{"slug":"tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1","id":"latin:ogl-pl:tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1","title":"Topicorum Aristotelis Libri Octo Severino Boethio Interprete","title_source":"Topicorum Aristotelis Libri Octo Severino Boethio Interprete","author":"Boethius. Severinus","genre":"treatise","date":"","tradition":"latin","coverage":"not-located","coverage_claim":{"status":"not-located","text":"No English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed."},"publication":{"status":"machine-draft","reviewed_by":null,"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash:floor","provider":"Baidu","generated":"2026-11-15T22:26:23Z","cost_usd":0.021761},"source":{"registry_id":"latin:ogl-pl:tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1","work_id":"tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1","edition":"ogl-pl","language":"","license":"Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License","url":"https://github.com/OpenGreekAndLatin/patrologia_latina-dev/blob/master/data/tmp1033/tmp1033/tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1.xml"},"stats":{"passages":234,"english_words":63624,"coptic_letters":0,"source_letters":231802,"commentary_units":0,"commentary_kinds":0,"derived_notes":5,"ambiguities":0,"work_notes":0,"external_links":0,"timeline":0},"summary":{},"links":[{"kind":"source","label":"Open Greek and Latin Patrologia Latina","url":"https://github.com/OpenGreekAndLatin/patrologia_latina-dev/blob/master/data/tmp1033/tmp1033/tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1.xml"}],"checks":{"work":"tmp1033.tmp1033.opp-lat1","status":"pass","blocking":[],"warnings":[],"stats":{"passages":234,"translated":234,"commentary_passages":0,"commentary_units":0,"english_words":63624,"source_letters":231383,"commentary_kinds":0},"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash:floor"},"work_notes":[],"derived_work_notes":[{"kind":"coverage","severity":"info","text":"No English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed."},{"kind":"limit","severity":"caution","text":"The English is a machine draft produced passage by passage from the transcribed Latin; no human has verified it. The commentary is model-written and cites only keys the pipeline could resolve."},{"kind":"register","severity":"info","text":"Register: treatise in Latin; the English keeps the liturgical formulae and the vocatives rather than normalising them."},{"kind":"structure","severity":"info","text":"Passages: 234 narrative."},{"kind":"caution","severity":"caution","text":"5 passage(s) are fragmentary in the source; the English bridges each break and says so in the note."},{"kind":"source","severity":"info","text":"Source edition: ogl-pl."},{"kind":"source","severity":"info","text":"Licence: Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License"}],"derived_structure":{"narrative":234},"term_index":[],"citations":{},"segments":[{"i":1,"ref":"p1","source":"TOPICORUM ARISTOTELIS LIBRI OCTO, AN. MANL., SEV. BOETIO INTERPRETE\n\nLIBER PRIMUS.\n\nCAPUT PRIMUM.\n\nPrimi lopicorum libri Aristotelis quæ intentio, et qum ratiocinandi species.\n\nPropositum quidem negotii et methodum invenire per quam poterimus syllogizare de omni proposito problemateex probabilibus, et ipsi disputationem sustinentes nibil dicernus repugnans Primum igiturdicendum quid est syllogismus, et quæ ejus differentiae, quomodo sumatur dialecticus syllogismus; hunc enim quærimus secundum propositum negotium.Est itaque syllogismus oratio in qua positis quibusdam aliquid aIi ud a positis:ex necessitate accidit per ea quae posita sunt. Demonstratio vero est quando ex veris et primis syllogismus erit, aut ex talibus quae per aliqua prima et vera ejus quae circa ipsa est cognitionis principium sumpserunt. Dialecticus aulem sylogismus est qui exprobabilibu est collectus. Sunt autem vera et prima quae non per alia,sed per se ipsa fidem habent. Non enim oportet in disciplinaribus principiis inquirere pro pter quod, sed secundumunumquodqueprincipiorum ipsam per se esse fidem.Probabilia autem sunt quae videntur omnibus, aut plurimis, aut sapientibus, et his vel omnibus, vel plurimis, vel maxime familiaribus et probatis.Litigiosus autem est syllogismus ex iis quae videntur probabilia, non sunt antem. Et qui ex probabilibus quidem, aut ex iis quæ videntur probabilia, est apparens.","english":"THE EIGHT BOOKS OF ARISTOTLE'S TOPICS, TRANSLATED BY ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS\n\nBOOK ONE\n\nCHAPTER ONE\n\nWhat is the intention of the first book of Aristotle's Topics, and what are the kinds of reasoning.\n\nThe purpose of the undertaking and the method to find by which we shall be able to syllogize about every proposed problem from probable premises, and, when we ourselves sustain a disputation, will say nothing contrary. First, therefore, it must be said what a syllogism is, and what its differences are, and how the dialectical syllogism is taken; for this is what we seek according to the proposed undertaking. A syllogism, then, is a discourse in which, certain things having been posited, something other than the things posited follows of necessity through the things that have been posited. A demonstration, however, is when the syllogism is from true and primary things, or from such things as have taken the beginning of their cognition of that which is around them through certain primary and true things. But the dialectical syllogism is the one collected from probable things. Now those things are true and primary which have their credibility not through other things but through themselves. For in the principles of the disciplines one ought not to inquire the reason why, but each one of the principles should itself be credible through itself. Probable things, however, are those which seem so to all, or to most, or to the wise, and among these either to all, or to most, or to the most familiar and approved. But a contentious syllogism is one from things that seem probable but are not. And the one that is from probable things indeed, or from things that seem probable, is apparent.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":2,"ref":"p2","source":"Non enim omne quod videtur probabile etiam est probabile, nihil enim eorum quæ dicunturprobabilia in superficie habet omnino phantasiam, velut circa litigiosarum disputationum principia accidit se habere; statim enim sæpius etiam eis qui parva videre pos-, sunt manifesta est in his falsitatis natura. Ergo priorquidem eorum(qui dicti sunt litigiosi syllogismi) etiam syllogismus dicatur.reliquusvero litigiosus quidem syllogismus,syllogismus autem non,eo quod videtur quidem ratiocinari,ratiocinaturautem minime. Amplius autem praeter omnes (qui dicti sunt; syllogismus, ex iis quæ sunt circa aliquas disciplinas pecularia fiunt paralogismi, quemadmodum in geometria et huic cognatis accidit se habere.Videtur autem hic modus differre a dictis syllogismis,nam neque ex veris et primis colligit pseudographus,neque ex probabilibus, nam sub definitione non cadit,neque enim quae omnibus videntur sumit,nequequaepluribus,neque sapientibus,ethis, neque omnibus,neque plurimis, neque probatissi- \" mis;sed ex peculiaribus quidem disciplinæ sumptis, non veris autem, syllogismum facit, nam eo quod aut semicirculos describit non ut oportet, aut Iineas aliquas ducit non ut ducendæ sunt, paralogismum facit.Species igitur syllogismorum, ut figuraliter sit complecti,dictae sint.","english":"For not everything that appears probable is also probable; for none of the things called probable has altogether the appearance [of truth] on its surface, as happens to be the case with the principles of contentious disputations; for immediately, and often even to those who can see but little, the nature of falsehood in these is manifest. Therefore, let the former of these (which have been called contentious syllogisms) also be called a syllogism. But the remaining one is indeed a contentious syllogism, but not a syllogism, because it indeed appears to reason, but does not reason at all. Moreover, besides all those that have been mentioned, from things peculiar to certain disciplines there arise fallacies, as happens to be the case in geometry and the disciplines akin to it. But this mode seems to differ from the syllogisms mentioned; for the pseudographer does not infer from things true and primary, nor from things probable—for it does not fall under the definition—for he does not assume what seems so to all, nor what seems so to the many, nor to the wise, and these neither to all nor to the most nor to the most approved; but from things assumed as peculiar to the discipline, yet not true, he makes a syllogism. For in that he describes semicircles not as they ought to be described, or draws certain lines not as they ought to be drawn, he makes a fallacy. Therefore, the species of syllogisms, to comprehend them figuratively, have been stated.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":3,"ref":"p3","source":"Summatim autem dicendo de omnibus prædictis et de his quae postea sunt dicenda,in tantum nobis determinatum sit, eo quod de nullo eorum exactam rationem assignare deligimus,sed aliquantulum figuraliter de his volumus pertransire,omnino sufficiens arbitrantes esse secundum propositam methodum posse cognoscere quoquomodo unumquodque illorum.\n\nCAPUT II.\n\nAd quotutilis dialectica disserendique disciplina. I\n\nConsequensautem eritexiis quae dicta sunt dicere ad quot et quæ utile sit hoc negotium.Est autem ad tria, ad exercitationes,ad colloquia,ad eas quae secundum philosophiam sunt disciplinas.Quod 'gitur ad exercitationem sit utile, ex his perspicuum est, methodum enim habentes,facile de propositio argumentari poterimus.Ad colloquia vero eo quod multorum annumerantes opiniones, non ex extraneis sed ex propriis doctrinis sermocinabimur ad eos, transmutantes quidquidnonbenevidenturmodisdicere.Ad secundum philosophiam autem disciplinas, quod potentes ad utraque dubitare,facileinsingulis intuebimur verum et falsum, praeterea autem ad primaeorum quasm unaquaque disciplina sunt principia.Nam ex propriis secundum propositam disciplinam principiis impossibile est dicere aliquid de ipsis,eo quod prima principia sunt omnium, per ea vero (quae sunt circa singula) probabilia necesse est de illis transigere.","english":"To speak summarily about all the aforementioned matters and about those that are to be said afterward, let this much have been determined by us, because we have chosen to assign an exact account of none of them, but we wish to pass over them somewhat figuratively, judging it altogether sufficient, according to the proposed method, to be able to know each of them in some way.\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTo how many things and for what the discipline of dialectic and disputation is useful. 1\n\nIt will be consequent upon what has been said to state to how many things and for what this undertaking is useful. It is useful for three things: for exercises, for conversations, and for the disciplines that pertain to philosophy. That it is useful for exercise is clear from this: for having the method, we shall easily be able to argue about a proposed question. For conversations, however, because by enumerating the opinions of many, we shall converse with them not from foreign doctrines but from their own, changing whatever they do not seem to state well. For the disciplines of philosophy, however, because being able to doubt about both sides, we shall easily discern the true and the false in each particular, and besides this, also regarding the first principles of each discipline. For from the principles proper to the proposed discipline it is impossible to say anything about them, because they are the first principles of all things; but through the things that are probable in each particular, it is necessary to deal with them.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":4,"ref":"p4","source":"Id autem proprium, maximeve peculiare dialecticae est,narn cum sit inquisitiva, ad omnium methodorum principia vi am habet.Ifabebi. mus autem perfecte methodum,quando perinde habebirnus ac in rhetorica,et medicina, et hujusmodi facultatibus,hoc autem ex: iis quae contingunt facere quae eligimus. Nam neque rhetor omni ex modo persuadebit, neque medicus sanabit; sed si ex iis quae contingunt nihil omiserit, sufficienter eum disciplinam habere dixerimus.\n\nCAPUT III.\n\nEx quibus e quot disceptatio dialectica constet.\n\nPrimum igitur considerandum ex quibusest methodus, siquidem sumpserimus ad quot, et quae ex quibus orationes et de quibus syllogismi, et quojaodo his abundemus,habebtmus sufficienter propositum.Suntautem numero æqualia, et eadem ea ex quibus orationes et de quibus syllogismi:fiunt enim orationes ex propositionibus;dequibus autem syllogismi fiunt,problemata sunt.Omnis autem propositio, et omne problema, aut proprium aut genus,aut accidens indicat; etenim differentia cum est generalis; cum genere ordinanda est.Quoniam autem pro. prium hocquidem quid est esse significat,illud autem non significat,dividatur proprium in utrasque prædictas partes, et vocetur illud quod quid erat esse significat,terminus; reliquum vero,secundum communem de ipsis assignatam nominationem,nuncupetnr proprium.","english":"But this is the peculiar and most especially characteristic feature of dialectic: for since it is inquisitive, it has the power with respect to the principles of all methods. We shall, however, possess the method perfectly when we are disposed just as in rhetoric, medicine, and faculties of this sort; and this comes about from those things which it happens to do, which we choose. For neither will the rhetorician persuade by every mode, nor will the physician heal; but if he has omitted nothing of those things which it happens to do, we shall say that he has the discipline sufficiently.\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nFrom which and how many things dialectical disputation consists.\n\nFirst, therefore, it must be considered from which things the method consists, since if we have grasped to how many things, and which things, and from which things speeches and concerning which things syllogisms, and in what way we abound in these, we shall have the proposed matter sufficiently. And they are equal in number, and the same are those from which speeches and concerning which syllogisms: for speeches are made from propositions; but those concerning which syllogisms are made are problems. But every proposition and every problem indicates either a property, or a genus, or an accident; for even difference, when it is general, must be ordered with the genus. Since, however, property—this one indeed signifies what it is to be, but that one does not signify—let property be divided into both of the aforementioned parts, and let that which signifies what it was to be be called a term; but the rest, according to the common designation assigned concerning them, let it be named property.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":5,"ref":"p5","source":"Manifestum igiturex iis quæ dicta suntquodsecundum præsentem divisionem quatuor omnia accidit fieri, aut proprium, aut terminum, aut genus, aut accidens. Nemo autem nos opinetur dicere quod unumquodquehorum secundum se dictum propositio vel problema est, sed quod ab his et problemata et propositiones iiunt.Difterunt autem problema et propositio modo, nam cum sic dicitur: putasne animal gressibilebipes?diffinitioesthomini et putasne animal genus est hominis? propositiofit. Si autem utrum animal gressibile bipes definitio est hominis, an non, problema fit.Similiter autem et in aliis. Quare merito aequalia numero problemata et propositiones sunt, nam ab omni propositione problema efficies, mutans modum.\n\nCAPUT IV.\n\nDe termino, proprio, geneve, et accidente.\n\nDicendum autem quid terminus,quid proprium, quid genus,quid accidens.Estautem terminus quidem oratio quid erat esse significans.","english":"From what has been said, then, it is manifest that according to the present division all things come to be four: either a property, or a definition, or a genus, or an accident. But let no one think that we are saying that each of these, spoken by itself, is a proposition or a problem, but that from these both problems and propositions come to be. A problem and a proposition differ in mode; for when it is said thus: \"Is an animal a two-footed walking thing?\" it is a definition of man, and \"Is animal a genus of man?\" becomes a proposition. But if it is asked whether an animal that is two-footed and walking is the definition of man or not, it becomes a problem. And similarly in other cases. Wherefore deservedly problems and propositions are equal in number, for from every proposition you will make a problem by changing the mode.\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nOn definition, property, genus, and accident.\n\nWe must say what a definition is, what a property is, what a genus is, what an accident is. A definition is an account signifying what it was to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":6,"ref":"p6","source":"Assignatur autem aut oratio pro nomine,autoratiopro oratione; possibile est enim et eorum quae sub ratione significantur quaedam definiri.Quicunque autem quolibet modo nomine assignationem faciunt, manifestum quoniam non assignant ii rei definitionem, eo quod omnis definitio oratio quaedam est,accommodatum tamen termino,ethujusmodi ponendum est,utquod honestum est,riecens.Similiter autem et utrum idem sensus,et disciplina vel diversum;etenim circa diffinitiones,utrum idem, vel diversum,plurima fit immoratio. Simpliciter autem accomodato termino omnia dicantur quæ sub eadem disciplina cum definitionibus contmentur.Quodautem omniaquaenunc dicta sunt hujusmodi sunt,manifestum ex his. Potentes enim quod idem et quod diversum disputare, eodem modo et ad definitiones argumentari facile poterimus; nam ostendentes quod non idem est, interimenteserimusdefinitionem: nontamen convertitur quod nunc dictum est,non enim sufficiens est ad astruendum definitionem ostendere idem esse, attamen ad destruendum sufficiens est ostendere quod non idem est. Proprium autem est quod non indicat quid est esse, soli autem inest, etconversim praedicatur de re ut proprium est hominis grammatices esse susceptivum. Nam si homo est, et grammatices susceptibilis est, si grammatices susceptivum est, et homo est.","english":"But an expression is assigned either in place of a name, or a name in place of an expression; for it is possible that some of the things signified by an expression are also defined. But whoever make an assignment by a name in any way whatsoever, it is manifest that they do not assign the definition of the thing, because every definition is a certain expression, and it is to be applied to the term, and things of this sort are to be posited, as that which is honorable is seemly. Likewise also whether the same sense and discipline are the same or different; for concerning definitions there is much lingering over whether they are the same or different. Simply, however, with the term applied, let all things be said which are contained under the same discipline together with definitions. But that all the things now said are of this sort is manifest from these considerations. For being able to dispute that a thing is the same and that it is different, in the same way we shall easily be able to argue toward definitions; for by showing that it is not the same, we shall have destroyed the definition; yet what has now been said is not convertible, for to show that it is the same is not sufficient to establish a definition, yet to show that it is not the same is sufficient to destroy it. A property, however, is that which does not indicate what it is to be, but belongs to a thing alone, and is predicated convertibly of the thing, as it is a property of man to be receptive of grammar. For if he is a man, he is also receptive of grammar; if he is receptive of grammar, he is also a man.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":7,"ref":"p7","source":"Nemo enim proprium dicit quod contingit alii inesse, ut homini dormire, ne quidem si forsitan per aliquod tempus inest soli. Si autem forte dicatur aliquid lalium proprium, non simpliciter, aliquando, vel ad aliquid dicetur, nam ex dextris quidem esse, aliquando proprium est. Bipes autem ad aliquid proprium est dictum, ut homini ad equum et canem. Quod autem eorum quæ contingunt alii inesse nullum conversim praedicatur, manifestum est; non enirn necessarium est si quid dormit, hominem esse. Genus autem est, quod de, pluribus et differentibus specie in eoquod quid est praedicatur. In eo quod quid est praedicari ea dicuntur, quæcunque convenit eum qui interrogatus est reddere quid est quod propositum est, quemadmodum de homine, convenit eum qui interrogatus est quid id est quod propositum est, dicere quod animal. Generi autem accommodatum est utrum in eodem genere aliud alii, an in ultero sit. Nam et hujusmodi sub eadem methodo cadit cum genere; disputantes enim quod animal genus hominis similiter et bonus, disputantes erimus quoniam haec in eodem sunt genere,sit autem alteriusquidemostendamus quod genus est,alterius autem quod non est, disputantes erimus quoniam non in eodem genere haec sunt.","english":"For no one calls \"property\" what happens to belong to another, as sleeping belongs to a human being—not even if it happens to belong to that one alone for some time. But if perhaps some such thing is called a property, it will be called so not simply, but sometimes, or in relation to something; for to be on the right is sometimes a property. \"Two-footed\" is said to be a property in relation to something, as for a human being in relation to a horse and a dog. But that none of the things that happen to belong to another is predicated convertibly is clear; for it is not necessary that if something sleeps, it is a human being. A genus, however, is what is predicated of many things differing in species in answer to the question what it is. Those things are said to be predicated in answer to the question what it is, whatever it is fitting for one who has been asked to give in reply to what the proposed thing is—as concerning a human being, it is fitting for one who has been asked what the proposed thing is to say that it is an animal. But it is suited to a genus to consider whether one thing is in the same genus as another, or whether it is in the other. For even matters of this kind fall under the same method as genus; for in disputing that animal is the genus of a human being, we shall similarly also be disputing that it is of a good [thing], since these are in the same genus. But let us suppose that we show that it is the genus of one thing, and that it is not the genus of another; we shall be disputing that these are not in the same genus.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":8,"ref":"p8","source":"Accidens autem est quod nibil horum est, neque definitio,ncque proprium, neque genus,inest autem rei; et quod contingit inesse cuivis uni et eidem,etnon inesse,utsedere contingitinesse alicui eidem, et non inesse. Similiter autem et album, nam et eidem nihil prohibet quandoque album, quandoque non album esse. Est autem accidentis definitionum secunda melior: nam cum dicitur pri. ma, necessarium est si debet quis intelligere, praescire quid est terminus, et genus, et proprium; secunda autem perfecta est ad cognoscendum (quid est quod dicitur) per se. Annectantur autem accidenti et quae ad se invicem sunt comparationes quolibet modo ab accidente dictae, ut utrum honestum, an quod confert, expetibilius, et utrum quae est secundum virtutem, an quae secundum voluptatem suavior vita, et si quid aliud similiter his est di-. ctum, in omnibus enim talibus utri magispraedicatum accidit, quæstio fit. Manifestum est autem ex his quoniam accidens nihil prohibet, et quando, et ad aliquid propriumfieri,utsederecumsit accidens, quando quis solus sedet, tunc aliquando proprium erit; solo vero sedente, ad non.sedentes proprium: quare et ad aliquid, at aliquando nihil prohibet accidens proprium fieri, simpliciter autem proprium non erit.","english":"An accident is what is none of these—neither definition, nor property, nor genus—yet belongs to a thing; and what can belong and not belong to one and the same thing, as sitting can belong to some one and the same person and not belong. Likewise also white: for nothing prevents the same thing from being white at one time and not white at another. The second of the definitions of accident is better; for when the first is stated, it is necessary, if one is to understand it, to know beforehand what a term is, and a genus, and a property; but the second is complete for knowing in itself what is being said. To accident are also attached the comparisons of things to one another spoken in any way in respect of an accident, as whether the honorable or the expedient is more desirable, and whether the life according to virtue or the life according to pleasure is sweeter, and whatever else is said similarly to these; for in all such cases the question becomes to which of the two the predicate belongs as an accident. It is clear from these things that nothing prevents an accident from becoming, at a certain time and in relation to something, a property—as when sitting is an accident, when someone sits alone, then at some time it will be a property; but when he alone is sitting, it is a property in relation to those not sitting; wherefore also in relation to something, and at some time, nothing prevents an accident from becoming a property, but simply a property it will not be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":9,"ref":"p9","source":"CAPUT V.\n\nQuod cætera prædicata aliquid claudant eorum quas definitio continet.\n\nNon lateat autem nos quoniam quae ad proprium, et genus, et accidens omnia dicuntur, et ad definitiones conveniet dici. Ostendentes enim quoniam non ei soli inest quod est sub definitione '(quemadmodum et in proprio), aut quoniam non genus quod assignatum est in definitione, aut quoniam non inest, aliquid eorum quae in definitione dicta sunt (quod quidem et in accidente dici potest), interimentes erimus definitionem. Quare secundum prius assignatam rationem, omnia erunt quodammodo defi. nitioni accommodanda qua; numerata sunt. Sed non propter hoc unam in omnibus universalem methodum quaerendum, neque enim facile invenire hanc est, et si inveniatur, omnino obscura et insuavis plane fuerit ad propositum negotium. Propria vera in unoquoque determinatorum generum assignata methodo, facile ex iis quae circa unumquodque propria sunt decursus propositi fieri possit. Quare universaliterfigura qu!Qem(quemadmodumdictum est prius) dividendum est, reliquorum autem ea quae maxime suntsingulis peculiaria, annectendum; definitioni et generi accomodata ea nuncupantes, peneautem adj uncta sunt quae dicta sunt ad singula.","english":"CHAPTER V.\n\nThat the other predicates contain something of those things which the definition contains.\n\nLet it not escape us that all the things said in relation to property, genus, and accident will also be suited to definitions. For by showing that what falls under the definition does not belong to it alone (as also in the case of property), or that the assigned genus is not in the definition, or that something of those things stated in the definition is not present (which can indeed also be said in the case of accident), we shall be destroying the definition. Wherefore, according to the account given earlier, all things must in some way be accommodated to the definition, in the manner that has been enumerated. But one should not for this reason seek a single universal method in all cases; for it is not easy to find this, and if it is found, it will be altogether obscure and plainly unpleasant for the task at hand. But with the method assigned for each of the determinate genera, an easy progression to the proposed task can be made from the things that are proper to each. Wherefore, universally, the outline must indeed be divided (as was said earlier), and of the rest those things which are most peculiar to each must be attached; calling those things accommodated to definition and genus, and those which have been stated are almost closely joined to the individual cases.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":10,"ref":"p10","source":"CAPUT VI.\n\nDe eodem.\n\nPrimumautemomniumdeeodem determinandum quoties dicitur. Videbitur autem idem ut figuraliter sit sumere, Iripliciterdividi. Numero enim, aut specie, aut genere, idem solemus appellare. Numero quidem, quorum nomina plura, res autem una, ut. indumentum etvestis.Specie autem quae cum sint plura, indifferentia sunt secundum speciem, ut homo homini, equus equo; nam hujusmodi specie di. cuntur, quaecunque sub eadem specie sunt. Similiter autem et genere eadem, quaecunque sub eodem genere sunt, ut equus homini. Videbitur autem ab eodem fonte aqua, quæ eadem dicitur, habere aliquam differentiam praeter dictos modos. Non tamen, sed et hujusmodi in eodem ordinetur iis quae secundum unam speciem quoquo modo dicta sunt: omnia enim talia cognata et affinia sibi invicem videntur esse: nam omnis aqua omni aquæ eadem specie dicitur, eo quod habeat quamdam similitudinem; ab eodem autem fonte aqua quæ eadem dicitur nullo alio differt, quam eo quod vehementior sitsimilitudo: quare non separamus idem ab iis quae secundum unam speciem quoquo modo dicuntur. Maxime autem indubitanter quod unum estnumero,idem ab omnibus videtur dici.","english":"CHAPTER VI.\n\nOn the Same.\n\nFirst of all, then, we must determine how many senses \"the same\" has. It will seem that one should take \"the same\" in a threefold division. For we are accustomed to call things the same in number, in species, or in genus. In number, those whose names are several but whose thing is one, as garment and clothing. In species, those which, though they are several, are undifferentiated according to species, as man to man, horse to horse; for things of this sort are called the same in species, whatever things are under the same species. Similarly also things are the same in genus, whatever things are under the same genus, as horse to man. But water said to be from the same source will seem to have some difference beyond the modes just mentioned. It is not so, however, but even this sort of thing will be ranked among those which are in some way said to be the same according to one species; for all such things seem to be kindred and akin to one another. For all water is said to be the same in species as all water, in that it has a certain likeness; but water said to be from the same source differs in nothing else than that the likeness is stronger. Wherefore we do not separate \"the same\" from those things which are in some way said to be the same according to one species. But most indisputably, what is one in number seems to be called the same by all.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":11,"ref":"p11","source":"Soletautem ethoc assignari multipliciter, propriissime autem et primo, quando nomine vel termino idem assignatum fuerit, ut vestis indumento, et animalgressibiiebipesbomini.Secundum autem, quando proprio, ut disciplinæ susceptibilis homini, et quod natura sursum fertur igni. Tertium vero, quando ab accidente, ut sedens, vel musicum Socrati, omnia enim haec unum numero volunt significare. Quod autem verum sit quod nunc dictum est, extranssumentibusnuncupationesmaximequis discat; saepe enim praecipientes nomine vocare aliquem sedentium,transsumimus,quandoforteisnon intelligitcui præceptum facimus, tanquam ab acci-, dente ipso magis intelligente, et jubemus sedentem vel disputantem vocare ad nos, maaifestum quod ut eumdem opinantes, et secundum nomen, et secundum accidens significare.Ergo idem,quemadmodum dictum est, tripliciter dividatur.","english":"But this is customarily assigned in many ways; most properly and primarily, when the same thing is designated by a name or term, as a garment by clothing, and a two-footed land animal by human being. Secondly, when by something proper, as the human being by what is capable of receiving discipline, and fire by what is borne upward by nature. Thirdly, when by an accident, as the seated person, or the musical person, to Socrates; for all these wish to signify one in number. But that what has now been said is true, one may learn most of all from those who use transferred designations; for often, when we instruct someone to call one of those sitting by name, we use a transferred designation, when perhaps the one to whom we give the instruction does not understand, as if he understood better from the accident itself, and we order him to call the seated or the disputing person to us; it is manifest that we think he signifies the same person both by the name and by the accident. Therefore the same, as has been said, is divided in three ways.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":12,"ref":"p12","source":"CAPUT VII.\n\nOmnem disputationem cLialecticamesseextermino.pro• prio, genere, nul accidente, et ubi illa reperianlur.\n\nQuoniam autem ex prius dictis sunt orationes, et per hæc et ad hæc una quidem fides est per inductionem.Sienim quis consideret unamquamque propositionum et problematum,apparebitauta termino, aut a proprio, aut a genere, aut ab accidente facta. Alia autem fides per syllogismum.Necesse est enim o:nne quod de aliquo praedicatur, aut conversim de re praedicari, aut non; et si conversim praedicalur, terminus erit, vel proprium. Nam si significat quid est esse, est terminus; si autem non significet, proprium. Hoc enim erat proprium, quod conversim praedicatur, non significans quid est esse. Si autem non conversim praedicatur de re, aut ex iis quæ in definitionis subjecti dicuntur, est, aut non, et si est ex iis quæ in definitione dicuntur,aut genus,aut differentia erit, eo quod definitio ex genere et differentiis est. Si vero ex iis non est quae in definitione dicuntur, palam est quoniam accidens erit, nam accidens dicebatur quod nequeterminus,neque genus, neque proprium, inest autem rei. Post haec autem oportet determinare genera prædicameotorumin quibus sunt dictae quatuor differentiae. Sunt haec autem numero decem, quod est, quantum, quale, ad aliquid, ubi, quando, situm esse, habere, facere, pati.","english":"CHAPTER VII.\n\nThat every dialectical disputation arises from definition, property, genus, and accident, and where these are found.\n\nSince, then, from what has been said before, arguments are formed, and through these and with a view to these there is one kind of assurance through induction. For if anyone considers each of the propositions and problems, it will appear that they are made either from a definition, or from a property, or from a genus, or from an accident. But another assurance is through syllogism. For it is necessary that whatever is predicated of something be predicated of it either convertibly or not; and if it is predicated convertibly, it will be a definition or a property. For if it signifies what it is to be, it is a definition; but if it does not signify this, it is a property. For this was a property: what is predicated convertibly, not signifying what it is to be. But if it is not predicated convertibly of the thing, it is either from those things that are said in the definition of the subject, or not; and if it is from those things that are said in the definition, it will be either a genus or a differentia, because the definition is from genus and differentiae. But if it is not from those things that are said in the definition, it is clear that it will be an accident; for an accident was said to be what is neither definition, nor genus, nor property, yet is present in the thing. After these things, moreover, one must determine the genera of the predicaments in which the four differences just mentioned are found. These are in number ten: substance, quantity, quality, relation, where, when, being situated, having, doing, being affected.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":13,"ref":"p13","source":"Semper enim accidens, et genus, et proprium, et definitio in uno praedicamentorum horum erit,nam omnes ab his propositiones, aut quid est, aut quale est, aut quantum,aut aliorum aliquod prasdicamentorum significant. Manifestum est autem exeisdemquoniam quod quidestsignificansquandoquequidemsubstantiam significat, quandoque autem quale,quandoque vero aliquod aliorum praedicamentorum; nam quandc, posito homine, dixerit quod positum est hominem esse, vel animal, et quid est dicit et significat substantiam j quundo,colore albo posito,dixerit quod positum est album esse, vel colorem, quid est dicit, et quale significat. Similiter autem et si, cubitali magnitudine posita, dixerit quod positum est cubitalem esse magnitudinem, et quid est dicit et quantum significat. Similiter autem et in aliis. Unumquodque enim talium sive idem de eodem dicatur, sive genus de hoc, quid est significat quandoautem de alio, non quid est significat, sed quantum, aut quale, aut aliquod aliorum praedicamentorum. Quare de quibus sunt disputationes, et ex quibus, hæc ettantasunt.Quomodo autem sumemus,et per quae copioso erimus, post haec dicendum.","english":"For accident, genus, property, and definition will always be in one of these categories; for all propositions from these signify either what a thing is, or of what sort it is, or how much, or some other of the categories. It is clear from the same considerations, moreover, that what signifies what a thing is sometimes signifies substance, sometimes quality, and sometimes some other of the categories. For when, a man having been posited, someone has said that what was posited is a man, or an animal, he both says what it is and signifies substance; but when, white color having been posited, he has said that what was posited is white, or a color, he says what it is and signifies quality. Likewise also if, a cubit-long magnitude having been posited, he has said that what was posited is a cubit-long magnitude, he both says what it is and signifies quantity. Likewise also in the others. For each of such things, whether the same is said of the same, or a genus of this, signifies what it is; but when [said] of another, it does not signify what it is, but how much, or of what sort, or some other of the categories. Therefore the things about which disputations are held, and from which, are these and so many. But how we shall take them, and by what means we shall be well supplied, must be said after these things.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":14,"ref":"p14","source":"CAPUT VIII.\n\nDe propositione dialectica.\n\nPrimum igitur determinetur quid est propositio dialectica, et quid problema dialecticum. Non enim omnem propositionem,nec omne problema dialecticum ponendum. Nullus enim offeret, qui mentem habeat, quod nulli videtur,nec proponetquod omnibus est manifestum, vel plurimis: nam haec quidem non habent dubitationem, illa autem nemo ponet. Est autem propositio dialectica interrogatio probabilis aut omnibus, aut plurimis, aut sapientibus, et his vel omnibus, vel plurimis, vel maxime familiaribus non inopinabilis. Ponet enim aliquis quod videtursapientibus, nis: id contrarium sitmultorum opi. nionibus. Sunt autem propositiones dialecticae, et ea quae probalibus sunt similia, et contraria iis quae videnturesse prolHibiliasecundum contradictionem protensa,etqu xecunqueopiniones suntsecundum artes inventas. Si enim probabile est eadem esse contrariorum disciplinam,etsensum eumdem esse contrariorum probabile apparebit, et si unam numero gramrnaticen esse,et tibicinariam u namjsi autemplures grammaticas, et plures tibicinariae, omnia enim similia et cognata haec videntur esse.Similiter autem etea quæ probabilibus sunt contrariasecundum contradictionem protensa probabilia videntur.","english":"CHAPTER VIII.\n\nOn the dialectical proposition.\n\nFirst, then, let it be determined what a dialectical proposition is, and what a dialectical problem is. For not every proposition, nor every problem, is to be posited. For no one who has a mind will offer what seems to no one, nor will he propose what is manifest to all or to most; for the latter indeed have no doubt, while the former no one will posit. A dialectical proposition is a probable interrogation, either to all, or to most, or to the wise, and to these either to all, or to most, or to those most familiar, and not contrary to opinion. For someone will posit what seems to the wise, unless it be contrary to the opinions of the many. Dialectical propositions are also those which are similar to probable things, and those which are contrary to things that appear to be probable, when extended according to contradiction, and whatever opinions there are according to invented arts. For if it is probable that the discipline of contraries is the same, and that the same sense is of contraries, it will appear probable; and if there is one grammar in number, and one flute-playing; but if there are many grammars, also many flute-playings; for all these seem to be similar and akin. In like manner, also, those things which are contrary to probable things, when extended according to contradiction, appear probable.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":15,"ref":"p15","source":"Si enim probabile est quod oportet amicis benefacere, et quod non oportet amicis maleface probabile est; est autem contrarium quidem quod oportet malefacereamicis,secundum contradictionem autem quod non oportet amicis malefacere. Similiter autem et si oportet amicis benefacere, inimicis non oportet; est autem etbocsecundum contradictionem contrariorum, nam oontrarium est quod oportet inimicis benefacere. Similiter autem et in aliis. Probabile autemetinsimilitudineapparetetiam contrarium de contrario, utsi oportet amicis benefacere, et inimicis oportet male, apparebit et contrarium hoc quod est amicis benef'acere, et quod inimicis male.Utrum autem secundum veritatem se habeat, vel non, in iis quae de contrario dicentur ostendetur. Palam autem quoniam et quaecunque opinione;; secundum artes sunt, dialecticaa propositiones sunt.Ponetenim aliquis ea quae videntur iis qui in eis probati sunt, ut de his quidem quae in geometria, ut geometer, de illis autem quae in medicina, ut medicus.","english":"For if it is probable that one ought to benefit friends, it is also probable that one ought not to harm friends; but the contrary is that one ought to harm friends, and by contradiction that one ought not to harm friends. Similarly also, if one ought to benefit friends, one ought not to benefit enemies; but this too follows by contradiction of contraries, for the contrary is that one ought to benefit enemies. Similarly also in other cases. And by similarity the contrary also appears probable concerning the contrary, as if one ought to benefit friends, one ought also to harm enemies; there will appear also the contrary of this, namely that one ought to benefit friends and harm enemies. But whether this holds according to truth or not will be shown in what is said concerning the contrary. It is clear, moreover, that whatever opinions are according to the arts are also dialectical propositions. For one may posit those things which appear so to those who are approved in these matters, as concerning geometry, to the geometer, and concerning medicine, to the physician.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":16,"ref":"p16","source":"CAPUT IX.\n\nDe problemate dialectico et positione dialectiua.\n\nProblema autem dialecticum est speculatio intendens vel ad electionem, et fugam, vel ad veritatem et scientiam, aut per se, aut ut adminiculans ad aliquid aliud talium, de quo aut neutro modo opinantur, aut contrarie plerique sapientibus, aut sapientes plerisque, aut utrisque iidem eisdem. Quædam enim problematum utile ostseire tanlum eligendum, vel fugiendum, ut utrum voluptas sit eligenda, an non. Qusedamjautem ad sciendum tantum, ututrum mundus æternus sit, an non. Quaedam vero ipsa per se quidemadneutrumhorum, adminiculantia autem sunt ad aliqua talium. Pleraque enim ipsa quidem per se non volumus cognoscere, sed aliorum gratia, ut perilla aliud quidpiam cognoscamus. Sunt autem problemata et de quibus contrarii sunt syllogismi: dubitationem enim habent utrum sic se habentan non sic, eo quod utrisque sunt rationes suasibiles. Et de quibus rationem non habemus, cum sint magna, difficilearbitrantesessepropterquodassignare; ut utrum mundus sit aeternus, an non, nam hujusmodi quaeret aliquis. Problemata ergo et propositionea (ut dictum est) derminata sint.","english":"CHAPTER IX.\n\nOn the dialectical problem and the dialectical position.\n\nA dialectical problem is a speculation aiming either at choice and avoidance, or at truth and knowledge, either in itself or as contributing to some other such thing, concerning which either no one holds an opinion in either direction, or the many hold a contrary opinion to the wise, or the wise to the many, or each of the two groups holds a contrary opinion to itself. For some problems are useful only for knowing what is to be chosen or avoided, such as whether pleasure is to be chosen or not. Some, however, are for knowing only, such as whether the world is eternal or not. Some, however, are in themselves indeed directed toward neither of these, but contribute to some such matters. For most of them we do not wish to know for their own sake, but for the sake of other things, so that through them we may know something else. There are also problems concerning which contrary syllogisms arise; for they involve doubt as to whether matters stand thus or not, because there are plausible arguments on both sides. And there are those for which we have no account, since they are great, and we judge it difficult to assign the reason; such as whether the world is eternal or not, for one would inquire into matters of this sort. Let problems, then, and propositions be defined as has been said.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":17,"ref":"p17","source":"Positio est opinio admirabilis alicujus familiarium secundum philosophiam,utquod non estcuntradicere,quemadmodum dixit Antisthenes, et quod omnia moventur, secundum Heraclitum, aut quod unum est ens, quemadmodum Melissus dixit(nam de quovis contraria opinionibus profarenle curam habere stultum est, aut de quibus orationem habemuscontrariam opinionibus, ut quoniam non omne quod est, vel factum est, vel aeternum, quemadmodum sophistae dicunt. Nam musicum, grammaticum esse, neque factum, neque esseaeternum. Hocenim etsialicuinon videatur, videbitur utique eo quod rationem habeat suasibilem. Est igitur et positio quidem problema, non autem omne problema positio,eoquodquasdam problematum talia sunt, de quibus neutro modo opinamur. Quod autem est positio problema manUestum est: necesse est enim ex iis quae dicta sunt, aut plures sapientibus circa positionem dubitare, aut utroBlibet sibimet, eo quod opinio quaedam admirandaposilio est. Pene autem nunc omnia dialecticaprobiematapositionesvacantur.Differat autem nihil quomodolibet dictum: non enim nomen effinere volentes divisimus sic ea, sed ut non lateant nos,cum quædam eorum suntdifferentiae. Non opor. tet autem omne problema, nec omnem positionem considerare, sed quam dubitabit aliquis eorum, qui ratione egent, et non pcena vel sensu.","english":"A position is an opinion that is remarkable concerning some matter familiar to philosophy, for example that not everything can be contradicted, as Antisthenes said, and that all things are moved, according to Heraclitus, or that being is one, as Melissus said. For to take pains over any question whatever that is contrary to received opinions is foolish, or over questions where we hold an opinion contrary to received opinions, as for instance that not everything that exists is either made or eternal, as the sophists say. For the musical and the grammatical are neither made nor eternal. For this, even if it does not seem so to someone, will at any rate seem so because it has a persuasive account. A position is therefore also a problem, but not every problem is a position, since some problems are of such a kind that we hold no opinion either way about them. But that a position is a problem is evident; for from what has been said it necessarily follows that either many of the wise are in doubt about the position, or that each side is in doubt for itself, because a position is a certain remarkable opinion. And now almost all dialectical problems are called positions. But it makes no difference in whatever way it is stated; for we did not divide them thus in order to coin a name, but so that the differences among some of them should not escape us. One ought not, however, to consider every problem, nor every position, but only such as someone among those who stand in need of argument might doubt, and not one that requires punishment or sense perception.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":18,"ref":"p18","source":"Nam qui dubitant utrum oporteal deos honorare, et parentes diligere, an non, pcenaindigent; qui vero utrum nix alba an non,sensu. Neque vero quorum propinqua est demonstratio, neque quorum valde longe: nam illa quidem non habent dubitationem, haec autem magis quam secundum falcultatem exercitativam.\n\nCAPUT X.\n\nDe speciebus disserendi, dialect icseque disputa tionis.\n\nDeterminatis autem his, oportet dividere quot dialecticarum disputationum sunt species. Est autem inductio quidem haec, illa autem syllogismus. Et syllogismus quidem quid est, dictum est prius. Inductio vero est a singularibus ad universalia accessio, ut si est gubernator eruditus, optimus, et auriga, et omnis qui est eruditus in unoquoque, optimus. Est autem inductio verisimilior, et clarior et secundum sensum notior, et pluribus communis syllogismus autem valentior, et ad contradicentes efficacior. Ergo genera de quibus disputationes, et ex quibus, quemadmodum ante dictum est, determinata sint.","english":"For those who doubt whether one ought to honor the gods and love one's parents or not need punishment; but those who doubt whether snow is white or not need sense perception. Nor indeed are those matters whose demonstration is near at hand, nor those that are very far off: for the former have no doubt, while the latter are beyond the capacity of exercise.\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nOn the species of discourse, and of dialectical disputation.\n\nHaving determined these matters, it is necessary to divide how many species of dialectical disputations there are. For one is induction, and the other is syllogism. And what syllogism is has been said earlier. Induction is the ascent from singulars to universals, as if one should say that the skilled pilot is the best, and the charioteer, and everyone who is skilled in each particular thing is the best. Induction is more persuasive, and clearer, and more known according to sense, and more common to many; but syllogism is more forceful, and more effective against those who contradict. Therefore let the genera about which disputations arise, and from which they arise, be determined, as was said before.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":19,"ref":"p19","source":"CAPUT XI.\n\nDe instrumentis quibus syllogismorum copiam nobis ad disserendum suppeditamus.\n\nInstrumenta autem perquae abundemus syllogismis sunt quatuor. Unum quidem, propositiones sumere. Secundum autem, quotupliciter unumquodque dicitur posse distinguere. Tertium, differentias invenire. Quartum autem, similitudinis consideratio. Sunt autem et modo quodam etiam tria horum propositiones. Est enim unumquodque eorum propositionem facere, ut quod eligendum est honestum, vel delectabile, vel utile, et quod differt sensus a disciplina, eo quod amittenti eam possibile est rursum sumere, illum autem impossibile. Etquoniam similiterse babelsalubre ad sanitatem, et habile ad bonam habitudinem. Est autem prima propositio ab iis quae multipliciter dicuntur, secunda a differentiis, tertia vero a similibus.\n\nCAPUT XII.\n\nDe sumptione propositionum.","english":"CHAPTER XI.\n\nOn the instruments by which we supply ourselves with an abundance of syllogisms for discussion.\n\nNow the instruments through which we abound in syllogisms are four. One, indeed, is to take up propositions. The second is to be able to distinguish in how many ways each thing is said. The third is to find differences. The fourth is the consideration of similarity. Yet in a certain way three of these are also propositions. For to make a proposition of each of them is possible, as that what is to be chosen is the honorable, or the pleasant, or the useful, and that sense differs from knowledge in that it is possible for one who loses the latter to take it up again, but impossible for one who loses the former. And since similar things are related to health and to good condition. Now the first proposition comes from things that are said in many ways, the second from differences, and the third from similars.\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nOn the taking up of propositions.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":20,"ref":"p20","source":"Ergo propositiones quidem eligendum quotquot modis determinatum est in propositione, aut omnium opiniones proponenti, aut plurium aut sapientum, et horum vel omnium, velplurimorum, vel notissimorum. Aut etiam contrarias apparentibus, et quaecunqueopinionessecundum artem sunt;atoportet protendere contrarias apparentibus probabilibus, secundum contradictionem) quemad modum dictum est prius. Utile autem et facere eas in eligendonon solum quae sunt probabiles, sed et similes eis, ut quod contrariorum idem est sensus, nam et scientia contrariornm est eadem. Etquod videmussuscipientes aliquid,non emittentes, nam et in aliis sensibus sic est, nam et audimus suscipientes aliquid, non emittentes, et olfacimus eodem modo, similiter autem et in aliis.Amplius:qusecunqueinomnibusvel plurimis videntur, sumendum ut principium et apparentem positionem, nam ponunt qui non conspiciunt, in aliquo non sic habel. Eligere autem oportet et ex scriptis disceptationibus. Descriptiones autem facere in unoquoque genere supponentes seorsum (ut de bono;:aut de animali, et de bono omni) incipientem a quid est. Adnotare autem et singulorum opiniones, ut quod Empedocles quatuor dixit clementa corporum esse. Ponet enim aJiquis quod ab aliquo probato dictum est.","english":"Therefore one must select propositions in all the ways that have been determined in the proposition—either the opinions of all, or of the majority, or of the wise, and of these either all, or the majority, or the most notable. Or also the contraries of things that appear, and whatever opinions there are according to art; but one must set out the contraries of probable appearances, according to contradiction, as was said earlier. It is useful also, in selecting, to make not only those which are probable, but also those which are similar to them, such as that the sense of contraries is the same; for the knowledge of contraries is also the same. And that we receive something when we perceive, not when we emit it; for this is so also in the other senses, for we hear by receiving something, not by emitting it, and we smell in the same way, and similarly also in the others. Moreover, whatever seems so in all cases or in most, one must take as a principle and an apparent position; for those who do not perceive it lay it down, that in some respect it is not so. One must also choose from written discussions. And one must make descriptions in each genus, setting them down separately (as about the good, or about the animal, and about every good), beginning from what it is. One must also note the opinions of individuals, as that Empedocles said the elements of bodies are four. For someone will lay down what has been said by someone approved.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":21,"ref":"p21","source":"Sunt autem (ut figuraliter sit complecti) propositionum et problematum partes tres; nam aliae sunt morales propositiones, aliae naturales, alix rationales. Morales quidembujusmodi, ut utrum oporteat parentibus magis an legibus obedire, si dissentiant. Rationales vero, ut utrum contrariorum eadem disciplina, annon. Naturales autem, ut utrum mundus sitseternus, necne. Similiter autem et problemata. At vero quales sint singulae earum quae dictae sunt, definiliGne quidem non facile assignare est de ipsis. Est autem ea(quae per inductionem est) assuetudine tentandum cognoscere unamquamque earum, secundum praedicta exempla consideranti. Ad philosophiam igitur, secundum veritatem de his negotiandum, dialectico autem modo ad opinionem. Sumendæ autem quam maximeuniversales propositiones omnes,et una faciendamultae,utquod oppositorum eadem disciplina, deinde quod contrariorum et quod et aliquid. Eodem modo et ipsae rursum dividendae, quousque contingere potest divisio, ut quod boni, et mali,et albi, et nigri, et frigidi, et calidi; similiter autem et in aliis. De propositionibus igitur sufficiant prædicta.","english":"To put it in outline, there are three parts of propositions and problems; for some propositions are ethical, others natural, others rational. Ethical ones are of this sort: whether one ought to obey one's parents rather than the laws, if they disagree. Rational ones, such as whether the same discipline deals with contraries or not. Natural ones, such as whether the world is eternal or not. And similarly also with problems. But what sort each of those mentioned is, it is not easy to assign by definition. Rather, one must try to recognize each of them by induction through familiarity, considering them according to the examples given above. For philosophy, then, one must deal with these matters according to truth, but for the dialectician, in the manner of opinion. One must take the most universal propositions as far as possible, all of them, and make many into one, as that the same discipline deals with opposites, then that it deals with contraries, and then that it deals with some other such thing. In the same way these too must again be divided, as far as division can reach, as that of good and evil, and white and black, and cold and hot; and similarly in other cases. Concerning propositions, then, let what has been said suffice.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":22,"ref":"p22","source":"CAPUT XIII.\n\nDe multiplicis distinctione.\n\nIpsum autem quotupliciter negotiandum est, non solum quaecunque dicuntur secundum alium modum, sed et rationes eorum tentandum assignare, ut non solum quod bonum alio quidem modo dicitur justitia et fortitudo, habile autem et salubre, sed quodetillaquidem eo quod ipsa qualia quædam sunt, hæc autem eo quod effectiva alicujus,et non eoquod qualia quædam sunt; similiter autem et in aliis. Utrum autem multipliciter, aut uno modo specie dicitur, per hæc considerandum. Primum quidem in contrario perspiciendum si multipliciter dicitur, sive specie, sive nomine dissonet. Quaedam enim statim et nominibus alia sunt, ut acuto in voce contrarium est grave, in magnitudine autem obtusum; patet igitur quod contrarium acuto multipliciter dicitur, si autem lhoc, et acutum. Nam secundum utrumque horum aliud erat contrarium, non enim idem acutum erit obluso et gravi contrarium; utriqwe autem acutum contrarium. Rursum gravi in voce qui dem contrarium acutum, magnitudine autem leve; quare multipliciter grave dicitur,eo quod etcontrarium. Similiterautem et pulchro, ei quidem quod in animali turpe, ei vero quod est in domo, perniciosum; quare æquivocum pulchrum. In quibusdan autem nominibus quidem nullo modo dissonat, specie autem manifesta in eis statim differentia est, ut in claro et obscuro; vox enim clara et obscura dicitur. Similiterautem etcolor.","english":"CHAPTER XIII.\n\nOn the distinction of the multiple.\n\nNow we must investigate in how many ways a thing is said, not only those things that are spoken of according to another mode, but we must also attempt to assign their accounts, so that we may show not only that the good is said in one way of justice and courage, and in another of what is capable and healthful, but also that the former are so called because they are themselves of a certain quality, while the latter because they are productive of something, and not because they are themselves of a certain quality; and similarly in other cases. Whether, however, something is said in many ways or in one way in respect of species is to be considered by these means. First, indeed, one must look to the contrary, whether it is said in many ways, whether it differs in species or in name. For some things are immediately different also in their names, as to the sharp in voice the contrary is the flat, but in magnitude the blunt; it is evident, therefore, that the contrary of the sharp is said in many ways, and if this is so, then also the sharp. For according to each of these the contrary was something different, for the sharp will not be the same as the contrary of the blunt and of the flat; yet the sharp is contrary to both. Again, to the flat in voice the contrary is the sharp, but in magnitude the light; wherefore the flat is said in many ways, because it also has a contrary. Similarly also with the beautiful: to that which is in a living being the contrary is the shameful, but to that which is in a house, the pernicious; wherefore the beautiful is equivocal. In some names, however, there is no difference at all in name, but the difference in species is immediately manifest in them, as in the clear and the obscure; for a voice is said to be clear and obscure. Similarly also with color.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":23,"ref":"p23","source":"Ergo nominibus quidem nihil dissonant., specie autem manifesta in eis statim differentia est; non enim similiteret color clarus dicitur, et vox clara. Manifestum autem id est et per sensum, nam eorum quae eadem sunt specie, idem sensus; at clarum quod in voce et in colore non eodem sensu judicamus, sed hoc quidem visu, illud autem'auditu.S!militer autem et acutumetobtusum in humoribus et ir magnitudinibus, sed hoc quidem tactu, illud autem gustu. Nam neque hæc dissonant nominibus, neque in seipsis, neque in contrariis, obtusum enim est contrariumutrique. Amplius si huic quidem est aliquid contrarium, illi autem simpliciter nihil, utei quae est a potu delectationi, ea quae est a siti tristitia, contrarium; ei autem quae est ab eo quod est considerare quod diameter est costae incommensurabilis, nihil. Quare multipliciter delectatio dicitur. Et ei quidem quae est secundum mentem amare, odire contrarium est; ei autem quæ est secundum corporalem actum, nihil; manifestum ergo quoniam amare aequivocum. Praeterea in mediis, Si huic quidem est aliquid medium, illi autem nihil, aut si utrisque quidem est, non idem autem, ut clari et obscuri, in coloribus quidem aliquid est medium, fuscum, in voce: autem nihil, aut si forte raucum, quemadmodum quidam dicunt raucam vocem medium esse, quare æquivocum clarum, similiter et obscurum.","english":"In names, then, they differ in no way, but in species the difference in them is immediately manifest; for \"clear\" is not said similarly of color and of voice. And this is manifest also through sense; for of things that are the same in species, the sense is the same; but we judge \"clear\" in voice and in color not by the same sense, but the one by sight, the other by hearing. Similarly also \"sharp\" and \"flat\" in humors and in magnitudes, but the one by touch, the other by taste. For neither do these differ in names, nor in themselves, nor in their contraries; for \"flat\" is contrary to both. Further, if to the one there is something contrary, but to the other simply nothing, as to the pleasure that comes from drink, the distress that comes from thirst is contrary; but to the pleasure that comes from considering that the diagonal is incommensurable with the side, nothing. Wherefore pleasure is said in many ways. And to loving according to the mind, hating is contrary; but to loving according to bodily act, nothing; manifest therefore that \"to love\" is equivocal. Moreover, in intermediates: if to the one there is some intermediate, but to the other nothing, or if to both there is one, but not the same, as of clear and obscure, in colors there is some intermediate, the dusky, but in voice nothing, or if perhaps the hoarse, as some say that a hoarse voice is the intermediate; wherefore \"clear\" is equivocal, and similarly also \"obscure.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":24,"ref":"p24","source":"Insuper si horum quidem plura media, illorum autemunum, ut in claro et obscuro. Nam in coloribus plura media, in voce autem unum, raucum. Rursum in eo quod secundum contradictionem oppor.itur, considerandum si multipliciter dicitur. Nam si hoc multipliciter dicitur, et quod huic opponitur multipliciter dicetur. Ut non videre multipliciter dicitur, unum quidem non habere visum, alterum autem non operari visu. Si autem boc multipliciterdicitur, necessarium est et videre multipliciter dici: utrique enim non videre opponitur, ut ei quidem quod est non habere visum, habere; illi autcm quod non est operarivisu, operari. Ampliusin hisqusesecundum privationem et habitum dicuntur perspiciendum. Si enim alterum mullipliciter dicitur, et reliquum utsi sensibilemultipliciterdicitur: et secundum animam etcorpus, et insensibile multipliciter dicetur et secundum animam et corpus. Quod autem secundumprivationem et habitumopponunturqnae dictasunt,manifestum, eo quod nata sint utrumque sensum habere animalia,etsecundum animum et secundum corpus. Amplius autem in casibus considerandum. Nam si juste multipliciter dicitur, et justum multipliciter dicetur, secundum utrumque enim justorum est justum, utsijustedicitur et secundum sui cognitionem judicare et ut oportet, similiter et justum.","english":"Moreover, if of the former there are several intermediates, but of the latter one, as in clear and obscure. For in colors there are several intermediates, but in voice there is one, the hoarse. Again, in the case of what is opposed according to contradiction, one must consider whether it is said in many ways. For if this is said in many ways, what is opposed to it will also be said in many ways. For instance, not to see is said in many ways: one way is not to have sight, another is not to exercise sight. But if this is said in many ways, it is necessary that to see also be said in many ways; for not to see is opposed to both, to having sight indeed is opposed having, but to not exercising sight is opposed exercising. Further, in the case of things that are said according to privation and habit, one must examine. For if the one is said in many ways, the other will also be said in many ways, as if the sensible is said in many ways, both according to soul and according to body, the insensible will also be said in many ways both according to soul and according to body. But that the things said according to privation and habit are opposed is manifest from the fact that animals are naturally disposed to have both senses, both according to soul and according to body. Further, one must consider in the cases. For if justly is said in many ways, just will also be said in many ways; for a just thing is just according to each of the just things, as if justly is said both to judge according to one's own knowledge and as one ought, similarly also just.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":25,"ref":"p25","source":"Eodem autem modo et si salubre multipliciter dicitur, et salubritermultipliciter dicetur, ut si salubre dicitur hoc quidem sanitatis effectivum, illud autem conservativum, quoddam vero significativum, et salubriter vel effective, vel conservative, vel significative dicetur. Similiter autem et in aliis quando ipsum multipliciter dictum fuerit, et casus ab eo multipliciter dicetur; et si casus, et ipsum. Consideranda autem et genera secundum nomen praedicationum, si eaedem sint nominibus. Nam si non eaedem, manifestum est quoniam æquivocumest quod dicitur, ut honum in cibisquidem effectivum est voluptatis, in n:edieina autem effectivum sanitatis, in animavero qualem esse, ut ca8tam, vel fortem, vel justam. Similiter autem etin homine; aliquoties autem et. quando ut in tempore bonum (bonumenim diciturin tempore), plerumque autem quantum in mediocri(diciturenimet mediocre bonum); quareaequivocum bonum. Similiter autem et candidum, in corpore quidem color, in voceautem bene audile. Similiter. autem et acutum, non enim similiter idem in omnibus dicitur. Nam vox acuta quidem velox (sicut dicunt, qui secundum numeros harmonici sunt), angulus autem acutus, qui minor est recto, gladius vero qui est anguli acuti.","english":"In the same way also, if \"healthy\" is said in many ways, \"healthily\" will also be said in many ways; for example, if this thing is called healthy as productive of health, that thing as preservative of health, and a certain thing as indicative of health, then \"healthily\" will be said either productively, or preservatively, or indicatively. Similarly also in other cases, when the thing itself is said in many ways, the case-form derived from it will also be said in many ways; and if the case-form is, so is the thing itself. One must also consider the genera of predications according to the name, whether they are the same for the names. For if they are not the same, it is clear that what is said is equivocal, as \"good\" in foods is productive of pleasure, in medicine productive of health, in the soul such as to be, for instance, temperate, or brave, or just. Similarly also in the case of man; and sometimes also in respect of when, as good in time (for good is said in time), but for the most part in respect of quantity, in the moderate (for the moderate is said to be good); wherefore good is equivocal. Similarly also \"white,\" in the body indeed a color, in the voice however well audible. Similarly also \"sharp,\" for it is not said in the same way in all cases. For a sharp voice is a swift one (as those say who are harmonic according to numbers), but a sharp angle is the one that is less than a right angle, and a sharp sword is the one that is of a sharp angle.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":26,"ref":"p26","source":"Consideranda etiam et genera eorum quæ sunt sub eodem nomine, si diversa et non subalterna sunt, ut equus, hoc autem animal, et hoc vas, Diversa enim quae secundum nomen est horum ratio,!; nam hoc quidem animal, quid significat, illud vero vas, quale quid. Si autem subalterna sintgenera, non necessarium diversas esse rationes, ut corvi animal, et avis genus est;quando autem corvum,dicimus autem esse et animal,quiddicimuseumdem esse;quareutraque genera de eodem prædicatur. Similiter autem et quando animal volatile bipes corvum dicimus, avem dicimus eumdem esse, et sic ergo utraquegenera de corvo praedicantur, et ratio eorum. In non subalternis generibus nonacciditboc;nequeenimquando vas dicimus, animal dicimus, nequequandoanimal vas. Considerandum autem non solum si in proposito diversa sunt genera, et non subalterna, sed et in contrano. bi enim contrarium multipliciterdicitur, manifestum quoniam et propositum. Utile autem ad definitionem inspicere quæ de composito fit, ut candidicorporiset candidas vocis, nam sublato proprio, eamdem rationem oportet relinqui. Hoc autem non accidit in æquivocis, ut in iis qua: nunc dicta sunt, nam hoc quidem erit corpus habens talem colorem, illud autem vox bene audibilis. Sublato igitur corpore, et voce, non idem in utraque relinquitur, at oportet si univoc.um essetcandidum, quod in utraque dicitur esse idem.","english":"One must also consider the genera of things that fall under the same name, whether they are different and not subordinate to one another, as horse, and this [is] an animal, and this a vessel. For the definitions of these according to the name are different; for the one signifies animal, the other vessel, a certain quality. But if the genera are subordinate, it is not necessary that the definitions be different, as the crow is an animal, and bird is a genus; for when we say crow, we also say that it is an animal, which is the same thing; wherefore both genera are predicated of the same thing. Similarly also when we call the crow a two-footed flying animal, we say that it is a bird, and the same thing; and so both genera are predicated of the crow, and their definition. In genera that are not subordinate this does not happen; for neither when we say vessel do we say animal, nor when we say animal do we say vessel. One must consider not only whether the genera in the proposed case are different and not subordinate, but also in the contrary case. For since the contrary is said in many ways, it is clear that the proposed case is also. It is useful for definition to examine what is made concerning the composite, as of a white body and a white voice; for when the proper [meaning] is removed, the same definition ought to remain. But this does not happen in equivocals, as in those things that have now been said; for the one will be a body having such a color, the other a voice that is well audible. When the body and the voice are removed, therefore, the same thing is not left in both, and yet it ought [to be], if white were univocal, [namely] that what is said in both is the same.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":27,"ref":"p27","source":"Saepeautem et in ipsis dofinitionibus latet assequens aequivocum, quapropter et in definitioneconsiderandum.Ut siquis significativum vel effectivum sanitatis quod moderate se babet ad sanitatem dicat esse, non refutandum; sed inspi- ' eiendum quid moderatequidem secundum utrum que dixit, ut si hoc quidem tale significat ut facerc sanitatem, illud autem tale ut significare qualis quidem sit habitus. Adhuc:si:non comparabilia sunt secundum magis, et minus, vel similiter, ut clara vox, clara vestis, et acutus humor, et acuta vox: haec enim neque similiter dicuntur clara vel acuta, neque magis alterum: quare aequivocum clarum et acutum, nam univocum omne comparabile, aut enim similiter dicetur aut magis alterum. Quoniam autem diversorumgenerum, et non subalternatim positorum diversas species sunt et difierentiae, ut animalis et suientise (diversaj enim horum differentiae), considerandum si quæ sub eodem sunt nomine diversorum generum, et non subalternorum diversae differentias sint, ut acutum vocis et magnitudinis; differt enim vox a voce eo quod acuta sit, similiter et magnitudo a magnitudine: quareaiquivocum acutum, diversorum enim generum, et non subalternorum diversae differentiae sunt. Rursum si eorumdem quae sunt sub eodem nomine diversæ differentiae sunt, ut coloris qui est in corporibus et in melodiis.","english":"But often also in the definitions themselves there lurks a consequent equivocation, and for this reason it must be considered in the definition as well. For example, if someone says that the significative or effective of health is what is moderately disposed toward health, this is not to be rejected; but one must examine what he meant by \"moderately\" in each case, namely whether the one signifies such a thing as to produce health, while the other signifies such a thing as to indicate what sort of habit it is. Further: [one must consider] whether they are not comparable according to more and less, or similarly, as a clear voice and a clear garment, and a sharp humor and a sharp voice; for these are neither said to be clear or sharp similarly, nor is one more so than the other; wherefore \"clear\" and \"sharp\" are equivocal, for everything univocal is comparable, since it will either be said similarly or one more than the other. But since of different genera, and of those not placed in subalternation, the species and differences are different, as of animal and knowledge (for their differences are different), one must consider whether things that fall under the same name belong to different genera, and not subalternate ones, and have different differences, as \"sharp\" of voice and of magnitude; for a voice differs from a voice in that it is sharp, and similarly a magnitude from a magnitude; wherefore \"sharp\" is equivocal, for of different genera, and of those not subalternate, the differences are different. Again, [one must consider] whether of things that fall under the same name the differences are different, as of color that is in bodies and in melodies.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":28,"ref":"p28","source":"Nam ejus qui est in corporibus congregativum et disgregativum visus, ejus vero qui in melodiis non eaedem differentias; quare aequivocum color,nameorumdem eædem differentiae. Amplius, uoniaa: species uli us est differentiainspicereoportet si eorum quat sub eodem sunt nomine, hoc quidem species esl, illud autem differentia, ut clarum, quod in corporequidem, speciescoloris;quod autem in voce, differentia. Differt enim vox a voce eo quod clara sit. Deeo igitur quod multipliciter dicitur, per haec et hujusmodi perspiciendum.\n\nCAPUT XIV.\n\nDe differentiarum inventione,similium consideratione, et utilitatibus instrumentorum.\n\nDifferentiasautem in ipsis generibus ad se invicem perspiciendum, ut quo differt justitia a fortitudine, et prudentia a temperantia: haec enim omnia ex eodem genere sunt ex virtute. Et ex alio ad aliud, ut in iis quae non nimium differunt, ut in quo differt sensus a scientia nam in iis quæ multum differunt, manifestae sunt omnino differentiae. Similitudinem autem considerandum in iis quae sunt in diversis generibus, ut sicut alterum ad alterum quidem, sic aliud ad aliud, ut sicut scientia ad scibile, sic sensus ad sensibile: et ut alterum in altero aliquo, sic aliud in alio, ut quemadmodum visus in oculo, mens in anima, et ut tranquillitas in mari, serenitas in aere, utrumque enim quies. Maxime autem iniisquae mul.","english":"For the faculty of sight in bodies is congregative and dispersive, but the faculty in melodies does not have the same differences; wherefore color is equivocal, since the same differences do not belong to the same name. Further, since it is necessary to inspect the difference of each species, if of those things that are under the same name, one is a species and the other a difference, as \"clear\" is in the body indeed a species of color, but in the voice a difference. For a voice differs from a voice in that it is clear. Concerning that which is said in many ways, therefore, this must be examined through these and suchlike considerations.\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nOn the discovery of differences, the consideration of similarities, and the utilities of the instruments.\n\nBut differences must be examined in the genera themselves in relation to one another, as in what way justice differs from courage, and prudence from temperance; for all these are from the same genus, from virtue. And from one thing to another, as in those things that do not differ too much, as in what way sense differs from knowledge; for in those things that differ greatly, the differences are altogether manifest. But similarity must be considered in those things that are in diverse genera, as that just as one thing is related to another, so another is to another, as just as knowledge is to the knowable, so sense is to the sensible; and as one thing is in something, so another is in another, as in what way sight is in the eye, mind in the soul, and as tranquillity in the sea, serenity in the air; for both are a kind of rest. But most of all in those things which are mul-","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":29,"ref":"p29","source":"tum distant exercerioportet, facile enim in reliquis poterimus similia inspicere. Considerandum autem et ea quae sub eodem sunt genere, si quid inest omnibus idem, ut homini, et equo, et cani; nam si inest aliquid eis idem in eo sunt similia. Utile autem ipsum quidem, quod quotupliciter, dicitur, considerasseaddiiuciditatem;maximeautem quis sciet quid ponatur, manifesto facto quotupliciterdicitur.Etad fieri secundum rem eamdem, et non ad nomen syllogismos: sieniminmanifestum sit quotupliciter dicitur, contingit non ad idem etiam qui respondet et qui interrogat ferre intellectum; manifestato autem quotupliciter dicitur, et ad quid ferens ponat, ridicuius videbitur interrogans esse, si non ad hoc sermonem faciat. Utile etiam, et ut non falsa ratione decipiamur, sed decipiamus potius: nam scientes quotu pliciterdicitur,llon allucinabimur,sed sciemus si non ad idem sermonem faciat is qui interrogat, et ipsi interrogantes poterimus apparenti ratiocinatione fallere, nisi is qui respondet agnoscat quotupliciter dicitur. Hoc non in omnibus semper possibile, sed quando fuerint eorum quae multipliciter dicuntur, aliaquidem vera, alta autem falsa. Est autem proprie nonconveniens.modus hic dialecticae, quare omnino vitanda dialecticishujusmodi ad nomen disputatio, nisi quis aliter non possit de proposito disserere.","english":"Then one must also distinguish these, for we shall easily be able to observe similar cases in the rest. One must also consider those things that fall under the same genus, whether some one thing is present in all of them, as in man, horse, and dog; for if some one thing is present in them, they are similar in that respect. It is useful to have considered how many ways a thing itself is said, for the sake of clarity; but most of all, once it has been made manifest how many ways it is said, one will know what is being posited. And one must make syllogisms with regard to the thing itself, and not with regard to the name; for if it is not manifest how many ways it is said, it happens that both the one who answers and the one who asks do not direct their understanding to the same thing; but once it has been made manifest how many ways it is said, and to which of them the respondent directs his assertion, the questioner will seem ridiculous if he does not direct his argument to that. It is useful also so that we are not deceived by a false account, but rather deceive others; for knowing how many ways it is said, we shall not be led astray, but shall know whether the one who asks is not directing his argument to the same thing, and we ourselves, when asking, will be able to deceive by an apparent syllogism, unless the one who answers recognizes how many ways it is said. This is not always possible in all cases, but when, of those things that are said in many ways, some are true and others false. But this mode is properly unsuitable for dialectic; wherefore dialecticians must altogether avoid this kind of disputation directed at the name, unless one cannot otherwise discuss the proposed matter.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":30,"ref":"p30","source":"Differentias autem invenireutile, et ad syllogismos de eodem, et diverso, et ad cognoscendum quid est unumquodque.Quod autem ad syllogismosdeeodem et diverso utile, manifestum: invenientes enim dieferentiam propositorum quamlibet,ostendenteserimus quoniam non idem. Ad cognoscendum autem qutdestunumquodque,eo quod propriam substantiae cujusque rationem,iis quæ (circa unuroquodquesunt) accommodatis differentiissepararesolemus. Similitudinis autem consideratio utilis est ad inductivas, rationes, et ad syllogismos ex suppositione, et ad assignationem definitionum. Ad inductivas quidem rationes, eo quod circa singula in similibus inductione universale existimamus inducere, non enim facileest mducercignorant.essimilia.Adaynagismoa ex suppositione, eo quod probabile est quemadmodum in uno similium se habet, sic et in reliquis. Quare ad quodcunque eoru facuItatem habebimus disputandi, profitebimur quemadmodum in bis se babet, sic et in proposito habere. Id enim ostendentes, et propositum ex suppositione ostendentes erimus: supponentes enim quomodo in his se habet, sic et in proposito se habere demonstrationem faciemus. Ad definitionem autem assignationem, eo quod potentes conspicere quid in unoquoque idem, non dubitabimus ad quid oporteat genus (cum definiemus propositum) collocare, nam communium quod maxime in eo quod quid prsedicatur' genus erit.","english":"To find differences is useful both for syllogisms concerning the same and the different and for knowing what each thing is. That it is useful for syllogisms concerning the same and the different is clear: for by finding whatever difference there is between the things proposed, we shall have shown that they are not the same. For knowing what each thing is, [it is useful] because we are accustomed to separate the differences proper to each thing's substance by applying them to the things that are around each thing. Consideration of similarity is useful for inductive arguments, for syllogisms from supposition, and for the assigning of definitions. For inductive arguments, because by induction we think we bring in the universal from particulars in similar cases; for it is not easy to bring in [the universal] when the similar cases are unknown. For syllogisms from supposition, because it is probable that as a thing stands in one of the similar cases, so it stands in the rest. Wherefore, for whatever of these we shall have the ability to dispute, we shall profess that as things stand in these, so they stand in the proposed case. For by showing this, we shall also have shown the proposed case from supposition; for supposing that as things stand in these, so they stand in the proposed case, we shall make the demonstration. For the assigning of a definition, because, being able to see what is the same in each thing, we shall not doubt where we ought to place the genus when we define the proposed thing; for the genus will be that of the common [attributes] which is most predicated in [answer to] the question \"what it is.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":31,"ref":"p31","source":"Similiter autem et in multum distantibus utilis ad definitiones similitudinis consideratio, ut quod idem tranquillitas in mari, et serenitas in aere, utrumqueenim quies, etquoniam punctum in linea, et unitas in numero, utrumque enim principium. Quare commune in omnibusgenusassignantes, arbitrabitur non extranee definire. Pene autem et definientes sic solent assignare, nam et unitatem principium numeri dicunt esse; et punctum principium lineae. Manifestum igitur quoniam ad commune utrorumque genus collocant. Instrumenta itaque per quae sunt syllogismi, ha'c sunt; loci autem ad quos utilia sunt prædicta, ii sunt qui dicendi sunt.\n\nLIBER SECUNDUS.\n\nCAPUT PRIMUM.\n\nDe problematis uuiversalibus et in quibus prædicatis inesse et esse convertuntur.\n\nSunt autem problematum haecquidemuniversalia, ilia vero particularia: universalia quidem, ut omnis voluptas bonum est, et nulla voluptas bonum; particularia vero, ut aliqua voluptas bonum, et aliqua voluptas non bonum. Sunt autem ad utraque genera problematum communia universalia, et constructiva, et destructiva. Ostendentes enim quod omni inest, et quod alicui inest ostendentes erimus; similiter autem et si quod nulli inest ostenderimus, et quod non omni inest ostendentes erimus.","english":"Similarly, the consideration of similarity is useful for definitions even in things that are far apart, as that tranquility at sea and clearness in the air are the same thing, for each is a rest; and that a point in a line and a unit in number are the same, for each is a principle. Therefore, when they assign the common genus in all these, one will judge that they are not defining in a foreign way. And indeed those who define are accustomed to assign in nearly this way, for they say that a unit is the principle of number and a point the principle of a line. It is clear, therefore, that they place them under the common genus of both. The instruments, then, through which syllogisms are made are these; and the places to which the aforementioned are useful are those that must now be stated.\n\nBOOK TWO\n\nCHAPTER ONE\n\nOn universal problems, and in which predicates inherence and being are converted.\n\nOf problems, some are universal and others particular: universal, as every pleasure is good, and no pleasure is good; particular, as some pleasure is good, and some pleasure is not good. But common to both kinds of problems are universal [problems], both constructive and destructive. For by showing that [something] is present in every case, we shall also have shown that it is present in some case; and similarly, if we show that it is present in no case, we shall also have shown that it is not present in every case.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":32,"ref":"p32","source":"Primum ergo de universalibus destructivis dicendum, eo quod communia sinthujusmodi ad universalia et particularia, et quia magis positiones afferant in eo quod inest, quam non,disputantes autem destruant. Est autem difficillimum converti ab accidente propriam nomitationem. Nam aliquo modo et non universaliter in solis contingit accidentibus, a definitioneenim, et proprio, et genere necessarium est converti, ut si inest alicui animal grepsibile bipes esse, convertentem verum erit dicere, quoniam illud animal gressibile bipes est. Similiter autem a genere, nam si animal inest alicui, animal est. Eodem autem modo et proprio est; si enim alicui inest J grammatices susceptivum esse, grammatices susceptivum erit. Nam nihil horum contingit secundum quid inesse, vel non esse, sed simpliciter vel inesse, vel non inesse. In accidentibus autem nihil prohibet secundum quid inesse, ut albedinem, vel justitiam. Quare non sufficit ostendere quoniam inest albedo, vel justitia, ad ostendendum quod albus, vel justus est, nam habet dubitationem, quoniam secundum quid albus, vel justus est: quapropter non necessarium est in accidentibus converti. Determinare autem oportet et peccata quas sunt in problematibus, nam sunt duo vel in eo quod falsum dicunt, vel in eo quod transgrediuntur positam locutionem.","english":"First, then, we must speak about the destructive arguments concerning universals, because the common [principles] of this kind apply to both universals and particulars, and because they contribute more to positions regarding what is present than what is not, while those who dispute destroy [them]. But it is most difficult to convert from an accident to its proper designation. For in some way and not universally does this happen in accidents alone; for from a definition, a property, and a genus it is necessary to convert, as if being a two-footed walking animal belongs to something, then when converted it will be true to say that that animal is a two-footed walking animal. Similarly also from a genus, for if animal belongs to something, it is an animal. In the same way also with a property; for if being receptive of grammar belongs to something, it will be receptive of grammar. For none of these happens to belong or not belong in a qualified sense, but simply to belong or not belong. In accidents, however, nothing prevents belonging in a qualified sense, as whiteness or justice. Therefore it is not sufficient to show that whiteness or justice is present in order to show that [something] is white or just, for there is a doubt, since it is white or just in a qualified sense; wherefore it is not necessary to convert in accidents. But one must also determine what errors there are in problems, for there are two: either in saying what is false, or in transgressing the established expression.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":33,"ref":"p33","source":"Falsum etenim dicentes, et qui quod non inest inesse alicui dicunt, peccant, et qui extraneis nominibus res appellant (ut Platanum hominem), transgrediuntur positam nominationem.\n\nCAPUT II.\n\nLoci problematum quod quidquam insit vel non insit.\n\nUnus autem locus est inspicere si quid secundum aliquem aliummodum inest, utaccidens assignavit. Peccatur autem maxime id circa genera, ut si quis albo dicat accidere colorem esse, non enim albo colorem esse accidit, sed genus ejus color est. Contingit autem et secundum nominationem determinare eum qui ponit, ut quod accidit justitiae virtutem esse. Saepe autem et cum non determinet, manifestum quod genus ut accidens assignavit, ut si quis albedinem colorari dixerit,vel ambulationem moveri. A nullo enim genere denominative prædicatio de specie dicitur, sed omnia univoce genera de speciebus praedicantur, nam et nomen et rationem generum suscipiunt species; qui igitur coloratum dixit album, neque genus assignavit, quoniam denominative dixit, neque ut proprium vel ut definitionem, nam definitio et proprium nulli alii inest:: sunt autem colorataet pleraque aliorum, utlignum, lapis, homo, equus. Manifestum igitur quoniam ut accidens assignavit. Alius locus est inspicere ea quibus inesse aut omnibus aut nulli dictum est, etconsiderare secundum species, et nun in infinitis.","english":"For those who state something false, and those who say that what is not present in something is present in it, err; and those who call things by extraneous names (as calling a man a plane-tree) transgress the established naming.\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nTopics of problems: whether something is present or not present.\n\nOne topic is to consider whether something is present in some other way, as someone has assigned it as an accident. The greatest error, however, occurs around genera, as if someone were to say that color is an accident of white; for color is not an accident of white, but color is its genus. It also happens that one may determine by naming the one who posits it, as that virtue is an accident of justice. Often, too, even when he does not determine it, it is clear that he has assigned the genus as an accident, as if someone were to say that whiteness is colored, or that walking is moved. For from no genus is predication made of a species by denomination, but all genera are predicated univocally of species; for species receive both the name and the definition of genera. Therefore, whoever said that white is colored neither assigned the genus, since he spoke by denomination, nor [assigned it] as a property or as a definition; for a definition and a property are present in no other thing; but many other things are colored, such as wood, stone, man, horse. It is clear, therefore, that he assigned it as an accident. Another topic is to examine those things of which it has been said that [something] is present in all or in none, and to consider according to species, and not in infinite cases.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":34,"ref":"p34","source":"Nam transitu magis et in paucioribus consideratio, oportet autem considerare et incipere a primis, deinde consequenter usque ad individua, ut si oppositorum eamdem disciplinam quis dixerit esse, perspiciendum si eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, et contrariorum, et quæ secundum privationem et habitum et quæ secundum contradictionem dicuntur, eadem fit disciplina et si in his nondum manifestum est, rursum ea dividendum usque ad individua, ut si, justi vel injusti, vel dupli vel dimidii, vel caeci-, tatis vel visus, vel esse vel non esse. Nam si in aliquo ostendatur quod non eadem, interimentes erimus problema,similiter autem et si nulli inest.Iste auten' locus convertitur ad construendum et destruendum. Si enim in omnibus videatur cum divisionem proferimus,nihil in pluribus, postulandum est autem universaliter ponere,aut instantiam ferrein ali. quo non sic esse;nam si neutrum horum faciat,absurdus apparebit, qui non ponet. Alius est, definitiones facere accidentis, et ejus -cui accidit, aut utriusqne de utroque, aut alterius,deinde considcrare si quid non verumin definitionibus perinde ac verum sumptum sit. Ut si est Deum injustitiam facere, quid injustitiam facere. Si enim nocere sponte,manifestum quoniam non est Deum injustitiam facere,non enim contingit nocere Deum;et si invidus sit studiosus, quisinvidus,etquae invidia.","english":"For the consideration is more by way of transition and in fewer instances, but one must consider and begin from the first things, then successively down to individuals, as if someone has said that the same discipline is of opposites, one must examine whether the same discipline is of those which are relative, and of contraries, and of those which are said according to privation and habit, and of those which are said according to contradiction; and if in these it is not yet manifest, again one must divide them down to individuals, as whether of the just or the unjust, or of the double or the half, or of blindness or sight, or of being or not being. For if in any one it is shown that it is not the same, we shall be destroying the problem; and similarly also if it belongs to none. But this topic is turned to constructing and destroying. For if in all it appears when we bring forward the division, [it appears] in nothing in the many; but one must posit universally, or bring an instance in some other case that it is not so; for if he does neither of these, he who does not posit will appear absurd. Another is to make definitions of an accident, and of that to which it accrues, either of both concerning both, or of one concerning the other, then to consider if anything not true has been assumed in the definitions just as if true. As if it is [said] that God does injustice, what is to do injustice. For if it is to harm willingly, it is manifest that it is not [possible] for God to do injustice, for it does not befall God to harm; and if the envious man is studious, who is envious, and what is envy.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":35,"ref":"p35","source":"Nam si invidia est tristitiainapparenti prosperitate alicujus proborum,manifestum est quod studiosus non est invidus, pravus enim esset;et si indignans invidus,quis uterque eorum; sic enim manifestum erit utrum verum an falsum sit,quod dictum est,ut si invidus quidem sit qui tristatur in bonorum prosperitatibu3,indignans autem qui in malorum prosperitatibus trislatur,manifestum quod non erit invidus indignans.Sumere autem etpro iis(quae in defitionibus sunt) nominibus definitiones, et non desistere donec ad nolum deventum sit;nam sæpe cum tota quidem definitio assignata sit,non manifestum est quod quæritur,pro aliquo autem eorum (quæ in definitione sunt) nominum definitione dicta, manifestum fit. Amplius,problema propositionem sibi facientem instare. Nam instantia erit argumentum ad positionem. Est autem locus hic pene idem ei quoconsiderarequibusinesse,vel omnibus,vel nulli dictum est,differt autem modo. Amplius, determinare quæ oportet dicere ut p!ures,et quae non Utile enim et ad construendum, et ad destruendum, ut quod nominationibus quidem res nuncupandum ut plures, quæ autem sunt, taliane, an non talia, non amplius attendendum ad plures:ut salubre quidem dicendum effectivum sanitatis, ceu plures dicunt.","english":"For if envy is distress at the apparent prosperity of someone among the good, it is evident that the studious man is not envious, for he would be wicked; and if the indignant man is envious, who is each of them? For thus it will be evident whether what was said is true or false: as, if the envious man is one who is distressed at the prosperities of the good, but the indignant man is one who rejoices at the prosperities of the wicked, it is evident that the indignant man will not be envious. But one must also take, in place of the names that are in the definitions, the definitions themselves, and not stop until one comes to a name; for often, when the whole definition has been assigned, it is not evident what is sought, but when a definition has been stated in place of one of the names that are in the definition, it becomes evident. Further, one must press the problem by making it a proposition for oneself. For the objection will be an argument against the position. And this topic is nearly the same as that by which it was said to consider to whom it is beneficial, either to all or to none, but it differs in manner. Further, to determine what one ought to say as the many do, and what not. For it is useful both for constructing and for destroying: that in names, indeed, things should be called as the many call them, but whether the things that exist are such or not, one should no longer attend to the many; as, indeed, one should say that the healthful is productive of health, as the many say.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":36,"ref":"p36","source":"Utrum autem propositumeffectivumsitsanitatis,an non,non amplius ut plures dicendum,sed ut medicus.Amplius,si multipliciter dicatur,positumautem sit quoniam inest,aul quoniam non inest, alterum. monstrare eorum quae multipliciter dicuntur,si non utraque contingat.Utendum autem in iis quae latent, nam si non lateatmultipliciterdictuminstabit,quoniam non monstratum est id quod ipse dubitabat, sed alterum. Hic autem locus convertitur et ad construendum et ad destruendum, nam construere volentes ostendemus quoniam alterum inest,si non ambo poterimus: destruentes autem quoniam non inest alterum ostendemus, si ambo non poterimus: verumtamen destruenti quidem nihil oportet ex concessione disputare, neque si omni, neque si nulli dictum Bit inesse;nam si ostenderimus quoniam non inest quodcunque id sit, interimentes erimus omni inesse;similiterautemet si uni ostenderimus inesse, interimemus nulliinesse.Construentibus autem præconfitendum quod cuivis inest omni inest, si verisimile sit postulatum.Non sufficit enim, ad ostendendum quod omni inest, in uno disputasse, ut si hominis anima immortalis est, propter hoc anima omnis immortalis; quare praeconfitendum quod si quæcunque anima immortalis, omnis immortalis.","english":"But whether the proposed definition is productive of health or not must no longer be discussed as the many do, but as the physician does. Further, if it is spoken of in many ways, and it has been laid down that it belongs, or that it does not belong, one must demonstrate the other of those things which are said in many ways, if both cannot be established. This must be used in matters that are hidden; for if it is not hidden that it is said in many ways, he will press the point that what he himself doubted has not been demonstrated, but the other. This topic is turned both to constructing and to destroying; for when we wish to construct, we shall show that the one belongs, if we cannot show both; but when destroying, we shall show that the one does not belong, if we cannot show both. Nevertheless, for one who is destroying, there is no need to dispute from a concession, neither that it has been said to belong to every one, nor to no one; for if we have shown that it does not belong, whatever that may be, we shall have destroyed its belonging to every one; and similarly, if we have shown that it belongs to one, we shall destroy its belonging to no one. But for those who are constructing, it must be conceded in advance that whatever belongs to any one belongs to every one, if the postulate is plausible. For to show that it belongs to every one, it is not enough to have disputed in the case of one—as, if the soul of a man is immortal, for this reason every soul is immortal; wherefore it must be conceded in advance that if any soul whatever is immortal, every soul is immortal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":37,"ref":"p37","source":"Hoc autem non semper faciendum,sed quando non facile possumus communem in omnibus unam rationem dicere, quemadmodum geometer, quod triangulus duobus rectis aequos babet tres angulos. Si autem non lateatquod multipliciter dicitur divisum, quotupliciterdicitur etinterirnendum et construendum. Ut si dicens est utile, aut honestum, tentandum ambo construere, vel intrimere de proposito, ut quod honestum et quod utile, vel quod neque honestum neque utile.Si autem non contingat utraque, alterum ostendendum,adnotato quod hoc quidem est, illud autem non, eadem autem ratio, etiam si plura sint in quae dividitur.Rursum quæcunque non secundum aequivocationem dicuntur multipliciter,sed alio modo.Ut disciplina una plurium, aut ut finis, aut ejus quod ad finem, ut medicina ejus quod samitatem t'acit,ut quod cibat,aut ut amborum finium velutcontrariorum eadem disciplina (nihil enim magis finis alterum altero)aut ut ejus quod per se est, et ejus quod per accidens. Ut perse.quidemquod triangulus duobus rectis æquales habet tres angulos,per accidens autem quod aequilaterus, quoniam enim accidit triangulo aequilaterum triangulum esse, per hoc cognoscimus quod duobus rectis æquales habet. Si ergo nullo modo contingit eadem esse plurium disciplinam, manifestum quoniam omnino non contingit esse, aut si aliquo modo contingit,manifestum quod contingit.","english":"But this is not always to be done, but when we cannot easily state one common account in all cases, as the geometer does, that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles. But if it does not escape us that what is said in many ways has been divided, we must both refute and establish in how many ways it is said. For example, if someone says that it is useful or honorable, one must attempt to establish both, or to refute one of the proposed alternatives, namely that it is honorable and that it is useful, or that it is neither honorable nor useful. But if it does not happen that both hold, one must show the other, noting that this one is so and that one is not; and the same account applies even if there are more things into which it is divided. Again, whatever things are said in many ways not according to equivocation, but in another mode: as one discipline is of many things, either as of the end, or as of that which is toward the end, as medicine is of that which produces health, as of that which nourishes, or as of both ends, as of contraries the same discipline (for neither is more an end than the other), or as of that which is per se and that which is per accidens. As per se, that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles; but per accidens, that it is equilateral, for since it happens to a triangle to be an equilateral triangle, through this we know that it has angles equal to two right angles. If, therefore, in no way does it happen that the same discipline be of many things, it is manifest that it altogether cannot be; or if in some way it happens, it is manifest that it does happen.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":38,"ref":"p38","source":"Dividere autem quotupliciter,utile,utsi voluerimus construere:taliaprsestatuendasunt quaecunque contingunt, et dividendum in ea tantum quaecunque utilia sunt ad construendum. Si autem destruere quaecunque non contingunt,reliqua vero omittenda. Id autem faciendum in iis cum latuerit quotupliciter dicuntur,et esse hoc quidem hujus aut non esse ex eisdem locis astruendum,ut disciplioam,hujus quidem aut ut finis, aut eorum quae sunt ad finem, aut ut eorum quæ sunt secundumaccidens,velrursum non esse aliquid secundum aliquem dictorum modorum,eadem autem ratio,et in desiderio,etquæcunque alia dicuntur plurium.Est enim desiderium bujusaututfinis,ut sanitatis,aututeorum quæ sunt ad finem,ut medicinæ conficiendæ,aut uteorurn quae sunt secundum accidens,utin vino amicum dulce, non quia vinum, sed quia dulce est, nam per se dulce desiderat,vinum autem per accidens.-si enim austerum fit, non amplius desiderat, per accidens ergo desiderabat. Utilis autem locus hic et in iis quae sunt ad aliquid,pene enim talia ea quae ad aliquid sunt.Amplius,transferreadevidentius nomen. Ut pro exacto in opinione clarum,et pro curiositate cupid i tas su perfluarum rerum,evidentiori enim facto quod dictum est, bene argumentabilis est positio. Estautem hic locus ad utrumquecommunis,ad construendum et ad destruendum.Ad ostendendum autem contraria circa idem inesse,considerandum in genere.","english":"To divide in how many ways it is useful, as, for instance, if we wish to establish something: all the consequences that follow must be posited, and division must be made only into those that are useful for establishing. But if we wish to refute, [we must take] all that do not follow, and omit the rest. This must be done in those cases when it has escaped us in how many ways things are said, and that this is or is not [predicated] of this must be established from the same topics—for example, that discipline is [desired] either as an end, or as one of the things that are for the sake of the end, or as one of the things that are [desired] incidentally; or again, that something is not [said] according to any of the modes mentioned. The same account holds also in the case of desire, and whatever else is said of several things. For desire is [desire] of this either as of an end, as of health, or as of the things that are for the sake of the end, as of preparing medicine, or as of the things that are incidental, as in wine [one desires] what is pleasant to a friend, not because it is wine, but because it is sweet; for he desires the sweet in itself, but wine incidentally—for if it becomes sour, he no longer desires it; therefore he desired it incidentally. This topic is useful also in things that are in relation to something, for such things are nearly of this sort. Further, to transfer [the argument] to a more evident name, as instead of \"exact\" in opinion, \"clear,\" and instead of \"curiosity,\" \"desire for superfluous things\"; for when what has been said is made more evident, the position can be argued well. This topic is common to both, to establishing and to refuting. But to show that contraries belong to the same thing, one must consider [this] in the genus.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":39,"ref":"p39","source":"ut si volumus ostendere quod est circa sensum rectitudo et peccatum,sentire quidem judicare est;judicare autem est recte et non recte, et circa sensum erit rectitudo et peccatum. Nunc ergo et genere circa speciem demonstratio fit,nam judicare est genus sentire; qui namque sentit, aliquo modo judicat.Rursum ex specie generi: quaecunque enim speciei insunt,et generi. Ut si disciplina prava est, et studiosa, et dispositio prava, et studiosa, nam dispositio disciplinæ genus.Primus autem locus falsusestad construenduIL,secundusautem verus;non enim necessarium quaecunque generi insunt,etspeciei inesse,nam animal est volatileetquadrupes,homo autem non.Qusecunque vero speciei insunt, necessario etgeneri:si enim homo studiosus,et animal studiosum est. Ad destruendum autem et primus quidem verus, secundus autem falsus, quæcunque enim generi non insunt, neque speciei, quaecunque vero speciei non insunt,non necesse est generi non inesse.Quoniamautemnecesaariumdequibusgenus prædicatur, et specierum aliquam prædicari, et quaecunquehabentgenus,veldenominativedicuntur a genere,et specierum aliquam habere necesse est, vel denominativa ab aliqua specierum dici.","english":"For example, if we wish to show that rightness and error exist in relation to sense perception: to perceive is to judge; and to judge is to judge rightly or not rightly; therefore rightness and error will exist in relation to sense perception. So now the demonstration is also made from genus to species, for to judge is the genus of perceiving; for whoever perceives in some way judges. Again, from species to genus: for whatever belongs to the species also belongs to the genus. For example, if a discipline is base, it is also worthy of pursuit, and if a disposition is base, it is also worthy of pursuit, for disposition is the genus of discipline. But the first topic is false for establishing, while the second is true; for it is not necessary that whatever belongs to the genus also belongs to the species—for an animal is capable of flight and four-footed, but a human being is not. But whatever belongs to the species necessarily also belongs to the genus: for if a human being is worthy of pursuit, an animal is worthy of pursuit. For refuting, however, the first is indeed true, but the second is false; for whatever does not belong to the genus does not belong to the species either, but whatever does not belong to the species it is not necessary that it not belong to the genus. Since, moreover, it is necessary that whatever the genus is predicated of, some one of the species is also predicated of, and that whatever have the genus, or are called by denomination from the genus, also necessarily have some one of the species, or are called by denomination from some one of the species.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":40,"ref":"p40","source":"Ut si de aliquo disciplina praedicatur, et grammatica, vel musica,vel aliqua disciplinarum aliarum praedicabitur,et si aliquis habet disciplinam,vel denominative a disciplina dicitur, et grammaticam habebit, aut musicam, aut aliquam aliarum disciplinarum, vel denominative ab aliqua earum dicitur,ut grammaticus,vel musicus;si igitur aliquid dictum a genere quoquo modo ut animam moveri,considerandum est secundum aliquam specierum motus contingit animam moveri, ut augeri, vel minui, vel corrumpi, vel generari, aut quaecunque aliæ motus species sunt: nam si secundum nullam, manifestum est quod non movetur. Hic autem locus communis ad utrumque,etad construendum,et ad destruendum, si enim secundum aliquam speciem movetur,perspicuum est quoniam movetur, et si secundum nullam specierum movetur,manifestum quod non movetur.Cum autem facultas non adsit argumentationis ad positionem,in-' tendendum ex definitionibuci autquaesunt propositæ rei, vel quæ vidpantur, et si non ab una, etiam a pluribus.Facile anim definientibus argumentarierit, nam ed definitiones facilis argumentatio.Considerandum autem in proposito, quoniam existente necesse est positum esse,aut quid est ex necessitate, si propositum est.","english":"For example, if discipline is predicated of something, grammar or music or some other of the disciplines will also be predicated; and if someone has a discipline, or is called denominatively from a discipline, he will have grammar or music or some other of the disciplines, or be called denominatively from one of them, as a grammarian or a musician. If, then, something is said from a genus in any way—for instance, that the soul is moved—one must consider according to which of the species of motion it happens that the soul is moved: as to be increased, or diminished, or corrupted, or generated, or whatever other species of motion there are; for if according to none, it is evident that it is not moved. This topic is common to both, both to constructing and to destroying: for if it is moved according to some species, it is clear that it is moved; and if it is moved according to no species, it is evident that it is not moved. But when the capacity for argumentation toward a position is not at hand, one must attend to the definitions of the proposed thing, or to those which seem so, and if not from one, also from several. For it will be easy for those defining to argue, since argumentation from definitions is easy. One must consider in the proposed matter that, when it exists, the position must necessarily be, or what it is by necessity, if it has been proposed.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":41,"ref":"p41","source":"Construere quidem volenti quo existente propositum eritex necessitate,nam si illud ostendatur esse, et propositum ostensum erit, destruere autem volenti quid est si propositum est, nam si ostenderimus consequens propositum non esse,interimentes erimus propositum.Amplius, ad tempus inspiciendum si alicubi dissonat.Ut si quod nutritur dixerit quis ex necessitate augerijnutriuntur enim semperanimalia,augenturautem non semper. Similiter autem et si scire dixerit quis reminisci, hoc enim præteriti temporis est, illud autem præsentis,et futuri; scire enim dicimur praesentia, et futura, ut quoniam erit solis defectus, reminisci autem non contingit aliud quam praeteritum.","english":"For one who wishes to construct an argument, the question is what, if it exists, will make the proposition follow of necessity; for if that is shown to exist, the proposition will also have been shown. But for one who wishes to destroy it, the question is what, if the proposition is, follows; for if we show that the consequent does not exist, we shall have destroyed the proposition. Moreover, one must examine the tense, to see whether it is inconsistent anywhere. For example, if someone says that what is nourished necessarily grows; for animals are always nourished, but they do not always grow. Likewise also if someone says that to know is to remember; for the latter belongs to past time, the former to present and future time; for we are said to know present and future things, as that there will be an eclipse of the sun, but to remember cannot apply to anything except the past.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":42,"ref":"p42","source":"Amplius,sophisticus modus ducere ad id ad quod plurimum habemus argumentoruUl falJultatem.Hoc autem erit quandoque quidem necessarium quandoque autem apparens necessarium,quandoque autem neque apparens neque necessarium,necessarium quidem,quando negante eo qui respondet aliquid utilium ad positionem,ad illud rationes facit,contingit autem id talium esse ad quae copiosam argumentorumfacultatem habemus.Similiter autem et quando inductionem ad aliquid per positum faciens,interimere conatur, hoc enim interempto, et propositum interirr,itur.A pparens au tern necessarium est quando videtur quidem utile'et accommodum positioni, non est autem ad id ad quod fiunt disputationes, sive negante eo qui disputationem sustinet, sive ab inductione probabili,per positionem ad idem factam, interimere conetur idipsum; reliquum vero quando nec necessarium est nec apparens ad id ad quod fiunt disputatio::Jes,et sine causa accidit redarguere respondentem. Oportet autem devitare postremum dictorum modum, omnino enim semotus et extraneus videtur esse a dialectica.Quare oportet et respondentem non graviter ferre, sed ponenda quae non utiliasuntad positionem significare quaecunque non videantur:Zponit tamen, nam magis perplexos esse ut plurimum contingit eos qui interrogant, quando omnia hujusmodi ab eis posita fuerint, si non concludunt.","english":"Further, the sophistic manner of leading to that for which we have the greatest abundance of arguments. This will be sometimes necessary, sometimes apparently necessary, and sometimes neither apparent nor necessary. It is necessary when, the respondent denying something useful for the thesis, he directs his arguments toward that thing, and it happens that this is among those for which we have a copious abundance of arguments. Likewise also when, making an induction toward something by means of what has been posited, he tries to destroy it; for when this is destroyed, the proposed thesis is also destroyed. But it is apparently necessary when it seems indeed useful and suited to the thesis, but is not directed toward that for which the disputations are made—whether the one maintaining the disputation denies it, or he tries to destroy that very thing by means of a probable induction, through a position made toward the same end. The remaining case is when it is neither necessary nor apparent toward that for which the disputations are made, and the refutation of the respondent happens without cause. But one ought to avoid the last-mentioned manner, for it seems altogether remote and foreign to dialectic. Wherefore the respondent also ought not to bear it with annoyance, but should indicate whatever does not seem useful for the thesis by positing them; yet he does posit them, for those who ask are generally made more perplexed when all such things have been posited by them, if they do not reach a conclusion.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":43,"ref":"p43","source":"Amplius, omnis qui dixit unumquodvis, quodam modo multa dixit, eo quod plura unicuique ex necessitate consequentia sunt(ut qui hominem dixit esse, et quod animal est dixit, et quod animatum,et quod hipes, et quod mentis, et disciplinae susceptivum); quare quovis uno consequentium interempto, interimitur et quod in principio est,cavere autem oportet in hujusmodi difficilioris assumptionem facere: nam quandoque facile est consequens interimere,quandoqueid ipsum propositum.Quibuscunque autem necesseest alterum tantum inesse, vel non inesse,ut homini aegritudinem,vel sanitatem, si ad alterum facile poterimus disputare quod inest, vel non inest,et ad reliquum facile poterimus. Hoc autem convertitur ad utrumque. Ostendentes enim quod inest alterum, quod non inest reliquum ostendentes erimus;si au. tem quod non inest ostendamus, reliquum inesse ostendentes erimus • manifestum igitur quod ad utrumque utilis hie locus est.Amplius argumentari transferendo nomen in orationem,cum longe magis consentaneum visum fuerit transsumerIJ quam utponitur nomen. Ut magnanimum non fortem (ut poni-. tur)sed magnum animum hahentem,quemadmodum fidentem, bona sperantem. Similiter autem et ingeniosum,cujus fuerit genius studiosus. Quemadmodum Xenocrates inquit ingeniosum eum esse qui animam sortitus est studiosam, ipsam enim unicuiqueessegenium.","english":"Further, everyone who has said any one thing has in a way said many things, because many things necessarily follow from each one (for example, one who has said that a man exists has also said that he is an animal, and that he is animate, and that he is a biped, and that he is capable of mind and discipline); therefore, when any one of the consequents is destroyed, that which was stated at the beginning is also destroyed. But in cases of this sort one must beware of making the assumption of the more difficult point; for sometimes it is easy to destroy the consequent, sometimes the very proposition itself. But in all cases where one of two things must necessarily be present or absent—as, for a man, sickness or health—if we can easily argue that one of them is present or absent, we shall also easily be able to argue the other. And this converts to both sides. For by showing that one is present, we shall have shown that the other is absent; but if we show that one is absent, we shall have shown that the other is present. It is clear, then, that this topic is useful for both. Further, to argue by transferring the name into a definition, when it has seemed far more fitting to use the definition than to use the name as it is posited. For example, \"magnanimous\" not as \"brave\" (as it is posited), but as \"having a great mind,\" just as \"confident\" means \"hoping for good things.\" Similarly also \"well-endowed by nature,\" whose genius is studious. As Xenocrates says, the well-endowed by nature is one who has obtained a studious soul; for the soul itself is the genius of each person.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":44,"ref":"p44","source":"Quoniaraautemrerumaliasquidem sunt ex necessitate, aliae autem ut in pluribus, alia: vero utrumlibet, si quod ex necessitate est, ut in pluribus ponatur,aut quod ut in pluribus,ex necessitate, autipsumautcontrariumeiquodestutinpluribussemperdatlocum argumentationis.Nam si quod ex necessitate est ut in pluribus ponatur, manifestum quoniam non omnidicitinesse,cum insitomni; quare peccavit, sive quod ut in pluribus dicitur ex necessitate dixit, omni dixit inesse, cum non insit omni: similiter autem et si contrarium ei quod in pluribus est ex necessitate dixit, semper enim in paucioribus dicitur contrarium ei quod est ut in pluribus, ut si ut in pluribus pravi homines, boni in paucioribus; quare multo magis peccavit, si bonos ex necessitate dixit esse: similiter autem et si quod utrumlibetest ex necessitate dixit,vel ut in pluribus, neque enim ex necessitate utrumlibet, neque ut in pluribus; contingit autem et si non determinans dixerit utrum ut in pluribus, an ex necessitate dixit, si autem res ut in pluribus, disputare ut ex necessitate is dixerit. Ut Iii pravos exhefcreditandos dixit esse, non determinans,tanquam ex necessitate is dixerit, disputare.","english":"Since, however, some things exist by necessity, others for the most part, and others indifferently, if what exists by necessity is taken as holding for the most part, or what holds for the most part as by necessity, or the opposite of what holds for the most part, one always has a place for argument. For if what exists by necessity is taken as holding for the most part, it is clear that he has not said it belongs to all, since it belongs to all; therefore he has erred. Or if he said that what is said to hold for the most part exists by necessity, he said it belongs to all, when it does not belong to all. Similarly also if he said the opposite of what holds for the most part to exist by necessity; for the opposite of what holds for the most part is always said to hold in fewer cases, as if bad men are so for the most part, good men in fewer cases; therefore he erred much more if he said that good men exist by necessity. Similarly also if he said that what is indifferent exists by necessity or for the most part; for neither is the indifferent by necessity nor for the most part. It also happens that if he did not determine whether he said it for the most part or by necessity, but the matter is one that holds for the most part, one may dispute that he said it by necessity. For example, if he said that the wicked are to be trusted, not determining it, one may dispute that he said it as by necessity.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":45,"ref":"p45","source":"Amplius,etsi idem sibi accidens posuerit ut alterum, eo quod alterum sit nomen.Quemadmodum Prodicus dividebat voluptates in gaudium, etjucunditatem, et laetitiam, hæc enim omnia ejusdem (id est voluptatis) nomina sunt; si ergo aliquis gaudere ei quod est laetari ponat accidere, idem utique sibi dicet accidere,\n\nCAPUT III.\n\nDe eisdem terminandis problematis loci alii.\n\nOuoniam autem contraria connectuntur quidem sibi invicem sex modis,contrarietatem autem faciunt quadrupliciter complexa,oportet accipere contraria quocunque modo utile fuerit et destruenti et construenti. Quod autem sex modis complectuntur, manifestum: nam aut utrumque contrariorum utriquecontrariorum connectitur,hoc autem dupliciter, ut amicis benefacere et inimicis male, vel econverso amicis male et inimicis bene: aut quando utraque de uno, dupliciter autem et hoc, ut amicis benefacere et amicis male, vel inimicis benefacere et inimicis male: aut unum de utrisque, et hoc quoque dupliciter, ut amicis bene et inimicis bene, vel amicis male et inimicis male. Primae autem duae dictæ complexiones non faciunt contrarietatem,nam id quod est amicis benefacere ei quod est inimicis malefacere non est contrarium, utraque enim eligenda sunt et ejusdem moris; neque id quod est amicis male ei quod est inimicis bene,nam et haec utraque fugienda et ejusdem moris.","english":"Further, even if someone posits the same thing as an accident of itself as of another, on the ground that the other is a name. Just as Prodicus divided pleasures into joy, and delight, and gladness, for all these are names of the same thing (that is, of pleasure); if, then, someone posits that to rejoice is an accident of that which is to be glad, he will surely say that the same thing is an accident of itself.\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nOther loci for settling the same problems.\n\nSince, however, contraries are linked with one another in six ways, but when combined they produce contrariety in four ways, one must take contraries in whatever way is useful both for refuting and for establishing. That they are combined in six ways is evident: for either each of the contraries is linked with each of the contraries, and this in two ways, as to benefit friends and to harm enemies, or conversely to harm friends and to benefit enemies; or when both are predicated of one thing, and this also in two ways, as to benefit friends and to harm friends, or to benefit enemies and to harm enemies; or one is predicated of both, and this too in two ways, as to benefit friends and to benefit enemies, or to harm friends and to harm enemies. But the first two combinations mentioned do not produce contrariety, for to benefit friends is not contrary to to harm enemies, since both are to be chosen and are of the same character; nor is to harm friends contrary to to benefit enemies, for both of these are to be avoided and are of the same character.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":46,"ref":"p46","source":"Non videtur autem fugiendum fugiendo contrariurnesse,nisi hoc quidem secundum superabundantiam. Illud autem secundum defectum dictum sit.Namsuperabundantiafugiendorum videturesse, similiter autem etdefectus. Reliqua vero quatuor omnia faciunt contrarietatem, nam id quod est amicis benefacere, ei quod est amicis male contrarium, nam a contrario more sunt, et illud quidem eligendum, hoc autem spernendum. Similiter autem et in aliis. Nam in unaquaque conjugatione unum eligendum et alterum fugiendum, illud quidem boni moris, hoc autem pravi. Manifestum igiturex iis quae dicta sunt quod eidem plura contraria accidunt fieri, nam ei quod est amicis benefacere, id quod est inimicis benefacere, et id quod est amicis male, contrarium est.\n\nSimiliter autem et aliorum singulis quibusque eodem modo considerantibus duo contraria apparebunt, accipere igitur contrariorum quodcunque erit ad positionem utile. Amplius si est aliquid contrarium accidenti, considerandum est si inest ei cui dictum est accidens inesse. Nam si hoc inest, illud non erit, impossibile enim simul contraria eidem inesse. Aut si quid tale dictum est de aliquo, quod cum sit necesse est contraria inesse, ut si ideas in nobis quis dixeritesse. Nam et moveri et quiescere easdem accidet, et etiam sensibiles et insensibiles esse.","english":"But one should not seem to avoid the contrary by avoiding it, unless this is said in respect of excess, while that is said in respect of defect. For excess of things to be avoided seems to be such, and similarly also defect. But the remaining four all produce contrariety; for doing good to friends is contrary to doing evil to friends, for they are from contrary customs, and the one is to be chosen, the other to be spurned. And similarly also in other cases. For in each conjugation one thing is to be chosen and the other avoided, the one of good custom, the other of depraved. It is clear, then, from what has been said that it happens that several things are contrary to the same thing; for to doing good to friends, both doing good to enemies and doing evil to friends are contrary.\n\nAnd similarly, for those who consider each of the others in the same way, two contraries will appear. To take, therefore, whichever of the contraries will be useful for the position. Further, if something is contrary to an accident, one must consider whether it is present in that to which the accident was said to be present. For if this is present, that will not be, since it is impossible for contraries to be present at the same time in the same thing. Or if some such thing has been said of something, which, since it is, must have contraries present, as if someone were to say that the ideas are in us. For it will happen that the same things are both moved and at rest, and also that they are both sensible and insensible.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":47,"ref":"p47","source":"Nam videntur ideas quiescere, immobiles et intelligibiles esse iis qui ponunt ideas esse Attamen cum sint in nobis, impossibile est immobiles esse. Nam motis nobis, necessarium est et quae in nobis suntomniasimulmoveri.Manifestumautemquoniam et sensibiles, si in nobis sunt, nam per sensum qui circa visum est eam quae in unoquoque est formam cognoscimus. Rursum si positum est accidens cui est aliqu id contrarium,considerandu si etcontrarii susceptivum quod et accidentis est. Nam idem contrariorum susceptivum,ut si odium haerere irae quis dixerit, erit odium in furoris specie, illic enim ira; inspiciendum igitursietcontrariuminfurorisspecie an in concupiscentia, nam si non, sed in concupiscibili est, non cohæret odium irae. Similiterautemet si concupiscibile, ignorare dixerit, nam erit et disciplinaesusceptivum, siquidem et ignorantiae; quod quidem non videtur, concupiscibile susceptivum esse disciplinae. Destruenti ergo quemadmodum dictum est utendum, astruenti vero quod inest quidem accidens non utilis locus,quod autem contingit inesse utilis. Ostendentes enim quod non susceptivum est contrarii, ostendentes erimus quod neque inest accidens, neque contingit inesse. Si autem ostenderimus quod inest contrarium, aut quod susceptivum est.","english":"For the ideas seem to be at rest, and to be immovable and intelligible to those who posit that ideas exist. Yet since they are in us, it is impossible for them to be immovable. For when we are moved, it is necessary that the things in us all be moved together. But it is clear that they are also objects of sense, if they are in us; for through the sense that is concerned with sight we cognize the form that is in each individual thing. Again, if it has been laid down that an accident belongs to something to which some contrary belongs, one must consider whether that which is receptive of the accident is also receptive of the contrary. For the same thing is receptive of contraries, as if someone should say that hatred resides in anger, hatred will be in the species of fury, for anger is there; one must therefore also examine whether the contrary is in the species of fury or in the concupiscible faculty—for if not, but it is in the concupiscible faculty, hatred does not cohere with anger. Similarly, moreover, if someone should say that the concupiscible faculty is ignorant, then it will also be receptive of discipline, since it is also receptive of ignorance; yet it does not seem that the concupiscible faculty is receptive of discipline. Therefore one must use the method just stated for refuting, but for establishing, the place that the accident belongs is not useful, whereas the place that it can belong is useful. For by showing that something is not receptive of the contrary, we will have shown that neither does the accident belong nor can it belong. But if we have shown that the contrary belongs, or that it is receptive of it.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":48,"ref":"p48","source":"contrarii, nondum ostendentes erimus quod et accidens inest, sed quod contingit inesse in tantum solum ostensum erit.Quoniam autem oppositionessuntquatuor, considerandum excontradictionibus, econverso ex consequentia, et interimenti e construcnti.Sumere auteO! est ex i nductione,ut si homo animal,non anin::al non homo;; similiterautemet in aliis.Hic enim econuerso consequentia, nam hominem animal sequitur, non hominem autem, non animal nequaquam; sed econverso, non animal, non homo.Inomnibusigiturtaleestexistimandum, utsibonum,suave, etr.onsuave, nonbonum; siautemnon hoc nec illud, similiter autem et si non suave, non bonum, bonum suave. Manifestum igiturquod utrumque convertitur, quæ secundum contradictionem est consequentia econverso facta. In contrariis autem considerandum si contrarium contrariumsequatur, an contra seipsa consequentia, an econverso, et interimentiet construenti. Sumere autem et talia est ex inductione quanlum utile est, contra ipsum consequentia est, ut in fortitudine et timiditate; nam illam quidem sequitur virtus, hanc autem vitium,et illam quidemsequitureligendumhancautemfugiendum: igitur contra seipsa et horum consequentia, contrarium enim eligendum fugiendo, similiter autem et in aliis.","english":"Of contraries, we shall not yet be showing that accident is present, but that it happens to be present will have been shown only to that extent. Since, however, there are four oppositions, one must consider from contradictions, and conversely from consequence, and from the destructive and the constructive. To assume, moreover, is from induction, as if man is animal, not animal not man; and similarly also in other cases. For here the consequence is conversely: for man is followed by animal, but not man by not animal in no way; but conversely, not animal, not man. In all cases, therefore, one must think it is such that if good, pleasant, and if not pleasant, not good; but if neither this nor that, similarly also if not pleasant, not good, and if good, pleasant. It is clear, therefore, that each is converted, which is the consequence according to contradiction made conversely. In contraries, however, one must consider whether a contrary follows a contrary, or whether the consequences are to themselves, or conversely, and the destructive and the constructive. To assume also such things is from induction as far as it is useful; the consequence is against itself, as in courage and timidity; for the one is followed by virtue, the other by vice, and the one is followed by what is to be chosen, the other by what is to be avoided. Therefore the consequence of these is also against itself; for the contrary of what is to be chosen is what is to be avoided, and similarly also in other cases.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":49,"ref":"p49","source":"Econverso autem consequentia, ut bonam quidem hahiludinem sanitas sequitur,malam autem habitudinem aegritudo nequaquam,sed aegritudinem mala habitudo,manifestum igitur quoniam econverso in his consequentiafit. Raro autem econverso accidit in contrariis, sed in pluribus in seipsa consequentia; si ergo neque contra seipsa contrarium sequitur contrarium, ncque econverso, manifestum quoniam neque eorum quæ dicta sunt alterum sequitur alterum, si autem in contrariis, et in iis quae dicta sunt necesse alterum sequi alterum. Similiter autem contrariis,et in privalionibus,et habitibus respiciendum. Verumtamen non est in privationibus econverso, sed conlraseipsa eonsequentiam necessarium est semper fieri, veluti visum sequi sensum, cæcitatem autem insensibilitatem; opponitur enim sensus insensibilitati, ut habitus et privatio, nam illud horum quidem habitus, hoc autem privatio est. Similiter autem habitui et privationi, et in iis quæsuntad aliquid,utendum, contra seipsaenim, et horum consequentia, ut si triplum multiplum,et subtriplum submultiplum dicitur: dicitur enim triplum quidem ad subtriplum, multiplurn autem ad submultiplum. Rursus, si scientia opinio, et scibile opinabile, et si visus sensus, et visibile sensibile.","english":"But conversely, in consequence, health follows a good habit of body, while sickness does not at all follow a bad habit of body; rather, a bad habit of body follows sickness. It is clear, therefore, that in these cases the consequence holds conversely. But conversely it rarely happens in contraries; rather, for the most part the consequence is in the things themselves. If, then, neither does a contrary follow its own contrary, nor conversely, it is clear that neither of the things said follows the other; but if it holds in contraries, then in the things said as well one must necessarily follow the other. In like manner, one must also consider privations and habits in relation to contraries. Yet in privations the consequence is not conversely, but it is necessary that the consequence always be in relation to themselves, as that sight follows sense and blindness follows insensibility; for sense is opposed to insensibility as habit to privation, since the one of these is a habit and the other a privation. In like manner, one must also use this in the case of habit and privation and in things that are in relation to something; for the consequence of these too is in relation to themselves, as if the triple is said to be multiple and the sub-triple sub-multiple; for the triple is said in relation to the sub-triple, and the multiple in relation to the sub-multiple. Again, if knowledge is opinion, then the knowable is also opinable; and if sight is sense, then the visible is also sensible.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":50,"ref":"p50","source":"Instantia, quod non necesse est in iis quae sunt ad aliquid consequentiam fieri quemadmodum dictum est,nam sensibile scibile est, sensus autem non est scientia.Non tamen verainstantiavideturesse,multi enim non dicunt sensibilium esse scientiam.Insuper autem ad contrarium non minus utile quod dictum est, ut quod sensibile non est scibile, neque enim sensus scientia Rursus in conjugatis et in casibus, et interimenti et construenti.Dicuntur autem conjugata hujusmodi, ut justa, et justus justitiæ,et fortia, et fortis fortitudini- Similiter autem effectiva eLconservativa, conjugata illi cujus sunt effectiva et conservativa, ut sanati va sanitatis,habitu ativa habitudinis, eodem autem modo et in aliis: conjugata igitur talia solent dici. Casus autem, ut juste, et fortiter, et sanative, habitative, et quæcunque eodem modo dicuntur. Videntur autem et quai sunt secundum casus, conjugata esse, ut juste justitiae, et fortiter fortitudini. Conjugata autem dicuntur secundum eamdem conjugationem omnia, ut justitia, justus, justum, juste;manifestum igitur quoniam uno quovis ostenso eorum quas secundum eamdem conjugationem dicuntur, ut bono, vel laudabili, et reliqua omniaostensa sunt, utsijustilia est laudabilium, et juste,justus,justumlaudabilium;diceturautemjuste et laudabiliter secundum eumdem casum (nam a laudabili) quemadmodum juste a justitia.","english":"An objection: it is not necessary that consequence occur in things that are relative in the way that has been stated; for the sensible is knowable, but sense is not knowledge. Yet this objection does not seem to be true, for many do not say that there is knowledge of sensibles. Moreover, what has been said is no less useful with respect to the contrary, as that the sensible is not knowable, for neither is sense knowledge. Again, in conjugates and in cases, both in the destructive and in the constructive [argument]. Now conjugates are spoken of in this way, as just things, and just [man] to justice, and brave things, and brave [man] to bravery. Similarly, however, the effective and preservative [things] are conjugates of that of which they are effective and preservative, as healthful [things] of health, habitual [things] of habit, and in the same way also in others; such things, then, are customarily called conjugates. Cases, however, [are] as justly, and bravely, and healthfully, habitually, and whatever are spoken of in the same way. But those that are according to cases seem also to be conjugates, as justly to justice, and bravely to bravery. But all are called conjugates according to the same conjugation, as justice, just [man], just [thing], justly; it is clear, therefore, that when any one of those that are spoken of according to the same conjugation has been shown, as the good, or the praiseworthy, all the rest have also been shown, as if justice is of praiseworthy things, then justly, just [man], just [thing] are of praiseworthy things; but justly and praiseworthily will be spoken according to the same case (for [they are] from the praiseworthy), just as justly [is] from justice.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":51,"ref":"p51","source":"Considerandum autem non solum in eo quod dictum est,sed et in contrario contrariam. Ut quod bonum non ex necessitatesuave,nequeenim malum triste,ut si hoc et illud,etsijustitia 8cienliil,et injustitiaignorantia, et si quod juste est, scienter et exporienterest, quod injuste est, ignoranter et experienter est, si autem haec non nec illa, velut in hoc quod nunc dictum, nam magis utique apparebit, quod injusteexperienter quam inexperienter. Hic autem locus dictus est prius incontrariorum conseq uentiis,nihil enim aliud nunc ostendimus quam contrarium sequi contrarium.Amplius in generationibus,et corruptionibus,et effectivis, et corruptivis, et interimenti, etastruenti, Quorum enim generationes bonae sunt, et ipsa bona sunt, et si ipsa bona sunt, et generationes bonæ; si, autem generationes malae, et ipsa mala. In corrup. tionibus autem econtrario.namsicorruptionesbonce, ipsa mala; si autem corruptiones malæ, ipsa sunt bona. Eadem ratio et in tffectivis, et corruptivis i quorum enim effectiva bona, et ipsa bona; quorum vero corruptiva bona, ipsa mala.","english":"But one must consider not only in the case just stated, but also the contrary in the contrary. For example, that the good is not necessarily pleasant, nor is the bad distressing; as, if this and that, and if justice is knowledge, injustice is ignorance, and if what is done justly is done knowingly and with experience, what is done unjustly is done ignorantly and with experience; but if these are not so, neither are those, as in the case just now stated—for it will appear more likely that what is done unjustly is done with experience than without experience. This topic has been stated earlier in the consequences of contraries; for we are now showing nothing other than that a contrary follows a contrary. Further, in generations and corruptions, and in things productive and corruptive, and in things destroying and building. For those things whose generations are good are themselves also good, and if they are themselves good, their generations are also good; but if their generations are bad, they are themselves also bad. In corruptions, however, the reverse: for if their corruptions are good, they are themselves bad; but if their corruptions are bad, they are themselves good. The same account holds in things productive and corruptive: for those things whose productive effects are good are themselves good; but those whose corruptive effects are good are themselves bad.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":52,"ref":"p52","source":"CAPUT IV.\n\nEx similibus, appositione, magis, minus, simpliciter, et secundum quid loci.\n\nRursum in similibus si similiter se habent. Ut si disciplina una plurium,etopinio,et si visum habere est videre, et auditum habere et audire, similiter autem et in aliis, et in his quae sunt, et in iis quae videntur. Utilis autem hic Jocus ad utrumque, nam si in aliquo similium sic se habet, etinfaliis similibus, si autem in aliquo non, nec in aliis similibus. Considerandum autem et in uno, et in pluribus si similiter se habet. Aliquoties enim dissonat, ut si scire est cogitare, et multa scire est multa cogitare, hoc autem non verum. Contingit enim plura scire, cogitare autem non; si autem non hoc, nec illud quod in uno quod scire est cogitare. Amplius, ex magis et minus. Sunt autem ejus quod est magis loci quatuor. Unus quidem si magis sequitur magis, ut sivoluptas bonum,et magis vuluptas,magis bonum; et si injuriam facere malum, et magis injuriam facere, magis malum. Utilis autem ad utrumque hic locus, nam si sequatur ad subjecti incrementum, accidentis incrementu,quemadmod um dictum est, manifestum quod accidit; si autem non sequatur,non accidit,hoc autem inductione sumendum.Alius,uno de duobus dicto, si cui magis videtur inesse non inest, nec cui minus, et si cui minus videtur inesse inest, et cui magis.","english":"CHAPTER IV.\n\nOn the topics from similars, from addition, from the more, the less, the simple, and the qualified.\n\nAgain, in the case of similars, if they are related in a similar way. For example, if one discipline is of several things, so too is one opinion; and if to have sight is to see, then to have hearing is also to hear; and similarly in other cases, both in things that exist and in things that appear. This topic is useful for both purposes: for if in some one of the similars it is so, then also in the other similars; but if in some one it is not so, then neither in the other similars. And one must consider whether it is similarly related in one case and in many. For sometimes it is inconsistent: for example, if to know is to think, then to know many things is to think many things; but this is not true. For it happens that one knows many things but does not think them; but if this is not so, then neither is that which was said in the single case, that to know is to think. Further, from the more and the less. There are four topics of what is more. One is, if the more follows the more: for example, if pleasure is good, then greater pleasure is a greater good; and if to do injury is bad, then to do greater injury is a greater bad. This topic is useful for both purposes; for if the increment of the accident follows the increment of the subject, as was said, it is manifest that it belongs; but if it does not follow, it does not belong; and this must be taken by induction. Another: when one of two things has been stated, if that to which it seems to belong more does not belong, then neither does that to which it seems to belong less; and if that to which it seems to belong less does belong, then also that to which it seems to belong more.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":53,"ref":"p53","source":"Rursum, duobus de uno dictis, si quod magis videtur alii inesse non inest,nequequod minus,aul si quod minus viJetur inesseinest,et quod magis.Amplius,duobus de duobus dictis,siquod alteri magisvideturinesse non inest,necreliquum reliquo,aut si quod minus videtur alteri inesse inest, et reliquum reliquo. Amplius, ex eo quod similiter inest, vel videtur inesse tripliciter,quemadmodum in eo quod magis,ut in posterioribus tribus dictis locis dicebatur. Sive enim unum quoddam duobus similiter inest,aut videtur inesse, si alteri non insit, nec alteri; si autem alteri inest,et reliquo.Sive duo eidem similiter,si alterum non insit,necreliquum; si autem alterurn,et reliquum.Eodem autem modo et si duobus duo similiter insunt, nam si alterum alteri non inest,nec reliquum reliquo;si autem inest alterum alteri,et reliquum reliquo.Exeo igitur quod est magis et rninus,el quod est similiter, tot modis contingitargumentari.Aropliusautemexappositione, si alterum ad alterum appositum faciat bonum,vel album,cum non fuerit prius album,vel bonum,quod appositum est erit album,vel bonum, quale reveraet totum facit.Amplius autem si id ad quod est appositum aliquid facit magis tale quale erat,et ipsum erit ejusmodi, similiter autem et in aliis. Utilis autom non in omnibus hic locus,sed in quibus ipsius magis crementum accidit fieri.","english":"Again, when two things are said of one, if that which seems more to belong to the other does not belong, neither does that which seems less; or if that which seems less to belong does belong, then also that which seems more. Further, when two things are said of two, if that which seems more to belong to one does not belong, neither does the other belong to the other; or if that which seems less to belong to one does belong, then also the other belongs to the other. Further, from the fact that something belongs, or seems to belong, in a similar way, in three ways, just as was said in the three latter topics, as in the case of the more. For either one thing belongs, or seems to belong, similarly to two things: if it does not belong to one, neither does it to the other; but if it belongs to one, also to the other. Or two things belong similarly to the same thing: if one does not belong, neither does the other; but if one belongs, also the other. In the same way also if two things belong similarly to two things: for if one does not belong to one, neither does the other to the other; but if one belongs to one, also the other to the other. From the more, then, and the less, and the similar, in so many ways does it happen to argue. Further, from addition: if one thing added to another makes it good or white, when it was not previously white or good, that which has been added will be white or good, such as in truth it also makes the whole. Further, if that to which something has been added makes it more of such a sort as it was, that thing itself will also be of this sort; and similarly in other cases. But this topic is not useful in all cases, but in those in which an increase of the thing itself happens to occur.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":54,"ref":"p54","source":"Iste vero locus non convertitur ad destruendum,nam si non facit quod appositu e\"t,bonum,nondu mani festum,si ipsum non bonum. Nam bonum malo appositum, non ex neceBsilate bonum totum facit,necalbum nigro,nec dulce amaro. Rursum,si quid magis et minus Jicitur, et simpliciterinest,Quod enim bonum vel album non est, neque magis etminusbonumvel album dicetur; nam malum de nullo magis,vel minus bonum,sed magis malum vel minus dicetur.Non convertitur autem hic locus ad destruendum,multa enim eorum quæ non dicuntur magis, simpliciter insunt; nam homo non dicitur magis et minus,sed non propter hoc non est homo.Eodem autem modo consideran. dum et in iis quæ secundum q:lid,et quando,et ubi. Namsi secundum quid contingit,et simpliciter contingit,similiter autem et quando,et ubi: nam quod simpliciter est impossibile, neque secundum quid, neque secundum ubi,neque secundum quando contingit. Instantia, quoniam secundum quid quidem sunt natura studiosi (ut liberales,vel casti), simpliciter autem non sunt natura studiosi, nam nullius natura prudens.Similiter autem etquando contingit corruptibilium aliquid non corrumpi, simpliciter autem non contingit non corrumpi. Eodem autem modo et ubi expedit quidem tali observantia victus uti,ut in morbosis locis,simpliciter autem non expedit adhuc autem, alicubi quidem [unum tantum possibile est esse, simpliciter autem non possibile unum tantum esse.","english":"But this topic is not convertible to refutation; for if what is added does not make a thing good, it is not yet evident that the thing itself is not good. For good added to evil does not of necessity make the whole good, nor white added to black, nor sweet to bitter. Again, if anything is said to be more and less, it is also present simply. For what is not good or white will not be said to be more or less good or white; for evil is said of nothing as more or less good, but as more or less evil. But this topic is not convertible to refutation, for many things that are not said to be more are present simply; for man is not said to be more and less, but it is not for this reason that he is not man. In the same way one must consider also in those things that are according to something, and when, and where. For if it is possible according to something, it is also possible simply, and likewise also when and where; for what is simply impossible is possible neither according to something, nor according to where, nor according to when. An objection: those who are naturally studious in a certain respect (as liberal or chaste) are so according to something, but they are not simply naturally studious, for no one is naturally prudent. Likewise also when it is possible for something corruptible not to be corrupted, but it is not simply possible for it not to be corrupted. In the same way also as to where: it is expedient to use a certain regimen of life, as in sickly places, but it is not simply expedient; and further, in some place it is possible for only one thing to be, but it is not simply possible for only one thing to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[{"kind":"lacuna","severity":"caution","text":"The source is fragmentary here: the edition marks a break or an editorial bracket, and the English carries across it. Treat the bridge as supplied, not translated."}]},{"i":55,"ref":"p55","source":"Eodem autem modo et alicubi bonum est quidem patrem significare,ut in Tribalis, simpliciterautem nonbonum.An in hoc quidem non ubi significat,sed quibusdam,nihil enim refert ubicunque sint,ubiqueenim erit eis bonum inTribalis. Rursus quidem expedit rnedicari,ut quandoaigrotat, simpliciter autem non.An neque hoc quando significat,sed in eo quod afficitur aliquo modo,nihil enim refertquandocunque,dummodo sic affectus sit.SimpJieiterautem est quod nullo addito dicis quod bonum est,aut contrarium,ut patrem sacrificare non dicis bonum esse, sed quibusdam bonum esse; non ergo simpliciter bonum,sed deos honorare bonum dictis nihil addens, simpliciter enim bonum est. Quare quod nullo addito videtur esse honestum, vel turpe, vel aliquid talium, simpliciter dicetur.\n\nLIBER TEHTIUS.\n\nCAPUT PRIMUM.\n\nDe meliorum eligibilinrumque problematum locis.","english":"In the same way, in some cases it is good to signify one's father, as among the Triballi, but not simply good. Is it not the case that this is not good in respect of what it signifies, but for certain persons? For it makes no difference wherever they are; for everywhere it will be good for them among the Triballi. Again, to be healed is expedient, as when one is sick, but not simply. Is it not the case that this too is not expedient in respect of when it signifies, but in that one is affected in some way? For it makes no difference at whatever time, provided one is so affected. But \"simply\" is what you say is good without any addition, or the contrary: for you do not say that to sacrifice one's father is good, but that it is good for certain persons; therefore it is not simply good. But to honor the gods you say is good, adding nothing; for it is simply good. Wherefore what without any addition seems to be honorable or base, or any such thing, will be called simply.\n\nBOOK THREE.\n\nCHAPTER ONE.\n\nOn the topics of better and more choiceworthy problems.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":56,"ref":"p56","source":"Utrum autem eligibilius aut melius duorum pluriumve ex his perspiciendum.Primum autem determinetur quod considerationem facimusnon de plurimum distantibus,et magnam ad invicem differentiam habentiuus(nulbs enim dubitat utrum felicitas, an divitiae expetibiliores),sed de iis quæ propinqua sunt,et de qui bus dubitamus utro oporteat apponere magis eo quod nullam videmus alterius ad alterum prxeeminentiam?Manifestum igitur in his quod ostensa una praeeminentia, vel pluribus,constituetur intelligentia,quoll id eligibilius est quod eorum est præeminens.Primum igitur quod diuturnius stabiliusve,eligibilius eo quod minus huj usmodi.Et quod magis eligit prudens,vel bonus vir,vel lex recta,vel studiosi circa shgula delecti qnatenustales sunt, vel in unoquoque genere periti,vei quaecunque plures, vel omnes (ut in medicina vel aedificatoria,quse plures medicorum vel omnes) vel quaecunque omnino plures,vel omnes,vel omnia,ut;bonum.Omniaenim bonum appetunt.Oportet autem ducere ad id quod fueritulile, quod dicendum est. Estautem simpliciter quidem melius,ac eligibilius,quod secundum meliorem disciplinam,alicui autem quod secundum propriam.Deinde quod idipsum quod est (eo quod non) in genereest,utjustiam justo.Nam illa quidem in genere bono,hoc autem non,et illa idipsum quod est bonum est, hoc autem non.","english":"Whether one of two or more things is more choiceworthy or better must be examined from these considerations. First, however, let it be determined that we are not making our consideration about things very far apart and having a great difference from one another (for no one doubts whether happiness or wealth is more desirable), but about things that are close and about which we doubt to which of the two one ought rather to assent, since we see no preeminence of one over the other. It is clear, then, in these cases that when one preeminence, or several, has been shown, the understanding will be established that that thing is more choiceworthy which is preeminent among them. First, therefore, what is more lasting or more stable is more choiceworthy than what is less so. And what the prudent person, or the good man, or right law, or the studious persons chosen in each case insofar as they are such, or those skilled in each genus, or whatever more people, or all people (as in medicine or building, whatever more physicians or all physicians), or whatever absolutely more people, or all people, or all things choose—as the good. For all things desire the good. But one must lead to what will be useful, which is what must be stated. Now simply better and more choiceworthy is what accords with the better discipline, but for someone, what accords with his own. Next, what is the very thing itself (rather than not) in a genus, as justice is to the just man. For those things are in the genus of good, but this is not, and those are the very thing that is good, but this is not.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":57,"ref":"p57","source":"Nam nihil dicitur idipsum quod genus est,quod non est in genere.Ut albus homo non est id quod culor.Similiter aulem et in aliis. Et quod propter se eligendum,eo eligendo quod propter aliud eligibilius.Ut sanum esse quam exercitari;illud enim propter se eligendum,hocautem propter aliud.Et quod per se,eo quod per accidens. Ut amicos justos esse,eo quod inimicos;illud enim per se eligendum, hoc autem per accidens eligimus.Nam inimicos justosesse secundum accidens eligimus, ut nihil nobis noceant. Est aut hocidem ei quod ante boe;ciiffeJ autem modo,nam amicos quidem justos esse propter se eligimus, et si nihil nobisdebeat forf1,quamvis apud Indos sint,inimicos autem propter alterum, ut nihil nobis noceant. Et quod causa boni per se,eo quod per accidens causa. Quemadmodum virtus,fortuna;nam illa quidem per se,hæc autem peraccidens est causa bonorum,etsi quid aliud hujusmodi.Similiter autem et in contrario.Nam quod perse est causa mali,fugibilius esteo quod peraccidens,utvitium quam fortuna,namiilud quidem perse malum,rortuna autem per accidens. Et quod simpliciter bonum,eo quod alicui eligibilius: ut sanum fieri,quam incidi. Nam hoc quidem simpliciter bonum,iIlud autem alicui indigentium incisione. Et quod natura est, eo quod non natura: ut justitia justo, illud enim natura, hoc autem acquisitivum.","english":"For nothing is said to be that very thing which is the genus, unless it is in the genus. For a white man is not that which is color. Similarly also in other cases. And that which is to be chosen for its own sake is more choiceworthy than that which is chosen for the sake of another, as being healthy is more choiceworthy than exercising; for the former is to be chosen for its own sake, but the latter for the sake of another. And that which is by itself is more choiceworthy than that which is by accident, as that friends be just is more choiceworthy than that enemies be just; for the former we choose by itself, but the latter by accident. For we choose that enemies be just only by accident, so that they may do us no harm. And this is the same as what was said before; but it has now been stated in this way, for we choose that friends be just for its own sake, even if nothing is owed to us by them, even if they are among the Indians, but that enemies be just for the sake of something else, so that they may do us no harm. And that which is the cause of good by itself is more choiceworthy than that which is the cause by accident, as virtue is more choiceworthy than fortune; for the former is the cause of goods by itself, but the latter by accident, and whatever else is of this sort. Similarly also in the contrary case. For that which is the cause of evil by itself is more to be avoided than that which is by accident, as vice is more to be avoided than fortune; for the former is evil by itself, but fortune by accident. And that which is simply good is more choiceworthy than that which is good for someone, as to become healthy is more choiceworthy than to undergo surgery. For the former is simply good, but the latter is good for someone among those who need surgery. And that which is by nature is more choiceworthy than that which is not by nature, as justice is more choiceworthy for a just man than for one who is not just; for the former is by nature, but the latter is acquired.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":58,"ref":"p58","source":"Et quod meliori et honorabiliori inest, eligibilius, ut Deo quam hominiTanimae quam corpori Et quod melioris proprium,melius quam quod pejoris: ul quod Dei,quam quod hominis, nam secundum communia utrisque,nihil differunt ab invicem,propriis autem alterum alteridifferenliissupereminet. Et quod in melioribus, vel prioribus, vel honorabilioribus, est melius: ut sanitas robore et pulchritudine,nam illa quidem in humidiset siccis, et (ut simpliciter dicatur; ex quibus prius coustitutum est animal. Haec vero posterioribus, nam robur in nervis et ossibus, pulchritudo autem membrorum quaedam commensuratio videtur esse. Et finis iis quae sunt ad finem eligibilior videtur esse. Et duorum, quod propinquius est fini. Et omnino quod ad vitae finem expetibiliusquam quod ad aliud aliquid,ut quod ad felicitatem contendit quam quod ad prudentiam,nam quod ad felicitatem contendit, eligibilius. Et possibile impossibili. Amplius, cum duo sint effectivacujusfinismelior5etipsum melius.","english":"And what belongs to the better and more honorable is more choiceworthy, as what belongs to God than what belongs to man, and what belongs to the soul than what belongs to the body. And the property of the better is better than that of the worse: as what is God's than what is man's; for in respect of the common attributes of both they differ in no way from one another, but by their proper attributes the one surpasses the other. And what is in better, or prior, or more honorable things is better: as health than strength and beauty; for these are in moist and dry things, and, to speak simply, in those from which the animal is first constituted, while the former are in later things; for strength is in sinews and bones, but beauty seems to be a certain commensuration of members. And the end seems more choiceworthy than the things that are for the sake of the end. And of two things, that which is nearer to the end. And in general, what tends toward the end of life is more desirable than what tends toward anything else: as what strives toward happiness than what strives toward prudence; for what strives toward happiness is more choiceworthy. And the possible than the impossible. Further, since there are two productive things, of which the end is better, that one is itself better.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":59,"ref":"p59","source":"Cum autem sit effectivum, et finis ex proportione, quandoplurisuperatfinisfinem,quam ille proprium effectivum: utfelicitasplurisuperatsanitatemquam sanitas salubre; quare effeclivum felicitatis melius sanitate,nam quantum felicitas superat sanitatem, tantum et effectivum felicitatis aalubresuperat;sanitas autemsalubreminus superabat,quareplus superat effectivum felicitatis salubre quam sanitas salubre;quapropter effectivum felicitatis melius sanitate;manifestum igitur quod eligibilius effectivum felicitatis quam sanitas, nam idem plus superat.Amplius,melius est quod propter se et honorabilius et laudabilius: ut amicitia divitiis et justitia sanitate et robore,nam illa quidem propter se honorabilium, haec vero non propter se, sed propter aliud. Nullus enim honorat divitias propter se,sed propter aliud; amicitiam vero propter se, et si nihil nobis debeat aliud ab ea esse.","english":"But since the productive cause is also a end by proportion, whenever the end exceeds the end more than that exceeds its own productive cause: as happiness exceeds health more than health exceeds the healthful; wherefore the productive cause of happiness is better than health, for as much as happiness exceeds health, so much does the productive cause of happiness exceed the healthful; but health exceeded the healthful less, wherefore the productive cause of happiness exceeds the healthful more than health exceeds the healthful; and therefore the productive cause of happiness is better than health; it is clear, then, that the productive cause of happiness is more choiceworthy than health, for the same thing exceeds by more. Further, that is better which is for its own sake, and more honorable and more praiseworthy: as friendship is than wealth, and justice than health and strength, for those are honorable for their own sake, but these are not for their own sake, but for the sake of another. For no one honors wealth for its own sake, but for the sake of another; but friendship for its own sake, even if nothing else ought to come to us from it.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":60,"ref":"p60","source":"CAPUT II.\n\nAlii pro eisdem problematis loci.\n\nAmplius,quando duo aliqua fuerint valde sibimetipsis similia,et non poterimus præeminentiarn aliquam conspicere alterius ad alterum videndum ex iis quas sequuntur.Nam cum consequens est majus bonum,hoc eligibilius; si autem sint consequentia mala,cui consequens minus malum,boc eligibilius. Nam cum utraque sint eligendo,nihil prohibet molestum aliquid sequi, dupliciter autem ab eo quod sequitur consideratio, nam et prius, et posterius sequitur,utaddiscentem ignorare prius,scire autem posterius, melius autem ut plurimum,quod posterius,sumendum igitur eorum quiB sequuntur quodcunque fuerit utile. Amplius, plura bona paucioribus, vel simpliciter,vel quando altera alteris insunt, ut pauciora in pluribus.Instantia,si alicubi alterum alterius gratia:nihil enim eligibiliora utraque quam unum, ut sanum fieri, et sanitas, quam sanitas,eo quod sanum fieri propter sanitatem eligimus.Et non bona, bonis nihil prohibet eligibiliora esse,ut felicitatem,et aliud aliquid quod non est bonum,justitia et fortitudine. Et eadem cum voluptate magis quam sine voluptate, et eadem cum indolentia quam cum tristitia.Etunumquodque in quo tempore magisvalet,in hocetetiam eligibilius. Utcarentia tristitiae in senectute magis quam in juventu te,magis enim in senectute valet.","english":"CHAPTER II.\n\nOther topics for the same problems.\n\nFurther, when two things are very similar to each other, and we cannot observe any pre-eminence of one over the other, we must look to the things that follow from them. For when the consequence is a greater good, that is more choiceworthy; but if the consequences are evils, that to which the lesser evil follows is more choiceworthy. For since both are matters of choice, nothing prevents something troublesome from following; and the consideration from what follows is twofold, for it follows both before and after: as that the learner is ignorant before and knows after; and for the most part the later is better. We must therefore take, from among the things that follow, whatever is useful. Further, more goods are preferable to fewer, either simply or when the one set is present in the other, as fewer are present in more. An objection: if in some case one thing exists for the sake of another; for neither is more choiceworthy than the one, as being healthy and health are than health, since we choose being healthy for the sake of health. And it is not forbidden that things which are not good be more choiceworthy than good things, as happiness and some other thing that is not good are than justice and courage. And the same things with pleasure are more choiceworthy than without pleasure, and the same with freedom from pain than with distress. And each thing is more choiceworthy at the time when it has greater power. As freedom from distress in old age is more choiceworthy than in youth, for it has greater power in old age.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":61,"ref":"p61","source":"Secundum haec autem, et prudentia in senectute eligilior,nemo enim juvenes eligit duces,eo quod non constat eos prudentes esse. Fortitudo autem e contrario,in juventute enim magis necessaria secundum fortitudinem operatio; similiter autem et in temperantia,magis enim juvenes quam senes concupiscentiis molestantur.Et quod in omni tempore, vel in pluribus utilius.Ut justitia,et temperantia,fortitudine, nam illae semper, haecautem aliquando utilis.Et quod cum omnes haberemus, nihil altero indigeremus, quam quod cum haberemus, indigeremus reliquo. Ut in justitia, et forliludine,narn si omnes essentj usti,njhil utilis fortitudo; si vero omnes essent fortes,utilis justitia.Amplius ex corruptionibus et adjectionibus, et generationibus, et sumptionibus, et contrariis. Quorum enim corruptiones malæ,ipsa eligibiliora,similiter autem et in abjectionibus,etin contrariis,nam si abjectio, vel contrarium fugibilius est, ipsum eligibilius; in generationibus autem et sumptionibuse contrario. Quorum enim sumptiones,et generationes et eligibiliores, et ipsa quoque eligibiliora. Alius autem locus est.Quod propinquius bono,melius atque eli. gibilius.Et quod similius est bono,ut justitiajusto. Et quod meliori eorum est similius,quemadmodum Ajacem Ulysse dicunt aliqui meliorem esse,eo quod similior est Achilli.","english":"Accordingly, in light of these considerations, prudence is more to be chosen in old age; for no one chooses young men as leaders, because it is not established that they are prudent. Courage, on the other hand, is the opposite; for in youth the operation according to courage is more necessary. Similarly also in temperance; for the young are more troubled by desires than the old. And that which is more useful at every time, or in most times, as justice and temperance and courage; for the former are always useful, but the latter sometimes. And that which, if we all had it, we would need nothing else, but which, if we had it, we would need the other, as in justice and courage; for if all were just, courage would be of no use; but if all were brave, justice would be useful. Further, from corruptions and additions and generations and consumptions and contraries. For those things whose corruptions are bad are themselves more to be chosen; similarly also in rejections and in contraries, for if the rejection or the contrary is more to be avoided, the thing itself is more to be chosen; but in generations and consumptions it is the other way around. For those things whose consumptions and generations are more to be chosen are themselves also more to be chosen. There is another topic: that which is nearer to the good is better and more to be chosen. And that which is more similar to the good, as justice is to the just man. And that which is more similar to the better of these, as some say that Ajax is better than Odysseus, because he is more similar to Achilles.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":62,"ref":"p62","source":"Instantia hujus est, quod non verum sit, nihil enim prohibet non qua ratione optimus est Achilles, eadem similiorem esse Ajacem: cum erit alter quidem bonus,non similiter autem. Considerandum autem si et in ridiculosioribus sit simile,ut simia homini quam equo,cum non sit similis:non enim est simia melior,similior tamen est homini. Rursum in duobus:si hoc quidem meliori, illud autem pejori est similius, erit melius quod meliori est similius.Habet autem et hoc instantiam, nihil enim prohibethoc quidem meliori parum simile esse, illud autem pejori valde, ut si Ajax quidem Achilli:'parum, Ulysses autem Nestori valde, ut si hoc quidem meliori in pejoribus,illud autem pejori in melioribus,ut equus asino, et simia hominis. Et quod maxime insigne,eo quod minus tale. Et quod difficilius,magis enim amamus cum habemus,quod non est facile adipisci.Et quod magis proprium eo quod communius.Etquod magis incommunius,nam magis eligendum quod nullamolestiasequitur,quam quod sequilur.Amplius,si hoc illo melius,etomnino optimum eorum quae in hoc,melius eo quod in altero optimum. Ut si melior est homo quam equus, et optimus homo, optimo equo melior. Etsi optimum optimo melius,et simpliciter hoc illo melius, ut si optimus homo,optimo equo melior,et simpliciter homo,simpliciterequo melior.Am plius,ea quæ volumus amicos participare, eligibiliora quam quae non.","english":"An objection to this is that it is not true; for nothing prevents Ajax from being more similar to Achilles, not for the reason that Achilles is the best: since the one will indeed be good, but not similarly. One must consider whether the similarity also holds in more ridiculous cases, as that a monkey is more similar to a man than a horse is, since it is not similar; for a monkey is not better, yet it is more similar to a man. Again, in two things: if this one is more similar to the better, and that one to the worse, then that which is more similar to the better will be better. But this also has an objection; for nothing prevents this one from being slightly similar to the better, and that one greatly similar to the worse—as if Ajax were slightly similar to Achilles, but Odysseus greatly similar to Nestor—or if this one is similar to the better in worse respects, and that one to the worse in better respects, as a horse to a donkey, and a monkey to a man. And what is most distinguished is that which is less such. And what is more difficult, for we love more what we have when it is not easy to obtain. And what is more proper because it is more common. And what is more uncommon, for what is followed by no trouble is more to be chosen than what is followed by trouble. Moreover, if this is better than that, and absolutely the best of the things in this, it is better than what is the best in the other—as, if a man is better than a horse, then the best man is better than the best horse. And if the best is better than the best, then this is also simply better than that—as, if the best man is better than the best horse, then a man is simply better than a horse. Moreover, the things we wish our friends to share in are more choiceworthy than those we do not.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":63,"ref":"p63","source":"Et quae ad amicum agere malumus quam quæ ad quemlibet,illa eligibiJiora.Ut juste agere et benefacere,magis quam videri,nam amicis benefacere volumus magis quam videri,quibuslibet autem e converso.Et quae sunt ex circumstantia necessariis me.. liora,aliquando autem et eligibiliora. Melius enim quam vivere, bene vivere,bene autem vivere est ex circumstantia,ipsumautem viverenecessarium.Aliquando autem meliora non etiam eligibiliora, non enim si meliora,necessariaquodeligibiliora: philosophari siquidem melius quam lucrari,sed non magis eligendum indigenti necessariis. Ex circumstantia autem est quando, existentibus necessariis, alia quædam adjiciuntur bonorum. Fere autem fortasse eligibilius quod necessarium est,melius autem quod ex circumstantia. Et quod non est ab alio exquirere quam quod est et ab alio. Quale sustinet justitia ad fortitudinem.Et si hoc quidem sine illo eligendum, illud autem sine hoc non. Ut potestas sine prudentia non cligenda,prudp.ntia vera sine pates tate eligenda. Et duorum,si alterum negamus,ut reliquum videaturnobis inesse,illud eligibilius quod volumus nobis videri inesse. Ut laborem diligere non negamus, ut ingeniosi essevideamur.Amplius,pro cujus absentia minus increpandi sunt moleste ferentes,hoc magis eligendum.Et pro cujus absentia non moleste ferentem magis increpandum, id eligibilius.","english":"And those things which we prefer to do for a friend rather than for just anyone are more choiceworthy, such as acting justly and doing good rather than seeming to, for we wish to benefit friends more than to seem to, but for just anyone the reverse. And those things which arise from circumstance are better than necessary things, and sometimes also more choiceworthy. For living well is better than living, and living well arises from circumstance, while living itself is necessary. But sometimes better things are not also more choiceworthy; for it is not the case that if they are better, they are also more choiceworthy than necessary things: for philosophizing is indeed better than making money, but it is not more to be chosen by one who lacks necessities. And it is from circumstance when, necessities being present, certain other goods are added. And in general, perhaps what is necessary is more choiceworthy, but what arises from circumstance is better. And that which is not to be sought from another is more choiceworthy than that which is also from another, such as the sort of thing justice sustains in comparison with courage. And if one thing is to be chosen without the other, but the other is not without it—as power without prudence is not to be chosen, but prudence without power is to be chosen. And of two things, if we deny one so that the other may seem to be present in us, that is more choiceworthy which we wish to seem to be present in us—as we do not deny that we love labor, so that we may seem to be naturally gifted. Moreover, that for whose absence those who are vexed are less to be reproached is more to be chosen. And that for whose absence one who is not vexed is more to be reproached, that is more choiceworthy.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":64,"ref":"p64","source":"CAPUT III.\n\nAlii meliorum eligibiliorumque loci.\n\nAmplius, eorum quae sunt sub eadem specie, quod habet propriam virtutem.eoquod non habet, utrisque autem habentibus,quod magis habet, eligibilius. Amplius,si hoc quidem facit bonum illud cui adest, illud autem non facit,quod facit eligibilius. Quemadmodum est calidius quod calefacit,eo quod non.Si autem utrumque facit,quod magis facit,aut quod melius,et principalius facit bonum,ut sihocquidem animam,illud autem corpus.Amplius autem a casibus,et usibus, et actionibus, et operibus, et haec ab illis. Sequuntur enim sese invicem, ut si quod juste est eligibilius quam quod fortiter,et justitiafortitudine eligibilior,etsi justitia quam fortitudo eligibilior,et quod juste quam quod fortiter. Similiter autem et in aliis.Amplius,si aliquo eodem hoc quidem majus bonum est, illud autem minus magis eligendum majus,aut si majore majus fuerit alterurn.Sed et si duo quædam uno aliquo sint eligibiliora,quod longe eligibilius eo quod minus est eligendum,eligibilius.Ampliuscujus est superabundantia eligibilior,et ipsum eligibilius. Ut amicitia, pecuniis,nam eligibilior superabundantia axicitiae quam pecuniarum.Et id cujus magis eligat quis ut ipse sibi causa sit, quam cujus alter. Ut amicos pecuniis.Amplius,exappositionesieidem appositum aliquid,quod totum eligibilius facit.","english":"CHAPTER III.\n\nOther topics of better and more choiceworthy things.\n\nFurther, among things that fall under the same species, that which has a proper power is more choiceworthy than that which does not; and when both have it, that which has it more. Further, if one of them makes the good thing to which it is present, and the other does not, that which makes it is more choiceworthy—as that which heats is warmer than that which does not. But if both make it, that which makes it more, or which makes a better and more principal good—as if one makes the soul and the other the body. Further, [arguments are drawn] from outcomes, uses, actions, and works, and these from those; for they follow one another in turn, so that if what is done justly is more choiceworthy than what is done bravely, then justice is more choiceworthy than courage; and if justice is more choiceworthy than courage, then what is done justly is more choiceworthy than what is done bravely. And similarly in other cases. Further, if by the same measure one thing is a greater good and the other less, the greater is more to be chosen; or if one is greater by a greater measure. But also if two things are more choiceworthy than some one thing, that which is far more choiceworthy than the less choiceworthy thing is more choiceworthy. Further, that whose abundance is more choiceworthy is itself more choiceworthy—as friendship is more choiceworthy than money, for the abundance of friendship is more choiceworthy than that of money. And that which a person would more choose to be the cause of for himself than for another—as friends are more choiceworthy than money. Further, from addition: if the same thing is added to something, that which makes the whole more choiceworthy.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":65,"ref":"p65","source":"Cavere autem oportet extendere ad ea in quibus altera quidem appositorum utitur commune, vel alio quolibet modo cooperativum est; reliquo autem non utitur,neque cooperativum est,ut serra et falce cum arte fabrili, nam eligibilior serra consociata, simpliciter autem non eligibilior.Rursum si minori appositum aliquid, quod totum majus facit.Similiter autem etexablatione: quo enim ablato ab eodem quod restat est minus, illud majus erit quod ablatum reliquum minus facit.Et si hoc quidem propter se, illud autem propter gloriam eligendum.Ut sanitas pulchritudine, terminus autem ejus quod est ad gloriam, quod nullo conscio, non studeret inesse. Et si hoc quidem propter se et propter gloriam eligendum, illud autem propter alterum tantum. Et utrumvis magis propter se honorandum,hoc et melius et eligibilius. Honorabilius utique fuerit secundum se, quod nibil aliud debeat esse, propter se eligimus magis.Amplius,dividendum quotiesquodsligendum est dicitur,et quorum gratia, ut utilis, vel honesti, vel delectabilis. Nam quod ad omnia vel ad plura est utile,eligibilius fuerit eo quod non sic. Si autem eadem utrisque insunt,utri magis insintconsiderandum. Ut utrum delectabile an honestum, an utile magis. Rursum quod propter melius, eligibilius. Ut quod propter virtutem quam quod propter delectionem.","english":"But one must beware of extending the comparison to cases where one of the things compared uses what is added as something common, or is in any other way cooperative with it, while the other does not use it nor cooperate with it—as a saw and a sickle in relation to the craft of carpentry; for a saw taken together with that craft is more choiceworthy, but simply in itself it is not more choiceworthy. Again, if something added to the lesser makes the whole greater. And similarly also by removal: for when that is removed from the same thing and what remains is less, that will be greater which, when removed, makes the remainder less. And if one thing is to be chosen for its own sake, but the other for the sake of glory—as health compared with beauty—and the end of what is for the sake of glory is that, with no one knowing of it, one would not strive for it to be present. And if one thing is to be chosen both for its own sake and for the sake of glory, but the other only for the sake of something else. And whichever is more to be honored for its own sake, this is both better and more choiceworthy. That which is more honorable in itself will surely be that to which nothing else ought to be preferred; for we choose it more for its own sake. Further, one must divide as often as \"choiceworthy\" is said, and for the sake of what—as the useful, or the honorable, or the pleasant. For what is useful toward all things or toward more things will be more choiceworthy than what is not so. But if the same things are present in both, one must consider to which they are more present—as whether the pleasant or the honorable, or the useful, is more so. Again, what is for the sake of the better is more choiceworthy—as what is for the sake of virtue rather than what is for the sake of pleasure.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":66,"ref":"p66","source":"Similiter autem et in fugiendis.Nam magis est fugiendum quod magis impetit virtutes, ut aegritudo turpitudine,nam et voluptatis etejusquod est studiosum esse,prohibentior est ægritudo.Amplius,ex similitudine monstrari potest fugiendum et eligendum quod propositum est. Namminuseligendum hujusmodi,quod aeque et eligeret aliquis etfugeret,altero quod eligendum est tantum; ad se invicem igitur comparationes (quemadmodum dictum est) faciendum.\n\nCAPUT IV.\n\nDe eligendis et fugiendis documenta,locicommunes.\n\nIdem autem loci utiles, et ad demonstrandum quodvis eligendum et fugiendum. Nam auferre solum eam oportet (quaa ad alterum est)praeeminentiam; si enim quod honorabilius,eligibilius,et honorabile eligendum, et si quod utilius,eligibilius et utile eligendum,similiterautem et in uliis quæcunque hujusmodi habent comparationem.ln aliquibus autem statim secundum eam quae ad alterum est comparationem, et quod eligendum utrumque vel alterum dicimus.Ut quando hoc quidem natura bonum,illud autem non natura bonum dicimus: nam quod natura bonum,manifestuæ a quoniam eligenduffi est. Sumendum autem quam maxime universales locos de eo quod est magis et minus, nam sic sumpti ad plura utiles erunt. Fieri autem potest ut eorum quidicti sunt quosda!L universales magis quis facial, pat'u transm utans secund urn appellationerr. Ut quod natul a tale, eo quod non natura tale,magis tale.","english":"Similarly also in the case of things to be avoided. For that which more greatly attacks the virtues is more to be avoided, as sickness is more to be avoided than disgrace; for sickness is more prohibitive of pleasure and of that which is to be studious. Moreover, from similarity it can be shown that what is proposed is to be avoided and chosen. For that is less to be chosen which one would equally choose and avoid, than the other which is only to be chosen; comparisons, therefore, are to be made with respect to one another, as has been said.\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nCommonplaces concerning things to be chosen and avoided.\n\nThe same commonplaces are useful also for demonstrating that anything whatever is to be chosen and avoided. For one must remove only that pre-eminence which is relative to the other; for if what is more honorable is more choiceworthy, and the honorable is to be chosen, and if what is more useful is more choiceworthy and the useful is to be chosen, similarly also in other cases whatever have a comparison of this kind. In some cases, however, we say immediately according to the comparison relative to the other that both or one of them is to be chosen, as when we say that this indeed is good by nature, but that is not good by nature; for what is good by nature is manifestly to be chosen. One must take the most universal commonplaces concerning the more and the less, for thus taken they will be useful for more cases. It can happen, however, that someone makes some of those which have been stated more universal, by transposing them according to the appellation, as that which is such by nature is more such than that which is not such by nature.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":67,"ref":"p67","source":"Et si hoc quidem facit, illud autem non facit quod habet tale cuicunque insit,magis tale quod interdum facit, tale quam quod non facit. Si autem utrumque facit, quod magis facit tale. Amplius, si eodem aliquo,hoc quidem magis, illud autem minus tale. Et si hoc tali magis tale, illud vero non tali tale,manifestum quoniam primum magis tale.Amplius ex auditione,si eidem additum,aliquod tutum magis tale facit,aut si ei quod minus est tale additum, totum magis tale [licit. Similiter autem et ex abbtione,nam quo ablato reliquis,reliquum minus tale,ipsum magis tale. Et quæ contrariis sunt impermixtiora3 magis talia. Ut;olbius quidem nigro impermixtius. Amplius, præter ea qua dicta sunt prius,quod magis suscipit propriam propositi rationem. Ut si albi est ratio color disgregativus visus, albioris est,color magis disgregativus visus. Si autem particulariter, et non universaliter problema ponatur, primum quidem dicti universaliter construtivi vel deslructivi loci omnes utiles. Universaliter enim interimentes vel construentes,et particulariter monstramus; nam si omni inest,et alicui,et si nulli inest, nec alicui.Maxime autem opportuni et communes loci,qui sunt ex oppositis,et conjugatis, et casibus.","english":"And if one thing produces what has such a character in whatever it inheres, while the other does not, then that which sometimes produces it is more of such a character than that which does not. But if both produce it, that which produces it more is more of such a character. Further, if by the same thing one is more of such a character and the other less. And if this is more of such a character by what is of such a character, while that is of such a character by what is not of such a character, it is clear that the first is more of such a character. Further, from addition: if when added to the same thing something makes it more of such a character, or if when added to that which is less of such a character it makes the whole more of such a character. Similarly also from subtraction; for when that is taken away from the rest, the remainder is less of such a character, and that thing itself is more of such a character. And those things which are more unmixed with their contraries are more of such a character, as the olive is more unmixed with black. Further, besides the things said before, that which more receives the proper account of the proposed thing. For if the account of white is a color that separates sight, then the account of what is whiter is a color that more separates sight. But if the problem is put particularly and not universally, first indeed all the places stated universally for establishing or destroying are useful. For by universally destroying or establishing, we also show particularly; for if it belongs to all, it also belongs to some, and if it belongs to none, it belongs to no some. But most opportune and common are the places that come from opposites, from conjugates, and from cases.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[{"kind":"lacuna","severity":"caution","text":"The source is fragmentary here: the edition marks a break or an editorial bracket, and the English carries across it. Treat the bridge as supplied, not translated."}]},{"i":68,"ref":"p68","source":"Nam similiter probabile est existimare, ei omnis voluptas honum,et tristitam omnem malum esse,et si aliqua voluptas bonum,et tristitiam aliquam esse malum.Item si aliquissensus non est potestas,et insensibilitas quasdam non est impotentia, et si quoddam opinatum disciplinatum, opinio quaedam disciplina; rursum si aliquod injustorum bonum, et justorum aliquod malum, et aliquod eorum quae injuste malum, et aliquod eorum quæ injuste bouum, et si quoddam delectabile fugienducr, et delectatio quaedam fugienda, secundum hæc autem et si aliquod delectabile utile, delectatio quaedam utilis. Et in corruptivis autem, et generationibus, et corruptionibus similiter. Nam si aliquod rorruptivum delectationisvel disciplinas bonum est, erit quaedam delectatio vel disciplina malorum; similiter autem et si corruptio quaedam disciplinae bonorum,velgeneratiomalorum,eritquaedam disciplina malorum.","english":"For it is similarly probable to think that every pleasure is a good and every pain an evil, and if some pleasure is a good, that some pain is an evil. Likewise, if some sensation is not a capacity, and some insensibility is not an incapacity, and if some object of opinion is a subject of knowledge, then some opinion is a subject of knowledge; again, if some good belongs to unjust things, then some evil belongs to just things, and some evil to things done unjustly, and some good to things done unjustly; and if some pleasant thing is to be avoided, then some pleasure is to be avoided, and according to these also, if some pleasant thing is useful, then some pleasure is useful. And in the case of corruptive things, and generations, and corruptions, similarly. For if some corruptive thing of pleasure or of knowledge is a good, then some pleasure or knowledge will be of evils; and similarly, if some corruption of knowledge is of goods, or some generation of evils, there will be some knowledge of evils.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":69,"ref":"p69","source":"Ut si oblivisci quæ quis turpia egit bonorum est,vel reminisci malorum,erit scire quæ quisturpiaegit,malorum.Similiterautem et in aliis, in omnibus enim similiter probalile.Amplius ex eo quod est magis et minus,et similiter; si enim magis quidem eorum quæ sunt ex alio genere aliquid tale, illorum autem nihil est,neque quod dictum est erit tale.Ut si magis quidem disciplina quaedam bonum quam voluptas, nulla autem disciplina bonum, nec voluptas bonum erit, et ex eo quod est similiter quidem et minus eudem modo. Nam erit et interimere et construere; verumtamen ex eo quod estsimiliter,utraque j ex minus autem construere solum,destruereautem non; si enim similiter potestas quædam bonum et disciplina, est autem quaedam potestas bonumetd[sciplina;siautem nulla potestas bonum nec disciplina,si autem minus quædam potestas bonum quam disciplina, est autem quædam potestas bonum et disciplina; at vero si nulla potestas bonum,non necesseestet disciplinam nullam esse bonum: manifestumigiturquoniam construere solum ex eo quod minus est.Non solum autem ex alio genere est destruere, verum et ex eadem,dum sumit quis quod maxime tale est. Ut si positum est disciplina quaedam bonum, ostendatur autem quoniam prudentia non bonum,nec alia ulla erit, quia nec quae maxime videtur.","english":"For example, if to forget the shameful things one has done is a good, or to remember evils, then to know the shameful things one has done will be [a good] of evils. And similarly in other cases, for in all things it is similarly probable. Moreover, from the more and the less, and likewise: for if something of another kind is more such, and of those [under consideration] nothing is, neither will what was stated be such. For example, if some discipline is more a good than pleasure, but no discipline is a good, neither will pleasure be a good. And from what is similarly and less in the same way. For there will be both to destroy and to construct; however, from what is similarly, both; but from the less, to construct only, but not to destroy. For if a certain power is similarly a good and a discipline, and some power is a good and a discipline; but if no power is a good, neither is a discipline; but if a certain power is less a good than a discipline, and some power is a good and a discipline; yet if no power is a good, it is not necessary that no discipline be a good. It is evident, therefore, that [one may] construct only from what is less. But it is not only from another kind that one may destroy, but also from the same kind, when one assumes what is most such. For example, if it has been posited that some discipline is a good, but it is shown that prudence is not a good, neither will any other be, because not even that which seems most [so].","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[{"kind":"lacuna","severity":"caution","text":"The source is fragmentary here: the edition marks a break or an editorial bracket, and the English carries across it. Treat the bridge as supplied, not translated."}]},{"i":70,"ref":"p70","source":"Amplius, ex suppositione similiter postulantem si uni etomni in esse vel non inesse.Ut si hominis anima immortalis,et alias; si autem haecnon,nec alias. Si igitur inesse alicui positum est,oatendendu''n quoniam alicui non inest, nam consequatur per hypothesin nulli inesse; si au..","english":"Further, they similarly demand from a supposition that something belongs or does not belong to one and to all. For example, if the soul of man is immortal, so too are others; but if this is not so, neither are others. If, then, it has been posited that it belongs to some one, it must be shown that it does not belong to some one; for it follows by hypothesis that it belongs to none; but if...","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":71,"ref":"p71","source":"tem alicui non inesse positum est,ostendendum quoniam inest alicui,nam et sic consequetur omnibus inesse.Manitestum igilur estquod qui hypothesi utitur, facit problema universale particulariter posi-, tum; nam particulariter confitentem universaliter postulabit confiteri, eo quod uni et omni similiter postulaveritinesse.Cumautem indefinitum est problema,unomododestruerecontingit.Utsi dixeritvoluptatem bonum esse,vel non bonum,et nibil aliud quidquam determinaverit, nam si aliquam voluptatem dixerit bonum esse,ostendendum universaliter quod nulla,si debeat interimi propositum; similiterautem et si aliquam dixerit voluptatem non esse bon um,oslendendum llniversaliter quodomnis;aliter vero non contingit interimere,nam si ostenderimus quoniam est quaedam voluptas bonum vel non bonum,nondum interimitur propositum.Manitesium igiturquoniaminterimerequidemuno modo dicitur, construereautem dupliciter: siveenim universaliter ostenderimus quod omnis voluptas bonum, sive quod est quasdam voluptas bonum, ostensum erit quod propositum est.Similiter autem et si oporteat disserere quod est quaedum voluptas non bonum, si ostenderimus quod nulla bonum, vel quod quaedam non bonum ostendentes erimus utrum que,et univer-■ saliter et particulariter,quod est quædam voluptas: non bonum.Cum autem determinata fuerit positio, dupliciterinterimere erit.","english":"But if it has been supposed that it does not belong to some one, one must show that it belongs to some one; for in this way it will follow that it belongs to all. It is evident, then, that one who uses a hypothesis makes a universal problem particular in his supposition; for he will demand that one who admits it in a particular case admit it universally, inasmuch as he has demanded that it belong to one and to all alike. But when the problem is indefinite, it can be destroyed in only one way. For example, if someone has said that pleasure is good, or not good, and has determined nothing else—for if he has said that some pleasure is good, one must show universally that no pleasure is good, if the proposition is to be refuted; and similarly, if he has said that some pleasure is not good, one must show universally that every pleasure is good; but otherwise it is not possible to refute it, for if we have shown that a certain pleasure is good or not good, the proposition is not yet refuted. It is evident, then, that to refute is spoken of in one way, but to establish in two ways; for whether we have shown universally that every pleasure is good, or that a certain pleasure is good, what was proposed will have been shown. And similarly, if one must argue that a certain pleasure is not good, if we have shown that no pleasure is good, or that a certain pleasure is not good, we shall have shown both universally and particularly that a certain pleasure is not good. But when the position has been determined, there will be two ways of refuting it.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":72,"ref":"p72","source":"Ut si ponaturalicuiquidem inesse voluptati bonum esse,alicui autem non inesse1 nam sive omnis ostendatur voluptas bonum, sive: nulla,interemptumerit propositum; si autem unam solam voluptatem posuerit bonum esse, tripliciter contingit interimere; nam ostendentes quodomnis vel nulla, vel quod plures quam una bonum, interimentes erimus quod propositum est.In pluribus vero positione determinata (utquod prudentia sola est! virtutum scientia),quadrupliciterestinterimere.Nam ostenso quod omnis virtus scientia,vel quod nulla, vel quod et alia aliqua ut justitia, vel quod eadem prudentia, non scientia,interemptum erit propositum.Utile autem et inspicere in singularibus,in quibus inesse aliquid vel nOn,dictu est,quemadmodum in universalibus problematibus.Ampliusautern et in generibusinspiciendum,dividentisecundum species usque ad individuc.,sicut prius dictum est.Nam si omni appareat inesse, sive nulli multa proferenti, postulandum un iversaliter conliteri, aut ferre instan. tiara in aliquo non sic.Amplius,in quibus possibile est aut specie, aut numero determinare accidens, inspiciendum si nullum horum inest.Utquod tempus non movetur,nec est motus,annumeranti quod sunt species motus; nam si nulla earum inest tempori, manifestum quoniam non movetur,nec est motus.","english":"For example, if it is supposed that good belongs to some pleasure but not to some other—for whether all pleasure is shown to be good, or none, the thesis will have been destroyed; but if someone has posited that one single pleasure is good, there are three ways to destroy it: for by showing that all, or none, or that more than one are good, we shall have destroyed the thesis. In the case of a position determined with respect to several things (for example, that prudence alone is the science of the virtues), there are four ways to destroy it. For when it has been shown that every virtue is a science, or that none is, or that some other as well, such as justice, is, or that prudence itself is not a science, the thesis will have been destroyed. It is also useful to examine particulars, in which it is said that something belongs or does not belong, in the same way as in universal problems. Moreover, one must also examine genera, dividing them according to species down to individuals, as was said before. For if it appears to belong to every one, or to none, when someone brings forward many instances, one must demand that he concede it universally, or else bring an objection in some case where it is not so. Moreover, in cases where it is possible to determine the attribute either by species or by number, one must examine whether none of these belongs. For example, that time is not moved nor is a motion, by enumerating the species of motion; for if none of them belongs to time, it is clear that it is not moved nor is a motion.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":73,"ref":"p73","source":"Similiter autem et quod anima non est numerus,dividenti quoniamomnis numerus aut impar aut par; nam si anima neque impar nequtl par, manil'estum quod non est numerus, ad accidens igitur per talia et hoc modo argumentandum.\n\nLIBER QUARTUS.\n\nCAPUT PRIMUM.\n\nDe quo discutiendum, et problematum generis loci decem.\n\nPost hæc autem de iis quae ad genus etproprtum, inspiciendum;sunt autem hæc elementa eorum quae sunt ad terminos, et his ipsis raro considerationes fiunt disputantibus.Siergo ponatur genus alicujus existentium,r;rimum quidem inspiciendum ad omnia qux e cognata sunt ei quod dicitur, si de alio non prædicatur, quemadmodum est in accidente.Ut si voluptatis bonum ponaturgenus,si aliqua voluptas non bonum. Nam si hoc manifestum est quoniam non genus bonum voluptatis,nam genusde omnibus qure sunt sub ipso speciebus prædicatur; deinde si non in eo quod quid est prædicatur,sed ut accidens, quemadmodum albuin, de nive,de anima, a seipso agit.-itum.-neque enimnixidipsum quod est,album, quapropter non est genus album nivis;neque anima idipsum quod est,agitatum, namaccidit ei moveri, quemadmodum et animali frequenter et ambulare et ambulans esse. Amplius,agitalum non quid est, sed quid faciens vel patiens significare videtur; similiter autem et album,non enim quid est nix,sed quale quid est indicat; quare neutrum horum in eo quod quid est prædicatur.","english":"Similarly also [one may argue] that the soul is not a number, by dividing [the claim] that every number is either odd or even; for if the soul is neither odd nor even, it is evident that it is not a number. Such arguments, then, must be directed to accident in this way as well.\n\nBOOK FOUR\n\nCHAPTER ONE\n\nWhat must be discussed, and the ten kinds of loci of problems.\n\nAfter these things, one must examine matters pertaining to genus and property; these are the elements of those [arguments] that relate to terms, and considerations of them are rarely made by disputants. If, then, the genus of any existing thing is posited, first one must examine all things akin to what is stated, [to see] whether it is not predicated of something else, as happens in the case of accident. For example, if good is posited as the genus of pleasure, [one must see] whether some pleasure is not good. For if this is evident, [it is evident] that good is not the genus of pleasure; for a genus is predicated of all the species that are under it. Then [one must see] whether it is not predicated in [answer to] what it is, but as an accident—as white [is predicated] of snow, and [motion] of the soul, [which moves] itself. For snow is not itself that which is white, and therefore white is not the genus of snow; nor is the soul itself that which is moved, for it happens to it to be moved, just as it happens to an animal frequently both to walk and to be walking. Further, \"moved\" seems to signify not what [a thing] is, but what it is doing or undergoing; and similarly also \"white\" indicates not what snow is, but of what sort it is; wherefore neither of these is predicated in [answer to] what it is.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":74,"ref":"p74","source":"Maximeautem inaccidentis definitione inspiciendum, si aptatur ad dictum genus, ut ad quae nunc dicta sunt: contingitenim quidpiam movere seipsum, et non,similiter autem et album esse,et non;quare neutrum horumgenus, sed accidens, eo quod accidens dicim us,quod contingit idem inesse alicui, et non. Amplius, si non in eadem divisione est genus, et species, sed hæc quidem substantia,illud autemquale.Utnixquidem et cygnus subslantia,album autem non substantia, sed quale;quare non est genus album nivis,neque cygni. Rursum disciplina quidem aliquid, bonum autem, et pulchrum quale; quare non est genus pulchrum, vel bonumdisciplinae,nam genera eorum quae sunt ad aliquid,et ipsa adaliquidoportetesse, ut in duplici:etenim multiplex est genus duplicis, et ipsum eorum quæ sunt adaliquidest.Ut universaliter autem dicatur, in eadem divisione oportet genus esse speciei,nam si species substantia,etgenus, et si quale quidpiam species est.genus quale quidpiam, ut si album quale quidpiam et color.Similiter autem et in aliis. Rursum si necesse fuerit, vel si contingerit genus participare, quod positnm est in genere.","english":"But most of all, in the definition of accident, one must examine whether it is fitted to the stated genus, as in the cases just mentioned; for it happens that something moves itself, and again does not, and likewise that it is white and again is not; wherefore neither of these is a genus but an accident, since we call an accident that which happens to be present in something and again not. Further, [one must examine] whether the genus and the species are not in the same division, but the one is substance and the other quality. For instance, snow and swan are substance, but white is not substance but quality; wherefore white is not the genus of snow or of swan. Again, knowledge is a certain thing, but the good and the beautiful are quality; wherefore the beautiful or the good is not the genus of knowledge, for the genera of things that are relative must themselves also be relative, as in the case of the double; for the multiple is the genus of the double, and it is itself among things that are relative. To put it universally, the genus must be in the same division as the species; for if the species is substance, the genus is also substance, and if the species is some quality, the genus is some quality, as if white is some quality, so is color. Similarly also in other cases. Again, [one must examine] whether it is necessary, or whether it happens, that the genus participates in that which is posited in the genus.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":75,"ref":"p75","source":"Terminus autem ejus quod est participare, est suscipere participati rationem, manifestum igitur quoniam species quidem participant genera,genera autem species non,nam species suscipit generis rationem,genus autem speciei non;considerandum igitur si participat, vel contingitassignatum genus participare speciem, ut si quis entisvel unius genus quidpiam assignaverit; accidet enim genus participare speciem, nam de omnibus quae sunt ens et unum praedicantur, quare et ratio eoru,!!. Amplius, si de aliquo assignata species vera est, genus autem non. Ut si ens,aut scibile,opinabilis genus ponatur,nam de non ente opinabile prædicabitur:multa enim non entia opinabilia sunt, at quod ens vel scibile non praedicatur de non ente; manifestum;quare non est genusens,nequescibile, opinabilis, nam de quibus species praedicatur, et genus oportet prædicari.Rursum si nullam specierum contingit participare quod positum est in genere.","english":"The definition of \"to participate\" is to receive the account of that which is participated in. It is clear, therefore, that species participate in genera, but genera do not participate in species; for a species receives the account of its genus, but a genus does not receive the account of its species. One must therefore consider whether it participates, or whether it happens that the assigned genus participates in the species—as if someone were to assign some genus of being or of the one. For it will result that the genus participates in the species, since being and one are predicated of all things that exist, and therefore their account as well. Furthermore, [consider] whether the species is true of something while the genus is not—as if being or knowable were posited as the genus of the opinable; for the opinable will be predicated of non-being, since many non-beings are opinable, whereas being or knowable is not predicated of non-being. It is clear, therefore, that being is not the genus of the opinable, nor is knowable; for whatever things the species is predicated of, the genus must also be predicated of. Again, [consider] whether it happens that none of the species participates in what has been posited as the genus.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":76,"ref":"p76","source":"Nam impossibile est participare genus, quod nullam specierum participat, nisi aliqua secundum primam divisionem specierum sit,il1æ autemgenus solum participant:si igitur motus genus voluptatis ponatur, considerandum si neque corruptio, neque alteratio voluptas, neque ullus reliquorum (quiassignarisolent) motuum;manifestum enim quoniam nullam specierum participabit,quare neque genus, eo quod necessarium est quod genus participat, et specierum aliquam participare;quare non eritspecies, motus, voluptas, neque individuorum, neque eorum quidquam qua? sub specie motus sunt: nam et individua participant speciem etgenus,ut quidam homo,et hominem participat et animal. Amplius,si de pluribus dicitur quam genus, quod in genere positum est. Ut opinabile quam ens, nam et ens,et non ens, opinabile,quare non erit opinabile species entis;de pluribus enim semper genus quam species praedicatur. Rursus, si de æqualibus genus et species dicuntur. Ut si eorum quæ omnia consequuntur, hoc quidem species, illud autem genus ponatur, quemadmodum ens et unum, omne enim ens et unum, quare neutrum neutrius genus, eo quod de aequalibus dicuntur. Similiter autem et si primum et principium ad se invicem ponantur,nam et principium primum, et primum principium, quare aut utraque quae dicta sunt idem sunt, aut neutrum neutrius genus.","english":"For it is impossible for a genus to participate in a genus that participates in none of its species, unless some species according to the first division of species exists, and those participate in the genus alone. If, therefore, motion is posited as the genus of pleasure, it must be considered whether neither corruption nor alteration is pleasure, nor any of the other motions that are customarily assigned; for it is clear that it will participate in no species, and therefore neither will it be a genus, because it is necessary that what participates in a genus also participate in some species. Wherefore pleasure will not be a species of motion, nor of individuals, nor will any of those things that are under the species of motion be so; for individuals participate in both species and genus, as a certain man participates in both man and animal. Further, if it is predicated of more things than the genus, what is placed in the genus. For example, the opinable than being, for both being and non-being are opinable, wherefore the opinable will not be a species of being; for a genus is always predicated of more things than a species. Again, if genus and species are predicated of equals. For example, if of those things that accompany all things, one is posited as a species and the other as a genus, as being and one, for every being is one, wherefore neither is the genus of the other, because they are predicated of equals. Similarly also if first and principle are posited in relation to each other, for both principle is first and first is principle, wherefore either both of the things said are the same, or neither is the genus of the other.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":77,"ref":"p77","source":"Elementum autem est ad omnia hujusmodi,quod de pluribus genus quam species et differentia dicitur;de paucioribus enim etiamdifferentia dicitur quam genus. Videndum autem et si alicujus in differentium specie non sit genus quod dictum est genus,vel non videatur.Construentiautem si est alicujus, idem enim omnium indifferen. tium specie genus;si igitur unius monstretur,manifestum quoniam omnium, et si unius non,manifestum quoniam nullius: ut si quis in secabiles ponens lineas indivisibile genus earum dicat esse, nam linearum habentium divisionem non est quod dictum est genus,cum sint indifferentes secundum speciem, indifferentes enim sibi invicem secundum speciem, rectæ lineae omnes.\n\nCAPUT II.\n\nDe genere loci alii.\n\nConsiderandum autem et si quod aliud genus est assitrnatse speciei,quod neque continet assignatum genus,neque sub illo est.Ut si quis justitiae scientiam ponat genus,est enim virtusgenus,et neutrum generum reliquum continet,quare non erat scientia genus justitiae.","english":"And a basic principle for all such cases is that genus is predicated of more things than species and differentia; for differentia too is predicated of fewer things than genus. One must also consider whether the genus stated to be a genus does not belong to any of the species under the differentia, or does not appear to. And for establishing it: if it belongs to any one, it is the same genus of all that are undifferentiated in species; so if it is shown of one, it is clear that it belongs to all, and if not of one, it is clear that it belongs to none—for example, if someone, setting down divisible lines, should say that the indivisible is their genus; for the stated genus does not belong to lines that have division, since they are undifferentiated in species—for all straight lines are undifferentiated in species from one another.\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nOn other topics of genus.\n\nOne must also consider whether some other genus has been assigned to the species, which neither contains the assigned genus nor is under it. For example, if someone should posit knowledge as the genus of justice—for virtue is a genus, and neither of the two genera contains the other; hence knowledge was not the genus of justice.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":78,"ref":"p78","source":"Videtur enim, quando species una sub duobus generibus est, alterum ab altero contineri.Hdbet autern dubitationsm in quibusdam quod hujusmodi est, nam videtur quibusdam prudentiaet virtus et scientia esse,et neutrum genusa neutro contineri; non tamen ab omnibus conceditur prudentiam scientiam esse.Si igitur quis admittat quod dictum est verum esse, attamen subalterna, vel sub eodem ambo fieri quae ejusdem sunt genera, necessarium videbitur esse, quemadmodum et in virtute et in scientia accidit: utraque enim sub eodem genere sunt,nam utrumque eorum habitus et dispositio est. Considerandum igitur si neutrum est inassignatogenere.Sienim neque subalterna sunt genera, neque sub eodem ambo, non erit quod assignatum est genus.Considerandumautem et genus assignati generis,et sic semper superius genus, si omnia praedicantur de specie, et si in eo quod quid est prædicantur,Nam omne superius genus praedicari oportet de specie in eo quod quid est; si ergo alicubi dissonet, manifestum quoniam non est genus quod assignatum est.Rursum,si genus participat speciem, vel ipsum, vel aliquod superiorum generum.Nam nullum superiorum participat quod inferius est.","english":"For it seems that when one species falls under two genera, one is contained by the other. There is, however, a difficulty in certain cases of this sort; for it seems to some that prudence and virtue and knowledge are the same, and that neither genus is contained by the other; yet it is not conceded by all that prudence is knowledge. If, then, one admits that what has been said is true, nevertheless it will seem necessary that both be made subalternate, or both fall under the same genus, since they are genera of the same thing, just as happens in the case of virtue and knowledge; for both are under the same genus, since each of them is a habit and disposition. One must consider, then, whether neither is in an unassignable genus. For if the genera are neither subalternate nor both under the same genus, that which has been assigned as genus will not be a genus. One must also consider the genus of the assigned genus, and so always the higher genus, whether all things are predicated of the species, and whether they are predicated in what it is. For every higher genus must be predicated of the species in what it is; if, then, it disagrees anywhere, it is clear that what has been assigned is not a genus. Again, whether the genus participates in the species, either itself or some of the higher genera. For none of the higher genera participates in what is lower.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":79,"ref":"p79","source":"Destruenti igitur quem admodum dictum est utendum, astruenti autem si confiteatur quidem inesse speciei quod dictum est genus, at ut genus inest dubitetur, sufficit ostendere aliquid superiorum generum in eo quod quid est de specie praedicari. Uno enim in eo quod quid est praedicato omnia et superioraillius,et inferiora si praedicantur de specie, in eo quod quid est prae dicabuntur;quare et assignatum genus in eo quod quid est prædicabitur;quod autem uno in eo quod quid est praedicato, omnia etiam reliqua (si praedicantur) in eo quod quid est prædicabundur,per inductionem sumendum. Si autem simpliciter inesse dubitetur assignatum genus,non sufficit ostendere aliquod superiorum generum in eo quod quid est de specie praedicari,ut si ambulationis genus quispiam assignavit lationem, non sufficit ostendere quod motus est ambulatio, ad ostendendum quod latio est eo quod et alii motus sunt, sed ostendendum quod nullum participat ambulatio eorum quae sunt secundum eamdem divisionem, nisi lationem; nam necesse est quod genus participat, et specierum aliquam participaresecundum primam divisionem; si enim ambulatio neque augmentationem, neque diminutionem,neque alios motus participet,manifestum quoniam lationem participabit; quare erit genus latio ambulationis.","english":"Therefore the one who is destroying must proceed as has been said, but the one who is establishing must, if he indeed concedes that the genus stated is present in the species, but doubts whether it is present as a genus, it is sufficient to show that some one of the higher genera is predicated of the species in what it is. For when one thing is predicated in what it is, all the higher genera of that thing, and the lower ones too, if they are predicated of the species, will be predicated in what it is; therefore the assigned genus will also be predicated in what it is. But that when one thing is predicated in what it is, all the rest also, if they are predicated, will be predicated in what it is, must be taken by induction. If, however, it is doubted whether the assigned genus is present simply, it is not sufficient to show that some one of the higher genera is predicated of the species in what it is—for example, if someone has assigned motion as the genus of walking, it is not sufficient to show that walking is a motion, in order to show that motion is its genus, because other motions also are; but one must show that walking participates in none of the things that are under the same division except motion. For it is necessary that what participates in the genus also participate in some one of the species according to the first division. For if walking participates neither in increase nor in decrease nor in the other motions, it is clear that it will participate in motion; therefore motion will be the genus of walking.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":80,"ref":"p80","source":"Rursum, de quibus species quae positaestut genus prædicalur,considerandum si et assignatum genus in eo quod quid est de ipsis eisdem prædicatur de quibus et species; similiter autem et si omnia quae supra genus sunt,nam si alicubi dissonat,manifestumquoniamnonest genus quod assignatum est;si enim esset genus,omniaet superiora illius,et ipsum,in eo quod quid est praedicarentur de iis de quibus et species in eo quod quid est praedicatur. Destruenti igitur utile si non praedicetur genus in eo quod quid est de quibus et species praedicatur; astruenti autem si praedicetur in eo quod quid est utile, accidet enim genus et speciem de eodem in eo quod quid est praedicari, quare et idem sut. duobus generibus fit,necesseest igitur subalterna genera esse. Si igitur ostendatur quod volumus genus astruere non esse sub specie, manifestum quoniam species sub hoc erit, quare ostensum erit quoniam genus hoc. Considerandae autem et rationes generum,si aptantur ad assignatam speciem, et ad participantia speciem. Necesse est enim generum rationes praedicari de specie et de iis quae participant speciem; si igitur in aliquo dissonet, dilucidum quoniam non est genus quod assignatum est. Rursus, si differentiam ut genus assignavit, ut si immortale genus Dei, nam differentia est animalis immortale, eo quod animalium alia mortalia, alia immortalia.","english":"Again, in the case of those things of which the species that has been posited is predicated as a genus, one must consider whether the assigned genus is also predicated in the what-it-is of the very same things of which the species is predicated; and likewise whether all the things above the genus are so predicated, for if there is disagreement anywhere, it is manifest that what has been assigned is not a genus; for if it were a genus, both all its superiors and it itself would be predicated in the what-it-is of those things of which the species is predicated in the what-it-is. Therefore, for the one who is destroying it is useful if the genus is not predicated in the what-it-is of those things of which the species is predicated; but for the one who is establishing, it is useful if it is predicated in the what-it-is, for it will follow that genus and species are predicated in the what-it-is of the same thing, and therefore they are the same. But if this happens with two genera, it is necessary that they be subaltern genera. If, therefore, it is shown that the genus we wish to establish is not under the species, it is manifest that the species will be under it, and therefore it will have been shown that this is the genus. One must also consider the definitions of genera, whether they fit the assigned species and the things that participate in the species. For it is necessary that the definitions of genera be predicated of the species and of those things that participate in the species; if, therefore, there is disagreement in anything, it is clear that what has been assigned is not a genus. Again, if someone has assigned a differentia as a genus, as if immortal were the genus of God—for immortal is a differentia of animal, since of animals some are mortal and some immortal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":81,"ref":"p81","source":"Mamtestum Igitur quoniam peccant, nullius enim differentia est genus. Quod autem hoc verum, manifestum, nulla enim differentia significat quid est, sed magis quale quid; ut gressibile et bipes.Et si differentiam in genere posuit tanquam speciem, ut imparem quidem numerum (differentiam enim numeri impar,et non species est), neque videtur participare differentia genus. Nam omne quod participat genus, vel species, vel individuum est:difrerentia autem neque individuum, neque species;manifestum igitur quoniam non participat genus differentia,quare neque impar species erit,sed differentia, quoniam non participat genus. Amplius,si genus in specie posuit,ut contiguitatem idipsum quod est continuitatem, aut mixturam idipsum quod est temperamentum,aut (ut Plato definivit) lationem secundum locum mutationem: non enim necessarium contiguitatem continuitatem esse, sed e converso continuitatem contiguitatem, non enim omne contiguum continuatur, sed quod continuatur contiguum est. Similiter autem et in aliis,nam neque mixtura omnis temperamentum, nam siccorum mixtura non est temperamentum, neque secundum locum mutatio omnis, latio,nam ambulatio non videtur latio esse. Pene enim in iis quæ involuntarie locum ex loco permutant, dicitur latio,quemadmodum inanimatis accidit; manifestum autem quoniam et de pluribus species dicitur quam genus in assisnatis.cum oporteat e contrario fieri.","english":"It is evident, therefore, that they err, for a differentia is the genus of nothing. And that this is true is manifest, for no differentia signifies what a thing is, but rather of what sort it is, as for example \"walking\" and \"two-footed.\" And if he has placed a differentia in the genus as though it were a species, as \"odd\" in the case of number (for odd is a differentia of number, and not a species), neither does a differentia appear to participate in the genus. For everything that participates in a genus is either a species or an individual; but a differentia is neither an individual nor a species. It is manifest, therefore, that a differentia does not participate in the genus; wherefore neither will odd be a species, but a differentia, since it does not participate in the genus. Further, if he has placed the genus in the species, as contiguity in that very thing which is continuity, or mixture in that very thing which is temperament, or (as Plato defined it) motion in place in local change: for it is not necessary that contiguity be continuity, but rather the converse, that continuity be contiguity; for not everything contiguous is continuous, but what is continuous is contiguous. And similarly also in other cases, for neither is every mixture a temperament, for the mixture of dry things is not a temperament, nor is every local change motion, for walking does not appear to be motion; for motion is spoken of, one might almost say, in the case of those things that change place involuntarily, as happens in inanimate things. And it is manifest that the species is also predicated of more things than the genus in the case of things that have been assumed, when the opposite ought to be the case.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":82,"ref":"p82","source":"Rursum, si differentiam in specie posuit, ut immortale idipsum quod est Deum, nam accidit de æqualibus aut pluribus quam speciem dici; differentia enim semper de æqualibus aut de pluribus quam species dicitur.Amplius,si in differentia genus posuit,ut colorem idipsum quod est congregativum, aut numerum quod impar; et si genus ut differentiam dixit: possibile estenim aliquemtalem suscipere positionem,ut temperantiae mixturam differentiam, aut lationis secundum locum mutationem. Inspiciendum autem omnia quae sunt hujus modi per eadem, communicant enim loci, de pluribus enim genus quam differentiam oportet dici,et non participare differentiam. Si autem assignato, neutrum eorum quae dicta sunt possibile est accidere,nam et de paucioribus dicetur,et participabit genus differentiam. Rursum, si nulla differentia generis prædicatur de assignata specie, nec genus praedicabitur,ut de anima, neque impar neque par prædicatur, quare nec numerus. Amplius, si prius est natura species, et simul interimit genus. Videtur enim contrarium. Amplius, si contingit relinquere dictorum genus vel differentiam (utanirnam moveri, opinionem, verum et falsum),neutrum erit dictorum genus vel differentia.Videtur enim genus et differentia sequi quamdiu fuerit species.","english":"Again, if he has placed a differentia in the species, as \"immortal\" in the case of God himself; for it happens that it is said of equals or of more things than the species. For a differentia is always said of equals or of more things than the species. Further, if he has placed a genus in the differentia, as \"color\" in the case of what is congregative, or \"number\" in the case of what is odd; and if he has called a genus a differentia—for it is possible for someone to accept such a position, as that mixture is a differentia of temperance, or change according to place a differentia of carrying. But all such things must be examined by the same considerations, for the topics are connected; for a genus must be said of more things than a differentia, and must not participate in a differentia. But if, when the subject has been assigned, neither of the things mentioned can happen—for it will be said of fewer things, and the genus will participate in the differentia. Again, if no differentia of the genus is predicated of the assigned species, neither will the genus be predicated, as neither odd nor even is predicated of the soul, and therefore neither is number. Further, if the species is prior by nature, the genus is also destroyed together with it. For the contrary seems to be the case. Further, if it is possible to leave out the genus or the differentia of the things stated (as, for example, to be moved, opinion, true and false), neither will be the genus or differentia of the things stated. For the genus and differentia seem to follow as long as the species exists.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":83,"ref":"p83","source":"CAPUT III.\n\nDe genere loca alii.\n\nInspiciendum autem et si quod in genere positum est participat aliquid contrarium generi, aut si, contingit participare. Nam idem contraria simul participabit,eoquod ipsum genus quidem nunquam relinquil5participat autem et contrarium, aut contingit participare.Amplius,si quidpiam communicat species, quod impossibile est omninoinesseiis quæ sunt sub genere,ut si anima communicat,numerorum autem nullum possibile est vivere, non erit species numeri anima.Considerandum autem et si aequivoca sit species generi elementis utenti, iis quae dicta sunt ad aequivocum.Univocum enim genus, et species. Quoniam inspiciendum autem omnis generis plures species, inspiciendum si non contingitalteram speciem esse dicti generis,nam si non est manifestum quoniam non erit genus omnino,quod dictum est. Considerandum etiam est si quod translatitie dictum est, ut genus assignavit: ut temperantiam consonantiam; nam omne genus proprie de speciebus prædicatur, consonantia vero de temperantia non proprie.sed translatitie,omnis enim consonantia in sonis. Amplius, si sit contrarium speciei aliquid, considerandum. Est autem multipliciter consideratio.Primum quidem si in eodem genere contrarium speciei, cum non sit contrarium generi; oportet enim contraria in eodem genere esse, si nihil sit contrarium generi.","english":"CHAPTER III.\n\nOn the topics of genus, other points.\n\nOne must also consider whether something placed in a genus participates in anything contrary to the genus, or whether it can participate in it. For the same thing will participate in contraries at the same time, because it never abandons the genus itself, yet it participates in the contrary, or can participate in it. Further, if a species shares in anything that it is altogether impossible for any of the things under the genus to have, as, if the soul shares in number, but no number can be alive, then the soul will not be a species of number. One must also consider whether the species is equivocal in relation to a genus that uses elements, [by the points] that have been stated concerning the equivocal. For the genus and the species are univocal. Since, moreover, one must examine the several species of every genus, one must consider whether it is possible for another species of the stated genus to exist; for if it is not evident, then what has been stated will not be a genus at all. One must also consider whether he has assigned as a genus something said metaphorically, as if he called temperance a harmony; for every genus is predicated properly of its species, but harmony is not predicated properly of temperance, but metaphorically, for all harmony is in sounds. Further, if there is anything contrary to the species, one must consider it. But the consideration is manifold. First, indeed, whether the contrary of the species is in the same genus, when it is not contrary to the genus; for contraries must be in the same genus, if nothing is contrary to the genus.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":84,"ref":"p84","source":"Cum autem est contrarium generi, considerandum si contrarium in contrarium.Necesse est enim contrarium in contrario esse,si sitcontrarium quidem generi; manifestum*autem est unumquodque eorum, per inductionem.Rursus si omnino in nullo genere quod speciei est contrarium, sed ipsum genus: ut bonum; nam ipsi hoc non in genere, nec contrarium hujus in genere erit,sed ipsum genus,quemadmodum in bono et malo accidit: neutrum enim horum in genere,sed utrumque eorum genus.Deinde considerandum si contrarium est alicui et genus etspecies, ethorumquidemestaliquidmedium, illorum autem non.Nam si generum est aliquid medium,et specierum: et si specierum, et generum, ut in virtute et vitio, et justitia et injustitia, utrorumque enim est aliquid medium.Instantia hujus, quoniam sanitatis et aegritudinis nihil est medium, mali autem et boni allquod medium.Amplius, si est quidem aliquid utrisque medium, et speciebus et generibus, non similiter autem,sed horum quidem secundum negationem,illorum vero ut subjectum. Probabile enim similiter et in utrisque, ut in virtute et in vitio,justitia et injustitia, utrisque enim secundum negationem medium. Amplius, quando non est contrarium generi,considerandum non solum si contrarium in eodem genere,sed et medium.","english":"When, however, a genus has a contrary, one must consider whether the contrary is in the contrary. For it is necessary that the contrary be in the contrary, if indeed it is contrary to the genus; and each of these is made evident by induction. Again, if the contrary of the species is in no genus at all, but the genus itself is: as in the case of good; for this is not in a genus, nor will its contrary be in a genus, but the genus itself, as happens in good and evil: for neither of these is in a genus, but each of them is a genus. Then one must consider whether both the genus and the species have a contrary, and whether there is some intermediate for the one but not for the other. For if there is some intermediate for the genera, there is also for the species; and if for the species, also for the genera, as in virtue and vice, and justice and injustice: for there is some intermediate for both. An objection to this is that there is no intermediate for health and sickness, but there is some intermediate for good and evil. Moreover, if there is some intermediate for both, both for the species and for the genera, yet not in the same way, but for the latter by negation, for the former as a subject. For it is plausible that it is similar in both, as in virtue and vice, justice and injustice: for the intermediate for both is by negation. Moreover, when the genus has no contrary, one must consider not only whether the contrary is in the same genus, but also the intermediate.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":85,"ref":"p85","source":"In quo enim extrema, et medium, ut in albo et nigro, nam color genus et horum et mediorum colorum omnium.Instantia,quoniamdefectusquidem, et superabundantia in eodem genere (in malo enim ambo), mediocre autem cum sit medium horum, non in malo, sed in bono est. Considerandum etiam si genus quidem contrarium est alicui, speciesautem nulli. Nam si genus est contrarium alicui, et species, quemadmodum virtus et vitium, et justitia et injustitia, similiter autem etin aliis consideranti manifestum videtur esse. Instantia, in sanitate et ægritudine, simpliciter enim sanitas xgritudini contraria; aliqua autem ægritudo, cum sit species aegritudinis, nulli contrarium, ut febris et ophthalmia, et unumquoque aliorum. Interimenti igitur tot modis inspiciendum: si enim non insint quae dicta sunt, manifestum autem non esse genus quod assignatum est. Construenti vero tripliciter, primum quidem si contrarium speciei sit in dicto genere, cum non sit contrarium generi. Nam si contrarium in hoc, manifestum quoniam et quod propositum est. Amplius si medium in dicto genere,nam in quo medium,et, extrema. Rursum si sit et contrarium quidem generi,considerandum est,et si contrarium in contrario.Nam si sit, manifestum quod et propositum in proposito.","english":"For in whatever case there are extremes, there is also the middle, as in white and black; for color is the genus both of these and of all intermediate colors. An objection: deficiency and excess are in the same genus (for both are in evil), but the intermediate, since it is the middle of these, is not in evil but in good. One must also consider whether the genus is contrary to something while the species is contrary to nothing. For if the genus is contrary to something, so is the species, as virtue and vice, and justice and injustice; and similarly in other cases it seems evident to one who considers. An objection: in health and sickness; for simply health is contrary to sickness, but a particular sickness, since it is a species of sickness, is contrary to nothing, as fever and ophthalmia, and each of the others. Therefore one must inspect the counterinstance in these many ways; for if the things said are not present, it is evident that what has been assigned is not a genus. For one who is establishing a genus, there are three ways: first, if the contrary of the species is in the stated genus, when it is not contrary to the genus. For if the contrary is in this, it is evident that the proposed thing also is. Further, if the middle is in the stated genus; for in whatever case the middle is, there are also the extremes. Again, if there is also a contrary to the genus, one must consider whether the contrary is in the contrary. For if it is, it is evident that the proposed thing is also in the proposed thing.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":86,"ref":"p86","source":"CAPUT IV.\n\nDe genere loci alii.\n\nRursum in casibus et conjugatis, si similiter sequuntur, et interimenti et construenti.Simul enim uni et omnibus insunt vel non insunt,ut si justitia scientia quxdam,et juste scienter,et justus sciens; si autem horum aliquid non inest,nec reliquorum ulIum.Rursum in iis quae similiter se habent ad invicem,ut delectabile similiter se ad voluptatem, et utile ad bonum,utrumque enim utriusqueeffectivum. Si igitur voluptas quiddam bonum, et delectabile quiddam utile erit; manifestum enim quoniam boni erit effectivum,eo quod voluptas bonum. Similiter autem et in generationibus et corruptionibus,ut si aedificare est operari,ædificasse operatum esse,et si discere est reminisci, et didisse recordatum esse, et si dissolvi est corrumpi,et dissolutum esse corruptum esse, et dissolutio corruptio quasdam. Et in generativis vero et in corruptivis,similiter et in potentiis et usibus, et omnino secundum quamlibet similitudinem et interimenti et construenti inspiciendum, quemadmodum in generationeet corruptione diximus. Nam si corruptivum dissolutivum et corrumpi dissolvi,et si generativum est effectivum,et generari fieri, et generatio factio, similiter et in potentiis etusibus,etomnino sipotentiadispositio,et posse disponi, et si -alicujus usus est actus, et uti agere,et usum esse egisse.","english":"CHAPTER IV.\n\nOn other topics of genus.\n\nAgain, in cases and conjugates, if they follow in like manner, one must examine both the destructive and the constructive [arguments]. For they are present or absent together in one and in all, as if justice is a certain knowledge, then justly is knowingly, and the just man is knowing; but if any of these is not present, neither is any of the rest. Again, in those things which are related to one another in like manner, as the pleasant is related to pleasure, and the useful to the good; for each is productive of each. If, therefore, pleasure is a certain good, the pleasant will also be a certain useful thing; for it is manifest that it will be productive of good, in that pleasure is good. Similarly also in generations and corruptions, as if to build is to work, then to have built is to have worked; and if to learn is to remember, then to have learned is to have remembered; and if to be dissolved is to be corrupted, then to have been dissolved is to have been corrupted, and dissolution is a certain corruption. And in things generative and corruptive, similarly also in potencies and uses, and in general according to any likeness one must inspect both the destructive and the constructive, just as we have said in generation and corruption. For if the corruptive is dissolutive and to be corrupted is to be dissolved, and if the generative is effective and to be generated is to become, and generation is a making, similarly also in potencies and uses, and in general if a potency is a disposition, then also to be able to be disposed; and if the use of anything is an act, then also to use is to act, and to have used is to have acted.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":87,"ref":"p87","source":"Si autem sit privatio id quod opponitur speciei, duobus modis est inlerimere.Primum quidem si assignato genereest oppositum.Aut enim simpliciter in nullo genereeodem privatio,aut non in ultimo,ut si visus in ultimo genere est,sensus,cæcitas non erit sensus.Secundo autem,si et generi et speciei opponitur privatio,non est autem oppositum in opposito,nec quod assignatum est in assignato erit.Interimenti igitur,quemadmodum dictum est,utendum. Construenti autem uno modo,nam si oppositum in opposito,et proposilum in proposito erit, ut si caecitas insensibilitas quaedam, et visus sensus. Rursum in negationibus considerandum e converso,quemadmodum in accidente dicebatur,ut si delectabile quod bonum,quod non bonum non delectabile.Nam si non ita se habet, erit contra, non bonum delectabile. At impossibile est,si bonum genus est delectabilis,e8se quidquam non bonum delectabile. Nam de quibus genus non praedicatur,nec specierum ulla.Et construentieliam similiter inspiciendum.Nam si non bonum,non delectabile, delectabile bonum, quare genus bonum delectabilis. Si autem si ad aliquid species, considerandum si et genus ad aliquid.Nam si species ad aliquid,et genus,ut in duplici et multiplici,utrumque enim ad aliquid.Si autem genus ad aliquid,non necessario est species. Nam disciplina ad aliquid, grammatica autem non.","english":"But if the thing opposed to the species is a privation, it can be destructive in two ways. First, if the assigned genus is its opposite. For either the privation is simply in no same genus, or not in the ultimate genus; for example, if sight is in the ultimate genus, sense, then blindness will not be a sense. Second, if the privation is opposed both to the genus and to the species, but the opposite is not in the opposite, then neither will what has been assigned be in what has been assigned. Therefore one must use the destructive argument in the way stated. For the constructive argument there is one way: for if the opposite is in the opposite, then the proposed thing will be in the proposed thing, as if blindness is a certain insensibility, and sight is sense. Again, in negations one must consider conversely, as was said in the case of accident: for example, if the good is pleasant, then the not-good is not pleasant. For if it is not so, the contrary will hold: the not-good is pleasant. But it is impossible, if the good is the genus of the pleasant, that anything not-good be pleasant. For those things of which the genus is not predicated, neither is any of the species. And the constructive arguments must likewise be examined in the same way. For if the not-good is not pleasant, then the pleasant is good; wherefore the good is the genus of the pleasant. But if the species is a relative, one must consider whether the genus is also a relative. For if the species is a relative, so is the genus, as in double and multiple; for each is a relative. But if the genus is a relative, the species is not necessarily so. For discipline is a relative, but grammar is not.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":88,"ref":"p88","source":"An nec quod prius dictum estverumvidebitur?namvirtus ipsum quod bonum, et ipsum quod honestum, et virtus quidem ad aliquid,bonum vero et honestum non ad aliquid, sed qualia. Rursum si non ad idem dicitur species, et secundum se,et secundum genus.Ut si duplum dimidi dicitur duplum, et multiplum dimidii oportet dici;si autem non, non erit multiplum genus dupli. Amplius,si non ad idem et secundum genus dicitur, et secundum omnia genera.Nam si duplum dimidii multiplum est,et abundans dimidii dicetur,et simpliciter secundum omnia superiora genera ad dimidium dicetur.Instantia,quod non necesse est secundum se, et secundum genus ad idem dici; nam scientia scibilis dicitur,habitus autem et dispositio non scibilis,sed animæ. Rursum si similiter dicitur genus,et species secundum casus. Ut si alicui, aut alicujus aut quolibet modo aliter dicitur: nam ut species et genus,velut in duplo et in superioribus, alicujus,enim et duplum et multiplum; similiter autem ei in scientia, alicujus enim et haec et genera, ut dispositio et habitus. Instantia autem,quod aliquoties non sic, nam differens,et contrarium alicui, diversum autem cum sitgenushorum,non alicui,sed ab aliquo,diversum enim dicitur ab aliquo.Rursum si similiter ad aliquid secundum casus dicta,non similiter convertuntur.","english":"But will what was said before not appear true? For virtue is the same as the good and the same as the honorable, and virtue is indeed relative, but the good and the honorable are not relative but qualities. Again, if the species is not predicated in relation to the same thing, neither in itself nor according to its genus. For example, if double is said to be double of half, multiple must also be said to be multiple of half; but if not, multiple will not be the genus of double. Further, if it is not predicated in relation to the same thing both according to itself and according to its genus, neither according to all its genera. For if double is multiple of half, it will also be said to be abundant of half, and simply according to all its superior genera it will be said in relation to half. An objection: that it is not necessary for something to be predicated in relation to the same thing both according to itself and according to its genus; for knowledge is said of the knowable, but habit and disposition are not of the knowable but of the soul. Again, if the genus and the species are predicated similarly according to cases. For example, if it is said of someone, or of someone's, or in any other way: for as species and genus, as in double and in its superior genera, for both double and multiple are of something; and similarly in the case of knowledge, for both these and their genera are of something, as disposition and habit. But an objection: that sometimes it is not so, for different and contrary are in relation to something, but diverse, though it is the genus of these, is not in relation to something but from something, for diverse is said from something. Again, if things said in relation according to cases are not similarly converted.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":89,"ref":"p89","source":"Quemadmodum in duplo et multiplo, utrumque enim horum alicujus, et idem etiam secund um conversionem dicitur,alicujus enim et dim:dium et submultiplum. Similiter autem et in disciplina et opinione,nam et hae alicujus,et convertitur,similiteret disciplinatum etopinabilealicujus; si igitur in aliquo non similiterconvertilur,manifestum est non esse genus alterum alterius.Rursum, si non ad aequaliae species, et genus dicitur. Similiter enim,et aequaliter utrumque videtur dici, quemadmodum in domo et datione,nam et donum alicuj us alicui dicitur,et datio alicujusetalicuidicitur; est autem datio genus doni,nam donum datio est irreddibilis. In aliquibus autem non accidit ad aequalia dici, nam duplum alicujus duplum,abundans autem et majus alicujus et aliquo,omne enim abundans,etmajusaliquoabundat,et alicujusabuneat,quare non sunt genera quas dicta sunt dupli,eo: quod non ad aequalia dicuntur speciei,aut non universa liter verum,ad æqualia speciem et genus dici.. Videndum autem et si oppositi est oppositum genus. Utsidupli multiplum,etdimidiisubmultiplum,oportet enim oppositum oppositi genus esse. Si igitur ponat aliquis scientiam idipsum quod est sensum, oportebit et scibile id quod 'est sensibile esse; sed non est, non enim omne scibile sensibile, nam intelligibilium quaedam scibilia.","english":"As in the double and the multiple, for each of these is of something, and the same is also said by conversion, for the half and the submultiple are also of something. Similarly also in discipline and opinion, for these too are of something, and it converts similarly, and likewise the disciplined and the opinable are of something; if, then, in some case it does not convert similarly, it is clear that the one is not the genus of the other. Again, if the species are not said in relation to equals, neither is the genus. For similarly and equally each seems to be said, as in house and giving, for both a gift is said to be of someone to someone, and a giving is said to be of someone and to someone; but giving is the genus of gift, for a gift is a giving that is not to be repaid. In some cases, however, it does not happen that they are said in relation to equals, for the double is the double of something, but the abundant and the greater are both of something and by something, for everything abundant and greater is abundant by something and is abundant of something; wherefore those things said are not genera of the double, because they are not said in relation to equals with the species, or not universally is it true that the species and the genus are said in relation to equals. One must also consider whether the genus of the opposite is the opposite. As if the multiple is the genus of the double, and the submultiple of the half, for the genus of the opposite ought to be the opposite. If, then, someone posits knowledge to be the very same thing as sense, it will be necessary that the knowable also be the same as the sensible; but it is not, for not every knowable is sensible, for some of the intelligibles are knowable.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":90,"ref":"p90","source":"Quare non est genus sensibile scibilis, si autem hoc non, neque sensus scientiae.Quoniam autem eorum quae ad aliquiddicuntur, alia quidem ex necessitate in eis aut circa ea sunt ad quas dicuntur (ut dispositio,et habitus,et commensuratio; in alia enim nullo possibile est esse quae dicta sunt,quam in eis ad quai dicuntur), alia autem non necesse est quidem in eis esse ad qua di-, cuntur,contingit autem (quemadmodum scibile est in anima,nihil enim prohibet sui scientiam habere animam,non necessarium autem,possibile est enim et in alio esse hanc eamdem), alia vero simpliciter non cOnlingit in eis esse ad quae dicuntur (uicontrarium in contrario,neque scientiam scibili,nisi sit scibile anima, vel homo),considerare igitur oportet si quis in genere ponat quod tale est,in non tali.Ut si memoriam immansionem scientiæ dicat,nam omnis immansio in mente,et circa illud,quareetscientiæ imr; ansioin scientia.Memoriaigitur in scientio, eo quod immansio scientiae est.Hoc autem non contingit,memoria enim omnis in anima.Est autem qui dictus est locus et accidens communis; nihil enim refert, memoriæ genus immansionem dicere,aut accidere dicere illi hoc: nam si quovis modo est memoria immansis scientiae,eadem aptabitur de ipsa ratio.","english":"Therefore the sensible is not a genus of the knowable; and if this is not so, neither is sense a genus of knowledge. But since of those things which are said in relation to something, some are of necessity in those things or about those things to which they are said (as disposition, habit, and commensuration; for it is not possible for the things said to be in anything other than those things to which they are said), while others are not of necessity in those things to which they are said, but it does happen (as the knowable is in the soul; for nothing prevents the soul from having knowledge of itself, but it is not necessary, for it is possible for this same thing to be in another as well), and others simply do not happen to be in those things to which they are said (as a contrary in a contrary, nor knowledge in the knowable, unless the knowable be a soul or a man), one must therefore consider whether anyone places in a genus something of such a kind in what is not of such a kind. As if he should call memory an abiding of knowledge; for every abiding is in the mind and about that, and therefore the abiding of knowledge is in knowledge. Memory, therefore, is in knowledge, because it is an abiding of knowledge. But this does not happen; for all memory is in the soul. And what has been said is a common place and accident; for it makes no difference whether one calls the genus of memory an abiding, or says that this happens to it; for if memory is in any way an abiding of knowledge, the same argument will be applied concerning it.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":91,"ref":"p91","source":"CAPUT V.\n\nDe re eadem loci alii.\n\nRursum si habitum in actu posuit,aut actum in habitu,non est genus quod tale est. Ut si sensum, motum per corpus,nam sensus habitus,motus autem actus.Similiter autem et si memoriam habitum continentivumopinionisdixerit,nam nulla memoria habitus,sed magis actus. Peccant autem et qui habitum in consequentem potentiam ordinat,ut mansuetudinem, continentiam irae, et fortitudinem, et justitiam,timorum et lucrorum continentiam, nam j fortis et mansuetus perturbatione vacans dicllur, continens autem qui perturbatur, sed non ducitur; fortasse igilurtalispotentiasequiturutrumque,ufcsi perturbetur,non ducatur; verum continere non hoc est,hunc quidem fortem,illum autem mansuetum esse, sed omnino perturbari ab hujusmodi nihil.","english":"CHAPTER V.\n\nOn other topics concerning the same matter.\n\nAgain, if he has placed a state in act, or an act in state, that which is such is not a genus. For example, if he calls sense a motion through the body; for sense is a state, but motion is an act. Likewise also if he says memory is a state that contains opinion; for memory is not a state, but rather an act. They also err who arrange a state under a consequent potentiality, as mildness, continence of anger, and courage, and justice, continence of fears and gains; for the courageous and the mild man are said to be free from disturbance, but the continent man is one who is disturbed but not led; perhaps, then, such a potentiality follows both, so that if he is disturbed, he is not led; yet to be continent is not this—for the one to be courageous, the other mild—but to be disturbed by such things not at all.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":92,"ref":"p92","source":"Aliquoties autem et quod sequitur,quovis modu ut genus ponunt: tristitiam iræ, et opinionem fidei, utraqueenim prædicta sequuntur quidem quodammodo assignatas 8pecies.Neulrurn autem eorum genus est nam qui irascitur,constristatur, priore in eo tristitiafacta,non enim ira tristitiæ,sed tristitiairae causa est; quare simpliciter ira non est tristitia.Secundum autem hæc,neque fides opinio: contingit enim eamdem opinionem etiarn non credentem habere; non contingere autem hoc,si fides esset species opinionis non enim contingit idem amplius perrnanere,si ex specie omnino permutatum sit quemadmodum nec idem animal quandoquehominem esse,etquandoque non.Si quis autem dicat ex necessitate opinantem etiam fidem habere,de aequalibus opinio et fides dicetur,quare neque sic erit genus,de pluribus enim oportet dici genus. Videndum autem et si in aliquo eurum nata sint utraque fieri. In quo enim species et genus, ut in quo album et color, et in quo grammatica et disciplina.Si igitur verecundiam timorem dixit, aut iram tristitiam, non accidit in eodem speciem et genus esse,nam verecundia quidem in rationali, timor in irascibili, at tristitia in concupiscibili, nam in hoc et voluptas, ira autem in irascibili; quare non sunt genera quae assignata sunt eo quod non in eodem cum speciebus nata sunt fieri.","english":"Sometimes, however, they also posit as a genus whatever follows, in whatever way: grief as the genus of anger, and opinion as the genus of faith; for both of the aforementioned do in some way follow the species assigned. But neither of them is a genus. For the one who is angry is grieved, since grief comes first in him, but anger is not the cause of grief; rather, grief is the cause of anger. Therefore, simply speaking, anger is not grief. And according to these considerations, neither is faith opinion; for it happens that one and the same opinion is also held by one who does not believe. But this would not happen if faith were a species of opinion; for it is not possible for the same thing to remain any longer if it has been entirely changed from its species, just as the same animal cannot be sometimes a man and sometimes not. But if someone says that one who opines necessarily also has faith, then opinion and faith will be said of equal things; wherefore not even in this way will it be a genus, for a genus must be said of many things. One must also consider whether both happen to occur in the same thing. For the species and the genus are in the same thing, as white and color are in the same thing, and grammar and discipline. If, therefore, he called shame fear, or anger grief, it does not happen that the species and the genus are in the same thing; for shame is in the rational part, fear in the irascible part, but grief in the concupiscible part—for pleasure is also in this part—while anger is in the irascible part. Wherefore the things assigned are not genera, because they do not happen to occur in the same thing as their species.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":93,"ref":"p93","source":"Similiter autem et si amicitia in concupiscibili,non erit voluntas quædam,omnis enim voluntas in rationali.Utilis autem hic locus et ad accidens, et id cui accidit, in eodem enim accidens et cui accidit;-quare nisi in eodem videatur, manifestum quoniam non accidit.Rursum si secundum quid species dictum genus participat, non enim videtur secundum quid participari genus.Nam non est homo secundum quid animal,neque grammaticasecundutn quid disciplina.Similiter autem et in aliis.Considerandum igitur si in aliquibus secundum quid participatur genus,ut si animal quod sensibile vel visibile dicitur;nam secundum quid sensibile vel visibile dicitur;nam secundum quid sensibilevel visibile animal,secundum corpus enim sensibile et visibile,secundum animam autem non:quare non erit genus,corpus visibile,et sensibile,animalis.Latent autem quandoque et totum in partem ponentes, ut animal,corpus animatum;nullo enim modo pars de toto praedicatur; quare non erit genus corpus animalis,eo quod pars est.","english":"Likewise also if friendship is in the concupiscible part, it will not be a kind of will, for every will is in the rational part. This topic is also useful for accident and for the subject in which the accident is; for the accident and its subject are in the same thing—therefore unless they appear to be in the same thing, it is clear that it is not an accident. Again, if a species participates in the genus spoken of in a qualified sense, for the genus does not seem to be participated in a qualified sense. For man is not animal in a qualified sense, nor is grammar a discipline in a qualified sense. Likewise also in other cases. One must consider, then, whether in some cases the genus is participated in a qualified sense, as if the animal is said to be sensible or visible; for the animal is said to be sensible or visible in a qualified sense—for it is sensible and visible in a qualified sense according to the body, but not according to the soul; therefore body, being visible and sensible, will not be the genus of animal. Sometimes, however, they also place the whole in the part, as animal, body animated; for in no way is a part predicated of the whole; therefore body will not be the genus of animal, since it is a part.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":94,"ref":"p94","source":"Videndum autem si quid vituperandorum aut fugiendorum in potestate aut potente posuit, ut sophistum,vel calumniatorem,vel furem eum qui possit aliena latenter surripere: nemo enim praedictorum in eo quod possit,aliquid horum talis dicitur.Potest enim et Deus,et studiosus, prava agere; non sunt autem hujusmodi,nam omnes pravi secundumelectionem dicuntur.Arn pIius,omn!3s poleslates eorum sunt quae sunt eligenda,nam pravorum potestatos eligendxe,eo quod Deum et studiosum habere dicimus eas. Potentes enim dicimus eos esse prava agere, quare nullius vituperabilis erit genus potestas.","english":"Next one must consider whether he has placed anything among things to be blamed or shunned in the power or the powerful, as calling a sophist, or a sycophant, or a thief the one who is able secretly to steal another's goods; for none of those mentioned is called such in respect of his being able to do any of these things. For both God and the virtuous man are able to do base things; but they are not of this sort, for all the base are said to be so according to choice. Moreover, all powers are of things that are to be chosen, for the powers of the base are to be chosen, in that we say that God and the virtuous man have them. For we call those powerful to do base things, wherefore the genus of no blameworthy thing will be power.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":95,"ref":"p95","source":"Si autem non, accidet vituperandorum quiddam eligendum esse,namerit quaedam potestas vituperabilis.Et si quid propter se honorabilium vel eligibilium, in potestate, vel potente, vel effectivo posuit.Nam omnis potestas,et omne potens aut effectivum,propter aliud igend umjaut si quid eorum quae sunt in duobus generibus vel pluribus,in altero posuit.Quaedam enim non est in uno genere ponere, ut fraudulentum aut calumniatorem, neque enim qui eligit,impotens autem,neque qui potest, at non eligens,calumniator aut fraudulentus,sed qui utraque haec habet;quare non ponenda sunt in uno genere,sed in utroque eorum quæ dicta sunt.Amplius, aliquoties e converso,genus quidem ut differentiam, differentiam autem ut genus assignant,ut sluporem superabundantiam admirationis,et fidem vehementiam opinionis:nam neque superabundantia,neque vehementia,genus,sed differentia videturenim stupor admiratio esse superabundans, et fides opinio vehemens;quare genus ad miratio et opinio est, superabundantia autem et vehementia differentia.","english":"But if not, it will follow that something among things to be blamed must be chosen, for there will be some blameworthy power. And if he has placed anything among things honorable or choiceworthy for their own sake in the power, or the powerful, or the effective. For every power, and everything powerful or effective, is for the sake of something else. Or if he has placed any of the things that are in two genera or more in one of them. For certain things cannot be placed in one genus, as the fraudulent or the calumniator; for neither the one who chooses but is unable, nor the one who is able but does not choose, is a calumniator or fraudulent, but the one who has both; wherefore they must not be placed in one genus, but in both of those mentioned. Moreover, sometimes conversely, they assign the genus as a differentia, and the differentia as a genus, as stupor as an excess of admiration, and belief as a vehemence of opinion; for neither excess nor vehemence is a genus, but a differentia; for stupor would seem to be an excessive admiration, and belief a vehement opinion; wherefore the genus is admiration and opinion, but excess and vehemence are the differentia.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":96,"ref":"p96","source":"Amplius,si quis superabundantiam et vehementiam ut generaassignet,inanimatafidem facient etstupefacient:nam cuj usque vehementiaetsu perabund antia illi adestcujusestsuperabundantia etvehementia.Sierl gostupor superabundantia est admirationis, aderit admirationi,quare admiratio stupefuciet; similiter autem et fides aderit opinioni,si vehementia quidem opinionis est,quare opinio fidem faciet.Amplius,accidet sic assignanti vehementiam vehementem dicere, et superabundantiam superabundantem: est enim quaedam fides vehemens; si ergo fides vehementia est,vehementia erit vehemens.Sirniliier autem etstupor quidem et superabundans;si ergo stupor est superabundantia, superabundantia erit superabundans.Videtur autem neutrum horum,quemadmodum nec disciplina disciplinatum, nec motus motum. Quandoque autem peccant, et passionem in genere ejus quod passum est ponentes,utimmortalilatem vitam sempiternam dicentes esse, passio enim vitae et accidens immortalitas videtur esse; quod autem verum sit quod dicitur, manifestum fiet,si quis admittat aliquem ex mortali fieri immortalem.","english":"Furthermore, if someone assigns excess and intensity as genera, they will make inanimate things credible and cause astonishment; for the intensity and excess of each thing belongs to that of which it is the excess and intensity. If, then, astonishment is an excess of admiration, it will belong to admiration, wherefore admiration will cause astonishment; and similarly, faith will belong to opinion, if indeed intensity is of opinion, wherefore opinion will make faith. Furthermore, it will happen to one assigning intensity thus to call intensity intense and excess excessive; for there is a certain intense faith; if, then, faith is intensity, intensity will be intense. Similarly also both astonishment and excess; if, then, astonishment is excess, excess will be excessive. But neither of these seems so, just as neither is discipline disciplined nor motion moved. Sometimes, moreover, they err, placing a passion in the genus of that which has suffered it, as when they say that immortality is eternal life; for immortality seems to be a passion and accident of life. But that what is said is true will become manifest if someone admits that some one becomes immortal from mortal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":97,"ref":"p97","source":"Nullus enim dicit aliam vitam eum sumere, sed accidens aliquod, vel passionem huic eidem advenire;quare non genus vitaimmortalitatis.Rursum si passionem cujus est passio, illius genus dicit, ut spiritum aerem motum, magis enim motus aeris, spiritus,nam aer idem permanet, et quando movetur,et quando stat;quare non est omnino aer spiritus:est etenim et non moto aere spiritus, siquidem idem aer permanet,qui quidem erat spiritus.Similiter autem et in aliis hujusmodi. Si igitur et in hoc oportet admittere quod aer motus est spiritus, non tamen de omnibus hujusmodi est assignandum,de quibus non verificatur genus,sed de quibuscunque vere prædicatur assignatum genus,nam in quibusdam non videtur verificari, ut in luto et nive, nam nivem dicuntesse aquam coagulatam,lutum autem terram humido temperatam: est autem neque nix aqua,neque lutum terra,quare neutrum assignatorum generum erit genus.Oportet enim genus verificari semper de omnibus speciebus.Similiter autem neque vinum est aqua putrefacta(sicut Empedocles dicit:In ligno putruit unda),nam simpliciter non est aqua.","english":"For no one says that it takes another life, but that some accident or passion comes to this same thing; wherefore life is not the genus of immortality. Again, if someone calls the passion of that of which it is the passion its genus, as breath is air in motion—for breath is rather the motion of air, since air remains the same both when it is moved and when it is at rest; wherefore breath is not wholly air, for there is breath even when the air is not moved, since the same air remains which was breath. Similarly also in other such cases. If, then, in this case too one must admit that breath is air in motion, nevertheless one must not assign a genus in all such cases in which the genus is not verified, but only in those cases in which the assigned genus is truly predicated; for in some cases it does not seem to be verified, as in mud and snow—for they say that snow is congealed water, and mud is earth tempered with moisture; but neither is snow water nor is mud earth, wherefore neither of the assigned genera will be a genus. For a genus must always be verified of all its species. Similarly, neither is wine putrefied water (as Empedocles says: in wood the water putrefied), for it is simply not water.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":98,"ref":"p98","source":"CAPUT VI.\n\nDe genere loci alii.\n\nAmplius,si omnino quod assignatum est, nullius est genus. Manifestum enim quoniam neque ejus quod dictum est.Considerandum autem ex eo quod nihil eorum differt specie,quae participant assignatum genus. Ut nihil alba differunt specie, ipsa a se invicem.Omnis autem generis sunt species differentes,quare nullius erit album genus.Rursum si quod omnia sequitur genus vel differentiam dixit.Plura enim sunt quae omnia sequuntur, ut ens,et unum, eorum sunt quae omnia sequuntur;si igitur ens genus assignaverimus,manifestum quoniam omnium erit genus,eo quod praedicatur de eis.De nullo enim genus quam despeciebuspraedicatur,quare et unum species erit entis;accidit ergo de omnibus de quibus genus praedicatur, et speciem prædicari, eo quod ens et unum de omnibus simpliciter praedicantur, oportet autem de paucioribus speciem praedicari. Si autem quod omnia sequitur,diflerentiam dixit, perspicuum quoniam deaequalibus vel de pluribus differentia quam genus dicetur.Nam si et genus omnia sequitur de aequalibus,sin vero non omnia sequatur genus de pluribus differentia dicetur quam ipsum genus. Amplius,siin subjecta specie est, quod assignatum genus dicitur,ut album in nive, quare manifestum quoniam non erit genus, de subjecta enim specie solum genus dicitur. Considerandum autem etiam est si non univocum sit genus speciei.","english":"CHAPTER VI.\n\nOn another [error concerning] the place of genus.\n\nFurther, [it is an error] if what has been assigned is in no way the genus of anything. For it is evident that it is not [the genus] of that which was mentioned. And one must consider this from the fact that none of the things which partake of the assigned genus differ in species, as nothing white differs in species from another white thing. But the species of every genus are different; wherefore white will be the genus of nothing. Again, [it is an error] if one has said that what follows all things is a genus or a differentia. For there are many things that follow all things, such as being and one; these are among the things that follow all things. If, therefore, we assign being as a genus, it is evident that it will be the genus of all things, since it is predicated of them. For a genus is predicated of nothing other than its species; wherefore one also will be a species of being. It follows, then, that the species is predicated of all things of which the genus is predicated, since being and one are predicated simply of all things; but a species ought to be predicated of fewer things. If, however, one has said that what follows all things is a differentia, it is clear that the differentia will be said of equal things or of more things than the genus. For if the genus also follows all things, [the differentia is said] of equal things; but if the genus does not follow all things, the differentia will be said of more things than the genus itself. Further, [it is an error] if what is called the assigned genus is in a subject species, as white is in snow; wherefore it is evident that it will not be a genus, for a genus is said only of a subject species. One must also consider whether the genus is not univocal with the species.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":99,"ref":"p99","source":"Nam de omnibus speciebus univoce genus praedicatur.Amplius,quando existente et speciei et generi contrario, si quod melius contrariorum est, in pejori genere ponit.\n\nNam accidet reliquum in reliquo esse, eo quod contraria in contrariisgeneribus,quare quod deteriue est, in meliori erit; at videtur melioris, et genus melius esse. Et si eodem similiter ad utraque se habente, in pejore,et non in meliore genere ponit, ut animam ipsum quod est agitionem, aut agitatum: nam pari modo eadem stativa et agitativa esse videtur; quare si melius statio,in hoc oportet genere ponere. Amplius, ex magis et minus. Destruenti quidem si genus suscipit magis species autem non suscipit,neque ipsa,neque quod ab ipsa dicitur,ut si virtus suscipit magis,et justitia et jusius,dicitur enim justus magis alter altero.Si igitur assignatum quidem genus magis suscipit, species autem non suscipit,neque ipsa neque quod ab ipsa dicitur,non erit quidem assignatum genus.Rursum quod magis videtur, vel similiter, non est genus, manifestum quoniam nec quod assignatum est.Utilis autem hic locus in talibus maxime in quibus plura videntur de specie in eo quod quid est praedicata,cum non determinatum est neque promptum nobis est dicere, quodnam eorum genus, ut de ira, tristitia, et opinio parvipendentiae, in eo quod quid est prædicari videntur: contristatur enim iratus,et opinatur parvipendi.","english":"For the genus is predicated univocally of all the species. Further, when a contrary belongs to both the species and the genus, if one of the contraries is better, [it is an error] to place it in the worse genus. For it will follow that the remaining one is in the remaining [genus], since contraries [are] in contrary genera; wherefore the worse will be in the better [genus]. But the genus of the better seems also to be better. And if, when it is related similarly to both, he places it in the worse and not in the better genus—as, for instance, the soul itself, which is either that which moves or that which is moved; for in like manner the same thing seems to be both that which stands still and that which moves; wherefore, if standing still is better, one ought to place it in this genus. Further, [the error is detected] from more and less. For one who destroys [the definition]: if the genus admits of more, but the species does not admit of more, neither itself nor what is said from it—as, for example, if virtue admits of more, then also justice and the just; for one man is said to be more just than another. If, therefore, the assigned genus admits of more, but the species does not admit of more, neither itself nor what is said from it, then the assigned genus will not be [the genus]. Again, [it is shown] that what seems [to admit] more, or [to admit] similarly, is not the genus; and it is clear that neither is what has been assigned. But this topic is useful especially in those cases in which several things seem to be predicated of the species in [answer to] what it is, when it is not determined nor ready for us to say which of them is the genus—as concerning anger, sorrow, and opinion of slight importance, which seem to be predicated in [answer to] what it is; for the angry man is sorrowful, and he opines that [something] is of slight importance.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":100,"ref":"p100","source":"Eadem autem consideratio et in specie ad aliud aliquid comparanti. Nam si quod magis aut similiter videtur esse in assignato genere, non est in genere manifestum quod nequeassignata omnino species erit in genere. Interimenti igiturquemadmodum dictum est,utendum.Astruenti vero,si quidem suscipit magis quod assignatum est genus,et species, non utilis locus, nihil enim prohibet utrorumque suscipientium non esse alterum alterius genus,nam bonum et album Buscipil magis,et neutrum neutrius genus.Generum autem et specierum ad se invicem comparatio utilis ut si similiter hoc,et hoc genus; si alterum genus et aItHrum.Similiter autem et si quod minus, et quod magis: ut si continentiae, magis potestas quam virtus genus; virtus autem genus,et potestas. Eademautem et de specie convenitdici;namsi similiter hoc,et hoc propositi species,si alterum species, et reliquum, et quod minus videtur species est et quod magis. Amplius, ad construendum, perspiciendum si de quibus assignaLum est genus, in eo quod quid est prædicatur,curn non sit una assignata species,sed plures et differentes. Nam manifestum quoniam erit genus. Si autem in assignato species est, considerandumet side aliis speciebus genus in eo quod quid est prædicatur. Nam rursus accidet de pluribus et differentibus idem praedicari.","english":"The same consideration applies also when comparing a species to something else. For if what seems to be more, or equally, in the assigned genus is not in the genus, it is evident that neither will the assigned species be wholly in the genus. Therefore, as has been said, one must use the method of refutation. But for one who is establishing a point, if indeed the assigned genus admits more, and so does the species, the topic is not useful; for nothing prevents both from admitting [the predicate] without either being the genus of the other—for good and white admit more, and neither is the genus of the other. But the comparison of genera and species to one another is useful, as, for instance, if this and this are similarly a genus; and if the one is a genus and the other is not. Likewise also with what is less and what is more: for example, if power is more a genus of self-control than virtue is; but virtue is a genus, and so is power. The same should also be said concerning species; for if this and this are similarly species of the proposed [genus], and if the one is a species, so is the other, and what seems less is also a species, and so is what seems more. Further, for establishing a point, one must examine whether the things of which the genus has been assigned are predicated in the what-it-is, when the assigned species is not one but several and different. For it is evident that it will be a genus. But if the species is in the assigned [genus], one must also consider whether the genus is predicated in the what-it-is of other species as well. For again it will follow that the same thing is predicated of several and different things.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":101,"ref":"p101","source":"Quoniam autem videtur in quibusdam et differentia in eo quod quid est de speciebus praedicari, separandum est genus et differentia, utenti iis quae dicentur elementis, primum quidem quoniam genus de pluribus dicitur quam differentia, deindequoniam secundum ejus (quod quid est) assignationem,magis convenit genus quam differentiam dicere. Nam qui animal dicit hominem, magis indicat quid est homo quam qui gressibile. Et quoniam differentia quidem qualitatem generis semper significat, genus autem differentiae, non: nam qui dicit gressibile, quiddam animal dicit; qui vero animal dicit, non dicit quale quiddam gressibile: differentia igitur a genere sic separanda.Quoniam autem videtur musicum,qua musicum est,sciens esse,et musica scientia quaedam est, et si ambulans, eo quod ambulat movetur,ambulatio motus quidam est, considerandum in quo genere vult quidpiam construere secundum dictum modum.Ut si scientiam ipsum quod est fidem,si sciens quatenus scit, fidit: manifestum enim quoniam scientia fides quaedam erit, eodem autem modo et in aliis hujusmodi. Amplius, quoniam quod sequitur aliquid semper et non convertitur, difficile est separare quod non sit genus, si hoc quidem illud sequitur omne,illud vero hoc non omne.","english":"Since, however, difference also seems in certain cases to be predicated of species in respect of what a thing is, genus and difference must be separated, using the principles that will be stated. First, because genus is said of more things than difference; second, because in the assignment of what a thing is, it is more fitting to state the genus than the difference. For one who says that man is an animal indicates more what man is than one who says he is capable of walking. And because difference always signifies a quality of the genus, but genus does not signify a quality of the difference—for one who says \"capable of walking\" says a certain kind of animal, but one who says \"animal\" does not say a certain quality of being capable of walking—therefore difference is to be separated from genus in this way. Since, however, the musical person, insofar as he is musical, seems to be one who knows, and music is a certain kind of knowledge, and if one who walks, insofar as he walks, is moved, walking is a certain kind of motion, one must consider under what genus one wishes to establish something according to the stated manner. For example, if one wishes to establish that knowledge itself is a kind of belief—if the one who knows, insofar as he knows, believes—it is evident that knowledge will be a certain kind of belief, and in the same way also in other such cases. Furthermore, since what follows something always and does not convert, it is difficult to separate what is not a genus, if the one follows the other universally, but the other does not follow this universally.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":102,"ref":"p102","source":"Ut tranquillitatem qui, et numerum divisibile, e converso autem non; nam divisibile non omne, numerus, neque quies omnis, tranquillitas, ipso quidem est utendum ut genere quod est semper consequens,cum non convertatur alterum; cum autem alterum se extendit non in omnibus, obsequendum. Instantia autem hujus,quoniam non ens eequitur omne quod fit (nam quod fit non est) et non convertitur (non enim omne quod non est fit); attamen non est genus non ens ejus quod fit, simpliciter enim non sunt non entis species. De genere igitur quemadmodum dictum est, transeundum.\n\nLIBER QUINTUS.\n\nCAPUT PRIMUM.\n\nDe modis proprii.\n\nUtrum autem proprium an non proprium est quod dictum est,per haec considerandum.Assignatur autem proprium aut per se et semper, aut ad ł aliud aut aliquando. Per se quidem, ut hominis, animal mansuetum natura; ad aliud autem,utanimae ad corpus,quoniam illa quidem imperare nata, hoc autem parere; semper autem, ut Dei, animal immortale; aliquando vero,ut alicujus hominis ambulare in gymnasio. Sunt autem proprii, quod ad alterum assignatum est, aut duo problemata, aut quatuor.Nam sidehocquidemassignatum quidpiam f'ueril,de illo vero negatum idipsum, duo duntaxat problemata fiunt quemadmodum hominis ad equum proprium est quod bipes est.Nam est quod homo non bipes est argumentabitur quispiam, et quod equus bipes: utrinque autem removetur proprium.","english":"As for tranquility and number being divisible, and conversely not; for not every divisible thing is number, nor is every rest tranquility. We must use the one that is always consequent as a genus, when the other does not convert; but when the other does not extend to all cases, we must yield. An objection to this is that non-being follows everything that comes to be (for what comes to be is not) and does not convert (for not everything that is not comes to be); yet non-being is not the genus of what comes to be, for simply there are no species of non-being. Concerning genus, therefore, we must proceed in the manner stated.\n\nBOOK FIVE\n\nCHAPTER ONE\n\nOn the modes of property.\n\nWhether what has been stated is a property or not must be considered through these means. A property is assigned either per se and always, or in relation to another, or at some time. Per se, as for man, to be a tame animal by nature; in relation to another, as for the soul to the body, since the former is born to rule, the latter to obey; always, as for God, to be an immortal animal; at some time, as for some man, to walk in the gymnasium. Properties, however, that are assigned in relation to another are either two problems or four. For if in the one case something has been affirmed, and in the other the same thing denied, only two problems result, as it is a property of man in relation to horse to be biped. For someone will argue that man is not biped, and that horse is biped; but in either case the property is removed.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":103,"ref":"p103","source":"Si autem de utroque utrumque assignatum fuerit,et de utroque negatum, quatuor problemata erunt,ut hominis proprium ad equum,quod ille quidem bipes, hic autem quadrupes est: nam et quod homo non bipes est, et quod esse quadrupes natus est, argumentari est;et quod equus bipes, et quod non quadrupes,possibile est argumentari. Quolibet igitur modo ostenso,interimitur quod propositum est. Est autem per sequidem proprium,quod ad omnia assignatur,et ab omni separat (quemadmodum hominis animal mortale disciplinae susceptivum): ad aliud autem,quod non ab omni,eed ab aliquo statuto determinat(ut virtutis addisciplinam,quoniam illa quidem in pluribus, haec in rationali solo,etin habentibus rationem nata est fieri); semper autem, quod secundum omne tempus verificatur, et nunquam relinquitur(quemadmodum animalis ex anima et corpore compositum esse); aliquando vero, quod secundum aliquod tempus verificatur,et non ex necessitate semper consequitur, ut alicujus hominis ambulare in foro. Est autem ad alterum proprium assignare, differentiam dicere, aut in omnibus et semper, aut in multum et in plurimis. Et in omnibus quidem et semper, quemadmodum hominis proprium ad equum quoniam bipes,nam homo quidem et omnis, et semper est bipes; equus autem nullus est bipes, et nunquam.","english":"But if both attributes have been assigned to both subjects and denied of both, there will be four problems, as in the case of the property of man in relation to horse, that the one is biped, the other quadruped; for to argue that man is not biped, and that he is naturally quadruped, is possible; and to argue that horse is biped, and that it is not quadruped, is possible. In whatever way, then, it is shown, what was proposed is destroyed. Now a property is per se which is assigned in relation to all and separates from every one (as of man, mortal animal receptive of discipline); but in relation to another, which does not determine it from every one but from some definite thing (as of virtue, to be added to discipline, since the former is in many, the latter is naturally brought to be in the rational alone and in those having reason); but always, what is verified according to every time, and is never left behind (as of animal, to be composed of soul and body); but sometimes, what is verified according to some time, and does not always follow of necessity, as for some man to walk in the marketplace. But to assign a property in relation to another is to state a difference, either in all and always, or in much and in most. And in all and always, as the property of man in relation to horse, that he is biped; for man both every one, and always, is biped; but no horse is biped, and never.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":104,"ref":"p104","source":"Ut multum autem et in plurimis, quemadmodum rationalis proprium principare ad concupiscibile, et irascibile, eo quod illud quidem imperat,hæc autem parent; nam neque rationale semper imperat, sed quandoque illi imperatur,neque concupiscibili et irascibili semper imperatur,sed imperant quandoque,cum fuerit hominis anima flagitiosa. Proprium autem ea maxime logica sunt, quae per se et semper, et quae ad aliud.Nam ejus quod ad aliud est proprium, plura problemata sunt, quemadmodum diximus et prius. nam aut duo,aut quatuor,ex necessitate fiunt problemata.Plures autem orationes fiunt ad haec,quod autem per se est et semper, ad multa est argumentari,et ad plura tempora observare; quod per se quidem ad multa, nam ad unumquodque eorum quae sunt, ut pole cui oportet inesse proprium, quare si non ab omni separat, non erit bene assignatum proprium; quod autem semper, ad plura tempora est observare, et sive non inest, sive non infuerit, sive non inerit, non erit proprium. Quod vero aliquando,ad illud (quod nunc dicitur)tempus, consideramus. Von igitur sunt rationes ad ipsum. plures. Logicum autem est problema, ad quod rationes fiunt, et crebrae quidem, et bonæ.Ad aliud igitur proprium dictum, ex iis quae sunt de accidente locis inspiciendum, si huic quidem accidit, illi vero non.De iis autem quae semper, et quæ per se, per haec considerandum.","english":"For the most part, and in most cases, [this is] as with the property of the rational [part] in relation to the concupiscible and irascible [parts], in that the former commands while the latter obey; for the rational does not always command, but sometimes is commanded, nor do the concupiscible and irascible always obey, but sometimes command, when the soul of a man has become wanton. Those properties, however, are especially logical which are per se and always, and which are relative. For of that which is relative, there are more problems, as we said also earlier; for either two or four problems necessarily arise. But more arguments are formed for these; whereas that which is per se and always admits of arguing toward many things and of observing for many times. That which is per se indeed [admits of arguing] toward many things, for toward each one of the things that are, as, for example, that to which the property ought to belong; wherefore if it does not separate it from every [other], the property will not have been well assigned. But that which is always admits of observing for many times, and whether it is not present, or was not present, or will not be present, it will not be a property. But that which is sometimes [present], we consider in relation to that time which is now called [present]. Hence the arguments for it are not many. A logical problem, however, is one for which arguments are formed, both numerous and good. Therefore, for a property said in relation to another, one must inspect from the topics concerning accident, [to see] whether it belongs to this indeed but not to that. But concerning those which are always and per se, one must consider through these [same topics].","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":105,"ref":"p105","source":"CAPUT II.\n\nDe locis proprii.\n\nPrimum quidem an non bene assignatum est proprium, an bene. Ejus autem quod est non bene,aut bene,est unum quidem,si non per notiora, aut per notiora positum est proprium. Destruenti quidem, si non per noli ora; at construendi, si per notiora. Ejus autem quod non per notiora est, hoc quidem si omnino ignotius.positum est proprium quod assignavit,illo cujus proprium dixit. Non enim erit bene positum propnum,nam propter notitiam proprium facimus.Discelldi enim causa,et proprium, et definitiones facimus. Per notiora igitur accipiendum: sic enim magis erit sufficientercognoscere,ut puta qui ponit ignis proprium esse simillimum animae, ignotiore quam ignis utitur anima (magisenimscimus quid est ignis quam quid anima),non igiturerit bene positum proprium ignis, simillimum animae. Aliud autem,si non notius est hoc huic inesse. Oportet enim non solum notius esse re,sed huic inesse,notius esse;nam qui non scit huic inest, neque si illi soli notius inest cognoscit. Quarecum quodvis horum acciderit,obscurum fit proprium,ut quia qui ponitiguis proprium,in quo primo anima nata est esse,ignotiore utitur quam sit ignis, eo quod igno-' tius est,si in hoc est anima,et si in hoc primo est; non erit itaque bene positum proprium ignis,in quo primo anima nata est esse.","english":"CHAPTER II.\n\nOn the topics of property.\n\nFirst, [we must consider] whether the property has been assigned well or not well. Of [the question] whether it is not well or well [assigned], there is one [topic]: whether the property has been stated not through things more known, or through things more known. For the purpose of refuting, [the topic is] if [it is stated] not through things more known; for the purpose of establishing, if through things more known. Of [the case] where it is not through things more known, there is this [sub-case]: whether the property he has assigned has been stated as altogether less known than that of which he has called it a property. For the property will not have been well stated, since it is for the sake of knowledge that we make a property. For it is for the sake of distinguishing that we make both properties and definitions. Therefore it must be taken through things more known; for thus it will be more possible to know sufficiently, as, for instance, one who posits that the property of fire is to be most similar to the soul uses the soul, which is less known than fire (for we know more what fire is than what the soul is); therefore the property of fire, \"most similar to the soul,\" will not have been well stated. Another [sub-case] is if this [property] is not more known to belong to this [subject]. For it is necessary not only that it be more known than the thing, but also that it be more known to belong to this [subject]; for one who does not know that it belongs to this [subject] does not know it even if it is more known to that [subject] alone. Wherefore, whenever either of these happens, the property becomes obscure, as, for instance, because one who posits that the property of fire is \"that in which the soul first naturally exists\" uses something less known than fire is, in that it is less known whether the soul is in this and whether it is first in this; therefore the property of fire, \"that in which the soul first naturally exists,\" will not have been well stated.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":106,"ref":"p106","source":"Construenti autem, si per notiora positum est proprium,et si per notiora secundum utrumque modum.Eritenim benesecundum hoc positum proprium, namconstructivorum locorum ejus quod bene, alii quidem secundum hoc solum, alii autem simpliciter monstrabunt quod bene, ut quia qui dixit animalis proprium,sensum habere, per notiora, et notius assignavit proprium secundum utrumque modum; quare erit bene assignatu m:secund urn hoc,animalis propriu m,sensurn habere.Deinde destruenti quidem,si quod nominum quæ in proprio sunt assignata multipliciter dicitur, vel etiam tota oratio plura significat. Non enim erit bene positum proprium, ut quoniam sentiremulta significat, unum quidem sensum habere allerum autem sensum uti,non erit animalis proprium bene positum quod natum est sentire. Quapropter non utendumest,neque nomine,quod multipliciter dicitur,nequeoratione,quaj plura significet, quia quod multipliciterdiciturobscurum facitquod dictum est, dubitante eo qui debet argumentari,quodnam dicit eorum quae multipliciter dicuntur, nam proprium discendi gratia assignatur. Amplius autem ad hoc necessarium est redargutionem aliquam fieri cum sic assignant proprium,quando in dissidente quispiam conficietsyllogismum,de eo quod multipliciter dicitur. Construenti autem,si non plura significat neque nominum quidpiam, neque tota oratio.","english":"For one who is establishing [a property], [we must consider] whether the property has been posited through things more known, and whether through things more known in both ways. For in this way the property will be well posited; for of the constructive topics of what is well [posited], some will show that it is well [posited] in this way alone, others simply, as when someone who said that it is a property of an animal to have sensation assigned the property through things more known and more known in both ways; wherefore it will be well assigned in this respect, that it is a property of an animal to have sensation. Then, for one who is refuting, [we must consider] whether any of the names assigned in the property is said in many ways, or even whether the whole phrase signifies several things. For the property will not be well posited, as since \"to perceive\" signifies many things—one thing, to have sensation, another, to use sensation—it will not be a property of an animal well posited that it is naturally capable of perceiving. Wherefore one must not use either a name that is said in many ways or a phrase that signifies several things, because what is said in many ways makes obscure what has been said, since he who ought to argue is in doubt which of the things said in many ways he means; for a property is assigned for the sake of learning. Moreover, in addition to this, it is necessary that some refutation be made when they thus assign a property, when someone in disagreement produces a syllogism concerning what is said in many ways. For one who is establishing [a property], [we must consider] whether it signifies several things, neither any of the names nor the whole phrase.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":107,"ref":"p107","source":"Erit enim secundum hoc bene positum proprium ut quia neque corpusplurasignificat,nequemobilissimumin superiorem locum,neque totum quodexhis compositum est,erit bene positum secundum hoc ignis proprium corpus mobilissimum in superiorem 10cum.Deinde destruentilquidem siimulLipliciter diciturillud cujus proprium assignatur,non determinatur autem cujus eorum ponatur proprium.Non enim bene erit assignatum proprium,ob quas autem causas non immanifestum estexiis quae prius dicta sunt,nam eadem accidere necessarium est; ut quia scire hoc plura significat(unum enim scientiam habere boc, alterum autemscientiauti hoc,aliud vero scientiam esse hujus, aliud autem scientia uti nujus, non eri! ejus quod est scire hoc,bene assignatum proprium ullum, non determinato cujus horum ponitur proprium. Construenti vero, si non dicitur multipliciter hoc cujus proprium ponitur,sed est unum et simplex. Erit enim bene positum secundum hoc proprium, ut quia homo simpliciter dicitur, erit bene positum secundum:hochominis proprium animal mansuetu natura.Deinde destruenti quidem,si frequenter dictum est idem in proprio (sæpe enim latent hoc facientes et in propriis,quemadmodum et in terminis), non erit bene positum quod hoc sustinet,proprium. Conturbat enim audientem,quod frequenter dicitur, obscurum igitur necessarium est fieri, et praeter id nugari videntur.","english":"For according to this, the property will be well posited: since \"body\" does not signify many things, nor \"most mobile toward the upper place,\" nor the whole composed of these, the property of fire will be well posited according to this: \"a body most mobile toward the upper place.\" Then, for one who is refuting: if that of which the property is assigned is said in many ways, and it is not determined of which of them the property is posited. For the property will not be well assigned; and the reasons for this are not unclear from what has been said before, for the same things must happen; for example, since \"to know this\" signifies many things (for one thing is to have knowledge of this, another to use knowledge of this, another to be knowledge of this, and another to use knowledge of this), the property of that which is \"to know this\" will not be well assigned, since it is not determined of which of these it is posited. But for one who is establishing: if that of which the property is posited is not said in many ways, but is one and simple. For according to this the property will be well posited, as, since \"man\" is said simply, the property of man will be well posited according to this: \"an animal tame by nature.\" Then, for one who is refuting: if the same thing has been said frequently in the property (for those who do this often escape notice, in properties just as in terms), the property that contains this will not be well posited. For what is said frequently confuses the hearer, and therefore it must become obscure, and beyond that they seem to babble.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":108,"ref":"p108","source":"Eveniet autem frequenter idem dicere duobus modis: unoquidemquando nomina. verit frequenter idem,ut si quis proprium assignet ignis; corpus tenuissimum corporum,hic enim frequenter dixit corpus. Secundo autem, si quis assumat oralionespro nominibus,ut si quis reddat terrae proprium, substantiam quae maxime corporum secundum naturam fertur in inferiorem locum,deinde aasumat pro corporibus, hujusmodi substantias, unum enim etidem eslcorpus,et hujusrnodisubslano tia; erit ergo hoc modo substantia frequenter dicta, quare neutrum erit bene positum proprium. Construenti vero,si nullo utitur frequenter nomine eodem. Erit enim secundum boc bene assignatum proprium,utquia qui dixit hominis proprium, animal disciplinæ susceptivum, non usus est frequenter eodem nomine,erit utique secundum hoc bene assignatum hominis proprium.Deindedestruenti quidem,si tale aliquid assignavit in proprio nomen, quod omnibus insit.","english":"But it will often happen that the same thing is said in two ways: first, when a name is used frequently for the same thing, as if someone assigns as the property of fire \"the finest body of bodies\"—for here he has frequently said \"body.\" Second, if someone takes expressions in place of names, as if someone renders the property of earth as \"the substance which, of bodies, is most borne by nature to the lower place,\" and then takes \"substances of this sort\" in place of \"bodies\"—for \"body\" and \"substance of this sort\" are one and the same; therefore in this way the substance will have been frequently stated, wherefore neither property will have been well posited. But for one who is constructing a property, it is well if he uses no name frequently for the same thing. For according to this the property will have been well assigned, as when someone said the property of man is \"an animal receptive of discipline\"—he has not used the same name frequently; accordingly, according to this, the property of man will have been well assigned. Then, for one who is destroying a property, it is well if he has assigned in the property some name that belongs to all.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":109,"ref":"p109","source":"Inutile enim erit, quod non separat ab aliquo, quod autem in propriis dicitur, separare oportet,quemadmodum et qua; in terminis non igitur erit bene positum proprium, ut quia qui posuit scientiæ proprium opinionernindissuasihilem a ratione,unum existens,lali aliquo ususest proprio (uno, inquam) quod omnibus inest, non erit utique bene positum scientias proprium.Astruenti autem,si nullo usus est commnni,sed quod ab aliquo separat, erit bene positum secundum hoc proprium, ut quia qui dixit animalis proprium animam habere, nullo usus est communi, erit secundum boc bene positum propriu.:n animalis,anLnam habere. Deinde destruenti quidem, si plura propria assignat ejusdem, non determinans quod plura ponit. Non enim erit bene positum proprium; nam quemadmodum nec interminis oportet praeter eam (quse indicat substantiam) orationem adjungere quidpiam plusculum, sic nec in propriis præter eam (quae facit proprium quod dictum est) orationem quidquam coassignandum Inutile enim fitejusmodi, utquia quidixitpropriurn ignis, tenuissimum et levissimum, plura assignavit propria (utrumque enim de solo igne verum est dicere), non erit bene positum proprium ignis, corpus subtilissimum et levissimum. Astruenti vero si non plura ejusdem propria assignavit, sed unum.","english":"For it will be useless if it does not separate the thing from something else; but what is stated in properties ought to separate, just as in definitions. Therefore a property will not be well posited in the case of terms, as when someone who posited as the property of knowledge \"an opinion that cannot be dissuaded by reason,\" being one thing, used some property (one, I say) that belongs to all things—then \"an opinion that cannot be dissuaded by reason\" will certainly not be well posited as the property of knowledge. But for one who is establishing a property, if he has used nothing common but something that separates from something else, the property will be well posited in this respect, as when someone who said the property of an animal is \"to have a soul\" used nothing common; in this respect \"to have a soul\" will be well posited as the property of an animal. Next, for one who is refuting, if he assigns several properties of the same thing without determining that he posits several—for the property will not be well posited; for just as in definitions one ought not to add anything beyond the account that indicates the substance, so neither in properties should anything be co-assigned beyond the account that makes the thing stated a property. For such a thing will be useless, as when someone who said the property of fire is \"the finest and lightest\" assigned several properties (for it is true to say each of them of fire alone)—\"the most subtle and lightest body\" will not be well posited as the property of fire. But for one who is establishing, if he has not assigned several properties of the same thing, but one.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":110,"ref":"p110","source":"Erit enim secundum hoc bene positum proprium, ut quia qui dixit humidi proprium, corpus quod in omnem figuram ducitur,unum assignavit proprium et non plura, erit secundum hoc bene positum humidi proprium. Deinde destruentiquidem,si eodem usus est cujus proprium assignavit, aut eorum quae sunt illius aliquo. Non enim erit bene positum proprium, nam discendi gratia assignatur proprium, idem autem eidem similiter ignotum est, id autem quod aliquid eorum est quae sunt ejus, posterius; non igiturest notius, quare non fit ut per hoc quisquam magis quidpiam discat, ut quia qui dixit animalisproprium, substantiam cujus species est homo aliquo usus est eorum quæ sunt animalis, non erit bene positum proprium.Construenti autem,si neque eodem, neque eorum quae sunt ipsius aliquo utitur. Eritenimbene secundum hoc positum proprium, ut quia qui posuit animalis proprium ex anima et corpore com positum esse, neque eorum quae sunt ipsius aliquo usus est: erit utique bene secundum boc assignatumanimalis proprium. Eodemautem modo et in aliis considerandum est quaenam non faciunt aut faciuntnotius. Destruenti quidem, si aliquo usus est, aut opposito, aut omnino simul natura, aut posteriore aliquo.","english":"For according to this a property will be well posited, as, because the one who stated the property of the moist to be the body that is drawn into every shape assigned one property and not several, according to this the property of the moist will be well posited. Then, for refutation, if he has used the same thing of which he assigned the property, or some one of the things that belong to it. For the property will not be well posited; for a property is assigned for the sake of learning, but the same thing is equally unknown by the same thing, and that which is some one of the things that belong to it is posterior; therefore it is not more known, wherefore it does not come about that through this anyone learns anything more, as, because the one who stated the property of the animal to be substance of which man is a species has used some one of the things that belong to the animal, the property will not be well posited. But for construction, if he uses neither the same thing nor some one of the things that belong to it. For according to this the property will be well posited, as, because the one who posited the property of the animal to be composed of soul and body has used none of the things that belong to it; accordingly the property of the animal assigned according to this will certainly be well posited. But in the same way also in other cases one must consider which things do not make a thing more known or do make it more known. For refutation, if he has used something either opposite, or altogether simultaneous in nature, or something posterior.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":111,"ref":"p111","source":"Non enim bene positum proprium, nam oppositumsimulnatura, quodjautemsimulnatura, et posterius, non efficit notius, ut quia qui dixit boni proprium quod malo maxime opponitur, opposito est usus boni, non erit profecto bene assignatum boni proprium. Construenti autem, si nullo usus est neque opposito, neque omnino simul natura, neque posteriore. Erit enim secundumhocbene assignatum proprium, ut quia qui posuit disciplinæ proprium,opinionem maxime facientemfidem, nullo usus est neque opposito, neque omnino simul natura, neque posteriore, erit secundum hoc bene positum disciplinæ proprium. Deinde destruenti quidem, si non quod semper sequitur proprium assignavit, sed id quod fit quandoque non proprium. Non enim erit bene pronuntiatum proprium, nam neque in quo deprehendimus inesse ipsum, de hoc et nomen ex necessitate verificatur, neque in quo deprehenditur non inesse, de hoc ex necessitate non dicetur nomen, quare non erit bene positum proprium. Amplius autem ad haec, neque quando quisquam assignaverit proprium, erit manifestum si inestsiquidemtale est, ut quod ipsum relinquere possit: non igitur eritclarum esse proprium, ut quia qui posuit animalis proprium moveri quandoque, vel stare tale, assignaverit proprium quod fitquandoque non proprium, nequaquam erit bene positum proprium. Astruenti vero, si quod ex necessitate semper est, proprium assignaverit.","english":"For a property is not well posited; for what is opposite is simultaneous by nature, and what is simultaneous by nature is also posterior, and it does not make [the thing] more known—as, because the one who said the property of the good is that which is most opposed to evil used the opposite of the good, the property of the good will certainly not have been well assigned. But for one who is establishing [it], [it is well posited] if he has used neither the opposite, nor anything at all simultaneous by nature, nor anything posterior. For according to this a property will be well assigned, as, because the one who posited the property of discipline to be the opinion that most produces conviction used neither the opposite, nor anything at all simultaneous by nature, nor anything posterior, according to this the property of discipline will be well posited. Then, for one who is refuting, [it is well refuted] if he has not assigned the property that always follows, but that which happens at some time, not [being] a property. For the property will not have been well pronounced; for neither in the case in which we apprehend that it is present is the name verified of this by necessity, nor in the case in which it is apprehended not to be present will the name be said of this by necessity; wherefore the property will not have been well posited. Moreover, in addition to these things, neither when someone has assigned a property will it be manifest if it is present—for such a thing is [merely] such as to be able to leave it behind; therefore it will not be clear that it is a property—as, because the one who posited the property of an animal to be to move at some time, or to stand, [being] such, has assigned a property that happens at some time, not a property, the property will by no means have been well posited. But for one who is establishing [it], [it is well posited] if he has assigned a property that always is by necessity.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":112,"ref":"p112","source":"Erit enim bene posilum secundum hoc proprium, ut quia qui posuit virtutis proprium quod habentem facit studiosum, quod semper sequitur, proprium assignavit; erit utique secundum hoc bene assignatum virtutis proprium. Deindedestrucnti quidem, si quod nunc proprium est assignans, non determinaverit quod non proprium assignat. Non enim eritbenepositum proprium,primumquidem quia quod præter consuetudinem fitomne, semper determinatione indiget, solent autem ut plurimum omnes, quod semper sequitur proprium assignare; secunda autem, quia immanifestum est quia non determinaverit, si quod nunc est proprium voluerit ponere. Non igitur danda est objurgationisoccasio,utquiaquiposuitalicujus hominis proprium sedere cum aliquo homme, quod nunc proprium est posuit, non bene proprium assignabit, si non determinans dixerit quod nunc. Construenti autem, si nunc proprium assignans determinando posuit, quod nunc proprium posuerit. Erit onim bene positum secundum hoc proprium, ut quia qui dixit cujusdam hominis proprium ambulare nunc alicubi, distinguensposuithoc, bene erit positumproprium.Deiade destruentiquidem, sitaleassignavit proprium, quod manifestum non est aliter inesse quam sensu. Non enim erit bene positum proprium, nam omne sensibile extra sensum factum immanifestum est, latens enim est si adhuc inest. eo quod sensu solum cognoscitur.","english":"For according to this it will be a property well posited, as, because the one who posited as a property of virtue that it makes the one having it studious, assigned as a property what always follows; according to this, then, the property of virtue will have been well assigned. Next, for one who is destroying [the thesis], if he who is now assigning a property has not determined that he is assigning what is not a property. For it will not be a property well posited, first indeed because everything that happens contrary to custom always needs determination, but all are accustomed for the most part to assign as a property what always follows; secondly, because it is unclear that he has not determined it, if he wished to posit what is now a property. Therefore occasion for reproach is not to be given, so that because he who posited as a property of this man to sit with some man posited what is now a property, he will not have assigned the property well, if without determining he said \"what is now.\" But for one who is constructing [the thesis], if, assigning a property now, he posited it with determination, [he shows] that he has posited what is now a property. For according to this it will be a property well posited, as, because he who said that it is a property of some man to walk now somewhere, posited this with distinction, the property will have been well posited. Next, for one who is destroying [the thesis], let him have assigned a property such that it is not clear that it belongs otherwise than by sense. For it will not be a property well posited, for every sensible thing, once made outside sense, is unclear, for it is hidden whether it is still present, because it is known by sense alone.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":113,"ref":"p113","source":"Erit autem verum hoc in iis quas non ex necessitate semper consequuntur, ut quia qui posuit solis proprium; astrum quod fertur super terram lucidissimum, tali usus est in proprio (super terram, inquam, ferri) quod sensu cognoscitur, non utique erit bene solis assignatum proprium; immanifestum enimerit cum occidetsol, si adhuc feratur super terram, eo quod nos tunc deseruimussensum. Gonstruentivero, sitaleassignavit proprium, quod non sensu est manifestum, aut cum sit sensibile, ex necessitate inesse manifestum est. Eritenimsecundumhocbenepositum proprium ut quia qui posuit superficiei proprium,quod primum coloratum est, sensibili quidem aliquo ususest(coloratumesse,inquam),taliquidemquodmanifestum est inesse semper: erit secundum hoc bene assignatum superficiei proprium.Deindedestruentiquidem, si terminumut proprium assignavit. Non enim erit benepositum proprium, nam non oportet indicare quod quid estesseproprium,utquia qui dixithominis proprium animal gressibile bipes, quod quid est esse significans assignavit hominis proprium, non utique erit bominis proprium bene assignatum. Construenti autem, si quod conversim quidem praedicatur assignavit proprium, non autem quod quid est esse indicans.","english":"But this will be true in those cases which do not always follow of necessity, as, because the one who posited as a property of the sun \"the brightest star that is carried over the earth,\" used in the property something (that it is carried over the earth, I say) which is known by sense, it will certainly not be a property well assigned to the sun; for it would be unclear when the sun sets whether it is still carried over the earth, because we then lack the sense. But for one constructing [an argument], it will be [valid] if he assigned a property that is not manifest to sense, or, when it is sensible, that it is manifestly present of necessity. For according to this a property will be well posited, as, because the one who posited as a property of surface \"that which is first colored,\" used something sensible indeed (that it is colored, I say), but something that is manifestly always present; according to this it will be a property well assigned to surface. Next, for one destroying [an argument], [it will be valid] if he assigned the term as a property. For it will not be a property well posited; for it is not proper to indicate what it is to be, as, because the one who said that the property of man is \"animal, footed, two-footed,\" signifying what it is to be, assigned it as a property of man, it will certainly not be a property well assigned to man. But for one constructing [an argument], [it will be valid] if he assigned as a property what is predicated convertibly indeed, but does not indicate what it is to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":114,"ref":"p114","source":"Erit enim secundum hoc bene assignatum proprium, ut quia qui posuit hominis proprium animal mansuetum natura, quod conversim quidem prædicatur, assignavit proprium, non quod quid est quidem indicans; erit secundum hoc bene assignatum proprium hominis. Deinde destruentiquidem,si non quidpiam in quid est ponens, assignavit proprium.Oportetenim in propriis,q uem. admodum in terminis, primum assignari genus, deinde sic jam addere reliqua et separare. Quare quod non hoc modo positum est proprium, non erit bene assignatum, ut quia qui dixit animalis;;proprium animam habere,nonposuitquidquam in quo autin quid est animal.non eritbenepositum animalis proprium. Construenti vero,si quis quidpiam quod in quid est ponens ejus cujus proprium assignavit, reliqua adjungit. Erit enim secundum hoc bene assignatum proprium, ut quia qui posuit bominis proprium animal disciplinae susceptibile, quidpiam quod in quid est'ponens, assignavit proprium: erit secundum hoc bene positum proprium hominis. Utrum igitur bene an non bene assignetur proprium, per haec inspiciendum.","english":"For according to this a property will be well assigned: for instance, because the one who posited as the property of man \"a tame animal by nature\" assigned a property that is indeed predicated convertibly, but not one that indicates what a thing is, according to this it will be a well-assigned property of man. Next, for refuting: if, without positing something in the category of what a thing is, he assigned a property. For in properties, just as in terms, one ought first to assign the genus, and then already add the rest and separate them. Wherefore a property that has not been posited in this way will not be well assigned, as, because the one who said that it is a property of an animal to have a soul did not posit anything in which or in the category of what a thing is for the animal, the property of the animal will not be well posited. But for establishing: if someone, positing something that is in the category of what a thing is of that whose property he assigned, adds the rest. For according to this a property will be well assigned, as, because the one who posited as the property of man \"an animal capable of discipline,\" positing something that is in the category of what a thing is, assigned the property: according to this the property of man will be well posited. Whether, therefore, a property is assigned well or not well, is to be examined by these means.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":115,"ref":"p115","source":"CAPUT III.\n\nDe proprio loci alii.\n\nUtrum vero proprium est omnino quod dictum est, an non proprium, ex his considerandum. Nam simplicitercoustruentes proprium quod bene positum est, loci iidem erunt iis qui proprium omnino faciunt; in illis igitur dicentur. Primum ergo destrufmti quidem inspiciendumad unum quodque eorum cujus proprium assignavit. Ut si nulli inest, aut si non de hoc quidem verificatur, aut si non est proprium cujusque eorum secundumillud cujus propriumassignavit. Non enim erit proprium, quodpositum est esse proprium, ut quia de geometra non verificatur indeceptibilem esse ab oratione pam decipitur geometer cum pseudographiam facit), non erit hoc scientis proprium, non decipi ab oratione. Construenti autem si de omni verificatur, et qua de hoc verificatur. Erit enim proprium, quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia animal disciplinas susceptivum de omni homine verificatur, et qua homo, erit bominis proprium animal disciplinæ susceptij vum. Est autem locus hic destruenti quidem, si non de quo nomen et oratio verificatur, et si non de quo oratio et nomen verificatur. Construenti autem, si de quo nomen et oratio, etsi de quo oratio et nomen prædicatur. Deinde destruenti quidem, si non de quo oritio et nomen verificatur, et si non de quo nomenetoratioverificatur.","english":"CHAPTER III.\n\nOn Other Topics of Property.\n\nWhether, however, what has been stated is a property in every respect, or not a property, must be considered from the following. For those who simply establish a property that has been well posited will use the same topics as those who establish a property in every respect; they will therefore be discussed under those topics. First, then, for one who is refuting, one must examine each of the things of which he has assigned the property. For instance, if it belongs to none, or if it is not truly predicated of this thing, or if it is not the property of each of them according to that of which he assigned it as a property. For it will not be a property which has been posited as a property; for example, since \"incapable of being deceived by argument\" is not truly predicated of the geometer (for the geometer is deceived when he draws a false diagram), this will not be a property of the knower, namely, not to be deceived by argument. For one who is establishing, however, if it is predicated of every instance, and in respect of that of which it is predicated. For it will be a property which has been posited as a property; for example, since \"receptive of disciplines\" is predicated of every man, and in respect of man, \"receptive of discipline\" will be a property of man. This topic is for one who is refuting, if it is not predicated of that of which the name and the definition are predicated, and if not of that of which the definition and the name are predicated. For one who is establishing, however, if it is predicated of that of which the name and the definition are, and if it is predicated of that of which the definition and the name are. Then, for one who is refuting, if it is not predicated of that of which the definition and the name are predicated, and if not of that of which the name and the definition are predicated.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":116,"ref":"p116","source":"Non enimeritproprium, quod positum est esse proprium,utquia animal quidem disciplinæ susceptivum verificalur de Deo; homo autem non praedicatur, non erit bominis proprium, animal disciplinas susceptivum. Construenti autem, si de quo oratio et nomen prædicatur, et si de quo nomen et oratio praedicatur. Erit enim proprium quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia de quo animam habere verificatur animal, et de quo animal animam habere, erit animam habere animalis proprium. Deinde destruendi quidem, si subjectum proprium assignavit ejus quod in subjecto esse dicitur. Non enim erit proprium quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia qui posuit proprium subtilissimi corporis, ignem,subjectum assignavit prædicati proprium, non erit ignis corporis subtillissimiproprium. Propter hoc autem non erit subjectum, ejus quod in subjecto esse dicitur proprium, eo quod idem esset plurium et differentium specie proprium, nam eidem plura quaedam discrepantia specie insunt, de solo dicta, quorum erit omnium proprium quod subjectum est, si quis hunc in modum ponat proprium. Construenti vero, si quod in subjecto,est, assignavit proprium subjecti.","english":"For it will not be a property, which was posited to be a property, as because \"animal\" is truly predicated of God as capable of discipline, but \"man\" is not predicated, \"animal capable of disciplines\" will not be a property of man. For one who constructs [the argument], if both the definition and the name are predicated of that of which [the other is predicated], and if both the name and the definition are predicated of that of which [the other is predicated]. For that will be a property which was posited to be a property, as because \"animal\" is truly predicated of that of which \"to have a soul\" is [predicated], and \"to have a soul\" of that of which \"animal\" is [predicated], \"to have a soul\" will be a property of animal. Then for one who destroys [the argument], if he assigned the subject as a property of that which is said to be in the subject. For it will not be a property which was posited to be a property, as because he who posited \"of the subtlest body\" as a property assigned fire as the subject of the property of the predicate, fire will not be a property of the subtlest body. But for this reason the subject will not be a property of that which is said to be in the subject, because the same thing would be a property of several things differing in species; for several things differing in species are present in the same thing, said of it alone, of all of which that which is the subject will be a property, if one posits a property in this way. For one who constructs [the argument], however, if he assigned as a property of the subject that which is in the subject.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":117,"ref":"p117","source":"Erit enim proprium quod positum est non esse proprium, siquidem de solo prædicatur (ut dictum est) proprium, ut quia qui dixit terras proprium corpus gravissimum specie, subjecti assignavit proprium, quod de sola dicitur re, et ut proprium praedicatur, erit terrie propriumrectepositum. Deinde destruenti uidem,si secundu partici pationem assignavi proprium Non enim erit proprium, quod positum est esseproprium,namquodsecundumparticipationem inest,ad quod quid est esse conducit; erit autem hujusmodidifferentiaquaedam de aliqua specie dicta, ut quia qui dixit hominis proprium gressibile bipes, secundum participationem assignavit propriurn, non erit utique proprium hominis gressibile bipes. Construenti autem, si non secundum participationem assignavit proprium, nec quod qui est esse indicans, conversim praedicata re. Erit enim proprium quod positum est esse proprium, ut quia qui posuit animalis proprium quod natum est sentire, neque secundum participationem assignavit proprium, neque quod quid esse indicans, conversim repraedicata, erit utique quod sentire natum est, animalis proprium. Deinde destruenti quidem, si non contingit simul inesse proprium, sed vel posterius, vel priusquamidipsum nomen.","english":"For it will be a property, which was posited not to be a property, if indeed it is predicated of it alone (as has been said) as a property; for example, because the one who said that earth is the property of the heaviest body in kind assigned as the property of the subject that which is said of that thing alone, and as it is predicated as a property, it will be correctly posited as the property of earth. Next, for one who is refuting, we must see whether he assigned the property according to participation. For it will not be a property, which was posited to be a property; for what is present according to participation contributes to what it is to be; but there will be a certain difference of this kind said of some species, as because the one who said that biped capable of walking is a property of man assigned the property according to participation, biped capable of walking will certainly not be a property of man. But for one who is establishing, if he did not assign the property according to participation, nor that which indicates what it is to be, with the predicate converted, it will be a property, which was posited to be a property; for example, because the one who posited that what is naturally capable of perceiving is a property of animal neither assigned the property according to participation nor that which indicates what it is to be, with the predicates converted, what is naturally capable of perceiving will certainly be a property of animal. Next, for one who is refuting, if it is not possible for the property to be present at the same time, but either later or earlier than that very name.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":118,"ref":"p118","source":"Nonenimerit proprium quod positum est esse proprium aut nunquam, aut non semper,ut quoniam contingit alicui prius fore, et posterius ambulare per forum quam quod homo, non erit ambulare per forum hominis proprium,aut nunquam aut non semper. Construenti autem, sisimul ex necessitatesemperinest, cum neque terminus, neque differentia sit. Erit enim proprium, quod positum estforsitan nonesse proprium,ut quia animal disciplinæ susceptivum, simul ex necessitate semperest,et id quod est homo, cum neque differentia sit nee terminus erit animal disciplinas susceptivun hominis proprium. Deinde destruenti quidem,si eorumdem qua eadem sunt, nonest idem proprium. Non enim erit proprium, quod positum est esse proprium,ut quia non est proprium prosequendi, apparere quibusdam bonum,neque eligendi fuerit utique proprium apparere quibusdam bonum; idem enim est prosequendum et eligendum.Construenti,si ejusdem quatenus idem proprium. Erit enim proprium quod positum est non esse proprium, ut quoniam homiois,qua homo dicitur proprium tripartitam animam habere, et terrigenae quatenus terrigena est, erit proprium tripartitam animam habere. Utilis autem locus hic et in accidente, nam iisdem in eo quod eadem sunt eadem oportet inesse vel non inesse.Deinde destruenti quidem,si eorum quae sunt eadem specie,non idemsemperspecie proprium est.","english":"For it will not be a property which was posited to be a property, either never or not always; for example, since it happens that someone first and later walks through the marketplace rather than that he is a man, walking through the marketplace will not be a property of man, either never or not always. For one who is constructing [an argument], if it belongs simultaneously and from necessity and always, when it is neither a definition nor a differentia. For it will be a property, which was perhaps posited not to be a property; for example, because \"animal capable of discipline\" is simultaneously and from necessity and always, and that which is a man, since it is neither a differentia nor a definition, \"animal capable of discipline\" will be a property of man. Then, for one who is destroying [an argument], if the property of the same things insofar as they are the same is not the same. For it will not be a property which was posited to be a property; for example, because \"to appear good to certain people\" is not a property of pursuing, neither will \"to appear good to certain people\" be a property of choosing; for pursuing and choosing are the same. For one who is constructing [an argument], if [it is] a property of the same thing insofar as it is the same. For it will be a property which was posited not to be a property; for example, since \"to have a three-part soul\" is a property of man insofar as he is called man, and of the earth-born insofar as he is earth-born, \"to have a three-part soul\" will be a property. But this topic is useful also in accident; for the same things must inhere or not inhere in the same things insofar as they are the same. Then, for one who is destroying [an argument], if the property of things that are the same in species is not always the same in species.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":119,"ref":"p119","source":"Neque enim ejus quod dictum erit proprium,quod positum est esse proprium,ut quia idem est specie homo et equus,non semperautemequi est proprium stere a se, nec hominis erit proprium moveri a se. Idem enim est specie moveri, et stare a se, quatenus utrique eorum ut animal est, accidit. Construenti vero,si eorum quae eunt eadem specie,idem semper specie sit proprium. Erit enim proprium quod positum est non esse proprium,ut quia hominis est proprium esse gressibile bipes, et avis erit proprium esse volatile bipes,utrumqueenim horum est idem quatenus illa quidem sub eodem sunt genere species, cum sint sub animali, haec autem ut generis differentiae animalis.Нic autem locus falsus est5quandoalterumquidemeorumquse dicuntur uni alicui soli inest speciei,alterum vero inest pluribus, quemadmodum gressibile quadrupes.","english":"For neither will it be a property of that which was said to be a property, which was posited to be a property; for example, since man and horse are the same in species, but it is not always a property of the horse to stand by itself, neither will it be a property of man to move by itself. For to move and to stand by itself are the same in species, insofar as they befall each of them as an animal. But for one constructing [an argument], [it holds] if of things which are the same in species, the same thing is always a property in species. For it will be a property which was posited not to be a property; for example, since it is a property of man to be a two-footed walking creature, it will also be a property of a bird to be a two-footed flying creature. For each of these is the same insofar as the former are species under the same genus, since they are under animal, while the latter are as differences of the genus animal. But this topic is false when one of the things said belongs to one single species, but the other belongs to several, as two-footed walking.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":120,"ref":"p120","source":"Quoniam autem idem et diversum multipliciter dicitur, labor est sophistice assumenti unius assignare,et solius alicujus proprium, nam quod inest alicui cui accidit aliquid,et accidenti inerit sum pia cum eo cui accidit, ut quod inest homini, et albo homini inerit, si fuerit albus homo, et quod albo homini inest,inerit et homini.Calummniabitur autem aliquis multa propriorum quod subjectum id aliud est quod secundum se facit,aliudautem cum accidente, ut aliud quidem hominem esse dicet,aliud vero album hominem,Amplius autem diversum facienshabitum et quod secundum habitum dicitur,namquod habitui inest,et ei quod seeundum habitum dicitnr inerit,et quod ei quod secundum habitum dicitur inest,et habituiinerit,utquoniam sciens secundum scientiam dicitur affici,non erit scientiae proprium, indissuasibile a ratione, nam et sciens indissuasibilis erit a ratione.","english":"But since \"same\" and \"different\" are said in many ways, it is a labor for one who assumes sophistically to assign the property of one thing and of something alone; for what is present in something to which something has happened will also be present in the thing that has happened together with that to which it has happened—for example, what is present in man will also be present in white man, if there is a white man, and what is present in white man will also be present in man. But someone will be slandered in many properties because the subject is one thing that makes [the predication] in itself, and another with an accident—for example, he will say that being a man is one thing, and being a white man another. Further, making different the habit and what is said according to the habit: for what is present in the habit will also be present in what is said according to the habit, and what is present in what is said according to the habit will also be present in the habit—for example, since the knower is said to be affected according to knowledge, it will not be a property of knowledge to be unpersuadable by reason; for the knower too will be unpersuadable by reason.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":121,"ref":"p121","source":"Construenti autem dicendum quoniam non est diversum simpliciter id cui accidit, et accidens cum eo cui accidit sumptum, sed aliud dicitur,eo quod diversum sit ipsis, esse; non enim idem est homini esse,quod sit homo,et albo homini esse,quod sit albus homo.Prasterea autem considerandum est ad casus dicenti,quod neque sciens est ind issuasibilearatione,sed indissuasibilis aratione, nequescientia indissuasibile, sed indissuasibilis a ratione,nam ei qui omnino instat,omninoestadversandum.Deinde destruenti quidem, si quod natura inest volens assignare, hoc modo ponit secundum locutionem,ut quod semper inest significet. Videbitur enim moveri posse quod positum est proprium esse,ut quia qui dtxithominis proprium bipes,vult quidem quod natura inest assignare: significat autem locutione, quod semper inest, non erit hominis proprium bipes, non enim omnis homo est duos pedes habens.Construenti,autem si vult quod natura inest proprium assignare, et locutione hoc modo significat:non enim movebitursecundum hoc proprium,ut quia qui hominis proprium assignavit, animal disciplinae susceptivum, et vult,et dictione significat quod natura inest proprium,non movebitur,secundum hoc quod non sit proprium hominis, animaldiscipiinaesusceptivum.Ampiiusquaecunque dicuntur ut secundum aliud aliquod primum,aut ut primum ipsum,laborestassignaretalium proprium.","english":"But for one who is constructing an argument, it must be said that the thing to which the accident belongs, taken together with the accident, is not simply different, but is said to be something else in that it is different from them; for it is not the same for a man to be, and for him to be a man, nor for a white man to be, and for him to be a white man. Furthermore, one must consider, in reply to the one who speaks with reference to cases, that he is not \"knowing in an indisputable account,\" but \"indisputable in an account,\" nor is knowledge \"indisputable,\" but \"indisputable from an account\"; for one who presses the point altogether must be opposed altogether. Then, for one who is destroying, if he wishes to assign what is present by nature, he posits it in this way according to the mode of expression, so that it signifies what is always present. For what has been posited as a property will seem able to be moved; for example, since the one who said that \"two-footed\" is the property of man wishes indeed to assign what is present by nature, but by his mode of expression signifies what is always present, \"two-footed\" will not be the property of man; for not every man is one having two feet. But for one who is constructing, if he wishes to assign as a property what is present by nature, he also signifies it in this way by his mode of expression; for according to this the property will not be moved; for example, since the one who assigned \"receptive of discipline\" as the property of man both wishes it and by his expression signifies the property that is present by nature, it will not be moved on the ground that \"receptive of discipline\" is not the property of man. Furthermore, whatever things are said as in relation to some other first thing, or as the first thing itself, it is a labor to assign the property of such things.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":122,"ref":"p122","source":"Nam si ejusquod est secundum aliud aliquid propriumassignavit,et deprimo verificabitur, si autem primi posuerit, et de eo quod est secundum aliud praedicabitur,utsiquisassignetsuperficiei proprium coloratum esse, et de corpore verificatur coloratum esse,si autem corporis,et de superficie, praedicabitur, quare non de quo oratio et nomen verificahitur.Acciditautem in quibusdam propriis plerumque fieri aliquod peccalum,propter hoc quod non determinetur quomodo et quorum ponitquis proprium; omnes enim conantur assignare proprium,aut quod natura inest, ut hominis bipes,aut quod nunc inest, ut hominis alicujus qualuor digitos habere,autspecie, ut ignis subtilissim um,aut:sim pliciter,ut animalis vivere, aut secundum aliud,ut animae prudens, aut ut primum,quemadmodum rationalis prudens, aut in eo quod habet, ut scientis indissuasibile a ratione (nihil enim aliud quam habendo aliquid erit indissuasibile a ratione), aut in eo quod habeatur, ut scientias indissuasibile a ratione, aut in eo quod participalur,ut animalis sentire(sentit enim etaliud quid ut homo, sed participans jam hoc,sentit), aut in eo quod participat, ut alicujus animalis vivere.","english":"For if he has assigned as a property something that belongs to the thing in virtue of something else, it will also be verified of the primary thing; but if he has posited it of the primary thing, it will also be predicated of that which is in virtue of something else—as if someone assigns \"being colored\" as the property of a surface, \"being colored\" is also verified of a body; but if of a body, it will also be predicated of a surface. Hence it will not be verified of that of which the definition and the name are [verified]. It happens, moreover, in certain properties that some error generally occurs, because it is not determined in what way and of which things one posits the property. For all try to assign a property either as what is present by nature, as \"two-footed\" of man, or as what is present now, as \"having four fingers\" of some particular man, or as [present] to the species, as \"most subtle\" of fire, or simply, as \"to live\" of an animal, or according to something else, as \"prudent\" of the soul, or as [present] to the primary thing, as \"rational prudent,\" or in respect of what it has, as \"indissoluble by reason\" of one who knows (for it will be indissoluble by reason in no other way than by having something), or in respect of what is had, as \"indissoluble by reason\" of knowledge, or in respect of what is participated, as \"to perceive\" of an animal (for it also perceives something else, as a man does, but as participating in this, it perceives), or in respect of what it participates, as \"to live\" of some animal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":123,"ref":"p123","source":"Qui non addit igitur,natura peccat,eo quod contingit quod naturae inest,non inesse illi cui nutura inest,ut homini duos pedes habere,qui vero non determinat,quoniam quod inestassignat quod non erit tale quale nunc inest id,ceu quatuor digitos babere hominem,nonindicans quoque quod ut primum,aut ut secundum aliud ponit,quod nondequo oratio et nomen verificabitur,ut coloratumessesive superficiei,sive corporis assignaverit proprium, non praedicens eLiam quod aut in eo juod est habere aut in eo quod haberi proprium assignavit. Ideo non erit proprium quod assignatum est, nam inerit(si in eo quod habetur assignavit proprium) etiam habenti, si autem habenti, et ei quod habetur, ut indissuasibile a ratione, scientiae vel scientis positum proprium,non praesignificansetiam in eoquod parti. cipat vel participatur,eo quod et in aliis quibusdam inerit proprium. Si enim in eo quidem quod participatur assignavit, participantibus inerit,si vero in eo quod participat,iis quae participantur,ut si alicujus animaiis posuerit vivere proprium, non dividens etiam specie quod uni soli inerit eorum quæ sub eo sunt,cujus proprium ponit,nam'quod est secundum superabundantiam, uni soli inest, ut ignis levissimum. Aliquoties autem et specie addens peccat.","english":"Therefore, whoever does not add this, errs by nature, in that it happens that what is inherent in a nature is not present in that to which the nature belongs—as for a human to have two feet. But whoever does not determine this, since he assigns what is present as though it will not be such as it now is—for example, that a human has four fingers—also fails to indicate whether he posits it as a primary thing or as something else secondary, which will not be verified of the thing of which the account and the name are predicated; as if he has assigned \"colored\" as a property either of a surface or of a body, not also stating whether he assigned the property in respect of having or in respect of being had. Therefore what has been assigned will not be a property; for it will also be present (if he assigned the property in respect of being had) in the thing that has it, and if in the thing that has it, also in the thing that is had—as \"indissoluble by reason\" posited as a property of knowledge or of the knower, not also signifying beforehand whether it is in respect of participating or of being participated, since the property will also be present in certain other things. For if he assigned it in respect of being participated, it will be present in the things that participate; but if in respect of participating, in the things that are participated—as if someone has posited \"to live\" as a property of some animal, not also dividing by species what will be present in one alone of those things that fall under it, of which he posits the property; for what is by way of excess is present in one alone, as \"lightest\" in fire. But sometimes he also errs by adding the species.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":124,"ref":"p124","source":"Nam oportebit unam speciem esse eorum quæ dicuntur, quando specie addiderit:hoc autem in quibusdam non accidit, ut nec in igne, non enim est una species ignis, nam diversum est carbo et flamma, et lux specie, cum unumquodque horum sit ignis;propter hoc autem non oportet,quando specie additur, diversam esse speciem ejus quod dicitur, quoniam his quidem magis,illis autem minus inerit quod dictum est proprium,ut in igne subtilissimum, subtilior enim est lux carbone et flamma. Hoc autem non oportet fieri quando non, et nomen magis prasdicatur de quo oratio magis verificatur.Si autem non,non eril de quo oratio magls,et nomen magis. Amplius autem ad haec idem esse accidit proprium ejus quod simpliciter,etejusquod maxime in simpliciter tali, ut in igne se habet subtilissimum, nam et simpliciter et ignis et lucis erit hoc ipsum propriurn,subtilissimaenim estlux;cum igituralius sic assignatproprium,argumentandum,sibiaulem non danda hæc instantia,sed statim cum ponit proprium determinandum est quomodo ponit proprium.","english":"For it will be necessary that there be one species of the things that are spoken of, when he has added the species; but this does not happen in certain cases, as not in fire, for there is not one species of fire, for charcoal and flame and light are different in species, although each of these is fire. On account of this, however, it must not be that, when the species is added, the species of that which is spoken of is different, since what has been stated as proper will be present in some things more and in others less, as in fire the most subtle, for light is more subtle than charcoal and flame. But this must not happen when it is not so, and the name is predicated more of that of which the account is more truly verified. If, however, it is not so, there will not be that of which the account is more and the name more. Furthermore, in addition to these, it happens that the same thing is proper to that which is simply and to that which is most in what is simply such, as in fire the most subtle is related; for both simply and of fire and of light this very thing will be proper, for light is most subtle. When, therefore, someone assigns a proper in this way, one must argue, if he does not grant these instances, but immediately when he posits a proper, one must determine how he posits the proper.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":125,"ref":"p125","source":"CAPUT IV.\n\nDe proprio loci alii.\n\nDeinde destruenti quidem,si idem ejusdem proprium posuit.Non enim erit proprium, quod positum est esse proprium,nam idem eidem omne,quid est csse indicat; quod autem esse indicat,non proprium, sed terminus est, ut quia qui dixit honesti proprium decens esse.idem ejusdem proprium assignavit(idem enim est honestumet decens),non utique erit decens honesti proprium.Construenti autem,si non ejusdem proprium assignavit,cam convel'sim prædicatum posuit.Nam erit proprium quod positum est non esse proprium,ut quia qui posuit animalispropriumid quod substantia animata,non idem quidem ejusdem proprium posuit,et conversim praedicatum assignavit,erit animalis proprium subatantiaanimata.DeindeetiaminhisqusesimiMum partium suntconsiderandum est,destruentiquidem, si quod totius est proprium,non verificatur de parte, aut quod partis, non dicitur de toto. Non enim erit proprium,quod positum est esse proprium, accidit autem in aliquibus hoc fieri.","english":"CHAPTER IV.\n\nOn other topics of property.\n\nNext, for one who is refuting: if he has posited the same thing as the property of the same thing. For what has been posited to be a property will not be a property; for the same thing indicates the whole of what it is to be for the same thing; but what indicates what it is to be is not a property but a definition, as when one who said that the property of the honorable is to be seemly assigned the same thing as the property of the same thing (for the honorable and the seemly are the same), it will certainly not be a property of the honorable to be seemly. But for one who is constructing: if he has not assigned the property of the same thing, and has posited the predicate convertibly. For what has been posited not to be a property will be a property, as when one who posited as the property of an animal that which is animate substance has not indeed posited the same thing as the property of the same thing, and has assigned the predicate convertibly, it will be a property of an animal to be animate substance. Next, also in these matters which are of the nature of parts, one must consider, for one who is refuting: if what is the property of the whole is not verified of the part, or what is of the part is not said of the whole. For what has been posited to be a property will not be a property; but it happens in certain cases that this occurs.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":126,"ref":"p126","source":"Assignabit enim aliquis in iis quæsirnilillm partium sunt proprium,aliquoties quidem in toto respiciens,aliquoties autem in eo quod secundum partem dicitur ipse seipsum intelligens,at erit neutrum recte assignatum, ut in toto quidem,quia qui dixit marisproprium,plurima aqua salsa, alicujus similium partium posuit proprium,ettaleassignavit quodnonverificaturdeparte (non enim erit quiddam maris plurima atqua salsa), non utique erit maris proprium,plurima aqua salsa. In parte autem,ut quia qui posuerit aeris proprium, respirabile,similium quidem partium alicujus dixit proprium,tale autem assignavit quod de quo aere verum est,de toto autem non dicitur(non enim erit universus aer respirabilis), non erit utique aeris pro. prium respirabile. Astruenti autem, si verificatur de unaquaque similium partim quod est proprium earum secundum totum.Erit enim proprium, quod positum est non esse proprium, ut quia verificatur deomni terra deorsum ferri secundum naturam;est autem et hoc proprium alicujus terrae secundum totumjnam secundum terram, et id quod est terram esse,erit terrae proprium deorsum ferri secundum naturam.","english":"For someone will assign as a property, among things that are parts, something that is not a property of the parts, sometimes looking to the whole, sometimes to what is said according to a part, understanding himself; and neither will have been assigned correctly. For in the case of the whole, because one who said that it is a property of the sea to be most water salty, posited a property of some one of the similar parts, and assigned such a thing as is not verified of the part (for there will not be some particular thing of the sea, most water salty), it will certainly not be a property of the sea to be most water salty. In the case of the part, however, as because one who posited that it is a property of the air to be breathable, said a property of some one of the similar parts, but assigned such a thing as is true of the air in question, yet is not said of the whole (for the whole air will not be breathable), it will certainly not be a property of the air to be breathable. For one who is affirming, however, if it is verified of each of the similar parts that it is their property according to the whole. For that will be a property which has been posited not to be a property, as because it is verified of all earth to be borne downward by nature; but this is also a property of some earth according to the whole; for according to earth, even that which is to be earth, it will be a property of earth to be borne downward by nature.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":127,"ref":"p127","source":"Deinde ex oppositis considerandum est, primum quidem ex contrariis, destruenti quidem, si contrarii non est contrarium.Neque enim contrarii eritcontrariumproprium,ut quia contrarium est justitiae quidem inju3titia,optimo autem pessimum, non est autem justitiae proprium optimum,non erit injustitiae proprium pessimum. Construenti autem si contrarii contrarium proprium est, et contrarii contrarium proprium erit. Ut quia contrarium est bono quidem malum,eligendo autem fugiendum,est aulem boni propriumeligendumjeritmali proprium fugiendum.Secundum autem, ex iis quae ad aliquid sunt,destruenti quidem,si hoc quod ad aliquid est ejus quod est ad aliquid non est proprium.","english":"Next, one must examine properties from opposites, first indeed from contraries: for the one who is refuting, if the contrary of a contrary is not a property. For neither will the contrary of a contrary be a property, as because the contrary of justice is injustice, and the contrary of the best is the worst, but the best is not a property of justice, the worst will not be a property of injustice. For the one who is establishing, however, if the contrary of a contrary is a property, then the contrary will also be a property of the contrary. As because the contrary of good is evil, and the contrary of choosing is avoiding, and choosing is a property of good, avoiding will be a property of evil. Second, from things that are relative: for the one who is refuting, if that which is relative is not a property of that which is relative.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":128,"ref":"p128","source":"Neque enlm hoc quod ad aliquid est,ejus quod ad aliquid est erit proprium, ut quia dicitur duplum quidem ad dimidium,superans autem ad superatum, non est autem dupli proprium superans, non erit dimidii proprium superatum.Construentiautem siejus quod est ad aliquid,hoc quod ad aliquid est proprium,et ejusquod est aliquid,id quod est adaliquid erit proprium.Ut quiadiciturduplum quirIem ad dimidiurrid esse quod duo ad unum,estautem dupli proprium ut duo ad unum, erit dimidii proprium, ut unum ad duo.Tertium autem destruenti quidem,si habitus,id quod secundum habitum dicitur non est proprium, neque profecto privationis id quod secundum privationem dicitur, erit proprium, et si privationis, id quod cundum privationem diciturnon est proprium, neque habitus, id quod secundum habitum dicitur erit proprium. Ut quia non dicitur surditatis proprium insensibilitatem esse, neque auditus erit proprium sensum esse.Construenti vero,si quod secundum haLitum dicitur,esthabitus proprium,etprivationis, id quod secundum privationem dicitur erit proprium,et si privationis,id quod secundum privationem dicitur,est proprium,et habitus, quod secundum habitum diciturerit proprium.","english":"For neither will that which is relative to something be a property of that which is relative to something, as, since the double is said in relation to the half, and the exceeding in relation to the exceeded, the exceeding is not a property of the double, nor will the exceeded be a property of the half. But for establishing, if that which is relative to something is a property of that which is relative to something, and that which is relative to something is a property of something, then that which is relative to something will be a property of it. For example, if it is said that the double is that which is in relation to the half as two to one, and it is a property of the double to be as two to one, then it will be a property of the half to be as one to two. Third, for refuting: if that which is said according to a state is not a property of the state, neither indeed will that which is said according to a privation be a property of the privation; and if that which is said according to a privation is not a property of the privation, neither will that which is said according to a state be a property of the state. For example, since insensibility is not said to be a property of deafness, neither will the sense be a property of hearing. But for establishing: if that which is said according to a state is a property of the state, then that which is said according to a privation will be a property of the privation; and if that which is said according to a privation is a property of the privation, then that which is said according to a state will be a property of the state.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":129,"ref":"p129","source":"Ut quia visus est proprium videre secundum quod habemus visum, erit caecitatis proprium non videre,secundum quod non habemus visum,nati habere.Deinde ex affirmationibus et negationibus, primum quidem ex ipsis quae praedicantur. Est autem locus hic utilis destruenti tantum,ut si affirmatio,vel quod secundum aftirmationem dicitur, ejus est proprium, non erit profecto ejus negatio,neque quodsecundum negationem dicitur, proprium, si autem si negatio, aut quod secundumnegationem dicitur proprium,ejusdem non erit affirmatio, neque quod secundum affirmationem dicitur proprium,utqui proprium animalis est animatum, non erit animalis proprium, non animatum. Secundum autem ex praedicatis,vel etiam non prædicatis, et de quibus praedicatur vel non prædicatur,destruenti quidem,si affirmationis affirmatio non est proprium.Neque enim negatio negationis erit proprium,et si negatio negationis non est proprium,neque affirmationis affirmatio erit proprium,ut quianon est proprium hominisanimal,nequa non hominis non animal;si autem non hominis non videtur proprium non animal, neque hominis erit proprium animal.Construenti autem,si affirmationis affirmatioest proprium.","english":"For example, since seeing, insofar as we have sight, is a property of sight, it will be a property of blindness not to see, insofar as we do not have sight, [though we are] born to have it. Next, [the topic is drawn] from affirmations and negations, first indeed from the things themselves that are predicated. This topic is useful only for one who is destroying [a claim], as: if the affirmation, or that which is said in accordance with the affirmation, is a property of something, then certainly its negation will not be [a property] of it, nor will that which is said in accordance with the negation be a property; but if the negation, or that which is said in accordance with the negation, is a property, then the affirmation of the same thing will not be [a property], nor will that which is said in accordance with the affirmation be a property; for example, that which is a property of animal, namely being animate, will not be a property of animal, namely not being animate. Secondly, [the topic is drawn] from things predicated, or even not predicated, and from the things of which they are predicated or not predicated, for one who is destroying [a claim]: if the affirmation of the affirmation is not a property. For neither will the negation of the negation be a property, and if the negation of the negation is not a property, neither will the affirmation of the affirmation be a property; for example, since being an animal is not a property of man, neither is not being an animal a property of not-man; but if not being an animal does not seem to be a property of not-man, neither will being an animal be a property of man. For one who is constructing [a claim], however, [it holds] if the affirmation of the affirmation is a property.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":130,"ref":"p130","source":"Nam et negatio negationis erit proprium,siautem negationis negatioest proprium,et affirmatio atfirmationis erit proprium, ut quia non animalis est proprium non vivere,erit animalis proprium vivere, et si animalis proprium videtur vivere, et non animalis proprium videbitur non vivere. Tertium autem ex ipsis subjectis, destruenti quidem,si quod assignatum est proprium, affirmationis est proprium. Non erit enim idem et negationis proprium; si autem negationis est proprium quod assignatum est, non erit affirmationis proprium,utquia animalispropriumest animatum, non animalis non erit proprium animatum. Construenti vero,si assignatum proprium non estaffirmationis proprium,erit negationis.At hic locus deficit, nam affirmatio negationis,et negatio affirmationis non est proprium,quandoqnidem affirmatio negationi omnino non inest, negatio autem affirmationi inest quidem, at non ut proprium inest. Deinde ex iis qua ex opposito dividuntur,destruenti quidem,si eorurn quæ exoppositodividuntur,nullum ullius reliquorum ex opposito divisorum est proprium. Neque enim quod positum est erit proprium ejus cujus positum est proprium.ut quia animal sensibile nulliusaliorummortalium animalium est proprium, non erit animal intelligibile Dei proprium. Construenti autem, si cæterorum quiB ex opposito dividuntur quodvis est proprium talium quorumcunque eorum quæ ex opposito dividuntur.","english":"For the negation of a negation will be a property; if the negation of a negation is a property, then the affirmation of an affirmation will also be a property—for example, since not to live is a property of the non-animal, to live will be a property of the animal; and if to live seems to be a property of the animal, then not to live will seem to be a property of the non-animal. The third [topic is drawn] from the subjects themselves: for one who is refuting, [the argument is] if what has been assigned as a property is a property of the affirmation. For the same thing will not be a property of both the affirmation and the negation; but if what has been assigned is a property of the negation, it will not be a property of the affirmation—for example, since to be animate is a property of the animal, to be animate will not be a property of the non-animal. For one who is establishing, [the argument is] if the assigned property is not a property of the affirmation, it will be [a property] of the negation. But this topic is defective, for the affirmation is not a property of the negation, nor the negation of the affirmation, since the affirmation is altogether not present in the negation, while the negation is present in the affirmation, but is not present as a property. Next, [the topic is drawn] from those things that are divided by opposition: for one who is refuting, [the argument is] if none of the things divided by opposition is a property of any of the remaining things divided by opposition. For neither will what has been posited be a property of that of which it has been posited as a property—for example, since sensible animal is not a property of any of the other mortal animals, intelligible animal will not be a property of God. For one who is establishing, [the argument is] if any whatever of the other things divided by opposition is a property of any such things as are divided by opposition.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":131,"ref":"p131","source":"Nam reliquum erit ejus proprium cujus positum est non esse proprium, ut quia prudentiæ est proprium, per se natum esse rationalis virtutem esse, et aliarum virtutum sic uniuscujusque sumptae, erit temperantiae proprium per se natum esse concupiscibilis virtutem esse.Deinde ex casibus,destruenti quidem,si casus ' non est casus proprium.Neque enim casus erit proprius casus,ut quia non est ejusquod estjuste proprium id quod bene,neque justi proprium erit bonum. Construenti autem,si casus est proprium casus.Nam et casus erit casus proprium,ut quia hominis est proprium gressibile bipes, et homini erit proprium gressibiiebipedi dici.Nonsolumautem in eo quod dictum est secundum casusest considerandum,sed et in oppositis,quemadmodum etin prioribus locis dictumesl,destruenti quidem,si oppositi casus,non est proprium oppositi casus.Neque enim oppositi casus erit proprium oppositi casus,ut quia non est ejus quodestjuste proprium quod bene,neque injuste erit proprium quod male. Construenti vero,si oppositi casus est proprium oppositi casus. Nam et oppositi casus erit proprium oppositi casus, ut quia honesti est proprium optimum,et inhonesti erit proprium pessimum.Deindeexiisqusesimiliter se habent, destruenti quidem, si quod similiter se habet, ejus quod similiter se habet non est proprium.","english":"For what remains will be a property of that of which it has been posited that it is not a property; for example, since it is a property of prudence to be by nature a virtue of the rational part, and so likewise of each of the other virtues taken one by one, it will be a property of temperance to be by nature a virtue of the concupiscible part. Next, from the cases: for the one who destroys, if the case of that which is not a case is not a property. For the case will not be a property of the case; for example, since what is well is not a property of what is just, neither will the good be a property of the just. For the one who constructs, however, if the case is a property of the case. For the case will also be a property of the case; for example, since it is a property of man to be a two-footed walking animal, it will also be a property of man to be said to be a two-footed walking animal. But one must consider this not only in what has been said according to the cases, but also in opposites, just as was said in the earlier topics: for the one who destroys, if the case of the opposite is not a property of the case of the opposite. For the case of the opposite will not be a property of the case of the opposite; for example, since what is well is not a property of what is just, neither will what is badly be a property of what is unjust. For the one who constructs, however, if the case of the opposite is a property of the case of the opposite. For the case of the opposite will also be a property of the case of the opposite; for example, since the best is a property of the honorable, the worst will also be a property of the dishonorable. Next, from things that are similarly related: for the one who destroys, if that which is similarly related is not a property of that which is similarly related.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":132,"ref":"p132","source":"Neque enim quod similiter se habet, ejus quod similiter sehabeteritproprium,utquiasimiliter se habet ad exstruendum aedificiumaedificatorjet medicus ad efficiendum sanitatem, non est autem propriurn medicieWcere sanitatem,neque ædificatoris erit proprium exstruere ædificium. Construenti autem,si quod similiter se habeteritproprium ejus quod similitersehabet.Namet quodsimilitersehabet, ejus quod similiter se habet erit proprium,ut quoniam similiter se habet medicus ad id quod est esse effectivum sanitatis,et ludimagisteradidquod est esse effectivum bonas habitudinis,est autem proprium magistri ludi esse effectivum bonæ habitudinis,erit proprium et medici effectivum esse sanitatis. Deinde ex iis quae sic se habent,destruentiquidem, si quod sic se habet, ejus quod sic se habet non est proprium.","english":"For neither is that which is similarly related a property of that which is similarly related—as, for example, since the builder is similarly related to building a house, and the physician to producing health; but it is not a property of the physician to produce health, nor will it be a property of the builder to build a house. But for one who constructs [the argument], if that which is similarly related is a property of that which is similarly related—for that which is similarly related will be a property of that which is similarly related—as, for example, since the physician is similarly related to being productive of health, and the schoolmaster to being productive of good habit, and it is a property of the schoolmaster to be productive of good habit, it will also be a property of the physician to be productive of health. Then, from things that are so related, they will refute—if that which is so related is not a property of that which is so related.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":133,"ref":"p133","source":"Neque enim quod sic se habet, ejus quod sic se habet eritproprium.Si autem ejus quod sic sa habet,id quod sicsehabet est proprium, ejus non erit proprium cujus positum est esse proprium.Ut quia sic se habet prudentia ad honestum et turpe, eo quod disciplina utriusque eorum est, non est autem prudentiae proprium disciplinam esse honesti, non utique erit proprium prudenliae disciplinam esse turpis;si vero est proprium prudentiae disciplinam esse honesti,noneritpropriumejusdem disciplinam esse turpis,impossibile est enim ejusdem plura esse propria.Construenti vero nihil locus iste utilis, nam quod sic se habet, unum ad plura comparatur. Deinde destruenti quidem,si quodsecundum esse dicitur, non est ejus quod secundum esse dicitur proprium. Nam neque generari ejus quod est secundumcorrumpi,neque corrumpi ejus quod secundum generari dicitur, erit proprium. Ut quia est hominis proprium esseanimal,neque ejus quod est hominem generari,erit proprium generari animal,neque ejus quod est hominem corrumpi erit proprium corrumpi animal.Eodem autem modo accipiendum est et ex generari ad esse et corrumpi,et ex corrumpi ad esse et generari,quemadmodumdictum est nunc ex esse ad generari, et corrumpi. Construenti autem,si ejus quod est secundum esse ordinatum est.","english":"For neither will that which is so related be a property of that which is so related. But if that which is so related is a property of that which is so related, it will not be a property of that of which it was posited to be a property. For example, since prudence is so related to what is honorable and what is base, in that it is the discipline of both of them, but it is not a property of prudence to be the discipline of what is honorable, then it will certainly not be a property of prudence to be the discipline of what is base. But if it is a property of prudence to be the discipline of what is honorable, it will not be a property of the same thing to be the discipline of what is base; for it is impossible for there to be several properties of the same thing. For one who is constructing an argument, however, this topic is of no use, for that which is so related is compared as one to many. Next, for one who is destroying an argument, [it is useful] if that which is said in respect of being is not a property of that which is said in respect of being. For neither will being generated be a property of that which is in respect of being corrupted, nor will being corrupted be a property of that which is said to be in respect of being generated. For example, since it is a property of man to be an animal, neither will being generated be a property of that which is for man to be generated, nor will being corrupted be a property of that which is for man to be corrupted. And in the same way it must be understood both from being generated to being and being corrupted, and from being corrupted to being and being generated, just as it has now been said from being to being generated and being corrupted. For one who is constructing an argument, however, [it is useful] if it has been ordered as a property of that which is in respect of being.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":134,"ref":"p134","source":"Est autem per se, ordinatum proprium,narr: et ejus quod secundum generari dicitur, erit hoc quod secundum generari dicitur proprium, et ejus quod secundum corrumpi,hoc quod secundum corrumpi est assignatum,ut quia hominis est proprium esse mortalem, et ejus quod estgenerari hominem,erit proprium generari mortalem,et ejus quod est corrumpi hominem, corrumpi mortalem. Eodem autem modo accipiendum est ex generari et corrumpi,et ad esse et ad ipsa exipsis fieri,quemadmodum et in destruenti dictum est. Deinde inspiciendum ad idem suppositi, destruenti quidem, si ideae non inest, aut si non qua id dicitur, cujus est proprium assignatum.Nonenim erit propriumquod positum est esse proprium,ut quoniam ipsi homini non inest quiescere quahomo est,sed qua idea,non erit hominis proprium quiescere. Construenti autem,si ideae ineat,et secundum hocinestqua dicitur de illo ipso cujus positum est non esse proprium. Eritenim proprium quod positum est non inesse proprium,utquoniam inest ipsi animali ex animaet corpore compositum esse, et qua animal est ipsi inest id,erit proprium animalis ex corpore et unima compositum esse.","english":"But \"ordered\" is a property in itself, as has been stated; and of that which is said to come to be, this will be the property of coming to be, and of that which is said to perish, that which is assigned as perishing—for example, since it is a property of man to be mortal, of coming to be a man the property will be to come to be mortal, and of perishing as a man, to perish as mortal. And in the same way one must understand it with respect to coming to be and perishing, both in relation to being and in relation to the very things that come about from them, just as was said in the case of the destructive argument. Next, one must look to the same subject: for the destructive argument, if it does not belong to the form, or if not insofar as that is said of which the property was assigned. For it will not be a property which was posited to be a property—for example, since resting does not belong to man himself insofar as he is a man, but insofar as he is a form, resting will not be a property of man. For the constructive argument, however, if it belongs to the form, and according to this belongs insofar as it is said of that very thing of which it was posited that it is not a property. For it will be a property which was posited not to be a property—for example, since being composed of soul and body belongs to the living being itself, and insofar as it is a living being this belongs to it, being composed of body and soul will be a property of the living being.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":135,"ref":"p135","source":"CAPUT V.\n\nDe proprio loci alii.\n\nDeinde ex magis et minus. Primum quidem destruenti,si quod magis est,ejusquod magis non est proprium. Neque enim quod minus est, ejus quod minus erit proprium,nequequod minimeejus quod minime,neque quod maxime ejus quod maxime,neque quod simpliciter ejus quod simpliciter,ut quia non est mag-is colorari magiscorporisproprium,neque minus colorari minus corporis proprium erit, neque colorari corporis omnino.Construenti autem, si quod magis est ejus quod magis est,est proprium. Nam quod minus est, ejus quod minus est erit proprium, et quod minime,ejus quod minirne,et quod maxime, ejus quod maxime, et quod simpliciter, ejus quod simpliciter,ut quiamagis viventis magis sentire est proprium, et minus viventis minus sentire erit proprium, et ejus quod maxime id quod maxime, et ejus quod minime id quod minime, et ejus quod simpliciter id quoque quod simpliciter.","english":"CHAPTER V.\n\nOn the other topics of property.\n\nNext, from \"more\" and \"less.\" First, for one who is refuting: if what is more is not a property of what is more. For neither will what is less be a property of what is less, nor what is least of what is least, nor what is most of what is most, nor what is simply of what is simply—for example, because to be more colored is not a property of a more extensive body, neither will to be less colored be a property of a less extensive body, nor to be colored a property of a body at all. But for one who is establishing: if what is more is a property of what is more. For what is less will be a property of what is less, and what is least of what is least, and what is most of what is most, and what is simply of what is simply—for example, because to perceive more is a property of what lives more, to perceive less will also be a property of what lives less, and of what is most, that which is most, and of what is least, that which is least, and of what is simply, that too which is simply.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":136,"ref":"p136","source":"Et ex eo autem quod simpliciter,adeadem considerandum,destruenti quidem,si quod simpliciter non est proprium.Neque enim quod magis est ejus quod magis, neque quod minus ejus quod minus, neque quod maxime ejus quod maxime,neque quod mini me ejus quod minime erit proprium, ut quia non est hominis propriumstudiosum,nequemagishominis, magis studiosum erit proprium.Construentiautem, si quod simpliciter est, ejus quod simpliciter est proprium.Nam et hoc quod magis ejus quod magis, et quod minus ejus quod minus, et quod minime ejus quod minime, et quod maxime ejus quod maxime erit proprium, ut quia est ignis proprium sursum ferri secundumnaturam,et magis igniserit magis proprium sursum ferri secundum naturam; eodem autem modo considerandum est et ex aliis hujusrnodi.Secundum autem,destruenti quidem,si quod magis est, non est ejus quod magis est proprium.Neque enim quodminusest ejus quod minus erit proprium,ut quoniam magis est proprium animalis sentire quam hominis scire; non est autem animalia proprium sentire,quare non erit hominis proprium scire. Construenti autem,si quod minus, ejus quod minus est proprium.Nam et quod magis ejus quod magis erit proprium, ut qua minus est proprium horninis lTIansuetum naturaquamanin:alis vivere,est autem hominis proprium mansuetum natura, eritproprium animalis vivere.","english":"And from the fact that something is so simply, one must consider the same things. For one who is refuting: if what is simply is not a property. For neither will what is more be a property of what is more, nor what is less of what is less, nor what is most of what is most, nor what is least of what is least, as, since being studious is not a property of man, neither will being more studious be a property of what is more a man. For one who is establishing: if what is simply is a property of what is simply. For in this case also what is more will be a property of what is more, and what is less of what is less, and what is least of what is least, and what is most of what is most, as, since it is a property of fire to be borne upward by nature, and more fire will be more a property to be borne upward by nature; and in the same way one must consider also from other things of this kind. Secondly, for one who is refuting: if what is more is not a property of what is more. For neither will what is less be a property of what is less, as, since it is more a property of an animal to perceive than of a man to know; but it is not a property of animals to perceive, wherefore neither will it be a property of man to know. For one who is establishing: if what is less is a property of what is less. For what is more will also be a property of what is more, as, since it is less a property of man to be gentle by nature than of an animal to live, but it is a property of man to be gentle by nature, it will be a property of an animal to live.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":137,"ref":"p137","source":"Tertium vero, destruenti quidem,si cujus magis est,proprju non est.Neque enim cujus est minus proprium,eritejus proprium,si autem illius est proprium,non erithujus proprium,ut quia colorari magis superficiei quam corporis est proprium, non est autem superficiei proprium, non erit corporis proprium, colorari, si vero est superficiei proprium,non erit corporis proprium. Construenti autem hic locus non est utilis, nam impossibile est idem plurium proprium esse.\n\nQuartum, destruenti quidem, si quod magis est ejus proprium, non est proprium, neque profecto quod minus est ejus proprium, erit proprium. Ut quia magis est proprium animalis sensibile quam partibile,non estautem animalissensibileproprium, quare non erit animalis partibile proprium. Construenti autem,si quod minus est ejus proprium,est proprium. Nam et quod magis est ejus proprium, erit proprium,ut quoniam minus est proprium animalis sentire quam vivere,est autem animalis proprium sentire,erit animalisproprium vivere.Deinde ex his quae similiter insunt, primum quidem destruenti, si quod similiter est proprium, non est proprium ejus cujus similiter est proprium.Neque enim quod similiter est proprium, erit proprium ejus cujus similiter est proprium,ut quia similiter est propriumconcupiscibiiisconcupiscere,et rationatis ratiocinari,non est autem proprium eoncupiscibilis concupiscere, non erit rationalis proprium ratiocinari.","english":"Third, for one who is refuting: if that of which something is more [a property] does not have it as a property. For neither will that of which it is less a property be a property of it; but if it is a property of the one, it will not be a property of the other. For example, since to be colored is more a property of surface than of body, and it is not a property of surface, then to be colored will not be a property of body; but if it is a property of surface, it will not be a property of body. For one who is establishing, however, this topic is not useful, for it is impossible for the same thing to be a property of several things.\n\nFourth, for one who is refuting: if that of which something is more a property does not have it as a property, then certainly that of which it is less a property will not have it as a property either. For example, since being perceptive is more a property of animal than being divisible into parts, and being perceptive is not a property of animal, therefore being divisible into parts will not be a property of animal. For one who is establishing, however: if that of which something is less a property has it as a property. For then that of which it is more a property will also have it as a property. For example, since perceiving is less a property of animal than living, and perceiving is a property of animal, then living will be a property of animal. Next, from things that belong in like manner: first, for one who is refuting: if something that is a property in like manner is not a property of that of which it is a property in like manner. For neither will that which is a property in like manner be a property of that of which it is a property in like manner. For example, since desiring is a property of the desiring [part] in like manner as reasoning is of the rational [part], and desiring is not a property of the desiring [part], then reasoning will not be a property of the rational [part].","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":138,"ref":"p138","source":"Construenti vero, si quod similiter est pr')prium,ejus est proprium cujus est similiter proprium.Nam et quod similiter est proprium,eritejus proprium cujus similiterest proprium,ut quiasimiliter est rationalis proprium primum prudens, et concupiscibilis proprium primum temperans,est autem rationalis primum prudens:eritigitur concupiscibilis proprium primum temperans.\n\nSecundum autem, destruenti quidem, si quod si. militerest proprium non est propriumejus.Namneque quod similiter est proprium,erit proprium ejus, ut quia similiter est proprium hominisvidere et audire, non est hominis proprium videre,non utique hominis proprium audire.Construenti vero,si quod similiter est ejus proprium, est proprium.","english":"For one who is establishing: if something is a property in a similar way, it is a property of that of which it is a property in a similar way. For also that which is a property in a similar way will be a property of that of which it is a property in a similar way; for example, since being rational is in a similar way the primary property of the prudent person, and being capable of desire is the primary property of the temperate person, and being rational is the primary property of the prudent person, therefore being capable of desire will be the primary property of the temperate person.\n\nSecond, for one who is refuting: if something is a property in a similar way, it is not a property of it. For neither will that which is a property in a similar way be a property of it; for example, since seeing and hearing are in a similar way properties of a human being, seeing is not a property of a human being, so certainly hearing is not a property of a human being. But for one who is establishing: if something is in a similar way a property of it, it is a property.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":139,"ref":"p139","source":"Nam quod similiter est ejus proprium,proprium erit,ut quia similiter est proprium anima?, aliquid partium ejus primo esse concupiscibile, et rationale primo; est autem propriumanimae,quidpiampartiumpjus esse concupiscibile primo,erit utique proprium animas, quidpiam partiumejus esse rationale primo.Tertium vero destruenti quidem, si cujus similiter est propriumnon est proprium.Neque euim cujus similiter proprium,erit proprium,si autem illius est proprium, non erit alterius proprium, ut quia urere similiter est proprium flammae et carbonis, non est autem flammae proprium urere,non erit carbonis proprium urere, si autem est flammae proprium, non erit car-, bouis proprium urera.Construenti autem hie locus non est utilis,differt autem quod est ex similiter se habentibus,ab eo quod ex iis est quae similiter insunt,quoniam iiludquidem secundum proportionem sumitur non in eo quod inest aliquid comparatum, hoc autemex eo quodinest,alicui;comparatur.Deindedestruenti quidem,si potentia proprium assignans et non adensassignavit proprium potentia,cum non contingat ei potentia inesse cum ens non est.","english":"For that which is similarly a property of it will be a property, as, since it is similarly a property of the soul that some one of its parts is primarily desirous and primarily rational; but it is a property of the soul that some one of its parts is primarily desirous; it will therefore be a property of the soul that some one of its parts is primarily rational. The third [topic] is for one who is destroying: if that of which something is similarly a property is not a property. For neither will it be a property of that of which it is similarly a property; but if it is a property of that, it will not be a property of the other, as, since burning is similarly a property of flame and of coal, but burning is not a property of flame, burning will not be a property of coal; but if it is a property of flame, it will not be a property of coal to burn. For one who is establishing, however, this topic is not useful. But that which is from things similarly disposed differs from that which is from things which are similarly present, because the former is taken according to proportion, not in respect of that in which something is present as compared, but the latter is compared from that which is present in something. Next, for one who is destroying: if, in assigning a property in potentiality and not in act, he has assigned a property in potentiality, when it does not happen to be present in it in potentiality when it is not.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":140,"ref":"p140","source":"Non enim erit proprium quod positum est esse proprium, utjquia qui dixitaeris propriumrespirabile,potentia quidem assignavit proprium (nam tale proprium ut respirari possit,respirabile est),assignavit autem et ad non esse proprium, nam et cum non est animal quod spirare natum ex aere, contingit aerem esse, nun tamen cum non est anima),possibile est spirare, quare neque aeris erit proprium hujusmodi possibile respirari tunc, quia animal non erit quod tale est ut respirare possit,non erga erit aeris proprium respirabile.Construenti autern,si potentia assignans proprium,tam ad ens assignavit proprium quamadnon ens, cum contingat potentia non enti inesse. Erit enim proprium quod positum est non esse proprium, ut quia qui assignavit proprium,entis possibile pati, aut facere potentia assignans proprium,ae ens assignavit proprium (nam cum ensest,etpossibilepati quid,aut facere erit), quare proprium erit entis possibile pati quid, aut facere. Deinde destruenti quidem, si per superabundantiam posuit proprium.","english":"For that which was posited as a property will not be a property, as when someone says that \"respirable\" is a property: in respect of potentiality he did assign a property (for such a property is \"respirable,\" namely that it be possible to breathe), but he also assigned it in relation to non-being; for even when the animal that is naturally able to breathe from the air does not exist, it still happens that air exists—yet it is not possible to breathe when the soul does not exist. Wherefore neither will such a thing as \"possible to breathe\" be a property of air at that time, because the animal that is such as to be able to breathe will not exist; therefore \"respirable\" will not be a property of air. But for one who is constructing an argument: if, assigning a property in respect of potentiality, he assigned the property both in relation to being and in relation to non-being, since it happens that a potentiality belongs also to a non-being. For that which was posited as a property will not be a property, as when someone assigned as a property \"possible to be affected\" or \"to act\" of a being, assigning the property in respect of potentiality, he assigned the property also in relation to being (for when it is a being, it will also be possible to be affected in some respect or to act); wherefore it will be a property of a being to be possible to be affected in some respect or to act. Then, for one who is destroying the argument: if he posited the property by way of excess.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":141,"ref":"p141","source":"Non erit enim proprium quod positum est esse proprium,accirlit enim sic assignantibus proprium,non de quo orationem et nomen verificari,nam corrupta re, nihil minus erit oratio, nam eorum quæ sunt, alicui maxime inest, ut si quis assignet ignis proprium,corpus Ievissimum,corruptio enim igne,erit aliquod corporum quod levissimum erit,quare non erit ignis proprium,corpus levissimum.Construenti autem, si non per superabundantiam posuit proprium.Erit enim secundum hoc bene positum proprium, ut quia qui posuit hominis proprium animal mansuetum natura, non superabundantia assignavit proprium, erit utique hoc bene positum proprium.\n\nLIBER SEXTUS.\n\nCAPUT PRIMUM.\n\nDe locis definitionis.\n\nEjus autem quod est circa terminos negotii, partes sunt quinque.Nam aut quod omnino non verum est dicere de quo nomen et orationem (oportetenim hominis definitionemde omnihomineverificari),aut quod cum sit genus non posuit in genere,vel non in accommodato genere posuit (oportet enim eum qui definit in genere ponentem differentias adjungere, nam maxime eorum quae sunt in definitione, genus videtur definili substantiarn significare),aut quod non propria est definitio (oportet enim definitionem propriam esse,quemadmodum prius dictum est),aut si omnia qua?","english":"For what was posited as a property will not be a property; for this happens to those who assign a property in this way—that the definition and the name are not verified of that of which they speak. For when the thing has perished, the definition will nonetheless remain; for it belongs most of all to something among the things that exist, as if someone should assign as the property of fire \"the lightest body.\" For with the destruction of fire, there will be some body that is the lightest; wherefore \"the lightest body\" will not be the property of fire. But for one who is constructing [an argument], [it fails] if he did not posit the property by way of excess. For according to this, the property will be well posited, as when one who posited as the property of man \"a tame animal by nature\" did not assign the property by way of excess; this property will certainly be well posited.\n\nBOOK SIX\n\nCHAPTER ONE\n\nOn the topics of definition.\n\nOf the business concerned with terms, there are five parts. For either [the fault is] that it is not true at all to speak of that of which the name and the definition [are predicated] (for the definition of man ought to be verified of every man), or that, although it is a genus, he did not place it in the genus, or did not place it in the appropriate genus (for one who defines, in placing the genus, ought to add the differences; for the genus seems most of all, among the things that are in the definition, to signify the substance of the thing defined), or that the definition is not proper (for the definition ought to be proper, as was said before), or if all the [attributes] which","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":142,"ref":"p142","source":"dicta sunt is qui fecit,non definivit, neque dixit quid est esse rei defillite,reliquum aulern praeter ea quae dicta sunt, si definivit quidem, at non bene definivit. Si igitur non verificatur de quo nomen et oratio,ex iis quae dicta sunt in accidente locis considerandum. Nam et illic utrum verum vel non verum,omnis consideratio fit;quando enim quod inest accidens disputamus,quod verum est dicimus, quando autem quod non inest,quod non verum. Sin vero non in accommodato genere posuit, aut si non propria est assignataoratio,ex iisqui suntad genus et proprium dictis locis, prospiciendum. Reliquum vero si non definivit,aut si non bene definivit, aliquo modo aggrediendum dicere.Primum igitur inveniendum si non bene definivit. Nam facilius est quodlibet fecisse, quam bene fecisse, manifestum igitur quoniam peccatum circa hoc plusculum, eo quod laboriosius. Quare argumentatio facilior quæ circa hoc quam quæ circa illud fit. Sunt autem ejus quod non est bene, partes duæ. Una quidem, obscura interpretatione uti. Oportet enim definientem (ut contingit) quam clarissima interpretatione uti, eo quod cognoscendi gratia assignatur definitio.Secunda autem si amplius dixit in definitione quam par sit,nam omne quod superadjectum est in definitione,superfluum est.","english":"those things have been said, he who made it has not defined it, nor has he said what the being of the defined thing is; but the remaining point, beyond those things which have been said, is whether he defined indeed, but did not define well. If, therefore, the name and the account are not verified of that of which they are spoken, this must be considered from the topics that have been stated in the places concerning accident. For there too all consideration is made as to whether it is true or not true; for when we argue that an accident is present, we say what is true, but when that it is not present, what is not true. But if he has not placed it in the appropriate genus, or if the account assigned is not proper, this must be examined from the topics that have been stated in the places concerning genus and property. But the remaining point—if he has not defined, or if he has not defined well—must be approached in some way by speaking. First, therefore, it must be discovered if he has not defined well. For it is easier to have made anything at all than to have made it well; it is evident, therefore, that error concerning this is somewhat greater, in that it is more laborious. Wherefore an argumentation concerning this is easier than that which is made concerning that. But there are two parts of that which is not well. One indeed is to use obscure interpretation. For one who defines ought, as far as possible, to use the clearest interpretation, because the definition is assigned for the sake of knowing. The second is if he has said more in the definition than is fitting, for everything that is added in a definition is superfluous.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":143,"ref":"p143","source":"CAPUT II.\n\nDe definitione loci alii.\n\nRursus autem utrumque quod dictum est,in pIures partes dividitur,unus autem locus ejus quod obscure est, si sit aequivocum alicui,quod dictum est. Ut quod generatio est ductio ad substantiam,etquod sanitascommensuratiocalidorumetfrigidorum,nam aequivoca est ductio, etcommensuratio;immamtestum igitur utrum vult dicere eorum quae significantur ab eo, quod multipliciterdicitur; similiter autem et si cum definitum multipliciter dicitur, dividens non dixit, nam manifeetum utrius definitionem assignavit,contingitque calumniarivelutnon conveniente oratione ad omnia quorum definitionem assignavit.Maxime autem contingittalequidpiam facere, cum latet aequivocatio.","english":"CHAPTER II.\n\nOn other points concerning the definition of place.\n\nAgain, each of the things that have been said is divided into several parts; and one point of attack concerning what is obscure is if what has been said is equivocal to something. For example, that generation is a leading into substance, and that health is a commensuration of hot and cold things; for \"leading\" and \"commensuration\" are equivocal. So one must examine whether he wishes to speak of one of the things signified by what is said in many ways; and similarly also if, when the thing defined is said in many ways, he has not distinguished them; for it is evident which of the two definitions he has assigned, and it happens that one may quibble as though the account does not fit all the things whose definition he has assigned. But this especially happens when the equivocation escapes notice.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":144,"ref":"p144","source":"Contingit etiam et eum qui dividit, quoties dicitur id quod in definitione assignatum est, syllogismum facere; nam si secundum nullum ntodorum sufficienter dictum est, manifestumquod non definierit ilia rnodo.Alius sisecundum metaphoram dixit; ut scientiam indeciduam,terram autem nutricum,aut temperantiam consonantiam, nam omne obscurum,quod secundum metaphoram dicitur,contingit et etiam metaphora loquentem calumniari,tanquam non proprie dicentem, non enim congruetdictadefinitio, ut in temperantia,nam omnis consonantia in sanis.Amplius,si est genus consonantia temperantiæ, in duobus generibus erit idem, non continentibus se invicem,nam nequeconsonantia virtutem, neque virtus continet consonantiam.","english":"It also happens that the one who divides makes a syllogism whenever what has been assigned in the definition is stated; for if it has not been stated sufficiently according to any of the modes, it is clear that he has not defined it in that way. Another mode is if he has spoken according to metaphor, as calling knowledge undecidable, and the earth a nurse, or temperance a harmony; for everything obscure that is said according to metaphor, it also happens that one may attack the speaker of the metaphor as not speaking properly, for what has been said will not fit the definition, as in the case of temperance; for every harmony is in things that are sound. Further, if harmony is the genus of temperance, the same thing will be in two genera that do not contain each other; for neither does harmony contain virtue, nor does virtue contain harmony.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":145,"ref":"p145","source":"Amplius, si non positis nominibus utitur, ut Plato ciliurabre oculum, aut araneum putrimordax, aut medullam ossigenium dixit, nam omne obscurum, quod insuetum est.Qusedam autem neque secundum xequivocationem,nequesecundum metaphoram,neque proprie dicuntur, ut les, mensura, vel imago eorum quae natura justasunt;sunt autem hujusmodi deteriora metaphora.nam metaphora facit quodammodo notum quod designatum est per similitudinem (umnesenimmetaphora utentes,secundum aliquam similitudinem ea utuntur), at quod tale esi,non facitnotum,nam neque similitudoestsecundumquam mensura,vel imago lex est,neque dici solet proprie; quapropter si proprie mensuram vel imaginem legem dicit esse, veritatis est expers; nam imago id est cujus generatio per imitationem est, hoc autem non inest legi; si autem non proprie, manifestum quod obscure dixit, atque deterius quolibet eorum quae secundum metaphoram dicuntur. Amplius,si non manifesta est contrarii oratio ex hoc quod dicitur.Nam quæ bene assignantur, contrarias commanifestant. Aut si per se dicta, non si manifestum cujus est definitio,sed quemadmodum ea quae sunt antiquorum scriptorum,nisi quis supercripsisset non cognoscebaturquid unumquodque'siigiturnon clare, ex hujusmodi est inspiciendum.","english":"Further, if he uses terms that are not established, as when Plato called the eye “ciliabrum,” the spider “putrimordax,” or the marrow “ossigenium”; for everything of this sort is obscure, because it is unfamiliar. Some things, however, are said neither by equivocation, nor by metaphor, nor properly, as “law,” “measure,” or “image” of the things that are just by nature; and such things are worse than metaphor. For metaphor in some way makes known what is signified through a likeness (for all who use metaphor use it according to some likeness), but what is of this sort does not make it known; for there is no likeness according to which “measure” or “image” is “law,” nor is it customarily said properly. Wherefore, if he says properly that “measure” or “image” is “law,” he is devoid of truth; for an image is that whose generation is through imitation, and this does not belong to law. But if he says it not properly, it is clear that he has spoken obscurely, and worse than any of the things that are said by metaphor. Further, [it is a fault] if the statement of the contrary is not manifest from what is said. For things that are well assigned make the contraries manifest together. Or [it is a fault] if the terms are spoken by themselves, not if it is manifest of what the definition is, but in the manner of the writings of the ancients, which no one would recognize for what each one is unless someone had inscribed it above. If, then, it is not clear, it must be examined from considerations of this sort.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":146,"ref":"p146","source":"Si igitur superfluum in termino dixit,primum quidem considerandum si aliquo usus est quod omnihus insit,vel simpliciter iis quae sunt, vel iis quæ sub eodem genere sunt definitorum.Nam superfluum dici necessarium id est.Oportetenim genus ab aliis separare,di£ferentiam autem ab aliquo eorum quæ sunt in eodem genere; atqui quod omnibus quidem inest simpliciter, a nullo separat, quod autem omnibus quae sub eodem sunt genere inest,non separat ab iis quae sunt in eodem genere,quaresupervacaneum hujusmodi oppo. situm.Aut si est quidem proprium quod appositum est,ablato autem illo,et reliqua definitio propria est, et indicat substantiam.Ut in hominis orationescientiae susceptivum appositam, superfluum: nam et eo ablato,reliqua oralio propria est, et indicat substantiam, simpliciterautern dicendo,omnes superfluum, quo ablato,reliquum manifestum facit id quod definitur. Talis autem est et animae terminus, si est. numerusipse seipsum movens, nam quod seipsum movet est anima, ceu Plato definivit, an proprium quidem quod dicitur,non indicat autern substantiam interempto numero? Utrovis igitur modo se habeat, difficile est ut explicet.","english":"If, then, he has stated something superfluous in the definition, one must first consider whether he has used something that belongs to all things, either simply to the things that exist, or to those things that fall under the same genus as the things defined. For to be called superfluous is to be necessary. For one must separate the genus from other things, and the differentia from some one of the things that are in the same genus; but what belongs to all things simply separates from nothing, and what belongs to all things that are under the same genus does not separate from the things that are in the same genus; wherefore such an addition is superfluous. But if what has been added is indeed proper, yet when it is removed the remaining definition is still proper and indicates the substance—as in the definition of man, “receptive of knowledge” is superfluous; for when this is removed, the remaining account is still proper and indicates the substance—and if, when it is stated simply, it is superfluous in every respect, then when it is removed the remainder makes clear that which is being defined. Such also is the definition of the soul, if it is “number itself moving itself”; for that which moves itself is the soul, as Plato defined it—or is what is said indeed proper, but does not indicate the substance once number is removed? In whichever way it may be, it is difficult to explain.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":147,"ref":"p147","source":"Utendum ergo in omnibus talibus ad id quod expedit,ut est phlegmatis terminus, humidum primum a cibo,indigeslum: unum enim primum,non multa,quare superfluum indigestum appositum, nam hoc ablato, reliqua erit propria definitio: non enim contingit a cibo et aliud quiddam primum esse. An non simpliciter a cibo phIegma,sed indigestorum primum? quare addendum est indigestum, nam illo quidem modo dicta, non vera erit definitio, siquidem non omnium pri. mum est.Amplius, si quidpiam eorum quae sunt in oratione non omnibus inest, quae sunt sub eadem specie.Nam talis pejus definivit,quam qui usi sunt eo quod inest omnibus quae sunt. Nam illic,si retiqua propria definitio, et tota propria erit,simpliciter enim ad proprium quolibet addito vero, tota oratio propria fit: at vero si aliquid eorum quae sunt in oratione, non omnibus insit quæ sunt sub eadem specie, impossibile est lotam orationem propriam esse,non enim conversim praedicabitur de re, ut animal gressibile bipes quadricubitale; nam hujusmodi oratio non conversim praedicabitur de re, eo quod non omnibus inest (quæ sub eadem specie sunt)quadricubitale. Rursum si idem frequenter dixit.Ut qui concupiscentiam appetitum delectationis dixit, nam omnis concupiscentia delectationis est, quare et idem concupiscentiae delectationis erit.","english":"Therefore in all such cases one must use what is expedient, as in the definition of phlegm: the first moisture from food, undigested. For it is one first thing, not many; hence \"undigested\" is added superfluously, for when this is removed, the rest will be the proper definition. For it is not possible that there be another first thing from food. Or is phlegm not simply from food, but the first of undigested things? Therefore \"undigested\" must be added; for in that other way, the definition as stated will not be true, since it is not the first of all things. Further, if any of the things in the account does not belong to all things that fall under the same species. For such a one has defined worse than those who have used what belongs to all things that exist. For there, if the rest is a proper definition, the whole will also be proper; for simply by adding something true to a proper term, the whole account becomes proper. But if any of the things in the account does not belong to all things that fall under the same species, it is impossible for the whole account to be proper; for it will not be predicated convertibly of the thing, as \"animal, footed, two-footed, four-cubit.\" For an account of this sort will not be predicated convertibly of the thing, because four-cubit does not belong to all things that fall under the same species. Again, if he has said the same thing frequently, as one who has said that desire is the appetite for pleasure; for all desire is for pleasure, and so it will be the same as the desire for pleasure.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":148,"ref":"p148","source":"Fit igitur terminus concupiscentiae appetitus delectationis (nihilenim differt concupiscentiam dicere,aut appetitum delectationis;:quare utrum que eorum delectationis erit. An hoc quidem nihil absurdum? nam et homo bipes est. Quare et idem homini, hipes erit; est autem idem bo:nini,animal gressibile bipes, quare animal gressibile bipes, bipes est; sed non propter ho cabsurdum aliquid accipit.Non enim de animali solum gressibile bis bipes praedicatur; sic enim de eodem bis bipes praedicatur, si de animali bipede, gressibile bipes dicitur, quare semel tantum bipes prasdicatur.Similiter autem et in concupiscentia, non enim de appetitu id quod est delectationis esse praedicatur, sed de toto, quare semel et hic praedicatio fit. Non est autem bis dicere idem nomen,aliquid absurdum,sed frequenter de aliquo idem praedicari, sicut Xenocrates prudentiam definitivam et contemplativam eorum quas sunt, dicit esse, nam definitiva, contemplativa quaedam est. Quare bis idem dicens,addens rursum etcontemplativam.Similiter autem et quicunque relrigerationer.o, privationem ejus quidem caloris,qui secundum naturam est, dicunt esse: nam omnis privatio ejus est quod secundum naturamest; quare superfluum est addere secundum naturam, sed sufficit fortasse dicere privationem caloris, eo quod ipsa privatio notam facit quod ejus sit quod secundum naturam dicitur.","english":"Therefore the term of concupiscence becomes the appetite for pleasure (for it makes no difference to say concupiscence or appetite for pleasure; hence each of them will be of pleasure. Or is this in fact nothing absurd? For man is also two-footed. Hence the same thing will also be two-footed for man; but the same thing for man is a walking two-footed animal, hence a walking two-footed animal is two-footed; but it does not on this account assume anything absurd. For \"two-footed\" is not predicated only of the walking two-footed animal; for thus \"two-footed\" would be predicated twice of the same thing, if \"walking two-footed\" is said of the two-footed animal, so that \"two-footed\" is predicated only once. And similarly also in the case of concupiscence: for that which is of pleasure is not predicated of the appetite, but of the whole; hence here too the predication is made once. But it is not absurd to say the same name twice, but rather to predicate the same thing of something frequently, as Xenocrates defines prudence as definitive and contemplative of the things that are; for the definitive is a certain contemplative. Hence, saying the same thing twice, he adds \"contemplative\" again. And similarly also those who say that refrigeration is the privation of that heat which is according to nature; for every privation is of that which is according to nature; hence it is superfluous to add \"according to nature,\" but perhaps it suffices to say the privation of heat, in that the privation itself makes known that it is of that which is said to be according to nature.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":149,"ref":"p149","source":"Rursum si universali dicto addidit et particulare.,ut si clementiam imminutionem, expedientiam et justorum, nam justum expediens quidpiam est,quare continetur in expediente, superfluum igitur justum: nam qui dixit universale,addidit et particulare,et si medicinam disciplinam sanativorum animali ethomini,autlegem imaginem eorum quaena turasuntbona,etjusta,namjustumbonumquidpiam quarefrequenteridemdicit.UtrumigiturbeDeannon benedefinivit,perhsecethujus modi perspiciendum.\n\nCAPUT III.\n\nDe definitione loci alii.\n\nUtrum vero definivit,et dixit quid est esse,an nonex his. Primum ergo si non per priora et notiora confecit definitionem.Nam terminus assignatur ejus cognoscendigratiaquoddicitur;cognoscimus autem non ex quibuslibet, sed ex prioribus notioribusque, quernadmodumin demonstrationibus(sicenim 0:0 nis doctrina et omnis disciplina se habet);manifestum igiturquodqui non per hujusmodi definivit, non definivit; si enim definivit, plures erunt ejusdem dennitiones. Nam manifestum quod et qui per priora ac notiora, iterum melius definivit, quare utrasque erunt definitiones ejusdem. Tale autem non videtur, nam unicuique eorum quæ sunt, unum est esse idipsum quod est; quare si plureseruntejusdemdefinitiones, idem erit definitio esse, quod quidem secundum utramque definitionem significatur; haec autem non eadem sunt, eo quod deiinitiones diversae.","english":"Again, if to a universal statement he has also added a particular one, as if he said that clemency is a lessening of what is expedient and of just things—for the just is something expedient, and so it is contained in the expedient; therefore \"just\" is superfluous, for he who stated the universal also added the particular—and if he said that medicine is the discipline of things conducive to health for animal and man, or that law is an image of the things that are by nature good and just—for the just is something good, and so he frequently says the same thing. Whether, then, he has defined well or not is to be examined through these and similar considerations.\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nOn other points concerning the definition of place.\n\nWhether he has defined, and stated what it is to be, or not, is to be examined from these considerations. First, then, if he has not constructed the definition through things prior and more known. For a term is assigned for the sake of knowing that which is being stated; but we know not from any things whatsoever, but from things prior and more known, just as in demonstrations (for thus does all teaching and all learning stand); it is evident, therefore, that he who has not defined through such things has not defined; for if he has defined, there will be several definitions of the same thing. For it is evident that he who has defined through things prior and more known has again defined better; hence there will be both definitions of the same thing. But such a thing does not seem to be the case, for of each of the things that are, the being is one and the same; hence if there are several definitions of the same thing, the same thing will be the being which is signified according to each definition; but these are not the same, in that the definitions are different.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":150,"ref":"p150","source":"Manifestum igitur quoniam non definivit, qui non per priora atque notiora definivit. Igitur per non notioraquidem terminum dici, dupliciter est accipere. Aut enim si simpliciter ex ignotioribus, aut si nobis ignotioribus, contingit enim utroque modo. Simpliciter igitur notius quod prius est posteriore, ut punctum linea, et linea superficie, et superficies solido, quemadmodum et unitas numero:pnusenim et principium omnis numeri, similiter autem et elementum syllaba. Nobis autem e converso quandoque accidit nam maxime solidum magis sub sensu cadit quam superficies, superficies autem magis quam linea, linea autem signo magis: quare multitudo magis hujusmodi cognoscit, nam illa quidem quomodolibet, haec autem subtili et fecundo intellectu comprehendere oportet; simpliciterigitur melius per priora, posteriora tentare cognoscere, nam magis scientificum tale est. Verum ad eos qui impotentes suntcognocere per talia, necessarium forte per ea quæ illis cognita sunt facere orationem; sunt autem talium definitiones quae et puncti, et lineæ, et superficiei, omnes enim per posteriora priora indicant: nam illud quidem lineae, istam autem superficiei, hanc vero solidi fines dicunt esse.","english":"It is evident, therefore, that he has not defined who has not defined through things prior and more known. So to state a term through things not more known is to be understood in two ways. For it happens either if [he defines] simply through things more unknown, or if through things more unknown to us; for it happens in both ways. Simply, then, that which is prior is more known than what is posterior, as the point is more known than the line, the line than the surface, and the surface than the solid, just as the unit is more known than number: for the unit is the beginning and principle of all number; and similarly the element is more known than the syllable. But in relation to us the opposite sometimes happens: for the solid falls under sense more than the surface, the surface more than the line, and the line more than the point. Hence the multitude knows things of this sort more; for those things require only some sort of apprehension, but these must be grasped by a subtle and fertile intellect. Simply, therefore, it is better to attempt to know posterior things through prior things, for such a procedure is more scientific. But for those who are unable to know through such things, it is perhaps necessary to make the account through the things that are known to them; and of this sort are the definitions of the point, the line, and the surface—for all of them indicate prior things through posterior things: for they say that the line is the boundary of the surface, the surface of the solid, and the point of the line.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":151,"ref":"p151","source":"Non oportet autem latere quoniam sic definientes non contingit quod quid est esse definitio, indicare nisi contingat idem nobis notius esse, et simpliciter notius, siquidem oportet per genus et differentias definire eum qui bene definit: hæc autem simpliciter notiora et priora sunt specie, interimit enim genus et differentiaspeciem, quare priora haec specie. Sunt autem notiora, nam specie quidem nola necesse est genusetdifferentias cognosci;qui hominem enim cognocit, et animal gressibile cognoscit: at genere et differentia notis, non necesse est et speciem cognosci, quare ignotior species. Amplius, illis qui secundum veritatem uj usmodi definitionesdicuntessequaesunt ex iis quæ unicuique sunt nota, plures ejusdem accidit dicere definitiones esse, nam alia aliis, et non omnibus eodem contingit notiora esse; quare ad unumquemque erit definitio assignanda, si quidem ex iis quae singulis quibusque sunt notiora, definitionem oportet facere.Amplius eisdem aliainterdum, alia magis nota, nam aprincipio quidem sensibilia, instructioribus autem factis, contra; quare neque ad eumdem semper ad eadem definitio assignanda, iis qui per ea quas singulis quibusque sunt notiora definitionem fatentur assignandam esse.Manifestum igitur quoJ non definiendum per ea quæ hujusmodi sunt, sed per simpliciter notiora, nam solo modo sic una et eadem definitio semper fiet.","english":"It must not escape notice that those who define in this way cannot indicate that the what-it-is-to-be is a definition, unless it happens that the same thing is more known to us and also simply more known, since one who defines well must define through genus and differentiae. But these are simply more known and prior in species; for genus and differentiae destroy the species, so these are prior in species. And they are more known, for it is not necessary that genus and differentiae be known when the species is known; for one who knows man also knows animal and gressible, but when genus and differentia are known, it is not necessary that the species also be known, so the species is less known. Further, for those who say that definitions of this sort are in accordance with truth—namely those formed from things that are known to each individual—it happens that there are many definitions of the same thing; for different things are more known to different people, and it does not happen that the same things are more known to all. Therefore a definition will have to be assigned for each individual, since one must make the definition from the things that are more known to each particular person. Further, the same things are sometimes more known to the same people and sometimes less; for at the beginning sensible things are more known, but for those who have become more instructed, the opposite is the case. Therefore a definition must not always be assigned to the same person in relation to the same things, if it is to be assigned to those who maintain that the definition is to be given through the things that are more known to each individual. It is evident, therefore that one must not define through things of this sort, but through things simply more known; for only in this way will one and the same definition always be produced.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":152,"ref":"p152","source":"Fortasse autem et quod simpliciter notum, non est id quod omnibus notum, sed quod bene dispositis intellectu; quemadmodum et simpliciter salubre iis qui bene affectum habentcorpus; oportetergo unumquodque talium diligenter pervestigare, uti autem disputantes ad id quod expedit.Maxime autem sine dissensione interimere contingit definitionem, si neque ex simpliciter notioribus,nequeex iis quae nobis,'contingit definitionem fieri. Unus igitur locus est ejus quod non per notiora,quod per posteriora priora indicat, quemadmodum prius diximus.Alius autem, si ejus quod est in quiete et definitione, per indefinitum, et quod in motu est assignata est oratio nobis.Prius enim est et notius quod manens est, et definitum, eo quod indefinitum etin motu est.Ejus autem quod est non ex prioribus,tres sunt loci. Primus quidem, si per oppositum oppositum definivit, ut si per ma. lum, bonum.","english":"Perhaps, however, even what is simply known is not what is known to all, but what is known to those well disposed in understanding; just as what is simply healthy is healthy for those who have a well-conditioned body. Each of such things, therefore, must be carefully investigated, but in disputing one must use what is expedient. But one can most effectively and without dispute destroy a definition if the definition cannot be made either from things simply more known or from things more known to us. One topic, then, is that of what is not [defined] through more known things, which indicates prior things through posterior things, as we said earlier. Another is if the account of what is in rest and definition is assigned by us through the indefinite and what is in motion. For what is permanent and defined is prior and more known than what is indefinite and in motion. But of what is not [defined] from prior things there are three topics. The first indeed is if one has defined the opposite through the opposite, as if through evil, good.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":153,"ref":"p153","source":"Simul enim natura opposita, et nonnullis etiam eadem disciplina utrorumque videtur esse;; quare non notius alterum altero.Oportetautem non latere quaedam fortassealiterdefinirinonposse, ut duplum sine dimidio, et quaecunque per se ad aliquid dicuntur: nam omnibus hujusmodi est idem esse ei quod est ad aliquid quodam modo se habere; quare non est possibile sine altero alterum cognoscere, eo quod necessarium est in alterius oratione coassumi et alterum.Ergo cognoscere quidem oportethujusmodiomnia,utiautemeisin his ut videbitur expedire. Alius, si eodem usus est ei quod definitur. Latet autem, cum non eodem deliniti nomine utitur, ut si solem stellam in die apparentem definivit,nam qui die utitur, sole utitur, et par est ad deprehendendatalia sumere pro nomine orationem, ut quod dies est, solis latio super terram: nam tunc manifestum quod qui solis lationem super terram dixit, solem dixit; quare utitur sole, qui die utitur. Rur. sum si eo quod e diverso dividitur, id quod e diverso dividitur definivit. Ut impar est, qui unitate major est pare, simul enim natura, quae ex eodem genere e diverso dividuntur, impar autem et par e diverso dividuntur,nam ambo numeri differentiae.","english":"For at the same time they are naturally opposed, and the same discipline of both seems to belong to certain people as well; wherefore neither is one more known than the other. But it must not escape notice that certain things perhaps cannot be defined otherwise, as the double without the half, and whatever things are said in relation to something per se; for for all such things, to be is the same as to be related in some way to something; wherefore it is not possible to know one without the other, because it is necessary that in the account of the one the other also be taken up together. Therefore it is necessary to know all such things, in such a way, however, as will seem expedient in these matters. Otherwise, if he has used the same [term] as the thing being defined. But it escapes notice when he does not use the same name as the thing defined, as if someone has defined the sun as the star appearing by day; for he who uses “day” uses “sun,” and it is fair to take the account in place of the name for grasping such things, as that day is the motion of the sun over the earth; for then it is manifest that he who has said the motion of the sun over the earth has said the sun; wherefore he who uses “day” uses the sun. Again, if he has defined the thing that is divided by opposition, [using] that which is divided by opposition. For example, odd is that which exceeds even by unity; for at the same time they are naturally [opposed], things that are divided by opposition from the same genus, and odd and even are divided by opposition, for both are differences of number.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":154,"ref":"p154","source":"Similiter autem et si per inferiora, superiora definivit.Ut parem numerum, qui bipartite secatur, aut bonum habitum virtutis:nam et bipartite sumptum est a duobus quæ paria sunt, et virtus bonum quod dam est, quare inferiora haec quam illa sunt. Est autem necesse eum qui inferioribus utitur, et illis uti: nam et qui virtute utitur, bono utitur,eo quod bonum quoddam virtus, similiterautem etqui bipartite utitur, et pare utitur, eo quod in duo secari significat bipartite secari, duo autem paria sunt. Universaliter igitur dicendo, unusest locus non per, priora et notiora fecisse orationem, partes autem ejus ea quae dicta sunt.Secundus autem, si res cum sit non poniturin genere.Ndm in omnibus hujusmodi peccatum est,in quibusnon prius ponitur in oratione quid est, ut corporis definitio, quod babet tres dimensiones, aut si quis hominem definivit, quod est sciens numerare, non enim dictum est quid est habere tres dimensiones, vel quid est scit numerare. Genus autem vult quid est significare, et primum apponitur eorum quae in definitione dicuntur.","english":"Likewise also if he has defined superior things through inferior ones—for example, an even number as that which is divided into two equal parts, or virtue as a good habit. For \"divided into two equal parts\" is taken from two things that are equal, and virtue is a certain good; wherefore these are inferior to those. But it is necessary that one who uses the inferior things also use those things: for one who uses virtue also uses good, since virtue is a certain good; and similarly one who uses \"divided into two equal parts\" also uses \"equal,\" because \"to be divided into two equal parts\" signifies to be cut into two, and two are equal. Speaking universally, then, one topic is not to have made the account through prior and more known things; and its parts are the things that have been said. The second is if the thing, though it exists, is not placed in a genus. For the error occurs in all such cases in which what it is is not first placed in the account—as the definition of body, that it has three dimensions, or if someone has defined man as that which knows how to count; for it has not been stated what it is to have three dimensions, or what it is to know how to count. But genus wishes to signify what it is, and it is placed first among the things said in a definition.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":155,"ref":"p155","source":"Amplius, si ad plura cum dicatur id quod definitur, non ad omnia assignavit, ut si grammaticen, scientiam scribendi quod proFertur, nam indiget et quod tegendi, nihilo enim magis scribendi quam legendi assignatqui definit.Quare non alius,sed qui utraque bæc dicit, eo quod plures non contingit ejusdem definitiones esse, in quibusdam profecto secundum veritatem se habet, ut dictum est, in quibusdam autem non, ut in quibuscunque non per se dicitur ad utrumque, ut medicinam, scientiam, sanitatem et aegritudinem efficiendi: nam de ilia quidem per se dicitur, de hacautem per accidens, simpliciter enim alienum a medicina ægritudinem efiicere. Quare nihil magis definivit qui ad utrumque assignavit, quam qui ad alterum, verum fortasse et deterius, eo quod et reliquorum quilibet potest aegritudinem efficere, Amplius, si non ad melius,sed ad pejus assignavit, cum sint plura ad qua? dicitur quod definitur. Nam omnis disciplina et potestas, optimi videtur esse. Rursum si non positnm est in proprio genere quod dictum est, considerandum ex iis (quæ ad genera sunt) elementis, quemadmodum est dictum prius. Rursum si transiliens dicit genera, ut qui justitiam, aequalitatis habitum efFectivum, vel distributivum æqui, nam transilit (qui sic deHuit) virtutem.","english":"Further, if the thing being defined is said in relation to several things, and he has not assigned it to all of them—for example, if he defines grammar as the science of writing what is expressed, for it also needs [the science] of covering over; for he who defines it assigns it no more to writing than to reading. Wherefore it is not another definition, but the one that states both of these, since it is not possible for there to be several definitions of the same thing. In some cases, indeed, this holds true, as has been said, but in others it does not—as in all cases where it is not said in itself in relation to both, for example, medicine as the science of producing health and sickness; for it is said of the former in itself, but of the latter incidentally, since it is simply foreign to medicine to produce sickness. Wherefore he who assigned it to both has defined it no more than he who assigned it to one, but perhaps even worse, because any of the others can also produce sickness. Further, if he has assigned it not to the better but to the worse, when there are several things in relation to which the thing being defined is said. For every discipline and power seems to be of the best. Again, if what has been stated has not been placed in its proper genus, this must be considered from the elements that pertain to genera, as was said earlier. Again, if he skips over the genera, as one who [defines] justice as the habit effective of equality, or distributive of what is equal; for he who defines it thus skips over virtue.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":156,"ref":"p156","source":"Relinquens;gitur justitiae genus, non dicit quid est esse (nam substantia unicuiqueest in genere); estautem hoc idem ei quod est non in proximo genere ponere. Nam qui in proximo posuit, omnia superioria dixit, eo quod omnia superiora genera de inferioribus prædicantur. Quare aut in proximo nenere ponend urn aut my,nes differentias superiori generiaddendum per quas definitur proximumgenus,sic enim eritnihil praetermissum,sedpro nomine,in oratione dictUIl1 erit inferius genus;qui vero ipsu superius geuus dicit, non citet inferius genus, nam qui plantam dicit non dicit arborem.Rursumin differentiis si [l;i literconsiderandu OJ, si et differentias dixit generis.Nam si rei non specialibus definivitdifferentiis,aut sietiamomnino aliquid hujusmodi dixit quod nullius contingit differentiam esse (utanimal, aut substantiam), manifestum quoniam non definivit: nullius enim differentiæ, quae dicta sunt. Videndum autem et si est aliquid quod e diverso dividitur dictæ dif. t'erentiæ. Nam si non est, perspicuum quoniam non erit quae dicta est generis differentia, nam omne ge. nus iis (quæ e diverso dividuntur) differentiis diviI;litur, ut animal gressibili,et volatili, et aquatili,et bipedi. Aut si est quidem e diverso divisa difTerentia, non verificatur autem de genere.","english":"Therefore, by omitting the genus of justice, he does not state what its essence is (for the substance of each thing lies in its genus); and this is the same as not placing it in the proximate genus. For one who has placed it in the proximate genus has stated all the superior [genera], since all superior genera are predicated of the inferior ones. Hence one must either place it in the proximate genus, or add to the superior genus all the differentiae by which the proximate genus is defined; for in this way nothing will have been omitted, but the inferior genus will be stated in the account in place of the name. But one who states the superior genus itself does not also state the inferior genus; for one who says \"plant\" does not say \"tree.\" Again, one must also consider whether he has stated the differentiae of the genus. For if he has defined the thing by differentiae that are not specific, or if he has even stated something of such a kind as cannot be the differentia of anything (for example, animal or substance), it is clear that he has not defined it; for it is the differentia of nothing of the things that have been stated. One must also consider whether there is anything that is divided in opposition to the differentia that has been stated. For if there is not, it is evident that what has been stated will not be the differentia of the genus, since every genus is divided by the differentiae that are divided in opposition, as animal is divided by the walking, the flying, the swimming, and the two-footed. Or if the differentia is indeed divided in opposition, but is not verified of the genus.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[{"kind":"lacuna","severity":"caution","text":"The source is fragmentary here: the edition marks a break or an editorial bracket, and the English carries across it. Treat the bridge as supplied, not translated."}]},{"i":157,"ref":"p157","source":"Nam si non, manifestum quoniam neutra erit generis differentia, omnes enim quae e diverso dividuntur differentiæ, verificantur de proprio genere. Similiter autem et si verificatur quidem, at non facit apposita generi, speciem. Nam manifestum, quod non erit hæc specifica differentia generis, nam omnis specifica differentia cum genere speciem facit, si autem haec non est differentia, nec quae dicta est, quia haec e diverso dividitur. Amplius, si negationedividatgenus, ut quilineam definiuntlongitudinem sine latitudine esse:nam nihil aliud sirnificat, sine latitudine,quam quod non habet latitudinem: accidet igitur genus participare speciem. Nam omnis longitudo sine latitudine aut latitudinem habens est, quia de omni affirmatio vel negatio vera Lt, quare genus lineae cum longitudo sit, sine latitudine aut latitudinem habens erit: at longitudo sine latitudine speciei est ratio, similiter autem et longitudo latitudinem habens, nam sine latitudine, et latitudinem habens, differentiæ sunt: ex differentia autem et genere est speciei oratio, quare genus suscipiet speciei orationem. Similiter autem et differentiæ, eo quod altera dictarum differentiarum ex necessitate praedicatur de genere. Est autem dictus locus utilis ad eos qui ponunt ideas esse, nam si non est ipsa longitudo, quodam modo'praedicabitur de genere quod Jatitudi.","english":"For if not, it is clear that neither will be a differentia of the genus; for all differentiae that divide from opposites are verified of their own genus. Similarly, even if it is verified, but does not, when added to the genus, make the species. For it is clear that this will not be a specific differentia of the genus, since every specific differentia together with the genus makes the species; but if this is not a differentia, neither is the one that has been stated, because this one is divided from opposites. Furthermore, if the genus is divided by a negation, as those who define a line as length without breadth: for \"without breadth\" signifies nothing other than that it does not have breadth; it will follow, then, that the genus partakes of the species. For every length without breadth is either without breadth or having breadth, since of every thing affirmation or negation is true; wherefore the genus of line, since it is length, will be either without breadth or having breadth; but \"length without breadth\" is the account of the species, and similarly \"length having breadth,\" for \"without breadth\" and \"having breadth\" are differentiae; but the account of the species is from the differentia and the genus; wherefore the genus will receive the account of the species. Similarly also with the differentiae, because one of the said differentiae is predicated of the genus by necessity. This place is said to be useful against those who posit that ideas exist; for if length itself is not, in a certain way it will be predicated of the genus, namely of breadth.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":158,"ref":"p158","source":"nem habet, aut sine latitudine est: oportet enim de omni longitudine alterum eorum verificari,siquidem de genere verificari debeat. Hoc autem non accidit, sunt autem et sine latitudine, et latitudinem habentes longitudines,quare ad illos solos utilis hic locus, quicunque genus unum numero dicunt esse, hoc autem faciunt qui ideas ponunt. Nam ipsam longitudinem et ipsum animal, genus dicunt esse. Fortasse autem in quibusdam etiam necessarium est negatione uti definientem, ut in privationibus:nam caecum est quod non habet visum, quando natum est babere. Differt autem nihil negatione dividere genus, autbujunmodi affirmatione qua negationem necesse est ediversodividi, ut si longitudinem, habens latitudinemdefinivit,nam habente latitudinem ediverso dividiturnon habens latitudinem, neque aliud quUquamjquare negatione rursum dividitur genus. Rursum si speciem ut differentiam assignavit, ut qui convictuminjuriam cum irrisione definivit,nam irrtsio injuria quædamest; quare non differentia, sed species est irrisio. Amplius, si genus ut differentiam dicit, ut virtutem habitum bonum vel studiosum, nam bonum est genus virtutis. An non genus est bo.","english":"has, or is without breadth; for one of these two must be verified of every length, if indeed it is to be verified of the genus. But this does not happen; for there are lengths both without breadth and having breadth. Wherefore this topic is useful only against those who say that the genus is one in number, and this is what those who posit ideas do. For they say that length itself and animal itself are a genus. But perhaps in certain cases it is also necessary for one who is defining to use negation, as in privations; for the blind is that which does not have sight, when it is naturally able to have it. But it makes no difference whether one divides the genus by negation or by an affirmation of such a kind that the negation must be divided from its opposite; as if one defined length as having breadth, for the one having breadth is divided from its opposite, the one not having breadth, nor anything else; wherefore the genus is again divided by negation. Again, if he has assigned the species as a differentia, as he who defined contumely as injury with mockery; for mockery is a certain injury; wherefore mockery is not a differentia but a species. Further, if he states the genus as a differentia, as virtue as a good habit or studious; for the good is the genus of virtue. Or is not the good a genus?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":159,"ref":"p159","source":"num, sed differentia?si quidem verum estquod non contingat idem in duobus generibus esse non continentibus se invicem (nam neque bonum continet habitum, neque habitus bonum: non enim omnia habitus bonum, neque omne bonum habitus), non erunt profecto genera ambo. Si igitur habitus genus estvirtutis,perspicuum bonum non genus,sed magis differentiam esse. Amplius, habitus quidem quid est virtus significat, bonum autem non quid est, sed quale quid est, videtur autem differentia quale quid significare. Videndum autem et si non quale quid, sed ipsum quid significat assignata differentia. Nam videtur quale quid omnis differentiasignificare.Considerandum autem et si secundum accidens inest definito differentia. Narn nulla differentia est eorum quae secundum accidens insunt, sicut neque genus, non enim contin:,:it differentiam inesse alicui et non inesse. Amplius, si praedicatur de genere differentia vel species, aut inferiorum aliquid speciei, non erit definiens.Nam nullum eorum quædicta sunt,contingit de genere prædicari, eo quod genus de quamplu. rimis omnium dicitur. Rursum si praedicatur genus de differentia.","english":"Or is it a differentia? For if it is true that the same thing cannot be in two genera that do not contain each other (for neither does good contain habit, nor habit good: for not all habit is good, nor is every good a habit), then both will certainly not be genera. If, therefore, habit is the genus of virtue, it is clear that good is not a genus, but rather a differentia. Furthermore, habit signifies what virtue is, but good does not signify what it is, but of what sort it is; and a differentia seems to signify of what sort a thing is. But one must also consider whether the assigned differentia signifies not of what sort a thing is, but the thing itself. For every differentia seems to signify of what sort a thing is. One must also consider whether the differentia belongs to the thing defined according to accident. For no differentia is among things that belong according to accident, just as neither is a genus; for it does not contain that a differentia is present in something and is not present. Furthermore, if a differentia is predicated of a genus, or a species, or some one of the things inferior to a species, it will not be definitive. For none of the things that have been mentioned can be predicated of a genus, because a genus is said of the greatest number of all things. Again, if a genus is predicated of a differentia.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":160,"ref":"p160","source":"Nam non de differentia, sed de;quibus differentia, genus videtur prædicari, ut animal de homine, et bove, et de aliis gressibitibusanimaHbus, non autem de ea differentia quæ de specie dicitur, nam si de unaquaque differentiarum animal prærJicabitur, multa animalia de specie prædicabuntur, nam differenliæ de specie prædicantur, Amplius, differentiae omnes,aut species, aut individua erunt, siquidem sunt animalia, nam unumquodque animalium aut species, autindividuum est. Similiterautem inspiciendum et si species, aut inferiorum speciei aliquod,de ifIerenti1l. præd icatu.lm possibile enim, eo quod de pluribus differentia quam species dicitur. Item accidetdifferentiam speciem esse,siquidem prædicabitur de ea aliqua specierum: nam si de differentia praedicatur homo, manifestum quoniam differentia est homo. Rursum si non prior est difTerentia specie. Nam genere quidem posleriorest, specie autem priorem differentiam esse oportet. C;onsiderandum autem et si alterius generis est dicta differentia, neque contenti, neque continentis.","english":"For it seems that genus is predicated not of the differentia, but of the things of which the differentia is said—as animal is predicated of man, and ox, and other walking animals, but not of that differentia which is said of the species. For if animal is predicated of each one of the differentiae, many animals will be predicated of the species; for the differentiae are predicated of the species. Further, all differentiae will be either species or individuals, if indeed they are animals; for each one of animals is either a species or an individual. In like manner one must also consider whether a species, or some one of the things inferior to the species, can be predicated of the differentia. For it is possible because the differentia is said of more things than the species. Again, it will follow that the differentia is a species, if indeed some one of the species is predicated of it; for if man is predicated of the differentia, it is clear that the differentia is man. Again, whether the differentia is not prior to the species. For in respect of genus it is posterior, but the differentia ought to be prior to the species. One must also consider whether the differentia stated is of another genus, and neither contained nor containing.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":161,"ref":"p161","source":"Nam Donvidetureadem differentiaduorum generum esse non continentium se invicem; si autem non accidet et speciem eamdem in duobus gcneribus esse non continentibus se invicem (infert enim unaquæque differentiarumproprium genus), ut gressibile et bipes animal coinf'erunt; quare si de quo differentia et generum utrumque, manifestum utique quoniam species in duobus erat generibus non continentibus se invicem. An non impossibileeamdemdifferentiam duorum generum essenoncontinentium se invicem, sed addendum neque utroque sub eodem existente? nam gressibile anima et volatile animal genera sunt non continentia se invicem, et utriusque eorum est bipes differentia; quare addendum est, neque sub eodem utroque existente: nam haec ambo sub animali sunt, manifestum etiam quoniam non necesse est differentiam omnem proprium genus inferre, eo quod contingit eamdem duorum generum esse non continentium se invicem, sed alterum tantum necesse est inferre, et superiora omnia, ut bipes, gressibHe, vel volatile infert animal. Videndum autem et si locum differentiam assignavit substantiæ. Nam videtur differre substantia a substantia in eo quod alicubi est, quare et eos qui gressibili et aquatili dividunt animal increpant,tanquam gressibiJeetaquatile alicubi significet. An in iis quidem non recte increpant?","english":"For it seems that the same differentia cannot belong to two genera that do not contain one another. But if this does not follow, then neither will it follow that the same species is in two genera that do not contain one another (for each of the differentiae implies its own genus), as walking and two-footed converge upon animal. Wherefore, if that of which the differentia is predicated is also under each of the two genera, it is manifest that the species was in two genera that do not contain one another. Or is it not impossible for the same differentia to belong to two genera that do not contain one another, but must it be added that neither is under the same genus? For walking animal and flying animal are genera that do not contain one another, and two-footed is a differentia of each of them. Wherefore it must be added that neither is under the same genus; for both of these are under animal. It is also manifest that not every differentia necessarily implies its own genus, since it happens that the same differentia belongs to two genera that do not contain one another, but it necessarily implies only one of them, and all the higher ones—as two-footed implies walking or flying animal. But one must also consider whether he assigned place as a differentia of substance. For substance seems to differ from substance in that it is somewhere; wherefore they also censure those who divide animal by walking and aquatic, as though walking and aquatic signify somewhere. Or in these cases do they not censure rightly?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":162,"ref":"p162","source":"non enim in aliquo, neque alicubi significat aquatile et terrestre, sed quale quid: nam et si in sicco sit, similiter aquatile, similiter autem et terrestre, et si in bumido sit, stmiliterterrestre, sed non aquatile erit; attamen si quandoque significat in aliquo differentia, manifestum quoniarn peccabit. Rursum si affectum differentiam assignavit. Nam omnis affectus, cum magis fit, detrahit a substantia, differentia autem non hujusmodi est, nam magis videtur salvare differentia id cujus est differentia,et simpliciter impossibile est singulum quodque esse sine propria differentia, nam cum non est gressible, non erit homo, et (ut simpliciter dicamus) secundum quaecunque aIteraturbabens,mhileorum differentis illius est. Nam omnia hujusmodi cum magis fiuut, detrahunta substantia; quare si aliquam hujusmodi differentiam quispiam assignavit, peccavit: simpliciter enim non alteramursecundumdifferentias.Et si alicujus eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, non aliud quid, difFerentiam assignavit.Nam eorum quæ sunt ad aliquid,et differeotiæ ad ali'luid, ut et in disciplina; contemplativa enim, et activa et effectiva dicitur,unumquodque aut!om horum ad aliquid significat: contemplativa enim alicujus, et activa alicujus, et effectiva alicujus. Considerandum autem et si ad quod natum est unumquodque eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, assignavit definiens.","english":"For \"in something\" and \"somewhere\" do not signify aquatic and terrestrial, but of what sort a thing is; for even if it be in a dry place, it will similarly be aquatic, and similarly also terrestrial; and if it be in a wet place, it will similarly be terrestrial, but it will not be aquatic. Yet if a differentia ever signifies \"in something,\" it is clear that he will be mistaken. Again, if he assigned an affection as a differentia. For every affection, when it becomes greater, detracts from substance, but a differentia is not of this sort; for a differentia seems rather to preserve that of which it is the differentia, and simply it is impossible for each single thing to be without its proper differentia; for when it is not capable of walking, it will not be a man, and (to speak simply) in whatever respects things having alteration, none of them is of that differentia. For all such things, when they become greater, detract from substance; wherefore if anyone has assigned any such differentia, he has erred; for simply we are not altered according to differentiae. And if he assigned as a differentia something of those things which are relative, not something else. For the differentiae of relative things are also relative, as also in discipline; for it is called contemplative, active, and effective, and each of these signifies something relative: for the contemplative is of something, and the active is of something, and the effective is of something. But one must also consider whether, in defining, he assigned that to which each of those things which are relative is naturally directed.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":163,"ref":"p163","source":"Nam in quibusdam quiclem, ad quod natum est singulum quodque eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, solum est uti, ad aliud autem nihil, ut visu ad videndum solum;quibusdam autem et ad aliquid aHud, ut dolio sanehauriat aliquis, attamen si quis definivit dolium, instrumentum ad bauriendum, peccavi t, nom enim ad hoe natum est: terminus autem est, ad quod natum est, ad quod sane utitur prudens, qua prudens, et quæ circa singulum quodque propria est disciplina. Amplius, si non primi assignavit, quando contingit ad plura dictum esse, ut prudentiam virtutem bominis, autani. mae, et non rationalis, primum enim rationalis virtus, prudentia, nam secundum hocet 1I.nimaet homo dicitur prudens. Amplius, si non susceptivum est ejus cujus dicitur affectus, vel dispositio, velquodvis aliud, peccavit. Nam omnis dispositio vel affectus in illo natus est fieri cujus est dispositio vel affectus, ut et scientia in anima, dispositio existens animae. Aliquvndo autem peccant in talibus, ut quicunque dicunt quod somnus est impotentia sensus, et dubitatio æqualitas contrariarum ratiocinationum,et dolor separatio naturalium partium cum violentia, nam neque somnus inest sensui,oporteret autem inesse si impotentia sensus est. Similiter autem neque dubitatio contrariis ratioci ationi bus inest, neque dolor naturalibus partibus, dolebunt enim inanimata, si dolor eis inest. Talis autem et sanitatis definitio, si.","english":"For in some cases, the single thing among relatives is naturally suited only to one thing, and to nothing else, as sight is only for seeing; but in other cases it is also suited to something else, as a jar is suited for someone to draw from. Yet if someone has defined a jar as an instrument for drawing, he has erred, for it is not naturally suited to this; the limit is that for which it is naturally suited, and that for which the prudent person, qua prudent, actually uses it, and the discipline proper to each single thing. Further, if he has not assigned the primary thing, when it happens that the term is said in relation to several things, as prudence is a virtue of man or of the soul, and not of the rational part—for the primary thing is the virtue of the rational part, namely prudence; for according to this, both the soul and the man are said to be prudent. Further, if it is not receptive of that of which it is said to be an affection, or a disposition, or any other such thing, he has erred. For every disposition or affection naturally comes to be in that of which it is the disposition or affection, as knowledge is in the soul, being a disposition of the soul. Sometimes, however, they err in such matters, as those who say that sleep is an impotence of sense, and doubt an equality of contrary reasonings, and pain a separation of natural parts with violence. For neither is sleep present in sense—yet it ought to be present if it is an impotence of sense. Similarly, neither is doubt present in contrary reasonings, nor pain in natural parts; for inanimate things would feel pain, if pain were present in them. Such also is the definition of health, if—","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":164,"ref":"p164","source":"quiHemcommensuratio calidorum et frigidorum est: necesse est enim sana esse calida et frigida, nam cujusquecommensuratioillisinestquorumest commensuratio, quare sanitas inerit utique ipsis. Item j id quod fit in effectivum, aut e converso; accidit ponere sic definientibus, non enim est dolor separatio naturalium partium, sed eFfectivum doloris, nec somnus impotentia sensus, sed affectivum alterum alterius; aut enim propter impotentiam Jormim us, aut propter somnum impotentes sumus. Similiter autem etdubitationisvidebitur effectivum esse, contrariaru aequalitas rat)ocinat]onum; quandocunque enim ad utraque ratiocinant:bus nobis simiLiter videntur omnia secundum utru,nque fieri,dubitahimus utrum agamus.Amplius,secundum tempora omnia considerandum sicubi dissonet,ut si immortale definivit, animal nunc incorruptibile esse. Nam nunc incorruptibile anima!, nunc immortale erit. An in hoc quidem non accidit?nam aucepssecuudum amphiboliam est nunc incorruptibile esse, aut enim quoniam noncorrumpitur nunc, significat, aut quoniam non possibile corrumpinunc, aut quoniam hujusmodi est nunc, ut nunquam possit corrumpi. Quando igiturdicimus quod incorruptibile nunc est animal, non hocdici mus, quod nunc tale est animal, sed ut nunquam possit corrumpi; hoc autem immortali idem erat, quare non accidit, nunc idem immortale esse.","english":"For the commensuration of hot and cold things is health; for it is necessary that the healthy be hot and cold, since the commensuration of each thing is present in those things of which it is the commensuration; wherefore health will certainly be present in them. Likewise, that which is productive is placed in place of the effect, or conversely; and this happens to those who define in this way. For pain is not the separation of natural parts, but the productive cause of pain; nor is sleep the incapacity of sense, but the one is affective of the other; for either we are incapacitated because of the loss of form, or because of sleep we are incapacitated. In like manner, the productive cause of doubt would seem to be the equality of contrary reasonings; for whenever, as we reason, all things appear to us alike in accordance with either side, we shall doubt which we should do. Moreover, one must consider in accordance with all times, whether it is discordant anywhere, as if someone defined an animal as immortal, [saying] that it is now incorruptible. For now the animal will be incorruptible, [and] now it will be immortal. Or does this not happen in this case? For \"to be now incorruptible\" is ambiguous; for it signifies either that it is not corrupted now, or that it is not possible for it to be corrupted now, or that it is of such a nature now that it can never be corrupted. When, therefore, we say that the animal is now incorruptible, we do not say this, that the animal is now of such a nature, but that it can never be corrupted; but this was the same as immortal; wherefore it does not happen that it is now the same as immortal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":165,"ref":"p165","source":"Sed tamen sicubi accidit quod secundum definitionem quidem assignatum est in esse, nunc vel prius, quod vero secundum nomen non inest, non erit idem, utendum ergo hoc loco quemadmodum dictum est. Inspiciendum autem et si secundum aliud quidpiam magis dicitur quod deHnitur, quam secundum assignatam orationem, ut si justitia potestas aequi distributiva est: justus enim magis est qui eligit æquum distribuere, eo qui potest; quare non erit justitia potestas aequi distributiva, nam et justus esset maxime qui posset aequum distribuere. Amplius, si res quidem suscipit magis, quod autem secundum orationem assignatur non suscipit, aut contra, quod secundum orationem ei assignatur suscipit, res autem non. Oportet enim aut utraque suscipere, aut neutrum, siquidem es rei quod secundum orationem assignatur. Amplius, si suscipiunt utraque quidem magis, non simul autem utraque augmentum sumunt: ut si amor concupiscentia conventionis est. Nam magis amans non magis concupiscitconventionem; quare non simul utraque suscipiunt magis, at oporteret, si idem essent.Amplius,si duobusquibusdam propositis, de quo res magis dicitur, id quod est secundum orationem minus dicitur: ut si ignis est corpus subtilissimum, ignis enim magis flamma quamlux,corpus autem subtilissimum minus flamma quam lux; oportet autem utraque magis inesse eidem,siquidem eadem sint.","english":"But nevertheless, if it happens that what is assigned by the definition is present in being, now or previously, while what is according to the name is not present, it will not be the same; this topic must therefore be used as has been said. One must also consider whether that which is defined is said more in accordance with something else than in accordance with the assigned account, as if justice is the power of distributing what is equal: for he is more just who chooses to distribute what is equal than he who has the power; wherefore justice will not be the power of distributing what is equal, for he who could distribute what is equal would also be most just. Further, if the thing admits of more, but what is assigned according to the account does not admit of more, or conversely, what is assigned to it according to the account admits of more, but the thing does not. For it is necessary that either both admit of more, or neither, if what is assigned according to the account is the being of the thing. Further, if both admit of more, but they do not both increase together: as if love is the desire of intercourse. For the one who loves more does not desire intercourse more; wherefore they do not both admit of more together, though it ought to be so, if they were the same. Further, if, with two things proposed, that of which the thing is said more is said less according to the account: as if fire is the subtlest body, for fire is more flame than light, but the subtlest body is less flame than light; yet it is necessary that both be present more in the same thing, if they are the same.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":166,"ref":"p166","source":"Rursum, si hoc quidem sirnililer utrisquiJ inest propositis, aliud autem non similiter utrisque, se-.l alteri magis. Amplius, si ad duo definitionem assignaverit secundum utrumque: ut bonum quod per visum aut per audiLum delectabile, et ens quod possibile est pati aut facere, simul enim idem et bonum et non bonum est, similiter autem et ens et non ens: nam per auditum delectabile, idern bono erit; quare quod non delectabile est per auditum, non bono idem, nam eisdem et opposi1a eadem erunt: opponitur autem bono quidem non bonum, per auditum autem delectabili, per auditumnon delectabile; manifestum igiturquoQiam idem non delectabile per auditum, non bono. Si igitur aliquid est per visum quidem delectabile, per auditum autem non, et bonum etnon bonum erit. Similiter autem ostendemus quoniam idem ens, et non ens est. Amplius, et generibus, et differentiis, et aliis omnibus quae in definitionibus sunt assignatis eis qui orationes pro nominibus faciunt, considerandum si quidquam dissonet.","english":"Again, if this is present similarly in both of the things proposed, but another feature is not similarly in both, but rather in one more than the other. Further, if he has assigned a definition to two things according to each: for example, good as what is pleasant through sight or through hearing, and being as what is capable of being acted upon or acting; for at the same time the same thing is both good and not good, and similarly both being and not being. For what is pleasant through hearing will be the same as good; therefore what is not pleasant through hearing will not be the same as good. For the same things will also have the same opposites; but to good is opposed not good, and to what is pleasant through hearing is opposed what is not pleasant through hearing. It is clear, therefore, that the same thing, what is not pleasant through hearing, is not good. If, then, something is pleasant through sight but not through hearing, it will be both good and not good. In the same way we shall show that the same thing is both being and not being. Further, with respect to genera, differentiae, and all the other things assigned in definitions by those who make accounts in place of names, one must consider whether anything is inconsistent.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":167,"ref":"p167","source":"CAPUT IV\n\nDe definitione loci alii.\n\nSi:autem sit ad aliquid quod definitur, aut per se, aut secundum genus, considerandum si non dictum est in definitione ad quod dicitur, aut secundum ipsum, aut secundum genus. Ut si scientiam definivit opinionem indissuasibilem, aut etiam voluntatem, appetitum sine tristitia: omnis enim ejus quod est ad'aliquid, substantia ad alterum, eo quod idem sit unicuique eorum quae sunt ad aliquid esse, idipsum quod est ad aliquid quodam modo se habere. Oportebat igitur scientiam dicere opinionem scibilis, et voluntatem appetitum bani. Similiter autem et si grammaticen definivit scientiam litterarum, oportebat enim aut ad ipsum dicitur, aut ad quod forte genus dicitur, in definitione assignari. Aut si cum quidpiam ad aliquid dicitur, non assignavit ad finem. Finis autem in unoquoque est quod optimum est, aut cujus gratia alia sunt; dicendum igitur aut optimum, aut ultimum, utconcupiscentianon delectabilis, sed:delectationis, nam propter hanc, et delectabile eligimus. Considerandum et si generatio est ad quod assignavit, vel actus. Nihil enim lalium finis, nam magis quod est egisse et generasse fin is, quam fieri et agere. An non in omnibus verurn hujusmodi? pene enim plurimi delectari magis volunt quam destitisse delectari; quare agere magis finem quis statuat quam egisse.","english":"CHAPTER IV\n\nOn the definition of place, other points.\n\nBut if the thing being defined is relative, whether in itself or according to its genus, one must consider whether that to which it is referred has not been stated in the definition, either according to the thing itself or according to its genus. For example, if he has defined knowledge as an unpersuadable opinion, or also will as desire without distress: for the whole substance of a relative is toward another, since for each of the things that are relative, to be is the same as to be somehow disposed toward something. It was necessary, therefore, to say that knowledge is the opinion of the knowable, and will the desire of the good. Similarly also if he has defined grammar as the knowledge of letters; for it was necessary that either that to which it is referred, or that to which perhaps its genus is referred, be assigned in the definition. Or if, when something is said to be relative, he has not assigned the end. Now the end in each thing is what is best, or that for the sake of which other things are; one must say, therefore, either the best or the last, as concupiscence is not of the pleasant, but of pleasure; for it is on account of this that we also choose the pleasant. One must also consider whether that to which he has assigned it is a generation or an activity. For none of these is an end; for having done and having generated is more an end than to be doing and to be generating. Or is this not true in all cases of this sort? For nearly most people wish to be pleased rather than to have ceased being pleased; wherefore one may set down doing as more an end than having done.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":168,"ref":"p168","source":"Rursum in quibusdam si non determinavit quanti, vel qualis, vel ubi,vel secundum alias differentias: utarnbitiosus, et qualis, et quanti appetens est honoris, nam omnes appetunt honorem; quare non sufficit ambitiosum dicere qui appetit honorem, sed addere oporLe cas ditrerentias. Similiter autem eavarus, quantas appetit pecunias; aut intemperans, circa qu ales voluptates: non enim qui a qualibet voluptate tenetur, intemperans dicilur, sed qui ab aliqua. Aut rursum, qui definivit noctem umbram terræ, aut succussionem motum terra?, aut nubem densitatem aeris, aut ventum motum aeris, addendum enim quanti et qualis, ubi et a quo. Similiter autem et in cæteris hujusmodi, nam omittens diiferentiam quamlibet, non dicit quid est esse, oportet autem semper ad id quo indiget argumentari. Non enim quolibet modo terra mota, neque quantacunque successio erit; similiter autem neque aere quolibet modo, neque quantocunque mota, ventus erit.Amplius in appetitibus, si non apponi-, tur quod apparet.et in quibuslibet aliis coDgruit,ut quoniam voluntas appetitus boni,concupiscentia,autem appetitus deJectationis,sed non apparentis boni vel delectationis, plerumque enim latet appetentes, quoniam bonum aut delectabile est,quare non necessarium bonum vel delectabile esse, sed apparens eolum;oportebat ergo sic et assignationem facere.","english":"Again, in certain cases, if one has not determined of what quantity, or of what quality, or where, or according to other differences: for example, the ambitious man is one who desires honor, and of what sort and of what quantity—for all desire honor; therefore it is not sufficient to say that the ambitious man is one who desires honor, but one must add the differences. Likewise the covetous man, of what quantity he desires money; or the intemperate man, concerning what sort of pleasures—for not everyone who is held by any pleasure whatsoever is called intemperate, but one who is held by a certain kind. Or again, one who has defined night as the shadow of the earth, or an earthquake as the motion of the earth, or a cloud as a density of air, or wind as a motion of air—for one must add of what quantity and of what quality, where, and from what. Likewise also in other such cases, for one who omits any difference whatsoever does not state what it is to be; and one must always argue toward that which is needed. For the earth is not moved in any way whatsoever, nor will there be a succession of any magnitude whatsoever; and likewise neither from air in any way whatsoever, nor moved to any extent whatsoever, will there be wind. Moreover, in desires, if what appears is not added; and in any other cases it is fitting, as that will is the desire of good, but concupiscence is the desire of pleasure, but not of apparent good or pleasure—for it often escapes those who desire, that it is good or pleasant; wherefore it is not necessary that it be good or pleasant, but only apparent; one ought therefore to make the assignment in this way also.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":169,"ref":"p169","source":"Si autem et assignavit quod dictum eat,in ipsas species ducendum eum qui ponit ideas esse. Non enim est idea ullius apparentis,ipsa autem species ad ipsam speciem videtur dici,ut ipsa concupiscentia ipasius delectationis,et ipsa voluntas ipsius boni.Apparentis igitur boni non erit ipsa voluntas, neque apparentis delectationis ipsa concupiscentia: absurdum enim est esse ipsum apparens bonum vel delecta-, bile.Amplius,si sit quidem habitus definitio,considerandum in habente, si quidem habentis, in habitu. Similiter autem et in cæteris talibus: ut si delectatio est juvantia, et delectabile juvabUe. Universaliter autem dicendo,in hujusmodi definitionibus,quodammodo, uno plura accidit eum qui definit definire. Nam qui scientiam definivit, quodammodo et ignorantiam definivit; similiter autem et scium et inscium, et scire et ignorare, nam primo dilucido facto, et reliqua quodammodo diiucida funt.Inspiciandum igitur in omnibus talibus, ne quidquam dissonet, utendo elementis ex contrariis et conjugatis.Amplius, in his quae ad aliquid sunt,considerandum si ad quod genusassignatur,et species ad illud quoddam assignetur: ut ei opinio ad opinatum,et quædam opmio aquoddam opmatum, et si multiplex ad multiplex,et quoddam multiplex ad quoddam subrnuItiplex; si autem non sic assignatur,manifestum, quoniam peccatur.","english":"But if he has also assigned what was said, one must lead the person who posits that ideas exist to the species themselves. For there is no idea of any apparent thing, but the species itself seems to be spoken in relation to the species itself, as concupiscence itself to pleasure itself, and will itself to the good itself. Therefore will itself will not be of apparent good, nor concupiscence itself of apparent pleasure; for it is absurd that the apparent good or the apparent pleasant should be the thing itself. Moreover, if the definition is of a habit, one must consider it in the one who has it, if indeed it is of the one having it, in the habit. And similarly also in the other such cases: as if pleasure is of things that help, and the pleasant is helpful. But speaking universally, in definitions of this sort, in a certain way it happens that the one who defines defines one thing as many. For he who has defined knowledge has in a certain way also defined ignorance; and similarly the knowing and the unknowing, and to know and to be ignorant, for when the first has been made clear, the rest also become clear in a certain way. One must therefore examine in all such cases lest anything be discordant, using the elements from contraries and conjugates. Moreover, in things that are relative, one must consider whether, to whatever genus it is assigned, the species is also assigned to that particular thing: as if opinion is relative to the opined, and a certain opinion to a certain opined thing, and if the multiple is relative to the multiple, and a certain multiple to a certain submultiple; but if it is not assigned thus, it is clear that there is a fault.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":170,"ref":"p170","source":"Videndum autem et si oppositi opposita definitio: ut si dimidii ea sit quae opposita est ei quae est duplicis,nam si duplex est quod in aequali superat dimidium, et dimidium quod in aequali superatur.ln contrariis autem similiter.Nam contraria contrarii oratio erit,secundum unam quamdam complexionem contrariorum, ut si adjutivum quidem effectivum boni est,nocivum effectivum mali, aut corruptivum boni; alterum enim horum necessarium estcontrarium esse ei quod ex principio dictum est. Si igitur neutrum contrarium est ei quod ex principio dictum est,manif'estum quoniam neutra eritearun.(quæ uC1steriusassignatæ) contrarii oratio; quare neque quæ ex principio assignataest deft nilio,recte assignata est.Quoniam autem quaedam contrariorum privatione alterius dicuntur, ut inæqualitas priva-tio æqualitatis videtur esse (inæqualia enim, qua; non a'qualia sunt, dicuntur), perspicuum quoniam quod secundum privationem quidem dicitur contrariul11,uecessarium est definire per alterum, reliquum vero nonjam oportet,per id quod secundum privationemdicitur.Nonenimaccidit alterutrum per alterutrum cognosci.Considerandum igitur in contrariis hujusmodi peceatum,utsi quis definivit aequalitatem contrarium inxqualitati,nam per hoc quod secundum privationem dicitur,definivit.","english":"One must also consider whether the definition of the opposite is the opposite of the definition: for example, if the definition of the half is the opposite of that of the double; for if the double is that which exceeds the half in equality, then the half is that which is exceeded in equality. And similarly in the case of contraries. For the account of a contrary will be [the account] of its contrary, according to some one combination of contraries: for example, if the helpful is productive of good, the harmful is productive of evil, or corruptive of good; for one of these must be contrary to what was stated from the beginning. If, then, neither is contrary to what was stated from the beginning, it is evident that neither of these (which are assigned later) will be the account of the contrary; and therefore neither will the definition assigned from the beginning be correctly assigned. But since some contraries are spoken of by the privation of the other, as inequality seems to be the privation of equality (for unequal things are said [to be] those which are not equal), it is clear that what is spoken of according to privation, being the contrary, must be defined through the other; but the remaining one no longer ought [to be defined] through that which is spoken of according to privation. For it does not happen that either one is known through the other. One must therefore consider this kind of error in contraries: for example, if someone has defined equality as the contrary of inequality; for he has defined it through that which is spoken of according to privation.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":171,"ref":"p171","source":"Amplius,sic defminientem necesse est eo quod deHnitur uti.Patet autem hoc,si accipiatur pro nomine oralio:nam quia nil refert icere inaequalitatem pri. vationem æquaritatis,eritæqualitas contrarium privationi æqualitatis, quare eodem erit usus.Si autem nentrum contrariorum secundum privationern dicatur, assignetur autem oratio similiter, ut bonum contrarium malo,manifestum quoniam malum contrarium bono erit: nam sic contrariorum similiter oratio assignanda; quare rursum eo quod definitur accidit uti, inest enim in mali oratione bonum. Quocirca quoniam bonum est malo contrarium,malum autem nihil differt, vel quod est bono contrarium, erit bonum contrarium,boni contrario. Perspicuum igitur quoniam eodem usus est.Amplius, si:quod secundum privationem dicitur assignans,non assignavit cujus est privatio. Ut habitus, aut contrarii, aut cujuscunque est privalio.Et si non in quo natumest fieri addidil,vel simpliciter, vel in quo primonatum est fieri. Vt si ignorantiam dicens privationem, non scientiæ privationpm dixit,aut si non addidit in quo natum est fieri,aut addens non in quo primo assignavit,ut quod non in rationali, sed in homine vel in anima: namsi quodlibet horum omitlat,peccavit. Similiter autem et si caecitatem non visus privationem in oculo dixitjoportetautem bene assignantem, quid est,et cujus est privatio assignare,et quidnam est quod privatum est.","english":"Further, one who defines in this way must necessarily use the thing defined. This is evident if one takes the definition in place of the name; for since it makes no difference to say that inequality is the privation of equality, equality will be the contrary of the privation of equality, and so he will have used the same thing. But if one of the contraries is stated in terms of privation, and the definition is assigned in like manner—for example, good as the contrary of evil—it is clear that evil will be the contrary of good; for the definition of contraries must be assigned in like manner. Hence again it happens that he uses the thing defined, for good is contained in the definition of evil. Therefore, since good is the contrary of evil, and evil differs in no way from that which is the contrary of good, good will be the contrary of the contrary of good. It is therefore evident that he has used the same thing. Further, if in assigning what is said in terms of privation he has not assigned that of which it is the privation—for example, of a habit, or of a contrary, or of whatever it is a privation of—and if he has not added in what it is naturally produced, either simply or in that in which it is first naturally produced. For example, if in saying that ignorance is a privation he has not said it is the privation of knowledge, or if he has not added that in which it is naturally produced, or in adding it has not assigned that in which it is first produced—for example, that it is not in the rational faculty but in man or in the soul—for if he omits any of these, he has erred. Likewise also if he has not said that blindness is the privation of sight in the eye; for one who assigns well must state both what it is and of what it is the privation, and also what it is that has been deprived.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":172,"ref":"p172","source":"Videndum autem et si non secundum privationem dictum,privatione definivit. Ut et in ignorantia videbitur esse hujusmodi peccalum,iis qui non secundum negationem ignorantiam dicunt: nam quod non babet scientiam non videtur ig[Jorare,sed magis quod deceptum est,propter quod neque inanimata, neque pueros dicimus ignorilre; quare non secundum privationem scientiae ignorantia dicitur. Amplius, si similibus nominis casibus similes orationis casus aptantur,ut si adjutivum est effectivum sanitalis,adjutive est sanitatis effective, et1adjuvansefficiens sanitatem.Considerandumiet in idea,si aptabitur dictus terminus. Nam in quibusdarE non accidit,ut quernadmodum Plato definivit, mortale addens in animalium definitionibus, idea enim non erit mortalis, ut ipse homo; quare non aptabitur ad ideam definitio. Simpliciter autem in quibus apponitur efl'ectivum aut passivum,necesse est dissonare in idea terminum,nam impassibiles et immobiles videntur esse ideæ iis qui dicunt ideas esse; adversum hos autem et tales orationes utiles sunt.","english":"One must also consider whether, when the thing is not stated in terms of privation, he has defined it by privation—as, for instance, in the case of ignorance, this sort of error will appear among those who do not say that ignorance is according to negation; for that which does not have knowledge does not seem to be ignorant, but rather that which has been deceived—on which account we say that neither inanimate things nor children are ignorant; wherefore ignorance is not said according to the privation of knowledge. Further, if similar cases of a name are matched to similar cases of a definition—as, if that which is productive of health is healthful, then that which is productive of health is productive of health, and that which produces health is healthful. One must also consider in the case of the idea whether the stated term will fit. For in certain cases it does not apply, as in the way Plato defined, adding \"mortal\" in his definitions of animals; for the idea will not be mortal, as man himself is; wherefore the definition will not fit the idea. And simply, in those cases in which \"productive\" or \"passive\" is added, the term must be discordant in the case of the idea; for the ideas seem to those who say that ideas exist to be impassible and immovable; but against these men such definitions are useful.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[{"kind":"lacuna","severity":"caution","text":"The source is fragmentary here: the edition marks a break or an editorial bracket, and the English carries across it. Treat the bridge as supplied, not translated."}]},{"i":173,"ref":"p173","source":"CAPUT V,\n\nDe definitione loci alii.\n\nAmplius,si eorum qum secundum æquivocationem dicuntur, unam definitionem omnium communem assignavit.Univoca enim,quorum una est secundum nomen oratio;quare nullius eorum quæ sub nomine sunt,assignatus est terminus, eo quod similiter ad omne,æquivocum adaptatur. Passus autem hoc est, et Dionysii vitae terminus. siquidem ea motus est generi nutriendi naturaliter in serviens, nihil enim hoc magisanimalibusquamplantisinest;vitaautem non secundum unam speciem\"videturdic;,sed altera, quidem animalibus, altera plantis inest.Contingit igitur et secundum electionem sie assignare ternnnum, ac si univoca, et secundum unam speciem omnis vita diceretur. Nihil autem prohibet et eum qui conspicit æquivocationern,et alterius vult defi. nitionefn assignare,latere non propriam, sed communem utrisque orationem assignare, sed nihil minus si utrovis modo Fecerit, peccavit. Postquam autem quædam latent æquivocorum, interroganti quidem ut univocis utendum.Narn non adaptabitur alterius terminus ad alterum, quare videbitur non distinguendum hoc pacto, oportet enim in omne univocum adaptari,eidem autem respondenti, distinguendum est. Quoniam autem quidam respon.","english":"CHAPTER V\n\nOn other definitions of place.\n\nFurther, if he has assigned one definition common to all things that are said according to equivocation. For univocals are those whose account is one according to the name; therefore the term assigned belongs to none of the things that fall under the name, because it is adapted equally to every equivocal. But this is also what has happened with the definition of Dionysius's life. For it is a movement of the genus naturally serving nutrition; for nothing of this sort is more present in animals than in plants; but life does not seem to be spoken of according to one species, but one is present in animals, another in plants. It happens, then, that one assigns the term both according to choice, as if they were univocals, and as if all life were said according to one species. But nothing prevents one who has noticed the equivocation, and wishes to assign a definition of the other, from failing to notice that he is assigning an account that is not proper but common to both; but none the less, if he has done it either way, he has erred. But since some equivocals escape notice, one must, when answering, treat them as univocals. For the term of the one will not be adapted to the other, and so it will seem that a distinction is not to be made in this way; for it ought to be adapted to every univocal. But to the same respondent, a distinction must be made. But since certain people answer...","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":174,"ref":"p174","source":"dentium univocum quidem dicunt esseæquivocum, quando non accommodaturadomne assignata oratio, æquivocum autem univocum,etiam si ad utrumque accommodetur,praeconfessioneutendumprotaltbus, aut præcolligendum quod æquivocum, vel univocum, aut utrumque fuerit. Magis enim concedunt non praevidentes, quod futurum est ut accidat. Si autem non facta confessione dixerit aliquis univtlcum æquivocum esse,eo quod non accommodetur et inhocassignata oratio,considerandum si hujus oratioaccommodatur etad reliqua. Nam manifestum quoniam univocumer]tre!iquis;siautem non,plures erunt definitiones reliquis: nam dux secundum nomen orationes accommodabuntur ad eamdem, quae prior assignala est,etquæ posterior.RurEurn si quis definiens aliquid eorum quæ multipliciter dicuntur, et oratio non accommodatur ad omnia,et quia æquivocum esse non concedat, nomen etiam dicat non ad omnia accommoriari,quoniam nec oratio, dicendum ad ()jusffiodi,quod nominatione quidem oportet uti quae tradita est, et quae sequitur, et non dimovere quae talia sunt, tametsi nonnulla dicenda non sint similiter multitudini. si autem alicujus complexorum assignetur terminus, considerandum est auferendo alterius eorum quæ complectunturorationem, si est et reliqua reliqui.","english":"For they say that a univocal is equivocal when the account assigned does not fit every case, and that an equivocal is univocal even if it fits both; one must use a prior admission concerning such things, or first gather whether it was equivocal, or univocal, or both. For those who do not foresee what will happen are more ready to concede. But if, without having made the admission, someone says that a univocal is equivocal because the account assigned does not fit in this case, one must consider whether his account also fits the remaining cases. For it is manifest that it will be univocal in the remaining cases; but if not, there will be several definitions for the remaining cases, for the accounts will fit the same name, both the one assigned first and the one assigned later. Again, if someone, in defining one of the things that are said in many ways, and the account does not fit all, and because he does not concede that it is equivocal, says that the name also does not fit all, because neither does the account, one must say in reply to such a person that one ought to use the naming that has been handed down and that follows, and not to disturb things of this sort, even if some things ought not to be said in the same way to the multitude. But if a term is assigned for one of the composite things, one must consider, by removing the account of one of the things that compose it, whether the account of the other belongs to the other.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":175,"ref":"p175","source":"Nam si non, manifestum quoniam neque tota totius: ut si quispiam definivitlineam finalem rectam,finem plani habentis fines,cujus medium superadditur finibus, si finalis lineae oratio est, finis plani habentis fines, rectæ oportet esse reliquurn,cujus medium superadditur finibus; sed infinita neque medium neque fines habet, recta autem est; quare non est reliqua reliqui oratio.AmpJius,si cum sit compositum quod definitur, æquimembris oratio assignetur definitio. Æquimembris autem dicituroratioesse quando quot fuerint composita,tot et in oratione nomina et verba fuerint:necesseestenimin talibus ipporum nominum commutationem fieri aut omnium aut aliquorum,eo quod nihil plura nunc quam prius nominadictasunt; verum oportet eum qui definit,orationem pro nominibus assignare,maxime quidem omnibus, quod si non, at saltem in plurimis. Sic enim et in simplici. bus qui nomen commutat., non definiturus est: ut pro tunica vestem.Amplius autem majus peccatum, si et per ignotiora nomina commutationem fecerit ut pro homine albo,terrigenam candentem; neque enim definivit,cum minus sit clarum quod sie didtur.Considerandum autem et si per commutationem nominum, non idem jam significat. Ut qui contemplativam \"scientiam, opinionem contemplativam dixit; nam'opinio scientiae non idem (at oportet,si debet; et totum idem esse); nam contemplativum quidem commune in utrisque orationibus est,reli.","english":"For if not, it is clear that neither is the whole [the account] of the whole; as if someone defined a final line as a straight boundary of a plane having boundaries, whose middle is added over the boundaries—if the account of a final line is \"boundary of a plane having boundaries,\" the remainder must belong to the straight [line], namely \"whose middle is added over the boundaries\"; but the infinite has neither middle nor boundaries, while the straight [line] is [straight]; wherefore the account of the one is not [the account] of the other. Further, if, when the thing defined is composite, an account with equal members is assigned as the definition. An account is said to have equal members when, as many as the components are, so many names and verbs are in the account; for in such cases it is necessary that a substitution of the names themselves occur, either of all or of some, since no more names are now stated than before; but the one who defines ought to assign the account in place of the names, most of all in all cases, but if not, at least in most. For thus also in simple cases the one who substitutes a name will not be defining, as \"garment\" for \"tunic.\" Further, it is a greater fault if he makes the substitution even through less known names, as for \"white man,\" \"earth-born shining one\"; for he has not defined, since what is thus stated is less clear. One must also consider whether through the substitution of names it no longer signifies the same thing. As he who said \"contemplative opinion\" for \"contemplative knowledge\"; for opinion is not the same as knowledge (as it ought to be, if it is to be the same as the whole); for \"contemplative\" is indeed common in both accounts, but the rest—","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":176,"ref":"p176","source":"quum vero differens.Amplius,si alterius nominum commutationem faciens,non differentiæ,sed generis commutationem|fecit: ut in eo quod nuper dictum est, ignotius enim contemplativa quam scientia: nam hoc qnidem genus, illud autem differentia, omnibus autem notius genus,nam cornmunis;quare non generis, sed differentiae oportebat commutationem fieri, eo quod ignotior est. An hæc quidem ridicuJa reprehensio? nihil enim probibet differentiam quidem notissimo nomine dici, genus autem non. Sic autem rebus se habentibus manifestum quoniam generis, et non differentiae secundum nomen cornmutatio facienda,' si autem non nomen pro nomine,sed orationem pro nomine commutat, manifestum quoniam differentiae magis quam generis definitio assignanda est, eo quod cognoscendi gratia definitio assignalur, nam minus differentiaquarn genus nota Si autem differentiae terminum assignavit, considerandum si et alicujus alius communis est assignatus terminus: ut cum imparem numerum, numerum medium habentem dixerit,determinandum est quo pacto medium habentem: nam numerus quidem communis in utrisque orationibus est.Imparis autem coassumpta est oratio; habent autem et linea et corpus medium, cum non sint imparia, quare non utiqueerit definitio hæe imparis. Si autem u ltipliciter dicitur med ium habens,determi nand um quomodo medium haben8,alioqui reprehensio erit, aut syllogismus, quod non definivit.","english":"But when it is different. Further, if in making an exchange of names for something else he has made an exchange not of the differentia but of the genus—as in what was said just now, for contemplative is less known than knowledge; for the latter is a genus, the former a differentia, and the genus is more known to all, for it is common; therefore the exchange ought to have been made not of the genus but of the differentia, because it is less known. Or is this indeed a ridiculous objection? For nothing prevents the differentia from being expressed by a most known name, while the genus is not. But since matters stand thus, it is clear that the exchange according to name should be made of the genus and not of the differentia. If, however, he exchanges not a name for a name but an account for a name, it is clear that the definition should be assigned to the differentia rather than to the genus, because the definition is assigned for the sake of knowing, for the differentia is less known than the genus. But if he has assigned the term of the differentia, one must consider whether the term assigned is also common to something else—as when he has called odd number a number having a middle; one must determine in what way it has a middle, for number is common in both accounts. But the account of odd has been assumed along with it; yet a line and a body also have a middle, though they are not odd, so that this will not be the definition of odd. But if having a middle is said in many ways, one must determine in what way it has a middle; otherwise there will be an objection, or a syllogism, that he has not defined it.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":177,"ref":"p177","source":"Rursum si id cujus quidem orationem assignavit est eorum quae sunt, quod autem sub oratione, non eorum qua? sunt: ut si album quispiam definivit colorem igni permixtum, impossibile enim incorporeum corpori permisceri; quare non ent color igni permixtus,attamen album est.Amplius,quicunquenon dividunt in iis quæ sunt ad aliquid ad quod dicitur, sed in pluribus comprehendentes dicunt,aut omnino, aut in aliquo falsum dicunt: ut si quis medicinam disciplinam entis dixit. Nam si nullius entium medicina est disciplina,manifestum quoniam totaoratio men. dax est; si autem alicujus quidem,alicu,jus autem non, in aliquo mendax: nam oportet de omni, siquidem per se, et non secundum accidens entis esse dicitur, quemadmodum in aliis se habent ea Quae ad aliquid sunt, nam omne disciplinatum ad disciplinam dicitur. Similiter autem et in aliis, eo quod convertuntur omnia ad aliquid.Omne enim disciplinatum, ad aliquid. Caeterum si is (qui non per se, sed secundum accidens assignationem fecit.) recte assignavit, non ad unum, sed ad plura unumquodque eorum quae ad aliquid dicuntur,assignavit,nihil enim prohibet idem, et ens, et album, et bonum esse; quare qui ad quodlibet horum assi. gnavil,recte assignavit, 3iquidem is qui secundum accidens assignavit, recte assignavit.","english":"Again, if the thing whose account he has assigned is among the things that exist, but the thing placed under the account is not among the things that exist—as if someone defined white as color mixed with fire; for it is impossible for an incorporeal thing to be mixed with a body, and therefore color mixed with fire will not exist, yet white does. Further, all who do not divide, in the case of relatives, the thing to which it is said in relation, but speak by comprehending it under many things, say what is false either altogether or in some respect—as if someone said that medicine is the discipline of being. For if medicine is the discipline of no being, it is manifest that the whole account is false; but if it is of some being and not of another, it is false in some respect. For it must be of every being, if indeed it is said to be of being per se and not according to accident, just as relatives are disposed in other cases; for every thing knowable is said in relation to knowledge. And similarly in other cases, because all relatives are convertible. For every thing knowable is relative. But if he who made the assignment not per se but according to accident assigned correctly, he assigned not to one but to many things each of those which are said in relation; for nothing prevents the same thing from being both a being and white and good. Therefore he who assigned it to any one of these assigned correctly, since he who assigned according to accident assigned correctly.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":178,"ref":"p178","source":"Præterea autem impossibile eslh:Jjusmo Ii orationem)ropriam assignati esse,nam non solum rnedicina,sed plures aliarum disciplinarum ad ens dicuntur: quare una quæqueentis disciplina erit; mauifestumigiturquoniam talis nullius est disciplinæ defini tio,propriam enim et non communem \"portet definitionem esse. Quandoque autem definiunt non rern,sed rem bene se habentem aut perfectam.Talis autem et rhetoris et furis terminus,si sit rhetorquidem,qui potest quod in unoquoque est verisimile considerare, et nibil prætermiltere; fur autem qui clam sumit: perspicuum enim quoniam cum talis uterque,hic quidem bonus rbetor,ille autem bonus fur erit: non enim qui clam sumit, sed qui vult clam sumere fur est. Rursum si quod propterse eligendum est,ut activum vel E'lfeClivum,vel quolibeidmodo propter aliud eligendum assignavit:ut qui,justitiamlegum conserva' tivam dixit,aut sapientiameffectivam felici ta tis: nam conservativum et effectivu eorum sunt quae propter aliud eliguntur. An nibil quidem probibet quod propter se eligendum est,pt propter aliud esse eligendum; attamen nihil minus peccavitqui sicdeHnivit quod propter se est eligendum:nam unicuiquc optimum, in substantia maxime, melius autem quod propter se eligend um, quam quod propter aHud; quare id et definition em oportebit magis sisniScare.","english":"Further, it is impossible that this be the proper account of it; for not only medicine but many of the other disciplines are spoken of in relation to being; hence each of them will be the discipline of being. It is evident, therefore, that such a definition belongs to no discipline, for a definition must be proper and not common. Sometimes, however, they define not the thing but the thing in a good or perfect state. Such is the definition of the rhetorician and of the thief—if a rhetorician is one who can consider what is persuasive in each particular case and omit nothing, while a thief is one who takes secretly; for it is clear that, when each is such, the one will be a good rhetorician and the other a good thief; for it is not the one who takes secretly but the one who wishes to take secretly who is a thief. Again, if he has assigned as the definition something choiceworthy for its own sake—as active or productive, or in any way choiceworthy for the sake of something else—as one who said that justice is the preserver of laws, or that wisdom is the producer of happiness; for a preserver and a producer are of things that are choiceworthy for the sake of something else. Now nothing prevents that which is choiceworthy for its own sake from also being choiceworthy for the sake of something else; nevertheless, he who thus defined that which is choiceworthy for its own sake has erred none the less; for the best for each thing is in its substance most of all, and that which is choiceworthy for its own sake is better than that which is choiceworthy for the sake of something else; wherefore the definition ought rather to signify this.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":179,"ref":"p179","source":"CAPUT VI.\n\nDe definitione loci alii.\n\nConsiderandum autem est et si is qui aticujusdefinitionem assignavit, aut h'ec,au quod est ex bis, aut hoc cum illo definivit.Narn si baec quidem,accidet utrisque et neutri inesse,ut si justitiam,temperantiam et fortitudinem definiverit;nam si sint duo, uterque autem alterum habeat,utrique justi erunt, et neuter,eo quod utrique quidem habent justitiam, uterque autem non habet.Si autem nondum quod dictum est admodum absurdum videtur,eo quod et in aliis accidat hujusmodi (nihil enim probibet ulrosque habere unam, cum neuter habeat), attamen contraria inessc cidem,omnino absurdum videbitur esse.Accidet autem hoc si hic quidem ipsorum temperantiam et timiditatem habet,ille autem fortitudinem et prodigalitatem, nam utrique et justitiam et itjjustitiam babent.","english":"CHAPTER VI.\n\nOn other [faults] in a definition.\n\nOne must also consider whether the person who has assigned a definition of something has defined either these things, or what is composed of them, or this together with that. For if it is these things, it will happen that they belong to both and to neither, as if someone has defined justice as temperance and courage; for if there are two [persons], and each has the other, both will be just, and neither will be, in that both indeed have justice, but each does not. But if what has been said does not yet seem quite absurd, because such a thing also happens in other cases (for nothing prevents both from having one thing when neither has it), yet that contraries be present in the same thing will seem altogether absurd. But this will happen if one of them has temperance and cowardice, and the other courage and prodigality; for both have justice and injustice.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":180,"ref":"p180","source":"Nam si justitia, temperantia etfortitudo eSI, el injustitia timiditaset prodigalitas erit,et omnino quæcunque ad argumentandum idonea quod non idem sunt et partes et totum, omnia utilia ad id quod dictum est; videtur autem qui sic definit partes,toli easdem dicere esse.Maxime autem accommodatae fiunt orationes, in quibuscunque rnanifesta partiu est com positio,quemadmodum in domo et in cæteris talibus; manifestum enim quoniam cunt sint partes, nihil prohibet totum nou esse, quare non idem partes toti.Si autem non haec, sed quod ex his est,dixit id esse quod definitur, primum quidem considerandum si non natum est quidpiam unum fieri ex iis quae dicta sunt.Quædam enim sic se habentad invicem, ut nihil exeis unum quidpiam fiat,ut linea et numerus.Amplius, si definitum quidem in uno aliquo natum est primo fieri, ex quibus autem dixit ipsum esse,non in uno primo nata suut fieri,sed utrumque in ulroque.Nam manifestum quoniam non erit ex iis illud; in quibus enim partes,et totum necesse est inesse;quare non in uno totum primo esse, sed in pluribus.","english":"For if justice is temperance and courage, then injustice will be timidity and prodigality, and in general all things that are useful for arguing that the parts and the whole are not the same—all are useful for what has been said; but he who defines in this way seems to say that the parts are the same as the whole. But speeches are most fitting in those cases in which the composition of the parts is manifest, as in a house and other such things; for it is manifest that, since there are parts, nothing prevents the whole from not being [the parts], and therefore the parts are not the same as the whole. But if he did not say that these are what is defined, but rather what is composed of them, first indeed one must consider whether something one is naturally able to come to be from the things that have been stated. For some things are related to one another in such a way that nothing one comes to be from them, as a line and a number. Further, if the thing defined is naturally able to come to be first in some one thing, but the things from which he said it is are not naturally able to come to be first in one thing, but each in both—for it is manifest that it will not be from these; for in whatever things there are parts, the whole must also be present; therefore the whole is not first in one thing, but in many.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":181,"ref":"p181","source":"Si autem et partes et totum in uno aliquo primo, considerandum si non in eodem,i:;ed in allero totum, et in altero partes. Nam in quo tatum, in il'.o et partes esse videntur.Rursum,Bi cum toto corrumuntur partes. E converso enim oportet accidere, partibus corruptis,lotum corrumpi; toto vero corrupto,non necesse est et partes corrumpi.Aut si totum quidem bonum vel malum,partes autem neutrae; aut e converso,partes quidem bonæ vel mala?, totum autem neutrum.Nam neque ex neutris posaibile bonum quidpiam vel malum fieri,neque ex bonis vel malis neutrum. Aut si magis quidem alterum bonum quam alterum malum,quod autem ex his, non magis bonum quam malum,ut si imprudentia ex fortitudine et falsa opinione; magis enim bonum fortitudo quam malum falsa opinio.Oportet ergo et quod ex hisest sequi illud quod magis est, et esse vel simpliciter honum,vel magis bonum quam malum.An hoc quidem nun necessarium,nisi utrumque sit per se bonum vel malum? muIta enim efl'ectivorum persequtdem nonsunt bona, mixta autemquibusdam fiunt bona,auteconverso utrumque quidem bonum,mixta autem malum vel neutrum.","english":"But if both the parts and the whole are in some one primary thing, one must consider whether they are not in the same thing, but the whole in one and the parts in the other. For the parts seem to be in that in which the whole is. Again, if the parts are destroyed together with the whole. For the converse ought to happen: when the parts are destroyed, the whole is destroyed; but when the whole is destroyed, it is not necessary that the parts also be destroyed. Or if the whole is good or evil, but the parts are neither; or conversely, the parts are good or evil, but the whole is neither. For neither can anything good or evil come from things that are neither, nor can a neither from things good or evil. Or if one of them is more good than the other is evil, and what comes from them is not more good than evil—as, for instance, imprudence from courage and false opinion; for courage is more good than false opinion is evil. It is necessary, then, that what comes from these should follow that which is the more, and be either simply good, or more good than evil. Or is this not necessary, unless each is in itself good or evil? For many things that are productive of something are not good in themselves, but when mixed with certain things become good; or conversely, when each is good, the mixture is evil or neither.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":182,"ref":"p182","source":"Maxime autem manifestumquodnuncdictumestinsalubribus et morbificis,nam quaedam medicamentorum sic se habent,ut utrumque quidem sit bonum,si autem utraque dentur mixta, malum.Rursum,si quod ex meliore et pejore est, non est totum pejore quidem melius, meliore autem pejus.An neque hoc necessarium, nisi per sesintex quihus componitur, bona? nam in iis quae non per se sunt bona, nihil probibet totum non fieri bonum,utin iis quae mododicl:1. sunt.Amplius,si cOl);nomine est totum alteri. Non oportet enim,ut neque in syllabis; nulli enim elementorum ex quibus componitur syllaba cognominis est.Amplius, si non dixit modum compositionis. Nonenirnsuf(jciens cstad cognoscendum quod dicHt ex his: nam non quod ex his, sed quod sic ex his, est cujusque cornpositorum su bstantia,ut in domo: non enim si quolibet modo componantur haec, dornus est.Si autem hoc cum illo assign::tvit, prirnum quidem dicendum quod cum hoc ilia aut hoc et illud dicitur, aut quod ex ill is.","english":"But what has now been said is most evident in things wholesome and harmful; for some medicines are so disposed that each is good, yet if both are given mixed together, it is bad. Again, whether that which consists of the better and the worse is not, as a whole, better than the worse but worse than the better. Or is not even this necessary, unless the things of which it is composed are good in themselves? For in those things which are not good in themselves, nothing prevents the whole from not becoming good, as in those things which are called by a certain name. Further, if the whole is homonymous with one of its parts. For it is not necessary, as neither in syllables; for none of the elements of which a syllable is composed is homonymous with it. Further, if he has not stated the mode of composition. For it is not sufficient for knowing what he says, that it is from these; for not that which is from these, but that which is so from these, is the substance of each composite thing, as in a house; for it is not a house if these are composed in any way whatever. But if he has assigned this with that, first indeed it must be said that with this those things are said, or this and that, or that which is from them.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":183,"ref":"p183","source":"Nam qui dicit mel cum aqua; vel mel et aquam dicit,vel quod ex melle et aqua, quare si cuilibet eorumquæ dicta suntidem confitebitur esse boc cum ilIo,eadem conveniet dicere quae quidem ad utrumque horum prius dicta sunt.Ampl ius,dividenti quoties dicituralterum cum altero,considerandum si nullo modo hoc cum illo: ut si dicitur alterum cum altero, aut ut in aliquo eodem susceptivo,ut justitia et fortitudo in anima, aut in ioco eodem, aut in tempore eodem, nullo autem modo verum sit quod dictum est in bis,manifestum est quoniam nullius erit assignatadefinitio, eo quod nullo modo hoc cum illoest.Siautem diviso quoties dicitur alterum cum altero, verum erit in eodem tempore utrumque esse, considerandum si contingit non ad eumdem utrumque dici finem i ut si fortitudinem defiQivitaudaciam cum recta intelJigentia,contingit enim audaciam quidem habere spoliandi,rectam autem intelligentiam circa salubria, sed nondum fortis qui in eodem tempore,cum illo hoc habet.Amplius, si et ad idem ambo dicuntur, ut ad medicativa,Nibil enim prohibet et audaciam quamdam,et rectam intelligentiam habere ad medicativa, attamen nec sic fortis qui hoc cum illo habet; neque enim ad alterum eorum utrumque oportet dici,neque ad idem quodcunque sit, sed ad fortitudinis finem, ut ad praeliorum pericula, aut si quid magis est illius ilnis.QuædaOl autem sic assignatorum nullo modo sub dictam cadunt divisionem,","english":"For he who says \"honey with water,\" or says \"honey and water,\" or \"that which is from honey and water\"—if he will admit that this same thing is with that, it will be consistent to say the same things that were said before about each of these two. Further, whenever \"the one with the other\" is said in division, one must consider whether in no way is this with that; for if \"the one with the other\" is said either as in some same receptive thing, as justice and courage in the soul, or in the same place, or in the same time, but what has been said in these is in no way true, it is evident that no definition will have been assigned to it, because in no way is this with that. But if, when \"the one with the other\" is said in division, it will be true that both are in the same time, one must consider whether it happens that both are not said in relation to the same end—as if someone defines courage as boldness with right understanding; for it happens that boldness has to do with plundering, but right understanding with things wholesome, yet he is not yet courageous who has this with that at the same time. Further, if both are said in relation to the same thing, as to medicine—for nothing prevents a certain boldness and right understanding from being directed to medicine—still not even so is he courageous who has this with that; for it is not necessary that both be said in relation to one of them, nor to the same thing whatever it may be, but to the end of courage, as to the dangers of battles, or if there is anything more proper to it. But certain of those assigned in this way fall in no way under the division stated.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":184,"ref":"p184","source":"ut si ira tristitia est cum opinione parvipendendi: nam quod propter hujusmodi opinionem tristitia ilt, hoc vult indicare; propter hoc autem fieri aliquid, non est idem ei quod est hoc quidem cum illo esse secundum ullum dictorum, modorurn, Rursum, si horum compositionem dixit totum: ut animæ et corporis compositionem animal. Primum quidem considerandum si non dixit qualis compositio; ut si carnem definiens, aut os, ignis et aeris et terrae dixit composilionem.Non enim sufticit compositionem dicere,sed qua? et qualis determinandum.Non enim quolibet modo compositis his caro fit, sed sic quidem compositis caro,sic vero os. Videlur autem neque esse omnino compositioni idem neutrum eorum quæ dicta sunt,nam compositioniomni dissolutio contraria,dictorum autem neutri, nihil. Amplius, si similiter est verisimile omne compositum compositionem esse,vel nullum;animalium autem unuruquodque cum sit compositurn, non est compositio,neque profecto aliorum compositorum ullum compositio erit.Rursum,si similiter in aliquo nata sunt esse contraria, definivit autem per alterum, manifestum quoniam non definivit. Si autem non ita est, plures accidet ejusdem definitiones esse; quid enim magis qui per hoc quam qui per alterum dedmens dixit?","english":"For example, if anger is sadness with the opinion of slighting; for he wishes to indicate that sadness arises on account of an opinion of this sort; but \"to come to be on account of this\" is not the same as \"this to be with that\" according to any of the ways mentioned. Again, if he said that the whole is the composition of these things, as the animal is the composition of soul and body. First, indeed, one must consider whether he did not say what sort of composition it is; for example, if in defining flesh or bone he said it is a composition of fire and air and earth. For it is not enough to say \"composition,\" but one must determine of what and of what sort. For flesh does not come to be when these things are composed in any random way, but when composed in this way it is flesh, and in that way it is bone. But it seems that composition is not altogether the same as either of the things that were mentioned; for dissolution is contrary to every composition, but to neither of the things mentioned is it anything. Further, if it is similarly plausible that every composite is a composition, or that none is; but each of the animals, since it is composite, is not a composition, then surely none of the other composites will be a composition either. Again, if contraries are naturally present in something in a similar way, but he defined it through one of them, it is manifest that he did not define it. But if this is not so, it will turn out that there are several definitions of the same thing; for why is the one who defined it through this rather than the one who defined it through the other said to have defined it?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":185,"ref":"p185","source":"eo quod similiter utraque nata sunt fieri in eodem.Talis autem animae est definitio, siquidem estosubstantia disciplillæ susceptiva, nam similiter et ignorantiae est susceptiva. Oportet autem si non ad totam habeat aliquis argumentari definitionern, eo quod non tota sit tota, ad aliquam partium argumentari si sit nota,et non bene assignata appareat, nam parte interempta,ettotadefinitio interimitur,Quæcunque autem obscurae sunt definitionum emendanti et conformanti ad manifestandum aliquid et habendum argumentum, sic considerandum.Necesse est enim respondentem aut suscipere quod sumptum est ab mterrogante, aut eumdem declarare quid temere est ostensum adefinitione.Amplius,quemadmodum in congregationibus solent legem inducere,et si sit melior quæ inducitur, interimit anteriorern,sic et in definitionibus faciendum,et definitio alia ferenda.Nam si appareL melior, et magis manifestum quod definitur, perspicuum quoniam interempta erit quæ posita est, eo quod non sunt ejusdem plures definitiones. Ad omnes autem definitiones non minimum elementum ad seipsum,solerter definire propositum, aut apte dictum tercninum assumere.Necesseest enim veluti ad exemplar considerantem,et quod minustest;iis quae oportet habere definitionem,et quod oppositum est superflue,inspicere,ut magis argumentis abundemus.Quæ igitur circa definitiones sunt., in tantum dicta sint.","english":"Because both are naturally able to come to be in the same thing. Such is the definition of the soul, if indeed it is substance receptive of discipline; for in like manner it is also receptive of ignorance. But if someone does not argue against the whole definition on the ground that the whole is not the whole, he ought to argue against some of its parts, if it is known and does not appear to be well assigned; for when a part is destroyed, the whole definition is also destroyed. But all definitions that are obscure, for one who is correcting and conforming them so as to make something manifest and to have an argument, must be considered as follows. For the respondent must either accept what has been assumed by the questioner, or himself make clear what has been rashly shown by the definition. Moreover, just as in assemblies they are accustomed to introduce a law, and if the one introduced is better, it destroys the earlier one, so also must it be done in definitions, and another definition must be brought forward. For if it appears better and what is being defined is more manifest, it is clear that the one that has been posited will be destroyed, because there are not several definitions of the same thing. But for all definitions, no small element is to define the proposed thing skillfully oneself, or to assume a term aptly stated. For one must, as it were looking to a model, consider both what is lacking in those things that the definition ought to have, and what is superfluous in the opposite, so that we may abound more in arguments. Let what has been said about definitions be said to this extent.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":186,"ref":"p186","source":"LIBER SEPTIMUS.\n\nCAPUT PRIMUM.\n\nDe eodem et diuerso loci.\n\nUtrum autem idem an diversum secundum propriissimum eorum (qm dicti suntde eodem) modo-: rum,dicendum (dicebatur autem IJropriissime idem, quod numero unum),considerandum autem ex ca, sibus, et conjugatis, et oppositis. Nam si justitia idem est fortitudini,et justus forti,etjuste fortiter, similiter autem et in oppositis.Nam si hæc eadem, etopposita bis,eadem secund um quamlibet ictarum oppositionum, Nihil enim differt hoc vel hoc modo oppositum sumere, eo quod idem est. Rursum ex effectivis et corruptivis,et generationibus et eorruptionibus,et omnino ex iis quae similiter se habent alterum ad alterum. Nam quaecunque simpliciter eadem, etiam generationes eorum et corruptiones eædem, et effectiva et corruptiva. Considerandum autem et quorum alterum maxime dicitur quodvis esse,si et alterum ipsorum secundum idem maxime dicitur.Sir.ut Xenocrates beatam vitam et studiosam assignavit eamdem,eo quodomniumvitarummaxime eligenda studiosa et beala,llDum enim maxime eligendum et maximum. Similiter et in aliis hujusmodi.Oportet autem utrumque unum numero esse, quod dicitur maximum et maxime eligendum; si autem nOn,non erit ostensum quod idem.","english":"BOOK SEVEN.\n\nCHAPTER ONE.\n\nOn the topics of the same and the different.\n\nWhether something is the same or different must be discussed according to the most proper of the modes of the same (which have been stated concerning the same); for the most proper same was said to be that which is one in number. But this must be considered from cases, and conjugates, and opposites. For if justice is the same as courage, then the just man is the same as the brave man, and to act justly is the same as to act bravely; and similarly also in opposites. For if these are the same, their opposites are also the same according to whichever of these oppositions. For it makes no difference to take the opposite in this way or in that way, since it is the same. Again, from things productive and destructive, and from generations and corruptions, and generally from things that are related to one another in a similar way. For whatever things are simply the same, their generations and corruptions are also the same, and their productive and destructive causes. One must also consider things of which one is said most of all to be anything, whether the other of them is also said to be the same according to the same. For example, Xenocrates assigned the happy life and the studious life to be the same, because of all lives the studious and happy life is most of all to be chosen; for the most to be chosen and the greatest are the same. Similarly also in other such cases. But it is necessary that both be one in number, that which is said to be greatest and most to be chosen; for if not, it will not have been shown that they are the same.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":187,"ref":"p187","source":"Non necessarium enirn,si fortissimi Graecorum sunt Peioponnesii,et Lacedæmonii, eosdem esse Peloponnesios Lacedæmoniis,eo quod non unus numero Peloponnesius et Lacedaemonius, sed contineri quidem alterum ab altero necessarium,ut Lacedaemonii aPeioponnesiia; si autem non,accidet seipsis invicem esse meliores si non continentur alteri ab alteris: necesse est enim Peloponnesios meliores esse quam Lacedæmonios,si non continentur alteri ab alteris,, Dam omnibus reliquis sunt meliores.Similiterautem et Lacedaemonios necesse est meliores esse Polopoanesiis, nam et isti omnibus caeteris sunt meliores, quare se invicem meliores fiunt. Manifestum ergo quoniam unum numero esse oportet,quod optimum et maximum dicitur, si debeat quod idem sint ostendi.Propterquod Xenocrates non idem assignavit: non enim uno numero beata et studiosa vita, quapropter non necessarium eamdem esse,eo quod ambae maxime eligendæ, sed altera sub altera. Rursum considerandum si cui alterum idem,et alterum.Nam si non sunt ambo eidem eaderr.,manifestum quoniam nee sjbi invicem,Amplius autem ex iis quæ bis accidunt,et quibus hæc accidunt,considerandurn.Nam quæJunq ue alteri accidunt,et alteri oportet accidere,et quibus alterum eorum accidit., et alterum eorum oportet accidere;si autem aliquid eorum dissonet, dilucidum quoniam non eadem.","english":"For it is not necessary, if the Peloponnesians and the Lacedaemonians are the bravest of the Greeks, that the Peloponnesians be the same as the Lacedaemonians, since the Peloponnesian and the Lacedaemonian are not one in number, but it is necessary that the one be contained by the other, as the Lacedaemonians by the Peloponnesians; but if not, it will happen that they are better than one another if the one is not contained by the others; for it is necessary that the Peloponnesians be better than the Lacedaemonians, if the one is not contained by the others, since they are better than all the rest. And similarly it is necessary that the Lacedaemonians be better than the Peloponnesians, for these too are better than all the others; wherefore they become better than one another. It is evident, therefore, that what is said to be the best and greatest must be one in number, if it is to be shown that they are the same. For this reason Xenocrates did not assign them as the same; for the happy life and the studious life are not one in number, wherefore it is not necessary that they be the same, because both are most to be chosen, but the one is under the other. Again, one must consider whether the one is the same as the other and the other as the one. For if both are not the same as the same thing, it is evident that neither are they the same as each other. Moreover, one must consider from the things that belong to both and to which these belong. For whatever belongs to the one must also belong to the other, and to whichever of them the one belongs, the other must also belong; but if any of these is discordant, it is clear that they are not the same.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":188,"ref":"p188","source":"Videndum autem et si non in uno genere prædicamenti utraque, sed hoc quidem quale, illud autem quantum, vel ad aliquid indicet. Ruranm si genus utrisque non idem, sed hoc quidem bonum, illud autem malum, aut boc quidem virtus, illud autem scientia.Aut si genus quidem idem, difFerentiæ autem non eædem de utroque prædicantur,sed de boc quidem quoniam contemplativa scientia, de illo autem quoniam activa; similiter autem et in aliis. Amplius autem ex rnagis,si hoc quidem suscipit magis,illud autem nOn,aut si ambo suscipiunt quidem, non simul autem. Ut qui magis amat, non magis concupiscit venerem,quare non idem amor et concupiscentia veneris. Amplius ex appositione, si eidem utrumque appositum,non facit idem totum. Aut si eodem ab utroque sublato,quod relinquitur est alterum.Ut si duplum dimidii et multiplum di. midii idem dixerit esse: sublato enim ab utroque dimidio,reliqua idem oporteret indicare; non indicant autem,nam duplum et multiplum non eadem significant.","english":"One must also consider whether the two are not in the same genus of predication, but the one indicates of what sort it is, the other how much, or relation. Again, if the genus of both is not the same, but the one is good, the other evil; or the one virtue, the other knowledge. Or if the genus is indeed the same, but the differentiae predicated of each are not the same, but of the one that it is contemplative knowledge, of the other that it is active; and similarly in other cases. Further, from the more: if the one admits of more, the other does not; or if both admit of it, but not at the same time. As he who loves more does not desire sexual pleasure more, wherefore love and the desire of sexual pleasure are not the same. Further, from addition: if both added to the same thing do not make the same whole. Or if, when the same thing is taken away from both, what remains is the other. As if someone should say that the double of a half and the multiple of a half are the same; for when the half is taken away from both, the remaining things ought to indicate the same; but they do not, for double and multiple do not signify the same.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":189,"ref":"p189","source":"Considerandum autem non solum si jam aliquid accidit impossibile per positionem,sed et si possibile sit ex suppositione existere.Quemadmodum iis qui vacuum et plenum aere idem dicunt esse;nam manifestum quoniam si exeat aer,vacuum quidem non minus,sed magis eril,plenum autem aere non amplius erit; quare supposito aliquo sive vero,sive falso (nibil enim refert.), si alterum interimitur, alterum autem non, profecto non idem sunt. Universałiter autem dicendo ex iis quae quovis modo de utroque prædicantur,el de quibus hæc prædicantur, cousiderandum si alicubi dissonent.Nam quaecunque de altero prædicantur, et de allero praedicari oportet, et de quibus alterum prædicatur, et alterum praedicari oportet.Amplius,quia multipliciter idem dicitur,considerandum si secundum alium aliquem modum eadem sunt. Nam specie vel genere eadem, non necesse est numero eadem esse;consideramu autem utrum sic eadem, an non sic.Amplius, si potest alterum siue altero esse,non erit enim idem ad idem. Igitur loci tot dicuntur.","english":"One must consider not only whether something impossible has already resulted from the positing, but also whether it is possible for it to exist from the supposition. For example, in the case of those who say that void and full are the same as air; for it is clear that if the air departs, the void will be no less but rather more, while the full will no longer be air; therefore, when something has been supposed, whether true or false (for it makes no difference), if one is destroyed and the other is not, they are assuredly not the same. And speaking universally, from the things that are predicated in any way of both, and of the things of which these are predicated, one must consider whether they disagree anywhere. For whatever things are predicated of the one ought also to be predicated of the other, and whatever things the one is predicated of, the other ought also to be predicated of. Moreover, since \"the same\" is said in many ways, one must consider whether they are the same according to some other mode. For things that are the same in species or genus are not necessarily the same in number; but we consider whether they are the same in this way or not. Moreover, if the one can be without the other, then it will not be the same as the same. So many loci are thus stated.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":190,"ref":"p190","source":"CAPUT II.\n\nDe eadem definitione loci alii.\n\nPalam autem ex iis quae dicta sunt, quoniam omnes qui ad idem sunt destructivi loci,et ad terminum utiles sunt,qllemadmodum prius dictum est. Nam si non idem indicet et nomen et oratio, manifestum quoniam non erit definitio assignataoratto. Constructil'orum autem locorum nullus utilis ad terminum. Non enim sufficit ostendere idem quod sub oratione et nomine est ad construendum quoniam definitio, sed et alia oportet omnia habere (quæ praecepta sunt) definitionem;interimere igitur definilionem sic et per haec semper tentandum.Si autem construere volumus, primum quidem scire oporlet quoniam nullus vel pauci disputantium terminum syllogismo colligunt, sed omnes principium quod tale est accipiunt, ut qui circa geometriam, et numeros,et alias hujusmodi disciplinas. Deinde quoniam exacte quidem alterius est negotii assignare, et quid est terminus, et quomodo definire oportet. Nunc autem, quantum sufficitad praesentem utilitatem, tantum solum dicendum quoniam possibile fieri definitionis, et ejus quod quid est, esse syllogismum. Nam si terminus est oratio quæ quid est esse rei indicat, et oportet ea quae in termino ponuntur, in eo quod quid est de re sola prædicari,prædicanlur autem sola in eo quod quid est,genera et differentiæ.","english":"CHAPTER II.\n\nOn the same definition of place, other points.\n\nIt is clear from what has been said that all destructive topics that lead to the same point are also useful for the term, just as was said earlier. For if both the name and the account do not indicate the same thing, it is clear that the definition assigned by the account will not be a definition. But none of the constructive topics is useful for the term. For it is not enough, in order to establish a definition, to show that the same thing is signified by the account and the name, but the definition must also have all the other requirements that have been laid down. Therefore one must always attempt to destroy a definition in this way and by these means. But if we wish to construct one, we must first know that none, or few, of those who argue collect the term by syllogism, but all take such a principle as given, as do those who work in geometry, numbers, and other such disciplines. Next, that to assign exactly what the term is and how one ought to define belongs to another undertaking. But now, as far as suffices for present usefulness, only this much need be said: that it is possible for a syllogism of a definition, and of what a thing is, to come about. For if a term is an account that indicates what it is for a thing to be, and the things posited in the term must be predicated in the what-it-is of the thing alone, and only genera and differentiae are predicated in the what-it-is.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":191,"ref":"p191","source":"Manifestum quoniam siquis sumat ea quæsolum de re in eo quod quid est prædicari oportet, quod hæc bnbens oratio, terminus ex necessitate erit, non enim contingit aliud esse terrninum,eo quod nihil aliud in eo quod quid est de re prædicatur;quod igitur possibile est ex termino syllogismum fieri manifestum.Exquibusauteæ oportet construere, determinatum est quidem in aliis diligentius,ad propositam autem methodum iidem loci utiles.Inspiciendum enim in contrariis et in aliis oppositis, et totas orationes, et secundum partem consideranti.Nam si opposita oppositæ, et eam (quæ dicta est)propositi necesse est esse.Quoniarn autem contrariorum plures complexiones,sumenda est ex contrariisqualiscunquemaximeapparebit contraria defi nitio;totas igitur definitiones,quemadmodum di. ctum est,considerandum.Secundum parterr: autem hoc pacto,primum quidem quoniam assignatum genus recte assignatum cst.Nam si contrarium in contrario, propo;itum autem nun est in eodem, manifestum quoniam in contrario erit,eo quod necesse est contraria in eodem genere vel in contrariis generibus esse.","english":"It is clear that if one takes the things that ought to be predicated solely of the thing in respect of what it is, then the account containing these will necessarily be a definition; for it is not possible for it to be anything else, since nothing else is predicated of the thing in respect of what it is. That a syllogism can be made from a definition is therefore clear. From what things one ought to construct it has indeed been determined more carefully elsewhere, but for the proposed method the same topics are useful. For one must examine contraries and other opposites, both whole accounts and accounts considered part by part. For if the opposite belongs to the opposite, the proposed predicate must also belong to the subject stated. Since, however, there are several combinations of contraries, one must take from the contraries the definition that appears most contrary in whatever way; whole definitions, then, must be considered as has been said. Part by part, however, in this way: first, that the assigned genus has been correctly assigned. For if the contrary is in the contrary, and the proposed subject is not in the same, it is clear that it will be in the contrary, since contraries must be in the same genus or in contrary genera.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":192,"ref":"p192","source":"Et dilferl'ntias quidem contrarias de contrariis arbitramur prædicari,ut de albo et nigro: nam illud quidem disgregativum,hocautemcongregativum vi!:!Usjquare si de contrario contrariae prædicantur,de proposito quae assignatæ sunt prædicabuntur; quapropter quia et genus et differentias recte assignata sunt,manifestum quoniam definitio erit quae assignata est, An non necessarium est de contrariia differentias prædicari, nisi in eodem genere sint contraria2quorum autem genera sunt contraria,nibil prohibet eamdem differentiam de utrisque dici,ut de justitia et injustitia:uarn illa quidem virtus,hæc autem vitium animæ.Quare id quod est anima, differentia de utrisque dicitur, eo quod et corporis est virtus et vitium jsed hoc verum quod contrariorum,aut contrariæ,aut eædem differentiae sunt; si ergo de contrario contraria prædicatur,de hoc autem non,manifestum quoniam quae dicta est de boc prædicabitur. Universaliter autem dicendo, si definitio est ex genere et differentiis,si sit contra.","english":"We consider that contrary differentiae are predicated of contraries, as of white and black; for the one is dispersive and the other congregative to sight. Therefore, if contrary differentiae are predicated of a contrary, the differentiae assigned will be predicated of the proposed subject; wherefore, since both the genus and the differentiae have been correctly assigned, it is clear that what has been assigned will be a definition. Or is it not necessary that differentiae be predicated of contraries, unless the contraries are in the same genus? But for those whose genera are contrary, nothing prevents the same differentia from being said of both, as of justice and injustice; for the one is a virtue and the other a vice of the soul. Therefore that which is the soul is said as a differentia of both, because it is both the virtue and the vice of the body; but this is true, that of contraries the differentiae are either contrary or the same. If, then, a contrary is predicated of a contrary, but not of this, it is clear that what has been stated will be predicated of this. And speaking universally, if the definition is from genus and differentiae, if it be of a contrary.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":193,"ref":"p193","source":"rii definitio manifesta, et quae propositi definitio manif'esta erit.Nam quoniam contrarium in eodem genere,vel in contrario,simiIiter autem et differentiae aut contrariae de contrariis, aut eaedem prædicantur, dilucidum quoniam de proposlto,aut idem genus prædicabilur quod de contrario; differentiae autem contrariæ, vel omnes, vel aliquae; reliquæ autem eaedem autcontra,differenliæ quidem eaedem, genera vero contraria,aut ambo contraria,efgenera et differentiæ:nam eadem esse ambo non contingit; si autem secus,definitio eadem contrariorum erit, Amplius,ex casibus et conjugatis. Necesse est enim consequi genera generibus,et terminos terminis,ut si oblivio est scientiae amissio,et oblivisci amittere scientiam erit,et oblitum esse amisisse scielltiam. Uno igitur quolibet eorum quae dicta sunt confesso, necesse est et reliqua confiteri.Similiter autem et si corruptio dissolutio substantiæ,et corrumpere dissolvere substantiam, et corruptive dissolutive, si corruptivum dissolutivum substantiæ,et corruptio substantiae dissolutio. Similiter autem et in aliis. Quare uno quovis sumpto, et reliqua omnia conflteantur oportet.","english":"For the definition of the contrary will be manifest, and the definition of the proposed term will be manifest. For since a contrary is in the same genus, or in a contrary genus, and likewise differentiae are predicated of contraries either as contraries or as the same, it is clear that of the proposed term either the same genus will be predicated as of its contrary, or contrary differentiae, either all or some; and the rest are either the same or contrary—the differentiae the same, but the genera contrary, or both contrary, both the genera and the differentiae; for it cannot happen that both are the same. Otherwise, the definition of contraries would be the same. Further, from cases and conjugates. For genera must follow genera, and terms follow terms: as, if forgetfulness is the loss of knowledge, then to forget will be to lose knowledge, and to have forgotten will be to have lost knowledge. Therefore, when any one of the things said is granted, the rest must also be granted. Likewise, if corruption is the dissolution of substance, then to corrupt is to dissolve substance, and corruptive is dissolutive; if corruptive is dissolutive of substance, then the corruption of substance is its dissolution. Likewise also in other cases. Wherefore, when any one is assumed, all the rest must be granted.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":194,"ref":"p194","source":"Et ex similiter se habentibus ad invicem.Nam si salubre est effectivum sanitatis, et habile effectivum bonæ habitudinis erit,etadjutivum effectivum boni:nam similiter unumquodque eorum quae dicta sunt ad suum finem se habet; quare si unius eorum definitio est effeclivum esse finis, et reliquorum cujusque sic erit definitio.Amplius, ex eo quod est magis et similiter, quod est similiter, quoties contingit construere duas ali duo comparantem, Ut si magis haec hujus quam ista istius definitio,ista autem que? minus,definitio est, et haec quae magis, et si similiter haec hujus, et ista istius, si altera alterius, et reliqua reliquæ. Una autem defi. nitio ad duo cornparata,aut duabus dofinitionibus ad unum.neutiquam utilis ea quæ ex magis est consideratio. Nam neque unam duorum, neque duas ejusdem definitiones possibile estesse.Suntautemopportunissimi locorum,et qui nunc dicti sunt,et qui ex casibus, et qui ex conjugatis, quocirca et oportet maxime detinere et promptos habere hos.UtiFssimi enim ad plurima.Aliorum autem hi qui maxime sunt communes. Nam illi maxime reliquorum efficacis. simi, ut inspicere in singularibus, et in speciebus considerare,si conveniat definitio, eo quod univoca species est; est autem utilis hic locus ad eos qui ponunt ideas esse,quemadmodum prius dictum est.","english":"And from things that are similarly related to one another. For if the healthful is productive of health, the capable will also be productive of good condition, and the helpful productive of good; for each of the things mentioned is similarly related to its end; wherefore if the definition of one of them is to be productive of the end, the definition of each of the rest will likewise be so. Further, from the more and similarly, that which is similarly, whenever it happens to establish two things by comparing two, as if the definition of this is more [the definition] of this than that is of that, but that one is less a definition, then this one which is more is also a definition, and if this is similarly [the definition] of this, and that of that, if one is of one, the rest also is of the rest. But one definition compared to two, or two definitions compared to one, the consideration from the more is in no way useful. For it is not possible for one to be the definition of two, nor two of the same thing. And the most serviceable of topics are both those now stated and those from cases and those from conjugates; wherefore one ought most of all to hold fast and have these ready. For they are most useful for many purposes. But of the others, those which are most common. For those are most effective of the rest, such as to inspect in particulars and to consider in species whether the definition fits, because the species is univocal; and this topic is useful against those who posit that ideas exist, as was said earlier.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":195,"ref":"p195","source":"Amplius,si per metaphoram dixit nomen, vel idem de eodem prædicavit ut diversum, et si quis alius communis et efficax 10corum,iIlo utendum.\n\nCAPUT III.\n\nDe constructione et destructione prædicatorum loci.\n\nQuoniam autem difficilius est construere quam destruere terminum,ex iis quae postea dicentur,manife8tum. Nam nosse ipsum, et sumere ab mterrogantibus uj usmodi proposil iones non facile,ut quod eorum quae sunt in assignata oratione boc quidem genus,illud autem differentia,et quod in eo quid est, genus et differentia? prædicantur.Sine bis vero impossibile est definitionis syllogismum fieri, nam si quaedam et alia in eo quod quid est de re prædicant, incertum utrumne, quæ dicta est,an alia eus einitio est, eo quod de6nitio est oratio quod est indicans. Manifestum autem et etiam ex his, nam facilius unum concludere quam multa,interimenti quidem sufficitad unum disserere.Unum enim quodcumque sit,destruentes,interempluri sumua terminum; at construenti,omnia necesse est construere quod insint, quæ in termino BUnt.","english":"Further, if he used a name by metaphor, or predicated the same thing of the same thing as though it were different, and if there is any other common and effective [principle] of these things, it must be used.\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nThe topics of constructing and destroying predicates.\n\nSince it is more difficult to construct than to destroy a term, this will be clear from what is said afterwards. For to know it and to take up propositions of this sort from those who ask questions is not easy—for instance, that of the things contained in the assigned speech, this is the genus and that the differentia, and that the what-it-is is predicated as genus and differentia. Without these it is impossible for a syllogism of definition to be made; for if certain other things also are predicated of the thing in respect of what it is, it is uncertain whether the definition stated is [the definition] or another, since a definition is a speech that indicates what [the thing] is. And it is clear also from these things; for it is easier to conclude one thing than many. For the one who destroys, it suffices to argue against one thing; for by destroying any single one, they will have destroyed the whole term. But for the one who constructs, it is necessary to construct all the things that are present in the term.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":196,"ref":"p196","source":"Amplius, construenti quidem universaliter statuendum syltogismum (nam oportet de omni, de quo nomen,prædicari et terminum, et etiam adhuc converti de quo orationem et nomen,si debeat proprius esseasaignatus terminus),destruenti vera non necesse ostendere universaliter: sufficit enim ostendere quod de quopiam eorum quae sub nomine sunt oratio non verificatur, et tametsi universale oporteat destruere, non tamen converti necessarium et in destruendo; nam sufficit destruenti universale, ostendere quod de aliquo eorum de quibus nomen praedicatur oratio non prædicatur, at e converso non necessarium ut ostendatur,quod de quibus oratio non prædicatur, neque nomen prædiceLur.Amplius etiam,si omni ei inest quod sub nomine est,at non soli, interempta est definitio: similiter autem et circa proprium et genus se habet. In utrisque enim destruere quam construere facilius est. De proprio quidem mauifestum, ex iis qua?","english":"Further, for one who is constructing a syllogism universally, it must be laid down (for it is necessary that the term be predicated of every thing of which the name is predicated, and also that it be converted of every thing of which the account and the name are [predicated], if the assigned term is to be proper); but for one who is destroying, it is not necessary to show universally: for it suffices to show that the account is not verified of any one of the things that fall under the name, and even if one must destroy a universal, it is not necessary that it be converted in destroying either; for it suffices for one who is destroying a universal to show that the account is not predicated of some one of the things of which the name is predicated, but conversely it is not necessary that it be shown that neither is the name predicated of the things of which the account is not predicated. Further, if it belongs to every thing that falls under the name, but not to that alone, the definition is destroyed; and it is similarly disposed in the case of the proper and the genus. For in both cases it is easier to destroy than to construct. In the case of the proper, indeed, it is manifest from those things which","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":197,"ref":"p197","source":"dicta sunt, nam ut plurimum in complexione proprium assignatur, quare destruere quidem est,unum interimenti, construenti autem, omnia ratiocinatione colligere necesse est.Pene autem et reliqua omnia quæcunque ad definitionem et ad proprium conveniet dici, nam et omni oportet quod sub nomine est, construenti monstrare quoniam inest,destruenti autem sufficit ostendere uni non inesse; si vero et omni inest, at non soli,etiam si destructum fit,perinde ac et in definitione dicebatur.De genere autem,quoniam construere quidem necesse est uno rnodo,qui omni ostendit inesse,destruenti autem duplidter,nam sive nulli,sive alicui ostensum sit non inesse, interemptum est quod in principio.ltem construenti quidem non sufficit quoniam inest ostendere,sed et quoniam ut genus inest ostendendum, destruenti autem sufficit ostendere non inesse, vel alicui, vel nulli. Videtur autem, quemadmodum in aliis,corrumpere quam facere facilius, sic et in his, destruere quam construere. In accidente vero universale quidem facilius destruere quamconstruere.Nanr construenti quidem ostendendum quoniam omni,destruenti autem sufficit ostendere uni non inesse.","english":"What has been said applies here as well, for for the most part a property is assigned in combination; wherefore to destroy is the work of a single refutation, but for one who constructs it is necessary to gather all things by reasoning. And nearly all the other points that pertain to definition and to property will be fittingly stated here too; for in constructing, one must show that it belongs to everything that falls under the name, while in destroying it suffices to show that it does not belong to one thing. But if it belongs to every thing and not to that thing alone, even so the destruction is effected, just as was said in the case of definition. Concerning genus, however: for in constructing it is necessary in one way only, namely by showing that it belongs to every thing; but in destroying, in two ways, for whether it has been shown to belong to none or to some one thing that it does not belong, what was posited at the beginning is destroyed. Likewise, for one who constructs it is not sufficient to show that it belongs, but one must also show that it belongs as a genus; whereas for one who destroys it suffices to show that it does not belong, either to some one thing or to none. And it seems, just as in other matters, that to corrupt is easier than to make, so also in these: to destroy is easier than to construct. In the case of accident, however, it is easier to destroy the universal than to construct it; for in constructing one must show that it belongs to every thing, but in destroying it suffices to show that it does not belong to one thing.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":198,"ref":"p198","source":"Particulare vero e converso, nam facilius construere quam destruere.Construenti enim sat est ostendere alicui inesse, destruenti autem ostendendum quoniam nulli inest.Manifestum autem qua de causa omnium facillimum estterminum destruere.Plurima enim sunt ipso data multorum dictorum,ex pluribus autem citius fit syllogismus,nam verisimilein multis magis quam in paucis peccatum fieri.Amplius, ad terminum quidem contingit,et per alia argumentari (sive enim non propria sit definitio, sive non genus quod assignatur, sive non inest aliquod eorum quae sunt in definitione, interempta fit definitio),ad alia autem neque ea quae ex terminis,neque alia contingitomniaargumentari, sola enim ea quae ad accidens,communia suntomnibus praedictis. Inesse enim oportet unumquodque eorum quae dicta sunt; si autem non ut proprium inest genus, nondum interemptum est genus. Similiter autem et proprium non necessarium ut genus inesse, neque accidens ut genus aut proprium, sed inesse tantum; quare non possibile ex aliis ad alia argumentari, nisi in definitione solum.","english":"But the particular case is the reverse, for it is easier to construct than to destroy. For to one constructing it is enough to show that it belongs to some one thing, but to one destroying it must be shown that it belongs to none. It is clear for what reason it is easiest of all to destroy a term. For very many things are given by the term itself from many statements, and from more things a syllogism comes about more quickly, for it is more likely that an error occurs in many things than in few. Moreover, in the case of a term it is possible to argue through other things as well (for whether the definition is not proper, or the genus assigned is not [the genus], or some one of the things that are in the definition does not belong, the definition is destroyed), but in the case of other things it is not possible to argue through all things, neither those that come from the term nor others, for only those that pertain to accident are common to all the aforesaid. For each of the things that have been said must belong; but if the genus does not belong as a property, the genus is not yet destroyed. Similarly, neither is it necessary that the property belong as a genus, nor that the accident belong as a genus or a property, but only that it belong; wherefore it is not possible to argue from other things to other things, except in definition alone.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":199,"ref":"p199","source":"Manifestum igiturquoniam facillimum omnium est, terminum interimere, construere autem difficillimuro,nam et illa oportet omnia ratiocinatione colligere, et quod insuntqusedictasunt,et quod genus quod assignatum est,quodque propria definitio,et adhuc præter hæc quod indicat quid est esse oratio,et hæc probe oportet fecisse.Aliorum autem proprium maxime hujusmodi.Nam interimere quidem facilius, eo quod ex pluribus plerumque fit.Construere autem difficillimum, quoniam multa oportet. astruere, et adhuc qunniam soli inest,et quoniam conversim praedicatur de re. Facillimum autem omnium construere accidens.Nam in aliis quidem non solum inesse,sed et quoniam sic inest ostendemiurn, in accidente vero quoniam inest duntaxat,sufricit ostendere. Destruere autem difficillimum est acidens,quia quam paucissima in eo data sunt,non enim consignificat in accidente quomodo inest.Quare in aliis quidem dupliciter interimere contingit, vel ostendendo quod non inest,vel quod non sic inest; in accidente vero non contingit interimere nisi ostendendo quod non inest.Loci per quos copiosi erimus ad singula quaeque problematum argumentari,fere sufficienter annumerati sunt.","english":"It is manifest, therefore, that it is easiest of all to destroy a term, but to construct it is most difficult. For one must gather all those things by reasoning: both that the attributes stated are present, and that the genus which has been assigned is present, and also the proper definition, and besides these that the account which indicates what it is to be is present, and one must have done these things correctly. But the proper [term] of others is especially of this sort. For to destroy is easier, because it generally comes about from many [points]. But to construct is most difficult, since one must build up many things, and also because it belongs to it alone, and because it is predicated convertibly of the thing. But it is easiest of all to construct an accident. For in the other cases one must show not only that it is present, but also that it is present in this way; but in the case of an accident it is enough to show merely that it is present. But to destroy an accident is most difficult, because the fewest things are given in it, for in an accident it does not signify how it is present. Wherefore in the other cases it is possible to destroy in two ways, either by showing that it is not present, or that it is not present in this way; but in the case of an accident it is not possible to destroy except by showing that it is not present. The topics through which we shall be copious for arguing against each of the problems have been enumerated pretty sufficiently.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":200,"ref":"p200","source":"LIBER OCTAVUS.\n\nCAPUT PRIMUM.\n\nLoci ad instruendum imerrogantem.\n\nPost haec autem de ordine et quonam pacto oportet interrogare, dicendum. Oportet autem primum quidem eum qui interrogare debet lucum invenire undesit argumentandum;secundum auteminterrogare et ordinare singula apud seipsum; reliquum vero et tertium dicere jam eadem ad alterum.Quod autem inveniat locum,similiter philosophi et dialectici consideratio,subinde vero illa ordinare et interropare, proprium dialectici; ad alterum enim omne quod tale est. Philosopho autem et quærenti per seipsum nihil curae est si vera quidem sint et nota per quae syllogismus,et non ponat ea quae respondet, eo quod propinqua sint illis quae sunt ex principio, et praevideat quod subsecutum est, sed fortasse et studiose aget,quoniam maxime notæ et propinquae sunt dignitates,ex illis enim scientifici syllogismi. Loci igitur inde oporteat sumere dicti sunt prius.De ordine autem et interrogatione dicendum dividendo propositiones quaecunque sumendae sunt ad necessarias,necessariæ autem dicuntur per quas syllogismus flt.Quae autem ab his sumuntur, quatuor sunt.Aut enim gratia inductionis,ut videtur universale,aut ad magnitudinem orationis, aut ad occultationem conclusionis,aut dilucidior fit oratio; praeter has autem nulla est assumenda propositio, sed per hac augere et interrogare tentandum.","english":"BOOK EIGHT.\n\nCHAPTER ONE.\n\nCommonplaces for Instructing the Questioner.\n\nAfter these things, however, we must speak of order and in what manner one ought to question. First, indeed, the one who is to question ought to find the place from which he is to argue; second, to question and to arrange each thing with himself; the remaining and third part is to say these same things to another. Now to find the place is the consideration of the philosopher and the dialectician alike; but thereafter to arrange those things and to question is proper to the dialectician; for everything of this sort is directed to another. But for the philosopher, who inquires by himself, there is no concern whether the things through which the syllogism is made are true and known, and whether he does not set down the things that the respondent grants, because they are close to those that are from the principle, and whether he foresees what follows; but perhaps he will also act with zeal, since the dignities are most known and close, for from those come scientific syllogisms. The commonplaces, therefore, from which one ought to take them have been stated earlier. But we must speak of order and questioning by dividing the propositions, whatever ones are to be assumed for the necessary ones; and those are called necessary through which the syllogism is made. But those that are assumed besides these are four in number. For they are either for the sake of induction, as the universal seems, or for the magnitude of the speech, or for the concealment of the conclusion, or so that the speech becomes clearer; but besides these no proposition is to be assumed, but one must try to increase and question through these.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":201,"ref":"p201","source":"Suntautem quae ad occultationem,certaminisgratia, sed quia omne(quod hujusmodiest)negotium ad alterum est,necesse est etillis uti.Necessarias igitur, perquas fit syllogismus,non statim præordinandum, sed abeundum ad suprema: ut non postulet quis contrariorum eamdem disciplinam, si hoc voluerit sumere,sed oppositorum; posito enim hoc,et quoniam contrariorum eadem disciplinasyllogismo col. liget, eo quod ex oppositis sunt contraria. Si vero illam non ponat per inductionem,'sumendum proponenti in particularibus contrariis.Nam aut per syllogismum,aut perinductionem necessarias sumendum,aut hac quidem inductione,illas autem syJlogismo. Quæ cunque autem valdemanifestae sunt,illas quoque oportet praeponere, nam immanifestius est semper in ab,cessu et inductione quod secuturum est,et simul ipsas necessarias proponere,et qui non potest illo modo,sumere esse paratum, quae vero ad has sumptaesunt,accipiendaequidem illarum gratia. Unaquaeque autem earum hoc modo utendum inducentem quidem a singularibus ad universalia,et a notis ad ignota, nota autem magis quae secundum sensum,vel simpliciter,vel multipliciter, vel multitudini.Occultantem vero ratiocinatione praecolligere oportet ea per quae syllogismus ejus quod ex principio est debet fieri,et haec ut plurimum. Erit autem boc, si quis non solum necessarias, sed et earum (quae ad illas sunt ulites) aliquam syllogizaverit.","english":"But the things that serve concealment, for the sake of the contest—yet because every business of this kind is directed toward another, it is necessary to use them as well. Therefore the necessary premises, through which the syllogism is made, must not be arranged beforehand at once, but one must go back to the highest principles: so that one should not demand the same discipline of contraries, if he wishes to assume this, but of opposites; for once this is posited, he will also bind together by syllogism that the discipline of contraries is the same, because contraries come from opposites. But if he does not lay that down, it must be assumed by induction for the one who proposes it in particular contraries. For one must assume the necessary premises either by syllogism or by induction—either by induction here, but those by syllogism. And whatever things are very manifest, these too one ought to set out beforehand; for in the approach and in induction what will follow is always more unclear, and at the same time to set out the necessary premises themselves, and for one who cannot do it in that way, to assume that he is prepared; but the things assumed for the sake of these are to be accepted for the sake of those. And each of them must be used in this way: the one who induces, from singulars to universals, and from things known to things unknown—and things known more are those according to sense, either simply, or in many ways, or to the multitude. But the one who conceals must pre-collect by reasoning the things through which the syllogism of the thesis ought to be made, and these for the most part. And this will be so if someone has syllogized not only the necessary premises, but also some of those that are useful for them.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":202,"ref":"p202","source":"Amplius, conclunsiones non dicere,sed postea ratiocinatione colligere subitarias, sic enim longissime abscedet ab ea (quse ex principio) positione; universaliter autem dicendo, sic oportet eum interrogare qui occulte interrogat,ut interrogata omni ratione, et eo dicente conclusionem,quæratur propter quid; id autem erit maxime per antedictum modum; nam sola ultima dicta conclusione, immanifestum quomodo accidit, eo quod non prævidit respondens ex quibus accidit, non per membra digestis prioribus syllogismis; minime autem per membra digeritur syllogismus conclusione,cum non ejus sumptiones ponuntur,sed cum illa sumuntur a quibus syllogismus fit.Utile autem et non continua postulata sumere,ex quibus syllogismi3sed vicissim ad aliam et ad aliamconclusionem.Nam positis convenientibus juxta se invicem,magis quod accidit ex ipsis manifestum. Oportet autem et definitione sumere in quibus possibile est)universalem propositionem,nonin ipsis, sed in conjugatis.Nam decipiunt falsa ratiocinatione seipsos (quando in conjugato sumitur Jefi.","english":"Further, not to state the conclusions, but afterwards to gather them by reasoning as if they had been granted all at once—for in this way he will depart very far from the position that was laid down at the beginning. And speaking generally, the one who questions covertly ought to question in such a way that, when everything has been asked and the respondent states the conclusion, one then asks on account of what it follows; and this will happen especially by the method just described. For when only the final conclusion has been stated, it is unclear how it came about, because the respondent did not foresee from what premises it followed, since the prior syllogisms were not set out limb by limb. But a syllogism is least of all set out limb by limb by means of the conclusion, when its assumptions are not laid down, but when those things are assumed from which the syllogism is made. It is useful also to take the requested premises not in a continuous series, from which the syllogisms are formed, but alternately toward one conclusion and then another. For when suitable premises are placed next to one another, what follows from them is more evident. One ought also to take by definition, in cases where it is possible, the universal proposition—not in the things themselves, but in their conjugates. For people deceive themselves by false reasoning when the definition is taken in the conjugate.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":203,"ref":"p203","source":"nitio),si non universale concedunt: ut si oportetsumere quod qui irascitur appetit poenam, sumatur autem ira appetitus esse poenae propter apparentem parvipensionem, manifestum autem quoniam hoc sumpto habebimus universale quod prfeelegimus;at eis qui in ipsis proponunt sæpe accidit ut abnuat respondens, eo quod magis se babeat in ea re inslantia,ut quod non omnis qui irascitur appetit prenam,nam parentibus irascimur quidem,non autem paenam appetimus.Fortasse autem non vera instantia est, nam a quibusdam sutficiens pcEna est tristari solum,et facere poenitere, verumtamen habet aliquid verisimile, ut non videatur irrationabiliter negare propositum,in irae autem definitione,non similiter facile instantiam invenire.Praeterea proponere par est, non ut propter ipsum, sed alterius gratia eum qui proponit. Nam devitant ea quae ad positionem sunt utilia. Simpliciter autem dicendo, quam maxime facere dubium utrum quod proponitur,an oppositum sumere vult.Nam dubio existente quidnam ad positionem est utile, magis quod sibi videtur ponunt. Amplius per similitudinem interrogare.","english":"(definition), if they do not grant the universal—for example, if one must assume that the angry person desires punishment, but it is assumed that anger is a desire for punishment on account of apparent slight, it is clear that once this is assumed we shall have the universal that we proposed. But with those who propose things in the very terms themselves, it often happens that the respondent refuses, because he is more firmly situated in that matter, as that not everyone who is angry desires punishment; for we are indeed angry with our parents, yet we do not desire punishment. Perhaps, however, this is not a true objection; for for some a sufficient punishment is merely to be grieved and to be made to repent. Nevertheless it has something plausible, so that he does not seem to deny the proposition unreasonably. But in the definition of anger it is not similarly easy to find an objection. Further, it is fair to propose, not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else, for the one who proposes. For they avoid the things that are useful for the position. And to speak simply, one should make it as doubtful as possible whether he wishes to assume what is proposed or the opposite. For when it is doubtful what is useful for the position, they rather lay down what seems to themselves. Further, to question by way of similarity.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":204,"ref":"p204","source":"Nam et verisimile, et latet magis universale, ut quod quemadmodum scienlia et ignorantia contrariorum eadem, sic et census contrariorum idem, aut e converso,postquam sensus idem contrariorum, et scientia; hoc autem est simile inductioni, non tamen idem; nam illic quidem a singularibus universale sumitur,in similibus autem non est quod sumitur. universale,sub quo omniasimihasunt.Oportet autem et ipsum sibimetquandoqueinstantiam ferre.Namisuspecte se habent respondentes ad eos qui videntur juste argumentari. Utile autem dicere quod consuetum,et quod dicitur tale.Nam pigrescunt quod solitum est dimovere,instantiam non babentes,simul autem et quia utantur et ipsi talibus,cavent ea dimovere. Amplius, non sedule agere, etsi omnino utile sit.Nam adversus sedule agentes, magis renituntur. Et ut in similitudine proponere quod propter aliud aliquid proponitur, et non propter seipsum,utile ponent magis Amplius,non id proponere quod oportet sumere, sed cui consequens, id est ex necessitate.Nam et magis concedunt, eo quod non similiter ex hoc manifestum sit quod consecuturum est,et sumpto hoc, sumptum est et illud. Et id ultimo interrogare quod maxime vult sumere.","english":"For it is both plausible and conceals the universal more, as that just as knowledge and ignorance are of the same contraries, so too perception is of the same contraries, or conversely, since perception is of the same contraries, so is knowledge. This, however, is similar to induction, yet not the same; for there the universal is taken from singulars, but in similarities what is taken is not the universal under which all similarities fall. But one must sometimes also bring an objection against oneself. For those who respond are suspicious of those who appear to argue justly. It is useful, moreover, to state what is customary and what is said to be such. For people grow lazy about disturbing what is customary, having no objection, and at the same time, because they themselves also use such things, they are wary of disturbing them. Further, not to act persistently, even if it is altogether useful. For against those who act persistently, people resist more. And to propose in the manner of a similarity what is proposed for the sake of something else and not for its own sake is useful for making them posit more. Further, not to propose what ought to be assumed, but that to which it follows, that is, by necessity. For they concede more, because it is not similarly clear from this what will follow, and once this is assumed, that too has been assumed. And to ask last what one most wants to assume.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":205,"ref":"p205","source":"Nam maximeprimarenuunt,eoquod plurimi interrogantium prima interrogant, circa quae vel maxime student.Ad quosdam autem prima quae utilia sunt proponere.Nam protervi maxime prima admittunt,nisi omnino manifestum sit quod secuturum est, in fine autem proterviunt.Similiter autem etquicunquearbitrantur acuti esse in respondendo.ponentes enim prima,in fine recantant,tanquam nihil acciderit ex iis quae posita sunt; ponunt autem prompte,confidentes habitui,et arbitrantes nihil se esse passuros. Amplius, prolongare et interponere quæ nihil sunt usui ad orationem, quemadmodum pseudographia utentes.Nam cum sint plura,immanifestum in quo, falsum sit, quare et occultant quandoque interro. gantes,in absconso proponentes ea quae per se proposita non ponerentur; ad occultationem igitur dictis est utendum.\n\nCAPUT II.\n\nPro instructione respondentis loci alii.","english":"For they especially deny first principles, because most questioners ask first about the things they are most eager for. But to some people one should put forward first the things that are useful. For the shameless admit first principles most of all, unless it is entirely manifest what will follow, but at the end they are shameless. Similarly also all who think themselves sharp at answering: for having granted the first principles, at the end they retract, as if nothing had followed from the things that were granted; but they grant readily, trusting in their habit and thinking they will suffer nothing. Further, to prolong and to interpose things that are of no use to the argument, using them like a forged document. For since there are several, it is unclear where the falsehood lies, and therefore they sometimes conceal it when questioning, putting forward in secret the things that would not be granted if put forward by themselves; therefore one must use what has been said for concealment.\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nOther topics for the instruction of the respondent.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":206,"ref":"p206","source":"Ad ornatum vero inductione et divisione eorum quæ affinia sunt. Inductio igitur quale quid est manifestum dividere autem hujusmodi,utscientiamscientiaesse meliorem,aut eo quodexactiorest,autquodmeliorum, etquod scientiarum aliae quidem sunt contemplativae, aliæ autem activae,alise porro effectivæ,nam unumquodque talium cooruat quidem orationem, at non necessarium est utdicaturad conclusionem.AddiluciditatemautemexemplaetsirnilitudinesafFerendum. Exempla autem accommodata,et ex quibus scimus, qualia Homerus,non qualia Cherilus; sic enim clarius eritquod proponitur.Utendum autem in disserendo,syllogismo quidem ad dialecticos magis quam admultitudinem; inductionevero contra ad multitudinem magis. Dictum est autem etde hiset prius.Est autem in aliquibus quidem inducenti possibileinterrogare universale, in aliquibus vero non facile, eo quod non positum sit similitudinibus nomen omnibus commune,sed quando oportet universale sumere, sic in omnibus talibus esse dicunt.","english":"For ornament, however, [one should proceed] by induction and by division of things that are akin. What induction is, then, is evident; but to divide is [to distinguish] things of this sort: that knowledge is better than knowledge, either because it is more exact or because it is of better objects; and that of sciences some are contemplative, others active, and others again productive. For each of these indeed contributes to the argument, but it is not necessary that it be stated up to the conclusion. For clarity, examples and likenesses should be adduced. Examples should be appropriate, and such as we know—like those of Homer, not like those of Cherilus; for thus what is proposed will be clearer. In disputation, one should use syllogism more against the dialecticians than against the multitude, but induction, on the contrary, more against the multitude. These things have been said also earlier. Now in some cases it is possible for one who is inducing to ask the universal, but in some cases it is not easy, because a name common to all [instances] has not been laid down upon the likenesses; but when one ought to take the universal, they say that it is so in all such cases.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":207,"ref":"p207","source":"Id autem determinare difficillimum est,qualia sunt ea quæ proferuntur hujusmodi,et qualianon,et propter hoc saepenumero dissident in disputationibus,aliiquidem dicentes similia esse quae non sunt similia,alii vero dubitantes quae sunt similia non esse similia.Quare tentandum in omnibus talibus ipsum nomina effingere,ut neque respondenti liceat dubitare quod non similiter quod infertur, dicitur neque interroganti calumniari,ut similiter dicto,eo quod pluraeorum quæ non similiter dicuntur,similiter videntur dici. Quando autem inducenti in pluribus non dederit universale,tunc justum est efflagitare instantiam, non dicente autem ipso in aliquibus sic, non justum est efflagitare5in aliquibus non sic. Oportet enim inducentem prius sic instantiam efflagitare.Efflagitandum autem instantias non in eo quod proponitur ferre, nisi unum tantum sit hujusmodi, ut dualitas parium numerorum solus primus. Nam oportet et eum qui instatin altero instantiamferre,autdicere quod hoc solum tale est. Ad eos autem qui instant universali, non in eodem autem instantiamferunt,sedin aequivoco(utquod habeat aliquis non suum colorem, vel pedem, vel manum, habebit enimpictornon suum colorem,etcocus pedem non suum),dividendo revera in talibus interrogandum est. Nam latente æquivocatione,bene viderentur instare propositioni.","english":"To determine, however, what sort of things are those that are brought forward in this way and what sort are not is very difficult, and for this reason people often disagree in disputations, some saying that things which are not similar are similar, while others, doubting, say that things which are similar are not similar. Therefore in all such cases one must attempt to fashion the names themselves, so that neither may the respondent be allowed to doubt that what is inferred is not said similarly, nor may the questioner quibble, on the ground that what is said similarly appears to be said similarly because many of the things that are not said similarly appear so. But when the one inducing has not been granted the universal in many cases, then it is fair to demand an instance; but when he himself has not said so in some cases, it is not fair to demand [an instance] in some cases not so. For the one inducing ought first to demand an instance thus. But instances must not be demanded to be brought against what is proposed, unless there be only one such thing, as duality is the only first of even numbers. For the one who brings an instance in another case ought also to bring an instance, or to say that this alone is such. But against those who bring an instance against the universal, yet do not bring the instance in the same [sense], but in an equivocal one (as that someone has a color, or a foot, or a hand, that is not his own; for the painter will have a color not his own, and the cook a foot not his own), one must in such cases question by dividing. For when the equivocation is hidden, they would seem to bring an instance well against the proposition.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":208,"ref":"p208","source":"Si autem non in æquivoco, sed in eodem instans praepediat interrogationem,oportet auferentem id in quo instantiaest, proponere reliquum, un;versale faciendo, donec sumat quod utile est. Ut in oblivione, et in oblitum esse, non enim concedunteum qui amisit disciplinam, oblitum esse, eo quod transeunte re amisit quidem disciplinam, oblitusautemnon est; dicendum autem auferenti id in quo instantia est, reliquum: ut si permanente re amisit disciplinam, ideirco oblitum esse. Similiter autem et contra instantes,quoniammajori bono majus opponitur malum, proferunt enim quoniam sanitati minori bono quambonahabitudo,majusmalum opponitur, nam aegritudinem majus esse malum mala habitudine. Auferendumigituret inhocin quo instantia est,nam ablato,magis ponct, ut quoniam majori bono majus malum opponitur, nisi conferat alterum ad alterum, quemadmodumbonahabitudoad sanitatem.Nonsolum autem eo instante hoc faciendum,sed et si sino instantia negat, eo quod praevideat aliquid talium. Nam ablato eo inquo instantia est,compelletur ponere, eo quod non prævideat in reliquo, in aliquo non sic esse. Si autem non ponat, efflagitatus instantiam,non habebitassignare.Suntautem hujusmodi propositionum quae in aliquo falsae sunt, in aliquo autem verae, in his enim par est auferre, reliquum autem verum relinquere. Si autem in multis proponenti non ferat instantiam, postulandum est ponere.","english":"If, however, the objection is not based on equivocation but obstructs the question in the same respect, then one who raises the objection must remove that in which the objection consists and propose the remainder, making it universal, until he obtains what is useful. As in the case of forgetfulness and having forgotten: for they do not concede that one who has lost a discipline has forgotten it, on the ground that when the thing passed away he lost the discipline but has not forgotten it. But one who raises the objection must be told to remove that in which the objection consists and state the remainder: for example, if, while the thing remained, he lost the discipline, then for that reason he has forgotten it. Similarly also against those who object that a greater evil is opposed to a greater good; for they bring forward that a greater evil is opposed to health, which is a lesser good than a good habit, since sickness is a greater evil than a bad habit. Therefore this too must be removed, in which the objection consists; for when it is removed, the point is more firmly established—namely, that a greater evil is opposed to a greater good—unless one compares one thing to another, as a good habit to health. And this must be done not only when the objection is present, but also if he denies without an objection, because he foresees something of this sort. For when that in which the objection consists is removed, he will be compelled to concede, since he does not foresee that in the remainder it is not so in some respect. But if he does not concede, when pressed for the objection, he will have nothing to assign. Such propositions, however, are those which are false in one respect but true in another; for in these it is fair to remove one part and leave the remainder true. But if one who proposes many things does not withstand the objection, it must be demanded that he concede.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":209,"ref":"p209","source":"Nam dialectica;est propositio ad quam sic in pluribus se habentem non est instantia. Quando autem contingit idemetsine impossibili et per impossibile syllogizare, demonstranti quidem et non disserenti, nihil refert vel sic vel illo modo syllogismo colligere, differentiautem non est utendum per impossibile syllogismo. Nam si sine impossibili quidem syllogismo colligat,minimetietutdubitent;at quando per impossibilesyllogizant(nisi valde manifestum sitfalsum esse),non I impossibile dicuntesse, quare non fitinterrogantibus quod volunt. Oportet autem proponerequsecunque in pluribusquidemsic se habent.Instantia autem aut omnino non est,aut non in superficie est conspicere, nam qui non possunt conspicere in quibus non sic, tanquam verum quidem sit, ponunt. Non oportet autem conclusionem interrogationem facere. Alioquin autem, eorenuente,non videturlieri syllogismus, nam et sæpe cum noninterrogat, sed ut sequens infert, negant,et hoc facientes non videntur redargui iis qui nonconspiciunt quod accidit ex iis qua; posita sunt. Quando igitur non dicens quidem accidere, interrogabit, ille autem negabit, omnino non videtur fieri syllogismus. Non autem omne universale dialectica propositio esse. ut quid est homo?","english":"For a dialectical proposition is one toward which things stand in many cases in such a way that no objection arises. But when it happens that the same thing can be syllogized both without impossibility and through impossibility, for one who demonstrates and is not engaging in dialectic it makes no difference whether he infers by syllogism in this way or that way, but in dialectic one must not use syllogism through impossibility. For if he infers by syllogism without impossibility, they do not doubt; but when they syllogize through impossibility (unless the falsehood is very manifest), they say that it is not impossible, and so what they wish does not come about for those asking questions. One ought, however, to propose whatever stands in many cases in such a way. But an objection either does not exist at all, or it is not easy to see on the surface; for those who cannot see the cases in which it does not hold, assume it as if it were true. But one ought not to make the conclusion a question. Otherwise, when that has come about, a syllogism does not seem to be produced; for often, when he does not ask but infers as a consequence, they deny it, and in doing this they do not seem to be refuted by those who do not see what follows from the things that have been posited. When, therefore, the one who does not state that it follows asks a question, and the other denies it, a syllogism does not seem to come about at all. But not every universal is a dialectical proposition, as, for example, \"What is man?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":210,"ref":"p210","source":"aut quot modis dicitur bonum?eslenim dialectica propositio, ad quam est respondere, sic vel non; ad dictas autem non est; quare non sunt dialecticae hujusmodiinterrogationes, nisi ipse determinans veldividens dicat,ut,pulasne bonum sic vel non sic dicitur? nam ad talia facilis responsio, vel affirmando, vel negando; quapropter tentandum sic proponere hujusmodi propositionum.Simul autem et justum fortasse ab illo interrogare,quot modis dicitur bonum,quando hoc dividente et proponente,nullo modo concesserit. Quisquis autem unam orationem multo tempore interrogat, male interrogat. Nam si respondeat quidem ei interrogatio quod inter. rogatur, manifestum quod multas interrogationes interrogat,aut frequenter easdem; quare aut nugatur, aut non habet syllogismum,nam expaucisomnissyilogismus. Si vero non respondeat, quid aut non increpat,autdiscedit? Est autem argumentari difficile, et sustinere facile ipsas suppositiones. Sunt autem talia,etquse natura sunt prima,etquae postrema.","english":"Or in how many ways is \"good\" said? For it is a dialectical proposition to which one must answer \"so\" or \"not so\"; but to the things said [in such questions] one must not [answer so]; wherefore such interrogations are not dialectical, unless the one who determines or divides says so himself, as, \"Is good said in this way or not in this way?\" For to such things the answer is easy, either by affirming or by denying; wherefore one must attempt to propound propositions of this sort in this way. At the same time, perhaps it is also just to ask from that [same principle] in how many ways \"good\" is said, when, with him dividing and propounding this, he will in no way have conceded it. But whoever asks a single statement for a long time asks badly. For if the interrogation answers what is asked, it is clear that he asks many questions, or frequently the same ones; wherefore he either babbles or does not have a syllogism, for a syllogism is from few things. But if he does not answer, what then—does he not rebuke, or depart? But to argue is difficult, and to sustain the suppositions themselves is easy. Such things are both those which are first by nature and those which are last.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":211,"ref":"p211","source":"Nam prima quidem termino egent, postrema vera per multa terminantur,volenti continuum sumere a primis,aut sophisticiP videntur argumentationes: impossibileenimdemonstrarequidpiamesteumquinon incipit a propriis principiis, et connectit usque ad ultima: detinire autem nihili ducunt respondentes, neque si interrogans definierit, advertunt; atqui non facto manifesto quidnam est quod propositum est, non facile est argumentari. Maxime autem quod tale estcirca principia accidit: nam alia quidem perhsec monstrantur, ipsa vero non contingit per alia, sed necesseestdefinitionetalium unumquodque cognoscere. Sunt autem difficile argumentabilia, ei quae valde propinqua sunt principio. Non enim contingit plures ad haec rationes invenire,cum sint pauca media,horumflueetprincipiorum, per quae necesseest monstrare ea quae post illasunt. Terminorum autem difficile argumentabiles ii omnium maximesunt,quicunque utuntur talibus nominibus, quaeprimum quidem immanifesta sunt, simpliciterne dicantur, an multipliciter, adhuc autem quæ neque nota utrum proprie, an secundum metaphoram de definito dicantur. Nam quia obscura sunt, non babet argumenta,quia vero ignorantur si absque metaphora dicitur quod tale est, non habet quod increpet.","english":"For the first [terms] indeed need a definition, while the last are bounded by many [terms], for one who wishes to take the continuous [series] from the first; or the argumentations seem sophistic. For it is impossible to demonstrate anything without beginning from proper principles and connecting up to the last [conclusions]. But they think nothing of defining, those who answer, nor do they pay attention if the questioner has defined; and yet, when it has not been made manifest what the proposed thing is, it is not easy to argue. But this happens most of all in the case of things that are such around principles; for some things are shown through these, but these themselves cannot be [shown] through others, but it is necessary to know each one by definition and in other ways. And those things that are very close to the principle are difficult to argue about. For it is not possible to find many accounts for these, since the middle terms are few—both of these and of the principles—through which it is necessary to demonstrate the things that are after them. But of terms, those are most difficult to argue about which use such names as are first indeed unclear, whether they are said simply or in many ways, and further, which are not known whether they are said of the defined thing properly or according to metaphor. For because they are obscure, it has no arguments; but because it is unknown whether what is such is said without metaphor, it has nothing to object.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":212,"ref":"p212","source":"Omnino autem omne problema quando difficile argumentabile,vel termino indigere arbitrandum est,vel est eorum quæ multipliciter,vel eorum quae secundum metaphoram de definito esse dicantur, vel non longe a principiis,vel quia non manifestum est primum nobis hoc idem, secundum quem dictorum modorum est quod dubitationem præstat. Nam cum est manifestus modus,manifestum quoniam aut definire oportebit,aut dividere,aut medias propositiones invenire. Nam perhsec monstrantur ultima. In multis autem positionibus(nonbeneassignata defi. nitione) non facile disputare ac argumentari, ut utrum unicontrarium,an plura?Definitisautem contrariis aliquo modo,facile est ostendere utrum contingit plura eidem esse contraria, an non. Eodem autem modoet in aliis definitione indigentibus. Videnturautemetin disciplinisquaedam obdefinitionis defectum non facile describi, ut et quoniam quæ ad latus secat planumlinea,similiter dividit et lineam et locum, definitione autem dicta, statim manifestum est quod dicitur. Nam eamdem ablationem habent loca et lineæ; estautem definitioejusorationishaec. Simpliciter autem prima elementorum, positisquidem definitionibus (ut quid linea vel quid circulus), facillimum ostendere,verum non multis ad unumquodque eorum est argumentari,eo quod non sunt multa media; si autem non ponantur principiorum definitiones,difficile, fortasse autem omnino impossibile.","english":"But generally, every problem, when it is difficult to argue, must be thought either to need a definition, or to belong to those things that are said in many ways, or to those that are said of the defined thing according to metaphor, or to be not far from the principles, or because this same thing is not manifest to us first, according to which of the said modes it is that provides the doubt. For when the mode is manifest, it is clear that one will need either to define, or to divide, or to find the middle propositions. For through these the last things are shown. But in many positions, when the definition has not been well assigned, it is not easy to dispute and argue, as whether there is one contrary or many. But when the contraries have been defined in some way, it is easy to show whether it happens that many things are contrary to the same thing, or not. And in the same way also in other things that need definition. But in the sciences certain things seem not easily to be described because of a defect of definition, as also that the line which cuts a plane at the side similarly divides both the line and the place; but when the definition has been stated, what is said is immediately manifest. For places and lines have the same removal; and the definition of this is this account. But simply the first elements, when definitions are posited (as what a line is, or what a circle is), it is easiest to show, but it is not for many to argue against each one of them, because there are not many middle terms; but if the definitions of the principles are not posited, it is difficult, and perhaps altogether impossible.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":213,"ref":"p213","source":"Similiter autem his et in iis quae sunt circa orationes se habet. Non igitur latere oportet,quando difficile argumentabilis est positio, quod passa est aliquid eorum quae dictasunt,quando autem erit ad dignitatem et propositioem, major labor disputare quam ad positionem.Dubitare autem possitquispiam utrum ponendasinttalia,an non: namsi non ponat, sed poscat et ad illa disputare, majus praecipiet quam quod in principio positum est; si vero ponat, credet ex minus credibilibus. Si igitur oportet non dilficilius problema facere,ponendum; si autem per notiora syllogizare, non ponendum. An discenti quidem non ponendum,nisi notius sit, exercilato vero ponendum,si verum solum videatur? Quare manifestum quoniamnon similiter et interroganti et docentiexistimandumesHeponendum.Quo pactoigitur interrogare et ordinare oportet, pene sufficiunt quae dicta sunt.","english":"Similarly also in the case of arguments about speeches. It must not be overlooked, then, when a position is difficult to argue, that it has suffered something of what has been said; but when it is directed toward dignity and the proposition, it is a greater labor to dispute than toward the position. But someone might doubt whether such things should be posited or not; for if he does not posit it, but asks for it and disputes toward those things, he will demand more than what was posited at the beginning; but if he does posit it, he will believe from less credible things. If, then, one ought not to make the problem more difficult, it must be posited; but if one ought to syllogize through more known things, it must not be posited. Or, for one who is learning, it must not be posited unless it is more known; but for one who is practiced, it must be posited if only it seems true? Wherefore it is manifest that one must not suppose it should be posited in the same way for the one who asks and the one who teaches. In what way, then, one ought to ask and order, what has been said is nearly sufficient.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":214,"ref":"p214","source":"CAPUT III.\n\nLoci pro respondente.\n\nDe responsione autem primum quidem determinandum quodnam est opus benerespondentis,quemadmodum bene interrogantis. Estauteminterrogantis quidem sicdeducere orationem,ut faciat respondentem dicere inopinabiliora quam ea quae propter positionem sunt necessaria; respondentis vero non propter se apparere,accidere impossibile,aut quod praeter opinionem est, sed propter positionem: nam alterum fortasse peccatum, ponere primum quod non oportet, et positum non servare aliquo modo. Quia autem sunt indeterminata iis qui propter exercitationem et experientiam orationes faciunt (nam non eaedem considerationes et discentibus,et do * centibus,et concertantibus, neque his et iis qui exercent se invicem inspectionis gratia: nam discentiquidemponendasuntsemperea quæ videntur; neque enim conatur falsum ullus docere, concertantium vero interrogantem quidem videri aliquid facere oportet omnino, respondentem autem nihil videri pati),eL in dialecticis congressionibus quæ non concertationis gratia,sed experimenti et inspectionis orationes faciunt, nondum enucleatum est quo pacto oportat conjectare respondentem, et qualia dare, et qualia non, ad bene aut non bene servandam posiLionem; quoniam, inquam,nihil habemus traditum ab aliis,ipsi aliquid dicere tentemus.","english":"CHAPTER III.\n\nCommonplaces for the respondent.\n\nConcerning the response, then, we must first determine what the task of the good respondent is, just as what the task of the good questioner is. For it is the task of the questioner so to draw out the argument as to make the respondent say things less in accord with opinion than those which are necessary on account of the position; but it is the task of the respondent not to appear to have something impossible, or contrary to opinion, happen on his own account, but on account of the position; for perhaps the one is a fault—to lay down first what one ought not, and in some way not to preserve what has been laid down. But since these matters are indefinite for those who conduct arguments for the sake of practice and experience (for the considerations are not the same for learners, for teachers, and for competitors, nor again for these and for those who exercise themselves against one another for the sake of examination; for learners must always lay down the things that seem so, for no one tries to teach what is false; but in the case of competitors, the questioner must by all means seem to be doing something, while the respondent must seem to be suffering nothing), and in dialectical encounters which conduct arguments not for the sake of competition but for the sake of experiment and examination, it has not yet been made clear in what way the respondent ought to form his conjectures, and what sorts of things he should grant and what he should not, for the good or bad preservation of the position; since, I say, we have nothing handed down from others, let us ourselves attempt to say something.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":215,"ref":"p215","source":"Necesseestautem respondentem sustinere orationem, ponendo aut probabilem,autimprobabilempositionem,aut neutram,et aut simpliciter probabilem, aut improbabilem,autindeterminate,uthuic alicui, vel alii. Nihil autem refert quomodocunque, dum ea probabilis aut improbabilis sit; nam idem modus erit bene respondendi,vel dandi,vel non dandi quod interrogatum est: nam cum improbabilis est positio,necesse est et conclusionem probabilem fieri, cum vero probabilis,improbabilem.Nam oppositum semper positionis interrogans concludet; si autem neque probabiie,neque improbabile quod positum est,et conclusio erit talis. Quoniamautembenesyllogizans,ex probabilioribus et notioribus, propositum demonstrat, manifestum est quod, quando simpliciter est improbabile quod proponitur, non dandum est respondenti,nec quod non videtur simpliciter,nec quod videtur quidem, minus autem conclusione videtur. Nam cum improbabilis est positio, probabilis est conclusio. Quare oportet quae sumunturprobabiliaesseomniaet magis probabilia quam quod proponitur, si debet per notiora quod minus notum est concludi. Quare si neque tale est quidpiam eorum quae interrogantur,non ponendum est respondenti.","english":"The respondent must maintain the argument by positing a position that is either probable or improbable, or neither, and either simply probable or improbable, or indeterminate, as being so to this person or to another. It makes no difference in what way, provided it be probable or improbable; for the same manner of responding well will apply, whether granting or not granting what was asked. For when the position is improbable, the conclusion must necessarily become probable; but when it is probable, the conclusion becomes improbable. For the questioner will always conclude the opposite of the position; and if what was posited is neither probable nor improbable, the conclusion will be of the same sort. Since, then, one who syllogizes well demonstrates the proposed thesis from more probable and better-known premises, it is clear that when what is proposed is simply improbable, it must not be granted by the respondent—nor what does not seem so simply, nor what indeed seems so but seems less so than the conclusion. For when the position is improbable, the conclusion is probable. Therefore all the premises assumed must be probable and more probable than what is proposed, if what is less known is to be concluded through things better known. Hence if none of the things asked is of this sort, the respondent must not grant it.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":216,"ref":"p216","source":"Simpliciter autem si est probabilis positio,dilucidum est,quoniam conclusio simpliciter improbabiiin,ponendum igitur et quae videnturomnia,et eorum quae non videntur,quaecunque minus sunt improbabilia conclusione.Nam sufficientersic videbitur disceptatum esse. Similiter autem erit,et si neque improbabilis,neque probabilis est positio. Nam sic et quae videntur omnia dandum, et eorum quae non videntur,quæcunque minus sunt improbabilia conclusione, sic enim probabiliores accidit orationes fieri.Si igitur simpliciter quidem probabile vel improbabile quod ponitur, ad ea quae videntur simpliciter comparatio facienda. Si autem non simpliciter probabile vel improbabib sit quod ponitur,sed respondenti,ad seipsum,quod videtur, et quod non videtur judicando, ponendum, vel non ponendum. Si vero alterius opinionem tutetur respondens, manifestum quoniam ad illius intelligentiam aspiciendo,ponere singula debetet negare; quare et qui curant extraneas opiniones (ut bonum et malum esse idem,quemadmodum Hpraclitus inquit,) non dant non adesse simul contraria eidem, non videntur eis haec,sed quia secundum Heraclitum sic dicendum.Faciunthoc autem et qui suscipiuntab invicem positiones; conjectant enim ac si is dicat qui ponit. Manifestum igitur quae conjectandum respondenti, sive simpliciter probabile, sive alicui positum est.","english":"But if the position is simply probable, it is clear that the conclusion is simply improbable; therefore one must grant both all things that seem so and, of those that do not seem so, whatever are less improbable than the conclusion. For in this way the debate will seem to have been conducted sufficiently. It will be the same also if the position is neither improbable nor probable. For in that case too one must grant all things that seem so, and of those that do not seem so, whatever are less improbable than the conclusion; for in this way the arguments come to be more probable. If, then, what is posited is simply probable or improbable, the comparison must be made with things that seem so simply. But if what is posited is not simply probable or improbable, but probable or improbable to the respondent, one must judge by reference to the respondent himself, granting or not granting what seems so and what does not seem so. But if the respondent is defending another person's opinion, it is clear that, looking to that person's understanding, he ought to grant or deny each point; wherefore those who concern themselves with foreign opinions (for example, that good and evil are the same, as Heraclitus says) do not grant that contraries cannot belong to the same thing at the same time—these things do not seem so to them, but they say it must be spoken of in accordance with Heraclitus. Those also do this who take over positions from one another; for they conjecture as though the one who posits were saying it. It is clear, therefore, what the respondent must conjecture, whether what is posited is simply probable or probable to someone.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":217,"ref":"p217","source":"Quoniam autem est necesse omne quod interrogatur aut probabile aut improbabile esse,aut neutrum, et ad orationem aut non ad orationem attinere quod interrogatur,si sit quidem quod videtur, et non ad orationem,dandum est dicendo quod videtur. Non enim interimitur (posito eo) quod in principio. Si vero non videtur, et non ad orationem,dandum quirlem,et consignificandum quod non videtur, ad devitationem absurditalis. Si vero sit ad orationem, et videatur, dicendum quoniam videtur quidem,sed valde propinquum ei quod in principio est,et interimitur (eo posito)quod propositum est. Si autem ad orationem quidem, valde autem probabile postulatum,dicendum quod accidit hoc posito, at valde absurdum esse quod proponitur.Si vero neque probabile,neque improbabile, si nihil quidem ad orationem, dandum nihil determinando.Si autem ad orationem,consignificandum quod interimitur (posito eo) quod in principio est. Nam sic et qui respondet nihil videbitur propter hoc pati, siquidem praevidens singula, posuerit, et qui interrogat assequitur syllogismum positis ab eo omnibus probabilioribus conclusione. Quicunque vero non ex probabilioribus conclusione conantur syllogizare,perspicuum quoniam non bene syllogizant, quare cum sic interrogant, non ponendum.","english":"Since it is necessary that everything asked be either probable or improbable or neither, and that what is asked pertain either to the argument or not to the argument: if it is what seems so and does not pertain to the argument, it must be granted by saying what seems so. For the point at the beginning is not destroyed when this is posited. But if it does not seem so and does not pertain to the argument, it must indeed be granted, and one must also signify that it does not seem so, to avoid absurdity. But if it pertains to the argument and seems so, one must say that it indeed seems so, but that it is very close to the point at the beginning, and the proposed point is destroyed when this is posited. But if it pertains to the argument and the postulate is very probable, one must say that this follows when it is posited, but that what is proposed is very absurd. But if it is neither probable nor improbable, if it in no way pertains to the argument, it must be granted without any determination. But if it pertains to the argument, one must signify that the point at the beginning is destroyed when this is posited. For thus the one who answers will seem to suffer nothing on this account, if indeed, foreseeing each point, he has posited it, and the one who asks attains the syllogism when all the things more probable than the conclusion have been posited by him. But whoever attempt to syllogize from things not more probable than the conclusion, it is clear that they do not syllogize well; therefore when they ask in this way, it must not be granted.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":218,"ref":"p218","source":"Similiter autem et in iis quæ obscure et multipliciter dicuntur occurrendum est.Nam quia datum est respondenti,non discenti,dicere non disco, et multipliciter dictum, non ex necessitate confiteri vel negare,manifestum quoniam primum quidem nisi planum sit quod dicitur, non cunctandum ut dicat haud intelligo, nam saepe ex eo quod non clare interrogantibus dant, occurrit aliquid difficile. Si autem notum quidem sit,multipliciter autem dictum; si in omnibus quidemverum vel falsum sit quod dicitur,dandum simpliciter quod dicitur, vel negandum;si vero in aliquo quidem sit verum, in aliquo autem falsum, significandum est quod multipliciter dicitur,et quia hoc quidem falsum, illud autem verum.Nam cum posterius distinguitur, immanifestum si et in principio ambiguum animadverterit.Si autem non praeviderit dubium, sed in alterum aspiciens posuerit,dicendum ad eum qui in alterum ducit,quoniam non ad id aspiciens dedi, sed ad alterum eorum. Nam pluribus existentibus quae sub eodem nomine,vel eadem oratione sunt, facilis est ambiguitas.Si vero et dilucidum sit et simplex quod interrogatur,aut sic, aut non respondendum. Quoniamsutemomnispropositio syllogistica,autearum aliqua est ex quibus syllogismus, aut propter aliquam illarum, manifestum quod quandoque alterius gratia sumetur exeoquodplurasimiliainterrogant.","english":"Similarly also one must meet arguments in matters that are obscure and stated in many senses. For since it is granted to the respondent, not to the learner, to say \"I do not learn,\" and since what is said in many senses need not be affirmed or denied of necessity, it is clear that, in the first place, unless what is said is plain, one should not hesitate to say \"I do not understand\"; for often, from the very fact that they grant something to questioners who are not clear, some difficulty arises. But if what is said is indeed known, yet stated in many senses: if what is said is true or false in all respects, one must simply grant or deny what is said; but if it is true in one respect and false in another, one must point out that it is said in many senses, and that this is false while that is true. For when the distinction is made afterward, it is unclear whether he noticed the ambiguity at the outset as well. But if he has not foreseen the doubt, but looking to one sense has laid it down, one must say to the one who leads him to the other sense that it was not with regard to that that I granted it, but with regard to the other of them. For when there are many things that fall under the same name or the same account, ambiguity is easy. But if what is asked is both clear and simple, one must answer either thus or not. And since every syllogistic proposition is either one of those from which the syllogism is formed, or is for the sake of one of them, it is clear that sometimes something will be assumed for the sake of another, from the fact that they ask many similar things.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":219,"ref":"p219","source":"Nam aut per inductionem, aut per similitudinem, plerumque universale sumunt; singularis igituromnia ponendum,3i sintveraet probabilia.Ad universale aut tentandum instantiam ferre. Nam sine instantia vel quæ sit, vel quæ videatur, prohibere orationem,protervire est; si igitur multis apparentibus non dederit universale qui non habet instantiam,manifestum est quoniam protervit. Amplius, si neque contra argument'ari babeat quod non verum,multo magis videbitur protervire,quamvis nec hoc sufficiat; nam complureso rationes opinionibus contrarias habemus,quas difficile est solvere, velut Zenonis, quod non contingit moveri, neque stadium pertransire, sed non propter id quas sunt opposita his non ponendum.Si igiturqui neque contra argumentari habet,neque instare,non ponit dilucidum, quoniam protervit.Est enim in disputationibus protervia responsio præter dictos mod os, syllogismi deAtructio.Sustinere autem et positionem et definitionem, ipsum sibi ipsi oportet praeargumentando. Nam ex quibus interimunt interrogantes quod proponitur,manifestumquoniam iis adversandum.Inopinabilem vera suppositionem cavendum sustinere.","english":"For they mostly take the universal either by induction or by similarity; therefore all the singulars must be laid down as true and probable. But against the universal one must attempt to bring an instance. For to block the argument without an instance, either one that is or one that seems to be, is to be shameless; if, then, when many things appear so, he does not grant the universal who has no instance, it is clear that he is shameless. Further, if he has nothing to argue against it as not true, he will much more seem to be shameless, although not even this suffices; for we have many arguments contrary to opinions which are difficult to solve, such as Zeno's, that motion does not occur, nor can the stadium be traversed, but not on that account are the things opposed to these not to be laid down. If, therefore, he who has nothing to argue against nor to bring an instance does not grant what is clear, it is evident that he is shameless. For in disputations shamelessness is a response beyond the said modes, the destruction of a syllogism. But one must sustain both the position and the definition by arguing beforehand against himself. For from the things by which the questioners destroy what is proposed, it is clear that these must be opposed. But an unbelievable supposition must be guarded against sustaining.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":220,"ref":"p220","source":"Eritauteminopinabilismultipliciter nameteaexqua absona contingit dicere (ut si omnia dicat aliquis moveri, aut nihil), et quaecunque pejoris majoris esse eligenda, et quae contraria, consiliis, ut quod voluptas bonum,etinjuriam facere melius quam injuriam pati, nam non ut orationis gratia sustinentem, sed ut ea quae videantur dicentem oderunt. Quæcunque vero orationum falsum sylJogizant,soIvendum interimendo id propter quod fil falsum. Nam non is qui quodvis interimit solvit,ne quidem si falsum est quod interimiturjbabere enim potest plura falsa oratio,ut si quis sumat sedentem scribere. Socratem vero sedere, accidit enim ex his, Socratem scribere; interempto igitur Socratem sedere,nihil magis soluta est oratio,quamvis falsum sit postulatum,sed non propterid oratio falsa.Nam si quis sit sedens,non scribens autem,non amplius in tali apte accommodabitur eadem solutio; quare non id interimendum, sed sedentem scribere, non enim omnis qui sedet scribit. Solvit igitur omnino, qui interimit id propter quod fitfalsum,novit autem solutionem qui scit quod propter id falsa oratio, quemadmodum in iis quae falso describuntur; non enim sufficit instare,ne quidem si falsum sit quod interimitur,sed et id propterquod falsum,assignandum; sic enim erit manifestum utrum praevidens aliquid, an non, facit instantiam.","english":"But it will be possible to object in many ways; for both those things from which something absurd results (for example, if someone says that all things move, or that nothing does), and whatever things are to be chosen as belonging to the worse and the greater, and whatever things are contrary to counsels—for example, that pleasure is good, and that to do injustice is better than to suffer injustice; for they do not endure it for the sake of argument, but they hate the one who says what seems to them, as if he were speaking his own opinion. But whatever arguments falsely conclude, one must solve by destroying that on account of which the falsehood results. For it is not the one who destroys any premise whatever who solves the argument, not even if what he destroys is false; for an argument can have several false premises—for example, if someone assumes that a seated man writes, and that Socrates is seated; for from these it follows that Socrates writes. Therefore, once \"Socrates is seated\" has been destroyed, the argument is no more solved, although the assumption was false, but the argument was not false on account of this. For if someone is seated but not writing, the same solution will no longer fit appropriately in such a case; therefore one must destroy not this, but \"a seated man writes\"; for not everyone who sits writes. Therefore he solves the argument altogether who destroys that on account of which the falsehood comes about, but he knows the solution who knows that the argument is false on account of this, as in the case of those things that are falsely described; for it is not enough to object, not even if what is destroyed is false, but one must also assign that on account of which it is false; for in this way it will be clear whether he makes the objection with some foresight or not.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":221,"ref":"p221","source":"CAPUT IV.\n\nLoci communes pro interrogante et respondente.\n\nEst autem orationem prohibere concludi quadrupliciter. Nam aut interimendo id propter quod fit falsum,aut ad interrogantem instantiam dicendo: saepe enim non solvit quidem,qui tamen interrogat non potest longius producere. Tertium autem ad interrogata,accidit enim exinterrogatisquidem non fieri quod volumus, eo quod non bene interrogata sint,additoautem aliquo, fieri conclugionem.Siigitur non amplius potest producere interrogans,ad interrogantem erit instantia, si autem potest, ad interrogata. Quartum autem, pessima est instantiarum quae est ad tempus,nam quidam talibus instant ad quae disputare pluris est temporis,quam praesentis exercitationis;instantiae igitur, ut dictum est prius, quatuor modis fiunt. Solutio autem est earum quae dictas sunt, prima tantum, reliquæ autem prohibitiones quaedam et impedimenta conclusionum. Inculpatiovero orationis et secundum ipsam orationem,et quandointerrogatur non eadem.Plerumque. enim quod non bene disputatur oralio,is qui interrogatur estcausaeo quod nonconcedatexquibusprobe erat disputare ad positionem,nam non est in altero solo bene absolvere commune opus. Necessarium igitur quandoque ad dicentem.etnonadpositionem argumentari,quando is qui respondet contraria interroganti observat corroborans; protervientes igitur altercatorias, et non dialecticas faciunt exercitationes.","english":"CHAPTER IV.\n\nCommon topics for the questioner and the respondent.\n\nNow there are four ways of preventing an argument from being concluded. For either by removing that on account of which the falsehood arises, or by raising an objection against the questioner; for often he does not indeed solve it, yet the questioner cannot draw it out any further. The third is against the things asked; for it happens that what we wish is not brought about from the things asked, because they have not been asked well, but with something added, the conclusion is brought about. If, then, the questioner can no longer draw it out, the objection will be against the questioner; but if he can, it will be against the things asked. The fourth is the worst of objections, that which is directed to time; for some raise objections to such things as require more time to dispute than the present exercise allows. Objections, then, as was said before, come about in four ways. But the solution of those that have been mentioned applies only to the first; the rest are certain preventions and hindrances of conclusions. But the censure of an argument is both in accordance with the argument itself and, when the question is put, is not the same. For often the argument is not well disputed, and the one who is questioned is the cause, because he does not concede the things from which it was proper to dispute with a view to the position; for it is not in one party alone to accomplish well a common task. It is necessary, then, sometimes to argue against the speaker and not against the position, when the respondent, strengthening his case, watches for things contrary to the questioner; those who are contentious, then, make their exercises contentious and not dialectical.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":222,"ref":"p222","source":"Amplius autem, quia exercitationis et experimenti gratia,et non doctrinæ hujusmodi sunt orationes,perspicuum quoniam non solum vera syllogizandum, verum etiam falsum, nec per vera semper, sed quandoque et per falsa-; saepe enim vero posito, interimere necesse est disputantem: quare proponenda falsa,quandoque autem et falso posito, interimendum per falsa, nihil enim prohibet alicui videri quae non sunt magis quam vera; quapropter ex iis quae illi videntur oratione facta, magis erit suasus quam adjutus.Oport.et autem eum qui bene transfert,dialectice et non contentiose transferre; ut geometram geometrice, sive falsum, sive verum sit quod concludendum est;quales autem dialectici syllogismi,dictum est prius.Quoniam autem malus particeps,qui impedit communeopus,patet quod et in orationibus,nam commune quidpiam quod proponitur et in illis est, præterquam in concertantibus; his autem non est eumdem utrisquefinemassequi, nam plurcs unoimpossibile est vincere. Differt autem nihil sive in respondendo,sive in interrogando fiat, nam et qui contentiose interrogat, prave disputat; et qui in respondendo non dat quod videtur,neque suscipitquicquamquod vult interrogans interrogare. Manifestum igitur ex iis quae dicta quod non similiter inculpandum et secundum seipsam orationem et interrogantem.","english":"Furthermore, since discussions of this kind are for the sake of exercise and experience, and not for the sake of this kind of teaching, it is clear that one must syllogize not only what is true but also what is false, and not always through true premises but sometimes also through false ones; for often, when something true has been posited, it is necessary to destroy the disputant. Therefore one must sometimes propose false premises, and sometimes, when something false has been posited, one must destroy the opponent through false premises. For nothing prevents certain things from appearing to someone more than the truth does; hence, when the argument is constructed from what appears to that person, he will be persuaded rather than helped. But the one who transfers well ought to transfer dialectically and not contentiously, as a geometer does geometrically, whether what is to be concluded is false or true. What kind of dialectical syllogisms there are has been said earlier. Since, however, the bad participant is the one who hinders the common work, it is clear that this also applies in discussions; for something common is also proposed in them, except among those who are contending. For these do not have the same end for both parties, since it is impossible for more than one to win. It makes no difference whether this happens in responding or in questioning, for the one who questions contentiously also disputes badly, and the one who in responding does not grant what appears to be the case, nor accepts whatever the questioner wishes to ask. It is clear, therefore, from what has been said that the argument itself and the questioner are not to be blamed in the same way.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":223,"ref":"p223","source":"Nam nihil prohibet orationem quidem pravam esse, interrogantem vero, ut possibile est, optime contra respondentem disceptare, nam contra protervos non possibile fortasse statimsumere quales quis vult, sed quales fieri possibile faciendi syllogismi. Quoniam autem est indeterminatum quando contraria,et quando ea quæ sunt in principio sumunt homines (nam plerumque per se ipsos dicentes contraria dicunt,et abnuentes prius, dant posterius,eo quod interroganti et contraria et quae in principio plerumque obediunt), necesse est pravas fieri disputationes;causaautem est qui respondeL hæc quidem non dans,illa autem talia dans;manifestum igitur quoniam non similiterinculpandum et interrogantes et orationes. Orationes autem secundum seipsas quinque sunt inculpationes.Prima quidem quando ex interrogatis non concluditur, neque quod propositum est neque omnino quidquam, cum sint vel falsa,vel inopinabilia, quo omnia, aut plurima, in quibus consistere debet conclusio, et nequo ablatis quibusdam,neque additis, neque his quidem ablatis, Illis vero additis, fit conclusio.","english":"For nothing prevents the argument itself from being faulty while the questioner, as far as possible, disputes against the respondent in the best way; for against contentious persons it is perhaps not possible immediately to assume such premises as one wishes, but only such as are possible for producing a syllogism. Since, however, it is undetermined when people assume contraries and when they assume the things that are in the beginning (for often, when speaking by themselves, they state contraries, and having denied the earlier points they grant the later, because in response to the questioner they generally yield both contraries and the things that are in the beginning), it is necessary that faulty discussions arise; and the cause is the respondent, who does not grant some things and grants others of such a kind. It is clear, therefore, that questioners and arguments are not to be blamed alike. But arguments, considered in themselves, have five grounds of blame. The first is when the conclusion does not follow from the things asked, neither the proposed conclusion nor anything at all, since the premises are either false or not generally accepted, from which—all or most of them—the conclusion ought to consist, and neither when certain things are removed nor when things are added, nor when some are removed and others added, does the conclusion follow.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":224,"ref":"p224","source":"Secundaautem,siad positionem non fiat syllogismus, et ex talibus,et eo modo quo dictum est prius.Tertia vero si additis quibusdam fiat syllogismus, hæc ' autem sint deteriora iis quæ interrogantur,et minus probabilia conclusione,etiamsi ablatis quibusdam, nam quandoque sumunt plura necessariis, quare non eo quod hæc sunt, fit syllogismus. Amplius, si ex inopinabilioribus, et minus credibilibus conclusione, aut si ex veris, sed majore opera indigentibus demonstrari,quam problema; non oportet autem ex omnibus problematis syllogismos existimare similiter probabiles esse et suasibiles;natura enim statim sunt aliqua quidem faciliora,alia vero difficiliora eorum quae interrogantur, quare si ex aliquibus, ut fieri potest, maxime probabilibus,conjeoturam fecerit,disputatum bene est.","english":"The second, however, is if the syllogism does not come about in relation to the position, both from such things and in the manner stated earlier. The third, truly, is if the syllogism comes about with certain things added, but these are worse than the things asked and less probable than the conclusion, even if certain things are removed; for sometimes they assume more than is necessary, wherefore the syllogism does not come about because of these things. Further, if from things more unexpected and less credible than the conclusion, or if from true things but ones requiring greater effort to demonstrate than the problem; for it is not right to think that syllogisms from all problems are similarly probable and persuasive; for by nature some of the things asked are immediately easier, others harder, wherefore if from some things, as far as possible the most probable, he has made a conjecture, the dispute has been conducted well.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":225,"ref":"p225","source":"Manifestum igitur quoniam orationis non eadem inculpatio,et ad problema,et secundum se.Nam nihil secundum se quidem orationem prohibetesse vituperabilem, ad problema autem laudabilem, et rursum diverso, secundum se quidem laudabilem,ad problema autem vituperabilem, quando ex pluribus est facile cum probabilibus tumverisconcludere.Erit autem quandoque oratio etiam concludens quam non concludens deterior,quando illa quidem ex absurdis concludit, cum non sit tale problema,haec autem indigeat talibus quæ sunt probabilia et vera, et nondum ex assumptis sit oratio.Eos autem qui perfalsaverum concludunt,non justum est inculpare. Nam falsum quidem semper necesse est per falsa syllogizare,verum autem est quandoque per falsa syllogizare,manifestum autem id ex Analyticis.Cum autem demonstratio sit alicujus dicta oratio, si aliquid est aliud quod ad conclusionem nullo modo se habet non erit ex illo syllogismus;si autem appareat, sophisma erit, non demonstratio.Est autem philosophema quidem syllgismus demonstrativus,epichirema autem syllogismus dialecticus, sophisma vero syllogismus contentiosus, aporema autem syllogismus dialecticus contradictionis.Si vero ex utrisque quas videantur aliquid ostendatur,non autem similiter videantur, nihil prohibet quod ostenditur magis altero videri.","english":"It is manifest, therefore, that the same accusation does not apply to an argument both in relation to the problem and in itself. For nothing prevents an argument from being blameworthy in itself, yet praiseworthy in relation to the problem; and again, conversely, praiseworthy in itself, yet blameworthy in relation to the problem, when it is easy to conclude from many things both probable and true. Sometimes, moreover, an argument that concludes will be worse than one that does not conclude, when the former concludes from absurdities, although the problem is not of that sort, while the latter requires things that are probable and true, and the argument is not yet based on the assumptions. But it is not just to blame those who conclude the true through the false. For it is always necessary to syllogize the false through the false, but it is sometimes possible to syllogize the true through the false; and this is manifest from the Analytics. Since demonstration is an argument that has been stated of something, if there is anything else that in no way relates to the conclusion, there will be no syllogism from it; but if it appears to be so, it will be a sophism, not a demonstration. A philosopheme is a demonstrative syllogism, an epichireme is a dialectical syllogism, a sophism is a contentious syllogism, and an aporema is a dialectical syllogism of contradiction. But if something is shown from both [sets of premises] as they appear, yet they do not appear alike, nothing prevents what is shown from appearing more [convincing] by one than the other.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":226,"ref":"p226","source":"Sed si hoc quidem videatur, illud autem neutra parte,aut si hoc quidem videatur, illud autem non videatur;si similiter quidem, similiter utique erit, et non;si autem magis alterum, sequetur quod est magis. Est autem quoddam et idem ad syllogismos peccatum,quando ostenditur per longioraquod contingit per breviora,et quæ orationi assunt. Ut quod est opinio magis altera quam altera, si quis petat ipsum quodque maxime esse,esse autem opinabile, ipsum quod vere est;quare quorumdam magis esse ipsum; ad quod autem magis, magis dicitur esse, esse autem et ipsam opinionem veram, an erit accuratius,quam par sit exigens quædam? Petitum est autem et ipsam opinionem veram esse, et ipsum quodque maxime esse,ac si ipsa opinio vera,certior sit; sed quæ nequitia major, quam quan facit circa id cujus est oratio latere causam? Oratio autem est manifesta uno quidem modo,et publicissimo,si sit concludens sic, ut nihil oporteat interrogare, uno autem et qui maxime dicitur,cum sumpta quidem sint ex quibus necessarium est conclusionem esse, quae quidem sint per conclusiones conclusa,etiamsi id mittitur quod valde probabile est.","english":"But if this one thing seems so, and that other on neither side; or if this one seems so, but that other does not seem so; if they are alike, it will likewise be and not be; but if one is more, what is more will follow. There is also a certain same fault in syllogisms, when what can be shown through shorter means is shown through longer ones, and through what is present in the speech. For example, that one opinion is more than another, if someone asks that each thing itself is most of all, and that what truly is is opinable; wherefore certain things are more themselves; but that toward which it is more is said to be more, and that the opinion itself is true—or will it be more exact than is fitting, demanding certain things? But it has been assumed both that the opinion itself is true and that each thing itself is most of all, as if the opinion itself, being true, were more certain; but what wickedness is greater than that which he causes to lie hidden the cause concerning that of which the speech is? But the speech is manifest in one way, and that the most common, if it concludes in such a way that nothing need be asked; and in another way, which is most spoken of, when those things have been assumed from which the conclusion is necessary, which things have been concluded through conclusions, even if that which is very probable is passed over.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":227,"ref":"p227","source":"CAPUT V.\n\nPro opponente ei respondente loci communes.\n\nFalsa autem oratio vocatur quadrupliciter. Uno quidem modo,quando apparet concludere quae non concludit,vocatur autem apparens,litigiosus syllogismus. Alio modo, quando concludit quidem, non tamen ad propositum,quod accidit maximein iis quae ad impossibile ducunt. Aut ad propositum quidem concludit,non tamen secundum propriam disciplinam: hoc autem est,si ea quae non est medicinalis videatur esse medicinalis,aut geometrica quas non est geometrica,autdialectica quæ non est dialectica, sive verum,sive falsum sit quod accidit.Alio autem modo,si per falsa non concludit, hujus autem erit quandoque quidem conclusio falsa,quandoque autem vera;nam falsum quidem semper per falsaconcludit, verum autem possibile est et non per vera,utdictum est prius. Quod autem falsa sit oratio,dicentis peccatum potius est quam orationis; at ne quid dicentis semper, sed cum lateat ipsum quod falsam orationem dixit aliquam,eo quod ab ipso suscipimus cum pluribus veri quidpiam amplius, si ex iis quae maxime videntur interi mit aliquid verorum(talis enim existens verorum demonstratio est), oportet sane positorum aliquid non esse omnino,quare erithujus demonstratio. Si autem verum concludat per falsa, et valde absurda, compluribus deterior erit quae falsum syllogizant; erit autem talis,et quae falsum I concludit.","english":"CHAPTER V.\n\nThe common topics for the one who opposes and the one who responds.\n\nA false argument is so called in four ways. In one way, when it appears to conclude what it does not conclude; and it is called an apparent, contentious syllogism. In another way, when it does conclude, but not to the point at issue, which happens most of all in those arguments that lead to the impossible. Or it does conclude to the point at issue, but not according to the proper discipline: this happens if what is not medicine appears to be medicine, or what is not geometry appears to be geometry, or what is not dialectic appears to be dialectic, whether what results be true or false. In another way, if it does not conclude through false premises; of this kind there will sometimes be a false conclusion, sometimes a true one; for a false conclusion always concludes through false premises, but a true one can also conclude not through true premises, as was said before. But that the argument be false is rather the fault of the speaker than of the argument; yet not always of the speaker, but when it escapes his notice that he has stated some false argument, in that we receive from him, along with many true things, something more besides, if from the things that seem most evident he inserts something of the true (for such a demonstration is of true things), it is surely necessary that something of the premises not be altogether [true], and so the demonstration will be of this kind. But if it concludes something true through false and very absurd premises, it will be worse than many arguments that syllogize a false conclusion; and such an argument will be one that concludes a false conclusion.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":228,"ref":"p228","source":"Quare manifestum quod prima quidem consideralio orationis secundum se ipsam est, si concludit secunda autem,utrum verum an falsum; tertia vero ex qualibus quibusdam.Nam si ex falsis quidem, opinabilibus autem, rationabilis; si autem existentibus quidem, sed inopinabilibus, prava; si vero et falsa et valde inopinabilia sint, dilucidum quod prava, aut simpliciter, aut ad rem. Id autem quod in principio etcontraria quonam pactopeteret interrogans,secundum veritatem quidem in Analyticis dictum est, secundum opinionem vero nunc dicendum est. Petere autem videntur id quod (estin principio quinque modis. Manifestissimo quidem et primo, si quis idipsum quod monstrari oporteat petat,hoc autem in eo ipso quidem non facile latere; potest, in synonimis autem, et in quibuscunque nomen et oratio idem significat, magis. Secundo autem,quando quod particulariter oporteat demonstrare universaliter quis petat,ut qui argumentatur quod contrariorum una disciplina,omnium oppositorum postulaverit unam esse,nam videtur id quod oportebat secundum se ostendere cum aliis petere pluribus. Tertio, si quid quod universaliter est ostendere propositum particulariter petit, ut si de omnibus contrariis propositum est, de aliquibus postulet: videtur enim hic quod cum pluribus oportebat ostendere secundum se extra petere.","english":"Therefore it is clear that the first consideration of a speech is according to itself, whether it concludes; the second, whether it is true or false; the third, from what sort of premises it is composed. For if it is from false but reputable premises, it is reasonable; if from true but disreputable premises, it is base; but if the premises are both false and thoroughly disreputable, it is clear that it is base, either simply or in relation to the matter. But in what way one who questions would beg the principle and the contraries, has been stated according to truth in the Analytics, but must now be stated according to opinion. They seem to beg what is in the principle in five ways. Most manifestly and first, if someone asks for that very thing which ought to be demonstrated; but this is not easily concealed in the thing itself, though it can be more so in synonyms and in all cases where a name and a definition signify the same thing. Second, when someone asks universally for what ought to be demonstrated particularly, as one who argues that there is one discipline of contraries has postulated that there is one of all opposites; for he seems to ask, along with many other things, that very thing which ought to have been shown according to itself. Third, if someone asks particularly for what was proposed to be shown universally, as if, when the proposal concerns all contraries, he asks for some of them; for this man seems to beg, apart from the question, that which ought to have been shown along with many things.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":229,"ref":"p229","source":"Rursus, si quis dividens petat problema, ut si oportet ostendere medicinam sani et aegri, extra utrumque postulet,aut si qui eorum quae sequuntur se invicem ex necessitate alterum petat, ut latus incommensurabile essediametro,sioporteat ostendere quod diameter lateri. Æqualiter autem et contraria petunt ei quod ex principio est. Nam primo quidem si quis opposita petat secundum affirmationem et negationem; secundo autem contraria secundum oppositionem,ut bonum et malum idem; tertio vero si quis universaliter postulans, particulariter petierit coDtradicLionem.Ut si quis sumens contrariorum unam disciplinam, sani et ægri alteram esse petat; aut si hoc petens in universali oppositionem tentet sumere.Rursum si quis petat contrarium ei quod ex necessitate accidit per ea quae posita sunt,et si quis ea quidem non sumat quae opposita,at alia petat duo,ex quibus erit opposita contradictio.Differt autem coctrariasumeretantillum ab eo quod est in principio,quoniam hujus quidem est peccatum ad conclusionem (nam adillamaspicientes,quod in principio est dicimus petere); contraria autem sunt in propositionibus eo quod ipsae aliquo modo se habent ad invicem. Adgymnasiam autem et exercitationemtaliumorationumprimumquidem convertere assuescere oportet orationes.","english":"Again, if someone, while making a division, begs the question—for example, if one must show that medicine is of the healthy and the sick, and he asks for one of these outside both; or if, of things that follow one another by necessity, he asks for one of them, as that the side is incommensurable with the diameter, if one must show that the diameter is so with the side. And in the same way they also beg things contrary to what follows from the principle. For first, if someone asks opposites according to affirmation and negation; second, contraries according to opposition, as that good and evil are the same; third, if someone, asking universally, begs the contradiction particularly—as if someone, assuming that there is one science of contraries, asks that the science of the healthy and the sick be another; or if, asking this in the universal, he tries to assume the opposition. Again, if someone asks the contrary of what necessarily results from the things laid down; and if someone does not assume the things that are opposed, but asks for two other things from which the opposed contradiction will follow. But asking contraries differs from what is from the principle, because the fault of the latter lies in relation to the conclusion (for looking to that, we say that he begs what is from the principle); but contraries are in the premises, in that they themselves are somehow related to one another. For gymnastics and exercise in such speeches, first indeed one must accustom oneself to turn speeches around.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":230,"ref":"p230","source":"Sic enim et ad id quod dicitur copiosius nos habebimus, et in paucis plures sciemus orationes; nam convertere est transsumentem conclusionem cum reliquis interrogationibus interimere unum.quidpiam eorum quae dicta sunt.Necesse est enim, si conclusio non est, unum aliquam interimere propositionum, siquidem omnibus positis necesse erat conclusionem esse. Ad omnem autem positionem et quod sic, et quod nonsicargumentumconsiderandum,etcum inveneris,solutionem statim quaerendum.","english":"For in this way we shall be better equipped for what is said more copiously, and in few words we shall know more arguments; for to convert is, by taking up the conclusion, to destroy one of the things that were said along with the remaining questions. For it is necessary, if the conclusion is not, that one of the propositions be destroyed, since when all were posited it was necessary for the conclusion to be. But against every position one must consider the argument both for the 'so' and for the 'not so,' and when you have found it, a solution must immediately be sought.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":231,"ref":"p231","source":"Sic enim simul accidetet ad interrogandum,et ad respondendum exerceri,eL si ad nullum alium habemus, apud nos ipsos sensim comparanda sunt qua: attinent ad ipsam positionem argumenta: nam id ad cogendum multam copiam praebet, et ad redarguendum magnum habet adjumentum, quando quispiam promptus est argumentari,et quod sic et quod non sic, nam ad contraria accidit facere observationem, et ad cognitionem,etea(quae secundum philosophiam est) peritiam posse conspicere, et conspexisse quae ab utraque accidunt suppositione,non parvum instrumentum: reliquum enim horum, recte eligere alterum; oportet autem ad id quod tale est esse bono ingenio,et hoc est secundum veritatem,bonum ingenium, posse bene eligere verum, et diffugere falsum, quod qui nati sunt bene possunt probe facere, nam qui amant et qui odiunt, quod profertur facile discernunt optimum.Et ad ea quae saepissime incidunt problemata, scire oportet orationes, et id maxime de primis positionibus. Nam in his fastidiunt saepe qui respondent. Amplius, terminorum copiosos esse oportet, et probabilium, et primorum se habere promptos: nam per haee fiunt syllogismi. Tentandum autem et ea(in qusesaepissime incidunt disputationes) tenere.","english":"For in this way it will happen at the same time that we are exercised both in questioning and in answering, and even if we have no one else, we must gradually gather for ourselves the arguments that pertain to the position itself; for this provides great abundance for compelling an opponent, and it has great assistance for refuting, when someone is ready to argue both that it is so and that it is not so. For it falls to us to make observation of contraries, and for knowledge—the knowledge that is according to philosophy—it is no small instrument to be able to discern, and to have discerned, the things that follow from each of the two suppositions; for the remaining task is to choose the one of them rightly. But one must be naturally well-endowed for what is of this sort, and this is, according to truth, good natural endowment: to be able to choose the true well and to shun the false. And those who are born with this can do it well; for those who love and those who hate easily discern what is best in what is brought forward. And for the problems that occur most often, one must know the arguments, and especially concerning the primary positions. For in these respondents often grow weary. Moreover, one must be copious in terms, and have probable and primary ones ready at hand; for through these syllogisms are made. But one must also try to hold on to those things that occur most often in disputations.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":232,"ref":"p232","source":"Nam quemadmodum in geometria ante opus est circa elementa exercitatum esse,et in numeris circa capitales prompte se habere, et multum refert ad hoc et alium numerum cognoscere multiplicatum, similiter quoque et in orationibus promptum esse ad principia, et propositiones memoria scire oportet: nam perinde ac in memoriae sensorio solum loci positi statim faciunt ipsas res memorare, et hac faciunt ad ratiocinandum promptiorem,eo quod ad determinatas illas inspiciatsecundumnumerum.Propositionemquecommunem magis quam positionem inmemoriaponendum.Nam principiorum et suppositionum copiosum esse mediocriter, difficile.Amplius, oratlionem unam plures facere assuescendum,velu ii qui occultissime abscondunt.Tale autem erit si quis quam plurimum abscedat ab affinitate eorum de quibus est oratio; eruntautempotioresorationumluniversalesmaxime, quae id pati possint,ut quoniam non est una plurium disciplina: sic enim et in iis quae sunt ad aliquid, et in contrariis, et conjugatis est. Oportet autem et reminisci universales facere orationes, tametsi fuerit disputans particulariter. Sic enim et plures licebit unam facere, similiter autemet apud rethores in eothymematibus.Eumdem autem quam maxime fugere, contra universale ferre syllogismos.","english":"For just as in geometry one must first be exercised in the elements, and in numbers be ready at hand with the principal ones, and it greatly matters for this also to know another number multiplied, so likewise in arguments one must be ready as to principles and know propositions by memory; for just as in the storehouse of memory the places once set down immediately cause the things themselves to be remembered, and by this they make one readier for reasoning, in that it looks to those determinate things according to number. And a common proposition is to be placed in memory more than a position. For to be copiously furnished with principles and suppositions is moderately difficult. Moreover, one must become accustomed to make one argument into many, like those who conceal things most secretly. Such a thing will be if one departs as far as possible from the affinity of the things about which the argument is; for the more universal arguments will be the more suitable, those which can undergo this, as that there is not one discipline of many things; for thus it is also in relatives, and in contraries, and in conjugates. But one must also remember to make arguments universal, even if one has been disputing particularly. For thus it will be possible to make many into one, and similarly also among the rhetoricians in enthymemes. But one must flee the same thing as much as possible, and bring syllogisms against the universal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":233,"ref":"p233","source":"Et semper oportet considerare orationes, si in pluribus communibus disputantur Nam omnes particulares in universali disputatae sunt, et inest in particularibus ejus quod est universale demonstratio,eo quod non est syllogizare quidquam sine universali. Exercitatio autem facienda, inductivarum quidem ad rudem,syllogisticarum autem ad expertum. Et tentandum accipere ab iis quidem qui in Syllogismis triti sunt propositiones, ab iis vero qui in inductionibus similitudines, in hoc enim utrique exercitati sunt. Omnino autem exercitationis gratia disceptantibus tentandum afferre aut syllogismum de aliquo,aut propositionem, aut solutionem, aut instantiam, sive recte quis dicat, sive perperam, vel ipse,velalter,etad quidpiam uterque. Ex his enim facultas,exet'cilatio autem facultatis gratia, et maxime circa propositiones et instantias. Est enim (ut simpliciter dicam) dialecticus,propositivuset instantivus.Estautemproponere quidem,uuumfacere quae sunt plura.Oportet enim unum omnino sumere ad quod esl oratio. Instare autem quod unum est, facere plura. Nam aut dividit, aut interimit, hoc quidem dans, illud autem non dans, eorum quae proposita sunt. Non est autem cum omni disputandum, neque contra quemlibet exercitandum.","english":"And one must always consider arguments, whether they are disputed in the case of more common [terms]. For all particular things are disputed in the universal, and the demonstration of the universal is present in particulars, because it is not possible to syllogize anything without the universal. But training must be undertaken—for the unskilled, in inductive arguments; for the experienced, in syllogistic ones. And one must try to take propositions from those who are practiced in syllogisms, and similarities from those who are practiced in inductions; for in this both kinds are trained. And in general, for those disputing for the sake of training, one must try to bring either a syllogism about something, or a proposition, or a solution, or an objection, whether someone speaks rightly or wrongly, whether oneself or another, and [to bring] each to some point. For from these comes facility, and exercise is for the sake of facility, and especially concerning propositions and objections. For (to speak simply) the dialectician is one who propounds and objects. And to propound is indeed to make one thing out of many. For one must take altogether one thing to which the argument [is directed]. But to object is to make many things out of what is one. For it either divides or destroys, granting this and not granting that, of the things that have been proposed. But one must not dispute with everyone, nor train against just anyone.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":234,"ref":"p234","source":"Nam necesse ad aliquos pravas fieri orationes, ab eo enim qui omnino tentat apparere, diffugiendum, juslum autem omnino ten tare syllogismo concludere, verumtamen non pulchrum, eo quod non oportet adversus quoslibet facile consistere.Quandoquidem necesse est parviloquium inde emergere, nam qui exercitati sunt non possunt abstinere adisputatione sine altercatione. Oportet autem et factas habere orationes ad hujusmodi problemata, in quiLus cum paucissimorum copia eas ad quam plurima utiles habeamus.Illæ vero sunt universales, et ad quas in promptu quidpiam adinvenire difficile est.","english":"For it is necessary that some arguments be directed at base opponents; for one must flee from the one who altogether attempts to appear [to be something], but one must altogether attempt to conclude by syllogism; yet it is not noble, because one ought not readily to stand against just anyone. Since it is necessary that petty quibbling arise from this—for those who are practiced cannot refrain from disputation without altercation. But one ought also to have arguments prepared for problems of this sort, in which, with a supply of the fewest [principles], we may have them useful for the greatest number of cases. Those [arguments], however, are universal, and [are those] for which it is difficult to find anything readily at hand.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]}]}