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Topicorum Aristotelis Libri Octo Severino Boethio Interprete

Boethius. Severinus · ogl-pl

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0 commentary units 5 derived notes 0 open questions 234 narrative
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  • coverageNo English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed.
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  • registerRegister: treatise in Latin; the English keeps the liturgical formulae and the vocatives rather than normalising them.
  • structurePassages: 234 narrative.
  • caution5 passage(s) are fragmentary in the source; the English bridges each break and says so in the note.
  • sourceSource edition: ogl-pl.
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tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:201 · narrative
Source · Latin

Suntautem quae ad occultationem,certaminisgratia, sed quia omne(quod hujusmodiest)negotium ad alterum est,necesse est etillis uti.Necessarias igitur, perquas fit syllogismus,non statim præordinandum, sed abeundum ad suprema: ut non postulet quis contrariorum eamdem disciplinam, si hoc voluerit sumere,sed oppositorum; posito enim hoc,et quoniam contrariorum eadem disciplinasyllogismo col. liget, eo quod ex oppositis sunt contraria. Si vero illam non ponat per inductionem,'sumendum proponenti in particularibus contrariis.Nam aut per syllogismum,aut perinductionem necessarias sumendum,aut hac quidem inductione,illas autem syJlogismo. Quæ cunque autem valdemanifestae sunt,illas quoque oportet praeponere, nam immanifestius est semper in ab,cessu et inductione quod secuturum est,et simul ipsas necessarias proponere,et qui non potest illo modo,sumere esse paratum, quae vero ad has sumptaesunt,accipiendaequidem illarum gratia. Unaquaeque autem earum hoc modo utendum inducentem quidem a singularibus ad universalia,et a notis ad ignota, nota autem magis quae secundum sensum,vel simpliciter,vel multipliciter, vel multitudini.Occultantem vero ratiocinatione praecolligere oportet ea per quae syllogismus ejus quod ex principio est debet fieri,et haec ut plurimum. Erit autem boc, si quis non solum necessarias, sed et earum (quae ad illas sunt ulites) aliquam syllogizaverit.

English

But the things that serve concealment, for the sake of the contest—yet because every business of this kind is directed toward another, it is necessary to use them as well. Therefore the necessary premises, through which the syllogism is made, must not be arranged beforehand at once, but one must go back to the highest principles: so that one should not demand the same discipline of contraries, if he wishes to assume this, but of opposites; for once this is posited, he will also bind together by syllogism that the discipline of contraries is the same, because contraries come from opposites. But if he does not lay that down, it must be assumed by induction for the one who proposes it in particular contraries. For one must assume the necessary premises either by syllogism or by induction—either by induction here, but those by syllogism. And whatever things are very manifest, these too one ought to set out beforehand; for in the approach and in induction what will follow is always more unclear, and at the same time to set out the necessary premises themselves, and for one who cannot do it in that way, to assume that he is prepared; but the things assumed for the sake of these are to be accepted for the sake of those. And each of them must be used in this way: the one who induces, from singulars to universals, and from things known to things unknown—and things known more are those according to sense, either simply, or in many ways, or to the multitude. But the one who conceals must pre-collect by reasoning the things through which the syllogism of the thesis ought to be made, and these for the most part. And this will be so if someone has syllogized not only the necessary premises, but also some of those that are useful for them.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:202 · narrative
Source · Latin

Amplius, conclunsiones non dicere,sed postea ratiocinatione colligere subitarias, sic enim longissime abscedet ab ea (quse ex principio) positione; universaliter autem dicendo, sic oportet eum interrogare qui occulte interrogat,ut interrogata omni ratione, et eo dicente conclusionem,quæratur propter quid; id autem erit maxime per antedictum modum; nam sola ultima dicta conclusione, immanifestum quomodo accidit, eo quod non prævidit respondens ex quibus accidit, non per membra digestis prioribus syllogismis; minime autem per membra digeritur syllogismus conclusione,cum non ejus sumptiones ponuntur,sed cum illa sumuntur a quibus syllogismus fit.Utile autem et non continua postulata sumere,ex quibus syllogismi3sed vicissim ad aliam et ad aliamconclusionem.Nam positis convenientibus juxta se invicem,magis quod accidit ex ipsis manifestum. Oportet autem et definitione sumere in quibus possibile est)universalem propositionem,nonin ipsis, sed in conjugatis.Nam decipiunt falsa ratiocinatione seipsos (quando in conjugato sumitur Jefi.

English

Further, not to state the conclusions, but afterwards to gather them by reasoning as if they had been granted all at once—for in this way he will depart very far from the position that was laid down at the beginning. And speaking generally, the one who questions covertly ought to question in such a way that, when everything has been asked and the respondent states the conclusion, one then asks on account of what it follows; and this will happen especially by the method just described. For when only the final conclusion has been stated, it is unclear how it came about, because the respondent did not foresee from what premises it followed, since the prior syllogisms were not set out limb by limb. But a syllogism is least of all set out limb by limb by means of the conclusion, when its assumptions are not laid down, but when those things are assumed from which the syllogism is made. It is useful also to take the requested premises not in a continuous series, from which the syllogisms are formed, but alternately toward one conclusion and then another. For when suitable premises are placed next to one another, what follows from them is more evident. One ought also to take by definition, in cases where it is possible, the universal proposition—not in the things themselves, but in their conjugates. For people deceive themselves by false reasoning when the definition is taken in the conjugate.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:203 · narrative
Source · Latin

nitio),si non universale concedunt: ut si oportetsumere quod qui irascitur appetit poenam, sumatur autem ira appetitus esse poenae propter apparentem parvipensionem, manifestum autem quoniam hoc sumpto habebimus universale quod prfeelegimus;at eis qui in ipsis proponunt sæpe accidit ut abnuat respondens, eo quod magis se babeat in ea re inslantia,ut quod non omnis qui irascitur appetit prenam,nam parentibus irascimur quidem,non autem paenam appetimus.Fortasse autem non vera instantia est, nam a quibusdam sutficiens pcEna est tristari solum,et facere poenitere, verumtamen habet aliquid verisimile, ut non videatur irrationabiliter negare propositum,in irae autem definitione,non similiter facile instantiam invenire.Praeterea proponere par est, non ut propter ipsum, sed alterius gratia eum qui proponit. Nam devitant ea quae ad positionem sunt utilia. Simpliciter autem dicendo, quam maxime facere dubium utrum quod proponitur,an oppositum sumere vult.Nam dubio existente quidnam ad positionem est utile, magis quod sibi videtur ponunt. Amplius per similitudinem interrogare.

English

(definition), if they do not grant the universal—for example, if one must assume that the angry person desires punishment, but it is assumed that anger is a desire for punishment on account of apparent slight, it is clear that once this is assumed we shall have the universal that we proposed. But with those who propose things in the very terms themselves, it often happens that the respondent refuses, because he is more firmly situated in that matter, as that not everyone who is angry desires punishment; for we are indeed angry with our parents, yet we do not desire punishment. Perhaps, however, this is not a true objection; for for some a sufficient punishment is merely to be grieved and to be made to repent. Nevertheless it has something plausible, so that he does not seem to deny the proposition unreasonably. But in the definition of anger it is not similarly easy to find an objection. Further, it is fair to propose, not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else, for the one who proposes. For they avoid the things that are useful for the position. And to speak simply, one should make it as doubtful as possible whether he wishes to assume what is proposed or the opposite. For when it is doubtful what is useful for the position, they rather lay down what seems to themselves. Further, to question by way of similarity.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:204 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam et verisimile, et latet magis universale, ut quod quemadmodum scienlia et ignorantia contrariorum eadem, sic et census contrariorum idem, aut e converso,postquam sensus idem contrariorum, et scientia; hoc autem est simile inductioni, non tamen idem; nam illic quidem a singularibus universale sumitur,in similibus autem non est quod sumitur. universale,sub quo omniasimihasunt.Oportet autem et ipsum sibimetquandoqueinstantiam ferre.Namisuspecte se habent respondentes ad eos qui videntur juste argumentari. Utile autem dicere quod consuetum,et quod dicitur tale.Nam pigrescunt quod solitum est dimovere,instantiam non babentes,simul autem et quia utantur et ipsi talibus,cavent ea dimovere. Amplius, non sedule agere, etsi omnino utile sit.Nam adversus sedule agentes, magis renituntur. Et ut in similitudine proponere quod propter aliud aliquid proponitur, et non propter seipsum,utile ponent magis Amplius,non id proponere quod oportet sumere, sed cui consequens, id est ex necessitate.Nam et magis concedunt, eo quod non similiter ex hoc manifestum sit quod consecuturum est,et sumpto hoc, sumptum est et illud. Et id ultimo interrogare quod maxime vult sumere.

English

For it is both plausible and conceals the universal more, as that just as knowledge and ignorance are of the same contraries, so too perception is of the same contraries, or conversely, since perception is of the same contraries, so is knowledge. This, however, is similar to induction, yet not the same; for there the universal is taken from singulars, but in similarities what is taken is not the universal under which all similarities fall. But one must sometimes also bring an objection against oneself. For those who respond are suspicious of those who appear to argue justly. It is useful, moreover, to state what is customary and what is said to be such. For people grow lazy about disturbing what is customary, having no objection, and at the same time, because they themselves also use such things, they are wary of disturbing them. Further, not to act persistently, even if it is altogether useful. For against those who act persistently, people resist more. And to propose in the manner of a similarity what is proposed for the sake of something else and not for its own sake is useful for making them posit more. Further, not to propose what ought to be assumed, but that to which it follows, that is, by necessity. For they concede more, because it is not similarly clear from this what will follow, and once this is assumed, that too has been assumed. And to ask last what one most wants to assume.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:205 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam maximeprimarenuunt,eoquod plurimi interrogantium prima interrogant, circa quae vel maxime student.Ad quosdam autem prima quae utilia sunt proponere.Nam protervi maxime prima admittunt,nisi omnino manifestum sit quod secuturum est, in fine autem proterviunt.Similiter autem etquicunquearbitrantur acuti esse in respondendo.ponentes enim prima,in fine recantant,tanquam nihil acciderit ex iis quae posita sunt; ponunt autem prompte,confidentes habitui,et arbitrantes nihil se esse passuros. Amplius, prolongare et interponere quæ nihil sunt usui ad orationem, quemadmodum pseudographia utentes.Nam cum sint plura,immanifestum in quo, falsum sit, quare et occultant quandoque interro. gantes,in absconso proponentes ea quae per se proposita non ponerentur; ad occultationem igitur dictis est utendum.

CAPUT II.

Pro instructione respondentis loci alii.

English

For they especially deny first principles, because most questioners ask first about the things they are most eager for. But to some people one should put forward first the things that are useful. For the shameless admit first principles most of all, unless it is entirely manifest what will follow, but at the end they are shameless. Similarly also all who think themselves sharp at answering: for having granted the first principles, at the end they retract, as if nothing had followed from the things that were granted; but they grant readily, trusting in their habit and thinking they will suffer nothing. Further, to prolong and to interpose things that are of no use to the argument, using them like a forged document. For since there are several, it is unclear where the falsehood lies, and therefore they sometimes conceal it when questioning, putting forward in secret the things that would not be granted if put forward by themselves; therefore one must use what has been said for concealment.

CHAPTER II.

Other topics for the instruction of the respondent.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:206 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ad ornatum vero inductione et divisione eorum quæ affinia sunt. Inductio igitur quale quid est manifestum dividere autem hujusmodi,utscientiamscientiaesse meliorem,aut eo quodexactiorest,autquodmeliorum, etquod scientiarum aliae quidem sunt contemplativae, aliæ autem activae,alise porro effectivæ,nam unumquodque talium cooruat quidem orationem, at non necessarium est utdicaturad conclusionem.AddiluciditatemautemexemplaetsirnilitudinesafFerendum. Exempla autem accommodata,et ex quibus scimus, qualia Homerus,non qualia Cherilus; sic enim clarius eritquod proponitur.Utendum autem in disserendo,syllogismo quidem ad dialecticos magis quam admultitudinem; inductionevero contra ad multitudinem magis. Dictum est autem etde hiset prius.Est autem in aliquibus quidem inducenti possibileinterrogare universale, in aliquibus vero non facile, eo quod non positum sit similitudinibus nomen omnibus commune,sed quando oportet universale sumere, sic in omnibus talibus esse dicunt.

English

For ornament, however, [one should proceed] by induction and by division of things that are akin. What induction is, then, is evident; but to divide is [to distinguish] things of this sort: that knowledge is better than knowledge, either because it is more exact or because it is of better objects; and that of sciences some are contemplative, others active, and others again productive. For each of these indeed contributes to the argument, but it is not necessary that it be stated up to the conclusion. For clarity, examples and likenesses should be adduced. Examples should be appropriate, and such as we know—like those of Homer, not like those of Cherilus; for thus what is proposed will be clearer. In disputation, one should use syllogism more against the dialecticians than against the multitude, but induction, on the contrary, more against the multitude. These things have been said also earlier. Now in some cases it is possible for one who is inducing to ask the universal, but in some cases it is not easy, because a name common to all [instances] has not been laid down upon the likenesses; but when one ought to take the universal, they say that it is so in all such cases.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:207 · narrative
Source · Latin

Id autem determinare difficillimum est,qualia sunt ea quæ proferuntur hujusmodi,et qualianon,et propter hoc saepenumero dissident in disputationibus,aliiquidem dicentes similia esse quae non sunt similia,alii vero dubitantes quae sunt similia non esse similia.Quare tentandum in omnibus talibus ipsum nomina effingere,ut neque respondenti liceat dubitare quod non similiter quod infertur, dicitur neque interroganti calumniari,ut similiter dicto,eo quod pluraeorum quæ non similiter dicuntur,similiter videntur dici. Quando autem inducenti in pluribus non dederit universale,tunc justum est efflagitare instantiam, non dicente autem ipso in aliquibus sic, non justum est efflagitare5in aliquibus non sic. Oportet enim inducentem prius sic instantiam efflagitare.Efflagitandum autem instantias non in eo quod proponitur ferre, nisi unum tantum sit hujusmodi, ut dualitas parium numerorum solus primus. Nam oportet et eum qui instatin altero instantiamferre,autdicere quod hoc solum tale est. Ad eos autem qui instant universali, non in eodem autem instantiamferunt,sedin aequivoco(utquod habeat aliquis non suum colorem, vel pedem, vel manum, habebit enimpictornon suum colorem,etcocus pedem non suum),dividendo revera in talibus interrogandum est. Nam latente æquivocatione,bene viderentur instare propositioni.

English

To determine, however, what sort of things are those that are brought forward in this way and what sort are not is very difficult, and for this reason people often disagree in disputations, some saying that things which are not similar are similar, while others, doubting, say that things which are similar are not similar. Therefore in all such cases one must attempt to fashion the names themselves, so that neither may the respondent be allowed to doubt that what is inferred is not said similarly, nor may the questioner quibble, on the ground that what is said similarly appears to be said similarly because many of the things that are not said similarly appear so. But when the one inducing has not been granted the universal in many cases, then it is fair to demand an instance; but when he himself has not said so in some cases, it is not fair to demand [an instance] in some cases not so. For the one inducing ought first to demand an instance thus. But instances must not be demanded to be brought against what is proposed, unless there be only one such thing, as duality is the only first of even numbers. For the one who brings an instance in another case ought also to bring an instance, or to say that this alone is such. But against those who bring an instance against the universal, yet do not bring the instance in the same [sense], but in an equivocal one (as that someone has a color, or a foot, or a hand, that is not his own; for the painter will have a color not his own, and the cook a foot not his own), one must in such cases question by dividing. For when the equivocation is hidden, they would seem to bring an instance well against the proposition.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:208 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si autem non in æquivoco, sed in eodem instans praepediat interrogationem,oportet auferentem id in quo instantiaest, proponere reliquum, un;versale faciendo, donec sumat quod utile est. Ut in oblivione, et in oblitum esse, non enim concedunteum qui amisit disciplinam, oblitum esse, eo quod transeunte re amisit quidem disciplinam, oblitusautemnon est; dicendum autem auferenti id in quo instantia est, reliquum: ut si permanente re amisit disciplinam, ideirco oblitum esse. Similiter autem et contra instantes,quoniammajori bono majus opponitur malum, proferunt enim quoniam sanitati minori bono quambonahabitudo,majusmalum opponitur, nam aegritudinem majus esse malum mala habitudine. Auferendumigituret inhocin quo instantia est,nam ablato,magis ponct, ut quoniam majori bono majus malum opponitur, nisi conferat alterum ad alterum, quemadmodumbonahabitudoad sanitatem.Nonsolum autem eo instante hoc faciendum,sed et si sino instantia negat, eo quod praevideat aliquid talium. Nam ablato eo inquo instantia est,compelletur ponere, eo quod non prævideat in reliquo, in aliquo non sic esse. Si autem non ponat, efflagitatus instantiam,non habebitassignare.Suntautem hujusmodi propositionum quae in aliquo falsae sunt, in aliquo autem verae, in his enim par est auferre, reliquum autem verum relinquere. Si autem in multis proponenti non ferat instantiam, postulandum est ponere.

English

If, however, the objection is not based on equivocation but obstructs the question in the same respect, then one who raises the objection must remove that in which the objection consists and propose the remainder, making it universal, until he obtains what is useful. As in the case of forgetfulness and having forgotten: for they do not concede that one who has lost a discipline has forgotten it, on the ground that when the thing passed away he lost the discipline but has not forgotten it. But one who raises the objection must be told to remove that in which the objection consists and state the remainder: for example, if, while the thing remained, he lost the discipline, then for that reason he has forgotten it. Similarly also against those who object that a greater evil is opposed to a greater good; for they bring forward that a greater evil is opposed to health, which is a lesser good than a good habit, since sickness is a greater evil than a bad habit. Therefore this too must be removed, in which the objection consists; for when it is removed, the point is more firmly established—namely, that a greater evil is opposed to a greater good—unless one compares one thing to another, as a good habit to health. And this must be done not only when the objection is present, but also if he denies without an objection, because he foresees something of this sort. For when that in which the objection consists is removed, he will be compelled to concede, since he does not foresee that in the remainder it is not so in some respect. But if he does not concede, when pressed for the objection, he will have nothing to assign. Such propositions, however, are those which are false in one respect but true in another; for in these it is fair to remove one part and leave the remainder true. But if one who proposes many things does not withstand the objection, it must be demanded that he concede.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:209 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam dialectica;est propositio ad quam sic in pluribus se habentem non est instantia. Quando autem contingit idemetsine impossibili et per impossibile syllogizare, demonstranti quidem et non disserenti, nihil refert vel sic vel illo modo syllogismo colligere, differentiautem non est utendum per impossibile syllogismo. Nam si sine impossibili quidem syllogismo colligat,minimetietutdubitent;at quando per impossibilesyllogizant(nisi valde manifestum sitfalsum esse),non I impossibile dicuntesse, quare non fitinterrogantibus quod volunt. Oportet autem proponerequsecunque in pluribusquidemsic se habent.Instantia autem aut omnino non est,aut non in superficie est conspicere, nam qui non possunt conspicere in quibus non sic, tanquam verum quidem sit, ponunt. Non oportet autem conclusionem interrogationem facere. Alioquin autem, eorenuente,non videturlieri syllogismus, nam et sæpe cum noninterrogat, sed ut sequens infert, negant,et hoc facientes non videntur redargui iis qui nonconspiciunt quod accidit ex iis qua; posita sunt. Quando igitur non dicens quidem accidere, interrogabit, ille autem negabit, omnino non videtur fieri syllogismus. Non autem omne universale dialectica propositio esse. ut quid est homo?

English

For a dialectical proposition is one toward which things stand in many cases in such a way that no objection arises. But when it happens that the same thing can be syllogized both without impossibility and through impossibility, for one who demonstrates and is not engaging in dialectic it makes no difference whether he infers by syllogism in this way or that way, but in dialectic one must not use syllogism through impossibility. For if he infers by syllogism without impossibility, they do not doubt; but when they syllogize through impossibility (unless the falsehood is very manifest), they say that it is not impossible, and so what they wish does not come about for those asking questions. One ought, however, to propose whatever stands in many cases in such a way. But an objection either does not exist at all, or it is not easy to see on the surface; for those who cannot see the cases in which it does not hold, assume it as if it were true. But one ought not to make the conclusion a question. Otherwise, when that has come about, a syllogism does not seem to be produced; for often, when he does not ask but infers as a consequence, they deny it, and in doing this they do not seem to be refuted by those who do not see what follows from the things that have been posited. When, therefore, the one who does not state that it follows asks a question, and the other denies it, a syllogism does not seem to come about at all. But not every universal is a dialectical proposition, as, for example, "What is man?

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:210 · narrative
Source · Latin

aut quot modis dicitur bonum?eslenim dialectica propositio, ad quam est respondere, sic vel non; ad dictas autem non est; quare non sunt dialecticae hujusmodiinterrogationes, nisi ipse determinans veldividens dicat,ut,pulasne bonum sic vel non sic dicitur? nam ad talia facilis responsio, vel affirmando, vel negando; quapropter tentandum sic proponere hujusmodi propositionum.Simul autem et justum fortasse ab illo interrogare,quot modis dicitur bonum,quando hoc dividente et proponente,nullo modo concesserit. Quisquis autem unam orationem multo tempore interrogat, male interrogat. Nam si respondeat quidem ei interrogatio quod inter. rogatur, manifestum quod multas interrogationes interrogat,aut frequenter easdem; quare aut nugatur, aut non habet syllogismum,nam expaucisomnissyilogismus. Si vero non respondeat, quid aut non increpat,autdiscedit? Est autem argumentari difficile, et sustinere facile ipsas suppositiones. Sunt autem talia,etquse natura sunt prima,etquae postrema.

English

Or in how many ways is "good" said? For it is a dialectical proposition to which one must answer "so" or "not so"; but to the things said [in such questions] one must not [answer so]; wherefore such interrogations are not dialectical, unless the one who determines or divides says so himself, as, "Is good said in this way or not in this way?" For to such things the answer is easy, either by affirming or by denying; wherefore one must attempt to propound propositions of this sort in this way. At the same time, perhaps it is also just to ask from that [same principle] in how many ways "good" is said, when, with him dividing and propounding this, he will in no way have conceded it. But whoever asks a single statement for a long time asks badly. For if the interrogation answers what is asked, it is clear that he asks many questions, or frequently the same ones; wherefore he either babbles or does not have a syllogism, for a syllogism is from few things. But if he does not answer, what then—does he not rebuke, or depart? But to argue is difficult, and to sustain the suppositions themselves is easy. Such things are both those which are first by nature and those which are last.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:211 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam prima quidem termino egent, postrema vera per multa terminantur,volenti continuum sumere a primis,aut sophisticiP videntur argumentationes: impossibileenimdemonstrarequidpiamesteumquinon incipit a propriis principiis, et connectit usque ad ultima: detinire autem nihili ducunt respondentes, neque si interrogans definierit, advertunt; atqui non facto manifesto quidnam est quod propositum est, non facile est argumentari. Maxime autem quod tale estcirca principia accidit: nam alia quidem perhsec monstrantur, ipsa vero non contingit per alia, sed necesseestdefinitionetalium unumquodque cognoscere. Sunt autem difficile argumentabilia, ei quae valde propinqua sunt principio. Non enim contingit plures ad haec rationes invenire,cum sint pauca media,horumflueetprincipiorum, per quae necesseest monstrare ea quae post illasunt. Terminorum autem difficile argumentabiles ii omnium maximesunt,quicunque utuntur talibus nominibus, quaeprimum quidem immanifesta sunt, simpliciterne dicantur, an multipliciter, adhuc autem quæ neque nota utrum proprie, an secundum metaphoram de definito dicantur. Nam quia obscura sunt, non babet argumenta,quia vero ignorantur si absque metaphora dicitur quod tale est, non habet quod increpet.

English

For the first [terms] indeed need a definition, while the last are bounded by many [terms], for one who wishes to take the continuous [series] from the first; or the argumentations seem sophistic. For it is impossible to demonstrate anything without beginning from proper principles and connecting up to the last [conclusions]. But they think nothing of defining, those who answer, nor do they pay attention if the questioner has defined; and yet, when it has not been made manifest what the proposed thing is, it is not easy to argue. But this happens most of all in the case of things that are such around principles; for some things are shown through these, but these themselves cannot be [shown] through others, but it is necessary to know each one by definition and in other ways. And those things that are very close to the principle are difficult to argue about. For it is not possible to find many accounts for these, since the middle terms are few—both of these and of the principles—through which it is necessary to demonstrate the things that are after them. But of terms, those are most difficult to argue about which use such names as are first indeed unclear, whether they are said simply or in many ways, and further, which are not known whether they are said of the defined thing properly or according to metaphor. For because they are obscure, it has no arguments; but because it is unknown whether what is such is said without metaphor, it has nothing to object.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:212 · narrative
Source · Latin

Omnino autem omne problema quando difficile argumentabile,vel termino indigere arbitrandum est,vel est eorum quæ multipliciter,vel eorum quae secundum metaphoram de definito esse dicantur, vel non longe a principiis,vel quia non manifestum est primum nobis hoc idem, secundum quem dictorum modorum est quod dubitationem præstat. Nam cum est manifestus modus,manifestum quoniam aut definire oportebit,aut dividere,aut medias propositiones invenire. Nam perhsec monstrantur ultima. In multis autem positionibus(nonbeneassignata defi. nitione) non facile disputare ac argumentari, ut utrum unicontrarium,an plura?Definitisautem contrariis aliquo modo,facile est ostendere utrum contingit plura eidem esse contraria, an non. Eodem autem modoet in aliis definitione indigentibus. Videnturautemetin disciplinisquaedam obdefinitionis defectum non facile describi, ut et quoniam quæ ad latus secat planumlinea,similiter dividit et lineam et locum, definitione autem dicta, statim manifestum est quod dicitur. Nam eamdem ablationem habent loca et lineæ; estautem definitioejusorationishaec. Simpliciter autem prima elementorum, positisquidem definitionibus (ut quid linea vel quid circulus), facillimum ostendere,verum non multis ad unumquodque eorum est argumentari,eo quod non sunt multa media; si autem non ponantur principiorum definitiones,difficile, fortasse autem omnino impossibile.

English

But generally, every problem, when it is difficult to argue, must be thought either to need a definition, or to belong to those things that are said in many ways, or to those that are said of the defined thing according to metaphor, or to be not far from the principles, or because this same thing is not manifest to us first, according to which of the said modes it is that provides the doubt. For when the mode is manifest, it is clear that one will need either to define, or to divide, or to find the middle propositions. For through these the last things are shown. But in many positions, when the definition has not been well assigned, it is not easy to dispute and argue, as whether there is one contrary or many. But when the contraries have been defined in some way, it is easy to show whether it happens that many things are contrary to the same thing, or not. And in the same way also in other things that need definition. But in the sciences certain things seem not easily to be described because of a defect of definition, as also that the line which cuts a plane at the side similarly divides both the line and the place; but when the definition has been stated, what is said is immediately manifest. For places and lines have the same removal; and the definition of this is this account. But simply the first elements, when definitions are posited (as what a line is, or what a circle is), it is easiest to show, but it is not for many to argue against each one of them, because there are not many middle terms; but if the definitions of the principles are not posited, it is difficult, and perhaps altogether impossible.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:213 · narrative
Source · Latin

Similiter autem his et in iis quae sunt circa orationes se habet. Non igitur latere oportet,quando difficile argumentabilis est positio, quod passa est aliquid eorum quae dictasunt,quando autem erit ad dignitatem et propositioem, major labor disputare quam ad positionem.Dubitare autem possitquispiam utrum ponendasinttalia,an non: namsi non ponat, sed poscat et ad illa disputare, majus praecipiet quam quod in principio positum est; si vero ponat, credet ex minus credibilibus. Si igitur oportet non dilficilius problema facere,ponendum; si autem per notiora syllogizare, non ponendum. An discenti quidem non ponendum,nisi notius sit, exercilato vero ponendum,si verum solum videatur? Quare manifestum quoniamnon similiter et interroganti et docentiexistimandumesHeponendum.Quo pactoigitur interrogare et ordinare oportet, pene sufficiunt quae dicta sunt.

English

Similarly also in the case of arguments about speeches. It must not be overlooked, then, when a position is difficult to argue, that it has suffered something of what has been said; but when it is directed toward dignity and the proposition, it is a greater labor to dispute than toward the position. But someone might doubt whether such things should be posited or not; for if he does not posit it, but asks for it and disputes toward those things, he will demand more than what was posited at the beginning; but if he does posit it, he will believe from less credible things. If, then, one ought not to make the problem more difficult, it must be posited; but if one ought to syllogize through more known things, it must not be posited. Or, for one who is learning, it must not be posited unless it is more known; but for one who is practiced, it must be posited if only it seems true? Wherefore it is manifest that one must not suppose it should be posited in the same way for the one who asks and the one who teaches. In what way, then, one ought to ask and order, what has been said is nearly sufficient.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:214 · narrative
Source · Latin

CAPUT III.

Loci pro respondente.

De responsione autem primum quidem determinandum quodnam est opus benerespondentis,quemadmodum bene interrogantis. Estauteminterrogantis quidem sicdeducere orationem,ut faciat respondentem dicere inopinabiliora quam ea quae propter positionem sunt necessaria; respondentis vero non propter se apparere,accidere impossibile,aut quod praeter opinionem est, sed propter positionem: nam alterum fortasse peccatum, ponere primum quod non oportet, et positum non servare aliquo modo. Quia autem sunt indeterminata iis qui propter exercitationem et experientiam orationes faciunt (nam non eaedem considerationes et discentibus,et do * centibus,et concertantibus, neque his et iis qui exercent se invicem inspectionis gratia: nam discentiquidemponendasuntsemperea quæ videntur; neque enim conatur falsum ullus docere, concertantium vero interrogantem quidem videri aliquid facere oportet omnino, respondentem autem nihil videri pati),eL in dialecticis congressionibus quæ non concertationis gratia,sed experimenti et inspectionis orationes faciunt, nondum enucleatum est quo pacto oportat conjectare respondentem, et qualia dare, et qualia non, ad bene aut non bene servandam posiLionem; quoniam, inquam,nihil habemus traditum ab aliis,ipsi aliquid dicere tentemus.

English

CHAPTER III.

Commonplaces for the respondent.

Concerning the response, then, we must first determine what the task of the good respondent is, just as what the task of the good questioner is. For it is the task of the questioner so to draw out the argument as to make the respondent say things less in accord with opinion than those which are necessary on account of the position; but it is the task of the respondent not to appear to have something impossible, or contrary to opinion, happen on his own account, but on account of the position; for perhaps the one is a fault—to lay down first what one ought not, and in some way not to preserve what has been laid down. But since these matters are indefinite for those who conduct arguments for the sake of practice and experience (for the considerations are not the same for learners, for teachers, and for competitors, nor again for these and for those who exercise themselves against one another for the sake of examination; for learners must always lay down the things that seem so, for no one tries to teach what is false; but in the case of competitors, the questioner must by all means seem to be doing something, while the respondent must seem to be suffering nothing), and in dialectical encounters which conduct arguments not for the sake of competition but for the sake of experiment and examination, it has not yet been made clear in what way the respondent ought to form his conjectures, and what sorts of things he should grant and what he should not, for the good or bad preservation of the position; since, I say, we have nothing handed down from others, let us ourselves attempt to say something.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:215 · narrative
Source · Latin

Necesseestautem respondentem sustinere orationem, ponendo aut probabilem,autimprobabilempositionem,aut neutram,et aut simpliciter probabilem, aut improbabilem,autindeterminate,uthuic alicui, vel alii. Nihil autem refert quomodocunque, dum ea probabilis aut improbabilis sit; nam idem modus erit bene respondendi,vel dandi,vel non dandi quod interrogatum est: nam cum improbabilis est positio,necesse est et conclusionem probabilem fieri, cum vero probabilis,improbabilem.Nam oppositum semper positionis interrogans concludet; si autem neque probabiie,neque improbabile quod positum est,et conclusio erit talis. Quoniamautembenesyllogizans,ex probabilioribus et notioribus, propositum demonstrat, manifestum est quod, quando simpliciter est improbabile quod proponitur, non dandum est respondenti,nec quod non videtur simpliciter,nec quod videtur quidem, minus autem conclusione videtur. Nam cum improbabilis est positio, probabilis est conclusio. Quare oportet quae sumunturprobabiliaesseomniaet magis probabilia quam quod proponitur, si debet per notiora quod minus notum est concludi. Quare si neque tale est quidpiam eorum quae interrogantur,non ponendum est respondenti.

English

The respondent must maintain the argument by positing a position that is either probable or improbable, or neither, and either simply probable or improbable, or indeterminate, as being so to this person or to another. It makes no difference in what way, provided it be probable or improbable; for the same manner of responding well will apply, whether granting or not granting what was asked. For when the position is improbable, the conclusion must necessarily become probable; but when it is probable, the conclusion becomes improbable. For the questioner will always conclude the opposite of the position; and if what was posited is neither probable nor improbable, the conclusion will be of the same sort. Since, then, one who syllogizes well demonstrates the proposed thesis from more probable and better-known premises, it is clear that when what is proposed is simply improbable, it must not be granted by the respondent—nor what does not seem so simply, nor what indeed seems so but seems less so than the conclusion. For when the position is improbable, the conclusion is probable. Therefore all the premises assumed must be probable and more probable than what is proposed, if what is less known is to be concluded through things better known. Hence if none of the things asked is of this sort, the respondent must not grant it.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:216 · narrative
Source · Latin

Simpliciter autem si est probabilis positio,dilucidum est,quoniam conclusio simpliciter improbabiiin,ponendum igitur et quae videnturomnia,et eorum quae non videntur,quaecunque minus sunt improbabilia conclusione.Nam sufficientersic videbitur disceptatum esse. Similiter autem erit,et si neque improbabilis,neque probabilis est positio. Nam sic et quae videntur omnia dandum, et eorum quae non videntur,quæcunque minus sunt improbabilia conclusione, sic enim probabiliores accidit orationes fieri.Si igitur simpliciter quidem probabile vel improbabile quod ponitur, ad ea quae videntur simpliciter comparatio facienda. Si autem non simpliciter probabile vel improbabib sit quod ponitur,sed respondenti,ad seipsum,quod videtur, et quod non videtur judicando, ponendum, vel non ponendum. Si vero alterius opinionem tutetur respondens, manifestum quoniam ad illius intelligentiam aspiciendo,ponere singula debetet negare; quare et qui curant extraneas opiniones (ut bonum et malum esse idem,quemadmodum Hpraclitus inquit,) non dant non adesse simul contraria eidem, non videntur eis haec,sed quia secundum Heraclitum sic dicendum.Faciunthoc autem et qui suscipiuntab invicem positiones; conjectant enim ac si is dicat qui ponit. Manifestum igitur quae conjectandum respondenti, sive simpliciter probabile, sive alicui positum est.

English

But if the position is simply probable, it is clear that the conclusion is simply improbable; therefore one must grant both all things that seem so and, of those that do not seem so, whatever are less improbable than the conclusion. For in this way the debate will seem to have been conducted sufficiently. It will be the same also if the position is neither improbable nor probable. For in that case too one must grant all things that seem so, and of those that do not seem so, whatever are less improbable than the conclusion; for in this way the arguments come to be more probable. If, then, what is posited is simply probable or improbable, the comparison must be made with things that seem so simply. But if what is posited is not simply probable or improbable, but probable or improbable to the respondent, one must judge by reference to the respondent himself, granting or not granting what seems so and what does not seem so. But if the respondent is defending another person's opinion, it is clear that, looking to that person's understanding, he ought to grant or deny each point; wherefore those who concern themselves with foreign opinions (for example, that good and evil are the same, as Heraclitus says) do not grant that contraries cannot belong to the same thing at the same time—these things do not seem so to them, but they say it must be spoken of in accordance with Heraclitus. Those also do this who take over positions from one another; for they conjecture as though the one who posits were saying it. It is clear, therefore, what the respondent must conjecture, whether what is posited is simply probable or probable to someone.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:217 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quoniam autem est necesse omne quod interrogatur aut probabile aut improbabile esse,aut neutrum, et ad orationem aut non ad orationem attinere quod interrogatur,si sit quidem quod videtur, et non ad orationem,dandum est dicendo quod videtur. Non enim interimitur (posito eo) quod in principio. Si vero non videtur, et non ad orationem,dandum quirlem,et consignificandum quod non videtur, ad devitationem absurditalis. Si vero sit ad orationem, et videatur, dicendum quoniam videtur quidem,sed valde propinquum ei quod in principio est,et interimitur (eo posito)quod propositum est. Si autem ad orationem quidem, valde autem probabile postulatum,dicendum quod accidit hoc posito, at valde absurdum esse quod proponitur.Si vero neque probabile,neque improbabile, si nihil quidem ad orationem, dandum nihil determinando.Si autem ad orationem,consignificandum quod interimitur (posito eo) quod in principio est. Nam sic et qui respondet nihil videbitur propter hoc pati, siquidem praevidens singula, posuerit, et qui interrogat assequitur syllogismum positis ab eo omnibus probabilioribus conclusione. Quicunque vero non ex probabilioribus conclusione conantur syllogizare,perspicuum quoniam non bene syllogizant, quare cum sic interrogant, non ponendum.

English

Since it is necessary that everything asked be either probable or improbable or neither, and that what is asked pertain either to the argument or not to the argument: if it is what seems so and does not pertain to the argument, it must be granted by saying what seems so. For the point at the beginning is not destroyed when this is posited. But if it does not seem so and does not pertain to the argument, it must indeed be granted, and one must also signify that it does not seem so, to avoid absurdity. But if it pertains to the argument and seems so, one must say that it indeed seems so, but that it is very close to the point at the beginning, and the proposed point is destroyed when this is posited. But if it pertains to the argument and the postulate is very probable, one must say that this follows when it is posited, but that what is proposed is very absurd. But if it is neither probable nor improbable, if it in no way pertains to the argument, it must be granted without any determination. But if it pertains to the argument, one must signify that the point at the beginning is destroyed when this is posited. For thus the one who answers will seem to suffer nothing on this account, if indeed, foreseeing each point, he has posited it, and the one who asks attains the syllogism when all the things more probable than the conclusion have been posited by him. But whoever attempt to syllogize from things not more probable than the conclusion, it is clear that they do not syllogize well; therefore when they ask in this way, it must not be granted.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:218 · narrative
Source · Latin

Similiter autem et in iis quæ obscure et multipliciter dicuntur occurrendum est.Nam quia datum est respondenti,non discenti,dicere non disco, et multipliciter dictum, non ex necessitate confiteri vel negare,manifestum quoniam primum quidem nisi planum sit quod dicitur, non cunctandum ut dicat haud intelligo, nam saepe ex eo quod non clare interrogantibus dant, occurrit aliquid difficile. Si autem notum quidem sit,multipliciter autem dictum; si in omnibus quidemverum vel falsum sit quod dicitur,dandum simpliciter quod dicitur, vel negandum;si vero in aliquo quidem sit verum, in aliquo autem falsum, significandum est quod multipliciter dicitur,et quia hoc quidem falsum, illud autem verum.Nam cum posterius distinguitur, immanifestum si et in principio ambiguum animadverterit.Si autem non praeviderit dubium, sed in alterum aspiciens posuerit,dicendum ad eum qui in alterum ducit,quoniam non ad id aspiciens dedi, sed ad alterum eorum. Nam pluribus existentibus quae sub eodem nomine,vel eadem oratione sunt, facilis est ambiguitas.Si vero et dilucidum sit et simplex quod interrogatur,aut sic, aut non respondendum. Quoniamsutemomnispropositio syllogistica,autearum aliqua est ex quibus syllogismus, aut propter aliquam illarum, manifestum quod quandoque alterius gratia sumetur exeoquodplurasimiliainterrogant.

English

Similarly also one must meet arguments in matters that are obscure and stated in many senses. For since it is granted to the respondent, not to the learner, to say "I do not learn," and since what is said in many senses need not be affirmed or denied of necessity, it is clear that, in the first place, unless what is said is plain, one should not hesitate to say "I do not understand"; for often, from the very fact that they grant something to questioners who are not clear, some difficulty arises. But if what is said is indeed known, yet stated in many senses: if what is said is true or false in all respects, one must simply grant or deny what is said; but if it is true in one respect and false in another, one must point out that it is said in many senses, and that this is false while that is true. For when the distinction is made afterward, it is unclear whether he noticed the ambiguity at the outset as well. But if he has not foreseen the doubt, but looking to one sense has laid it down, one must say to the one who leads him to the other sense that it was not with regard to that that I granted it, but with regard to the other of them. For when there are many things that fall under the same name or the same account, ambiguity is easy. But if what is asked is both clear and simple, one must answer either thus or not. And since every syllogistic proposition is either one of those from which the syllogism is formed, or is for the sake of one of them, it is clear that sometimes something will be assumed for the sake of another, from the fact that they ask many similar things.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:219 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam aut per inductionem, aut per similitudinem, plerumque universale sumunt; singularis igituromnia ponendum,3i sintveraet probabilia.Ad universale aut tentandum instantiam ferre. Nam sine instantia vel quæ sit, vel quæ videatur, prohibere orationem,protervire est; si igitur multis apparentibus non dederit universale qui non habet instantiam,manifestum est quoniam protervit. Amplius, si neque contra argument'ari babeat quod non verum,multo magis videbitur protervire,quamvis nec hoc sufficiat; nam complureso rationes opinionibus contrarias habemus,quas difficile est solvere, velut Zenonis, quod non contingit moveri, neque stadium pertransire, sed non propter id quas sunt opposita his non ponendum.Si igiturqui neque contra argumentari habet,neque instare,non ponit dilucidum, quoniam protervit.Est enim in disputationibus protervia responsio præter dictos mod os, syllogismi deAtructio.Sustinere autem et positionem et definitionem, ipsum sibi ipsi oportet praeargumentando. Nam ex quibus interimunt interrogantes quod proponitur,manifestumquoniam iis adversandum.Inopinabilem vera suppositionem cavendum sustinere.

English

For they mostly take the universal either by induction or by similarity; therefore all the singulars must be laid down as true and probable. But against the universal one must attempt to bring an instance. For to block the argument without an instance, either one that is or one that seems to be, is to be shameless; if, then, when many things appear so, he does not grant the universal who has no instance, it is clear that he is shameless. Further, if he has nothing to argue against it as not true, he will much more seem to be shameless, although not even this suffices; for we have many arguments contrary to opinions which are difficult to solve, such as Zeno's, that motion does not occur, nor can the stadium be traversed, but not on that account are the things opposed to these not to be laid down. If, therefore, he who has nothing to argue against nor to bring an instance does not grant what is clear, it is evident that he is shameless. For in disputations shamelessness is a response beyond the said modes, the destruction of a syllogism. But one must sustain both the position and the definition by arguing beforehand against himself. For from the things by which the questioners destroy what is proposed, it is clear that these must be opposed. But an unbelievable supposition must be guarded against sustaining.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:220 · narrative
Source · Latin

Eritauteminopinabilismultipliciter nameteaexqua absona contingit dicere (ut si omnia dicat aliquis moveri, aut nihil), et quaecunque pejoris majoris esse eligenda, et quae contraria, consiliis, ut quod voluptas bonum,etinjuriam facere melius quam injuriam pati, nam non ut orationis gratia sustinentem, sed ut ea quae videantur dicentem oderunt. Quæcunque vero orationum falsum sylJogizant,soIvendum interimendo id propter quod fil falsum. Nam non is qui quodvis interimit solvit,ne quidem si falsum est quod interimiturjbabere enim potest plura falsa oratio,ut si quis sumat sedentem scribere. Socratem vero sedere, accidit enim ex his, Socratem scribere; interempto igitur Socratem sedere,nihil magis soluta est oratio,quamvis falsum sit postulatum,sed non propterid oratio falsa.Nam si quis sit sedens,non scribens autem,non amplius in tali apte accommodabitur eadem solutio; quare non id interimendum, sed sedentem scribere, non enim omnis qui sedet scribit. Solvit igitur omnino, qui interimit id propter quod fitfalsum,novit autem solutionem qui scit quod propter id falsa oratio, quemadmodum in iis quae falso describuntur; non enim sufficit instare,ne quidem si falsum sit quod interimitur,sed et id propterquod falsum,assignandum; sic enim erit manifestum utrum praevidens aliquid, an non, facit instantiam.

English

But it will be possible to object in many ways; for both those things from which something absurd results (for example, if someone says that all things move, or that nothing does), and whatever things are to be chosen as belonging to the worse and the greater, and whatever things are contrary to counsels—for example, that pleasure is good, and that to do injustice is better than to suffer injustice; for they do not endure it for the sake of argument, but they hate the one who says what seems to them, as if he were speaking his own opinion. But whatever arguments falsely conclude, one must solve by destroying that on account of which the falsehood results. For it is not the one who destroys any premise whatever who solves the argument, not even if what he destroys is false; for an argument can have several false premises—for example, if someone assumes that a seated man writes, and that Socrates is seated; for from these it follows that Socrates writes. Therefore, once "Socrates is seated" has been destroyed, the argument is no more solved, although the assumption was false, but the argument was not false on account of this. For if someone is seated but not writing, the same solution will no longer fit appropriately in such a case; therefore one must destroy not this, but "a seated man writes"; for not everyone who sits writes. Therefore he solves the argument altogether who destroys that on account of which the falsehood comes about, but he knows the solution who knows that the argument is false on account of this, as in the case of those things that are falsely described; for it is not enough to object, not even if what is destroyed is false, but one must also assign that on account of which it is false; for in this way it will be clear whether he makes the objection with some foresight or not.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:221 · narrative
Source · Latin

CAPUT IV.

Loci communes pro interrogante et respondente.

Est autem orationem prohibere concludi quadrupliciter. Nam aut interimendo id propter quod fit falsum,aut ad interrogantem instantiam dicendo: saepe enim non solvit quidem,qui tamen interrogat non potest longius producere. Tertium autem ad interrogata,accidit enim exinterrogatisquidem non fieri quod volumus, eo quod non bene interrogata sint,additoautem aliquo, fieri conclugionem.Siigitur non amplius potest producere interrogans,ad interrogantem erit instantia, si autem potest, ad interrogata. Quartum autem, pessima est instantiarum quae est ad tempus,nam quidam talibus instant ad quae disputare pluris est temporis,quam praesentis exercitationis;instantiae igitur, ut dictum est prius, quatuor modis fiunt. Solutio autem est earum quae dictas sunt, prima tantum, reliquæ autem prohibitiones quaedam et impedimenta conclusionum. Inculpatiovero orationis et secundum ipsam orationem,et quandointerrogatur non eadem.Plerumque. enim quod non bene disputatur oralio,is qui interrogatur estcausaeo quod nonconcedatexquibusprobe erat disputare ad positionem,nam non est in altero solo bene absolvere commune opus. Necessarium igitur quandoque ad dicentem.etnonadpositionem argumentari,quando is qui respondet contraria interroganti observat corroborans; protervientes igitur altercatorias, et non dialecticas faciunt exercitationes.

English

CHAPTER IV.

Common topics for the questioner and the respondent.

Now there are four ways of preventing an argument from being concluded. For either by removing that on account of which the falsehood arises, or by raising an objection against the questioner; for often he does not indeed solve it, yet the questioner cannot draw it out any further. The third is against the things asked; for it happens that what we wish is not brought about from the things asked, because they have not been asked well, but with something added, the conclusion is brought about. If, then, the questioner can no longer draw it out, the objection will be against the questioner; but if he can, it will be against the things asked. The fourth is the worst of objections, that which is directed to time; for some raise objections to such things as require more time to dispute than the present exercise allows. Objections, then, as was said before, come about in four ways. But the solution of those that have been mentioned applies only to the first; the rest are certain preventions and hindrances of conclusions. But the censure of an argument is both in accordance with the argument itself and, when the question is put, is not the same. For often the argument is not well disputed, and the one who is questioned is the cause, because he does not concede the things from which it was proper to dispute with a view to the position; for it is not in one party alone to accomplish well a common task. It is necessary, then, sometimes to argue against the speaker and not against the position, when the respondent, strengthening his case, watches for things contrary to the questioner; those who are contentious, then, make their exercises contentious and not dialectical.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:222 · narrative
Source · Latin

Amplius autem, quia exercitationis et experimenti gratia,et non doctrinæ hujusmodi sunt orationes,perspicuum quoniam non solum vera syllogizandum, verum etiam falsum, nec per vera semper, sed quandoque et per falsa-; saepe enim vero posito, interimere necesse est disputantem: quare proponenda falsa,quandoque autem et falso posito, interimendum per falsa, nihil enim prohibet alicui videri quae non sunt magis quam vera; quapropter ex iis quae illi videntur oratione facta, magis erit suasus quam adjutus.Oport.et autem eum qui bene transfert,dialectice et non contentiose transferre; ut geometram geometrice, sive falsum, sive verum sit quod concludendum est;quales autem dialectici syllogismi,dictum est prius.Quoniam autem malus particeps,qui impedit communeopus,patet quod et in orationibus,nam commune quidpiam quod proponitur et in illis est, præterquam in concertantibus; his autem non est eumdem utrisquefinemassequi, nam plurcs unoimpossibile est vincere. Differt autem nihil sive in respondendo,sive in interrogando fiat, nam et qui contentiose interrogat, prave disputat; et qui in respondendo non dat quod videtur,neque suscipitquicquamquod vult interrogans interrogare. Manifestum igitur ex iis quae dicta quod non similiter inculpandum et secundum seipsam orationem et interrogantem.

English

Furthermore, since discussions of this kind are for the sake of exercise and experience, and not for the sake of this kind of teaching, it is clear that one must syllogize not only what is true but also what is false, and not always through true premises but sometimes also through false ones; for often, when something true has been posited, it is necessary to destroy the disputant. Therefore one must sometimes propose false premises, and sometimes, when something false has been posited, one must destroy the opponent through false premises. For nothing prevents certain things from appearing to someone more than the truth does; hence, when the argument is constructed from what appears to that person, he will be persuaded rather than helped. But the one who transfers well ought to transfer dialectically and not contentiously, as a geometer does geometrically, whether what is to be concluded is false or true. What kind of dialectical syllogisms there are has been said earlier. Since, however, the bad participant is the one who hinders the common work, it is clear that this also applies in discussions; for something common is also proposed in them, except among those who are contending. For these do not have the same end for both parties, since it is impossible for more than one to win. It makes no difference whether this happens in responding or in questioning, for the one who questions contentiously also disputes badly, and the one who in responding does not grant what appears to be the case, nor accepts whatever the questioner wishes to ask. It is clear, therefore, from what has been said that the argument itself and the questioner are not to be blamed in the same way.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:223 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam nihil prohibet orationem quidem pravam esse, interrogantem vero, ut possibile est, optime contra respondentem disceptare, nam contra protervos non possibile fortasse statimsumere quales quis vult, sed quales fieri possibile faciendi syllogismi. Quoniam autem est indeterminatum quando contraria,et quando ea quæ sunt in principio sumunt homines (nam plerumque per se ipsos dicentes contraria dicunt,et abnuentes prius, dant posterius,eo quod interroganti et contraria et quae in principio plerumque obediunt), necesse est pravas fieri disputationes;causaautem est qui respondeL hæc quidem non dans,illa autem talia dans;manifestum igitur quoniam non similiterinculpandum et interrogantes et orationes. Orationes autem secundum seipsas quinque sunt inculpationes.Prima quidem quando ex interrogatis non concluditur, neque quod propositum est neque omnino quidquam, cum sint vel falsa,vel inopinabilia, quo omnia, aut plurima, in quibus consistere debet conclusio, et nequo ablatis quibusdam,neque additis, neque his quidem ablatis, Illis vero additis, fit conclusio.

English

For nothing prevents the argument itself from being faulty while the questioner, as far as possible, disputes against the respondent in the best way; for against contentious persons it is perhaps not possible immediately to assume such premises as one wishes, but only such as are possible for producing a syllogism. Since, however, it is undetermined when people assume contraries and when they assume the things that are in the beginning (for often, when speaking by themselves, they state contraries, and having denied the earlier points they grant the later, because in response to the questioner they generally yield both contraries and the things that are in the beginning), it is necessary that faulty discussions arise; and the cause is the respondent, who does not grant some things and grants others of such a kind. It is clear, therefore, that questioners and arguments are not to be blamed alike. But arguments, considered in themselves, have five grounds of blame. The first is when the conclusion does not follow from the things asked, neither the proposed conclusion nor anything at all, since the premises are either false or not generally accepted, from which—all or most of them—the conclusion ought to consist, and neither when certain things are removed nor when things are added, nor when some are removed and others added, does the conclusion follow.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:224 · narrative
Source · Latin

Secundaautem,siad positionem non fiat syllogismus, et ex talibus,et eo modo quo dictum est prius.Tertia vero si additis quibusdam fiat syllogismus, hæc ' autem sint deteriora iis quæ interrogantur,et minus probabilia conclusione,etiamsi ablatis quibusdam, nam quandoque sumunt plura necessariis, quare non eo quod hæc sunt, fit syllogismus. Amplius, si ex inopinabilioribus, et minus credibilibus conclusione, aut si ex veris, sed majore opera indigentibus demonstrari,quam problema; non oportet autem ex omnibus problematis syllogismos existimare similiter probabiles esse et suasibiles;natura enim statim sunt aliqua quidem faciliora,alia vero difficiliora eorum quae interrogantur, quare si ex aliquibus, ut fieri potest, maxime probabilibus,conjeoturam fecerit,disputatum bene est.

English

The second, however, is if the syllogism does not come about in relation to the position, both from such things and in the manner stated earlier. The third, truly, is if the syllogism comes about with certain things added, but these are worse than the things asked and less probable than the conclusion, even if certain things are removed; for sometimes they assume more than is necessary, wherefore the syllogism does not come about because of these things. Further, if from things more unexpected and less credible than the conclusion, or if from true things but ones requiring greater effort to demonstrate than the problem; for it is not right to think that syllogisms from all problems are similarly probable and persuasive; for by nature some of the things asked are immediately easier, others harder, wherefore if from some things, as far as possible the most probable, he has made a conjecture, the dispute has been conducted well.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:225 · narrative
Source · Latin

Manifestum igitur quoniam orationis non eadem inculpatio,et ad problema,et secundum se.Nam nihil secundum se quidem orationem prohibetesse vituperabilem, ad problema autem laudabilem, et rursum diverso, secundum se quidem laudabilem,ad problema autem vituperabilem, quando ex pluribus est facile cum probabilibus tumverisconcludere.Erit autem quandoque oratio etiam concludens quam non concludens deterior,quando illa quidem ex absurdis concludit, cum non sit tale problema,haec autem indigeat talibus quæ sunt probabilia et vera, et nondum ex assumptis sit oratio.Eos autem qui perfalsaverum concludunt,non justum est inculpare. Nam falsum quidem semper necesse est per falsa syllogizare,verum autem est quandoque per falsa syllogizare,manifestum autem id ex Analyticis.Cum autem demonstratio sit alicujus dicta oratio, si aliquid est aliud quod ad conclusionem nullo modo se habet non erit ex illo syllogismus;si autem appareat, sophisma erit, non demonstratio.Est autem philosophema quidem syllgismus demonstrativus,epichirema autem syllogismus dialecticus, sophisma vero syllogismus contentiosus, aporema autem syllogismus dialecticus contradictionis.Si vero ex utrisque quas videantur aliquid ostendatur,non autem similiter videantur, nihil prohibet quod ostenditur magis altero videri.

English

It is manifest, therefore, that the same accusation does not apply to an argument both in relation to the problem and in itself. For nothing prevents an argument from being blameworthy in itself, yet praiseworthy in relation to the problem; and again, conversely, praiseworthy in itself, yet blameworthy in relation to the problem, when it is easy to conclude from many things both probable and true. Sometimes, moreover, an argument that concludes will be worse than one that does not conclude, when the former concludes from absurdities, although the problem is not of that sort, while the latter requires things that are probable and true, and the argument is not yet based on the assumptions. But it is not just to blame those who conclude the true through the false. For it is always necessary to syllogize the false through the false, but it is sometimes possible to syllogize the true through the false; and this is manifest from the Analytics. Since demonstration is an argument that has been stated of something, if there is anything else that in no way relates to the conclusion, there will be no syllogism from it; but if it appears to be so, it will be a sophism, not a demonstration. A philosopheme is a demonstrative syllogism, an epichireme is a dialectical syllogism, a sophism is a contentious syllogism, and an aporema is a dialectical syllogism of contradiction. But if something is shown from both [sets of premises] as they appear, yet they do not appear alike, nothing prevents what is shown from appearing more [convincing] by one than the other.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:226 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed si hoc quidem videatur, illud autem neutra parte,aut si hoc quidem videatur, illud autem non videatur;si similiter quidem, similiter utique erit, et non;si autem magis alterum, sequetur quod est magis. Est autem quoddam et idem ad syllogismos peccatum,quando ostenditur per longioraquod contingit per breviora,et quæ orationi assunt. Ut quod est opinio magis altera quam altera, si quis petat ipsum quodque maxime esse,esse autem opinabile, ipsum quod vere est;quare quorumdam magis esse ipsum; ad quod autem magis, magis dicitur esse, esse autem et ipsam opinionem veram, an erit accuratius,quam par sit exigens quædam? Petitum est autem et ipsam opinionem veram esse, et ipsum quodque maxime esse,ac si ipsa opinio vera,certior sit; sed quæ nequitia major, quam quan facit circa id cujus est oratio latere causam? Oratio autem est manifesta uno quidem modo,et publicissimo,si sit concludens sic, ut nihil oporteat interrogare, uno autem et qui maxime dicitur,cum sumpta quidem sint ex quibus necessarium est conclusionem esse, quae quidem sint per conclusiones conclusa,etiamsi id mittitur quod valde probabile est.

English

But if this one thing seems so, and that other on neither side; or if this one seems so, but that other does not seem so; if they are alike, it will likewise be and not be; but if one is more, what is more will follow. There is also a certain same fault in syllogisms, when what can be shown through shorter means is shown through longer ones, and through what is present in the speech. For example, that one opinion is more than another, if someone asks that each thing itself is most of all, and that what truly is is opinable; wherefore certain things are more themselves; but that toward which it is more is said to be more, and that the opinion itself is true—or will it be more exact than is fitting, demanding certain things? But it has been assumed both that the opinion itself is true and that each thing itself is most of all, as if the opinion itself, being true, were more certain; but what wickedness is greater than that which he causes to lie hidden the cause concerning that of which the speech is? But the speech is manifest in one way, and that the most common, if it concludes in such a way that nothing need be asked; and in another way, which is most spoken of, when those things have been assumed from which the conclusion is necessary, which things have been concluded through conclusions, even if that which is very probable is passed over.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:227 · narrative
Source · Latin

CAPUT V.

Pro opponente ei respondente loci communes.

Falsa autem oratio vocatur quadrupliciter. Uno quidem modo,quando apparet concludere quae non concludit,vocatur autem apparens,litigiosus syllogismus. Alio modo, quando concludit quidem, non tamen ad propositum,quod accidit maximein iis quae ad impossibile ducunt. Aut ad propositum quidem concludit,non tamen secundum propriam disciplinam: hoc autem est,si ea quae non est medicinalis videatur esse medicinalis,aut geometrica quas non est geometrica,autdialectica quæ non est dialectica, sive verum,sive falsum sit quod accidit.Alio autem modo,si per falsa non concludit, hujus autem erit quandoque quidem conclusio falsa,quandoque autem vera;nam falsum quidem semper per falsaconcludit, verum autem possibile est et non per vera,utdictum est prius. Quod autem falsa sit oratio,dicentis peccatum potius est quam orationis; at ne quid dicentis semper, sed cum lateat ipsum quod falsam orationem dixit aliquam,eo quod ab ipso suscipimus cum pluribus veri quidpiam amplius, si ex iis quae maxime videntur interi mit aliquid verorum(talis enim existens verorum demonstratio est), oportet sane positorum aliquid non esse omnino,quare erithujus demonstratio. Si autem verum concludat per falsa, et valde absurda, compluribus deterior erit quae falsum syllogizant; erit autem talis,et quae falsum I concludit.

English

CHAPTER V.

The common topics for the one who opposes and the one who responds.

A false argument is so called in four ways. In one way, when it appears to conclude what it does not conclude; and it is called an apparent, contentious syllogism. In another way, when it does conclude, but not to the point at issue, which happens most of all in those arguments that lead to the impossible. Or it does conclude to the point at issue, but not according to the proper discipline: this happens if what is not medicine appears to be medicine, or what is not geometry appears to be geometry, or what is not dialectic appears to be dialectic, whether what results be true or false. In another way, if it does not conclude through false premises; of this kind there will sometimes be a false conclusion, sometimes a true one; for a false conclusion always concludes through false premises, but a true one can also conclude not through true premises, as was said before. But that the argument be false is rather the fault of the speaker than of the argument; yet not always of the speaker, but when it escapes his notice that he has stated some false argument, in that we receive from him, along with many true things, something more besides, if from the things that seem most evident he inserts something of the true (for such a demonstration is of true things), it is surely necessary that something of the premises not be altogether [true], and so the demonstration will be of this kind. But if it concludes something true through false and very absurd premises, it will be worse than many arguments that syllogize a false conclusion; and such an argument will be one that concludes a false conclusion.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:228 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quare manifestum quod prima quidem consideralio orationis secundum se ipsam est, si concludit secunda autem,utrum verum an falsum; tertia vero ex qualibus quibusdam.Nam si ex falsis quidem, opinabilibus autem, rationabilis; si autem existentibus quidem, sed inopinabilibus, prava; si vero et falsa et valde inopinabilia sint, dilucidum quod prava, aut simpliciter, aut ad rem. Id autem quod in principio etcontraria quonam pactopeteret interrogans,secundum veritatem quidem in Analyticis dictum est, secundum opinionem vero nunc dicendum est. Petere autem videntur id quod (estin principio quinque modis. Manifestissimo quidem et primo, si quis idipsum quod monstrari oporteat petat,hoc autem in eo ipso quidem non facile latere; potest, in synonimis autem, et in quibuscunque nomen et oratio idem significat, magis. Secundo autem,quando quod particulariter oporteat demonstrare universaliter quis petat,ut qui argumentatur quod contrariorum una disciplina,omnium oppositorum postulaverit unam esse,nam videtur id quod oportebat secundum se ostendere cum aliis petere pluribus. Tertio, si quid quod universaliter est ostendere propositum particulariter petit, ut si de omnibus contrariis propositum est, de aliquibus postulet: videtur enim hic quod cum pluribus oportebat ostendere secundum se extra petere.

English

Therefore it is clear that the first consideration of a speech is according to itself, whether it concludes; the second, whether it is true or false; the third, from what sort of premises it is composed. For if it is from false but reputable premises, it is reasonable; if from true but disreputable premises, it is base; but if the premises are both false and thoroughly disreputable, it is clear that it is base, either simply or in relation to the matter. But in what way one who questions would beg the principle and the contraries, has been stated according to truth in the Analytics, but must now be stated according to opinion. They seem to beg what is in the principle in five ways. Most manifestly and first, if someone asks for that very thing which ought to be demonstrated; but this is not easily concealed in the thing itself, though it can be more so in synonyms and in all cases where a name and a definition signify the same thing. Second, when someone asks universally for what ought to be demonstrated particularly, as one who argues that there is one discipline of contraries has postulated that there is one of all opposites; for he seems to ask, along with many other things, that very thing which ought to have been shown according to itself. Third, if someone asks particularly for what was proposed to be shown universally, as if, when the proposal concerns all contraries, he asks for some of them; for this man seems to beg, apart from the question, that which ought to have been shown along with many things.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:229 · narrative
Source · Latin

Rursus, si quis dividens petat problema, ut si oportet ostendere medicinam sani et aegri, extra utrumque postulet,aut si qui eorum quae sequuntur se invicem ex necessitate alterum petat, ut latus incommensurabile essediametro,sioporteat ostendere quod diameter lateri. Æqualiter autem et contraria petunt ei quod ex principio est. Nam primo quidem si quis opposita petat secundum affirmationem et negationem; secundo autem contraria secundum oppositionem,ut bonum et malum idem; tertio vero si quis universaliter postulans, particulariter petierit coDtradicLionem.Ut si quis sumens contrariorum unam disciplinam, sani et ægri alteram esse petat; aut si hoc petens in universali oppositionem tentet sumere.Rursum si quis petat contrarium ei quod ex necessitate accidit per ea quae posita sunt,et si quis ea quidem non sumat quae opposita,at alia petat duo,ex quibus erit opposita contradictio.Differt autem coctrariasumeretantillum ab eo quod est in principio,quoniam hujus quidem est peccatum ad conclusionem (nam adillamaspicientes,quod in principio est dicimus petere); contraria autem sunt in propositionibus eo quod ipsae aliquo modo se habent ad invicem. Adgymnasiam autem et exercitationemtaliumorationumprimumquidem convertere assuescere oportet orationes.

English

Again, if someone, while making a division, begs the question—for example, if one must show that medicine is of the healthy and the sick, and he asks for one of these outside both; or if, of things that follow one another by necessity, he asks for one of them, as that the side is incommensurable with the diameter, if one must show that the diameter is so with the side. And in the same way they also beg things contrary to what follows from the principle. For first, if someone asks opposites according to affirmation and negation; second, contraries according to opposition, as that good and evil are the same; third, if someone, asking universally, begs the contradiction particularly—as if someone, assuming that there is one science of contraries, asks that the science of the healthy and the sick be another; or if, asking this in the universal, he tries to assume the opposition. Again, if someone asks the contrary of what necessarily results from the things laid down; and if someone does not assume the things that are opposed, but asks for two other things from which the opposed contradiction will follow. But asking contraries differs from what is from the principle, because the fault of the latter lies in relation to the conclusion (for looking to that, we say that he begs what is from the principle); but contraries are in the premises, in that they themselves are somehow related to one another. For gymnastics and exercise in such speeches, first indeed one must accustom oneself to turn speeches around.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:230 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sic enim et ad id quod dicitur copiosius nos habebimus, et in paucis plures sciemus orationes; nam convertere est transsumentem conclusionem cum reliquis interrogationibus interimere unum.quidpiam eorum quae dicta sunt.Necesse est enim, si conclusio non est, unum aliquam interimere propositionum, siquidem omnibus positis necesse erat conclusionem esse. Ad omnem autem positionem et quod sic, et quod nonsicargumentumconsiderandum,etcum inveneris,solutionem statim quaerendum.

English

For in this way we shall be better equipped for what is said more copiously, and in few words we shall know more arguments; for to convert is, by taking up the conclusion, to destroy one of the things that were said along with the remaining questions. For it is necessary, if the conclusion is not, that one of the propositions be destroyed, since when all were posited it was necessary for the conclusion to be. But against every position one must consider the argument both for the 'so' and for the 'not so,' and when you have found it, a solution must immediately be sought.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:231 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sic enim simul accidetet ad interrogandum,et ad respondendum exerceri,eL si ad nullum alium habemus, apud nos ipsos sensim comparanda sunt qua: attinent ad ipsam positionem argumenta: nam id ad cogendum multam copiam praebet, et ad redarguendum magnum habet adjumentum, quando quispiam promptus est argumentari,et quod sic et quod non sic, nam ad contraria accidit facere observationem, et ad cognitionem,etea(quae secundum philosophiam est) peritiam posse conspicere, et conspexisse quae ab utraque accidunt suppositione,non parvum instrumentum: reliquum enim horum, recte eligere alterum; oportet autem ad id quod tale est esse bono ingenio,et hoc est secundum veritatem,bonum ingenium, posse bene eligere verum, et diffugere falsum, quod qui nati sunt bene possunt probe facere, nam qui amant et qui odiunt, quod profertur facile discernunt optimum.Et ad ea quae saepissime incidunt problemata, scire oportet orationes, et id maxime de primis positionibus. Nam in his fastidiunt saepe qui respondent. Amplius, terminorum copiosos esse oportet, et probabilium, et primorum se habere promptos: nam per haee fiunt syllogismi. Tentandum autem et ea(in qusesaepissime incidunt disputationes) tenere.

English

For in this way it will happen at the same time that we are exercised both in questioning and in answering, and even if we have no one else, we must gradually gather for ourselves the arguments that pertain to the position itself; for this provides great abundance for compelling an opponent, and it has great assistance for refuting, when someone is ready to argue both that it is so and that it is not so. For it falls to us to make observation of contraries, and for knowledge—the knowledge that is according to philosophy—it is no small instrument to be able to discern, and to have discerned, the things that follow from each of the two suppositions; for the remaining task is to choose the one of them rightly. But one must be naturally well-endowed for what is of this sort, and this is, according to truth, good natural endowment: to be able to choose the true well and to shun the false. And those who are born with this can do it well; for those who love and those who hate easily discern what is best in what is brought forward. And for the problems that occur most often, one must know the arguments, and especially concerning the primary positions. For in these respondents often grow weary. Moreover, one must be copious in terms, and have probable and primary ones ready at hand; for through these syllogisms are made. But one must also try to hold on to those things that occur most often in disputations.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:232 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam quemadmodum in geometria ante opus est circa elementa exercitatum esse,et in numeris circa capitales prompte se habere, et multum refert ad hoc et alium numerum cognoscere multiplicatum, similiter quoque et in orationibus promptum esse ad principia, et propositiones memoria scire oportet: nam perinde ac in memoriae sensorio solum loci positi statim faciunt ipsas res memorare, et hac faciunt ad ratiocinandum promptiorem,eo quod ad determinatas illas inspiciatsecundumnumerum.Propositionemquecommunem magis quam positionem inmemoriaponendum.Nam principiorum et suppositionum copiosum esse mediocriter, difficile.Amplius, oratlionem unam plures facere assuescendum,velu ii qui occultissime abscondunt.Tale autem erit si quis quam plurimum abscedat ab affinitate eorum de quibus est oratio; eruntautempotioresorationumluniversalesmaxime, quae id pati possint,ut quoniam non est una plurium disciplina: sic enim et in iis quae sunt ad aliquid, et in contrariis, et conjugatis est. Oportet autem et reminisci universales facere orationes, tametsi fuerit disputans particulariter. Sic enim et plures licebit unam facere, similiter autemet apud rethores in eothymematibus.Eumdem autem quam maxime fugere, contra universale ferre syllogismos.

English

For just as in geometry one must first be exercised in the elements, and in numbers be ready at hand with the principal ones, and it greatly matters for this also to know another number multiplied, so likewise in arguments one must be ready as to principles and know propositions by memory; for just as in the storehouse of memory the places once set down immediately cause the things themselves to be remembered, and by this they make one readier for reasoning, in that it looks to those determinate things according to number. And a common proposition is to be placed in memory more than a position. For to be copiously furnished with principles and suppositions is moderately difficult. Moreover, one must become accustomed to make one argument into many, like those who conceal things most secretly. Such a thing will be if one departs as far as possible from the affinity of the things about which the argument is; for the more universal arguments will be the more suitable, those which can undergo this, as that there is not one discipline of many things; for thus it is also in relatives, and in contraries, and in conjugates. But one must also remember to make arguments universal, even if one has been disputing particularly. For thus it will be possible to make many into one, and similarly also among the rhetoricians in enthymemes. But one must flee the same thing as much as possible, and bring syllogisms against the universal.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:233 · narrative
Source · Latin

Et semper oportet considerare orationes, si in pluribus communibus disputantur Nam omnes particulares in universali disputatae sunt, et inest in particularibus ejus quod est universale demonstratio,eo quod non est syllogizare quidquam sine universali. Exercitatio autem facienda, inductivarum quidem ad rudem,syllogisticarum autem ad expertum. Et tentandum accipere ab iis quidem qui in Syllogismis triti sunt propositiones, ab iis vero qui in inductionibus similitudines, in hoc enim utrique exercitati sunt. Omnino autem exercitationis gratia disceptantibus tentandum afferre aut syllogismum de aliquo,aut propositionem, aut solutionem, aut instantiam, sive recte quis dicat, sive perperam, vel ipse,velalter,etad quidpiam uterque. Ex his enim facultas,exet'cilatio autem facultatis gratia, et maxime circa propositiones et instantias. Est enim (ut simpliciter dicam) dialecticus,propositivuset instantivus.Estautemproponere quidem,uuumfacere quae sunt plura.Oportet enim unum omnino sumere ad quod esl oratio. Instare autem quod unum est, facere plura. Nam aut dividit, aut interimit, hoc quidem dans, illud autem non dans, eorum quae proposita sunt. Non est autem cum omni disputandum, neque contra quemlibet exercitandum.

English

And one must always consider arguments, whether they are disputed in the case of more common [terms]. For all particular things are disputed in the universal, and the demonstration of the universal is present in particulars, because it is not possible to syllogize anything without the universal. But training must be undertaken—for the unskilled, in inductive arguments; for the experienced, in syllogistic ones. And one must try to take propositions from those who are practiced in syllogisms, and similarities from those who are practiced in inductions; for in this both kinds are trained. And in general, for those disputing for the sake of training, one must try to bring either a syllogism about something, or a proposition, or a solution, or an objection, whether someone speaks rightly or wrongly, whether oneself or another, and [to bring] each to some point. For from these comes facility, and exercise is for the sake of facility, and especially concerning propositions and objections. For (to speak simply) the dialectician is one who propounds and objects. And to propound is indeed to make one thing out of many. For one must take altogether one thing to which the argument [is directed]. But to object is to make many things out of what is one. For it either divides or destroys, granting this and not granting that, of the things that have been proposed. But one must not dispute with everyone, nor train against just anyone.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:234 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam necesse ad aliquos pravas fieri orationes, ab eo enim qui omnino tentat apparere, diffugiendum, juslum autem omnino ten tare syllogismo concludere, verumtamen non pulchrum, eo quod non oportet adversus quoslibet facile consistere.Quandoquidem necesse est parviloquium inde emergere, nam qui exercitati sunt non possunt abstinere adisputatione sine altercatione. Oportet autem et factas habere orationes ad hujusmodi problemata, in quiLus cum paucissimorum copia eas ad quam plurima utiles habeamus.Illæ vero sunt universales, et ad quas in promptu quidpiam adinvenire difficile est.

English

For it is necessary that some arguments be directed at base opponents; for one must flee from the one who altogether attempts to appear [to be something], but one must altogether attempt to conclude by syllogism; yet it is not noble, because one ought not readily to stand against just anyone. Since it is necessary that petty quibbling arise from this—for those who are practiced cannot refrain from disputation without altercation. But one ought also to have arguments prepared for problems of this sort, in which, with a supply of the fewest [principles], we may have them useful for the greatest number of cases. Those [arguments], however, are universal, and [are those] for which it is difficult to find anything readily at hand.

Citation. Tergwame, “Topicorum Aristotelis Libri Octo Severino Boethio Interprete”, tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:1, machine-draft, 2026. https://naxiai.com/christian/works/tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1#s1
Colophon. Source: ogl-pl · licence: Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License · model: deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash:floor · provider: Baidu · cost: $0.0218 · generated 2026-11-15.