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Latin · Treatises ·

In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Duo

Boethius. Severinus · ogl-pl

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0 commentary units 3 derived notes 0 open questions 237 narrative
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stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:201 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quocirca secundum contradictionem fit hæc quoque consequentia, nam impossibile esse et non impossibile esse contradictio est, sed affirmationem, id est impossibile esse, sequitur negatio non possibile esse. Negalionem vero, id est non impossibile esse, sequitur affirmatio possibile est esse, sed non possibile est esse, et possibile est esse, contradictio est, sed negationem possibilis, id est non possibile esse consequetur necesse est. non esse afOrmalio, sed affirmalionem possibilis, id est possibile esse sequetur non necesse est non esse negatio. Quare ita positis nibil evenit impossibile, sed omnia conveniunt et consentiunt, et secundum superiorem possibilis et impossibilis modum afHrmaLiones et negationes converso ordine contradictone se sequuntur. Et sensus quidem totius hujusmodi est, ordo autem verborum sic. Quoniam, inquit, ei quod est possibile esse, nec illud quod est necesse esse, nec illud quod est necesse non esse consentit, relinquitur ut id quod est non necessarium non esse sequatur possibile esse. Hoc enim quod dicitur non necessarium non esse verum est dicere do necesse est non esse, et subaudimus quoniam est ejus contradictio. Haec enim quae dicit, non necesse est non esse, contradictio fit ei quae sequitur negationem possibilis, id est non possibile esse.

English

Wherefore by contradiction this consequence also comes about; for "it is impossible to be" and "it is not impossible to be" are a contradiction, but the negation "it is not possible to be" follows the affirmation, that is, "it is impossible to be." But the affirmation "it is possible to be" follows the negation, that is, "it is not impossible to be." But "it is not possible to be" and "it is possible to be" are a contradiction, but the affirmation "it is necessary not to be" will follow the negation of "possible," that is, "it is not possible to be." But the negation "it is not necessary not to be" will follow the affirmation of "possible," that is, "it is possible to be." Wherefore, when these things are thus posited, nothing impossible results, but all things agree and are in harmony, and according to the higher mode of "possible" and "impossible" the affirmations and negations follow one another by contradiction in reversed order. And indeed the sense of all this is of such a kind, but the order of the words is as follows. Since, he says, neither that which is "it is necessary to be" nor that which is "it is necessary not to be" agrees with that which is "it is possible to be," it remains that "it is possible to be" follows that which is "it is not necessary not to be." For this which is said, "it is not necessary not to be," it is true to say of "it is necessary not to be," and we understand that it is its contradiction. For these things which it says, "it is not necessary not to be," become a contradiction to that which follows the negation of "possible," that is, "it is not possible to be.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:202 · narrative
Source · Latin

Hæc est autem ea quae dicit, necesse est non esse, illud enim quod est non possibile esse, utrumque horum sequitur, et quod est impossibile esse, et quod est, necesse est non esse. Cujus affirmationis, id est necesse est non esse, negatio est, non necesse est non esse. Sed haee sequitur non impossibile esse et possibile esse; igitur hae contradictiones secundum praedictum modum se sequuntur, seiticet contradictorie, sed conversim, et his positis atque ita ol'dinalis nihil contingit impossibile.

Dubitabitautem aliquis si ad illud quod necessarium esse, possibile esse sequatur. Nam si non sequitur, contradictio sequetur, non possibile esse, et si quia dicat non hunc esse contradictionem, necesse esse est ipsum dicere possibile non esse, sed utræque (alsæ sunt de necesse esse. At vero rursus, idem videtur esse possibile incidi et non incidi, et esse et non esse. Quare erit nece.5se esse, contingens non esse, hoc autem falsum est.

English

But this is the one that says "it is necessary not to be." For "it is not possible to be" is followed by both of these: both "it is impossible to be" and "it is necessary not to be." The negation of this affirmation, that is, of "it is necessary not to be," is "it is not necessary not to be." But this is followed by "it is not impossible to be" and "it is possible to be." Therefore these contradictions follow one another in the manner stated above, namely contradictorily, but in reverse order; and when these are posited and thus ordered, nothing impossible results.

But someone will ask whether "it is possible to be" follows from "it is necessary to be." For if it does not follow, the contradiction will follow: "it is not possible to be"; and if someone says that this is not the contradiction, he must say that "it is possible not to be" is the contradiction of "it is necessary to be"—but both of these are about "it is necessary to be." Yet again, "it is possible to happen" and "not to happen," and "to be" and "not to be," seem to be the same. Wherefore it will be necessary to be, and contingent not to be—but this is false.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:203 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ad superiorem possibilis et necessarii consequen'tiae reversus est quaestionem. Dicit enim dubitari posse, si id quod est possibile esse consentiat ei propositioni, quae est necessarium esse, sive enim consentire dicatur, sive non consentire, aliquid impossibile et inconveniens utroque modo contingit; nam si quis dicat id quod dicitur possibile esse non consenlire ei quod est necessarium esse, consentiet ei negatio possibilis, ea quæ est non possibile esse; sed si ista consenliet, erit idem necessarium esse quod est non possibile esse. Quod si hoc rursus aliquis neget, el dical nou esse negalioDem ejus propositionis quæ est possibile esse, eam quæ dicit non possibile esse, sed illam potius quæ proponit, possibile est uon esse, quamquam falsum sit, tamen ne hæc quidem ei quo est necessarium esse convenire potest. Fit enim negatio ejus quae est possibile esse, ea quae dicit, possibile est non esse, si affirmatio possibile esse non sequitur affirmationem quae dicit, necesse est esse, sequitur negatio ea quæ est, possibile est non esse, sed quod necesse est esse, falsum est dicere quoniam possibile est non esse. Quod enim necesse esl esse, dici non polesl fieri posse ut non sit, sed potius non posse Seri ut non sit: quod si quis dicat rursus sequi id quod dicitur necesse esse, et consenlire ei quæ dicit possibile esse, sic quoque aliquid inconveniens reperietur.

English

He returns to the earlier question of the consequence of "possible" and "necessary." For he says it can be doubted whether "it is possible to be" agrees with the proposition "it is necessary to be." For whether it is said to agree or not to agree, something impossible and incongruous follows in either case. For if someone says that "it is possible to be" does not agree with "it is necessary to be," the negation of "possible," namely "it is not possible to be," will agree with it. But if that agrees, it will be the same thing for it to be necessary to be and not possible to be. But if someone again denies this and says that the negation of the proposition "it is possible to be" is not "it is not possible to be," but rather "it is possible not to be"—although this is false, still not even this can agree with "it is necessary to be." For the negation of "it is possible to be" becomes that which says "it is possible not to be." If the affirmation "it is possible to be" does not follow the affirmation which says "it is necessary to be," the negation "it is possible not to be" follows. But it is false to say of what is necessary to be that it is possible not to be. For what is necessary to be cannot be said to be able not to be, but rather to be unable not to be. But if someone again says that "it is necessary to be" follows and agrees with "it is possible to be," in this way too something incongruous will be found.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:204 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod enim possibile est esse, idem possibile est non esse, erit igitur quod necesse est esse, possibile non esse, et erit contingensquod necessarium est. Possibile autem et contingens ill utramque partem facile vertitur, et ad esae et ad non esse. Quod autem necesse est esse, interclusum habet eventum ad contrariam dictionem. Ut si necesse est esse, ut non sit, fieri non potest, et si necesse est non esse, ut sil, impossibile est. Quare qui dicit possibile esse consentire ei quod est necesse esse, quoniam id quod est possibile est potest etiam non esse, et hoc est contingens, dicit id quod esse necesse est, posse non esse, et esse conlingens, quod est inconveniens. Hanc igitur dnbitationem solvens, ita sequitur:

Manifestum est autem quoniam non omne possibile, vel esse, vel ambulare, et opposita valet. Sed est in quibus non sit verum. At primum quidem in his quæ. non secundum rationem possunt, tat ignis calefactibilis est, et habet vim irrationabilem, ergo secundum I'ationem polestales eædem plurimum ctiam contrariorum sunt,irrationabiles vero non omnes,sedquemadmodum dictum est, ignem non est possibile calefacere, et non calefacere, neque qllæcunque alia semper agunt. Alia vero possunt et secundum irrationabiles potestates simul opposita suscipere, sed hoc idcirco dictum est quoniam non omnis potestas oppositorum est, neque quæcunque secundum eamdem speciem dicantur.

English

For what is possible to be is the same as possible not to be; therefore, what is necessary to be will be possible not to be, and what is necessary will be contingent. But "possible" and "contingent" are easily turned toward either part, both to be and not to be. But what is necessary to be has its outcome closed off from the contrary statement. For example, if it is necessary to be, it cannot happen that it not be; and if it is necessary not to be, it is impossible that it be. Therefore, one who says that "possible to be" agrees with "necessary to be"—since what is possible is also able not to be, and this is contingent—says that what is necessary to be can not be and is contingent, which is absurd. Resolving this doubt, then, he continues thus:

But it is evident that not every possible thing—whether to be or to walk—is also capable of the opposites. Rather, there are cases in which this is not true. And first, indeed, in those things which are not capable according to reason, as fire is capable of heating and has an irrational power. Therefore, powers according to reason are for the most part also of contraries; but irrational powers are not all so, but, as was said, it is not possible for fire to heat and not to heat, nor for whatever other things always act. But other things can also receive opposites at the same time according to irrational powers. But this was said for the reason that not every power is of opposites, nor whatever things are spoken of according to the same species.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:205 · narrative
Source · Latin

Multa,inquit, sunt quæ unum esse possunt id quod suut, non etiam aliud aliquid quod non sunt. Plura enim sunt quæ ab eo quod sunt non mutantur. Alia vero sunt quae mutari possunt. III coelum unam rem solam potest, id est. moveri, huic vero oppositum, id est non moveri non polest; ergo non omue quod est possibile vel esse vel ambulare, id est non omne de quo quaelibet possibilitas prædicatur, etiam opposila valet, ut utrumque possit tieri et facere quod facit, et huic opposhum, id est non facere quod facit; sed sunt quaedam in quibus ila poteslates predicentur, ut non sit verum de his dici quoniam et opposita possuul, ut etiam in his quas praeter rationem aliquam possunt; ut ignis. Namque ignis praeter rationem aliquam calidus est, non est enim reddere rationem cur ignis sit calidus, natura enim est calidus, et cum possit esse calidus, non tamen potest id quod est oppositum. id est non potest non calere, quod est oppositum ei, scilicet quod est calere; ergo secundum rationem potestates ipsae easdem plurimorum etiam contrariorum sunt.

English

He says: Many things can be that one thing which they are, but not also something else which they are not. For there are more things that are not changed from what they are. But there are others that can be changed. Heaven can be one thing only, that is, to be moved; but it cannot be its opposite, that is, not to be moved. Therefore not everything that is possible either to be or to walk—that is, not everything of which any possibility whatsoever is predicated—is also capable of the opposite, so that it can both come to be and do what it does, and also its opposite, that is, not do what it does. But there are certain things in which those possibilities are predicated in such a way that it is not true to say of them that they can also be their opposites, as even in those things which are possible apart from some reason, such as fire. For fire is hot apart from some reason—for it is not possible to give a reason why fire is hot, since it is hot by nature—and although it can be hot, it nevertheless cannot be what is opposite to it, that is, it cannot not be hot, which is the opposite of being hot. Therefore, according to reason, those very possibilities are of the same things, even of many contraries.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:206 · narrative
Source · Latin

Poleslales, inquit, quae sunt secundum rationem, id est in quibus est aliqua ratio, non unius possibilitatis, sed plurimorum sunt atque oppositorum, ut possibilitas medicinæ esl curare, quae quoniam secundum rationem fit, ut curet medicus, et est rationabilis potestas medico curandi, non solum potest curare, sed etiam non curare, et potest aliquid plusquam unum, et ipsum quod potesL oppositum est, id est non curare. Oppositum namque est ei quod est curare id quod dicitur non curare, quae opposita contraria vocantur. Affirmatio namque et negatio contrarietatibus discernuntur. Irrationabilis vero nou omnis, sed quemadmodum dictum est, ignem non est possibile calefacere, et non omnis, inquil, secundum rationem potestas opposita quoque valet. Irrationabilium vero non omnis hujus. modi poleslas est, ut opposita non valeat: nam cum ferrum calere sine ratione potestas sit (non enim ex ratione calet, quoniam rationem non habe)), potest etiam non calere, ignis autem cum irrationabilis potestas sit calefacere non potest, et non calefacere. Quare recte dictum est irrationabiles potestates non omnes non posse contraria, sed quasdam, ut ignem, qui cum sit calefactibilis, non calefactibilis non est. Quæ autem sint irrationabilia, qnæ unam tantum habeant potestatem non eliam oppositam, sic demonstrat dicens, nec quæcunque alia semper agunt.

English

He says that those capacities which are in accordance with reason, that is, in which there is some account, are not of one possibility but of many and of opposites, as the possibility of medicine is to heal; and since this comes about according to reason, so that the doctor heals, and it is a rational power in the doctor for healing, he can not only heal but also not heal, and can do more than one thing, and the very thing that he can do has its opposite, that is, not to heal. For "not to heal" is opposed to "to heal," and these opposites are called contraries. For affirmation and negation are distinguished by contrarieties. But not every irrational capacity is of this sort, but, as has been said, it is not possible for fire to heat; and he says that not every power according to reason is also capable of opposites. But not every irrational capacity is of this kind, such that it is not capable of opposites; for since the power of iron to be hot is without reason (for it is not heated from reason, since it does not have reason), it can also not be hot; but fire, since it is an irrational power, cannot heat and not heat. Therefore it was rightly said that not all irrational powers are incapable of contraries, but some are, such as fire, which, since it is capable of heating, is not capable of not heating. But what things are irrational, which have only one power and not also its opposite, he shows thus, saying, nor any other things whatsoever always act.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:207 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ignis enim opposita non potest, sed non solum ignis, sed itia quoque omnia unum possunl, el non multa neo opposi)a, quaecunque actu semper sunt, ut sol semper actu est lucidus, idcirco non potest non lucere; et nix semper actu frigida est, et ideo nunquam potest esse non frigida; ergo quæcunque semper agunt, id est in eo quod sunl, semper in actu sunt. Manifestum est, quoniam sicut ignis non capit frigus, ita nec illa quoque opposita possunt. Idcirco enim ignis qooque opposita non potest, quia semper in actu habet propriam potestatem. Semper enim est ca)idus, sed non omnia irralionabilia (ut. dictum esl) unam tantum habent potestatem, ut opposita non possint, sed sunt quaedam irralionabiles potestates, quae utrumque possunt, ut in eo quod est secari pellem vel non secari pellem. Potest namque secari pellis, po!est etiam non secari, sed haec sunt opposta; secundum gur irrationabiles quoque poleslates possunt quaedam opposita; sed idcirco superiora sunt dicta, inquit, quibus monstravimus quoniam ignis et quæcunque semper sunt actu, non possunt opposita, ut doceremus non omnem potestatem oppositorum esse potentiam, sed alias veras esse hujusmodi potestates quae actu essent, et unam rem solam possent, ab oppositorum vero paleslale discederent. Hoc autem non solum in his quai secundum rationem potestates dicuntur, sed eliam secundum eam spe-ciem qua: irrationabilis dicitur.

English

For fire cannot [do] opposites, but not only fire, but all those things too can [do] one thing, and not many nor opposites, whatever things are always in act, as the sun is always in act shining, and therefore cannot not shine; and snow is always in act cold, and therefore can never be not cold; therefore whatever things always act, that is, are always in act in respect of what they are. It is manifest that just as fire does not admit cold, so neither can those things [do] opposites. For fire too cannot [do] opposites for this reason, that it always has its proper capacity in act. For it is always hot, but not all irrational things (as has been said) have only one capacity, so that they cannot [do] opposites, but there are certain irrational capacities which can do both, as in the case of a skin being cut or not being cut. For a skin can be cut, it can also not be cut, but these are opposites; accordingly even irrational capacities can [do] certain opposites. But for this reason, he says, the things above were stated, by which we showed that fire and whatever things are always in act cannot [do] opposites, so that we might teach that not every capacity is a capacity of opposites, but that some capacities of this kind are true which were in act and could [do] one single thing alone, but departed from the capacity of opposites. But this not only in those things which are called capacities in accordance with reason, but also in accordance with that species which is called irrational.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:208 · narrative
Source · Latin

Suutenim quaedam eorum quae irrationabiles potestates esse dicuntur, quae non solum id quod sunt, verum etiam opposita possint, alia vero unum tantum possunt. Pellis enim potest secari et non secari. et idcirco opposita otest; ignis vero, cum sit calidus, frigidus esse non potest. Et idcirco nulla oppositorum est illi poleslas.

Quædam vero potestates æquivoce sunt. Possibile enim non similiter dicetur, sed hoc quidem quoniam verum est, ut in actu, ut possibile est ambulare, quoniam ambulat, et omnino possibile est esse,quoniam est jam actu, quod dicitur possibile. Illud uero quoniam forsitan agel, ut possibile est ambulare,quoniam forsitan ambulabit,et hæcquidem in solia mobilibus esl potestas.Illa vero et immobilibus. In utrisque vero uerum eat dicere, non impossibile est ambulare vel esse, et quod ambulcd jam et agit, et ambulabile est. Sic igitur passibile non est verum de necessario simpliciter dicere, alterum autem verum est. Quare quonam partem universale sequitur, ilLud quod ex necessitate est, consequitur posse esse, sed nan omnino.

English

For some of those things which are said to be irrational powers can do not only what they are, but also opposites, while others can do only one thing. For skin can be cut and not be cut, and therefore it can do opposites; but fire, since it is hot, cannot be cold. And therefore no power of opposites belongs to it.

But some powers are spoken of equivocally. For "possible" is not said in the same way, but in one sense because it is true, as in act—for example, it is possible to walk because he walks, and generally it is possible to be because it already is in act, which is called possible. But in another sense because it will perhaps act—for example, it is possible to walk because he will perhaps walk—and this power is in movable things only. But that other sense is also in immovable things. In both, however, it is true to say that it is not impossible to walk or to be, and that he who already walks and acts is able to walk. So, therefore, it is not true to say that the passible is [said] of the necessary without qualification, but the other is true. Wherefore, insofar as the universal follows, that which is from necessity is followed by being able to be, but not altogether.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:209 · narrative
Source · Latin

Possibilitalis breviter divisio facienda est, possibile enim duobus dicitur modis. Est enim unum possibile quod cum non sit, esse possit, ut homo cum sedet, non quidem ambulat, sed ambulare polesl. Aliud possibile est quod cum sit, esse possibile est, ut quoniam ignis calet, potest esse calidus, et quoniam homo sedet, potest sedere. Hujus autem posstbilis duae sunt species, una cum est quidem, potest tamen non esse, ut si quis sedeat, ita quidem potest sed ere, ut possit etiam non sddere. Alia vero ut cum sit, non esse non possit, ut ignis calidus est, sed non potest esse non calidus. Atque hoc est quod ait,quædam vero potestates aequivoce sunt. Possibile enim non simpliciter dicUur, sed hoc quidem quoniam verum est, ut in actu, id est quod ost et fil, quod dicitur esse possibile, ut in actu possibile est ambulare, quoniam jam ambulat, et est in actu et omnino possibile est esse quidquid in actu est. Illud vero quod forsitau aget,ut possibile est ambulare quoniam ambulabil,id est quod non est quidem, sed esse poterit ut possibile est ambulare, non quoniam DUnC quidem ambulat, sed quoniam ambulaturus esl aliquis, lWc autem suut quaecunque non secundum actum dicuntur,sed secaudum potestatem tantum, quæ nondum quidem in actu sit, esse tamen possit. Haec quidem in solis mobilibus est possibilitas, illa vero et in immobilihus.

English

A brief division of possibility must be made, for "possible" is said in two ways. For one kind of possible is that which, though it is not, can be, as when a man is sitting, he is indeed not walking, but he can walk. Another possible is that which, though it is, can be, as because fire is hot, it can be hot, and because a man is sitting, he can sit. But of this possible there are two species: one when a thing indeed is, yet can not be, as if someone is sitting, he can indeed sit in such a way that he can also not sit. The other, however, is when a thing is, and cannot not be, as fire is hot, but cannot be not hot. And this is what he says, that certain powers are equivocal. For "possible" is not said simply, but this one indeed because it is true, as in act, that is, what is and is done, which is said to be possible, as in act it is possible to walk, because he is already walking, and it is in act, and absolutely whatever is in act is possible to be. But that which perhaps will act, as it is possible to walk because he is walkable, that is, what indeed is not, but will be able to be, as it is possible to walk, not because he is now walking, but because someone is going to walk—these, however, are whatever things are said not according to act, but according to power only, which is not yet indeed in act, but can be. This possibility is in movable things alone, but that one also in immovable things.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:210 · narrative
Source · Latin

Mobilia vocat fJuæcunque sunt naturalia, et in generatione et in corruptione.Quæcunque enim generata sunt et corrumpi possunl, ea semper in motu sunt, ipsa etenim generatio motus quidam est, atque ipsa corruptio. Ergo in hujusmodi rebus quaecunque generata sunt atque mortalia, in his vera est illa potestas, quae non secundum actum dicitur, sed secundum id quod non esl quidem,sed esse potest. Nusquam enim evenit hujusmodi potestas nisi in his quae nascuntur et mortem oppetunt, illa vero quæ sunt immobilia, id est quae in sua natura fixa sunt et constituta, ut mutari moverique non possint, id est divina solam illam habent potentiam quae secundum actum dicitur,ut sol immobilis quidem ad subbtantiam quanquam sit mobilis secundum locum. Quoniam ergo est immobilis secundum suhstautiam et ab ea non permutatur,neque movetur,babet in selumen, quod ita habere potest, ut non habere non possit. Sed in utrisque his vel mobilibus vel immobilibus illud verum est qnod de his dicitur, non impossibile est esse. Nam et quod actu quidem non est, esse tamen poleril,ut homo cum non ambulat, ambulandi tamen retinet potestatem. Non est enim hominem imposMbile ambulare, et solem non est impossibile habere lucem, quam actu retinet sempiterno. In utrisque igitur et mobilibus et immobilibus, verum illud est quod dicitur, non impossibile esse.

English

He calls "mutable" all things that are natural, both in generation and in corruption. For whatever things have been generated and can be corrupted are always in motion, since generation itself is a kind of motion, and so is corruption itself. Therefore in things of this sort—whatever have been generated and are mortal—that potentiality is true which is spoken of not according to act, but according to what indeed is not, yet can be. For a potentiality of this sort never occurs except in those things which are born and meet death. But those things which are immovable, that is, which are fixed and established in their own nature so that they cannot be changed or moved—that is, divine things—have only that power which is spoken of according to act, as the sun is indeed immovable in respect of substance, although it is movable in respect of place. Since, therefore, it is immovable in respect of substance and is not changed from it nor moved, it has light in itself, which it can possess in such a way that it cannot not possess it. But in both these cases, whether in movable or in immovable things, that which is said of them is true: it is not impossible for them to be. For even what is not in act can nevertheless be, as when a man is not walking, he nonetheless retains the power of walking. For it is not impossible for a man to walk, and it is not impossible for the sun to possess the light which it retains in act eternally. In both, therefore—both movable and immovable things—that which is said is true: it is not impossible to be.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:211 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam et de eo quod agit, et de eo quod agere potest, de utrisque idem vero dicitur, quoniam non est impossibile esse. Nam et quod ambulat, non est impossibile ambulare, et quod est ambulabile, id est qnod ambulare potest, non illi est impossibile ambulare.Sed quoniam diximus eam quae secundum aclum est potestatem duas habere species,unam quidem cum in actu quidem sit et nunquam possit non esse, ut igni actu est calere et nunquam esse non potest. calidus; aliam vero secundum id quod dicimus esse quidem actu, posse tamen non esse, ut aliquis cum sedet,polest quidem sedere, sed potest eliam non sedere. Hujusmodi quidem secundum actum possibile de necessario nullo modo prædicatur, quod enim in actu est, et neces. sarium est esse, est quidem, sed ita est ut non esse non possit. Hoc est enim quod ait. Sic igitur possibile, id est quod cum aclu sit, possit tamen non esse, non est verum de necessario simpliciter dicere, Alterum autem verum est, nam quodita est actu, ut non esse non possit, et semper actu est, hoc juste de necessario prædicatur. Quod enim necesse est esse, est quidem, sed non esse non potest. Quare quoniam partem id quod est universale sequitur, illud quod ex necessitate est, consequens est id quod est posse esse, sed non omnino. Quoniam semper, inquit, speciem sequitur gelJus, et partem suam sequitur universalitas.

English

For both concerning that which acts and concerning that which can act, the same thing is said truly of both, namely that it is not impossible for it to be. For both what walks—it is not impossible for it to walk—and what is walkable, that is, what can walk, it is not impossible for that to walk. But since we have said that the potency according to act has two species: one, indeed, when it is in act and can never not be, as it is in act for fire to be hot and it can never not be hot; the other, however, according to what we say is indeed in act, yet can not be, as when someone sits, he can indeed sit, but he can also not sit. The possible of this kind according to act is in no way predicated of the necessary. For what is in act and is necessary to be, is indeed, but it is in such a way that it cannot not be. For this is what he says. Thus, therefore, the possible, that is, what, when it is in act, can nevertheless not be, it is not true to say simply of the necessary. The other, however, is true, for what is so in act that it cannot not be, and is always in act, this is rightly predicated of the necessary. For what is necessary to be, is indeed, but cannot not be. Wherefore, since the part follows what is universal, that which is from necessity—the consequence is that which is able to be, but not altogether. For always, he says, the genus follows the species, and universality follows its part.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:212 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si enim homo est, animal est, id est si pars ei species est, universalitatem et genus esse necesse est. Quod si ita est, sequitur scilicet eum propositionem quae dicit necesse esse, illa propositio quae dicit possibile esse, eique consentit, sed non omnis significatio possibiliLalis sequitur necessarium.Illa enim quæ ita possunt, ut non sint quidem, esse tamen possint., nulla raone enecessario prædicantur. Necessarium vero non modo necesse est, sed etiam est, hoc est enim quod ait, sed non omnino. Etenim de necessario quod jam est, non potest illud possibile prædicari,quod non est adhuc quidem, sed esse poterit.

Et est quidem fortasse principium quod necessarium est et quod non necessarium est omnium, vel esse vet non esse. Et alia ut horum consequentia considerare oportet.

Principium, inquH, esL fortasse harum propositionum consequentias inveniendi. Si quis primo in loco necessarium ponat,el non necessarium,secundo vero in loco possibile esse et caetera, naturaliter enim id quod necessarium est prius est, nam si necessaria sunt ea quæ semper actu sun, quæ autem semper acu sun sempneraa, rerum omnium principia sunt, recte initium quoque speculandi, quae barum propositionum consequentia sit, ex his sumemus quae sunt necessariae, et propter has ex necessarii negationibus, id est ex non necessaria.

English

For if a man is, he is an animal, that is, if a species is a part of him, it is necessary that there be universality and genus. But if this is so, it follows, of course, that the proposition which says "it is necessary to be" agrees with that proposition which says "it is possible to be," and the latter consents to the former; but not every signification of "possible" follows upon "necessary." For those things which can be in such a way that they are not indeed, yet are able to be, are predicated of the necessary on no account. But the necessary is not only necessary but also is—this is what he says—but not wholly. For concerning the necessary which already is, that possible cannot be predicated which is not yet indeed, but will be able to be.

And perhaps the principle of all things, both of being and of not being, is what is necessary and what is not necessary. And other consequentia of these ought to be considered.

The principle, he says, perhaps of discovering the consequentia of these propositions. If someone places in the first place the necessary and the not necessary, but in the second place "it is possible to be" and the rest—for naturally that which is necessary is prior, for if those things are necessary which are always in act, but those things which are always in act are eternal, they are the principles of all things—rightly we shall take the beginning also of speculating what the consequentia of these propositions is from those things which are necessary, and on account of these from the negations of the necessary, that is, from the not necessary.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:213 · narrative
Source · Latin

Constat igitur a necessario et non necessario harum consequentias inveniendi sumeuda esse principia. Illae enim, id est possibile esse et contingens esse, et esse necessarium et non necessarium, velut in natura ipsa praecedentes subsequuntur. Atque ideo ait.: Et alia, id esl possibile esse,el contingens esse,ul horum cOilsequenlia considerare oporlet.Hoc est, ita bæ considerari debent, tanquam si quod cst necessarium, et non necessarium praecedant, consequantur vero possibile et contingens, et caera.

Manifestum est autem ex his qua? dieta sunt, quoniam quod ex necessitate est, seeundum actum est. Quare si priora sunt sempiterna, et quæ actu sunt, potestate priora sunt; et hæc quæ sine potestate sunt, actu suut, ut prima? substantiæ. Alia vero sunt actu cum possibilitate, quæ natura quidem priora sunt, tempore vero posteriora, alia uero nunquam sunt actu, sed potestate tantum.

English

It is established, therefore, that the principles for discovering the consequences of these—the necessary and the non-necessary—must be taken as starting points. For those, namely "possible to be" and "contingent to be," and "necessary to be" and "not necessary," follow as subsequent in the manner of things that precede in nature itself. And therefore he says: "And the others, that is, possible to be and contingent to be, one ought to consider their consequence." That is, these ought to be considered as if whatever is necessary and not necessary precede, while possible and contingent and the rest follow.

It is clear, moreover, from what has been said that what exists by necessity exists according to act. Wherefore, if eternal things are prior, and things that exist in act are prior in potency, these also that are without potency exist in act, as the first substances. But others exist in act with possibility, which are prior in nature indeed but posterior in time; while others never exist in act, but only in potency.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:214 · narrative
Source · Latin

Palel, inquit, ac liquet omnia quaecunque secundum necessitatem sunt, semper esse secundum actum. Quoniam enim ignis ex uecessitaLe calidus est,actu quoque semper calidus est. Quocirca si quae sempiterna sunt omnibus quæ non sunt sempiterna priora sunt,eliam ea quae semper aclu sunt, his quæ sunt potestate priora sunt. Horum autem omnium divisionem facit: sunt enim,inquil,alia quidem praeter potestatem, actu tantum, ut sol non potestate movetur, sed acLu, et illam movendi poteslalem non babel, quae non est quidem, sed esse potest, sed actum habet solum, a potestate vero quae praeter actum solet esse, relinquitur. Primae etiam substantiae actu quidem sont, nunquam vero po. testate, primas autem substantias dicit, divinas scilicet et sempiternas, non eas quas in praedicamentis primas esse monstravit, id est individuas. Tunc enim de his loquebatur primis, qua? nobis primae sunt, nunc de his quænatura sunt primæuxdivinae sunt scilicet et sempilernæ. Alia vero, ait,sunt quae sunt actu cum potestate, id est quae et actum habent, et aliquando habuerunt potestatem, ut fabricala jam domus, aliquando potuit fabricari, et prius habuit potestatem secundum tempus, postea vero actum; sed natura actus prior est potestate. Ars vero ipsa actum cogitatione praecipit, formamque domus prius sibi ipsa designat et efticit: quare natura actus prior est potestate, potestas actu prior est tempore.

English

He says, "It is clear and evident that all things whatsoever which exist according to necessity are always in actuality. For since fire is hot by necessity, it is also always actually hot. Wherefore if those things which are eternal are prior to all things which are not eternal, then also those things which are always in actuality are prior to those which are in potentiality. But he makes a division of all these: for, he says, some things exist apart from potentiality, in actuality alone, as the sun is not moved in potentiality but in actuality, and does not possess that potentiality of moving which is not indeed but can be, but has only actuality, and is left without the potentiality which is accustomed to exist apart from actuality. Also the primary substances are in actuality indeed, but never in potentiality. But he calls primary substances the divine, namely, and eternal ones, not those which he showed to be primary in the Categories, that is, individuals. For then he was speaking of those things which are primary for us; now he speaks of those which are primary by nature, namely the divine and eternal. But others, he says, are those which exist in actuality together with potentiality, that is, which both have actuality and at some time had potentiality, as a house already built could at some time be built, and first had potentiality according to time, but afterward actuality; but by nature actuality is prior to potentiality. But art itself anticipates the actuality by thought, and first designates and produces for itself the form of the house: wherefore by nature actuality is prior to potentiality, but potentiality is prior to actuality in time.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:215 · narrative
Source · Latin

Alia vero sun!, inquit, quæ aclu quidem nunquam sunt, semper autem sunt potestate, ut numerus infinitus quidem est, quod cum semper in infinitum possis augere, sed actu infinitus non est, Quemcunque enim numerum sumpseris,actu finilu3 est; quemlibet enim dicas numerum, finita illum numerositas necesse esl complectatur, ut decem vel centum. Infinitus vero idcirco est potestate, quod eum possis facere in infinitum concrescere, non lamen ut quilibet actu sil nnmerus infinitus.

QUÆ MAGIS APTÆ ENUNTIATIONES CONTRARIÆ DICANTUR.

Utrum autem contraria est affirmatio negationi,an * atfirmatio atfirmationi, et oratio, ut quæ dicit omnis, homo iustus est, ei quæ ast, nullus homo justus est, an omnis homo justus est, ei quæ est,omnis homo injustus est, ut CaLlias iustus est, Callias justus non est, Callias injustus est. Quænam harum contraria est. Nam si ea qua sunt in uoce sequuntur ea quæ sunt in anima, itlic autem contraria est opinio contrarii, ut omnis homo justus est, ei quæ est, omnis homo injustus est, etiam squæ sunt voce affirmationibus, necesse est similiter esse habere. Quod si neque illic contrarii opinatio contraria est, nec affirmulio affirmationi contraria erit, sed ea que dicta est, negatio. Quare considerandum est quæ opinio falsa opinioni veræ contraria sit, utrum negationis, an certe ea quæ contrarium esse opinatur.

English

Other things, he says, are never in actuality but are always in potentiality, as an infinite number: for while you can always increase it toward infinity, it is not infinite in actuality. For whatever number you take, it is finite in actuality; for whatever number you name, its quantity must be comprehended as finite, such as ten or a hundred. It is therefore infinite in potentiality because you can make it grow without limit, yet not so that any number is infinite in actuality.

WHICH STATEMENTS ARE MORE PROPERLY CALLED CONTRARIES.

But whether the contrary of an affirmation is a negation, or an affirmation is contrary to an affirmation, and a statement—such as the one that says "every man is just"—is contrary to the one that says "no man is just," or "every man is just" is contrary to "every man is unjust"; as "Callias is just," "Callias is not just," "Callias is unjust." Which of these is the contrary? For if the things that are in the voice follow the things that are in the soul, and there the opinion of a contrary is contrary to the opinion of its contrary—as "every man is just" is contrary to "every man is unjust"—then the affirmations that are in the voice must likewise be related in the same way. But if neither is the opinion of a contrary contrary to the contrary opinion, nor will an affirmation be contrary to an affirmation, but rather the negation that has been mentioned. Wherefore it must be considered which false opinion is contrary to a true opinion: whether that of the negation, or certainly that which opines the contrary.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:216 · narrative
Source · Latin

Dico autern hoc modo, est quædam opinalio vera boni, quoniam bonum est. Alia vero falsa, quoniam bonum non est, alia quoniam malum est, quænam harum contraria est veræ, et si est una, secundum quam contraria.

Propositio quidem quaestionis talis est.Quærit enim quoniam huic propositioni quæ dicit, omnis homo justus eSl,ea quae proponit, nullus horno justus est, et rursus ea quae dicit,omnis homo injuslusesL,videntur oppositæ, quae harum mais superiori affirmalioni, qua: dicit, omnis bomo justus est, conlraria est, utrum ea per quam proponimus, omnis homo injustus est, an certe negatio universalis, ea quae es), nullus homo justus est. Similiter etiam huic propositioni quae est, Callias justus eSI, propositio quæ proponit, Callias injustus est, an ea quae dicit, Callias juslus non est, contraria est. De quare hanc viam disputationis ingreditur: nam si ea, inquit., qua; sunt in voce illis quae sunt in anima famulantur, hisque in significatione consentiunt, necesse est ut quod in opinionibus animæ reperitur, hoc idem evenire videatur in voce, quod si illic ei opinioni quae arbitratur omnem hominem justum esse illa opinio opposita est, et illa est maxime contraria quae putat omnem hominem injustum esse, et in vocibus quoquo affirmatio ea quae est, omnis homo justus est., ei affirmationi magis contraria est qua: dixit, omnis bomo injuslus est.

English

I say this in the following way: there is a certain true opinion of the good, that it is good; another false, that the good is not; another, that it is evil. Which of these is contrary to the true one, and if there is one, according to which it is contrary?

The question is posed as follows. For he asks whether, to this proposition which says "every man is just," the proposition which states "no man is just," and again the one which says "every man is unjust," seem to be opposed; and which of these is contrary to the superior affirmation which says "every man is just"—whether it is the one by which we propose "every man is unjust," or certainly the universal negation, the one which is "no man is just." Similarly also to this proposition which is "Callias is just," whether the proposition which proposes "Callias is unjust" is contrary, or the one which says "Callias is not just." Concerning this he enters upon the following path of disputation: for if, he says, the things which are in the voice are servants of those which are in the soul, and agree with them in signification, it is necessary that what is found in the opinions of the soul should appear to happen the same in the voice. But if there that opinion which judges every man to be just is opposed to that opinion, and that one is most contrary which thinks every man to be unjust, then also in voices the affirmation which is "every man is just" is more contrary to that affirmation which said "every man is unjust.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:217 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod si in opinionibus non hæc magis opponitur potius quam illa quæ dicil, nullus bomo justus est, et in vocibus quoque a(firmalio universalis videatur esse contraria, utraeque ergo et affirmatio quas dicit, omnis homo injustus est, et negatio quae dicit, nullus bomo justus est, erunt contrariae ei quae dicit, omnis bomo justus est. Quod autem dicit, quod si neque illic contrarii opinatio contraria est. Tale est enim justum esse et injustum esse, quanquam sit se. cundum habitum et privationem, praedicatio tamen hæc nunc, id est injustum csse, pro contrario sumitur. Ergo si in opinionibus contrarii, id est injusti affirmatio contraria non est, non erit et in vocibus conlraria affirmatio, sed potius negatio quae est, nullus homo justus est. Quare, inquit, considerandum est cui opinioni falsa? opinio vera sit contraria, nam si qua res bona sit,verum est de ea dicere, quoniam bonum est, contra quam propositionem falsum est dicere, quia malum est,falsum eliam quia non bonum est. Ped videndum est quæ harum sit magis contraria verae affirmationi, quae dicit bonum esse quod bonum est; utrum falsa illa contraria est,quæ id quod bonum est dicit esse malum, an ea quæ id quod bonum est dicit esse non bonum. Atque hoc est quod ait, dico autem boc modo: est quaedam opinatio vera boni, quoniam bonum est., alia vero falsa, quoniam non bonum est, alia vero, quoniam malum est.

English

But if in opinions this one is not more opposed than that one which says, no man is just, and in words too the universal affirmation seems to be contrary, then both the affirmation which says, every man is unjust, and the negation which says, no man is just, will be contrary to that which says, every man is just. But as for what he says, that if neither there is the contrary opinion, the contrary opinion is not contrary. For such is to be just and to be unjust, although it is according to habit and privation, yet this predication now, that is, to be unjust, is taken as the contrary. Therefore if in opinions the affirmation of the contrary, that is, of the unjust, is not contrary, neither will the affirmation in words be contrary, but rather the negation which is, no man is just. Wherefore, he says, it must be considered to which opinion the false opinion is contrary to the true one; for if some thing is good, it is true to say of it that it is good, against which proposition it is false to say that it is evil, and false also that it is not good. But it must be seen which of these is more contrary to the true affirmation which says that what is good is good; whether that false one is contrary which says that what is good is evil, or that which says that what is good is not good. And this is what he says, I speak in this way: there is a certain true opinion of the good, that it is good, another false, that it is not good, another, that it is evil.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:218 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quænamergo harumeoutraria est verae, id est. utrum ea quae negat id quod esl, an ea quae ponitid quod non est, quae magis harurn ei quae dicit esse, id quod est videalur esse cOnlraria, requirendum est. Sed quod his adjecit et si est una, secundum quam contraria, tale est. Contrariorum alia sunt habentia medium, alia vero sunt non habenlia. Et illorum quae habent, si quis unum contrarium neget, non necesse est per illam negationem illud aliud contrarium inlelligere. Nam quoniam interalbum el nigrum est aIiquid,si quis dicat, non est album, non idcirco nigrum esse monstravit. Potest enim esse et rubrum. Et quidquid aliud in talium contrariorum mediLate localum est. In illis vero conlrariis quae medio carent, nihil differt nej gare rem propositam, an affirmare contrariam. Nihil enim differt dicere diem non esse quam dicere noctem esse. Hoc est enim diem non esse, qnod esse noctem. Nihil anim est inter noctem atque diem. Ergo in his affirmatio contrarii idem valet, quod rei propositae negatio; ergo nunc boc dicit: etiamsi in aliquibus, inquit, tales propositiones inveniuntur, ut et negatio rei propositæ, et. affirmatio contrarii idem valeat, et sint unæ significatione. Quærendum est secundum quam enuntiationem propositio magis est contraria, an secundum eam quæ dicit non esse diem, an secundum eam quae proponit esse noctem.

English

Which of these, then, is contrary to the true one—that is, whether the one which denies what is, or the one which affirms what is not—and which of these seems more contrary to the one that says that what is, is—this must be asked. But what he added, "and if it is one, according to which it is contrary," is of this sort. Of contraries, some have a middle, others do not have one. And of those which have a middle, if someone denies one contrary, it is not necessary through that negation to understand the other contrary. For since there is something between white and black, if someone says, it is not white, he has not for that reason shown it to be black. For it can also be red, and whatever else is situated in the middle of contraries of this kind. But in those contraries which lack a middle, it makes no difference to deny the proposed thing or to affirm the contrary. For it makes no difference to say that it is not day and to say that it is night. For this is "it is not day," namely "it is night." For there is nothing between night and day. Therefore in these, the affirmation of the contrary has the same force as the negation of the proposed thing; therefore now he says this: even if in some cases, he says, such propositions are found that both the negation of the proposed thing and the affirmation of the contrary have the same force, and are one in signification, it must be asked according to which enunciation the proposition is more contrary—whether according to that which says "it is not day," or according to that which proposes "it is night.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:219 · narrative
Source · Latin

Investigandum igitur est quae harum, quanquam unum utraque significet, mais est contraria ei qua; dicit esse diem; boc est enim quod ait. Et si est una secundum quam contraria, id est, et si unum significabunt aliquando rei negatio et contrarii affirmatio, secundum quam barum magis est contraria propositio superiori propositae enuntiationi.

Nam arbitrari contrarias opinwnes definiri in eo quod contrariorum sunt, falsum est. Boni enim quoniam bonum est, et mali quoniam malum est, eadem fortasse opinio est et vera, sive plures, siue una sit. Sunt autem ista contraria, sed non in eo quod contrariorum sunt contraria, sed magis in eo quod con trarie.

Contrariorum naturam prius recte determinat, qui de contrariis proposilionibus tracta. Quidam enim putaverunt contrarias es;e opiniones, quæ sint contrariarum rerum, quod Arisloleles negat: I dicitenim falsem esse definitionem, quæ determinat eas esse contrarias opiniones, quae sunt contrariarum rerum. Nam cum sit contrarium bonum malo, possumus habere opinionem de bono quoniam bonum est, et haec vera est; possumus rursus id quod malum est putare malum, et haec rursus vera est, et opiniones quidem boni, quoniam bonum est, et mali quoniam malum est, contrariarum rerum sunt; lamen ulræque sunt vera?. Sed contrariæ utræque veræ esse non possunt. Falso igilur definitum est eas esse contrarias opiniones, qua? contrariarum sint rerum.

English

It must therefore be investigated which of these, although each signifies one thing, is contrary to the one which says that it is day—for this is what it says. And if there is one according to which it is contrary—that is, if the negation of a thing and the affirmation of its contrary will sometimes signify one thing—according to which of these is the proposition more contrary to the proposition previously stated.

For to think that contrary opinions are defined by the fact that they concern contraries is false. For the opinion that good is good, and the opinion that evil is evil, is perhaps the same opinion and true, whether there are several or one. These things are indeed contraries, but they are not contrary in that they concern contraries, but rather in that they are contrarily disposed.

He rightly determines the nature of contraries first, who treats of contrary propositions. For some have thought that those opinions are contrary which concern contrary things, which Aristotle denies; for he says that the definition is false which determines those opinions to be contrary which concern contrary things. For since good is contrary to evil, we can have an opinion about good, that it is good, and this is true; we can again think that what is evil is evil, and this again is true; and the opinions of good, that it is good, and of evil, that it is evil, concern contrary things; yet both are true. But both cannot be true as contraries. Therefore it has been falsely defined that those opinions are contrary which concern contrary things.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:220 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod autem ait, boni enim quoniam bonum est, et mali quoniam malum est, eadem fortasse opinio est et vera. Aut id quod dixit eadem ad id retulit quod post secuLus est, vera namque verae in eo quod verae sunt eadem sunt., aut certes quod ejusdem esset opinionis, quod bonum esset, bonum putare, quod malum esset, malum. Siveautem eadem sint, sive plures, contraria esse non poterunt, idcirco quoniam simul verae sunt. Sunt aulem ista contraria, sed non eo quod contrariorum sint conlrariæ sunl, sed magis eo quod conlrariæ. Sunt autem, inquit, isLa, scilicet quae sunt in opinionibus contra ria, non tamen conlraria quando contrariorum sunt, sed potius quando de uno eodemque diverso modo et contrariæ suspicantur, hoc est enim quod ait. Sunt autem ista contraria, ea scilicet quae in animae opinionibus posita sunt, quorum propositiones sunt contrariæ, non eo quod sunt contrariorum, sed potius eo quod de uno eodemque subjecto contrariae suspicantur, ut si quis de bono suspicetur quoniam bonum est, et rursus alius de eodem bono quoniam malum est, bæc sunt contraria quae veræ simul esse non possunt. Et de eodemsulijecto, id est bono, nunc bene, nunc vero male, id est contrariæ suspicantur.

English

But what he says—"of the good, that it is good, and of the evil, that it is evil"—is perhaps the same opinion and true. Or he referred what he said as "the same" to what follows: for true opinions, insofar as they are true, are the same. Or certainly he meant that it belongs to the same opinion to think the good to be good and the evil to be evil. But whether they are the same or several, they cannot be contrary, for the reason that they are true at the same time. But these things are contrary—not because they are of contraries are they contrary, but rather because they are contrary. But these things, he says—namely, the things that are contrary in opinions—are not contrary when they are of contraries, but rather when concerning one and the same thing they opine in a different and contrary way; for this is what he says. But these things are contrary—namely, those things that are placed in the opinions of the soul, whose propositions are contrary—not because they are of contraries, but rather because concerning one and the same subject they opine contraries; as if someone should opine concerning the good that it is good, and again another concerning the same good that it is evil—these are contrary things, which cannot be true at the same time. And concerning the same subject, that is, the good, now well, now truly ill—that is, they opine contraries.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:221 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si ergo boni, quoniam bonum est, opinalio est, alia vero, quoniam non est bonum. Est vero et alia quoniam aliud aliquid est, quod non est, neque potest esse. Aliarum quidem nulla ponenda est, neque quæcunque esse quod non est opinantur, neque quæcunque non esse quod est. (Infinitæ enim utræque sunt, et quæ esse opinantur quod non est, et qllæ non esse quod est) sed in quibus fallacia est. Hæc autem sunt, ex quibus sunt generationes, e.v oppositis vero sunt generationes. Quare eliam fallaciæ.

Hujus argumenti principium est, quo pro confesso utitur et probato, quod unius rei plura alque inlinita non possint esse contraria, quare unius rei unum erit contrarium. Eat ergo opinio boni quoniam bonum est, et hæc vera est; est rursus boni quoniam bonum non es), et haec falsa est. Potest etiam esse quæ putet, esso bonum id quod non est, ut si quis dicat id quod est bonum quoniam malum est, vel quoniam quantitas est, vel quoniam aliquid quod non esi. Sed hæc quae de bono dici possunt, quæ ipsum bonum nOnlsinl, infinita sunt. Rursus possumus de bono arbilrari mulla non esse, quae sunt. Bonum enim quod honestum est possumus dicere quonam honestum non est, possumus icere quoniam utile non est, possumus quoque dicere quoniam expetendum non eSI, cLalia plura. Infinita ergo sunt et ea quæ possumus arbitrari de bono, quoniam est id quod bonum ipsum non est.

English

If, therefore, there is an opinion of the good, that it is good, and another, that it is not good. But there is also another, that it is something else, which is not, nor can be. Of the others, indeed, none is to be posited—neither those which opine that what is not is, nor those which opine that what is is not. (For both are infinite: both those which opine that what is not is, and those which opine that what is is not)—but those in which there is fallacy. And these are the things from which generations come; but generations come from opposites. Wherefore also fallacies.

The principle of this argument is what he uses as conceded and proved: that of one thing there cannot be many and infinite contraries; wherefore of one thing there will be one contrary. Let there be, then, an opinion of the good, that it is good, and this is true; there is again an opinion of the good, that it is not good, and this is false. There can also be one which thinks that to be good which is not, as if someone should say that what is good is evil, or that it is quantity, or that it is something which is not. But these things which can be said of the good, which do not belong to the good itself, are infinite. Again, we can judge many things not to be of the good, which are. For the good, which is the honorable, we can say that it is not honorable; we can say that it is not useful; we can also say that it is not to be sought, and many other things. Infinite, therefore, are both those things which we can judge of the good, that it is what the good itself is not.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:222 · narrative
Source · Latin

Et eaquæ opinamur non esse bonum quod est, ea quoque sunt infi. nila. Quare nec ea quæ putat opinio bonum esse quod non est, nec ea quæ putat non esse quod est, ei opinioni ponenda est esse contra ria, qua? putat bonum esse quod bonum est. Hoc enim est quod ait: Aliarum quidem nulla ponenda est, neque quæcunque esse quod uon est opinatur, ut dicamus de bono quoniam malum est, vel inutile, vel turpe, neque quæcunqne non esse quod est, ut si de eodem bono dicamus, bonum expetendum non est, bonum bonestum non est. Infinitae enim ulræqne sunt, et quæ esse opinantur quod non est, et quæ non esse quod est. Hae igitur rejiciendæ sunt, et ad nullam contrarii opinionum sumendæ, quoniam infinilæ sunt,cum semper contrariorum oppositio sit tlnita. Quaecunque autem contrariae ponendae sint opiniones, sequitur dicens: Sed in quibus est fallacia, hae autem sunt ex his ex quibus sunt et gencraliones. Ex oppositis vero generationes, quare eliam fallacia opinioni, inquit, de bono quoniam bonum est, contraria illa sola ponenda est, in qua primum fallacia reperitur. In qua autem fallacia primum reperiatur, ostendit per id quod dixit: Ex quibus sunt. et generationes fallacia facillime reperitur. Generatio enim semper ex oppositis est; quoties enim aliquid fit album, non fit ex dulci, nec ex duro, nec ex liquido, sed ex non albo.

English

And those things which we opine not to be good, when they are, are also unlimited. Wherefore neither those things which opinion thinks to be good when they are not, nor those which it thinks not to be when they are, are to be posited as contrary to that opinion which thinks the good to be good. For this is what he says: Of the others, indeed, none is to be posited, neither whatever it opines to be what is not—so that we should say of the good that it is evil, or useless, or base—nor whatever [it opines] not to be what is, as if we should say of the same good that the good is not to be sought, that the good is not honorable. For both are unlimited: both those which opine to be what is not, and those which [opine] not to be what is. These, therefore, are to be rejected, and are to be taken as contrary to no opinion, since they are unlimited, whereas the opposition of contraries is always limited. But whatever opinions are to be posited as contrary, he then adds, saying: But in those in which there is fallacy, these are from those from which also generations [arise]. But generations are from opposites; wherefore, he says, the fallacy of the opinion about the good, that it is good, has only that one posited as contrary in which the fallacy is first found. But in what the fallacy is first found he shows through what he said: from those from which they are, and generations of fallacy are most easily found. For generation is always from opposites; for as often as something becomes white, it does not become so from sweet, nor from hard, nor from liquid, but from not-white.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:223 · narrative
Source · Latin

Et quod dulce tit, non fit ex calido, neque frigido, nec nigro, nec ex ulla alla alia qualitate, nisi ex sibi opposito, id est non dulci. Eodemque modo in aliis sese res habet. Omnis ergo generatio ex eo fil quod non fuit, ut duice ex non dulci, album ex non albo, calidum ex non calido. Quare si generationes quidem ex oppositis sunt, in his autem est fallacia in quibus sunt generationes, erit in oppositis prima fallacia. Prima namque fallacia est nou putare aliquid esse quod est. Secunda putare esse quod noa est, ut in eo quod est bonum prima fallacia est putare illud non esse bonum. Secunda malum esse arbit.rari quod bonum est. Quocirca illic maxime ponenda est contrarietas ubi est prima fallacia, in bis autem est prima fallacia ex quibus generationes oriuntur. Generationes vero dico esse quae fiunt ex his qua? id fiunt non fuerunt. Generationes autem fiunt ex oppositis, in oppositis est igitur prima fallacia; sed in quibus est prima fallacia, maxime conlraria ilia ponenda sunt: opposita igitur maxime contraria sunt, sed bonum esse et bonum non esse opposita sunt. Bonum igitur non esse ei quod est bonum esse contrarium est, non illud quod est malum esse, quod majori argumentatione confirmat.

English

And what is sweet does not come to be from hot, nor from cold, nor from black, nor from any other quality, except from its opposite, that is, from not-sweet. And in the same way matters stand in other cases. Every generation, therefore, is from that which was not, as sweet from not-sweet, white from not-white, hot from not-hot. Wherefore, if generations are indeed from opposites, and the fallacy lies in those things in which there are generations, the first fallacy will be in opposites. For the first fallacy is to think that something is not which is. The second is to think that to be which is not, as in the case of what is good the first fallacy is to think that it is not good. The second is to judge that what is good is evil. Wherefore contrariety must be posited most of all there where the first fallacy is; and the first fallacy is in those things from which generations arise. But I say that generations are those which come to be from those things which, when they come to be, were not. But generations come to be from opposites; therefore the first fallacy is in opposites. But in those things in which the first fallacy is, those things must be posited as most contrary. Therefore opposites are most contrary. But to be good and not to be good are opposites. Therefore not to be good is contrary to that which is to be good, not that which is to be evil, which he confirms by a greater argument.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:224 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si ergo quod bonum est, et bonum et non malum est, el hoc quidem secundum se, illud vero secundum accidens. Accidit enim ei malum non esse, magis autem in unoqlloque vera est, quæ secundum se ext, et falsa, siquidem et vera,ergo ea quæ est, quoniam aion est bonum quod bonum est, secundum se falsa est. Illa vero quæ est, quoniam malum, est ejus quæ est secundum accidens. Quare magis erit falsa de bono ea quæ est negationis opinio, quam ea quæ est contrarii.

Persubtilis argumentatio tati ratione formata est: bonum, inquit, et bonum est, et non malum, quorum unum secundum se et proxime, et naturaliter est, hoc scilicet quod bonum eht, alterum vero est accidenlaliter, id est quod malum non est. Accidit enim ei quod bonum est, ut malum non sit; ergo quod bonum est naluraJius habet bonum esse quam non esse maJum.illud enim secundum se inest, illud (Ul dictum est) secundum accidens. Quod si boc eat, verior est ea propositio quae affirmat quod secundum se est quam illa quæ affirmat quod secundum accidens est. Est aulem secundum se bonum esse quod bonum est, secundum accidens vero malum non esse quod bonum est: verius igitur et propinquius est dicere de bono quoniam bonum est, quam dicere de bono quoniam malum non est; quod si hoc est, etiam opinio qua? secundum se falsa est mendacior juste videbitur ea quae secundum accidens mentitur.

English

If, then, what is good is both good and not evil, and this indeed is so according to itself, but that according to accident—for it happens to it that it is not evil—yet in each case the statement that is according to itself is more true, and the one that is not is false. Therefore the statement that what is good is good, since it is good, is false according to itself. But the statement that it is not evil is of the kind that is according to accident. Wherefore the opinion of the negation concerning the good will be more false than the opinion of the contrary.

This most subtle argument is formed by the following reasoning: the good, he says, is both good and not evil, of which one is according to itself and immediately and naturally—namely, that it is good—while the other is accidental, namely, that it is not evil. For it happens to what is good that it is not evil; therefore what is good has more naturally that it is good than that it is not evil. For the former is present according to itself, the latter, as has been said, according to accident. But if this is so, that proposition which affirms what is according to itself is more true than that which affirms what is according to accident. Now it is according to itself that what is good is good, but according to accident that what is good is not evil. More truly, therefore, and more closely does one say of the good that it is good than say of the good that it is not evil. But if this is so, then also the opinion which is false according to itself will rightly be seen to be more mendacious than the one which lies according to accident.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:225 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam si illa vera est, propinqnius quae secundum se est, illa erit falsa propinquius quae secundum se est. Hoc est enim quod ait, magis au!em in unoquoque est vera, quae secundum se est etiam falsa, sicut et vera, si illa Wagis vera est quae secundum se est, recte a magis falsadictur, quae secundum se falsa est, id est quæ id negat quod secundum se verum est. Ergo ea quae est quoniam non est bonum quod bonum est, secundumse consislenLis falsa est. Ad quod tendit tota superior argumentatio conHnua disputatione subnectit. Superius euim diclum est opinionem eam quae putat bonum esse, quod bonum est, secundum se esse vquare ilia opinio quae dicit non esse bonum quod bonum est, falsa est, et de ea rcfalsa est, qua? secundum se vera est. Secundum se enim vera est opinio quae putat bonum esse quod bonum est, quae vero arbitratur non esse bonum quod bonum est, ejus quae secundum se est, veritatem opinionis intercipit.. Nam bonum esse quod bonum est, quisquis opinatur secundum ipsius boni naturam habet opinionem, atque ideo secundum se opiniones hujusmodi nominantur; quare erit hæc quoque secundum se falsa, quoniam secundum se veritatis Vldelur auferreproposilionem; idem autem bonum secundum accidens est, non malum. Et boc de bono verum est-dicere, quoniam non est malum, sed accidentaliter. Bono enim accidit non esse malum, illa vero quae putat malum esse quod bonum.

English

For if that [statement] is true, the one that is closer—the one that is according to itself—then that one will be false which is closer, the one that is according to itself. For this is what he says: but in each thing the statement that is according to itself is more truly [true], and also [more truly] false, just as also [more truly] true. If, then, that statement is more true which is according to itself, it is rightly said to be more false which is according to itself false, that is, which denies what is true according to itself. Therefore the statement that what is good is not good, being consistent according to itself, is false. To this the whole preceding argument tends, and he adds it in continuous disputation. For it was said above that the opinion which thinks that what is good is good is according to itself; wherefore that opinion which says that what is good is not good is false, and it is false concerning that which is true according to itself. For the opinion which thinks that what is good is good is true according to itself; but the one which judges that what is good is not good cuts off the truth of the opinion that is according to itself. For whoever opines that what is good is good has his opinion according to the nature of the good itself, and therefore opinions of this kind are called according to themselves; wherefore this one too will be false according to itself, since it seems to remove the proposition of truth according to itself. But the same good is according to accident, not evil. And it is true to say this concerning the good, that it is not evil, but accidentally. For it happens to the good that it is not evil; but that [opinion] which thinks that what is good is evil.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:226 · narrative
Source · Latin

est, aufert non malum ab eo quod bonum est, et interimit rem secundum accidens veram, vera namque est opinio quæ dicit non esse malum quod bonum est, sed secundum accidens; quare secundum accidens falsa eril ea quae dicit malum esse quod bonum est. Illam enim propositionem tollit quae secundum accidens vera est. Quare quoniam propior est ea quae secundumse est quam ea quæ secundum accidens, falsitas ejus quæ secundum se est fa)!acior erit ea falsitate quae secundum accidens est. Sed ea quae putat non esse bonum quod bonum est, secundum se veritatis peremptoria est ea, vero quae dicit malum esse quod bonum est, ejus quod est non esse malum quod bonum est, secundum accidens rei veras peremptoria est. Quare falsior est ea qua? dicit non esse bonum quod bonum est, quam ea quæ dicit esse malum id quod est bonum.

Falsus autem est maxime circa singula qui habet contrariam opinionem. Contraria enim sunt eorum quæ plurimum circa idem differunt. Quod si harum contraria quidem est altera, magis uero contraria est contradictio, manifestum est quoniam hæc erit centraria.

English

For it does not take away the evil from that which is good, and it destroys the true thing according to accident; for the opinion is true which says that what is good is not evil, but [only] according to accident. Wherefore that [opinion] will be false according to accident which says that what is good is evil. For it removes that proposition which is true according to accident. Wherefore, since the one that is according to itself is closer than the one that is according to accident, the falsity of the one that is according to itself will be more false than the falsity that is according to accident. But the one that thinks that what is good is not good is, according to itself, destructive of truth; whereas the one that says that what is good is evil is, according to accident, destructive of the truth of the thing, namely that what is good is not evil. Wherefore the one that says that what is good is not good is more false than the one that says that what is good is evil.

But he is most false concerning individual things who holds the contrary opinion. For those things are contrary which differ most concerning the same thing. But if of these the one is contrary, and the contradiction is more truly contrary, it is manifest that this will be contrary.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:227 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quærebatur utrum affirmatio contrarii, an negatio propositae rei, eidem propositæ rei affirmationi magis possit esse contraria. Sed nunc hoc dicit quod quae falsa sunt magis, ea sunt magis contraria. Contraria enim sunt quæcunque circa eamdem rem plurimum differunt, ut circa colorem album et nigrum; ergo quae maxime falsa sunt et maxime vera, ea plurimum a se distant. Maxime autem vera est secundum se consistentis reienunliatio. Maxime autem falsasecundum se consistentis veritatis perempIa ria. Necesse est autem inter affirmationem contraru et negationem propositæ rei unam magis esse contrariam. Falsior autem et magis contraiia est opinio illa quae contradictionem cogitat, ut, ea quæ est non esse bonum quod bonum est, quam ea opinio quae habet malum esse quod bonum est, quoniam ea quae sunt in vocibus opiniones sequuntur; simili modo negatio ejus quae est omne bonum bonum est, ea scilicet quae dicit nullum bonum bonum est, magis est contraria quam ea quae proponit omne bonum malum est. Quocirca et in aliis quoque ut in ea quae est omnis homo justus est, magis est contraria illa qua; dicit, nullus homo justus esl, quam ea ques dicit, omnis homo injustus est.

English

It was asked whether the affirmation of the contrary, or the negation of the proposed thing, can be more contrary to the same proposed affirmation. But now he says that those things which are more false are more contrary. For all things are contrary which differ most concerning the same thing, as concerning color, white and black; therefore those things which are most false and most true differ most from each other. But the enunciation of a thing consistent in itself is most true. But the destruction of truth consistent in itself is most false. Now it is necessary that between the affirmation of the contrary and the negation of the proposed thing, one be more contrary. But that opinion is more false and more contrary which thinks the contradiction, as, that what is good is not good, than that opinion which holds that what is good is evil, since opinions follow the things which are in words; in like manner the negation of that which is "every good thing is good," namely that which says "no good thing is good," is more contrary than that which proposes "every good thing is evil." Wherefore also in other cases, as in that which is "every man is just," that is more contrary which says "no man is just" than that which says "every man is unjust.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:228 · narrative
Source · Latin

llla vero quæ esi, quoniam malum est quod bonum est, implicita est. Etenim quoniam MOM bonum est, necesse est forte idem ipsum opinari.

Addit ad demonstrationem superiorem argumentum quod demonst.ret magis esse contrariam eam quas negat potius quam eam quae conlrariam afiimat; implicita est, inquit, affirmatio contrarii. Quisquis enim putat id quod bonum est malum esse, fieri aliter non potest, nisi illud quoque putet non esse bonum. Quare duplex quodammodo propositio est ea quae dicit malum esse quod bonum est. Nam etiam illud in se contine!, quod bonum non est. Simplex autem est propositio, bonum esse quod bonum est, et simplici simplex potest magis esse contraria, simplexque est negatio quod bonum est, non esse bonum. Hæc igitur magis conlraria est.

Amplius si etiam in aliis similiter oportet se habere, et hic videtur bene esse dictum, aut enim ubique ea quæ est contradictio, aut nusquarn, quibus uero nota est conlrarium, de lais quidem est falsa ea quæ est veræ opposita, ut qui hominem non pulat hominem, falsus est; ergo si hæ contrariæ sunt, et alia quæ sunt contradictiones.

English

But that affirmation which says that what is good is evil is implicit. For since it is not good, one must perhaps also hold this very same thing.

He adds to the earlier demonstration an argument showing that the one which denies is more contrary than the one which affirms the contrary. The affirmation of the contrary, he says, is implicit. For whoever thinks that what is good is evil cannot do otherwise unless he also thinks that it is not good. Wherefore the proposition which says that what is good is evil is in a way twofold. For it also contains within itself that it is not good. But the proposition that what is good is good is simple, and a simple thing can be more contrary to a simple thing, and the negation that what is good is not good is simple. This one, therefore, is more contrary.

Moreover, if in other cases too things must stand similarly, here also it seems to have been well said; for either everywhere the things which are contradiction, or nowhere; but in those cases where the contrary is known, concerning these the one opposed to the true one is false, as he who does not think that a man is a man is false; therefore if these are contraries, so too are the others which are contradictions.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:229 · narrative
Source · Latin

Aut in omnibus, inquit, vere dicilur contradicLionem magis esse contrariam quam contrarii affirmalionem, aut nusquam. Aut enim et in aliis quoque idem evenire oporLet., aut ne hic quidem verum est., quod dicitur, contrariam esse eam quae contradictionis est, id est negationis potius quam contrarii affirmationem. Hoc autem speculemur, inquit, in his quae contrarium non habent, ut in homine. Si quis enim putet hominem hominem esse, vera esse, verum est; si quis vero hominem putet non esse hominem, falsa. Si quis autem putet hominem equum esse, nullus dixerit hanc magis esso contrariam quae putat hominem equum esse quamuxhominem non esse hominem arbitratur. Quare si in bis quæ contraria non habent, illa contraria est quae contradicMone formatur, in tis quoque quae habent contrana, non contrarii affirmationis, sed negationis propositio magis contraria est.

English

Or, he says, in all cases it is truly said that a contradiction is more contrary than the affirmation of the contrary, or in no case. For either this same thing must also occur in other cases, or not even here is what is said true—that the one belonging to contradiction, that is, of negation, is contrary rather than the affirmation of the contrary. But let us consider this, he says, in those things which have no contrary, as in man. For if anyone thinks that man is man, it is true that it is true; but if anyone thinks that man is not man, it is false. If, however, anyone thinks that man is a horse, no one would say that this—which thinks man is a horse—is more contrary than the one which judges man not to be man. Wherefore, if in those things which have no contrary, that is contrary which is formed by contradiction, in those things also which have a contrary, the proposition of the negation, not the affirmation of the contrary, is more contrary.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:230 · narrative
Source · Latin

Amplius similiter se habent bOl'ii quoniam bonum est, et non boni quoniam non bonum est. Et ad has boni quoniam non bonum est, etnon boni quoniam bonum est. Illi ergo quæ est non boni quoniam non bonum est, veræ opinationi quænam est contraria. Non enim ea quæ dicit quoniam malum est. Simul enim aliquando erunt veræ, nunquam autem vel a veræ est contra ria. Est enim quiddam non bonum, malum. Quare contingit simul esse veras. At veto nec illa quæ est, quo. nam non malum, vern enim et hæc, simul enim et hæ erunt. Relinquitur ergo ei qllæ est non bonum quoniam non bonum esl, contraria ea quæ est non bonum quoniam bonum est. Falsa enim hæc, quare et ei quæ est boni quoniam bonum est, ea quæ est boni quoniam non bonum est.

Ex similitudine et proportione contrarietatis vim proposilionum vestigare conatur. Sed bas prepositiones prius disponamus, post autem quantum possumus breviter vim Arislolelicæ argumentationis exsequamur.

English

Further, the expressions "of the good, that it is good" and "of the not-good, that it is not good" are related in a similar way. And to these [are opposed] "of the good, that it is not good" and "of the not-good, that it is good." Therefore, to that [opinion] which is "of the not-good, that it is not good," which true opinion is contrary? For it is not the one which says "that it is bad." For at some time they will be true at the same time, but never is a true [opinion] contrary to a true one. For there is a certain not-good thing, namely evil. Wherefore it happens that they are true at the same time. But neither is that [contrary] which is "of the not-good, that it is not bad," for this too is true, and they will be [true] at the same time. It remains, therefore, that to the one which is "of the not-good, that it is not good," the contrary is the one which is "of the not-good, that it is good." For this is false; wherefore also to the one which is "of the good, that it is good," [the contrary is] the one which is "of the good, that it is not good."

From similarity and proportion of contrariety he attempts to trace the force of the propositions. But let us first set out these propositions, and afterwards, as briefly as we can, follow out the force of Aristotle's argument.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:231 · narrative
Source · Latin

Vera boni quoniam bonum est.

Falsa boni quoniam bonum non est.

Vera non boni quoniam non bonum est.

Falsa non boni quoniam bonum est.

Harum quatuor opiniorum dux vera; sunt, dum falsæ. Illa quae est boni quoniam bonum est,vera est; illa quae est boni quoniam bonum non est, falsa est. Rursus illa quæ est non boni quoniam bonum non est, vera est; illa quæ est non boni quoniam bonum est, falsa est. Ergo hæc est similitudo et proporlio harum quatuor propositionum.Nam quemadmodum se habet opinio boni quoniam bonum est, ad cam opinionem quæ est boni quoniam bonum non est, eodem modo sese babet et opinio qum est non boni quonil;m non bonum est, ad eam quae est non boni quoniam bonum est. Nam sicut illic vera una est, alLera falsa, ita quoque hic una vera est, altera falsa. Capit igitur exemplum prius ab ea qua? est non boni quoniam non bonum esL Hsc enim, inquil, cum vera sit, quam huic ponemus esse contrariam? eamne qua: dicit, malum est? sed non est contraria. Potest enim simul esse vera, et ea quae dicit non esse bonum quod bonum non est, ut ea quæ dicit malum esse quod bonum non est. Sunt enim quædam non bona quoe mala sunt. Quocirca conlrariæ non sunt, in quibus ponitur quod non bonum est, bonum non esse, et quod non est bonum, malum esse.

English

True: of the good, that it is good.

False: of the good, that it is not good.

True: of the not-good, that it is not good.

False: of the not-good, that it is good.

Of these four opinions the true one is the leader; they exist, so long as they are false. That one which is of the good, that it is good, is true; that one which is of the good, that it is not good, is false. Again, that which is of the not-good, that it is not good, is true; that which is of the not-good, that it is good, is false. Therefore this is the similarity and proportion of these four propositions. For just as the opinion of the good, that it is good, stands to that opinion which is of the good, that it is not good, in the same way also the opinion which is of the not-good, that it is not good, stands to that which is of the not-good, that it is good. For just as there one is true, the other false, so also here one is true, the other false. The example therefore begins first from that which is of the not-good, that it is not good. For this, he says, since it is true, which one shall we set as contrary to it? Shall it be the one which says, it is evil? But it is not contrary. For it can be true at the same time, both the one which says that what is not good is not good, and the one which says that what is not good is evil. For there are certain not-good things which are evil. Wherefore they are not contrary, in which it is posited that what is not good is not good, and that what is not good is evil.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:232 · narrative
Source · Latin

Contrariæ enim verae simul neqnenL inveniri, et vera veras contraria nunquam est, sed nec illa poterit esse contraria huic, quai dicit malum esse quod bonum non est. Possunt enim quaedam non quidem esse pona, non esse lamen mala, ut ex arbore nullius utilitatis causa ramum defringere, si arborem uihil lædat,neque malum neque bonum est. Quare verae simul possunt esse, et haec quoque quae opinantur id quod est non bonum quoniam non bonum est, ei id quod est non bonum quoniam malum non est. Quare nec hae eontrariæ sunt; restat. ighur ut ejus opinionis quæ est non boni quoniam non bonum est, ea sit contraria quae est non boni quoniam bonum est. Quod si in his quatuor propositionibus quæ supra descripsimus similitudo servatur, et sicut est opinio non boni quoniam non bonum est, ad eam quæ est non boni quoniam bonum est, sic opinio boni quoniam bonum est ad opinionem boni quoniam bonum non est. Contraria autem est opinio non boni quoniam bonum non est, opinio non boni quoniam bonum est; contraria igitur erit opinioni boni quoniam bonum est, opinio boni quoniam bonum non est.

English

For contrary true opinions cannot be found together, and a true opinion is never contrary to true opinions, but neither can that opinion be contrary to this one which says that what is not good is bad. For certain things can indeed not be good and yet not be bad—as, for the sake of no usefulness, to break a branch from a tree, if it harms the tree in no way, is neither bad nor good. Wherefore they can be true together: both the opinion that thinks that what is not good is not good, and the opinion that what is not good is not bad. Wherefore neither are these contrary; it remains, therefore, that to the opinion which holds that what is not good is not good, that opinion is contrary which holds that what is not good is good. But if in these four propositions which we described above the likeness is preserved, and just as the opinion of the not-good, that it is not good, stands to the opinion of the not-good, that it is good, so the opinion of the good, that it is good, stands to the opinion of the good, that it is not good. But the opinion of the not-good, that it is not good, is contrary to the opinion of the not-good, that it is good; therefore the opinion of the good, that it is not good, will be contrary to the opinion of the good, that it is good.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:233 · narrative
Source · Latin

Manifestum est autem quoniam nihil interest, ner: si ttniversaliter, ponamus affirmationem. Huic enim universalis negatio erit contraria,ut opinioni quæ opinatur quoniam omne quod c81 bonum benum est, ea quæ est, quoniam nihil horum quæ bona stint, bonum est. Nam ejus quæ est boni quoniam bonum est, si wtiversaliter sit bonum, eadem est ei quæ opinatur, ici quod bonum est quoniam bonum est. floc autem nihil differt nb eo quod est, quoniam omne quod est bonum honum est. Similiter autem et in non bono. Quare si in opinione sic se habet. Sunt autem hæ quæ sunt in uoce affirmationes et negationes nolæ eorum quæ sunt in anima. Manifestum est, quoniam affirmationi contraria quidem negationi est circa idem universalis, ut ei quæ est quoniam omne bonum bonum est, vel quoniam omnis homo bonus est, ea quæ est. quoniam nullum, vel nullus, contradictoriæ autem, quoniam non omne, aut non omnis.

English

But it is manifest that it makes no difference whether we set down the affirmation universally or not. For the universal negation will be contrary to it, as to the opinion which opines that everything that is good is good, the opinion which is that none of the things that are good is good. For the opinion that the good is good, if the good be universal, is the same as the opinion that what is good is good. But this differs in no way from the opinion that everything that is good is good. And similarly also in the case of what is not good. Wherefore, if this is how it stands in opinion, and the affirmations and negations in speech are symbols of those things that are in the soul, it is manifest that the universal negation about the same thing is contrary to the affirmation, as to the affirmation that every good is good, or that every man is good, the negation that no good is good, or that no man is good; but the contradictory is that not every good is good, or that not every man is good.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:234 · narrative
Source · Latin

Illud quoquo recte commemorat. quod nibil differt. in opinionibus hæc esse contraria non universaliter conslitulis, et in iis quae sibi universalit.er opponuntur. Similiter enim in ea quoque opinione quae arbitratur omne bonum bonum esse, illa contraria est quæ putat nullum bonum bonum esse.Nam quod dicimus bonum osse id quod bonum est, id si in opinione universaliter affirmetur; ita putandum est, quidquid bonum est bonum esse, Hoc autem nibil differt, tanquam si dicamus, omne bonum bonum est. Quae opinio cum sit vera, illa ei contrarie opponilur quæ dicit quiquid bonum est bonum non est. Hoc autem nihil differt,tanquam si opinemur nullum bonum bonum esse, et in non bono quoque eodem modo,ulsi ita dicamus, omne quod non bonum est non est bonum,et rursus, omne quod non bonum est bonum est, eodem modo sibi sunt istae contrariae, ut una vera sit, altera falsa. Quod in contrariis maxime reperitur; quare tota disputatio quaestioque ita concluditur: Nam si ea quae sunl in anima principia, quaedam sunt eorum quae significantur in voce, vox autem nota quaedam est animae passionum, quidquid contingit in anima, idem quoque ad vocem redire necesse est.

English

He also rightly recalls that it makes no difference that in opinions these things are contrary when not set down universally, and in those which are opposed to one another universally. For similarly in that opinion too which judges that every good thing is good, the contrary is that which thinks that no good thing is good. For what we say—that a good thing is what is good—if this is affirmed universally in opinion, it must be understood thus: whatever is good is good. But this makes no difference from saying that every good thing is good. Since this opinion is true, the one opposed to it as contrary is that which says that whatever is good is not good. But this makes no difference from opining that no good thing is good. And in the case of the non-good in the same way, as if we should say that everything which is not good is not good, and again that everything which is not good is good—in the same way these are contrary to one another, so that one is true and the other false. This is found most of all in contraries; wherefore the whole disputation and inquiry is concluded thus: for if the principles which are in the soul are certain likenesses of those things which are signified in speech, and speech is a certain token of the soul's affections, whatever happens in the soul must also return to speech in the same way.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:235 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod si universalis affirmatio et universalis negatio sunt in opinione contrariæ, eodem quoque in vocibus erunt, id est, non crit ea contraria quæ contrarium affirmat, sed ea quæ id quod ante propositum est per universalitalis contrarietatem negat, ut est omne bonum bonum est, vel omnis homo bonus est: bis contraria est nullum bonum bonum est, vel nullus homo bonus est. Hoc est enim quod ait, vel quoniam nullum, vel nullus, nullum ad illam referens propositionem,quæ dicit omne bonum bonum est. Nullus illi scilicet opponit quae dicit omnis homo bonus est, ut sint hoc modo, omne bonum bonum est, huic contraria est nullum bonum bonum est. Rursus omnis homo bonus est, huic cOnlrari., nullus homo bonus est. Contradictorias autem dicit cas esse quas supra posuit, dum de universalibus ac particularibus toquerclur, eas scilicet quae suut angulares. Universalis enim affirmatio particulari negationi, et particularis arfirmalio universali negationi per contradictionem opponi monstrata est.

English

But if the universal affirmation and the universal negation are contrary in opinion, they will likewise be contrary in spoken expressions—that is, it will not be the one that affirms the contrary that is contrary, but the one that denies, through the contrariety of universality, that which was proposed beforehand; as, for example, "every good thing is good," or "every man is good": to these is contrary "no good thing is good," or "no man is good." For this is what he says, either "no thing" or "no man," referring "no thing" to that proposition which says "every good thing is good." "No man," of course, is opposed to the one that says "every man is good," so that in this way: to "every good thing is good" is contrary "no good thing is good"; again, to "every man is good" is contrary "no man is good." But he calls those contradictory which he set down above, when he was speaking about universals and particulars—namely, those which are the angular ones. For the universal affirmation has been shown to be opposed by contradiction to the particular negation, and the particular affirmation to the universal negation.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:236 · narrative
Source · Latin

Manifestum est autem quoniam et veram veræ raon contingit esse contrariam, nee opinionem, nec contra. dictionem. Contrariæ enim sunt quæ circa opposita sunt,circa eadem autem contingit verum dicere eumdem. Simul autem non contingit eidem inesse contraria. Ex his quae supra sunt dicta illud quoque colligit, quod nec ea quæ sunt contraria vera simul esse possint, nec ea quae vera sunl sibi possint esse contraria, et hoc non solum in opinionibus esse, ut vnra opinio verae opinioni contraria sit, sed in proposilionibus quoque; neque enim fieri potest ut duas contrarias simul veras esse contingit. Et hoc per syllogismum colligit hujusmodi. Omnia contraria sunt opposita. Quae aulem opposita sunt, simul eidem inesse non possunt, contraria igitur in uno eodemque esse natura non patitur, quare si duo vera de eodem prædicari possunt,duo autem conlraria eidem inesse non possunt.. Quae contraria sunt, vera esse nulla naturae ratione permittitur. Hoc est enim quod ait, contraria enim sunt quae circa opposita sunt, id est omneconlrarium oppositum est, nec fien potest ut quæ sunt contraria in oppositis non contineantur: sicut euim in prædicamentis edocuit, contrariorum genus quoddam est oppositio, circa eadem autem contingit verum dicere eumdem, id est. duo vera pos.

English

It is evident, moreover, that a true statement can also be contrary to a true one—and neither an opinion nor a contradiction [is at issue here]. For things that are contrary are those that concern opposites, but concerning the same things it is possible for the same person to speak the truth. At the same time, however, it is not possible for contraries to be present in the same thing. From what has been said above he also gathers this point: that neither can things that are contrary be true at the same time, nor can things that are true be contrary to one another—and this applies not only in opinions, as when one true opinion is contrary to another true opinion, but also in propositions; for it cannot happen that two contrary propositions are true at the same time. And he gathers this by a syllogism of the following kind: all contraries are opposites; but things that are opposites cannot be present in the same thing at the same time; therefore nature does not allow contraries to exist in one and the same thing. Hence, if two true things can be predicated of the same subject, but two contraries cannot be present in the same thing, then by no principle of nature is it permitted that things which are contrary be true. For this is what he says: for things that are contrary are those that concern opposites—that is, every contrary is an opposite, nor can it happen that things which are contrary are not contained among opposites; for, as he taught in the Categories, opposition is a kind of genus of contraries. But concerning the same things it is possible for the same person to speak the truth—that is, two true things can be posited.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:237 · narrative
Source · Latin

sunt simul esse, et de eodem simul vere prædicari, ut cum dicimus aliquid bonum non esse, et malum esse, utraque simul vere dici possunt. Possunt. enim quaedam quæ cum bona non sint, tamen mala esse,ul turpitudo bona quidem non est, malum tamen est. Ergo ea quae vera sunt, simul ut praedicentur vere fieri potest, et ut in eodem sint, simul autem eidem non contingit inesse contraria. Quocirca si vera quidem possunt eidem inesse, contraria autem eidem inesse non possunt, ea quas contraria sunt, vera simul esse non possunt: quare convertitur nec quæ vera simul sunt contraria esse possunl. Non igitur fieri potest ut, vel in opinionibus vel in propositionibus ea quae vera sunt, possit aliquis recte contraria suspicari. Hæc autem quantum brevitas espostt.ionis permittebat expressimus. Quid aulem allior hujus libri tractatus edoceat, secundæ editionis series explicabit.

English

They can be at the same time, and be truly predicated of the same thing at the same time, as when we say that something is not good and is evil, both can be said truly at the same time. For certain things can be evil although they are not good, as shamefulness is indeed not good, yet it is evil. Therefore it can happen that things which are true are both truly predicated at the same time and are in the same thing, but contraries cannot at the same time be present in the same thing. Wherefore, if true things can indeed be present in the same thing, but contraries cannot be present in the same thing, those things which are contraries cannot be true at the same time; hence it is converted: nor can those things which are true at the same time be contraries. It cannot therefore happen that, either in opinions or in propositions, someone can rightly suppose contraries of those things which are true. But these things we have expressed as far as the brevity of the exposition permitted. What the deeper treatment of this book teaches, however, the sequence of the second edition will explain.

Citation. Tergwame, “In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Duo”, stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:1, machine-draft, 2026. https://naxiai.com/christian/works/stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2#s1
Colophon. Source: ogl-pl · licence: Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License · model: deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash:floor · provider: Baidu · cost: $0.0213 · generated 2026-11-15.