TOPICORUM ARISTOTELIS LIBRI OCTO, AN. MANL., SEV. BOETIO INTERPRETE
LIBER PRIMUS.
CAPUT PRIMUM.
Primi lopicorum libri Aristotelis quæ intentio, et qum ratiocinandi species.
Propositum quidem negotii et methodum invenire per quam poterimus syllogizare de omni proposito problemateex probabilibus, et ipsi disputationem sustinentes nibil dicernus repugnans Primum igiturdicendum quid est syllogismus, et quæ ejus differentiae, quomodo sumatur dialecticus syllogismus; hunc enim quærimus secundum propositum negotium.Est itaque syllogismus oratio in qua positis quibusdam aliquid aIi ud a positis:ex necessitate accidit per ea quae posita sunt. Demonstratio vero est quando ex veris et primis syllogismus erit, aut ex talibus quae per aliqua prima et vera ejus quae circa ipsa est cognitionis principium sumpserunt. Dialecticus aulem sylogismus est qui exprobabilibu est collectus. Sunt autem vera et prima quae non per alia,sed per se ipsa fidem habent. Non enim oportet in disciplinaribus principiis inquirere pro pter quod, sed secundumunumquodqueprincipiorum ipsam per se esse fidem.Probabilia autem sunt quae videntur omnibus, aut plurimis, aut sapientibus, et his vel omnibus, vel plurimis, vel maxime familiaribus et probatis.Litigiosus autem est syllogismus ex iis quae videntur probabilia, non sunt antem. Et qui ex probabilibus quidem, aut ex iis quæ videntur probabilia, est apparens.
THE EIGHT BOOKS OF ARISTOTLE'S TOPICS, TRANSLATED BY ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS
BOOK ONE
CHAPTER ONE
What is the intention of the first book of Aristotle's Topics, and what are the kinds of reasoning.
The purpose of the undertaking and the method to find by which we shall be able to syllogize about every proposed problem from probable premises, and, when we ourselves sustain a disputation, will say nothing contrary. First, therefore, it must be said what a syllogism is, and what its differences are, and how the dialectical syllogism is taken; for this is what we seek according to the proposed undertaking. A syllogism, then, is a discourse in which, certain things having been posited, something other than the things posited follows of necessity through the things that have been posited. A demonstration, however, is when the syllogism is from true and primary things, or from such things as have taken the beginning of their cognition of that which is around them through certain primary and true things. But the dialectical syllogism is the one collected from probable things. Now those things are true and primary which have their credibility not through other things but through themselves. For in the principles of the disciplines one ought not to inquire the reason why, but each one of the principles should itself be credible through itself. Probable things, however, are those which seem so to all, or to most, or to the wise, and among these either to all, or to most, or to the most familiar and approved. But a contentious syllogism is one from things that seem probable but are not. And the one that is from probable things indeed, or from things that seem probable, is apparent.
Non enim omne quod videtur probabile etiam est probabile, nihil enim eorum quæ dicunturprobabilia in superficie habet omnino phantasiam, velut circa litigiosarum disputationum principia accidit se habere; statim enim sæpius etiam eis qui parva videre pos-, sunt manifesta est in his falsitatis natura. Ergo priorquidem eorum(qui dicti sunt litigiosi syllogismi) etiam syllogismus dicatur.reliquusvero litigiosus quidem syllogismus,syllogismus autem non,eo quod videtur quidem ratiocinari,ratiocinaturautem minime. Amplius autem praeter omnes (qui dicti sunt; syllogismus, ex iis quæ sunt circa aliquas disciplinas pecularia fiunt paralogismi, quemadmodum in geometria et huic cognatis accidit se habere.Videtur autem hic modus differre a dictis syllogismis,nam neque ex veris et primis colligit pseudographus,neque ex probabilibus, nam sub definitione non cadit,neque enim quae omnibus videntur sumit,nequequaepluribus,neque sapientibus,ethis, neque omnibus,neque plurimis, neque probatissi- " mis;sed ex peculiaribus quidem disciplinæ sumptis, non veris autem, syllogismum facit, nam eo quod aut semicirculos describit non ut oportet, aut Iineas aliquas ducit non ut ducendæ sunt, paralogismum facit.Species igitur syllogismorum, ut figuraliter sit complecti,dictae sint.
For not everything that appears probable is also probable; for none of the things called probable has altogether the appearance [of truth] on its surface, as happens to be the case with the principles of contentious disputations; for immediately, and often even to those who can see but little, the nature of falsehood in these is manifest. Therefore, let the former of these (which have been called contentious syllogisms) also be called a syllogism. But the remaining one is indeed a contentious syllogism, but not a syllogism, because it indeed appears to reason, but does not reason at all. Moreover, besides all those that have been mentioned, from things peculiar to certain disciplines there arise fallacies, as happens to be the case in geometry and the disciplines akin to it. But this mode seems to differ from the syllogisms mentioned; for the pseudographer does not infer from things true and primary, nor from things probable—for it does not fall under the definition—for he does not assume what seems so to all, nor what seems so to the many, nor to the wise, and these neither to all nor to the most nor to the most approved; but from things assumed as peculiar to the discipline, yet not true, he makes a syllogism. For in that he describes semicircles not as they ought to be described, or draws certain lines not as they ought to be drawn, he makes a fallacy. Therefore, the species of syllogisms, to comprehend them figuratively, have been stated.
Summatim autem dicendo de omnibus prædictis et de his quae postea sunt dicenda,in tantum nobis determinatum sit, eo quod de nullo eorum exactam rationem assignare deligimus,sed aliquantulum figuraliter de his volumus pertransire,omnino sufficiens arbitrantes esse secundum propositam methodum posse cognoscere quoquomodo unumquodque illorum.
CAPUT II.
Ad quotutilis dialectica disserendique disciplina. I
Consequensautem eritexiis quae dicta sunt dicere ad quot et quæ utile sit hoc negotium.Est autem ad tria, ad exercitationes,ad colloquia,ad eas quae secundum philosophiam sunt disciplinas.Quod 'gitur ad exercitationem sit utile, ex his perspicuum est, methodum enim habentes,facile de propositio argumentari poterimus.Ad colloquia vero eo quod multorum annumerantes opiniones, non ex extraneis sed ex propriis doctrinis sermocinabimur ad eos, transmutantes quidquidnonbenevidenturmodisdicere.Ad secundum philosophiam autem disciplinas, quod potentes ad utraque dubitare,facileinsingulis intuebimur verum et falsum, praeterea autem ad primaeorum quasm unaquaque disciplina sunt principia.Nam ex propriis secundum propositam disciplinam principiis impossibile est dicere aliquid de ipsis,eo quod prima principia sunt omnium, per ea vero (quae sunt circa singula) probabilia necesse est de illis transigere.
To speak summarily about all the aforementioned matters and about those that are to be said afterward, let this much have been determined by us, because we have chosen to assign an exact account of none of them, but we wish to pass over them somewhat figuratively, judging it altogether sufficient, according to the proposed method, to be able to know each of them in some way.
CHAPTER II
To how many things and for what the discipline of dialectic and disputation is useful. 1
It will be consequent upon what has been said to state to how many things and for what this undertaking is useful. It is useful for three things: for exercises, for conversations, and for the disciplines that pertain to philosophy. That it is useful for exercise is clear from this: for having the method, we shall easily be able to argue about a proposed question. For conversations, however, because by enumerating the opinions of many, we shall converse with them not from foreign doctrines but from their own, changing whatever they do not seem to state well. For the disciplines of philosophy, however, because being able to doubt about both sides, we shall easily discern the true and the false in each particular, and besides this, also regarding the first principles of each discipline. For from the principles proper to the proposed discipline it is impossible to say anything about them, because they are the first principles of all things; but through the things that are probable in each particular, it is necessary to deal with them.
Id autem proprium, maximeve peculiare dialecticae est,narn cum sit inquisitiva, ad omnium methodorum principia vi am habet.Ifabebi. mus autem perfecte methodum,quando perinde habebirnus ac in rhetorica,et medicina, et hujusmodi facultatibus,hoc autem ex: iis quae contingunt facere quae eligimus. Nam neque rhetor omni ex modo persuadebit, neque medicus sanabit; sed si ex iis quae contingunt nihil omiserit, sufficienter eum disciplinam habere dixerimus.
CAPUT III.
Ex quibus e quot disceptatio dialectica constet.
Primum igitur considerandum ex quibusest methodus, siquidem sumpserimus ad quot, et quae ex quibus orationes et de quibus syllogismi, et quojaodo his abundemus,habebtmus sufficienter propositum.Suntautem numero æqualia, et eadem ea ex quibus orationes et de quibus syllogismi:fiunt enim orationes ex propositionibus;dequibus autem syllogismi fiunt,problemata sunt.Omnis autem propositio, et omne problema, aut proprium aut genus,aut accidens indicat; etenim differentia cum est generalis; cum genere ordinanda est.Quoniam autem pro. prium hocquidem quid est esse significat,illud autem non significat,dividatur proprium in utrasque prædictas partes, et vocetur illud quod quid erat esse significat,terminus; reliquum vero,secundum communem de ipsis assignatam nominationem,nuncupetnr proprium.
But this is the peculiar and most especially characteristic feature of dialectic: for since it is inquisitive, it has the power with respect to the principles of all methods. We shall, however, possess the method perfectly when we are disposed just as in rhetoric, medicine, and faculties of this sort; and this comes about from those things which it happens to do, which we choose. For neither will the rhetorician persuade by every mode, nor will the physician heal; but if he has omitted nothing of those things which it happens to do, we shall say that he has the discipline sufficiently.
CHAPTER III
From which and how many things dialectical disputation consists.
First, therefore, it must be considered from which things the method consists, since if we have grasped to how many things, and which things, and from which things speeches and concerning which things syllogisms, and in what way we abound in these, we shall have the proposed matter sufficiently. And they are equal in number, and the same are those from which speeches and concerning which syllogisms: for speeches are made from propositions; but those concerning which syllogisms are made are problems. But every proposition and every problem indicates either a property, or a genus, or an accident; for even difference, when it is general, must be ordered with the genus. Since, however, property—this one indeed signifies what it is to be, but that one does not signify—let property be divided into both of the aforementioned parts, and let that which signifies what it was to be be called a term; but the rest, according to the common designation assigned concerning them, let it be named property.
Manifestum igiturex iis quæ dicta suntquodsecundum præsentem divisionem quatuor omnia accidit fieri, aut proprium, aut terminum, aut genus, aut accidens. Nemo autem nos opinetur dicere quod unumquodquehorum secundum se dictum propositio vel problema est, sed quod ab his et problemata et propositiones iiunt.Difterunt autem problema et propositio modo, nam cum sic dicitur: putasne animal gressibilebipes?diffinitioesthomini et putasne animal genus est hominis? propositiofit. Si autem utrum animal gressibile bipes definitio est hominis, an non, problema fit.Similiter autem et in aliis. Quare merito aequalia numero problemata et propositiones sunt, nam ab omni propositione problema efficies, mutans modum.
CAPUT IV.
De termino, proprio, geneve, et accidente.
Dicendum autem quid terminus,quid proprium, quid genus,quid accidens.Estautem terminus quidem oratio quid erat esse significans.
From what has been said, then, it is manifest that according to the present division all things come to be four: either a property, or a definition, or a genus, or an accident. But let no one think that we are saying that each of these, spoken by itself, is a proposition or a problem, but that from these both problems and propositions come to be. A problem and a proposition differ in mode; for when it is said thus: "Is an animal a two-footed walking thing?" it is a definition of man, and "Is animal a genus of man?" becomes a proposition. But if it is asked whether an animal that is two-footed and walking is the definition of man or not, it becomes a problem. And similarly in other cases. Wherefore deservedly problems and propositions are equal in number, for from every proposition you will make a problem by changing the mode.
CHAPTER IV
On definition, property, genus, and accident.
We must say what a definition is, what a property is, what a genus is, what an accident is. A definition is an account signifying what it was to be.
Assignatur autem aut oratio pro nomine,autoratiopro oratione; possibile est enim et eorum quae sub ratione significantur quaedam definiri.Quicunque autem quolibet modo nomine assignationem faciunt, manifestum quoniam non assignant ii rei definitionem, eo quod omnis definitio oratio quaedam est,accommodatum tamen termino,ethujusmodi ponendum est,utquod honestum est,riecens.Similiter autem et utrum idem sensus,et disciplina vel diversum;etenim circa diffinitiones,utrum idem, vel diversum,plurima fit immoratio. Simpliciter autem accomodato termino omnia dicantur quæ sub eadem disciplina cum definitionibus contmentur.Quodautem omniaquaenunc dicta sunt hujusmodi sunt,manifestum ex his. Potentes enim quod idem et quod diversum disputare, eodem modo et ad definitiones argumentari facile poterimus; nam ostendentes quod non idem est, interimenteserimusdefinitionem: nontamen convertitur quod nunc dictum est,non enim sufficiens est ad astruendum definitionem ostendere idem esse, attamen ad destruendum sufficiens est ostendere quod non idem est. Proprium autem est quod non indicat quid est esse, soli autem inest, etconversim praedicatur de re ut proprium est hominis grammatices esse susceptivum. Nam si homo est, et grammatices susceptibilis est, si grammatices susceptivum est, et homo est.
But an expression is assigned either in place of a name, or a name in place of an expression; for it is possible that some of the things signified by an expression are also defined. But whoever make an assignment by a name in any way whatsoever, it is manifest that they do not assign the definition of the thing, because every definition is a certain expression, and it is to be applied to the term, and things of this sort are to be posited, as that which is honorable is seemly. Likewise also whether the same sense and discipline are the same or different; for concerning definitions there is much lingering over whether they are the same or different. Simply, however, with the term applied, let all things be said which are contained under the same discipline together with definitions. But that all the things now said are of this sort is manifest from these considerations. For being able to dispute that a thing is the same and that it is different, in the same way we shall easily be able to argue toward definitions; for by showing that it is not the same, we shall have destroyed the definition; yet what has now been said is not convertible, for to show that it is the same is not sufficient to establish a definition, yet to show that it is not the same is sufficient to destroy it. A property, however, is that which does not indicate what it is to be, but belongs to a thing alone, and is predicated convertibly of the thing, as it is a property of man to be receptive of grammar. For if he is a man, he is also receptive of grammar; if he is receptive of grammar, he is also a man.
Nemo enim proprium dicit quod contingit alii inesse, ut homini dormire, ne quidem si forsitan per aliquod tempus inest soli. Si autem forte dicatur aliquid lalium proprium, non simpliciter, aliquando, vel ad aliquid dicetur, nam ex dextris quidem esse, aliquando proprium est. Bipes autem ad aliquid proprium est dictum, ut homini ad equum et canem. Quod autem eorum quæ contingunt alii inesse nullum conversim praedicatur, manifestum est; non enirn necessarium est si quid dormit, hominem esse. Genus autem est, quod de, pluribus et differentibus specie in eoquod quid est praedicatur. In eo quod quid est praedicari ea dicuntur, quæcunque convenit eum qui interrogatus est reddere quid est quod propositum est, quemadmodum de homine, convenit eum qui interrogatus est quid id est quod propositum est, dicere quod animal. Generi autem accommodatum est utrum in eodem genere aliud alii, an in ultero sit. Nam et hujusmodi sub eadem methodo cadit cum genere; disputantes enim quod animal genus hominis similiter et bonus, disputantes erimus quoniam haec in eodem sunt genere,sit autem alteriusquidemostendamus quod genus est,alterius autem quod non est, disputantes erimus quoniam non in eodem genere haec sunt.
For no one calls "property" what happens to belong to another, as sleeping belongs to a human being—not even if it happens to belong to that one alone for some time. But if perhaps some such thing is called a property, it will be called so not simply, but sometimes, or in relation to something; for to be on the right is sometimes a property. "Two-footed" is said to be a property in relation to something, as for a human being in relation to a horse and a dog. But that none of the things that happen to belong to another is predicated convertibly is clear; for it is not necessary that if something sleeps, it is a human being. A genus, however, is what is predicated of many things differing in species in answer to the question what it is. Those things are said to be predicated in answer to the question what it is, whatever it is fitting for one who has been asked to give in reply to what the proposed thing is—as concerning a human being, it is fitting for one who has been asked what the proposed thing is to say that it is an animal. But it is suited to a genus to consider whether one thing is in the same genus as another, or whether it is in the other. For even matters of this kind fall under the same method as genus; for in disputing that animal is the genus of a human being, we shall similarly also be disputing that it is of a good [thing], since these are in the same genus. But let us suppose that we show that it is the genus of one thing, and that it is not the genus of another; we shall be disputing that these are not in the same genus.
Accidens autem est quod nibil horum est, neque definitio,ncque proprium, neque genus,inest autem rei; et quod contingit inesse cuivis uni et eidem,etnon inesse,utsedere contingitinesse alicui eidem, et non inesse. Similiter autem et album, nam et eidem nihil prohibet quandoque album, quandoque non album esse. Est autem accidentis definitionum secunda melior: nam cum dicitur pri. ma, necessarium est si debet quis intelligere, praescire quid est terminus, et genus, et proprium; secunda autem perfecta est ad cognoscendum (quid est quod dicitur) per se. Annectantur autem accidenti et quae ad se invicem sunt comparationes quolibet modo ab accidente dictae, ut utrum honestum, an quod confert, expetibilius, et utrum quae est secundum virtutem, an quae secundum voluptatem suavior vita, et si quid aliud similiter his est di-. ctum, in omnibus enim talibus utri magispraedicatum accidit, quæstio fit. Manifestum est autem ex his quoniam accidens nihil prohibet, et quando, et ad aliquid propriumfieri,utsederecumsit accidens, quando quis solus sedet, tunc aliquando proprium erit; solo vero sedente, ad non.sedentes proprium: quare et ad aliquid, at aliquando nihil prohibet accidens proprium fieri, simpliciter autem proprium non erit.
An accident is what is none of these—neither definition, nor property, nor genus—yet belongs to a thing; and what can belong and not belong to one and the same thing, as sitting can belong to some one and the same person and not belong. Likewise also white: for nothing prevents the same thing from being white at one time and not white at another. The second of the definitions of accident is better; for when the first is stated, it is necessary, if one is to understand it, to know beforehand what a term is, and a genus, and a property; but the second is complete for knowing in itself what is being said. To accident are also attached the comparisons of things to one another spoken in any way in respect of an accident, as whether the honorable or the expedient is more desirable, and whether the life according to virtue or the life according to pleasure is sweeter, and whatever else is said similarly to these; for in all such cases the question becomes to which of the two the predicate belongs as an accident. It is clear from these things that nothing prevents an accident from becoming, at a certain time and in relation to something, a property—as when sitting is an accident, when someone sits alone, then at some time it will be a property; but when he alone is sitting, it is a property in relation to those not sitting; wherefore also in relation to something, and at some time, nothing prevents an accident from becoming a property, but simply a property it will not be.
CAPUT V.
Quod cætera prædicata aliquid claudant eorum quas definitio continet.
Non lateat autem nos quoniam quae ad proprium, et genus, et accidens omnia dicuntur, et ad definitiones conveniet dici. Ostendentes enim quoniam non ei soli inest quod est sub definitione '(quemadmodum et in proprio), aut quoniam non genus quod assignatum est in definitione, aut quoniam non inest, aliquid eorum quae in definitione dicta sunt (quod quidem et in accidente dici potest), interimentes erimus definitionem. Quare secundum prius assignatam rationem, omnia erunt quodammodo defi. nitioni accommodanda qua; numerata sunt. Sed non propter hoc unam in omnibus universalem methodum quaerendum, neque enim facile invenire hanc est, et si inveniatur, omnino obscura et insuavis plane fuerit ad propositum negotium. Propria vera in unoquoque determinatorum generum assignata methodo, facile ex iis quae circa unumquodque propria sunt decursus propositi fieri possit. Quare universaliterfigura qu!Qem(quemadmodumdictum est prius) dividendum est, reliquorum autem ea quae maxime suntsingulis peculiaria, annectendum; definitioni et generi accomodata ea nuncupantes, peneautem adj uncta sunt quae dicta sunt ad singula.
CHAPTER V.
That the other predicates contain something of those things which the definition contains.
Let it not escape us that all the things said in relation to property, genus, and accident will also be suited to definitions. For by showing that what falls under the definition does not belong to it alone (as also in the case of property), or that the assigned genus is not in the definition, or that something of those things stated in the definition is not present (which can indeed also be said in the case of accident), we shall be destroying the definition. Wherefore, according to the account given earlier, all things must in some way be accommodated to the definition, in the manner that has been enumerated. But one should not for this reason seek a single universal method in all cases; for it is not easy to find this, and if it is found, it will be altogether obscure and plainly unpleasant for the task at hand. But with the method assigned for each of the determinate genera, an easy progression to the proposed task can be made from the things that are proper to each. Wherefore, universally, the outline must indeed be divided (as was said earlier), and of the rest those things which are most peculiar to each must be attached; calling those things accommodated to definition and genus, and those which have been stated are almost closely joined to the individual cases.
CAPUT VI.
De eodem.
Primumautemomniumdeeodem determinandum quoties dicitur. Videbitur autem idem ut figuraliter sit sumere, Iripliciterdividi. Numero enim, aut specie, aut genere, idem solemus appellare. Numero quidem, quorum nomina plura, res autem una, ut. indumentum etvestis.Specie autem quae cum sint plura, indifferentia sunt secundum speciem, ut homo homini, equus equo; nam hujusmodi specie di. cuntur, quaecunque sub eadem specie sunt. Similiter autem et genere eadem, quaecunque sub eodem genere sunt, ut equus homini. Videbitur autem ab eodem fonte aqua, quæ eadem dicitur, habere aliquam differentiam praeter dictos modos. Non tamen, sed et hujusmodi in eodem ordinetur iis quae secundum unam speciem quoquo modo dicta sunt: omnia enim talia cognata et affinia sibi invicem videntur esse: nam omnis aqua omni aquæ eadem specie dicitur, eo quod habeat quamdam similitudinem; ab eodem autem fonte aqua quæ eadem dicitur nullo alio differt, quam eo quod vehementior sitsimilitudo: quare non separamus idem ab iis quae secundum unam speciem quoquo modo dicuntur. Maxime autem indubitanter quod unum estnumero,idem ab omnibus videtur dici.
CHAPTER VI.
On the Same.
First of all, then, we must determine how many senses "the same" has. It will seem that one should take "the same" in a threefold division. For we are accustomed to call things the same in number, in species, or in genus. In number, those whose names are several but whose thing is one, as garment and clothing. In species, those which, though they are several, are undifferentiated according to species, as man to man, horse to horse; for things of this sort are called the same in species, whatever things are under the same species. Similarly also things are the same in genus, whatever things are under the same genus, as horse to man. But water said to be from the same source will seem to have some difference beyond the modes just mentioned. It is not so, however, but even this sort of thing will be ranked among those which are in some way said to be the same according to one species; for all such things seem to be kindred and akin to one another. For all water is said to be the same in species as all water, in that it has a certain likeness; but water said to be from the same source differs in nothing else than that the likeness is stronger. Wherefore we do not separate "the same" from those things which are in some way said to be the same according to one species. But most indisputably, what is one in number seems to be called the same by all.
Soletautem ethoc assignari multipliciter, propriissime autem et primo, quando nomine vel termino idem assignatum fuerit, ut vestis indumento, et animalgressibiiebipesbomini.Secundum autem, quando proprio, ut disciplinæ susceptibilis homini, et quod natura sursum fertur igni. Tertium vero, quando ab accidente, ut sedens, vel musicum Socrati, omnia enim haec unum numero volunt significare. Quod autem verum sit quod nunc dictum est, extranssumentibusnuncupationesmaximequis discat; saepe enim praecipientes nomine vocare aliquem sedentium,transsumimus,quandoforteisnon intelligitcui præceptum facimus, tanquam ab acci-, dente ipso magis intelligente, et jubemus sedentem vel disputantem vocare ad nos, maaifestum quod ut eumdem opinantes, et secundum nomen, et secundum accidens significare.Ergo idem,quemadmodum dictum est, tripliciter dividatur.
But this is customarily assigned in many ways; most properly and primarily, when the same thing is designated by a name or term, as a garment by clothing, and a two-footed land animal by human being. Secondly, when by something proper, as the human being by what is capable of receiving discipline, and fire by what is borne upward by nature. Thirdly, when by an accident, as the seated person, or the musical person, to Socrates; for all these wish to signify one in number. But that what has now been said is true, one may learn most of all from those who use transferred designations; for often, when we instruct someone to call one of those sitting by name, we use a transferred designation, when perhaps the one to whom we give the instruction does not understand, as if he understood better from the accident itself, and we order him to call the seated or the disputing person to us; it is manifest that we think he signifies the same person both by the name and by the accident. Therefore the same, as has been said, is divided in three ways.
CAPUT VII.
Omnem disputationem cLialecticamesseextermino.pro• prio, genere, nul accidente, et ubi illa reperianlur.
Quoniam autem ex prius dictis sunt orationes, et per hæc et ad hæc una quidem fides est per inductionem.Sienim quis consideret unamquamque propositionum et problematum,apparebitauta termino, aut a proprio, aut a genere, aut ab accidente facta. Alia autem fides per syllogismum.Necesse est enim o:nne quod de aliquo praedicatur, aut conversim de re praedicari, aut non; et si conversim praedicalur, terminus erit, vel proprium. Nam si significat quid est esse, est terminus; si autem non significet, proprium. Hoc enim erat proprium, quod conversim praedicatur, non significans quid est esse. Si autem non conversim praedicatur de re, aut ex iis quæ in definitionis subjecti dicuntur, est, aut non, et si est ex iis quæ in definitione dicuntur,aut genus,aut differentia erit, eo quod definitio ex genere et differentiis est. Si vero ex iis non est quae in definitione dicuntur, palam est quoniam accidens erit, nam accidens dicebatur quod nequeterminus,neque genus, neque proprium, inest autem rei. Post haec autem oportet determinare genera prædicameotorumin quibus sunt dictae quatuor differentiae. Sunt haec autem numero decem, quod est, quantum, quale, ad aliquid, ubi, quando, situm esse, habere, facere, pati.
CHAPTER VII.
That every dialectical disputation arises from definition, property, genus, and accident, and where these are found.
Since, then, from what has been said before, arguments are formed, and through these and with a view to these there is one kind of assurance through induction. For if anyone considers each of the propositions and problems, it will appear that they are made either from a definition, or from a property, or from a genus, or from an accident. But another assurance is through syllogism. For it is necessary that whatever is predicated of something be predicated of it either convertibly or not; and if it is predicated convertibly, it will be a definition or a property. For if it signifies what it is to be, it is a definition; but if it does not signify this, it is a property. For this was a property: what is predicated convertibly, not signifying what it is to be. But if it is not predicated convertibly of the thing, it is either from those things that are said in the definition of the subject, or not; and if it is from those things that are said in the definition, it will be either a genus or a differentia, because the definition is from genus and differentiae. But if it is not from those things that are said in the definition, it is clear that it will be an accident; for an accident was said to be what is neither definition, nor genus, nor property, yet is present in the thing. After these things, moreover, one must determine the genera of the predicaments in which the four differences just mentioned are found. These are in number ten: substance, quantity, quality, relation, where, when, being situated, having, doing, being affected.
Semper enim accidens, et genus, et proprium, et definitio in uno praedicamentorum horum erit,nam omnes ab his propositiones, aut quid est, aut quale est, aut quantum,aut aliorum aliquod prasdicamentorum significant. Manifestum est autem exeisdemquoniam quod quidestsignificansquandoquequidemsubstantiam significat, quandoque autem quale,quandoque vero aliquod aliorum praedicamentorum; nam quandc, posito homine, dixerit quod positum est hominem esse, vel animal, et quid est dicit et significat substantiam j quundo,colore albo posito,dixerit quod positum est album esse, vel colorem, quid est dicit, et quale significat. Similiter autem et si, cubitali magnitudine posita, dixerit quod positum est cubitalem esse magnitudinem, et quid est dicit et quantum significat. Similiter autem et in aliis. Unumquodque enim talium sive idem de eodem dicatur, sive genus de hoc, quid est significat quandoautem de alio, non quid est significat, sed quantum, aut quale, aut aliquod aliorum praedicamentorum. Quare de quibus sunt disputationes, et ex quibus, hæc ettantasunt.Quomodo autem sumemus,et per quae copioso erimus, post haec dicendum.
For accident, genus, property, and definition will always be in one of these categories; for all propositions from these signify either what a thing is, or of what sort it is, or how much, or some other of the categories. It is clear from the same considerations, moreover, that what signifies what a thing is sometimes signifies substance, sometimes quality, and sometimes some other of the categories. For when, a man having been posited, someone has said that what was posited is a man, or an animal, he both says what it is and signifies substance; but when, white color having been posited, he has said that what was posited is white, or a color, he says what it is and signifies quality. Likewise also if, a cubit-long magnitude having been posited, he has said that what was posited is a cubit-long magnitude, he both says what it is and signifies quantity. Likewise also in the others. For each of such things, whether the same is said of the same, or a genus of this, signifies what it is; but when [said] of another, it does not signify what it is, but how much, or of what sort, or some other of the categories. Therefore the things about which disputations are held, and from which, are these and so many. But how we shall take them, and by what means we shall be well supplied, must be said after these things.
CAPUT VIII.
De propositione dialectica.
Primum igitur determinetur quid est propositio dialectica, et quid problema dialecticum. Non enim omnem propositionem,nec omne problema dialecticum ponendum. Nullus enim offeret, qui mentem habeat, quod nulli videtur,nec proponetquod omnibus est manifestum, vel plurimis: nam haec quidem non habent dubitationem, illa autem nemo ponet. Est autem propositio dialectica interrogatio probabilis aut omnibus, aut plurimis, aut sapientibus, et his vel omnibus, vel plurimis, vel maxime familiaribus non inopinabilis. Ponet enim aliquis quod videtursapientibus, nis: id contrarium sitmultorum opi. nionibus. Sunt autem propositiones dialecticae, et ea quae probalibus sunt similia, et contraria iis quae videnturesse prolHibiliasecundum contradictionem protensa,etqu xecunqueopiniones suntsecundum artes inventas. Si enim probabile est eadem esse contrariorum disciplinam,etsensum eumdem esse contrariorum probabile apparebit, et si unam numero gramrnaticen esse,et tibicinariam u namjsi autemplures grammaticas, et plures tibicinariae, omnia enim similia et cognata haec videntur esse.Similiter autem etea quæ probabilibus sunt contrariasecundum contradictionem protensa probabilia videntur.
CHAPTER VIII.
On the dialectical proposition.
First, then, let it be determined what a dialectical proposition is, and what a dialectical problem is. For not every proposition, nor every problem, is to be posited. For no one who has a mind will offer what seems to no one, nor will he propose what is manifest to all or to most; for the latter indeed have no doubt, while the former no one will posit. A dialectical proposition is a probable interrogation, either to all, or to most, or to the wise, and to these either to all, or to most, or to those most familiar, and not contrary to opinion. For someone will posit what seems to the wise, unless it be contrary to the opinions of the many. Dialectical propositions are also those which are similar to probable things, and those which are contrary to things that appear to be probable, when extended according to contradiction, and whatever opinions there are according to invented arts. For if it is probable that the discipline of contraries is the same, and that the same sense is of contraries, it will appear probable; and if there is one grammar in number, and one flute-playing; but if there are many grammars, also many flute-playings; for all these seem to be similar and akin. In like manner, also, those things which are contrary to probable things, when extended according to contradiction, appear probable.
Si enim probabile est quod oportet amicis benefacere, et quod non oportet amicis maleface probabile est; est autem contrarium quidem quod oportet malefacereamicis,secundum contradictionem autem quod non oportet amicis malefacere. Similiter autem et si oportet amicis benefacere, inimicis non oportet; est autem etbocsecundum contradictionem contrariorum, nam oontrarium est quod oportet inimicis benefacere. Similiter autem et in aliis. Probabile autemetinsimilitudineapparetetiam contrarium de contrario, utsi oportet amicis benefacere, et inimicis oportet male, apparebit et contrarium hoc quod est amicis benef'acere, et quod inimicis male.Utrum autem secundum veritatem se habeat, vel non, in iis quae de contrario dicentur ostendetur. Palam autem quoniam et quaecunque opinione;; secundum artes sunt, dialecticaa propositiones sunt.Ponetenim aliquis ea quae videntur iis qui in eis probati sunt, ut de his quidem quae in geometria, ut geometer, de illis autem quae in medicina, ut medicus.
For if it is probable that one ought to benefit friends, it is also probable that one ought not to harm friends; but the contrary is that one ought to harm friends, and by contradiction that one ought not to harm friends. Similarly also, if one ought to benefit friends, one ought not to benefit enemies; but this too follows by contradiction of contraries, for the contrary is that one ought to benefit enemies. Similarly also in other cases. And by similarity the contrary also appears probable concerning the contrary, as if one ought to benefit friends, one ought also to harm enemies; there will appear also the contrary of this, namely that one ought to benefit friends and harm enemies. But whether this holds according to truth or not will be shown in what is said concerning the contrary. It is clear, moreover, that whatever opinions are according to the arts are also dialectical propositions. For one may posit those things which appear so to those who are approved in these matters, as concerning geometry, to the geometer, and concerning medicine, to the physician.
CAPUT IX.
De problemate dialectico et positione dialectiua.
Problema autem dialecticum est speculatio intendens vel ad electionem, et fugam, vel ad veritatem et scientiam, aut per se, aut ut adminiculans ad aliquid aliud talium, de quo aut neutro modo opinantur, aut contrarie plerique sapientibus, aut sapientes plerisque, aut utrisque iidem eisdem. Quædam enim problematum utile ostseire tanlum eligendum, vel fugiendum, ut utrum voluptas sit eligenda, an non. Qusedamjautem ad sciendum tantum, ututrum mundus æternus sit, an non. Quaedam vero ipsa per se quidemadneutrumhorum, adminiculantia autem sunt ad aliqua talium. Pleraque enim ipsa quidem per se non volumus cognoscere, sed aliorum gratia, ut perilla aliud quidpiam cognoscamus. Sunt autem problemata et de quibus contrarii sunt syllogismi: dubitationem enim habent utrum sic se habentan non sic, eo quod utrisque sunt rationes suasibiles. Et de quibus rationem non habemus, cum sint magna, difficilearbitrantesessepropterquodassignare; ut utrum mundus sit aeternus, an non, nam hujusmodi quaeret aliquis. Problemata ergo et propositionea (ut dictum est) derminata sint.
CHAPTER IX.
On the dialectical problem and the dialectical position.
A dialectical problem is a speculation aiming either at choice and avoidance, or at truth and knowledge, either in itself or as contributing to some other such thing, concerning which either no one holds an opinion in either direction, or the many hold a contrary opinion to the wise, or the wise to the many, or each of the two groups holds a contrary opinion to itself. For some problems are useful only for knowing what is to be chosen or avoided, such as whether pleasure is to be chosen or not. Some, however, are for knowing only, such as whether the world is eternal or not. Some, however, are in themselves indeed directed toward neither of these, but contribute to some such matters. For most of them we do not wish to know for their own sake, but for the sake of other things, so that through them we may know something else. There are also problems concerning which contrary syllogisms arise; for they involve doubt as to whether matters stand thus or not, because there are plausible arguments on both sides. And there are those for which we have no account, since they are great, and we judge it difficult to assign the reason; such as whether the world is eternal or not, for one would inquire into matters of this sort. Let problems, then, and propositions be defined as has been said.
Positio est opinio admirabilis alicujus familiarium secundum philosophiam,utquod non estcuntradicere,quemadmodum dixit Antisthenes, et quod omnia moventur, secundum Heraclitum, aut quod unum est ens, quemadmodum Melissus dixit(nam de quovis contraria opinionibus profarenle curam habere stultum est, aut de quibus orationem habemuscontrariam opinionibus, ut quoniam non omne quod est, vel factum est, vel aeternum, quemadmodum sophistae dicunt. Nam musicum, grammaticum esse, neque factum, neque esseaeternum. Hocenim etsialicuinon videatur, videbitur utique eo quod rationem habeat suasibilem. Est igitur et positio quidem problema, non autem omne problema positio,eoquodquasdam problematum talia sunt, de quibus neutro modo opinamur. Quod autem est positio problema manUestum est: necesse est enim ex iis quae dicta sunt, aut plures sapientibus circa positionem dubitare, aut utroBlibet sibimet, eo quod opinio quaedam admirandaposilio est. Pene autem nunc omnia dialecticaprobiematapositionesvacantur.Differat autem nihil quomodolibet dictum: non enim nomen effinere volentes divisimus sic ea, sed ut non lateant nos,cum quædam eorum suntdifferentiae. Non opor. tet autem omne problema, nec omnem positionem considerare, sed quam dubitabit aliquis eorum, qui ratione egent, et non pcena vel sensu.
A position is an opinion that is remarkable concerning some matter familiar to philosophy, for example that not everything can be contradicted, as Antisthenes said, and that all things are moved, according to Heraclitus, or that being is one, as Melissus said. For to take pains over any question whatever that is contrary to received opinions is foolish, or over questions where we hold an opinion contrary to received opinions, as for instance that not everything that exists is either made or eternal, as the sophists say. For the musical and the grammatical are neither made nor eternal. For this, even if it does not seem so to someone, will at any rate seem so because it has a persuasive account. A position is therefore also a problem, but not every problem is a position, since some problems are of such a kind that we hold no opinion either way about them. But that a position is a problem is evident; for from what has been said it necessarily follows that either many of the wise are in doubt about the position, or that each side is in doubt for itself, because a position is a certain remarkable opinion. And now almost all dialectical problems are called positions. But it makes no difference in whatever way it is stated; for we did not divide them thus in order to coin a name, but so that the differences among some of them should not escape us. One ought not, however, to consider every problem, nor every position, but only such as someone among those who stand in need of argument might doubt, and not one that requires punishment or sense perception.
Nam qui dubitant utrum oporteal deos honorare, et parentes diligere, an non, pcenaindigent; qui vero utrum nix alba an non,sensu. Neque vero quorum propinqua est demonstratio, neque quorum valde longe: nam illa quidem non habent dubitationem, haec autem magis quam secundum falcultatem exercitativam.
CAPUT X.
De speciebus disserendi, dialect icseque disputa tionis.
Determinatis autem his, oportet dividere quot dialecticarum disputationum sunt species. Est autem inductio quidem haec, illa autem syllogismus. Et syllogismus quidem quid est, dictum est prius. Inductio vero est a singularibus ad universalia accessio, ut si est gubernator eruditus, optimus, et auriga, et omnis qui est eruditus in unoquoque, optimus. Est autem inductio verisimilior, et clarior et secundum sensum notior, et pluribus communis syllogismus autem valentior, et ad contradicentes efficacior. Ergo genera de quibus disputationes, et ex quibus, quemadmodum ante dictum est, determinata sint.
For those who doubt whether one ought to honor the gods and love one's parents or not need punishment; but those who doubt whether snow is white or not need sense perception. Nor indeed are those matters whose demonstration is near at hand, nor those that are very far off: for the former have no doubt, while the latter are beyond the capacity of exercise.
CHAPTER X.
On the species of discourse, and of dialectical disputation.
Having determined these matters, it is necessary to divide how many species of dialectical disputations there are. For one is induction, and the other is syllogism. And what syllogism is has been said earlier. Induction is the ascent from singulars to universals, as if one should say that the skilled pilot is the best, and the charioteer, and everyone who is skilled in each particular thing is the best. Induction is more persuasive, and clearer, and more known according to sense, and more common to many; but syllogism is more forceful, and more effective against those who contradict. Therefore let the genera about which disputations arise, and from which they arise, be determined, as was said before.
CAPUT XI.
De instrumentis quibus syllogismorum copiam nobis ad disserendum suppeditamus.
Instrumenta autem perquae abundemus syllogismis sunt quatuor. Unum quidem, propositiones sumere. Secundum autem, quotupliciter unumquodque dicitur posse distinguere. Tertium, differentias invenire. Quartum autem, similitudinis consideratio. Sunt autem et modo quodam etiam tria horum propositiones. Est enim unumquodque eorum propositionem facere, ut quod eligendum est honestum, vel delectabile, vel utile, et quod differt sensus a disciplina, eo quod amittenti eam possibile est rursum sumere, illum autem impossibile. Etquoniam similiterse babelsalubre ad sanitatem, et habile ad bonam habitudinem. Est autem prima propositio ab iis quae multipliciter dicuntur, secunda a differentiis, tertia vero a similibus.
CAPUT XII.
De sumptione propositionum.
CHAPTER XI.
On the instruments by which we supply ourselves with an abundance of syllogisms for discussion.
Now the instruments through which we abound in syllogisms are four. One, indeed, is to take up propositions. The second is to be able to distinguish in how many ways each thing is said. The third is to find differences. The fourth is the consideration of similarity. Yet in a certain way three of these are also propositions. For to make a proposition of each of them is possible, as that what is to be chosen is the honorable, or the pleasant, or the useful, and that sense differs from knowledge in that it is possible for one who loses the latter to take it up again, but impossible for one who loses the former. And since similar things are related to health and to good condition. Now the first proposition comes from things that are said in many ways, the second from differences, and the third from similars.
CHAPTER XII.
On the taking up of propositions.
Ergo propositiones quidem eligendum quotquot modis determinatum est in propositione, aut omnium opiniones proponenti, aut plurium aut sapientum, et horum vel omnium, velplurimorum, vel notissimorum. Aut etiam contrarias apparentibus, et quaecunqueopinionessecundum artem sunt;atoportet protendere contrarias apparentibus probabilibus, secundum contradictionem) quemad modum dictum est prius. Utile autem et facere eas in eligendonon solum quae sunt probabiles, sed et similes eis, ut quod contrariorum idem est sensus, nam et scientia contrariornm est eadem. Etquod videmussuscipientes aliquid,non emittentes, nam et in aliis sensibus sic est, nam et audimus suscipientes aliquid, non emittentes, et olfacimus eodem modo, similiter autem et in aliis.Amplius:qusecunqueinomnibusvel plurimis videntur, sumendum ut principium et apparentem positionem, nam ponunt qui non conspiciunt, in aliquo non sic habel. Eligere autem oportet et ex scriptis disceptationibus. Descriptiones autem facere in unoquoque genere supponentes seorsum (ut de bono;:aut de animali, et de bono omni) incipientem a quid est. Adnotare autem et singulorum opiniones, ut quod Empedocles quatuor dixit clementa corporum esse. Ponet enim aJiquis quod ab aliquo probato dictum est.
Therefore one must select propositions in all the ways that have been determined in the proposition—either the opinions of all, or of the majority, or of the wise, and of these either all, or the majority, or the most notable. Or also the contraries of things that appear, and whatever opinions there are according to art; but one must set out the contraries of probable appearances, according to contradiction, as was said earlier. It is useful also, in selecting, to make not only those which are probable, but also those which are similar to them, such as that the sense of contraries is the same; for the knowledge of contraries is also the same. And that we receive something when we perceive, not when we emit it; for this is so also in the other senses, for we hear by receiving something, not by emitting it, and we smell in the same way, and similarly also in the others. Moreover, whatever seems so in all cases or in most, one must take as a principle and an apparent position; for those who do not perceive it lay it down, that in some respect it is not so. One must also choose from written discussions. And one must make descriptions in each genus, setting them down separately (as about the good, or about the animal, and about every good), beginning from what it is. One must also note the opinions of individuals, as that Empedocles said the elements of bodies are four. For someone will lay down what has been said by someone approved.
Sunt autem (ut figuraliter sit complecti) propositionum et problematum partes tres; nam aliae sunt morales propositiones, aliae naturales, alix rationales. Morales quidembujusmodi, ut utrum oporteat parentibus magis an legibus obedire, si dissentiant. Rationales vero, ut utrum contrariorum eadem disciplina, annon. Naturales autem, ut utrum mundus sitseternus, necne. Similiter autem et problemata. At vero quales sint singulae earum quae dictae sunt, definiliGne quidem non facile assignare est de ipsis. Est autem ea(quae per inductionem est) assuetudine tentandum cognoscere unamquamque earum, secundum praedicta exempla consideranti. Ad philosophiam igitur, secundum veritatem de his negotiandum, dialectico autem modo ad opinionem. Sumendæ autem quam maximeuniversales propositiones omnes,et una faciendamultae,utquod oppositorum eadem disciplina, deinde quod contrariorum et quod et aliquid. Eodem modo et ipsae rursum dividendae, quousque contingere potest divisio, ut quod boni, et mali,et albi, et nigri, et frigidi, et calidi; similiter autem et in aliis. De propositionibus igitur sufficiant prædicta.
To put it in outline, there are three parts of propositions and problems; for some propositions are ethical, others natural, others rational. Ethical ones are of this sort: whether one ought to obey one's parents rather than the laws, if they disagree. Rational ones, such as whether the same discipline deals with contraries or not. Natural ones, such as whether the world is eternal or not. And similarly also with problems. But what sort each of those mentioned is, it is not easy to assign by definition. Rather, one must try to recognize each of them by induction through familiarity, considering them according to the examples given above. For philosophy, then, one must deal with these matters according to truth, but for the dialectician, in the manner of opinion. One must take the most universal propositions as far as possible, all of them, and make many into one, as that the same discipline deals with opposites, then that it deals with contraries, and then that it deals with some other such thing. In the same way these too must again be divided, as far as division can reach, as that of good and evil, and white and black, and cold and hot; and similarly in other cases. Concerning propositions, then, let what has been said suffice.
CAPUT XIII.
De multiplicis distinctione.
Ipsum autem quotupliciter negotiandum est, non solum quaecunque dicuntur secundum alium modum, sed et rationes eorum tentandum assignare, ut non solum quod bonum alio quidem modo dicitur justitia et fortitudo, habile autem et salubre, sed quodetillaquidem eo quod ipsa qualia quædam sunt, hæc autem eo quod effectiva alicujus,et non eoquod qualia quædam sunt; similiter autem et in aliis. Utrum autem multipliciter, aut uno modo specie dicitur, per hæc considerandum. Primum quidem in contrario perspiciendum si multipliciter dicitur, sive specie, sive nomine dissonet. Quaedam enim statim et nominibus alia sunt, ut acuto in voce contrarium est grave, in magnitudine autem obtusum; patet igitur quod contrarium acuto multipliciter dicitur, si autem lhoc, et acutum. Nam secundum utrumque horum aliud erat contrarium, non enim idem acutum erit obluso et gravi contrarium; utriqwe autem acutum contrarium. Rursum gravi in voce qui dem contrarium acutum, magnitudine autem leve; quare multipliciter grave dicitur,eo quod etcontrarium. Similiterautem et pulchro, ei quidem quod in animali turpe, ei vero quod est in domo, perniciosum; quare æquivocum pulchrum. In quibusdan autem nominibus quidem nullo modo dissonat, specie autem manifesta in eis statim differentia est, ut in claro et obscuro; vox enim clara et obscura dicitur. Similiterautem etcolor.
CHAPTER XIII.
On the distinction of the multiple.
Now we must investigate in how many ways a thing is said, not only those things that are spoken of according to another mode, but we must also attempt to assign their accounts, so that we may show not only that the good is said in one way of justice and courage, and in another of what is capable and healthful, but also that the former are so called because they are themselves of a certain quality, while the latter because they are productive of something, and not because they are themselves of a certain quality; and similarly in other cases. Whether, however, something is said in many ways or in one way in respect of species is to be considered by these means. First, indeed, one must look to the contrary, whether it is said in many ways, whether it differs in species or in name. For some things are immediately different also in their names, as to the sharp in voice the contrary is the flat, but in magnitude the blunt; it is evident, therefore, that the contrary of the sharp is said in many ways, and if this is so, then also the sharp. For according to each of these the contrary was something different, for the sharp will not be the same as the contrary of the blunt and of the flat; yet the sharp is contrary to both. Again, to the flat in voice the contrary is the sharp, but in magnitude the light; wherefore the flat is said in many ways, because it also has a contrary. Similarly also with the beautiful: to that which is in a living being the contrary is the shameful, but to that which is in a house, the pernicious; wherefore the beautiful is equivocal. In some names, however, there is no difference at all in name, but the difference in species is immediately manifest in them, as in the clear and the obscure; for a voice is said to be clear and obscure. Similarly also with color.
Ergo nominibus quidem nihil dissonant., specie autem manifesta in eis statim differentia est; non enim similiteret color clarus dicitur, et vox clara. Manifestum autem id est et per sensum, nam eorum quae eadem sunt specie, idem sensus; at clarum quod in voce et in colore non eodem sensu judicamus, sed hoc quidem visu, illud autem'auditu.S!militer autem et acutumetobtusum in humoribus et ir magnitudinibus, sed hoc quidem tactu, illud autem gustu. Nam neque hæc dissonant nominibus, neque in seipsis, neque in contrariis, obtusum enim est contrariumutrique. Amplius si huic quidem est aliquid contrarium, illi autem simpliciter nihil, utei quae est a potu delectationi, ea quae est a siti tristitia, contrarium; ei autem quae est ab eo quod est considerare quod diameter est costae incommensurabilis, nihil. Quare multipliciter delectatio dicitur. Et ei quidem quae est secundum mentem amare, odire contrarium est; ei autem quæ est secundum corporalem actum, nihil; manifestum ergo quoniam amare aequivocum. Praeterea in mediis, Si huic quidem est aliquid medium, illi autem nihil, aut si utrisque quidem est, non idem autem, ut clari et obscuri, in coloribus quidem aliquid est medium, fuscum, in voce: autem nihil, aut si forte raucum, quemadmodum quidam dicunt raucam vocem medium esse, quare æquivocum clarum, similiter et obscurum.
In names, then, they differ in no way, but in species the difference in them is immediately manifest; for "clear" is not said similarly of color and of voice. And this is manifest also through sense; for of things that are the same in species, the sense is the same; but we judge "clear" in voice and in color not by the same sense, but the one by sight, the other by hearing. Similarly also "sharp" and "flat" in humors and in magnitudes, but the one by touch, the other by taste. For neither do these differ in names, nor in themselves, nor in their contraries; for "flat" is contrary to both. Further, if to the one there is something contrary, but to the other simply nothing, as to the pleasure that comes from drink, the distress that comes from thirst is contrary; but to the pleasure that comes from considering that the diagonal is incommensurable with the side, nothing. Wherefore pleasure is said in many ways. And to loving according to the mind, hating is contrary; but to loving according to bodily act, nothing; manifest therefore that "to love" is equivocal. Moreover, in intermediates: if to the one there is some intermediate, but to the other nothing, or if to both there is one, but not the same, as of clear and obscure, in colors there is some intermediate, the dusky, but in voice nothing, or if perhaps the hoarse, as some say that a hoarse voice is the intermediate; wherefore "clear" is equivocal, and similarly also "obscure.
Insuper si horum quidem plura media, illorum autemunum, ut in claro et obscuro. Nam in coloribus plura media, in voce autem unum, raucum. Rursum in eo quod secundum contradictionem oppor.itur, considerandum si multipliciter dicitur. Nam si hoc multipliciter dicitur, et quod huic opponitur multipliciter dicetur. Ut non videre multipliciter dicitur, unum quidem non habere visum, alterum autem non operari visu. Si autem boc multipliciterdicitur, necessarium est et videre multipliciter dici: utrique enim non videre opponitur, ut ei quidem quod est non habere visum, habere; illi autcm quod non est operarivisu, operari. Ampliusin hisqusesecundum privationem et habitum dicuntur perspiciendum. Si enim alterum mullipliciter dicitur, et reliquum utsi sensibilemultipliciterdicitur: et secundum animam etcorpus, et insensibile multipliciter dicetur et secundum animam et corpus. Quod autem secundumprivationem et habitumopponunturqnae dictasunt,manifestum, eo quod nata sint utrumque sensum habere animalia,etsecundum animum et secundum corpus. Amplius autem in casibus considerandum. Nam si juste multipliciter dicitur, et justum multipliciter dicetur, secundum utrumque enim justorum est justum, utsijustedicitur et secundum sui cognitionem judicare et ut oportet, similiter et justum.
Moreover, if of the former there are several intermediates, but of the latter one, as in clear and obscure. For in colors there are several intermediates, but in voice there is one, the hoarse. Again, in the case of what is opposed according to contradiction, one must consider whether it is said in many ways. For if this is said in many ways, what is opposed to it will also be said in many ways. For instance, not to see is said in many ways: one way is not to have sight, another is not to exercise sight. But if this is said in many ways, it is necessary that to see also be said in many ways; for not to see is opposed to both, to having sight indeed is opposed having, but to not exercising sight is opposed exercising. Further, in the case of things that are said according to privation and habit, one must examine. For if the one is said in many ways, the other will also be said in many ways, as if the sensible is said in many ways, both according to soul and according to body, the insensible will also be said in many ways both according to soul and according to body. But that the things said according to privation and habit are opposed is manifest from the fact that animals are naturally disposed to have both senses, both according to soul and according to body. Further, one must consider in the cases. For if justly is said in many ways, just will also be said in many ways; for a just thing is just according to each of the just things, as if justly is said both to judge according to one's own knowledge and as one ought, similarly also just.
Eodem autem modo et si salubre multipliciter dicitur, et salubritermultipliciter dicetur, ut si salubre dicitur hoc quidem sanitatis effectivum, illud autem conservativum, quoddam vero significativum, et salubriter vel effective, vel conservative, vel significative dicetur. Similiter autem et in aliis quando ipsum multipliciter dictum fuerit, et casus ab eo multipliciter dicetur; et si casus, et ipsum. Consideranda autem et genera secundum nomen praedicationum, si eaedem sint nominibus. Nam si non eaedem, manifestum est quoniam æquivocumest quod dicitur, ut honum in cibisquidem effectivum est voluptatis, in n:edieina autem effectivum sanitatis, in animavero qualem esse, ut ca8tam, vel fortem, vel justam. Similiter autem etin homine; aliquoties autem et. quando ut in tempore bonum (bonumenim diciturin tempore), plerumque autem quantum in mediocri(diciturenimet mediocre bonum); quareaequivocum bonum. Similiter autem et candidum, in corpore quidem color, in voceautem bene audile. Similiter. autem et acutum, non enim similiter idem in omnibus dicitur. Nam vox acuta quidem velox (sicut dicunt, qui secundum numeros harmonici sunt), angulus autem acutus, qui minor est recto, gladius vero qui est anguli acuti.
In the same way also, if "healthy" is said in many ways, "healthily" will also be said in many ways; for example, if this thing is called healthy as productive of health, that thing as preservative of health, and a certain thing as indicative of health, then "healthily" will be said either productively, or preservatively, or indicatively. Similarly also in other cases, when the thing itself is said in many ways, the case-form derived from it will also be said in many ways; and if the case-form is, so is the thing itself. One must also consider the genera of predications according to the name, whether they are the same for the names. For if they are not the same, it is clear that what is said is equivocal, as "good" in foods is productive of pleasure, in medicine productive of health, in the soul such as to be, for instance, temperate, or brave, or just. Similarly also in the case of man; and sometimes also in respect of when, as good in time (for good is said in time), but for the most part in respect of quantity, in the moderate (for the moderate is said to be good); wherefore good is equivocal. Similarly also "white," in the body indeed a color, in the voice however well audible. Similarly also "sharp," for it is not said in the same way in all cases. For a sharp voice is a swift one (as those say who are harmonic according to numbers), but a sharp angle is the one that is less than a right angle, and a sharp sword is the one that is of a sharp angle.
Consideranda etiam et genera eorum quæ sunt sub eodem nomine, si diversa et non subalterna sunt, ut equus, hoc autem animal, et hoc vas, Diversa enim quae secundum nomen est horum ratio,!; nam hoc quidem animal, quid significat, illud vero vas, quale quid. Si autem subalterna sintgenera, non necessarium diversas esse rationes, ut corvi animal, et avis genus est;quando autem corvum,dicimus autem esse et animal,quiddicimuseumdem esse;quareutraque genera de eodem prædicatur. Similiter autem et quando animal volatile bipes corvum dicimus, avem dicimus eumdem esse, et sic ergo utraquegenera de corvo praedicantur, et ratio eorum. In non subalternis generibus nonacciditboc;nequeenimquando vas dicimus, animal dicimus, nequequandoanimal vas. Considerandum autem non solum si in proposito diversa sunt genera, et non subalterna, sed et in contrano. bi enim contrarium multipliciterdicitur, manifestum quoniam et propositum. Utile autem ad definitionem inspicere quæ de composito fit, ut candidicorporiset candidas vocis, nam sublato proprio, eamdem rationem oportet relinqui. Hoc autem non accidit in æquivocis, ut in iis qua: nunc dicta sunt, nam hoc quidem erit corpus habens talem colorem, illud autem vox bene audibilis. Sublato igitur corpore, et voce, non idem in utraque relinquitur, at oportet si univoc.um essetcandidum, quod in utraque dicitur esse idem.
One must also consider the genera of things that fall under the same name, whether they are different and not subordinate to one another, as horse, and this [is] an animal, and this a vessel. For the definitions of these according to the name are different; for the one signifies animal, the other vessel, a certain quality. But if the genera are subordinate, it is not necessary that the definitions be different, as the crow is an animal, and bird is a genus; for when we say crow, we also say that it is an animal, which is the same thing; wherefore both genera are predicated of the same thing. Similarly also when we call the crow a two-footed flying animal, we say that it is a bird, and the same thing; and so both genera are predicated of the crow, and their definition. In genera that are not subordinate this does not happen; for neither when we say vessel do we say animal, nor when we say animal do we say vessel. One must consider not only whether the genera in the proposed case are different and not subordinate, but also in the contrary case. For since the contrary is said in many ways, it is clear that the proposed case is also. It is useful for definition to examine what is made concerning the composite, as of a white body and a white voice; for when the proper [meaning] is removed, the same definition ought to remain. But this does not happen in equivocals, as in those things that have now been said; for the one will be a body having such a color, the other a voice that is well audible. When the body and the voice are removed, therefore, the same thing is not left in both, and yet it ought [to be], if white were univocal, [namely] that what is said in both is the same.
Saepeautem et in ipsis dofinitionibus latet assequens aequivocum, quapropter et in definitioneconsiderandum.Ut siquis significativum vel effectivum sanitatis quod moderate se babet ad sanitatem dicat esse, non refutandum; sed inspi- ' eiendum quid moderatequidem secundum utrum que dixit, ut si hoc quidem tale significat ut facerc sanitatem, illud autem tale ut significare qualis quidem sit habitus. Adhuc:si:non comparabilia sunt secundum magis, et minus, vel similiter, ut clara vox, clara vestis, et acutus humor, et acuta vox: haec enim neque similiter dicuntur clara vel acuta, neque magis alterum: quare aequivocum clarum et acutum, nam univocum omne comparabile, aut enim similiter dicetur aut magis alterum. Quoniam autem diversorumgenerum, et non subalternatim positorum diversas species sunt et difierentiae, ut animalis et suientise (diversaj enim horum differentiae), considerandum si quæ sub eodem sunt nomine diversorum generum, et non subalternorum diversae differentias sint, ut acutum vocis et magnitudinis; differt enim vox a voce eo quod acuta sit, similiter et magnitudo a magnitudine: quareaiquivocum acutum, diversorum enim generum, et non subalternorum diversae differentiae sunt. Rursum si eorumdem quae sunt sub eodem nomine diversæ differentiae sunt, ut coloris qui est in corporibus et in melodiis.
But often also in the definitions themselves there lurks a consequent equivocation, and for this reason it must be considered in the definition as well. For example, if someone says that the significative or effective of health is what is moderately disposed toward health, this is not to be rejected; but one must examine what he meant by "moderately" in each case, namely whether the one signifies such a thing as to produce health, while the other signifies such a thing as to indicate what sort of habit it is. Further: [one must consider] whether they are not comparable according to more and less, or similarly, as a clear voice and a clear garment, and a sharp humor and a sharp voice; for these are neither said to be clear or sharp similarly, nor is one more so than the other; wherefore "clear" and "sharp" are equivocal, for everything univocal is comparable, since it will either be said similarly or one more than the other. But since of different genera, and of those not placed in subalternation, the species and differences are different, as of animal and knowledge (for their differences are different), one must consider whether things that fall under the same name belong to different genera, and not subalternate ones, and have different differences, as "sharp" of voice and of magnitude; for a voice differs from a voice in that it is sharp, and similarly a magnitude from a magnitude; wherefore "sharp" is equivocal, for of different genera, and of those not subalternate, the differences are different. Again, [one must consider] whether of things that fall under the same name the differences are different, as of color that is in bodies and in melodies.
Nam ejus qui est in corporibus congregativum et disgregativum visus, ejus vero qui in melodiis non eaedem differentias; quare aequivocum color,nameorumdem eædem differentiae. Amplius, uoniaa: species uli us est differentiainspicereoportet si eorum quat sub eodem sunt nomine, hoc quidem species esl, illud autem differentia, ut clarum, quod in corporequidem, speciescoloris;quod autem in voce, differentia. Differt enim vox a voce eo quod clara sit. Deeo igitur quod multipliciter dicitur, per haec et hujusmodi perspiciendum.
CAPUT XIV.
De differentiarum inventione,similium consideratione, et utilitatibus instrumentorum.
Differentiasautem in ipsis generibus ad se invicem perspiciendum, ut quo differt justitia a fortitudine, et prudentia a temperantia: haec enim omnia ex eodem genere sunt ex virtute. Et ex alio ad aliud, ut in iis quae non nimium differunt, ut in quo differt sensus a scientia nam in iis quæ multum differunt, manifestae sunt omnino differentiae. Similitudinem autem considerandum in iis quae sunt in diversis generibus, ut sicut alterum ad alterum quidem, sic aliud ad aliud, ut sicut scientia ad scibile, sic sensus ad sensibile: et ut alterum in altero aliquo, sic aliud in alio, ut quemadmodum visus in oculo, mens in anima, et ut tranquillitas in mari, serenitas in aere, utrumque enim quies. Maxime autem iniisquae mul.
For the faculty of sight in bodies is congregative and dispersive, but the faculty in melodies does not have the same differences; wherefore color is equivocal, since the same differences do not belong to the same name. Further, since it is necessary to inspect the difference of each species, if of those things that are under the same name, one is a species and the other a difference, as "clear" is in the body indeed a species of color, but in the voice a difference. For a voice differs from a voice in that it is clear. Concerning that which is said in many ways, therefore, this must be examined through these and suchlike considerations.
CHAPTER XIV.
On the discovery of differences, the consideration of similarities, and the utilities of the instruments.
But differences must be examined in the genera themselves in relation to one another, as in what way justice differs from courage, and prudence from temperance; for all these are from the same genus, from virtue. And from one thing to another, as in those things that do not differ too much, as in what way sense differs from knowledge; for in those things that differ greatly, the differences are altogether manifest. But similarity must be considered in those things that are in diverse genera, as that just as one thing is related to another, so another is to another, as just as knowledge is to the knowable, so sense is to the sensible; and as one thing is in something, so another is in another, as in what way sight is in the eye, mind in the soul, and as tranquillity in the sea, serenity in the air; for both are a kind of rest. But most of all in those things which are mul-
tum distant exercerioportet, facile enim in reliquis poterimus similia inspicere. Considerandum autem et ea quae sub eodem sunt genere, si quid inest omnibus idem, ut homini, et equo, et cani; nam si inest aliquid eis idem in eo sunt similia. Utile autem ipsum quidem, quod quotupliciter, dicitur, considerasseaddiiuciditatem;maximeautem quis sciet quid ponatur, manifesto facto quotupliciterdicitur.Etad fieri secundum rem eamdem, et non ad nomen syllogismos: sieniminmanifestum sit quotupliciter dicitur, contingit non ad idem etiam qui respondet et qui interrogat ferre intellectum; manifestato autem quotupliciter dicitur, et ad quid ferens ponat, ridicuius videbitur interrogans esse, si non ad hoc sermonem faciat. Utile etiam, et ut non falsa ratione decipiamur, sed decipiamus potius: nam scientes quotu pliciterdicitur,llon allucinabimur,sed sciemus si non ad idem sermonem faciat is qui interrogat, et ipsi interrogantes poterimus apparenti ratiocinatione fallere, nisi is qui respondet agnoscat quotupliciter dicitur. Hoc non in omnibus semper possibile, sed quando fuerint eorum quae multipliciter dicuntur, aliaquidem vera, alta autem falsa. Est autem proprie nonconveniens.modus hic dialecticae, quare omnino vitanda dialecticishujusmodi ad nomen disputatio, nisi quis aliter non possit de proposito disserere.
Then one must also distinguish these, for we shall easily be able to observe similar cases in the rest. One must also consider those things that fall under the same genus, whether some one thing is present in all of them, as in man, horse, and dog; for if some one thing is present in them, they are similar in that respect. It is useful to have considered how many ways a thing itself is said, for the sake of clarity; but most of all, once it has been made manifest how many ways it is said, one will know what is being posited. And one must make syllogisms with regard to the thing itself, and not with regard to the name; for if it is not manifest how many ways it is said, it happens that both the one who answers and the one who asks do not direct their understanding to the same thing; but once it has been made manifest how many ways it is said, and to which of them the respondent directs his assertion, the questioner will seem ridiculous if he does not direct his argument to that. It is useful also so that we are not deceived by a false account, but rather deceive others; for knowing how many ways it is said, we shall not be led astray, but shall know whether the one who asks is not directing his argument to the same thing, and we ourselves, when asking, will be able to deceive by an apparent syllogism, unless the one who answers recognizes how many ways it is said. This is not always possible in all cases, but when, of those things that are said in many ways, some are true and others false. But this mode is properly unsuitable for dialectic; wherefore dialecticians must altogether avoid this kind of disputation directed at the name, unless one cannot otherwise discuss the proposed matter.
Differentias autem invenireutile, et ad syllogismos de eodem, et diverso, et ad cognoscendum quid est unumquodque.Quod autem ad syllogismosdeeodem et diverso utile, manifestum: invenientes enim dieferentiam propositorum quamlibet,ostendenteserimus quoniam non idem. Ad cognoscendum autem qutdestunumquodque,eo quod propriam substantiae cujusque rationem,iis quæ (circa unuroquodquesunt) accommodatis differentiissepararesolemus. Similitudinis autem consideratio utilis est ad inductivas, rationes, et ad syllogismos ex suppositione, et ad assignationem definitionum. Ad inductivas quidem rationes, eo quod circa singula in similibus inductione universale existimamus inducere, non enim facileest mducercignorant.essimilia.Adaynagismoa ex suppositione, eo quod probabile est quemadmodum in uno similium se habet, sic et in reliquis. Quare ad quodcunque eoru facuItatem habebimus disputandi, profitebimur quemadmodum in bis se babet, sic et in proposito habere. Id enim ostendentes, et propositum ex suppositione ostendentes erimus: supponentes enim quomodo in his se habet, sic et in proposito se habere demonstrationem faciemus. Ad definitionem autem assignationem, eo quod potentes conspicere quid in unoquoque idem, non dubitabimus ad quid oporteat genus (cum definiemus propositum) collocare, nam communium quod maxime in eo quod quid prsedicatur' genus erit.
To find differences is useful both for syllogisms concerning the same and the different and for knowing what each thing is. That it is useful for syllogisms concerning the same and the different is clear: for by finding whatever difference there is between the things proposed, we shall have shown that they are not the same. For knowing what each thing is, [it is useful] because we are accustomed to separate the differences proper to each thing's substance by applying them to the things that are around each thing. Consideration of similarity is useful for inductive arguments, for syllogisms from supposition, and for the assigning of definitions. For inductive arguments, because by induction we think we bring in the universal from particulars in similar cases; for it is not easy to bring in [the universal] when the similar cases are unknown. For syllogisms from supposition, because it is probable that as a thing stands in one of the similar cases, so it stands in the rest. Wherefore, for whatever of these we shall have the ability to dispute, we shall profess that as things stand in these, so they stand in the proposed case. For by showing this, we shall also have shown the proposed case from supposition; for supposing that as things stand in these, so they stand in the proposed case, we shall make the demonstration. For the assigning of a definition, because, being able to see what is the same in each thing, we shall not doubt where we ought to place the genus when we define the proposed thing; for the genus will be that of the common [attributes] which is most predicated in [answer to] the question "what it is.
Similiter autem et in multum distantibus utilis ad definitiones similitudinis consideratio, ut quod idem tranquillitas in mari, et serenitas in aere, utrumqueenim quies, etquoniam punctum in linea, et unitas in numero, utrumque enim principium. Quare commune in omnibusgenusassignantes, arbitrabitur non extranee definire. Pene autem et definientes sic solent assignare, nam et unitatem principium numeri dicunt esse; et punctum principium lineae. Manifestum igitur quoniam ad commune utrorumque genus collocant. Instrumenta itaque per quae sunt syllogismi, ha'c sunt; loci autem ad quos utilia sunt prædicta, ii sunt qui dicendi sunt.
LIBER SECUNDUS.
CAPUT PRIMUM.
De problematis uuiversalibus et in quibus prædicatis inesse et esse convertuntur.
Sunt autem problematum haecquidemuniversalia, ilia vero particularia: universalia quidem, ut omnis voluptas bonum est, et nulla voluptas bonum; particularia vero, ut aliqua voluptas bonum, et aliqua voluptas non bonum. Sunt autem ad utraque genera problematum communia universalia, et constructiva, et destructiva. Ostendentes enim quod omni inest, et quod alicui inest ostendentes erimus; similiter autem et si quod nulli inest ostenderimus, et quod non omni inest ostendentes erimus.
Similarly, the consideration of similarity is useful for definitions even in things that are far apart, as that tranquility at sea and clearness in the air are the same thing, for each is a rest; and that a point in a line and a unit in number are the same, for each is a principle. Therefore, when they assign the common genus in all these, one will judge that they are not defining in a foreign way. And indeed those who define are accustomed to assign in nearly this way, for they say that a unit is the principle of number and a point the principle of a line. It is clear, therefore, that they place them under the common genus of both. The instruments, then, through which syllogisms are made are these; and the places to which the aforementioned are useful are those that must now be stated.
BOOK TWO
CHAPTER ONE
On universal problems, and in which predicates inherence and being are converted.
Of problems, some are universal and others particular: universal, as every pleasure is good, and no pleasure is good; particular, as some pleasure is good, and some pleasure is not good. But common to both kinds of problems are universal [problems], both constructive and destructive. For by showing that [something] is present in every case, we shall also have shown that it is present in some case; and similarly, if we show that it is present in no case, we shall also have shown that it is not present in every case.
Primum ergo de universalibus destructivis dicendum, eo quod communia sinthujusmodi ad universalia et particularia, et quia magis positiones afferant in eo quod inest, quam non,disputantes autem destruant. Est autem difficillimum converti ab accidente propriam nomitationem. Nam aliquo modo et non universaliter in solis contingit accidentibus, a definitioneenim, et proprio, et genere necessarium est converti, ut si inest alicui animal grepsibile bipes esse, convertentem verum erit dicere, quoniam illud animal gressibile bipes est. Similiter autem a genere, nam si animal inest alicui, animal est. Eodem autem modo et proprio est; si enim alicui inest J grammatices susceptivum esse, grammatices susceptivum erit. Nam nihil horum contingit secundum quid inesse, vel non esse, sed simpliciter vel inesse, vel non inesse. In accidentibus autem nihil prohibet secundum quid inesse, ut albedinem, vel justitiam. Quare non sufficit ostendere quoniam inest albedo, vel justitia, ad ostendendum quod albus, vel justus est, nam habet dubitationem, quoniam secundum quid albus, vel justus est: quapropter non necessarium est in accidentibus converti. Determinare autem oportet et peccata quas sunt in problematibus, nam sunt duo vel in eo quod falsum dicunt, vel in eo quod transgrediuntur positam locutionem.
First, then, we must speak about the destructive arguments concerning universals, because the common [principles] of this kind apply to both universals and particulars, and because they contribute more to positions regarding what is present than what is not, while those who dispute destroy [them]. But it is most difficult to convert from an accident to its proper designation. For in some way and not universally does this happen in accidents alone; for from a definition, a property, and a genus it is necessary to convert, as if being a two-footed walking animal belongs to something, then when converted it will be true to say that that animal is a two-footed walking animal. Similarly also from a genus, for if animal belongs to something, it is an animal. In the same way also with a property; for if being receptive of grammar belongs to something, it will be receptive of grammar. For none of these happens to belong or not belong in a qualified sense, but simply to belong or not belong. In accidents, however, nothing prevents belonging in a qualified sense, as whiteness or justice. Therefore it is not sufficient to show that whiteness or justice is present in order to show that [something] is white or just, for there is a doubt, since it is white or just in a qualified sense; wherefore it is not necessary to convert in accidents. But one must also determine what errors there are in problems, for there are two: either in saying what is false, or in transgressing the established expression.
Falsum etenim dicentes, et qui quod non inest inesse alicui dicunt, peccant, et qui extraneis nominibus res appellant (ut Platanum hominem), transgrediuntur positam nominationem.
CAPUT II.
Loci problematum quod quidquam insit vel non insit.
Unus autem locus est inspicere si quid secundum aliquem aliummodum inest, utaccidens assignavit. Peccatur autem maxime id circa genera, ut si quis albo dicat accidere colorem esse, non enim albo colorem esse accidit, sed genus ejus color est. Contingit autem et secundum nominationem determinare eum qui ponit, ut quod accidit justitiae virtutem esse. Saepe autem et cum non determinet, manifestum quod genus ut accidens assignavit, ut si quis albedinem colorari dixerit,vel ambulationem moveri. A nullo enim genere denominative prædicatio de specie dicitur, sed omnia univoce genera de speciebus praedicantur, nam et nomen et rationem generum suscipiunt species; qui igitur coloratum dixit album, neque genus assignavit, quoniam denominative dixit, neque ut proprium vel ut definitionem, nam definitio et proprium nulli alii inest:: sunt autem colorataet pleraque aliorum, utlignum, lapis, homo, equus. Manifestum igitur quoniam ut accidens assignavit. Alius locus est inspicere ea quibus inesse aut omnibus aut nulli dictum est, etconsiderare secundum species, et nun in infinitis.
For those who state something false, and those who say that what is not present in something is present in it, err; and those who call things by extraneous names (as calling a man a plane-tree) transgress the established naming.
CHAPTER II.
Topics of problems: whether something is present or not present.
One topic is to consider whether something is present in some other way, as someone has assigned it as an accident. The greatest error, however, occurs around genera, as if someone were to say that color is an accident of white; for color is not an accident of white, but color is its genus. It also happens that one may determine by naming the one who posits it, as that virtue is an accident of justice. Often, too, even when he does not determine it, it is clear that he has assigned the genus as an accident, as if someone were to say that whiteness is colored, or that walking is moved. For from no genus is predication made of a species by denomination, but all genera are predicated univocally of species; for species receive both the name and the definition of genera. Therefore, whoever said that white is colored neither assigned the genus, since he spoke by denomination, nor [assigned it] as a property or as a definition; for a definition and a property are present in no other thing; but many other things are colored, such as wood, stone, man, horse. It is clear, therefore, that he assigned it as an accident. Another topic is to examine those things of which it has been said that [something] is present in all or in none, and to consider according to species, and not in infinite cases.
Nam transitu magis et in paucioribus consideratio, oportet autem considerare et incipere a primis, deinde consequenter usque ad individua, ut si oppositorum eamdem disciplinam quis dixerit esse, perspiciendum si eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, et contrariorum, et quæ secundum privationem et habitum et quæ secundum contradictionem dicuntur, eadem fit disciplina et si in his nondum manifestum est, rursum ea dividendum usque ad individua, ut si, justi vel injusti, vel dupli vel dimidii, vel caeci-, tatis vel visus, vel esse vel non esse. Nam si in aliquo ostendatur quod non eadem, interimentes erimus problema,similiter autem et si nulli inest.Iste auten' locus convertitur ad construendum et destruendum. Si enim in omnibus videatur cum divisionem proferimus,nihil in pluribus, postulandum est autem universaliter ponere,aut instantiam ferrein ali. quo non sic esse;nam si neutrum horum faciat,absurdus apparebit, qui non ponet. Alius est, definitiones facere accidentis, et ejus -cui accidit, aut utriusqne de utroque, aut alterius,deinde considcrare si quid non verumin definitionibus perinde ac verum sumptum sit. Ut si est Deum injustitiam facere, quid injustitiam facere. Si enim nocere sponte,manifestum quoniam non est Deum injustitiam facere,non enim contingit nocere Deum;et si invidus sit studiosus, quisinvidus,etquae invidia.
For the consideration is more by way of transition and in fewer instances, but one must consider and begin from the first things, then successively down to individuals, as if someone has said that the same discipline is of opposites, one must examine whether the same discipline is of those which are relative, and of contraries, and of those which are said according to privation and habit, and of those which are said according to contradiction; and if in these it is not yet manifest, again one must divide them down to individuals, as whether of the just or the unjust, or of the double or the half, or of blindness or sight, or of being or not being. For if in any one it is shown that it is not the same, we shall be destroying the problem; and similarly also if it belongs to none. But this topic is turned to constructing and destroying. For if in all it appears when we bring forward the division, [it appears] in nothing in the many; but one must posit universally, or bring an instance in some other case that it is not so; for if he does neither of these, he who does not posit will appear absurd. Another is to make definitions of an accident, and of that to which it accrues, either of both concerning both, or of one concerning the other, then to consider if anything not true has been assumed in the definitions just as if true. As if it is [said] that God does injustice, what is to do injustice. For if it is to harm willingly, it is manifest that it is not [possible] for God to do injustice, for it does not befall God to harm; and if the envious man is studious, who is envious, and what is envy.
Nam si invidia est tristitiainapparenti prosperitate alicujus proborum,manifestum est quod studiosus non est invidus, pravus enim esset;et si indignans invidus,quis uterque eorum; sic enim manifestum erit utrum verum an falsum sit,quod dictum est,ut si invidus quidem sit qui tristatur in bonorum prosperitatibu3,indignans autem qui in malorum prosperitatibus trislatur,manifestum quod non erit invidus indignans.Sumere autem etpro iis(quae in defitionibus sunt) nominibus definitiones, et non desistere donec ad nolum deventum sit;nam sæpe cum tota quidem definitio assignata sit,non manifestum est quod quæritur,pro aliquo autem eorum (quæ in definitione sunt) nominum definitione dicta, manifestum fit. Amplius,problema propositionem sibi facientem instare. Nam instantia erit argumentum ad positionem. Est autem locus hic pene idem ei quoconsiderarequibusinesse,vel omnibus,vel nulli dictum est,differt autem modo. Amplius, determinare quæ oportet dicere ut p!ures,et quae non Utile enim et ad construendum, et ad destruendum, ut quod nominationibus quidem res nuncupandum ut plures, quæ autem sunt, taliane, an non talia, non amplius attendendum ad plures:ut salubre quidem dicendum effectivum sanitatis, ceu plures dicunt.
For if envy is distress at the apparent prosperity of someone among the good, it is evident that the studious man is not envious, for he would be wicked; and if the indignant man is envious, who is each of them? For thus it will be evident whether what was said is true or false: as, if the envious man is one who is distressed at the prosperities of the good, but the indignant man is one who rejoices at the prosperities of the wicked, it is evident that the indignant man will not be envious. But one must also take, in place of the names that are in the definitions, the definitions themselves, and not stop until one comes to a name; for often, when the whole definition has been assigned, it is not evident what is sought, but when a definition has been stated in place of one of the names that are in the definition, it becomes evident. Further, one must press the problem by making it a proposition for oneself. For the objection will be an argument against the position. And this topic is nearly the same as that by which it was said to consider to whom it is beneficial, either to all or to none, but it differs in manner. Further, to determine what one ought to say as the many do, and what not. For it is useful both for constructing and for destroying: that in names, indeed, things should be called as the many call them, but whether the things that exist are such or not, one should no longer attend to the many; as, indeed, one should say that the healthful is productive of health, as the many say.
Utrum autem propositumeffectivumsitsanitatis,an non,non amplius ut plures dicendum,sed ut medicus.Amplius,si multipliciter dicatur,positumautem sit quoniam inest,aul quoniam non inest, alterum. monstrare eorum quae multipliciter dicuntur,si non utraque contingat.Utendum autem in iis quae latent, nam si non lateatmultipliciterdictuminstabit,quoniam non monstratum est id quod ipse dubitabat, sed alterum. Hic autem locus convertitur et ad construendum et ad destruendum, nam construere volentes ostendemus quoniam alterum inest,si non ambo poterimus: destruentes autem quoniam non inest alterum ostendemus, si ambo non poterimus: verumtamen destruenti quidem nihil oportet ex concessione disputare, neque si omni, neque si nulli dictum Bit inesse;nam si ostenderimus quoniam non inest quodcunque id sit, interimentes erimus omni inesse;similiterautemet si uni ostenderimus inesse, interimemus nulliinesse.Construentibus autem præconfitendum quod cuivis inest omni inest, si verisimile sit postulatum.Non sufficit enim, ad ostendendum quod omni inest, in uno disputasse, ut si hominis anima immortalis est, propter hoc anima omnis immortalis; quare praeconfitendum quod si quæcunque anima immortalis, omnis immortalis.
But whether the proposed definition is productive of health or not must no longer be discussed as the many do, but as the physician does. Further, if it is spoken of in many ways, and it has been laid down that it belongs, or that it does not belong, one must demonstrate the other of those things which are said in many ways, if both cannot be established. This must be used in matters that are hidden; for if it is not hidden that it is said in many ways, he will press the point that what he himself doubted has not been demonstrated, but the other. This topic is turned both to constructing and to destroying; for when we wish to construct, we shall show that the one belongs, if we cannot show both; but when destroying, we shall show that the one does not belong, if we cannot show both. Nevertheless, for one who is destroying, there is no need to dispute from a concession, neither that it has been said to belong to every one, nor to no one; for if we have shown that it does not belong, whatever that may be, we shall have destroyed its belonging to every one; and similarly, if we have shown that it belongs to one, we shall destroy its belonging to no one. But for those who are constructing, it must be conceded in advance that whatever belongs to any one belongs to every one, if the postulate is plausible. For to show that it belongs to every one, it is not enough to have disputed in the case of one—as, if the soul of a man is immortal, for this reason every soul is immortal; wherefore it must be conceded in advance that if any soul whatever is immortal, every soul is immortal.
Hoc autem non semper faciendum,sed quando non facile possumus communem in omnibus unam rationem dicere, quemadmodum geometer, quod triangulus duobus rectis aequos babet tres angulos. Si autem non lateatquod multipliciter dicitur divisum, quotupliciterdicitur etinterirnendum et construendum. Ut si dicens est utile, aut honestum, tentandum ambo construere, vel intrimere de proposito, ut quod honestum et quod utile, vel quod neque honestum neque utile.Si autem non contingat utraque, alterum ostendendum,adnotato quod hoc quidem est, illud autem non, eadem autem ratio, etiam si plura sint in quae dividitur.Rursum quæcunque non secundum aequivocationem dicuntur multipliciter,sed alio modo.Ut disciplina una plurium, aut ut finis, aut ejus quod ad finem, ut medicina ejus quod samitatem t'acit,ut quod cibat,aut ut amborum finium velutcontrariorum eadem disciplina (nihil enim magis finis alterum altero)aut ut ejus quod per se est, et ejus quod per accidens. Ut perse.quidemquod triangulus duobus rectis æquales habet tres angulos,per accidens autem quod aequilaterus, quoniam enim accidit triangulo aequilaterum triangulum esse, per hoc cognoscimus quod duobus rectis æquales habet. Si ergo nullo modo contingit eadem esse plurium disciplinam, manifestum quoniam omnino non contingit esse, aut si aliquo modo contingit,manifestum quod contingit.
But this is not always to be done, but when we cannot easily state one common account in all cases, as the geometer does, that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles. But if it does not escape us that what is said in many ways has been divided, we must both refute and establish in how many ways it is said. For example, if someone says that it is useful or honorable, one must attempt to establish both, or to refute one of the proposed alternatives, namely that it is honorable and that it is useful, or that it is neither honorable nor useful. But if it does not happen that both hold, one must show the other, noting that this one is so and that one is not; and the same account applies even if there are more things into which it is divided. Again, whatever things are said in many ways not according to equivocation, but in another mode: as one discipline is of many things, either as of the end, or as of that which is toward the end, as medicine is of that which produces health, as of that which nourishes, or as of both ends, as of contraries the same discipline (for neither is more an end than the other), or as of that which is per se and that which is per accidens. As per se, that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles; but per accidens, that it is equilateral, for since it happens to a triangle to be an equilateral triangle, through this we know that it has angles equal to two right angles. If, therefore, in no way does it happen that the same discipline be of many things, it is manifest that it altogether cannot be; or if in some way it happens, it is manifest that it does happen.
Dividere autem quotupliciter,utile,utsi voluerimus construere:taliaprsestatuendasunt quaecunque contingunt, et dividendum in ea tantum quaecunque utilia sunt ad construendum. Si autem destruere quaecunque non contingunt,reliqua vero omittenda. Id autem faciendum in iis cum latuerit quotupliciter dicuntur,et esse hoc quidem hujus aut non esse ex eisdem locis astruendum,ut disciplioam,hujus quidem aut ut finis, aut eorum quae sunt ad finem, aut ut eorum quæ sunt secundumaccidens,velrursum non esse aliquid secundum aliquem dictorum modorum,eadem autem ratio,et in desiderio,etquæcunque alia dicuntur plurium.Est enim desiderium bujusaututfinis,ut sanitatis,aututeorum quæ sunt ad finem,ut medicinæ conficiendæ,aut uteorurn quae sunt secundum accidens,utin vino amicum dulce, non quia vinum, sed quia dulce est, nam per se dulce desiderat,vinum autem per accidens.-si enim austerum fit, non amplius desiderat, per accidens ergo desiderabat. Utilis autem locus hic et in iis quae sunt ad aliquid,pene enim talia ea quae ad aliquid sunt.Amplius,transferreadevidentius nomen. Ut pro exacto in opinione clarum,et pro curiositate cupid i tas su perfluarum rerum,evidentiori enim facto quod dictum est, bene argumentabilis est positio. Estautem hic locus ad utrumquecommunis,ad construendum et ad destruendum.Ad ostendendum autem contraria circa idem inesse,considerandum in genere.
To divide in how many ways it is useful, as, for instance, if we wish to establish something: all the consequences that follow must be posited, and division must be made only into those that are useful for establishing. But if we wish to refute, [we must take] all that do not follow, and omit the rest. This must be done in those cases when it has escaped us in how many ways things are said, and that this is or is not [predicated] of this must be established from the same topics—for example, that discipline is [desired] either as an end, or as one of the things that are for the sake of the end, or as one of the things that are [desired] incidentally; or again, that something is not [said] according to any of the modes mentioned. The same account holds also in the case of desire, and whatever else is said of several things. For desire is [desire] of this either as of an end, as of health, or as of the things that are for the sake of the end, as of preparing medicine, or as of the things that are incidental, as in wine [one desires] what is pleasant to a friend, not because it is wine, but because it is sweet; for he desires the sweet in itself, but wine incidentally—for if it becomes sour, he no longer desires it; therefore he desired it incidentally. This topic is useful also in things that are in relation to something, for such things are nearly of this sort. Further, to transfer [the argument] to a more evident name, as instead of "exact" in opinion, "clear," and instead of "curiosity," "desire for superfluous things"; for when what has been said is made more evident, the position can be argued well. This topic is common to both, to establishing and to refuting. But to show that contraries belong to the same thing, one must consider [this] in the genus.
ut si volumus ostendere quod est circa sensum rectitudo et peccatum,sentire quidem judicare est;judicare autem est recte et non recte, et circa sensum erit rectitudo et peccatum. Nunc ergo et genere circa speciem demonstratio fit,nam judicare est genus sentire; qui namque sentit, aliquo modo judicat.Rursum ex specie generi: quaecunque enim speciei insunt,et generi. Ut si disciplina prava est, et studiosa, et dispositio prava, et studiosa, nam dispositio disciplinæ genus.Primus autem locus falsusestad construenduIL,secundusautem verus;non enim necessarium quaecunque generi insunt,etspeciei inesse,nam animal est volatileetquadrupes,homo autem non.Qusecunque vero speciei insunt, necessario etgeneri:si enim homo studiosus,et animal studiosum est. Ad destruendum autem et primus quidem verus, secundus autem falsus, quæcunque enim generi non insunt, neque speciei, quaecunque vero speciei non insunt,non necesse est generi non inesse.Quoniamautemnecesaariumdequibusgenus prædicatur, et specierum aliquam prædicari, et quaecunquehabentgenus,veldenominativedicuntur a genere,et specierum aliquam habere necesse est, vel denominativa ab aliqua specierum dici.
For example, if we wish to show that rightness and error exist in relation to sense perception: to perceive is to judge; and to judge is to judge rightly or not rightly; therefore rightness and error will exist in relation to sense perception. So now the demonstration is also made from genus to species, for to judge is the genus of perceiving; for whoever perceives in some way judges. Again, from species to genus: for whatever belongs to the species also belongs to the genus. For example, if a discipline is base, it is also worthy of pursuit, and if a disposition is base, it is also worthy of pursuit, for disposition is the genus of discipline. But the first topic is false for establishing, while the second is true; for it is not necessary that whatever belongs to the genus also belongs to the species—for an animal is capable of flight and four-footed, but a human being is not. But whatever belongs to the species necessarily also belongs to the genus: for if a human being is worthy of pursuit, an animal is worthy of pursuit. For refuting, however, the first is indeed true, but the second is false; for whatever does not belong to the genus does not belong to the species either, but whatever does not belong to the species it is not necessary that it not belong to the genus. Since, moreover, it is necessary that whatever the genus is predicated of, some one of the species is also predicated of, and that whatever have the genus, or are called by denomination from the genus, also necessarily have some one of the species, or are called by denomination from some one of the species.
Ut si de aliquo disciplina praedicatur, et grammatica, vel musica,vel aliqua disciplinarum aliarum praedicabitur,et si aliquis habet disciplinam,vel denominative a disciplina dicitur, et grammaticam habebit, aut musicam, aut aliquam aliarum disciplinarum, vel denominative ab aliqua earum dicitur,ut grammaticus,vel musicus;si igitur aliquid dictum a genere quoquo modo ut animam moveri,considerandum est secundum aliquam specierum motus contingit animam moveri, ut augeri, vel minui, vel corrumpi, vel generari, aut quaecunque aliæ motus species sunt: nam si secundum nullam, manifestum est quod non movetur. Hic autem locus communis ad utrumque,etad construendum,et ad destruendum, si enim secundum aliquam speciem movetur,perspicuum est quoniam movetur, et si secundum nullam specierum movetur,manifestum quod non movetur.Cum autem facultas non adsit argumentationis ad positionem,in-' tendendum ex definitionibuci autquaesunt propositæ rei, vel quæ vidpantur, et si non ab una, etiam a pluribus.Facile anim definientibus argumentarierit, nam ed definitiones facilis argumentatio.Considerandum autem in proposito, quoniam existente necesse est positum esse,aut quid est ex necessitate, si propositum est.
For example, if discipline is predicated of something, grammar or music or some other of the disciplines will also be predicated; and if someone has a discipline, or is called denominatively from a discipline, he will have grammar or music or some other of the disciplines, or be called denominatively from one of them, as a grammarian or a musician. If, then, something is said from a genus in any way—for instance, that the soul is moved—one must consider according to which of the species of motion it happens that the soul is moved: as to be increased, or diminished, or corrupted, or generated, or whatever other species of motion there are; for if according to none, it is evident that it is not moved. This topic is common to both, both to constructing and to destroying: for if it is moved according to some species, it is clear that it is moved; and if it is moved according to no species, it is evident that it is not moved. But when the capacity for argumentation toward a position is not at hand, one must attend to the definitions of the proposed thing, or to those which seem so, and if not from one, also from several. For it will be easy for those defining to argue, since argumentation from definitions is easy. One must consider in the proposed matter that, when it exists, the position must necessarily be, or what it is by necessity, if it has been proposed.
Construere quidem volenti quo existente propositum eritex necessitate,nam si illud ostendatur esse, et propositum ostensum erit, destruere autem volenti quid est si propositum est, nam si ostenderimus consequens propositum non esse,interimentes erimus propositum.Amplius, ad tempus inspiciendum si alicubi dissonat.Ut si quod nutritur dixerit quis ex necessitate augerijnutriuntur enim semperanimalia,augenturautem non semper. Similiter autem et si scire dixerit quis reminisci, hoc enim præteriti temporis est, illud autem præsentis,et futuri; scire enim dicimur praesentia, et futura, ut quoniam erit solis defectus, reminisci autem non contingit aliud quam praeteritum.
For one who wishes to construct an argument, the question is what, if it exists, will make the proposition follow of necessity; for if that is shown to exist, the proposition will also have been shown. But for one who wishes to destroy it, the question is what, if the proposition is, follows; for if we show that the consequent does not exist, we shall have destroyed the proposition. Moreover, one must examine the tense, to see whether it is inconsistent anywhere. For example, if someone says that what is nourished necessarily grows; for animals are always nourished, but they do not always grow. Likewise also if someone says that to know is to remember; for the latter belongs to past time, the former to present and future time; for we are said to know present and future things, as that there will be an eclipse of the sun, but to remember cannot apply to anything except the past.
Amplius,sophisticus modus ducere ad id ad quod plurimum habemus argumentoruUl falJultatem.Hoc autem erit quandoque quidem necessarium quandoque autem apparens necessarium,quandoque autem neque apparens neque necessarium,necessarium quidem,quando negante eo qui respondet aliquid utilium ad positionem,ad illud rationes facit,contingit autem id talium esse ad quae copiosam argumentorumfacultatem habemus.Similiter autem et quando inductionem ad aliquid per positum faciens,interimere conatur, hoc enim interempto, et propositum interirr,itur.A pparens au tern necessarium est quando videtur quidem utile'et accommodum positioni, non est autem ad id ad quod fiunt disputationes, sive negante eo qui disputationem sustinet, sive ab inductione probabili,per positionem ad idem factam, interimere conetur idipsum; reliquum vero quando nec necessarium est nec apparens ad id ad quod fiunt disputatio::Jes,et sine causa accidit redarguere respondentem. Oportet autem devitare postremum dictorum modum, omnino enim semotus et extraneus videtur esse a dialectica.Quare oportet et respondentem non graviter ferre, sed ponenda quae non utiliasuntad positionem significare quaecunque non videantur:Zponit tamen, nam magis perplexos esse ut plurimum contingit eos qui interrogant, quando omnia hujusmodi ab eis posita fuerint, si non concludunt.
Further, the sophistic manner of leading to that for which we have the greatest abundance of arguments. This will be sometimes necessary, sometimes apparently necessary, and sometimes neither apparent nor necessary. It is necessary when, the respondent denying something useful for the thesis, he directs his arguments toward that thing, and it happens that this is among those for which we have a copious abundance of arguments. Likewise also when, making an induction toward something by means of what has been posited, he tries to destroy it; for when this is destroyed, the proposed thesis is also destroyed. But it is apparently necessary when it seems indeed useful and suited to the thesis, but is not directed toward that for which the disputations are made—whether the one maintaining the disputation denies it, or he tries to destroy that very thing by means of a probable induction, through a position made toward the same end. The remaining case is when it is neither necessary nor apparent toward that for which the disputations are made, and the refutation of the respondent happens without cause. But one ought to avoid the last-mentioned manner, for it seems altogether remote and foreign to dialectic. Wherefore the respondent also ought not to bear it with annoyance, but should indicate whatever does not seem useful for the thesis by positing them; yet he does posit them, for those who ask are generally made more perplexed when all such things have been posited by them, if they do not reach a conclusion.
Amplius, omnis qui dixit unumquodvis, quodam modo multa dixit, eo quod plura unicuique ex necessitate consequentia sunt(ut qui hominem dixit esse, et quod animal est dixit, et quod animatum,et quod hipes, et quod mentis, et disciplinae susceptivum); quare quovis uno consequentium interempto, interimitur et quod in principio est,cavere autem oportet in hujusmodi difficilioris assumptionem facere: nam quandoque facile est consequens interimere,quandoqueid ipsum propositum.Quibuscunque autem necesseest alterum tantum inesse, vel non inesse,ut homini aegritudinem,vel sanitatem, si ad alterum facile poterimus disputare quod inest, vel non inest,et ad reliquum facile poterimus. Hoc autem convertitur ad utrumque. Ostendentes enim quod inest alterum, quod non inest reliquum ostendentes erimus;si au. tem quod non inest ostendamus, reliquum inesse ostendentes erimus • manifestum igitur quod ad utrumque utilis hie locus est.Amplius argumentari transferendo nomen in orationem,cum longe magis consentaneum visum fuerit transsumerIJ quam utponitur nomen. Ut magnanimum non fortem (ut poni-. tur)sed magnum animum hahentem,quemadmodum fidentem, bona sperantem. Similiter autem et ingeniosum,cujus fuerit genius studiosus. Quemadmodum Xenocrates inquit ingeniosum eum esse qui animam sortitus est studiosam, ipsam enim unicuiqueessegenium.
Further, everyone who has said any one thing has in a way said many things, because many things necessarily follow from each one (for example, one who has said that a man exists has also said that he is an animal, and that he is animate, and that he is a biped, and that he is capable of mind and discipline); therefore, when any one of the consequents is destroyed, that which was stated at the beginning is also destroyed. But in cases of this sort one must beware of making the assumption of the more difficult point; for sometimes it is easy to destroy the consequent, sometimes the very proposition itself. But in all cases where one of two things must necessarily be present or absent—as, for a man, sickness or health—if we can easily argue that one of them is present or absent, we shall also easily be able to argue the other. And this converts to both sides. For by showing that one is present, we shall have shown that the other is absent; but if we show that one is absent, we shall have shown that the other is present. It is clear, then, that this topic is useful for both. Further, to argue by transferring the name into a definition, when it has seemed far more fitting to use the definition than to use the name as it is posited. For example, "magnanimous" not as "brave" (as it is posited), but as "having a great mind," just as "confident" means "hoping for good things." Similarly also "well-endowed by nature," whose genius is studious. As Xenocrates says, the well-endowed by nature is one who has obtained a studious soul; for the soul itself is the genius of each person.
Quoniaraautemrerumaliasquidem sunt ex necessitate, aliae autem ut in pluribus, alia: vero utrumlibet, si quod ex necessitate est, ut in pluribus ponatur,aut quod ut in pluribus,ex necessitate, autipsumautcontrariumeiquodestutinpluribussemperdatlocum argumentationis.Nam si quod ex necessitate est ut in pluribus ponatur, manifestum quoniam non omnidicitinesse,cum insitomni; quare peccavit, sive quod ut in pluribus dicitur ex necessitate dixit, omni dixit inesse, cum non insit omni: similiter autem et si contrarium ei quod in pluribus est ex necessitate dixit, semper enim in paucioribus dicitur contrarium ei quod est ut in pluribus, ut si ut in pluribus pravi homines, boni in paucioribus; quare multo magis peccavit, si bonos ex necessitate dixit esse: similiter autem et si quod utrumlibetest ex necessitate dixit,vel ut in pluribus, neque enim ex necessitate utrumlibet, neque ut in pluribus; contingit autem et si non determinans dixerit utrum ut in pluribus, an ex necessitate dixit, si autem res ut in pluribus, disputare ut ex necessitate is dixerit. Ut Iii pravos exhefcreditandos dixit esse, non determinans,tanquam ex necessitate is dixerit, disputare.
Since, however, some things exist by necessity, others for the most part, and others indifferently, if what exists by necessity is taken as holding for the most part, or what holds for the most part as by necessity, or the opposite of what holds for the most part, one always has a place for argument. For if what exists by necessity is taken as holding for the most part, it is clear that he has not said it belongs to all, since it belongs to all; therefore he has erred. Or if he said that what is said to hold for the most part exists by necessity, he said it belongs to all, when it does not belong to all. Similarly also if he said the opposite of what holds for the most part to exist by necessity; for the opposite of what holds for the most part is always said to hold in fewer cases, as if bad men are so for the most part, good men in fewer cases; therefore he erred much more if he said that good men exist by necessity. Similarly also if he said that what is indifferent exists by necessity or for the most part; for neither is the indifferent by necessity nor for the most part. It also happens that if he did not determine whether he said it for the most part or by necessity, but the matter is one that holds for the most part, one may dispute that he said it by necessity. For example, if he said that the wicked are to be trusted, not determining it, one may dispute that he said it as by necessity.
Amplius,etsi idem sibi accidens posuerit ut alterum, eo quod alterum sit nomen.Quemadmodum Prodicus dividebat voluptates in gaudium, etjucunditatem, et laetitiam, hæc enim omnia ejusdem (id est voluptatis) nomina sunt; si ergo aliquis gaudere ei quod est laetari ponat accidere, idem utique sibi dicet accidere,
CAPUT III.
De eisdem terminandis problematis loci alii.
Ouoniam autem contraria connectuntur quidem sibi invicem sex modis,contrarietatem autem faciunt quadrupliciter complexa,oportet accipere contraria quocunque modo utile fuerit et destruenti et construenti. Quod autem sex modis complectuntur, manifestum: nam aut utrumque contrariorum utriquecontrariorum connectitur,hoc autem dupliciter, ut amicis benefacere et inimicis male, vel econverso amicis male et inimicis bene: aut quando utraque de uno, dupliciter autem et hoc, ut amicis benefacere et amicis male, vel inimicis benefacere et inimicis male: aut unum de utrisque, et hoc quoque dupliciter, ut amicis bene et inimicis bene, vel amicis male et inimicis male. Primae autem duae dictæ complexiones non faciunt contrarietatem,nam id quod est amicis benefacere ei quod est inimicis malefacere non est contrarium, utraque enim eligenda sunt et ejusdem moris; neque id quod est amicis male ei quod est inimicis bene,nam et haec utraque fugienda et ejusdem moris.
Further, even if someone posits the same thing as an accident of itself as of another, on the ground that the other is a name. Just as Prodicus divided pleasures into joy, and delight, and gladness, for all these are names of the same thing (that is, of pleasure); if, then, someone posits that to rejoice is an accident of that which is to be glad, he will surely say that the same thing is an accident of itself.
CHAPTER III.
Other loci for settling the same problems.
Since, however, contraries are linked with one another in six ways, but when combined they produce contrariety in four ways, one must take contraries in whatever way is useful both for refuting and for establishing. That they are combined in six ways is evident: for either each of the contraries is linked with each of the contraries, and this in two ways, as to benefit friends and to harm enemies, or conversely to harm friends and to benefit enemies; or when both are predicated of one thing, and this also in two ways, as to benefit friends and to harm friends, or to benefit enemies and to harm enemies; or one is predicated of both, and this too in two ways, as to benefit friends and to benefit enemies, or to harm friends and to harm enemies. But the first two combinations mentioned do not produce contrariety, for to benefit friends is not contrary to to harm enemies, since both are to be chosen and are of the same character; nor is to harm friends contrary to to benefit enemies, for both of these are to be avoided and are of the same character.
Non videtur autem fugiendum fugiendo contrariurnesse,nisi hoc quidem secundum superabundantiam. Illud autem secundum defectum dictum sit.Namsuperabundantiafugiendorum videturesse, similiter autem etdefectus. Reliqua vero quatuor omnia faciunt contrarietatem, nam id quod est amicis benefacere, ei quod est amicis male contrarium, nam a contrario more sunt, et illud quidem eligendum, hoc autem spernendum. Similiter autem et in aliis. Nam in unaquaque conjugatione unum eligendum et alterum fugiendum, illud quidem boni moris, hoc autem pravi. Manifestum igiturex iis quae dicta sunt quod eidem plura contraria accidunt fieri, nam ei quod est amicis benefacere, id quod est inimicis benefacere, et id quod est amicis male, contrarium est.
Similiter autem et aliorum singulis quibusque eodem modo considerantibus duo contraria apparebunt, accipere igitur contrariorum quodcunque erit ad positionem utile. Amplius si est aliquid contrarium accidenti, considerandum est si inest ei cui dictum est accidens inesse. Nam si hoc inest, illud non erit, impossibile enim simul contraria eidem inesse. Aut si quid tale dictum est de aliquo, quod cum sit necesse est contraria inesse, ut si ideas in nobis quis dixeritesse. Nam et moveri et quiescere easdem accidet, et etiam sensibiles et insensibiles esse.
But one should not seem to avoid the contrary by avoiding it, unless this is said in respect of excess, while that is said in respect of defect. For excess of things to be avoided seems to be such, and similarly also defect. But the remaining four all produce contrariety; for doing good to friends is contrary to doing evil to friends, for they are from contrary customs, and the one is to be chosen, the other to be spurned. And similarly also in other cases. For in each conjugation one thing is to be chosen and the other avoided, the one of good custom, the other of depraved. It is clear, then, from what has been said that it happens that several things are contrary to the same thing; for to doing good to friends, both doing good to enemies and doing evil to friends are contrary.
And similarly, for those who consider each of the others in the same way, two contraries will appear. To take, therefore, whichever of the contraries will be useful for the position. Further, if something is contrary to an accident, one must consider whether it is present in that to which the accident was said to be present. For if this is present, that will not be, since it is impossible for contraries to be present at the same time in the same thing. Or if some such thing has been said of something, which, since it is, must have contraries present, as if someone were to say that the ideas are in us. For it will happen that the same things are both moved and at rest, and also that they are both sensible and insensible.
Nam videntur ideas quiescere, immobiles et intelligibiles esse iis qui ponunt ideas esse Attamen cum sint in nobis, impossibile est immobiles esse. Nam motis nobis, necessarium est et quae in nobis suntomniasimulmoveri.Manifestumautemquoniam et sensibiles, si in nobis sunt, nam per sensum qui circa visum est eam quae in unoquoque est formam cognoscimus. Rursum si positum est accidens cui est aliqu id contrarium,considerandu si etcontrarii susceptivum quod et accidentis est. Nam idem contrariorum susceptivum,ut si odium haerere irae quis dixerit, erit odium in furoris specie, illic enim ira; inspiciendum igitursietcontrariuminfurorisspecie an in concupiscentia, nam si non, sed in concupiscibili est, non cohæret odium irae. Similiterautemet si concupiscibile, ignorare dixerit, nam erit et disciplinaesusceptivum, siquidem et ignorantiae; quod quidem non videtur, concupiscibile susceptivum esse disciplinae. Destruenti ergo quemadmodum dictum est utendum, astruenti vero quod inest quidem accidens non utilis locus,quod autem contingit inesse utilis. Ostendentes enim quod non susceptivum est contrarii, ostendentes erimus quod neque inest accidens, neque contingit inesse. Si autem ostenderimus quod inest contrarium, aut quod susceptivum est.
For the ideas seem to be at rest, and to be immovable and intelligible to those who posit that ideas exist. Yet since they are in us, it is impossible for them to be immovable. For when we are moved, it is necessary that the things in us all be moved together. But it is clear that they are also objects of sense, if they are in us; for through the sense that is concerned with sight we cognize the form that is in each individual thing. Again, if it has been laid down that an accident belongs to something to which some contrary belongs, one must consider whether that which is receptive of the accident is also receptive of the contrary. For the same thing is receptive of contraries, as if someone should say that hatred resides in anger, hatred will be in the species of fury, for anger is there; one must therefore also examine whether the contrary is in the species of fury or in the concupiscible faculty—for if not, but it is in the concupiscible faculty, hatred does not cohere with anger. Similarly, moreover, if someone should say that the concupiscible faculty is ignorant, then it will also be receptive of discipline, since it is also receptive of ignorance; yet it does not seem that the concupiscible faculty is receptive of discipline. Therefore one must use the method just stated for refuting, but for establishing, the place that the accident belongs is not useful, whereas the place that it can belong is useful. For by showing that something is not receptive of the contrary, we will have shown that neither does the accident belong nor can it belong. But if we have shown that the contrary belongs, or that it is receptive of it.
contrarii, nondum ostendentes erimus quod et accidens inest, sed quod contingit inesse in tantum solum ostensum erit.Quoniam autem oppositionessuntquatuor, considerandum excontradictionibus, econverso ex consequentia, et interimenti e construcnti.Sumere auteO! est ex i nductione,ut si homo animal,non anin::al non homo;; similiterautemet in aliis.Hic enim econuerso consequentia, nam hominem animal sequitur, non hominem autem, non animal nequaquam; sed econverso, non animal, non homo.Inomnibusigiturtaleestexistimandum, utsibonum,suave, etr.onsuave, nonbonum; siautemnon hoc nec illud, similiter autem et si non suave, non bonum, bonum suave. Manifestum igiturquod utrumque convertitur, quæ secundum contradictionem est consequentia econverso facta. In contrariis autem considerandum si contrarium contrariumsequatur, an contra seipsa consequentia, an econverso, et interimentiet construenti. Sumere autem et talia est ex inductione quanlum utile est, contra ipsum consequentia est, ut in fortitudine et timiditate; nam illam quidem sequitur virtus, hanc autem vitium,et illam quidemsequitureligendumhancautemfugiendum: igitur contra seipsa et horum consequentia, contrarium enim eligendum fugiendo, similiter autem et in aliis.
Of contraries, we shall not yet be showing that accident is present, but that it happens to be present will have been shown only to that extent. Since, however, there are four oppositions, one must consider from contradictions, and conversely from consequence, and from the destructive and the constructive. To assume, moreover, is from induction, as if man is animal, not animal not man; and similarly also in other cases. For here the consequence is conversely: for man is followed by animal, but not man by not animal in no way; but conversely, not animal, not man. In all cases, therefore, one must think it is such that if good, pleasant, and if not pleasant, not good; but if neither this nor that, similarly also if not pleasant, not good, and if good, pleasant. It is clear, therefore, that each is converted, which is the consequence according to contradiction made conversely. In contraries, however, one must consider whether a contrary follows a contrary, or whether the consequences are to themselves, or conversely, and the destructive and the constructive. To assume also such things is from induction as far as it is useful; the consequence is against itself, as in courage and timidity; for the one is followed by virtue, the other by vice, and the one is followed by what is to be chosen, the other by what is to be avoided. Therefore the consequence of these is also against itself; for the contrary of what is to be chosen is what is to be avoided, and similarly also in other cases.
Econverso autem consequentia, ut bonam quidem hahiludinem sanitas sequitur,malam autem habitudinem aegritudo nequaquam,sed aegritudinem mala habitudo,manifestum igitur quoniam econverso in his consequentiafit. Raro autem econverso accidit in contrariis, sed in pluribus in seipsa consequentia; si ergo neque contra seipsa contrarium sequitur contrarium, ncque econverso, manifestum quoniam neque eorum quæ dicta sunt alterum sequitur alterum, si autem in contrariis, et in iis quae dicta sunt necesse alterum sequi alterum. Similiter autem contrariis,et in privalionibus,et habitibus respiciendum. Verumtamen non est in privationibus econverso, sed conlraseipsa eonsequentiam necessarium est semper fieri, veluti visum sequi sensum, cæcitatem autem insensibilitatem; opponitur enim sensus insensibilitati, ut habitus et privatio, nam illud horum quidem habitus, hoc autem privatio est. Similiter autem habitui et privationi, et in iis quæsuntad aliquid,utendum, contra seipsaenim, et horum consequentia, ut si triplum multiplum,et subtriplum submultiplum dicitur: dicitur enim triplum quidem ad subtriplum, multiplurn autem ad submultiplum. Rursus, si scientia opinio, et scibile opinabile, et si visus sensus, et visibile sensibile.
But conversely, in consequence, health follows a good habit of body, while sickness does not at all follow a bad habit of body; rather, a bad habit of body follows sickness. It is clear, therefore, that in these cases the consequence holds conversely. But conversely it rarely happens in contraries; rather, for the most part the consequence is in the things themselves. If, then, neither does a contrary follow its own contrary, nor conversely, it is clear that neither of the things said follows the other; but if it holds in contraries, then in the things said as well one must necessarily follow the other. In like manner, one must also consider privations and habits in relation to contraries. Yet in privations the consequence is not conversely, but it is necessary that the consequence always be in relation to themselves, as that sight follows sense and blindness follows insensibility; for sense is opposed to insensibility as habit to privation, since the one of these is a habit and the other a privation. In like manner, one must also use this in the case of habit and privation and in things that are in relation to something; for the consequence of these too is in relation to themselves, as if the triple is said to be multiple and the sub-triple sub-multiple; for the triple is said in relation to the sub-triple, and the multiple in relation to the sub-multiple. Again, if knowledge is opinion, then the knowable is also opinable; and if sight is sense, then the visible is also sensible.
Instantia, quod non necesse est in iis quae sunt ad aliquid consequentiam fieri quemadmodum dictum est,nam sensibile scibile est, sensus autem non est scientia.Non tamen verainstantiavideturesse,multi enim non dicunt sensibilium esse scientiam.Insuper autem ad contrarium non minus utile quod dictum est, ut quod sensibile non est scibile, neque enim sensus scientia Rursus in conjugatis et in casibus, et interimenti et construenti.Dicuntur autem conjugata hujusmodi, ut justa, et justus justitiæ,et fortia, et fortis fortitudini- Similiter autem effectiva eLconservativa, conjugata illi cujus sunt effectiva et conservativa, ut sanati va sanitatis,habitu ativa habitudinis, eodem autem modo et in aliis: conjugata igitur talia solent dici. Casus autem, ut juste, et fortiter, et sanative, habitative, et quæcunque eodem modo dicuntur. Videntur autem et quai sunt secundum casus, conjugata esse, ut juste justitiae, et fortiter fortitudini. Conjugata autem dicuntur secundum eamdem conjugationem omnia, ut justitia, justus, justum, juste;manifestum igitur quoniam uno quovis ostenso eorum quas secundum eamdem conjugationem dicuntur, ut bono, vel laudabili, et reliqua omniaostensa sunt, utsijustilia est laudabilium, et juste,justus,justumlaudabilium;diceturautemjuste et laudabiliter secundum eumdem casum (nam a laudabili) quemadmodum juste a justitia.
An objection: it is not necessary that consequence occur in things that are relative in the way that has been stated; for the sensible is knowable, but sense is not knowledge. Yet this objection does not seem to be true, for many do not say that there is knowledge of sensibles. Moreover, what has been said is no less useful with respect to the contrary, as that the sensible is not knowable, for neither is sense knowledge. Again, in conjugates and in cases, both in the destructive and in the constructive [argument]. Now conjugates are spoken of in this way, as just things, and just [man] to justice, and brave things, and brave [man] to bravery. Similarly, however, the effective and preservative [things] are conjugates of that of which they are effective and preservative, as healthful [things] of health, habitual [things] of habit, and in the same way also in others; such things, then, are customarily called conjugates. Cases, however, [are] as justly, and bravely, and healthfully, habitually, and whatever are spoken of in the same way. But those that are according to cases seem also to be conjugates, as justly to justice, and bravely to bravery. But all are called conjugates according to the same conjugation, as justice, just [man], just [thing], justly; it is clear, therefore, that when any one of those that are spoken of according to the same conjugation has been shown, as the good, or the praiseworthy, all the rest have also been shown, as if justice is of praiseworthy things, then justly, just [man], just [thing] are of praiseworthy things; but justly and praiseworthily will be spoken according to the same case (for [they are] from the praiseworthy), just as justly [is] from justice.
Considerandum autem non solum in eo quod dictum est,sed et in contrario contrariam. Ut quod bonum non ex necessitatesuave,nequeenim malum triste,ut si hoc et illud,etsijustitia 8cienliil,et injustitiaignorantia, et si quod juste est, scienter et exporienterest, quod injuste est, ignoranter et experienter est, si autem haec non nec illa, velut in hoc quod nunc dictum, nam magis utique apparebit, quod injusteexperienter quam inexperienter. Hic autem locus dictus est prius incontrariorum conseq uentiis,nihil enim aliud nunc ostendimus quam contrarium sequi contrarium.Amplius in generationibus,et corruptionibus,et effectivis, et corruptivis, et interimenti, etastruenti, Quorum enim generationes bonae sunt, et ipsa bona sunt, et si ipsa bona sunt, et generationes bonæ; si, autem generationes malae, et ipsa mala. In corrup. tionibus autem econtrario.namsicorruptionesbonce, ipsa mala; si autem corruptiones malæ, ipsa sunt bona. Eadem ratio et in tffectivis, et corruptivis i quorum enim effectiva bona, et ipsa bona; quorum vero corruptiva bona, ipsa mala.
But one must consider not only in the case just stated, but also the contrary in the contrary. For example, that the good is not necessarily pleasant, nor is the bad distressing; as, if this and that, and if justice is knowledge, injustice is ignorance, and if what is done justly is done knowingly and with experience, what is done unjustly is done ignorantly and with experience; but if these are not so, neither are those, as in the case just now stated—for it will appear more likely that what is done unjustly is done with experience than without experience. This topic has been stated earlier in the consequences of contraries; for we are now showing nothing other than that a contrary follows a contrary. Further, in generations and corruptions, and in things productive and corruptive, and in things destroying and building. For those things whose generations are good are themselves also good, and if they are themselves good, their generations are also good; but if their generations are bad, they are themselves also bad. In corruptions, however, the reverse: for if their corruptions are good, they are themselves bad; but if their corruptions are bad, they are themselves good. The same account holds in things productive and corruptive: for those things whose productive effects are good are themselves good; but those whose corruptive effects are good are themselves bad.
CAPUT IV.
Ex similibus, appositione, magis, minus, simpliciter, et secundum quid loci.
Rursum in similibus si similiter se habent. Ut si disciplina una plurium,etopinio,et si visum habere est videre, et auditum habere et audire, similiter autem et in aliis, et in his quae sunt, et in iis quae videntur. Utilis autem hic Jocus ad utrumque, nam si in aliquo similium sic se habet, etinfaliis similibus, si autem in aliquo non, nec in aliis similibus. Considerandum autem et in uno, et in pluribus si similiter se habet. Aliquoties enim dissonat, ut si scire est cogitare, et multa scire est multa cogitare, hoc autem non verum. Contingit enim plura scire, cogitare autem non; si autem non hoc, nec illud quod in uno quod scire est cogitare. Amplius, ex magis et minus. Sunt autem ejus quod est magis loci quatuor. Unus quidem si magis sequitur magis, ut sivoluptas bonum,et magis vuluptas,magis bonum; et si injuriam facere malum, et magis injuriam facere, magis malum. Utilis autem ad utrumque hic locus, nam si sequatur ad subjecti incrementum, accidentis incrementu,quemadmod um dictum est, manifestum quod accidit; si autem non sequatur,non accidit,hoc autem inductione sumendum.Alius,uno de duobus dicto, si cui magis videtur inesse non inest, nec cui minus, et si cui minus videtur inesse inest, et cui magis.
CHAPTER IV.
On the topics from similars, from addition, from the more, the less, the simple, and the qualified.
Again, in the case of similars, if they are related in a similar way. For example, if one discipline is of several things, so too is one opinion; and if to have sight is to see, then to have hearing is also to hear; and similarly in other cases, both in things that exist and in things that appear. This topic is useful for both purposes: for if in some one of the similars it is so, then also in the other similars; but if in some one it is not so, then neither in the other similars. And one must consider whether it is similarly related in one case and in many. For sometimes it is inconsistent: for example, if to know is to think, then to know many things is to think many things; but this is not true. For it happens that one knows many things but does not think them; but if this is not so, then neither is that which was said in the single case, that to know is to think. Further, from the more and the less. There are four topics of what is more. One is, if the more follows the more: for example, if pleasure is good, then greater pleasure is a greater good; and if to do injury is bad, then to do greater injury is a greater bad. This topic is useful for both purposes; for if the increment of the accident follows the increment of the subject, as was said, it is manifest that it belongs; but if it does not follow, it does not belong; and this must be taken by induction. Another: when one of two things has been stated, if that to which it seems to belong more does not belong, then neither does that to which it seems to belong less; and if that to which it seems to belong less does belong, then also that to which it seems to belong more.
Rursum, duobus de uno dictis, si quod magis videtur alii inesse non inest,nequequod minus,aul si quod minus viJetur inesseinest,et quod magis.Amplius,duobus de duobus dictis,siquod alteri magisvideturinesse non inest,necreliquum reliquo,aut si quod minus videtur alteri inesse inest, et reliquum reliquo. Amplius, ex eo quod similiter inest, vel videtur inesse tripliciter,quemadmodum in eo quod magis,ut in posterioribus tribus dictis locis dicebatur. Sive enim unum quoddam duobus similiter inest,aut videtur inesse, si alteri non insit, nec alteri; si autem alteri inest,et reliquo.Sive duo eidem similiter,si alterum non insit,necreliquum; si autem alterurn,et reliquum.Eodem autem modo et si duobus duo similiter insunt, nam si alterum alteri non inest,nec reliquum reliquo;si autem inest alterum alteri,et reliquum reliquo.Exeo igitur quod est magis et rninus,el quod est similiter, tot modis contingitargumentari.Aropliusautemexappositione, si alterum ad alterum appositum faciat bonum,vel album,cum non fuerit prius album,vel bonum,quod appositum est erit album,vel bonum, quale reveraet totum facit.Amplius autem si id ad quod est appositum aliquid facit magis tale quale erat,et ipsum erit ejusmodi, similiter autem et in aliis. Utilis autom non in omnibus hic locus,sed in quibus ipsius magis crementum accidit fieri.
Again, when two things are said of one, if that which seems more to belong to the other does not belong, neither does that which seems less; or if that which seems less to belong does belong, then also that which seems more. Further, when two things are said of two, if that which seems more to belong to one does not belong, neither does the other belong to the other; or if that which seems less to belong to one does belong, then also the other belongs to the other. Further, from the fact that something belongs, or seems to belong, in a similar way, in three ways, just as was said in the three latter topics, as in the case of the more. For either one thing belongs, or seems to belong, similarly to two things: if it does not belong to one, neither does it to the other; but if it belongs to one, also to the other. Or two things belong similarly to the same thing: if one does not belong, neither does the other; but if one belongs, also the other. In the same way also if two things belong similarly to two things: for if one does not belong to one, neither does the other to the other; but if one belongs to one, also the other to the other. From the more, then, and the less, and the similar, in so many ways does it happen to argue. Further, from addition: if one thing added to another makes it good or white, when it was not previously white or good, that which has been added will be white or good, such as in truth it also makes the whole. Further, if that to which something has been added makes it more of such a sort as it was, that thing itself will also be of this sort; and similarly in other cases. But this topic is not useful in all cases, but in those in which an increase of the thing itself happens to occur.
Iste vero locus non convertitur ad destruendum,nam si non facit quod appositu e"t,bonum,nondu mani festum,si ipsum non bonum. Nam bonum malo appositum, non ex neceBsilate bonum totum facit,necalbum nigro,nec dulce amaro. Rursum,si quid magis et minus Jicitur, et simpliciterinest,Quod enim bonum vel album non est, neque magis etminusbonumvel album dicetur; nam malum de nullo magis,vel minus bonum,sed magis malum vel minus dicetur.Non convertitur autem hic locus ad destruendum,multa enim eorum quæ non dicuntur magis, simpliciter insunt; nam homo non dicitur magis et minus,sed non propter hoc non est homo.Eodem autem modo consideran. dum et in iis quæ secundum q:lid,et quando,et ubi. Namsi secundum quid contingit,et simpliciter contingit,similiter autem et quando,et ubi: nam quod simpliciter est impossibile, neque secundum quid, neque secundum ubi,neque secundum quando contingit. Instantia, quoniam secundum quid quidem sunt natura studiosi (ut liberales,vel casti), simpliciter autem non sunt natura studiosi, nam nullius natura prudens.Similiter autem etquando contingit corruptibilium aliquid non corrumpi, simpliciter autem non contingit non corrumpi. Eodem autem modo et ubi expedit quidem tali observantia victus uti,ut in morbosis locis,simpliciter autem non expedit adhuc autem, alicubi quidem [unum tantum possibile est esse, simpliciter autem non possibile unum tantum esse.
But this topic is not convertible to refutation; for if what is added does not make a thing good, it is not yet evident that the thing itself is not good. For good added to evil does not of necessity make the whole good, nor white added to black, nor sweet to bitter. Again, if anything is said to be more and less, it is also present simply. For what is not good or white will not be said to be more or less good or white; for evil is said of nothing as more or less good, but as more or less evil. But this topic is not convertible to refutation, for many things that are not said to be more are present simply; for man is not said to be more and less, but it is not for this reason that he is not man. In the same way one must consider also in those things that are according to something, and when, and where. For if it is possible according to something, it is also possible simply, and likewise also when and where; for what is simply impossible is possible neither according to something, nor according to where, nor according to when. An objection: those who are naturally studious in a certain respect (as liberal or chaste) are so according to something, but they are not simply naturally studious, for no one is naturally prudent. Likewise also when it is possible for something corruptible not to be corrupted, but it is not simply possible for it not to be corrupted. In the same way also as to where: it is expedient to use a certain regimen of life, as in sickly places, but it is not simply expedient; and further, in some place it is possible for only one thing to be, but it is not simply possible for only one thing to be.
Eodem autem modo et alicubi bonum est quidem patrem significare,ut in Tribalis, simpliciterautem nonbonum.An in hoc quidem non ubi significat,sed quibusdam,nihil enim refert ubicunque sint,ubiqueenim erit eis bonum inTribalis. Rursus quidem expedit rnedicari,ut quandoaigrotat, simpliciter autem non.An neque hoc quando significat,sed in eo quod afficitur aliquo modo,nihil enim refertquandocunque,dummodo sic affectus sit.SimpJieiterautem est quod nullo addito dicis quod bonum est,aut contrarium,ut patrem sacrificare non dicis bonum esse, sed quibusdam bonum esse; non ergo simpliciter bonum,sed deos honorare bonum dictis nihil addens, simpliciter enim bonum est. Quare quod nullo addito videtur esse honestum, vel turpe, vel aliquid talium, simpliciter dicetur.
LIBER TEHTIUS.
CAPUT PRIMUM.
De meliorum eligibilinrumque problematum locis.
In the same way, in some cases it is good to signify one's father, as among the Triballi, but not simply good. Is it not the case that this is not good in respect of what it signifies, but for certain persons? For it makes no difference wherever they are; for everywhere it will be good for them among the Triballi. Again, to be healed is expedient, as when one is sick, but not simply. Is it not the case that this too is not expedient in respect of when it signifies, but in that one is affected in some way? For it makes no difference at whatever time, provided one is so affected. But "simply" is what you say is good without any addition, or the contrary: for you do not say that to sacrifice one's father is good, but that it is good for certain persons; therefore it is not simply good. But to honor the gods you say is good, adding nothing; for it is simply good. Wherefore what without any addition seems to be honorable or base, or any such thing, will be called simply.
BOOK THREE.
CHAPTER ONE.
On the topics of better and more choiceworthy problems.
Utrum autem eligibilius aut melius duorum pluriumve ex his perspiciendum.Primum autem determinetur quod considerationem facimusnon de plurimum distantibus,et magnam ad invicem differentiam habentiuus(nulbs enim dubitat utrum felicitas, an divitiae expetibiliores),sed de iis quæ propinqua sunt,et de qui bus dubitamus utro oporteat apponere magis eo quod nullam videmus alterius ad alterum prxeeminentiam?Manifestum igitur in his quod ostensa una praeeminentia, vel pluribus,constituetur intelligentia,quoll id eligibilius est quod eorum est præeminens.Primum igitur quod diuturnius stabiliusve,eligibilius eo quod minus huj usmodi.Et quod magis eligit prudens,vel bonus vir,vel lex recta,vel studiosi circa shgula delecti qnatenustales sunt, vel in unoquoque genere periti,vei quaecunque plures, vel omnes (ut in medicina vel aedificatoria,quse plures medicorum vel omnes) vel quaecunque omnino plures,vel omnes,vel omnia,ut;bonum.Omniaenim bonum appetunt.Oportet autem ducere ad id quod fueritulile, quod dicendum est. Estautem simpliciter quidem melius,ac eligibilius,quod secundum meliorem disciplinam,alicui autem quod secundum propriam.Deinde quod idipsum quod est (eo quod non) in genereest,utjustiam justo.Nam illa quidem in genere bono,hoc autem non,et illa idipsum quod est bonum est, hoc autem non.
Whether one of two or more things is more choiceworthy or better must be examined from these considerations. First, however, let it be determined that we are not making our consideration about things very far apart and having a great difference from one another (for no one doubts whether happiness or wealth is more desirable), but about things that are close and about which we doubt to which of the two one ought rather to assent, since we see no preeminence of one over the other. It is clear, then, in these cases that when one preeminence, or several, has been shown, the understanding will be established that that thing is more choiceworthy which is preeminent among them. First, therefore, what is more lasting or more stable is more choiceworthy than what is less so. And what the prudent person, or the good man, or right law, or the studious persons chosen in each case insofar as they are such, or those skilled in each genus, or whatever more people, or all people (as in medicine or building, whatever more physicians or all physicians), or whatever absolutely more people, or all people, or all things choose—as the good. For all things desire the good. But one must lead to what will be useful, which is what must be stated. Now simply better and more choiceworthy is what accords with the better discipline, but for someone, what accords with his own. Next, what is the very thing itself (rather than not) in a genus, as justice is to the just man. For those things are in the genus of good, but this is not, and those are the very thing that is good, but this is not.
Nam nihil dicitur idipsum quod genus est,quod non est in genere.Ut albus homo non est id quod culor.Similiter aulem et in aliis. Et quod propter se eligendum,eo eligendo quod propter aliud eligibilius.Ut sanum esse quam exercitari;illud enim propter se eligendum,hocautem propter aliud.Et quod per se,eo quod per accidens. Ut amicos justos esse,eo quod inimicos;illud enim per se eligendum, hoc autem per accidens eligimus.Nam inimicos justosesse secundum accidens eligimus, ut nihil nobis noceant. Est aut hocidem ei quod ante boe;ciiffeJ autem modo,nam amicos quidem justos esse propter se eligimus, et si nihil nobisdebeat forf1,quamvis apud Indos sint,inimicos autem propter alterum, ut nihil nobis noceant. Et quod causa boni per se,eo quod per accidens causa. Quemadmodum virtus,fortuna;nam illa quidem per se,hæc autem peraccidens est causa bonorum,etsi quid aliud hujusmodi.Similiter autem et in contrario.Nam quod perse est causa mali,fugibilius esteo quod peraccidens,utvitium quam fortuna,namiilud quidem perse malum,rortuna autem per accidens. Et quod simpliciter bonum,eo quod alicui eligibilius: ut sanum fieri,quam incidi. Nam hoc quidem simpliciter bonum,iIlud autem alicui indigentium incisione. Et quod natura est, eo quod non natura: ut justitia justo, illud enim natura, hoc autem acquisitivum.
For nothing is said to be that very thing which is the genus, unless it is in the genus. For a white man is not that which is color. Similarly also in other cases. And that which is to be chosen for its own sake is more choiceworthy than that which is chosen for the sake of another, as being healthy is more choiceworthy than exercising; for the former is to be chosen for its own sake, but the latter for the sake of another. And that which is by itself is more choiceworthy than that which is by accident, as that friends be just is more choiceworthy than that enemies be just; for the former we choose by itself, but the latter by accident. For we choose that enemies be just only by accident, so that they may do us no harm. And this is the same as what was said before; but it has now been stated in this way, for we choose that friends be just for its own sake, even if nothing is owed to us by them, even if they are among the Indians, but that enemies be just for the sake of something else, so that they may do us no harm. And that which is the cause of good by itself is more choiceworthy than that which is the cause by accident, as virtue is more choiceworthy than fortune; for the former is the cause of goods by itself, but the latter by accident, and whatever else is of this sort. Similarly also in the contrary case. For that which is the cause of evil by itself is more to be avoided than that which is by accident, as vice is more to be avoided than fortune; for the former is evil by itself, but fortune by accident. And that which is simply good is more choiceworthy than that which is good for someone, as to become healthy is more choiceworthy than to undergo surgery. For the former is simply good, but the latter is good for someone among those who need surgery. And that which is by nature is more choiceworthy than that which is not by nature, as justice is more choiceworthy for a just man than for one who is not just; for the former is by nature, but the latter is acquired.
Et quod meliori et honorabiliori inest, eligibilius, ut Deo quam hominiTanimae quam corpori Et quod melioris proprium,melius quam quod pejoris: ul quod Dei,quam quod hominis, nam secundum communia utrisque,nihil differunt ab invicem,propriis autem alterum alteridifferenliissupereminet. Et quod in melioribus, vel prioribus, vel honorabilioribus, est melius: ut sanitas robore et pulchritudine,nam illa quidem in humidiset siccis, et (ut simpliciter dicatur; ex quibus prius coustitutum est animal. Haec vero posterioribus, nam robur in nervis et ossibus, pulchritudo autem membrorum quaedam commensuratio videtur esse. Et finis iis quae sunt ad finem eligibilior videtur esse. Et duorum, quod propinquius est fini. Et omnino quod ad vitae finem expetibiliusquam quod ad aliud aliquid,ut quod ad felicitatem contendit quam quod ad prudentiam,nam quod ad felicitatem contendit, eligibilius. Et possibile impossibili. Amplius, cum duo sint effectivacujusfinismelior5etipsum melius.
And what belongs to the better and more honorable is more choiceworthy, as what belongs to God than what belongs to man, and what belongs to the soul than what belongs to the body. And the property of the better is better than that of the worse: as what is God's than what is man's; for in respect of the common attributes of both they differ in no way from one another, but by their proper attributes the one surpasses the other. And what is in better, or prior, or more honorable things is better: as health than strength and beauty; for these are in moist and dry things, and, to speak simply, in those from which the animal is first constituted, while the former are in later things; for strength is in sinews and bones, but beauty seems to be a certain commensuration of members. And the end seems more choiceworthy than the things that are for the sake of the end. And of two things, that which is nearer to the end. And in general, what tends toward the end of life is more desirable than what tends toward anything else: as what strives toward happiness than what strives toward prudence; for what strives toward happiness is more choiceworthy. And the possible than the impossible. Further, since there are two productive things, of which the end is better, that one is itself better.
Cum autem sit effectivum, et finis ex proportione, quandoplurisuperatfinisfinem,quam ille proprium effectivum: utfelicitasplurisuperatsanitatemquam sanitas salubre; quare effeclivum felicitatis melius sanitate,nam quantum felicitas superat sanitatem, tantum et effectivum felicitatis aalubresuperat;sanitas autemsalubreminus superabat,quareplus superat effectivum felicitatis salubre quam sanitas salubre;quapropter effectivum felicitatis melius sanitate;manifestum igitur quod eligibilius effectivum felicitatis quam sanitas, nam idem plus superat.Amplius,melius est quod propter se et honorabilius et laudabilius: ut amicitia divitiis et justitia sanitate et robore,nam illa quidem propter se honorabilium, haec vero non propter se, sed propter aliud. Nullus enim honorat divitias propter se,sed propter aliud; amicitiam vero propter se, et si nihil nobis debeat aliud ab ea esse.
But since the productive cause is also a end by proportion, whenever the end exceeds the end more than that exceeds its own productive cause: as happiness exceeds health more than health exceeds the healthful; wherefore the productive cause of happiness is better than health, for as much as happiness exceeds health, so much does the productive cause of happiness exceed the healthful; but health exceeded the healthful less, wherefore the productive cause of happiness exceeds the healthful more than health exceeds the healthful; and therefore the productive cause of happiness is better than health; it is clear, then, that the productive cause of happiness is more choiceworthy than health, for the same thing exceeds by more. Further, that is better which is for its own sake, and more honorable and more praiseworthy: as friendship is than wealth, and justice than health and strength, for those are honorable for their own sake, but these are not for their own sake, but for the sake of another. For no one honors wealth for its own sake, but for the sake of another; but friendship for its own sake, even if nothing else ought to come to us from it.
CAPUT II.
Alii pro eisdem problematis loci.
Amplius,quando duo aliqua fuerint valde sibimetipsis similia,et non poterimus præeminentiarn aliquam conspicere alterius ad alterum videndum ex iis quas sequuntur.Nam cum consequens est majus bonum,hoc eligibilius; si autem sint consequentia mala,cui consequens minus malum,boc eligibilius. Nam cum utraque sint eligendo,nihil prohibet molestum aliquid sequi, dupliciter autem ab eo quod sequitur consideratio, nam et prius, et posterius sequitur,utaddiscentem ignorare prius,scire autem posterius, melius autem ut plurimum,quod posterius,sumendum igitur eorum quiB sequuntur quodcunque fuerit utile. Amplius, plura bona paucioribus, vel simpliciter,vel quando altera alteris insunt, ut pauciora in pluribus.Instantia,si alicubi alterum alterius gratia:nihil enim eligibiliora utraque quam unum, ut sanum fieri, et sanitas, quam sanitas,eo quod sanum fieri propter sanitatem eligimus.Et non bona, bonis nihil prohibet eligibiliora esse,ut felicitatem,et aliud aliquid quod non est bonum,justitia et fortitudine. Et eadem cum voluptate magis quam sine voluptate, et eadem cum indolentia quam cum tristitia.Etunumquodque in quo tempore magisvalet,in hocetetiam eligibilius. Utcarentia tristitiae in senectute magis quam in juventu te,magis enim in senectute valet.
CHAPTER II.
Other topics for the same problems.
Further, when two things are very similar to each other, and we cannot observe any pre-eminence of one over the other, we must look to the things that follow from them. For when the consequence is a greater good, that is more choiceworthy; but if the consequences are evils, that to which the lesser evil follows is more choiceworthy. For since both are matters of choice, nothing prevents something troublesome from following; and the consideration from what follows is twofold, for it follows both before and after: as that the learner is ignorant before and knows after; and for the most part the later is better. We must therefore take, from among the things that follow, whatever is useful. Further, more goods are preferable to fewer, either simply or when the one set is present in the other, as fewer are present in more. An objection: if in some case one thing exists for the sake of another; for neither is more choiceworthy than the one, as being healthy and health are than health, since we choose being healthy for the sake of health. And it is not forbidden that things which are not good be more choiceworthy than good things, as happiness and some other thing that is not good are than justice and courage. And the same things with pleasure are more choiceworthy than without pleasure, and the same with freedom from pain than with distress. And each thing is more choiceworthy at the time when it has greater power. As freedom from distress in old age is more choiceworthy than in youth, for it has greater power in old age.
Secundum haec autem, et prudentia in senectute eligilior,nemo enim juvenes eligit duces,eo quod non constat eos prudentes esse. Fortitudo autem e contrario,in juventute enim magis necessaria secundum fortitudinem operatio; similiter autem et in temperantia,magis enim juvenes quam senes concupiscentiis molestantur.Et quod in omni tempore, vel in pluribus utilius.Ut justitia,et temperantia,fortitudine, nam illae semper, haecautem aliquando utilis.Et quod cum omnes haberemus, nihil altero indigeremus, quam quod cum haberemus, indigeremus reliquo. Ut in justitia, et forliludine,narn si omnes essentj usti,njhil utilis fortitudo; si vero omnes essent fortes,utilis justitia.Amplius ex corruptionibus et adjectionibus, et generationibus, et sumptionibus, et contrariis. Quorum enim corruptiones malæ,ipsa eligibiliora,similiter autem et in abjectionibus,etin contrariis,nam si abjectio, vel contrarium fugibilius est, ipsum eligibilius; in generationibus autem et sumptionibuse contrario. Quorum enim sumptiones,et generationes et eligibiliores, et ipsa quoque eligibiliora. Alius autem locus est.Quod propinquius bono,melius atque eli. gibilius.Et quod similius est bono,ut justitiajusto. Et quod meliori eorum est similius,quemadmodum Ajacem Ulysse dicunt aliqui meliorem esse,eo quod similior est Achilli.
Accordingly, in light of these considerations, prudence is more to be chosen in old age; for no one chooses young men as leaders, because it is not established that they are prudent. Courage, on the other hand, is the opposite; for in youth the operation according to courage is more necessary. Similarly also in temperance; for the young are more troubled by desires than the old. And that which is more useful at every time, or in most times, as justice and temperance and courage; for the former are always useful, but the latter sometimes. And that which, if we all had it, we would need nothing else, but which, if we had it, we would need the other, as in justice and courage; for if all were just, courage would be of no use; but if all were brave, justice would be useful. Further, from corruptions and additions and generations and consumptions and contraries. For those things whose corruptions are bad are themselves more to be chosen; similarly also in rejections and in contraries, for if the rejection or the contrary is more to be avoided, the thing itself is more to be chosen; but in generations and consumptions it is the other way around. For those things whose consumptions and generations are more to be chosen are themselves also more to be chosen. There is another topic: that which is nearer to the good is better and more to be chosen. And that which is more similar to the good, as justice is to the just man. And that which is more similar to the better of these, as some say that Ajax is better than Odysseus, because he is more similar to Achilles.
Instantia hujus est, quod non verum sit, nihil enim prohibet non qua ratione optimus est Achilles, eadem similiorem esse Ajacem: cum erit alter quidem bonus,non similiter autem. Considerandum autem si et in ridiculosioribus sit simile,ut simia homini quam equo,cum non sit similis:non enim est simia melior,similior tamen est homini. Rursum in duobus:si hoc quidem meliori, illud autem pejori est similius, erit melius quod meliori est similius.Habet autem et hoc instantiam, nihil enim prohibethoc quidem meliori parum simile esse, illud autem pejori valde, ut si Ajax quidem Achilli:'parum, Ulysses autem Nestori valde, ut si hoc quidem meliori in pejoribus,illud autem pejori in melioribus,ut equus asino, et simia hominis. Et quod maxime insigne,eo quod minus tale. Et quod difficilius,magis enim amamus cum habemus,quod non est facile adipisci.Et quod magis proprium eo quod communius.Etquod magis incommunius,nam magis eligendum quod nullamolestiasequitur,quam quod sequilur.Amplius,si hoc illo melius,etomnino optimum eorum quae in hoc,melius eo quod in altero optimum. Ut si melior est homo quam equus, et optimus homo, optimo equo melior. Etsi optimum optimo melius,et simpliciter hoc illo melius, ut si optimus homo,optimo equo melior,et simpliciter homo,simpliciterequo melior.Am plius,ea quæ volumus amicos participare, eligibiliora quam quae non.
An objection to this is that it is not true; for nothing prevents Ajax from being more similar to Achilles, not for the reason that Achilles is the best: since the one will indeed be good, but not similarly. One must consider whether the similarity also holds in more ridiculous cases, as that a monkey is more similar to a man than a horse is, since it is not similar; for a monkey is not better, yet it is more similar to a man. Again, in two things: if this one is more similar to the better, and that one to the worse, then that which is more similar to the better will be better. But this also has an objection; for nothing prevents this one from being slightly similar to the better, and that one greatly similar to the worse—as if Ajax were slightly similar to Achilles, but Odysseus greatly similar to Nestor—or if this one is similar to the better in worse respects, and that one to the worse in better respects, as a horse to a donkey, and a monkey to a man. And what is most distinguished is that which is less such. And what is more difficult, for we love more what we have when it is not easy to obtain. And what is more proper because it is more common. And what is more uncommon, for what is followed by no trouble is more to be chosen than what is followed by trouble. Moreover, if this is better than that, and absolutely the best of the things in this, it is better than what is the best in the other—as, if a man is better than a horse, then the best man is better than the best horse. And if the best is better than the best, then this is also simply better than that—as, if the best man is better than the best horse, then a man is simply better than a horse. Moreover, the things we wish our friends to share in are more choiceworthy than those we do not.
Et quae ad amicum agere malumus quam quæ ad quemlibet,illa eligibiJiora.Ut juste agere et benefacere,magis quam videri,nam amicis benefacere volumus magis quam videri,quibuslibet autem e converso.Et quae sunt ex circumstantia necessariis me.. liora,aliquando autem et eligibiliora. Melius enim quam vivere, bene vivere,bene autem vivere est ex circumstantia,ipsumautem viverenecessarium.Aliquando autem meliora non etiam eligibiliora, non enim si meliora,necessariaquodeligibiliora: philosophari siquidem melius quam lucrari,sed non magis eligendum indigenti necessariis. Ex circumstantia autem est quando, existentibus necessariis, alia quædam adjiciuntur bonorum. Fere autem fortasse eligibilius quod necessarium est,melius autem quod ex circumstantia. Et quod non est ab alio exquirere quam quod est et ab alio. Quale sustinet justitia ad fortitudinem.Et si hoc quidem sine illo eligendum, illud autem sine hoc non. Ut potestas sine prudentia non cligenda,prudp.ntia vera sine pates tate eligenda. Et duorum,si alterum negamus,ut reliquum videaturnobis inesse,illud eligibilius quod volumus nobis videri inesse. Ut laborem diligere non negamus, ut ingeniosi essevideamur.Amplius,pro cujus absentia minus increpandi sunt moleste ferentes,hoc magis eligendum.Et pro cujus absentia non moleste ferentem magis increpandum, id eligibilius.
And those things which we prefer to do for a friend rather than for just anyone are more choiceworthy, such as acting justly and doing good rather than seeming to, for we wish to benefit friends more than to seem to, but for just anyone the reverse. And those things which arise from circumstance are better than necessary things, and sometimes also more choiceworthy. For living well is better than living, and living well arises from circumstance, while living itself is necessary. But sometimes better things are not also more choiceworthy; for it is not the case that if they are better, they are also more choiceworthy than necessary things: for philosophizing is indeed better than making money, but it is not more to be chosen by one who lacks necessities. And it is from circumstance when, necessities being present, certain other goods are added. And in general, perhaps what is necessary is more choiceworthy, but what arises from circumstance is better. And that which is not to be sought from another is more choiceworthy than that which is also from another, such as the sort of thing justice sustains in comparison with courage. And if one thing is to be chosen without the other, but the other is not without it—as power without prudence is not to be chosen, but prudence without power is to be chosen. And of two things, if we deny one so that the other may seem to be present in us, that is more choiceworthy which we wish to seem to be present in us—as we do not deny that we love labor, so that we may seem to be naturally gifted. Moreover, that for whose absence those who are vexed are less to be reproached is more to be chosen. And that for whose absence one who is not vexed is more to be reproached, that is more choiceworthy.
CAPUT III.
Alii meliorum eligibiliorumque loci.
Amplius, eorum quae sunt sub eadem specie, quod habet propriam virtutem.eoquod non habet, utrisque autem habentibus,quod magis habet, eligibilius. Amplius,si hoc quidem facit bonum illud cui adest, illud autem non facit,quod facit eligibilius. Quemadmodum est calidius quod calefacit,eo quod non.Si autem utrumque facit,quod magis facit,aut quod melius,et principalius facit bonum,ut sihocquidem animam,illud autem corpus.Amplius autem a casibus,et usibus, et actionibus, et operibus, et haec ab illis. Sequuntur enim sese invicem, ut si quod juste est eligibilius quam quod fortiter,et justitiafortitudine eligibilior,etsi justitia quam fortitudo eligibilior,et quod juste quam quod fortiter. Similiter autem et in aliis.Amplius,si aliquo eodem hoc quidem majus bonum est, illud autem minus magis eligendum majus,aut si majore majus fuerit alterurn.Sed et si duo quædam uno aliquo sint eligibiliora,quod longe eligibilius eo quod minus est eligendum,eligibilius.Ampliuscujus est superabundantia eligibilior,et ipsum eligibilius. Ut amicitia, pecuniis,nam eligibilior superabundantia axicitiae quam pecuniarum.Et id cujus magis eligat quis ut ipse sibi causa sit, quam cujus alter. Ut amicos pecuniis.Amplius,exappositionesieidem appositum aliquid,quod totum eligibilius facit.
CHAPTER III.
Other topics of better and more choiceworthy things.
Further, among things that fall under the same species, that which has a proper power is more choiceworthy than that which does not; and when both have it, that which has it more. Further, if one of them makes the good thing to which it is present, and the other does not, that which makes it is more choiceworthy—as that which heats is warmer than that which does not. But if both make it, that which makes it more, or which makes a better and more principal good—as if one makes the soul and the other the body. Further, [arguments are drawn] from outcomes, uses, actions, and works, and these from those; for they follow one another in turn, so that if what is done justly is more choiceworthy than what is done bravely, then justice is more choiceworthy than courage; and if justice is more choiceworthy than courage, then what is done justly is more choiceworthy than what is done bravely. And similarly in other cases. Further, if by the same measure one thing is a greater good and the other less, the greater is more to be chosen; or if one is greater by a greater measure. But also if two things are more choiceworthy than some one thing, that which is far more choiceworthy than the less choiceworthy thing is more choiceworthy. Further, that whose abundance is more choiceworthy is itself more choiceworthy—as friendship is more choiceworthy than money, for the abundance of friendship is more choiceworthy than that of money. And that which a person would more choose to be the cause of for himself than for another—as friends are more choiceworthy than money. Further, from addition: if the same thing is added to something, that which makes the whole more choiceworthy.
Cavere autem oportet extendere ad ea in quibus altera quidem appositorum utitur commune, vel alio quolibet modo cooperativum est; reliquo autem non utitur,neque cooperativum est,ut serra et falce cum arte fabrili, nam eligibilior serra consociata, simpliciter autem non eligibilior.Rursum si minori appositum aliquid, quod totum majus facit.Similiter autem etexablatione: quo enim ablato ab eodem quod restat est minus, illud majus erit quod ablatum reliquum minus facit.Et si hoc quidem propter se, illud autem propter gloriam eligendum.Ut sanitas pulchritudine, terminus autem ejus quod est ad gloriam, quod nullo conscio, non studeret inesse. Et si hoc quidem propter se et propter gloriam eligendum, illud autem propter alterum tantum. Et utrumvis magis propter se honorandum,hoc et melius et eligibilius. Honorabilius utique fuerit secundum se, quod nibil aliud debeat esse, propter se eligimus magis.Amplius,dividendum quotiesquodsligendum est dicitur,et quorum gratia, ut utilis, vel honesti, vel delectabilis. Nam quod ad omnia vel ad plura est utile,eligibilius fuerit eo quod non sic. Si autem eadem utrisque insunt,utri magis insintconsiderandum. Ut utrum delectabile an honestum, an utile magis. Rursum quod propter melius, eligibilius. Ut quod propter virtutem quam quod propter delectionem.
But one must beware of extending the comparison to cases where one of the things compared uses what is added as something common, or is in any other way cooperative with it, while the other does not use it nor cooperate with it—as a saw and a sickle in relation to the craft of carpentry; for a saw taken together with that craft is more choiceworthy, but simply in itself it is not more choiceworthy. Again, if something added to the lesser makes the whole greater. And similarly also by removal: for when that is removed from the same thing and what remains is less, that will be greater which, when removed, makes the remainder less. And if one thing is to be chosen for its own sake, but the other for the sake of glory—as health compared with beauty—and the end of what is for the sake of glory is that, with no one knowing of it, one would not strive for it to be present. And if one thing is to be chosen both for its own sake and for the sake of glory, but the other only for the sake of something else. And whichever is more to be honored for its own sake, this is both better and more choiceworthy. That which is more honorable in itself will surely be that to which nothing else ought to be preferred; for we choose it more for its own sake. Further, one must divide as often as "choiceworthy" is said, and for the sake of what—as the useful, or the honorable, or the pleasant. For what is useful toward all things or toward more things will be more choiceworthy than what is not so. But if the same things are present in both, one must consider to which they are more present—as whether the pleasant or the honorable, or the useful, is more so. Again, what is for the sake of the better is more choiceworthy—as what is for the sake of virtue rather than what is for the sake of pleasure.
Similiter autem et in fugiendis.Nam magis est fugiendum quod magis impetit virtutes, ut aegritudo turpitudine,nam et voluptatis etejusquod est studiosum esse,prohibentior est ægritudo.Amplius,ex similitudine monstrari potest fugiendum et eligendum quod propositum est. Namminuseligendum hujusmodi,quod aeque et eligeret aliquis etfugeret,altero quod eligendum est tantum; ad se invicem igitur comparationes (quemadmodum dictum est) faciendum.
CAPUT IV.
De eligendis et fugiendis documenta,locicommunes.
Idem autem loci utiles, et ad demonstrandum quodvis eligendum et fugiendum. Nam auferre solum eam oportet (quaa ad alterum est)praeeminentiam; si enim quod honorabilius,eligibilius,et honorabile eligendum, et si quod utilius,eligibilius et utile eligendum,similiterautem et in uliis quæcunque hujusmodi habent comparationem.ln aliquibus autem statim secundum eam quae ad alterum est comparationem, et quod eligendum utrumque vel alterum dicimus.Ut quando hoc quidem natura bonum,illud autem non natura bonum dicimus: nam quod natura bonum,manifestuæ a quoniam eligenduffi est. Sumendum autem quam maxime universales locos de eo quod est magis et minus, nam sic sumpti ad plura utiles erunt. Fieri autem potest ut eorum quidicti sunt quosda!L universales magis quis facial, pat'u transm utans secund urn appellationerr. Ut quod natul a tale, eo quod non natura tale,magis tale.
Similarly also in the case of things to be avoided. For that which more greatly attacks the virtues is more to be avoided, as sickness is more to be avoided than disgrace; for sickness is more prohibitive of pleasure and of that which is to be studious. Moreover, from similarity it can be shown that what is proposed is to be avoided and chosen. For that is less to be chosen which one would equally choose and avoid, than the other which is only to be chosen; comparisons, therefore, are to be made with respect to one another, as has been said.
CHAPTER IV.
Commonplaces concerning things to be chosen and avoided.
The same commonplaces are useful also for demonstrating that anything whatever is to be chosen and avoided. For one must remove only that pre-eminence which is relative to the other; for if what is more honorable is more choiceworthy, and the honorable is to be chosen, and if what is more useful is more choiceworthy and the useful is to be chosen, similarly also in other cases whatever have a comparison of this kind. In some cases, however, we say immediately according to the comparison relative to the other that both or one of them is to be chosen, as when we say that this indeed is good by nature, but that is not good by nature; for what is good by nature is manifestly to be chosen. One must take the most universal commonplaces concerning the more and the less, for thus taken they will be useful for more cases. It can happen, however, that someone makes some of those which have been stated more universal, by transposing them according to the appellation, as that which is such by nature is more such than that which is not such by nature.
Et si hoc quidem facit, illud autem non facit quod habet tale cuicunque insit,magis tale quod interdum facit, tale quam quod non facit. Si autem utrumque facit, quod magis facit tale. Amplius, si eodem aliquo,hoc quidem magis, illud autem minus tale. Et si hoc tali magis tale, illud vero non tali tale,manifestum quoniam primum magis tale.Amplius ex auditione,si eidem additum,aliquod tutum magis tale facit,aut si ei quod minus est tale additum, totum magis tale [licit. Similiter autem et ex abbtione,nam quo ablato reliquis,reliquum minus tale,ipsum magis tale. Et quæ contrariis sunt impermixtiora3 magis talia. Ut;olbius quidem nigro impermixtius. Amplius, præter ea qua dicta sunt prius,quod magis suscipit propriam propositi rationem. Ut si albi est ratio color disgregativus visus, albioris est,color magis disgregativus visus. Si autem particulariter, et non universaliter problema ponatur, primum quidem dicti universaliter construtivi vel deslructivi loci omnes utiles. Universaliter enim interimentes vel construentes,et particulariter monstramus; nam si omni inest,et alicui,et si nulli inest, nec alicui.Maxime autem opportuni et communes loci,qui sunt ex oppositis,et conjugatis, et casibus.
And if one thing produces what has such a character in whatever it inheres, while the other does not, then that which sometimes produces it is more of such a character than that which does not. But if both produce it, that which produces it more is more of such a character. Further, if by the same thing one is more of such a character and the other less. And if this is more of such a character by what is of such a character, while that is of such a character by what is not of such a character, it is clear that the first is more of such a character. Further, from addition: if when added to the same thing something makes it more of such a character, or if when added to that which is less of such a character it makes the whole more of such a character. Similarly also from subtraction; for when that is taken away from the rest, the remainder is less of such a character, and that thing itself is more of such a character. And those things which are more unmixed with their contraries are more of such a character, as the olive is more unmixed with black. Further, besides the things said before, that which more receives the proper account of the proposed thing. For if the account of white is a color that separates sight, then the account of what is whiter is a color that more separates sight. But if the problem is put particularly and not universally, first indeed all the places stated universally for establishing or destroying are useful. For by universally destroying or establishing, we also show particularly; for if it belongs to all, it also belongs to some, and if it belongs to none, it belongs to no some. But most opportune and common are the places that come from opposites, from conjugates, and from cases.
Nam similiter probabile est existimare, ei omnis voluptas honum,et tristitam omnem malum esse,et si aliqua voluptas bonum,et tristitiam aliquam esse malum.Item si aliquissensus non est potestas,et insensibilitas quasdam non est impotentia, et si quoddam opinatum disciplinatum, opinio quaedam disciplina; rursum si aliquod injustorum bonum, et justorum aliquod malum, et aliquod eorum quae injuste malum, et aliquod eorum quæ injuste bouum, et si quoddam delectabile fugienducr, et delectatio quaedam fugienda, secundum hæc autem et si aliquod delectabile utile, delectatio quaedam utilis. Et in corruptivis autem, et generationibus, et corruptionibus similiter. Nam si aliquod rorruptivum delectationisvel disciplinas bonum est, erit quaedam delectatio vel disciplina malorum; similiter autem et si corruptio quaedam disciplinae bonorum,velgeneratiomalorum,eritquaedam disciplina malorum.
For it is similarly probable to think that every pleasure is a good and every pain an evil, and if some pleasure is a good, that some pain is an evil. Likewise, if some sensation is not a capacity, and some insensibility is not an incapacity, and if some object of opinion is a subject of knowledge, then some opinion is a subject of knowledge; again, if some good belongs to unjust things, then some evil belongs to just things, and some evil to things done unjustly, and some good to things done unjustly; and if some pleasant thing is to be avoided, then some pleasure is to be avoided, and according to these also, if some pleasant thing is useful, then some pleasure is useful. And in the case of corruptive things, and generations, and corruptions, similarly. For if some corruptive thing of pleasure or of knowledge is a good, then some pleasure or knowledge will be of evils; and similarly, if some corruption of knowledge is of goods, or some generation of evils, there will be some knowledge of evils.
Ut si oblivisci quæ quis turpia egit bonorum est,vel reminisci malorum,erit scire quæ quisturpiaegit,malorum.Similiterautem et in aliis, in omnibus enim similiter probalile.Amplius ex eo quod est magis et minus,et similiter; si enim magis quidem eorum quæ sunt ex alio genere aliquid tale, illorum autem nihil est,neque quod dictum est erit tale.Ut si magis quidem disciplina quaedam bonum quam voluptas, nulla autem disciplina bonum, nec voluptas bonum erit, et ex eo quod est similiter quidem et minus eudem modo. Nam erit et interimere et construere; verumtamen ex eo quod estsimiliter,utraque j ex minus autem construere solum,destruereautem non; si enim similiter potestas quædam bonum et disciplina, est autem quaedam potestas bonumetd[sciplina;siautem nulla potestas bonum nec disciplina,si autem minus quædam potestas bonum quam disciplina, est autem quædam potestas bonum et disciplina; at vero si nulla potestas bonum,non necesseestet disciplinam nullam esse bonum: manifestumigiturquoniam construere solum ex eo quod minus est.Non solum autem ex alio genere est destruere, verum et ex eadem,dum sumit quis quod maxime tale est. Ut si positum est disciplina quaedam bonum, ostendatur autem quoniam prudentia non bonum,nec alia ulla erit, quia nec quae maxime videtur.
For example, if to forget the shameful things one has done is a good, or to remember evils, then to know the shameful things one has done will be [a good] of evils. And similarly in other cases, for in all things it is similarly probable. Moreover, from the more and the less, and likewise: for if something of another kind is more such, and of those [under consideration] nothing is, neither will what was stated be such. For example, if some discipline is more a good than pleasure, but no discipline is a good, neither will pleasure be a good. And from what is similarly and less in the same way. For there will be both to destroy and to construct; however, from what is similarly, both; but from the less, to construct only, but not to destroy. For if a certain power is similarly a good and a discipline, and some power is a good and a discipline; but if no power is a good, neither is a discipline; but if a certain power is less a good than a discipline, and some power is a good and a discipline; yet if no power is a good, it is not necessary that no discipline be a good. It is evident, therefore, that [one may] construct only from what is less. But it is not only from another kind that one may destroy, but also from the same kind, when one assumes what is most such. For example, if it has been posited that some discipline is a good, but it is shown that prudence is not a good, neither will any other be, because not even that which seems most [so].
Amplius, ex suppositione similiter postulantem si uni etomni in esse vel non inesse.Ut si hominis anima immortalis,et alias; si autem haecnon,nec alias. Si igitur inesse alicui positum est,oatendendu''n quoniam alicui non inest, nam consequatur per hypothesin nulli inesse; si au..
Further, they similarly demand from a supposition that something belongs or does not belong to one and to all. For example, if the soul of man is immortal, so too are others; but if this is not so, neither are others. If, then, it has been posited that it belongs to some one, it must be shown that it does not belong to some one; for it follows by hypothesis that it belongs to none; but if...
tem alicui non inesse positum est,ostendendum quoniam inest alicui,nam et sic consequetur omnibus inesse.Manitestum igilur estquod qui hypothesi utitur, facit problema universale particulariter posi-, tum; nam particulariter confitentem universaliter postulabit confiteri, eo quod uni et omni similiter postulaveritinesse.Cumautem indefinitum est problema,unomododestruerecontingit.Utsi dixeritvoluptatem bonum esse,vel non bonum,et nibil aliud quidquam determinaverit, nam si aliquam voluptatem dixerit bonum esse,ostendendum universaliter quod nulla,si debeat interimi propositum; similiterautem et si aliquam dixerit voluptatem non esse bon um,oslendendum llniversaliter quodomnis;aliter vero non contingit interimere,nam si ostenderimus quoniam est quaedam voluptas bonum vel non bonum,nondum interimitur propositum.Manitesium igiturquoniaminterimerequidemuno modo dicitur, construereautem dupliciter: siveenim universaliter ostenderimus quod omnis voluptas bonum, sive quod est quasdam voluptas bonum, ostensum erit quod propositum est.Similiter autem et si oporteat disserere quod est quaedum voluptas non bonum, si ostenderimus quod nulla bonum, vel quod quaedam non bonum ostendentes erimus utrum que,et univer-■ saliter et particulariter,quod est quædam voluptas: non bonum.Cum autem determinata fuerit positio, dupliciterinterimere erit.
But if it has been supposed that it does not belong to some one, one must show that it belongs to some one; for in this way it will follow that it belongs to all. It is evident, then, that one who uses a hypothesis makes a universal problem particular in his supposition; for he will demand that one who admits it in a particular case admit it universally, inasmuch as he has demanded that it belong to one and to all alike. But when the problem is indefinite, it can be destroyed in only one way. For example, if someone has said that pleasure is good, or not good, and has determined nothing else—for if he has said that some pleasure is good, one must show universally that no pleasure is good, if the proposition is to be refuted; and similarly, if he has said that some pleasure is not good, one must show universally that every pleasure is good; but otherwise it is not possible to refute it, for if we have shown that a certain pleasure is good or not good, the proposition is not yet refuted. It is evident, then, that to refute is spoken of in one way, but to establish in two ways; for whether we have shown universally that every pleasure is good, or that a certain pleasure is good, what was proposed will have been shown. And similarly, if one must argue that a certain pleasure is not good, if we have shown that no pleasure is good, or that a certain pleasure is not good, we shall have shown both universally and particularly that a certain pleasure is not good. But when the position has been determined, there will be two ways of refuting it.
Ut si ponaturalicuiquidem inesse voluptati bonum esse,alicui autem non inesse1 nam sive omnis ostendatur voluptas bonum, sive: nulla,interemptumerit propositum; si autem unam solam voluptatem posuerit bonum esse, tripliciter contingit interimere; nam ostendentes quodomnis vel nulla, vel quod plures quam una bonum, interimentes erimus quod propositum est.In pluribus vero positione determinata (utquod prudentia sola est! virtutum scientia),quadrupliciterestinterimere.Nam ostenso quod omnis virtus scientia,vel quod nulla, vel quod et alia aliqua ut justitia, vel quod eadem prudentia, non scientia,interemptum erit propositum.Utile autem et inspicere in singularibus,in quibus inesse aliquid vel nOn,dictu est,quemadmodum in universalibus problematibus.Ampliusautern et in generibusinspiciendum,dividentisecundum species usque ad individuc.,sicut prius dictum est.Nam si omni appareat inesse, sive nulli multa proferenti, postulandum un iversaliter conliteri, aut ferre instan. tiara in aliquo non sic.Amplius,in quibus possibile est aut specie, aut numero determinare accidens, inspiciendum si nullum horum inest.Utquod tempus non movetur,nec est motus,annumeranti quod sunt species motus; nam si nulla earum inest tempori, manifestum quoniam non movetur,nec est motus.
For example, if it is supposed that good belongs to some pleasure but not to some other—for whether all pleasure is shown to be good, or none, the thesis will have been destroyed; but if someone has posited that one single pleasure is good, there are three ways to destroy it: for by showing that all, or none, or that more than one are good, we shall have destroyed the thesis. In the case of a position determined with respect to several things (for example, that prudence alone is the science of the virtues), there are four ways to destroy it. For when it has been shown that every virtue is a science, or that none is, or that some other as well, such as justice, is, or that prudence itself is not a science, the thesis will have been destroyed. It is also useful to examine particulars, in which it is said that something belongs or does not belong, in the same way as in universal problems. Moreover, one must also examine genera, dividing them according to species down to individuals, as was said before. For if it appears to belong to every one, or to none, when someone brings forward many instances, one must demand that he concede it universally, or else bring an objection in some case where it is not so. Moreover, in cases where it is possible to determine the attribute either by species or by number, one must examine whether none of these belongs. For example, that time is not moved nor is a motion, by enumerating the species of motion; for if none of them belongs to time, it is clear that it is not moved nor is a motion.
Similiter autem et quod anima non est numerus,dividenti quoniamomnis numerus aut impar aut par; nam si anima neque impar nequtl par, manil'estum quod non est numerus, ad accidens igitur per talia et hoc modo argumentandum.
LIBER QUARTUS.
CAPUT PRIMUM.
De quo discutiendum, et problematum generis loci decem.
Post hæc autem de iis quae ad genus etproprtum, inspiciendum;sunt autem hæc elementa eorum quae sunt ad terminos, et his ipsis raro considerationes fiunt disputantibus.Siergo ponatur genus alicujus existentium,r;rimum quidem inspiciendum ad omnia qux e cognata sunt ei quod dicitur, si de alio non prædicatur, quemadmodum est in accidente.Ut si voluptatis bonum ponaturgenus,si aliqua voluptas non bonum. Nam si hoc manifestum est quoniam non genus bonum voluptatis,nam genusde omnibus qure sunt sub ipso speciebus prædicatur; deinde si non in eo quod quid est prædicatur,sed ut accidens, quemadmodum albuin, de nive,de anima, a seipso agit.-itum.-neque enimnixidipsum quod est,album, quapropter non est genus album nivis;neque anima idipsum quod est,agitatum, namaccidit ei moveri, quemadmodum et animali frequenter et ambulare et ambulans esse. Amplius,agitalum non quid est, sed quid faciens vel patiens significare videtur; similiter autem et album,non enim quid est nix,sed quale quid est indicat; quare neutrum horum in eo quod quid est prædicatur.
Similarly also [one may argue] that the soul is not a number, by dividing [the claim] that every number is either odd or even; for if the soul is neither odd nor even, it is evident that it is not a number. Such arguments, then, must be directed to accident in this way as well.
BOOK FOUR
CHAPTER ONE
What must be discussed, and the ten kinds of loci of problems.
After these things, one must examine matters pertaining to genus and property; these are the elements of those [arguments] that relate to terms, and considerations of them are rarely made by disputants. If, then, the genus of any existing thing is posited, first one must examine all things akin to what is stated, [to see] whether it is not predicated of something else, as happens in the case of accident. For example, if good is posited as the genus of pleasure, [one must see] whether some pleasure is not good. For if this is evident, [it is evident] that good is not the genus of pleasure; for a genus is predicated of all the species that are under it. Then [one must see] whether it is not predicated in [answer to] what it is, but as an accident—as white [is predicated] of snow, and [motion] of the soul, [which moves] itself. For snow is not itself that which is white, and therefore white is not the genus of snow; nor is the soul itself that which is moved, for it happens to it to be moved, just as it happens to an animal frequently both to walk and to be walking. Further, "moved" seems to signify not what [a thing] is, but what it is doing or undergoing; and similarly also "white" indicates not what snow is, but of what sort it is; wherefore neither of these is predicated in [answer to] what it is.
Maximeautem inaccidentis definitione inspiciendum, si aptatur ad dictum genus, ut ad quae nunc dicta sunt: contingitenim quidpiam movere seipsum, et non,similiter autem et album esse,et non;quare neutrum horumgenus, sed accidens, eo quod accidens dicim us,quod contingit idem inesse alicui, et non. Amplius, si non in eadem divisione est genus, et species, sed hæc quidem substantia,illud autemquale.Utnixquidem et cygnus subslantia,album autem non substantia, sed quale;quare non est genus album nivis,neque cygni. Rursum disciplina quidem aliquid, bonum autem, et pulchrum quale; quare non est genus pulchrum, vel bonumdisciplinae,nam genera eorum quae sunt ad aliquid,et ipsa adaliquidoportetesse, ut in duplici:etenim multiplex est genus duplicis, et ipsum eorum quæ sunt adaliquidest.Ut universaliter autem dicatur, in eadem divisione oportet genus esse speciei,nam si species substantia,etgenus, et si quale quidpiam species est.genus quale quidpiam, ut si album quale quidpiam et color.Similiter autem et in aliis. Rursum si necesse fuerit, vel si contingerit genus participare, quod positnm est in genere.
But most of all, in the definition of accident, one must examine whether it is fitted to the stated genus, as in the cases just mentioned; for it happens that something moves itself, and again does not, and likewise that it is white and again is not; wherefore neither of these is a genus but an accident, since we call an accident that which happens to be present in something and again not. Further, [one must examine] whether the genus and the species are not in the same division, but the one is substance and the other quality. For instance, snow and swan are substance, but white is not substance but quality; wherefore white is not the genus of snow or of swan. Again, knowledge is a certain thing, but the good and the beautiful are quality; wherefore the beautiful or the good is not the genus of knowledge, for the genera of things that are relative must themselves also be relative, as in the case of the double; for the multiple is the genus of the double, and it is itself among things that are relative. To put it universally, the genus must be in the same division as the species; for if the species is substance, the genus is also substance, and if the species is some quality, the genus is some quality, as if white is some quality, so is color. Similarly also in other cases. Again, [one must examine] whether it is necessary, or whether it happens, that the genus participates in that which is posited in the genus.
Terminus autem ejus quod est participare, est suscipere participati rationem, manifestum igitur quoniam species quidem participant genera,genera autem species non,nam species suscipit generis rationem,genus autem speciei non;considerandum igitur si participat, vel contingitassignatum genus participare speciem, ut si quis entisvel unius genus quidpiam assignaverit; accidet enim genus participare speciem, nam de omnibus quae sunt ens et unum praedicantur, quare et ratio eoru,!!. Amplius, si de aliquo assignata species vera est, genus autem non. Ut si ens,aut scibile,opinabilis genus ponatur,nam de non ente opinabile prædicabitur:multa enim non entia opinabilia sunt, at quod ens vel scibile non praedicatur de non ente; manifestum;quare non est genusens,nequescibile, opinabilis, nam de quibus species praedicatur, et genus oportet prædicari.Rursum si nullam specierum contingit participare quod positum est in genere.
The definition of "to participate" is to receive the account of that which is participated in. It is clear, therefore, that species participate in genera, but genera do not participate in species; for a species receives the account of its genus, but a genus does not receive the account of its species. One must therefore consider whether it participates, or whether it happens that the assigned genus participates in the species—as if someone were to assign some genus of being or of the one. For it will result that the genus participates in the species, since being and one are predicated of all things that exist, and therefore their account as well. Furthermore, [consider] whether the species is true of something while the genus is not—as if being or knowable were posited as the genus of the opinable; for the opinable will be predicated of non-being, since many non-beings are opinable, whereas being or knowable is not predicated of non-being. It is clear, therefore, that being is not the genus of the opinable, nor is knowable; for whatever things the species is predicated of, the genus must also be predicated of. Again, [consider] whether it happens that none of the species participates in what has been posited as the genus.
Nam impossibile est participare genus, quod nullam specierum participat, nisi aliqua secundum primam divisionem specierum sit,il1æ autemgenus solum participant:si igitur motus genus voluptatis ponatur, considerandum si neque corruptio, neque alteratio voluptas, neque ullus reliquorum (quiassignarisolent) motuum;manifestum enim quoniam nullam specierum participabit,quare neque genus, eo quod necessarium est quod genus participat, et specierum aliquam participare;quare non eritspecies, motus, voluptas, neque individuorum, neque eorum quidquam qua? sub specie motus sunt: nam et individua participant speciem etgenus,ut quidam homo,et hominem participat et animal. Amplius,si de pluribus dicitur quam genus, quod in genere positum est. Ut opinabile quam ens, nam et ens,et non ens, opinabile,quare non erit opinabile species entis;de pluribus enim semper genus quam species praedicatur. Rursus, si de æqualibus genus et species dicuntur. Ut si eorum quæ omnia consequuntur, hoc quidem species, illud autem genus ponatur, quemadmodum ens et unum, omne enim ens et unum, quare neutrum neutrius genus, eo quod de aequalibus dicuntur. Similiter autem et si primum et principium ad se invicem ponantur,nam et principium primum, et primum principium, quare aut utraque quae dicta sunt idem sunt, aut neutrum neutrius genus.
For it is impossible for a genus to participate in a genus that participates in none of its species, unless some species according to the first division of species exists, and those participate in the genus alone. If, therefore, motion is posited as the genus of pleasure, it must be considered whether neither corruption nor alteration is pleasure, nor any of the other motions that are customarily assigned; for it is clear that it will participate in no species, and therefore neither will it be a genus, because it is necessary that what participates in a genus also participate in some species. Wherefore pleasure will not be a species of motion, nor of individuals, nor will any of those things that are under the species of motion be so; for individuals participate in both species and genus, as a certain man participates in both man and animal. Further, if it is predicated of more things than the genus, what is placed in the genus. For example, the opinable than being, for both being and non-being are opinable, wherefore the opinable will not be a species of being; for a genus is always predicated of more things than a species. Again, if genus and species are predicated of equals. For example, if of those things that accompany all things, one is posited as a species and the other as a genus, as being and one, for every being is one, wherefore neither is the genus of the other, because they are predicated of equals. Similarly also if first and principle are posited in relation to each other, for both principle is first and first is principle, wherefore either both of the things said are the same, or neither is the genus of the other.
Elementum autem est ad omnia hujusmodi,quod de pluribus genus quam species et differentia dicitur;de paucioribus enim etiamdifferentia dicitur quam genus. Videndum autem et si alicujus in differentium specie non sit genus quod dictum est genus,vel non videatur.Construentiautem si est alicujus, idem enim omnium indifferen. tium specie genus;si igitur unius monstretur,manifestum quoniam omnium, et si unius non,manifestum quoniam nullius: ut si quis in secabiles ponens lineas indivisibile genus earum dicat esse, nam linearum habentium divisionem non est quod dictum est genus,cum sint indifferentes secundum speciem, indifferentes enim sibi invicem secundum speciem, rectæ lineae omnes.
CAPUT II.
De genere loci alii.
Considerandum autem et si quod aliud genus est assitrnatse speciei,quod neque continet assignatum genus,neque sub illo est.Ut si quis justitiae scientiam ponat genus,est enim virtusgenus,et neutrum generum reliquum continet,quare non erat scientia genus justitiae.
And a basic principle for all such cases is that genus is predicated of more things than species and differentia; for differentia too is predicated of fewer things than genus. One must also consider whether the genus stated to be a genus does not belong to any of the species under the differentia, or does not appear to. And for establishing it: if it belongs to any one, it is the same genus of all that are undifferentiated in species; so if it is shown of one, it is clear that it belongs to all, and if not of one, it is clear that it belongs to none—for example, if someone, setting down divisible lines, should say that the indivisible is their genus; for the stated genus does not belong to lines that have division, since they are undifferentiated in species—for all straight lines are undifferentiated in species from one another.
CHAPTER II
On other topics of genus.
One must also consider whether some other genus has been assigned to the species, which neither contains the assigned genus nor is under it. For example, if someone should posit knowledge as the genus of justice—for virtue is a genus, and neither of the two genera contains the other; hence knowledge was not the genus of justice.
Videtur enim, quando species una sub duobus generibus est, alterum ab altero contineri.Hdbet autern dubitationsm in quibusdam quod hujusmodi est, nam videtur quibusdam prudentiaet virtus et scientia esse,et neutrum genusa neutro contineri; non tamen ab omnibus conceditur prudentiam scientiam esse.Si igitur quis admittat quod dictum est verum esse, attamen subalterna, vel sub eodem ambo fieri quae ejusdem sunt genera, necessarium videbitur esse, quemadmodum et in virtute et in scientia accidit: utraque enim sub eodem genere sunt,nam utrumque eorum habitus et dispositio est. Considerandum igitur si neutrum est inassignatogenere.Sienim neque subalterna sunt genera, neque sub eodem ambo, non erit quod assignatum est genus.Considerandumautem et genus assignati generis,et sic semper superius genus, si omnia praedicantur de specie, et si in eo quod quid est prædicantur,Nam omne superius genus praedicari oportet de specie in eo quod quid est; si ergo alicubi dissonet, manifestum quoniam non est genus quod assignatum est.Rursum,si genus participat speciem, vel ipsum, vel aliquod superiorum generum.Nam nullum superiorum participat quod inferius est.
For it seems that when one species falls under two genera, one is contained by the other. There is, however, a difficulty in certain cases of this sort; for it seems to some that prudence and virtue and knowledge are the same, and that neither genus is contained by the other; yet it is not conceded by all that prudence is knowledge. If, then, one admits that what has been said is true, nevertheless it will seem necessary that both be made subalternate, or both fall under the same genus, since they are genera of the same thing, just as happens in the case of virtue and knowledge; for both are under the same genus, since each of them is a habit and disposition. One must consider, then, whether neither is in an unassignable genus. For if the genera are neither subalternate nor both under the same genus, that which has been assigned as genus will not be a genus. One must also consider the genus of the assigned genus, and so always the higher genus, whether all things are predicated of the species, and whether they are predicated in what it is. For every higher genus must be predicated of the species in what it is; if, then, it disagrees anywhere, it is clear that what has been assigned is not a genus. Again, whether the genus participates in the species, either itself or some of the higher genera. For none of the higher genera participates in what is lower.
Destruenti igitur quem admodum dictum est utendum, astruenti autem si confiteatur quidem inesse speciei quod dictum est genus, at ut genus inest dubitetur, sufficit ostendere aliquid superiorum generum in eo quod quid est de specie praedicari. Uno enim in eo quod quid est praedicato omnia et superioraillius,et inferiora si praedicantur de specie, in eo quod quid est prae dicabuntur;quare et assignatum genus in eo quod quid est prædicabitur;quod autem uno in eo quod quid est praedicato, omnia etiam reliqua (si praedicantur) in eo quod quid est prædicabundur,per inductionem sumendum. Si autem simpliciter inesse dubitetur assignatum genus,non sufficit ostendere aliquod superiorum generum in eo quod quid est de specie praedicari,ut si ambulationis genus quispiam assignavit lationem, non sufficit ostendere quod motus est ambulatio, ad ostendendum quod latio est eo quod et alii motus sunt, sed ostendendum quod nullum participat ambulatio eorum quae sunt secundum eamdem divisionem, nisi lationem; nam necesse est quod genus participat, et specierum aliquam participaresecundum primam divisionem; si enim ambulatio neque augmentationem, neque diminutionem,neque alios motus participet,manifestum quoniam lationem participabit; quare erit genus latio ambulationis.
Therefore the one who is destroying must proceed as has been said, but the one who is establishing must, if he indeed concedes that the genus stated is present in the species, but doubts whether it is present as a genus, it is sufficient to show that some one of the higher genera is predicated of the species in what it is. For when one thing is predicated in what it is, all the higher genera of that thing, and the lower ones too, if they are predicated of the species, will be predicated in what it is; therefore the assigned genus will also be predicated in what it is. But that when one thing is predicated in what it is, all the rest also, if they are predicated, will be predicated in what it is, must be taken by induction. If, however, it is doubted whether the assigned genus is present simply, it is not sufficient to show that some one of the higher genera is predicated of the species in what it is—for example, if someone has assigned motion as the genus of walking, it is not sufficient to show that walking is a motion, in order to show that motion is its genus, because other motions also are; but one must show that walking participates in none of the things that are under the same division except motion. For it is necessary that what participates in the genus also participate in some one of the species according to the first division. For if walking participates neither in increase nor in decrease nor in the other motions, it is clear that it will participate in motion; therefore motion will be the genus of walking.
Rursum, de quibus species quae positaestut genus prædicalur,considerandum si et assignatum genus in eo quod quid est de ipsis eisdem prædicatur de quibus et species; similiter autem et si omnia quae supra genus sunt,nam si alicubi dissonat,manifestumquoniamnonest genus quod assignatum est;si enim esset genus,omniaet superiora illius,et ipsum,in eo quod quid est praedicarentur de iis de quibus et species in eo quod quid est praedicatur. Destruenti igitur utile si non praedicetur genus in eo quod quid est de quibus et species praedicatur; astruenti autem si praedicetur in eo quod quid est utile, accidet enim genus et speciem de eodem in eo quod quid est praedicari, quare et idem sut. duobus generibus fit,necesseest igitur subalterna genera esse. Si igitur ostendatur quod volumus genus astruere non esse sub specie, manifestum quoniam species sub hoc erit, quare ostensum erit quoniam genus hoc. Considerandae autem et rationes generum,si aptantur ad assignatam speciem, et ad participantia speciem. Necesse est enim generum rationes praedicari de specie et de iis quae participant speciem; si igitur in aliquo dissonet, dilucidum quoniam non est genus quod assignatum est. Rursus, si differentiam ut genus assignavit, ut si immortale genus Dei, nam differentia est animalis immortale, eo quod animalium alia mortalia, alia immortalia.
Again, in the case of those things of which the species that has been posited is predicated as a genus, one must consider whether the assigned genus is also predicated in the what-it-is of the very same things of which the species is predicated; and likewise whether all the things above the genus are so predicated, for if there is disagreement anywhere, it is manifest that what has been assigned is not a genus; for if it were a genus, both all its superiors and it itself would be predicated in the what-it-is of those things of which the species is predicated in the what-it-is. Therefore, for the one who is destroying it is useful if the genus is not predicated in the what-it-is of those things of which the species is predicated; but for the one who is establishing, it is useful if it is predicated in the what-it-is, for it will follow that genus and species are predicated in the what-it-is of the same thing, and therefore they are the same. But if this happens with two genera, it is necessary that they be subaltern genera. If, therefore, it is shown that the genus we wish to establish is not under the species, it is manifest that the species will be under it, and therefore it will have been shown that this is the genus. One must also consider the definitions of genera, whether they fit the assigned species and the things that participate in the species. For it is necessary that the definitions of genera be predicated of the species and of those things that participate in the species; if, therefore, there is disagreement in anything, it is clear that what has been assigned is not a genus. Again, if someone has assigned a differentia as a genus, as if immortal were the genus of God—for immortal is a differentia of animal, since of animals some are mortal and some immortal.
Mamtestum Igitur quoniam peccant, nullius enim differentia est genus. Quod autem hoc verum, manifestum, nulla enim differentia significat quid est, sed magis quale quid; ut gressibile et bipes.Et si differentiam in genere posuit tanquam speciem, ut imparem quidem numerum (differentiam enim numeri impar,et non species est), neque videtur participare differentia genus. Nam omne quod participat genus, vel species, vel individuum est:difrerentia autem neque individuum, neque species;manifestum igitur quoniam non participat genus differentia,quare neque impar species erit,sed differentia, quoniam non participat genus. Amplius,si genus in specie posuit,ut contiguitatem idipsum quod est continuitatem, aut mixturam idipsum quod est temperamentum,aut (ut Plato definivit) lationem secundum locum mutationem: non enim necessarium contiguitatem continuitatem esse, sed e converso continuitatem contiguitatem, non enim omne contiguum continuatur, sed quod continuatur contiguum est. Similiter autem et in aliis,nam neque mixtura omnis temperamentum, nam siccorum mixtura non est temperamentum, neque secundum locum mutatio omnis, latio,nam ambulatio non videtur latio esse. Pene enim in iis quæ involuntarie locum ex loco permutant, dicitur latio,quemadmodum inanimatis accidit; manifestum autem quoniam et de pluribus species dicitur quam genus in assisnatis.cum oporteat e contrario fieri.
It is evident, therefore, that they err, for a differentia is the genus of nothing. And that this is true is manifest, for no differentia signifies what a thing is, but rather of what sort it is, as for example "walking" and "two-footed." And if he has placed a differentia in the genus as though it were a species, as "odd" in the case of number (for odd is a differentia of number, and not a species), neither does a differentia appear to participate in the genus. For everything that participates in a genus is either a species or an individual; but a differentia is neither an individual nor a species. It is manifest, therefore, that a differentia does not participate in the genus; wherefore neither will odd be a species, but a differentia, since it does not participate in the genus. Further, if he has placed the genus in the species, as contiguity in that very thing which is continuity, or mixture in that very thing which is temperament, or (as Plato defined it) motion in place in local change: for it is not necessary that contiguity be continuity, but rather the converse, that continuity be contiguity; for not everything contiguous is continuous, but what is continuous is contiguous. And similarly also in other cases, for neither is every mixture a temperament, for the mixture of dry things is not a temperament, nor is every local change motion, for walking does not appear to be motion; for motion is spoken of, one might almost say, in the case of those things that change place involuntarily, as happens in inanimate things. And it is manifest that the species is also predicated of more things than the genus in the case of things that have been assumed, when the opposite ought to be the case.
Rursum, si differentiam in specie posuit, ut immortale idipsum quod est Deum, nam accidit de æqualibus aut pluribus quam speciem dici; differentia enim semper de æqualibus aut de pluribus quam species dicitur.Amplius,si in differentia genus posuit,ut colorem idipsum quod est congregativum, aut numerum quod impar; et si genus ut differentiam dixit: possibile estenim aliquemtalem suscipere positionem,ut temperantiae mixturam differentiam, aut lationis secundum locum mutationem. Inspiciendum autem omnia quae sunt hujus modi per eadem, communicant enim loci, de pluribus enim genus quam differentiam oportet dici,et non participare differentiam. Si autem assignato, neutrum eorum quae dicta sunt possibile est accidere,nam et de paucioribus dicetur,et participabit genus differentiam. Rursum, si nulla differentia generis prædicatur de assignata specie, nec genus praedicabitur,ut de anima, neque impar neque par prædicatur, quare nec numerus. Amplius, si prius est natura species, et simul interimit genus. Videtur enim contrarium. Amplius, si contingit relinquere dictorum genus vel differentiam (utanirnam moveri, opinionem, verum et falsum),neutrum erit dictorum genus vel differentia.Videtur enim genus et differentia sequi quamdiu fuerit species.
Again, if he has placed a differentia in the species, as "immortal" in the case of God himself; for it happens that it is said of equals or of more things than the species. For a differentia is always said of equals or of more things than the species. Further, if he has placed a genus in the differentia, as "color" in the case of what is congregative, or "number" in the case of what is odd; and if he has called a genus a differentia—for it is possible for someone to accept such a position, as that mixture is a differentia of temperance, or change according to place a differentia of carrying. But all such things must be examined by the same considerations, for the topics are connected; for a genus must be said of more things than a differentia, and must not participate in a differentia. But if, when the subject has been assigned, neither of the things mentioned can happen—for it will be said of fewer things, and the genus will participate in the differentia. Again, if no differentia of the genus is predicated of the assigned species, neither will the genus be predicated, as neither odd nor even is predicated of the soul, and therefore neither is number. Further, if the species is prior by nature, the genus is also destroyed together with it. For the contrary seems to be the case. Further, if it is possible to leave out the genus or the differentia of the things stated (as, for example, to be moved, opinion, true and false), neither will be the genus or differentia of the things stated. For the genus and differentia seem to follow as long as the species exists.
CAPUT III.
De genere loca alii.
Inspiciendum autem et si quod in genere positum est participat aliquid contrarium generi, aut si, contingit participare. Nam idem contraria simul participabit,eoquod ipsum genus quidem nunquam relinquil5participat autem et contrarium, aut contingit participare.Amplius,si quidpiam communicat species, quod impossibile est omninoinesseiis quæ sunt sub genere,ut si anima communicat,numerorum autem nullum possibile est vivere, non erit species numeri anima.Considerandum autem et si aequivoca sit species generi elementis utenti, iis quae dicta sunt ad aequivocum.Univocum enim genus, et species. Quoniam inspiciendum autem omnis generis plures species, inspiciendum si non contingitalteram speciem esse dicti generis,nam si non est manifestum quoniam non erit genus omnino,quod dictum est. Considerandum etiam est si quod translatitie dictum est, ut genus assignavit: ut temperantiam consonantiam; nam omne genus proprie de speciebus prædicatur, consonantia vero de temperantia non proprie.sed translatitie,omnis enim consonantia in sonis. Amplius, si sit contrarium speciei aliquid, considerandum. Est autem multipliciter consideratio.Primum quidem si in eodem genere contrarium speciei, cum non sit contrarium generi; oportet enim contraria in eodem genere esse, si nihil sit contrarium generi.
CHAPTER III.
On the topics of genus, other points.
One must also consider whether something placed in a genus participates in anything contrary to the genus, or whether it can participate in it. For the same thing will participate in contraries at the same time, because it never abandons the genus itself, yet it participates in the contrary, or can participate in it. Further, if a species shares in anything that it is altogether impossible for any of the things under the genus to have, as, if the soul shares in number, but no number can be alive, then the soul will not be a species of number. One must also consider whether the species is equivocal in relation to a genus that uses elements, [by the points] that have been stated concerning the equivocal. For the genus and the species are univocal. Since, moreover, one must examine the several species of every genus, one must consider whether it is possible for another species of the stated genus to exist; for if it is not evident, then what has been stated will not be a genus at all. One must also consider whether he has assigned as a genus something said metaphorically, as if he called temperance a harmony; for every genus is predicated properly of its species, but harmony is not predicated properly of temperance, but metaphorically, for all harmony is in sounds. Further, if there is anything contrary to the species, one must consider it. But the consideration is manifold. First, indeed, whether the contrary of the species is in the same genus, when it is not contrary to the genus; for contraries must be in the same genus, if nothing is contrary to the genus.
Cum autem est contrarium generi, considerandum si contrarium in contrarium.Necesse est enim contrarium in contrario esse,si sitcontrarium quidem generi; manifestum*autem est unumquodque eorum, per inductionem.Rursus si omnino in nullo genere quod speciei est contrarium, sed ipsum genus: ut bonum; nam ipsi hoc non in genere, nec contrarium hujus in genere erit,sed ipsum genus,quemadmodum in bono et malo accidit: neutrum enim horum in genere,sed utrumque eorum genus.Deinde considerandum si contrarium est alicui et genus etspecies, ethorumquidemestaliquidmedium, illorum autem non.Nam si generum est aliquid medium,et specierum: et si specierum, et generum, ut in virtute et vitio, et justitia et injustitia, utrorumque enim est aliquid medium.Instantia hujus, quoniam sanitatis et aegritudinis nihil est medium, mali autem et boni allquod medium.Amplius, si est quidem aliquid utrisque medium, et speciebus et generibus, non similiter autem,sed horum quidem secundum negationem,illorum vero ut subjectum. Probabile enim similiter et in utrisque, ut in virtute et in vitio,justitia et injustitia, utrisque enim secundum negationem medium. Amplius, quando non est contrarium generi,considerandum non solum si contrarium in eodem genere,sed et medium.
When, however, a genus has a contrary, one must consider whether the contrary is in the contrary. For it is necessary that the contrary be in the contrary, if indeed it is contrary to the genus; and each of these is made evident by induction. Again, if the contrary of the species is in no genus at all, but the genus itself is: as in the case of good; for this is not in a genus, nor will its contrary be in a genus, but the genus itself, as happens in good and evil: for neither of these is in a genus, but each of them is a genus. Then one must consider whether both the genus and the species have a contrary, and whether there is some intermediate for the one but not for the other. For if there is some intermediate for the genera, there is also for the species; and if for the species, also for the genera, as in virtue and vice, and justice and injustice: for there is some intermediate for both. An objection to this is that there is no intermediate for health and sickness, but there is some intermediate for good and evil. Moreover, if there is some intermediate for both, both for the species and for the genera, yet not in the same way, but for the latter by negation, for the former as a subject. For it is plausible that it is similar in both, as in virtue and vice, justice and injustice: for the intermediate for both is by negation. Moreover, when the genus has no contrary, one must consider not only whether the contrary is in the same genus, but also the intermediate.
In quo enim extrema, et medium, ut in albo et nigro, nam color genus et horum et mediorum colorum omnium.Instantia,quoniamdefectusquidem, et superabundantia in eodem genere (in malo enim ambo), mediocre autem cum sit medium horum, non in malo, sed in bono est. Considerandum etiam si genus quidem contrarium est alicui, speciesautem nulli. Nam si genus est contrarium alicui, et species, quemadmodum virtus et vitium, et justitia et injustitia, similiter autem etin aliis consideranti manifestum videtur esse. Instantia, in sanitate et ægritudine, simpliciter enim sanitas xgritudini contraria; aliqua autem ægritudo, cum sit species aegritudinis, nulli contrarium, ut febris et ophthalmia, et unumquoque aliorum. Interimenti igitur tot modis inspiciendum: si enim non insint quae dicta sunt, manifestum autem non esse genus quod assignatum est. Construenti vero tripliciter, primum quidem si contrarium speciei sit in dicto genere, cum non sit contrarium generi. Nam si contrarium in hoc, manifestum quoniam et quod propositum est. Amplius si medium in dicto genere,nam in quo medium,et, extrema. Rursum si sit et contrarium quidem generi,considerandum est,et si contrarium in contrario.Nam si sit, manifestum quod et propositum in proposito.
For in whatever case there are extremes, there is also the middle, as in white and black; for color is the genus both of these and of all intermediate colors. An objection: deficiency and excess are in the same genus (for both are in evil), but the intermediate, since it is the middle of these, is not in evil but in good. One must also consider whether the genus is contrary to something while the species is contrary to nothing. For if the genus is contrary to something, so is the species, as virtue and vice, and justice and injustice; and similarly in other cases it seems evident to one who considers. An objection: in health and sickness; for simply health is contrary to sickness, but a particular sickness, since it is a species of sickness, is contrary to nothing, as fever and ophthalmia, and each of the others. Therefore one must inspect the counterinstance in these many ways; for if the things said are not present, it is evident that what has been assigned is not a genus. For one who is establishing a genus, there are three ways: first, if the contrary of the species is in the stated genus, when it is not contrary to the genus. For if the contrary is in this, it is evident that the proposed thing also is. Further, if the middle is in the stated genus; for in whatever case the middle is, there are also the extremes. Again, if there is also a contrary to the genus, one must consider whether the contrary is in the contrary. For if it is, it is evident that the proposed thing is also in the proposed thing.
CAPUT IV.
De genere loci alii.
Rursum in casibus et conjugatis, si similiter sequuntur, et interimenti et construenti.Simul enim uni et omnibus insunt vel non insunt,ut si justitia scientia quxdam,et juste scienter,et justus sciens; si autem horum aliquid non inest,nec reliquorum ulIum.Rursum in iis quae similiter se habent ad invicem,ut delectabile similiter se ad voluptatem, et utile ad bonum,utrumque enim utriusqueeffectivum. Si igitur voluptas quiddam bonum, et delectabile quiddam utile erit; manifestum enim quoniam boni erit effectivum,eo quod voluptas bonum. Similiter autem et in generationibus et corruptionibus,ut si aedificare est operari,ædificasse operatum esse,et si discere est reminisci, et didisse recordatum esse, et si dissolvi est corrumpi,et dissolutum esse corruptum esse, et dissolutio corruptio quasdam. Et in generativis vero et in corruptivis,similiter et in potentiis et usibus, et omnino secundum quamlibet similitudinem et interimenti et construenti inspiciendum, quemadmodum in generationeet corruptione diximus. Nam si corruptivum dissolutivum et corrumpi dissolvi,et si generativum est effectivum,et generari fieri, et generatio factio, similiter et in potentiis etusibus,etomnino sipotentiadispositio,et posse disponi, et si -alicujus usus est actus, et uti agere,et usum esse egisse.
CHAPTER IV.
On other topics of genus.
Again, in cases and conjugates, if they follow in like manner, one must examine both the destructive and the constructive [arguments]. For they are present or absent together in one and in all, as if justice is a certain knowledge, then justly is knowingly, and the just man is knowing; but if any of these is not present, neither is any of the rest. Again, in those things which are related to one another in like manner, as the pleasant is related to pleasure, and the useful to the good; for each is productive of each. If, therefore, pleasure is a certain good, the pleasant will also be a certain useful thing; for it is manifest that it will be productive of good, in that pleasure is good. Similarly also in generations and corruptions, as if to build is to work, then to have built is to have worked; and if to learn is to remember, then to have learned is to have remembered; and if to be dissolved is to be corrupted, then to have been dissolved is to have been corrupted, and dissolution is a certain corruption. And in things generative and corruptive, similarly also in potencies and uses, and in general according to any likeness one must inspect both the destructive and the constructive, just as we have said in generation and corruption. For if the corruptive is dissolutive and to be corrupted is to be dissolved, and if the generative is effective and to be generated is to become, and generation is a making, similarly also in potencies and uses, and in general if a potency is a disposition, then also to be able to be disposed; and if the use of anything is an act, then also to use is to act, and to have used is to have acted.
Si autem sit privatio id quod opponitur speciei, duobus modis est inlerimere.Primum quidem si assignato genereest oppositum.Aut enim simpliciter in nullo genereeodem privatio,aut non in ultimo,ut si visus in ultimo genere est,sensus,cæcitas non erit sensus.Secundo autem,si et generi et speciei opponitur privatio,non est autem oppositum in opposito,nec quod assignatum est in assignato erit.Interimenti igitur,quemadmodum dictum est,utendum. Construenti autem uno modo,nam si oppositum in opposito,et proposilum in proposito erit, ut si caecitas insensibilitas quaedam, et visus sensus. Rursum in negationibus considerandum e converso,quemadmodum in accidente dicebatur,ut si delectabile quod bonum,quod non bonum non delectabile.Nam si non ita se habet, erit contra, non bonum delectabile. At impossibile est,si bonum genus est delectabilis,e8se quidquam non bonum delectabile. Nam de quibus genus non praedicatur,nec specierum ulla.Et construentieliam similiter inspiciendum.Nam si non bonum,non delectabile, delectabile bonum, quare genus bonum delectabilis. Si autem si ad aliquid species, considerandum si et genus ad aliquid.Nam si species ad aliquid,et genus,ut in duplici et multiplici,utrumque enim ad aliquid.Si autem genus ad aliquid,non necessario est species. Nam disciplina ad aliquid, grammatica autem non.
But if the thing opposed to the species is a privation, it can be destructive in two ways. First, if the assigned genus is its opposite. For either the privation is simply in no same genus, or not in the ultimate genus; for example, if sight is in the ultimate genus, sense, then blindness will not be a sense. Second, if the privation is opposed both to the genus and to the species, but the opposite is not in the opposite, then neither will what has been assigned be in what has been assigned. Therefore one must use the destructive argument in the way stated. For the constructive argument there is one way: for if the opposite is in the opposite, then the proposed thing will be in the proposed thing, as if blindness is a certain insensibility, and sight is sense. Again, in negations one must consider conversely, as was said in the case of accident: for example, if the good is pleasant, then the not-good is not pleasant. For if it is not so, the contrary will hold: the not-good is pleasant. But it is impossible, if the good is the genus of the pleasant, that anything not-good be pleasant. For those things of which the genus is not predicated, neither is any of the species. And the constructive arguments must likewise be examined in the same way. For if the not-good is not pleasant, then the pleasant is good; wherefore the good is the genus of the pleasant. But if the species is a relative, one must consider whether the genus is also a relative. For if the species is a relative, so is the genus, as in double and multiple; for each is a relative. But if the genus is a relative, the species is not necessarily so. For discipline is a relative, but grammar is not.
An nec quod prius dictum estverumvidebitur?namvirtus ipsum quod bonum, et ipsum quod honestum, et virtus quidem ad aliquid,bonum vero et honestum non ad aliquid, sed qualia. Rursum si non ad idem dicitur species, et secundum se,et secundum genus.Ut si duplum dimidi dicitur duplum, et multiplum dimidii oportet dici;si autem non, non erit multiplum genus dupli. Amplius,si non ad idem et secundum genus dicitur, et secundum omnia genera.Nam si duplum dimidii multiplum est,et abundans dimidii dicetur,et simpliciter secundum omnia superiora genera ad dimidium dicetur.Instantia,quod non necesse est secundum se, et secundum genus ad idem dici; nam scientia scibilis dicitur,habitus autem et dispositio non scibilis,sed animæ. Rursum si similiter dicitur genus,et species secundum casus. Ut si alicui, aut alicujus aut quolibet modo aliter dicitur: nam ut species et genus,velut in duplo et in superioribus, alicujus,enim et duplum et multiplum; similiter autem ei in scientia, alicujus enim et haec et genera, ut dispositio et habitus. Instantia autem,quod aliquoties non sic, nam differens,et contrarium alicui, diversum autem cum sitgenushorum,non alicui,sed ab aliquo,diversum enim dicitur ab aliquo.Rursum si similiter ad aliquid secundum casus dicta,non similiter convertuntur.
But will what was said before not appear true? For virtue is the same as the good and the same as the honorable, and virtue is indeed relative, but the good and the honorable are not relative but qualities. Again, if the species is not predicated in relation to the same thing, neither in itself nor according to its genus. For example, if double is said to be double of half, multiple must also be said to be multiple of half; but if not, multiple will not be the genus of double. Further, if it is not predicated in relation to the same thing both according to itself and according to its genus, neither according to all its genera. For if double is multiple of half, it will also be said to be abundant of half, and simply according to all its superior genera it will be said in relation to half. An objection: that it is not necessary for something to be predicated in relation to the same thing both according to itself and according to its genus; for knowledge is said of the knowable, but habit and disposition are not of the knowable but of the soul. Again, if the genus and the species are predicated similarly according to cases. For example, if it is said of someone, or of someone's, or in any other way: for as species and genus, as in double and in its superior genera, for both double and multiple are of something; and similarly in the case of knowledge, for both these and their genera are of something, as disposition and habit. But an objection: that sometimes it is not so, for different and contrary are in relation to something, but diverse, though it is the genus of these, is not in relation to something but from something, for diverse is said from something. Again, if things said in relation according to cases are not similarly converted.
Quemadmodum in duplo et multiplo, utrumque enim horum alicujus, et idem etiam secund um conversionem dicitur,alicujus enim et dim:dium et submultiplum. Similiter autem et in disciplina et opinione,nam et hae alicujus,et convertitur,similiteret disciplinatum etopinabilealicujus; si igitur in aliquo non similiterconvertilur,manifestum est non esse genus alterum alterius.Rursum, si non ad aequaliae species, et genus dicitur. Similiter enim,et aequaliter utrumque videtur dici, quemadmodum in domo et datione,nam et donum alicuj us alicui dicitur,et datio alicujusetalicuidicitur; est autem datio genus doni,nam donum datio est irreddibilis. In aliquibus autem non accidit ad aequalia dici, nam duplum alicujus duplum,abundans autem et majus alicujus et aliquo,omne enim abundans,etmajusaliquoabundat,et alicujusabuneat,quare non sunt genera quas dicta sunt dupli,eo: quod non ad aequalia dicuntur speciei,aut non universa liter verum,ad æqualia speciem et genus dici.. Videndum autem et si oppositi est oppositum genus. Utsidupli multiplum,etdimidiisubmultiplum,oportet enim oppositum oppositi genus esse. Si igitur ponat aliquis scientiam idipsum quod est sensum, oportebit et scibile id quod 'est sensibile esse; sed non est, non enim omne scibile sensibile, nam intelligibilium quaedam scibilia.
As in the double and the multiple, for each of these is of something, and the same is also said by conversion, for the half and the submultiple are also of something. Similarly also in discipline and opinion, for these too are of something, and it converts similarly, and likewise the disciplined and the opinable are of something; if, then, in some case it does not convert similarly, it is clear that the one is not the genus of the other. Again, if the species are not said in relation to equals, neither is the genus. For similarly and equally each seems to be said, as in house and giving, for both a gift is said to be of someone to someone, and a giving is said to be of someone and to someone; but giving is the genus of gift, for a gift is a giving that is not to be repaid. In some cases, however, it does not happen that they are said in relation to equals, for the double is the double of something, but the abundant and the greater are both of something and by something, for everything abundant and greater is abundant by something and is abundant of something; wherefore those things said are not genera of the double, because they are not said in relation to equals with the species, or not universally is it true that the species and the genus are said in relation to equals. One must also consider whether the genus of the opposite is the opposite. As if the multiple is the genus of the double, and the submultiple of the half, for the genus of the opposite ought to be the opposite. If, then, someone posits knowledge to be the very same thing as sense, it will be necessary that the knowable also be the same as the sensible; but it is not, for not every knowable is sensible, for some of the intelligibles are knowable.
Quare non est genus sensibile scibilis, si autem hoc non, neque sensus scientiae.Quoniam autem eorum quae ad aliquiddicuntur, alia quidem ex necessitate in eis aut circa ea sunt ad quas dicuntur (ut dispositio,et habitus,et commensuratio; in alia enim nullo possibile est esse quae dicta sunt,quam in eis ad quai dicuntur), alia autem non necesse est quidem in eis esse ad qua di-, cuntur,contingit autem (quemadmodum scibile est in anima,nihil enim prohibet sui scientiam habere animam,non necessarium autem,possibile est enim et in alio esse hanc eamdem), alia vero simpliciter non cOnlingit in eis esse ad quae dicuntur (uicontrarium in contrario,neque scientiam scibili,nisi sit scibile anima, vel homo),considerare igitur oportet si quis in genere ponat quod tale est,in non tali.Ut si memoriam immansionem scientiæ dicat,nam omnis immansio in mente,et circa illud,quareetscientiæ imr; ansioin scientia.Memoriaigitur in scientio, eo quod immansio scientiae est.Hoc autem non contingit,memoria enim omnis in anima.Est autem qui dictus est locus et accidens communis; nihil enim refert, memoriæ genus immansionem dicere,aut accidere dicere illi hoc: nam si quovis modo est memoria immansis scientiae,eadem aptabitur de ipsa ratio.
Therefore the sensible is not a genus of the knowable; and if this is not so, neither is sense a genus of knowledge. But since of those things which are said in relation to something, some are of necessity in those things or about those things to which they are said (as disposition, habit, and commensuration; for it is not possible for the things said to be in anything other than those things to which they are said), while others are not of necessity in those things to which they are said, but it does happen (as the knowable is in the soul; for nothing prevents the soul from having knowledge of itself, but it is not necessary, for it is possible for this same thing to be in another as well), and others simply do not happen to be in those things to which they are said (as a contrary in a contrary, nor knowledge in the knowable, unless the knowable be a soul or a man), one must therefore consider whether anyone places in a genus something of such a kind in what is not of such a kind. As if he should call memory an abiding of knowledge; for every abiding is in the mind and about that, and therefore the abiding of knowledge is in knowledge. Memory, therefore, is in knowledge, because it is an abiding of knowledge. But this does not happen; for all memory is in the soul. And what has been said is a common place and accident; for it makes no difference whether one calls the genus of memory an abiding, or says that this happens to it; for if memory is in any way an abiding of knowledge, the same argument will be applied concerning it.
CAPUT V.
De re eadem loci alii.
Rursum si habitum in actu posuit,aut actum in habitu,non est genus quod tale est. Ut si sensum, motum per corpus,nam sensus habitus,motus autem actus.Similiter autem et si memoriam habitum continentivumopinionisdixerit,nam nulla memoria habitus,sed magis actus. Peccant autem et qui habitum in consequentem potentiam ordinat,ut mansuetudinem, continentiam irae, et fortitudinem, et justitiam,timorum et lucrorum continentiam, nam j fortis et mansuetus perturbatione vacans dicllur, continens autem qui perturbatur, sed non ducitur; fortasse igilurtalispotentiasequiturutrumque,ufcsi perturbetur,non ducatur; verum continere non hoc est,hunc quidem fortem,illum autem mansuetum esse, sed omnino perturbari ab hujusmodi nihil.
CHAPTER V.
On other topics concerning the same matter.
Again, if he has placed a state in act, or an act in state, that which is such is not a genus. For example, if he calls sense a motion through the body; for sense is a state, but motion is an act. Likewise also if he says memory is a state that contains opinion; for memory is not a state, but rather an act. They also err who arrange a state under a consequent potentiality, as mildness, continence of anger, and courage, and justice, continence of fears and gains; for the courageous and the mild man are said to be free from disturbance, but the continent man is one who is disturbed but not led; perhaps, then, such a potentiality follows both, so that if he is disturbed, he is not led; yet to be continent is not this—for the one to be courageous, the other mild—but to be disturbed by such things not at all.
Aliquoties autem et quod sequitur,quovis modu ut genus ponunt: tristitiam iræ, et opinionem fidei, utraqueenim prædicta sequuntur quidem quodammodo assignatas 8pecies.Neulrurn autem eorum genus est nam qui irascitur,constristatur, priore in eo tristitiafacta,non enim ira tristitiæ,sed tristitiairae causa est; quare simpliciter ira non est tristitia.Secundum autem hæc,neque fides opinio: contingit enim eamdem opinionem etiarn non credentem habere; non contingere autem hoc,si fides esset species opinionis non enim contingit idem amplius perrnanere,si ex specie omnino permutatum sit quemadmodum nec idem animal quandoquehominem esse,etquandoque non.Si quis autem dicat ex necessitate opinantem etiam fidem habere,de aequalibus opinio et fides dicetur,quare neque sic erit genus,de pluribus enim oportet dici genus. Videndum autem et si in aliquo eurum nata sint utraque fieri. In quo enim species et genus, ut in quo album et color, et in quo grammatica et disciplina.Si igitur verecundiam timorem dixit, aut iram tristitiam, non accidit in eodem speciem et genus esse,nam verecundia quidem in rationali, timor in irascibili, at tristitia in concupiscibili, nam in hoc et voluptas, ira autem in irascibili; quare non sunt genera quae assignata sunt eo quod non in eodem cum speciebus nata sunt fieri.
Sometimes, however, they also posit as a genus whatever follows, in whatever way: grief as the genus of anger, and opinion as the genus of faith; for both of the aforementioned do in some way follow the species assigned. But neither of them is a genus. For the one who is angry is grieved, since grief comes first in him, but anger is not the cause of grief; rather, grief is the cause of anger. Therefore, simply speaking, anger is not grief. And according to these considerations, neither is faith opinion; for it happens that one and the same opinion is also held by one who does not believe. But this would not happen if faith were a species of opinion; for it is not possible for the same thing to remain any longer if it has been entirely changed from its species, just as the same animal cannot be sometimes a man and sometimes not. But if someone says that one who opines necessarily also has faith, then opinion and faith will be said of equal things; wherefore not even in this way will it be a genus, for a genus must be said of many things. One must also consider whether both happen to occur in the same thing. For the species and the genus are in the same thing, as white and color are in the same thing, and grammar and discipline. If, therefore, he called shame fear, or anger grief, it does not happen that the species and the genus are in the same thing; for shame is in the rational part, fear in the irascible part, but grief in the concupiscible part—for pleasure is also in this part—while anger is in the irascible part. Wherefore the things assigned are not genera, because they do not happen to occur in the same thing as their species.
Similiter autem et si amicitia in concupiscibili,non erit voluntas quædam,omnis enim voluntas in rationali.Utilis autem hic locus et ad accidens, et id cui accidit, in eodem enim accidens et cui accidit;-quare nisi in eodem videatur, manifestum quoniam non accidit.Rursum si secundum quid species dictum genus participat, non enim videtur secundum quid participari genus.Nam non est homo secundum quid animal,neque grammaticasecundutn quid disciplina.Similiter autem et in aliis.Considerandum igitur si in aliquibus secundum quid participatur genus,ut si animal quod sensibile vel visibile dicitur;nam secundum quid sensibile vel visibile dicitur;nam secundum quid sensibilevel visibile animal,secundum corpus enim sensibile et visibile,secundum animam autem non:quare non erit genus,corpus visibile,et sensibile,animalis.Latent autem quandoque et totum in partem ponentes, ut animal,corpus animatum;nullo enim modo pars de toto praedicatur; quare non erit genus corpus animalis,eo quod pars est.
Likewise also if friendship is in the concupiscible part, it will not be a kind of will, for every will is in the rational part. This topic is also useful for accident and for the subject in which the accident is; for the accident and its subject are in the same thing—therefore unless they appear to be in the same thing, it is clear that it is not an accident. Again, if a species participates in the genus spoken of in a qualified sense, for the genus does not seem to be participated in a qualified sense. For man is not animal in a qualified sense, nor is grammar a discipline in a qualified sense. Likewise also in other cases. One must consider, then, whether in some cases the genus is participated in a qualified sense, as if the animal is said to be sensible or visible; for the animal is said to be sensible or visible in a qualified sense—for it is sensible and visible in a qualified sense according to the body, but not according to the soul; therefore body, being visible and sensible, will not be the genus of animal. Sometimes, however, they also place the whole in the part, as animal, body animated; for in no way is a part predicated of the whole; therefore body will not be the genus of animal, since it is a part.
Videndum autem si quid vituperandorum aut fugiendorum in potestate aut potente posuit, ut sophistum,vel calumniatorem,vel furem eum qui possit aliena latenter surripere: nemo enim praedictorum in eo quod possit,aliquid horum talis dicitur.Potest enim et Deus,et studiosus, prava agere; non sunt autem hujusmodi,nam omnes pravi secundumelectionem dicuntur.Arn pIius,omn!3s poleslates eorum sunt quae sunt eligenda,nam pravorum potestatos eligendxe,eo quod Deum et studiosum habere dicimus eas. Potentes enim dicimus eos esse prava agere, quare nullius vituperabilis erit genus potestas.
Next one must consider whether he has placed anything among things to be blamed or shunned in the power or the powerful, as calling a sophist, or a sycophant, or a thief the one who is able secretly to steal another's goods; for none of those mentioned is called such in respect of his being able to do any of these things. For both God and the virtuous man are able to do base things; but they are not of this sort, for all the base are said to be so according to choice. Moreover, all powers are of things that are to be chosen, for the powers of the base are to be chosen, in that we say that God and the virtuous man have them. For we call those powerful to do base things, wherefore the genus of no blameworthy thing will be power.
Si autem non, accidet vituperandorum quiddam eligendum esse,namerit quaedam potestas vituperabilis.Et si quid propter se honorabilium vel eligibilium, in potestate, vel potente, vel effectivo posuit.Nam omnis potestas,et omne potens aut effectivum,propter aliud igend umjaut si quid eorum quae sunt in duobus generibus vel pluribus,in altero posuit.Quaedam enim non est in uno genere ponere, ut fraudulentum aut calumniatorem, neque enim qui eligit,impotens autem,neque qui potest, at non eligens,calumniator aut fraudulentus,sed qui utraque haec habet;quare non ponenda sunt in uno genere,sed in utroque eorum quæ dicta sunt.Amplius, aliquoties e converso,genus quidem ut differentiam, differentiam autem ut genus assignant,ut sluporem superabundantiam admirationis,et fidem vehementiam opinionis:nam neque superabundantia,neque vehementia,genus,sed differentia videturenim stupor admiratio esse superabundans, et fides opinio vehemens;quare genus ad miratio et opinio est, superabundantia autem et vehementia differentia.
But if not, it will follow that something among things to be blamed must be chosen, for there will be some blameworthy power. And if he has placed anything among things honorable or choiceworthy for their own sake in the power, or the powerful, or the effective. For every power, and everything powerful or effective, is for the sake of something else. Or if he has placed any of the things that are in two genera or more in one of them. For certain things cannot be placed in one genus, as the fraudulent or the calumniator; for neither the one who chooses but is unable, nor the one who is able but does not choose, is a calumniator or fraudulent, but the one who has both; wherefore they must not be placed in one genus, but in both of those mentioned. Moreover, sometimes conversely, they assign the genus as a differentia, and the differentia as a genus, as stupor as an excess of admiration, and belief as a vehemence of opinion; for neither excess nor vehemence is a genus, but a differentia; for stupor would seem to be an excessive admiration, and belief a vehement opinion; wherefore the genus is admiration and opinion, but excess and vehemence are the differentia.
Amplius,si quis superabundantiam et vehementiam ut generaassignet,inanimatafidem facient etstupefacient:nam cuj usque vehementiaetsu perabund antia illi adestcujusestsuperabundantia etvehementia.Sierl gostupor superabundantia est admirationis, aderit admirationi,quare admiratio stupefuciet; similiter autem et fides aderit opinioni,si vehementia quidem opinionis est,quare opinio fidem faciet.Amplius,accidet sic assignanti vehementiam vehementem dicere, et superabundantiam superabundantem: est enim quaedam fides vehemens; si ergo fides vehementia est,vehementia erit vehemens.Sirniliier autem etstupor quidem et superabundans;si ergo stupor est superabundantia, superabundantia erit superabundans.Videtur autem neutrum horum,quemadmodum nec disciplina disciplinatum, nec motus motum. Quandoque autem peccant, et passionem in genere ejus quod passum est ponentes,utimmortalilatem vitam sempiternam dicentes esse, passio enim vitae et accidens immortalitas videtur esse; quod autem verum sit quod dicitur, manifestum fiet,si quis admittat aliquem ex mortali fieri immortalem.
Furthermore, if someone assigns excess and intensity as genera, they will make inanimate things credible and cause astonishment; for the intensity and excess of each thing belongs to that of which it is the excess and intensity. If, then, astonishment is an excess of admiration, it will belong to admiration, wherefore admiration will cause astonishment; and similarly, faith will belong to opinion, if indeed intensity is of opinion, wherefore opinion will make faith. Furthermore, it will happen to one assigning intensity thus to call intensity intense and excess excessive; for there is a certain intense faith; if, then, faith is intensity, intensity will be intense. Similarly also both astonishment and excess; if, then, astonishment is excess, excess will be excessive. But neither of these seems so, just as neither is discipline disciplined nor motion moved. Sometimes, moreover, they err, placing a passion in the genus of that which has suffered it, as when they say that immortality is eternal life; for immortality seems to be a passion and accident of life. But that what is said is true will become manifest if someone admits that some one becomes immortal from mortal.
Nullus enim dicit aliam vitam eum sumere, sed accidens aliquod, vel passionem huic eidem advenire;quare non genus vitaimmortalitatis.Rursum si passionem cujus est passio, illius genus dicit, ut spiritum aerem motum, magis enim motus aeris, spiritus,nam aer idem permanet, et quando movetur,et quando stat;quare non est omnino aer spiritus:est etenim et non moto aere spiritus, siquidem idem aer permanet,qui quidem erat spiritus.Similiter autem et in aliis hujusmodi. Si igitur et in hoc oportet admittere quod aer motus est spiritus, non tamen de omnibus hujusmodi est assignandum,de quibus non verificatur genus,sed de quibuscunque vere prædicatur assignatum genus,nam in quibusdam non videtur verificari, ut in luto et nive, nam nivem dicuntesse aquam coagulatam,lutum autem terram humido temperatam: est autem neque nix aqua,neque lutum terra,quare neutrum assignatorum generum erit genus.Oportet enim genus verificari semper de omnibus speciebus.Similiter autem neque vinum est aqua putrefacta(sicut Empedocles dicit:In ligno putruit unda),nam simpliciter non est aqua.
For no one says that it takes another life, but that some accident or passion comes to this same thing; wherefore life is not the genus of immortality. Again, if someone calls the passion of that of which it is the passion its genus, as breath is air in motion—for breath is rather the motion of air, since air remains the same both when it is moved and when it is at rest; wherefore breath is not wholly air, for there is breath even when the air is not moved, since the same air remains which was breath. Similarly also in other such cases. If, then, in this case too one must admit that breath is air in motion, nevertheless one must not assign a genus in all such cases in which the genus is not verified, but only in those cases in which the assigned genus is truly predicated; for in some cases it does not seem to be verified, as in mud and snow—for they say that snow is congealed water, and mud is earth tempered with moisture; but neither is snow water nor is mud earth, wherefore neither of the assigned genera will be a genus. For a genus must always be verified of all its species. Similarly, neither is wine putrefied water (as Empedocles says: in wood the water putrefied), for it is simply not water.
CAPUT VI.
De genere loci alii.
Amplius,si omnino quod assignatum est, nullius est genus. Manifestum enim quoniam neque ejus quod dictum est.Considerandum autem ex eo quod nihil eorum differt specie,quae participant assignatum genus. Ut nihil alba differunt specie, ipsa a se invicem.Omnis autem generis sunt species differentes,quare nullius erit album genus.Rursum si quod omnia sequitur genus vel differentiam dixit.Plura enim sunt quae omnia sequuntur, ut ens,et unum, eorum sunt quae omnia sequuntur;si igitur ens genus assignaverimus,manifestum quoniam omnium erit genus,eo quod praedicatur de eis.De nullo enim genus quam despeciebuspraedicatur,quare et unum species erit entis;accidit ergo de omnibus de quibus genus praedicatur, et speciem prædicari, eo quod ens et unum de omnibus simpliciter praedicantur, oportet autem de paucioribus speciem praedicari. Si autem quod omnia sequitur,diflerentiam dixit, perspicuum quoniam deaequalibus vel de pluribus differentia quam genus dicetur.Nam si et genus omnia sequitur de aequalibus,sin vero non omnia sequatur genus de pluribus differentia dicetur quam ipsum genus. Amplius,siin subjecta specie est, quod assignatum genus dicitur,ut album in nive, quare manifestum quoniam non erit genus, de subjecta enim specie solum genus dicitur. Considerandum autem etiam est si non univocum sit genus speciei.
CHAPTER VI.
On another [error concerning] the place of genus.
Further, [it is an error] if what has been assigned is in no way the genus of anything. For it is evident that it is not [the genus] of that which was mentioned. And one must consider this from the fact that none of the things which partake of the assigned genus differ in species, as nothing white differs in species from another white thing. But the species of every genus are different; wherefore white will be the genus of nothing. Again, [it is an error] if one has said that what follows all things is a genus or a differentia. For there are many things that follow all things, such as being and one; these are among the things that follow all things. If, therefore, we assign being as a genus, it is evident that it will be the genus of all things, since it is predicated of them. For a genus is predicated of nothing other than its species; wherefore one also will be a species of being. It follows, then, that the species is predicated of all things of which the genus is predicated, since being and one are predicated simply of all things; but a species ought to be predicated of fewer things. If, however, one has said that what follows all things is a differentia, it is clear that the differentia will be said of equal things or of more things than the genus. For if the genus also follows all things, [the differentia is said] of equal things; but if the genus does not follow all things, the differentia will be said of more things than the genus itself. Further, [it is an error] if what is called the assigned genus is in a subject species, as white is in snow; wherefore it is evident that it will not be a genus, for a genus is said only of a subject species. One must also consider whether the genus is not univocal with the species.
Nam de omnibus speciebus univoce genus praedicatur.Amplius,quando existente et speciei et generi contrario, si quod melius contrariorum est, in pejori genere ponit.
Nam accidet reliquum in reliquo esse, eo quod contraria in contrariisgeneribus,quare quod deteriue est, in meliori erit; at videtur melioris, et genus melius esse. Et si eodem similiter ad utraque se habente, in pejore,et non in meliore genere ponit, ut animam ipsum quod est agitionem, aut agitatum: nam pari modo eadem stativa et agitativa esse videtur; quare si melius statio,in hoc oportet genere ponere. Amplius, ex magis et minus. Destruenti quidem si genus suscipit magis species autem non suscipit,neque ipsa,neque quod ab ipsa dicitur,ut si virtus suscipit magis,et justitia et jusius,dicitur enim justus magis alter altero.Si igitur assignatum quidem genus magis suscipit, species autem non suscipit,neque ipsa neque quod ab ipsa dicitur,non erit quidem assignatum genus.Rursum quod magis videtur, vel similiter, non est genus, manifestum quoniam nec quod assignatum est.Utilis autem hic locus in talibus maxime in quibus plura videntur de specie in eo quod quid est praedicata,cum non determinatum est neque promptum nobis est dicere, quodnam eorum genus, ut de ira, tristitia, et opinio parvipendentiae, in eo quod quid est prædicari videntur: contristatur enim iratus,et opinatur parvipendi.
For the genus is predicated univocally of all the species. Further, when a contrary belongs to both the species and the genus, if one of the contraries is better, [it is an error] to place it in the worse genus. For it will follow that the remaining one is in the remaining [genus], since contraries [are] in contrary genera; wherefore the worse will be in the better [genus]. But the genus of the better seems also to be better. And if, when it is related similarly to both, he places it in the worse and not in the better genus—as, for instance, the soul itself, which is either that which moves or that which is moved; for in like manner the same thing seems to be both that which stands still and that which moves; wherefore, if standing still is better, one ought to place it in this genus. Further, [the error is detected] from more and less. For one who destroys [the definition]: if the genus admits of more, but the species does not admit of more, neither itself nor what is said from it—as, for example, if virtue admits of more, then also justice and the just; for one man is said to be more just than another. If, therefore, the assigned genus admits of more, but the species does not admit of more, neither itself nor what is said from it, then the assigned genus will not be [the genus]. Again, [it is shown] that what seems [to admit] more, or [to admit] similarly, is not the genus; and it is clear that neither is what has been assigned. But this topic is useful especially in those cases in which several things seem to be predicated of the species in [answer to] what it is, when it is not determined nor ready for us to say which of them is the genus—as concerning anger, sorrow, and opinion of slight importance, which seem to be predicated in [answer to] what it is; for the angry man is sorrowful, and he opines that [something] is of slight importance.
Eadem autem consideratio et in specie ad aliud aliquid comparanti. Nam si quod magis aut similiter videtur esse in assignato genere, non est in genere manifestum quod nequeassignata omnino species erit in genere. Interimenti igiturquemadmodum dictum est,utendum.Astruenti vero,si quidem suscipit magis quod assignatum est genus,et species, non utilis locus, nihil enim prohibet utrorumque suscipientium non esse alterum alterius genus,nam bonum et album Buscipil magis,et neutrum neutrius genus.Generum autem et specierum ad se invicem comparatio utilis ut si similiter hoc,et hoc genus; si alterum genus et aItHrum.Similiter autem et si quod minus, et quod magis: ut si continentiae, magis potestas quam virtus genus; virtus autem genus,et potestas. Eademautem et de specie convenitdici;namsi similiter hoc,et hoc propositi species,si alterum species, et reliquum, et quod minus videtur species est et quod magis. Amplius, ad construendum, perspiciendum si de quibus assignaLum est genus, in eo quod quid est prædicatur,curn non sit una assignata species,sed plures et differentes. Nam manifestum quoniam erit genus. Si autem in assignato species est, considerandumet side aliis speciebus genus in eo quod quid est prædicatur. Nam rursus accidet de pluribus et differentibus idem praedicari.
The same consideration applies also when comparing a species to something else. For if what seems to be more, or equally, in the assigned genus is not in the genus, it is evident that neither will the assigned species be wholly in the genus. Therefore, as has been said, one must use the method of refutation. But for one who is establishing a point, if indeed the assigned genus admits more, and so does the species, the topic is not useful; for nothing prevents both from admitting [the predicate] without either being the genus of the other—for good and white admit more, and neither is the genus of the other. But the comparison of genera and species to one another is useful, as, for instance, if this and this are similarly a genus; and if the one is a genus and the other is not. Likewise also with what is less and what is more: for example, if power is more a genus of self-control than virtue is; but virtue is a genus, and so is power. The same should also be said concerning species; for if this and this are similarly species of the proposed [genus], and if the one is a species, so is the other, and what seems less is also a species, and so is what seems more. Further, for establishing a point, one must examine whether the things of which the genus has been assigned are predicated in the what-it-is, when the assigned species is not one but several and different. For it is evident that it will be a genus. But if the species is in the assigned [genus], one must also consider whether the genus is predicated in the what-it-is of other species as well. For again it will follow that the same thing is predicated of several and different things.