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Latin · Treatises ·

Topicorum Aristotelis Libri Octo Severino Boethio Interprete

Boethius. Severinus · ogl-pl

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tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:101 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quoniam autem videtur in quibusdam et differentia in eo quod quid est de speciebus praedicari, separandum est genus et differentia, utenti iis quae dicentur elementis, primum quidem quoniam genus de pluribus dicitur quam differentia, deindequoniam secundum ejus (quod quid est) assignationem,magis convenit genus quam differentiam dicere. Nam qui animal dicit hominem, magis indicat quid est homo quam qui gressibile. Et quoniam differentia quidem qualitatem generis semper significat, genus autem differentiae, non: nam qui dicit gressibile, quiddam animal dicit; qui vero animal dicit, non dicit quale quiddam gressibile: differentia igitur a genere sic separanda.Quoniam autem videtur musicum,qua musicum est,sciens esse,et musica scientia quaedam est, et si ambulans, eo quod ambulat movetur,ambulatio motus quidam est, considerandum in quo genere vult quidpiam construere secundum dictum modum.Ut si scientiam ipsum quod est fidem,si sciens quatenus scit, fidit: manifestum enim quoniam scientia fides quaedam erit, eodem autem modo et in aliis hujusmodi. Amplius, quoniam quod sequitur aliquid semper et non convertitur, difficile est separare quod non sit genus, si hoc quidem illud sequitur omne,illud vero hoc non omne.

English

Since, however, difference also seems in certain cases to be predicated of species in respect of what a thing is, genus and difference must be separated, using the principles that will be stated. First, because genus is said of more things than difference; second, because in the assignment of what a thing is, it is more fitting to state the genus than the difference. For one who says that man is an animal indicates more what man is than one who says he is capable of walking. And because difference always signifies a quality of the genus, but genus does not signify a quality of the difference—for one who says "capable of walking" says a certain kind of animal, but one who says "animal" does not say a certain quality of being capable of walking—therefore difference is to be separated from genus in this way. Since, however, the musical person, insofar as he is musical, seems to be one who knows, and music is a certain kind of knowledge, and if one who walks, insofar as he walks, is moved, walking is a certain kind of motion, one must consider under what genus one wishes to establish something according to the stated manner. For example, if one wishes to establish that knowledge itself is a kind of belief—if the one who knows, insofar as he knows, believes—it is evident that knowledge will be a certain kind of belief, and in the same way also in other such cases. Furthermore, since what follows something always and does not convert, it is difficult to separate what is not a genus, if the one follows the other universally, but the other does not follow this universally.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:102 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ut tranquillitatem qui, et numerum divisibile, e converso autem non; nam divisibile non omne, numerus, neque quies omnis, tranquillitas, ipso quidem est utendum ut genere quod est semper consequens,cum non convertatur alterum; cum autem alterum se extendit non in omnibus, obsequendum. Instantia autem hujus,quoniam non ens eequitur omne quod fit (nam quod fit non est) et non convertitur (non enim omne quod non est fit); attamen non est genus non ens ejus quod fit, simpliciter enim non sunt non entis species. De genere igitur quemadmodum dictum est, transeundum.

LIBER QUINTUS.

CAPUT PRIMUM.

De modis proprii.

Utrum autem proprium an non proprium est quod dictum est,per haec considerandum.Assignatur autem proprium aut per se et semper, aut ad ł aliud aut aliquando. Per se quidem, ut hominis, animal mansuetum natura; ad aliud autem,utanimae ad corpus,quoniam illa quidem imperare nata, hoc autem parere; semper autem, ut Dei, animal immortale; aliquando vero,ut alicujus hominis ambulare in gymnasio. Sunt autem proprii, quod ad alterum assignatum est, aut duo problemata, aut quatuor.Nam sidehocquidemassignatum quidpiam f'ueril,de illo vero negatum idipsum, duo duntaxat problemata fiunt quemadmodum hominis ad equum proprium est quod bipes est.Nam est quod homo non bipes est argumentabitur quispiam, et quod equus bipes: utrinque autem removetur proprium.

English

As for tranquility and number being divisible, and conversely not; for not every divisible thing is number, nor is every rest tranquility. We must use the one that is always consequent as a genus, when the other does not convert; but when the other does not extend to all cases, we must yield. An objection to this is that non-being follows everything that comes to be (for what comes to be is not) and does not convert (for not everything that is not comes to be); yet non-being is not the genus of what comes to be, for simply there are no species of non-being. Concerning genus, therefore, we must proceed in the manner stated.

BOOK FIVE

CHAPTER ONE

On the modes of property.

Whether what has been stated is a property or not must be considered through these means. A property is assigned either per se and always, or in relation to another, or at some time. Per se, as for man, to be a tame animal by nature; in relation to another, as for the soul to the body, since the former is born to rule, the latter to obey; always, as for God, to be an immortal animal; at some time, as for some man, to walk in the gymnasium. Properties, however, that are assigned in relation to another are either two problems or four. For if in the one case something has been affirmed, and in the other the same thing denied, only two problems result, as it is a property of man in relation to horse to be biped. For someone will argue that man is not biped, and that horse is biped; but in either case the property is removed.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:103 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si autem de utroque utrumque assignatum fuerit,et de utroque negatum, quatuor problemata erunt,ut hominis proprium ad equum,quod ille quidem bipes, hic autem quadrupes est: nam et quod homo non bipes est, et quod esse quadrupes natus est, argumentari est;et quod equus bipes, et quod non quadrupes,possibile est argumentari. Quolibet igitur modo ostenso,interimitur quod propositum est. Est autem per sequidem proprium,quod ad omnia assignatur,et ab omni separat (quemadmodum hominis animal mortale disciplinae susceptivum): ad aliud autem,quod non ab omni,eed ab aliquo statuto determinat(ut virtutis addisciplinam,quoniam illa quidem in pluribus, haec in rationali solo,etin habentibus rationem nata est fieri); semper autem, quod secundum omne tempus verificatur, et nunquam relinquitur(quemadmodum animalis ex anima et corpore compositum esse); aliquando vero, quod secundum aliquod tempus verificatur,et non ex necessitate semper consequitur, ut alicujus hominis ambulare in foro. Est autem ad alterum proprium assignare, differentiam dicere, aut in omnibus et semper, aut in multum et in plurimis. Et in omnibus quidem et semper, quemadmodum hominis proprium ad equum quoniam bipes,nam homo quidem et omnis, et semper est bipes; equus autem nullus est bipes, et nunquam.

English

But if both attributes have been assigned to both subjects and denied of both, there will be four problems, as in the case of the property of man in relation to horse, that the one is biped, the other quadruped; for to argue that man is not biped, and that he is naturally quadruped, is possible; and to argue that horse is biped, and that it is not quadruped, is possible. In whatever way, then, it is shown, what was proposed is destroyed. Now a property is per se which is assigned in relation to all and separates from every one (as of man, mortal animal receptive of discipline); but in relation to another, which does not determine it from every one but from some definite thing (as of virtue, to be added to discipline, since the former is in many, the latter is naturally brought to be in the rational alone and in those having reason); but always, what is verified according to every time, and is never left behind (as of animal, to be composed of soul and body); but sometimes, what is verified according to some time, and does not always follow of necessity, as for some man to walk in the marketplace. But to assign a property in relation to another is to state a difference, either in all and always, or in much and in most. And in all and always, as the property of man in relation to horse, that he is biped; for man both every one, and always, is biped; but no horse is biped, and never.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:104 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ut multum autem et in plurimis, quemadmodum rationalis proprium principare ad concupiscibile, et irascibile, eo quod illud quidem imperat,hæc autem parent; nam neque rationale semper imperat, sed quandoque illi imperatur,neque concupiscibili et irascibili semper imperatur,sed imperant quandoque,cum fuerit hominis anima flagitiosa. Proprium autem ea maxime logica sunt, quae per se et semper, et quae ad aliud.Nam ejus quod ad aliud est proprium, plura problemata sunt, quemadmodum diximus et prius. nam aut duo,aut quatuor,ex necessitate fiunt problemata.Plures autem orationes fiunt ad haec,quod autem per se est et semper, ad multa est argumentari,et ad plura tempora observare; quod per se quidem ad multa, nam ad unumquodque eorum quae sunt, ut pole cui oportet inesse proprium, quare si non ab omni separat, non erit bene assignatum proprium; quod autem semper, ad plura tempora est observare, et sive non inest, sive non infuerit, sive non inerit, non erit proprium. Quod vero aliquando,ad illud (quod nunc dicitur)tempus, consideramus. Von igitur sunt rationes ad ipsum. plures. Logicum autem est problema, ad quod rationes fiunt, et crebrae quidem, et bonæ.Ad aliud igitur proprium dictum, ex iis quae sunt de accidente locis inspiciendum, si huic quidem accidit, illi vero non.De iis autem quae semper, et quæ per se, per haec considerandum.

English

For the most part, and in most cases, [this is] as with the property of the rational [part] in relation to the concupiscible and irascible [parts], in that the former commands while the latter obey; for the rational does not always command, but sometimes is commanded, nor do the concupiscible and irascible always obey, but sometimes command, when the soul of a man has become wanton. Those properties, however, are especially logical which are per se and always, and which are relative. For of that which is relative, there are more problems, as we said also earlier; for either two or four problems necessarily arise. But more arguments are formed for these; whereas that which is per se and always admits of arguing toward many things and of observing for many times. That which is per se indeed [admits of arguing] toward many things, for toward each one of the things that are, as, for example, that to which the property ought to belong; wherefore if it does not separate it from every [other], the property will not have been well assigned. But that which is always admits of observing for many times, and whether it is not present, or was not present, or will not be present, it will not be a property. But that which is sometimes [present], we consider in relation to that time which is now called [present]. Hence the arguments for it are not many. A logical problem, however, is one for which arguments are formed, both numerous and good. Therefore, for a property said in relation to another, one must inspect from the topics concerning accident, [to see] whether it belongs to this indeed but not to that. But concerning those which are always and per se, one must consider through these [same topics].

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:105 · narrative
Source · Latin

CAPUT II.

De locis proprii.

Primum quidem an non bene assignatum est proprium, an bene. Ejus autem quod est non bene,aut bene,est unum quidem,si non per notiora, aut per notiora positum est proprium. Destruenti quidem, si non per noli ora; at construendi, si per notiora. Ejus autem quod non per notiora est, hoc quidem si omnino ignotius.positum est proprium quod assignavit,illo cujus proprium dixit. Non enim erit bene positum propnum,nam propter notitiam proprium facimus.Discelldi enim causa,et proprium, et definitiones facimus. Per notiora igitur accipiendum: sic enim magis erit sufficientercognoscere,ut puta qui ponit ignis proprium esse simillimum animae, ignotiore quam ignis utitur anima (magisenimscimus quid est ignis quam quid anima),non igiturerit bene positum proprium ignis, simillimum animae. Aliud autem,si non notius est hoc huic inesse. Oportet enim non solum notius esse re,sed huic inesse,notius esse;nam qui non scit huic inest, neque si illi soli notius inest cognoscit. Quarecum quodvis horum acciderit,obscurum fit proprium,ut quia qui ponitiguis proprium,in quo primo anima nata est esse,ignotiore utitur quam sit ignis, eo quod igno-' tius est,si in hoc est anima,et si in hoc primo est; non erit itaque bene positum proprium ignis,in quo primo anima nata est esse.

English

CHAPTER II.

On the topics of property.

First, [we must consider] whether the property has been assigned well or not well. Of [the question] whether it is not well or well [assigned], there is one [topic]: whether the property has been stated not through things more known, or through things more known. For the purpose of refuting, [the topic is] if [it is stated] not through things more known; for the purpose of establishing, if through things more known. Of [the case] where it is not through things more known, there is this [sub-case]: whether the property he has assigned has been stated as altogether less known than that of which he has called it a property. For the property will not have been well stated, since it is for the sake of knowledge that we make a property. For it is for the sake of distinguishing that we make both properties and definitions. Therefore it must be taken through things more known; for thus it will be more possible to know sufficiently, as, for instance, one who posits that the property of fire is to be most similar to the soul uses the soul, which is less known than fire (for we know more what fire is than what the soul is); therefore the property of fire, "most similar to the soul," will not have been well stated. Another [sub-case] is if this [property] is not more known to belong to this [subject]. For it is necessary not only that it be more known than the thing, but also that it be more known to belong to this [subject]; for one who does not know that it belongs to this [subject] does not know it even if it is more known to that [subject] alone. Wherefore, whenever either of these happens, the property becomes obscure, as, for instance, because one who posits that the property of fire is "that in which the soul first naturally exists" uses something less known than fire is, in that it is less known whether the soul is in this and whether it is first in this; therefore the property of fire, "that in which the soul first naturally exists," will not have been well stated.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:106 · narrative
Source · Latin

Construenti autem, si per notiora positum est proprium,et si per notiora secundum utrumque modum.Eritenim benesecundum hoc positum proprium, namconstructivorum locorum ejus quod bene, alii quidem secundum hoc solum, alii autem simpliciter monstrabunt quod bene, ut quia qui dixit animalis proprium,sensum habere, per notiora, et notius assignavit proprium secundum utrumque modum; quare erit bene assignatu m:secund urn hoc,animalis propriu m,sensurn habere.Deinde destruenti quidem,si quod nominum quæ in proprio sunt assignata multipliciter dicitur, vel etiam tota oratio plura significat. Non enim erit bene positum proprium, ut quoniam sentiremulta significat, unum quidem sensum habere allerum autem sensum uti,non erit animalis proprium bene positum quod natum est sentire. Quapropter non utendumest,neque nomine,quod multipliciter dicitur,nequeoratione,quaj plura significet, quia quod multipliciterdiciturobscurum facitquod dictum est, dubitante eo qui debet argumentari,quodnam dicit eorum quae multipliciter dicuntur, nam proprium discendi gratia assignatur. Amplius autem ad hoc necessarium est redargutionem aliquam fieri cum sic assignant proprium,quando in dissidente quispiam conficietsyllogismum,de eo quod multipliciter dicitur. Construenti autem,si non plura significat neque nominum quidpiam, neque tota oratio.

English

For one who is establishing [a property], [we must consider] whether the property has been posited through things more known, and whether through things more known in both ways. For in this way the property will be well posited; for of the constructive topics of what is well [posited], some will show that it is well [posited] in this way alone, others simply, as when someone who said that it is a property of an animal to have sensation assigned the property through things more known and more known in both ways; wherefore it will be well assigned in this respect, that it is a property of an animal to have sensation. Then, for one who is refuting, [we must consider] whether any of the names assigned in the property is said in many ways, or even whether the whole phrase signifies several things. For the property will not be well posited, as since "to perceive" signifies many things—one thing, to have sensation, another, to use sensation—it will not be a property of an animal well posited that it is naturally capable of perceiving. Wherefore one must not use either a name that is said in many ways or a phrase that signifies several things, because what is said in many ways makes obscure what has been said, since he who ought to argue is in doubt which of the things said in many ways he means; for a property is assigned for the sake of learning. Moreover, in addition to this, it is necessary that some refutation be made when they thus assign a property, when someone in disagreement produces a syllogism concerning what is said in many ways. For one who is establishing [a property], [we must consider] whether it signifies several things, neither any of the names nor the whole phrase.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:107 · narrative
Source · Latin

Erit enim secundum hoc bene positum proprium ut quia neque corpusplurasignificat,nequemobilissimumin superiorem locum,neque totum quodexhis compositum est,erit bene positum secundum hoc ignis proprium corpus mobilissimum in superiorem 10cum.Deinde destruentilquidem siimulLipliciter diciturillud cujus proprium assignatur,non determinatur autem cujus eorum ponatur proprium.Non enim bene erit assignatum proprium,ob quas autem causas non immanifestum estexiis quae prius dicta sunt,nam eadem accidere necessarium est; ut quia scire hoc plura significat(unum enim scientiam habere boc, alterum autemscientiauti hoc,aliud vero scientiam esse hujus, aliud autem scientia uti nujus, non eri! ejus quod est scire hoc,bene assignatum proprium ullum, non determinato cujus horum ponitur proprium. Construenti vero, si non dicitur multipliciter hoc cujus proprium ponitur,sed est unum et simplex. Erit enim bene positum secundum hoc proprium, ut quia homo simpliciter dicitur, erit bene positum secundum:hochominis proprium animal mansuetu natura.Deinde destruenti quidem,si frequenter dictum est idem in proprio (sæpe enim latent hoc facientes et in propriis,quemadmodum et in terminis), non erit bene positum quod hoc sustinet,proprium. Conturbat enim audientem,quod frequenter dicitur, obscurum igitur necessarium est fieri, et praeter id nugari videntur.

English

For according to this, the property will be well posited: since "body" does not signify many things, nor "most mobile toward the upper place," nor the whole composed of these, the property of fire will be well posited according to this: "a body most mobile toward the upper place." Then, for one who is refuting: if that of which the property is assigned is said in many ways, and it is not determined of which of them the property is posited. For the property will not be well assigned; and the reasons for this are not unclear from what has been said before, for the same things must happen; for example, since "to know this" signifies many things (for one thing is to have knowledge of this, another to use knowledge of this, another to be knowledge of this, and another to use knowledge of this), the property of that which is "to know this" will not be well assigned, since it is not determined of which of these it is posited. But for one who is establishing: if that of which the property is posited is not said in many ways, but is one and simple. For according to this the property will be well posited, as, since "man" is said simply, the property of man will be well posited according to this: "an animal tame by nature." Then, for one who is refuting: if the same thing has been said frequently in the property (for those who do this often escape notice, in properties just as in terms), the property that contains this will not be well posited. For what is said frequently confuses the hearer, and therefore it must become obscure, and beyond that they seem to babble.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:108 · narrative
Source · Latin

Eveniet autem frequenter idem dicere duobus modis: unoquidemquando nomina. verit frequenter idem,ut si quis proprium assignet ignis; corpus tenuissimum corporum,hic enim frequenter dixit corpus. Secundo autem, si quis assumat oralionespro nominibus,ut si quis reddat terrae proprium, substantiam quae maxime corporum secundum naturam fertur in inferiorem locum,deinde aasumat pro corporibus, hujusmodi substantias, unum enim etidem eslcorpus,et hujusrnodisubslano tia; erit ergo hoc modo substantia frequenter dicta, quare neutrum erit bene positum proprium. Construenti vero,si nullo utitur frequenter nomine eodem. Erit enim secundum boc bene assignatum proprium,utquia qui dixit hominis proprium, animal disciplinæ susceptivum, non usus est frequenter eodem nomine,erit utique secundum hoc bene assignatum hominis proprium.Deindedestruenti quidem,si tale aliquid assignavit in proprio nomen, quod omnibus insit.

English

But it will often happen that the same thing is said in two ways: first, when a name is used frequently for the same thing, as if someone assigns as the property of fire "the finest body of bodies"—for here he has frequently said "body." Second, if someone takes expressions in place of names, as if someone renders the property of earth as "the substance which, of bodies, is most borne by nature to the lower place," and then takes "substances of this sort" in place of "bodies"—for "body" and "substance of this sort" are one and the same; therefore in this way the substance will have been frequently stated, wherefore neither property will have been well posited. But for one who is constructing a property, it is well if he uses no name frequently for the same thing. For according to this the property will have been well assigned, as when someone said the property of man is "an animal receptive of discipline"—he has not used the same name frequently; accordingly, according to this, the property of man will have been well assigned. Then, for one who is destroying a property, it is well if he has assigned in the property some name that belongs to all.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:109 · narrative
Source · Latin

Inutile enim erit, quod non separat ab aliquo, quod autem in propriis dicitur, separare oportet,quemadmodum et qua; in terminis non igitur erit bene positum proprium, ut quia qui posuit scientiæ proprium opinionernindissuasihilem a ratione,unum existens,lali aliquo ususest proprio (uno, inquam) quod omnibus inest, non erit utique bene positum scientias proprium.Astruenti autem,si nullo usus est commnni,sed quod ab aliquo separat, erit bene positum secundum hoc proprium, ut quia qui dixit animalis proprium animam habere, nullo usus est communi, erit secundum boc bene positum propriu.:n animalis,anLnam habere. Deinde destruenti quidem, si plura propria assignat ejusdem, non determinans quod plura ponit. Non enim erit bene positum proprium; nam quemadmodum nec interminis oportet praeter eam (quse indicat substantiam) orationem adjungere quidpiam plusculum, sic nec in propriis præter eam (quae facit proprium quod dictum est) orationem quidquam coassignandum Inutile enim fitejusmodi, utquia quidixitpropriurn ignis, tenuissimum et levissimum, plura assignavit propria (utrumque enim de solo igne verum est dicere), non erit bene positum proprium ignis, corpus subtilissimum et levissimum. Astruenti vero si non plura ejusdem propria assignavit, sed unum.

English

For it will be useless if it does not separate the thing from something else; but what is stated in properties ought to separate, just as in definitions. Therefore a property will not be well posited in the case of terms, as when someone who posited as the property of knowledge "an opinion that cannot be dissuaded by reason," being one thing, used some property (one, I say) that belongs to all things—then "an opinion that cannot be dissuaded by reason" will certainly not be well posited as the property of knowledge. But for one who is establishing a property, if he has used nothing common but something that separates from something else, the property will be well posited in this respect, as when someone who said the property of an animal is "to have a soul" used nothing common; in this respect "to have a soul" will be well posited as the property of an animal. Next, for one who is refuting, if he assigns several properties of the same thing without determining that he posits several—for the property will not be well posited; for just as in definitions one ought not to add anything beyond the account that indicates the substance, so neither in properties should anything be co-assigned beyond the account that makes the thing stated a property. For such a thing will be useless, as when someone who said the property of fire is "the finest and lightest" assigned several properties (for it is true to say each of them of fire alone)—"the most subtle and lightest body" will not be well posited as the property of fire. But for one who is establishing, if he has not assigned several properties of the same thing, but one.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:110 · narrative
Source · Latin

Erit enim secundum hoc bene positum proprium, ut quia qui dixit humidi proprium, corpus quod in omnem figuram ducitur,unum assignavit proprium et non plura, erit secundum hoc bene positum humidi proprium. Deinde destruentiquidem,si eodem usus est cujus proprium assignavit, aut eorum quae sunt illius aliquo. Non enim erit bene positum proprium, nam discendi gratia assignatur proprium, idem autem eidem similiter ignotum est, id autem quod aliquid eorum est quae sunt ejus, posterius; non igiturest notius, quare non fit ut per hoc quisquam magis quidpiam discat, ut quia qui dixit animalisproprium, substantiam cujus species est homo aliquo usus est eorum quæ sunt animalis, non erit bene positum proprium.Construenti autem,si neque eodem, neque eorum quae sunt ipsius aliquo utitur. Eritenimbene secundum hoc positum proprium, ut quia qui posuit animalis proprium ex anima et corpore com positum esse, neque eorum quae sunt ipsius aliquo usus est: erit utique bene secundum boc assignatumanimalis proprium. Eodemautem modo et in aliis considerandum est quaenam non faciunt aut faciuntnotius. Destruenti quidem, si aliquo usus est, aut opposito, aut omnino simul natura, aut posteriore aliquo.

English

For according to this a property will be well posited, as, because the one who stated the property of the moist to be the body that is drawn into every shape assigned one property and not several, according to this the property of the moist will be well posited. Then, for refutation, if he has used the same thing of which he assigned the property, or some one of the things that belong to it. For the property will not be well posited; for a property is assigned for the sake of learning, but the same thing is equally unknown by the same thing, and that which is some one of the things that belong to it is posterior; therefore it is not more known, wherefore it does not come about that through this anyone learns anything more, as, because the one who stated the property of the animal to be substance of which man is a species has used some one of the things that belong to the animal, the property will not be well posited. But for construction, if he uses neither the same thing nor some one of the things that belong to it. For according to this the property will be well posited, as, because the one who posited the property of the animal to be composed of soul and body has used none of the things that belong to it; accordingly the property of the animal assigned according to this will certainly be well posited. But in the same way also in other cases one must consider which things do not make a thing more known or do make it more known. For refutation, if he has used something either opposite, or altogether simultaneous in nature, or something posterior.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:111 · narrative
Source · Latin

Non enim bene positum proprium, nam oppositumsimulnatura, quodjautemsimulnatura, et posterius, non efficit notius, ut quia qui dixit boni proprium quod malo maxime opponitur, opposito est usus boni, non erit profecto bene assignatum boni proprium. Construenti autem, si nullo usus est neque opposito, neque omnino simul natura, neque posteriore. Erit enim secundumhocbene assignatum proprium, ut quia qui posuit disciplinæ proprium,opinionem maxime facientemfidem, nullo usus est neque opposito, neque omnino simul natura, neque posteriore, erit secundum hoc bene positum disciplinæ proprium. Deinde destruenti quidem, si non quod semper sequitur proprium assignavit, sed id quod fit quandoque non proprium. Non enim erit bene pronuntiatum proprium, nam neque in quo deprehendimus inesse ipsum, de hoc et nomen ex necessitate verificatur, neque in quo deprehenditur non inesse, de hoc ex necessitate non dicetur nomen, quare non erit bene positum proprium. Amplius autem ad haec, neque quando quisquam assignaverit proprium, erit manifestum si inestsiquidemtale est, ut quod ipsum relinquere possit: non igitur eritclarum esse proprium, ut quia qui posuit animalis proprium moveri quandoque, vel stare tale, assignaverit proprium quod fitquandoque non proprium, nequaquam erit bene positum proprium. Astruenti vero, si quod ex necessitate semper est, proprium assignaverit.

English

For a property is not well posited; for what is opposite is simultaneous by nature, and what is simultaneous by nature is also posterior, and it does not make [the thing] more known—as, because the one who said the property of the good is that which is most opposed to evil used the opposite of the good, the property of the good will certainly not have been well assigned. But for one who is establishing [it], [it is well posited] if he has used neither the opposite, nor anything at all simultaneous by nature, nor anything posterior. For according to this a property will be well assigned, as, because the one who posited the property of discipline to be the opinion that most produces conviction used neither the opposite, nor anything at all simultaneous by nature, nor anything posterior, according to this the property of discipline will be well posited. Then, for one who is refuting, [it is well refuted] if he has not assigned the property that always follows, but that which happens at some time, not [being] a property. For the property will not have been well pronounced; for neither in the case in which we apprehend that it is present is the name verified of this by necessity, nor in the case in which it is apprehended not to be present will the name be said of this by necessity; wherefore the property will not have been well posited. Moreover, in addition to these things, neither when someone has assigned a property will it be manifest if it is present—for such a thing is [merely] such as to be able to leave it behind; therefore it will not be clear that it is a property—as, because the one who posited the property of an animal to be to move at some time, or to stand, [being] such, has assigned a property that happens at some time, not a property, the property will by no means have been well posited. But for one who is establishing [it], [it is well posited] if he has assigned a property that always is by necessity.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:112 · narrative
Source · Latin

Erit enim bene posilum secundum hoc proprium, ut quia qui posuit virtutis proprium quod habentem facit studiosum, quod semper sequitur, proprium assignavit; erit utique secundum hoc bene assignatum virtutis proprium. Deindedestrucnti quidem, si quod nunc proprium est assignans, non determinaverit quod non proprium assignat. Non enim eritbenepositum proprium,primumquidem quia quod præter consuetudinem fitomne, semper determinatione indiget, solent autem ut plurimum omnes, quod semper sequitur proprium assignare; secunda autem, quia immanifestum est quia non determinaverit, si quod nunc est proprium voluerit ponere. Non igitur danda est objurgationisoccasio,utquiaquiposuitalicujus hominis proprium sedere cum aliquo homme, quod nunc proprium est posuit, non bene proprium assignabit, si non determinans dixerit quod nunc. Construenti autem, si nunc proprium assignans determinando posuit, quod nunc proprium posuerit. Erit onim bene positum secundum hoc proprium, ut quia qui dixit cujusdam hominis proprium ambulare nunc alicubi, distinguensposuithoc, bene erit positumproprium.Deiade destruentiquidem, sitaleassignavit proprium, quod manifestum non est aliter inesse quam sensu. Non enim erit bene positum proprium, nam omne sensibile extra sensum factum immanifestum est, latens enim est si adhuc inest. eo quod sensu solum cognoscitur.

English

For according to this it will be a property well posited, as, because the one who posited as a property of virtue that it makes the one having it studious, assigned as a property what always follows; according to this, then, the property of virtue will have been well assigned. Next, for one who is destroying [the thesis], if he who is now assigning a property has not determined that he is assigning what is not a property. For it will not be a property well posited, first indeed because everything that happens contrary to custom always needs determination, but all are accustomed for the most part to assign as a property what always follows; secondly, because it is unclear that he has not determined it, if he wished to posit what is now a property. Therefore occasion for reproach is not to be given, so that because he who posited as a property of this man to sit with some man posited what is now a property, he will not have assigned the property well, if without determining he said "what is now." But for one who is constructing [the thesis], if, assigning a property now, he posited it with determination, [he shows] that he has posited what is now a property. For according to this it will be a property well posited, as, because he who said that it is a property of some man to walk now somewhere, posited this with distinction, the property will have been well posited. Next, for one who is destroying [the thesis], let him have assigned a property such that it is not clear that it belongs otherwise than by sense. For it will not be a property well posited, for every sensible thing, once made outside sense, is unclear, for it is hidden whether it is still present, because it is known by sense alone.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:113 · narrative
Source · Latin

Erit autem verum hoc in iis quas non ex necessitate semper consequuntur, ut quia qui posuit solis proprium; astrum quod fertur super terram lucidissimum, tali usus est in proprio (super terram, inquam, ferri) quod sensu cognoscitur, non utique erit bene solis assignatum proprium; immanifestum enimerit cum occidetsol, si adhuc feratur super terram, eo quod nos tunc deseruimussensum. Gonstruentivero, sitaleassignavit proprium, quod non sensu est manifestum, aut cum sit sensibile, ex necessitate inesse manifestum est. Eritenimsecundumhocbenepositum proprium ut quia qui posuit superficiei proprium,quod primum coloratum est, sensibili quidem aliquo ususest(coloratumesse,inquam),taliquidemquodmanifestum est inesse semper: erit secundum hoc bene assignatum superficiei proprium.Deindedestruentiquidem, si terminumut proprium assignavit. Non enim erit benepositum proprium, nam non oportet indicare quod quid estesseproprium,utquia qui dixithominis proprium animal gressibile bipes, quod quid est esse significans assignavit hominis proprium, non utique erit bominis proprium bene assignatum. Construenti autem, si quod conversim quidem praedicatur assignavit proprium, non autem quod quid est esse indicans.

English

But this will be true in those cases which do not always follow of necessity, as, because the one who posited as a property of the sun "the brightest star that is carried over the earth," used in the property something (that it is carried over the earth, I say) which is known by sense, it will certainly not be a property well assigned to the sun; for it would be unclear when the sun sets whether it is still carried over the earth, because we then lack the sense. But for one constructing [an argument], it will be [valid] if he assigned a property that is not manifest to sense, or, when it is sensible, that it is manifestly present of necessity. For according to this a property will be well posited, as, because the one who posited as a property of surface "that which is first colored," used something sensible indeed (that it is colored, I say), but something that is manifestly always present; according to this it will be a property well assigned to surface. Next, for one destroying [an argument], [it will be valid] if he assigned the term as a property. For it will not be a property well posited; for it is not proper to indicate what it is to be, as, because the one who said that the property of man is "animal, footed, two-footed," signifying what it is to be, assigned it as a property of man, it will certainly not be a property well assigned to man. But for one constructing [an argument], [it will be valid] if he assigned as a property what is predicated convertibly indeed, but does not indicate what it is to be.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:114 · narrative
Source · Latin

Erit enim secundum hoc bene assignatum proprium, ut quia qui posuit hominis proprium animal mansuetum natura, quod conversim quidem prædicatur, assignavit proprium, non quod quid est quidem indicans; erit secundum hoc bene assignatum proprium hominis. Deinde destruentiquidem,si non quidpiam in quid est ponens, assignavit proprium.Oportetenim in propriis,q uem. admodum in terminis, primum assignari genus, deinde sic jam addere reliqua et separare. Quare quod non hoc modo positum est proprium, non erit bene assignatum, ut quia qui dixit animalis;;proprium animam habere,nonposuitquidquam in quo autin quid est animal.non eritbenepositum animalis proprium. Construenti vero,si quis quidpiam quod in quid est ponens ejus cujus proprium assignavit, reliqua adjungit. Erit enim secundum hoc bene assignatum proprium, ut quia qui posuit bominis proprium animal disciplinae susceptibile, quidpiam quod in quid est'ponens, assignavit proprium: erit secundum hoc bene positum proprium hominis. Utrum igitur bene an non bene assignetur proprium, per haec inspiciendum.

English

For according to this a property will be well assigned: for instance, because the one who posited as the property of man "a tame animal by nature" assigned a property that is indeed predicated convertibly, but not one that indicates what a thing is, according to this it will be a well-assigned property of man. Next, for refuting: if, without positing something in the category of what a thing is, he assigned a property. For in properties, just as in terms, one ought first to assign the genus, and then already add the rest and separate them. Wherefore a property that has not been posited in this way will not be well assigned, as, because the one who said that it is a property of an animal to have a soul did not posit anything in which or in the category of what a thing is for the animal, the property of the animal will not be well posited. But for establishing: if someone, positing something that is in the category of what a thing is of that whose property he assigned, adds the rest. For according to this a property will be well assigned, as, because the one who posited as the property of man "an animal capable of discipline," positing something that is in the category of what a thing is, assigned the property: according to this the property of man will be well posited. Whether, therefore, a property is assigned well or not well, is to be examined by these means.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:115 · narrative
Source · Latin

CAPUT III.

De proprio loci alii.

Utrum vero proprium est omnino quod dictum est, an non proprium, ex his considerandum. Nam simplicitercoustruentes proprium quod bene positum est, loci iidem erunt iis qui proprium omnino faciunt; in illis igitur dicentur. Primum ergo destrufmti quidem inspiciendumad unum quodque eorum cujus proprium assignavit. Ut si nulli inest, aut si non de hoc quidem verificatur, aut si non est proprium cujusque eorum secundumillud cujus propriumassignavit. Non enim erit proprium, quodpositum est esse proprium, ut quia de geometra non verificatur indeceptibilem esse ab oratione pam decipitur geometer cum pseudographiam facit), non erit hoc scientis proprium, non decipi ab oratione. Construenti autem si de omni verificatur, et qua de hoc verificatur. Erit enim proprium, quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia animal disciplinas susceptivum de omni homine verificatur, et qua homo, erit bominis proprium animal disciplinæ susceptij vum. Est autem locus hic destruenti quidem, si non de quo nomen et oratio verificatur, et si non de quo oratio et nomen verificatur. Construenti autem, si de quo nomen et oratio, etsi de quo oratio et nomen prædicatur. Deinde destruenti quidem, si non de quo oritio et nomen verificatur, et si non de quo nomenetoratioverificatur.

English

CHAPTER III.

On Other Topics of Property.

Whether, however, what has been stated is a property in every respect, or not a property, must be considered from the following. For those who simply establish a property that has been well posited will use the same topics as those who establish a property in every respect; they will therefore be discussed under those topics. First, then, for one who is refuting, one must examine each of the things of which he has assigned the property. For instance, if it belongs to none, or if it is not truly predicated of this thing, or if it is not the property of each of them according to that of which he assigned it as a property. For it will not be a property which has been posited as a property; for example, since "incapable of being deceived by argument" is not truly predicated of the geometer (for the geometer is deceived when he draws a false diagram), this will not be a property of the knower, namely, not to be deceived by argument. For one who is establishing, however, if it is predicated of every instance, and in respect of that of which it is predicated. For it will be a property which has been posited as a property; for example, since "receptive of disciplines" is predicated of every man, and in respect of man, "receptive of discipline" will be a property of man. This topic is for one who is refuting, if it is not predicated of that of which the name and the definition are predicated, and if not of that of which the definition and the name are predicated. For one who is establishing, however, if it is predicated of that of which the name and the definition are, and if it is predicated of that of which the definition and the name are. Then, for one who is refuting, if it is not predicated of that of which the definition and the name are predicated, and if not of that of which the name and the definition are predicated.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:116 · narrative
Source · Latin

Non enimeritproprium, quod positum est esse proprium,utquia animal quidem disciplinæ susceptivum verificalur de Deo; homo autem non praedicatur, non erit bominis proprium, animal disciplinas susceptivum. Construenti autem, si de quo oratio et nomen prædicatur, et si de quo nomen et oratio praedicatur. Erit enim proprium quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia de quo animam habere verificatur animal, et de quo animal animam habere, erit animam habere animalis proprium. Deinde destruendi quidem, si subjectum proprium assignavit ejus quod in subjecto esse dicitur. Non enim erit proprium quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia qui posuit proprium subtilissimi corporis, ignem,subjectum assignavit prædicati proprium, non erit ignis corporis subtillissimiproprium. Propter hoc autem non erit subjectum, ejus quod in subjecto esse dicitur proprium, eo quod idem esset plurium et differentium specie proprium, nam eidem plura quaedam discrepantia specie insunt, de solo dicta, quorum erit omnium proprium quod subjectum est, si quis hunc in modum ponat proprium. Construenti vero, si quod in subjecto,est, assignavit proprium subjecti.

English

For it will not be a property, which was posited to be a property, as because "animal" is truly predicated of God as capable of discipline, but "man" is not predicated, "animal capable of disciplines" will not be a property of man. For one who constructs [the argument], if both the definition and the name are predicated of that of which [the other is predicated], and if both the name and the definition are predicated of that of which [the other is predicated]. For that will be a property which was posited to be a property, as because "animal" is truly predicated of that of which "to have a soul" is [predicated], and "to have a soul" of that of which "animal" is [predicated], "to have a soul" will be a property of animal. Then for one who destroys [the argument], if he assigned the subject as a property of that which is said to be in the subject. For it will not be a property which was posited to be a property, as because he who posited "of the subtlest body" as a property assigned fire as the subject of the property of the predicate, fire will not be a property of the subtlest body. But for this reason the subject will not be a property of that which is said to be in the subject, because the same thing would be a property of several things differing in species; for several things differing in species are present in the same thing, said of it alone, of all of which that which is the subject will be a property, if one posits a property in this way. For one who constructs [the argument], however, if he assigned as a property of the subject that which is in the subject.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:117 · narrative
Source · Latin

Erit enim proprium quod positum est non esse proprium, siquidem de solo prædicatur (ut dictum est) proprium, ut quia qui dixit terras proprium corpus gravissimum specie, subjecti assignavit proprium, quod de sola dicitur re, et ut proprium praedicatur, erit terrie propriumrectepositum. Deinde destruenti uidem,si secundu partici pationem assignavi proprium Non enim erit proprium, quod positum est esseproprium,namquodsecundumparticipationem inest,ad quod quid est esse conducit; erit autem hujusmodidifferentiaquaedam de aliqua specie dicta, ut quia qui dixit hominis proprium gressibile bipes, secundum participationem assignavit propriurn, non erit utique proprium hominis gressibile bipes. Construenti autem, si non secundum participationem assignavit proprium, nec quod qui est esse indicans, conversim praedicata re. Erit enim proprium quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia qui posuit animalis proprium quod natum est sentire, neque secundum participationem assignavit proprium, neque quod quid esse indicans, conversim repraedicata, erit utique quod sentire natum est, animalis proprium. Deinde destruenti quidem, si non contingit simul inesse proprium, sed vel posterius, vel priusquamidipsum nomen.

English

For it will be a property, which was posited not to be a property, if indeed it is predicated of it alone (as has been said) as a property; for example, because the one who said that earth is the property of the heaviest body in kind assigned as the property of the subject that which is said of that thing alone, and as it is predicated as a property, it will be correctly posited as the property of earth. Next, for one who is refuting, we must see whether he assigned the property according to participation. For it will not be a property, which was posited to be a property; for what is present according to participation contributes to what it is to be; but there will be a certain difference of this kind said of some species, as because the one who said that biped capable of walking is a property of man assigned the property according to participation, biped capable of walking will certainly not be a property of man. But for one who is establishing, if he did not assign the property according to participation, nor that which indicates what it is to be, with the predicate converted, it will be a property, which was posited to be a property; for example, because the one who posited that what is naturally capable of perceiving is a property of animal neither assigned the property according to participation nor that which indicates what it is to be, with the predicates converted, what is naturally capable of perceiving will certainly be a property of animal. Next, for one who is refuting, if it is not possible for the property to be present at the same time, but either later or earlier than that very name.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:118 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nonenimerit proprium quod positum est esse proprium aut nunquam, aut non semper,ut quoniam contingit alicui prius fore, et posterius ambulare per forum quam quod homo, non erit ambulare per forum hominis proprium,aut nunquam aut non semper. Construenti autem, sisimul ex necessitatesemperinest, cum neque terminus, neque differentia sit. Erit enim proprium, quod positum estforsitan nonesse proprium,ut quia animal disciplinæ susceptivum, simul ex necessitate semperest,et id quod est homo, cum neque differentia sit nee terminus erit animal disciplinas susceptivun hominis proprium. Deinde destruenti quidem,si eorumdem qua eadem sunt, nonest idem proprium. Non enim erit proprium, quod positum est esse proprium,ut quia non est proprium prosequendi, apparere quibusdam bonum,neque eligendi fuerit utique proprium apparere quibusdam bonum; idem enim est prosequendum et eligendum.Construenti,si ejusdem quatenus idem proprium. Erit enim proprium quod positum est non esse proprium, ut quoniam homiois,qua homo dicitur proprium tripartitam animam habere, et terrigenae quatenus terrigena est, erit proprium tripartitam animam habere. Utilis autem locus hic et in accidente, nam iisdem in eo quod eadem sunt eadem oportet inesse vel non inesse.Deinde destruenti quidem,si eorum quae sunt eadem specie,non idemsemperspecie proprium est.

English

For it will not be a property which was posited to be a property, either never or not always; for example, since it happens that someone first and later walks through the marketplace rather than that he is a man, walking through the marketplace will not be a property of man, either never or not always. For one who is constructing [an argument], if it belongs simultaneously and from necessity and always, when it is neither a definition nor a differentia. For it will be a property, which was perhaps posited not to be a property; for example, because "animal capable of discipline" is simultaneously and from necessity and always, and that which is a man, since it is neither a differentia nor a definition, "animal capable of discipline" will be a property of man. Then, for one who is destroying [an argument], if the property of the same things insofar as they are the same is not the same. For it will not be a property which was posited to be a property; for example, because "to appear good to certain people" is not a property of pursuing, neither will "to appear good to certain people" be a property of choosing; for pursuing and choosing are the same. For one who is constructing [an argument], if [it is] a property of the same thing insofar as it is the same. For it will be a property which was posited not to be a property; for example, since "to have a three-part soul" is a property of man insofar as he is called man, and of the earth-born insofar as he is earth-born, "to have a three-part soul" will be a property. But this topic is useful also in accident; for the same things must inhere or not inhere in the same things insofar as they are the same. Then, for one who is destroying [an argument], if the property of things that are the same in species is not always the same in species.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:119 · narrative
Source · Latin

Neque enim ejus quod dictum erit proprium,quod positum est esse proprium,ut quia idem est specie homo et equus,non semperautemequi est proprium stere a se, nec hominis erit proprium moveri a se. Idem enim est specie moveri, et stare a se, quatenus utrique eorum ut animal est, accidit. Construenti vero,si eorum quae eunt eadem specie,idem semper specie sit proprium. Erit enim proprium quod positum est non esse proprium,ut quia hominis est proprium esse gressibile bipes, et avis erit proprium esse volatile bipes,utrumqueenim horum est idem quatenus illa quidem sub eodem sunt genere species, cum sint sub animali, haec autem ut generis differentiae animalis.Нic autem locus falsus est5quandoalterumquidemeorumquse dicuntur uni alicui soli inest speciei,alterum vero inest pluribus, quemadmodum gressibile quadrupes.

English

For neither will it be a property of that which was said to be a property, which was posited to be a property; for example, since man and horse are the same in species, but it is not always a property of the horse to stand by itself, neither will it be a property of man to move by itself. For to move and to stand by itself are the same in species, insofar as they befall each of them as an animal. But for one constructing [an argument], [it holds] if of things which are the same in species, the same thing is always a property in species. For it will be a property which was posited not to be a property; for example, since it is a property of man to be a two-footed walking creature, it will also be a property of a bird to be a two-footed flying creature. For each of these is the same insofar as the former are species under the same genus, since they are under animal, while the latter are as differences of the genus animal. But this topic is false when one of the things said belongs to one single species, but the other belongs to several, as two-footed walking.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:120 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quoniam autem idem et diversum multipliciter dicitur, labor est sophistice assumenti unius assignare,et solius alicujus proprium, nam quod inest alicui cui accidit aliquid,et accidenti inerit sum pia cum eo cui accidit, ut quod inest homini, et albo homini inerit, si fuerit albus homo, et quod albo homini inest,inerit et homini.Calummniabitur autem aliquis multa propriorum quod subjectum id aliud est quod secundum se facit,aliudautem cum accidente, ut aliud quidem hominem esse dicet,aliud vero album hominem,Amplius autem diversum facienshabitum et quod secundum habitum dicitur,namquod habitui inest,et ei quod seeundum habitum dicitnr inerit,et quod ei quod secundum habitum dicitur inest,et habituiinerit,utquoniam sciens secundum scientiam dicitur affici,non erit scientiae proprium, indissuasibile a ratione, nam et sciens indissuasibilis erit a ratione.

English

But since "same" and "different" are said in many ways, it is a labor for one who assumes sophistically to assign the property of one thing and of something alone; for what is present in something to which something has happened will also be present in the thing that has happened together with that to which it has happened—for example, what is present in man will also be present in white man, if there is a white man, and what is present in white man will also be present in man. But someone will be slandered in many properties because the subject is one thing that makes [the predication] in itself, and another with an accident—for example, he will say that being a man is one thing, and being a white man another. Further, making different the habit and what is said according to the habit: for what is present in the habit will also be present in what is said according to the habit, and what is present in what is said according to the habit will also be present in the habit—for example, since the knower is said to be affected according to knowledge, it will not be a property of knowledge to be unpersuadable by reason; for the knower too will be unpersuadable by reason.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:121 · narrative
Source · Latin

Construenti autem dicendum quoniam non est diversum simpliciter id cui accidit, et accidens cum eo cui accidit sumptum, sed aliud dicitur,eo quod diversum sit ipsis, esse; non enim idem est homini esse,quod sit homo,et albo homini esse,quod sit albus homo.Prasterea autem considerandum est ad casus dicenti,quod neque sciens est ind issuasibilearatione,sed indissuasibilis aratione, nequescientia indissuasibile, sed indissuasibilis a ratione,nam ei qui omnino instat,omninoestadversandum.Deinde destruenti quidem, si quod natura inest volens assignare, hoc modo ponit secundum locutionem,ut quod semper inest significet. Videbitur enim moveri posse quod positum est proprium esse,ut quia qui dtxithominis proprium bipes,vult quidem quod natura inest assignare: significat autem locutione, quod semper inest, non erit hominis proprium bipes, non enim omnis homo est duos pedes habens.Construenti,autem si vult quod natura inest proprium assignare, et locutione hoc modo significat:non enim movebitursecundum hoc proprium,ut quia qui hominis proprium assignavit, animal disciplinae susceptivum, et vult,et dictione significat quod natura inest proprium,non movebitur,secundum hoc quod non sit proprium hominis, animaldiscipiinaesusceptivum.Ampiiusquaecunque dicuntur ut secundum aliud aliquod primum,aut ut primum ipsum,laborestassignaretalium proprium.

English

But for one who is constructing an argument, it must be said that the thing to which the accident belongs, taken together with the accident, is not simply different, but is said to be something else in that it is different from them; for it is not the same for a man to be, and for him to be a man, nor for a white man to be, and for him to be a white man. Furthermore, one must consider, in reply to the one who speaks with reference to cases, that he is not "knowing in an indisputable account," but "indisputable in an account," nor is knowledge "indisputable," but "indisputable from an account"; for one who presses the point altogether must be opposed altogether. Then, for one who is destroying, if he wishes to assign what is present by nature, he posits it in this way according to the mode of expression, so that it signifies what is always present. For what has been posited as a property will seem able to be moved; for example, since the one who said that "two-footed" is the property of man wishes indeed to assign what is present by nature, but by his mode of expression signifies what is always present, "two-footed" will not be the property of man; for not every man is one having two feet. But for one who is constructing, if he wishes to assign as a property what is present by nature, he also signifies it in this way by his mode of expression; for according to this the property will not be moved; for example, since the one who assigned "receptive of discipline" as the property of man both wishes it and by his expression signifies the property that is present by nature, it will not be moved on the ground that "receptive of discipline" is not the property of man. Furthermore, whatever things are said as in relation to some other first thing, or as the first thing itself, it is a labor to assign the property of such things.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:122 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam si ejusquod est secundum aliud aliquid propriumassignavit,et deprimo verificabitur, si autem primi posuerit, et de eo quod est secundum aliud praedicabitur,utsiquisassignetsuperficiei proprium coloratum esse, et de corpore verificatur coloratum esse,si autem corporis,et de superficie, praedicabitur, quare non de quo oratio et nomen verificahitur.Acciditautem in quibusdam propriis plerumque fieri aliquod peccalum,propter hoc quod non determinetur quomodo et quorum ponitquis proprium; omnes enim conantur assignare proprium,aut quod natura inest, ut hominis bipes,aut quod nunc inest, ut hominis alicujus qualuor digitos habere,autspecie, ut ignis subtilissim um,aut:sim pliciter,ut animalis vivere, aut secundum aliud,ut animae prudens, aut ut primum,quemadmodum rationalis prudens, aut in eo quod habet, ut scientis indissuasibile a ratione (nihil enim aliud quam habendo aliquid erit indissuasibile a ratione), aut in eo quod habeatur, ut scientias indissuasibile a ratione, aut in eo quod participalur,ut animalis sentire(sentit enim etaliud quid ut homo, sed participans jam hoc,sentit), aut in eo quod participat, ut alicujus animalis vivere.

English

For if he has assigned as a property something that belongs to the thing in virtue of something else, it will also be verified of the primary thing; but if he has posited it of the primary thing, it will also be predicated of that which is in virtue of something else—as if someone assigns "being colored" as the property of a surface, "being colored" is also verified of a body; but if of a body, it will also be predicated of a surface. Hence it will not be verified of that of which the definition and the name are [verified]. It happens, moreover, in certain properties that some error generally occurs, because it is not determined in what way and of which things one posits the property. For all try to assign a property either as what is present by nature, as "two-footed" of man, or as what is present now, as "having four fingers" of some particular man, or as [present] to the species, as "most subtle" of fire, or simply, as "to live" of an animal, or according to something else, as "prudent" of the soul, or as [present] to the primary thing, as "rational prudent," or in respect of what it has, as "indissoluble by reason" of one who knows (for it will be indissoluble by reason in no other way than by having something), or in respect of what is had, as "indissoluble by reason" of knowledge, or in respect of what is participated, as "to perceive" of an animal (for it also perceives something else, as a man does, but as participating in this, it perceives), or in respect of what it participates, as "to live" of some animal.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:123 · narrative
Source · Latin

Qui non addit igitur,natura peccat,eo quod contingit quod naturae inest,non inesse illi cui nutura inest,ut homini duos pedes habere,qui vero non determinat,quoniam quod inestassignat quod non erit tale quale nunc inest id,ceu quatuor digitos babere hominem,nonindicans quoque quod ut primum,aut ut secundum aliud ponit,quod nondequo oratio et nomen verificabitur,ut coloratumessesive superficiei,sive corporis assignaverit proprium, non praedicens eLiam quod aut in eo juod est habere aut in eo quod haberi proprium assignavit. Ideo non erit proprium quod assignatum est, nam inerit(si in eo quod habetur assignavit proprium) etiam habenti, si autem habenti, et ei quod habetur, ut indissuasibile a ratione, scientiae vel scientis positum proprium,non praesignificansetiam in eoquod parti. cipat vel participatur,eo quod et in aliis quibusdam inerit proprium. Si enim in eo quidem quod participatur assignavit, participantibus inerit,si vero in eo quod participat,iis quae participantur,ut si alicujus animaiis posuerit vivere proprium, non dividens etiam specie quod uni soli inerit eorum quæ sub eo sunt,cujus proprium ponit,nam'quod est secundum superabundantiam, uni soli inest, ut ignis levissimum. Aliquoties autem et specie addens peccat.

English

Therefore, whoever does not add this, errs by nature, in that it happens that what is inherent in a nature is not present in that to which the nature belongs—as for a human to have two feet. But whoever does not determine this, since he assigns what is present as though it will not be such as it now is—for example, that a human has four fingers—also fails to indicate whether he posits it as a primary thing or as something else secondary, which will not be verified of the thing of which the account and the name are predicated; as if he has assigned "colored" as a property either of a surface or of a body, not also stating whether he assigned the property in respect of having or in respect of being had. Therefore what has been assigned will not be a property; for it will also be present (if he assigned the property in respect of being had) in the thing that has it, and if in the thing that has it, also in the thing that is had—as "indissoluble by reason" posited as a property of knowledge or of the knower, not also signifying beforehand whether it is in respect of participating or of being participated, since the property will also be present in certain other things. For if he assigned it in respect of being participated, it will be present in the things that participate; but if in respect of participating, in the things that are participated—as if someone has posited "to live" as a property of some animal, not also dividing by species what will be present in one alone of those things that fall under it, of which he posits the property; for what is by way of excess is present in one alone, as "lightest" in fire. But sometimes he also errs by adding the species.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:124 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam oportebit unam speciem esse eorum quæ dicuntur, quando specie addiderit:hoc autem in quibusdam non accidit, ut nec in igne, non enim est una species ignis, nam diversum est carbo et flamma, et lux specie, cum unumquodque horum sit ignis;propter hoc autem non oportet,quando specie additur, diversam esse speciem ejus quod dicitur, quoniam his quidem magis,illis autem minus inerit quod dictum est proprium,ut in igne subtilissimum, subtilior enim est lux carbone et flamma. Hoc autem non oportet fieri quando non, et nomen magis prasdicatur de quo oratio magis verificatur.Si autem non,non eril de quo oratio magls,et nomen magis. Amplius autem ad haec idem esse accidit proprium ejus quod simpliciter,etejusquod maxime in simpliciter tali, ut in igne se habet subtilissimum, nam et simpliciter et ignis et lucis erit hoc ipsum propriurn,subtilissimaenim estlux;cum igituralius sic assignatproprium,argumentandum,sibiaulem non danda hæc instantia,sed statim cum ponit proprium determinandum est quomodo ponit proprium.

English

For it will be necessary that there be one species of the things that are spoken of, when he has added the species; but this does not happen in certain cases, as not in fire, for there is not one species of fire, for charcoal and flame and light are different in species, although each of these is fire. On account of this, however, it must not be that, when the species is added, the species of that which is spoken of is different, since what has been stated as proper will be present in some things more and in others less, as in fire the most subtle, for light is more subtle than charcoal and flame. But this must not happen when it is not so, and the name is predicated more of that of which the account is more truly verified. If, however, it is not so, there will not be that of which the account is more and the name more. Furthermore, in addition to these, it happens that the same thing is proper to that which is simply and to that which is most in what is simply such, as in fire the most subtle is related; for both simply and of fire and of light this very thing will be proper, for light is most subtle. When, therefore, someone assigns a proper in this way, one must argue, if he does not grant these instances, but immediately when he posits a proper, one must determine how he posits the proper.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:125 · narrative
Source · Latin

CAPUT IV.

De proprio loci alii.

Deinde destruenti quidem,si idem ejusdem proprium posuit.Non enim erit proprium, quod positum est esse proprium,nam idem eidem omne,quid est csse indicat; quod autem esse indicat,non proprium, sed terminus est, ut quia qui dixit honesti proprium decens esse.idem ejusdem proprium assignavit(idem enim est honestumet decens),non utique erit decens honesti proprium.Construenti autem,si non ejusdem proprium assignavit,cam convel'sim prædicatum posuit.Nam erit proprium quod positum est non esse proprium,ut quia qui posuit animalispropriumid quod substantia animata,non idem quidem ejusdem proprium posuit,et conversim praedicatum assignavit,erit animalis proprium subatantiaanimata.DeindeetiaminhisqusesimiMum partium suntconsiderandum est,destruentiquidem, si quod totius est proprium,non verificatur de parte, aut quod partis, non dicitur de toto. Non enim erit proprium,quod positum est esse proprium, accidit autem in aliquibus hoc fieri.

English

CHAPTER IV.

On other topics of property.

Next, for one who is refuting: if he has posited the same thing as the property of the same thing. For what has been posited to be a property will not be a property; for the same thing indicates the whole of what it is to be for the same thing; but what indicates what it is to be is not a property but a definition, as when one who said that the property of the honorable is to be seemly assigned the same thing as the property of the same thing (for the honorable and the seemly are the same), it will certainly not be a property of the honorable to be seemly. But for one who is constructing: if he has not assigned the property of the same thing, and has posited the predicate convertibly. For what has been posited not to be a property will be a property, as when one who posited as the property of an animal that which is animate substance has not indeed posited the same thing as the property of the same thing, and has assigned the predicate convertibly, it will be a property of an animal to be animate substance. Next, also in these matters which are of the nature of parts, one must consider, for one who is refuting: if what is the property of the whole is not verified of the part, or what is of the part is not said of the whole. For what has been posited to be a property will not be a property; but it happens in certain cases that this occurs.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:126 · narrative
Source · Latin

Assignabit enim aliquis in iis quæsirnilillm partium sunt proprium,aliquoties quidem in toto respiciens,aliquoties autem in eo quod secundum partem dicitur ipse seipsum intelligens,at erit neutrum recte assignatum, ut in toto quidem,quia qui dixit marisproprium,plurima aqua salsa, alicujus similium partium posuit proprium,ettaleassignavit quodnonverificaturdeparte (non enim erit quiddam maris plurima atqua salsa), non utique erit maris proprium,plurima aqua salsa. In parte autem,ut quia qui posuerit aeris proprium, respirabile,similium quidem partium alicujus dixit proprium,tale autem assignavit quod de quo aere verum est,de toto autem non dicitur(non enim erit universus aer respirabilis), non erit utique aeris pro. prium respirabile. Astruenti autem, si verificatur de unaquaque similium partim quod est proprium earum secundum totum.Erit enim proprium, quod positum est non esse proprium, ut quia verificatur deomni terra deorsum ferri secundum naturam;est autem et hoc proprium alicujus terrae secundum totumjnam secundum terram, et id quod est terram esse,erit terrae proprium deorsum ferri secundum naturam.

English

For someone will assign as a property, among things that are parts, something that is not a property of the parts, sometimes looking to the whole, sometimes to what is said according to a part, understanding himself; and neither will have been assigned correctly. For in the case of the whole, because one who said that it is a property of the sea to be most water salty, posited a property of some one of the similar parts, and assigned such a thing as is not verified of the part (for there will not be some particular thing of the sea, most water salty), it will certainly not be a property of the sea to be most water salty. In the case of the part, however, as because one who posited that it is a property of the air to be breathable, said a property of some one of the similar parts, but assigned such a thing as is true of the air in question, yet is not said of the whole (for the whole air will not be breathable), it will certainly not be a property of the air to be breathable. For one who is affirming, however, if it is verified of each of the similar parts that it is their property according to the whole. For that will be a property which has been posited not to be a property, as because it is verified of all earth to be borne downward by nature; but this is also a property of some earth according to the whole; for according to earth, even that which is to be earth, it will be a property of earth to be borne downward by nature.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:127 · narrative
Source · Latin

Deinde ex oppositis considerandum est, primum quidem ex contrariis, destruenti quidem, si contrarii non est contrarium.Neque enim contrarii eritcontrariumproprium,ut quia contrarium est justitiae quidem inju3titia,optimo autem pessimum, non est autem justitiae proprium optimum,non erit injustitiae proprium pessimum. Construenti autem si contrarii contrarium proprium est, et contrarii contrarium proprium erit. Ut quia contrarium est bono quidem malum,eligendo autem fugiendum,est aulem boni propriumeligendumjeritmali proprium fugiendum.Secundum autem, ex iis quae ad aliquid sunt,destruenti quidem,si hoc quod ad aliquid est ejus quod est ad aliquid non est proprium.

English

Next, one must examine properties from opposites, first indeed from contraries: for the one who is refuting, if the contrary of a contrary is not a property. For neither will the contrary of a contrary be a property, as because the contrary of justice is injustice, and the contrary of the best is the worst, but the best is not a property of justice, the worst will not be a property of injustice. For the one who is establishing, however, if the contrary of a contrary is a property, then the contrary will also be a property of the contrary. As because the contrary of good is evil, and the contrary of choosing is avoiding, and choosing is a property of good, avoiding will be a property of evil. Second, from things that are relative: for the one who is refuting, if that which is relative is not a property of that which is relative.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:128 · narrative
Source · Latin

Neque enlm hoc quod ad aliquid est,ejus quod ad aliquid est erit proprium, ut quia dicitur duplum quidem ad dimidium,superans autem ad superatum, non est autem dupli proprium superans, non erit dimidii proprium superatum.Construentiautem siejus quod est ad aliquid,hoc quod ad aliquid est proprium,et ejusquod est aliquid,id quod est adaliquid erit proprium.Ut quiadiciturduplum quirIem ad dimidiurrid esse quod duo ad unum,estautem dupli proprium ut duo ad unum, erit dimidii proprium, ut unum ad duo.Tertium autem destruenti quidem,si habitus,id quod secundum habitum dicitur non est proprium, neque profecto privationis id quod secundum privationem dicitur, erit proprium, et si privationis, id quod cundum privationem diciturnon est proprium, neque habitus, id quod secundum habitum dicitur erit proprium. Ut quia non dicitur surditatis proprium insensibilitatem esse, neque auditus erit proprium sensum esse.Construenti vero,si quod secundum haLitum dicitur,esthabitus proprium,etprivationis, id quod secundum privationem dicitur erit proprium,et si privationis,id quod secundum privationem dicitur,est proprium,et habitus, quod secundum habitum diciturerit proprium.

English

For neither will that which is relative to something be a property of that which is relative to something, as, since the double is said in relation to the half, and the exceeding in relation to the exceeded, the exceeding is not a property of the double, nor will the exceeded be a property of the half. But for establishing, if that which is relative to something is a property of that which is relative to something, and that which is relative to something is a property of something, then that which is relative to something will be a property of it. For example, if it is said that the double is that which is in relation to the half as two to one, and it is a property of the double to be as two to one, then it will be a property of the half to be as one to two. Third, for refuting: if that which is said according to a state is not a property of the state, neither indeed will that which is said according to a privation be a property of the privation; and if that which is said according to a privation is not a property of the privation, neither will that which is said according to a state be a property of the state. For example, since insensibility is not said to be a property of deafness, neither will the sense be a property of hearing. But for establishing: if that which is said according to a state is a property of the state, then that which is said according to a privation will be a property of the privation; and if that which is said according to a privation is a property of the privation, then that which is said according to a state will be a property of the state.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:129 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ut quia visus est proprium videre secundum quod habemus visum, erit caecitatis proprium non videre,secundum quod non habemus visum,nati habere.Deinde ex affirmationibus et negationibus, primum quidem ex ipsis quae praedicantur. Est autem locus hic utilis destruenti tantum,ut si affirmatio,vel quod secundum aftirmationem dicitur, ejus est proprium, non erit profecto ejus negatio,neque quodsecundum negationem dicitur, proprium, si autem si negatio, aut quod secundumnegationem dicitur proprium,ejusdem non erit affirmatio, neque quod secundum affirmationem dicitur proprium,utqui proprium animalis est animatum, non erit animalis proprium, non animatum. Secundum autem ex praedicatis,vel etiam non prædicatis, et de quibus praedicatur vel non prædicatur,destruenti quidem,si affirmationis affirmatio non est proprium.Neque enim negatio negationis erit proprium,et si negatio negationis non est proprium,neque affirmationis affirmatio erit proprium,ut quianon est proprium hominisanimal,nequa non hominis non animal;si autem non hominis non videtur proprium non animal, neque hominis erit proprium animal.Construenti autem,si affirmationis affirmatioest proprium.

English

For example, since seeing, insofar as we have sight, is a property of sight, it will be a property of blindness not to see, insofar as we do not have sight, [though we are] born to have it. Next, [the topic is drawn] from affirmations and negations, first indeed from the things themselves that are predicated. This topic is useful only for one who is destroying [a claim], as: if the affirmation, or that which is said in accordance with the affirmation, is a property of something, then certainly its negation will not be [a property] of it, nor will that which is said in accordance with the negation be a property; but if the negation, or that which is said in accordance with the negation, is a property, then the affirmation of the same thing will not be [a property], nor will that which is said in accordance with the affirmation be a property; for example, that which is a property of animal, namely being animate, will not be a property of animal, namely not being animate. Secondly, [the topic is drawn] from things predicated, or even not predicated, and from the things of which they are predicated or not predicated, for one who is destroying [a claim]: if the affirmation of the affirmation is not a property. For neither will the negation of the negation be a property, and if the negation of the negation is not a property, neither will the affirmation of the affirmation be a property; for example, since being an animal is not a property of man, neither is not being an animal a property of not-man; but if not being an animal does not seem to be a property of not-man, neither will being an animal be a property of man. For one who is constructing [a claim], however, [it holds] if the affirmation of the affirmation is a property.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:130 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam et negatio negationis erit proprium,siautem negationis negatioest proprium,et affirmatio atfirmationis erit proprium, ut quia non animalis est proprium non vivere,erit animalis proprium vivere, et si animalis proprium videtur vivere, et non animalis proprium videbitur non vivere. Tertium autem ex ipsis subjectis, destruenti quidem,si quod assignatum est proprium, affirmationis est proprium. Non erit enim idem et negationis proprium; si autem negationis est proprium quod assignatum est, non erit affirmationis proprium,utquia animalispropriumest animatum, non animalis non erit proprium animatum. Construenti vero,si assignatum proprium non estaffirmationis proprium,erit negationis.At hic locus deficit, nam affirmatio negationis,et negatio affirmationis non est proprium,quandoqnidem affirmatio negationi omnino non inest, negatio autem affirmationi inest quidem, at non ut proprium inest. Deinde ex iis qua ex opposito dividuntur,destruenti quidem,si eorurn quæ exoppositodividuntur,nullum ullius reliquorum ex opposito divisorum est proprium. Neque enim quod positum est erit proprium ejus cujus positum est proprium.ut quia animal sensibile nulliusaliorummortalium animalium est proprium, non erit animal intelligibile Dei proprium. Construenti autem, si cæterorum quiB ex opposito dividuntur quodvis est proprium talium quorumcunque eorum quæ ex opposito dividuntur.

English

For the negation of a negation will be a property; if the negation of a negation is a property, then the affirmation of an affirmation will also be a property—for example, since not to live is a property of the non-animal, to live will be a property of the animal; and if to live seems to be a property of the animal, then not to live will seem to be a property of the non-animal. The third [topic is drawn] from the subjects themselves: for one who is refuting, [the argument is] if what has been assigned as a property is a property of the affirmation. For the same thing will not be a property of both the affirmation and the negation; but if what has been assigned is a property of the negation, it will not be a property of the affirmation—for example, since to be animate is a property of the animal, to be animate will not be a property of the non-animal. For one who is establishing, [the argument is] if the assigned property is not a property of the affirmation, it will be [a property] of the negation. But this topic is defective, for the affirmation is not a property of the negation, nor the negation of the affirmation, since the affirmation is altogether not present in the negation, while the negation is present in the affirmation, but is not present as a property. Next, [the topic is drawn] from those things that are divided by opposition: for one who is refuting, [the argument is] if none of the things divided by opposition is a property of any of the remaining things divided by opposition. For neither will what has been posited be a property of that of which it has been posited as a property—for example, since sensible animal is not a property of any of the other mortal animals, intelligible animal will not be a property of God. For one who is establishing, [the argument is] if any whatever of the other things divided by opposition is a property of any such things as are divided by opposition.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:131 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam reliquum erit ejus proprium cujus positum est non esse proprium, ut quia prudentiæ est proprium, per se natum esse rationalis virtutem esse, et aliarum virtutum sic uniuscujusque sumptae, erit temperantiae proprium per se natum esse concupiscibilis virtutem esse.Deinde ex casibus,destruenti quidem,si casus ' non est casus proprium.Neque enim casus erit proprius casus,ut quia non est ejusquod estjuste proprium id quod bene,neque justi proprium erit bonum. Construenti autem,si casus est proprium casus.Nam et casus erit casus proprium,ut quia hominis est proprium gressibile bipes, et homini erit proprium gressibiiebipedi dici.Nonsolumautem in eo quod dictum est secundum casusest considerandum,sed et in oppositis,quemadmodum etin prioribus locis dictumesl,destruenti quidem,si oppositi casus,non est proprium oppositi casus.Neque enim oppositi casus erit proprium oppositi casus,ut quia non est ejus quodestjuste proprium quod bene,neque injuste erit proprium quod male. Construenti vero,si oppositi casus est proprium oppositi casus. Nam et oppositi casus erit proprium oppositi casus, ut quia honesti est proprium optimum,et inhonesti erit proprium pessimum.Deindeexiisqusesimiliter se habent, destruenti quidem, si quod similiter se habet, ejus quod similiter se habet non est proprium.

English

For what remains will be a property of that of which it has been posited that it is not a property; for example, since it is a property of prudence to be by nature a virtue of the rational part, and so likewise of each of the other virtues taken one by one, it will be a property of temperance to be by nature a virtue of the concupiscible part. Next, from the cases: for the one who destroys, if the case of that which is not a case is not a property. For the case will not be a property of the case; for example, since what is well is not a property of what is just, neither will the good be a property of the just. For the one who constructs, however, if the case is a property of the case. For the case will also be a property of the case; for example, since it is a property of man to be a two-footed walking animal, it will also be a property of man to be said to be a two-footed walking animal. But one must consider this not only in what has been said according to the cases, but also in opposites, just as was said in the earlier topics: for the one who destroys, if the case of the opposite is not a property of the case of the opposite. For the case of the opposite will not be a property of the case of the opposite; for example, since what is well is not a property of what is just, neither will what is badly be a property of what is unjust. For the one who constructs, however, if the case of the opposite is a property of the case of the opposite. For the case of the opposite will also be a property of the case of the opposite; for example, since the best is a property of the honorable, the worst will also be a property of the dishonorable. Next, from things that are similarly related: for the one who destroys, if that which is similarly related is not a property of that which is similarly related.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:132 · narrative
Source · Latin

Neque enim quod similiter se habet, ejus quod similiter sehabeteritproprium,utquiasimiliter se habet ad exstruendum aedificiumaedificatorjet medicus ad efficiendum sanitatem, non est autem propriurn medicieWcere sanitatem,neque ædificatoris erit proprium exstruere ædificium. Construenti autem,si quod similiter se habeteritproprium ejus quod similitersehabet.Namet quodsimilitersehabet, ejus quod similiter se habet erit proprium,ut quoniam similiter se habet medicus ad id quod est esse effectivum sanitatis,et ludimagisteradidquod est esse effectivum bonas habitudinis,est autem proprium magistri ludi esse effectivum bonæ habitudinis,erit proprium et medici effectivum esse sanitatis. Deinde ex iis quae sic se habent,destruentiquidem, si quod sic se habet, ejus quod sic se habet non est proprium.

English

For neither is that which is similarly related a property of that which is similarly related—as, for example, since the builder is similarly related to building a house, and the physician to producing health; but it is not a property of the physician to produce health, nor will it be a property of the builder to build a house. But for one who constructs [the argument], if that which is similarly related is a property of that which is similarly related—for that which is similarly related will be a property of that which is similarly related—as, for example, since the physician is similarly related to being productive of health, and the schoolmaster to being productive of good habit, and it is a property of the schoolmaster to be productive of good habit, it will also be a property of the physician to be productive of health. Then, from things that are so related, they will refute—if that which is so related is not a property of that which is so related.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:133 · narrative
Source · Latin

Neque enim quod sic se habet, ejus quod sic se habet eritproprium.Si autem ejus quod sic sa habet,id quod sicsehabet est proprium, ejus non erit proprium cujus positum est esse proprium.Ut quia sic se habet prudentia ad honestum et turpe, eo quod disciplina utriusque eorum est, non est autem prudentiae proprium disciplinam esse honesti, non utique erit proprium prudenliae disciplinam esse turpis;si vero est proprium prudentiae disciplinam esse honesti,noneritpropriumejusdem disciplinam esse turpis,impossibile est enim ejusdem plura esse propria.Construenti vero nihil locus iste utilis, nam quod sic se habet, unum ad plura comparatur. Deinde destruenti quidem,si quodsecundum esse dicitur, non est ejus quod secundum esse dicitur proprium. Nam neque generari ejus quod est secundumcorrumpi,neque corrumpi ejus quod secundum generari dicitur, erit proprium. Ut quia est hominis proprium esseanimal,neque ejus quod est hominem generari,erit proprium generari animal,neque ejus quod est hominem corrumpi erit proprium corrumpi animal.Eodem autem modo accipiendum est et ex generari ad esse et corrumpi,et ex corrumpi ad esse et generari,quemadmodumdictum est nunc ex esse ad generari, et corrumpi. Construenti autem,si ejus quod est secundum esse ordinatum est.

English

For neither will that which is so related be a property of that which is so related. But if that which is so related is a property of that which is so related, it will not be a property of that of which it was posited to be a property. For example, since prudence is so related to what is honorable and what is base, in that it is the discipline of both of them, but it is not a property of prudence to be the discipline of what is honorable, then it will certainly not be a property of prudence to be the discipline of what is base. But if it is a property of prudence to be the discipline of what is honorable, it will not be a property of the same thing to be the discipline of what is base; for it is impossible for there to be several properties of the same thing. For one who is constructing an argument, however, this topic is of no use, for that which is so related is compared as one to many. Next, for one who is destroying an argument, [it is useful] if that which is said in respect of being is not a property of that which is said in respect of being. For neither will being generated be a property of that which is in respect of being corrupted, nor will being corrupted be a property of that which is said to be in respect of being generated. For example, since it is a property of man to be an animal, neither will being generated be a property of that which is for man to be generated, nor will being corrupted be a property of that which is for man to be corrupted. And in the same way it must be understood both from being generated to being and being corrupted, and from being corrupted to being and being generated, just as it has now been said from being to being generated and being corrupted. For one who is constructing an argument, however, [it is useful] if it has been ordered as a property of that which is in respect of being.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:134 · narrative
Source · Latin

Est autem per se, ordinatum proprium,narr: et ejus quod secundum generari dicitur, erit hoc quod secundum generari dicitur proprium, et ejus quod secundum corrumpi,hoc quod secundum corrumpi est assignatum,ut quia hominis est proprium esse mortalem, et ejus quod estgenerari hominem,erit proprium generari mortalem,et ejus quod est corrumpi hominem, corrumpi mortalem. Eodem autem modo accipiendum est ex generari et corrumpi,et ad esse et ad ipsa exipsis fieri,quemadmodum et in destruenti dictum est. Deinde inspiciendum ad idem suppositi, destruenti quidem, si ideae non inest, aut si non qua id dicitur, cujus est proprium assignatum.Nonenim erit propriumquod positum est esse proprium,ut quoniam ipsi homini non inest quiescere quahomo est,sed qua idea,non erit hominis proprium quiescere. Construenti autem,si ideae ineat,et secundum hocinestqua dicitur de illo ipso cujus positum est non esse proprium. Eritenim proprium quod positum est non inesse proprium,utquoniam inest ipsi animali ex animaet corpore compositum esse, et qua animal est ipsi inest id,erit proprium animalis ex corpore et unima compositum esse.

English

But "ordered" is a property in itself, as has been stated; and of that which is said to come to be, this will be the property of coming to be, and of that which is said to perish, that which is assigned as perishing—for example, since it is a property of man to be mortal, of coming to be a man the property will be to come to be mortal, and of perishing as a man, to perish as mortal. And in the same way one must understand it with respect to coming to be and perishing, both in relation to being and in relation to the very things that come about from them, just as was said in the case of the destructive argument. Next, one must look to the same subject: for the destructive argument, if it does not belong to the form, or if not insofar as that is said of which the property was assigned. For it will not be a property which was posited to be a property—for example, since resting does not belong to man himself insofar as he is a man, but insofar as he is a form, resting will not be a property of man. For the constructive argument, however, if it belongs to the form, and according to this belongs insofar as it is said of that very thing of which it was posited that it is not a property. For it will be a property which was posited not to be a property—for example, since being composed of soul and body belongs to the living being itself, and insofar as it is a living being this belongs to it, being composed of body and soul will be a property of the living being.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:135 · narrative
Source · Latin

CAPUT V.

De proprio loci alii.

Deinde ex magis et minus. Primum quidem destruenti,si quod magis est,ejusquod magis non est proprium. Neque enim quod minus est, ejus quod minus erit proprium,nequequod minimeejus quod minime,neque quod maxime ejus quod maxime,neque quod simpliciter ejus quod simpliciter,ut quia non est mag-is colorari magiscorporisproprium,neque minus colorari minus corporis proprium erit, neque colorari corporis omnino.Construenti autem, si quod magis est ejus quod magis est,est proprium. Nam quod minus est, ejus quod minus est erit proprium, et quod minime,ejus quod minirne,et quod maxime, ejus quod maxime, et quod simpliciter, ejus quod simpliciter,ut quiamagis viventis magis sentire est proprium, et minus viventis minus sentire erit proprium, et ejus quod maxime id quod maxime, et ejus quod minime id quod minime, et ejus quod simpliciter id quoque quod simpliciter.

English

CHAPTER V.

On the other topics of property.

Next, from "more" and "less." First, for one who is refuting: if what is more is not a property of what is more. For neither will what is less be a property of what is less, nor what is least of what is least, nor what is most of what is most, nor what is simply of what is simply—for example, because to be more colored is not a property of a more extensive body, neither will to be less colored be a property of a less extensive body, nor to be colored a property of a body at all. But for one who is establishing: if what is more is a property of what is more. For what is less will be a property of what is less, and what is least of what is least, and what is most of what is most, and what is simply of what is simply—for example, because to perceive more is a property of what lives more, to perceive less will also be a property of what lives less, and of what is most, that which is most, and of what is least, that which is least, and of what is simply, that too which is simply.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:136 · narrative
Source · Latin

Et ex eo autem quod simpliciter,adeadem considerandum,destruenti quidem,si quod simpliciter non est proprium.Neque enim quod magis est ejus quod magis, neque quod minus ejus quod minus, neque quod maxime ejus quod maxime,neque quod mini me ejus quod minime erit proprium, ut quia non est hominis propriumstudiosum,nequemagishominis, magis studiosum erit proprium.Construentiautem, si quod simpliciter est, ejus quod simpliciter est proprium.Nam et hoc quod magis ejus quod magis, et quod minus ejus quod minus, et quod minime ejus quod minime, et quod maxime ejus quod maxime erit proprium, ut quia est ignis proprium sursum ferri secundumnaturam,et magis igniserit magis proprium sursum ferri secundum naturam; eodem autem modo considerandum est et ex aliis hujusrnodi.Secundum autem,destruenti quidem,si quod magis est, non est ejus quod magis est proprium.Neque enim quodminusest ejus quod minus erit proprium,ut quoniam magis est proprium animalis sentire quam hominis scire; non est autem animalia proprium sentire,quare non erit hominis proprium scire. Construenti autem,si quod minus, ejus quod minus est proprium.Nam et quod magis ejus quod magis erit proprium, ut qua minus est proprium horninis lTIansuetum naturaquamanin:alis vivere,est autem hominis proprium mansuetum natura, eritproprium animalis vivere.

English

And from the fact that something is so simply, one must consider the same things. For one who is refuting: if what is simply is not a property. For neither will what is more be a property of what is more, nor what is less of what is less, nor what is most of what is most, nor what is least of what is least, as, since being studious is not a property of man, neither will being more studious be a property of what is more a man. For one who is establishing: if what is simply is a property of what is simply. For in this case also what is more will be a property of what is more, and what is less of what is less, and what is least of what is least, and what is most of what is most, as, since it is a property of fire to be borne upward by nature, and more fire will be more a property to be borne upward by nature; and in the same way one must consider also from other things of this kind. Secondly, for one who is refuting: if what is more is not a property of what is more. For neither will what is less be a property of what is less, as, since it is more a property of an animal to perceive than of a man to know; but it is not a property of animals to perceive, wherefore neither will it be a property of man to know. For one who is establishing: if what is less is a property of what is less. For what is more will also be a property of what is more, as, since it is less a property of man to be gentle by nature than of an animal to live, but it is a property of man to be gentle by nature, it will be a property of an animal to live.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:137 · narrative
Source · Latin

Tertium vero, destruenti quidem,si cujus magis est,proprju non est.Neque enim cujus est minus proprium,eritejus proprium,si autem illius est proprium,non erithujus proprium,ut quia colorari magis superficiei quam corporis est proprium, non est autem superficiei proprium, non erit corporis proprium, colorari, si vero est superficiei proprium,non erit corporis proprium. Construenti autem hic locus non est utilis, nam impossibile est idem plurium proprium esse.

Quartum, destruenti quidem, si quod magis est ejus proprium, non est proprium, neque profecto quod minus est ejus proprium, erit proprium. Ut quia magis est proprium animalis sensibile quam partibile,non estautem animalissensibileproprium, quare non erit animalis partibile proprium. Construenti autem,si quod minus est ejus proprium,est proprium. Nam et quod magis est ejus proprium, erit proprium,ut quoniam minus est proprium animalis sentire quam vivere,est autem animalis proprium sentire,erit animalisproprium vivere.Deinde ex his quae similiter insunt, primum quidem destruenti, si quod similiter est proprium, non est proprium ejus cujus similiter est proprium.Neque enim quod similiter est proprium, erit proprium ejus cujus similiter est proprium,ut quia similiter est propriumconcupiscibiiisconcupiscere,et rationatis ratiocinari,non est autem proprium eoncupiscibilis concupiscere, non erit rationalis proprium ratiocinari.

English

Third, for one who is refuting: if that of which something is more [a property] does not have it as a property. For neither will that of which it is less a property be a property of it; but if it is a property of the one, it will not be a property of the other. For example, since to be colored is more a property of surface than of body, and it is not a property of surface, then to be colored will not be a property of body; but if it is a property of surface, it will not be a property of body. For one who is establishing, however, this topic is not useful, for it is impossible for the same thing to be a property of several things.

Fourth, for one who is refuting: if that of which something is more a property does not have it as a property, then certainly that of which it is less a property will not have it as a property either. For example, since being perceptive is more a property of animal than being divisible into parts, and being perceptive is not a property of animal, therefore being divisible into parts will not be a property of animal. For one who is establishing, however: if that of which something is less a property has it as a property. For then that of which it is more a property will also have it as a property. For example, since perceiving is less a property of animal than living, and perceiving is a property of animal, then living will be a property of animal. Next, from things that belong in like manner: first, for one who is refuting: if something that is a property in like manner is not a property of that of which it is a property in like manner. For neither will that which is a property in like manner be a property of that of which it is a property in like manner. For example, since desiring is a property of the desiring [part] in like manner as reasoning is of the rational [part], and desiring is not a property of the desiring [part], then reasoning will not be a property of the rational [part].

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:138 · narrative
Source · Latin

Construenti vero, si quod similiter est pr')prium,ejus est proprium cujus est similiter proprium.Nam et quod similiter est proprium,eritejus proprium cujus similiterest proprium,ut quiasimiliter est rationalis proprium primum prudens, et concupiscibilis proprium primum temperans,est autem rationalis primum prudens:eritigitur concupiscibilis proprium primum temperans.

Secundum autem, destruenti quidem, si quod si. militerest proprium non est propriumejus.Namneque quod similiter est proprium,erit proprium ejus, ut quia similiter est proprium hominisvidere et audire, non est hominis proprium videre,non utique hominis proprium audire.Construenti vero,si quod similiter est ejus proprium, est proprium.

English

For one who is establishing: if something is a property in a similar way, it is a property of that of which it is a property in a similar way. For also that which is a property in a similar way will be a property of that of which it is a property in a similar way; for example, since being rational is in a similar way the primary property of the prudent person, and being capable of desire is the primary property of the temperate person, and being rational is the primary property of the prudent person, therefore being capable of desire will be the primary property of the temperate person.

Second, for one who is refuting: if something is a property in a similar way, it is not a property of it. For neither will that which is a property in a similar way be a property of it; for example, since seeing and hearing are in a similar way properties of a human being, seeing is not a property of a human being, so certainly hearing is not a property of a human being. But for one who is establishing: if something is in a similar way a property of it, it is a property.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:139 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam quod similiter est ejus proprium,proprium erit,ut quia similiter est proprium anima?, aliquid partium ejus primo esse concupiscibile, et rationale primo; est autem propriumanimae,quidpiampartiumpjus esse concupiscibile primo,erit utique proprium animas, quidpiam partiumejus esse rationale primo.Tertium vero destruenti quidem, si cujus similiter est propriumnon est proprium.Neque euim cujus similiter proprium,erit proprium,si autem illius est proprium, non erit alterius proprium, ut quia urere similiter est proprium flammae et carbonis, non est autem flammae proprium urere,non erit carbonis proprium urere, si autem est flammae proprium, non erit car-, bouis proprium urera.Construenti autem hie locus non est utilis,differt autem quod est ex similiter se habentibus,ab eo quod ex iis est quae similiter insunt,quoniam iiludquidem secundum proportionem sumitur non in eo quod inest aliquid comparatum, hoc autemex eo quodinest,alicui;comparatur.Deindedestruenti quidem,si potentia proprium assignans et non adensassignavit proprium potentia,cum non contingat ei potentia inesse cum ens non est.

English

For that which is similarly a property of it will be a property, as, since it is similarly a property of the soul that some one of its parts is primarily desirous and primarily rational; but it is a property of the soul that some one of its parts is primarily desirous; it will therefore be a property of the soul that some one of its parts is primarily rational. The third [topic] is for one who is destroying: if that of which something is similarly a property is not a property. For neither will it be a property of that of which it is similarly a property; but if it is a property of that, it will not be a property of the other, as, since burning is similarly a property of flame and of coal, but burning is not a property of flame, burning will not be a property of coal; but if it is a property of flame, it will not be a property of coal to burn. For one who is establishing, however, this topic is not useful. But that which is from things similarly disposed differs from that which is from things which are similarly present, because the former is taken according to proportion, not in respect of that in which something is present as compared, but the latter is compared from that which is present in something. Next, for one who is destroying: if, in assigning a property in potentiality and not in act, he has assigned a property in potentiality, when it does not happen to be present in it in potentiality when it is not.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:140 · narrative
Source · Latin

Non enim erit proprium quod positum est esse proprium, utjquia qui dixitaeris propriumrespirabile,potentia quidem assignavit proprium (nam tale proprium ut respirari possit,respirabile est),assignavit autem et ad non esse proprium, nam et cum non est animal quod spirare natum ex aere, contingit aerem esse, nun tamen cum non est anima),possibile est spirare, quare neque aeris erit proprium hujusmodi possibile respirari tunc, quia animal non erit quod tale est ut respirare possit,non erga erit aeris proprium respirabile.Construenti autern,si potentia assignans proprium,tam ad ens assignavit proprium quamadnon ens, cum contingat potentia non enti inesse. Erit enim proprium quod positum est non esse proprium, ut quia qui assignavit proprium,entis possibile pati, aut facere potentia assignans proprium,ae ens assignavit proprium (nam cum ensest,etpossibilepati quid,aut facere erit), quare proprium erit entis possibile pati quid, aut facere. Deinde destruenti quidem, si per superabundantiam posuit proprium.

English

For that which was posited as a property will not be a property, as when someone says that "respirable" is a property: in respect of potentiality he did assign a property (for such a property is "respirable," namely that it be possible to breathe), but he also assigned it in relation to non-being; for even when the animal that is naturally able to breathe from the air does not exist, it still happens that air exists—yet it is not possible to breathe when the soul does not exist. Wherefore neither will such a thing as "possible to breathe" be a property of air at that time, because the animal that is such as to be able to breathe will not exist; therefore "respirable" will not be a property of air. But for one who is constructing an argument: if, assigning a property in respect of potentiality, he assigned the property both in relation to being and in relation to non-being, since it happens that a potentiality belongs also to a non-being. For that which was posited as a property will not be a property, as when someone assigned as a property "possible to be affected" or "to act" of a being, assigning the property in respect of potentiality, he assigned the property also in relation to being (for when it is a being, it will also be possible to be affected in some respect or to act); wherefore it will be a property of a being to be possible to be affected in some respect or to act. Then, for one who is destroying the argument: if he posited the property by way of excess.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:141 · narrative
Source · Latin

Non erit enim proprium quod positum est esse proprium,accirlit enim sic assignantibus proprium,non de quo orationem et nomen verificari,nam corrupta re, nihil minus erit oratio, nam eorum quæ sunt, alicui maxime inest, ut si quis assignet ignis proprium,corpus Ievissimum,corruptio enim igne,erit aliquod corporum quod levissimum erit,quare non erit ignis proprium,corpus levissimum.Construenti autem, si non per superabundantiam posuit proprium.Erit enim secundum hoc bene positum proprium, ut quia qui posuit hominis proprium animal mansuetum natura, non superabundantia assignavit proprium, erit utique hoc bene positum proprium.

LIBER SEXTUS.

CAPUT PRIMUM.

De locis definitionis.

Ejus autem quod est circa terminos negotii, partes sunt quinque.Nam aut quod omnino non verum est dicere de quo nomen et orationem (oportetenim hominis definitionemde omnihomineverificari),aut quod cum sit genus non posuit in genere,vel non in accommodato genere posuit (oportet enim eum qui definit in genere ponentem differentias adjungere, nam maxime eorum quae sunt in definitione, genus videtur definili substantiarn significare),aut quod non propria est definitio (oportet enim definitionem propriam esse,quemadmodum prius dictum est),aut si omnia qua?

English

For what was posited as a property will not be a property; for this happens to those who assign a property in this way—that the definition and the name are not verified of that of which they speak. For when the thing has perished, the definition will nonetheless remain; for it belongs most of all to something among the things that exist, as if someone should assign as the property of fire "the lightest body." For with the destruction of fire, there will be some body that is the lightest; wherefore "the lightest body" will not be the property of fire. But for one who is constructing [an argument], [it fails] if he did not posit the property by way of excess. For according to this, the property will be well posited, as when one who posited as the property of man "a tame animal by nature" did not assign the property by way of excess; this property will certainly be well posited.

BOOK SIX

CHAPTER ONE

On the topics of definition.

Of the business concerned with terms, there are five parts. For either [the fault is] that it is not true at all to speak of that of which the name and the definition [are predicated] (for the definition of man ought to be verified of every man), or that, although it is a genus, he did not place it in the genus, or did not place it in the appropriate genus (for one who defines, in placing the genus, ought to add the differences; for the genus seems most of all, among the things that are in the definition, to signify the substance of the thing defined), or that the definition is not proper (for the definition ought to be proper, as was said before), or if all the [attributes] which

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:142 · narrative
Source · Latin

dicta sunt is qui fecit,non definivit, neque dixit quid est esse rei defillite,reliquum aulern praeter ea quae dicta sunt, si definivit quidem, at non bene definivit. Si igitur non verificatur de quo nomen et oratio,ex iis quae dicta sunt in accidente locis considerandum. Nam et illic utrum verum vel non verum,omnis consideratio fit;quando enim quod inest accidens disputamus,quod verum est dicimus, quando autem quod non inest,quod non verum. Sin vero non in accommodato genere posuit, aut si non propria est assignataoratio,ex iisqui suntad genus et proprium dictis locis, prospiciendum. Reliquum vero si non definivit,aut si non bene definivit, aliquo modo aggrediendum dicere.Primum igitur inveniendum si non bene definivit. Nam facilius est quodlibet fecisse, quam bene fecisse, manifestum igitur quoniam peccatum circa hoc plusculum, eo quod laboriosius. Quare argumentatio facilior quæ circa hoc quam quæ circa illud fit. Sunt autem ejus quod non est bene, partes duæ. Una quidem, obscura interpretatione uti. Oportet enim definientem (ut contingit) quam clarissima interpretatione uti, eo quod cognoscendi gratia assignatur definitio.Secunda autem si amplius dixit in definitione quam par sit,nam omne quod superadjectum est in definitione,superfluum est.

English

those things have been said, he who made it has not defined it, nor has he said what the being of the defined thing is; but the remaining point, beyond those things which have been said, is whether he defined indeed, but did not define well. If, therefore, the name and the account are not verified of that of which they are spoken, this must be considered from the topics that have been stated in the places concerning accident. For there too all consideration is made as to whether it is true or not true; for when we argue that an accident is present, we say what is true, but when that it is not present, what is not true. But if he has not placed it in the appropriate genus, or if the account assigned is not proper, this must be examined from the topics that have been stated in the places concerning genus and property. But the remaining point—if he has not defined, or if he has not defined well—must be approached in some way by speaking. First, therefore, it must be discovered if he has not defined well. For it is easier to have made anything at all than to have made it well; it is evident, therefore, that error concerning this is somewhat greater, in that it is more laborious. Wherefore an argumentation concerning this is easier than that which is made concerning that. But there are two parts of that which is not well. One indeed is to use obscure interpretation. For one who defines ought, as far as possible, to use the clearest interpretation, because the definition is assigned for the sake of knowing. The second is if he has said more in the definition than is fitting, for everything that is added in a definition is superfluous.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:143 · narrative
Source · Latin

CAPUT II.

De definitione loci alii.

Rursus autem utrumque quod dictum est,in pIures partes dividitur,unus autem locus ejus quod obscure est, si sit aequivocum alicui,quod dictum est. Ut quod generatio est ductio ad substantiam,etquod sanitascommensuratiocalidorumetfrigidorum,nam aequivoca est ductio, etcommensuratio;immamtestum igitur utrum vult dicere eorum quae significantur ab eo, quod multipliciterdicitur; similiter autem et si cum definitum multipliciter dicitur, dividens non dixit, nam manifeetum utrius definitionem assignavit,contingitque calumniarivelutnon conveniente oratione ad omnia quorum definitionem assignavit.Maxime autem contingittalequidpiam facere, cum latet aequivocatio.

English

CHAPTER II.

On other points concerning the definition of place.

Again, each of the things that have been said is divided into several parts; and one point of attack concerning what is obscure is if what has been said is equivocal to something. For example, that generation is a leading into substance, and that health is a commensuration of hot and cold things; for "leading" and "commensuration" are equivocal. So one must examine whether he wishes to speak of one of the things signified by what is said in many ways; and similarly also if, when the thing defined is said in many ways, he has not distinguished them; for it is evident which of the two definitions he has assigned, and it happens that one may quibble as though the account does not fit all the things whose definition he has assigned. But this especially happens when the equivocation escapes notice.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:144 · narrative
Source · Latin

Contingit etiam et eum qui dividit, quoties dicitur id quod in definitione assignatum est, syllogismum facere; nam si secundum nullum ntodorum sufficienter dictum est, manifestumquod non definierit ilia rnodo.Alius sisecundum metaphoram dixit; ut scientiam indeciduam,terram autem nutricum,aut temperantiam consonantiam, nam omne obscurum,quod secundum metaphoram dicitur,contingit et etiam metaphora loquentem calumniari,tanquam non proprie dicentem, non enim congruetdictadefinitio, ut in temperantia,nam omnis consonantia in sanis.Amplius,si est genus consonantia temperantiæ, in duobus generibus erit idem, non continentibus se invicem,nam nequeconsonantia virtutem, neque virtus continet consonantiam.

English

It also happens that the one who divides makes a syllogism whenever what has been assigned in the definition is stated; for if it has not been stated sufficiently according to any of the modes, it is clear that he has not defined it in that way. Another mode is if he has spoken according to metaphor, as calling knowledge undecidable, and the earth a nurse, or temperance a harmony; for everything obscure that is said according to metaphor, it also happens that one may attack the speaker of the metaphor as not speaking properly, for what has been said will not fit the definition, as in the case of temperance; for every harmony is in things that are sound. Further, if harmony is the genus of temperance, the same thing will be in two genera that do not contain each other; for neither does harmony contain virtue, nor does virtue contain harmony.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:145 · narrative
Source · Latin

Amplius, si non positis nominibus utitur, ut Plato ciliurabre oculum, aut araneum putrimordax, aut medullam ossigenium dixit, nam omne obscurum, quod insuetum est.Qusedam autem neque secundum xequivocationem,nequesecundum metaphoram,neque proprie dicuntur, ut les, mensura, vel imago eorum quae natura justasunt;sunt autem hujusmodi deteriora metaphora.nam metaphora facit quodammodo notum quod designatum est per similitudinem (umnesenimmetaphora utentes,secundum aliquam similitudinem ea utuntur), at quod tale esi,non facitnotum,nam neque similitudoestsecundumquam mensura,vel imago lex est,neque dici solet proprie; quapropter si proprie mensuram vel imaginem legem dicit esse, veritatis est expers; nam imago id est cujus generatio per imitationem est, hoc autem non inest legi; si autem non proprie, manifestum quod obscure dixit, atque deterius quolibet eorum quae secundum metaphoram dicuntur. Amplius,si non manifesta est contrarii oratio ex hoc quod dicitur.Nam quæ bene assignantur, contrarias commanifestant. Aut si per se dicta, non si manifestum cujus est definitio,sed quemadmodum ea quae sunt antiquorum scriptorum,nisi quis supercripsisset non cognoscebaturquid unumquodque'siigiturnon clare, ex hujusmodi est inspiciendum.

English

Further, if he uses terms that are not established, as when Plato called the eye “ciliabrum,” the spider “putrimordax,” or the marrow “ossigenium”; for everything of this sort is obscure, because it is unfamiliar. Some things, however, are said neither by equivocation, nor by metaphor, nor properly, as “law,” “measure,” or “image” of the things that are just by nature; and such things are worse than metaphor. For metaphor in some way makes known what is signified through a likeness (for all who use metaphor use it according to some likeness), but what is of this sort does not make it known; for there is no likeness according to which “measure” or “image” is “law,” nor is it customarily said properly. Wherefore, if he says properly that “measure” or “image” is “law,” he is devoid of truth; for an image is that whose generation is through imitation, and this does not belong to law. But if he says it not properly, it is clear that he has spoken obscurely, and worse than any of the things that are said by metaphor. Further, [it is a fault] if the statement of the contrary is not manifest from what is said. For things that are well assigned make the contraries manifest together. Or [it is a fault] if the terms are spoken by themselves, not if it is manifest of what the definition is, but in the manner of the writings of the ancients, which no one would recognize for what each one is unless someone had inscribed it above. If, then, it is not clear, it must be examined from considerations of this sort.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:146 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si igitur superfluum in termino dixit,primum quidem considerandum si aliquo usus est quod omnihus insit,vel simpliciter iis quae sunt, vel iis quæ sub eodem genere sunt definitorum.Nam superfluum dici necessarium id est.Oportetenim genus ab aliis separare,di£ferentiam autem ab aliquo eorum quæ sunt in eodem genere; atqui quod omnibus quidem inest simpliciter, a nullo separat, quod autem omnibus quae sub eodem sunt genere inest,non separat ab iis quae sunt in eodem genere,quaresupervacaneum hujusmodi oppo. situm.Aut si est quidem proprium quod appositum est,ablato autem illo,et reliqua definitio propria est, et indicat substantiam.Ut in hominis orationescientiae susceptivum appositam, superfluum: nam et eo ablato,reliqua oralio propria est, et indicat substantiam, simpliciterautern dicendo,omnes superfluum, quo ablato,reliquum manifestum facit id quod definitur. Talis autem est et animae terminus, si est. numerusipse seipsum movens, nam quod seipsum movet est anima, ceu Plato definivit, an proprium quidem quod dicitur,non indicat autern substantiam interempto numero? Utrovis igitur modo se habeat, difficile est ut explicet.

English

If, then, he has stated something superfluous in the definition, one must first consider whether he has used something that belongs to all things, either simply to the things that exist, or to those things that fall under the same genus as the things defined. For to be called superfluous is to be necessary. For one must separate the genus from other things, and the differentia from some one of the things that are in the same genus; but what belongs to all things simply separates from nothing, and what belongs to all things that are under the same genus does not separate from the things that are in the same genus; wherefore such an addition is superfluous. But if what has been added is indeed proper, yet when it is removed the remaining definition is still proper and indicates the substance—as in the definition of man, “receptive of knowledge” is superfluous; for when this is removed, the remaining account is still proper and indicates the substance—and if, when it is stated simply, it is superfluous in every respect, then when it is removed the remainder makes clear that which is being defined. Such also is the definition of the soul, if it is “number itself moving itself”; for that which moves itself is the soul, as Plato defined it—or is what is said indeed proper, but does not indicate the substance once number is removed? In whichever way it may be, it is difficult to explain.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:147 · narrative
Source · Latin

Utendum ergo in omnibus talibus ad id quod expedit,ut est phlegmatis terminus, humidum primum a cibo,indigeslum: unum enim primum,non multa,quare superfluum indigestum appositum, nam hoc ablato, reliqua erit propria definitio: non enim contingit a cibo et aliud quiddam primum esse. An non simpliciter a cibo phIegma,sed indigestorum primum? quare addendum est indigestum, nam illo quidem modo dicta, non vera erit definitio, siquidem non omnium pri. mum est.Amplius, si quidpiam eorum quae sunt in oratione non omnibus inest, quae sunt sub eadem specie.Nam talis pejus definivit,quam qui usi sunt eo quod inest omnibus quae sunt. Nam illic,si retiqua propria definitio, et tota propria erit,simpliciter enim ad proprium quolibet addito vero, tota oratio propria fit: at vero si aliquid eorum quae sunt in oratione, non omnibus insit quæ sunt sub eadem specie, impossibile est lotam orationem propriam esse,non enim conversim praedicabitur de re, ut animal gressibile bipes quadricubitale; nam hujusmodi oratio non conversim praedicabitur de re, eo quod non omnibus inest (quæ sub eadem specie sunt)quadricubitale. Rursum si idem frequenter dixit.Ut qui concupiscentiam appetitum delectationis dixit, nam omnis concupiscentia delectationis est, quare et idem concupiscentiae delectationis erit.

English

Therefore in all such cases one must use what is expedient, as in the definition of phlegm: the first moisture from food, undigested. For it is one first thing, not many; hence "undigested" is added superfluously, for when this is removed, the rest will be the proper definition. For it is not possible that there be another first thing from food. Or is phlegm not simply from food, but the first of undigested things? Therefore "undigested" must be added; for in that other way, the definition as stated will not be true, since it is not the first of all things. Further, if any of the things in the account does not belong to all things that fall under the same species. For such a one has defined worse than those who have used what belongs to all things that exist. For there, if the rest is a proper definition, the whole will also be proper; for simply by adding something true to a proper term, the whole account becomes proper. But if any of the things in the account does not belong to all things that fall under the same species, it is impossible for the whole account to be proper; for it will not be predicated convertibly of the thing, as "animal, footed, two-footed, four-cubit." For an account of this sort will not be predicated convertibly of the thing, because four-cubit does not belong to all things that fall under the same species. Again, if he has said the same thing frequently, as one who has said that desire is the appetite for pleasure; for all desire is for pleasure, and so it will be the same as the desire for pleasure.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:148 · narrative
Source · Latin

Fit igitur terminus concupiscentiae appetitus delectationis (nihilenim differt concupiscentiam dicere,aut appetitum delectationis;:quare utrum que eorum delectationis erit. An hoc quidem nihil absurdum? nam et homo bipes est. Quare et idem homini, hipes erit; est autem idem bo:nini,animal gressibile bipes, quare animal gressibile bipes, bipes est; sed non propter ho cabsurdum aliquid accipit.Non enim de animali solum gressibile bis bipes praedicatur; sic enim de eodem bis bipes praedicatur, si de animali bipede, gressibile bipes dicitur, quare semel tantum bipes prasdicatur.Similiter autem et in concupiscentia, non enim de appetitu id quod est delectationis esse praedicatur, sed de toto, quare semel et hic praedicatio fit. Non est autem bis dicere idem nomen,aliquid absurdum,sed frequenter de aliquo idem praedicari, sicut Xenocrates prudentiam definitivam et contemplativam eorum quas sunt, dicit esse, nam definitiva, contemplativa quaedam est. Quare bis idem dicens,addens rursum etcontemplativam.Similiter autem et quicunque relrigerationer.o, privationem ejus quidem caloris,qui secundum naturam est, dicunt esse: nam omnis privatio ejus est quod secundum naturamest; quare superfluum est addere secundum naturam, sed sufficit fortasse dicere privationem caloris, eo quod ipsa privatio notam facit quod ejus sit quod secundum naturam dicitur.

English

Therefore the term of concupiscence becomes the appetite for pleasure (for it makes no difference to say concupiscence or appetite for pleasure; hence each of them will be of pleasure. Or is this in fact nothing absurd? For man is also two-footed. Hence the same thing will also be two-footed for man; but the same thing for man is a walking two-footed animal, hence a walking two-footed animal is two-footed; but it does not on this account assume anything absurd. For "two-footed" is not predicated only of the walking two-footed animal; for thus "two-footed" would be predicated twice of the same thing, if "walking two-footed" is said of the two-footed animal, so that "two-footed" is predicated only once. And similarly also in the case of concupiscence: for that which is of pleasure is not predicated of the appetite, but of the whole; hence here too the predication is made once. But it is not absurd to say the same name twice, but rather to predicate the same thing of something frequently, as Xenocrates defines prudence as definitive and contemplative of the things that are; for the definitive is a certain contemplative. Hence, saying the same thing twice, he adds "contemplative" again. And similarly also those who say that refrigeration is the privation of that heat which is according to nature; for every privation is of that which is according to nature; hence it is superfluous to add "according to nature," but perhaps it suffices to say the privation of heat, in that the privation itself makes known that it is of that which is said to be according to nature.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:149 · narrative
Source · Latin

Rursum si universali dicto addidit et particulare.,ut si clementiam imminutionem, expedientiam et justorum, nam justum expediens quidpiam est,quare continetur in expediente, superfluum igitur justum: nam qui dixit universale,addidit et particulare,et si medicinam disciplinam sanativorum animali ethomini,autlegem imaginem eorum quaena turasuntbona,etjusta,namjustumbonumquidpiam quarefrequenteridemdicit.UtrumigiturbeDeannon benedefinivit,perhsecethujus modi perspiciendum.

CAPUT III.

De definitione loci alii.

Utrum vero definivit,et dixit quid est esse,an nonex his. Primum ergo si non per priora et notiora confecit definitionem.Nam terminus assignatur ejus cognoscendigratiaquoddicitur;cognoscimus autem non ex quibuslibet, sed ex prioribus notioribusque, quernadmodumin demonstrationibus(sicenim 0:0 nis doctrina et omnis disciplina se habet);manifestum igiturquodqui non per hujusmodi definivit, non definivit; si enim definivit, plures erunt ejusdem dennitiones. Nam manifestum quod et qui per priora ac notiora, iterum melius definivit, quare utrasque erunt definitiones ejusdem. Tale autem non videtur, nam unicuique eorum quæ sunt, unum est esse idipsum quod est; quare si plureseruntejusdemdefinitiones, idem erit definitio esse, quod quidem secundum utramque definitionem significatur; haec autem non eadem sunt, eo quod deiinitiones diversae.

English

Again, if to a universal statement he has also added a particular one, as if he said that clemency is a lessening of what is expedient and of just things—for the just is something expedient, and so it is contained in the expedient; therefore "just" is superfluous, for he who stated the universal also added the particular—and if he said that medicine is the discipline of things conducive to health for animal and man, or that law is an image of the things that are by nature good and just—for the just is something good, and so he frequently says the same thing. Whether, then, he has defined well or not is to be examined through these and similar considerations.

CHAPTER III.

On other points concerning the definition of place.

Whether he has defined, and stated what it is to be, or not, is to be examined from these considerations. First, then, if he has not constructed the definition through things prior and more known. For a term is assigned for the sake of knowing that which is being stated; but we know not from any things whatsoever, but from things prior and more known, just as in demonstrations (for thus does all teaching and all learning stand); it is evident, therefore, that he who has not defined through such things has not defined; for if he has defined, there will be several definitions of the same thing. For it is evident that he who has defined through things prior and more known has again defined better; hence there will be both definitions of the same thing. But such a thing does not seem to be the case, for of each of the things that are, the being is one and the same; hence if there are several definitions of the same thing, the same thing will be the being which is signified according to each definition; but these are not the same, in that the definitions are different.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:150 · narrative
Source · Latin

Manifestum igitur quoniam non definivit, qui non per priora atque notiora definivit. Igitur per non notioraquidem terminum dici, dupliciter est accipere. Aut enim si simpliciter ex ignotioribus, aut si nobis ignotioribus, contingit enim utroque modo. Simpliciter igitur notius quod prius est posteriore, ut punctum linea, et linea superficie, et superficies solido, quemadmodum et unitas numero:pnusenim et principium omnis numeri, similiter autem et elementum syllaba. Nobis autem e converso quandoque accidit nam maxime solidum magis sub sensu cadit quam superficies, superficies autem magis quam linea, linea autem signo magis: quare multitudo magis hujusmodi cognoscit, nam illa quidem quomodolibet, haec autem subtili et fecundo intellectu comprehendere oportet; simpliciterigitur melius per priora, posteriora tentare cognoscere, nam magis scientificum tale est. Verum ad eos qui impotentes suntcognocere per talia, necessarium forte per ea quæ illis cognita sunt facere orationem; sunt autem talium definitiones quae et puncti, et lineæ, et superficiei, omnes enim per posteriora priora indicant: nam illud quidem lineae, istam autem superficiei, hanc vero solidi fines dicunt esse.

English

It is evident, therefore, that he has not defined who has not defined through things prior and more known. So to state a term through things not more known is to be understood in two ways. For it happens either if [he defines] simply through things more unknown, or if through things more unknown to us; for it happens in both ways. Simply, then, that which is prior is more known than what is posterior, as the point is more known than the line, the line than the surface, and the surface than the solid, just as the unit is more known than number: for the unit is the beginning and principle of all number; and similarly the element is more known than the syllable. But in relation to us the opposite sometimes happens: for the solid falls under sense more than the surface, the surface more than the line, and the line more than the point. Hence the multitude knows things of this sort more; for those things require only some sort of apprehension, but these must be grasped by a subtle and fertile intellect. Simply, therefore, it is better to attempt to know posterior things through prior things, for such a procedure is more scientific. But for those who are unable to know through such things, it is perhaps necessary to make the account through the things that are known to them; and of this sort are the definitions of the point, the line, and the surface—for all of them indicate prior things through posterior things: for they say that the line is the boundary of the surface, the surface of the solid, and the point of the line.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:151 · narrative
Source · Latin

Non oportet autem latere quoniam sic definientes non contingit quod quid est esse definitio, indicare nisi contingat idem nobis notius esse, et simpliciter notius, siquidem oportet per genus et differentias definire eum qui bene definit: hæc autem simpliciter notiora et priora sunt specie, interimit enim genus et differentiaspeciem, quare priora haec specie. Sunt autem notiora, nam specie quidem nola necesse est genusetdifferentias cognosci;qui hominem enim cognocit, et animal gressibile cognoscit: at genere et differentia notis, non necesse est et speciem cognosci, quare ignotior species. Amplius, illis qui secundum veritatem uj usmodi definitionesdicuntessequaesunt ex iis quæ unicuique sunt nota, plures ejusdem accidit dicere definitiones esse, nam alia aliis, et non omnibus eodem contingit notiora esse; quare ad unumquemque erit definitio assignanda, si quidem ex iis quae singulis quibusque sunt notiora, definitionem oportet facere.Amplius eisdem aliainterdum, alia magis nota, nam aprincipio quidem sensibilia, instructioribus autem factis, contra; quare neque ad eumdem semper ad eadem definitio assignanda, iis qui per ea quas singulis quibusque sunt notiora definitionem fatentur assignandam esse.Manifestum igitur quoJ non definiendum per ea quæ hujusmodi sunt, sed per simpliciter notiora, nam solo modo sic una et eadem definitio semper fiet.

English

It must not escape notice that those who define in this way cannot indicate that the what-it-is-to-be is a definition, unless it happens that the same thing is more known to us and also simply more known, since one who defines well must define through genus and differentiae. But these are simply more known and prior in species; for genus and differentiae destroy the species, so these are prior in species. And they are more known, for it is not necessary that genus and differentiae be known when the species is known; for one who knows man also knows animal and gressible, but when genus and differentia are known, it is not necessary that the species also be known, so the species is less known. Further, for those who say that definitions of this sort are in accordance with truth—namely those formed from things that are known to each individual—it happens that there are many definitions of the same thing; for different things are more known to different people, and it does not happen that the same things are more known to all. Therefore a definition will have to be assigned for each individual, since one must make the definition from the things that are more known to each particular person. Further, the same things are sometimes more known to the same people and sometimes less; for at the beginning sensible things are more known, but for those who have become more instructed, the opposite is the case. Therefore a definition must not always be assigned to the same person in relation to the same things, if it is to be assigned to those who maintain that the definition is to be given through the things that are more known to each individual. It is evident, therefore that one must not define through things of this sort, but through things simply more known; for only in this way will one and the same definition always be produced.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:152 · narrative
Source · Latin

Fortasse autem et quod simpliciter notum, non est id quod omnibus notum, sed quod bene dispositis intellectu; quemadmodum et simpliciter salubre iis qui bene affectum habentcorpus; oportetergo unumquodque talium diligenter pervestigare, uti autem disputantes ad id quod expedit.Maxime autem sine dissensione interimere contingit definitionem, si neque ex simpliciter notioribus,nequeex iis quae nobis,'contingit definitionem fieri. Unus igitur locus est ejus quod non per notiora,quod per posteriora priora indicat, quemadmodum prius diximus.Alius autem, si ejus quod est in quiete et definitione, per indefinitum, et quod in motu est assignata est oratio nobis.Prius enim est et notius quod manens est, et definitum, eo quod indefinitum etin motu est.Ejus autem quod est non ex prioribus,tres sunt loci. Primus quidem, si per oppositum oppositum definivit, ut si per ma. lum, bonum.

English

Perhaps, however, even what is simply known is not what is known to all, but what is known to those well disposed in understanding; just as what is simply healthy is healthy for those who have a well-conditioned body. Each of such things, therefore, must be carefully investigated, but in disputing one must use what is expedient. But one can most effectively and without dispute destroy a definition if the definition cannot be made either from things simply more known or from things more known to us. One topic, then, is that of what is not [defined] through more known things, which indicates prior things through posterior things, as we said earlier. Another is if the account of what is in rest and definition is assigned by us through the indefinite and what is in motion. For what is permanent and defined is prior and more known than what is indefinite and in motion. But of what is not [defined] from prior things there are three topics. The first indeed is if one has defined the opposite through the opposite, as if through evil, good.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:153 · narrative
Source · Latin

Simul enim natura opposita, et nonnullis etiam eadem disciplina utrorumque videtur esse;; quare non notius alterum altero.Oportetautem non latere quaedam fortassealiterdefinirinonposse, ut duplum sine dimidio, et quaecunque per se ad aliquid dicuntur: nam omnibus hujusmodi est idem esse ei quod est ad aliquid quodam modo se habere; quare non est possibile sine altero alterum cognoscere, eo quod necessarium est in alterius oratione coassumi et alterum.Ergo cognoscere quidem oportethujusmodiomnia,utiautemeisin his ut videbitur expedire. Alius, si eodem usus est ei quod definitur. Latet autem, cum non eodem deliniti nomine utitur, ut si solem stellam in die apparentem definivit,nam qui die utitur, sole utitur, et par est ad deprehendendatalia sumere pro nomine orationem, ut quod dies est, solis latio super terram: nam tunc manifestum quod qui solis lationem super terram dixit, solem dixit; quare utitur sole, qui die utitur. Rur. sum si eo quod e diverso dividitur, id quod e diverso dividitur definivit. Ut impar est, qui unitate major est pare, simul enim natura, quae ex eodem genere e diverso dividuntur, impar autem et par e diverso dividuntur,nam ambo numeri differentiae.

English

For at the same time they are naturally opposed, and the same discipline of both seems to belong to certain people as well; wherefore neither is one more known than the other. But it must not escape notice that certain things perhaps cannot be defined otherwise, as the double without the half, and whatever things are said in relation to something per se; for for all such things, to be is the same as to be related in some way to something; wherefore it is not possible to know one without the other, because it is necessary that in the account of the one the other also be taken up together. Therefore it is necessary to know all such things, in such a way, however, as will seem expedient in these matters. Otherwise, if he has used the same [term] as the thing being defined. But it escapes notice when he does not use the same name as the thing defined, as if someone has defined the sun as the star appearing by day; for he who uses “day” uses “sun,” and it is fair to take the account in place of the name for grasping such things, as that day is the motion of the sun over the earth; for then it is manifest that he who has said the motion of the sun over the earth has said the sun; wherefore he who uses “day” uses the sun. Again, if he has defined the thing that is divided by opposition, [using] that which is divided by opposition. For example, odd is that which exceeds even by unity; for at the same time they are naturally [opposed], things that are divided by opposition from the same genus, and odd and even are divided by opposition, for both are differences of number.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:154 · narrative
Source · Latin

Similiter autem et si per inferiora, superiora definivit.Ut parem numerum, qui bipartite secatur, aut bonum habitum virtutis:nam et bipartite sumptum est a duobus quæ paria sunt, et virtus bonum quod dam est, quare inferiora haec quam illa sunt. Est autem necesse eum qui inferioribus utitur, et illis uti: nam et qui virtute utitur, bono utitur,eo quod bonum quoddam virtus, similiterautem etqui bipartite utitur, et pare utitur, eo quod in duo secari significat bipartite secari, duo autem paria sunt. Universaliter igitur dicendo, unusest locus non per, priora et notiora fecisse orationem, partes autem ejus ea quae dicta sunt.Secundus autem, si res cum sit non poniturin genere.Ndm in omnibus hujusmodi peccatum est,in quibusnon prius ponitur in oratione quid est, ut corporis definitio, quod babet tres dimensiones, aut si quis hominem definivit, quod est sciens numerare, non enim dictum est quid est habere tres dimensiones, vel quid est scit numerare. Genus autem vult quid est significare, et primum apponitur eorum quae in definitione dicuntur.

English

Likewise also if he has defined superior things through inferior ones—for example, an even number as that which is divided into two equal parts, or virtue as a good habit. For "divided into two equal parts" is taken from two things that are equal, and virtue is a certain good; wherefore these are inferior to those. But it is necessary that one who uses the inferior things also use those things: for one who uses virtue also uses good, since virtue is a certain good; and similarly one who uses "divided into two equal parts" also uses "equal," because "to be divided into two equal parts" signifies to be cut into two, and two are equal. Speaking universally, then, one topic is not to have made the account through prior and more known things; and its parts are the things that have been said. The second is if the thing, though it exists, is not placed in a genus. For the error occurs in all such cases in which what it is is not first placed in the account—as the definition of body, that it has three dimensions, or if someone has defined man as that which knows how to count; for it has not been stated what it is to have three dimensions, or what it is to know how to count. But genus wishes to signify what it is, and it is placed first among the things said in a definition.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:155 · narrative
Source · Latin

Amplius, si ad plura cum dicatur id quod definitur, non ad omnia assignavit, ut si grammaticen, scientiam scribendi quod proFertur, nam indiget et quod tegendi, nihilo enim magis scribendi quam legendi assignatqui definit.Quare non alius,sed qui utraque bæc dicit, eo quod plures non contingit ejusdem definitiones esse, in quibusdam profecto secundum veritatem se habet, ut dictum est, in quibusdam autem non, ut in quibuscunque non per se dicitur ad utrumque, ut medicinam, scientiam, sanitatem et aegritudinem efficiendi: nam de ilia quidem per se dicitur, de hacautem per accidens, simpliciter enim alienum a medicina ægritudinem efiicere. Quare nihil magis definivit qui ad utrumque assignavit, quam qui ad alterum, verum fortasse et deterius, eo quod et reliquorum quilibet potest aegritudinem efficere, Amplius, si non ad melius,sed ad pejus assignavit, cum sint plura ad qua? dicitur quod definitur. Nam omnis disciplina et potestas, optimi videtur esse. Rursum si non positnm est in proprio genere quod dictum est, considerandum ex iis (quæ ad genera sunt) elementis, quemadmodum est dictum prius. Rursum si transiliens dicit genera, ut qui justitiam, aequalitatis habitum efFectivum, vel distributivum æqui, nam transilit (qui sic deHuit) virtutem.

English

Further, if the thing being defined is said in relation to several things, and he has not assigned it to all of them—for example, if he defines grammar as the science of writing what is expressed, for it also needs [the science] of covering over; for he who defines it assigns it no more to writing than to reading. Wherefore it is not another definition, but the one that states both of these, since it is not possible for there to be several definitions of the same thing. In some cases, indeed, this holds true, as has been said, but in others it does not—as in all cases where it is not said in itself in relation to both, for example, medicine as the science of producing health and sickness; for it is said of the former in itself, but of the latter incidentally, since it is simply foreign to medicine to produce sickness. Wherefore he who assigned it to both has defined it no more than he who assigned it to one, but perhaps even worse, because any of the others can also produce sickness. Further, if he has assigned it not to the better but to the worse, when there are several things in relation to which the thing being defined is said. For every discipline and power seems to be of the best. Again, if what has been stated has not been placed in its proper genus, this must be considered from the elements that pertain to genera, as was said earlier. Again, if he skips over the genera, as one who [defines] justice as the habit effective of equality, or distributive of what is equal; for he who defines it thus skips over virtue.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:156 · narrative
Source · Latin

Relinquens;gitur justitiae genus, non dicit quid est esse (nam substantia unicuiqueest in genere); estautem hoc idem ei quod est non in proximo genere ponere. Nam qui in proximo posuit, omnia superioria dixit, eo quod omnia superiora genera de inferioribus prædicantur. Quare aut in proximo nenere ponend urn aut my,nes differentias superiori generiaddendum per quas definitur proximumgenus,sic enim eritnihil praetermissum,sedpro nomine,in oratione dictUIl1 erit inferius genus;qui vero ipsu superius geuus dicit, non citet inferius genus, nam qui plantam dicit non dicit arborem.Rursumin differentiis si [l;i literconsiderandu OJ, si et differentias dixit generis.Nam si rei non specialibus definivitdifferentiis,aut sietiamomnino aliquid hujusmodi dixit quod nullius contingit differentiam esse (utanimal, aut substantiam), manifestum quoniam non definivit: nullius enim differentiæ, quae dicta sunt. Videndum autem et si est aliquid quod e diverso dividitur dictæ dif. t'erentiæ. Nam si non est, perspicuum quoniam non erit quae dicta est generis differentia, nam omne ge. nus iis (quæ e diverso dividuntur) differentiis diviI;litur, ut animal gressibili,et volatili, et aquatili,et bipedi. Aut si est quidem e diverso divisa difTerentia, non verificatur autem de genere.

English

Therefore, by omitting the genus of justice, he does not state what its essence is (for the substance of each thing lies in its genus); and this is the same as not placing it in the proximate genus. For one who has placed it in the proximate genus has stated all the superior [genera], since all superior genera are predicated of the inferior ones. Hence one must either place it in the proximate genus, or add to the superior genus all the differentiae by which the proximate genus is defined; for in this way nothing will have been omitted, but the inferior genus will be stated in the account in place of the name. But one who states the superior genus itself does not also state the inferior genus; for one who says "plant" does not say "tree." Again, one must also consider whether he has stated the differentiae of the genus. For if he has defined the thing by differentiae that are not specific, or if he has even stated something of such a kind as cannot be the differentia of anything (for example, animal or substance), it is clear that he has not defined it; for it is the differentia of nothing of the things that have been stated. One must also consider whether there is anything that is divided in opposition to the differentia that has been stated. For if there is not, it is evident that what has been stated will not be the differentia of the genus, since every genus is divided by the differentiae that are divided in opposition, as animal is divided by the walking, the flying, the swimming, and the two-footed. Or if the differentia is indeed divided in opposition, but is not verified of the genus.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:157 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam si non, manifestum quoniam neutra erit generis differentia, omnes enim quae e diverso dividuntur differentiæ, verificantur de proprio genere. Similiter autem et si verificatur quidem, at non facit apposita generi, speciem. Nam manifestum, quod non erit hæc specifica differentia generis, nam omnis specifica differentia cum genere speciem facit, si autem haec non est differentia, nec quae dicta est, quia haec e diverso dividitur. Amplius, si negationedividatgenus, ut quilineam definiuntlongitudinem sine latitudine esse:nam nihil aliud sirnificat, sine latitudine,quam quod non habet latitudinem: accidet igitur genus participare speciem. Nam omnis longitudo sine latitudine aut latitudinem habens est, quia de omni affirmatio vel negatio vera Lt, quare genus lineae cum longitudo sit, sine latitudine aut latitudinem habens erit: at longitudo sine latitudine speciei est ratio, similiter autem et longitudo latitudinem habens, nam sine latitudine, et latitudinem habens, differentiæ sunt: ex differentia autem et genere est speciei oratio, quare genus suscipiet speciei orationem. Similiter autem et differentiæ, eo quod altera dictarum differentiarum ex necessitate praedicatur de genere. Est autem dictus locus utilis ad eos qui ponunt ideas esse, nam si non est ipsa longitudo, quodam modo'praedicabitur de genere quod Jatitudi.

English

For if not, it is clear that neither will be a differentia of the genus; for all differentiae that divide from opposites are verified of their own genus. Similarly, even if it is verified, but does not, when added to the genus, make the species. For it is clear that this will not be a specific differentia of the genus, since every specific differentia together with the genus makes the species; but if this is not a differentia, neither is the one that has been stated, because this one is divided from opposites. Furthermore, if the genus is divided by a negation, as those who define a line as length without breadth: for "without breadth" signifies nothing other than that it does not have breadth; it will follow, then, that the genus partakes of the species. For every length without breadth is either without breadth or having breadth, since of every thing affirmation or negation is true; wherefore the genus of line, since it is length, will be either without breadth or having breadth; but "length without breadth" is the account of the species, and similarly "length having breadth," for "without breadth" and "having breadth" are differentiae; but the account of the species is from the differentia and the genus; wherefore the genus will receive the account of the species. Similarly also with the differentiae, because one of the said differentiae is predicated of the genus by necessity. This place is said to be useful against those who posit that ideas exist; for if length itself is not, in a certain way it will be predicated of the genus, namely of breadth.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:158 · narrative
Source · Latin

nem habet, aut sine latitudine est: oportet enim de omni longitudine alterum eorum verificari,siquidem de genere verificari debeat. Hoc autem non accidit, sunt autem et sine latitudine, et latitudinem habentes longitudines,quare ad illos solos utilis hic locus, quicunque genus unum numero dicunt esse, hoc autem faciunt qui ideas ponunt. Nam ipsam longitudinem et ipsum animal, genus dicunt esse. Fortasse autem in quibusdam etiam necessarium est negatione uti definientem, ut in privationibus:nam caecum est quod non habet visum, quando natum est babere. Differt autem nihil negatione dividere genus, autbujunmodi affirmatione qua negationem necesse est ediversodividi, ut si longitudinem, habens latitudinemdefinivit,nam habente latitudinem ediverso dividiturnon habens latitudinem, neque aliud quUquamjquare negatione rursum dividitur genus. Rursum si speciem ut differentiam assignavit, ut qui convictuminjuriam cum irrisione definivit,nam irrtsio injuria quædamest; quare non differentia, sed species est irrisio. Amplius, si genus ut differentiam dicit, ut virtutem habitum bonum vel studiosum, nam bonum est genus virtutis. An non genus est bo.

English

has, or is without breadth; for one of these two must be verified of every length, if indeed it is to be verified of the genus. But this does not happen; for there are lengths both without breadth and having breadth. Wherefore this topic is useful only against those who say that the genus is one in number, and this is what those who posit ideas do. For they say that length itself and animal itself are a genus. But perhaps in certain cases it is also necessary for one who is defining to use negation, as in privations; for the blind is that which does not have sight, when it is naturally able to have it. But it makes no difference whether one divides the genus by negation or by an affirmation of such a kind that the negation must be divided from its opposite; as if one defined length as having breadth, for the one having breadth is divided from its opposite, the one not having breadth, nor anything else; wherefore the genus is again divided by negation. Again, if he has assigned the species as a differentia, as he who defined contumely as injury with mockery; for mockery is a certain injury; wherefore mockery is not a differentia but a species. Further, if he states the genus as a differentia, as virtue as a good habit or studious; for the good is the genus of virtue. Or is not the good a genus?

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:159 · narrative
Source · Latin

num, sed differentia?si quidem verum estquod non contingat idem in duobus generibus esse non continentibus se invicem (nam neque bonum continet habitum, neque habitus bonum: non enim omnia habitus bonum, neque omne bonum habitus), non erunt profecto genera ambo. Si igitur habitus genus estvirtutis,perspicuum bonum non genus,sed magis differentiam esse. Amplius, habitus quidem quid est virtus significat, bonum autem non quid est, sed quale quid est, videtur autem differentia quale quid significare. Videndum autem et si non quale quid, sed ipsum quid significat assignata differentia. Nam videtur quale quid omnis differentiasignificare.Considerandum autem et si secundum accidens inest definito differentia. Narn nulla differentia est eorum quae secundum accidens insunt, sicut neque genus, non enim contin:,:it differentiam inesse alicui et non inesse. Amplius, si praedicatur de genere differentia vel species, aut inferiorum aliquid speciei, non erit definiens.Nam nullum eorum quædicta sunt,contingit de genere prædicari, eo quod genus de quamplu. rimis omnium dicitur. Rursum si praedicatur genus de differentia.

English

Or is it a differentia? For if it is true that the same thing cannot be in two genera that do not contain each other (for neither does good contain habit, nor habit good: for not all habit is good, nor is every good a habit), then both will certainly not be genera. If, therefore, habit is the genus of virtue, it is clear that good is not a genus, but rather a differentia. Furthermore, habit signifies what virtue is, but good does not signify what it is, but of what sort it is; and a differentia seems to signify of what sort a thing is. But one must also consider whether the assigned differentia signifies not of what sort a thing is, but the thing itself. For every differentia seems to signify of what sort a thing is. One must also consider whether the differentia belongs to the thing defined according to accident. For no differentia is among things that belong according to accident, just as neither is a genus; for it does not contain that a differentia is present in something and is not present. Furthermore, if a differentia is predicated of a genus, or a species, or some one of the things inferior to a species, it will not be definitive. For none of the things that have been mentioned can be predicated of a genus, because a genus is said of the greatest number of all things. Again, if a genus is predicated of a differentia.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:160 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam non de differentia, sed de;quibus differentia, genus videtur prædicari, ut animal de homine, et bove, et de aliis gressibitibusanimaHbus, non autem de ea differentia quæ de specie dicitur, nam si de unaquaque differentiarum animal prærJicabitur, multa animalia de specie prædicabuntur, nam differenliæ de specie prædicantur, Amplius, differentiae omnes,aut species, aut individua erunt, siquidem sunt animalia, nam unumquodque animalium aut species, autindividuum est. Similiterautem inspiciendum et si species, aut inferiorum speciei aliquod,de ifIerenti1l. præd icatu.lm possibile enim, eo quod de pluribus differentia quam species dicitur. Item accidetdifferentiam speciem esse,siquidem prædicabitur de ea aliqua specierum: nam si de differentia praedicatur homo, manifestum quoniam differentia est homo. Rursum si non prior est difTerentia specie. Nam genere quidem posleriorest, specie autem priorem differentiam esse oportet. C;onsiderandum autem et si alterius generis est dicta differentia, neque contenti, neque continentis.

English

For it seems that genus is predicated not of the differentia, but of the things of which the differentia is said—as animal is predicated of man, and ox, and other walking animals, but not of that differentia which is said of the species. For if animal is predicated of each one of the differentiae, many animals will be predicated of the species; for the differentiae are predicated of the species. Further, all differentiae will be either species or individuals, if indeed they are animals; for each one of animals is either a species or an individual. In like manner one must also consider whether a species, or some one of the things inferior to the species, can be predicated of the differentia. For it is possible because the differentia is said of more things than the species. Again, it will follow that the differentia is a species, if indeed some one of the species is predicated of it; for if man is predicated of the differentia, it is clear that the differentia is man. Again, whether the differentia is not prior to the species. For in respect of genus it is posterior, but the differentia ought to be prior to the species. One must also consider whether the differentia stated is of another genus, and neither contained nor containing.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:161 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam Donvidetureadem differentiaduorum generum esse non continentium se invicem; si autem non accidet et speciem eamdem in duobus gcneribus esse non continentibus se invicem (infert enim unaquæque differentiarumproprium genus), ut gressibile et bipes animal coinf'erunt; quare si de quo differentia et generum utrumque, manifestum utique quoniam species in duobus erat generibus non continentibus se invicem. An non impossibileeamdemdifferentiam duorum generum essenoncontinentium se invicem, sed addendum neque utroque sub eodem existente? nam gressibile anima et volatile animal genera sunt non continentia se invicem, et utriusque eorum est bipes differentia; quare addendum est, neque sub eodem utroque existente: nam haec ambo sub animali sunt, manifestum etiam quoniam non necesse est differentiam omnem proprium genus inferre, eo quod contingit eamdem duorum generum esse non continentium se invicem, sed alterum tantum necesse est inferre, et superiora omnia, ut bipes, gressibHe, vel volatile infert animal. Videndum autem et si locum differentiam assignavit substantiæ. Nam videtur differre substantia a substantia in eo quod alicubi est, quare et eos qui gressibili et aquatili dividunt animal increpant,tanquam gressibiJeetaquatile alicubi significet. An in iis quidem non recte increpant?

English

For it seems that the same differentia cannot belong to two genera that do not contain one another. But if this does not follow, then neither will it follow that the same species is in two genera that do not contain one another (for each of the differentiae implies its own genus), as walking and two-footed converge upon animal. Wherefore, if that of which the differentia is predicated is also under each of the two genera, it is manifest that the species was in two genera that do not contain one another. Or is it not impossible for the same differentia to belong to two genera that do not contain one another, but must it be added that neither is under the same genus? For walking animal and flying animal are genera that do not contain one another, and two-footed is a differentia of each of them. Wherefore it must be added that neither is under the same genus; for both of these are under animal. It is also manifest that not every differentia necessarily implies its own genus, since it happens that the same differentia belongs to two genera that do not contain one another, but it necessarily implies only one of them, and all the higher ones—as two-footed implies walking or flying animal. But one must also consider whether he assigned place as a differentia of substance. For substance seems to differ from substance in that it is somewhere; wherefore they also censure those who divide animal by walking and aquatic, as though walking and aquatic signify somewhere. Or in these cases do they not censure rightly?

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:162 · narrative
Source · Latin

non enim in aliquo, neque alicubi significat aquatile et terrestre, sed quale quid: nam et si in sicco sit, similiter aquatile, similiter autem et terrestre, et si in bumido sit, stmiliterterrestre, sed non aquatile erit; attamen si quandoque significat in aliquo differentia, manifestum quoniarn peccabit. Rursum si affectum differentiam assignavit. Nam omnis affectus, cum magis fit, detrahit a substantia, differentia autem non hujusmodi est, nam magis videtur salvare differentia id cujus est differentia,et simpliciter impossibile est singulum quodque esse sine propria differentia, nam cum non est gressible, non erit homo, et (ut simpliciter dicamus) secundum quaecunque aIteraturbabens,mhileorum differentis illius est. Nam omnia hujusmodi cum magis fiuut, detrahunta substantia; quare si aliquam hujusmodi differentiam quispiam assignavit, peccavit: simpliciter enim non alteramursecundumdifferentias.Et si alicujus eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, non aliud quid, difFerentiam assignavit.Nam eorum quæ sunt ad aliquid,et differeotiæ ad ali'luid, ut et in disciplina; contemplativa enim, et activa et effectiva dicitur,unumquodque aut!om horum ad aliquid significat: contemplativa enim alicujus, et activa alicujus, et effectiva alicujus. Considerandum autem et si ad quod natum est unumquodque eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, assignavit definiens.

English

For "in something" and "somewhere" do not signify aquatic and terrestrial, but of what sort a thing is; for even if it be in a dry place, it will similarly be aquatic, and similarly also terrestrial; and if it be in a wet place, it will similarly be terrestrial, but it will not be aquatic. Yet if a differentia ever signifies "in something," it is clear that he will be mistaken. Again, if he assigned an affection as a differentia. For every affection, when it becomes greater, detracts from substance, but a differentia is not of this sort; for a differentia seems rather to preserve that of which it is the differentia, and simply it is impossible for each single thing to be without its proper differentia; for when it is not capable of walking, it will not be a man, and (to speak simply) in whatever respects things having alteration, none of them is of that differentia. For all such things, when they become greater, detract from substance; wherefore if anyone has assigned any such differentia, he has erred; for simply we are not altered according to differentiae. And if he assigned as a differentia something of those things which are relative, not something else. For the differentiae of relative things are also relative, as also in discipline; for it is called contemplative, active, and effective, and each of these signifies something relative: for the contemplative is of something, and the active is of something, and the effective is of something. But one must also consider whether, in defining, he assigned that to which each of those things which are relative is naturally directed.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:163 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam in quibusdam quiclem, ad quod natum est singulum quodque eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, solum est uti, ad aliud autem nihil, ut visu ad videndum solum;quibusdam autem et ad aliquid aHud, ut dolio sanehauriat aliquis, attamen si quis definivit dolium, instrumentum ad bauriendum, peccavi t, nom enim ad hoe natum est: terminus autem est, ad quod natum est, ad quod sane utitur prudens, qua prudens, et quæ circa singulum quodque propria est disciplina. Amplius, si non primi assignavit, quando contingit ad plura dictum esse, ut prudentiam virtutem bominis, autani. mae, et non rationalis, primum enim rationalis virtus, prudentia, nam secundum hocet 1I.nimaet homo dicitur prudens. Amplius, si non susceptivum est ejus cujus dicitur affectus, vel dispositio, velquodvis aliud, peccavit. Nam omnis dispositio vel affectus in illo natus est fieri cujus est dispositio vel affectus, ut et scientia in anima, dispositio existens animae. Aliquvndo autem peccant in talibus, ut quicunque dicunt quod somnus est impotentia sensus, et dubitatio æqualitas contrariarum ratiocinationum,et dolor separatio naturalium partium cum violentia, nam neque somnus inest sensui,oporteret autem inesse si impotentia sensus est. Similiter autem neque dubitatio contrariis ratioci ationi bus inest, neque dolor naturalibus partibus, dolebunt enim inanimata, si dolor eis inest. Talis autem et sanitatis definitio, si.

English

For in some cases, the single thing among relatives is naturally suited only to one thing, and to nothing else, as sight is only for seeing; but in other cases it is also suited to something else, as a jar is suited for someone to draw from. Yet if someone has defined a jar as an instrument for drawing, he has erred, for it is not naturally suited to this; the limit is that for which it is naturally suited, and that for which the prudent person, qua prudent, actually uses it, and the discipline proper to each single thing. Further, if he has not assigned the primary thing, when it happens that the term is said in relation to several things, as prudence is a virtue of man or of the soul, and not of the rational part—for the primary thing is the virtue of the rational part, namely prudence; for according to this, both the soul and the man are said to be prudent. Further, if it is not receptive of that of which it is said to be an affection, or a disposition, or any other such thing, he has erred. For every disposition or affection naturally comes to be in that of which it is the disposition or affection, as knowledge is in the soul, being a disposition of the soul. Sometimes, however, they err in such matters, as those who say that sleep is an impotence of sense, and doubt an equality of contrary reasonings, and pain a separation of natural parts with violence. For neither is sleep present in sense—yet it ought to be present if it is an impotence of sense. Similarly, neither is doubt present in contrary reasonings, nor pain in natural parts; for inanimate things would feel pain, if pain were present in them. Such also is the definition of health, if—

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:164 · narrative
Source · Latin

quiHemcommensuratio calidorum et frigidorum est: necesse est enim sana esse calida et frigida, nam cujusquecommensuratioillisinestquorumest commensuratio, quare sanitas inerit utique ipsis. Item j id quod fit in effectivum, aut e converso; accidit ponere sic definientibus, non enim est dolor separatio naturalium partium, sed eFfectivum doloris, nec somnus impotentia sensus, sed affectivum alterum alterius; aut enim propter impotentiam Jormim us, aut propter somnum impotentes sumus. Similiter autem etdubitationisvidebitur effectivum esse, contrariaru aequalitas rat)ocinat]onum; quandocunque enim ad utraque ratiocinant:bus nobis simiLiter videntur omnia secundum utru,nque fieri,dubitahimus utrum agamus.Amplius,secundum tempora omnia considerandum sicubi dissonet,ut si immortale definivit, animal nunc incorruptibile esse. Nam nunc incorruptibile anima!, nunc immortale erit. An in hoc quidem non accidit?nam aucepssecuudum amphiboliam est nunc incorruptibile esse, aut enim quoniam noncorrumpitur nunc, significat, aut quoniam non possibile corrumpinunc, aut quoniam hujusmodi est nunc, ut nunquam possit corrumpi. Quando igiturdicimus quod incorruptibile nunc est animal, non hocdici mus, quod nunc tale est animal, sed ut nunquam possit corrumpi; hoc autem immortali idem erat, quare non accidit, nunc idem immortale esse.

English

For the commensuration of hot and cold things is health; for it is necessary that the healthy be hot and cold, since the commensuration of each thing is present in those things of which it is the commensuration; wherefore health will certainly be present in them. Likewise, that which is productive is placed in place of the effect, or conversely; and this happens to those who define in this way. For pain is not the separation of natural parts, but the productive cause of pain; nor is sleep the incapacity of sense, but the one is affective of the other; for either we are incapacitated because of the loss of form, or because of sleep we are incapacitated. In like manner, the productive cause of doubt would seem to be the equality of contrary reasonings; for whenever, as we reason, all things appear to us alike in accordance with either side, we shall doubt which we should do. Moreover, one must consider in accordance with all times, whether it is discordant anywhere, as if someone defined an animal as immortal, [saying] that it is now incorruptible. For now the animal will be incorruptible, [and] now it will be immortal. Or does this not happen in this case? For "to be now incorruptible" is ambiguous; for it signifies either that it is not corrupted now, or that it is not possible for it to be corrupted now, or that it is of such a nature now that it can never be corrupted. When, therefore, we say that the animal is now incorruptible, we do not say this, that the animal is now of such a nature, but that it can never be corrupted; but this was the same as immortal; wherefore it does not happen that it is now the same as immortal.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:165 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed tamen sicubi accidit quod secundum definitionem quidem assignatum est in esse, nunc vel prius, quod vero secundum nomen non inest, non erit idem, utendum ergo hoc loco quemadmodum dictum est. Inspiciendum autem et si secundum aliud quidpiam magis dicitur quod deHnitur, quam secundum assignatam orationem, ut si justitia potestas aequi distributiva est: justus enim magis est qui eligit æquum distribuere, eo qui potest; quare non erit justitia potestas aequi distributiva, nam et justus esset maxime qui posset aequum distribuere. Amplius, si res quidem suscipit magis, quod autem secundum orationem assignatur non suscipit, aut contra, quod secundum orationem ei assignatur suscipit, res autem non. Oportet enim aut utraque suscipere, aut neutrum, siquidem es rei quod secundum orationem assignatur. Amplius, si suscipiunt utraque quidem magis, non simul autem utraque augmentum sumunt: ut si amor concupiscentia conventionis est. Nam magis amans non magis concupiscitconventionem; quare non simul utraque suscipiunt magis, at oporteret, si idem essent.Amplius,si duobusquibusdam propositis, de quo res magis dicitur, id quod est secundum orationem minus dicitur: ut si ignis est corpus subtilissimum, ignis enim magis flamma quamlux,corpus autem subtilissimum minus flamma quam lux; oportet autem utraque magis inesse eidem,siquidem eadem sint.

English

But nevertheless, if it happens that what is assigned by the definition is present in being, now or previously, while what is according to the name is not present, it will not be the same; this topic must therefore be used as has been said. One must also consider whether that which is defined is said more in accordance with something else than in accordance with the assigned account, as if justice is the power of distributing what is equal: for he is more just who chooses to distribute what is equal than he who has the power; wherefore justice will not be the power of distributing what is equal, for he who could distribute what is equal would also be most just. Further, if the thing admits of more, but what is assigned according to the account does not admit of more, or conversely, what is assigned to it according to the account admits of more, but the thing does not. For it is necessary that either both admit of more, or neither, if what is assigned according to the account is the being of the thing. Further, if both admit of more, but they do not both increase together: as if love is the desire of intercourse. For the one who loves more does not desire intercourse more; wherefore they do not both admit of more together, though it ought to be so, if they were the same. Further, if, with two things proposed, that of which the thing is said more is said less according to the account: as if fire is the subtlest body, for fire is more flame than light, but the subtlest body is less flame than light; yet it is necessary that both be present more in the same thing, if they are the same.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:166 · narrative
Source · Latin

Rursum, si hoc quidem sirnililer utrisquiJ inest propositis, aliud autem non similiter utrisque, se-.l alteri magis. Amplius, si ad duo definitionem assignaverit secundum utrumque: ut bonum quod per visum aut per audiLum delectabile, et ens quod possibile est pati aut facere, simul enim idem et bonum et non bonum est, similiter autem et ens et non ens: nam per auditum delectabile, idern bono erit; quare quod non delectabile est per auditum, non bono idem, nam eisdem et opposi1a eadem erunt: opponitur autem bono quidem non bonum, per auditum autem delectabili, per auditumnon delectabile; manifestum igiturquoQiam idem non delectabile per auditum, non bono. Si igitur aliquid est per visum quidem delectabile, per auditum autem non, et bonum etnon bonum erit. Similiter autem ostendemus quoniam idem ens, et non ens est. Amplius, et generibus, et differentiis, et aliis omnibus quae in definitionibus sunt assignatis eis qui orationes pro nominibus faciunt, considerandum si quidquam dissonet.

English

Again, if this is present similarly in both of the things proposed, but another feature is not similarly in both, but rather in one more than the other. Further, if he has assigned a definition to two things according to each: for example, good as what is pleasant through sight or through hearing, and being as what is capable of being acted upon or acting; for at the same time the same thing is both good and not good, and similarly both being and not being. For what is pleasant through hearing will be the same as good; therefore what is not pleasant through hearing will not be the same as good. For the same things will also have the same opposites; but to good is opposed not good, and to what is pleasant through hearing is opposed what is not pleasant through hearing. It is clear, therefore, that the same thing, what is not pleasant through hearing, is not good. If, then, something is pleasant through sight but not through hearing, it will be both good and not good. In the same way we shall show that the same thing is both being and not being. Further, with respect to genera, differentiae, and all the other things assigned in definitions by those who make accounts in place of names, one must consider whether anything is inconsistent.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:167 · narrative
Source · Latin

CAPUT IV

De definitione loci alii.

Si:autem sit ad aliquid quod definitur, aut per se, aut secundum genus, considerandum si non dictum est in definitione ad quod dicitur, aut secundum ipsum, aut secundum genus. Ut si scientiam definivit opinionem indissuasibilem, aut etiam voluntatem, appetitum sine tristitia: omnis enim ejus quod est ad'aliquid, substantia ad alterum, eo quod idem sit unicuique eorum quae sunt ad aliquid esse, idipsum quod est ad aliquid quodam modo se habere. Oportebat igitur scientiam dicere opinionem scibilis, et voluntatem appetitum bani. Similiter autem et si grammaticen definivit scientiam litterarum, oportebat enim aut ad ipsum dicitur, aut ad quod forte genus dicitur, in definitione assignari. Aut si cum quidpiam ad aliquid dicitur, non assignavit ad finem. Finis autem in unoquoque est quod optimum est, aut cujus gratia alia sunt; dicendum igitur aut optimum, aut ultimum, utconcupiscentianon delectabilis, sed:delectationis, nam propter hanc, et delectabile eligimus. Considerandum et si generatio est ad quod assignavit, vel actus. Nihil enim lalium finis, nam magis quod est egisse et generasse fin is, quam fieri et agere. An non in omnibus verurn hujusmodi? pene enim plurimi delectari magis volunt quam destitisse delectari; quare agere magis finem quis statuat quam egisse.

English

CHAPTER IV

On the definition of place, other points.

But if the thing being defined is relative, whether in itself or according to its genus, one must consider whether that to which it is referred has not been stated in the definition, either according to the thing itself or according to its genus. For example, if he has defined knowledge as an unpersuadable opinion, or also will as desire without distress: for the whole substance of a relative is toward another, since for each of the things that are relative, to be is the same as to be somehow disposed toward something. It was necessary, therefore, to say that knowledge is the opinion of the knowable, and will the desire of the good. Similarly also if he has defined grammar as the knowledge of letters; for it was necessary that either that to which it is referred, or that to which perhaps its genus is referred, be assigned in the definition. Or if, when something is said to be relative, he has not assigned the end. Now the end in each thing is what is best, or that for the sake of which other things are; one must say, therefore, either the best or the last, as concupiscence is not of the pleasant, but of pleasure; for it is on account of this that we also choose the pleasant. One must also consider whether that to which he has assigned it is a generation or an activity. For none of these is an end; for having done and having generated is more an end than to be doing and to be generating. Or is this not true in all cases of this sort? For nearly most people wish to be pleased rather than to have ceased being pleased; wherefore one may set down doing as more an end than having done.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:168 · narrative
Source · Latin

Rursum in quibusdam si non determinavit quanti, vel qualis, vel ubi,vel secundum alias differentias: utarnbitiosus, et qualis, et quanti appetens est honoris, nam omnes appetunt honorem; quare non sufficit ambitiosum dicere qui appetit honorem, sed addere oporLe cas ditrerentias. Similiter autem eavarus, quantas appetit pecunias; aut intemperans, circa qu ales voluptates: non enim qui a qualibet voluptate tenetur, intemperans dicilur, sed qui ab aliqua. Aut rursum, qui definivit noctem umbram terræ, aut succussionem motum terra?, aut nubem densitatem aeris, aut ventum motum aeris, addendum enim quanti et qualis, ubi et a quo. Similiter autem et in cæteris hujusmodi, nam omittens diiferentiam quamlibet, non dicit quid est esse, oportet autem semper ad id quo indiget argumentari. Non enim quolibet modo terra mota, neque quantacunque successio erit; similiter autem neque aere quolibet modo, neque quantocunque mota, ventus erit.Amplius in appetitibus, si non apponi-, tur quod apparet.et in quibuslibet aliis coDgruit,ut quoniam voluntas appetitus boni,concupiscentia,autem appetitus deJectationis,sed non apparentis boni vel delectationis, plerumque enim latet appetentes, quoniam bonum aut delectabile est,quare non necessarium bonum vel delectabile esse, sed apparens eolum;oportebat ergo sic et assignationem facere.

English

Again, in certain cases, if one has not determined of what quantity, or of what quality, or where, or according to other differences: for example, the ambitious man is one who desires honor, and of what sort and of what quantity—for all desire honor; therefore it is not sufficient to say that the ambitious man is one who desires honor, but one must add the differences. Likewise the covetous man, of what quantity he desires money; or the intemperate man, concerning what sort of pleasures—for not everyone who is held by any pleasure whatsoever is called intemperate, but one who is held by a certain kind. Or again, one who has defined night as the shadow of the earth, or an earthquake as the motion of the earth, or a cloud as a density of air, or wind as a motion of air—for one must add of what quantity and of what quality, where, and from what. Likewise also in other such cases, for one who omits any difference whatsoever does not state what it is to be; and one must always argue toward that which is needed. For the earth is not moved in any way whatsoever, nor will there be a succession of any magnitude whatsoever; and likewise neither from air in any way whatsoever, nor moved to any extent whatsoever, will there be wind. Moreover, in desires, if what appears is not added; and in any other cases it is fitting, as that will is the desire of good, but concupiscence is the desire of pleasure, but not of apparent good or pleasure—for it often escapes those who desire, that it is good or pleasant; wherefore it is not necessary that it be good or pleasant, but only apparent; one ought therefore to make the assignment in this way also.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:169 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si autem et assignavit quod dictum eat,in ipsas species ducendum eum qui ponit ideas esse. Non enim est idea ullius apparentis,ipsa autem species ad ipsam speciem videtur dici,ut ipsa concupiscentia ipasius delectationis,et ipsa voluntas ipsius boni.Apparentis igitur boni non erit ipsa voluntas, neque apparentis delectationis ipsa concupiscentia: absurdum enim est esse ipsum apparens bonum vel delecta-, bile.Amplius,si sit quidem habitus definitio,considerandum in habente, si quidem habentis, in habitu. Similiter autem et in cæteris talibus: ut si delectatio est juvantia, et delectabile juvabUe. Universaliter autem dicendo,in hujusmodi definitionibus,quodammodo, uno plura accidit eum qui definit definire. Nam qui scientiam definivit, quodammodo et ignorantiam definivit; similiter autem et scium et inscium, et scire et ignorare, nam primo dilucido facto, et reliqua quodammodo diiucida funt.Inspiciandum igitur in omnibus talibus, ne quidquam dissonet, utendo elementis ex contrariis et conjugatis.Amplius, in his quae ad aliquid sunt,considerandum si ad quod genusassignatur,et species ad illud quoddam assignetur: ut ei opinio ad opinatum,et quædam opmio aquoddam opmatum, et si multiplex ad multiplex,et quoddam multiplex ad quoddam subrnuItiplex; si autem non sic assignatur,manifestum, quoniam peccatur.

English

But if he has also assigned what was said, one must lead the person who posits that ideas exist to the species themselves. For there is no idea of any apparent thing, but the species itself seems to be spoken in relation to the species itself, as concupiscence itself to pleasure itself, and will itself to the good itself. Therefore will itself will not be of apparent good, nor concupiscence itself of apparent pleasure; for it is absurd that the apparent good or the apparent pleasant should be the thing itself. Moreover, if the definition is of a habit, one must consider it in the one who has it, if indeed it is of the one having it, in the habit. And similarly also in the other such cases: as if pleasure is of things that help, and the pleasant is helpful. But speaking universally, in definitions of this sort, in a certain way it happens that the one who defines defines one thing as many. For he who has defined knowledge has in a certain way also defined ignorance; and similarly the knowing and the unknowing, and to know and to be ignorant, for when the first has been made clear, the rest also become clear in a certain way. One must therefore examine in all such cases lest anything be discordant, using the elements from contraries and conjugates. Moreover, in things that are relative, one must consider whether, to whatever genus it is assigned, the species is also assigned to that particular thing: as if opinion is relative to the opined, and a certain opinion to a certain opined thing, and if the multiple is relative to the multiple, and a certain multiple to a certain submultiple; but if it is not assigned thus, it is clear that there is a fault.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:170 · narrative
Source · Latin

Videndum autem et si oppositi opposita definitio: ut si dimidii ea sit quae opposita est ei quae est duplicis,nam si duplex est quod in aequali superat dimidium, et dimidium quod in aequali superatur.ln contrariis autem similiter.Nam contraria contrarii oratio erit,secundum unam quamdam complexionem contrariorum, ut si adjutivum quidem effectivum boni est,nocivum effectivum mali, aut corruptivum boni; alterum enim horum necessarium estcontrarium esse ei quod ex principio dictum est. Si igitur neutrum contrarium est ei quod ex principio dictum est,manif'estum quoniam neutra eritearun.(quæ uC1steriusassignatæ) contrarii oratio; quare neque quæ ex principio assignataest deft nilio,recte assignata est.Quoniam autem quaedam contrariorum privatione alterius dicuntur, ut inæqualitas priva-tio æqualitatis videtur esse (inæqualia enim, qua; non a'qualia sunt, dicuntur), perspicuum quoniam quod secundum privationem quidem dicitur contrariul11,uecessarium est definire per alterum, reliquum vero nonjam oportet,per id quod secundum privationemdicitur.Nonenimaccidit alterutrum per alterutrum cognosci.Considerandum igitur in contrariis hujusmodi peceatum,utsi quis definivit aequalitatem contrarium inxqualitati,nam per hoc quod secundum privationem dicitur,definivit.

English

One must also consider whether the definition of the opposite is the opposite of the definition: for example, if the definition of the half is the opposite of that of the double; for if the double is that which exceeds the half in equality, then the half is that which is exceeded in equality. And similarly in the case of contraries. For the account of a contrary will be [the account] of its contrary, according to some one combination of contraries: for example, if the helpful is productive of good, the harmful is productive of evil, or corruptive of good; for one of these must be contrary to what was stated from the beginning. If, then, neither is contrary to what was stated from the beginning, it is evident that neither of these (which are assigned later) will be the account of the contrary; and therefore neither will the definition assigned from the beginning be correctly assigned. But since some contraries are spoken of by the privation of the other, as inequality seems to be the privation of equality (for unequal things are said [to be] those which are not equal), it is clear that what is spoken of according to privation, being the contrary, must be defined through the other; but the remaining one no longer ought [to be defined] through that which is spoken of according to privation. For it does not happen that either one is known through the other. One must therefore consider this kind of error in contraries: for example, if someone has defined equality as the contrary of inequality; for he has defined it through that which is spoken of according to privation.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:171 · narrative
Source · Latin

Amplius,sic defminientem necesse est eo quod deHnitur uti.Patet autem hoc,si accipiatur pro nomine oralio:nam quia nil refert icere inaequalitatem pri. vationem æquaritatis,eritæqualitas contrarium privationi æqualitatis, quare eodem erit usus.Si autem nentrum contrariorum secundum privationern dicatur, assignetur autem oratio similiter, ut bonum contrarium malo,manifestum quoniam malum contrarium bono erit: nam sic contrariorum similiter oratio assignanda; quare rursum eo quod definitur accidit uti, inest enim in mali oratione bonum. Quocirca quoniam bonum est malo contrarium,malum autem nihil differt, vel quod est bono contrarium, erit bonum contrarium,boni contrario. Perspicuum igitur quoniam eodem usus est.Amplius, si:quod secundum privationem dicitur assignans,non assignavit cujus est privatio. Ut habitus, aut contrarii, aut cujuscunque est privalio.Et si non in quo natumest fieri addidil,vel simpliciter, vel in quo primonatum est fieri. Vt si ignorantiam dicens privationem, non scientiæ privationpm dixit,aut si non addidit in quo natum est fieri,aut addens non in quo primo assignavit,ut quod non in rationali, sed in homine vel in anima: namsi quodlibet horum omitlat,peccavit. Similiter autem et si caecitatem non visus privationem in oculo dixitjoportetautem bene assignantem, quid est,et cujus est privatio assignare,et quidnam est quod privatum est.

English

Further, one who defines in this way must necessarily use the thing defined. This is evident if one takes the definition in place of the name; for since it makes no difference to say that inequality is the privation of equality, equality will be the contrary of the privation of equality, and so he will have used the same thing. But if one of the contraries is stated in terms of privation, and the definition is assigned in like manner—for example, good as the contrary of evil—it is clear that evil will be the contrary of good; for the definition of contraries must be assigned in like manner. Hence again it happens that he uses the thing defined, for good is contained in the definition of evil. Therefore, since good is the contrary of evil, and evil differs in no way from that which is the contrary of good, good will be the contrary of the contrary of good. It is therefore evident that he has used the same thing. Further, if in assigning what is said in terms of privation he has not assigned that of which it is the privation—for example, of a habit, or of a contrary, or of whatever it is a privation of—and if he has not added in what it is naturally produced, either simply or in that in which it is first naturally produced. For example, if in saying that ignorance is a privation he has not said it is the privation of knowledge, or if he has not added that in which it is naturally produced, or in adding it has not assigned that in which it is first produced—for example, that it is not in the rational faculty but in man or in the soul—for if he omits any of these, he has erred. Likewise also if he has not said that blindness is the privation of sight in the eye; for one who assigns well must state both what it is and of what it is the privation, and also what it is that has been deprived.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:172 · narrative
Source · Latin

Videndum autem et si non secundum privationem dictum,privatione definivit. Ut et in ignorantia videbitur esse hujusmodi peccalum,iis qui non secundum negationem ignorantiam dicunt: nam quod non babet scientiam non videtur ig[Jorare,sed magis quod deceptum est,propter quod neque inanimata, neque pueros dicimus ignorilre; quare non secundum privationem scientiae ignorantia dicitur. Amplius, si similibus nominis casibus similes orationis casus aptantur,ut si adjutivum est effectivum sanitalis,adjutive est sanitatis effective, et1adjuvansefficiens sanitatem.Considerandumiet in idea,si aptabitur dictus terminus. Nam in quibusdarE non accidit,ut quernadmodum Plato definivit, mortale addens in animalium definitionibus, idea enim non erit mortalis, ut ipse homo; quare non aptabitur ad ideam definitio. Simpliciter autem in quibus apponitur efl'ectivum aut passivum,necesse est dissonare in idea terminum,nam impassibiles et immobiles videntur esse ideæ iis qui dicunt ideas esse; adversum hos autem et tales orationes utiles sunt.

English

One must also consider whether, when the thing is not stated in terms of privation, he has defined it by privation—as, for instance, in the case of ignorance, this sort of error will appear among those who do not say that ignorance is according to negation; for that which does not have knowledge does not seem to be ignorant, but rather that which has been deceived—on which account we say that neither inanimate things nor children are ignorant; wherefore ignorance is not said according to the privation of knowledge. Further, if similar cases of a name are matched to similar cases of a definition—as, if that which is productive of health is healthful, then that which is productive of health is productive of health, and that which produces health is healthful. One must also consider in the case of the idea whether the stated term will fit. For in certain cases it does not apply, as in the way Plato defined, adding "mortal" in his definitions of animals; for the idea will not be mortal, as man himself is; wherefore the definition will not fit the idea. And simply, in those cases in which "productive" or "passive" is added, the term must be discordant in the case of the idea; for the ideas seem to those who say that ideas exist to be impassible and immovable; but against these men such definitions are useful.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:173 · narrative
Source · Latin

CAPUT V,

De definitione loci alii.

Amplius,si eorum qum secundum æquivocationem dicuntur, unam definitionem omnium communem assignavit.Univoca enim,quorum una est secundum nomen oratio;quare nullius eorum quæ sub nomine sunt,assignatus est terminus, eo quod similiter ad omne,æquivocum adaptatur. Passus autem hoc est, et Dionysii vitae terminus. siquidem ea motus est generi nutriendi naturaliter in serviens, nihil enim hoc magisanimalibusquamplantisinest;vitaautem non secundum unam speciem"videturdic;,sed altera, quidem animalibus, altera plantis inest.Contingit igitur et secundum electionem sie assignare ternnnum, ac si univoca, et secundum unam speciem omnis vita diceretur. Nihil autem prohibet et eum qui conspicit æquivocationern,et alterius vult defi. nitionefn assignare,latere non propriam, sed communem utrisque orationem assignare, sed nihil minus si utrovis modo Fecerit, peccavit. Postquam autem quædam latent æquivocorum, interroganti quidem ut univocis utendum.Narn non adaptabitur alterius terminus ad alterum, quare videbitur non distinguendum hoc pacto, oportet enim in omne univocum adaptari,eidem autem respondenti, distinguendum est. Quoniam autem quidam respon.

English

CHAPTER V

On other definitions of place.

Further, if he has assigned one definition common to all things that are said according to equivocation. For univocals are those whose account is one according to the name; therefore the term assigned belongs to none of the things that fall under the name, because it is adapted equally to every equivocal. But this is also what has happened with the definition of Dionysius's life. For it is a movement of the genus naturally serving nutrition; for nothing of this sort is more present in animals than in plants; but life does not seem to be spoken of according to one species, but one is present in animals, another in plants. It happens, then, that one assigns the term both according to choice, as if they were univocals, and as if all life were said according to one species. But nothing prevents one who has noticed the equivocation, and wishes to assign a definition of the other, from failing to notice that he is assigning an account that is not proper but common to both; but none the less, if he has done it either way, he has erred. But since some equivocals escape notice, one must, when answering, treat them as univocals. For the term of the one will not be adapted to the other, and so it will seem that a distinction is not to be made in this way; for it ought to be adapted to every univocal. But to the same respondent, a distinction must be made. But since certain people answer...

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:174 · narrative
Source · Latin

dentium univocum quidem dicunt esseæquivocum, quando non accommodaturadomne assignata oratio, æquivocum autem univocum,etiam si ad utrumque accommodetur,praeconfessioneutendumprotaltbus, aut præcolligendum quod æquivocum, vel univocum, aut utrumque fuerit. Magis enim concedunt non praevidentes, quod futurum est ut accidat. Si autem non facta confessione dixerit aliquis univtlcum æquivocum esse,eo quod non accommodetur et inhocassignata oratio,considerandum si hujus oratioaccommodatur etad reliqua. Nam manifestum quoniam univocumer]tre!iquis;siautem non,plures erunt definitiones reliquis: nam dux secundum nomen orationes accommodabuntur ad eamdem, quae prior assignala est,etquæ posterior.RurEurn si quis definiens aliquid eorum quæ multipliciter dicuntur, et oratio non accommodatur ad omnia,et quia æquivocum esse non concedat, nomen etiam dicat non ad omnia accommoriari,quoniam nec oratio, dicendum ad ()jusffiodi,quod nominatione quidem oportet uti quae tradita est, et quae sequitur, et non dimovere quae talia sunt, tametsi nonnulla dicenda non sint similiter multitudini. si autem alicujus complexorum assignetur terminus, considerandum est auferendo alterius eorum quæ complectunturorationem, si est et reliqua reliqui.

English

For they say that a univocal is equivocal when the account assigned does not fit every case, and that an equivocal is univocal even if it fits both; one must use a prior admission concerning such things, or first gather whether it was equivocal, or univocal, or both. For those who do not foresee what will happen are more ready to concede. But if, without having made the admission, someone says that a univocal is equivocal because the account assigned does not fit in this case, one must consider whether his account also fits the remaining cases. For it is manifest that it will be univocal in the remaining cases; but if not, there will be several definitions for the remaining cases, for the accounts will fit the same name, both the one assigned first and the one assigned later. Again, if someone, in defining one of the things that are said in many ways, and the account does not fit all, and because he does not concede that it is equivocal, says that the name also does not fit all, because neither does the account, one must say in reply to such a person that one ought to use the naming that has been handed down and that follows, and not to disturb things of this sort, even if some things ought not to be said in the same way to the multitude. But if a term is assigned for one of the composite things, one must consider, by removing the account of one of the things that compose it, whether the account of the other belongs to the other.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:175 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam si non, manifestum quoniam neque tota totius: ut si quispiam definivitlineam finalem rectam,finem plani habentis fines,cujus medium superadditur finibus, si finalis lineae oratio est, finis plani habentis fines, rectæ oportet esse reliquurn,cujus medium superadditur finibus; sed infinita neque medium neque fines habet, recta autem est; quare non est reliqua reliqui oratio.AmpJius,si cum sit compositum quod definitur, æquimembris oratio assignetur definitio. Æquimembris autem dicituroratioesse quando quot fuerint composita,tot et in oratione nomina et verba fuerint:necesseestenimin talibus ipporum nominum commutationem fieri aut omnium aut aliquorum,eo quod nihil plura nunc quam prius nominadictasunt; verum oportet eum qui definit,orationem pro nominibus assignare,maxime quidem omnibus, quod si non, at saltem in plurimis. Sic enim et in simplici. bus qui nomen commutat., non definiturus est: ut pro tunica vestem.Amplius autem majus peccatum, si et per ignotiora nomina commutationem fecerit ut pro homine albo,terrigenam candentem; neque enim definivit,cum minus sit clarum quod sie didtur.Considerandum autem et si per commutationem nominum, non idem jam significat. Ut qui contemplativam "scientiam, opinionem contemplativam dixit; nam'opinio scientiae non idem (at oportet,si debet; et totum idem esse); nam contemplativum quidem commune in utrisque orationibus est,reli.

English

For if not, it is clear that neither is the whole [the account] of the whole; as if someone defined a final line as a straight boundary of a plane having boundaries, whose middle is added over the boundaries—if the account of a final line is "boundary of a plane having boundaries," the remainder must belong to the straight [line], namely "whose middle is added over the boundaries"; but the infinite has neither middle nor boundaries, while the straight [line] is [straight]; wherefore the account of the one is not [the account] of the other. Further, if, when the thing defined is composite, an account with equal members is assigned as the definition. An account is said to have equal members when, as many as the components are, so many names and verbs are in the account; for in such cases it is necessary that a substitution of the names themselves occur, either of all or of some, since no more names are now stated than before; but the one who defines ought to assign the account in place of the names, most of all in all cases, but if not, at least in most. For thus also in simple cases the one who substitutes a name will not be defining, as "garment" for "tunic." Further, it is a greater fault if he makes the substitution even through less known names, as for "white man," "earth-born shining one"; for he has not defined, since what is thus stated is less clear. One must also consider whether through the substitution of names it no longer signifies the same thing. As he who said "contemplative opinion" for "contemplative knowledge"; for opinion is not the same as knowledge (as it ought to be, if it is to be the same as the whole); for "contemplative" is indeed common in both accounts, but the rest—

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:176 · narrative
Source · Latin

quum vero differens.Amplius,si alterius nominum commutationem faciens,non differentiæ,sed generis commutationem|fecit: ut in eo quod nuper dictum est, ignotius enim contemplativa quam scientia: nam hoc qnidem genus, illud autem differentia, omnibus autem notius genus,nam cornmunis;quare non generis, sed differentiae oportebat commutationem fieri, eo quod ignotior est. An hæc quidem ridicuJa reprehensio? nihil enim probibet differentiam quidem notissimo nomine dici, genus autem non. Sic autem rebus se habentibus manifestum quoniam generis, et non differentiae secundum nomen cornmutatio facienda,' si autem non nomen pro nomine,sed orationem pro nomine commutat, manifestum quoniam differentiae magis quam generis definitio assignanda est, eo quod cognoscendi gratia definitio assignalur, nam minus differentiaquarn genus nota Si autem differentiae terminum assignavit, considerandum si et alicujus alius communis est assignatus terminus: ut cum imparem numerum, numerum medium habentem dixerit,determinandum est quo pacto medium habentem: nam numerus quidem communis in utrisque orationibus est.Imparis autem coassumpta est oratio; habent autem et linea et corpus medium, cum non sint imparia, quare non utiqueerit definitio hæe imparis. Si autem u ltipliciter dicitur med ium habens,determi nand um quomodo medium haben8,alioqui reprehensio erit, aut syllogismus, quod non definivit.

English

But when it is different. Further, if in making an exchange of names for something else he has made an exchange not of the differentia but of the genus—as in what was said just now, for contemplative is less known than knowledge; for the latter is a genus, the former a differentia, and the genus is more known to all, for it is common; therefore the exchange ought to have been made not of the genus but of the differentia, because it is less known. Or is this indeed a ridiculous objection? For nothing prevents the differentia from being expressed by a most known name, while the genus is not. But since matters stand thus, it is clear that the exchange according to name should be made of the genus and not of the differentia. If, however, he exchanges not a name for a name but an account for a name, it is clear that the definition should be assigned to the differentia rather than to the genus, because the definition is assigned for the sake of knowing, for the differentia is less known than the genus. But if he has assigned the term of the differentia, one must consider whether the term assigned is also common to something else—as when he has called odd number a number having a middle; one must determine in what way it has a middle, for number is common in both accounts. But the account of odd has been assumed along with it; yet a line and a body also have a middle, though they are not odd, so that this will not be the definition of odd. But if having a middle is said in many ways, one must determine in what way it has a middle; otherwise there will be an objection, or a syllogism, that he has not defined it.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:177 · narrative
Source · Latin

Rursum si id cujus quidem orationem assignavit est eorum quae sunt, quod autem sub oratione, non eorum qua? sunt: ut si album quispiam definivit colorem igni permixtum, impossibile enim incorporeum corpori permisceri; quare non ent color igni permixtus,attamen album est.Amplius,quicunquenon dividunt in iis quæ sunt ad aliquid ad quod dicitur, sed in pluribus comprehendentes dicunt,aut omnino, aut in aliquo falsum dicunt: ut si quis medicinam disciplinam entis dixit. Nam si nullius entium medicina est disciplina,manifestum quoniam totaoratio men. dax est; si autem alicujus quidem,alicu,jus autem non, in aliquo mendax: nam oportet de omni, siquidem per se, et non secundum accidens entis esse dicitur, quemadmodum in aliis se habent ea Quae ad aliquid sunt, nam omne disciplinatum ad disciplinam dicitur. Similiter autem et in aliis, eo quod convertuntur omnia ad aliquid.Omne enim disciplinatum, ad aliquid. Caeterum si is (qui non per se, sed secundum accidens assignationem fecit.) recte assignavit, non ad unum, sed ad plura unumquodque eorum quae ad aliquid dicuntur,assignavit,nihil enim prohibet idem, et ens, et album, et bonum esse; quare qui ad quodlibet horum assi. gnavil,recte assignavit, 3iquidem is qui secundum accidens assignavit, recte assignavit.

English

Again, if the thing whose account he has assigned is among the things that exist, but the thing placed under the account is not among the things that exist—as if someone defined white as color mixed with fire; for it is impossible for an incorporeal thing to be mixed with a body, and therefore color mixed with fire will not exist, yet white does. Further, all who do not divide, in the case of relatives, the thing to which it is said in relation, but speak by comprehending it under many things, say what is false either altogether or in some respect—as if someone said that medicine is the discipline of being. For if medicine is the discipline of no being, it is manifest that the whole account is false; but if it is of some being and not of another, it is false in some respect. For it must be of every being, if indeed it is said to be of being per se and not according to accident, just as relatives are disposed in other cases; for every thing knowable is said in relation to knowledge. And similarly in other cases, because all relatives are convertible. For every thing knowable is relative. But if he who made the assignment not per se but according to accident assigned correctly, he assigned not to one but to many things each of those which are said in relation; for nothing prevents the same thing from being both a being and white and good. Therefore he who assigned it to any one of these assigned correctly, since he who assigned according to accident assigned correctly.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:178 · narrative
Source · Latin

Præterea autem impossibile eslh:Jjusmo Ii orationem)ropriam assignati esse,nam non solum rnedicina,sed plures aliarum disciplinarum ad ens dicuntur: quare una quæqueentis disciplina erit; mauifestumigiturquoniam talis nullius est disciplinæ defini tio,propriam enim et non communem "portet definitionem esse. Quandoque autem definiunt non rern,sed rem bene se habentem aut perfectam.Talis autem et rhetoris et furis terminus,si sit rhetorquidem,qui potest quod in unoquoque est verisimile considerare, et nibil prætermiltere; fur autem qui clam sumit: perspicuum enim quoniam cum talis uterque,hic quidem bonus rbetor,ille autem bonus fur erit: non enim qui clam sumit, sed qui vult clam sumere fur est. Rursum si quod propterse eligendum est,ut activum vel E'lfeClivum,vel quolibeidmodo propter aliud eligendum assignavit:ut qui,justitiamlegum conserva' tivam dixit,aut sapientiameffectivam felici ta tis: nam conservativum et effectivu eorum sunt quae propter aliud eliguntur. An nibil quidem probibet quod propter se eligendum est,pt propter aliud esse eligendum; attamen nihil minus peccavitqui sicdeHnivit quod propter se est eligendum:nam unicuiquc optimum, in substantia maxime, melius autem quod propter se eligend um, quam quod propter aHud; quare id et definition em oportebit magis sisniScare.

English

Further, it is impossible that this be the proper account of it; for not only medicine but many of the other disciplines are spoken of in relation to being; hence each of them will be the discipline of being. It is evident, therefore, that such a definition belongs to no discipline, for a definition must be proper and not common. Sometimes, however, they define not the thing but the thing in a good or perfect state. Such is the definition of the rhetorician and of the thief—if a rhetorician is one who can consider what is persuasive in each particular case and omit nothing, while a thief is one who takes secretly; for it is clear that, when each is such, the one will be a good rhetorician and the other a good thief; for it is not the one who takes secretly but the one who wishes to take secretly who is a thief. Again, if he has assigned as the definition something choiceworthy for its own sake—as active or productive, or in any way choiceworthy for the sake of something else—as one who said that justice is the preserver of laws, or that wisdom is the producer of happiness; for a preserver and a producer are of things that are choiceworthy for the sake of something else. Now nothing prevents that which is choiceworthy for its own sake from also being choiceworthy for the sake of something else; nevertheless, he who thus defined that which is choiceworthy for its own sake has erred none the less; for the best for each thing is in its substance most of all, and that which is choiceworthy for its own sake is better than that which is choiceworthy for the sake of something else; wherefore the definition ought rather to signify this.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:179 · narrative
Source · Latin

CAPUT VI.

De definitione loci alii.

Considerandum autem est et si is qui aticujusdefinitionem assignavit, aut h'ec,au quod est ex bis, aut hoc cum illo definivit.Narn si baec quidem,accidet utrisque et neutri inesse,ut si justitiam,temperantiam et fortitudinem definiverit;nam si sint duo, uterque autem alterum habeat,utrique justi erunt, et neuter,eo quod utrique quidem habent justitiam, uterque autem non habet.Si autem nondum quod dictum est admodum absurdum videtur,eo quod et in aliis accidat hujusmodi (nihil enim probibet ulrosque habere unam, cum neuter habeat), attamen contraria inessc cidem,omnino absurdum videbitur esse.Accidet autem hoc si hic quidem ipsorum temperantiam et timiditatem habet,ille autem fortitudinem et prodigalitatem, nam utrique et justitiam et itjjustitiam babent.

English

CHAPTER VI.

On other [faults] in a definition.

One must also consider whether the person who has assigned a definition of something has defined either these things, or what is composed of them, or this together with that. For if it is these things, it will happen that they belong to both and to neither, as if someone has defined justice as temperance and courage; for if there are two [persons], and each has the other, both will be just, and neither will be, in that both indeed have justice, but each does not. But if what has been said does not yet seem quite absurd, because such a thing also happens in other cases (for nothing prevents both from having one thing when neither has it), yet that contraries be present in the same thing will seem altogether absurd. But this will happen if one of them has temperance and cowardice, and the other courage and prodigality; for both have justice and injustice.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:180 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam si justitia, temperantia etfortitudo eSI, el injustitia timiditaset prodigalitas erit,et omnino quæcunque ad argumentandum idonea quod non idem sunt et partes et totum, omnia utilia ad id quod dictum est; videtur autem qui sic definit partes,toli easdem dicere esse.Maxime autem accommodatae fiunt orationes, in quibuscunque rnanifesta partiu est com positio,quemadmodum in domo et in cæteris talibus; manifestum enim quoniam cunt sint partes, nihil prohibet totum nou esse, quare non idem partes toti.Si autem non haec, sed quod ex his est,dixit id esse quod definitur, primum quidem considerandum si non natum est quidpiam unum fieri ex iis quae dicta sunt.Quædam enim sic se habentad invicem, ut nihil exeis unum quidpiam fiat,ut linea et numerus.Amplius, si definitum quidem in uno aliquo natum est primo fieri, ex quibus autem dixit ipsum esse,non in uno primo nata suut fieri,sed utrumque in ulroque.Nam manifestum quoniam non erit ex iis illud; in quibus enim partes,et totum necesse est inesse;quare non in uno totum primo esse, sed in pluribus.

English

For if justice is temperance and courage, then injustice will be timidity and prodigality, and in general all things that are useful for arguing that the parts and the whole are not the same—all are useful for what has been said; but he who defines in this way seems to say that the parts are the same as the whole. But speeches are most fitting in those cases in which the composition of the parts is manifest, as in a house and other such things; for it is manifest that, since there are parts, nothing prevents the whole from not being [the parts], and therefore the parts are not the same as the whole. But if he did not say that these are what is defined, but rather what is composed of them, first indeed one must consider whether something one is naturally able to come to be from the things that have been stated. For some things are related to one another in such a way that nothing one comes to be from them, as a line and a number. Further, if the thing defined is naturally able to come to be first in some one thing, but the things from which he said it is are not naturally able to come to be first in one thing, but each in both—for it is manifest that it will not be from these; for in whatever things there are parts, the whole must also be present; therefore the whole is not first in one thing, but in many.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:181 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si autem et partes et totum in uno aliquo primo, considerandum si non in eodem,i:;ed in allero totum, et in altero partes. Nam in quo tatum, in il'.o et partes esse videntur.Rursum,Bi cum toto corrumuntur partes. E converso enim oportet accidere, partibus corruptis,lotum corrumpi; toto vero corrupto,non necesse est et partes corrumpi.Aut si totum quidem bonum vel malum,partes autem neutrae; aut e converso,partes quidem bonæ vel mala?, totum autem neutrum.Nam neque ex neutris posaibile bonum quidpiam vel malum fieri,neque ex bonis vel malis neutrum. Aut si magis quidem alterum bonum quam alterum malum,quod autem ex his, non magis bonum quam malum,ut si imprudentia ex fortitudine et falsa opinione; magis enim bonum fortitudo quam malum falsa opinio.Oportet ergo et quod ex hisest sequi illud quod magis est, et esse vel simpliciter honum,vel magis bonum quam malum.An hoc quidem nun necessarium,nisi utrumque sit per se bonum vel malum? muIta enim efl'ectivorum persequtdem nonsunt bona, mixta autemquibusdam fiunt bona,auteconverso utrumque quidem bonum,mixta autem malum vel neutrum.

English

But if both the parts and the whole are in some one primary thing, one must consider whether they are not in the same thing, but the whole in one and the parts in the other. For the parts seem to be in that in which the whole is. Again, if the parts are destroyed together with the whole. For the converse ought to happen: when the parts are destroyed, the whole is destroyed; but when the whole is destroyed, it is not necessary that the parts also be destroyed. Or if the whole is good or evil, but the parts are neither; or conversely, the parts are good or evil, but the whole is neither. For neither can anything good or evil come from things that are neither, nor can a neither from things good or evil. Or if one of them is more good than the other is evil, and what comes from them is not more good than evil—as, for instance, imprudence from courage and false opinion; for courage is more good than false opinion is evil. It is necessary, then, that what comes from these should follow that which is the more, and be either simply good, or more good than evil. Or is this not necessary, unless each is in itself good or evil? For many things that are productive of something are not good in themselves, but when mixed with certain things become good; or conversely, when each is good, the mixture is evil or neither.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:182 · narrative
Source · Latin

Maxime autem manifestumquodnuncdictumestinsalubribus et morbificis,nam quaedam medicamentorum sic se habent,ut utrumque quidem sit bonum,si autem utraque dentur mixta, malum.Rursum,si quod ex meliore et pejore est, non est totum pejore quidem melius, meliore autem pejus.An neque hoc necessarium, nisi per sesintex quihus componitur, bona? nam in iis quae non per se sunt bona, nihil probibet totum non fieri bonum,utin iis quae mododicl:1. sunt.Amplius,si cOl);nomine est totum alteri. Non oportet enim,ut neque in syllabis; nulli enim elementorum ex quibus componitur syllaba cognominis est.Amplius, si non dixit modum compositionis. Nonenirnsuf(jciens cstad cognoscendum quod dicHt ex his: nam non quod ex his, sed quod sic ex his, est cujusque cornpositorum su bstantia,ut in domo: non enim si quolibet modo componantur haec, dornus est.Si autem hoc cum illo assign::tvit, prirnum quidem dicendum quod cum hoc ilia aut hoc et illud dicitur, aut quod ex ill is.

English

But what has now been said is most evident in things wholesome and harmful; for some medicines are so disposed that each is good, yet if both are given mixed together, it is bad. Again, whether that which consists of the better and the worse is not, as a whole, better than the worse but worse than the better. Or is not even this necessary, unless the things of which it is composed are good in themselves? For in those things which are not good in themselves, nothing prevents the whole from not becoming good, as in those things which are called by a certain name. Further, if the whole is homonymous with one of its parts. For it is not necessary, as neither in syllables; for none of the elements of which a syllable is composed is homonymous with it. Further, if he has not stated the mode of composition. For it is not sufficient for knowing what he says, that it is from these; for not that which is from these, but that which is so from these, is the substance of each composite thing, as in a house; for it is not a house if these are composed in any way whatever. But if he has assigned this with that, first indeed it must be said that with this those things are said, or this and that, or that which is from them.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:183 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam qui dicit mel cum aqua; vel mel et aquam dicit,vel quod ex melle et aqua, quare si cuilibet eorumquæ dicta suntidem confitebitur esse boc cum ilIo,eadem conveniet dicere quae quidem ad utrumque horum prius dicta sunt.Ampl ius,dividenti quoties dicituralterum cum altero,considerandum si nullo modo hoc cum illo: ut si dicitur alterum cum altero, aut ut in aliquo eodem susceptivo,ut justitia et fortitudo in anima, aut in ioco eodem, aut in tempore eodem, nullo autem modo verum sit quod dictum est in bis,manifestum est quoniam nullius erit assignatadefinitio, eo quod nullo modo hoc cum illoest.Siautem diviso quoties dicitur alterum cum altero, verum erit in eodem tempore utrumque esse, considerandum si contingit non ad eumdem utrumque dici finem i ut si fortitudinem defiQivitaudaciam cum recta intelJigentia,contingit enim audaciam quidem habere spoliandi,rectam autem intelligentiam circa salubria, sed nondum fortis qui in eodem tempore,cum illo hoc habet.Amplius, si et ad idem ambo dicuntur, ut ad medicativa,Nibil enim prohibet et audaciam quamdam,et rectam intelligentiam habere ad medicativa, attamen nec sic fortis qui hoc cum illo habet; neque enim ad alterum eorum utrumque oportet dici,neque ad idem quodcunque sit, sed ad fortitudinis finem, ut ad praeliorum pericula, aut si quid magis est illius ilnis.QuædaOl autem sic assignatorum nullo modo sub dictam cadunt divisionem,

English

For he who says "honey with water," or says "honey and water," or "that which is from honey and water"—if he will admit that this same thing is with that, it will be consistent to say the same things that were said before about each of these two. Further, whenever "the one with the other" is said in division, one must consider whether in no way is this with that; for if "the one with the other" is said either as in some same receptive thing, as justice and courage in the soul, or in the same place, or in the same time, but what has been said in these is in no way true, it is evident that no definition will have been assigned to it, because in no way is this with that. But if, when "the one with the other" is said in division, it will be true that both are in the same time, one must consider whether it happens that both are not said in relation to the same end—as if someone defines courage as boldness with right understanding; for it happens that boldness has to do with plundering, but right understanding with things wholesome, yet he is not yet courageous who has this with that at the same time. Further, if both are said in relation to the same thing, as to medicine—for nothing prevents a certain boldness and right understanding from being directed to medicine—still not even so is he courageous who has this with that; for it is not necessary that both be said in relation to one of them, nor to the same thing whatever it may be, but to the end of courage, as to the dangers of battles, or if there is anything more proper to it. But certain of those assigned in this way fall in no way under the division stated.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:184 · narrative
Source · Latin

ut si ira tristitia est cum opinione parvipendendi: nam quod propter hujusmodi opinionem tristitia ilt, hoc vult indicare; propter hoc autem fieri aliquid, non est idem ei quod est hoc quidem cum illo esse secundum ullum dictorum, modorurn, Rursum, si horum compositionem dixit totum: ut animæ et corporis compositionem animal. Primum quidem considerandum si non dixit qualis compositio; ut si carnem definiens, aut os, ignis et aeris et terrae dixit composilionem.Non enim sufticit compositionem dicere,sed qua? et qualis determinandum.Non enim quolibet modo compositis his caro fit, sed sic quidem compositis caro,sic vero os. Videlur autem neque esse omnino compositioni idem neutrum eorum quæ dicta sunt,nam compositioniomni dissolutio contraria,dictorum autem neutri, nihil. Amplius, si similiter est verisimile omne compositum compositionem esse,vel nullum;animalium autem unuruquodque cum sit compositurn, non est compositio,neque profecto aliorum compositorum ullum compositio erit.Rursum,si similiter in aliquo nata sunt esse contraria, definivit autem per alterum, manifestum quoniam non definivit. Si autem non ita est, plures accidet ejusdem definitiones esse; quid enim magis qui per hoc quam qui per alterum dedmens dixit?

English

For example, if anger is sadness with the opinion of slighting; for he wishes to indicate that sadness arises on account of an opinion of this sort; but "to come to be on account of this" is not the same as "this to be with that" according to any of the ways mentioned. Again, if he said that the whole is the composition of these things, as the animal is the composition of soul and body. First, indeed, one must consider whether he did not say what sort of composition it is; for example, if in defining flesh or bone he said it is a composition of fire and air and earth. For it is not enough to say "composition," but one must determine of what and of what sort. For flesh does not come to be when these things are composed in any random way, but when composed in this way it is flesh, and in that way it is bone. But it seems that composition is not altogether the same as either of the things that were mentioned; for dissolution is contrary to every composition, but to neither of the things mentioned is it anything. Further, if it is similarly plausible that every composite is a composition, or that none is; but each of the animals, since it is composite, is not a composition, then surely none of the other composites will be a composition either. Again, if contraries are naturally present in something in a similar way, but he defined it through one of them, it is manifest that he did not define it. But if this is not so, it will turn out that there are several definitions of the same thing; for why is the one who defined it through this rather than the one who defined it through the other said to have defined it?

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:185 · narrative
Source · Latin

eo quod similiter utraque nata sunt fieri in eodem.Talis autem animae est definitio, siquidem estosubstantia disciplillæ susceptiva, nam similiter et ignorantiae est susceptiva. Oportet autem si non ad totam habeat aliquis argumentari definitionern, eo quod non tota sit tota, ad aliquam partium argumentari si sit nota,et non bene assignata appareat, nam parte interempta,ettotadefinitio interimitur,Quæcunque autem obscurae sunt definitionum emendanti et conformanti ad manifestandum aliquid et habendum argumentum, sic considerandum.Necesse est enim respondentem aut suscipere quod sumptum est ab mterrogante, aut eumdem declarare quid temere est ostensum adefinitione.Amplius,quemadmodum in congregationibus solent legem inducere,et si sit melior quæ inducitur, interimit anteriorern,sic et in definitionibus faciendum,et definitio alia ferenda.Nam si appareL melior, et magis manifestum quod definitur, perspicuum quoniam interempta erit quæ posita est, eo quod non sunt ejusdem plures definitiones. Ad omnes autem definitiones non minimum elementum ad seipsum,solerter definire propositum, aut apte dictum tercninum assumere.Necesseest enim veluti ad exemplar considerantem,et quod minustest;iis quae oportet habere definitionem,et quod oppositum est superflue,inspicere,ut magis argumentis abundemus.Quæ igitur circa definitiones sunt., in tantum dicta sint.

English

Because both are naturally able to come to be in the same thing. Such is the definition of the soul, if indeed it is substance receptive of discipline; for in like manner it is also receptive of ignorance. But if someone does not argue against the whole definition on the ground that the whole is not the whole, he ought to argue against some of its parts, if it is known and does not appear to be well assigned; for when a part is destroyed, the whole definition is also destroyed. But all definitions that are obscure, for one who is correcting and conforming them so as to make something manifest and to have an argument, must be considered as follows. For the respondent must either accept what has been assumed by the questioner, or himself make clear what has been rashly shown by the definition. Moreover, just as in assemblies they are accustomed to introduce a law, and if the one introduced is better, it destroys the earlier one, so also must it be done in definitions, and another definition must be brought forward. For if it appears better and what is being defined is more manifest, it is clear that the one that has been posited will be destroyed, because there are not several definitions of the same thing. But for all definitions, no small element is to define the proposed thing skillfully oneself, or to assume a term aptly stated. For one must, as it were looking to a model, consider both what is lacking in those things that the definition ought to have, and what is superfluous in the opposite, so that we may abound more in arguments. Let what has been said about definitions be said to this extent.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:186 · narrative
Source · Latin

LIBER SEPTIMUS.

CAPUT PRIMUM.

De eodem et diuerso loci.

Utrum autem idem an diversum secundum propriissimum eorum (qm dicti suntde eodem) modo-: rum,dicendum (dicebatur autem IJropriissime idem, quod numero unum),considerandum autem ex ca, sibus, et conjugatis, et oppositis. Nam si justitia idem est fortitudini,et justus forti,etjuste fortiter, similiter autem et in oppositis.Nam si hæc eadem, etopposita bis,eadem secund um quamlibet ictarum oppositionum, Nihil enim differt hoc vel hoc modo oppositum sumere, eo quod idem est. Rursum ex effectivis et corruptivis,et generationibus et eorruptionibus,et omnino ex iis quae similiter se habent alterum ad alterum. Nam quaecunque simpliciter eadem, etiam generationes eorum et corruptiones eædem, et effectiva et corruptiva. Considerandum autem et quorum alterum maxime dicitur quodvis esse,si et alterum ipsorum secundum idem maxime dicitur.Sir.ut Xenocrates beatam vitam et studiosam assignavit eamdem,eo quodomniumvitarummaxime eligenda studiosa et beala,llDum enim maxime eligendum et maximum. Similiter et in aliis hujusmodi.Oportet autem utrumque unum numero esse, quod dicitur maximum et maxime eligendum; si autem nOn,non erit ostensum quod idem.

English

BOOK SEVEN.

CHAPTER ONE.

On the topics of the same and the different.

Whether something is the same or different must be discussed according to the most proper of the modes of the same (which have been stated concerning the same); for the most proper same was said to be that which is one in number. But this must be considered from cases, and conjugates, and opposites. For if justice is the same as courage, then the just man is the same as the brave man, and to act justly is the same as to act bravely; and similarly also in opposites. For if these are the same, their opposites are also the same according to whichever of these oppositions. For it makes no difference to take the opposite in this way or in that way, since it is the same. Again, from things productive and destructive, and from generations and corruptions, and generally from things that are related to one another in a similar way. For whatever things are simply the same, their generations and corruptions are also the same, and their productive and destructive causes. One must also consider things of which one is said most of all to be anything, whether the other of them is also said to be the same according to the same. For example, Xenocrates assigned the happy life and the studious life to be the same, because of all lives the studious and happy life is most of all to be chosen; for the most to be chosen and the greatest are the same. Similarly also in other such cases. But it is necessary that both be one in number, that which is said to be greatest and most to be chosen; for if not, it will not have been shown that they are the same.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:187 · narrative
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Non necessarium enirn,si fortissimi Graecorum sunt Peioponnesii,et Lacedæmonii, eosdem esse Peloponnesios Lacedæmoniis,eo quod non unus numero Peloponnesius et Lacedaemonius, sed contineri quidem alterum ab altero necessarium,ut Lacedaemonii aPeioponnesiia; si autem non,accidet seipsis invicem esse meliores si non continentur alteri ab alteris: necesse est enim Peloponnesios meliores esse quam Lacedæmonios,si non continentur alteri ab alteris,, Dam omnibus reliquis sunt meliores.Similiterautem et Lacedaemonios necesse est meliores esse Polopoanesiis, nam et isti omnibus caeteris sunt meliores, quare se invicem meliores fiunt. Manifestum ergo quoniam unum numero esse oportet,quod optimum et maximum dicitur, si debeat quod idem sint ostendi.Propterquod Xenocrates non idem assignavit: non enim uno numero beata et studiosa vita, quapropter non necessarium eamdem esse,eo quod ambae maxime eligendæ, sed altera sub altera. Rursum considerandum si cui alterum idem,et alterum.Nam si non sunt ambo eidem eaderr.,manifestum quoniam nee sjbi invicem,Amplius autem ex iis quæ bis accidunt,et quibus hæc accidunt,considerandurn.Nam quæJunq ue alteri accidunt,et alteri oportet accidere,et quibus alterum eorum accidit., et alterum eorum oportet accidere;si autem aliquid eorum dissonet, dilucidum quoniam non eadem.

English

For it is not necessary, if the Peloponnesians and the Lacedaemonians are the bravest of the Greeks, that the Peloponnesians be the same as the Lacedaemonians, since the Peloponnesian and the Lacedaemonian are not one in number, but it is necessary that the one be contained by the other, as the Lacedaemonians by the Peloponnesians; but if not, it will happen that they are better than one another if the one is not contained by the others; for it is necessary that the Peloponnesians be better than the Lacedaemonians, if the one is not contained by the others, since they are better than all the rest. And similarly it is necessary that the Lacedaemonians be better than the Peloponnesians, for these too are better than all the others; wherefore they become better than one another. It is evident, therefore, that what is said to be the best and greatest must be one in number, if it is to be shown that they are the same. For this reason Xenocrates did not assign them as the same; for the happy life and the studious life are not one in number, wherefore it is not necessary that they be the same, because both are most to be chosen, but the one is under the other. Again, one must consider whether the one is the same as the other and the other as the one. For if both are not the same as the same thing, it is evident that neither are they the same as each other. Moreover, one must consider from the things that belong to both and to which these belong. For whatever belongs to the one must also belong to the other, and to whichever of them the one belongs, the other must also belong; but if any of these is discordant, it is clear that they are not the same.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:188 · narrative
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Videndum autem et si non in uno genere prædicamenti utraque, sed hoc quidem quale, illud autem quantum, vel ad aliquid indicet. Ruranm si genus utrisque non idem, sed hoc quidem bonum, illud autem malum, aut boc quidem virtus, illud autem scientia.Aut si genus quidem idem, difFerentiæ autem non eædem de utroque prædicantur,sed de boc quidem quoniam contemplativa scientia, de illo autem quoniam activa; similiter autem et in aliis. Amplius autem ex rnagis,si hoc quidem suscipit magis,illud autem nOn,aut si ambo suscipiunt quidem, non simul autem. Ut qui magis amat, non magis concupiscit venerem,quare non idem amor et concupiscentia veneris. Amplius ex appositione, si eidem utrumque appositum,non facit idem totum. Aut si eodem ab utroque sublato,quod relinquitur est alterum.Ut si duplum dimidii et multiplum di. midii idem dixerit esse: sublato enim ab utroque dimidio,reliqua idem oporteret indicare; non indicant autem,nam duplum et multiplum non eadem significant.

English

One must also consider whether the two are not in the same genus of predication, but the one indicates of what sort it is, the other how much, or relation. Again, if the genus of both is not the same, but the one is good, the other evil; or the one virtue, the other knowledge. Or if the genus is indeed the same, but the differentiae predicated of each are not the same, but of the one that it is contemplative knowledge, of the other that it is active; and similarly in other cases. Further, from the more: if the one admits of more, the other does not; or if both admit of it, but not at the same time. As he who loves more does not desire sexual pleasure more, wherefore love and the desire of sexual pleasure are not the same. Further, from addition: if both added to the same thing do not make the same whole. Or if, when the same thing is taken away from both, what remains is the other. As if someone should say that the double of a half and the multiple of a half are the same; for when the half is taken away from both, the remaining things ought to indicate the same; but they do not, for double and multiple do not signify the same.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:189 · narrative
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Considerandum autem non solum si jam aliquid accidit impossibile per positionem,sed et si possibile sit ex suppositione existere.Quemadmodum iis qui vacuum et plenum aere idem dicunt esse;nam manifestum quoniam si exeat aer,vacuum quidem non minus,sed magis eril,plenum autem aere non amplius erit; quare supposito aliquo sive vero,sive falso (nibil enim refert.), si alterum interimitur, alterum autem non, profecto non idem sunt. Universałiter autem dicendo ex iis quae quovis modo de utroque prædicantur,el de quibus hæc prædicantur, cousiderandum si alicubi dissonent.Nam quaecunque de altero prædicantur, et de allero praedicari oportet, et de quibus alterum prædicatur, et alterum praedicari oportet.Amplius,quia multipliciter idem dicitur,considerandum si secundum alium aliquem modum eadem sunt. Nam specie vel genere eadem, non necesse est numero eadem esse;consideramu autem utrum sic eadem, an non sic.Amplius, si potest alterum siue altero esse,non erit enim idem ad idem. Igitur loci tot dicuntur.

English

One must consider not only whether something impossible has already resulted from the positing, but also whether it is possible for it to exist from the supposition. For example, in the case of those who say that void and full are the same as air; for it is clear that if the air departs, the void will be no less but rather more, while the full will no longer be air; therefore, when something has been supposed, whether true or false (for it makes no difference), if one is destroyed and the other is not, they are assuredly not the same. And speaking universally, from the things that are predicated in any way of both, and of the things of which these are predicated, one must consider whether they disagree anywhere. For whatever things are predicated of the one ought also to be predicated of the other, and whatever things the one is predicated of, the other ought also to be predicated of. Moreover, since "the same" is said in many ways, one must consider whether they are the same according to some other mode. For things that are the same in species or genus are not necessarily the same in number; but we consider whether they are the same in this way or not. Moreover, if the one can be without the other, then it will not be the same as the same. So many loci are thus stated.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:190 · narrative
Source · Latin

CAPUT II.

De eadem definitione loci alii.

Palam autem ex iis quae dicta sunt, quoniam omnes qui ad idem sunt destructivi loci,et ad terminum utiles sunt,qllemadmodum prius dictum est. Nam si non idem indicet et nomen et oratio, manifestum quoniam non erit definitio assignataoratto. Constructil'orum autem locorum nullus utilis ad terminum. Non enim sufficit ostendere idem quod sub oratione et nomine est ad construendum quoniam definitio, sed et alia oportet omnia habere (quæ praecepta sunt) definitionem;interimere igitur definilionem sic et per haec semper tentandum.Si autem construere volumus, primum quidem scire oporlet quoniam nullus vel pauci disputantium terminum syllogismo colligunt, sed omnes principium quod tale est accipiunt, ut qui circa geometriam, et numeros,et alias hujusmodi disciplinas. Deinde quoniam exacte quidem alterius est negotii assignare, et quid est terminus, et quomodo definire oportet. Nunc autem, quantum sufficitad praesentem utilitatem, tantum solum dicendum quoniam possibile fieri definitionis, et ejus quod quid est, esse syllogismum. Nam si terminus est oratio quæ quid est esse rei indicat, et oportet ea quae in termino ponuntur, in eo quod quid est de re sola prædicari,prædicanlur autem sola in eo quod quid est,genera et differentiæ.

English

CHAPTER II.

On the same definition of place, other points.

It is clear from what has been said that all destructive topics that lead to the same point are also useful for the term, just as was said earlier. For if both the name and the account do not indicate the same thing, it is clear that the definition assigned by the account will not be a definition. But none of the constructive topics is useful for the term. For it is not enough, in order to establish a definition, to show that the same thing is signified by the account and the name, but the definition must also have all the other requirements that have been laid down. Therefore one must always attempt to destroy a definition in this way and by these means. But if we wish to construct one, we must first know that none, or few, of those who argue collect the term by syllogism, but all take such a principle as given, as do those who work in geometry, numbers, and other such disciplines. Next, that to assign exactly what the term is and how one ought to define belongs to another undertaking. But now, as far as suffices for present usefulness, only this much need be said: that it is possible for a syllogism of a definition, and of what a thing is, to come about. For if a term is an account that indicates what it is for a thing to be, and the things posited in the term must be predicated in the what-it-is of the thing alone, and only genera and differentiae are predicated in the what-it-is.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:191 · narrative
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Manifestum quoniam siquis sumat ea quæsolum de re in eo quod quid est prædicari oportet, quod hæc bnbens oratio, terminus ex necessitate erit, non enim contingit aliud esse terrninum,eo quod nihil aliud in eo quod quid est de re prædicatur;quod igitur possibile est ex termino syllogismum fieri manifestum.Exquibusauteæ oportet construere, determinatum est quidem in aliis diligentius,ad propositam autem methodum iidem loci utiles.Inspiciendum enim in contrariis et in aliis oppositis, et totas orationes, et secundum partem consideranti.Nam si opposita oppositæ, et eam (quæ dicta est)propositi necesse est esse.Quoniarn autem contrariorum plures complexiones,sumenda est ex contrariisqualiscunquemaximeapparebit contraria defi nitio;totas igitur definitiones,quemadmodum di. ctum est,considerandum.Secundum parterr: autem hoc pacto,primum quidem quoniam assignatum genus recte assignatum cst.Nam si contrarium in contrario, propo;itum autem nun est in eodem, manifestum quoniam in contrario erit,eo quod necesse est contraria in eodem genere vel in contrariis generibus esse.

English

It is clear that if one takes the things that ought to be predicated solely of the thing in respect of what it is, then the account containing these will necessarily be a definition; for it is not possible for it to be anything else, since nothing else is predicated of the thing in respect of what it is. That a syllogism can be made from a definition is therefore clear. From what things one ought to construct it has indeed been determined more carefully elsewhere, but for the proposed method the same topics are useful. For one must examine contraries and other opposites, both whole accounts and accounts considered part by part. For if the opposite belongs to the opposite, the proposed predicate must also belong to the subject stated. Since, however, there are several combinations of contraries, one must take from the contraries the definition that appears most contrary in whatever way; whole definitions, then, must be considered as has been said. Part by part, however, in this way: first, that the assigned genus has been correctly assigned. For if the contrary is in the contrary, and the proposed subject is not in the same, it is clear that it will be in the contrary, since contraries must be in the same genus or in contrary genera.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:192 · narrative
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Et dilferl'ntias quidem contrarias de contrariis arbitramur prædicari,ut de albo et nigro: nam illud quidem disgregativum,hocautemcongregativum vi!:!Usjquare si de contrario contrariae prædicantur,de proposito quae assignatæ sunt prædicabuntur; quapropter quia et genus et differentias recte assignata sunt,manifestum quoniam definitio erit quae assignata est, An non necessarium est de contrariia differentias prædicari, nisi in eodem genere sint contraria2quorum autem genera sunt contraria,nibil prohibet eamdem differentiam de utrisque dici,ut de justitia et injustitia:uarn illa quidem virtus,hæc autem vitium animæ.Quare id quod est anima, differentia de utrisque dicitur, eo quod et corporis est virtus et vitium jsed hoc verum quod contrariorum,aut contrariæ,aut eædem differentiae sunt; si ergo de contrario contraria prædicatur,de hoc autem non,manifestum quoniam quae dicta est de boc prædicabitur. Universaliter autem dicendo, si definitio est ex genere et differentiis,si sit contra.

English

We consider that contrary differentiae are predicated of contraries, as of white and black; for the one is dispersive and the other congregative to sight. Therefore, if contrary differentiae are predicated of a contrary, the differentiae assigned will be predicated of the proposed subject; wherefore, since both the genus and the differentiae have been correctly assigned, it is clear that what has been assigned will be a definition. Or is it not necessary that differentiae be predicated of contraries, unless the contraries are in the same genus? But for those whose genera are contrary, nothing prevents the same differentia from being said of both, as of justice and injustice; for the one is a virtue and the other a vice of the soul. Therefore that which is the soul is said as a differentia of both, because it is both the virtue and the vice of the body; but this is true, that of contraries the differentiae are either contrary or the same. If, then, a contrary is predicated of a contrary, but not of this, it is clear that what has been stated will be predicated of this. And speaking universally, if the definition is from genus and differentiae, if it be of a contrary.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:193 · narrative
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rii definitio manifesta, et quae propositi definitio manif'esta erit.Nam quoniam contrarium in eodem genere,vel in contrario,simiIiter autem et differentiae aut contrariae de contrariis, aut eaedem prædicantur, dilucidum quoniam de proposlto,aut idem genus prædicabilur quod de contrario; differentiae autem contrariæ, vel omnes, vel aliquae; reliquæ autem eaedem autcontra,differenliæ quidem eaedem, genera vero contraria,aut ambo contraria,efgenera et differentiæ:nam eadem esse ambo non contingit; si autem secus,definitio eadem contrariorum erit, Amplius,ex casibus et conjugatis. Necesse est enim consequi genera generibus,et terminos terminis,ut si oblivio est scientiae amissio,et oblivisci amittere scientiam erit,et oblitum esse amisisse scielltiam. Uno igitur quolibet eorum quae dicta sunt confesso, necesse est et reliqua confiteri.Similiter autem et si corruptio dissolutio substantiæ,et corrumpere dissolvere substantiam, et corruptive dissolutive, si corruptivum dissolutivum substantiæ,et corruptio substantiae dissolutio. Similiter autem et in aliis. Quare uno quovis sumpto, et reliqua omnia conflteantur oportet.

English

For the definition of the contrary will be manifest, and the definition of the proposed term will be manifest. For since a contrary is in the same genus, or in a contrary genus, and likewise differentiae are predicated of contraries either as contraries or as the same, it is clear that of the proposed term either the same genus will be predicated as of its contrary, or contrary differentiae, either all or some; and the rest are either the same or contrary—the differentiae the same, but the genera contrary, or both contrary, both the genera and the differentiae; for it cannot happen that both are the same. Otherwise, the definition of contraries would be the same. Further, from cases and conjugates. For genera must follow genera, and terms follow terms: as, if forgetfulness is the loss of knowledge, then to forget will be to lose knowledge, and to have forgotten will be to have lost knowledge. Therefore, when any one of the things said is granted, the rest must also be granted. Likewise, if corruption is the dissolution of substance, then to corrupt is to dissolve substance, and corruptive is dissolutive; if corruptive is dissolutive of substance, then the corruption of substance is its dissolution. Likewise also in other cases. Wherefore, when any one is assumed, all the rest must be granted.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:194 · narrative
Source · Latin

Et ex similiter se habentibus ad invicem.Nam si salubre est effectivum sanitatis, et habile effectivum bonæ habitudinis erit,etadjutivum effectivum boni:nam similiter unumquodque eorum quae dicta sunt ad suum finem se habet; quare si unius eorum definitio est effeclivum esse finis, et reliquorum cujusque sic erit definitio.Amplius, ex eo quod est magis et similiter, quod est similiter, quoties contingit construere duas ali duo comparantem, Ut si magis haec hujus quam ista istius definitio,ista autem que? minus,definitio est, et haec quae magis, et si similiter haec hujus, et ista istius, si altera alterius, et reliqua reliquæ. Una autem defi. nitio ad duo cornparata,aut duabus dofinitionibus ad unum.neutiquam utilis ea quæ ex magis est consideratio. Nam neque unam duorum, neque duas ejusdem definitiones possibile estesse.Suntautemopportunissimi locorum,et qui nunc dicti sunt,et qui ex casibus, et qui ex conjugatis, quocirca et oportet maxime detinere et promptos habere hos.UtiFssimi enim ad plurima.Aliorum autem hi qui maxime sunt communes. Nam illi maxime reliquorum efficacis. simi, ut inspicere in singularibus, et in speciebus considerare,si conveniat definitio, eo quod univoca species est; est autem utilis hic locus ad eos qui ponunt ideas esse,quemadmodum prius dictum est.

English

And from things that are similarly related to one another. For if the healthful is productive of health, the capable will also be productive of good condition, and the helpful productive of good; for each of the things mentioned is similarly related to its end; wherefore if the definition of one of them is to be productive of the end, the definition of each of the rest will likewise be so. Further, from the more and similarly, that which is similarly, whenever it happens to establish two things by comparing two, as if the definition of this is more [the definition] of this than that is of that, but that one is less a definition, then this one which is more is also a definition, and if this is similarly [the definition] of this, and that of that, if one is of one, the rest also is of the rest. But one definition compared to two, or two definitions compared to one, the consideration from the more is in no way useful. For it is not possible for one to be the definition of two, nor two of the same thing. And the most serviceable of topics are both those now stated and those from cases and those from conjugates; wherefore one ought most of all to hold fast and have these ready. For they are most useful for many purposes. But of the others, those which are most common. For those are most effective of the rest, such as to inspect in particulars and to consider in species whether the definition fits, because the species is univocal; and this topic is useful against those who posit that ideas exist, as was said earlier.

tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:195 · narrative
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Amplius,si per metaphoram dixit nomen, vel idem de eodem prædicavit ut diversum, et si quis alius communis et efficax 10corum,iIlo utendum.

CAPUT III.

De constructione et destructione prædicatorum loci.

Quoniam autem difficilius est construere quam destruere terminum,ex iis quae postea dicentur,manife8tum. Nam nosse ipsum, et sumere ab mterrogantibus uj usmodi proposil iones non facile,ut quod eorum quae sunt in assignata oratione boc quidem genus,illud autem differentia,et quod in eo quid est, genus et differentia? prædicantur.Sine bis vero impossibile est definitionis syllogismum fieri, nam si quaedam et alia in eo quod quid est de re prædicant, incertum utrumne, quæ dicta est,an alia eus einitio est, eo quod de6nitio est oratio quod est indicans. Manifestum autem et etiam ex his, nam facilius unum concludere quam multa,interimenti quidem sufficitad unum disserere.Unum enim quodcumque sit,destruentes,interempluri sumua terminum; at construenti,omnia necesse est construere quod insint, quæ in termino BUnt.

English

Further, if he used a name by metaphor, or predicated the same thing of the same thing as though it were different, and if there is any other common and effective [principle] of these things, it must be used.

CHAPTER III.

The topics of constructing and destroying predicates.

Since it is more difficult to construct than to destroy a term, this will be clear from what is said afterwards. For to know it and to take up propositions of this sort from those who ask questions is not easy—for instance, that of the things contained in the assigned speech, this is the genus and that the differentia, and that the what-it-is is predicated as genus and differentia. Without these it is impossible for a syllogism of definition to be made; for if certain other things also are predicated of the thing in respect of what it is, it is uncertain whether the definition stated is [the definition] or another, since a definition is a speech that indicates what [the thing] is. And it is clear also from these things; for it is easier to conclude one thing than many. For the one who destroys, it suffices to argue against one thing; for by destroying any single one, they will have destroyed the whole term. But for the one who constructs, it is necessary to construct all the things that are present in the term.

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Amplius, construenti quidem universaliter statuendum syltogismum (nam oportet de omni, de quo nomen,prædicari et terminum, et etiam adhuc converti de quo orationem et nomen,si debeat proprius esseasaignatus terminus),destruenti vera non necesse ostendere universaliter: sufficit enim ostendere quod de quopiam eorum quae sub nomine sunt oratio non verificatur, et tametsi universale oporteat destruere, non tamen converti necessarium et in destruendo; nam sufficit destruenti universale, ostendere quod de aliquo eorum de quibus nomen praedicatur oratio non prædicatur, at e converso non necessarium ut ostendatur,quod de quibus oratio non prædicatur, neque nomen prædiceLur.Amplius etiam,si omni ei inest quod sub nomine est,at non soli, interempta est definitio: similiter autem et circa proprium et genus se habet. In utrisque enim destruere quam construere facilius est. De proprio quidem mauifestum, ex iis qua?

English

Further, for one who is constructing a syllogism universally, it must be laid down (for it is necessary that the term be predicated of every thing of which the name is predicated, and also that it be converted of every thing of which the account and the name are [predicated], if the assigned term is to be proper); but for one who is destroying, it is not necessary to show universally: for it suffices to show that the account is not verified of any one of the things that fall under the name, and even if one must destroy a universal, it is not necessary that it be converted in destroying either; for it suffices for one who is destroying a universal to show that the account is not predicated of some one of the things of which the name is predicated, but conversely it is not necessary that it be shown that neither is the name predicated of the things of which the account is not predicated. Further, if it belongs to every thing that falls under the name, but not to that alone, the definition is destroyed; and it is similarly disposed in the case of the proper and the genus. For in both cases it is easier to destroy than to construct. In the case of the proper, indeed, it is manifest from those things which

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dicta sunt, nam ut plurimum in complexione proprium assignatur, quare destruere quidem est,unum interimenti, construenti autem, omnia ratiocinatione colligere necesse est.Pene autem et reliqua omnia quæcunque ad definitionem et ad proprium conveniet dici, nam et omni oportet quod sub nomine est, construenti monstrare quoniam inest,destruenti autem sufficit ostendere uni non inesse; si vero et omni inest, at non soli,etiam si destructum fit,perinde ac et in definitione dicebatur.De genere autem,quoniam construere quidem necesse est uno rnodo,qui omni ostendit inesse,destruenti autem duplidter,nam sive nulli,sive alicui ostensum sit non inesse, interemptum est quod in principio.ltem construenti quidem non sufficit quoniam inest ostendere,sed et quoniam ut genus inest ostendendum, destruenti autem sufficit ostendere non inesse, vel alicui, vel nulli. Videtur autem, quemadmodum in aliis,corrumpere quam facere facilius, sic et in his, destruere quam construere. In accidente vero universale quidem facilius destruere quamconstruere.Nanr construenti quidem ostendendum quoniam omni,destruenti autem sufficit ostendere uni non inesse.

English

What has been said applies here as well, for for the most part a property is assigned in combination; wherefore to destroy is the work of a single refutation, but for one who constructs it is necessary to gather all things by reasoning. And nearly all the other points that pertain to definition and to property will be fittingly stated here too; for in constructing, one must show that it belongs to everything that falls under the name, while in destroying it suffices to show that it does not belong to one thing. But if it belongs to every thing and not to that thing alone, even so the destruction is effected, just as was said in the case of definition. Concerning genus, however: for in constructing it is necessary in one way only, namely by showing that it belongs to every thing; but in destroying, in two ways, for whether it has been shown to belong to none or to some one thing that it does not belong, what was posited at the beginning is destroyed. Likewise, for one who constructs it is not sufficient to show that it belongs, but one must also show that it belongs as a genus; whereas for one who destroys it suffices to show that it does not belong, either to some one thing or to none. And it seems, just as in other matters, that to corrupt is easier than to make, so also in these: to destroy is easier than to construct. In the case of accident, however, it is easier to destroy the universal than to construct it; for in constructing one must show that it belongs to every thing, but in destroying it suffices to show that it does not belong to one thing.

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Particulare vero e converso, nam facilius construere quam destruere.Construenti enim sat est ostendere alicui inesse, destruenti autem ostendendum quoniam nulli inest.Manifestum autem qua de causa omnium facillimum estterminum destruere.Plurima enim sunt ipso data multorum dictorum,ex pluribus autem citius fit syllogismus,nam verisimilein multis magis quam in paucis peccatum fieri.Amplius, ad terminum quidem contingit,et per alia argumentari (sive enim non propria sit definitio, sive non genus quod assignatur, sive non inest aliquod eorum quae sunt in definitione, interempta fit definitio),ad alia autem neque ea quae ex terminis,neque alia contingitomniaargumentari, sola enim ea quae ad accidens,communia suntomnibus praedictis. Inesse enim oportet unumquodque eorum quae dicta sunt; si autem non ut proprium inest genus, nondum interemptum est genus. Similiter autem et proprium non necessarium ut genus inesse, neque accidens ut genus aut proprium, sed inesse tantum; quare non possibile ex aliis ad alia argumentari, nisi in definitione solum.

English

But the particular case is the reverse, for it is easier to construct than to destroy. For to one constructing it is enough to show that it belongs to some one thing, but to one destroying it must be shown that it belongs to none. It is clear for what reason it is easiest of all to destroy a term. For very many things are given by the term itself from many statements, and from more things a syllogism comes about more quickly, for it is more likely that an error occurs in many things than in few. Moreover, in the case of a term it is possible to argue through other things as well (for whether the definition is not proper, or the genus assigned is not [the genus], or some one of the things that are in the definition does not belong, the definition is destroyed), but in the case of other things it is not possible to argue through all things, neither those that come from the term nor others, for only those that pertain to accident are common to all the aforesaid. For each of the things that have been said must belong; but if the genus does not belong as a property, the genus is not yet destroyed. Similarly, neither is it necessary that the property belong as a genus, nor that the accident belong as a genus or a property, but only that it belong; wherefore it is not possible to argue from other things to other things, except in definition alone.

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Manifestum igiturquoniam facillimum omnium est, terminum interimere, construere autem difficillimuro,nam et illa oportet omnia ratiocinatione colligere, et quod insuntqusedictasunt,et quod genus quod assignatum est,quodque propria definitio,et adhuc præter hæc quod indicat quid est esse oratio,et hæc probe oportet fecisse.Aliorum autem proprium maxime hujusmodi.Nam interimere quidem facilius, eo quod ex pluribus plerumque fit.Construere autem difficillimum, quoniam multa oportet. astruere, et adhuc qunniam soli inest,et quoniam conversim praedicatur de re. Facillimum autem omnium construere accidens.Nam in aliis quidem non solum inesse,sed et quoniam sic inest ostendemiurn, in accidente vero quoniam inest duntaxat,sufricit ostendere. Destruere autem difficillimum est acidens,quia quam paucissima in eo data sunt,non enim consignificat in accidente quomodo inest.Quare in aliis quidem dupliciter interimere contingit, vel ostendendo quod non inest,vel quod non sic inest; in accidente vero non contingit interimere nisi ostendendo quod non inest.Loci per quos copiosi erimus ad singula quaeque problematum argumentari,fere sufficienter annumerati sunt.

English

It is manifest, therefore, that it is easiest of all to destroy a term, but to construct it is most difficult. For one must gather all those things by reasoning: both that the attributes stated are present, and that the genus which has been assigned is present, and also the proper definition, and besides these that the account which indicates what it is to be is present, and one must have done these things correctly. But the proper [term] of others is especially of this sort. For to destroy is easier, because it generally comes about from many [points]. But to construct is most difficult, since one must build up many things, and also because it belongs to it alone, and because it is predicated convertibly of the thing. But it is easiest of all to construct an accident. For in the other cases one must show not only that it is present, but also that it is present in this way; but in the case of an accident it is enough to show merely that it is present. But to destroy an accident is most difficult, because the fewest things are given in it, for in an accident it does not signify how it is present. Wherefore in the other cases it is possible to destroy in two ways, either by showing that it is not present, or that it is not present in this way; but in the case of an accident it is not possible to destroy except by showing that it is not present. The topics through which we shall be copious for arguing against each of the problems have been enumerated pretty sufficiently.

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LIBER OCTAVUS.

CAPUT PRIMUM.

Loci ad instruendum imerrogantem.

Post haec autem de ordine et quonam pacto oportet interrogare, dicendum. Oportet autem primum quidem eum qui interrogare debet lucum invenire undesit argumentandum;secundum auteminterrogare et ordinare singula apud seipsum; reliquum vero et tertium dicere jam eadem ad alterum.Quod autem inveniat locum,similiter philosophi et dialectici consideratio,subinde vero illa ordinare et interropare, proprium dialectici; ad alterum enim omne quod tale est. Philosopho autem et quærenti per seipsum nihil curae est si vera quidem sint et nota per quae syllogismus,et non ponat ea quae respondet, eo quod propinqua sint illis quae sunt ex principio, et praevideat quod subsecutum est, sed fortasse et studiose aget,quoniam maxime notæ et propinquae sunt dignitates,ex illis enim scientifici syllogismi. Loci igitur inde oporteat sumere dicti sunt prius.De ordine autem et interrogatione dicendum dividendo propositiones quaecunque sumendae sunt ad necessarias,necessariæ autem dicuntur per quas syllogismus flt.Quae autem ab his sumuntur, quatuor sunt.Aut enim gratia inductionis,ut videtur universale,aut ad magnitudinem orationis, aut ad occultationem conclusionis,aut dilucidior fit oratio; praeter has autem nulla est assumenda propositio, sed per hac augere et interrogare tentandum.

English

BOOK EIGHT.

CHAPTER ONE.

Commonplaces for Instructing the Questioner.

After these things, however, we must speak of order and in what manner one ought to question. First, indeed, the one who is to question ought to find the place from which he is to argue; second, to question and to arrange each thing with himself; the remaining and third part is to say these same things to another. Now to find the place is the consideration of the philosopher and the dialectician alike; but thereafter to arrange those things and to question is proper to the dialectician; for everything of this sort is directed to another. But for the philosopher, who inquires by himself, there is no concern whether the things through which the syllogism is made are true and known, and whether he does not set down the things that the respondent grants, because they are close to those that are from the principle, and whether he foresees what follows; but perhaps he will also act with zeal, since the dignities are most known and close, for from those come scientific syllogisms. The commonplaces, therefore, from which one ought to take them have been stated earlier. But we must speak of order and questioning by dividing the propositions, whatever ones are to be assumed for the necessary ones; and those are called necessary through which the syllogism is made. But those that are assumed besides these are four in number. For they are either for the sake of induction, as the universal seems, or for the magnitude of the speech, or for the concealment of the conclusion, or so that the speech becomes clearer; but besides these no proposition is to be assumed, but one must try to increase and question through these.

Citation. Tergwame, “Topicorum Aristotelis Libri Octo Severino Boethio Interprete”, tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1:1, machine-draft, 2026. https://naxiai.com/christian/works/tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1#s1
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