. But concerning the most demented error of these people, we have already said many things elsewhere.
In hoc autem opere quaerendum est secundum sanctam scripturam quid de diabolo dicendum sit. primum utrum ab initio ipsius mundi sua potestate delectatus abstiterit ab illa societate et caritate, qua beati sunt angeli, qui fruuntur deo, an aliquo tempore in sancto coetu fuerit angelorum etiam ipse pariter iustus et pariter beatus. nonnulli enim dicunt ipsum ei fuisse casum a supernis sedibus, quod inuiderit homini facto ad imaginem dei. porro autem inuidia sequitur superbiam, non praecedit; non enim causa superbiendi est inuidia, sed causa inuidendi superbia. cum igitur superbia sit amor excellentiae propriae, inuidia uero sit odium felicitatis alienae, quid unde nascatur satis in promtu est; amando enim quisque excellentiam suam uel paribus inuidet, quod ei coaequentur, uel inferioribus, ne sibi coaequentur, uel superioribus, quod eis non coaequetur. superbiendo igitur inuidus, non inuidendo quisque superbus est...
In this work, however, we must ask, in accordance with holy Scripture, what is to be said concerning the devil. First, whether from the very beginning of the world he stood apart, delighted in his own power, from that fellowship and charity by which the angels who enjoy God are blessed; or whether he too was at some time in the holy company of angels, equally righteous and equally blessed. For some say that his fall from the heavenly seats came about because he envied man, made in the image of God. But envy follows pride; it does not precede it. For envy is not the cause of being proud, but pride is the cause of envying. Since, therefore, pride is the love of one's own excellence, while envy is hatred of another's happiness, what is born from what is sufficiently clear. For by loving his own excellence, each one envies either his equals, because they are made equal to him, or his inferiors, lest they be made equal to him, or his superiors, because he is not made equal to them. Therefore it is by being proud that one is envious, not by being envious that one is proud...
Merito initium omnis peccati superbiam scriptura definiuit dicens: initium omnis peccati superbia. cui testimonio non inconuenienter aptatur etiam illud quod apostolus ait: radix omnium malorum est auaritia, si auaritiam generalem intellegamus, qua quisque appetit aliquid amplius quam oportet propter excellentiam suam et quendam propriae rei amorem. cui sapienter nomen latina lingua indidit, cum appellauit priuatam, quod potius a detrimento quam ab incremento dictum elucet; omnis enim priuatio minuit. unde itaque uult eminere superbia, inde in angustias et in egestatem contruditur, cum a communi ad proprium damnoso sui amore redigitur. specialis est autem auaritia, quae usitatius appellatur amor pecuniae, cuius nomine apostolus per speciem genus significans uniuersalem auaritiam uolebat intellegi dicendo: radix omnium malorum est auaritia. hac enim et diabolus cecidit, qui utique non amauit pecuniam, sed propriam potestatem. proinde peruersus sui amor priuat sancta societate turgidum spiritum eumque coartat miseria iam per iniquitatem satiari cupientem. hinc alio loco cum dixisset: erunt enim homines se ipsos amantes, continuo subiecit: amatores pecuniae, ab illa generali auaritia, cuius superbia caput est, ad hanc specialem descendens, quae propria hominum est. neque enim essent etiam homines amatores pecuniae, nisi eo se putarent excellentiores, quo ditiores.
Rightly did Scripture define pride as the beginning of all sin, saying: The beginning of all sin is pride. To this testimony that saying of the apostle is also fittingly applied: The root of all evils is avarice, if we understand avarice in a general sense, whereby each person desires something more than is proper on account of his own excellence and a certain love of his own possession. To this the Latin language wisely gave the name, when it called it privata, which is shown more clearly to be said from detriment than from increase; for every privation diminishes. Hence, therefore, pride wishes to stand out, and from there it is thrust into narrow straits and want, when by a self-love that is harmful to itself it is reduced from the common to the private. Special avarice, however, is that which is more commonly called love of money; by its name the apostle, signifying the genus through the species, wished universal avarice to be understood, when he said: The root of all evils is avarice. For by this even the devil fell, who certainly did not love money, but his own power. Accordingly, perverse self-love deprives the swollen spirit of holy fellowship and confines it in misery, now desiring to be sated through iniquity. Hence, in another place, when he had said: For men shall be lovers of themselves, he immediately added: lovers of money, descending from that general avarice, whose head is pride, to this special avarice, which is proper to men. For men would not even be lovers of money, unless they thought themselves more excellent in proportion as they were richer.
cui morbo contraria caritas, quae non quaerit quae sua sunt, id est non priuata excellentia laetatur; merito ergo et non inflatur. hi duo amores, quorum alter sanctas, alter immundus, alter socialis, alter priuatus, alter communi utilitati consulens propter supernam societatem, alter etiam rem communem in potestatem propriam redigens propter arrogantem dominationem, alter subditus, alter aemulus deo, alter tranquillus, alter turbulentus, alter pacificus, alter seditiosus, alter ueritatem laudibus errantium praeferens, alter quoquo modo laudis auidus, alter amicalis, alter inuidus, alter hoc uolens proximo quod sibi, alter subicere proximum sibi, alter propter proximi utilitatem regens proximum, alter propter suam, praecesserunt in angelis, alter in bonis, alter in malis, et distinxerunt conditas in genere humano ciuitates duas sub admirabili et ineffabili prouidentia dei cuncta quae creat administrantis, alteram iustorum, alteram iniquorum. quarum etiam quadam temporali commixtione peragitur saeculum, donec ultimo iudicio separentur et altera coniuncta angelis bonis in regno suo uitam consequatur aeternam, altera coniuncta angelis malis in ignem cum rege suo mittatur aeternum.
To this disease charity is contrary, which does not seek the things that are its own, that is, it does not rejoice in private preeminence; rightly, therefore, it is also not puffed up. These two loves—one holy, the other impure; one social, the other private; one consulting the common good on account of the heavenly society, the other even reducing the common thing into its own power on account of arrogant domination; one submissive, the other rivaling God; one tranquil, the other turbulent; one peaceable, the other seditious; one preferring truth to the praises of the erring, the other greedy of praise in whatever way; one friendly, the other envious; one willing for a neighbor what it wills for itself, the other subjecting a neighbor to itself; one ruling a neighbor for the neighbor's benefit, the other for its own—these two loves preceded in the angels, the one in the good, the other in the evil, and they distinguished the two cities founded in the human race under the admirable and ineffable providence of God, who administers all things that he creates: the one of the just, the other of the wicked. By a certain temporal mixture of these the age is also carried through, until at the last judgment they are separated, and the one, joined to the good angels, obtains eternal life in its kingdom, while the other, joined to the evil angels, is sent with its king into eternal fire.
XXVI DE DECIMATIONE LEVI IN LVMBIS ABRAHAE. EX LIBRO DE GENESI X AD LITTERAM.
Quamuis nullius hominis anima sit in lumbis patris sui, secundum carnem tamen in lumbis Abrahae constitutum Leui decimatum et ibi constitutum secundum carnem Christum non decimatum. secundum rationem quippe illam seminalem ibi fuit Leui, qua ratione per concubitum uenturus erat in matrem; secundum quam rationem non ibi erat Christi caro, quamuis secundum ipsam ibi fuerit Mariae caro. quapropter nec Leui nec Christus in lumbis Abrahae secundum animam, secundum carnem uero et Leui et Christus: sed Leui secundum concupiscentiam carnalem, Christus autem secundum solam substantiam corporalem. cum enim sit in semine et uisibilis corpulentia et inuisibilis ratio, utrumque cucurrit ex Abraham uel etiam ex ipso Adam usque ad corpus Mariae, quia et ipsum eo modo conceptum et exortum est. Christus autem uisibilem carnis substantiam de carne uirginis sumsit, ratio uero conceptionis eius non a semine uirili, sed longe aliter ac desuper uenit. proinde secundum hoc quod de matre accepit etiam in lumbis Abrahae fuit.
XXVI. CONCERNING THE TITHING OF LEVI IN THE LOINS OF ABRAHAM. FROM THE BOOK ON GENESIS, TO THE LETTER, X.
Although the soul of no man is in the loins of his father, yet according to the flesh Levi was established in the loins of Abraham and was tithed, and Christ, established there according to the flesh, was not tithed. For Levi was there according to that seminal principle by which he was to come into his mother through intercourse; according to which principle the flesh of Christ was not there, although according to that same principle the flesh of Mary was there. Wherefore neither Levi nor Christ was in the loins of Abraham according to the soul, but according to the flesh both Levi and Christ were: Levi, however, according to carnal concupiscence, but Christ according to the bodily substance alone. For since in the seed there is both a visible corpulence and an invisible principle, both flowed from Abraham or even from Adam himself all the way to the body of Mary, because he too was conceived and brought forth in that manner. But Christ took the visible substance of the flesh from the flesh of the virgin, whereas the principle of his conception came not from male seed, but far otherwise and from above. Accordingly, in respect of what he received from his mother, he too was in the loins of Abraham.