{"slug":"stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2","id":"latin:ogl-pl:stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2","title":"In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Duo","title_source":"In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Duo","author":"Boethius. Severinus","genre":"treatise","date":"","tradition":"latin","coverage":"not-located","coverage_claim":{"status":"not-located","text":"No English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed."},"publication":{"status":"machine-draft","reviewed_by":null,"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash:floor","provider":"Baidu","generated":"2026-11-15T22:30:58Z","cost_usd":0.021349},"source":{"registry_id":"latin:ogl-pl:stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2","work_id":"stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2","edition":"ogl-pl","language":"","license":"Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License","url":"https://github.com/OpenGreekAndLatin/patrologia_latina-dev/blob/master/data/stoa0058/stoa022/stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2.xml"},"stats":{"passages":237,"english_words":59456,"coptic_letters":0,"source_letters":231075,"commentary_units":0,"commentary_kinds":0,"derived_notes":3,"ambiguities":0,"work_notes":0,"external_links":0,"timeline":0},"summary":{},"links":[{"kind":"source","label":"Open Greek and Latin Patrologia Latina","url":"https://github.com/OpenGreekAndLatin/patrologia_latina-dev/blob/master/data/stoa0058/stoa022/stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2.xml"}],"checks":{"work":"stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2","status":"pass","blocking":[],"warnings":[],"stats":{"passages":237,"translated":237,"commentary_passages":0,"commentary_units":0,"english_words":59456,"source_letters":229851,"commentary_kinds":0},"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash:floor"},"work_notes":[],"derived_work_notes":[{"kind":"coverage","severity":"info","text":"No English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed."},{"kind":"limit","severity":"caution","text":"The English is a machine draft produced passage by passage from the transcribed Latin; no human has verified it. The commentary is model-written and cites only keys the pipeline could resolve."},{"kind":"register","severity":"info","text":"Register: treatise in Latin; the English keeps the liturgical formulae and the vocatives rather than normalising them."},{"kind":"structure","severity":"info","text":"Passages: 237 narrative."},{"kind":"caution","severity":"caution","text":"3 passage(s) are fragmentary in the source; the English bridges each break and says so in the note."},{"kind":"source","severity":"info","text":"Source edition: ogl-pl."},{"kind":"source","severity":"info","text":"Licence: Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License"}],"derived_structure":{"narrative":237},"term_index":[],"citations":{},"segments":[{"i":1,"ref":"p1","source":"AN. MANL. SEV. BOETH IN LIBRUM ARISTOTELIS DE INTERPRETATIONE LIBRI DUO\n\nEDITIO PRIMA, SEU MINORA COMMENTARIA.\n\nLIBER PiUMUS.\n\nMagna quidem libri hujus apud Peripateticam, sectam probatur auctoritas.Hic namque Aristoteles simplicium propositionum naturam diligenter egaminat,sed ejus series scrupulosa impeditur semita, et sublimibus pressa sententiis,aditum intelligentiæ facilem non relinquit.Quocirca nos libri hujus enodationem duplici commentatione supplevimus, et quantum simplices quidem intellectus sententiarum oratio brevis obscuraque complectitur,tantum hac operis hujus tractatione digressimus.Quod vero altius acumen considerationis exposcit,secundae series editionis expediet.Nunc a me tantum lector exspectetquantum pedetentim minutatimque secundum orationis ordinem textumque sermonis id quod angustia brevitatis latet intelligat. Et prius quae sit hujus operis intentio breviter demonstrandum est. Inscribitur etenim Graece liber hic Ilept, quod Latine de interpretatione significat.Quid ergo sit interpretatio paucis absolvam. Interpretatio est vox significativa per seipsam aliquid significans.Sive enim nomen sit,quod per se significet,ut est homo. Sive verbum, ut est curro. Sive quod grammatici participium vocant.Sive pronomen.Sive ex his juncta oralio, ut est, Homo currit.","english":"AN. MANL. SEV. BOETHIUS, TWO BOOKS ON ARISTOTLE'S DE INTERPRETATIONE\n\nFIRST EDITION, OR THE SHORTER COMMENTARY.\n\nBOOK ONE.\n\nThe authority of this book is indeed greatly approved among the Peripatetic sect. For here Aristotle diligently examines the nature of simple propositions, but the course of it is hindered by a scrupulous path, and, pressed by sublime thoughts, it does not leave an easy approach to understanding. Wherefore we have supplied the unknotting of this book with a twofold commentary, and to the extent that the brief and obscure speech of the sentences embraces simple understandings of thoughts, to that extent we have digressed in this treatment of this work. But what the deeper acumen of consideration demands, the course of the second edition will set forth. Now let the reader expect from me only as much as, step by step and little by little, according to the order of the speech and the text of the discourse, he may understand that which lies hidden in the narrowness of brevity. And first what the intention of this work is must briefly be shown. For this book is entitled in Greek Peri, which in Latin means de interpretatione. What therefore interpretation is, I shall set out in a few words. Interpretation is a significant utterance signifying something by itself. For whether it is a noun, which signifies by itself, as is man. Or a verb, as is I run. Or what the grammarians call a participle. Or a pronoun. Or speech joined from these, as is, Man runs.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":2,"ref":"p2","source":"Sive quolibet alio modo, vel nomen, vel verbum, vel ex his oratio juncta,per se aliquid significet,interpretatio nominatur.Qaare cum sintqujedam in orationis partibus quas per se nihil signifioant,aliis tamen junctae designant,ut sunt conjunctiones vel præpositiones,hæc interpretationes esse non dicimus. Interpretatio enim sive simplex est,ut nomen et verbum, sive composita,ut ex his junctacopulataque oratio, vel per seipsam significare debet,si simplex est, vel ex his quae per se significantjunctaesse,sicomposita est. Quare interpretatio est vox aliquid perseipsamsignificans.Sed quoniam verba nominaque interpretationes sunt, oratio quoque omnis quæ exsignificantibus per se praedicamentis jungitur interpretatio nuncupatur,et quoniamplurimaesuntinterpretat.iones,inter quas illa quoque est oratio,in qua verum falsumve inveniri potest,id est enuntiativa, de qua hoc in libro tractandum est, idcirco Aristoteles de communi nomine et continenti, libro titulum inscripsit.Interpretatio namque est nomen et verbum, et interpretatio etiam est hujusmodi: Omnis homo animal est. Sed in hac verum falsumque auditor intelligit.Hæc enim oratio quae dicit omnis homo animal esl,vera vel falsa est. Interpretatio quoque est etiam hujusmodi oratio: Da mihi codicem. In qua verum falsumque nullus inveniat. Etenim da mihi codicem, neque verum esse potent neque falsum.","english":"Or in any other way whatsoever, whether a noun, a verb, or a sentence composed of these, signifies something by itself, it is called an interpretation. Wherefore, since there are certain parts of speech which signify nothing by themselves but, joined to others, do designate something, as are conjunctions or prepositions, we say that these are not interpretations. For an interpretation, whether it is simple, as a noun and a verb, or composite, as a sentence joined and coupled from these, ought either to signify by itself, if it is simple, or to be joined from those things which signify by themselves, if it is composite. Wherefore an interpretation is a utterance signifying something by itself. But since verbs and nouns are interpretations, every sentence also which is joined from predicates that signify by themselves is called an interpretation, and since there are very many interpretations, among which is also that sentence in which the true or the false can be found, that is, the enunciative one, about which this book must treat, for that reason Aristotle inscribed the title of the book concerning the common and containing name. For an interpretation is a noun and a verb, and an interpretation is also of this kind: Every man is an animal. But in this the hearer understands the true and the false. For this sentence which says every man is an animal is true or false. An interpretation is also even a sentence of this kind: Give me the book. In which no one finds the true or the false. For give me the book can neither be true nor false.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":3,"ref":"p3","source":"Quocirca quoniam de his solis orationibus in quibus verum falsumque reperitur,quas enuntiationes, et propositiones vocamus,quse interpretationes sunt, disputaturus est, quoniamque de nominibus illis verbisque dicendum est, quid sint, quamve vim in significatione retineant.rectelibrum de interpretatione signavit.Nec nos hoc turbet, quod sunt quædam interpretationes de quibus in hoc libro non tractet.Tanquam enim si quis dehominedisputans, titulum operis de animali posuisset, quanquam non de omni animali, tamen quoniam de aliquo disputaturus esset, recte de animali libro nomen imponeret. Ita nunc licet non de omni interpretatione pertractet,tamen quoniam de una quae est enuntiatio,et de nominibus et verbis,quae interpretationes simplices sunt,dicendum erat, de communi et generali vocabulum libro de interpretatione imposuit. Est autem intentio libri hujus de simplici enuntiativa oratione disserere.Simplex autem enuntiativa oratio est,in qua cum verum falsumve sit,illud tamen est ut sine conjunctione totus orationis ordo proponatur,ut est: Homo est, homo animal est, homo currit,homo pavidus currit.","english":"Wherefore, since he is about to dispute concerning only those speeches in which truth and falsehood are found—which we call enunciations and propositions, and which are interpretations—and since he must speak of those nouns and verbs, what they are and what force they retain in signification, he rightly titled the book On Interpretation. Nor should this disturb us, that there are certain interpretations with which he does not deal in this book. For just as if someone disputing about man had set the title of the work as On Animal—although not about every animal, yet because he was about to dispute about some animal, he would rightly give the book the name On Animal—so now, although he does not treat of every interpretation, yet because he had to speak of one which is the enunciation, and of nouns and verbs, which are simple interpretations, he imposed on the book the name On Interpretation from the common and general term. Now the intention of this book is to discourse concerning simple enunciative speech. But simple enunciative speech is that in which, although there is truth or falsehood, nevertheless the whole order of the speech is set forth without conjunction, as: Man is, man is an animal, man runs, a fearful man runs.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":4,"ref":"p4","source":"Hae enim propositiones sine conjunctione propositae sunt, et hae dicuntur praedicativae, quae sunt cum nomine et verbo.IIla vero quæ sunt hujusmodi: Si sol est super terram dies est, duplices atque hypotheticae, nec non etiam conditionales vocantur.Ponitur enim si hoc sit, hoc esse, id est si sol est, esse diem. Quare hae simplices non sunt, soi est eDlm,et ales est, duae propositiones sunt, quas una conjunctio si,copulat atque componit. Sed de his nullus hoc libro tractatus habebitur.Quare quoniam de simplicibus enuntiativis orationibus tractaturus est,id est de simplici affirmatione et simplici negatione,quoniamque affirmationes et negationes verbis ac nominibus conjunguntur,ut in ea quae est: Homo currit, affirmatione, est homo nomen, currit verbum. Et rursum: Uomo non currit, negatio eodem nomine verboque conjungitur.Recte prius de simplici affirmatione et de simplici negatione, omninoque de enuntiatione simplici disputaturus est. Quoniam omnis enuntiatio simplex, verbis nominibusque conjungitur, primam disputationem de nominibus et verbis instituit.His enim prius ad scientiam venientibus, tota facillime natura orationis aperitur. De quibus autem ei in toto dicendum est libro,inchoans ipse sic proponit.","english":"For these propositions are set forth without conjunction, and these are called predicative, which consist of a noun and a verb. But those of this sort—\"If the sun is above the earth, it is day\"—are called compound and hypothetical, and also conditional. For it is laid down that if this is, that is, that if the sun is, it is day. Wherefore these are not simple, for \"the sun is\" and \"it is day\" are two propositions, which the one conjunction \"if\" couples and composes. But no treatment of these will be given in this book. Wherefore, since he is about to treat of simple enunciative speeches, that is, of simple affirmation and simple negation, and since affirmations and negations are joined by verbs and nouns—as in the affirmation \"Man runs,\" \"man\" is a noun and \"runs\" a verb; and again, in the negation \"Man does not run,\" the negation is joined by the same noun and verb—he rightly is about to dispute first concerning simple affirmation and simple negation, and altogether concerning simple enunciation. Since every simple enunciation is joined by verbs and nouns, he makes his first disputation concerning nouns and verbs. For when these have first come to knowledge, the whole nature of speech is most easily laid open. But concerning the matters that must be spoken of in the whole book, he himself sets them forth at the beginning as follows.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":5,"ref":"p5","source":"DE SIGNIS.\n\nPrimum oportet constituere quid sit nomen, et quid verbum,postea quid est negatio,et affirmatiotet enuntiatio,et oratio.\n\nIn principio, inquit, hujus sermoni3 de enuntiatione instituitur,constituere,id est definire,oportet quid nomen sit,quid verbum.Haec enim (ut dictum est)omnem conjungere orationem valent. Quae oratio genus est aliarum orationum.Sunt enim principales quinque orationum differentiae: Est autem prima oratio deprecativa, ut: Jupiter omnipotens precibus si flecteris ullis.Secunda imperativa, ut: Suggere tela mihi. Tertia interrogativa, ut: Quo te, Mceri,pedes? Quarta vocativa, ut: Huc ades, o Melibaee?Quinta enuntiativa, in qua verum inesse falsumque perspicitur.Hujus autem duae sunt species una affirmatio, altera negatio. Affirmatio est, ut: Homo animal est. Negatio, ut: Homo animal non est. Ergo orationem verba nominaque constituunt. Enuntiationis autem oratio genus est. Enuntiatio vero affirmationis et negationis. Quare elementa quaedam suntquae conjungunt orationem,nominaet verba,et de his disputat primum, dehinc propositionis duas ultimas species sunt, et dicit se de affirmatione et negatione dicturum. Post has harum genus proponit,id est enunliationem.Ultimum vero quod horum maximum est, orationem. Est vero i**♦».i quodammodo conversus ordo ab speciebus usque aa earum genera prima perveniens.","english":"ON SIGNS.\n\nFirst it is necessary to establish what a noun is, and what a verb is, then what negation is, and affirmation, and statement, and speech.\n\nAt the beginning, he says, of this discourse on statement, it is established—that is, defined—that one must set out what a noun is and what a verb is. For these (as has been said) have the power to join together every speech. And speech is the genus of the other kinds of speech. For there are five principal differences of speech: the first is the deprecative, as: Almighty Jupiter, if you are moved by any prayers. The second is the imperative, as: Hand me the weapons. The third is the interrogative, as: Whither, Moeris, do your feet carry you? The fourth is the vocative, as: Be present here, O Meliboeus. The fifth is the enunciative, in which truth and falsehood are discerned. Of this there are two species: one affirmation, the other negation. Affirmation is, as: Man is an animal. Negation, as: Man is not an animal. Therefore words and nouns constitute speech. But speech is the genus of statement. And statement is the genus of affirmation and negation. Wherefore there are certain elements which join together speech—nouns and verbs—and he disputes first about these; then the last two species of the proposition, and he says he will speak about affirmation and negation. After these he sets forth their genus, that is, statement. Last, what is greatest of these, speech. And indeed the order is in a certain way reversed, arriving from the species all the way to their first genera.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":6,"ref":"p6","source":"Proponendo enim ab affirmatione et negatione ad enuntiationem,quod est genus,ascensum est. Ab enuntiatione ad enuntiationis geous,quod est oratio,propositionem operis levavit, diverso tamen modo de cunctis disputat. Prius enim de oratione, post de enuntiatione, deinde de affirmatione,postremo de diffinitione negationis edisserit,converso scilicet ordine. Sed hoc posterius liquebit. Quod autem prius negationem, postea proposuit affirmationem,nihil interest, cum omnes species aequeve sibimet sint, et uni generi aequaliter supponantur. Quocirca si affirmatio et negatio enuntiationis species sunt,rectum est quamlibet earum prius indiscrete proponere.Quemadmodum autem affirmatio et negatio species enuntiationis sint, et hæc earum genus, secunda editione monstrandum est.\n\nSunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce, earum quae sunt in anima passionum, notæ, et ea quæ scribuntur,eorum quæ sunt in voce.Ac quemadmodum nec lilterx eædem omnibus,sic nec eædem voces.Quorum autem hseprimo notæ, eædem omnibus passiones animæ sunt, et quorum hæ similitudines, res jam eædem. De his itaque dictum est in his quæ dicta suni de anima.Alterius est enim negotii.'","english":"For by proposing [to proceed] from affirmation and negation to statement, which is the genus, he has made an ascent. From statement to the genus of statement, which is speech, he has raised the proposition of the work, yet he disputes about all of these in a different order. For first he discusses speech, afterward statement, then affirmation, and lastly the definition of negation—that is, in reversed order. But this will become clear later. That he set forth negation first and affirmation afterward makes no difference, since all the species are equal to one another and are equally subordinate to one genus. Wherefore, if affirmation and negation are species of statement, it is right to set forth either of them first without distinction. But that affirmation and negation are species of statement, and that the latter is their genus, must be shown in the second edition.\n\nThose things, then, which are in the voice are signs of the passions that are in the soul, and those things which are written are signs of those things which are in the voice. And just as letters are not the same for all, so neither are voices the same. But those things of which these are first signs—the passions of the soul—are the same for all, and those things of which these are likenesses—the things themselves—are also the same. About these matters, then, it has been said in the works that have been written On the Soul. For it belongs to another inquiry.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":7,"ref":"p7","source":"Quoniam nomen et verbum in definitionibus suis, significativa paulo post propositurus est,primum explicat quorum sint significativa quaecunque significant, id est, qusedesignentipsum nomen et verbum. Tota autem ratio sensus hujusmodi est Tria sunt ex quibus omnis collocutio disputatioque perficitur, res, intellectus, voces. Res sunt quas animi ratione percipimus, intellectuque discernimus. Intellectus vero qui bus res ipsas addiscimus. Voces quibus ad quod intellectu capimus, significamus. Praeter haec autem tria est aliud quiddam quod significat voces, hæ sunt litteræ, harum enim scriptio vocum significatio est. Cum rigitur haec sint quatuor, res,iutellectus, vox, littera; rem concipit intellectus, intellectum vero voces designant, ipsas vero voces litterae significant. Intellectus vero animae quaedam passio est.Nisi enim quamdam similitudinem rei quam quis intelligit in animae ratione patiatur,nullus est intellectus. Cum enim video orbem vel quadratum, figuram ejus mente concipio, et ejus mihi similitudo in animae ratione formatur, patiturque anima rei intellectæ similitudinem, unde fit ut intellectus,et similitudo sit rei,et animae passio.Horum autem rursus quatuor,duæ sunt naturales,duæ secundum hominum positionem.Voces namque etlitteraesecundumhominum positionem sunt. lntellectusautem et res naturaliter.","english":"Since he is shortly going to state in their definitions that the noun and the verb are significative, he first explains what those things are of which whatever things signify are significative—that is, what the noun and the verb themselves designate. Now the whole account of this sense is of the following sort: there are three things from which every conversation and disputation is completed—things, intellect, and spoken words. Things are what we perceive by the reasoning of the mind and discern by the intellect. The intellect is that by which we learn the things themselves. Spoken words are that by which we signify what we grasp by the intellect. But besides these three there is another something that signifies spoken words; these are letters, for the writing of these is the signification of spoken words. Since, therefore, these are four—thing, intellect, spoken word, and letter—the intellect conceives the thing, spoken words designate the intellect, and letters signify the spoken words themselves. The intellect is a certain passion of the soul. For unless someone undergoes in the reason of the soul a certain likeness of the thing that he understands, there is no intellect. For when I see a circle or a square, I conceive its figure in the mind, and a likeness of it is formed for me in the reason of the soul, and the soul undergoes a likeness of the thing understood, whence it comes about that the intellect is both a likeness of the thing and a passion of the soul. Of these four, again, two are natural and two are according to human convention. For spoken words and letters are according to human convention, but intellect and thing are natural.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":8,"ref":"p8","source":"Hoc illo approbatur, quod apud diversas gentes diversis vocibus utuntur et litteris. Idcirco quoniam ipsi sibi voces, quibus uterentur,et litteras quibus scribeient, composuerunt.Intellectus autem et res nullus posuit,sed naturalitersunt.Neque enim quodapudRomanos estequus,apud barbaros cervus est, sed apud diversas gentes eadem rerum natura est.Præterea neque quod nos intelligimus esse equum, canem barbari putant.Sed eadem apud diversissimas gentes substantiarum intellectuumque ratio est constituta.Quare duae harum sunt secundum hominum positionem, id est voces et litterae, duae secundum naturam,res et intellectus.Nunc ergo hoc dicit,quoniam voces quidem significant intellectum, ipsas etiam voces litteræ significant.Sunt autem intellectus animæ passiones,el vocesquidemetlitterse naturales non sunt.Quemadmodum enim vox non eadem apud omnes gentes, ita nee litteræ. Sed intellectus et res easdem apud omnesquamlibetdiversissimasgentes invenies. Atque hoc est quod ait: Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce, earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae, id est, ipsæ, inquit, voces intellectus qui sunt animae passiones significant, eorumquesunt significativae; ergo ea quae sunt in voce significant illas; et earum sunt notas quas sunt animæ passiones.Animae autem passiones intellectus sunt. Igitur ea qua; sunt in voce, intellectum qui sunt in anima passiones, notae sunt eosque significant.","english":"This is approved by the fact that among different peoples they use different spoken words and letters. For they themselves composed for themselves the words they use and the letters they write with. But no one established the understandings and the things, but they are by nature. For it is not the case that what is a horse among the Romans is a deer among the barbarians, but among different peoples the same nature of things exists. Moreover, neither do the barbarians think that what we understand to be a horse is a dog. But among the most widely different peoples the same account of substances and understandings is established. Therefore two of these are according to human imposition—namely, spoken words and letters—and two according to nature—things and understandings. Now, then, he says this: that spoken words indeed signify understanding, and letters also signify the spoken words themselves. But understandings are passions of the soul, and spoken words and letters are not natural. For just as the spoken word is not the same among all peoples, so neither are letters. But you will find understandings and things the same among all peoples, however widely different. And this is what he says: \"Therefore those things which are in the spoken word are notes of those passions which are in the soul\"—that is, he says, the spoken words themselves signify the understandings which are passions of the soul, and they are significative of them; therefore those things which are in the spoken word signify those things; and they are notes of those which are passions of the soul. But the passions of the soul are understandings. Therefore those things which are in the spoken word are notes of the understandings which are passions of the soul, and they signify them.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":9,"ref":"p9","source":"Quoniam his, id est vocibus, omnis significatur inteJligenliamentisque conceptio. Atvero quod addidit: Et ea quae scribuntur, eorum quae sunt in voce, tantumdem valet quantum si diceret: Notæ sunt litteræ quæ scrihuntur verborum et nominum quae sunt in voce. Monstravit igitur voces intellectuum esse significativas, et litteras vocum; nunc de eorum natura pertractat, dicens: Et quemadmodum nec litterae omnibus eaeaem, sic nec eaedem voces. Hoc ad monstrandum valet voces et litteraspositioneconstitui,non natura. Etenim diversae apud diversos sunt voces et littera, et quemadmodum litterae eædem apud omnes homines non inveniuntur,itaquoque nec voces. Quare hae secundum positionem sunt, quod ipse reticuit velut planum. Manifestum enim est, quod per gentes singulas permutatur,hoc non naturaconstitutum esse, sed positione.Quod vero addidit: Quorum autem hae primum notae sunl,eædem omnibus passiones animæ sunt, et quorum hae similitudines,res etiam eadem, ad hoc pertinet, ut naturales esse res intellectusque declaret.","english":"Since by these, that is, by spoken words, every conception of the understanding is signified. But what he added: And those things which are written, of those things which are in the voice, is worth as much as if he had said: The letters which are written are notes of the words and names which are in the voice. He has shown, therefore, that spoken words are significative of understandings, and letters of spoken words; now he treats of their nature, saying: And just as neither are letters the same for all, so neither are the same spoken words. This serves to show that spoken words and letters are established by position, not by nature. For different spoken words and letters exist among different peoples, and just as the same letters are not found among all men, so too neither are the same spoken words. Wherefore these are according to position, which he himself passed over in silence as being plain. For it is manifest that what is changed among individual peoples was not established by nature, but by position. But what he added: Of which, however, these are the first notes, the same passions of the soul are for all, and of which these are likenesses, the things also are the same, pertains to this, that he may declare that things and understandings are natural.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":10,"ref":"p10","source":"Idem namque (ut dictum est) intellectus passiones animae sunt,rerumverosimilitudines.Ergo nunc quidem hoc dicit: Quorum hæ, id est voces, de quibus supra dixerat,notæ sunt,eædem sunt animæ passiones, et ut nec litterae sunt eaedem, sic nec eaedem voces Quorumergo haevoces significativae sunt, id est passionum animæ, haesuntapudomnesesedem significant autem voces illa quæ sunt intellectus: intellectus igitur animæ passio est,apud omnes ho. mines non diversa. Ergo naturalisapudomneshomines est animi conceptio atque animæ passio.Quorum sunt notæ ea quæ versantur in vocibus.Docet autem et resquarumsuntsimilitudinesintellectusetanimae passiones,eHse non positione,sed naturaliter constitutas.Idcirco quodhse res quarum simililudinessunt intellectus, qui intellectus animae passiones sunt, apud omnes eædem sunt. Hoc est enim quod ait, Et quorum hae similitudinesscilicet animæ passiones. quae sunt similitudines rerum,res etiam eaedem. Ac si diceret: Quorum intellectus sunt similitudines.","english":"For the same things (as has been said) are the passions of the soul, that is, the conceptions of the understanding, and the likenesses of things. Therefore he now says this: Of which these, that is, the spoken words, of which he had spoken above, are notes, the same are the passions of the soul, and just as the letters are not the same, so neither are the spoken words the same. Therefore of which these spoken words are significative, that is, of the passions of the soul, these are the same among all. But the spoken words signify those things which are the understanding; the understanding, therefore, is a passion of the soul, not different among all men. Therefore the conception of the mind and the passion of the soul is natural among all men. Of which the things that are employed in spoken words are notes. But he also teaches that the things of which the understanding and the passions of the soul are likenesses are established not by convention but by nature. And for this reason, because these things of which the understanding are likenesses—which understanding are the passions of the soul—are the same among all. For this is what he says: And of which these are likenesses, namely the passions of the soul, which are likenesses of things, the things also are the same. And as if he were to say: Of which the understandings are likenesses.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":11,"ref":"p11","source":"Qui intellectus animae passionessunt,id est resapud omnes eaedem sunt.Quod autem ita posuit:Quorum autem hae primum notae,hoc sentit: de vocibus enim dicit,quoniamquorum vocas primum notsesunt,apud omneseaedemsuntanimaepassiones.Voxenimetiam intellectum rei significat, et ipsam rem.Utcum dico lapis,et intellectum lapides et ipsum lapidem,id est ipsam substantiam designat.Sed prius intellectum, secundo vero loco rem significat. Ergo non omnia quae voxsignificat passiones animæ sunt,sed illa sola quae primae; primo enim significatur intellectus,secundo vero loco res. Sed intellectus passiones animæ sunt; quorum ergo primum notae sunt voces,eaedem sunt apud omnes homines animae passiones.Esl alia quoque scriptura hoc modo se habens: Quorum autem has primum notæ,hæ omnibus passiones animae sunt, et quorum hae similitudines, res etiam hae. Quod si ita scriptum est, huc dicere videtur: Ostendit enim quorum sint notas voces, et quorum sint rursus animae passiones; tanquam sidiceret:Voces quod significant, et quorum notae sunt, illae sunt animae passiones, et rursus quorum similitudines sunt hæ quae sunt animae passiones, has sunt res; tanquam rursus si diceret: Quorum sunt similitudines ea quae in intellectibus atque animae passionibus sunt, illae res sunt. Sed de his disputationes trahere longius non vult.Aitenim:De his quidem dictum est, in his quae suntdictadeanima.","english":"The understandings that are passions of the soul, that is, the things, are the same among all. But what he set down thus: \"Of which these are the first notes,\" he means this: for he is speaking about spoken words, since of which words are the first notes, the passions of the soul are the same among all. For a spoken word also signifies the understanding of a thing, and the thing itself. As when I say \"stone,\" it designates both the understanding of a stone and the stone itself, that is, the substance itself. But it signifies the understanding first, and the thing in the second place. Therefore not all things that a spoken word signifies are passions of the soul, but only those that are first; for the understanding is signified first, and the thing in the second place. But understandings are passions of the soul; therefore of which words are the first notes, the passions of the soul are the same among all men. There is also another reading having itself thus: \"Of which, moreover, these are the first notes, these are passions of the soul for all, and of which these are likenesses, these are also things.\" But if it is written thus, he seems to say this: for he shows of which things words are notes, and of which things again the passions of the soul are; as if he were saying: The words which they signify, and of which they are notes, those are the passions of the soul; and again, of which these things that are passions of the soul are likenesses, these are things; as if again he were saying: Of which those things that are in the understandings and passions of the soul are likenesses, those are things. But he does not wish to draw out disputations about these matters at greater length. For he says: \"Concerning these things, indeed, it has been said in those things that are said concerning the soul.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":12,"ref":"p12","source":"Alterius est enim uegotii.Etenim aliud est principaliter de iutellectibus animae disputare,aliud tantum sibi ad disputationem sumere.quantum ad logicae possit pertinere peritiam. Quare alterius negotii est principaliter de animae passionibus dibputare.\n\nEst autem, quemadmodum in anima, aliquoties quidem intellectus sine vero vel falso,aliquoties autem cui jana necesse est horum alterum inesse,sic etiam in voce. Circa conpositionem enim et divisionem est falsilas et veritas.\n\nDe enuntiatione dicturus in qua veritas et falsitas invenitur, recte prius monstrare proponit, in qua prolatione vocum horum alterum, id est aut veritas aut falsitas inveniri queat.,Sed omnis vox animi sensa significat, quare ex animi intellectibus quidquid evenerit vocibus indicatur.Ergo nunc hoc dicit: Similitudo est,inquit,quaedam inter se intellectuum atque vocum: quemadmodum enim sunt quasdam simplicia quae ratione animi concipiuntur,etconstituunturintelligentiamentis,in quibus neque veritas ulla, neque falsitas invenitur,ita quoque in vocibus est. Simplex enim intelleclus,ut, verbi gratia,hominis vel equi, neque falsitatem ullam retinet neque veritatem; cum enim intelligo simpliciter hominem et substantiam ipsam,nihil veri vel falsi in cogitatione retineo.","english":"For it belongs to another business. For it is one thing to dispute principally about the understandings of the soul, and another to take up for oneself for disputation only as much as can pertain to the expertise of logic. Wherefore it belongs to another business to dispute principally about the passions of the soul.\n\nBut just as in the soul, sometimes indeed there is an understanding without truth or falsity, and sometimes one to which one of these two must already necessarily belong, so also in speech. For falsity and truth are concerned with composition and division.\n\nAbout to speak of the enunciation in which truth and falsity are found, he rightly proposes first to show in which utterance of words one of these two, that is, either truth or falsity, can be found. But every word signifies the senses of the mind; wherefore whatever has come about from the understandings of the mind is indicated by words. Therefore now he says this: There is, he says, a certain likeness between understandings and words among themselves; for just as there are certain simple things that are conceived by the reason of the mind and are established in the mind of one who understands, in which neither any truth nor falsity is found, so also it is in words. For a simple understanding, as, for example, of man or of horse, retains neither any falsity nor truth; for when I understand simply man and that very substance, I retain nothing true or false in my thought.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":13,"ref":"p13","source":"Quod si cursum rursus animi cogitatione perspexero,cogitatioipsa,quoniamsimplicisreitenet intuitum,veritate et falsitateseclusaest.Sed quando cursum et hominem iunxero. et ex his aliquid intelligentia mea lecero, id quoque si voce proferam, hu- J jusmodi erit: Homo currit. Tunc ex hac substantiae et accidenti compositione etconjunctione hujusmodi intellectus fit, in quo vel falsitas possit esse vel veritas.Ergo quemadmodum in intellectu sunt quædam aliquoties simpliciaverofalsoquecarentia,aliquoties autem cum jam necesse est aut veritatem inesse intellectui aut falsitatem, sic est etiam in voce.Nam si simplicem intellectum vero falsoque carentem vox prseterat, ipsa quoque vox a veritate et falsitate relinquitur. Quod si hujuemodi proterat intellectum, qui in se verum falsum ve contineat, ipsa quoque veri falsique retinet significationem.Docuit autem per hoc quod ait: Circa compositionem enim et divisionem estveritas falsitasque,in qua prolatione vocis enuntiationes possumus invenire.Quoties enim substantiam cum accidenteconjungimusatquecomponimus, vel intellectum intellectui copulamus, ut fieri propositio possit in cogitatione, tunc fit idem in voce. Et est nunc affirmatio, ut: Homo currit. Hominem quippe cursumque composuit atque conjunxit, et inde affirmatio nata est veritatem continens vel mendacium.","english":"But if I have again surveyed a course in the thought of the mind, the thought itself, since it retains an intuition of something simple, is excluded from truth and falsehood. But when I have joined a course and a man, and my understanding has brought something out of these, if I express it in speech, it will be of this sort: \"A man runs.\" Then from this composition and conjunction of substance and accident, an understanding of this kind comes to be, in which there can be either falsehood or truth. Therefore, just as in the understanding there are sometimes certain simple things lacking truth and falsehood, but sometimes, when it is now necessary that either truth or falsehood be present in the understanding, so it is also in speech. For if speech brings forth a simple understanding lacking truth and falsehood, that speech itself is also left devoid of truth and falsehood. But if it brings forth an understanding of this kind which contains in itself truth or falsehood, it also retains the signification of truth and falsehood. He taught this, moreover, through what he said: \"For truth and falsehood are concerned with composition and division,\" in which utterance of speech we can find enunciations. For as often as we join and compose a substance with an accident, or couple an understanding with an understanding, so that a proposition can come to be in thought, then the same thing happens in speech. And now it is an affirmation, as: \"A man runs.\" For it has composed and conjoined a man and a course, and from this an affirmation has arisen containing truth or falsehood.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":14,"ref":"p14","source":"Nunc vero negatio, si huic adverbium negativum non junxero, et substantiam ab accidente divisero atque disjunxero, ut est: Homo non currit, id non quod est adverbium negativum, hominem a cursu divisit atque disjunxit, factaque est inde negatio rursus veritatem falsitatemve significans. Recte igitur dictum est circa compositionem quod est affirmatio, vel divisionem quod est negatio, veras falsitatisque constare naturam.\n\nNomina igitur ipsa et verba consimilia sunt, sine compositione vel divisione intellectui, ut komo, vel album, quando non additur aliquid, neque enim verum aut falsum est.\n\nNunc quid sit intellectus sine vero vel falso continuata oratione prosequitur. Ea enim, inquit, quae simplicia dicuntur, similia suntsimplicibus intellectibus, qui sine ulla compositione vel divisione,animi puro capiuntur intuitu. Cum enim homo vel album, ipsaquidem simplicia sint, et significent aliquid, nihil tamen neque verum neque falsum designant. Omne enim simplex nomen vel verbum a veritate et falsitate secluditur. Atqne ideo (quoniam ut dictum est)quaecunquesunt in vocibus,significant animae passiones, simplices voces, et sine compositione vel divisione, similes sunt his intellectibus quos sine compositione et divisione simplex intelligentia concipit.","english":"But now negation, if I have not joined the negative adverb to this, and have divided and separated substance from accident, as in \"A man does not run,\" then the negative adverb has divided and separated the man from running, and from this a negation has again been made, signifying truth or falsehood. Rightly, therefore, it has been said that affirmation consists in composition, and negation in division, and that the nature of truth and falsehood rests upon these.\n\nNames, then, and verbs are alike in relation to the intellect without composition or division, as \"man\" or \"white,\" when nothing is added; for neither is it true or false.\n\nNow he continues in connected discourse what the intellect is without truth or falsehood. For those things, he says, which are called simple are like simple intellects, which are grasped by the pure intuition of the mind without any composition or division. For when [we say] \"man\" or \"white,\" these indeed are simple, and they signify something, yet they designate nothing either true or false. For every simple name or verb is excluded from truth and falsehood. And therefore (since, as has been said) whatever things are in utterances signify passions of the soul, simple utterances, and those without composition or division, are like those intellects which simple understanding conceives without composition and division.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":15,"ref":"p15","source":"In his enim atque hujusmodi nulla neque veritas, neque falsitas invenitur: nisi enim aliquid addatur, ut id quod simplex intelligis, vel per seconstituasesseveleialiquidsecundum esseconjungas, in his veritas et falsitas non erit. Cum enim simpliciter dico homo, si non aliquid addidero, ut verbum Est, et fiat hujusmodi compositio: Bomo eat, vel hujusmodi aliquid,ut: Homo vivit,quodidemvalet, tanquam si dicam: Homo vivens est; ergo nisi aliquid hujusmodi fuerit adjunctum, quod intellectam rem vel per se esse coostituat, ut: Homo est, cum dico;per se hominem esse designavi, vel juncto D; accidente tale aliquid apponatur,quod idem ei quod est esse significet,ut est: Homo vivit. Vita enim homini junctaest,et vivit idem significat quod vivens est,nulla veritas nec falsitas valet intelligi. Hoc autem convenientissimo monstrat exemplo.\n\nSignum autem hujus est,et enim hircocervus significat quidem aliquid,sed quod nondum verum vel falsum,si non esse, vel non esse, addatur,vel simpliciter,vel secundum tempus.","english":"For in these and things of this kind no truth or falsity is found; for unless something is added, so that what you understand as simple you either establish to be per se or join something according to being, there will be no truth and falsity in these. For when I say simply \"man,\" if I do not add something, such as the verb \"is,\" and a composition of this kind is made—\"man is\"—or something of this kind, as \"man lives,\" which is worth the same as if I said \"man is living\"—therefore unless something of this kind has been added, which either establishes the understood thing to be per se, as when I say \"man is,\" I have designated man to be per se, or, with an accident joined, something of this kind is appended which signifies the same as \"to be,\" as is \"man lives\"—for life is joined to man, and \"lives\" signifies the same as \"is living\"—no truth or falsity can be understood. But he shows this by a most fitting example.\n\nNow a sign of this is that \"goat-stag\" indeed signifies something, but not yet true or false, unless \"to be\" or \"not to be\" is added, either simply or according to time.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":16,"ref":"p16","source":"Magnam vim habet exempli hujus subtilitas, Non enim scIa ilia nomina vel verba falsitate acmendacio separata sunt, quaecunque simplicia sunt,sed etiam iila quaecunque sunt composita,si sint dicta simpli-; citer.Hircocervus enim compositu III nomen est,signi.:, flcans hircum et cervum.Sed nisi et aut esse aut non esse addatur,ut dicamus hircocervus est, vel hircocervus non est, nullus inde veri falsive intellectus poterit provenire. Ipsum enim quanquam sit composilum,tamen simpliciter dictum, veritati vel falsitati proximum non est.Si quis enim dicat tantum hircocervus, nihil enuntiat. Quod si nihil enuntiat præter veritatem falsitatemque,quoddam compositum designans nomen auditor intelligit. Quod vero ait vel simpliciter vel secundum tempus, ad boc valet, ne putaremusluncfierisolum denomineenuntiationem, Cum ei præsens tempus adjicitur,ut cum dicimus: Hircocervus est, vel hircorcervus non est,in his jam veritas est aut falsitas. Sed non solum si praesens tempus designet propositio, sed etiam si praeteritum, ut si quis dicat: Hircocervus fuit; vel futurum,ut si quis dicat: Hircocervus erit, enuntiationem facit.Ergo hoc est quod ait vel simpliciter vel secundum tempus,hujusmodienim simpliciter facta enuntiatio secundum præsens est.","english":"The subtlety of this example has great force. For those names or verbs are not separated from falsity and falsehood—whatever ones are simple—but even those whatever ones are composite, if they are spoken simply. For \"goat-stag\" is a composite name, signifying a goat and a stag. But unless either \"is\" or \"is not\" is added, so that we say \"a goat-stag is\" or \"a goat-stag is not,\" no understanding of truth or falsity can arise from it. For although it is composite, nevertheless when spoken simply it is not close to truth or falsity. For if someone says only \"goat-stag,\" he states nothing. But if he states nothing beyond truth and falsity, the hearer understands it as a name designating something composite. But what he says—\"either simply or according to time\"—avails for this: that we should not think that an utterance is made from a name alone when the present time is added to it, as when we say \"a goat-stag is\" or \"a goat-stag is not\"; in these there is already truth or falsity. But a proposition makes an utterance not only if it designates the present time, but also if the past, as if someone says \"a goat-stag was,\" or the future, as if someone says \"a goat-stag will be.\" Therefore this is what he says—\"either simply or according to time\"—for an utterance of this kind made simply is according to the present.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":17,"ref":"p17","source":"Etenim quod praesens dicimus,tempus nonest,sed confinium temporum.Tempus autem est aut futurum autpraeteritum;ergonon potest in eo quod est hircocervus veritas aut falsitas inveniri, nisi ei aut. esse aut non esse addatur, vel praesens significans,qund est simpliciter,vel tempus quod est praeteritum aut futurum.Si quis enim sic dicat: Hircocervus est, simpliciter dixit, id est secundum praesens. Si quis autem, Hircocervus erit vel fuit, secundum tempus, futurum scilicet et praeteritum. Haec igitur quae erant utiliapraelocutus, ad definitionem nominis,disputationis cursu accedit.\n\nDE NOMINE.\n\nNomen igitur est vox significativa secundum placitum sine tempore,cujus nulla pars est significativa,separala.\n\nOmnis diffinitio genere et differentiis perficitur. Sumpsit ergo ad diffinitionem vocem esse nominis genus.Cætera vero quae exsecutus est, pro ditferentiisaggregavit.Est autem hujus termini talis expositio: Nomen est, inquit, vox. Sed vocum aliae sunt quae significant, aliae quae nihil significant. Nomen autem significat id cujus nomen est. Nomen igitur est vox significativa. Vocum significativarum aliae sunt naturaliter,aliæ non naturaliter.Naturaliterest vox significativa,ut ea quae dolores naturalitermonstrat aut gaudia.Non naturaliter vero significativae voces sunt,quas secundum positionem essedicimus. Secundumpositionem vero sunt;quassibi ipsi homi.","english":"For what we call \"present\" is not time, but the boundary of times. Time, however, is either future or past; therefore in that which is a goat-stag, truth or falsity cannot be found unless either \"to be\" or \"not to be\" is added to it, signifying either the present, which is simply, or the time which is past or future. For if someone speaks thus: \"A goat-stag is,\" he has spoken simply, that is, according to the present. But if someone says, \"A goat-stag will be\" or \"was,\" it is according to time, namely future and past. These things, then, which he had usefully said beforehand for the definition of the name, he approaches in the course of the discussion.\n\nON THE NAME.\n\nA name, therefore, is a spoken sound significant by convention without time, no part of which is significant when separated.\n\nEvery definition is completed by genus and differentiae. He has therefore taken for the definition that \"spoken sound\" is the genus of the name. But the other things which he has set out, he has gathered as differentiae. Now the exposition of this term is as follows: A name, he says, is a spoken sound. But of spoken sounds, some are those which signify, others which signify nothing. A name, however, signifies that of which it is the name. A name, therefore, is a significant spoken sound. Of significant spoken sounds, some are by nature, others not by nature. A significant spoken sound by nature is, for example, that which naturally indicates pains or joys. But spoken sounds significant not by nature are those which we say are by convention. And they are by convention which [are established] by humans themselves for themselves.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":18,"ref":"p18","source":"nes posuerunt,ut cum dixit aliquis.Primus qui rebus nomina condidit,hæc substantia dicatur aurum,bic lapis, haec aqua, et alia similia. Tales igitur voces secundum positionem sunt. Et ita secundum positionem, quemadmodum ipsis hominibus placuit, a quibus nomina illa formata sunt. Hujusmodi ergo voces quaesecundum positionem sunt,secundum ponentium placitum Bunt. Sed nomen non naturaliter significat. Apud diversas enim gentas,diversa sunt nomina.Quae autem apud diversos diversa sunt, ea non sunt naturaliter,sedsecundum placitum eorum qui posuerunt,positionemque ponentium.Alioqui si naturaliteressent,quemadmodum ea quæ dulcia sunt apud Romanos,noneadem suntapudScythasamara, nec acida, sed apud ipsos quoque dulcia, et apud omnes gentes sunt eodem modo.Ita quoque omnia nomina;si naturaliter essent,eisdem.omnes homines uterentur. Quare quoniam nomina naturaliter non sunt,nec naturalitersignificant,secundum placitum sunt, scilicet ponentium atque auctorum, et a quibus nomiua ipsa rebus impressa sunt.Est ergo nomenvoxsignificativasecundumplacitum.Secundum placitum autem positionemque signilicantium vocum,aliæ tempus secum ad significationem trahunt, aliae praeter tempus praedicantur. Tempus secum trahunt, ut est curro et lego, vel cucurri et legi, et quaecunque sunt verba. Omne enim verbum cum tempore est. Nomina vero sine tempore sunt.","english":"...as they established, as when someone has said \"First who assigned names to things, let this substance be called gold, this stone, this water,\" and other such cases. Voices of this kind, then, exist by convention—and by convention in the way it pleased the humans themselves by whom those names were formed. Therefore voices of this sort, which exist by convention, will be by the pleasure of those who established them. But a name does not signify by nature. For among different peoples, names are different. But things that are different among different peoples are not by nature, but according to the pleasure of those who established them and the convention of those who established them. Otherwise, if they were by nature, just as sweet things are not the same among the Romans as bitter things among the Scythians, nor sour, but are sweet among them too and among all peoples in the same way, so too all names: if they were by nature, all humans would use the same ones. Therefore, since names are not by nature, nor do they signify by nature, they exist by convention—namely, of those who established them and are their authors, and by whom the names themselves were impressed upon things. A name, therefore, is a significant voice by convention. But of voices that signify by convention and establishment, some bring time with them into their signification, while others are predicated without time. Those that bring time with them are, for example, \"I run\" and \"I read,\" or \"I ran\" and \"I read\" (past), and whatever verbs there are. For every verb is with time. Names, however, are without time.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":19,"ref":"p19","source":"Cum enim dico: bocrates, vel Plato, vel albedo, vel aliquid hujusmodi,temporibus carent.Nomen ergo vox est significativa secundum placitum sine tempore. Vocum significativarum secundum placitum sine tempore,aliae sunt quarum partes aliquid extra significant,aliae quarum partes extra nihil designant. Haec namque vox, quae est, Socrates uum Platone aliisque discipulis, quae est oratio, et significativa est, et secundum placitum. Partas namque ipsius quæ sunt nomina, secundum placitum sunt,et sine tempore.Nu]la namque in eane imaginatio quidem temporis:invenitur,sed habethoc quod partesejusextra significant.Totanamqueoratioest,Socrates cum Platone aliisque discipulis; sed ejus pars Socrates, si a tota oratione disjuncta sit, significat aliquid. Nominis autem pars nihil extra significat; ipsius enim nominis quod est Socrates, quod disjunctum a tota connexione significat, partes nihil extra designant.Neque enim So,nequecra,neque tes,aliquid praeter totum nomen extra designant. Quare rectis-. sime diffinitio constituta est: Nomen essevocemsecundum placitum designativam sine tempore,cujus partes nihil extra significant. Hoc autem propositis docet exemplis.","english":"For when I say \"Socrates,\" or \"Plato,\" or \"whiteness,\" or anything of this sort, they are without times. A name, therefore, is a significant utterance by convention, without time. Of significant utterances by convention without time, some are those whose parts signify something extra, others are those whose parts designate nothing extra. For this utterance, which is \"Socrates with Plato and the other disciples,\" which is a sentence, is both significant and by convention. For its parts, which are names, are by convention and without time. For no imagination of time is found in it, but it has this, that its parts signify something extra. For the whole is a sentence: \"Socrates with Plato and the other disciples\"; but its part \"Socrates,\" if it be separated from the whole sentence, signifies something. But the part of a name signifies nothing extra; for of the name itself, which is \"Socrates,\" which when separated from the whole connection signifies, the parts designate nothing extra. For neither \"So,\" nor \"cra,\" nor \"tes\" designate anything extra beyond the whole name. Wherefore most rightly has the definition been established: that a name is a significant utterance by convention without time, whose parts signify nothing extra. And this he teaches by the examples set forth.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":20,"ref":"p20","source":"In nomine enim quod est equiferus,ferus per senihil significat, quemadmodum in oratione quæ est equus ferus. Si enim sit oratio quae dicat equus ferus,duas res significat; equum et ferum. Utrumque enim est, unumsubstantia,alterumquale.Quivero dicit equiferus, unum nomen est, et ei unum quod significat subjectumesl;quocirca unum quoque permistioista significat: quod si unum significat tota permistio, pars inde separata nihil extra designat. In toto enim nomine quod est equiferus,consignificat quidem ferus per se vero nihil significat; quod si per se id quod dicimus ferus aliquid significare;arbitremur,non jam erit pars nominis,sed ipsum erit integrum nomen, et habebit partes fe etrus. Quocirca,quoniam nominibus unum subjectum est,et unum significat totum nomen, vel si sit aequivocum,vel si non sit: canis enim cum sit aequivocum, semel totum latrabilem, secundo totum ccelestem,et rursus totum marinum significat, quare quoniam quodlibet nomen unum aliquid significat totum.pars ejus feparata,et velut a tota compositione se juncta,in qua unum aliquid. consignificabat, nihil extra significat. Dat autem differentias simplicium nominum et compositorum.","english":"For in the name \"equiferus\" (wild horse), \"ferus\" (wild) signifies nothing by itself, just as in the phrase \"equus ferus\" (wild horse). For if there were a phrase saying \"equus ferus,\" it signifies two things: horse and wild. For each is a thing—one a substance, the other a quality. But one who says \"equiferus\" — it is one name, and there is one subject that it signifies; and therefore the whole mixture signifies one thing too. But if the whole mixture signifies one thing, a part separated from it designates nothing besides. For in the whole name \"equiferus,\" \"ferus\" does indeed co-signify, but by itself it signifies nothing. But if we believe that what we call \"ferus\" signifies something by itself, it will no longer be a part of the name, but will itself be a complete name, and will have the parts \"fe\" and \"trus.\" Therefore, since names have one subject, and the whole name signifies one thing—whether it be equivocal or not (for \"canis,\" since it is equivocal, signifies once the whole barking kind, secondly the whole celestial kind, and again the whole marine kind)—therefore, since any name whatsoever signifies one thing as a whole, a part of it separated and, as it were, disjoined from the whole composition in which it co-signified one thing, signifies nothing besides. He gives, moreover, the differences of simple and composite names.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":21,"ref":"p21","source":"At vern non quemadmodum in simplicibus nominibus, sic se habet eliam in compositis. In aliis enim nullo modo pars significativa est, in his autem vult quidem, sed nihil significat separata, ut in eo quod est, equiferus, ferus.\n\n'Simplicia, inquit, nominis partes, quoniam non constant ex aliis partibus,ne imaginatione quidem significationis aliquid prod unt,ut in eo nominequud est homo, neque ho, neque mo, quidquam significant, neque significare putantur, idcirco quoniam simplex nomen est.In his vero quae composita sunt, quoniam ex duobus signiticativis in unam significantiam rediguntur,vult quidem significare aliquid pars, sed nihil separata designat. In eo enim quod est equiferus, dat quidem imaginationem aliquam significationis, et putatur significare ferus. Hoc est enim quod dicit; vult quidem, sed nihil extra separatumque significat.Si enim boc ipsum ferus ut pars nominis dicatur,dimidium nomen dicitur ejus quod est equiferus, dimidium autem nomen nibil designat. Ergo id quod dicimus ferus, cum alia parte nominis quae est equi unum consignificat, id es equiferus, separatum etiam nihil extra designatt Quod si rursus ipsum nomen extrinsecus,non in al. terius nominis parte ponatur, per se sibi significavelut nomen. Ergo non est similis in simplicibu nominibus compositisque partium consignificatios Sed simplicium quidem nominum partes nec ipsae.","english":"But it is not the case that, as in simple names, so also in composite names the situation is the same. For in the former, a part is in no way significant, whereas in the latter it does indeed wish to signify, but when separated it signifies nothing, as in \"equiferus\" (wild horse), \"ferus\" (wild).\n\n\"Simple parts of a name,\" he says, \"since they do not consist of other parts, produce nothing even by way of the imagination of signification, as in the name 'homo' (man), neither 'ho' nor 'mo' signifies anything, nor are they thought to signify, for the reason that it is a simple name.\" But in those names which are composite, since they are reduced from two significant parts into one signification, a part does indeed wish to signify something, but when separated it designates nothing. For in \"equiferus,\" it does indeed give some imagination of signification, and \"ferus\" is thought to signify. For this is what he says: it wishes to, but signifies nothing separately and apart. For if \"ferus\" itself, as a part of the name, is spoken, it is called half the name of \"equiferus,\" but half a name designates nothing. Therefore what we call \"ferus,\" when it signifies together with the other part of the name, which is \"equi,\" is one thing, that is \"equiferus\"; but when separated, it also designates nothing apart. But if again the name itself is placed externally, not as part of another name, it will signify by itself for itself, as a name. Therefore the co-signification of the parts is not similar in simple and composite names. But indeed the parts of simple names are not themselves [significant].","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":22,"ref":"p22","source":"significant,nec significare putantur,Compositorum vero volunt quidem partes aliquid significare, et dant significationis imaginationem, et significare aliquid putantur, sed nullus separatim retinent significationem.\n\nSecundum placitum l'ero. Quoniam naturaliter nomen nullum est,sed quando ftt nota.*\n\nTunc enim significat nomen secundum placitum, quando fit nota aJicujus rei, id est quando significat aliquam rem,ut scindapsus.Qu.mdiu enim huic voci nihil subjectum est,scindapsus nomen non est. Nam nominis est significare subjectum,scindapsus autem subjectum non significat. Non initur nomen est.Ac rursus est hujus constituere subjectum, nominis autem significare subjectum est. Non enim nomen aliquid diceretur, nisi a subjecti significatione boc traheret, præcipue cum nomen dicatur quasi notamen. Itaque cum scindapsus subjectum significat nomen est. Constat igitur nomen esse secundum placitum, sed tunc quando fit nota, id est quando aliquod subjectum significat.","english":"For they are not thought to signify, but the parts of composite names do wish to signify something, and they give an impression of signification, and they are thought to signify something, but separately they retain no signification.\n\n\"By convention,\" then. Since no name is by nature, but when it becomes a token.\n\nFor a name signifies by convention when it becomes a token of some thing, that is, when it signifies some thing, as \"scindapsus.\" For as long as nothing is underlying this utterance, \"scindapsus\" is not a name. For it is the function of a name to signify a subject, but \"scindapsus\" does not signify a subject. Therefore it is not a name. And again, it is the function of this [utterance] to establish a subject, but it is the function of a name to signify a subject. For it would not be called a name unless it drew this from the signification of a subject, especially since a name is spoken of as, so to speak, a token. Therefore when \"scindapsus\" signifies a subject, it is a name. It is agreed, then, that a name is by convention, but then when it becomes a token, that is, when it signifies some subject.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":23,"ref":"p23","source":"Nam designant et illitterati soni, ut ferarum, quorum nullus est nomen.\n\nDixerat superius in diffinitione, nomen esse secundum placitum,non natura. Hoc autem nunc diligentius monstratdicens nihil esse nominum naturaliter. Atque ideo non illi sufficit ad diffinitionem quod est significativa vox,nisi illud quoque adderet quod secundum placitum vox significativa est.Alioqui multi illitterati soni significant, ut sibilus ali\" quid interdum significat. Ferarum quoque mutorumque animalium voces interdum aliqua significatione praeditas esse perspicimus. Quaedam enim vox canum iram significat, hinnitus quoque equorum saepe alterius equi consuetudinem quaerit. Sed haec naturaliter significant,atqueideo nomina sunt; quod igitur naturaliter significat, nomen non est. Atque haec hactenus.Nunc quemadmodum facta sit definitio videamus. Quod dixit nomen esse vocem, traxit a genere definitionem.Quod significativam esse consequenter apposuit,nomen ab non significantibus vocibus separavit. Quod secundum placitum, a naturaliter significantibus vocibus natura nominis divisa est.Quod sine tempore,ad verborum discrepantiam respicit.Quod ejus nullam partem extra sL gnificare propositumest,idcircodictum est utnomen ab orationibus distare videretur.","english":"For even unlettered sounds, such as those of wild beasts, signify, though none of these is a name.\n\nHe had said above in the definition that a name is by convention, not by nature. But now he shows this more carefully, saying that nothing of names is by nature. And for this reason it does not suffice for the definition that it is a significant utterance, unless he also added that it is a significant utterance by convention. Otherwise many unlettered sounds signify, as a hiss sometimes signifies something. We also perceive that the voices of wild beasts and mute animals are sometimes endowed with some signification. For a certain voice of dogs signifies anger, and the neighing of horses often seeks the company of another horse. But these signify by nature, and for that reason they are not names; for what signifies by nature is not a name. And so much for these matters. Now let us see how the definition was made. What he said, that a name is a voice, he drew the definition from the genus. What he added consequently, that it is significant, separated the name from non-significant voices. What he said, by convention, divided the nature of the name from voices that signify by nature. What he said, without time, regards the distinction from verbs. What he proposed, that no part of it signifies separately, was said for this reason, that the name might be seen to differ from sentences.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":24,"ref":"p24","source":"Hæctenus quidem de tota nominis definitione tractatum est, et quibus differentiis ab aliis vocibus distare possit nomen explicitum est.Nunc autem quæ videntur inde. finitionem nominis incurrere, an nomina sint, diligentius quaerit.\n\nNon homo uero non est nomen. At vero nec posilum est nomen quo itlud oporteat appellare. Nam neque oratio, neque negatio est, sed sit nomen infinitum, quoniam similiter in quolibet est, et quod est, et quod non est.\n\nNunc disserit qualia esse arbitrari oportet, qua cum sub definitione nominis quidem cadant,integra tamen nomina non esse videantur. Unde fit ut hie diligentissime distributis,integerrima hominis definitio concludatur. Hoc enim quod dicimus non homo quid sit,ambigitur.Oratio enim non est. Omnis enim oratio verbis nominibusque conjungitur. Hoc autemquod dicimus non homo,duabus quidem partibus constat, sed unum in se retinet nomen, verbum vero non habet. Negaiiva enim particula, quae est non,neque nomen est neque verbum. Rursus negatio non est.Omnis enim negatio verum falsumve significat. Non homo vero quod dicimus, neque verum est neque falsum.Nisi enim (ut supra ait) aliquid quod sit proximum ad id quod est esse addatur, nulla veritatis aut falsitatis ratio in qualibet orationis partium compositione perficitur.","english":"Thus far indeed the discussion has concerned the whole definition of the name, and it has been explained by what differences a name can be distinguished from other utterances. But now he inquires more carefully whether the things that appear to fall under the definition of a name are names.\n\n“Not-man” however is not a name. But neither is there any name by which it ought to be called. For it is neither a sentence nor a negation, but let it be an infinite name, since it applies alike to anything whatever, both to what is and to what is not.\n\nNow he discusses what sort of things one ought to judge them to be, which, although they fall under the definition of a name, nevertheless appear not to be complete names. Whence it comes about that, with these most carefully distinguished, the fullest definition of man is concluded. For what this is that we call “not-man” is doubtful. For it is not a sentence. For every sentence is joined together from verbs and names. But this that we call “not-man” consists indeed of two parts, but it retains one name in itself and has no verb. For the negative particle, which is “not,” is neither a name nor a verb. Again, it is not a negation. For every negation signifies the true or the false. But what we call “not-man” is neither true nor false. For unless (as he said above) something that is near to that which is, is added, no account of truth or falsity is completed in any composition of the parts of a sentence.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":25,"ref":"p25","source":"At vero non homo nomen non est.Omne enim nomen unam rem significat definitam, ut cum dicimus homo,substantiam significat nec quamlibet,sed rationalem atque morta]em.Eodem modo et caetera nomina.Qui vero dicit non homo,hominem quidem tollit.Quid autem illa significatione velit ostendere, non definit, potest enim quod homo non est, et equus esse,et canis, et lapsis, et caetera quæcunque homo non fuerint. Quare quoniam id quod definite significare potest, aufert in eo negativa particula, quid vero significare debeat, definite non dicit, sed multa atque infinita unusquisque auditor intelligit. Dicatur, inquit, nomen infinitum. Hoc enim quod dicimus non homo,tam multa significat quam multa, sunt quae a definitione hominis disjunguntur. Sed hoc Aristoteles vocabulum, cum infinitum momen vocaret, primu3 iL venit.Apud antiquiores enim ista quidem erat dubitatio, sed huic differentiae qua ditfertnomen definitum ab hujusmodi nomine quod cum negatione proponitur, impressum vocabulum non erat, quod ipse testatur dicens: At vero nec positum est nomen quo illud oporleat appellari. Nullus enim posuit vocabulum quo oporteat appellari id quod dicimus,non homo;Aristoteles perspicaciter infinitum nomen hujusmodi prædicamentum censuit appellari.","english":"But indeed \"not-man\" is not a name. For every name signifies one definite thing, as when we say \"man,\" it signifies a substance, and not just any substance, but a rational and mortal one. In the same way also the other names. But one who says \"not-man\" does indeed remove man, but what he wishes to indicate by that signification he does not define; for what is not man can be a horse, and a dog, and a stone, and whatever other things are not man. Wherefore, since he takes away that which can signify something definite by the negative particle in it, but does not definitely say what it ought to signify, but each hearer understands many and infinite things, let it be called, he says, an infinite name. For this that we say, \"not-man,\" signifies as many things as there are that are separated from the definition of man. But Aristotle was the first to come upon this term, when he called it an infinite name. For among the ancients there was indeed this doubt, but no word had been impressed upon this difference by which a definite name is distinguished from a name of this kind which is put forward with a negation, as he himself testifies, saying: But indeed no name has been established by which it ought to be called. For no one has established a word by which it ought to be called that which we say, \"not-man\"; Aristotle, with keen insight, judged that a designation of this kind should be called an infinite name.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":26,"ref":"p26","source":"Catonis autem vel Catoni,et quæcunque talia sunt, non sunt nomina, sed casus nominis.\n\nOmnis,inquit,casus alterius casus est. Itaque fit ut quicunque casus sit alterius inflexio videatur. Ergo quod dicimus hujus Catonis,vel huic Catoni, vel alia bujusmodi,casus nominum suot.Unde fit ut hi casus inflexiones quoque dicantur,sed omnis inflexio alicujus inflexio est. Quod autem inflectitur, ab eo quod ipsa inflexio fit prius est, quare cum id quod dicimus Cato nomen sit, et sit primum,distat ab inflexionibus suis.Inflexio autem nominativi genitivus est, et caeteri. Nullus enim dixerit recte nominativum casum esse.Si enim id quod dicimus Cato alicujus casus sit, cujus casus esse possit, oportet ostendi,sed ante id quod dicimus Cato,nullus praedicatur casus: igitur quoniam Cato nomen nullius inflexionis ost, nec omnino casus est.Caeleri autem casus qui dicuntur nominativi inflexione formantur, Catonis, et Catoni, Catonem; quare si distant ea quæ ab inflexione nascunt ab his quae i inflectuntur, distant quoque hi qui omnes casus, quisuntCatonis,Catoni,Catonem,abeo quod est Cato,id est a nomine principali:sed hicCato nomen est, casus igitur nomina non sunt. Aliud enim est ipse casus, aliud cujus est casus.","english":"But \"Cato's\" or \"to Cato,\" and whatever else is of this sort, are not names but cases of a name.\n\nEvery case, he says, is the case of another. And so it comes about that whatever case there is appears to be an inflection of another. Therefore what we call \"of this Cato,\" or \"to this Cato,\" or other such things, are cases of names. Hence it comes about that these cases are also called inflections, but every inflection is the inflection of something. Moreover, that which is inflected is prior to that from which the inflection itself is made; wherefore, since what we call \"Cato\" is a name and is primary, it is distinct from its inflections. But the inflection of the nominative is the genitive, and the rest. For no one would rightly say that the nominative case is a case. For if what we call \"Cato\" were the case of something, it would be necessary to show of what case it could be a case, but before what we call \"Cato\" no case is predicated; therefore, since \"Cato\" is a name, it is the inflection of nothing, nor is it a case at all. But the remaining cases which are called of the nominative are formed by inflection—\"Catonis,\" \"Catoni,\" \"Catonem\"; wherefore, if those things which are born from inflection differ from those which are inflected, then all these cases which are \"Catonis,\" \"Catoni,\" \"Catonem\" also differ from that which is \"Cato,\" that is, from the principal name. But this \"Cato\" is a name; therefore cases are not names. For one thing is the case itself, and another is that whose case it is.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":27,"ref":"p27","source":"Quocirca si nominis hac omnia casus sunt,hsec nomina non sUnl.Atque ideo prudenter veteres omnes casus genitivum,dativum,accusativum,vocativum, ablativum, suis diversisque nominibus vocaverunt.Primum vero alias rectum,quasi a nullo inflexum,alias nominis ipsius vocabulo nominativum dixerunt. Quare nunc hoc Aristoteles exsequitur, qui casus nominum videantur non esse nomina,sed tantum nominum inflexiones, id est casus.\n\nRatio autem ejus in aliis quidem eadem est,sed cliffert.Quoniam cum est, vet fuit,erit, adjunctum, neque verum neque falsum est; nomen vero semper, ut Catonis est, vel non est, nondum enim aliquid verum dicit aut falsum.\n\nRatio,inquit,id est definitio nominis et casus nominis, eadem est,nam sicut nomen vox significativa est secundum placitum sine tempore, ut ejus pars nulla extra significet, sic etiam casus. Nam vox est et secundum placitum designativa,etcujusseparatæ partes nihil extra designanl. Ergo eadem diffinitio ratioque nominis est et casus nomiuis, sed his una additur differentia, quod omne nomen cum eo quod diciturest,autnon est conjunctum,aut affirmativam enuntiationem facit,aut negativam,ut Socrates est, vel Socrates non est.Hic enim quonam ventas aut falsitas incidit, enuntiationem esse necesse est; in casibus vero quamvis addas est, aut non est, nulla inde affirmatio neque negatio fit.Neque enim in hos ulla veritas aut falsitas cadit.","english":"Wherefore if all these are cases of a name, they are not names. And therefore the ancients wisely called all the cases—the genitive, dative, accusative, vocative, and ablative—by their own distinct names. But the first they called in one respect the \"straight\" case, as being inflected from no other, and in another respect they called it by the term of the name itself, the \"nominative.\" Hence Aristotle now pursues this point: which cases of names appear not to be names, but only inflections of names, that is, cases.\n\nBut the account of it is indeed the same in the other cases, yet it differs. For when \"is\" or \"was\" or \"will be\" is joined, it is neither true nor false; but a name always, as \"Cato's is\" or \"is not\"—for as yet it says nothing true or false.\n\nThe account, he says—that is, the definition—of a name and of a case of a name is the same. For just as a name is a significant utterance according to convention without time, such that no part of it signifies separately, so too is a case. For it is an utterance and designative according to convention, and its separate parts designate nothing further. Therefore the definition and account of a name and of a case of a name is the same, but one difference is added to these: that every name, when joined with what is said—\"is\" or \"is not\"—either makes an affirmative statement or a negative one, as \"Socrates is\" or \"Socrates is not.\" For here, since truth or falsity falls upon it, it must be a statement; but in cases, even if you add \"is\" or \"is not,\" no affirmation or negation is made from it. For neither truth nor falsity falls upon these.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":28,"ref":"p28","source":"Si quis enim dicat, Socratis est, Socratis non est, vel Catonis est, Catonis non esi,quid sit vel non sit non apponens,cum simplici casu,est,aut non est,jungens,imperfectam faciet orationem a falsitate ac veritate disjunctam. Quare nulla enuntiatio est. Ergo differt nomen a casu, quod nomen quidem cum est, aut non junctum, vel verum vel falsum facit.Casus vero neque verum dicit neque mentitur.Etenim nullo alio addito trunca est atque imperfecta sententia; sed quorsum istuc? ut definitio scilicet nominis integerrima compleretur. Etenim jam nunc definitio nominis hoc modo est: Nomen est vox signiQcativa, secundum placitum, sinetempore,cujusnullapars signiticativa est separata, definitum aliquid significans,cum eat aut non est juncta faciensenuntiationem.Sed de nomine hactenus, Nunc verbum diligentissima definitione determinat.\n\nDE VERBO.","english":"For if anyone says “Socrates’ is” or “Socrates’ is not,” or “Cato’s is” or “Cato’s is not,” without adding what it is or is not, joining “is” or “is not” to a simple case, he will make an incomplete sentence divorced from truth and falsity. Wherefore it is no statement. Therefore a name differs from a case in that a name, when joined with “is” or “is not,” makes something true or false. But a case neither says what is true nor lies. Indeed, with nothing else added, the sentence is truncated and incomplete; but why this? Clearly so that the definition of a name might be completed most fully. For even now the definition of a name is as follows: A name is a significant spoken sound by convention, without time, no part of which is significant when separated, signifying something definite, which when joined with “is” or “is not” makes a statement. But about the name, enough so far. Now he determines the verb with a most diligent definition.\n\nON THE VERB.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":29,"ref":"p29","source":"Verbum autem est, quod consignificat tempus,cujus pars nihil extra significat, et est semper eorum quæ de altero prædicatur, nota.\n\nVerbum distat a nomine in hoc solo quod nomen sine tempore est,ut supra jam dictum est, verbum vim temporis in significationibus trahit, etesset quidem plena definitio verbi, si alia in eo omnia quæ in nomine posita sunt ponerentur, hoc solo discrepante quod verbum consignificat tempus, essetque definitio ita: Verbum est vox significativa secundum placitum,cujusnulla pars extra significativa est;sed quoniam sunt illa nomini verboque communia,proprium autem verbi est consignificare tempus;a proprietate definiti,scilicet verbi,qua a diffinitione nominissegregratur, verbum voluit diffinire. Diligenter autem ait,consignificat.Nam significat nomina tempus,utdies,ut annus, hæc enim temporum nomina sunt.Verbum autem proprie consignificat tempus, principaliterenim autpassionemdesignat,utactum, utcum dico, accuso vel accusor. Sed cum ipsa actuspassionisque significatione, vim quoque secum temporistrahit, ut ille actus aut passio praeter praesens, aut futurum, aut præteritum,aut quod inter hae est, esse non possit. Et est semper eorum quae de altero praedicantur nota. Sensus hujusmodi est: Omne, inquit, verbum significat aliquod accidens,quod accidens semper de altero prædicatur.","english":"But a verb is that which signifies time in addition, no part of which signifies anything separately, and it is always the sign of those things which are predicated of another.\n\nA verb differs from a noun in this alone, that a noun is without time, as has already been said above; a verb draws with it the force of time in its significations. And indeed the full definition of a verb would be if all the other things that are posited in the case of a noun were also posited in its case, differing in this alone, that a verb signifies time in addition; and the definition would be thus: A verb is a significant utterance according to convention, no part of which is significant separately. But since those things are common to noun and verb, while it is proper to the verb to signify time in addition, from the property of the thing defined—namely the verb—by which it is separated from the definition of the noun, he wished to define the verb. Carefully, moreover, he says \"signifies in addition.\" For nouns signify time, as \"day,\" as \"year\"—for these are names of times. But a verb properly signifies time in addition; for it designates principally either an action or a passion, as \"I accuse\" or \"I am accused.\" But with the very signification of action and passion, it draws with it also the force of time, so that that action or passion cannot be apart from the present, or the future, or the past, or what is between these. And it is always the sign of those things which are predicated of another. The sense of this is as follows: Every verb, he says, signifies some accident, which accident is always predicated of another.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":30,"ref":"p30","source":"Nam si omne verbum aut actionem aut passionem designat,actio vero et passio in accidentibus numerantur, omne vel'bum vim significat acciJenlis; sed accidens semper de eo prædicatur quod sibi subjectum est,ut. album de corpore, et durum de ferro. Quale omnia verba ejusmodi aliqua designant, quae semper de altero praedicantur, quod per hoc scilicet dixit,quod aitverbum notam esse, id est significationem eorum quae de altero praedicantur, quod idem valet tanquam sidiceret:Verbum semperaccidentia significat, quorum haec natura est ut semper de altero praediceutur;cujus enim quaelibet res nota est,hanc ipsa quæ nota est, designat.\n\nDico uero quoniam consignifical tempus, ut cursus quidem nomen eSI,currit autem verbum, consignificat enim nunc esse.\n\nSupra in nominis diffinitione proposuit nomen esse sine tempore, quod nunc quoque hoc monstrat exemplo, et diligentissimo quidem.Nam idem praedicamentum ad nomen relatum sine temporis cunsignificatione monstratur, ad verbum vero, videtur esse cum tempore. Cursus enim simpliciter dictus ut nomen et ut res propria, sine tempore est, si vero in actionem, quae verbi semper est. inducatur, mox proprietatem verbi ac temporis in se suscipit. significationem.Curritenimverbumest, etsignificat actionem, et cum eadem tempus ostendit, monstrat enim nunc esse, id est præsens tempus.","english":"For if every verb signifies either an action or a passion, and action and passion are counted among accidents, then every verb signifies the force of an accident; but an accident is always predicated of that which is its subject, as white of a body, and hard of iron. And all verbs of this kind signify some such quality, which is always predicated of another—which is what he meant by saying that a verb is a sign, that is, the signification of those things which are predicated of another, which is the same as if he had said: a verb always signifies accidents, whose nature it is always to be predicated of another; for whatever thing a thing is a sign of, it designates that very thing of which it is the sign.\n\nBut I say that it additionally signifies time: for instance, \"course\" is indeed a noun, but \"runs\" is a verb, for it additionally signifies that it is now.\n\nAbove, in the definition of the noun, he proposed that a noun is without time, which he now also shows by this example, and indeed most diligently. For the same predicate, when related to a noun, is shown without the additional signification of time, but when related to a verb, it seems to be with time. For \"course,\" said simply as a noun and as a proper thing, is without time; but if it is brought into an action, which is always the property of a verb, it at once takes upon itself the character of a verb and the signification of time. For \"runs\" is a verb, and it signifies an action, and together with it shows time—for it shows that it is now, that is, the present time.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":31,"ref":"p31","source":"Consignificat autem idcirco dictum est, quoniam quod dicimus currit, actum quidem quemdamsignificat,cum eo vero actu in ipsa significatione verbi praesens tempusinducitur,atqueideodiligenter ait consignificat. Et est hæcverborum subtilitas in Aristotele mirabilis.\n\nEt est semper eorum quæ de altero dicuntur nota, ut eorum quæ de subjecto vel in subjecto sunt.\n\nSemper, inquit, Verbum ea significat quae de altero praedicentur. Qua: sint autem haec quanquam brevissima, ipse tamen ostendit.Est autem consuetudo Aristotelis ea quae accidentia sunt, in subjecto esse dicere.Nec non etiam eadem ipsa accidentia de subjecto praedicari, idcirco quod omnia quaecunque accidentia sunt, vel denominative, vel quolibet alio modo et de subjecto praedicantur, et in subjecto sunt. Nunc ergo boc dicit, tale quiddam significat verbum, quod semper accidens sit, quod accidens vel in subjecto semper, vel de suhjecto praedicatur. Est alia quoque expositio hoc modo, de subjecto dicitur genus semper ad species. Ergo eorum quae sunt accidentia, alia sunt individua, alia generalia,et illa quidem quæ sunt individua, in subjecto tantum sunt, ut quodlibet porticulari corpori accidens, alia vero sunt gmeialia accidentia, quae de aliis accidentibus praedicaulur, ut de subjectis, ut est color, namque praedicatur de albedine et nigredine et caeteris.","english":"It has been said that a verb signifies together for this reason: because when we say \"runs,\" it signifies a certain action, but along with that action the present tense is brought into the very signification of the verb, and therefore he carefully says \"signifies together.\" And this subtlety of verbs in Aristotle is admirable.\n\nAnd it is always a mark of those things which are said of another, as of those which are in a subject or of a subject.\n\n\"Always,\" he says, a verb signifies those things which are predicated of another. What these are, although very briefly, he himself nevertheless shows. Now it is Aristotle's custom to say that those things which are accidents are in a subject. And indeed the same accidents are also predicated of a subject, for the reason that all things whatsoever that are accidents, whether denominatively or in any other way, are both predicated of a subject and are in a subject. Now therefore he says this: a verb signifies something of such a kind as is always an accident, which accident is either always in a subject or is predicated of a subject. There is also another exposition in this way: a genus is always said of a subject in relation to species. Therefore of those things which are accidents, some are individual, some are general; and those indeed which are individual are only in a subject, as any accident of a particular body, but others are general accidents, which are predicated of other accidents as of subjects, as is color, for it is predicated of whiteness and blackness and the rest.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":32,"ref":"p32","source":"Ergo nunc omne, inquit, verwu*x' bum quiddam quod de altero prædicatur,significat. Sed hoc hujusmodi erat, quod aut particulare sit,et in subjecto tantnm, ut est,currit.Cursusenim de nullo alio praedicatur subjecto, nisi tantum in subjecto est,aut generale erit illud accidens et universale, ut de alio rursus accidente prædicetur ut de subjecto, ut sidicam movetur. Hoc enim quod dicimus movetur, de subjecto cursu praedicatur, qui currit enim movetur. Significat igitur verbum aut particulare accidens, quod est tantum in subjecto, aut universale, quod de alio accidente velut de subjecto praedicatur. Hactenus definitionem verbi distribuit. Nunc vero sicut fecit in nomine, ea quae in verbum incidere poterant, et verba non esse, a verbi ratione et propnetate disjungit.\n\nNon currit vero, et non laborat, verbum non dico. Consignificat etenim tempus, et semper de aliquo est. Differentiæ autem huic nomen non est positum, sed fit infinitum verbum.","english":"Therefore now, he says, every verb signifies something that is predicated of another. But this was of such a kind as either to be particular and only in a subject, as is \"runs.\" For \"running\" is predicated of no other subject, except that it is only in a subject; or that accident will be general and universal, so that it is predicated of another accident as of a subject, as if I were to say \"is moved.\" For this that we say, \"is moved,\" is predicated of \"running\" as of a subject; for what runs is moved. The verb therefore signifies either a particular accident, which is only in a subject, or a universal one, which is predicated of another accident as of a subject. Up to this point he has distributed the definition of the verb. But now, just as he did in the case of the noun, he separates from the nature and property of the verb those things which could fall under \"verb\" and yet are not verbs.\n\nBut \"does not run\" and \"does not labor\" I do not call a verb. For it signifies time together, and is always of something. But a name has not been assigned to this difference, but it becomes an indefinite verb.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":33,"ref":"p33","source":"Sicut in nomine fecit,ita quoque in verbo ad integram definitionem verbi proprietatemque contendit. Ait enim, non currit, non esse verbum. Et idcirco quod verbum omne finitum aliquid designat. Non curritautemquemadmodum infinitum sit, paulo post demonstrabitur quod neque oratio est. In hoc enim quod dicitur non currit, neque duo verba sunt,neque duo nomina, neque nomen et verbum,quae sola possunt jungere orationem.Atvero negatio non est, etenim tota imperfecta sententia est,sed neque huic,, inquit, antiquiores posuere vocabulum. Haec enim differentia quae est non currit, et non laborat,quae a verbo puro et simplici distat, nullo apud antiquiores vocabulo nuncupata est. Differentiam autem vocavit id quod dicitur non currit, et non Jaborat, ab eo quod est currit et Iaborat.Sed quoniam his nullum estnomenab antiquisimpositum,Aristoteles nomen ipse constituit dicens:Sit verbum infinitum.Alioqui maximam rJubitationem facit hujus praedicamenti similitudo, quod ipsumquidempraedicamentumvox est designativa secundum placitum,el de altero praedicatur, et consignificat tempus, idem scilicet quod verbum quod est currit. Sed hoc solo differre perspicitur, quod illud finitum verbum est, hoc infinitum.Curautem hoc infinitum est, continua ratione persequitur.","english":"Just as he did in the case of the noun, so too in the case of the verb he strives toward a complete definition and the proper character of the verb. For he says that \"does not run\" is not a verb. And for this reason, because every verb signifies something definite. But how \"does not run\" is indefinite will be shown a little later, namely that it is not even a sentence. For in what is said as \"does not run,\" there are not two verbs, nor two nouns, nor a noun and a verb, which alone can join together a sentence. But it is not a negation, for the whole is an incomplete sentence; but nor, he says, did the ancients assign a word to this. For this difference which is \"does not run\" and \"does not labor,\" which differs from the pure and simple verb, was called by no word among the ancients. But he called \"difference\" that which is said as \"does not run\" and \"does not labor,\" from that which is \"runs\" and \"labors.\" But since no name was imposed on these by the ancients, Aristotle himself established the name, saying: let it be an indefinite verb. Otherwise the similarity of this predication creates the greatest doubt, because the predication itself is indeed a vocal sound significative by convention, and is predicated of another, and consignifies time—namely the same thing as the verb which is \"runs.\" But it is seen to differ in this alone, that the former is a finite verb, the latter an indefinite one. But why this is indefinite, he pursues with continuous reasoning.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":34,"ref":"p34","source":"Quoniam similiter in quolibet est, et quod est, et quod non est.\n\nInfinitum,inquit, verbum est, quoniam cum de al tero semper praedicetur (non currit enim de altero dicitur), tamen aeque vel de subsistente re,vel de non subsistente praedicari potest,utin eo quod est,homo non currit, homo resestsubsistens.Ergo dicitur id, quod est non currit, de homine, id est de re subsistente. Rursus dicimus, chimaera non currit, chimaera vero non est, nec omnino subsistit.Et potest de ea vere dici, quod omnino non currit. Ergo id quod est, non currit, et de ea re quae su bsistit alque est in rebus dicitur, et de ea quae neque est, neque esse poterit, prædicatur; quare infinitum dicitur verbum. Nec solum hoc, sed illud etiam, quod cui dicit currit, rem quam quisque faciat,definite signiScat. Cum vero dicit, non currit, ipsum quidem cursum videtur auferre, sed utrum sedeat,an jaceat,an ambulet, an aliquid aliud faciat non relinquit.Quare quoniam et ea quae sunt, et ea non sunt, infinita sunt, et de his omnibus praedicatur,quoniamque id quod tollit finitum est, quod vero ponit infinitum, propter hoc, verbum vocabitur infinitum.","english":"Since this holds similarly in any case, both what is and what is not.\n\nHe says that the infinite verb is so called because, although it is always predicated of something else (for \"does not run\" is said of something else), nevertheless it can be predicated equally of a subsisting thing or of a non-subsisting thing; as in the case of \"man does not run,\" man is a subsisting thing. Therefore \"does not run\" is said of man, that is, of a subsisting thing. Again we say, \"a chimera does not run,\" but a chimera is not, nor does it subsist at all. And it can truly be said of it that it does not run at all. Therefore \"does not run\" is both said of a thing that subsists and exists among things, and predicated of that which neither is nor can be; for which reason the verb is called infinite. Nor is this the only reason, but also because when someone says \"runs,\" he signifies definitely the thing that someone does. But when he says \"does not run,\" he indeed seems to take away the running itself, but he does not leave off whether it sits, or lies, or walks, or does something else. Therefore, since both the things that are and the things that are not are infinite, and it is predicated of all these, and since what it takes away is finite but what it posits is infinite, for this reason the verb will be called infinite.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":35,"ref":"p35","source":"Similiter autem curret et currebat verbum non est, sed casus verbi. Differt autem a verbo quod hoc quidcm consignificat præsens tempus, illa uero quæ circa sunt.\n\nUt in nomine fecit cum casusanominibuadistinxit, ita quoque casus verborum nunc averborum ratione disjungit.Curret enim quod futurum est,vel curre. bat quod praeteriti retinet partem,vel cucurrit quod est integrum perfectumque præteritum, non sunt,erba,sed verborum casus, præsens enim aut futurum exspectat,aut praeteritum relinquit.Atque ideo futurum tempus ad præsens tendit, præteritum a praesenti inchoat.Unde fit ut principaliter contineat verbum id quod est præsens, ut sit verbum integrum quod praesens designat.Hæc autem quae præter pra?sens in aliqua significatione Bunt, non sunt verba, sed verborum casus.Hicquoquesicut in nomine fecit, verborum et casuum differentiam prodiLAit enim: Omne verbum praesens significat tempus.Casus verborum illud tempussignificat,quodcircaipsum præsens est,idque comp]ectitur.Complectuntur autem id quod est præsens, circa quod ipsum sunt, futurum et præteritum tempusjinter utraque enim tempara praesens locatur. Quidquid ergo vel futurum tempus, vel praeteritum significat,quæ tempora præsens complectuntur et circa sunt, non verba, sed verborum casusdicuntur.Est ergo integra definitio verbi.","english":"Similarly, \"will run\" and \"was running\" are not a verb, but a case of a verb. It differs from a verb in that the latter signifies the present time, while those [cases] signify what is around it.\n\nAs he did in the case of the noun, when he distinguished cases from nouns, so too now he separates the cases of verbs from the nature of a verb. For \"will run,\" which is future, or \"was running,\" which retains part of the past, or \"ran,\" which is complete and perfect past, are not verbs but cases of verbs; for the present either awaits the future or leaves behind the past. And for this reason the future time tends toward the present, and the past begins from the present. Hence it comes about that a verb principally contains what is present, so that the complete verb is what designates the present. But those which, beyond the present, are in some signification are not verbs but cases of verbs. Here too, as he did in the case of the noun, he brought out the difference between verbs and cases. For he said: Every verb signifies the present time. A case of a verb signifies that time which is around the present itself, and it embraces it. But they embrace what is present, around which they are: future and past time; for the present is placed between both times. Whatever therefore signifies either future time or past time—times which the present embraces and which are around it—is said to be not verbs but cases of verbs. The definition of a verb is therefore complete.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":36,"ref":"p36","source":"Verbum est vox significativa secundum p)acitum cum tempore,cujus nulla pars extra significativa est separata,dcIJnitum aliquid significans, præsentis significationem tenens. Quoniam vero pars verbi nihil extra designet,ex eo manifestum est quod ne nominis quidem pars quidquam extra significat.\n\nIpsa itaque secundum se dicta verba, nomina suni, et significant aliquid. Constiluit enim qui dicit intellectum, el gui audit quiescil.\n\nSubtilissimum quidem ini;reditur sensum,sed est hujusmodi:Omne,inquit,verbum per se el sinealterius conjunctione prolatum,nominis quodammodo speciem tenet, et vere nomen est. Cum enim dico, Homo currit,tunc id quod dixi currit, ad hominem referens integrum feci verbum,quoniam sine dubio semper de altero prædicatur.8in vero per se dixero currit,suum quiddam quodammodo facio ipsum currH,cum nullo alio jungens,et fit mibi nomen. Unde Graeci quoque his per se dictis verbis,aliquoties addunt articufaria praepositiva, ut est To, Tou.Si quis enim dicit, velocius est id quod est currere eo quod est ambulare,in illo nominativum junxit articulum,dicens,id quod est currerejin illo vero ablativum,dicens,eo quod est ambulare. Velut i si quis in nomine dicat. id quod est scamnum levius est eo quod est ostium, hoc quod diximus,id quod est scamnum,ad ipsum scamnum articulare praepositivumjunximus,tanquam num. Et quod rursus diximus,eo quod est ostium,ei diceremus,hor.","english":"A verb is a significant utterance according to convention, with time, no part of which is significant when separated, signifying something definite, and holding the signification of the present. But since no part of a verb designates anything extra, it is clear from this that not even a part of a noun signifies anything extra.\n\nThus verbs themselves, spoken according to themselves, are names, and they signify something. For the one who speaks establishes understanding, and the one who hears rests.\n\nHe enters upon a most subtle sense, but it is of this sort: Every verb, he says, brought forth by itself and without conjunction with another, holds in a certain way the species of a name, and is truly a name. For when I say \"Man runs,\" then what I said, \"runs,\" referring it to man, I have made a complete verb, since without doubt it is always predicated of another. But if I say \"runs\" by itself, I in a certain way make that very \"to run\" something of my own, joining it to nothing else, and it becomes for me a name. Whence the Greeks too, to verbs spoken by themselves, sometimes add prepositive articles, as is \"to,\" \"tou.\" For if anyone says, \"to run is swifter than to walk,\" in the former he has joined the nominative article, saying \"that which is to run\"; in the latter the ablative, saying \"that which is to walk.\" Just as if someone in a name should say, \"that which is a bench is lighter than that which is a door\": what we said, \"that which is a bench,\" we have joined the prepositive article to the bench itself, as if a name. And what again we said, \"that which is a door,\" we would say to it, \"this.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":37,"ref":"p37","source":"scamtanquam si diceremus, hoc ostio. Ita quoque cum dicimus,velocius est id quod est currere eo quod est ambulare,hoc quod dicimus,id quod est currere,ita ponimus tanquam si dicamu8,hoc currerejet rursus, eoquod est ambulare,lanquam si diceremus ablativo modo,ambulare,quasi translatum ad nomen sit, dictumque sit hac ambulatione.Quare per se dicta verba nomina sunt.Et est hujus rei probatio quam ipse Aristoteles pan it. Cum enim simplex dicimus nomen,audiloris inchoat intellectus cum nostra prolatione,et dum proferimus,dicentis sequiturvocem, et tunc quiescit,cum illud nomen fuerit expletum. Cum enim dico,Hippocentaurus,ingreditur aprima syllaba audientis inteIlectus,et usque ad finem totius nominis non quiescit. Ubi vero extremam audierit syllabam, mox quid dictum sit auditor intelIigit,et ad ejus intelligentiam conquiescit.Sic ergo et in verbo, cum dicimus currere, intellectus quidem audientis per ejus syllabas qua: sunt, cur, et re, et rursus re, vadit; sed ubi extremam audierit syllabam,mox lotiusverbi capiens signidcationem intellectus quiescit. Ergo verbum per se dictum nomini simile est, et est quodammodo nomen.","english":"just as if we were to say \"by this door.\" So too, when we say that running is swifter than walking, we set down what we call \"to run\" just as if we were to say \"this running,\" and again, what is \"to walk\" just as if we were to say in the ablative mode \"by walking,\" as though it had been transferred to a noun and expressed as \"by this walking.\" Wherefore verbs, spoken by themselves, are names. And the proof of this matter is what Aristotle himself sets forth. For when we utter a simple name, the hearer's understanding begins with our utterance, and while we are pronouncing it, it follows the speaker's voice, and then comes to rest when that name has been completed. For when I say \"Hippocentaur,\" the hearer's understanding enters at the first syllable, and does not rest until the end of the whole name. But when it has heard the final syllable, the hearer immediately understands what has been said, and comes to rest in the understanding of it. So also in a verb, when we say \"to run,\" the hearer's understanding does indeed pass through its syllables, which are \"cur\" and \"re,\" and again \"re\"; but when it has heard the final syllable, the understanding immediately grasps the signification of the whole verb and comes to rest. Therefore a verb spoken by itself is like a name, and is in a certain way a name.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":38,"ref":"p38","source":"Sicut enim in nomine is qui dicit,intellectum audientis ultimæ syllabae prolatione, et totius nominis perfectione constituit,et is qui audit quiescit,et ultra ejus inteMigentia non progreditur, ita quoque et verbum, si per se dicatur,audientis constituit intellectum,quod si cum alio conjuogatur,nondum tota intelligentia constituitur audientis.Ul cum dico,Socrates ambulat,in solo ambulat,quorl est verbum,oon consistit perfecta sententia, nisi in toto, quod est Socrates ambulat. Rursus cum dico, ambulare, moveri est, non in unoquoque horum verbo sententia constituta est,sed in tota oratione conquiescit, auditor. Idcirco quoniam si verbum de verbo altero subjecto prædicetur, utriusque verbi significationem jungit auditor, et non per se verbum ipsum considerat quod dicitur, sed ad allerum refert, ut ambulare moveri est,ambulationem ad motum,vel Socrates ambu]at,ambu]ationem ad Socratem.Tuncergo integrum verum, cum referturad alterllm.At si sim pliciter prædicetur, verbum nomen est,idcirco quod sicut nomen dictum, ita quoque verbum audientis constituit intellectum.","english":"For just as in the case of a noun, the one who speaks establishes the understanding of the hearer by the utterance of the final syllable and the completion of the whole noun, and the one who hears comes to rest and his understanding does not proceed further, so too a verb, if it is spoken by itself, establishes the understanding of the hearer; but if it is joined with something else, the full understanding of the hearer is not yet established. For when I say \"Socrates walks,\" the complete sentence consists not in \"walks\" alone, which is the verb, but in the whole, which is \"Socrates walks.\" Again, when I say \"to walk is to be moved,\" the sentence is not established in each of these verbs individually, but the hearer comes to rest in the whole utterance. For this reason, because if a verb is predicated of another subject verb, the hearer joins the signification of both verbs, and does not consider the verb itself by itself as what is said, but refers it to another, as \"to walk is to be moved,\" walking to motion; or \"Socrates walks,\" walking to Socrates. Then, therefore, it is a complete true [statement] when it is referred to another. But if it is predicated simply, the verb is a noun, for the reason that just as a noun, when spoken, so too a verb establishes the understanding of the hearer.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":39,"ref":"p39","source":"Sed si est, vel non est, nondum significat, neque enim signum est rei,esse vel non esse.\n\nSed quanquam nomen sit,inquit, verbum,et aliquid definite significet per se dietum,solum tamen non faciet enuntiationem,neque verum aliquid falsumve conslituet,hoc est enim quod ait:Sed si est, vel non est,nondum significat. Ad affirmationem referens quod dixit, sed siestjad negationem, quod ait, vel non est.Nihil enim horum signifieat verbi perse praedicta prolatio.Cum enim dico,currit,hoc ipsum currit significat queni aliquid,sed sesaunon est nondum signifJcat.Neque enim esse signum est rei, aut non esse. Quod tantum velet, tanquam si dicam, id quod dico currit, non significat esse ipsum cursum,aut non esse. Si enim significaret, ita diceretur: currere est, vel currere non est. Nunc autem currit non designat esse ipsam rem vel non esse.Dicitur enim solum,et est intellectus quidam, sed neque affirmationem signifJcat,neque negationem, idcirco quod neque ponit rem esse, nec eam interimit. Quod per hoe monstravit quod ait: Neque enim esse signum est rei, vel non esse,id est neque enim quodlibet verbum ita prædicatur,utsi. gnum sit rei illius de qua prædicatur,quoniam est, j vel quoniam non est.","english":"But if it is or is not, it does not yet signify; for it is not a sign of the thing's being or not being.\n\nBut although, he says, the verb is a noun and signifies something definite when spoken by itself, nevertheless by itself it will not make an enunciation, nor will it establish anything true or false. For this is what he says: \"But if it is or is not, it does not yet signify\"—referring to affirmation what he said, \"but if it is,\" and to negation what he said, \"or is not.\" For none of these things does the utterance of the verb, as previously stated, signify by itself. For when I say \"runs,\" this very word \"runs\" signifies something, but it does not yet signify that it is or is not. For it is not a sign of the thing's being or not being. This means only as much as if I were to say that what I say, \"runs,\" does not signify that the running itself is or is not. For if it signified that, it would be said thus: \"to run is\" or \"to run is not.\" But now \"runs\" does not designate that the thing itself is or is not. For it is spoken alone, and it is a certain understanding, but it signifies neither affirmation nor negation, for the reason that it neither posits the thing to be nor destroys it. He showed this through what he said: \"For it is not a sign of the thing's being or not being,\" that is, for no verb is predicated in such a way that it is a sign of that thing of which it is predicated, that it is or that it is not.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":40,"ref":"p40","source":"Nec si hoc ipsum,est, purum dixeris, ipsum enim nihil est, consignificat autem quamdam compositionem,quam sine compositis non est intelligere.\n\nEst verbum,juuctum cum alio verba vel nomine, solet facere propositionem, ut, homo est, vpl, currere est.Ipsum autem est purum si dictum,inquit, fuerit,neque verum est,neque falsum,a quo omnes pene enuntiationes fiunt, quæ sunt simplices: ergo nec si hoc ipsum est purum dixeris, esse aliquid, aut non esse significat, id est aut affirmat, aut negat,idcirco quod ipsum est simpliciter dictum nihil est.Non quod omnino nihil significet,sed quod nihil veritatis habeat neque falsitatis,id est non nihil est ad significationem,sed ad veritalis falsitatisque significationem,de qua nunc tractabitur.Cur autem nihil veri falsique monstret,ostendit:est enim duobus modis dicitur,ut verum falsumque designet,aut cum unam rem quamlibetpropriacompositioneconstituit,ut cum dico: homo est, ipsum est cum bomine junctum, atque compositum esse hominem constituit,et fit exinde enuntiatio: aut rursus cum duæ res per ipsius verbi compositionem copulationemque junguntur,ut est, homo animal est.","english":"Nor, if you say this very word \"is\" by itself, is it anything; for it signifies a certain composition, which cannot be understood without the things composed. The verb, joined with another verb or a noun, is accustomed to make a proposition, as \"man is,\" or \"to run is.\" But this word \"is\" itself, he says, if spoken by itself, is neither true nor false, from which nearly all enunciations that are simple are made. Therefore, if you say this very \"is\" by itself, it does not signify that something is or is not—that is, it neither affirms nor denies—for the reason that \"is\" itself, spoken simply, is nothing. Not that it signifies nothing at all, but that it has nothing of truth or falsity—that is, it is not nothing with respect to signification, but with respect to the signification of truth and falsity, about which we shall now treat. But why it shows nothing of true or false, he explains: for \"is\" is spoken in two ways, so as to designate the true and the false—either when it establishes some one thing by its own composition, as when I say \"man is,\" where \"is\" joined with \"man\" and composed establishes that a man is, and from this an enunciation is made; or again when two things are joined by the composition and copulation of the verb itself, as \"man is an animal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":41,"ref":"p41","source":"Homo namque etanimal copulantur junguntur perid quod dicitur,homo animal est.Ergosiomnisverifalsique in enuntiatione significatio,ejus quod dicitur est,io compositione est,cum aut sua compositione aliquid esse constituit,aut duas res copulat atque componit,vis ejus quae in enuntiationibus propositionibusque monstratur,in veri falsique scilicet designatione,praeter ipsas compositiones,in quibus hoc solet efficere,nulla est;atque hoc est quod ait: Consignificatautem quam dam compositionem,quam sinecompositis non est intelligere.Cum enim dico est, nihil significavi quid sit,aut non sit.Quod si faciam enuntiationem,componam necesse est,ut,homo est, aut,homo animal est.Quare si omnis ejus vis in veri falsique enuntiatione ad compositionem refertur, cum praeter compositionem dicitur,quod in compositione designare potest, irl præter compositionem non designat, potest autcm comi ositione facta verum falsumque in enuntiatione monstrare.Hrr igitur sine compositis in verbo est, nullus valet advertere.Recte igiturdictum est consignificare quamdam compositionem, quæ sine compositis intelligi non valeret.","english":"For \"man\" and \"animal\" are coupled and joined by what is said, \"man is an animal.\" Therefore, if all the signification of truth and falsity in an enunciation belongs to what is said—that is, \"is\"—it belongs to composition, since either by its own composition it establishes that something is, or it couples and composes two things. The force of it that is shown in enunciations and propositions—namely, in the designation of true and false—apart from the compositions themselves, in which it is accustomed to effect this, is none; and this is what he says: \"But it signifies a certain composition, which cannot be understood without the things composed.\" For when I say \"is,\" I have signified nothing as to what is or is not. But if I make an enunciation, I must compose, as \"man is,\" or \"man is an animal.\" Wherefore, if all its force in the enunciation of true and false is referred to composition, when it is said apart from composition, it does not designate what it can designate in composition; but when composition has been made, it can show true and false in the enunciation. This, therefore, which is in the verb \"is\" without things composed, no one can attend to. Rightly, therefore, it was said that it signifies a certain composition, which could not be understood without the things composed.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":42,"ref":"p42","source":"DE ORATIONE.\n\nOralio autem est vox significativa, cujus partium aliquid significativum est separatum,ut dictio,non ut affirmatio, vel negatio.\n\nOmne quod compositum esl, eorum suscipit naturam ex quibus totum compositi ipsius corpus efficitur. Quare quoniam oratio verbis constat atque nominibus, quae significativa sunt, recte quoque oratio significativa esse definitur.Sed distat oratio ab his ex quibus ipsa effecta est, id est nominibus atque verbis, quod eorum partes nihil extra designant, orationis vera pars aliquid separata significa!. Nam si nomen et verbum partes orationis sunt,ha?c autem per se significant,non est dubium separatas orationis partes significare. Quid autem designent, sequenti determinatione monstrabit.","english":"ON SPEECH.\n\nBut speech is a significant utterance, of which some part is significant when separated, as a word, but not as an affirmation or a negation.\n\nEverything that is composite receives the nature of those things from which the whole body of the composite itself is made. Wherefore, since speech consists of verbs and nouns, which are significant, speech is rightly also defined as significant. But speech differs from those things from which it is itself made—that is, from nouns and verbs—in that their parts designate nothing apart from the whole, whereas a part of speech, when separated, does signify something. For if noun and verb are parts of speech, and these signify by themselves, there is no doubt that the separated parts of speech signify. What they designate, however, the following determination will show.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":43,"ref":"p43","source":"Significant igitur partes orationum,ut dictio semper, non ut affirmatio semper vel negatio.Nunc autem dictionem dicit simplicem verbi aut nominis nuncupationem: sunt enim quaedam orationes, quarum partes ita significant quasi atfirmatio,ut in ea oratione quae est, si dies est,lux est, id quod dicimus lux est,totius orationis pars est,et ita est significativa ut quædam affirmatio.Sed non omnis oratioaffirmationem habet in parte,heec enim ipsa quae dicit lux est, habet in partibus id quod dicimus lux, et rursus id quod dicimus est,sed neutra ipsarum affirmatio est,sed tantum simplex dictio.Omnis ergo oratio dictionem quidem habet in parte, non vero omnis oratio affirmationem.Recte igitur dictum est partes orationis significare,ut dictionem,non ut affirmationem. Quid autem sit dictio,ipse paulo post clarius demonstrabit.\n\nDico autem, ut homo, significat enim aliquid, sed non quoniam est, aut non est, sed erit affirmatio vel negatio si aliquid addatur. Sed non una hominis syllaba.","english":"Significant, therefore, are the parts of speech—always as a word, but not always as an affirmation or a negation. Now he calls a \"word\" the simple utterance of a verb or a noun; for there are certain speeches whose parts are significant in the manner of an affirmation, as in the speech \"if it is day, there is light\": the thing we call \"there is light\" is a part of the whole speech, and it is significant in such a way as a kind of affirmation. But not every speech has an affirmation in its part; for this very speech which says \"there is light\" has in its parts the thing we call \"light,\" and again the thing we call \"is,\" but neither of these is an affirmation, only a simple word. Every speech, therefore, has a word in its part, but not every speech has an affirmation. Rightly, then, it was said that the parts of speech are significant as a word, not as an affirmation. But what a word is, he himself will show more clearly a little later.\n\nI say, for example, \"man\" signifies something, but not that it is or is not; but it will be an affirmation or a negation if something is added. But not one syllable of \"man.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":44,"ref":"p44","source":"Quod supra posuit dicens, orationis partes ut dictionem significare, non ut affirmationem, boc convenienti monstravit exemplo: Homo, inquit dictio est, et est pars orationis, si in tota oratione ponatur, ut est, homo animal est. Ergo id quod dicimus homo, dictio quaedam est, sed affirmatio non est. Cum ergo nomen hoc, id est homo, pars orationis sit, et affirmatio non sil, docet verum esse quod dicitur, orationis partes significare, ut dictionem, non ut affirmationem. Docet autem illa res nomen hoc affirmationem non esse,quod in affirmatione semper veritas aut falsitas invenitur,nomen vero simpliciter dictum, neque verum neque falsum est. Quare nomen boc, id est homo,ut affirmatio non significat,sed designat aliquid simplex, significat igitur aliquid,ut dictio.Hsec autem dictio si ei addatur aliquid, ut verbum est, aut quodlibet verbum aliud quod enuntiationem possit efficere, erit affirmatio. Si enim quis dicat, homo est,vel bomo vivit, fit affirmatio, atque hoc est quod ait, sed erit affirmatio, vel negatio.si quid addatur.Si enim aliquid ita apponatur vel appositum ita nege. tur,ut enuntiatio constitui possit, affirmatio negatione perficitur. Si quis enim dicat, homo vivit, affirmatio est;bomo non vivit, negatio. Docet autem dictionem esse vocem secundum posilionem per ce significantem per hoc quod ait,sed non una hominis syllaba.","english":"What he set down above when he said that the parts of speech signify as a word, not as an affirmation, he showed by a fitting example: \"Man,\" he says, is a word and is a part of speech, if it is placed in a whole speech, as in \"man is an animal.\" Therefore that which we call \"man\" is a certain word, but it is not an affirmation. Since, then, this noun, that is \"man,\" is a part of speech and is not an affirmation, he teaches that what is said is true—that the parts of speech signify as a word, not as an affirmation. But the fact that this noun is not an affirmation he teaches by this: that in an affirmation truth or falsity is always found, whereas a noun simply uttered is neither true nor false. Wherefore this noun, that is \"man,\" does not signify as an affirmation, but designates something simple; it signifies something, therefore, as a word. But if something is added to this word, as the verb \"is,\" or any other verb that can make an enunciation, there will be an affirmation. For if someone says \"man is\" or \"man lives,\" an affirmation is made, and this is what he says: \"but it will be an affirmation or a negation if something is added.\" For if something is so added, or, having been added, is so denied, that an enunciation can be constituted, the affirmation is completed by the negation. For if someone says \"man lives,\" it is an affirmation; \"man does not live,\" a negation. But that a word is a utterance significant by convention he teaches by this: that he says \"but not one syllable of man.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":45,"ref":"p45","source":"Una enim hominis syllaba dictio non est, idcirco quod nihil per se separata significat,ut ho, et mo,et in caeteris, ut supra ostendimus. Omnis enim hujusmodi pars quae per se nihil significat, non est dictio,sed tantum in toto nomine quiddam positum designat et consignificat, ut in eo quod ipse ponit exemplo: Neque enim in eo quod est sorex, rex, significat,, sed vox nunc esE sola. In duplicibus vern significat quidem aliquid, sed non secundum se,quemadmodum dictum est.\n\nIn eo, inquit,quod est sorex,rex videtur quidem aliquid significare;sed cum toto nomine consignificat potius quam quidquam per seipsum designet quemadmodum supra jam dictum est.Docuit enim supra partes nominis nihil omnino significare separatas.Quod ergo dicit, sed non secul'dum se,id est in eo quod est sorex,rex per se nihil significat,sed tantum quiddam consignificat, quod cum tota nominis compositione designat, cum et so syllaba et rex juncta in unum, id quod est sorex,in tota syllabarum conjunctione designet.","english":"For a single syllable of \"homo\" is not a word, for the reason that by itself, separated, it signifies nothing—as \"ho\" and \"mo\" and the rest, as we showed above. For every part of this kind that by itself signifies nothing is not a word, but only designates and consignifies something placed in the whole name, as in the example he himself gives. For in the word \"sorex,\" \"rex\" does not signify, but is now only a sound. In compound words it does signify something, but not in accordance with itself, as has been said.\n\nIn the word, he says, \"sorex,\" \"rex\" seems indeed to signify something, but it consignifies with the whole name rather than designating anything by itself, as has already been said above. For he taught above that the parts of a name signify nothing at all when separated. What he therefore says—\"but not in accordance with itself\"—means that in the word \"sorex,\" \"rex\" by itself signifies nothing, but only consignifies something, which it designates together with the whole composition of the name, since both the syllable \"so\" and \"rex,\" joined into one, designate that which is \"sorex\" in the whole conjunction of syllables.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":46,"ref":"p46","source":"Est autem oratia omnis quidem significativa, non sicut instrumentum, sed quemadmodum dictum est, secundum placitum.\n\nPlato nomina naturalia esse constituit, et hoc hinc probare contendit quod quaedam supellex,et quodammodo instrumentum sit,invicem sensa prodendi. Naturalium vero su pellectiles sunt naturales, ut oculi instrumenta quidem sunt videndi,qui visus res naturalis est. Quare oculos quoque naturales esse necesse est,ita etiam oratorio rerum naturalium supellexest,atque instrumentum,id est sententiarum. Quare ipsa quoque oratio est naturalis.Aristoteles autem dicit, non secundum naturam esse orationem,sed secundum placitum. Quocirca nec orationem esse suppellectilem naturalem. Quod enim dicit, non sicut instrumentum,non dicit non perhoc instrumentum sensa proferri,sed tantum rem esse orationem secundum positionem,per quas proprias sententias demonstremus. Cujus enim rei partes ad placitum sunt,ipsa quoque ad placitum est. Sed orationis partes nomen et verbum sunt,hæc autem sunt ad placitum,non natura.Oratio igitur ipsa secundum placitum positionemqueest,sed non est naturaliter constituta. Est autem integra definiUo orationis: haec:Oratio est vox siguificativa secundum placitum, cujus partes aliquid extra significant.","english":"Every oratio is indeed significative, not as an instrument, but, as has been said, according to convention.\n\nPlato established that names are natural, and he strives to prove this from the fact that there is a certain equipment, and in a way an instrument, for mutually producing sensa. But the instruments of natural things are natural, as the eyes are indeed instruments of seeing, which sight is a natural thing. Wherefore the eyes too must be natural; so also the equipment of oratory is of natural things, and an instrument, that is, of thoughts. Wherefore oratio itself is also natural. Aristotle, however, says that oratio is not according to nature, but according to convention. Wherefore neither is oratio a natural piece of equipment. For what he says, \"not as an instrument,\" he does not say that sensa are not produced through this instrument, but only that oratio is a thing according to position, through which we demonstrate our own thoughts. For of whatever thing the parts are according to convention, that thing itself is also according to convention. But the parts of oratio are the noun and the verb, and these are according to convention, not by nature. Oratio itself, therefore, is according to convention and position, but is not constituted naturally. But the complete definition of oratio is this: Oratio is a significative utterance according to convention, whose parts signify something extra.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":47,"ref":"p47","source":"Enuntiativa vero non omnis, sed illa iia qua verum vel falsum est, non autem omnibus inest, ut deprecatio, oratio quidem est, sed neque vera, neque falsa.\n\nOrationis (ut supra jamdiximus)multæ sunt species: est enim oratio prima optativa,ut.Utinam tibi istam mentem dii immortales dent!Secunda, vocativa, ut Heus tu. Tertia, imperativa,ut Cape,da hoc, Portio. QuartR, deprecativa, ut,Jupiter omnipotens: precibus si flecteris ullis.Quinta,enuntiativa,ut dies est, dies non est. Sed in hac sola specie orationis veritas et falsitas inest,in illis vero cæteris minime Volens autem Aristoteles ostendere multas esse orationes,et non omnem orationem esse enuntiativam, hoc addidit: Deprecatio oratio quidem est,sed neque vera neque falsa Etenim deprecatio in orationis speciebus ponitur, sed nulla in ea veritatis natura falsitatisque cognoscitur.","english":"But not every oratio is enuntiative, but only that in which truth or falsehood is present; and this is not present in all, as a prayer is indeed an oratio, but is neither true nor false.\n\nThere are many species of oratio, as we have already said above: for the first oratio is optative, as, Would that the immortal gods grant you that mind! The second is vocative, as, Ho there, you! The third is imperative, as, Take this, give this, Portius. The fourth is deprecative, as, Almighty Jupiter: if you are moved by any prayers. The fifth is enuntiative, as, It is day, it is not day. But in this species of oratio alone are truth and falsehood present, while in the other kinds they are by no means present. But Aristotle, wishing to show that there are many orationes and that not every oratio is enuntiative, added this: a prayer is indeed an oratio, but is neither true nor false. For a prayer is placed among the species of oratio, but no nature of truth or falsehood is recognized in it.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":48,"ref":"p48","source":"Cateræ igitur relinquantur.Rhetoricæ enim vel poeticæ convenientior est consideratio.Enuntiativa vero, præsentis est speculalionis.\n\nDeprecativam, inquit,et optativHm,et vocativam, et imperativam, poetis atque oratoribus relicquamus.lIlis enim vel ad immittendos vel ad movendos affectus cæteræ orationis species assumantur. Nos vero philosophi,quibus veritatis falsitatisque discretio est curæ, de ilia sola oratione tractamus in qua utrumlibet horum possit agnosci. In enuntiatione vero aut veritas inest aut falsitas,quocirca nos quoque de enuntiatione tractemus.\n\nEst aulem una prima oratio enuniiaiiva,affirmatio, deinde negatio; alix varo omnes conjunctione unæ.\n\nEnuntiativarum orationum aliae sunt per se unae, ut est,homo animal est;aliæ conjunctione unae, ut est, si bomo est,animal est.Homo est enim et anmaest,duæ sunt,sed ata conjunctione quæest si,una redditur.Earum autem quæ unae per se sunt prima est affirmatio,secunda negatio.Hoc enim toilit negatio quod affirmatio ante constituit, et hoc negatio dividit quod illaconjunxit.Enuntiativarum igitur orationum earum quae sunt per se unæ,primaest affirmatio, deinde negatio. Aliae vero sunt non per se unae, sed cum plures sint naturaliter, unæ fiunt conjunctione.","english":"Let the rest, then, be set aside. For the consideration of them belongs more fittingly to rhetoric or poetry. But the enuntiative [statement-making] kind belongs to the present inquiry.\n\nThe deprecative, he says, and the optative, and the vocative, and the imperative, let us leave to the poets and orators. For the other species of oratio are assumed by them either for stirring up or for moving the affections. But we philosophers, whose care is the discernment of truth and falsehood, treat of that oratio alone in which either of these can be recognized. In enuntiation, indeed, there is present either truth or falsehood; wherefore let us also treat of enuntiation.\n\nNow there is one first enuntiative oratio, affirmation, and then negation; but all the others are one by conjunction.\n\nOf enuntiative orationes, some are one by themselves, as \"man is an animal\"; others are one by conjunction, as \"if man is, animal is.\" For \"man is\" and \"animal is\" are two, but by the conjunction \"if\" they are rendered one. Of those, however, which are one by themselves, the first is affirmation, the second negation. For negation takes away what affirmation has first established, and negation divides what the other has joined together. Of enuntiative orationes, therefore, those which are one by themselves—the first is affirmation, then negation. But the others are not one by themselves, but though they are naturally several, they become one by conjunction.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":49,"ref":"p49","source":"Necesse est autemomnem orationem enuntiativam ex verbo esse,vel caru verbi.Etenim hominis ratio,si non est, aut erit, aut fuit,aut aliquid huiusmodi addatur, nondum est oralio enuntiativa.\n\nAristotelis in Graeco textus non habet ita ut os supra posuimus, seocmodo:Etenim hominissi non aut est,aut erit,aut fuit, et cætera. untegendum relinquente philosopho,quod de ratione diceret,id estde diffinitione quam,Græci dicunt. Sed cum suprade oratione tractasset,quæ apud illos similiter vocatur, dum de hominis ratione,id est definitione velletdicere,quoniam non significat verum vel falsum,nisi ei aut est, aut erit, aut fuit, addatur, communione vocabuli usus, ad de quo superius tractabat, retulit, ut non orationem intelligeremus,sed potius rationem.De qua rcnunc illis satisfacimus qui Graecae orationis pertiri nos forte culpabunt,cur quod illic non fuit,nostræ traDsIation: adjecerimus. Nos enim ad faciliorem inteHectum Latinæ orationi famutantesboc apposuimus, quia de oratione loquentibus intellectus ad rationem, nisi idesset adjectum, transferri non poterat. Totum vero quod dicit tale est:en untiativæ orationes si sunt simplices,has verba constituunt. Ex duobus enim nominibus solis enunLiatio non fit,ex nomine autem et verbo iit, ut est, homo vivit.Fit quoque ex solis verbis ut est,arnbulare moveri est.Fit etiam excasu verbi, ut Socrates fuit, vel etiam,dies erit.","english":"But every enuntiative [statement-making] utterance must necessarily consist of a verb, or be without a verb. For the reason [definition] of man, if \"is not,\" or \"will be,\" or \"was,\" or something of this sort is not added, is not yet an enuntiative utterance.\n\nThe Greek text of Aristotle does not have it as we have set it out above, but rather in this way: \"For of man, if he neither is, nor will be, nor was,\" and so on—the philosopher leaving to be understood what he was saying about reason, that is, about the definition which the Greeks call [logos]. But since he had treated above of utterance, which among them is called by a similar name, when he wished to speak about the reason of man, that is, the definition—since it does not signify the true or the false unless \"is,\" or \"will be,\" or \"was\" is added to it—using the community of the word, he referred it to that which he was treating of above, so that we would understand not utterance, but rather reason. Concerning which we now satisfy those who will perhaps blame us for having rendered the Greek utterance, [asking] why we have added to our translation what was not there. For we, serving the easier understanding of the Latin utterance, have appended this, because for those speaking about utterance the understanding could not be transferred to reason unless this had been added. But the whole of what he says is such: enuntiative utterances, if they are simple, verbs constitute them. For an enuntiation is not made from two names alone, but it comes to be from a name and a verb, as \"man lives.\" It is also made from verbs alone, as \"to walk is to be moved.\" It is also made with a verb in the past, as \"Socrates was,\" or also \"the day will be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":50,"ref":"p50","source":"Erit enim et fuit verbicasussunt.Quocircaenuntiativam orationem simplicem sola maxime verba constituunt.Eorumque ponit exemplum,in quo cumplura sint nomina, nisi addito tamen verbo in enuntiationis proprietatem et significantiam non venit, utest definitio hominis.(Ratio enim hominis est speciei detinitio.y Cui si non aut est, aut non est,aul aliquid hujusmodi addatur,enuntiatio esse non poterit.Nam si quis dicat, Animal rationale mortale,nulla in eo adhuc falsitas autveritas intelligitur. Si vero addatur est, utsit,Animal rationale mortale est, enuntiatio sine ulla dubitatione perficitur. Solum igitur verbum enuntiativam simplicem continet orationem.\n\nQuare autem utum quiddam est et nonmulta,animal gressibile bipes,neque enim eo quod propinque dtcuntur, unum erit.Est autem nUerius hoc traclare ne. otii.\n\nCum de simplicibus atque unis orationibus loqueretur,definitionem hominis interposuit,de qua nunc hoc dicit. Ita quidem interposita est definitiohominis tanquam si una esset oratio.Cur autem una sit oratio nunc, inquit, dicere intermittemus. Neque enim idcirco una esseputanda est, quia continue dicituretsibimet propinque,animal gressibile bipes.","english":"For \"will be\" and \"was\" are verbal expressions. Therefore it is chiefly verbs alone that constitute a simple enuntiative utterance. And he gives an example of this, in which there are several names, yet without an added verb it does not come into the property and significance of an enuntiation, as is the definition of man. For the reason of man is the definition of the species. But if \"is\" or \"is not,\" or something of this sort, is not added to it, it cannot be an enuntiation. For if someone says \"rational mortal animal,\" no falsity or truth is yet understood in it. But if \"is\" is added, so that it is \"rational mortal animal is,\" the enuntiation is completed without any doubt. Therefore the verb alone contains a simple enuntiative utterance.\n\nBut why \"two-footed walking animal\" is something one and not many — for it will not be one because they are spoken closely together — it is more truly a matter of leisure to treat this.\n\nWhen he was speaking of simple and one utterances, he interposed the definition of man, about which he now says this. The definition of man was indeed interposed as if it were one utterance. But why it is one utterance, he says, we shall now omit to say. For it is not to be thought one for the reason that \"two-footed walking animal\" is said continuously and closely together with itself.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":51,"ref":"p51","source":"Posset enim videri horum continua,et sub una prolatione dicta, unam facere enuntiationem; sed hoc Aristoteles negat.Nam non idcirco una oratio est quia propinque et continue dicitur.Cur autem una ait, alterius est hoc tractare negotii,et de eodisputat in his libris quos Metapbysica inscripsit, quod est primi opus philosophi. Nobis autem hoc in ee. ohnda editione monstrandum est.\n\nEst autem una oratio enuntiativa vel quæ unum significat, vel conjunctione utta. Plures autem, qua: pluar, et non unum, vel anconjunetæ.\n\nDuplicem modum unarum multarumque orationum esse denuntiat.Estnamqueunaoralio vel cum unam rem significat,vel cum conjunctione una est,ut est ea quæ dicit, animal ralionale morlale homo est: hancenim hujus orationis sententiam nullus in multas significationes diducere poterit,sed unum quoddam significat,et est præter conjunctionem.Alia vero oratio est una,quæ per conjunclionem una est,ut,Si dies est, lux esl.Est ergo una oratio quæ vel unam rem significat,vel conjunctione jungitur.Plures autem sunt quae plura signifJcant,ut est,canis movetur. Hanc enim potest et adla trabilem et ad marinum et ad cælestem auditor advertere,atque ideo quoniam multa significat,non est unaoratio,sed plures.Sunt quoque orationes per se plures et numero et significalione,quæ nullaconjunctionecopulanlur,utsi quis dicat.sot est.pax erit.nox est coelum volvitur.","english":"For it could seem that these, being continuous and spoken in one utterance, make one enuntiation; but Aristotle denies this. For it is not for this reason one utterance because it is spoken closely and continuously. But why he says it is one belongs to another business, and he disputes about this in those books which he inscribed Metaphysics, which is the work of the first philosopher. But we must show this in this edition.\n\nBut an enuntiative utterance is one either which signifies one thing, or which is united by conjunction. But there are several, which signify several things and not one, or which are without conjunction.\n\nHe declares that there is a twofold mode of one and of many utterances. For an utterance is one either when it signifies one thing, or when it is one by conjunction, as is that which says, \"man is a mortal rational animal\"; for no one can draw out the sense of this utterance into many significations, but it signifies some one thing, and it is without conjunction. But another utterance is one which is one through conjunction, as, \"If it is day, it is light.\" Therefore an utterance is one which either signifies one thing, or is joined by conjunction. But there are several which signify several things, as is, \"a dog is moved.\" For the hearer can turn this both to the hunting dog and to the sea dog and to the celestial dog, and therefore, because it signifies many things, it is not one utterance, but several. There are also utterances several in themselves both in number and in signification, which are joined by no conjunction, as if someone should say, \"the sun is,\" \"peace will be,\" \"night is,\" \"the heaven is turned.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":52,"ref":"p52","source":"Hæc enim cum plura significent,nulla tamen conjunctione junguntur,atque ideo plures orationes vocantur.In summa igiturorationum unarum,aliæsunt significatione unæ,aliæ conjunctione;non unarum veroorationum aliæ sunt significatione plures,aliæ eo quo niam nulla conjunctione copulantur.\n\nNomen ergo et verbum dictio sit sola,quoniam non dicere, sic aliquid significantem voce enuntiare, vel aliquo interrogante, vel non, sed ipso proferente.\n\nPer hanc sententiam simplex diclio quid sit expo nit,Dicitenim verbum nomenque dictiones viderisolum,non etiam affirmationes, atque hujus sententiæ causam subnectit. Idcirco enim verba et nomine dictiones solum Bunt, quoniam cum dicta fuerint simplicia, sive aliquo proferente, id est sponte cente, sive ad alterius interrogationem aliquo respondente,neque verum ex his neque falsum valet intelligi. Si quis enim per se dicat: Socrates, vel rursus per se solum simplexque, ambulat, neque verum efficit, neque falsum. Si vero alio interrogante,Socratesne ambulat? ille reepondeat,Ambulat,si huic ipsi verbo per se quisquam velit advertere quod dixit ambulat, enuntiatio nulla eat,quod et cum superiore interrogatione conjungat,tunc ex interrogationisetresponsionis conjunctione nascitur enuntiatio.Solum autem nomen vel verbum neque dicente aliquo, et sponte proferente, nec respondente, potest quisquam dicere, quoniam enuntiatio facta est.","english":"For these things, since they signify many things, are nevertheless joined by no conjunction, and for that reason are called several utterances. In sum, then, of unitary utterances, some are one by signification, others by conjunction; and of non-unitary utterances, some are many by signification, others because they are connected by no conjunction.\n\nTherefore a noun and a verb are an expression alone, since it is not to say—by uttering with the voice something that signifies—either when someone asks or when not, but when the speaker himself brings it forth.\n\nThrough this sentence he explains what a simple expression is. For he says that a verb and a noun seem to be expressions alone, not also affirmations, and he adds the cause of this sentence. For verbs and nouns are expressions alone for this reason: when simple things have been said, whether by someone speaking, that is, of his own accord, or by someone responding to another's question, neither true nor false can be understood from them. For if someone says by itself: Socrates, or again by itself and alone, the simple word, walks, he makes neither true nor false. But if, when another asks, Does Socrates walk? he answers, He walks—if anyone wishes to attend to this very verb by itself, what he said, walks, is no enuntiation; but when he joins it with the preceding question, then from the conjunction of question and answer an enuntiation is born. But a noun or verb alone, with no one speaking and of his own accord bringing it forth, nor responding, no one can say, because an enuntiation has been made.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":53,"ref":"p53","source":"Et sensus quidem hujusmodi est. Ordo autem verborum talis est. Nomen ergo et verbum dictio sit sola, quoniam sic aliquid significantem voce, id est nomen aut verbum simpliciter proferentem,non est dicereenuntiare.Nonenim possumus dicere quod aliquid enuntietis \"qui simplex nomen aut simplex protulitverbum,sive aliointerrogante, sive non interrogante, sed ipso sponte proferente.\n\nHarum autem, hæc quidem simplex est enunlialio, ut aliquid de aliquo,vel aliquid,ab aliquo.Hæc autem ex his conjuncta,velut oratio quædam jam composita.\n\nNunc quid oratio sitsimplex compositaque declarat. Est enim simplex oratio quæ duobus terminis constat. Tertimi autem sunt nomina et verba, quae in simplici propositione prædicamus,ut in eo quod est, Socrates disputat,Socrates et disputat termini sunt.et qui minor terminus in enuntiatione proponitur,ut Socrates,subjectus dicitur,et ponitur prior; qui vero major, prædicatur,et locatur posterior,ut disputat. Quaecunque propositio ex uno subjecto et uno prædicato facta est,illa simplex enuntiatio nuncupatur, atque hoc est quod ait. Harum autem,id est enuntiativarum, simplex est enuntiatio, ut aliquid de aliquo, ut unum praedicatum quod est aliquid de uno subjecto quodestdealiquo prapdicetur.","english":"And the sense of this is as follows. The order of the words, however, is such. Therefore let a name and a verb be a single expression, since it is not possible to say that one who signifies something by voice in this way—that is, one who simply utters a name or a verb—makes an enunciation. For we cannot say that he enunciates something who has uttered a simple name or a simple verb, whether another is asking or not asking, but he himself is speaking of his own accord.\n\nOf these, however, one is a simple enunciation, as when something is said of something, or something from something. Another is joined from these, as it were a certain already composite speech.\n\nNow he declares what a simple and composite speech is. For a simple speech is one that consists of two terms. The terms, however, are names and verbs, which we predicate in a simple proposition, as in that which is \"Socrates disputes,\" \"Socrates\" and \"disputes\" are the terms. And the lesser term that is set forth in the enunciation, as \"Socrates,\" is called the subject and is placed first; but the greater, which is predicated, is placed afterward, as \"disputes.\" Whatever proposition is made from one subject and one predicate, that is called a simple enunciation, and this is what he says: \"Of these,\" that is, of enunciations, \"the simple enunciation is, as when something is said of something,\" that is, one predicate which is something is predicated of one subject which is something.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":54,"ref":"p54","source":"Hoc autem pertinet ad affirmationem,ut aliquid de aliquo prædices. Ad negationem vero, ut unum aliquid ab uno aliquo praedicando disjungas, ut in eo quod est,;Socrates non disputat, disputare unum terminum,a non Socrate alio termino,prædicando disjunxi.Aliæ vero suntoratione;; enuntiativae, quae compositæ nominantur,quæ ex simplicibus orationibus componuntur, ut est, sesest,lux es; dies est et lux est,duæ sunt simplices enuntiativae orationes, idcirco quod binis terminis constant, ex duabus autem simplicibus orationibus tota haec oratio est,quæ dicit,si dies est,lux est;hoc est enim quod ait.Hæc autem ex his conjuncla,id est ex simplicibus orationibus enuutiativis, velut oratio quaedam jam composita, quippe cujus totum corpus ex his jungitur, quas simplices esse jam supra docui.\n\nEstautem simplexenuntiatio,vox signicativa de eo quod est aliquid,vel non est, quemadmodum tempora divisa sunt.","english":"This pertains to affirmation, so that you predicate something of something. To negation, however, so that you separate one thing from one thing by predicating, as in the statement \"Socrates does not dispute\": I have separated \"to dispute\" as one term from \"Socrates\" as another term by predicating. But there are other enunciative expressions of speech, which are called composite, which are composed from simple expressions, as in \"light is; day is\" and \"light is and day is\"—these are two simple enunciative expressions, for the reason that they consist of two terms; but the whole expression that says \"if day is, light is\" is from two simple expressions. For this is what he means. But these things joined from these, that is, from simple enunciative expressions, are as it were already a certain composite expression, since its whole body is joined from those which I have already shown above to be simple.\n\nBut a simple enunciation is a significative utterance concerning whether something is or is not, as the times are divided.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":55,"ref":"p55","source":"Postquam de compositis orationibus simplicibusquetractavit,diffioitionem en untiationis per affirmationem et negationem ingreditur;ait enim:Enuntiatio est vox signidcans affirmationem vel negationem, vel in præteritum,vel in præsens, vel in futurum tempus.Quod enim dixit,de eo quod esl,ad affirmationem retulit; quod addit,vel non est,ad negationem; quod vero secutus est,quemadmodum tempora divisa sunt,ad singulorum,temporum retuMtrationem; sive enim aliquis dicat: Socrates vivit,Socrates non vivit,sive Socrates vixil,Socrates non vixil,vel sic: Socrates victurus est,Socrates victurus non est,quoniam affirmatio est aut negatio,et quoniam quaelibet ipsarum in aliquo temporum est,quæ dividuntur in futurum, praesens ac præteritum, plenam retinet simplicis enuntiationis naturam.\n\nAffirmatio vero est enuntiatio alicujus de aliquo Ne. gatio vero enuntiatio aticuius ab alifjuo.","english":"After he has treated of composite and simple expressions, he enters upon the definition of a statement through affirmation and negation; for he says: A statement is a spoken sound signifying an affirmation or a negation, either in past, or in present, or in future time. For what he said, \"concerning what is,\" he referred to affirmation; what he added, \"or is not,\" to negation; but what followed, \"in whatever way the times are divided,\" to the reckoning of each of the times; for whether someone says \"Socrates lives,\" \"Socrates does not live,\" or \"Socrates lived,\" \"Socrates did not live,\" or thus: \"Socrates will live,\" \"Socrates will not live,\" since it is either an affirmation or a negation, and since any one of them is in some one of the times, which are divided into future, present, and past, it retains the full nature of a simple statement.\n\nAn affirmation, however, is a statement of something concerning something. A negation, however, is a statement of something apart from something.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":56,"ref":"p56","source":"Ad affirmationis et negationis determinationem enuntiationis nomen sumpsit,ut generis; est autem affirmatio quoties aliqnid de aliquo eum eo quod est esse prædicamus,utcum dicimus,Homo animal est, animal de homine prædicamus; quoties autem aliquid ab aliquo prædicando disjungimus,nrgaLio est, ut homo lapis non est,lapidem enim ab bomine disjungimus. Quare recta affirmationis et negationis facta est diff'initio.\n\nDE SUBJECTIS ET PRÆDICATIS ENUNTIATIONUM.\n\nQuoniam autem ext enuntiare,et quod est,non esse: et qnod non est, esse:: et quod est,esse: et quod non est,non esse; et circa ea quæ sunt extra præsens tempora, similiter omne conlingit quod quis affirmaverit, negare,et quod quis negaverit. affirmare; quare manifestum est quoniam omni affirmationi est negatio opposita,et omni negationi affirmatio.Et sit hoc cont, adic/is et negalio oppositæ.","english":"He took the name of statement as a genus for the determination of affirmation and negation. Now there is an affirmation whenever we predicate something of something together with the fact that it is, as when we say, Man is an animal, we predicate animal of man; but whenever by predicating we separate something from something, it is a negation, as, Man is not a stone, for we separate stone from man. Wherefore the definition of affirmation and negation has been correctly made.\n\nON THE SUBJECTS AND PREDICATES OF STATEMENTS.\n\nSince it is possible to enunciate both that what is, is not, and that what is not, is, and that what is, is, and that what is not, is not, and likewise concerning things outside the present time, it comes about in every case that whatever someone has affirmed he may deny, and whatever someone has denied he may affirm; wherefore it is evident that every affirmation has a negation opposed to it, and every negation an affirmation. And let this be laid down, that affirmation and negation are opposites.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":57,"ref":"p57","source":"Nunc dividit enunliationes,ve] quæ de his possunt fieri rebus,quæ sunt,vel quae de iis quae non sunt, sive in affirmatione, sive in negatione. Dicit enim quoniam est enuntiare quod est non esse,ut si quis dicat, Nullus homo animal est.Hoc enim quod est, non esse proposuit. Hæc est falsa negatio.Et quod non est esse,ut si quis dicat,Omnis lapis animal est, quod enim non est esse constituit, et bæc eat falsa affirmatio. Et quod est esse, ut si quis dicat,Omnis homo animal est.Quod enim est, esse confirmal,et hæc est affirmatio vera. Et quod non est, non esse, ut si quis dicat,NuIlus lapis animal est.Quod enim non eat,non esse proposuit,et haec est vera negatio. Et non solum hoc in præsenti tempore,sed circaea quoque quae praeter praesens sunt tempora.Hocautem tantum valet ac si diceret, hoc non modo in praesenti tempore ita enuntiari potest, ut sit vera falsaque negatio,et rursus vera falsaque affirmatio, aed etiam in præteritum et futurum,quæ extra præsens tempora sUDt.Similiter etenim omne contingit quod affirmatur negare, et quod negatur ab alio, alium rursus affil'mare.Quod si omni veritali falsitas opponitur,omni etiam falsilati veritas;est autem et affirmationis et negationis falsa proferre,constat quod omni negationi affirmatio,etomni affirmationi negatio opponitur.","english":"Now he divides statements, namely those that can be made about things that are, or about those that are not, whether in affirmation or in negation. For he says that it is possible to state that what is, is not, as if someone should say, No man is an animal. For he has proposed that what is, is not. This is a false negation. And that what is not, is, as if someone should say, Every stone is an animal; for he has established that what is not, is, and this is a false affirmation. And that what is, is, as if someone should say, Every man is an animal. For he confirms that what is, is, and this is a true affirmation. And that what is not, is not, as if someone should say, No stone is an animal. For he has proposed that what is not, is not, and this is a true negation. And this applies not only in the present time, but also in regard to those times that are beyond the present. Now this is as much as to say: this can be stated not only in the present time, so that there is a true and false negation, and again a true and false affirmation, but also with respect to the past and the future, which are outside the present times. For in like manner it happens that whatever is affirmed can be denied, and what is denied by one person, another in turn can affirm. But if falsity is opposed to every truth, then truth is also opposed to every falsity; and since it is possible to utter both a false affirmation and a false negation, it is evident that to every negation an affirmation is opposed, and to every affirmation a negation.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":58,"ref":"p58","source":"Hinc ergo quid sit quod dicitur contradictio,declaratur.Est e[]im contradictio affirmationis et negationis oppositio.Cum enim quis atfirmat quod alius negat,ipsa utrarumque propositionum pugna contraditio nominatur.Atque hoc est quod ait.Et sit boc contradictio,affirmatio et negatio,opposita.Cum enim affirmatio negationi opponitur,contradictio est.Sed quas sit affirmatio opposita negationi,aut quae sit harum propositionum oppositio,m sequentibus prodit.Neque enim quaelibet negatio cuilibet affirmationi opposita est,sed tantum hæc quas in sequentibus ipse determinat.Quocirca erit contradictio,affirmatio et negatio oppositæ; quae sint autem oppositæ,sequens expositionis ordo conext.\n\nDico autem opponi ejusdem de eodem. Non autem æquivoce,et quæcunque cætera talium determinavimus contra sophisticas imporlunilales.\n\nFierituncoppositionem in affirmationibus negationibusque demonstrat,cum idem subjectum idem que praedicatum in negatione sit, quod quilibet in affirmatione proposuit: oportet enim semper, si opposita est affirmatio negationi, unam essse veram,alteram falsam. Quod si utræque falsae sunt, aut utraeque verae, non sunt oppositæ.Neque enim se perimunt. Si autem una sit falsa, alia vera, tunc vera perlmit falsam. Et si illa fuerit vera, alia mox a veritate discedit. Quod si in qualibet affirmatione aut subjectum aut prædicatum fuerit aequivocum non sunt oppositæ.","english":"Hence it is made clear what a contradiction is. For a contradiction is the opposition of affirmation and negation. For when one person affirms what another denies, the very clash of the two propositions is called a contradiction. And this is what he says: And let this be a contradiction, affirmation and negation, opposites. For when affirmation is opposed to negation, it is a contradiction. But which affirmation is opposed to which negation, or what the opposition of these propositions is, he sets forth in what follows. For not every negation is opposed to every affirmation, but only those which he himself determines in what follows. Wherefore there will be a contradiction, affirmation and negation being opposites; but which are opposites, the following order of exposition will make clear.\n\nBut I say that they are opposed when they are of the same thing, about the same thing. Not, however, equivocally, and whatever other such conditions we have determined against sophistical importunities.\n\nHere he demonstrates what the opposition in affirmations and negations consists in, since the same subject and the same predicate is in the negation as anyone proposed in the affirmation. For it must always be that, if the affirmation is opposed to the negation, one is true and the other false. But if both are false, or both are true, they are not opposed. For they do not destroy each other. But if one is false and the other true, then the true destroys the false. And if that one is true, the other at once departs from the truth. But if in any affirmation either the subject or the predicate is equivocal, they are not opposed.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[{"kind":"lacuna","severity":"caution","text":"The source is fragmentary here: the edition marks a break or an editorial bracket, and the English carries across it. Treat the bridge as supplied, not translated."}]},{"i":59,"ref":"p59","source":"Si quis enim dicat; Alexander Helenam rapuit, et hoc aliquis neget dicens: Alexander Helenam non rapuit,quoniam Alexander aequivocum nomen est, potest utrumque esse verum, et negatio, si de Alexandra Magno loqualur,etalfirmatio,si de Alexandro Trojano proponat.Quare non sunt. hae oppositæ. Hlasautem esse dicitoppositas,quæcunque ejusdem praedicati habentoppositionem de eodem subjecto,ut ibi nulla aequivocatio diversitatis causa sit; hoc euim est quod ait: Dico autem opponi ejusdem de eodem. Non autem æquivoce,ut ejusdem praedicati sit oppositio in negatione, qui fuit in affirmatione, et de eo subjecto fiat negatio,de quo ante facta et affirmatio. Sed diligentius bæc in libro quem inscribit edisserit; illic enim sophistarum, quos fallaces argumentatores Latine possumus dicere, qui per hujusmodipropositiones quae verum inter se falsumque non dividunt, mendaces colligunt syllogismos, argumenta distinxit, quibus capere respondentem atque innectere consueverunt. Ergo nunc hoc dicit etiam illa esse observanda quae contraargumentorumimportunitatem determinata sunt. Quae vero sint illa, dicenda a me secundae editionis textus exspectet.","english":"For if someone says, \"Alexander ravished Helen,\" and someone else denies this, saying, \"Alexander did not ravish Helen,\" since \"Alexander\" is an equivocal name, both can be true—the negation if he is speaking of Alexander the Great, and the affirmation if he is proposing it of Alexander the Trojan. Wherefore these are not opposed. But those things should be called opposed, whatever have the opposition of the same predicate concerning the same subject, so that there no equivocation is the cause of difference. For this is what he says: \"I say that they are opposed, of the same concerning the same; not, however, equivocally,\" so that the opposition of the same predicate may be in the negation which was in the affirmation, and the negation may be made concerning that subject concerning which the affirmation was also made before. But he discusses these things more diligently in the book which he entitles the Sophistical Refutations; for there he distinguished the arguments of the sophists—whom we may call in Latin \"deceitful arguers\"—who through propositions of this kind, which do not divide truth from falsehood among themselves, gather lying syllogisms, by which they are accustomed to trap and entangle the respondent. Therefore he now says that even those things are to be observed which have been determined against the importunity of counter-arguments. But what those things are, let him expect from me to be said in the text of the second edition.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":60,"ref":"p60","source":"Quoniam autemsunt hæc quidem rerumuniversalia, illa uero singularia. Dico autem universale, quod de pluribus natum est prædicari,singulare vero quod non, ut,homo quidem universale est,Plato vero eorumquæ singularia sunt.\n\nOmnis propositio quemadmodum fiat ostendit.Secundum enim res quae significantur, propositionis natura perficitur.Rerum autem alia sunt universalia, alia particularia. Universale est quod de pluribus prædicatur,ut homo de pluribus dicitur, et est univeraalia. Singulare vero est, ut quaelibet res iodivi. dua, cujus nulla praedicatio ad sibimet subjecta perveniat, ut Plato vel Socrates; horum autem naturam docet exemplis, ait enim: Ut bomo quidem un iversale, Plato vero eorum quæ sunt singularia. Nam si hoc est universale quod de pluribus prædicatur, homo universale est, de pluribus enim individuis dicitur. Quod si hoc rursus est singulare, quod de nullo alio prædicantur,Plato singulare est.Individua namque de nullis aliis prædicantur. Quoniam ergo sunt quaedam rerum universalia,alia vero singularia,manifestum est quoniam omnis affirmatio aut negatio per haec constituitur.","english":"Since some of these things are universal and others singular. I call universal that which is naturally predicated of many things, and singular that which is not, as \"man\" is indeed universal, but \"Plato\" is among things that are singular.\n\nHe shows how every proposition comes to be. For the nature of a proposition is completed according to the things that are signified. Now of things, some are universal and others particular. Universal is that which is predicated of many, as \"man\" is said of many, and these are universals. But singular is, as any one individual thing, whose predication reaches to no things subject to it, as Plato or Socrates; he teaches the nature of these by examples, for he says: as \"man\" is indeed universal, but \"Plato\" is among things that are singular. For if that is universal which is predicated of many, \"man\" is universal, for it is said of many individuals. But if again that is singular which is predicated of no other, \"Plato\" is singular. For individuals are predicated of no other things. Since, therefore, some things are universal and others singular, it is manifest that every affirmation or negation is constituted through these.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":61,"ref":"p61","source":"Necesse est autem enuntiare quoniam inest aliquid, aut non.Aliquoties quidemeorum alicuiquæ universalia sunt,aliquoties autem alicui eorum quæ sunt singularia.\n\nOmnis namque propositio, aut sinnulare habet, aut universale subjectum, sive affirmatione annuat, sive abnuat negatione. Si quis enim dicat, Homo animal est, Homo animal non est, universalem rem, id est hominem, animal aut esse aut non esse proposuit. Atque hoc est quod ait, Necesse est autem enuntiare quod inest aIiquid,aut non,aliquoties quidem eorum alicui quae sunt universalia. Homo enim cum sit universale animal illi inesse affirmatio proposuit. Quae dixit, Homo animal est, et non inesse negatio quae ait, Homo animal non est. Si vero aliquis SiD dicat: Socrates disputat, Socrates non disputat, alicui eorum quae sunt singularia esse et non esse conjunxit. Et boc est quodait: AHquotiesautem eorum quae sunt singularia. Nam cum Socrates singulare quiddam sit,disputatio ei ab affirmationejuncta est, sed a negatione sejuncta.","english":"It is necessary, however, to state that something is present or is not. Sometimes indeed [we speak] of some one of the things that are universal, sometimes of some one of the things that are singular.\n\nFor every proposition has either a singular or a universal subject, whether it assents by affirmation or denies by negation. For if anyone says, \"Man is an animal,\" \"Man is not an animal,\" he has proposed that a universal thing, that is, man, either is or is not an animal. And this is what he says: \"It is necessary, however, to state that something is present or is not, sometimes indeed of some one of the things that are universal.\" For since man is a universal, the affirmation has proposed that an animal is present to him—the one that said, \"Man is an animal\"—and the negation that it is not present—the one that said, \"Man is not an animal.\" But if someone says, \"Socrates disputes,\" \"Socrates does not dispute,\" he has joined being and not being to some one of the things that are singular. And this is what he says: \"sometimes of the things that are singular.\" For since Socrates is something singular, disputing has been joined to him by affirmation, but separated from him by negation.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":62,"ref":"p62","source":"Si ergo universaliter enuntiet de universali, quoniam est,aut non., erunt hæ contrariæ enuntiationes. Dico autem de universali enuntiationem universalem, ut omnis homoalbusest,nullus homo albus est. Quando autem de Itniversalibus, non universaliter, non sunt hæ contrariæ, quæ autem significantur est esse aliquando oontraria.\n\nOmnis affirmatioomnisquenegatio aut universalis est, aut particularis, aut indefinita. Universalis est. affirmatio, ut si quis dicat, Omnis homo animal est. Cum sit enim universale subjectum homo(de multis enim pra'dicari aliis poteat), universaliter praedicatum esl.Diximus enim,Omnis homo est animal. Nec solum hominem,quod est universale,posuimus, sed etiam omne universale, id est omne adjecimus universali, id est homini, et hæc est affirmatio universalis; sin vero dicat aliquis,Nullus homo animal est, rursus homini, universali rei determinationem universalem,id quod dicitur nullus,adjecit.Siveergo in affirmatione, sive in negatione, si eas universatiter aliquis proferat, universale universali proponit.","english":"If, then, one enunciates universally concerning a universal, that it is or is not, these enunciations will be contrary. I call an enunciation universal concerning a universal, for example, \"Every man is white,\" \"No man is white.\" But when [one speaks] concerning universals not universally, these are not contrary; yet the things that are signified are sometimes contrary.\n\nEvery affirmation and every negation is either universal, or particular, or indefinite. It is a universal affirmation, for example, if someone says, \"Every man is an animal.\" For since the subject \"man\" is universal (for it can be predicated of many other things), the predicate is [stated] universally. For we have said, \"Every man is an animal.\" Nor have we posited only \"man,\" which is a universal, but we have also added \"every\" to the universal, that is, to \"man,\" and this is a universal affirmation. But if someone says, \"No man is an animal,\" again to \"man,\" a universal thing, he has added a universal determination, namely what is said [by] \"no one.\" Whether, therefore, in affirmation or in negation, if someone utters them universally, he proposes a universal of a universal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":63,"ref":"p63","source":"Non proponit autem universale universali quoties ita dicit: Homo animal est,homo animal non est.Cum enim homo sit res universaIis,nulla adjectio univerHaiitatis, quæ est nullus, aut omnis, affirmationem vel negationem fecit.Quocirca repetendum est,affirmatio universalis est,in qua universale universaliter praedicatur affirmative.Et negatio universalis,in qua rursusuniversale universaliter prædicatur negative. Et hae bujusmodi contrariæ sunt. Fieri enim non potest ut ubi vera affirmatio universalis,illic universalis negatio vera sit, et econtrario, fieri tamen potest ut utraeque falsæinveniri possint,utOmnis homo justus est,nullus homo justus est; hic enim utraeque sunt falsæ,sed una quidem vera,aItera. falsa reperitur,utin eo quod est,Omnis homo animal esl,nullus homo animal est. Hic una vera est, altera falsa, ut vero utraeque verae sint, fieri non potest, quocirca quoniam utræque falsæ inveniuntur, oppositæ non sunt, sed sunt contrariæ. Cur autem contrariae dicantur, alio loco nobis erit dicendum. Particulares vero propositi ones sunt hujusmodi, Quidam homo animal est, quidam bomo animal non est; hae dicuntur Bubalternæ,affirmatio enim particularis,sub af. firmatione universali, subalterna est.Rursus eodem modo particularis negatio,sub universali negatione, subalterna est.","english":"But he does not set forth a universal concerning a universal whenever he speaks thus: \"Man is an animal,\" \"Man is not an animal.\" For since man is a universal thing, no addition of universality—which is \"no\" or \"every\"—has made the affirmation or the negation. Wherefore it must be repeated: a universal affirmation is one in which a universal is predicated universally and affirmatively. And a universal negation is one in which again a universal is predicated universally and negatively. And these of this kind are contraries. For it cannot happen that where the universal affirmation is true, the universal negation is true there, and conversely; yet it can happen that both are found to be false, as \"Every man is just,\" \"No man is just\"; for here both are false. But one is found true and the other false, as in \"Every man is an animal,\" \"No man is an animal.\" Here one is true, the other false. But that both should be true cannot happen. Wherefore, since both are found to be false, they are not opposites but are contraries. But why they are called contraries, we shall have to say in another place. Particular propositions, however, are of this kind: \"Some man is an animal,\" \"Some man is not an animal\"; these are called subaltern. For a particular affirmation is subaltern under a universal affirmation. Again, in the same way, a particular negation is subaltern under a universal negation.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":64,"ref":"p64","source":"Sed hae utræque verae sint aut una vera, alia falsa fieri potest, ut utræque falsae sint, non potest inveniri, ut in eo quod est, Quidam homo justus est,quidam homo justus non est,utræque sunt veræ. Cum vero dicimus, Quidam homo animal est, quidam homo animal non est, una vera est, altera falsa, et dicuntur affirmatio et negatio particulares, subcontrariæ. Quarenec istae etiam vocantur oppositæ, idcirco quia utraeque veræ inveniuntur interdum; sit autem barum talis descriptio: Ergoneque superiores universales, nequc inferiores. particulares opposita? sunt, idcirco quod inferiores quidem utraeque vera?, superiores autem utraeque falsæ eese possunt. Sunt autem oppositæ contradictoriæ(ul ipsæ ait)si quis aspiciat angulares,ut affirmationem universalem particulari comparet negationi, ut est Omnis homojustus est,quidam homojustus non est;hæ enim neque verae possunt inveniri, neque falsæ,sed in omnibus una vera est,altera falsa. Et rursus si universalis negatio particulari affirmationi,comparclur,reperiuntur oppositae: ut est, Nullus homo justus est, quidam homo justus est. Semper enim una vera est, altera falsa. Et hoc in quibuslibet terminis si despexeris,oratio nostra non dtscrepabit. Sit autem plenissima hoc modo descripto. Affirmatio universalis Negatio universali Sunt.ergo determinationes,universlium quidem omnis et nullus, particularium vero, quidam.","english":"But both of these can be true, or one true and the other false; yet it cannot be found that both are false, as in the case of \"Some man is just, some man is not just,\" where both are true. But when we say \"Some man is an animal, some man is not an animal,\" one is true and the other false, and they are called particular affirmation and negation, subcontraries. Wherefore these too are not called opposites, for the reason that both are sometimes found to be true. But let there be this description of them: Are, then, neither the superior universals nor the inferior particulars opposites? They are, for the reason that the inferior particulars can both be true, while the superior universals can both be false. But those are contradictory opposites (as he himself says) if one looks at the diagonal corners, comparing the universal affirmation with the particular negation, as in \"Every man is just, some man is not just\"; for these can neither be found both true nor both false, but in all cases one is true and the other false. And again, if the universal negation is compared with the particular affirmation, they are found to be opposites, as in \"No man is just, some man is just.\" For always one is true and the other false. And if you examine this in any terms whatsoever, our account will not disagree. But let the fullest description be in this way: universal affirmation, universal negation. These, then, are the determinations: of universals, \"every\" and \"no one\"; of particulars, \"some.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":65,"ref":"p65","source":"IlIæ autem propositiones quae neque universale habent additum,neque particulare, indefinitæ vocantur, et particularibus similes sunt,ut est,Homojustus est, homo justus non est. Possunt enim utra'que esse veræ,ut in hoc ipso exemploquod dicimus,et potest una esse vera, altera falsa, ut, Homo animal est, bomo animal non est, utraeque vero ut falsae sunt, non potest inveniri,et hae (ut dictum est) vocantur indefinitae. Praeter bas autem omnes singulares sunt, in quibus contradictio potest inveniri, ut in eo quod est, Socrates animal est, Socrat-es animal non est,Socrates justus est, Socrates Justus non est.Nam si nulla eas aequivocatio vel prædicati,vel subjecti, vel alterius temporis,vel aliquid eorum quae singulas determinant,impediat,semperunavera est,altera falsa.Quare,quoniam de omnibus in commune speculati sumus,et quid quaeque esset, quantum brevitas patiebatur,expressimus;arj textum nunc,quoniam tempus est,revertamur.","english":"But those propositions which have neither a universal nor a particular term added are called indefinite, and they are similar to particular propositions, as for example \"A man is just,\" \"A man is not just.\" For both of these can be true, as in this very example that we give, and one can be true and the other false, as \"A man is an animal,\" \"A man is not an animal\"; but that both be true or both be false cannot be found, and these (as has been said) are called indefinite. But besides these, all are singular in which a contradiction can be found, as in \"Socrates is an animal,\" \"Socrates is not an animal,\" \"Socrates is just,\" \"Socrates is not just.\" For if no equivocation either of the predicate or of the subject, or of another time, or of any of the things that determine singular propositions, hinders it, one is always true and the other false. Wherefore, since we have examined all these in common, and have expressed what each one is, as far as brevity allowed, let us now return to the text, since it is time.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":66,"ref":"p66","source":"Si ergG, inquit, universaliter enuntiet in universali, quoniam est, aut non, erunt contrariae enuntiationes, universaliter enim enuntiat aliquis in universali,quoties universalem affirmationem,aut universalem fecerit negationem.Cumenim dicit,Omnis homo animal est,universalem hominem universaliter enuntiavit per id quod addiditomnis;quod si rursus dicat,nullushomo animal est,eodem modo universalem hominem universaHter enuntiat per id quod ait,Nullus, et sunt contrariæ.","english":"If, then, he says, one enunciates universally in a universal [term], that it is or is not, the enunciations will be contraries. For someone enunciates universally in a universal whenever he makes either a universal affirmation or a universal negation. For when he says \"Every man is an animal,\" he has enunciated \"man\" universally and in a universal way through the addition of \"every\"; and if again he says \"No man is an animal,\" in the same way he enunciates \"man\" universally and in a universal way through what he says, \"No one,\" and these are contraries.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":67,"ref":"p67","source":"Quas autem dicatesse contrarias,subjecto declaratexemp]o.Dico autem in universali enuntiationem universalem,ut,Omnis homo albus est,nullus homo albus est;una quidem est affirmatio universalis,altera negatio universalis, quas contrarias esse supra in descriptione docuimus-Quando autem in universalibus non universaliter,non suntcontrariæ.Quoties autem,inquit,indennitæ sunt propositio nes,et universalitpr universale non proponitur,contrariae non sunt,ea enim affirmatio quae dicit,homo justus est,et quæ dicit,homojustus non est,contraria non est.Possunt enim utræque simul esse veræ, et in eodem,id est homine, quod in contrariis fieri impossibile est.Quodvero addidit,quæ autem significantur est esse contraria,tale est:ipsæ quidem propositiones contrariae non sunt, significant tamen aliquando contraria.Si quis enim dicat,bomo albus est,et alius neget,homo albus non est,ipsæ quidem contrariæ non sunt.Quod autem dicilur,homo albus non est,potest quiddam significare contrarium.Nam designat hoc quod dicitur, homo albus non est, et rubri colora esse et pallidi,et fusci,designat etiam nig:i,quod estalbo contrarium.Potest igiturid quod non est album esse nigrum.","english":"But which ones he calls contraries, he makes clear by an example. I say that an enunciation is universal in a universal [term], as: Every man is white; no man is white. One indeed is a universal affirmation, the other a universal negation, which we have shown above in the description to be contraries. But when [the terms] are in universals not universally, they are not contraries. Whenever, he says, the propositions are indefinite, and a universal is not predicated universally, they are not contraries. For the affirmation which says \"man is just\" and the one which says \"man is not just\" are not contraries. For both can be true at the same time, and in the same [subject], that is, in man, which in contraries is impossible to happen. But what he adds, \"but the things signified are contraries,\" is such: the propositions themselves are not contraries, yet they sometimes signify contraries. For if someone says \"man is white\" and another denies \"man is not white,\" these themselves are not contraries. But what is said, \"man is not white,\" can signify something contrary. For what is said, \"man is not white,\" designates both that he is of a red color and of a pale one, and of a dark one; it designates also black, which is contrary to white. Therefore what is not white can be black.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":68,"ref":"p68","source":"Ergo quanquam ipsae contrariæ non sunt, tamen potest aliquando quod dixit contrarium significare, priori affirmationi, ut in eo quod diximus.Nam si id quod dicitur,non est homo a]bus,nigrum esse designet, quoniam is ui niger est albus non est,contrariæ quidem propoaitiones non sunt,quoniam possunt esse utraeque veræ.Quæ autem significantur,interdum contraria reperiuntur:quæ autem sint hujusmodi propositiones exemplorum subjectione monstravit.\n\nDico autem non universaliter enunliare de his quæ sunt universalia,utest albus homo,non est albus homo.\n\nEt quod dicat esse universale, non universaliter prædicare,planissime demonstravit dicens:\n\nCum enim universale sit homo, non universaliter utitur enunliatione.Omnis namque non universale significat, sed quoniam univeTsallter.\n\nNam id quod dicitur omnis,illud ad quod prædicatur colligit,atque in unum corpus adducit,ut cum dicitur,omnis homoustus est, nullum excipit horninem.Sed totam colligit humanitalem,et fit de re universali,homine, prædicatio universali8,cum dicimus,omnis homo.:Vam cum sit universale homo, huic universali universalitatem consignificat; id quod additur omnis,et res universalis universaliter prædicatur.","english":"Therefore, although they are not themselves contraries, nevertheless what he said can sometimes signify a contrary to the earlier affirmation, as in the case we mentioned. For if what is said—not man is white—designates being black, since he who is black is not white, they are indeed not contrary propositions, because both can be true. But the things signified are sometimes found to be contraries; and he showed by the addition of examples what sort of propositions these are.\n\nBut I say that one does not enunciate universally about the things that are universal, as: white man, not white man.\n\nAnd that he says \"to be universal\" means not to predicate universally, he demonstrated most plainly, saying:\n\nFor although man is universal, he does not use the enunciation universally. For \"every\" does not signify something universal, but [signifies] that [it is said] universally.\n\nFor what is said [by] \"every\" gathers together that to which it is predicated and brings it into one body, as when it is said, \"Every man is a being,\" it excepts no man. But it gathers the whole of humanity, and the predication of a universal thing, man, becomes universal when we say \"every man.\" For since man is universal, [the word] \"every\" signifies universality together with this universal; and what is added—\"every\"—means that the universal thing is predicated universally.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":69,"ref":"p69","source":"In eo vero quod universale prædicatur, id quod est universaliter prædicare,non est verum.\n\nHac nos sententia quem ad locum universalitatis determinationem recte ponamus,instituit. Docetenim semper istam universalilatem,quam determinatiotemuniversalemvocamus, ad subjectum poni debere terminum, nunquam ad prædicatum.Si quis enim sic dicat, omnis homo animal est, recte dixerit, omnis ad subjectum, id est ad hominem ponens. Quod si sic dicat, omnis homo omne animal est, falsum dixeritErgo hoc non dicit, in eo vero quod universale prædicatur, ut animal de homme. Ani. mal enim universale est. De omni homine prædicatur,non est verum,hoc ipsum universale, quod est animal,universaliter prædicare,utdicatur,omne animal esse hominem,nec solum in his,sed in nulla recte fieri affirmatione concedit; ait enim:\n\nNulla enim affirmatio vera erit, in qua universale prædicatum universaliter prædicatur,ut omnis homo est omne animal.","english":"But in the case where a universal is predicated, to predicate it universally is not true.\n\nBy this sentence he instructs us where we may rightly place the determination of universality. For he teaches that this universality—which we call universal determination—must always be placed on the subject term, never on the predicate. For if someone says, \"Every man is an animal,\" he has spoken correctly, placing \"every\" on the subject, that is, on \"man.\" But if he says, \"Every man is every animal,\" he has spoken falsely. Therefore he does not say this—that in the case where a universal is predicated, as \"animal\" of \"man.\" For \"animal\" is a universal. It is predicated of every man, but it is not true to predicate this very universal, which is \"animal,\" universally, so that it is said that every animal is a man; and he grants that this happens rightly not only in these cases but in no affirmation at all. For he says:\n\nFor no affirmation will be true in which a universal predicate is predicated universally, as \"every man is every animal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":70,"ref":"p70","source":"Hoc autem cur eveniat, paucis absolvam. Prædicatum semper majus est subjecto vel æquum, majus:ut cum dico,bomo animal pst,animal prædicatur,bomo subjicitur. Sed majus est animal homine. De pluribus enim quam ipse homo prædicatur. Rursus aequale est,cum sic dicimus,bomo risibilis est,homo subjectum est, risibile praedicitum. Sed homo atque risibile aequalia sunt, proprium namque est bominis,quod est risibile, ut autem minus praedicatum inveniatur, quam subjectum Heri non polest. Sive ergo majus sit prædicatum, falsum est universale adjicere praedicato, ut in eo quod ipso posuit exemplo,Omnis bomo omne animal est,sive aequale git,superfluum est.ut si quis sic dicat, omnis homo,omne risibile est,quare universale prædicatum praedicare umversaliter non oportet.\n\nOpponi itaque dico affirmationem negationi contra- I dictorie,quæ universaliter significat ei qua? non univerJaliter, ut omnis homo albus est, non omnis homo albus est,nullus homo albus est, quidam homo albus est.","english":"But why this happens, I will set out briefly. The predicate is always greater than the subject or equal to it. Greater, as when I say \"man is an animal\": animal is predicated, man is the subject. But animal is greater than man; for it is predicated of more things than man himself. Again, it is equal when we speak thus: \"man is capable of laughter\": man is the subject, capable of laughter is the predicate. But man and capable of laughter are equal, for it is a property of man to be capable of laughter. But that the predicate be found less than the subject cannot happen. Whether, then, the predicate is greater, it is false to add \"universally\" to the predicate, as in the example he himself gave: \"every man is every animal\"; or whether it is equal, it is superfluous, as if someone were to say thus: \"every man is every thing capable of laughter.\" Wherefore a universal predicate ought not to be predicated universally.\n\nI say, therefore, that the affirmation is opposed contradictorily to the negation—the one that signifies universally to the one that does not signify universally—as \"every man is white,\" \"not every man is white,\" \"no man is white,\" \"a certain man is white.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":71,"ref":"p71","source":"Quid sit proprie contradictio consequenter eaponit:aitenimopponi contradictorie propositiones,quolies universalem affirmationem particularis abnuit negatio,et quoties universalem negationem parlicu. laris affirmatio destruxerit.Cum enim dicitur,omnis homo albus eSl,de eodem homine universaliter tollit quod universaliter affrmatioconstituerat.Illaenim omnem hominem esse album ponit. lata dicit non omnelu,tanquam si concedat aliquem,sed ei tantum auferat universalitatem.Hoc est enim quod ait,quæ universale significat eidem quoniam non universaliter. Nam sicut universale significataffirmatio dicens hominem,ita quoque negatio universale significat, habet enim et ipsa hominem.Sed idem ipsum uni versale docet non esse universaliter,id est non omne esse album,quod affirmatio universalileresse posuerat,omnem hominem esse album proponens.Rodem modo etiam in negatione,quas nos supra angulares posuimus, et contradictorias in descriptione. Hic nunc easdem oppositas contradictorie vocat. Quod autem universali affirmationi,quæ est,omnis homo albus est, particularem negationem opposuit, quae cst,non omnis homo albus esl,tantumdem est tanquam sidiceret,quidam homo albus non est.Nam si non omnis homo albus est,et quidam bomo albus non est.","english":"He next sets out what contradiction properly is: for he says that propositions are opposed contradictorily whenever a particular negation denies a universal affirmation, and whenever a particular affirmation destroys a universal negation. For when it is said, \"every man is white,\" it removes universally from the same man what the universal affirmation had established. For that affirmation posits that every man is white. But the other says \"not every,\" as if it were to concede that some one is, but only to remove universality from it. For this is what he says: the proposition that signifies universally is the same, because it does not signify universally. For just as the affirmation that signifies universally by saying \"man,\" so too the negation signifies universally, for it also has \"man.\" But it teaches that the same universal is not universally, that is, that not every man is white, which the affirmation had posited to be universally, proposing that every man is white. In the same way also in negation, which we placed above as the angular ones, and as contradictory in the description. Here now he calls these same ones opposed contradictorily. But that he opposed to the universal affirmation, which is \"every man is white,\" the particular negation, which is \"not every man is white,\" is just as if he were to say \"a certain man is not white.\" For if not every man is white, also a certain man is not white.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":72,"ref":"p72","source":"Contrarie velo uniuersalem atfirmationem et universalem negationem,ut,omnis homo justus est. Quocirca has quidem impossibile est simul esse veras.His vero oppositas,contingit aliquando in eodem, ut, non omnis homo albus eat,et, quidam homo albus est.\n\nPlenissime omnes exsequitur dicitque contrarias universalem affirmationem,et universalem negationem.Has enim nos quoque supra descripsimus.Нic vero nunc easdem contrarie demonstrat opponi. IIlud quoque addidit;quod eas impossibile sit in eodem veras aliquando cognosci. Nam sicut contrariorum natura in eodem non potest inveniri,neque enim uno eodemque tempore aliquid nigrum est atque album,sic quoque neo contrarie, ut utraeque simul sint verae fieri potest. Quod autem adjecit, his vero oppositas, contingit aliquando in eodem, particularem affirmationem et particularem negationem designat. Particularis namque affirmatio universali negationi opposita est contradictorie, particularis vero negatio universali affirmationi. Contrariarum igitur oppositae possunt in eodem verae aliquoties inveniri,id est particularis affirma. tio et particularis negatio, verae ut sint aliquoties fieri potest,ut est,quidam homo albus est, quidam homo albus non est, ulræque sunt veræ.","english":"He sets out contraries: a universal affirmation and a universal negation, as \"every man is just.\" Hence it is impossible for these to be true at the same time. But the propositions opposed to these can sometimes be true of the same thing, as \"not every man is white\" and \"some man is white.\"\n\nHe treats all these points most fully and says that the contraries are the universal affirmation and the universal negation. For we too have described these above. But here he now shows that these same propositions are opposed as contraries. He also adds that it is impossible for them ever to be found true of the same thing. For just as the nature of contraries cannot be found in the same thing—for something cannot be black and white at one and the same time—so too it cannot happen that contraries are both true at the same time. But when he adds \"the propositions opposed to these can sometimes be true of the same thing,\" he designates the particular affirmation and the particular negation. For the particular affirmation is opposed contradictorily to the universal negation, and the particular negation to the universal affirmation. Therefore the propositions opposed to the contraries can sometimes be found true of the same thing—that is, the particular affirmation and the particular negation can sometimes be true, as \"some man is white\" and \"some man is not white\" are both true.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":73,"ref":"p73","source":".DE REGULIS OPPOSITORUM.\n\nQuæcunque igitur contradictiones universalium sum universaliter,necesse est alteram esse veram vel jalsam.Et quæcunque in singularibus sunt,ut Socrates albus est,non est Socrates albus.\n\nDe contradictorie oppositis Joquitur,et de aingularibus proposilionibus,quod unam semper veram, falsam semper alteram necesse est inveniri. Hoc enim dicit contradictiones eorum,q uæ sunt universalium universaliter prædicatorum,una semper vera est,altera falsa. Universalium autem universaliter prædicatorum sunt contradictiones universalium particulariter praedicatorum. Nam affirmatio universalis,vel negatio universalis, universaliter prædicantur, harum contradictoriæ particulares affirmationes vel negationes sunt, sihi angulariter comparentur. Harum igitur contradictionum, quas sunt universalium universaliter prædicatoru rn,una semper vera est,semper altera falsa reperitur. In singularibus quoque idem est.Nam si nulla,ut dictum est,varielas aequivocationis impediat,idemque siL prædicaturu,idemque subjectum,ad unum idemque tempus,ad unam eamdemque partem,ad unum idomque relatum,uno atque eodem. modo,una semper vera est,aItpra falsa, et veritatis inter se naturam et mendacii partiuntur.","english":"ON THE RULES OF OPPOSITES.\n\nTherefore, whatever contradictions there are of universals predicated universally, one of them must be true and the other false. And whatever contradictions there are in singulars, as \"Socrates is white,\" \"Socrates is not white.\"\n\nHe speaks of contradictory opposites, and of singular propositions, that one must always be found true and the other always false. For he says that of the contradictions of those things which are predicated universally of universals, one is always true and the other false. But the contradictions of universals predicated universally are those of universals predicated particularly. For a universal affirmation or a universal negation is predicated universally; the contradictories of these are particular affirmations or negations, if they are compared singularly. Therefore of these contradictions, which are of universals predicated universally, one is always true and the other is always found false. The same holds also in singulars. For if, as has been said, no variety of equivocation hinders it, and the same thing is predicated, and the same subject, at one and the same time, in one and the same respect, in relation to one and the same thing, in one and the same way, one is always true and the other false, and they share between themselves the nature of truth and of falsehood.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":74,"ref":"p74","source":"Quæcunque autem universalium non universaliter, non semper hæc quidem tera est,illa vero falsa.\n\nQuae vero sunt, inquit, definitæ, ut neque universalem habeant, neque particularem determinationem, quod tacuit, non semper una vera est, altera falsa, sed utraeque interdum inveniuntur veræ. In universalibus autem non universaliter praedicatur aliquid hoc modo. Homo albusest, homo albus non est, in quo uno eodemque tempore utrasque veras esse contingit. Hic enim cum universale sit homo, non universaliter praedicatum est nomen. At vero nec particulariter. Neque enim quidam,aut nulIus,aut omnisadjectum est. Docet autem hujusmodi propositiones non inter se dividere veritatem atque mendacium, hoc modo:\n\nSimul enim verum est dicere quoniam est homo albus, et non est homo albus; et quoniam est homo pulcher. et non est homo pulcher. Si enim fædus, etnon pulchen: et si fil aliquid, nondum eat.","english":"But whatever contradictions there are of universals not predicated universally, these are not always one true and the other false.\n\nBut those which are, he says, indefinite, so that they have neither a universal nor a particular determination—which he passed over in silence—are not always one true and the other false, but sometimes both are found to be true. In universals, however, something is predicated not universally in this way: \"Man is white,\" \"Man is not white,\" in which it happens that both are true at one and the same time. For here, although \"man\" is universal, the name has not been predicated universally. But neither has it been predicated particularly. For neither \"a certain one\" nor \"no one\" nor \"every one\" has been added. He teaches, moreover, that propositions of this kind do not divide truth and falsehood between themselves, in this way:\n\nFor at the same time it is true to say that man is white and that man is not white; and that man is beautiful and that man is not beautiful. For if he is ugly, he is also not beautiful; and if he is something, he is not yet [nothing].","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":75,"ref":"p75","source":"Documentum autem est-hujusmodi dictum,indefinitam affirmationem negationemque veras utrasque posse inveniri; verum enim dicere est, est homo al bus, et non est homo albus, hujus autem rei probatio est: nam si verum est dicere, est homo niger, et est homo albu8,uno eodemque tempore; qui autem niger est, albus non est, verum est dicere uno eodemque tempore quoniam est homo albus,et non est homo albus.Rursus si verum est dicerequoniam est homo pulcher,et est homo faedus uno eodemque tempore, qui autem fædus est,pulcbernon est, verum est dicere hominem essepulchrum et bominem esse fædum, uno eodemque tempore. Cum enim Achilles esset pulcher,claudusThersites eratfædus. Rursus si verum est dicere esse hominem album,et rursus uno eodemque tempore fieri hominem album, nec hoc ulla contrarietas vetat ut sit homo albus, et rursus fiat homo albus, sed qui fit albus nondum albus est, verum est igitur dicere quoniam est homo albus,et non est homo albus.Hoc est enim quod ait, et si fit aliquid,et non est: cum enim fit, non est, sed potest dici quoniam est homo albus,el fit homo albus, ut utrumque vere dicatur. Potest igitur vere utrumque dici, Etest homo albus, et non est homo albus.","english":"But a proof of this is a statement of this sort: that an indefinite affirmation and negation can both be found to be true. For it is true to say \"a man is white\" and \"a man is not white.\" And the proof of this matter is: for if it is true to say \"a man is black\" and \"a man is white\" at one and the same time—yet he who is black is not white—then it is true to say at one and the same time that a man is white and that a man is not white. Again, if it is true to say that a man is beautiful and that a man is ugly at one and the same time—yet he who is ugly is not beautiful—then it is true to say that a man is beautiful and that a man is ugly at one and the same time. For when Achilles was beautiful, Thersites the lame was ugly. Again, if it is true to say that a man is white, and again at one and the same time that a man is becoming white—nor does any contrariety prevent this, that a man is white and again becomes white, but he who is becoming white is not yet white—therefore it is true to say that a man is white and that a man is not white. For this is what he says: even if something is coming to be, it also is not; for while it is coming to be, it is not, yet it can be said that a man is white and is becoming white, so that each is truly said. Therefore each can truly be said: \"a man is white\" and \"a man is not white.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":76,"ref":"p76","source":"Videbitur autem subito inconveniens esse. Mcirco quoniam videtur significare, non est homo albus, simul eliam quoniam nemo homo albus. Hoc autem neque idem significat, neque simul neeessario.\n\nTacita? hominum dubitationi respondet.Quod enim dicimus, est albus homo, et non est albus homo, utrumque vero esse videtur, sed aliquoties inconveniens esse. Si enim verum est dicere, est albus homo,quemadmodum fieri potest utverum sit dicere, non est albus homo. Hoc autem videtur quibusdam inconveniens,idcirco quoniam apparetquibusdamid quod dicimus, non est bomo albus, hoc significare, tanquam si dicamus,nullus homo albus est, sed boc verum non est. Neque enim idem est dicere,non est albus homo,et nullus homo albus est. Et quanquam cum dicimus,nullus homo albus est,simul significamus quoniam non est homo albus, non tarr,en ex necessitate idem utraque significat.Cum enim dicimus,non est homoalbus, simul nondicere,quoniam nullus homo albus est, non oportet intelligi, neque enim semper simul est,non est homo albuB,et nullus homo albus est. Nam aliquoties simul est, scilicet cum prius dicitur universalis negatio. Cum vero indefinita dicitur prius,non est simul negatio univcrsalisconjuncta negationi indefinitæ. Nam si dicam, nullus borno albus est, simul dixi, quoniam homo albus non est.","english":"But this will seem suddenly inconvenient. Therefore, because it seems to signify \"a man is not white,\" and at the same time also \"no man is white.\" But this signifies neither the same thing nor necessarily at the same time.\n\nHe responds to the silent doubt of people. For what we say, \"a man is white,\" and \"a man is not white,\" both seem to be true, but sometimes it seems inconvenient. For if it is true to say \"a man is white,\" how can it be possible that it is true to say \"a man is not white\"? But this seems inconvenient to some, for this reason: because it appears to some that what we say, \"a man is not white,\" signifies this, as if we were to say \"no man is white,\" but this is not true. For it is not the same to say \"a man is not white\" and \"no man is white.\" And although when we say \"no man is white,\" we at the same time signify that a man is not white, nevertheless both do not signify the same thing by necessity. For when we say \"a man is not white,\" we do not at the same time say that no man is white, nor is it necessary to understand this; for \"a man is not white\" and \"no man is white\" are not always at the same time. For sometimes they are at the same time, namely when the universal negation is stated first. But when the indefinite is stated first, the universal negation is not at the same time conjoined with the indefinite negation. For if I say \"no man is white,\" I have at the same time said that a man is not white.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":77,"ref":"p77","source":"Quod si dicam, homo albus non est, non est simul dicta negatio universalis, quae est, nullus bomo albus est, quoniam potest quidam esee non albus de quo dicatur,homo albus non est,neque tamenomnesesse nonaibi. Non igitursimulnecessario sunt, non est homo albus, et nullus homo albus est.\n\nManifestum est autem 1uoniam una negatio unius affirmationis est, idem enim oportetnegarenegalionem, quod affirmauit affirmalio, et de eodem, vel de aliquo singularium, uel de aliquo universalium, vel universaliter, vel non universaliter.\n\nBoc quoque argumentum et negationem indefinitam et universalem idem non significare, et eas a se esse diversas. Nam si unius affrmationis una negatio est, contra eam quae dicit, Ban est homo albus, illa est aftirmatio quae dicit, est homo albus. Et conLraeam quae dicit,nuIlus homo albus est, illa est affirmatio quae dicit,quidam homo albus sed hae aflirmationes diversae sunt,id est, est homo albus,et quidam homo albus est; diversae igitur illae quoque sunt quae his proportionaliter opponuntur. Diversa igitur est negatio quae dicit, nullus homo albus est, et ea quae dicil,non est homo albus.Docet autem nos uniusaffirmationis unam esse negationem,idquehac ratione demonstrat: Oportetenim praedicatum negare negationem, quod prædicaverit affirmatio, et rursus de eodem subjecto auferre praedicatum negationem oportet id quod affirmatio ante conjunxerat.","english":"But if I say, \"a white man is not,\" the universal negation \"no white man is\" is not thereby stated at the same time, since it can be that some one is not white, of whom it is said \"a white man is not,\" and yet not all are not white. Therefore \"a man is not white\" and \"no man is white\" are not necessarily simultaneous.\n\nBut it is manifest that there is one negation of one affirmation; for the negation must deny the same thing that the affirmation affirmed, and concerning the same subject, whether of some one of the singulars or of some one of the universals, and either universally or not universally.\n\nThis argument also shows that the indefinite and the universal negation do not signify the same thing, and that they are distinct from one another. For if there is one negation of one affirmation, then opposed to the one that says \"a white man is not\" is the affirmation that says \"a white man is.\" And opposed to the one that says \"no white man is\" is the affirmation that says \"some white man is.\" But these affirmations are distinct, that is, \"a white man is\" and \"some white man is\"; therefore those too are distinct which are opposed to them in corresponding relation. Therefore the negation that says \"no white man is\" is distinct from that which says \"a white man is not.\" But he teaches us that there is one negation of one affirmation, and he demonstrates this by this reasoning: for the negation ought to deny the predicate that the affirmation predicated, and again the negation ought to remove from the same subject the predicate that the affirmation had joined to it.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":78,"ref":"p78","source":"Quod si fit, dubium non est uniusesse affirmationis unam negationem, sive autem ia universalibus hoc fiat universaliter prædicatis, sive indefinite, et non universaliter, aive in singularibus, una eademque propositionum natura est, ut unius affirmationis sit tantum naturaliter una negatio. Hoc autem induetione probat.\n\nDico autem, ut est Socrates albus, non est Socrates albus.\n\nIn hac enim propositione idem subjectum est, idem prædicatum,et in medio exemplorum subjecit.\n\nSi autem aliud aliquid de eodem vel de alio, idem, non opposita erit, sed ab ea diuersa.\n\nSensus huj usmodi est,si autem aliud aliquid prædicaverit negatio quam affirmatio prædicavit, vel si de alio subjecto idem negatio prædicaverit quod in affirmatione fuerit prædicatum, non sunt sibi oppositae, sed a se tantum diversæ sunt.si quis enim dicat, Socrates disputat, et aliud respondeat, Socrates non ambulat, diversum prædicatum est, etdiversæ sunt propositiones, et non oppositæ,et hoc est quod dixit.Si autem aliud aliquid, aliud enim praedicavit negatio quam affirmatio praedicaverat.Quod si quis sic dicat, Socrales disputat, aliusque respondeat, Plato non disputat,dealio subjecto idem prædicavit,. et sunt a se diversae propositiones,et non oppositæ. Eterit id quod ait aliquis, vel de alio idem.","english":"But if this happens, there is no doubt that there is one negation of one affirmation; whether this is done in universals predicated universally, or indefinitely and not universally, or in singulars, the nature of propositions is one and the same, so that naturally there is only one negation of one affirmation. And he proves this by induction.\n\nI mean, for example, \"Socrates is white,\" \"Socrates is not white.\"\n\nFor in this proposition the subject is the same, the predicate is the same, and he has set this forth among the examples.\n\nBut if the negation predicates something else about the same subject, or the same thing about another subject, it will not be opposed to it, but different from it.\n\nThe sense of this passage is as follows: but if the negation has predicated something other than the affirmation predicated, or if the negation has predicated about another subject the same thing that was the predicate in the affirmation, they are not opposed to each other, but are only different from each other. For if someone says, \"Socrates is disputing,\" and another answers, \"Socrates is not walking,\" the predicate is different, and the propositions are different and not opposed, and this is what he said. But if [it predicates] something else—for the negation has predicated something other than the affirmation had predicated. But if someone says thus, \"Socrates is disputing,\" and another answers, \"Plato is not disputing,\" he has predicated the same thing about another subject, and the propositions are different from each other and not opposed. And that will be what someone said, either \"something else\" or \"the same thing about another.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":79,"ref":"p79","source":"Quod si utraque sint diversa, multo magis propositiones diversae fiunt, quibus positis ad proposita rursus exempla conlendit, et uni aFfirmationi uuam enuntiationem negationis opponit,angularibus angulares, af'firmativis negativas, particularibus universales, indefinitis indefinitas opponens et comparans.\n\nHuic autem quæ est, omnis homo albus est, contradicit illa quæ est, non omnis homo albus est. Illi autem quæ est, aliquis homo albus est, ilia quæ est, nullus homo albus est. Illi autem quæ est, homo albus est, illa quæ est, homo albus non est.\n\nEt post haec concludit sententiam dicens: Quod igitur una affirmatio uni negationi opponitur contradictorie, et quæ sunt hæ, dictum est. Et quod sunt aliæ contrariæ, et quæ sint hæ, dictum est, et quod non omnis vera vel falsa contradictio, et quare, et quando vera, vel falsa.\n\nRevolvit quoque breviter, quoniam aliae sunt contrariæ, alix contradictoriae, dicitque se quae sint hae diligentius in superiori disputatione monstrasse. Illud quoque patet non omnem esse veram vel falsam aftirmationis et negationis opposilionem,quam nunc communiter et improprie contradictionem vocat. Et quando non sint verae vel falsae, vel cur, se exposuisse commemorat.","english":"But if both are different, much more do the propositions become different; and when these are set down, he again has recourse to the examples already given, and opposes to one affirmation one enunciation of negation, opposing and comparing singulars to singulars, negatives to affirmatives, universals to particulars, and indefinites to indefinites.\n\nNow to the one that is \"every man is white,\" that one contradicts which is \"not every man is white.\" But to that which is \"some man is white,\" that one which is \"no man is white.\" And to that which is \"man is white,\" that one which is \"man is not white.\"\n\nAnd after these things he concludes his meaning, saying: \"That therefore one affirmation is opposed contradictorily to one negation, and which these are, has been said. And that there are other contraries, and which these are, has been said; and that not every contradiction is true or false, and why, and when it is true or false.\"\n\nHe also briefly reviews that some are contraries and others contradictories, and says that he has shown more carefully in the preceding discussion which these are. It is also evident that not every opposition of affirmation and negation is true or false, which he now calls contradiction in a common and improper sense. And when they are not true or false, or why, he recalls that he has set forth.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":80,"ref":"p80","source":"DE AFFIRMATIONE ET NEGATIONE UNA.\n\nUna autem affirmatio et negatio est, quæ unum de uno significat, vel cum sit universale universaliter, uel i non similiter.\n\nQuid sit una affirmatio et supra jam diximus, et nunc quoque idem docere non piget.Cum idem Aristoteles revolverit, una enim affirmatio est, quas unam rem de uno significat, id est quas bujusmodi habet prædicatum,et hujusmodi subjectum,ut utrumque singula significet.Nam si unum aliquid significet prædicatum simplex atque unum est. Quod si rursus unum aliQuid significet subjectum, et non plura, simplex rursus est atque unum. Quocirca si unum prædicatum de uno erit subJecto, utraque singula significabunt et non plura. Eoque tit,ut non sit simplex propositionis significatio, et quae unum significet una sit. Idem autem oportet esse etiam in universalibus universaliter prædicatis,et in particularibus, quas universalibus opponi necesse est, quorum etiam subdit exempla.","english":"ON ONE AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION.\n\nBut an affirmation and a negation is one which signifies one thing of one thing, either when the universal is taken universally, or when it is not taken in like manner.\n\nWhat a single affirmation is, we have already said above, and now too it is no burden to teach the same again. For since the same Aristotle has gone over it, an affirmation is one which signifies one thing of one thing, that is, which has a predicate of this kind and a subject of this kind, so that each signifies something single. For if it signifies some one thing, the predicate is simple and one. But if again the subject signifies some one thing and not several, it is again simple and one. Wherefore if there is one predicate of one subject, each will signify single things and not several. And hence it comes about that the signification of the proposition is not simple, and that the proposition which signifies one thing is one. But the same must hold also in universals predicated universally, and in particulars which must be opposed to universals, examples of which he also sets down.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":81,"ref":"p81","source":"Ut omnis homo albus est, non omnis homo albus esi, est homo albus, non est humo albus, nullus homo albus est, quidam homo albus est.\n\nDicit enim unam esse propositionem,Omnis homo albus est, et rursus ei oppositam unam esse, non est omnis homo albus.\n\nSi album unum significat. Sin autem duobus unum nomen positum est, ex quibus non est unum, non est una affirmatio, neque una negatio.\n\nSi album, inquit, unum significat, quod si plura designat non est una affirmatio, nec una negatio. Hoc autem et in subjecto convenit custodire, scilicet ut subjecti quoque simplex significatio servet. Docet autem non esse unam propositionem,si prædicatum vel quodlibet in propositi one verbum multa significet hoc modo.\n\nSin vero duobus unum non est positum ex quibus non est unum, non est una affirmatio, neque negatio.\n\nSunt quaedam res quæ plura quidem signitJcent, ex quibus omnibus junctis unum quiddam valeat effici, hominis quidem nomen significat animal, signif1cat mortale, rationale quoque designat, sed haec juncta unum quiddam efficiunt, quod est animal rationale mortale. Hæc namque omnia unum hominem complent. Sunt quoque alia qua; duas vel plures hujusmodi res designant, ex quibusjunctis unum aliquid esse non possit, ut liber. Dicitur namque et Dionysius liber, et ingenuus, sed ingenuus et Dionysius juncti; nihil efficiunt.","english":"As, for example, \"every man is white,\" \"not every man is white,\" \"man is white,\" \"man is not white,\" \"no man is white,\" \"some man is white.\"\n\nFor he says that \"every man is white\" is one proposition, and again that its opposite, \"not every man is white,\" is one.\n\nIf \"white\" signifies one thing. But if one name is posited for two things, from which no one thing results, there is not one affirmation nor one negation.\n\nIf \"white,\" he says, signifies one thing; but if it designates more things, there is not one affirmation nor one negation. This also ought to be observed in the subject, namely that the simple signification of the subject likewise be preserved. But he teaches that a proposition is not one if the predicate, or any word whatever in the proposition, signifies many things, in this way.\n\nBut if one name is not posited for two things from which no one thing results, there is not one affirmation nor one negation.\n\nThere are certain things that signify several things, from all of which taken together some one thing can be produced. For the name \"man\" signifies animal, signifies mortal, and designates rational as well, but these joined together produce some one thing, which is a mortal rational animal. For all these complete one man. There are also other things that designate two or more things of this sort, from which, when joined, one thing cannot be, as \"free.\" For Dionysius is called free, and a freeborn man is called free, but \"freeborn\" and \"Dionysius\" joined together produce nothing.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":82,"ref":"p82","source":"Quare si quid tale sit, inquit, aut subjectum aut prædicatum quod plura significet, ex quibus unum aliquid esse non possit, non est illa una affirmatio, neque una negatio. Et hoc fictitii exempli ratione confirmat.\n\nUt si quis ponat hoc nomen tunica, homini et equo, et dicat tunica est alba. hæc non est una affirmatio, nec una negatio. Nihil enim differt hoc quam dicere, est homo equus albus. Hoc autem nihil differt quam dicere, est homo albus, et est equus albus.\n\nDicatur enim, inquit, equus et homo tunica. Et habeant, verbi gratia, hoc nomen, si quis enim dicat, et tunica alba quoniam tunica equum atque hominem designat, videtur dicere quoniam est equus et homo alus, seoclae es, tanquam dicat,es equus albus, et est homoalbus. Sed bæ duae propositiones sunt, et non una; duplexigitur illa quoque propositio est, est bomo et equus albus; quare duplex illa quoque quae dicit, est tunica alba. Etenim subjecti hujus,id est tunicæ, duplex significatio propositiones fecit esse duplices. Quod si quid dicat unum quiddam significare, est tunica alba, quia signincat, est homo et equus albus; impossibile est. Naque enim ex homine et equo quiddam unum fit, ut haec propositio unum aliquiddesignet; quare aut hæc propositio multa significat, aut si non multa, nihil omnino designat. Nihil enim est homo equus, uL simul dicatur atque intelligatur, hoc est enim quod ait:","english":"Therefore, he says, if there is any such thing, either as subject or as predicate, that signifies several things from which no single thing can be, that is not one affirmation nor one negation. And he confirms this by the account of a fictitious example.\n\nAs if someone were to assign this name \"tunic\" to a man and a horse, and say \"the tunic is white.\" This is not one affirmation, nor one negation. For it differs in nothing from saying \"a man is a white horse.\" But this differs in nothing from saying \"a man is white\" and \"a horse is white.\"\n\nFor let it be said, he says, that \"horse\" and \"man\" are \"tunic.\" And let them have, for example, this name; for if someone says \"the tunic is white,\" since \"tunic\" designates a horse and a man, he seems to say that a horse and a man are white—that is, as if he were to say \"a horse is white\" and \"a man is white.\" But these are two propositions, and not one; therefore that proposition too is double, \"a man and a horse is white\"; wherefore that one also is double which says \"the tunic is white.\" For indeed the double signification of this subject, that is, of the tunic, has made the propositions double. But if someone says that it signifies one single thing, \"the tunic is white,\" because it signifies \"a man and a horse is white,\" it is impossible. For neither does some one thing come to be from a man and a horse, so that this proposition should designate some one thing; wherefore either this proposition signifies many things, or, if not many, it designates nothing at all. For \"a man horse\" is nothing, such that it be spoken and understood at once; for this is what he says:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":83,"ref":"p83","source":"Si ergo æ multa significant, esunt ptures, manifestum est quoniam et prima multa vel nihil significat, neque enim ext aliquis homo equus.\n\nSi ergo hæ multa significantet sunt plures, man ifestum est quod et prima, id est ea quae dicit, est tunica alba, multa vel nihil significat.Nihil autem idcirco quoniam Hi non multa designet propositio cujus quilibet terminus æquivocus est, cum illa quae nomine aequivoco significanturjuncta fuerint,neque in unam substantiam convenerint, talis juncturae quae res sibimet incontextas copulant,non erit nullus intellectus: ut in ea quæest, tunica alba est,aliteresse una non potest, si tunica equum hominemque significet., nisi equus atque homo,juncti unum aliquid efficiant; sed hiterminitales sunt, ut necesse sit hanc propositionem vel multiplicem esse, vel nibil significare: nam si jungantur bomo et equus, fit nihil. Nibil enim est humo equus, quod per hoc monstravit, quod ait: Neque enim est aliquid homo equus, hoc autem cur nunc ab ipso propositum sit, lucidissime demonstravit; cum enim de his propositionibus loqueretur quae verumintersefalsumque dividerent, hoc addidit, quod etiam hae quas habent vel prædicatum æquivocum, vel subjectum, verum falsumque non dividunt, utraeque enim esse verse possunt, ut haec quae dicunt, est liber homo si ad ingenuitatem referas, et non est liber homo, si ad Dionysium. Recte igitur dictum est:","english":"If therefore these signify many things and are many, it is evident that the first also signifies many things or nothing; for neither is any man a horse.\n\nIf therefore these signify many things and are many, it is evident that the first also—that is, what he says, \"the tunic is white\"—signifies many things or nothing. But it signifies nothing for this reason: that a proposition is not a designation of many things when any one of its terms is equivocal, since the things signified by an equivocal name, when joined together, have not come together into one substance; of such a joining as couples things interconnected with one another there will be no single understanding. For example, in the proposition \"the tunic is white,\" it cannot be one in any other way, if \"tunic\" signifies a horse and a man, unless horse and man joined together make one thing. But these are terminal, so that it is necessary that this proposition be either multiple or signify nothing; for if man and horse are joined, nothing is made. For \"man horse\" is nothing, which he showed by this, that he said: \"For neither is any man a horse.\" But why this has now been proposed by him, he has demonstrated most clearly; for when he was speaking about those propositions which divide the true and the false between them, he added this, that even those which have either an equivocal predicate or an equivocal subject do not divide the true and the false. For both can be true, as these which say \"a free man is\" if you refer it to free birth, and \"a free man is not\" if you refer it to Dionysius. Rightly therefore it has been said:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":84,"ref":"p84","source":"Quare nec in his necesse est hanc quidem contradictionem veram esse, illam vero falsam.\n\nCum enim m:Jlta significat, multiplex significatio in negationeatque affirmationese invicem non perimit, quod si una sit affirmatio et una negatio, quoniam utræque in eodem esse non possunt., unam veram semper, falsam alteram esse necesse est.\n\nDE FUTURIS CONTINGENTIBUS.\n\nlit his ergo quæ sunt, et facta sunt, necesse est affirmationem, vel negationem, veram esse vel falsam. Acin universalibus quidem universaliter semper hancveram, illam vero falsam esse, et in his quæ sunt singularia, quemadmodum dictum est. In his vero quæ in universalibus non universaliter dicuntur, non est necesse, dictum est autem et de his.\n\nIn praesentibus rebus et in praeteritis Factas contradictorias enuntiationes dicit definite, unam semper veram, alteram definite semper esse mendacem, ut si quis dicat: OmnesFabn perierunt, qui ad pugnam contraVeientesprivataconspirationeprogressi sunt. Hoc si negetur sic, non omnes Fabii perierant, qui ad pugnamcontra Veientes privata conspiratione progressi sunt, necesseestquidemunam veram, alteram esse falsam, sed del1nite vera affirmatio est, definite falsa, negatio.","english":"Therefore neither in these is it necessary that this one of the contradiction be true and that one false. For when it signifies many things, the multiple signification in the negation and the affirmation does not destroy one another; but if the affirmation is one and the negation one, since both cannot be in the same, it is necessary that one always be true and the other false.\n\nON FUTURE CONTINGENTS.\n\nIn those things therefore which are and have been done, it is necessary that the affirmation or the negation be true or false. And in universals indeed, universally, it is always necessary that this one be true and that one false, and in those things which are singular, as has been said. But in those things which are said in universals not universally, it is not necessary; and it has been said also concerning these.\n\nIn present things and in past things he says that contradictory statements are definite: that one is always true, the other definitely always false; as if someone should say: All the Fabii perished who went forth to battle against the Veientes in a private conspiracy. If this is denied thus — not all the Fabii perished who went forth to battle against the Veientes in a private conspiracy — it is indeed necessary that one be true and the other false, but the affirmation is definitely true and the negation definitely false.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":85,"ref":"p85","source":"Cum enim id quod factum est dicitur factum, definite verum est, quod si id factum esse denegetur, falsum est definite; siveergo in universalibus universaliter prædicatis contradictio per oppositionem particularitatis fiat, sive in singularibus, ut in Socrate et in cæteris individuis in his quoque quæ sunt præterita, semper una vera est, altera falsa, ut in eo quod est, Socrates veneno peremptus est. Socrates veneno peremptus non est, vera est affirmatio definite, et ita rursus falsa negatio est in præsentibus quoque idem esse necesse est. Si enim, disputante Socrate, dicat aliquis: Socrates disputat, et hoc alius neget, sicut disputare Socratem præsentis lemporis ratione definitura est, ita quoque definite affirmatio retinet et veritatem, negatio definite mendacium. Et in universalibus quidem vel affirmatis vel negativis, in quibus vel affirmatio particularis, vel negatio particularis opponitur idem est. Hoc est enim quod ait: In his quae sunt, et quae facta sunt, id est in praesentibus atque in præteritis, una semper defir.ite vera est, semper altera falsa definite, sive universalis sit una, altera particularis. Quod per hoc monstratur, quod ait: In universalibus quidem universaliler, semper hanc esse veram, illam vero falsam, sive in singularibus atque individuis prædicamentis.","english":"For when what has been done is said to have been done, it is definitely true; but if it is denied that it has been done, it is definitely false. Therefore, whether the contradiction arises through opposition of particularity in universals predicated universally, or in singulars—as in Socrates and the other individuals, and in these also which are past—always one is true and the other false; as in \"Socrates has been killed by poison\" and \"Socrates has not been killed by poison\": the affirmation is definitely true, and so again the negation is false. In present things too it must be the same. For if, while Socrates is disputing, someone says \"Socrates is disputing,\" and another denies this, just as \"Socrates is disputing\" will be defined by the reckoning of present time, so too the affirmation definitely retains truth and the negation definitely falsehood. And in universals, whether affirmed or denied, in which either a particular affirmation or a particular negation is opposed, the same holds. For this is what he says: in things which are and which have been done, that is, in present and in past things, one is always definitely true and the other always definitely false, whether one is universal and the other particular. This is shown by what he says: in universals indeed universally, this one is always true and that one false, whether in singulars and individual predicates.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":86,"ref":"p86","source":"Quod per hoc designat quod addidit: Et in his quae sunt singularia, una vera est, altera falsa; sed postquam dixit de contradictoriis, adjecit, in his autem quas indefinitæ sunt, non necesse est semper hanc quidem veram, illam vero esse mendacem. Hoc scilicet designans quod ait: In his vero qua? in universalibus non universaliter dicuntur, non est necesse in his unam veram, alteram falsam proponi, potest enim fieri ut utraeque sint verae quae fuerint indefinitæ.\n\nIn singularibus vero, et (uturis non similiter.Propositionum aliæ sunt tantum inesse significantes, ut si quis Socrate vivo dixisset: Socrates calvus est, alius negaret, Socrates calvus non est. Illa enim inesse posuit Socrati calvitiem, illa calvitiem a 80crate disjunxit. Aliae vero sunt necessariæ, ut si quis dicat, Necesse est solem annis omnibus in Arietem rursus redire. Rem namque necessariam et ex necessitate evenientem prædicaus, totam fecit necessariam propositionem. Aliae autem sunt contingentes, quae cum non sint, eas tamen in futurum evenire possibile est, ut si quis dicat: Hodie Alexander pransurus est, hodie Alexander pransurus non est. Etenim cum ista dicantur, quoniam illi adhuc prandere non inest, inesse tamen contingit,, et potest fieri ut oeprandeat, idcirco dicimus eas contingentes, contingit enim fieri, quoniam adhuc nondum facta est. Sed hæ non insunt quidem, ut dictum est.","english":"He indicates this by what he added: \"And in those things which are singular, one is true, the other false.\" But after he spoke about contradictories, he added: \"In those, however, which are indefinite, it is not necessary that one be true and the other false.\" He indicates this, namely, by what he said: \"In those, however\"—which?—\"that are said of universals not universally,\" it is not necessary that one be proposed as true and the other as false; for it can happen that both are true, being indefinite.\n\nIn singulars, however, and in future things it is not similarly so. Some propositions signify only that something is present, as if someone, while Socrates is alive, should say, \"Socrates is bald,\" and another should deny, \"Socrates is not bald.\" For the one posited baldness as present in Socrates, the other separated baldness from Socrates. Others are necessary, as if someone should say, \"It is necessary that the sun return again to Aries in all years.\" For by predicating a necessary thing and one that comes about from necessity, he made the whole proposition necessary. Others, however, are contingent, which, though they are not, it is nevertheless possible for them to come about in the future, as if someone should say, \"Today Alexander is going to dine,\" \"Today Alexander is not going to dine.\" For when these things are said, since dining is not yet present in him, yet it can be present, and it can happen that he dines, for that reason we call them contingent; for it can happen to come about, since it has not yet been done. But these are not present, as has been said.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":87,"ref":"p87","source":"Sunt enim futuri temporis. Quae autem non insunt, sed inesse possunt, necessarias non sunt, quoniam hujusmodi retinent naturam, ut eas et esse, et non esse possibile sit, potest enim feri ut hodie Alexander prandeat, et rursus fieri ut hodie non prandeat. Et hanc eveniendi vel non eveniendi possibilitatem, utrumlibet vocamus. In hujusmodi enim rebus utrumlibet contingit, aut affirmatio, aut negatio, et non est necesse aut affirmationem fieri, aut negationem. Nam cum non sit affirmatio necessaria, non interclusum est contingere negationem. Rursus cum negatio necessaria non sit, interdum accidit, ut affirmatio contingat. Quare hæc hujusmodi eveniendi et non eveniendi potentia, utrumlibet vocatur. Quod in his utrumlibet, id est vel atfirmationes vel negationes, evenire conceditur. Nunc ergo Aristoteles hoc validissima argumentatione contendit astruere, quod quemadmodum:n præteritis, et in his quæ sunt præsentia, non modoin affirmatione et negatione, unam veram, alteram falsam esse necesse est, sed definite una vera est, definite altera suscipit falsitatem, non ita in his quae contingentes vocantur. Necesse enim est utaut affirmatio vera sit, aut negatio, sed non ut definite quælibet earum vera sit, altera falsa definite.","english":"For they are of future time. But those things which are not present but can be present are not necessary, since things of this kind retain a nature such that it is possible for them both to be and not to be; for it can happen that Alexander dines today, and again it can happen that he does not dine today. And this possibility of coming about or not coming about we call \"either of the two.\" For in things of this kind either the affirmation or the negation happens as \"either of the two,\" and it is not necessary that either the affirmation come about or the negation. For since the affirmation is not necessary, it is not excluded that the negation may happen. Again, since the negation is not necessary, it sometimes happens that the affirmation comes about. Wherefore this power of coming about and not coming about in things of this kind is called \"either of the two.\" For in these it is granted that \"either of the two,\" that is, either affirmations or negations, may come about. Now, therefore, Aristotle strives to establish by the strongest argument that, just as in past things and in those which are present, not only in affirmation and negation is it necessary that one be true and the other false, but one is definitely true and the other definitely receives falsity, it is not so in those things which are called contingent. For it is necessary that either the affirmation be true or the negation, but not that each of them be definitely true and the other definitely false.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":88,"ref":"p88","source":"Nam quod dicimus Alexander lavandus est, id si alius neget, dicatque: Alexander lavandus non est, tolum quidem hoc necesse est evenire, ut aut lavetur, aut non lavetur, et necesse est unam esse veram, alteram si lotus fuerit, aut si lotusfalsam, aut affirmationem, non fuerit, negationem. Sed non est necesse ut definite affirmatio vera sit, idcirco quod in hujusmodi rebus poterit evenire negatio. Sed nec unquam definitum est, ut negatio vera sit, falsa affirmatio. idcirco quoniam potest non evenire negatio. Quare in tota contradictione, unam quidem veram, falsam alteram esse necesse est. Ut autem definite una vera sit, altera falsa definite, sicut in his quae sunt præterita quæque præsentia, nulla ratione rerum possi bile est. Sed hoc prius Aristoteles in -singularium praedicamentorum propositionibus probat. Post autem idem debere in universalibus docet intelligi. Idcirco enim ait, in singularibus vero et futuris non similiter. Id est in singularibus propositionibus, et de quibus prius tractat, et in futuris, id est in contingentibus, non idem modus est verarum falsarumque propositionum, qui est in præsenteritis atque præsentibus.","english":"For what we say, \"Alexander is to be bathed,\" if another denies it and says, \"Alexander is not to be bathed,\" the whole of this must necessarily come about, that he is either bathed or not bathed, and one of them must be true and the other false—either the affirmation if he has been bathed, or the negation if he has not been bathed. But it is not necessary that the affirmation be definitely true, for the reason that in matters of this kind the negation can come about. Nor is it ever definite that the negation is true and the affirmation false, for the reason that the negation can fail to come about. Wherefore in the whole contradiction it is necessary that one be true and the other false. But that one be definitely true and the other definitely false, as in things past and present, is in no way possible by the nature of things. But Aristotle first proves this in propositions about singular predicates. Afterwards he teaches that the same must be understood in universal propositions. For this reason he says, \"but in singulars and futures it is not similarly\"—that is, in singular propositions, both those about which he treated earlier and those about the future, that is, in contingent matters, the mode of true and false propositions is not the same as it is in past and present things.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":89,"ref":"p89","source":"Quoniam in præteritis atque præsentibus, et to tum contradictionis corpus in veritatem falsi tatemque dividitur, et vera est una definite, ut possit exhis certus aliquis nul-ac sciens dicere quoniam affirmatio vera sit, vel rursus, quoniam negatio; vel si id nul lus dixerit, certa jam præteriti temporis vel præsentis secundum sui naturam ratio, certusque eventus est, in his vero in quibus contingens est et futurum, idestvariabile etinslabile, totum quidem corpus contradictionis veritatem falsitalemque partitur,sed hæc veritas atque falsilas indiscreta est atque volubilis. Nullus enim potest dicere quoniam affirmatio vera est. N on est enim necesse veram esse affirmationem, idcirco quoniam negationem fieri possibile est, nec rursus negationem, quoniam non est impossibile affirmationem contingere, et postremo quoniam utrumlibet ipsorum contingit, idcirco una earum, vera esse definite et certa, naturaliter non potest, quibusautem id argumentationibusexsequatur, manifestum erit hoc modo:","english":"Since in past and present things both the whole body of the contradiction is divided into truth and falsity, and one of them is definitely true, so that from these someone who knows can state with certainty that the affirmation is true, or again that the negation is; or if no one has said so, the reason of past or present time is already certain according to its own nature, and the outcome is certain—but in those things in which there is contingency and a future, that is, what is variable and unsettled, the whole body of the contradiction is indeed divided into truth and falsity, but this truth and falsity is indistinct and shifting. For no one can say that the affirmation is true. For it is not necessary that the affirmation be true for the reason that it is possible for the negation to come about, nor again that the negation be true for the reason that it is not impossible for the affirmation to happen; and finally, because either of them can happen, for that reason one of them cannot naturally be definitely and certainly true. But by what arguments this is worked out will be clear in this way:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":90,"ref":"p90","source":"Nam si omnis affirmatio vel negatio, vera vel falsa est, et omne necesse est vei esse vel non esse. Quare si hic quidem dicat futurum aliquid, ille vero non dicat hoe idem ipsum, manifestum est quoniarn necesse est verum dicere alterum ipsorum, si omnis affirmatio vel negatio vera vel alsa est. Utræque enim non erunt simul in talibus.\n\nSi quidquid in affirmationibus negationibusque proponitur, verum vel falsum est definite, sequitur ut quod ilIænegationes affirmationesque significant, aut evenire, aut non evenire necesse sit; hoc est enim quod dicit: Nam si omnis affirmatio vel negatio vera vel falsa est definite; idcirco enim addit omnis. In his enim quae sunt futura vel contingentia, non esse affirmationes et negationes veras vel falsas definite probare contendit. Nam si unus dicat aliquid futurum, alius neget, ut utraque eveniant, fieri non potest; quis enim dixerit, dicente aliquo Socrates cœnaturus est, alioque negante Socrates crenaturus non est, utrasqueveras in uno eodemque contingere? Hoc igitur fieri non potest; unus ergo eorum verum dicturus. est alius mentietur: ponatur enim una eorum definite vera esse, vel falsa, si ergo omnis affirmafio et negatio vera vel falsa est definite, et uterque negans affirmansque veri in contradictionibus esse non possunt, necesse est unum verum dicere. alterum falsum, et unum definite verum, alterum definite falsum.","english":"For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, and everything must either be or not be. Therefore if one person says that something will be and another says that this same thing will not be, it is clear that one of them must speak the truth, if every affirmation or negation is true or false. For both will not be true at the same time in such cases.\n\nIf whatever is proposed in affirmations and negations is definitely true or false, it follows that what those negations and affirmations signify must either happen or not happen; for this is what he says: For if every affirmation or negation is definitely true or false; for that reason he adds \"every.\" For in those things which are future or contingent, he contends that affirmations and negations are not definitely true or false. For if one person says that something will be and another denies it, it cannot happen that both come about; for who would say that, when one person says \"Socrates will dine\" and another denies it, saying \"Socrates will not dine,\" both are true in one and the same case? This, then, cannot happen; therefore one of them will speak the truth, the other will lie. For let it be supposed that one of them is definitely true or false; if, therefore, every affirmation and negation is definitely true or false, and both the one denying and the one affirming cannot be in the truth in contradictions, it is necessary that one speak the truth, the other falsehood, and that one be definitely true, the other definitely false.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":91,"ref":"p91","source":"Hoc si estin omnibus affirmationibus atque negationibus, ut una definite falsa sit, altera vera definite, quidquid vera dicit eventurum eve. nire necesse est, quidquid non eventurum non evenire necesse est, boc est enim quod ait: Manifestum est quoniam necesse est verum dicere alterum ipsorum; neque enim potest fieri ut affirmatio negatioque consentiant in talibus, id est in contradictionis propositionibus. Necesse esautem evenire quaecunque vera definite affirmatio loquitur, et non evenire quod profert definite vera negatio, quod sic probat.\n\nNam si verum est dicere, quoniam est album vel non album, necesse est esse album uel non album. Bt si est album vel non album, verum est atfirmare vel negare, et si non est, mentitur, et si mentitur, non est. Quare necesse est aut affirmationem, aut negationem veram esse vel falsam.\n\nQuod de futuropossitesse judicium, a præsentibus trahit exemplum: ait enim hanc esse rerum consequentiam, utrem subsistentem propositionis veritasconsequatur, veritatem propositionis rei, de qua 10quitur propositio, essentia comitetur. Nam si hic lapis vequodlibet aualbum est, verum est de eo dicere quoniam album est, et hoc convertitur. Nam si verum est dicere de eo quoniam album est, sine dubio album est, et album esse necesse est, itaque fit ut res veritatem, et veritas rem, de qua proponitur, subsequatur.","english":"If this holds for all affirmations and negations—that one is definitely false and the other definitely true—then whatever the true statement says will happen must necessarily happen, and whatever it says will not happen must necessarily not happen. For this is what he means when he says: It is manifest that one of them must speak the truth; for it cannot happen that affirmation and negation agree in such cases, that is, in propositions that form a contradiction. But whatever a definitely true affirmation states must necessarily happen, and whatever a definitely true negation states must necessarily not happen, which he proves as follows.\n\nFor if it is true to say that something is white or is not white, it is necessary that it be white or not be white. And if it is white or not white, it is true to affirm or deny it; and if it is not, the statement lies, and if it lies, it is not. Therefore it is necessary that either the affirmation or the negation be true or false.\n\nThat there can be a judgment about the future, he draws an example from present things; for he says that this is the consequence of things: that the truth of a proposition follows upon the thing's existing, and the existence of the thing about which the proposition speaks accompanies the truth of the proposition. For if this stone or any white thing whatsoever is white, it is true to say of it that it is white, and this converts. For if it is true to say of it that it is white, without doubt it is white, and it is necessary that it be white. And so it comes about that the thing follows the truth, and the truth follows the thing about which the proposition is made.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":92,"ref":"p92","source":"Rursus si hic lapis albus non est, verum est de eo dicere quoniam non est albus, et si de eo verum est dicere quoniam non est albus, ut sit albus fieri non potest, cum vere dicatur quoniam non est albus.Idem quoque etiam in mendaciis valet. Nam si quid non est, cum hoc aliquis esse proposuit, mentietur. Et si quis de alio mentietur, illud de quo fit mendacium non est, ut si quam rem cum alba non sit dicat, aliquis esse albam mentitus est, quocirca necesse est illud quoque non esse de quo mentitus est. Ita igitur veritas quidem rei quae est, et res quæ est veritati, falsitas vero rei quae non est, et res quae non est, falsitati convertitur, quod si hoc est in omnibus rebus, quidquid dioitur cum veritate vel falsitate, ad rem quae est vel non est convertitur. sive negatio sil, sive affirmatio, et unam veram semper, alteram falsam esse necesse est; si una definite vera est, impossibile quiddam ex bac positione continget. Evenient namque omnia, quaecunque sunt vel fiuntexnecessitatefieri, etnihil a casu, nihil que esse possibile quod sit, et non esse possibile. Nihil etiam in liberi arbitrii moderamine relinquetur, sed totum erit ex necessitate. quidquid evenerit. Nam si verum est definilede qualibet re dicere quoniamerit, illam rem sine dubio futuram esse necesse est, et ut non fiat non potest evenire.","english":"Again, if this stone is not white, it is true to say of it that it is not white; and if it is true to say of it that it is not white, it cannot come about that it is white, since it is truly said that it is not white. The same holds also in the case of falsehoods. For if something does not exist, when someone has proposed that it does exist, he will lie. And if someone lies about something else, that about which the lie is made does not exist; so if someone says that a thing is white when it is not white, he has lied that it is white, and therefore it is necessary that that also, about which he lied, does not exist. Thus, then, truth is converted with the thing that exists, and the thing that exists with the truth; while falsehood is converted with the thing that does not exist, and the thing that does not exist with falsehood. But if this holds in all things, whatever is said with truth or falsehood is converted to the thing that exists or does not exist, whether it be a negation or an affirmation, and one must always be true and the other false. If one is definitely true, something impossible will follow from this position. For all things whatsoever that are or come to be will come to be by necessity, and nothing will be by chance, and nothing will be possible that is, and not be possible. Nothing will even be left in the governance of free will, but everything whatsoever that has happened will be from necessity. For if it is true to say definitely of any thing that it will be, that thing must without doubt be going to exist, and it cannot come about that it not happen.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":93,"ref":"p93","source":"Verum enim est dicere de ea quouiam futura est, nee verum de ea quoniam futura est poterat dici,nisi eam fore esset necesse; quare si in omni affirmatione ct negatione,aut affirmatio aut negatio in futurum definite,vera vel falsa est, necesse est val quod ab affirmatione vera defi. nite,vel quod a negatione dicitur falsum evenire.ln falsitate quoque similis causa est. Nam quod non erit,falsum est dicere quoniam erit.Et quod falsum est dicere quoniam erit, ex necessitate non erit. Item quod erit,fa]sum est dicere quoniam non erit, et quod falsum est dicere quoniam non erit necessarioerit. Ut igitur veras propositionesnecessarifs sequitur eventus ut fiat, quod dicitur, ita et falsas propositiones necessarius sequitur eventus,ut non fiat, quod dicitur afalsapropositione.Quod si in futurum omnis affirmatio vel negatio definite semperdividunt veritatem et falsitatem,erit rerum qua? prædicantur necessarius eventus,et omnia ex necessitate contingent, vel non contingent,emaque et casus,et possibilitas,et liberum perit arbitrium. Syllogismus aut hujusmodi est: si omnis affirmatio vera est aut falsa definite, et eodem modo negatio eveniet, ut omnia inevitabili necessitatis ratione contingant, quod si hoc est, liberum perit arbitrium.","english":"For it is true to say of it that it will be, and it could not be said to be true of it that it will be unless it were necessary that it should be; wherefore if in every affirmation and negation, either the affirmation or the negation concerning the future is definitely true or false, it is necessary that whatever is definitely stated by a true affirmation, or whatever is stated by a negation, should come about. In falsity too the cause is similar. For what will not be, it is false to say that it will be. And what it is false to say will be, will necessarily not be. Likewise, what will be, it is false to say will not be; and what it is false to say will not be, will necessarily be. Therefore, just as true propositions are followed by the necessary outcome that what is said should happen, so also false propositions are followed by the necessary outcome that what is said by a false proposition should not happen. But if, concerning the future, every affirmation or negation always definitely divides truth and falsity, there will be a necessary outcome of the things that are predicated, and all things will come about by necessity, or will not come about, and thus chance, possibility, and free will perish. And the syllogism is of this sort: if every affirmation is definitely true or false, and the negation comes about in the same way, then all things will come about by the principle of inevitable necessity; but if this is so, free will perishes.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":94,"ref":"p94","source":"Sed hoc impossibile est; non igitur verum est omnem affirmationem vel negationem veram esse definite vel falsam.Omnia autem ex necessitatecontingere, si illæ detmite verae vel falsae sunt,talis syllogismus ostendit: omnisin futurum definita veritas vel falsitas eventum rei vel futurum vel non futurum ex necessitate conslituit, sed omnes propositiones futurae definite veræ vel falsae sunt.ln omnibus igitur eveniendi, vel non eve. niendi necessitas erit, pro qua conclusione illud Aristoteles intulit, quod ait:\n\nNihil igitur neque est, neque fit, nee a casu, nee utrumlibet, nec erit, nec non erit, sed ex necessitate omnia et non utrumlibet, aut enim qui dicit; verus est, aut qui negat.\n\nCasus namque,et id quod est utrumlibet exstinguitur,liberaetiam voluntas adimitur,si omnia quæcunque fient; ex necessitate futura sunt; et probat superiorem conclusionem, quae dicit omnia ex neessitate contingere, per hoc quod ait: aut enim ui, dicit verus est,aut qui negat; si ergo veritus rerum necessitati eonvertitur,aut qui negat verus est, aut qui affirmat omnia fieri et necessitate necesse est. Nam si non erunt ex necessitate,non erunt verae definite, id quod ipse subjunxit:","english":"But this is impossible; therefore it is not true that every affirmation or negation is definitely true or false. But that all things come about by necessity, if those [propositions] are definitely true or false, such a syllogism shows: every definite truth or falsity concerning the future establishes the outcome of the matter as either going to be or not going to be by necessity, but all propositions about the future are definitely true or false. In all things, therefore, there will be necessity of coming about or not coming about, for which conclusion Aristotle inferred that which he says:\n\nNothing, therefore, either is or comes about, neither by chance nor as either of two outcomes, nor will it be nor will it not be, but all things are by necessity and not as either of two outcomes; for either the one who says it is true, or the one who denies it.\n\nFor chance, and that which is either of two outcomes, is extinguished, and free will is also taken away, if all things whatsoever that will come about are going to be by necessity; and he proves the superior conclusion, which says that all things come about by necessity, through this that he says: for either the one who says it is true, or the one who denies it; if therefore truth is turned into the necessity of things, either the one who denies is true, or the one who affirms that all things come about by necessity. For if they will not be by necessity, they will not be definitely true, which he himself added:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":95,"ref":"p95","source":"Similiter enim, vel fient, vel non fieret, utrumlibet enim nihil magis sie ved non sic se hahet, aut habebit.\n\nExponit enim quæ sit contingentis natura, cum quid sit utrumlibet exponit,utrumlibet est id cujus indiscretus eventus est,id est, quod æqualiter esse vel non esse contingit.Hoc est enim quod ait,similiter enim fieret vel non fieret. Neque enim directam viam necessariamquebabet unam vel aMrmationem vel negationem,sed nihil se magis sic habet,vel sio non habet, et est utrumlibet quod æqualem cursum et ad evenire retinet, et ad non evenire.Nihil enim se magis vel sic habet, vel sic non habet, id est aequaliter se habet ad esse,et ad non esse. Nihil enim magis sese habet, ut fiat quam ut non fiat.\n\nAmplius si est album nunc, verum erat dicere prius quoniam erit album, quare semper verum fuit dicere quodlibet eorum quæ facta sunt, quoniam est vel erit.","english":"For in like manner it will either come about or will not come about; for in the case of the contingent, nothing is more disposed thus or not thus, nor will be.\n\nFor he sets forth what the nature of the contingent is, when he explains what \"either of the two\" is. \"Either of the two\" is that whose outcome is undetermined, that is, what can equally come to be or not come to be. For this is what he says: \"for in like manner it would come about or would not come about.\" For neither an affirmation nor a negation has one direct and necessary path, but nothing is more disposed thus or not thus, and it is \"either of the two\" that keeps an equal course both toward coming about and toward not coming about. For nothing is more disposed thus or not thus, that is, it is equally disposed toward being and toward not being. For nothing is more disposed to come about than not to come about.\n\nMoreover, if it is white now, it was true to say before that it will be white; therefore it was always true to say of any of the things that have come about that it is or will be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":96,"ref":"p96","source":"Validam sibi ipsi vim argumentationis opponit,qua possit ostendere affirmationes negationesque veras vel falsas esse definite, et ait providendum esse ne forte necesse sit suspicari id quod jam factum est vere dici potuisse antequam fieret,esse faciendum, ut si Socrates hesterna nocte cænavit, verum fuit hesterna matutina dicere, quoniam coenaturus est; quocirca definite quoque verum fuisset, seeo pra'diceretur. Omnia igi).ur ea quae fiunt definite poterant vera prædicari. Hoc est enim quod dicit,Bi est album nunc, verum erat dicere prius quoniam erit albu:n.Nam si qua res nunc alba est,verum erat ante dicere quoniam erit alba, quare definite quoque fuit quodlibeteorum quae facta sunt vere prædicere. Hoc enim rei ipsius exitus comprobavit. Huic oppositioniper eadem rursus occurit.Nam enim quid hæc dicit, licet ei laqueum superioris argumentationis effugere,rursus enim eadem illum cuncta circumveniunt,et eisdem iterum urgetur incommodis.","english":"He sets against himself the strong force of an argument by which he can show that affirmations and negations are definitely true or false, and says that care must be taken lest perhaps one must suspect that what has already happened could truly have been said before it happened that it was going to happen; so that if Socrates dined last night, it was true yesterday morning to say that he was going to dine; and for that reason it would also have been definitely true if it had been foretold. All things, therefore, that come about could definitely have been truly foretold. For this is what he says: if it is white now, it was true to say beforehand that it will be white. For if some thing is white now, it was true to say before that it will be white; therefore it was also definite to truly foretell whatever of those things that have been done. For the outcome of the thing itself has proved this. Against this objection he again meets them by the same means. For what does he say to this? Although he may escape the snare of the earlier argument, the same considerations again surround him on all sides, and he is again pressed by the same difficulties.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":97,"ref":"p97","source":"Quod si semper verum (uit dIcere quoniam est vel erit, non potest hoc non esse vel non (uturum esse. Quoi autem non potest non fieri impossibile est non fieri; et quod impossibile est non fieri, necesse est fieri. Omnia ergo quæ futura sUnl, necesse est fieri, nihil igitur utrumlibet, neque casu erit; nam si casu, non ex necessitate.\n\nMira ratione superiorum argumentationem dicentis ad idem reduxit incommodum dicens: Siverum est omnia quaecunque facta sunt, definite vere potuisse prædici,quoniam veritatem propositionis rei necessitas sequitur, quod vere definite praedicatum erat non evenire non poterat; sed si non evenire non poterat,ut non eveniret erat impossibile. Quod autem non fieri impossibile est, fieri necesse est. Eventus igitur ejus ex necessitate consequitur.Nihil ergo utrumlibet, neque a casu erit. Nam si a casu esse poterit, non ex necessitate futurum est;quod si non es ex necessitate tuturum,non non fieri; si non est impossibile non fieri,potestnon fieri; si potest non fieri, non potest definite vere prædici. Quod enim vere definite prædicetur,ex necessitate futurum est, quod autem a casu est, ex necessitate non evenit.","english":"But if it is always true to say that a thing is or will be, then it cannot not be or not be going to be. But what cannot not happen, it is impossible not to happen; and what is impossible not to happen, it is necessary that it happen. Therefore all things that are future must necessarily happen; nothing, then, is a matter of either outcome, nor will it be by chance; for if by chance, not from necessity.\n\nBy a remarkable argument he reduced the reasoning of the one speaking above to the same difficulty, saying: If it is true that all things whatsoever that have been done could have been definitely and truly predicted, then, since the necessity of the thing follows from the truth of the proposition, what had been truly and definitely predicted could not fail to happen; but if it could not fail to happen, it was impossible that it not happen. But what it is impossible not to happen, it is necessary that it happen. The outcome of it, therefore, follows from necessity. Nothing, then, will be a matter of either outcome, nor will it be by chance. For if it can be by chance, it will not be going to happen from necessity; but if it is not going to happen from necessity, it is not impossible not to happen; if it is not impossible not to happen, it can not happen; if it can not happen, it cannot be definitely and truly predicted. For what is truly and definitely predicted is going to happen from necessity, whereas what is by chance does not happen from necessity.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":98,"ref":"p98","source":"At veronec quoniam neutrum verum est, contingit dicere ut quoniam neque erit, neque non erit; primum enim cum sit affirmatio falsa, erit negatio non vera, et cum hæc sis falsa, contingit affirmationem esse non veram.\n\nQuatuor differentiis contingentium futurorum diversitas constat.Autenim id quod affirmatur etnegatur in futurum,utrumque erit verum aut utrumque fal- Į sum; aut unum verum, falsum alterum definite; aut unum verum, falsum alterumindetinite.Non enimesse quidem et affirmationem et negationem veram in hispropositionibus,quæ de rebus contingentibus in futurum proponuntur per hoc demonstravit superius quod ait: Manifestum est quoniam necesse est verum dicere,alterum ipsorum, si omnis affirmatio vera vel Falsa est.Utraque enim non erunt simul in talibus.Neque enim fieri potest ut in contradictoria propositionum oppositione, utrasque veras quisquam valeat invenirc.Nunc autem monstratur quo niam ne hoc quidem fieri potest ut utraeque sint falsæ,ait enim: At vero,ne hocquidem nobis contingit dicere quoniam neutrum verum est,id est nee a[firmatio,nec negatio; contingeret autam utraque esse falsam affirmationem scilicet et negationem, si nec quod diceret affirmatio, futurum esset,nec,non esse.negatio diceret non esset. Ita enim fieret,ut nec esset. quod affirmatio, esse prædieavit, nec non esset quod negatio non esse proposuit.","english":"But neither can we say that neither is true, namely that it will neither be nor not be; for first, since the affirmation is false, the negation will not be true, and since this is false, it follows that the affirmation is not true.\n\nThe diversity of contingent future things consists in four differences. For what is affirmed and denied with respect to the future is either both true or both false; or one is true and the other false definitely; or one is true and the other false indefinitely. For that both the affirmation and the negation are not true in those propositions which are put forward concerning contingent future things, he demonstrated above by this, when he said: It is manifest that it is necessary to say what is true, one of them, if every affirmation is true or false. For both will not be together in such cases. Nor indeed can it happen that in the contradictory opposition of propositions anyone be able to find both true. But now it is shown that not even this can happen, that both be false; for he says: But neither can we say this, that neither is true, that is, neither the affirmation nor the negation; but it would follow that both are false, namely the affirmation and the negation, if neither what the affirmation said would be, nor what the negation said would not be. For thus it would come about that neither would be what the affirmation declared to be, nor would not be what the negation proposed not to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[{"kind":"lacuna","severity":"caution","text":"The source is fragmentary here: the edition marks a break or an editorial bracket, and the English carries across it. Treat the bridge as supplied, not translated."}]},{"i":99,"ref":"p99","source":"Si quis ergo hoc ita dicat, primum,inquit, illud inconveniens atque impossibile est,quod in contradictoria propositione, cum affirmatio falsa sit non est vera negatio,et rur sus cum negatio falsa sit, falsa quoque affirmatio sit.Hoe enim in solis contrariis contingebat, non etiam in contradictoria oppositione.In hac enim unam semper veram esse necesse est, semperalteram falsam.\n\nAd hæc si verum est dicere quoniam albuni est et magnum, oportet esse utrumque. Si vero erit cras, oportet esse cras Si autem.nequc erit, neque non erit cras non erit.utrumlibet, ut navale bellum. Oportebit enim neque fieri navale bellum, neque non fieri. Quæ ergo contingunt inconvenientia hæc sunt,,et hujusmodi alia,siomnis affirmationis el negationis,vel in his quæ de universalibus dicuntur universaliter, in his quæ sunt singularia,necesse est, esse, opposilarum hanc quidem veram esse illam vero falsam. Nihil autem utrumtibet esse in his quæ fiunt, sed omnia esse et fieri ex necessitate. Quare non oportebit neque consulere, neque negotiari,ut si facimus, erit hoc,si veronon hoc, non eritNihilenim prohibet in millesimum an num hunc quidem dicere hoc futurum esse, illum vero non dicere. Quare ex necessitate erit quodlibet eorum, unc ab eo verum erat dicere. At vero neque hoc differt,si aliquis dixerit dixerit contradictionem, vel non di xerit.","english":"If anyone, then, says this, he says, first, that that is incongruous and impossible: that in a contradictory proposition, when the affirmation is false, the negation is not true, and again when the negation is false, the affirmation is also false. For this used to happen only in contraries, not also in contradictory opposition. For in this, one must always be true, and the other always false.\n\nIn addition to these things, if it is true to say that it is white and large, both must be. But if it will be tomorrow, it must be tomorrow. But if it will neither be nor not be, tomorrow it will not be, whichever of the two. For example, a naval battle. For it will be necessary that a naval battle neither happen nor not happen. These, then, are the incongruities that follow, and others of this sort, if of every affirmation and negation, both in those things that are said universally of universals and in those that are singular, it is necessary that of the opposites one be true and the other false. But nothing is to be whichever of the two in things that come to be, but all things are and come to be from necessity. Therefore it will not be necessary either to deliberate or to conduct business, as if, if we do this, this will be, but if we do not do this, it will not be. For nothing prevents someone from saying at the thousandth year that this will be, and another from saying that it will not. Therefore whichever of them it is will be from necessity, since it was true to say it then. But indeed it makes no difference whether someone has stated a contradiction or has not stated it.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":100,"ref":"p100","source":"Manifestum est eaim quoniam se habentres, etiamsi non hic quidem affirmaverit ille vero negaverit, Non enim propter negare vel affirmare erit vet non erit, MCC in millesimum annum magis quam in quantolibet tempore. Quare si in omni tempore sic se habebat, ut unum diceretur vere, necesse erathoc fieri, et unumquodque eorum quæ (tunt sic semper se habebat, ut ex necessitate fieret. Quando enim vere dicit quis quoniam erit, non potest non fieri; et quod jactum est,verum erat dicere semper quoniam erit.\n\nAddidit quoque aliud, quo magis id quod dicitur videatur incongruum.Omne enim idquod praedicitur in futurum, si vere prædicitur, erit. Si quis enim dicat in praesenti tempore, hoc animal quodlibet albumest, vel magni corporis,et ocvere pronuntiet, album et magnum illud animal esse necesse est.Ita etiam in futuro si quis vere dicat quoniam hocanimal cras album fiet, et corporis vastioris, necesse est cras utraque contingere,ut et album fiat et corporis vastioris. Sin vero falso aliquid prædicatur, necesse est non esse quod dicitur,si sit affirmatio:ut si quis affirmet falso futurum navale bellum,necesse est non fieri quod a falsa affirmatione prædicitur.At si sit falsa negatio,necesse est fieri quod falsa negatio futurum non esse prædixit; sin vero utraque falsa sunt, non erit ex necessitate quod dicitur, quia de.","english":"For it is evident that things are so disposed that, even if this one affirms and that one denies, it will not be because of the denying or affirming that it will be or not be—more in the thousandth year than in any whatever time. Wherefore if in every time it was so disposed that one thing was truly said, it was necessary that this come about, and each one of those things which are was always so disposed that it came about by necessity. For when someone truly says that a thing will be, it cannot not come about; and what has been said, it was true to say always that it will be.\n\nHe added also another point, by which what is said may seem more incongruous. For everything that is foretold for the future, if it is truly foretold, will be. For if anyone says in the present time that this or that animal is white, or of large body, and pronounces it truly, that animal must be white and large. So also in the future, if anyone truly says that this animal will become white tomorrow, and of a more massive body, both must come about tomorrow, so that it both becomes white and becomes of a more massive body. But if something is foretold falsely, it is necessary that what is said not be, if it is an affirmation: as if anyone falsely affirms that a naval battle will be in the future, it is necessary that what is foretold by the false affirmation not come about. But if it is a false negation, it is necessary that what the false negation foretold would not be come about; but if both are false, what is said will not be by necessity, because concerning","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":101,"ref":"p101","source":"finite affirmatio falsa est,nec non erit ex necessitate quod dicitur, quia definite est falsa negatio. Unde fit ut utrumlibet quod est in rebus omnino perimatur utraque enim necessario sunt et ex necessitate con tingunt, et est necessitas illa impossibilis. Nam si quis dicat cras futurum navale bellum,aliusque neget,et pronuntiet non futurum,si utraque sint falsa, necesse quidem erit non essa cras navale bellum, quoniam affirmatio, quas illud dicit futurum, falsa est.Rursus necesse est esse cras navale bellum,quoniam negatio quæ dicit cras non futurum,ipsa quoque mentitur. Quare necesse erit et esse navale bellum,et non esse,quod est impossibile,et præter communem cogitationis naturam.Non est igitur verum utrasque et simul,id est affirmationem negationemque mentiri.Quæ ergo, inquit, contingunt inconvenientia,hæc sunt.et hujusmodi. si quis dicat vel in his quae universalia sunt et universaliter prædicantur, vel in his quæ singularia in propositionibus enuntiantur, unam necessario definite esse veram, definite esse alteram falsam,talia ilium, inquit, inconvenientia conseqlJentur,et alia similia. Hoc scilicet dicens de superioribus argumentis, in quibus ostendebat omnia ex necessitate contingere,si quia unam veram definite, alteram diceret definite mendacem.","english":"the affirmation is false, and what is said will not necessarily not be, because the negation is definitely false. Hence it comes about that what is in things is altogether destroyed as being either-way; for both are necessarily and come about from necessity, and that necessity is impossible. For if someone says that there will be a naval battle tomorrow, and another denies it and pronounces that it will not be, if both are false, it will indeed be necessary that there not be a naval battle tomorrow, since the affirmation which says it will be is false. Again, it is necessary that there be a naval battle tomorrow, since the negation which says that tomorrow it will not be is itself also lying. Wherefore it will be necessary both that there be a naval battle and that there not be, which is impossible and beyond the common nature of thought. It is not therefore true that both are false at the same time, that is, the affirmation and the negation. These, then, he says, are the absurdities that follow, and of this kind. If someone should say either in those things which are universal and are predicated universally, or in those things which are singular and enunciated in propositions, that one is necessarily definitely true and the other definitely false, such absurdities, he says, would follow, and others like them. He says this, namely, concerning the earlier arguments, in which he was showing that all things come about from necessity, if because he said that one is definitely true, the other definitely false.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":102,"ref":"p102","source":"Quaenam vero asserat alia inconvenientia impossibiliaque concurrere his qui unam definite veram proponunt, haec sunt: si quis enim proponat unam esse veram,alteram esse falsam, tollit (ut supra dictum est) id quod est utrumlibet in rebus,eL omnia esse vel fieri ex necessitate constituit, nihil a casu,ninilque a propria volunLate.Undefit ut neque negotiari sit utiJe,nec inire actum,quæ omnia consilii ratione tractantur, ipsum enim consilium supervacuum est,cum omnia quaecunque futura sint necesse sit evenire. Quid enim unusquisque dicat, Si hoc faciam, illud mihi eveniet atque continget, si vero hæc, illa res eveniet? etenim nihil prohibet quemvis illum affirmare aliquid esse faciendum, alium vero negare,cum omnia vi necessitatis eveniant. Nam si omnia quæ Eunt nunc, ante aliquis vere prædiceret,quis dubitatq:nn illa quæ factasunt,immutabili violentia necessitatis evenerint? Hoc est enim quod ait: Quare ex necessitate erit quodlibet eorum quod tunc verum erat dicere.","english":"But what other inconsistencies and impossibilities follow for those who propose that one [of the two] is definitely true, are these: for if anyone proposes that one is true and the other false, he removes (as was said above) that which is the either-way in things, and establishes that all things are or come to be from necessity, nothing from chance, nothing from one's own will. It follows that neither is it useful to conduct business nor to enter upon action, all of which are handled by the reasoning of counsel; for counsel itself is superfluous, since whatever is going to be must necessarily come about. For what does each person say: \"If I do this, that will happen and fall to me; but if this, that thing will happen\"? For nothing prevents one person from affirming that something ought to be done, and another from denying it, since all things come about by the force of necessity. For if someone had truly foretold all the things that are now, who doubts that those things which have been done came about by the immutable violence of necessity? For this is what he says: Therefore, whatever of those things which it was then true to say, will be by necessity.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":103,"ref":"p103","source":"Sed ne illud videatur incongruumquodrerum eventum nonexipsa rerum natura, sed ex propositionum veritate et falsitate judicamus,scrupulum ipse dissolvit dicens.At vero nec hoc differt,si aliqui dixerint contradictionem,vel non dixerint:ad tollendum enim perimendumqueconsilium,quod nihil omnino homines oporteat consiliari,parum valet aliquid ante prædici;sive enim dicatur aliquid,sive non, quidquid vere prædici potest, illud eliam si non praedicatur evenire necesse est;idcirco enim vere prædicitur,quia vere prædici potest;idcirco vere prædici potest,quia immutabiliterfuturum est. Quare futurum est,si prædicitur vere, nec tantum si prædicitur, sed etiam si prædici vere potest; sive enim prædicatur,sive non prædicatur, quidquid vere prædici potest, hoc ex necessitate futurum est. Manifestum est enim, inquit,quod si sic se habeat res,sive unus eam affirmet et alius neget,si eventura est, nihil illi negatio officit; si eventura non est, nihil affirmatio prodest. Non enim,inquit,propternegare etaffirmare erit vel non erit,nec banc vim naturae tempus mutabit.Eodem modo enim evenient,ea quaepost millesimum annum eventura creduntur,his qux post quantumlibet tempus ex necessitate futura sunt:unde Ht,ut si in omni tempore omnia sic se habent, ut unum definite verum dici possit,definite alterum falsum, omnia quæcunque facta sunt, vel fient, immutabili rerum ratione contingant.","english":"But lest this seem incongruous—that we judge the outcome of things not from the nature of the things themselves but from the truth and falsity of propositions—he himself dissolves the scruple, saying: Yet this too makes no difference, whether some have said there is a contradiction or have not said so; for to remove and destroy the counsel that men ought not to deliberate about anything at all, it matters little that something is foretold beforehand; for whether something is said or not, whatever can be truly foretold, even if it is not foretold, must necessarily come to pass; for it is truly foretold because it can be truly foretold; and it can be truly foretold because it will immutably come to be. Wherefore it will come to be, if it is truly foretold—and not only if it is foretold, but also if it can be truly foretold; for whether it is foretold or not foretold, whatever can be truly foretold will necessarily come to be. For it is manifest, he says, that if the matter stands thus—whether one affirms it and another denies it—if it is going to happen, the denial hinders it in nothing; if it is not going to happen, the affirmation profits nothing. For, he says, it will not be or not be because of the denying and affirming, nor will time change this force of nature. For in the same way those things which are believed to be going to happen after a thousand years will come to pass as those which are going to be by necessity after however great a time; whence it follows that if at all times all things stand thus, that one can be called definitely true and the other definitely false, all things whatsoever that have been made or will be made come about by an immutable order of things.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":104,"ref":"p104","source":"Hoc est enim quod ail, necesse esse fieri unumquodque eorum quae fiunt; id est, si sic se haberet, ut ex necessitate fierent omnia, et hoc superiori argumentatione confirmat dicens:Qllando enim vere dicit quis quoniam erit, non potest non fieri, eventus enim necessitatem, necessitas sequitur veritatem, et quod factum est, verum erat dicere semper quoniam erit, veritas namque propositionis ex rerum necessariis venit eventibus.\n\nQuod si hæc non sunt possibilia. Videmus enim esse principium futurorum, et ab eo quod consultamus, atque agimus aliquid, et quoniam est omnino in his. quæ non semper actu sunt, possibile esse et non esse, similiter, in quibus utrumque contingit et esse et non esse, quare fieri et non fieri. Ac multa nobis manifest!! sunt sic se habentia, ut quoniarn hanc vestem possibile est incidi, et non incidetur,sed priusexteretur. Similiter autem et non incidi possibile est. Non enim esset eam prius exteri,nisi possibile esset non incidi. Quare et in aliis fiendis,quæcunque secundacm potentium hujusmodi dicuntur, Manifestum igitur est quoniam non omnia ex necessitate vel sunt, vel fiunt,sed alia quidem utrumlibet,et non magis vel affirmatio, vel negatio nera est, alia vero magis quidem, et in pluribus alterum, seri contingit fieri et alterum, alterum vero minime.","english":"For this is what he says: that each of the things which come to be must necessarily come to be; that is, if matters stood thus, that all things came to be from necessity, and this he confirms by the preceding argument, saying: For when someone truly says that a thing will be, it cannot not come to be; for the outcome follows necessity, necessity follows truth, and what has been made, it was true to say always that it would be; for the truth of a proposition comes from the necessary outcomes of things.\n\nBut if these things are not possible. For we see that there is a beginning of future things, and from the fact that we deliberate and do something, and since it is altogether in those things which are not always in act, that they are possible to be and not to be; similarly, in those in which both being and not being fall out, whence also to come to be and not to come to be. And many things are manifest to us that stand thus, as that it is possible for this garment to be cut, and it will not be cut, but will first be worn out. Similarly, however, it is also possible for it not to be cut. For it would not first be worn out unless it were possible for it not to be cut. Wherefore also in other things that come to be, whatever are said in this way according to powers, it is manifest therefore that not all things either are or come to be from necessity, but some indeed either way, and the affirmation or the negation is no more true, while others indeed more, and in more cases, it happens that one comes to be and the other, but the other not at all.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":105,"ref":"p105","source":"Longum hyperbaton est, quo'1 nos priuseaponimus, postea continuamus. Liquet enim aliquarum rerum nos esse principium, ut actuum nostrorum. Si quis enim aliquid consilio faciat,quidquid consiliatione peregerit, ejus rei ipse principium est. A consiliante enim incipit,quidquid consilii solertia ministratur.Sunt enim quaedamquæ actunonsunt, sed poteslate,quæ potestasnon fit ex necessitat.e,id es,u possit quem fieri,non tmen necesse s,u hanc vel quamlibet tunicam possibile est quidem ferro incidi, sed non est necesse. Fortasse enim utendo vetustabitur,et ipso quotidiano solyetur attritu.Ergo potest quidem incidi,sed forte non incidetur, sed antequam incidi possit exteritur.Rursus potest fieri utnon dividatur,neque enim exterieam possibile esset,nisi prius esset possibile non incidi, quare possunt quidem quaedam fieri,sed ita contingit fortasse ut non fiant Suntigitur quaedam possibilia non necessaria, et in aliis quoque quae fiunt eadem ratio est.","english":"It is a long hyperbaton, which we first set apart and afterwards continue. For it is clear that we are the principle of certain things, as of our own actions. For if anyone does something by counsel, whatever he has accomplished by counsel, he himself is the principle of that thing. For whatever is supplied by the skill of counsel begins from the one who counsels. For there are certain things which are not in act but in power, which power does not come to be from necessity—that is, so that it could indeed come to be, but not necessarily. For this tunic, or any tunic you please, can indeed be cut with iron, but it is not necessary. For perhaps by use it will grow old and be dissolved by daily rubbing. Therefore it can indeed be cut, but perhaps it will not be cut, but will be worn out before it can be cut. Again, it can happen that it is not divided, for it would not be possible for it to be worn out unless it were first possible for it not to be cut. Wherefore certain things can indeed come to be, but it happens perhaps by chance that they do not come to be. There are therefore certain things which are possible but not necessary, and in other things which come to be the same account holds.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":106,"ref":"p106","source":"Omne enim quod fit a quolibetconsilio, ipse qui consiliatur illius rei principium est, non necessitas,et quæcunque sunt possibilia, mutabiliter evenient.Quæenimeecundumaliquam possibilitatem dicuntur,non eveniuntsecundum necessitatem, unde fit ut manifestum sit qu oniam non omnia ex necessitate vel sunt, vel fiunt,sed quædam sunt quae aequali modo, vel fiunt,vel non fiunt,et hoc est utrumlibet fieri,alia vero in pluribus quidem fiunt, in paucioribus vero non fiunt, et aequaliter quidem fiunt,ut egredientem domo amicum videre, fit enim hoc et fit æqualiter;quædam vero frequentius fiunt; quam non fiunt,ut sexagenarium canescere frequentius fit,quam non fit.Et tamen ita hoc potestHen, ut non fieri impossibile non sit. Hoc enim est quod ait:Alia vero magis quidem et in pluribus alterum, ut canescere in pluribus sexagenarii quam non canescere. Sed contingit fieri alterum, scilicet ut non canescat,alterum vero minime, scilicet ut canescat. Esl autem hyperbaton hoc modo. Quod si hæc impossibilia videmus,quod sumusenim aliquibus ipsi principium,etquæcunque possibilia sunt,fieri possunt,et nou fieri.Si igitur possibile est et ut sint et non sint, manifestum est non omnia ex necessitate contingere, sed alia æqualiter,alia vero evenire quidem in pluribus, in paucioribus vero non evenire,sed ut non eveniant necesse non est.","english":"For everything that is done by any counsel whatsoever, the one who takes counsel is himself the principle of that thing, not necessity, and all things that are possible come about changeably. For things that are spoken of according to some possibility do not come about according to necessity; hence it is clear that not all things either are or come to be from necessity, but some things there are that in equal measure either come to be or do not come to be, and this is to come to be either way; others, however, come to be in the greater number of cases but not in the fewer, and they come to be equally, as to see a friend upon leaving the house—for this happens and happens equally; but some things happen more frequently than they do not, as for a man of sixty years to grow gray happens more frequently than it does not. And yet this can so happen that not to happen is not impossible. For this is what he says: some things are more and in the greater number of cases one way, as to grow gray in the greater number of cases for a man of sixty rather than not to grow gray. But it happens that the one comes about—namely, that he does not grow gray—while the other does not at all—namely, that he grows gray. And the hyperbaton is in this manner. But if we see that these things are impossible—for we ourselves are the principle of certain things, and whatever things are possible can both come to be and not come to be. If, therefore, it is possible both that they be and that they not be, it is manifest that not all things come about from necessity, but some equally, while others indeed come about in the greater number of cases and do not come about in the fewer, but that they not come about is not necessary.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":107,"ref":"p107","source":"Igitur esse quod est, quando est, et non esse, quod non est, quando non est, necesse est. Sed non omne quod est,necesse est esse, nee omne quod non est,necesse est non esse.Non enim idem est omne quod est, necessario eSbe, quando est, et simpliciter esse ex necessitate. Similiter autem et in eo quod nan est. Ei In contradictione eadem ratio est,esse quidem vel non esse omne, necesse est,et futurum esse, vel non.Non tamen dividentem dicere alterum necessarium.Dico autem ut necesse est quidem esse futurum bellum navale cras vel non futurum esse. Sed non necesse est futurum esse cras bellum navale, uel non futurum esse. Futurum autem uel esse, vel non esse necesse est.\n\nNunc quid sit necessarium temporale describit. Ait enim omnisres quando est,ea:n sine dubio esse necesse est. Non enim fieri potest ut cum est, non sit,et rursus res quæ non est, quando non est,eam non esse necesse est, neque enim fieri potest, ut quando non est, sit; sed si quando est, eam esse necesse est, id est, non simplex necessarium,sicul solem oriri simpliciter,sed temporaliter necessa-, rium,utsedeo,non idcirco simpliciter,et sine temporis præsentis descriptione ex necessitate est. Quando enim sedeo, non potest fieri ut non sedeam,et necesse est mihi tunc sedere cum sedeo, sed ipsum sedere mihi non ex necessitate inest,possum enim surgere.","english":"Therefore, that what is, is when it is, and that what is not, is not when it is not, is necessary. But not everything that is, is necessarily, nor is everything that is not, necessarily not. For it is not the same thing for everything that is to be necessarily when it is, and to be simply from necessity. And similarly also in the case of what is not. And in contradiction the same reasoning holds: that everything either is or is not is necessary, and that it will be or will not be. Yet it is not by dividing that one should say that one of the two is necessary. I mean, for example, that it is indeed necessary that there will be a naval battle tomorrow or that there will not be. But it is not necessary that there will be a naval battle tomorrow, or that there will not be. For it is necessary that it either will be or will not be.\n\nNow he describes what is temporally necessary. For he says that every thing, when it is, is without doubt necessarily. For it cannot happen that when it is, it is not; and again, a thing that is not, when it is not, is necessarily not; for it cannot happen that when it is not, it is. But if at some time it is, it is necessary that it be—that is, not a simple necessity, as that the sun rises simply, but a temporal necessity, as that I am sitting is not for that reason simply and without the description of the present time from necessity. For when I am sitting, it cannot happen that I am not sitting, and it is necessary for me then to sit when I am sitting; but the sitting itself is not present in me from necessity, for I can rise.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":108,"ref":"p108","source":"Rursus cum non sedeo,tunc mihi necesse est non sedere, sed ipsum non sedere, mihi ex necessitate non inest,possum enim sedere;ergo quod est, quando est, ex necessitate est,et quod non est, tunc cum non esl, fieri ut non sit non potest. Non tamen omnia quaecunque sunt aut non sunt,autex necessitate sunt,præter temporis præsentis nuncupationem, aut ex necessitate non sunt, nulla mentione praesentis temporis facta. Quare non est, inquit, idem temporaliter necessarium esse, ut est mihi cum sedeo, et simpliciter ex necessitaleesse, ut homini mortalitas, nec idem est, cum non est necessario non esse, ut mihi cum non sedeo non inest ser!ere,et quod simpliciter ex necessitate non habeo,ut tres oculos vel immortalilatem,atquehoc est quod ait,similiter autem et in eo quod non est. Hoc autem cur dixerit sequitur,et in contradictione eadem ratio est, esse quidem vel non esse omne necesse est,et futurum esse vel non esse.Similis est, inquit,ratio in contradictionibus cuntingentibus,et in his quæ,cum sunt,secundum tempus necessaria Bunt, simpliciter autem necessaria non sunt.","english":"Again, when I am not sitting, then it is necessary for me not to sit, but the not sitting itself is not present in me by necessity, for I can sit. Therefore, what is, when it is, is by necessity, and what is not, when it is not, cannot come to be so that it is not. Yet not all things whatsoever that are or are not are either by necessity, apart from the designation of the present time, or are by necessity not, with no mention made of the present time. Wherefore, he says, it is not the same thing to be necessary in a temporal sense, as it is for me when I sit, and to be simply by necessity, as mortality is for a human being; nor is it the same to be necessarily not, when one is not, as it is for me when I do not sit that not sitting is not present in me, and to have something simply by necessity not, as three eyes or immortality. And this is what he says: similarly also in the case of what is not. But why he said this follows, and in contradiction the same reasoning holds: that everything necessarily is or is not, and that it will be or will not be. The reasoning, he says, is similar in contingent contradictions and in those things which, when they are, are necessary according to time, but are not simply necessary.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":109,"ref":"p109","source":"Nam in futuris et in contingentibus contradictionibus,totam quidem contradictionem necesseestunam veram habere partem, alteram falsam,utsi quis affirmet cras bellum navale futurum;id ergo non est necesse: et rursus siquis neget non futurum,est quidem aut esse,aut non esse necesse,sed non est neceaseesse, nec rursus necesse est non esse, sed tantum aut esse aut non esse;idcirco tota quidem contradictio, unam habebit partem veram, alteram falsam, sed non erit ipsorum una definite vera, falsa altera definite. In praeteritis enim sic dicimus: Romulus Romam condidit. Romulus Romam non condidit; una quidem vera est,nlterafalsa,sed in his definite vera est affirmatio,definite falsa negatio. Nam quia quod factumesl,fieri ut fa.it,non potest, ideo definite in præterito contradictio vera vel falsa est. In futuris vero propositionibus non idem estin his scilicet uxcontingentia significant utsidicam Philoxenus coenaturus est, Philoxenus coenaturus. non est. In tota quidem contradictione,una vera est, altera falsa,sed nullus potest dividere, ut dicat aut affirmationem constitute et definite veram esse aut negationem.Ante enim quam cænet, indefinitum est et variabile an cænet. Postquam vero cænaverit praeteritum definitur, igitur aut esse aut non esse aliquid in futuris contradictionibus necesse est.","english":"For in future and contingent contradictions, the whole contradiction must indeed have one part true and the other false, as if someone should affirm that there will be a naval battle tomorrow; that, therefore, is not necessary. And again, if someone should deny that it will not be, it is indeed necessary either that it be or that it not be, but it is not necessary that it be, nor again is it necessary that it not be, but only either that it be or that it not be. Therefore the whole contradiction will indeed have one part true and the other false, but one of them will not be definitely true and the other definitely false. For in past things we speak thus: Romulus founded Rome; Romulus did not found Rome. One is indeed true and the other false, but in these the affirmation is definitely true and the negation definitely false. For because what has been done cannot be made not to have been done, therefore in the past the contradiction is definitely true or false. But in future propositions it is not the same, namely in those which signify contingent things, as if I should say: Philoxenus will dine; Philoxenus will not dine. In the whole contradiction one is indeed true and the other false, but no one can divide it so as to say that either the affirmation is established and definitely true or the negation. For before he dines, it is indefinite and variable whether he will dine. But after he has dined, it is defined as past. Therefore in future contradictions it is necessary that something either be or not be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":110,"ref":"p110","source":"Ut autem unum fiat, et unum non fiat,non est necesse, in quo igitur similitudo est contingentis contradiclionis et temporalis, neque simplicis necessitatis in eo scilicet, quia sicut necesse est esse quod est quando est,non tamen simpliciter necesse est esse quod est præter temporis adjectionem:ita in contradictione contingenti,affirmationem quidem vel negationem veram esse necesse est, non tamen vel affirmationem simpliciter ac definite veram,vel negationem, sed utramlibet et quam certae veritatis constituerit eventus.\n\nQuare quoniam similiterorationes vera; sunl,quemadmodum et res,manifestum est,quoniam quæcunque sic se habent, ut utrumlibet sint,et contraria ipsorum contingant, necesse est similiter se habere et contradictionem,quod contingit in his quæ non semper sunt,et non semper non sunt. Horum enim necesse est alteram partem contradictionis veram esse vel falsam.Non tamen hoc vel illud, sed tdrumlibet, et magis quidem alteram veram,non tamen jam veram vel falsam. Quare manifestum est,quoniamnon est necesse omnis ajfirmationis et negationis oppositarum hanc quem veram, illam vero talsam esse.Neque enim quemadmodum in his quæ sunt,sic se res habet etiam in his quæ non sunt, possibilibus tamen esse, vel HOM esse, sed quemadmodum dictum est.","english":"But that one thing should come to be and one thing not come to be is not necessary. Therefore, in the case where there is the likeness of a contingent and temporal contradiction, there is not likewise [the likeness] of simple necessity—namely, because just as it is necessary that what is, is when it is, yet it is not simply necessary that what is, is, apart from the addition of time, so in a contingent contradiction it is indeed necessary that the affirmation or the negation be true, yet not that the affirmation be simply and definitely true, nor the negation, but either one, whichever the outcome has established as of certain truth.\n\nWherefore, since speeches are true in the same way as things are, it is manifest that whatever things are so disposed that they may be either way, and their opposites may come about, the contradiction in their case must likewise be so disposed—which happens in those things that are not always and are not always not. For of these it is necessary that one part of the contradiction be true or false, yet not this one or that one, but either, and indeed one more [likely] true, yet not already [definitely] true or false. Wherefore it is manifest that it is not necessary that of every opposed affirmation and negation this one be true and that one false. For neither in the case of things that are, nor in the case of things that are not but are possible to be or not to be, is the matter as it is in things that are—but as has been said.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":111,"ref":"p111","source":"Habent,inquit,quamdam cognationem res,et ilia quæ resipsaspropria significatione designant.Quare et oratio quae designat atque significat rem, sic se habebit,quemadmodum res ipsa est.Ergo si res non fuerit,falsa oratio est;si res fuerit, vera oratio est; et si vera vel falsa oratio est,erit id quod diciturvel non erit, ut sibi res et oratio convertantur. Ergo si res constituta non est, nee definita necessitate proveniens, nec illa oratio,quæ rem ipsam designat, definitae est veritatis.Ergo in quibus rebus possibile esnon modo esse,sed euam non esse contingere, in bis affirmatio et negatio utrumlibet sese habel,et quemadmodum rem ipsam,et esse et non esse contingit,ita quoque contradictionem et veram et falsam esse indefinite proveniet. Hoc autem in quibus fiat, ipse declarat,ait enim:ln hisquæ non sempersunt, et non semper non sunt,sola enim sunt quæ etesse et non esse contingunt,quæ non semper sunt, status eo semper non sunt;si enim semper essent, et non rum mutari non posset, atque ideo ex necessitate essent; si autem semper non essent, eas non esse, necesse esset.Etenim sicut ipsa natura rerum evenientium est varia, ita quoque altera pars contradictionis habet variabilem veritatem,et semper quidem vera vel falsa est, non tamen una definite, ut hoc verum sit determinate,aut illud,sed utrumlibet.","english":"Things, he says, have a certain kinship with those things that designate the things themselves by their own proper signification. Wherefore the speech also which designates and signifies a thing will be disposed in such a way as the thing itself is. Therefore, if the thing has not been, the speech is false; if the thing has been, the speech is true; and if the speech is true or false, that which is said will either be or not be, so that the thing and the speech are converted with each other. Therefore, if the thing is not established, nor comes about by a defined necessity, neither is that speech which designates the thing itself of defined truth. Therefore, in those things in which it is possible not only to be but also not to be, in these the affirmation and the negation hold themselves to either side, and just as it is contingent for the thing itself both to be and not to be, so too it will come about indefinitely that the contradiction is both true and false. But in which things this happens, he himself declares, for he says: in those things which are not always and are not always not; for those alone are which are contingent both to be and not to be, which are not always and are not always not; for if they were always, they could not be changed, and therefore they would be by necessity; but if they were always not, it would be necessary for them not to be. For just as the nature itself of things coming to be is various, so too the other part of the contradiction has a variable truth, and indeed it is always true or false, yet not definitely one, so that this is true determinately, or that, but either side.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":112,"ref":"p112","source":"Et sicutstatus ipse rerum mutabilisest,ita quoqueveritas aut falsitas propositionum dubitabilis sit, et eveniet quidem,ut in aliquibus frequentius una sit vera,non tamen semper, et ut una rarius vera,non tamen eam falsam esse necesse sit semper, quod per hoc demonstravit quod dixit,et magis quidem veram alteram, non tantum jam:emperveram vel falsam. Concludit totam de futuris contingentibus propositionibus quæstionem,et ait:Manifestum est; non necesse esseomnes atfirmaliones et negationes definite veras esse, sed deest definite, atque ideo subaudiendum est.Illarum enim quæ contingentes et futurae Bunt, nunquam definite una vera est,altera, falsa.Neque enim,inquit,quemadmodum in his quae sunt,sic se habet in his quae non sunt,possibilibus tamen esse, aut non esse, sed quemadmodum dictum est. IlIa etenim quae sunt praesentis temporis, sicut ipsorum esse definitum est,ita quoque de his definita est propositionum veritas faisitasque.Ilta vero quae non sunt quidem,possunt tamen esse,et non esse: et ita futura sunt,ut non ex necessitate proveniant, sed possunt ita esse, ut etiam possint et non esse, in his hocmodo se habebitcontradictio quemadmodum dictum est. Dictum autem est quoniam esse quidem vel non esse:omne necesse est, et futurum esse vel non necesse est. ontamen jam divise ac definite alterum eorum esse necesse est.","english":"And just as the state of things itself is changeable, so too the truth or falsity of propositions is doubtful; and it will indeed happen that in some cases one is true more often, yet not always, and that one is true more rarely, yet it is not necessary that it always be false. He demonstrated this by what he said—that the one is more true, but not already always true or false. He concludes the whole question concerning propositions about future contingents, and says: It is manifest that not all affirmations and negations are definitely true, but \"definitely\" is missing, and therefore must be understood. For of those which are contingent and future, never is one definitely true and the other false. For, he says, it is not as in those things which are, so also in those things which are not but are possible to be or not to be, but as has been said. For those things which are of the present time, just as their own being is definite, so too the truth and falsity of propositions about them is definite. But those things which indeed are not, yet can be and not be, and are future in such a way that they do not come about by necessity, but can be so as also to be able not to be—in these the contradiction will stand in this way, as has been said. And it has been said that to be or not to be is in every case necessary, and to be about to be or not to be is not necessary. Yet it is not the case that one of them must already be dividedly and definitely.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":113,"ref":"p113","source":"Erant autem quatuor diversitates, ut aut utraeque verae essent, quod sustulit per hoc quod ait, utraeque enim non erunt simul in talibus;aut utraeque falsae essent,quod per hoc evertit quod ait:Atvero nec quoniam neutrum verum est contingit dicere; aut ut una vera definite, altera falsa definite esset, quod illa argumentatione destruxit,per quam omnia ex necessitate docuit evenire, si hoc admitteretur. Quod si res ilis minime sunt,constat unam quidem veram esse, aliam vero in contradictione mend acem; sed sicut res ipsae mutabiliter et indefinite futuræ sunt, ita quoque enuntiationes variabili nec definita veritate et falsitate proferuntur.\n\nLIBER SECUNDUS.\n\nDE ENUNTIATIONIBUS INFINITIS.\n\nQuoniam autem est affirmatio de aliquo significans aliquid, hoc autem est vel nomen vel innominatum, unum autem oportet esse, et de uno, id quod est in affirmatione,nomen autem dictum est,et innominalum prius,non homo enim nomen quidem non dieo, sed nomen infinitum,unum enim signifieat quodammodo infinitum nomen, quemadmodum et non currit, non uerbum dico,sed infinitum verbum; erit omnis affi)matio et negatio,vel ex nomine et verbo,vel ex infinito nomine et verbo.Præter verbum autem nulla affirmatio vel negatio est.Est enim vel erit, velfuit,vel sit, tel quæcunque alia hujusmodi verba,ex his sunt quæ sunt posita. Consignificant enim tempus.","english":"But there were four differences: either that both should be true, which he removed by this, that he says, \"for both will not be together in such things\"; or that both should be false, which he overturned by this, that he says, \"but neither does it happen that one can say that neither is true\"; or that one should be definitely true and the other definitely false, which he destroyed by that argumentation through which he showed that all things come about from necessity, if this were admitted. But if these things are not so, it is clear that one is indeed true, but the other is false in a contradiction; yet just as the things themselves are going to be future changeably and indefinitely, so too utterances are brought forth with changeable and indefinite truth and falsity.\n\nBOOK TWO.\n\nON INDEFINITE ENUNCIATIONS.\n\nSince, then, affirmation is a signification of something about something, and this is either a name or a nameless term, and it is necessary that there be one, and about one, that which is in the affirmation—and a name has been spoken of, and a nameless term earlier; for I do not call \"not-man\" a name, but an indefinite name, for it signifies in a certain way an infinite name, just as also \"does not run\" I do not call a verb, but an indefinite verb—every affirmation and negation will be either from a name and a verb, or from an indefinite name and a verb. But apart from a verb there is no affirmation or negation. For \"is\" or \"will be,\" or \"was,\" or \"may be,\" or whatever other verbs of this kind there are, are among those which have been posited. For they signify time along with.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":114,"ref":"p114","source":"Postquam de praeteriti ac præsentis, futuri etiam temporisveritateet falsilate disseruit,nunc vim simplicis et praedicative prupositionis informat dicens quoniam simplex affirmatio unam rem de una significat,id est,da uno subjecto unum prædicat, subjeotum autem illud aut nomen est, aut quod apud veteres quidem fuit innominatum, ab Aristotele vero infinitum nomen vocatum est;prius enim dictum est quod homo nomen esset,non homo vero innominatum quidem apud antiquos,sed nunc infinitum nomen. Quoniam igitur manifestum est unum de uno prædicaresimplicem propositionem,omnis erit propositio simplex, aut ex nomine et verbo, aut ex infinito nomine et verho.Quod autem dixit.-Non homo enim nomen quidem non dico,sed infinitum nomen hujus.modi est. Nomen, inquit, omnia definita significat, non homo vero quamvis unum quodlibet eorum designare possit,quæ homines non sunt, tamen quid designet infinitum est et dubium.","english":"After he has discussed the truth and falsity of past and present time, and also of future time, he now sets forth the force of the simple and predicative proposition, saying that a simple affirmation signifies one thing about one thing, that is, it predicates one thing of one subject; and that subject is either a noun, or what among the ancients was indeed unnamed, but by Aristotle was called an infinite noun. For it was said earlier that \"man\" is a noun, but \"not-man\" was indeed unnamed among the ancients, but is now an infinite noun. Since, therefore, it is manifest that a simple proposition predicates one thing of one thing, every simple proposition will be either from a noun and a verb, or from an infinite noun and a verb. But as for what he said—\"For not-man I do not indeed call a noun, but it is an infinite noun of this sort\"—he says that a noun signifies all things defined, whereas \"not-man,\" although it can designate any one whatever of those things which are not men, yet what it designates is infinite and doubtful.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":115,"ref":"p115","source":"Nam cum multa sint quae homines non sunt,et unum quodlibet eorum significare possit quid significet ignoratur:sicut enim non currit non est verbum simpliciter,sed infinitum verbum,ita nomina cum negatione non sunt nomina,sed infinita nomina.Erunl igitur in propositionibus subjecta aut nomina,aulinfinita nomina,præter verbum autem nulla est affirmatio vel negatio planissime docuit,quæ pars orationis in simplici propositione obtineat principatum.N am si praeterverbum fieri simplex propositio non potest,constat omnemvim simplicis propositionis verba complecti.Omnis au. tem propositio aut esse, aut fuisse, aut futurum esse aut hujusmodi aliquid habebit.Nam qui dicit curro currens est dicit. Et qui dicit cucurrit, currens fuit proponit;et quid dicitcurret, currenserit. Si ergo omnis propositio, aut esse, aut fuisse, aut futurum esse,aut aliquid hujusmodi utsit enuntiatio, retinebit,, manifestum est quod præter verbum esse non possit.Hæc enim,id est,fuit vel est,aut futurum est, verba sunt, ut ex his cognosci possit quae sunt superius posita atque confessa,cum diceremus verba esse quæ coosignificarent tempus. Etenim est,et fuit, et Coetera significationem temporis secum trahunt.","english":"For since there are many things that men are not, and any one of them can signify something, it is unknown what it signifies; for just as \"does not run\" is not a verb simply, but an infinite verb, so names with negation are not names, but infinite names. Therefore, in propositions the subjects are either names or infinite names, but apart from a verb there is no affirmation or negation—he has most plainly taught which part of speech holds the principal place in a simple proposition. For if a simple proposition cannot be made apart from a verb, it is established that all the force of a simple proposition involves verbs. But every proposition will have either \"is,\" or \"was,\" or \"will be,\" or something of this kind. For he who says \"I run\" says that he is running. And he who says \"I ran\" proposes that he was running; and he who says \"I will run\" that he will be running. If, therefore, every proposition either is, or was, or will be, or announces something of this kind, it will retain it, it is manifest that it cannot be apart from a verb. For these, that is, \"was\" or \"is,\" or \"will be,\" are verbs, so that from these it can be recognized what was placed and conceded above, when we said that verbs are those which signify time along with their meaning. For \"is,\" and \"was,\" and the rest carry with them the signification of time.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":116,"ref":"p116","source":"Quare prima erit alfirmatio et negatio,est homo,non est orno, deinde est non homo, non est nora homo. Rursus,est omnis homo,non est omnis homo,est omnis non homo, non est omnis non homo.Et in extrinsecus temporibus eadem est ratio.\n\nSimplicium exempla propositionum apposuit, simplices autem supra diximus esse propositiones quae duobus terminis jungerentur. Quare quoniam omne definitum prius est infiuito nomine, et non homo non est nomen, sed infinitum nomen,homo vero finitum recte priores eas propositiones quae ex definito sunt nomine in eorum pronuntiavit exemplis; ait enim, Quare prima est affirm alia et negalio,est homo, non est hom.o.Deinde infiniti nominis affirmationes et negationes subjunxit dicens, Est non homo, non est non homo. post hæc, universalitatem jungens, easdem rursus iterat propositiones Et prius illas proponit quae ex finito nomine sunt; secundo vero loco eas quæ ex infinito nomine proponuntur, unde fit ut illud intelligere necesse sit, illas quantitates quae universales et particulares determinant, in terminis non haberi.","english":"Therefore the first affirmation and negation will be \"is a man,\" \"is not a man,\" then \"is a non-man,\" \"is not a non-man.\" Again, \"is every man,\" \"is not every man,\" \"is every non-man,\" \"is not every non-man.\" And in the oblique cases of time the same account holds.\n\nHe has added examples of simple propositions, but we have said above that simple propositions are those which are joined by two terms. Therefore, since every definite thing is prior to an infinite name, and \"non-man\" is not a name but an infinite name, while \"man\" is a finite name, he has rightly pronounced those propositions which are from a definite name first in his examples; for he says, \"Therefore the first affirmation and negation is 'is a man,' 'is not a man.'\" Then he subjoined the affirmations and negations of the infinite name, saying, \"is a non-man,\" \"is not a non-man.\" After this, joining universality, he again repeats the same propositions, and first he sets forth those which are from a finite name; in the second place, however, those which are proposed from an infinite name, whence it must be understood that those quantities which determine universals and particulars are not had in the terms.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":117,"ref":"p117","source":"Nam cum duorum terminorum propositio sola simplex sit, inter simplices hujusmodi numerat propositionem quae dicit est omnis homo, cum tres sint partes orationis, quare determinationes non numerantur in terminis.Eodem modo dicit eademque ratione in extrinsecustemporibus simplices fieri propositiones,ut 6sl,fuit homo,non fuit homo, fuit non homo,non fuit non homo.Etin aliis quoque temporibus idem modus est.Extrinsecus vero tempara vocat quæ sunt præter præsens,id est præteritum etfuturum;sed hic de his solis propositionibus locutus est quae unum subjectum habent, alterum prædicatum. Nunc de his loquetur quae unum habent subjeetum,duo prædicata.An vero bæ quoque simplices sint,in secunda? editionis expositione dicendum est. Nunc vero praeter demonstrationem, esse simplices intelligamus.\n\nQuando autem est tertium,adjacens prædicatur,dupUciter tunc dicuntur oppositiones.Dico antem, ut est justus homo est, tertium dico adjacere nomen vel verbum in affirmatione.Quare quatuvr erunt istæ quarum duæ quidem ad affirmationem et negationem se habebunt secundum consequentiam,ut privationes,duæ vero minime.Dico autem quoniam est, aut justo adjecebit, nul non justo,quare etiam negatio. Quatuor ergo erunt.Intelligimus vero quod dicitur ex his quæ subscripta SUllt. Est justus homo.Hujus negafio: Non est justus homo.Est non just us horno.","english":"For since a proposition of two terms alone is simple, he counts among simple propositions of this kind the proposition which says \"every man is,\" although there are three parts of speech, so that determinations are not counted among the terms. In the same way and by the same reasoning he says that propositions are made simple with respect to extrinsic times, as \"was a man,\" \"was not a man,\" \"was a non-man,\" \"was not a non-man.\" And in other times too the same pattern holds. But he calls extrinsic times those which are beyond the present, that is, past and future; but here he has spoken only of those propositions which have one subject and the other predicate. Now he will speak of those which have one subject and two predicates. But whether these too are simple must be said in the exposition of the second edition. For now, without demonstration, let us understand that they are simple.\n\nBut when there is a third term, and it is predicated as adjacent, then the oppositions are said in two ways. I say \"as is a just man is,\" I say that a third term, a noun or a verb, is adjacent in the affirmation. Wherefore there will be four of these, of which two will stand in relation to affirmation and negation according to consequence, as privations, but two not at all. I say \"is,\" either it will be added to \"just,\" or to \"not just,\" wherefore also the negation. There will therefore be four. But we understand what is said from those which are written below. \"A just man is.\" Its negation: \"A just man is not.\" \"A non-just man is.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":118,"ref":"p118","source":"Hujus negatio, non est nora jstus homo.Est enim hoc loco et non est justo et non justo adjacet.Hæc igitur,quemadmodum in resolutoriis dictum est,sic sunt disposita.Similiter autem se habent;et si universalis nominis sil affirmatio, ut omnis est homo justus, negatlo, non omnis est homo justus.Omnis est homo non justus, non omnis est homo non Justus. Sed non similiter angulares contingit veras esse. Contingit autem aliquando.\n\nUnum subjectum etduo prædicata,quemadmodum possint esse in propositione commemurat. Si enim hoc modo sit.ut dicamus est justus homo,est eLjustus prædicatum, homo veru subjectum est. Nunc enim non illud aspiciamus,quid prius,quid posterius dictumest,sed quoniam universaliusest justum esse quam hominem,potest enimjustus esse et qui homo non est,ut Deus, et rursus potest esse simpliciter, et quod homo non est,idcirco est atquejustusquanquam primo dicanturin eo quod est,est justus homo, tamen quoniam universaliora sunt, non de his homo,sed hæc de homine prædicantur,ethis homo subjectus est. Ex his igitur duplicem fieri oppositionem dicit,et quatuor propositiones,quarum subterexempla subjecitaddens:Dico au quoniam est aut justo adjacebil,aut non justo.","english":"Its negation is \"not every man is just.\" For here \"is\" and \"is not\" are placed alongside \"just\" and \"not just.\" These things, then, are arranged in this way, as was said in the Resolutoria. They are related similarly also if the affirmation is of a universal name, as \"every man is just,\" and the negation \"not every man is just\"; \"every man is not just,\" \"not every man is not just.\" But it does not happen that the angular propositions are true in a similar way. Yet it sometimes happens.\n\nOne subject and two predicates, how they can be reckoned together in a proposition. For if it is in this way, so that we say \"a just man is,\" \"just\" is the predicate, but \"man\" is the subject. For now let us not look at what was said first and what afterward, but since \"to be just\" is more universal than \"man\"—for he who is not a man can be just, as God, and again it can be simply, and what is not a man, for that reason it is and is just—although they are said first in \"a just man is,\" nevertheless, since they are more universal, \"man\" is not predicated of these, but these of \"man,\" and \"man\" is the subject to these. From these, therefore, he says a double opposition is made, and four propositions, examples of which he set down below, adding: I say \"is\" is adjacent either to \"just\" or to \"not just.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":119,"ref":"p119","source":"Si quis enim dicat faciens duas affirmationes, est justus homo,est non justus homo,hæc,cum dux affirmationes sint,duas habebunt negationes.Nam si verbum estinhaepropositione quae dicit,est justus homo, ad justum posuimus. Et in hac rursus propositione quae dicit, est non justus homo, rursus ad non justum idem est verbumjunximus:quoniam negationis oppositionern effecit cura est verbo juncta negatio,id est. non, manifestum est quoniam id quod dicitur non est adjustum rursus et ad nonjustum adjugendum est, ut negationes fiant hujus modi,non est justus homo, non est non justus homo.Rects igitur dixit:Quare si est justo et non justo adjp.cebit,etiam negatio justo et non justo adjacebit Sunt autem propositiones quas dicit quatuor hæ, est justus homo: in hac affirmatione ad justum verbum est adjunximus; hujus est negatio,non est justus homo. In hac quoque negatione quae dicit non est, ad justum rursus adjunximus.Iterum,est non justus bomo.Io hac,est ad non justum jungitur;hujus est negatio,non est non justus homo:etiam in bac quoque negatione quæ dicit, non est,ad non justum ponitur.Quod vero ait: Dico autem, ut est justus homo,est tertium adjacere his nomen vel verbum in affirmatione,hujusmodi est. Tertium,inquit, dico, id est, adjacere verbum est.","english":"For if anyone, making two affirmations, says \"a just man is\" and \"a not-just man is,\" these, since they are two affirmations, will have two negations. For if we have placed the word \"is\" in this proposition which says \"a just man is\" alongside \"just,\" and again in this proposition which says \"a not-just man is\" we have again joined the same word \"is\" to \"not-just\"—since the negation joined to the word \"is,\" that is \"not,\" has produced the opposition of negation—it is clear that what is said \"is not\" must again be added both to \"just\" and to \"not-just,\" so that negations of this kind are made: \"a just man is not,\" \"a not-just man is not.\" Rightly, therefore, he said: \"Wherefore if 'is' will be adjacent to 'just' and 'not-just,' the negation also will be adjacent to 'just' and 'not-just.'\" Now the four propositions of which he speaks are these: \"a just man is\"—in this affirmation we have joined the word \"is\" to \"just\"; its negation is \"a just man is not.\" In this negation too, which says \"is not,\" we have again joined it to \"just.\" Again, \"a not-just man is\"—in this, \"is\" is joined to \"not-just\"; its negation is \"a not-just man is not\"; and in this negation also, which says \"is not,\" it is placed alongside \"not-just.\" But what he says—\"I mean, as 'a just man is,' that a third thing, a noun or a verb, is adjacent in the affirmation\"—is of this sort. \"A third thing,\" he says, \"I mean,\" that is, the verb \"is\" is adjacent.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":120,"ref":"p120","source":"Homo enim et justus duo sunt,quibus adjiciturverbum est.ldcirco autem dixit nomen vel verbum,quia superius quoque docuit ipsa verba nomina esse,eo scilicetloco ubi ait,Ipsa quidem verba secundum se dicta nomina sunt. Quod autem sequitur continet difficillimum sensum.quem ipse solitabrevitate perstrinxit. In medio namque totius sensus addidit: Quare idcirco quatuor istae erunt, quarum duae ad affirmationem et negationem sese habebunt ad consequentiam,ut privationes,duæ vero minime.Bujus sententiæ multiplex expositio ab Alexandro et Porpbyno, Aspasio quoque et Hermino proditur, in, quibus quid excellentissimus expositorum Porpbyrius dixerit,alias dicemus.Quoniam vero simplicior explanatio Alexandri essevidetur,eam nunc pro brevitate subjecimus. Privatoriæ propositiones sunt quaecunque prædicant privationem.Privatio autem est,ul si quis dicat injustus. privat enim hominem justitia. Ergo affirmatio privat6ria est quæ dicit, homo est injustus.Negatio rursus privatoria est,non est homo injustus. eneque ansignificatione plena affirmatio est (aliquid enim tollit), sed privatoria affirmatio,quoniam formam quidem affirmationis tenet, sed privationem prædicat,et aliquid ab eo cui privationem copulat abjungit,ut in propositione est injustus homo,ab homine justitiam.Nec his rursus pura negatio est.Fugansenim privationem, ut in ea quæ est,non est homo injustus,habitum reti.","english":"For \"man\" and \"just\" are two things, to which the verb \"is\" is added. And for this reason he said \"noun or verb,\" because above he also taught that the verbs themselves are names, namely in that place where he says, \"The verbs themselves, spoken by themselves, are names.\" But what follows contains a very difficult sense, which he himself touched upon briefly. For in the middle of the whole sense he added: \"Wherefore for this reason there will be four of these, of which two will stand in relation to affirmation and negation by way of consequence, as privations, but two not at all.\" The manifold exposition of this sentence is handed down by Alexander and Porphyry, and also by Aspasius and Herminus; in which [expositions], what the most excellent of expositors, Porphyry, said, we shall discuss elsewhere. But since the explanation of Alexander seems simpler, we have now appended it for brevity's sake. Privative propositions are whatever predicate a privation. But a privation is, for example, if someone says \"unjust\"; for it deprives a man of justice. Therefore the privative affirmation is the one that says, \"a man is unjust.\" Again the privative negation is, \"a man is not unjust.\" For neither is the affirmation full in signification (for it takes something away), but it is a privative affirmation, since it holds indeed the form of an affirmation, but predicates a privation, and separates something from that to which it joins the privation, as in the proposition \"an unjust man,\" it separates justice from the man. Nor again is the negation in these pure. For it shuns the privation, as in that [proposition], \"a man is not unjust,\" it has retained the state.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":121,"ref":"p121","source":"net,id est justitiam. Sed quoniam quod affirmatio prædicabat., hoc aufert negatio, licet habeat talis negatio,quasi reponendi habitus significationem,tamen quia ipsa privationem subtrahit,privatoria negatio nominatur. Ergo nunc hoc dicit: Cum sint, inquit,qllatuor proposiUonea,quarum dux ex finitimis nominibus sunt., ut est justus homo, non est justus homo, uxex infinitis nominibus, ut est non Justus homo, non est non justus homo, dux, inquit, hæ quarum una affirmatio est, habens infinitum nomen, ut est non justus homo, et una negatio habens rursus infinitum nomen,ut non est non justus homo, sic se habent ad affirmationem et nega.tionem,id est,eamdem formam retinentafnrmationis et negationis,et similes sunt ad affirm andum aliquid vel negandum his quae sunt privatoriæ. Nam quemadmodum privatoria quae dicit est injustud homo non solum affirmatio est, sed privatoria d'firmatio, ita quoque ea quae dicit est non justus homo non solum est affirmatio, sed cum infinito nomine, et cum aliqua privatione affirmatio. Idem enim valet ad intelligentiam quod dicitur injustus, tanquam si dicatur noa justus.Et rursus quemadmodum non est injustus homo,non est solum negatio sed privatoria negatio,quoniam quamquam det habiturn,tamen privationem negat, ita quoque et ea quae est exinfinitio nomine, non est non justus homo, non solum est negatio,sed ex infinito facta nomine, infinitum negans.","english":"not \"justice.\" But since a negation takes away what an affirmation was predicating, although such a negation has, as it were, the signification of a habit that is to be restored, nevertheless, because it itself removes the privation, it is called a privative negation. So now he says this: Since, he says, there are four propositions, of which two are from finite names, as \"just man,\" \"not just man,\" and two from infinite names, as \"not just man,\" \"not not just man,\" these two, he says, of which one is an affirmation having an infinite name, as \"not just man,\" and one a negation having again an infinite name, as \"not not just man,\" stand in the same relation to affirmation and negation, that is, they retain the same form of affirmation and negation, and they are similar for affirming or denying something to those which are privative. For just as the privative proposition which says \"unjust man\" is not only an affirmation but a privative affirmation, so too the one which says \"not just man\" is not only an affirmation but an affirmation with an infinite name and with some privation. For what is said as \"unjust\" has the same force for understanding as if \"not just\" were said. And again, just as \"not unjust man\" is not only a negation but a privative negation, since although it grants the habit, it nevertheless denies the privation, so too the one which is from an infinite name, \"not not just man,\" is not only a negation but, made from an infinite name, a negation of the infinite.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":122,"ref":"p122","source":"Quia igitur infinitum negat, et subjectum infinito negando privat,privatoriæ similis est. Nam si idem valet injustum esse quod non justum, idem valebit non esse injuslum quod non esse non justum.Igitur hae duae quae infinitum nomen habent,quantum ad speciemformamque afCrmalionis et negationis similiter se habent his quæ sunt privatoriæ affirmationes. Duae vero ilIæ quae simplex definitumque praedicant nomen, ab omni similitudine privationum seclusae sunt. Nihil enim similis est illa quae dicit, est justus homo, ei quae dicit, est injustas homo,cum utræque sint affirmationes,sed illa est simplex, illa privatoria.At vero ea qua? dicit, non est justus homo, ad eam quæ dicit, non est injustus homo, nulla rationis similitudine conjungitur,cum sint utraeque negationes; sed illa est simplex, illa privatoria: quare quæ ex infinito nomine sunt,simililer sese habent quemadmodum privationes, similis namque affirmatio est ea quae dicit,esl non justus bomo,ei quæ dicil,est injustus homo. Et rursus ea quae dicit, non est non justus homo, ei qua; dicit, non est injustus bomo, privationesvero simplicibus propositionibus et his quae ex finitis nominibus fiunt, non conjunguntur. Neque enim quisquam dixerit eam quæ dicit, est justus homo, esse comparem ei quæ dicit, est injustus homo,nec vero eam qua: dicit,non est justus homo?","english":"Therefore, because it negates \"infinite\" and by negating deprives the subject of the infinite, it is similar to a privative. For if \"to be unjust\" means the same as \"not to be just,\" then \"not to be unjust\" will mean the same as \"not to be not just.\" So these two [propositions] that contain the infinite name, as regards the species and form of affirmation and negation, stand in the same relation as those which are privative affirmations. But those two which predicate a simple and definite name are cut off from all similarity to privations. For that [proposition] which says \"a man is just\" is in no way similar to that which says \"a man is unjust,\" although both are affirmations; but the one is simple, the other privative. But that [proposition] which says \"a man is not just\" is joined to that which says \"a man is not unjust\" by no similarity of reason, although both are negations; but the one is simple, the other privative. Wherefore those [propositions] that come from an infinite name stand in the same relation as privations; for the affirmation which says \"a man is not just\" is similar to that which says \"a man is unjust.\" And again, that which says \"a man is not not just\" [is similar] to that which says \"a man is not unjust.\" But privations are not joined to simple propositions and to those which are formed from finite names. For no one would say that the [proposition] which says \"a man is just\" is on a par with that which says \"a man is unjust,\" nor indeed that which says \"a man is not just.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":123,"ref":"p123","source":"posse aliquid comparari cum ea quæ dicit, non est injustus homo.Recte ergo dictum est de his quatuor propositionibusduasad affirmationem et negationem ita se habere, ut sunt privationes; duas vero esse simplices,et præter aliquam privationum simHitudinem. Quod autem aaconsequentiam,tanquam dixisset ad similitudinem, ita debet intelligi. Quas enim sibi sunt similia,a se quodammodo non recedunt et se invicem consequuntur.Describuntur ergo duæ prius simplices propositiones,post has duæ privatoriæ,postremo quæ infinitis nominibus constant, utaffirmationes sub.affirmalionibus,negationes sub negationibus constituantur. Sed hæ,inquit,ita sunt dispositae eamdemque ad se simililudinem gerunt,quemadmodum in Analyticis id est resolutoriis. dictum est.Scripsit autem duos resolutorios libros de Syllogismo. In uorum primo de propositionum ex finito nomine et infinito consequentia disseruit.Est vero similitudo affirmativæ quidem simplicis ex finilo nomine, et negativæ ejus quæ habet infinitum nomen.Namque ea quæ dicit; est justus homo,affil'matio,ei quae dicit,non est non justus homo, negationi similis est. Negatio quoque simplex finiti nominis,affirmationi infiniti nominis convenit. Ea enim quae dicit, non est justus homo, similis est ei qua; dicit, est non justus homo.","english":"...that something can be compared with what it states, he is not an unjust man. Correctly, therefore, it has been said concerning these four propositions that two stand to affirmation and negation as privations do, while two are simple and without any resemblance to privations. But what he adds concerning consequence, as if he had spoken by way of resemblance, must be understood thus: for things that are similar to one another do not in some way depart from one another and follow one another in turn. Therefore the two simple propositions are described first, after these the two privative ones, and lastly those that consist of infinite names, so that affirmations are set under affirmations and negations under negations. But these, he says, are so arranged and bear the same resemblance to one another as was said in the Analytics, that is, the Resolutoria. For he wrote two books of Resolutoria concerning the syllogism. In the first of these he discussed the consequence of propositions from a finite name and an infinite name. Now there is a resemblance between the simple affirmative proposition from a finite name and the negative proposition that has an infinite name. For the one that says \"he is a just man\" is an affirmation, and it is similar to the negation that says \"he is not a non-just man.\" The simple negation of a finite name also agrees with the affirmation of an infinite name. For the one that says \"he is not a just man\" is similar to the one that says \"he is a non-just man.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":124,"ref":"p124","source":"Sed quemadmodum ista; sibi sint similes,et quomodo in consequentia proprium teneant ordinem,nunc quidem exsequi distulimus,paulisper tamen describantur, ut earum quaedam proprietas ostendatur. Sit enim affirmatio finiti nominis,et sub ea negatio nominis inl1niti.Sit item negatio finiti nominis,et sub ea aFfirmatio nominis infiniti.\n\nAffirmatio. Est justus homo. Non est justus homo. Negatio.\n\nNegatio. Non est homo.non justus\n\nEst non justus. Affirmatio. homo.\n\nInhacigiturdescriptionenegatioexinfinito nomine sub affirmatione finiti nominis ponitur,et rursus affirmatio infiniti nominis sub negatione finiti,quarum angulares,quoniam sunt indefinitæ,omnes simul in omnibus verae esse possunt, nisi in his tantum quæ aut' naturaliter insunt, aut naturaliter inesse non possunt,ut si quis dicat,est homo animal,nunquam cum hac vera esse potest: illa quae dicit, est homo non animal, uxest angularis, idcirco quoniam animal naturaliterin substantia hominis perspicitur inhærere.Rursus siquis dicat,es homo lapis,est homo non lapis,ne hæc quidem simul veræ esse possunt idcirco quod lapidem inesse homini naturaliter impossibile est. Quod si hujusmodi sunt.","english":"But in what way these are similar to one another, and how they keep their proper order in consequence, we have postponed to pursue for now; yet let them be described for a little while, so that a certain property of them may be shown. For let there be the affirmation of a finite name, and under it the negation of an infinite name. Let there be likewise the negation of a finite name, and under it the affirmation of an infinite name.\n\nAffirmation. A just man is. A just man is not. Negation.\n\nNegation. Not a man, not just.\n\nA non-just [man] is. Affirmation. A man.\n\nIn this description, therefore, the negation from an infinite name is placed under the affirmation of a finite name, and again the affirmation of an infinite name under the negation of a finite one; their angular [opposites], since they are indefinite, can all at once be true in all cases, except only in those which either naturally inhere or naturally cannot inhere, as if someone should say, a man is an animal, this can never be true together with that which says, a man is not an animal, which is angular, for the reason that animal is perceived naturally to inhere in the substance of man. Again, if someone should say, a man is a stone, a man is not a stone, not even these can be true at the same time, for the reason that it is naturally impossible for a stone to inhere in a man. But if they are of this sort.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":125,"ref":"p125","source":"quæ non insint naturaliter, sed inesse possint,ut inhis quae supra posuimus exemplis, angulares verae sunt semper.Polest enim vera esse et ea quæ dicit,estju\" atus homo,el ea quae dicit, est nonjustus homo.Rursus potest vera esse quæ dicil,non est justus homo, si hoc de Sylla dicatur,et ea quae dicit, non est non justus homo, Eli hoc de Catone praedicetur. In his igitur quae sunt indefinitæ, si ea quae praedicantur naturaliter non insunt, sed ea ines;e possibile est, semer angulares simul veras esse contingit.Quod si hujusmodi propositiones cum definitione ponamus ita dicendum est:est omnis homo justus,hujus ncgatio,non est omnis homo justus. Rursus,est omnis homo non justus,hujus negatio,non estomnis homo non justus, quae disponantur hoc modo,ut negatio sub affirmatione sit,et sub negatione affirmatio.\n\nAffirmatio. hst omnis homo justus.","english":"But those things which are not present naturally, yet can be present, as in the examples we set out above, the angular propositions are always true. For both what it says can be true—\"the man is just\"—and what it says—\"the man is not just.\" Again, what it says can be true—\"the man is not just\"—if this is said of Sylla, and also what it says—\"the man is not not-just\"—if this is predicated of Cato. In these indefinite propositions, then, if the things predicated are not present naturally but can be present, it happens that the angular propositions are always true together. But if we set down propositions of this kind with a definition, it must be said thus: \"every man is just\"; its negation, \"not every man is just.\" Again, \"every man is not just\"; its negation, \"not every man is not just\"—which are to be arranged in such a way that the negation is under the affirmation, and the affirmation under the negation.\n\nAffirmation: every man is just.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":126,"ref":"p126","source":"Non est omnis Negatio. homo justus.\n\nNegatio. Non est omnis j justns.homo non\n\nEstomnis homo.Affirmatio. non justus.\n\nIn his ergo quamdam dissimilitudinem monstrat. Nam in indefinitis si ea quæ prædicantur naturaliter non inessent,esse tamen in subjectis possent,semper angulares simul veras esse sine dubio contingebat.Nam et affirmationes affirmationibus et negationes negationibus conveniebant. In his autem quae eum diffinitione quantitatis dicuntur,non idem modus est. Affirmationes enim affirmationibus nulla ratione junguntur.Nam si vera sit ea quae dicit,est omnis homojustus,nunquam vera esse potest ea quas dicit,et omnis homo nonjustus,quæ est angularis,et hoc discrepare in nullo reperieturexemplo.Negatione autem particulares, quae sunt sibi angulares, simul veras esse contingit.Potest enim verum esse in his quae naturaliter non sunt,et possibilia sunt in esse, ut negatio particulari negationi particulari ei quæ est angularis conveniat,ut ea quae est,non est omnis homo justus,ei quae est augularis conveniat,non est omnis homo non justus,sed hoc dissimiliterquam in indefinitis. Nam in illis et ea quæ dicit, est justus homo,ei quae dicit, est non justus homo, angulari scilicet, conveniebat.","english":"Not every negation: \"man is just.\"\n\nNegation: \"Not every man is just.\" Man not.\n\n\"Every man\" — Affirmation: \"not just.\"\n\nIn these, therefore, he shows a certain dissimilarity. For in indefinite propositions, if the things predicated were not present naturally, yet could be present in the subjects, it would without doubt always happen that the angular propositions are true together. For both affirmations agreed with affirmations and negations with negations. But in those which are stated with the determination of quantity, the same mode does not hold. For affirmations are joined with affirmations by no reckoning. For if that which says \"every man is just\" is true, that which says \"every man is not just,\" which is the angular proposition, can never be true, and this will be found to differ in no example. But with a negation, the particular propositions which are angular to it can happen to be true together. For it can be true in those things which are not naturally present and are possible to be, so that a negation agrees with a particular negation that is angular to it—as \"not every man is just\" agrees with the angular proposition \"not every man is not just\"—but this dissimilarly than in indefinite propositions. For in those, both what says \"the man is just\" agreed with what says \"the man is not just,\" namely the angular proposition.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":127,"ref":"p127","source":"Rursus ea quæ dicit, non est non justus homo,ei quæ est, non est justus homo, angulariter positae congruebat.ln his autem, id est secundum quantitatem definitis,arfirmationes quidem duae universales, quae sunt, est omnis homo justus,et est omnis homo non justus,nunquam simul vera? esse possunt,angulares autem negationes quae particulares sunt, id est, non est omnis bomo justus,et non est omnis homo non justus, in his quæ et esse et non esse possibilia sunt,simul verse sunt., Non ergo similiter in his quae sunt definitæ,angulares sibimet congruunt,ut in his quae definitae sunt. Quod per hoc demonstratquodait: Sed non similiter angulares contingit veras esse.In illis enim sibimet utrasque consentiuntangu]ares,in his autem angulares quidem affirmativas nunquam simul veras esse contingit.Alias vero angulares quae sunt particulares negationes contingit aliquando. Hoc enim ipsius declarant verba dicentis: Sed non:similiter angulares, contingit veras esse.Contingit autem al iquando.Non similiter quidem contingit veras esse, idcirco quod affirmationes universales, 'angulares veræ nunquan sunt,quod in his quæ indefinitæ sunt, conlingebat. Contingereautem aliquando dixit,cum angularium,quæ sunt particulares negationes,facimus comparationem,si ea quæ prædicantur non sint naturalia subjectis,sed tamen inesse possibilia.","english":"Again, the statement \"not is not just man\" corresponded angularly with the statement \"not is just man.\" But in these, that is, in propositions defined according to quantity, the two universal affirmations, which are \"every man is just\" and \"every man is not just,\" can never be true at the same time; but the angular negations, which are particular, that is, \"not every man is just\" and \"not every man is not just,\" in those things which are possible both to be and not to be, are true at the same time. Therefore the angular propositions do not correspond to one another in the same way in those which are defined, as they do in those which are defined. He demonstrates this by what he says: \"But it does not happen that angular propositions are true in the same way.\" For in those, the angular propositions agree with one another on both sides; but in these, it does not happen that the angular affirmations are ever true at the same time. But the other angular propositions, which are particular negations, sometimes do happen to be true. For the words of the one saying this declare it: \"But not in the same way do angular propositions happen to be true. But sometimes they do happen.\" They do not happen to be true in the same way for this reason, that the universal affirmations, which are angular, are never true, which was happening in those which are indefinite. But he said \"sometimes happen\" when we make a comparison of the angular propositions, which are particular negations, if the things predicated are not natural to the subjects, but are nevertheless possible to be in them.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":128,"ref":"p128","source":"Hæ igzlur duæ oppositæ sunt, alix autem ad id quod est non homo,quasi subjectum aliquod additum: ut,est justus non homo,non est justus non homo. Est non justus non homo, MOM est non justus non homo. Magis autem plures hisnon sunt oppositiones,hæ autem extra illa ipsæ secundum se erunt ut nomine utentes eo quod est non homo.\n\nAlias nobis rursus esse propositiones ostendit, quarum aliis quidem nos prædicatum,sed subjectum infinitum sit, aliis utrumque. Si quis enim dicat, est justus non homo,quoniam non homo subjectum est, et est infinitum nomen,vocatur propositiofacta ex infinito subjecto:idem est et in negatione quae est, non esustus non homo.At vero sunt aliæ propositiones quae et ex praedicato et ex subjecto infinitis esse videantur, ut est cum dicimus, est non justus non homo, non est nonjustus non homo. In his enim non justus praedicatum ent, non homo subjectum.","english":"These two, then, are opposed; but the others are opposed with respect to \"not man\" as though it were some added subject: as \"just not man is,\" \"just not man is not\"; \"not just not man is,\" \"not just not man is not.\" But there are more oppositions than these; these, however, beyond those, will be according to themselves, using \"not man\" as a name.\n\nHe shows again that there are other propositions for us, of which in some the predicate is infinite but the subject is infinite, in others both. For if anyone says \"just not man is,\" since \"not man\" is the subject and is an infinite name, the proposition is called one made from an infinite subject; the same holds in the negation which is \"not just not man is.\" But there are other propositions which appear to be from both an infinite predicate and an infinite subject, as when we say \"not just not man is,\" \"not just not man is not.\" For in these \"not just\" will be the predicate, \"not man\" the subject.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":129,"ref":"p129","source":"Sed utraque sunt infinita;unde fit ut in his proposltionibus in quibus est verbum tertium prædicatum, magis plures propositionesquam hæ quæ dictæ sunt inveniri non possint.Aut enim ex utrisque erit finitis, praedicato scilicet et subjecto,ut est homo justus,non esthomo justus; aut solum praedicatum habebit infinitum,ut est non justus homo, non est non justus homo;aut praedicatum quidem finitum erit, infinitum'vero subjectum,ut est justus non homo non est Justus non homo;aut et prædicatum et subjectumnna proponuntur, uesnon Justus non bomo, non est non justus non homo; ultra autem propositiones, in quibus est verbum tertium prædicatum sit inveniri non possunt.Sed hæ qua? subjectum infinitum habent, vel utrumque infmitur, praeter illas superiores sunt,quæ aut prædicatum infinitum habent,aut utraque finita,atque ideo extra illas esse dicuntur,et nullam ad eas consequentiam servant, et est ita positum in ea propositione quae dicit,est justus non homo, nomen infinitum quod est non homo, tanquam si finitum nomen aliquod poneretur. Atque hocest quod ait,Utnomine utentes non homo ita enim infinitum nomen positum est,tanquam si finitum nomen esset positum,nominis enim locum tenet;uanuam etiam cum itapositum sit,nihilominus tamen nomen sit:infinitum enim nomen licet simpliciter nomen non sit,tamen cum infinito junctum nomen est.","english":"But both are infinite; hence it comes about that in those propositions in which the verb is the third predicate, more propositions than those that have been stated cannot be found. For either both will be finite, namely the predicate and the subject, as \"man is just,\" \"man is not just\"; or only the predicate will be infinite, as \"not just man is,\" \"not just man is not\"; or the predicate will indeed be finite but the subject infinite, as \"just not man is,\" \"just not man is not\"; or both the predicate and the subject are proposed as infinite, as \"not just not man is,\" \"not just not man is not\"; but beyond the propositions in which the verb is the third predicate, no more can be found. But these which have an infinite subject, or both infinite, are beyond those former ones which have either an infinite predicate or both finite, and therefore are said to be outside them, and they preserve no consequence to them, and it is so posited in that proposition which says \"just not man is,\" the infinite name which is \"not man,\" just as if some finite name were posited. And this is what he says: \"as using the name 'not man'\"—for thus the infinite name is posited, just as if a finite name had been posited; for it holds the place of a name, although even when it is so posited, it is nevertheless a name; for an infinite name, although it is not simply a name, yet when joined with an infinite [term] it is a name.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":130,"ref":"p130","source":"In his vero in quibus est non convenit,ut eo quod est curreve, vel ambulare,idem facit sic positum, ac si est adderetur,ut,Currit omnis homo,noncurrit omnis homo. Currit omnis non homo, non currit omnisnon homo.Non enim dicendum est non omnis homo,sed non negationem ad id quod est homo addendum est. Omnisenim non universate significat,sed quoniam universaliter. Manitestum est autem ex eo quod est:Currit homo,non currit homo. Currit non homo, non currit non. Hæc enim ab illis differunt,eo quod universaliter non sunt.Quare omnis vel nullus, nihil consignificat aliud, nisi quod universaliter de nomine,vei affirmationem,vel negationem.Ergo et cætem eadem oportet opponi.\n\nSunt,inquit, quaedam propositiones,quæ cum est prædicantur. Aliæ vero quas cum est verbo prædicare non possumus, ut in eoquod dicimus homo ambu]at,homo currit. Sed in his nihil differt an ita quis dicat,ut dicitur, id est homo currit, et homo ambulat,an cum est verbo eas prædicet,idem namque est dicere, homo currit et homo ambulat,tanquam si dicatur,bomo currens est,homo ambulans est.","english":"But in those cases in which \"is\" does not fit, as in \"to run\" or \"to walk,\" it makes the same result when put in this way as if \"is\" were added, for example: \"Every man runs,\" \"Every man does not run\"; \"Every non-man runs,\" \"Every non-man does not run.\" For one should not say \"not every man,\" but the negation \"not\" must be added to that which is \"man.\" For \"every\" signifies not universality but that it is universally. And it is evident from this: \"A man runs,\" \"A man does not run\"; \"A non-man runs,\" \"A non-man does not run.\" For these differ from those in that they are not universal. Wherefore \"every\" or \"no one\" signifies nothing else than that the affirmation or negation is universal concerning the name. Therefore the rest also ought to be opposed in the same way.\n\nHe says there are certain propositions which are predicated with \"is.\" But there are others which we cannot predicate with the verb \"is,\" as in what we say: \"A man walks,\" \"A man runs.\" But in these it makes no difference whether someone speaks thus, as is said, that is, \"A man runs\" and \"A man walks,\" or predicates them with the verb \"is\"; for it is the same to say \"A man runs\" and \"A man walks\" as if it were said \"A man running is,\" \"A man walking is.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":131,"ref":"p131","source":"Quocirca nihil differt in hujusmodi propositionibus utrum cum est verbo,an praeter est adjuncto verbi actu proponatur.Idem quoque est etiam in universalibus.Nam cum dicimus omnis homo curritomnis homo non currit, et rursus omnis non homo currit, omnis non homo non currit, idem est tanquam si dicamus, omnis homo currens est,et omnis homo currens non est, et rursus omnis non homo currens est, omnis non homo currens non est. Docel. autem illud quoque multum differre an ad positum terminum jungatur negatio,an certe ad determinationem: nam si ad subjectum terminum dicitur, fit nomen infinitum, ut est omnis non homo currit, si ad determinationem fit negatio, ut est non omnis homo currit; unde fit ut si non ad determinationem univeraalem, sed ad rem ac terminum negatio ponatur, ait infinitum nomen, ut est non homo. Quod si non ad rem universalem, sed ad determinationem uni.","english":"Therefore in propositions of this kind it makes no difference whether the verb \"is\" is joined, or whether the act of the verb is set forth without the addition of \"is.\" The same holds also in universal propositions. For when we say \"Every man runs,\" \"Every man does not run,\" and again \"Every non-man runs,\" \"Every non-man does not run,\" it is the same as if we said \"Every man is running,\" \"Every man is not running,\" and again \"Every non-man is running,\" \"Every non-man is not running.\" But it makes a great difference whether the negation is joined to the term that has been posited, or rather to the determination; for if it is spoken with respect to the subject term, an infinite noun results, as in \"Every non-man runs\"; if the negation is applied to the determination, as in \"Not every man runs.\" Hence it comes about that if the negation is placed not with respect to the universal determination but with respect to the thing and the term, he calls it an infinite noun, as in \"non-man.\" But if not with respect to the universal thing, but with respect to the determination of the uni—","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":132,"ref":"p132","source":"versalem, negatio est: cum enim dicimus,non omnis,omnis quidem universale non est, sed consignificatquoniam illud de quo dicituruniversaliter dicitur, ut cum dicimus, omnis homo, homo quidem ipsum universale est, omnis vero non est quidem universale, sed consignificat, quoniam res universalis,id est homo, u niversaliter dicta est;ergo quoties ad determinationem quæ rem quamlibet universalem universaliter dictam demonstrat,negaLio ponitur,nonnomen infinitum,sed negationem cOlistituit,atque hoc est quod ait: Non enim dicendumest, non omnisbomo,sed nonnegationem ad id quod est homo addendum est, omnis enim non universale signat, sed quoniam universaIiter.lpsum enimomnis non est universalis terminus,nec omnino terminus, sed universali prædicato additum, facit illud universaliter enuntiari, probat autem hos non esse universales terminos, sed tantum determinationes universaliter consignificantes hoc modo:Cum enim dicimus, currit homo, non currit homo, currit non homo,non currit non homo,universaliaquidcm subjecta sunt in his propositionibja, sed non universaliter prædicantur. Distant autem hae ab his propositionibus in quibus sic dicimus: Omnis homo currit, nullus homo currit,eo quod istae quidem universale universaliter prædicant, illæ vero universale non universa)iter.","english":"For the negation is of the universal. For when we say \"not every,\" \"every\" is indeed not a universal, but it signifies additionally that that of which it is said is said universally—as when we say \"every man\": \"man\" itself is indeed the universal, but \"every\" is not indeed a universal, yet it signifies additionally that the universal thing, that is \"man,\" has been said universally. Therefore, whenever a negation is placed before the determination that shows the thing, whatever universal thing it may be, to have been said universally, it does not make an infinite name but a negation. And this is what he says: for one ought not to say \"not every man,\" but the negation must be added to that which is \"man\"; for \"every\" signifies not a universal, but that it is universally [said]. For \"every\" itself is not a universal term, nor indeed a term at all, but when added to a universal predicate it makes it be enunciated universally. But he proves that these are not universal terms but only determinations signifying universally, in this way: for when we say \"man runs,\" \"man does not run,\" \"not-man runs,\" \"not-man does not run,\" the subjects in these propositions are indeed universal, but they are not predicated universally. But these differ from those propositions in which we speak thus: \"every man runs,\" \"no man runs,\" in that the latter indeed predicate the universal universally, while the former [predicate] the universal not universally.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":133,"ref":"p133","source":"Manifestum est ergo quoniam omnis et nullus non sunt universalia, sed id quod universale prædicatur faciunt ut universaliter en untietur.Quare eadem omnia ponenda sunt, currit omnis homo, si infinitum nomen volumus facere,non dicamus currit non omnis homo, sed negationem,id est non, nomini addemus,eadem in propositione cuncta servantes, si affirmationem volumus ex munito nomine facere.Quod si ad determinationem universalis rei negationem apiemus,fit non affirmatio nominis infiniti, sed propositionis ex nomine finito negatio.\n\nQuoniam vero contraria est negatio ei quæ est,omne est animal justum,illa qua? significat,quoniam nullum est animal iustum, hæ quidem manifestum est, quod nunquam erunt,neque vere simul,neque in eodem ipso. His vero oppositæ erunt aliquando, ut non omne animal iustum est, et est aliquod animal justum.\n\nQuoniam, inquit, hæ contrariae sunt, simul veras esse non possunt,neque in eodem,et possunt quidem vicissim et cum temporis diversitate esse veræ,simul autem esse non possunt, ut si quis dicat aureo quidem saeculo omnes homines fuissejustos, ferreo vero nullum hominem esse justum; utraeque verae esse pOBsunt,sed non eodem tempore.","english":"It is clear, therefore, that \"every\" and \"none\" are not universals, but they make that which is predicated as universal be uttered universally. Wherefore all these things must be posited in the same way: \"every man runs.\" If we wish to make an infinite name, let us not say \"not every man runs,\" but we shall add the negation, that is \"not,\" to the name, preserving all things in the proposition in the same way, if we wish to make an affirmation from an unlimited name. But if we apply the negation to the determination of a universal thing, there comes about not an affirmation of an infinite name, but the negation of a proposition from a finite name.\n\nBut since the negation is contrary to that which is \"every animal is just\"—namely that which signifies that no animal is just—it is manifest that these will never be true at the same time, nor in the same thing. But the opposites of these will sometimes be true, as \"not every animal is just\" and \"some animal is just.\"\n\nSince, he says, these are contraries, they cannot be true at the same time, nor in the same thing, and they can indeed be true in turn and with a diversity of time, but they cannot be at the same time—as if someone should say that in the golden age all men were just, but in the iron age no man is just; both can be true, but not at the same time.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":134,"ref":"p134","source":"Hoc est enim quod ait,neque verse simul,quod autem secutus est,neque in eodem in ipso scilicet subjecto,ut dicamus: Est omne vivensjustum, si referamus ad coelestes potestates, vera est.NuIlum vivensjustumest, sireferamus ad equos, utræque sunt veræ,sed non in eodem ipso,illud enim in divinis,istud in equis retinet veritatem. HIs autem quæ sunt oppositæ, id est, parti culares possuntsimul esse veræ,tunccum superiores universales sint simul falsæ. Quæ autem sunt hæ, ipse planissimo monstravit exemplo dicens: Non omneanimal justum est, quod estparticularis negatio, et est aliquod animal justum,quod est particularis affirmatio.\n\nSequuntur vero hæ,eam quidem qua? est,nullus est homo justus, illa quæ est;omnis est homo non justus. Illam vero quæ est,aliquis homo justus est,opposita, non omnis est homo non justus. Necesse est enim aliquem esse.","english":"For this is what he says: \"neither true at the same time\"; and what follows, \"nor in the same thing,\" namely in the same subject, so that we may say: \"Every living thing is just,\" if we refer it to the heavenly powers, it is true. \"No living thing is just,\" if we refer it to horses, both are true, but not in the same thing; for the one keeps its truth among divine beings, the other among horses. But of things that are opposed, that is, particulars, they can be true at the same time, when the superior universals are at the same time false. And what these are, he showed most plainly by example, saying: \"Not every animal is just,\" which is a particular negation, and \"some animal is just,\" which is a particular affirmation.\n\nBut these follow: the one that is \"no man is just\" is followed by that which is \"every man is not just.\" But the one that is \"some man is just\" is followed by its opposite, \"not every man is not just.\" For it is necessary that some man be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":135,"ref":"p135","source":"Ostendit superius affirmationem universalemet universalem negationem,quoniamsibi essentcontrariæ, simul veras esse non posse. Nunc autem monstrat universali negationi nominis finiti,consentire universalem affirmationem nominis infiniti,et particulari affirmationi, quae est opposita universali negationi nominis finiti,consentire eam quae est opposita universali affirmationi nominis infiniti,scilicet particularem negationem praedicatum retinentem infinitum. Et prius describantur hoc modo:\n\nEst autem universalis negatio ea quae dicit,nullus homo justus est, huic opposita est, contradictoriæ particularis affirmatio,quidam homo justus est Rursus universalis affirmatioestinfinitum habens prædicatum, ea quae dicit, omnis bomo non justus est, huic contradictoriæ particularis opponiturinfinitum habens prædicatum, ea quæ dicit,non omnis homo non justus est. Hæ igitur sese perimunt,sed universalis affirmatio nominis infiniti, id est, omnis homo non justus est, sequitur negationem eam quae cit, nulius homo justus est. Nam si verum est nullum esse hominem justum, verum est omnem hominem esse non justum. Sed his oppositæ rursus sibiipsaa consentiunt. Nam si verum eat.dicere quoniam quidam homo justus est, verum est dicere non omnis homo non justus est. Si enim non omnis homo non justus est, aliquem justum esse necesse est.","english":"He showed above that the universal affirmation and the universal negation cannot be true at the same time, since they are contrary to each other. But now he shows that the universal affirmation of the infinite name agrees with the universal negation of the finite name, and that the particular affirmation which is opposed to the universal negation of the finite name agrees with that which is opposed to the universal affirmation of the infinite name, namely the particular negation retaining an infinite predicate. And first let them be set out in this way:\n\nNow the universal negation is the one which says, \"No man is just\"; opposed to it contradictorily is the particular affirmation, \"Some man is just.\" Again, the universal affirmation having an infinite predicate is the one which says, \"Every man is not just\"; opposed to it contradictorily is the particular [affirmation] having an infinite predicate, the one which says, \"Not every man is not just.\" These, then, destroy each other, but the universal affirmation of the infinite name, that is, \"Every man is not just,\" follows the negation which says, \"No man is just.\" For if it is true that no man is just, it is true that every man is not just. But their opposites again agree with each other. For if it is true to say that some man is just, it is true to say that not every man is not just. For if not every man is not just, it is necessary that some man is just.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":136,"ref":"p136","source":"Manifestum est quoniam etiam in singularibus, si est verum interrogatum negare,quod et alfirmare verum est, ut, Putasne Socrates sapiens est? Non, Socrates igitur non sapiens est. In unwersalibus vero non est vern quæ similiter dicilur. Vera est aulem nellatio, ut Putasne omnis hnmo sapiens est? Non. Omnis igitur horno non sapiens est, hoc enim est falsum; sed non igitur omnis horno sapiens est,vera est.Hæc enim opposita est, illa vero contraria.\n\nQuoties aliquis, inquit, in singularibus rebus interrogat,et is qui interrogalur,negat, tunc is qui interrogat recte negationem cum singularijungens, ex infinito nomine faciet affirmationem, ut si aliquis dicat: Putasne Socrates sapiens est? contra alius respondeat, Non, erit recta conclusio dicentis: Socrates igitur non sapiens est.Ex negatione ergo respondentis et infinito nomine non sapiens, facta est affirmatio, Socrates non sapiens est, atque hoc quidem in singularibus. Quod si boc in universalibus fiat universaliter prædicatis,negationem potius fieri contingit quam affirmationem,ut si quis interroget: Putasne omnis homo sapiens?","english":"It is clear that this also holds in singular cases: if it is true to deny what was asked, then what is affirmed is true—for example, \"Do you think Socrates is wise?\" \"No.\" \"Therefore Socrates is not wise.\" But in universal cases what is said in a similar way is not true. The negation, however, is true—for example, \"Do you think every man is wise?\" \"No.\" \"Therefore every man is not wise\"—for this is false. But \"Therefore not every man is wise\" is true. For the latter is the opposite, while the former is the contrary.\n\nWhenever, he says, someone asks about singular matters and the one who is asked denies, then the one who asks, correctly joining the negation with the singular term, will make an affirmation from the infinite name—for example, if someone says, \"Do you think Socrates is wise?\" and another answers to the contrary, \"No,\" the correct conclusion of the one speaking will be: \"Therefore Socrates is not wise.\" So from the respondent's negation and the infinite name \"not wise,\" the affirmation \"Socrates is not wise\" has been made, and this indeed in singular cases. But if this is done in universal cases with universally predicated terms, a negation rather than an affirmation comes about—for example, if someone asks, \"Do you think every man is wise?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":137,"ref":"p137","source":"ille respondeat.Non, non necesse est ita concludere ut dicatut,omnis igitur homo non sapiens est, hoc enim falsum est., nec hoc evenit necessario ex interrogati responsione Sed magis illud, non omnis homo sapiens est.Nam cum aliquis interrogat,Putasne omnis homo sapiens est, si ille neget,dicens, Non, tu concludas oportet, non omnis igitur homo sapiens est. Hoc enim ex illius responsione necesse est evenire.Sed hæc contrajacens est interrogationi, id est opposita. Interrogasti enim universalem affirmationem dicens, Putasne omnis homo animal est?respondit,Non,concludes tu particulnrem negationem,non omnis homo animal est, et haec dividit verum vel falsum.Nam si contra eam interrogationem perquam universalem affirmationem interrogasti, ille neget,ettu concludas eam propositionem quæ dicit, omnis homo igiturnon sapiens est, non potius contrajaceatem, sed contrariam facies, hæc enim quae d:eit,omnis homo non sapiens est, consentit l'i quædieit nullus homo sapiens esl.Quare nihil differt,utrum banc aliquis ex infinito numine affirmationem respondeat,an ex finito nomine universalem negationem quae cum affirmatione universali,quam interrogasti,verum falsumque non dividit. Sed illa sola concludenda sunt, in quibus unum.","english":"Let him answer. No, it is not necessary to conclude in such a way as to say, \"Therefore every man is not wise\"—for this is false, nor does this follow necessarily from the respondent's answer, but rather that other: \"Not every man is wise.\" For when someone asks, \"Do you think every man is wise?\" if he denies it, saying \"No,\" you ought to conclude, \"Therefore not every man is wise.\" For this must necessarily follow from his answer. But this is the contradictory of the question, that is, its opposite. For you asked the universal affirmation, saying, \"Do you think every man is an animal?\" He answered, \"No\"; you conclude the particular negation, \"Not every man is an animal,\" and this divides truth and falsehood. For if you asked that question as a universal affirmation, and he denies it, and you conclude the proposition that says, \"Therefore every man is not wise,\" you make not the contradictory but rather the contrary. For this proposition which says, \"Every man is not wise,\" agrees with that which says, \"No man is wise.\" Wherefore it makes no difference whether someone answers this as an affirmation from an infinite term or as a universal negation from a finite term—which negation, together with the universal affirmation you asked, does not divide truth and falsehood. But only those conclusions are to be drawn in which one [term]...","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":138,"ref":"p138","source":"verum est, alterum fiilsum.Non igitur ita debet fieri in universalibuS, ut interrogata universali affirmatione, si alius negationem respondeat, univeralis affirmatio ex infinito nomine concludalur,sed potius particularis negatio ex nomine finito.\n\nlllæ vera quæ sunt contrajacentes secundum infinita nomina vel verba, ait in eo quod est, non homo, uel non justus, quasi negationes sine nomine et verbo esse videbuntur, sed non sunt: semper enim vei veram esse uel (alsam necesse est negationem.Qui vero dixit non homo, non plus dicente homo, sed etiam minus, uerus uel falsus (uit. si non aliquid addatur. Cum de propositionibus ex infinitis loqueretur nominibus ipse infinita nomina sola sumpsit,et de his qualia videantur esse pertractat.Sermonum,inquit, prolationes, quae secundum contrajacentia nomina vel verba sibi oppositæ sunt,ut in eo quod dicimus, homo,non homo; currit, non currit.,quoties finitum infinito comparatur, videnturquasi quædam esse negationes.Sec ita non est, omnia namque negatio vel vera vel falsa est.Qui autem dicit non currit, et non lahorat,et non homo,neque verum aliquid enuntiavit neque falsum,et fortasse minus aliquid veri vel falsi significavit,quam is qui finitum nomen ponit.","english":"But it is not true; the other is false. Therefore it should not be done thus in universals, that when a universal affirmation has been asked and another answers with a negation, a universal affirmation should be concluded from an infinite name, but rather a particular negation from a finite name.\n\nThose things, however, which are opposed according to infinite names or verbs—he says in the case of \"not man\" or \"not just\"—will seem to be, as it were, negations without a name and verb, but they are not; for a negation must always be either true or false. But he who says \"not man\" has not said more than one who says \"man,\" but even less, and has been true or false only if something is added. When he was speaking about propositions formed from infinite names, he himself took infinite names alone, and discusses what sort of things they appear to be. The utterances of speech, he says, which are opposed to one another according to contrary names or verbs—as when we say \"man,\" \"not man\"; \"runs,\" \"does not run\"—whenever a finite is compared with an infinite, appear to be, as it were, certain negations. But it is not so; for every negation is either true or false. But he who says \"does not run,\" and \"does not work,\" and \"not man,\" has enunciated neither anything true nor false, and perhaps has signified something less of truth or falsehood than he who posits a finite name.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":139,"ref":"p139","source":"Nam qui finitum nomen constituit, nihil quidem adhuc verum falsumve enuntiavit,sed quoniam quiddam finitum posuit,propinquior est hujusmodi prolatio ad veritatem,quæ aliquid finitum ponit, ea prolatione quæ aliquid infinitum.Sicut illa aliquid signant propinquiora sunt ad enuntiationem faciendam his quæ nihil significant, quare in his quæ infinita sunt; minus illa veritas falsitasve perspicitur, quam in his omnibus quæ sunt finita. Ac multo magis nihil adhuc verum falsumve designat, id quod dicitur non homo, vel non currit, nisi aliquid addatur, quod enuntiationem possit efficere.Quod autem dixit,quasi negationes sine nomine et verbo esse videbuntur,idcirco addit quoniam in8nita nomina vel verba, neque nomina sunt simpliciter,neque verba, et videntur non homo, et non currit, negationes esse. Quod si ita est, sine nomine et verbo, esse negationes videntur. Addidit etiam illud nibil magis de homme, sed etiam minus verus fuit vel fa]sus.Qui enim dicit homo,rem constituit,qui dicit non homo,ipsam quidem rem tulit,sed nihiladdidit..Quocirca longe minus quiddam enuntiavit de homine, qui infinitum de homine dixit, quam qui finitum.","english":"For he who sets down a finite name has as yet stated nothing true or false, but since he has posited something finite, a utterance of this kind is closer to the truth—one that posits something finite—than the utterance that posits something infinite. Just as those things that signify something are closer to making a statement than those that signify nothing, so it is in the case of things that are infinite: truth or falsity is discerned less in them than in all those things that are finite. And much more does that which is called \"not-man\" or \"does not run\" designate as yet nothing true or false, unless something be added that can make a statement. But as for what he said—that they will seem to be negations without a name and a verb—he adds this for the reason that infinite names or verbs are neither names nor verbs in the simple sense, and \"not-man\" and \"does not run\" seem to be negations. But if this is so, they seem to be negations without a name and a verb. He also added that it was no more true or false about man, but even less. For he who says \"man\" establishes the thing; he who says \"not-man\" has indeed removed the thing itself, but has added nothing. Wherefore he has stated far less about man who has spoken of man as infinite than he who has spoken of him as finite.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":140,"ref":"p140","source":"Significat autem, est omnis non hamo justus nulli illarum idem, nec huic opposita ea qllæ est, non est omnis non homo justus.Illa I'ero quæ est, omnis non justus non homo est,illi quæ est,nullus est justus non homo, idem significat.\n\nIllæ propositiones in quibus infinita nomina subjecta sunt, longe aliud,inquit,significant,et non idem his propositionibus quae vel secundum tinita,vel secundum infinita prædicata dicuntur; ea enim quas dicit, est omnis non homojustus, nihil idem significat illi quæ dicit, est omnis homo justus,vel nullus homo justus est, vel iterum, est omnis homo non justus, vel nullus homo non justus,nulli enim similis est earum, ea quas dicit, est omnis non homo justus, nec huic opposita negatio particularis, ea quae dicit, non estomnis nonhomojustus,ulli earum idem significat qua; superius descriptae sunt, vel alicui earum quoe sunt in superius oppositae descriptis.","english":"But \"is every not-man just\" signifies the same as none of those, nor is that which is opposed to it—\"is not every not-man just\"—the same. But the one that is \"every not-just man is not a man\" signifies the same as that which is \"no just man is a not-man.\"\n\nThose propositions in which infinite names are subjects, he says, signify something far different, and not the same as those propositions which are stated either with finite or with infinite predicates; for the one he states—\"is every not-man just\"—signifies nothing the same as that which states \"is every man just,\" or \"is no man just,\" or again \"is every man not-just,\" or \"is no man not-just.\" For it is similar to none of them—the one he states, \"is every not-man just\"—nor does the particular negation opposed to it, the one that states \"is not every not-man just,\" signify the same as any of those which were described above, or as any of those which are opposed to the things described above.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":141,"ref":"p141","source":"Iilæ vero quxex uobus terminis infinitis constituta'sunt, illis sunt similes, quæ universales negationes sunt habentes subjectum infinitum, ut ea quae dicit, est omnis nonjustusnon homo,illi idem significat,eique consentit quæ dicit, est nullus justus non homo, et prior quidem utrosque terminos retinet infinitos, hæc vero secunda prædicatum quidem finitum,subjectum vero infinitum; et illa quidem est affirmatio ex duobus infinitis, hæc vero ex finito prædicato et subjecto infinite negatio universalis.\n\nTransposita vero nomina et verba idem significant,ut est albus Iwmo, est homo albus. Nam si hoc non est, ąjusdem multæ erunt negationes.Sed ostensum est quod una unius est. Ejus enim quæ est, est albus homo,negatio est, non est albus homo, ejus uero guæ est, eSt homo albus,si non eadem est ei qua? est, est albus homo, erit negatio vel ea quæ est, non est non homo albus, vel ea quæ est, non est homo albus. Sed altera quidem est negatio ejus qUÆ est, est non homo albus, altera vero ejus quæ est, est albus homo. Quare erunt dux, unius. Quoniam igitur transposita nomine et verbo eadem fit affirmatio et negatio, manifestum est.","english":"But those [propositions] constituted from two infinite terms are similar to those which are universal negations having an infinite subject, as when one says \"every not-just [man] is not a man\" signifies the same as that which says \"no just man is not a man,\" and the former indeed retains both terms as infinite, while the latter has a finite predicate but an infinite subject; and the former is an affirmation from two infinite terms, while the latter is a universal negation from a finite predicate and an infinite subject.\n\nTransposed nouns and verbs signify the same, as \"white [is] a man\" [is the same as] \"a man is white.\" For if this were not so, there would be many negations of the same thing. But it has been shown that there is one [negation] of one [affirmation]. For of that which is \"white is a man,\" the negation is \"white is not a man\"; but of that which is \"a man is white,\" if it is not the same as that which is \"white is a man,\" the negation will be either that which is \"not a not-man is white\" or that which is \"a man is not white.\" But the one is the negation of that which is \"a not-man is white,\" while the other is of that which is \"white is a man.\" Wherefore there will be two [negations] of one [affirmation]. Since, therefore, when the noun and verb are transposed, the same affirmation and negation is made, it is manifest.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":142,"ref":"p142","source":"Quoties, in quit, nomina permutantur etverbo,eæ dem propositionum significationes permanent. Quoties autem negatio permutatur, non eædem,nam si quis dicat: Est non homo albus, et non est horno albus,non idem significat permutata scilicet et transposita negatione. Quoties autem dicitur, est albus homo, et rursus est homo albus, idem transposita verba nominaque significant, et erunt eædem am rmationes: namsi quis hoc negat, contingit ut unius affirmationis, duae negationes sint. Hoc autem monstratum est su p5rius fieri non p08se,sed semper unius affirmationis unam esse negationem.IJlius namque affirmationis quæ dicit, est albus homo, illa negatio est, quae dicil,non est albus homo; illius autem quae propunlt,est homo albus, si non est eadem illi afhrmationi quae enuntiat, est albus homo, sed est ab ea diversa, sit negatio vel ea quæ dicit, non est non homo albus, vel ea quae dicit, non est homo albus; sed ilIa quæ proponit, non est non homo albus, habet suam affirmationem ad quam referri debeat,eam scilicet quæ enuntiat, est non homo albus.IlIa vero quae dicit, non est homo albus, negatio est ejus quæ proponit, est homo albus.","english":"As often, he says, as names and the verb are interchanged, the same meanings of the propositions remain. But as often as the negation is interchanged, they are not the same; for if someone says \"a not-man is white\" and \"a man is not white,\" he does not signify the same thing, since the negation has been interchanged and transposed. But as often as it is said \"a white man is\" and again \"a man is white,\" with the words and names transposed they signify the same thing, and they will be the same affirmations; for if someone denies this, it happens that there are two negations of one affirmation. But it has been shown above that this cannot happen, but that there is always one negation of one affirmation. For the negation of that affirmation which says \"a white man is\" is the one which says \"a white man is not\"; but of that which proposes \"a man is white,\" if it is not the same as that affirmation which states \"a white man is,\" but is different from it, let its negation be either the one which says \"a not-man is not white\" or the one which says \"a man is not white\"; but the one which proposes \"a not-man is not white\" has its own affirmation to which it ought to be referred, namely that which states \"a not-man is white.\" But the one which says \"a man is not white\" is the negation of that which proposes \"a man is white.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":143,"ref":"p143","source":"Sed si affirmationes eurum diversae sunt, diversae erunt etiam negationes.Si quis ergo dicat afirmationem quae proponit, est albus homo, diversam esse ab ea, quæ enuntiat, est homo albus, illud quoque concedat necesse estutnegationesquoque ipsarum diversæ sint,est autem negatio illius qua; dicit, est albus homo, ilia scilicet quæ proponit, non est albus homo. Rursus illius quæ enuntiat, est homo albus, est negatio,non est homo albus. Quare hae duae negationes, non est homo albus, et non est albus homo a se diversæ sunt.","english":"But if their affirmations are different, their negations will also be different. If, then, someone says that the affirmation which proposes \"a white man is\" is different from that which states \"a man is white,\" he must also concede that the negations of these are different as well. Now the negation of that which says \"a white man is\" is, namely, that which proposes \"a white man is not.\" Again, the negation of that which states \"a man is white\" is \"a man is not white.\" Wherefore these two negations, \"a man is not white\" and \"a white man is not,\" are different from each other.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":144,"ref":"p144","source":"Rursus cum dicimus, est albus homo, et negatur non est albus homo, si de eodem homine utraeque dicantur,unam veram alteram falsam esse necesse est;ut si de Socrate dicatur, est albus homo, non est albus homo, quae cum ita sint, necesse est ut ejus quæ ait est albus homo negatio sit ea quae dicit non est albus homo; sed posita est quidem prius negatio quæ dicit non est albus homo ejus affirmationis esse qua: dicit est albus homo.Nuncvero monstramus illam quoque quae dicit non est albus homo ejus a[ilrmationis negationem esse quae dicit est albus homo, utræque enimverum inter se falsumque dividunt.Neque enim fieri potest ut si de uno eodemque homine dicatur, est albus homo, et non est homo albus, ut utraeque sint verae: quod si itaut nunc sunt positæ aliquando in veritate concordant, hoc idcirco evenit quia indefinitæ sunt, non quia verbi fiunt nominibusque transpo?it)s:quare evenit ut unius affirmationis duplex sit negatio. Quod autem diximus inferiori descriptione magis liquebit.","english":"Again, when we say \"a white man is\" and it is denied \"a white man is not,\" if both are said of the same man, one must necessarily be true and the other false; as, if it is said of Socrates \"a white man is\" and \"a white man is not,\" since these things are so, the negation of the one that says \"a white man is\" must necessarily be the one that says \"a white man is not.\" But the negation that says \"a white man is not\" was previously posited as belonging to the affirmation that says \"a white man is.\" Now, however, we show that the one that says \"a white man is not\" is also the negation of the affirmation that says \"a white man is,\" for both divide truth and falsehood between them. For it cannot happen that, if it is said of one and the same man \"a white man is\" and \"a white man is not,\" both should be true. But if, as they are now posited, they sometimes agree in truth, this happens because they are indefinite, not because the words are transposed into nouns. Wherefore it comes about that a single affirmation has a double negation. What we have said will be made clearer by the description below.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[{"kind":"lacuna","severity":"caution","text":"The source is fragmentary here: the edition marks a break or an editorial bracket, and the English carries across it. Treat the bridge as supplied, not translated."}]},{"i":145,"ref":"p145","source":"DE CONJUNCTIS ET DIVISIS ENUNTIATIONIBUS.\n\nAt vero unum depluribus,velplura deuno affirmare, vel negare, si non est unum ex pluribus, non est affirmatio una, neque negatio. Dico autem unum, non sz unum nomen positum sit: non fit autem unum ex illis, ut homo est fortasse et animal, et bipes, et mansuetum; sed ex his etiam unum fil. Ex alboautemet homine, et ambulare non fitunum. Quare nee si unum aliquid de his affirmet aliquis, erit arfirmalio una, sed vox quidem una,affirmaliones vero mullæ.Nec si de uno ista, sesimiliter plures.\n\nMulta Peripateticis dediscernendis propositionibus quæessentuna, quæ multæ, consideratio fuit.Atque ideo nunc hoc elicit, et si una res, inquit, de pluribus praedicetur in propositionibus vel affirmativis, vel negativis, vel rursus res plures de una iterum prædicentur, et si pluribus illis rebus unum nomen sit positum,vel una res de uno nomine plura significanti prædicetur, si ex illis omnibus rebus unum aliquid non iii, non est una affirmatio, nec una negatio: si quis enim dicat animal rationale bipes homo est, unum hominem pluribus praedicando subjecit: sed haec sigillatim quidem dicta plura sunt, unam vero quamdam substantiam informant. Coeuntibus namque animali, rationali,et pibede fit una substantia animal rationale bipes, quod est homo.","english":"ON CONJUNCT AND DIVIDED ENUNCIATIONS.\n\nBut to affirm one thing of many, or many things of one, or to deny, if there is not one thing from the many, is not one affirmation, nor one negation. I say \"one,\" not if one name is posited; for one thing is not made from them, as perhaps \"man\" is \"animal\" and \"biped\" and \"tame\"; but from these there is also one thing. But from \"white\" and \"man\" and \"to walk\" one thing is not made. Wherefore neither, if someone affirms one thing of these, will there be one affirmation, but the utterance is one, the affirmations many. Nor if one thing is said of one subject, similarly many.\n\nThe consideration of distinguishing which propositions are one and which many was a matter of much concern to the Peripatetics. And therefore he now draws this out, and says: if one thing is predicated of many in propositions, whether affirmative or negative, or again many things are predicated of one, and if one name is posited for those many things, or one thing is predicated of one name signifying many things, if from all those things one something does not come to be, it is not one affirmation nor one negation. For if someone says \"man is animal rational biped,\" he has subjected one man by predicating many things; but these, said one by one, are many, yet they inform one certain substance. For when animal, rational, and biped come together, there is made one substance, animal rational biped, which is man.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":146,"ref":"p146","source":"Et quanquam hæc silligatim dicta multa sint, si quis enim dicat animal,et rursus rationale, et intermisso tempore bipes, discretim multa significantia,tamen juncta in unum unam faciunt naturam, et hoc est quod ait: Ut bomo est fortasse animai, et bipes, et mansuetum; sed ex his unum fit, tanquam si diceret: Homo enim plura significat, sed ita, ei ea quae significantur discerptim dicantur. Nam etanimal, et bipes, et mansuetum designat.Dicimus enim hominem esse animal, et bipedem. et mansuetum; sed hæc juncta in unum corpus efficiunt unum animal mansuetum bipes, quod est homo.Quare quanquam de uno plura prædicata sint, tamen quoniam ex omnibus unum aliquid fit, ex hoc una est affirmatio atque negatio. Quod si duae res tales subjectae sint de quibus una res prædicetur, ut de his unum fieri aliquid nequeat, non est una affirmatio, nec una negatio. Si quis enim candido aliquo homine ambulante dicat, album et ambulans homo est, album et ambulare in unam naturam non conveniunt, nec fit ex utrisque aliquid unum,ita ut alicujus hæc duojunclasubstantiam forment.Quare sive affirmentur, sive negentur, sive subjecta sint, sive prædicata, non erit una affirmatio, nec una negatio, sed vox quidem una est.","english":"And although these things, said syllable by syllable, are many—for if someone should say \"animal,\" and again \"rational,\" and after an interval \"two-footed,\" separately they signify many things—yet joined into one they make one nature, and this is what he says: as \"man\" is perhaps \"animal\" and \"two-footed\" and \"tame\"; but from these one thing is made, as if he should say: \"man\" indeed signifies many things, but in such a way that those things which are signified are said separately. For it designates both \"animal\" and \"two-footed\" and \"tame.\" For we say that man is an animal, and two-footed, and tame; but these joined into one body effect one tame two-footed animal, which is man. Wherefore, although many things are predicated of one, yet since from all of them some one thing is made, from this there is one affirmation and one negation. But if two such things are subjects of which one thing is predicated, such that from them some one thing cannot be made, there is not one affirmation, nor one negation. For if someone, when some white man is walking, should say \"the white [thing] and the walking [thing] is a man,\" \"white\" and \"walking\" do not come together into one nature, nor is anything one made from both, such that these two joined form the substance of something. Wherefore whether they are affirmed or denied, whether they are subjects or predicates, there will not be one affirmation, nor one negation, but the utterance is indeed one.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":147,"ref":"p147","source":"Tot autem in ea sunt affirmationes et negationes,quot termini sunt positi ex quibus unum non fit, sive autem de pluribus unum praedicetur, siveplurade uno praedicentur,idem'modus est,ut si quis dicat,homo animalrationalebipes est, quoniam e:chis unum quiddam fit, una est propositio. Sin vero quis ducat,homo albus ambulans est, quoniam ex his nibil unum fit, non est una propositio. Amplius quoque si de pluribus rebus unum nomen sit positum, ex quibus conjunctisnullaunanaturasit,et de illo uno nomine unum quodlibet aliud prædicetur, non est una affirmatio, nee una negatio. Marinus namque et hic latrabilis uno vocabulo canes vocantur.Si quis igitur dicat, canis animal est, quoniam ex his quae significat canis in unum junctis nihil unum efficitur (ex cane enim et latrabili et marino junctis nulla una substantia esl), illa propositio multiplex est,et multa significans, et non una. Quare quemadmodum si quis hujusmodi propositiones interroget, debeat responderi, docet dicens:responsionis peti-I","english":"For there are as many affirmations and negations in it as there are terms posited from which one thing does not come to be; whether one thing is predicated of many, or many of one, the mode is the same—as if someone should say, \"Man is a rational two-footed animal,\" since from these one single thing comes to be, it is one proposition. But if someone should say, \"Man is white, walking,\" since from these nothing one comes to be, it is not one proposition. Furthermore, if one name is posited for many things, from which when joined together no single nature arises, and something else whatsoever is predicated of that one name, it is not one affirmation nor one negation. For \"marine\" and \"barking\" are called dogs by one word. If, therefore, someone should say, \"A dog is an animal,\" since from those things which \"dog\" signifies, joined into one, nothing one is effected (for from \"dog\" and \"barking\" and \"marine\" joined together there is no one substance), that proposition is multiple and signifies many things, and is not one. Wherefore, just as if someone should ask about propositions of this kind, one ought to answer, he teaches, saying: of the response, the request—","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":148,"ref":"p148","source":"Si ergo dialectica interrogatio est tio,vel propositionis,vel alterius partis eontradielionis, propositio vero unius contradictionis pars est, non erit una responsio ad hæe. Neque enim est una in lerrogatio,nee si sit vera. Dictum estautem de his in Topicis, simul autem manifestum est, quoniam nec hocipsum, quid est,dialectica interrogatio est. Oportet enim datum esse ut ex interrogatione eligat, utram uelit contradictionis partem enuntiare. Sed oportet interrogantem, determinare, utrum hoc sit homo, an non hoc.\n\nSensus hujusmodi est, quicunque interrogat si ab arte dialectica non declinet, idcirco interrogat ut ei respondeatur. Respondeatur autem aut tota propositio, aut contradictionis particula. Si quis enim sic dicat interrogans, Animane immortalis est?. Tunc respondens aut est respondebit, aut non. Hoc autem est totius contradictionis una particula. Contradictio enim est, anima immortalis, est, anima immortalis non est, ergo est, et non contradictionis sunt particulæ. Quod si quis interroget, Animane immortalis est an non? tunc ille ita respondeat si velit totam propositionem dicens, Videtur mihi immortalis esse, vel rursus, Videtur mihi non esse immortalis. Ergo quisquis ita responsionem petit,ut illa responsionis petitio vel propositionis petitio sit, vel unius partis contradictionis.","english":"If, then, a dialectical question is a request for either a proposition or the other part of a contradiction, and a proposition is a part of one contradiction, there will not be one answer to these. For there is not one question, nor even if it be true. But these things have been said in the Topics; at the same time it is also clear that this very thing—what a dialectical question is—is not [settled]. For it must be granted that from the question the respondent chooses which part of the contradiction he wishes to state. But the questioner must determine whether this is a man or not this.\n\nThe sense of this is as follows: whoever asks a question, if he does not depart from the dialectical art, asks for the purpose that an answer be given to him. But an answer is given either as the whole proposition or as a part of the contradiction. For if someone asks, saying, \"Is the soul immortal?\" then the respondent will say either \"It is\" or \"It is not.\" But this is one part of the whole contradiction. For the contradiction is: \"The soul is immortal\" and \"The soul is not immortal\"; therefore \"It is\" and \"It is not\" are parts of the contradiction. But if someone asks, \"Is the soul immortal or not?\" then let him answer thus, if he wishes to state the whole proposition: \"It seems to me to be immortal,\" or again, \"It seems to me not to be immortal.\" Therefore whoever seeks an answer in this way, that request for an answer is either a request for a proposition or for one part of the contradiction.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":149,"ref":"p149","source":"Propositio autem unius contradictionis pars est, id est, omnis affirmatio una unam habebit negationem, et in duabus propositionibus una erit contradictio. Quare quisquis plura significantem propositionem dixerit,ille non facit propositionem ad quam sit una negatio. Quocirca hujusmodi interrogationi quae plura significat, nec si vera sit, debet esse una responsio.Si quis interroget substantiane sit canis, quanquam verum sit dicere substantia est, quoniam et latrabilis et marinus substantiæ sunt, tamen non est ad hanc una facienda responsio.Sed dicendum est de quo cane interroget, quod si ille dixerit de marino, vel rursus de latrabili, tunc cum per illius determinationem definitionemque interrogationis factafuerituna propositio, unumque significans, adhibenda est una responsio. De his autem in Topicis dictum esse commemorat. Similiter autem manifestumest,quoniam nec hoc ipsum quid est, dialectica est interrogatio, quas eeesse modus dlalecticæ interrogationis exsequitur. Ait enim, Si quis interroget quid est animal, hæc non est dialectica inlerrogatio.Oportet enim per dialecticam interrogationemoptionem respondenti dare,utrum affirmare velit,an negare quod dicitur,ut si quis sic interroget, Putasne bonum malo contrarium est? tunc respondenti datur electio utrum affirmare velit an negare.Dicit enim ilIe,aut est, aut non est. Qui autem ita interrogat, quid est animal?","english":"But a proposition is part of one contradiction, that is, every affirmation will have one negation, and in two propositions there will be one contradiction. Therefore whoever states a proposition that signifies several things does not make a proposition to which there may be one negation. Hence to an inquiry of this kind, which signifies several things, even if it is true, there ought not to be one answer. If someone asks whether a dog is a substance, although it is true to say that it is a substance, since both the barking dog and the sea dog are substances, nevertheless one answer is not to be given to this. But it must be said of which dog he is asking; and if he says of the sea dog, or again of the barking dog, then when by his determination and definition of the inquiry one proposition has been made and one thing is signified, one answer is to be applied. He recalls that these matters have been discussed in the Topics. In like manner it is clear that this very question \"what is it?\" is not a dialectical inquiry, which he sets out as the mode of dialectical inquiry. For he says, If someone asks what an animal is, this is not a dialectical inquiry. For by a dialectical inquiry one ought to give the respondent a choice, whether he wishes to affirm or to deny what is said, as if someone asks thus: Do you think good is contrary to evil? Then a choice is given to the respondent whether he wishes to affirm or to deny. For he says either it is or it is not. But one who asks thus, what is an animal?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":150,"ref":"p150","source":"nullum illi locum aut affirmationis aut negationis relinquit;quidenim dicturus estinterrogante aliquo. Quid estanima]e?dicturus est.Non? in conveniens erit responsio. Eodem modo quoquesidicat est animat, ad causam.Eola igitur illa est dialectica interrogatio, in qua datur respondenti ex interrogatione optio utrum velit patrem contradictionis eligere, eamque enuntiare vel affirmando scilicet vel negando. Oportet enim interrogantem determinare, utrum, verbi gratia, animal homo sit,an ron, ut ex illa interrogatione, quam velit partem contradictionis possit, is qui respondet eligere.\n\nQuoniam vero hæc quidem prædicantur composita, ut unum sit omne prædicamentum eorum quæ separatim prædicantur, alia vero non,quæ differentia est.De homine enim verum est dicere et separatim animal,et separatim bipes,et hæc ut unum;et hominem,et album, ethæcutunum. Sednonsi citharædus est et bonus,est et citharædus bonus.Si enim quoniam altetrurum dicitur, et utrumque dicetur: multa inconvenientia erunt. De homine enim verum est et hominem etalbum dicere. Quare et omne.Rursus si album, et omne, quare erit homo albus albus,et hoc in infinitum. Et rursus musicus albus ambulans,et hæc eadem frequenterimplicita ill infinitum. Amplius Socrates. Socrates est,et homo, et Socrates Socrates homo.Et si homo et bipes,et homo homo bipes.","english":"It leaves him no place for either affirmation or negation; for what will he say when someone asks, \"What is the soul?\" He will say, \"Not?\"—the response will be incongruous. In the same way, too, if someone says \"is the soul\" in answer to the cause. That dialectical question, then, is the one in which the option is given to the respondent from the question whether he wishes to choose one part of the contradiction and state it, namely by affirming or by denying. For the questioner ought to determine, for example, whether animal is man or not, so that from that question the one who responds can choose whichever part of the contradiction he wishes.\n\nBut since some things are predicated as composites, so that every predication of things that are predicated separately is one, while others are not, there is this difference. For concerning man it is true to say both \"animal\" separately and \"two-footed\" separately, and these as one; and \"man\" and \"white,\" and these as one. But it is not so if he is a cithara-player and good—he is also a good cithara-player. For if because each of the two is said, both will also be said, there will be many incongruities. For concerning man it is true to say both \"man\" and \"white.\" Wherefore also \"every.\" Again, if \"white,\" also \"every,\" wherefore there will be \"white white man,\" and this to infinity. And again \"musical white walking,\" and these same things repeatedly entangled to infinity. Further, Socrates. Socrates is, and man, and Socrates Socrates man. And if man and two-footed, also man man two-footed.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":151,"ref":"p151","source":"Quoniarn ergo si quis simpliciter dicat complexiones fieri plurima inconvenientia, contingit dicere,manifestum est.Quemadmodum autem ponen. dum sit, nunc dicamus:\n\nPostquam de unitate propositionis explicuit, et quid esset dialectica propositio terminavil.Nunc ad illa venit in quibus plura sæpe de uno sigillatim veraciter prædicant,quæ simul prædicata, alias vera sunt,alias falsa.Si quis enim sic dicat: Marius malus est,fortasse verum est.Rursus: Marius dux est, et hoc verum est.Quæ conjuncta in unum nulla ratione sunt vera, velut si quis dicat: Marius malus dux est,esL namque optimus dux omnium. Rursus homo animal est, varum est, et homo bipes est, verum est, et hæo juncta vera rursus sunt. Si quis enim dicat homo animal bipes est,verum est. Horum ergo qui modus sit, vel quando ea quae singula extra prædicantur,juncta,vera vel falsa sint,regulam daturus aggreditur,et sensus quidem hujusmodi est.","english":"Therefore, since it is clear that if someone were to say without qualification that combinations are formed, many absurdities follow, it is evident. But in what way this should be posited, let us now say.\n\nAfter he had explained the unity of the proposition and had finished what the dialectical proposition is, he now comes to those cases in which many things are often truly predicated separately of one thing, which, when predicated together, are sometimes true and sometimes false. For if someone says thus: \"Marius is bad,\" perhaps it is true. Again: \"Marius is a general,\" and this is true. But these joined into one are in no way true, as if someone should say: \"Marius is a bad general\"—for he is the best general of all. Again, \"man is an animal\" is true, and \"man is two-footed\" is true, and these joined together are again true. For if someone says \"man is a two-footed animal,\" it is true. Therefore, approaching the task of giving a rule as to what the mode of these is, or when those things which are predicated separately are true or false when joined, he begins; and the sense is of this kind.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":152,"ref":"p152","source":"Ordo autem sermonum talis est.Quoniam vera, inquit, quaedam sunt, quae ita conjuncta de aliquo prædicantur,ut eorum praedicamentum unum sit,et in unum congruat forma eorum quæ extra vere oterant prædicari,ut in eo quod est animal bipes de homine juncta compositaque dicuntur, et fit una quodammodo prædicatio: cum animal et bipes extra sigillatim valeant prædicari, dicimus enim homo animal est,et rursus homo bipes est, alia vero quæ non sunt eo modo,quæ sigillatim quidem praedicari verum est,composita vero falsum, sed quae horum differentia est, vel quando illud,quando hoc eveniat, dicendum est, et hoc docet exemplis. De homine enim, in quit, verum est dicere extra anima!, extra bipes, et ut unum, ut de eo dicatur, animal bipes. Rursum quemlibet hominem, ut Socratem possumus dicere, ille homo albus est, rursus ille bomo homo est,et haec ut unum juncta dicentes: ille homo homo albus est. Sed aliquoties evenit ut aliquis homo citharcedus sitquidem et iwperitus.Bonusautem homo,et si de ipso dicatur quoniam est citbarædus,verum cst,et quia bonus est hoc quoque verum est.Sed non et si citharœdus estet bonus,idcirco jam bonus est etiam citharœdus,fortasse enim est imperitissimua, homo autem bonus.","english":"Now the order of the discussion is as follows. Since, he says, certain things are true which are predicated of something in such a way that they are joined together, so that their predication is one and the form of those things which can truly be predicated separately converges into one—as when \"animal\" and \"two-footed\" are said of man as joined and combined, and the predication becomes in a certain way one, even though \"animal\" and \"two-footed\" can be predicated separately; for we say \"man is an animal,\" and again \"man is two-footed\"—but other things are not of this kind, things which it is true to predicate separately but false to predicate when combined. What the difference between these is, or when the one and when the other occurs, must be stated, and he teaches this by examples. For of man, he says, it is true to say separately \"animal,\" separately \"two-footed,\" and as one, so that \"animal two-footed\" is said of him. Again, we can say of any man, for instance Socrates, \"that man is white,\" and again \"that man is a man,\" and saying these joined as one: \"that man is a white man.\" But sometimes it happens that some man is a cithara-player and yet unskilled, but a good man; and if it is said of him that he is a cithara-player, it is true, and that he is good is also true. But it is not the case that if he is a cithara-player and good, he is therefore already a good cithara-player; for perhaps he is most unskilled, though a good man.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":153,"ref":"p153","source":"Si enim quoniam alterutrum dicitur,et utrumque dicetur, multa inconvenientia erunt.Si quis enim sit qui dicat,omnia quaecunque sigiIlatim vere dicuntur,eajuncta etiam vere possunt dici,multa inconvenientia et impossibilia contingunt.Hoc est enim quod att.Si enim quoniam alterutrum dicitur,et utrumquedicitur; si enim aliquis dicat quoniam allerutrum extra vere dicitur. et utrumque simul vere semper posse dici, multa sunlimpossibilia quae contingunt; qua; autem sint impossibilia quæ contingunt,hæc sunt. De homine enim possumus dicere quoniam homo est,et rursus possumus dicere quoniam albus est; dicimus igitur et simul de homine, homo albus est.","english":"For if, because each of the two is said separately, both together will also be said, there will be many absurdities. For if there is anyone who says that all things whatsoever are truly said individually can also truly be said when joined together, many absurdities and impossibilities follow. For this is what he says: \"For if, because each of the two is said, both are also said\" — that is, if anyone says that because each of the two is truly said separately, both together can always truly be said, many impossibilities follow; and what the impossibilities are that follow, these are they. For of a man we can say that he is a man, and again we can say that he is white; therefore we also say at the same time of the man that the man is white.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":154,"ref":"p154","source":"Rursus de homine albo possumus dicere quoniam homo est, possumus dicere quoniam albus est; igitur et haec juncta dicuntur,homo homo albus albus est.Nam si verum est dicere de homine quoniam homo est, et de albo quoniam albus est, et omne hoc vere dici potesl,id est homo homo albus albusest.Et si de hoc iterum homine albo,verum est dicerequoniam albus est,et verum est de eo album prædicare, et rursus de homine prædicare album verum est; erit ergo homo albus albus,et rursus de hoc homine album praedicare verum est, erit igitur tertio homo albus aus abus, et hoc in infinitum progreditur.Et rursus si verum est dicere de homine quoniam musicus est,et rursus quoniam albus est, et quoniam ambulans est,et hæc rursus in unum homo dicuntur, quoniam musicus albus ambulans est.Rursus quimusicusalbus ambulansest,et albus est et ambulansest, et musicus est. Dicuntur hæc igitur rursus simul homo albus albus musicus musicus, ambulans ambulans est, et hæc assidue complexa eadem faciunt superfluam locutionem. Nec non in singularibus quod idem eveni.","english":"Again, concerning a white man we can say that he is a man, and we can say that he is white; therefore these things too are said in combination: man man white white is. For if it is true to say of a man that he is a man, and of a white thing that it is white, and all this can be truly said, that is, man man white white is. And if again of this white man it is true to say that he is white, and it is true to predicate white of him, and again it is true to predicate white of the man, then there will be a white white man, and again it is true to predicate white of this man, so there will be a third time a white white white man, and this proceeds to infinity. And again, if it is true to say of a man that he is musical, and again that he is white, and that he is walking, and these again are said together in one, man, that he is musical, white, walking. Again, since he is musical, white, walking, and he is white, and he is walking, and he is musical. These things, then, are again said together: man white white musical musical, walking walking is, and these continually combined make the same superfluous utterance. Nor is it otherwise in the case of singulars.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":155,"ref":"p155","source":"Si enim Socrates et Socrates est et homo,erit So crates Socrates homo, et si Socrates Socrates est et homo et bipes, erit Socrates Socrates homo bipes; et rursus si hicidem bipes est et homo, erit Socrates Socrates homo bomo bipes bipes.Quæ omnia quam sninconvenientia nullus ignorat.Non igitur dicendum est quoniam omnia quaecunque sigillatim prædicantur,eademjuncta semper potuerunt prædicari, ergo quae juncta vere dici possunt,et quae falso, eorum quae sigillatim atque extra ante vere dicuntur, exponit. Hoc enim solum hactenus demonstratum est quoniam si quis simpliciter et omni modo fieri complexiones dicat, multa inconvenientia evenire necesse est.Quemadmodum autem fiant complexiunes, ponendum atque tractandum est.\n\nEorum, igitur quæ prædicantur, et de quibus prædicantur,quæcunque secundum accidens dicuntur vel de eodem,vel alterum de altero, hæc non erunt unum, ut homo albus est etmusicus. Sed non est idem album et musicum,accidentia enim utraque eidem,nec si album muscum verum est dicere,tamen erit album musicum unum aliquid.Secundum accidens enim album musicum dicitur.Quare non erit album musicum unum aliquid. Quocirca nec citharædus bonus simpliciter, sed animal bipes. Non enim sunt secundum accidens.","english":"For if Socrates is both Socrates and a man, then Socrates Socrates man will be; and if Socrates is both Socrates and a man and two-footed, then Socrates Socrates man two-footed will be; and again, if this same thing is two-footed and a man, then Socrates Socrates man man two-footed two-footed will be. No one is ignorant of how incongruous all these things are. Therefore it must not be said that, because all things whatsoever that are predicated individually could always be predicated when joined together, consequently those things which can be truly said when joined, and those which can be said falsely, are set forth from among those things which are truly said individually and separately. For this alone has been demonstrated thus far: that if anyone says that combinations come about simply and in every way, many incongruities must necessarily result. But in what manner combinations come about must be set down and treated.\n\nTherefore, of those things which are predicated, and of those things of which they are predicated, whatever are said according to accident, either of the same thing or one of another, these will not be one, as a man is white and musical. But white and musical are not the same; for both are accidents of the same thing, and even if it is true to say that the white thing is musical, nevertheless white musical will not be some one thing. For white musical is said according to accident. Wherefore white musical will not be some one thing. And for this reason neither will a good cithara-player be [one thing] simply, but a two-footed animal. For they are not according to accident.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":156,"ref":"p156","source":"In his, in quit, quae prædicantur, et de his de qaibus illa ipsa prædicantur, duplex ratio est.Aut enim duo accidentia de uno subjecto dicunlur,ut Marius malus est,Marius duxest; aut unum accidens de uno subjecto praedicantur, aliud vero accidens de illo praedicato accidenti prædicatur, ut si quis dicat: Cicero est calvus,calvus orator est.Hic enim calvus de subjecto Cicerone, orator de calvo pra'dicatur. Hoc est enim quod ait: Quaecunque secundum accidensdicuntur, veeeodem, vel alterum de altero eeodem, usqua uoaccidentia euno prædicentur; alterum de altero, ut si unum accidens de altero accidenti dicatur, ut ipsum accidens de quo dicitur de altero rursus subjecto prædicetur.","english":"In these cases, he says, which are predicated, and concerning those things of which they are themselves predicated, there is a twofold account. For either two accidents are said of one subject, as Marius is bad, Marius is a leader; or one accident is predicated of one subject, but another accident is predicated of that predicated accident, as if someone should say: Cicero is bald, the bald man is an orator. For here bald is predicated of the subject Cicero, and orator of the bald man. For this is what he says: whatever things are said according to accident, either the same is said of the same, or one thing of another of the same, until the accidents come to be predicated; one thing of another, as if one accident is said of another accident, so that the accident itself, of which it is said, is in turn predicated of another subject.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":157,"ref":"p157","source":"Quod si ita fiat prædicatio, in unum jungi accidentia copuJarique non possunt; etenim si quis sic dicat,bomo albus est, bomo musicus est, hæc juncta simul unum non faciunt,ut est musicus albus,vel si rursus musicum prædicetur de albo, ut a!bumde homine praedicetur et dicatur, ut illud album musicum, est non idem est album musicum,nec in unam substanliam coeunt quaecunque vere praedicari possunt sigi!latim: idcirco enim haec de se invicem videntur posse prædicantur quia de uno eodem que subjecto præ dicantur, non quod ex his unum aliquid fiat, acci dentia enim sunt utraque.Quare non erit album musicum: sed quoniam homo albus idem musicus est, per id quod utraque uni accidunt per accidens album de musico prædicatur. Nee rursus si citbaraedus est et bonus,idcirco jam bonus dici puterit citharædus, neque enim bonus et citharaedus talia sunt ut ex his unum fieri possit.Sed quoniam utraque eidem accid unt,idcirco de sesecundum accidens praedicantur. Sed magis animalfortasse possumus dicere: Homo animal est, homo bipes est,ut hæc junctadicamus, bipes,e! his junctis secundum substantiam non secundum accidens est facta prædicatio.","english":"But if predication is made in this way, accidents cannot be joined and coupled into one; for if someone says thus, \"man is white,\" \"man is musical,\" these joined together do not make one thing, such as \"musical white,\" or again if \"musical\" is predicated of \"white,\" so that \"white\" is predicated of \"man\" and it is said that \"that white thing is musical,\" it is not the same as \"white musical,\" nor do all things that can be truly predicated separately come together into one substance; for they seem able to be predicated of each other for this reason, because they are predicated of one and the same subject, not because some one thing is made from them—for both are accidents. Wherefore \"white musical\" will not be [one thing]; but since the white man is the same as the musical man, through the fact that both befall one [subject], \"white\" is predicated of \"musical\" per accidens. Nor again, if someone is both a cithara-player and good, will the cithara-player therefore be able to be called good; for \"good\" and \"cithara-player\" are not such that one thing can be made from them. But since both befall the same [subject], they are therefore predicated of each other according to accident. But perhaps we can speak more properly of \"animal\": \"man is an animal,\" \"man is two-footed,\" so that we say these joined—\"two-footed animal\"—and from these joined the predication is made according to substance, not according to accident.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":158,"ref":"p158","source":"Amplius nec quæcunque insunt inaltero. Quare neque album frequenter, neque homo, homo animal est vel bipes, sunt enzm in homine bipes et animal.\n\nQuæcunque sigillatim secundum accidens prædica. musea simul prædicari nou posse monstravit. Nunc autem illud etiam docet, quoniam illa quoque quae substantialiter prædicantur, non semper simul juncta prædicentur,et haec ratio et accidentibus convenit et substantialibus rebus.Quoties enim inest prædicato aliquid, et nos illud extra volumus prædicare, et in unum rursus duo prædicata conjungere, tunc fit incongrua prædicatio;et hæc aliquoties quidem in ipsa hominum prolatione perspicitur, aliquoties vero in venitur in intellectu, atque in termini continentia. Si quis enim sit homo albus, et de eo dicatur, verbi gratia: Callias homo albus est, et rursus de eo dicatur, Callias albus est, si quis id velit adjungere, inconvenientissime prædicabitur. Dicit enim: Callias homo albus albus est,idcirco quoniam albus in homine albo continebatur, quod ante de CaIliaprædicatum est. Atque hoc est quod ait: Quare neque album frequenter. Alia vero sunt quae hoc in prolatione non habent, sed in natura, si quis enim sic dicat: Socrates So::rates est, et rursus Socrates homo est, et haec simul Jungat, ut dicat Socrates Socrates homo est, non recte fecerit prædicationem. Nam homo in Socrate inerat, et rursus bomo de Socrate praedicatum est.","english":"Further, not even all things that are present in another. Therefore neither \"white\" repeatedly, nor \"man\"—\"man is an animal\" or \"two-footed\"—for \"two-footed\" and \"animal\" are in man.\n\nHe has shown that whatever are predicated separately according to accident cannot be predicated together at the same time. But now he teaches this as well: that those things too which are predicated substantially are not always predicated when joined together at the same time, and this reasoning applies both to accidents and to substantial things. For whenever something is present in a predicate, and we wish to predicate that separately, and again to join two predicates into one, then the predication becomes incongruous; and this is sometimes observed in the very utterance of men, sometimes it is found in the understanding and in the content of the term. For if someone is a white man, and it is said of him, for example, \"Callias is a white man,\" and again it is said of him, \"Callias is white,\" if someone wishes to add this, it will be predicated most incongruously. For he says, \"Callias is a white man white,\" because \"white\" was contained in \"white man,\" which was predicated of Callias before. And this is what he says: \"Therefore neither 'white' repeatedly.\" But there are other things which do not have this in utterance but in nature; for if someone says thus, \"Socrates is Socrates,\" and again \"Socrates is a man,\" and joins these together so as to say \"Socrates is Socrates a man,\" he will not have made a correct predication. For \"man\" was present in Socrates, and again \"man\" was predicated of Socrates.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":159,"ref":"p159","source":"Talis est ergo qui haec juncta, id est, Socratem et hominem, voluerit prædicare de Socrate, tanquam si dicat Socrates homo homo est. Nam in Socrate inest'nominis natura. Vel rursus si de aliquo homine, velit aliquis hominem prædicare, et rursus animal, et dicat, homo, homo et animal. Homo enim idem est quod animal; ergo qui hæc duo juncta componit,nihil differt quam si dicat, homo animal animal est Homo namque animal est.Eodem modo et si de aliquo homine hominem praedicet prædica-aliquis, et rursus bipedem, atque hæc juncta velit dicere, incongruam faciet lionem.Nihil enim aliud dicit, qui dixerit, homo homo bipes est, quam si dicat,homo bipes bipes est, etenim homo bipes est. Quare neque ea quae in ipsa prolatione in altero insunt cum extra prædicantur rectejunguntur, nec ea quae in prolatione quidem non sunt, sed tantum in natura atque substantia. Quod si nec accidentia sint,nec alterum in altero,et ea sigillatim prædicenlur,recte juncta prædicantur; si quis enim dicat de homine quoniam animal est, verum dixerit,et rursus quoniam bipes,verum hoc quoque dixerit.Hæc si jungat,faciet, homo est animal bipes,hic recteprædicatur.Nam neque accidentia dicuntur, nec alterum alteri inest. Non enim sumitur in definitione animalis bipes,ac per hoc non inest ilii substantialiter.","english":"Such, then, is the one who wishes to predicate these things joined together—that is, Socrates and man—of Socrates, as if he were to say \"Socrates man man is.\" For the nature of the name is present in Socrates. Or again, if someone wishes to predicate man of some man, and again animal, and says \"man, man and animal.\" For man is the same as animal; therefore one who combines these two joined together differs in nothing from one who says \"man animal animal is.\" For man is an animal. In the same way, if someone predicates man of some man, and again two-footed, and wishes to say these joined together, he will make an incongruous predication. For one who says \"man man two-footed is\" says nothing other than if he were to say \"man two-footed two-footed is,\" since man is two-footed. Wherefore neither the things that are present in the other in the very utterance itself are rightly joined when they are predicated externally, nor those that are not present in the utterance but only in nature and substance. But if they are neither accidents, nor the one in the other, and they are predicated individually, they are rightly predicated when joined; for if someone says of man that he is an animal, he will have spoken truly, and again that he is two-footed, he will have spoken this too truly. If he joins these, he will make \"man is an animal two-footed\"—here it is rightly predicated. For they are not called accidents, nor is the one present in the other. For two-footed is not assumed in the definition of animal, and through this it is not present in it substantially.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":160,"ref":"p160","source":"Illa autem sola aliquibus insunt substantialiter quæcunque in eorum definitione sumuntur, ut in definitione hominis sumitur animal, et in definitione rursus hominis sumitur bipes: inest ergo et bipes in homine.Quare illa sola sigillatim prædicata recte juncta prædicantur,quæ neque accidentia sunt,nec alterum in altero est, vel prolatione vel natura: idque fiet manifestum,si eorum alterius definitio sumatur,velut squæratur an de homine homo et bipes prædicari simul possint, diffiniendus est homo, etsiinhominisdefinitione bipes incurrerit,dicendum est bipes inessehomini, et utrumque junctum de homine non posse prædicari, quia cum dixeris homo homo bipes, tale est:quasi dicas,homo bipes bipes, quod est incongruum.\n\nVerum eat autem dicere de aliquo et simpliciter,ut quemdam hominem honnnem, aut quemdam album hominem hominem album.\n\nDudum quæsivit utrum omnia quæ sigillatim vere prædicantur ea juncta veraciter dicerentur. Nunc autem considerat atque perpendit utrum omniaquæcunque simul vere di:,untur,et simpIiciterveræ prædicentur.Dicimus enim Socratem quemdarr, hominem esse, et rursus simpliciter cimus Socratem hominem esse.","english":"But those things alone are present in things substantially, whatever is taken in their definition—as animal is taken in the definition of man, and again two-footed is taken in the definition of man; therefore two-footed is also present in man. Wherefore those things alone, predicated individually, are rightly predicated when joined, which are neither accidents nor one in the other, either in utterance or in nature. And this will become manifest if the definition of one of them is taken—for example, if it is asked whether man and two-footed can be predicated of man at the same time, man must be defined; and even if two-footed has entered into the definition of man, it must be said that two-footed is present in man, and that both joined together cannot be predicated of man, because when you have said \"man man two-footed,\" it is as if you were to say \"man two-footed two-footed,\" which is incongruous.\n\nBut it is possible to speak of something both with qualification and simply—as a certain man [is] a man, or a certain white man [is] a white man.\n\nA little earlier he asked whether all things that are truly predicated individually would be truly stated when joined. Now, however, he considers and weighs whether all things whatsoever that are truly said together are also truly predicated simply. For we say that a certain Socrates is a man, and again we say simply that Socrates is a man.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":161,"ref":"p161","source":"Rursus dicimus, verbi gratia, Calliam album bominem esse, et de eo album simpliciter prædicamus, dicimus enim,Callias albus est.Quærit ergo utrum boc in omnibus esse videatur, ut quascunque verum est juncta prædicare, eadem quoque verum sit simpliciter dicere; sed hoc non in omnibus eveniet.Nam si qua hujusmodi sit præ dicatio,in qua aliquid oppositum addatur ipsi prædicationi,præter illud oppositum,simpliciter illa prædicatio non potest prædicari,ut si quis dicat de Socrate jam mortuo, quoniam hoc quod jacet, bomo mortuus est,vere dicit,simpliciterautem dicere non potest, hoc quod jacet homo est. Idcirco quoniam additum est prædicato, id est homini, id quodhomini oppositum est,id est mortuus. Dictum est enim hoc quod jacet homo mortuus est. Mortuus autem et homo opposita quodammodo Eunl.Nam si eorum definitiones sumamus,facile hoc perspici potest.Homo namque est animatus, mortuus vero præter ani.. mam: atque ideo quoniam quædam est oppositio secundum privationem atque habitum, hominis et mortui et utraque simul vere prædicantur, unum, ipsorum,quod est bomo.,simpliciter et præler mor-tuum de cadavere non potest prædicari, atque hoc est quod ait:","english":"Again we say, for example, that Callias is a white man, and we predicate white of him without qualification; for we say, \"Callias is white.\" The question therefore arises whether this seems to hold in all cases, so that whatever things it is true to predicate jointly, it is also true to state without qualification; but this will not occur in all cases. For if there is some predication of this sort in which something opposed is added to the predicate itself, then apart from that opposed thing the predication cannot be made without qualification—as if someone says of Socrates, now dead, that this thing lying here is a dead man, he speaks truly, but he cannot say without qualification that this thing lying here is a man. The reason is that there has been added to the predicate—that is, to \"man\"—that which is opposed to man, namely \"dead.\" For it has been said that this thing lying here is a dead man. But \"dead\" and \"man\" are in a certain way opposites. For if we take their definitions, this can easily be seen. For man is animate, but dead is without soul; and therefore, since there is a certain opposition according to privation and habit, of man and dead—and both are truly predicated together—one of them, namely \"man,\" cannot be predicated without qualification, apart from \"dead,\" of the corpse; and this is what he says:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":162,"ref":"p162","source":"Non autem semper, sed quando in agjecto alzquid I quidem oppositorum idest quod consequilur contradictio,non verum,sed falsum est, ut hominem mortuum,, horninemdicere. Quando autem non est, verum est. Vel eliam quando inest, semper non verum est; quando vero nora inest, non semper verum est,!It Homerus est aliquid, ut poeta\" ergo eliam est, an non, secundum accidens enim prædicatur esse de Homero quoniam est poeta, sed non secundum se prædicatur de Homero quoniam est.\n\nQuae utraque, id est et prædicatum ef quod additur prædicato, ex ipsa oppositione contradictio comilalur, ut quoniam homo et mortuus opposila sunt, ea quædam comitatur atque consequitur per oppositionem contradictio. Dicimus enim, qui bomo est vivit, qui mortuus est non vivit; vivit autem et non vivit, quasdam conlradiclio esL Ero in hujusmodi prædicationibus non est verum unum simpliciter prædicari. Quando autem hujusmodi oppositioni ei quod prædicatur, non jungitur, potest simpliciter vere prædicari, sed nec hoc semper, magisque illud verius dicitur, quoniam cum ista oppositio est, nunquam verum est eorum qua: juncta vere prædicantur, simpliciter vere aliquid appellari. Cum autem ista oppositio non inest, noa semper vere simpliciter praedicari eorum aliquid, quas de aliquo vere juncta dicuntur.","english":"But not always, but when something of the opposites—that is, what follows from the contradiction—is present in what is added, it is not true but false, as to say \"a dead man\" of a man. But when it is not present, it is true. Or even when it is present, it is always not true; but when it is not present, it is not always true. If Homer is something, as a poet, therefore he also is, or not? For it is predicated according to accident that he is of Homer, since he is a poet; but it is not predicated according to itself that he is of Homer.\n\nIn both of these—that is, both the predicate and what is added to the predicate—the contradiction is brought together from the opposition itself, so that since \"man\" and \"dead\" are opposites, a certain contradiction accompanies and follows them through opposition. For we say that he who is a man lives, and he who is dead does not live; but \"lives\" and \"does not live\" are a certain contradiction. Therefore in predications of this kind it is not true that one thing is predicated without qualification. But when an opposition of this kind is not joined to what is predicated, it can be predicated simply and truly—but not even this always; and rather that is said more truly, that when this opposition is present, it is never true that any of the things which are truly predicated when joined is called something simply and truly. But when this opposition is not present, it is not always true that any of the things which are truly said when joined of something is predicated simply and truly.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":163,"ref":"p163","source":"Si quis enim sic dicat: Homerus polea est, verum dixerit; quod si dicat: Homerus est simpliciter praeter poetam, falsum est. Atqui esse et polea, non sunt opposita. Ergo nonsemper quando oppositio non est in prædicalis, verum est aliquid simpliciter prædicari. Qum autem oppositio inest, semper falsum est unum prædicamentorum quae juncta dicunlur, simpliciter et praeter aliud dicere. Nam cum de Homero dicimus quoniam est aliquid, id est quoniam Homerus poeta est, verum est. Nunquid etiam dicendum est per se quoniam est, an potius esse non simpliciter, sed secundum accidens de Homero praedicatum est. Non enim quia est, sed quia poeta est, et quoniam ei et poeta esse accidit. Idcirco esse quoque Homerum aliquid, id est poetam, non per se esse praedicamus; concludit igitur hoc modo: Quare in quibuscunque prædicatis contarietas non inest, si defmitiones pro nominibus dicantur, el secundum se prædicantur, et nou secundum accidens in his aliquid. eG simpliciter verum erit dicere. Quod aulem non est, quoniam opinabile est, non est verum dicere esse aliquid. Opinatio enim ejus est, non quoniam est, sed quoniam non est.","english":"For if someone says thus: \"Homer is a poet,\" he will have spoken truly; but if he says: \"Homer is,\" simply, apart from being a poet, it is false. And yet \"to be\" and \"to be a poet\" are not opposites. Therefore it is not always the case that when there is no opposition in the predicates, something is truly predicated simply. But when the opposition is present, it is always false to speak one of the categories that are said in conjunction, simply and apart from the other. For when we say of Homer that he is something, that is, that Homer is a poet, it is true. But should we also say per se that he is, or rather is \"to be\" predicated of Homer not simply, but according to accident? For it is not because he is, but because he is a poet, and because being a poet happens to him. For this reason we also predicate that Homer is something, that is, a poet, not per se. He concludes therefore in this way: Wherefore in whatever predicates contrariety is not present, if definitions are given in place of names, they are predicated both per se and not according to accident in these, and it will be simply true to say something. But what is not, because it is opinable, it is not true to say that it is something. For the opinion of it is not that it is, but that it is not.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":164,"ref":"p164","source":"In quibusdam enim nominibus dicds non apparet oppositio: quod si deliniantur, mox sese illa oppositio patefacit, ut in eo quod est homo et mortuus, nomina quidem ipsa opposita non sunt, sed definita inveniuntur opposiLa. In hujusmodi igitur oppositionibus vel quoties non secundum accidens praedicatur aliquid, ut esse de Homero secundum poelam, scilicet quod Homero accidens est, sed per se et secundum ipsum subjectum, manifestum est quoniam quidquid conjuncte vere dici potest, idem vere dicitur et simpliciter praedicatum, ut si quis dicat de aliquo homine quoniam hic homo albus est, verum Fortasse dixerU, el rursus hie albus est. Hoc quoque verum est dicere, idcirco quoniam de eo non ideo album praedicavit, quia dixit illum esse hominem, sicut de Qomero, idcirco esse praedicatur, quia poeta esse dicitur, sed quod per se albus est; sed hoc non secundum accidens prædicatur, sad per se. Quare recte dictum est in quibus junctis praedicationibus neque oppositio quædam inest, nec ipsa per accidens prædicalio est iilasimpliciter etiam posse praedicari. Quod autem non est, quoniam opinabile est, non est verum dicere esse aliquid. Opinato enim non est, quoniam est, sed quoniam non est. Quidam volentes id quod non est, aliquo modo esse monstrare, tali utebantursyljogismo, quod est opinabile est.","english":"For in certain names, the opposition does not at first appear; but if they are defined, that opposition soon reveals itself, as in the case of \"man\" and \"dead\": the names themselves are not opposites, but when defined they are found to be opposed. In oppositions of this kind, then, or whenever something is not predicated according to accident—as \"to be\" is predicated of Homer according to \"poet,\" namely because being a poet is accidental to Homer—but per se and according to the subject itself, it is manifest that whatever can be truly said in conjunction is also truly said when predicated simply. For if someone says of some man that this man is white, he has perhaps spoken truly; and again, \"this one is white\"—this too it is true to say, for the reason that he did not predicate white of him because he said he was a man, as in Homer's case \"to be\" is predicated because he is said to be a poet, but because he is white per se; and this is not predicated according to accident, but per se. Therefore it was rightly said that in joined predications in which no opposition is present, and which are not predicated according to accident, they can also be predicated simply. But what is not, because it is opinable, it is not true to say that it is something. For it is opinable not because it is, but because it is not. Certain people, wishing to show that what is not is in some way, used this syllogism: what is opinable is.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":165,"ref":"p165","source":"Concludebant quod non est igitur est, docentes ea quæ essent, sca potus, non opinabilia esse; quo autem non es, opinioni aum subjacere, nulla etiam scientia claudio Quod Aristoteles hoc modo discutit: ait enim, non idcirco est opinabile, quoniam est, sed idcirco opinabile est, quoniam non est; sed hoc quod non est, est quidem aliquid, sed est non per se, sed opinabile. Et quemadmodum Homerus quidem est quiddam, id est poeta, non tamen est per se, ita id quod non eSI, est quidem aliquid, id est opinabile, vel ignorabile, vel nescibile, non tamen est aliquid per se in natura.\n\nDE ENUNTIATIONIBUS MODORUM, POSSIBILIS, CONTINGEN TIS, INPOSSIBILIS, ET NECESSARII.\n\nlIis vero deferminatis, perspiciendum est quemadmodum sese habent affirmatiane. et negatione. ad se invicem, hæ scilicet quæ sunt de possibili esse et non possibili, de conlingenti et non contingenti, de imp ossibili et necessario. lIabent enim aliquas dubitationes. Propositionum alix sunt quae simpliciter profcruotur, aliae quibus aliquis modus in enuntiatione miscelur. Si quis enim dicat: Socrates disputat, simplicem propositionem fccit; si vero aliquis dicat: Socrates bene disputat, modum propositioni quam enuntiabat adjunxit; quomodo enim disputaret ap-' posuit, cum dixit bene.","english":"They concluded: \"What is not, therefore, is\"—teaching that the things which exist, or rather the things which are, are not objects of opinion; but that what is not falls under opinion, and is also wholly excluded from knowledge. Aristotle discusses this as follows: for he says that it is not for this reason an object of opinion because it is, but for this reason it is an object of opinion because it is not; but this very thing which is not is indeed something, yet it is not per se, but is an object of opinion. And just as Homer is indeed something, that is, a poet, yet is not per se, so that which is not is indeed something, that is, an object of opinion, or an object of ignorance, or an object of unknowing, yet it is not something per se in nature.\n\nON ENUNCIATIONS OF MODES: THE POSSIBLE, THE CONTINGENT, THE IMPOSSIBLE, AND THE NECESSARY.\n\nBut these matters having been determined, it must be examined how affirmations and negations stand in relation to one another—namely those which concern the possible to be and the not possible, the contingent and the not contingent, the impossible and the necessary. For they involve certain difficulties. Of propositions, some are those which are put forward simply, others are those in which some mode is mixed into the enunciation. For if someone says, \"Socrates disputes,\" he has made a simple proposition; but if someone says, \"Socrates disputes well,\" he has added a mode to the proposition which he was enunciating; for he added how he disputes, when he said \"well.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":166,"ref":"p166","source":"Nunc ergo boc speculatur quemadmodum se habent affirmationr.s et negaLioDes earum propositionum, quae cum modo aliquo proferunlur, ut siquis dicat, possibile est boc fieri, et rursua, non possibile est hoc fieri, quemadmodum sese in his affirmationis habeat negationisque natura. Similiter aulem et in eo quod est impossibile esse, et in eo quod est necesse esse, et in eo quod dicitur contingere esse, et non contingere esse. Quæquc horum sint affirmationes, quæve negationes, aut quam affirmationem cui negationi recte aliquis opponat: De his omnibus perspiciendum, inquit, est, quoniam ea quae de conjunctis et simplicibus prædicationibus dicenda fuerant, (erminala sunt. Nam de earum propositionum quae cum modo proferuntur, oppositionibus, multa causatio est. Quæ autem sint dubitationes, vel quemadmodum in his oppositiones inveniendae sunt, continua disputatione persequitur.","english":"Now therefore he examines how affirmations and their negations stand in the case of those propositions which are uttered with some mode, as if someone should say, \"It is possible for this to happen,\" and again, \"It is not possible for this to happen\"—how the nature of affirmation and negation stands in these. Similarly also in the case of \"it is impossible to be,\" and in the case of \"it is necessary to be,\" and in the case of what is said to happen to be and not to happen to be. Which of these are affirmations, which are negations, or which affirmation one rightly opposes to which negation—concerning all these things, he says, it must be examined, since the matters that had to be said about conjoined and simple predications have been completed. For concerning the oppositions of those propositions which are uttered with a mode, there is much dispute. But what the doubts are, or how the oppositions in these are to be found, he pursues in continuous discussion.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":167,"ref":"p167","source":"Nam si eorum quæ complectuntur illæ sibi invicem oppositæ sunt contradictiones, quæcunque secundum esse et non esse disponuntur, ut ejus quæ est, esse hominem, negatio est, non esse hominem, non, esse non hominem. Et ejus quæ est, esse album horninem, negatio est ea quæ est, non esse album hominem, sed non, esse non album hominem. Si enim de omnibus aut diclio est, aut negatio, lignum erit verum dicere esse non album hominem. Quod si hæc hoc modo, et quibuscunque esse non additur, idem faciet id quod pro esse dicitur, ut ejus quæ est, ambulat homo, negatio est, non ea qua? est, ambulat mun homo, sed ea quæ est, MOM ambulat homo. Nihil enim differtdicere hominemambulare, vel hominem ambulantem esse. Quare si hoc modo in omnibus, et eius quæ est, possibileest esse,negaUo est, possibile est non esse, sed non ea quæ est, non possibile est esse; videtur autem idem posse esse et nota esse, omne enim quod est possibile dividi vet ambulare, et non ambulare et non dividi possibile est.","english":"For if those contradictions which are opposed to one another are of the things that are encompassed, whatever are arranged according to being and not being—as of the one which is \"to be a man,\" the negation is \"not to be a man,\" not \"to be a non-man.\" And of the one which is \"to be a white man,\" the negation is that which is \"not to be a white man,\" but not \"to be a non-white man.\" For if concerning all things there is either affirmation or negation, it will be true to say of a piece of wood that it is a non-white man. But if these things are so in this way, then also in whatever cases \"not to be\" is not added, the same thing will do what is said in place of \"to be,\" as of the one which is \"a man walks,\" the negation is not that which is \"a non-man walks,\" but that which is \"a man does not walk.\" For it makes no difference to say that a man walks or that a man is walking. Wherefore if in all cases in this way, also of the one which is \"it is possible to be,\" the negation is \"it is possible not to be,\" but not that which is \"it is not possible to be\"; but it seems that the same thing can be and not be, for everything which is possible to be divided or to walk, it is also possible not to walk and not to be divided.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":168,"ref":"p168","source":"Omnis propositio verborum et nominum complexione formatur;ergo propositionum quæ complectuntur, et quarum natura in complexione est, illæ solæ sunt, inquit, contradictiones. Quaecunque secundum esse et non esse ponuntur, ut in ea propositione quæ dicit, est homo, non est illa negatio hujus affirmationis quae proponit, est. non bomo, sed illa potius quae enuntiat, non est homo, ut sit affirmatio et negatio, est homo, non est homo. Illa vero quae dicit, est non homo, non est negatio ejus quæ enuntiat, est homo, sed est aQrmatio ejus negationis quae est, non esl non homo. Rursus cum dicimus, est albus homo, non est negatio illa hujus affirmationis quæ dicit, est non albus homo, sad illa potius quæ dicit, non est albus homo; hoc autem probatur sic: Necesse est enim in contradictionibus unam veram esse semper, alteram semper falsam: ergo si ejus affirmationis quae dicit, est albus homo, negatio esset, est non albus homo, unam veram, alteram falsam esse, constaret. Nunc autem si quis de ligno dicat, est albus bomo, falsum dixerit; si quis vero de ligno eodem neget dicens, est nou albus homo, hoc quoque falsum est; bæc euim propositio quæ dicit, est non albus homo, hoc sentit, hominem quidem esse non tamen album, quod de ligno falsum est prædicare.","english":"Every proposition is formed by the combination of words and names; therefore, he says, those alone are contradictions which are encompassed and whose nature lies in combination. Whatever are posited according to being and not being—as in the proposition which says \"is a man,\" the negation of this affirmation is not the one which proposes \"is not-man,\" but rather the one which declares \"is not a man,\" so that the affirmation and negation are \"is a man\" and \"is not a man.\" But the one which says \"is not-man\" is not the negation of the one which declares \"is a man,\" but is the affirmation of that negation which is \"is not not-man.\" Again, when we say \"is a white man,\" the negation of this affirmation is not the one which says \"is a not-white man,\" but rather the one which says \"is not a white man\"; and this is proved thus: for in contradictions one must always be true and the other always false. Therefore, if the negation of the affirmation which says \"is a white man\" were \"is a not-white man,\" it would be established that one is true and the other false. But as it is, if someone says of wood \"is a white man,\" he has spoken falsely; and if someone denies the same of the wood, saying \"is a not-white man,\" this too is false. For this proposition which says \"is a not-white man\" means that a man indeed exists but is not white, which it is false to predicate of wood.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":169,"ref":"p169","source":"Ergo et ea quae dicit, est albus homo, et illa quæ proponit, est non albus homo, utræquealiquando falsae sunt, ut in ligno: quare non sunt sibimet apposita?. Igitur nee ea uxdicit est albus non homo, negatio est ejus quæ dicit, est albus homo; quare illa hujus negatio ponenda est, quæ dicit, non est albus homo. In bis namque una semper vera est, semper altera falsa. Quod si ita est, secundum esse semper, et non esse, natura contradictionis efficitur. Nam cum dico, est homo, secundum id quod est esse fit negalio, non est homo. Et rursus cum dico, est albus bomo, secundum id quod est esse rursus negatio fit, non est albus homo. Et sensus quidem totus hujusmodi est. Ipsi autem in oratione sermones propter similitudinem videntur quidem obscuri. Erit autem planius pronunliantibus et subaudientibus sic, Nam si corum quae complectuntur, id est, propositionum quarum natura in complexione est, illae sibi invicem opposita? sunt contradictiones, quæcunquesecundum esse et nou esse disponuntur, ut hae quas supra di. gessimus, quarumque ipse exempla proponit, ut ejus qua? est, esse bominem, negatio est, non esse hominem. Haec enim ipsius affirmationis secundum esse, et non esse negatio est, et hic subaudiendum est, non illa negatio est, per quam dicit esse non hominem, ut sit sensus affirmationis quae est esse bominem, negaLio est non esse bominem. Non illa quae dicit esse non bominem.","english":"Therefore both the statements \"is white man\" and the one that proposes \"is not white man\" are sometimes both false, as in the case of wood; why then are they not set in opposition to each other? Therefore neither is the statement \"is white not-man\" the negation of the one that says \"is white man\"; wherefore that negation of this one must be posited which says \"is not white man.\" For in these cases one is always true and the other always false. But if this is so, the nature of contradiction is effected according to being and not being. For when I say \"is man,\" the negation is made according to that which is being: \"is not man.\" And again, when I say \"is white man,\" the negation is again made according to that which is being: \"is not white man.\" And indeed the whole sense is of this sort. But the words themselves in the discourse seem obscure because of their similarity. It will be clearer, however, if we pronounce and supply them thus: For if those contradictions which are formed by combinations—that is, of propositions whose nature lies in combination—are opposed to one another, whatever are arranged according to being and not being, such as those we have set out above and of which he himself gives examples, as of the one that is \"to be man\" the negation is \"not to be man.\" For this is the negation of the affirmation itself according to being and not being, and here one must supply: not that negation by which it says \"to be not-man,\" so that the sense may be: of the affirmation which is \"to be man,\" the negation is \"not to be man,\" not that one which says \"to be not-man.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":170,"ref":"p170","source":"El hoc quidem de simplicibus. Rursus de his in quibus est tertium prædicatur, ejus quae est, esse album hominem, non hic subaudiendum est, illa est negatio quae dicit, esse non album hominem. Sed hic quoque subaudiendum est, ilia quæ dixit,non es.e album omnem, ut sit csensus: Hujusaffirmationis qnæ est, esse album nominem, non est illa negatio quæ dicit esse non album hominem; sed illa potius quoe proponit, non esse album hominem,et hoc approbat ind uclione. Si enim, inquit, de omnibus aut dictio est, id est affirmatio aut negatio vera, cum lignum falsum sit dicere esse album hominem, verum debet esse de eo dicere esse non album hominem, si hæc negatio est superioris affirmationis, sed utræque falsæ sunt. Hæc igitur non est illius affirmationis negatio. Ergo secundum esse etnon esse contradictiones sibimet opponunlur.Quod si hoc modo et quantiscunque esse non additur, idem faciet quod pro esse dicitur. Sunt quædam propositiones in quibus esse non additur, sed id quod in his enuntiatur idem valet tanquam si esse poneretur, ut in ea quæ est, homo ambulat, quod dico ambulat, tale est tanquam si dicatur, homo ambulans est. Ergo in his quoque quæ non habent est verbum junctum, si negationem ad verbum illud junxero, quod pro esse posiLum est, lalis mibi negatio redditur, qualis esset si negatio ad esse poneretur, ut in eo quod est, ambulat homo, ambulat pro esso posilum est.","english":"And this indeed concerning simple statements. Again, in those in which a third term is predicated, in the case of the affirmation \"is white man,\" the negation to be understood here is not the one that says \"is not white man.\" But here too one must understand what he said—\"is not white man\"—in the sense of \"is not every white man,\" so that the meaning is: of this affirmation which is \"is white man,\" the negation is not the one that says \"is not white man,\" but rather the one that proposes \"is not white man,\" and he confirms this by the division. For if, he says, concerning all things either the statement—that is, the affirmation—or the negation is true, then since it is false to say of wood that it is a white man, it ought to be true to say of it that it is not a white man, if this is the negation of the former affirmation; but both are false. This, therefore, is not the negation of that affirmation. Therefore contradictions are opposed to one another according to \"is\" and \"is not.\" But if in this way, and in however many cases \"is\" is not added, the same thing will be done as is said in place of \"is.\" There are certain propositions in which \"is\" is not added, but what is enunciated in them has the same force as if \"is\" were posited, as in the one that is \"a man walks\": what I call \"walks\" is such as if it were said \"a man walking is.\" Therefore in these too, which do not have the verb \"is\" joined, if I join the negation to that verb which is posited in place of \"is,\" such a negation is rendered to me as would be the case if the negation were posited with \"is,\" as in the one that is \"a man walks\": \"walks\" is posited in place of \"is.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":171,"ref":"p171","source":"IIujus ergo affirmationis, ambulat homo, non estnegatio ea quæ dicit, ambulat non homo, sed illa potius quæ dicit, non ambulat homo. In hac enim ad id quod est ambulat negatio juncta est, quod ambulat homini pro eo quod est esse conjunctum est. Tale enim est dicere, homo ambulat, tanquam si quis dicat, est ambulans homo. Quare si hoc modo in omnibus, et ejus quæest possible est esse, negatio est, possibile est non esse, sed non ea quae est non possible est esse;si nomnibus, inquit, secundum essecontradicto fit, in bis quoque quæ possibilia dicuntur secundum esseet. non esse contradictio facienda est; in eo enim quod dicimus possibile est esse, illa erit negatio quai dicit possibile est non esse, non illa quae est, non' possibile est esse. Nam si ei quæ est possibile est esse, illa opponatur quas est non possibile est esse,. non secundum esse et non esse oppositio facta est. _ Quocirca quoniam supra docuit secundumesseet-non esse, fieri contradictionem, dicendum est ejus quae est., possibile est esse, illam esse oppositionem quae dicit, possibile est non esse. Sed aliud rursus occur. rit, quonos aacopinione dimoveat. omnibus enim aut affirmatio vera est, aut negatio.","english":"Therefore of this affirmation, \"a man walks,\" the negation is not the one that says \"a non-man walks,\" but rather the one that says \"a man does not walk.\" For in this one the negation is joined to that which is \"walks,\" since \"walks\" is joined to \"man\" in place of \"is.\" For saying \"a man walks\" is such as if someone should say \"a walking man is.\" Wherefore if in all cases in this way, also of that which is \"it is possible to be,\" the negation is \"it is possible not to be,\" but not that which is \"it is not possible to be\"; if, he says, in all cases the contradiction is made according to being and not being, in those things also which are said to be possible, the contradiction must be made according to being and not being. For in that which we say \"it is possible to be,\" the negation will be that which says \"it is possible not to be,\" not that which is \"it is not possible to be.\" For if to that which is \"it is possible to be\" there is opposed that which is \"it is not possible to be,\" the opposition has not been made according to being and not being. Wherefore, since he taught above that the contradiction is made according to being and not being, it must be said that of that which is \"it is possible to be,\" that opposition is the one which says \"it is possible not to be.\" But again another difficulty occurs, which he removes from us lest it disturb our opinion. For in all cases either the affirmation is true or the negation.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":172,"ref":"p172","source":"In his enim ulræque sunt veræ, nam quod possibile est esse, possibile est non esse, ut quia possibile est hominem ambulare, possibile est hominem nou ambulare, et quod possibile est videri, possibile est non videri. Rursus quod possibile est secari et dividi, et non secari et nou dividi possibile est. Quare utraeque in eodem verae sunt, possibile est esse et possibile est non esse. Nam quod dicimus, possibile est non esse, ita intelligendum est ut si diceremus, possibile est hodie pluviam non esse, cum si possibile ut sit. Cur autem hoc ita eveniat, ipse demonstrat, dicens:\n\nRatio autem est quoniam omnequod sic possibile eat, non semper in actu est. Quare inerit ipsi etiam negatio; potest igitur et non ambulare quod est ambulabiles,et: non videri quod est visibile. Al vero impossibile est de eodem oppositas esse veras dictiones. Non igitur ejus quæ est, possibile est esse, negatio est possibile eat non esse. Contingit enim ex his aut idem ipsum affirmare et negare simul de codem, aut non secundum esse et non esse quæ opponuntur, fieri nfirmationes et negationes. Si ergo illud impossibilius est, hocerit magis eligendum.","english":"For in these both are true, for what is possible to be is possible not to be, as because it is possible for a man to walk, it is possible for a man not to walk, and what is possible to be seen is possible not to be seen. Again, what is possible to be cut and divided is also possible not to be cut and not to be divided. Wherefore both are true in the same thing: it is possible to be and it is possible not to be. For what we say, \"it is possible not to be,\" must be understood as if we said, \"it is possible that there be no rain today,\" when it is possible that there be. But why this happens thus, he himself demonstrates, saying:\n\nThe reason is that everything which is possible in this way is not always in act. Wherefore negation will also belong to it; therefore what is walkable can also not walk, and what is visible can also not be seen. But it is impossible for opposite statements to be true concerning the same thing. Therefore the negation of that which is \"it is possible to be\" is not \"it is possible not to be.\" For from these it happens either that the same thing is affirmed and denied at the same time concerning the same thing, or that the affirmations and negations which are opposed are not made according to being and not being. If, therefore, that is more impossible, this is rather to be chosen.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":173,"ref":"p173","source":"Hoc hujusmodi est, quaecunque ita sunt possibilia ut sint actu et opere, illa nulla ratione possunt non esse, lit caelo semper actu inest moveri. Sernper enim movelur, et dicimus, possibile est caelum moveri, idcirco quoniam caeli motus actu est, hoc est, id illi semper agitur. Movetur enim semper; in hac ergo possibilitate talis propositio non potest eon venire, ut dicamus, possibile est cælum non moveri, hoc euim impossibile est. Ergo in his quæcunque actu sunt, hae duae propositiones possibile est esse, possibile est non esse, nulla ralione conveniunl. In his autem qua? non semper actu sunt, et sunt possibilia esse, convenire possunt propositiones, id est, possibile est esse et possibile est non esse. Non est enim semper actu pluvia, et possibile est esse aliquando, quare possibile est eam aliquando non esse.","english":"This is of the following sort: whatever things are possible in such a way that they exist in act and in deed, these cannot in any way not be—as it is always actually present in the heaven to move. For it is always moved, and we say that it is possible for the heaven to move, because the motion of the heaven is in act, that is, that is always being done to it. For it is always moved; therefore, in this possibility such a proposition cannot come about that we say, \"It is possible for the heaven not to move,\" for this is impossible. Therefore, in those things whatever are in act, these two propositions—\"It is possible to be,\" \"It is possible not to be\"—in no way agree. But in those things which are not always in act and are possible to be, the propositions can agree, that is, \"It is possible to be\" and \"It is possible not to be.\" For rain is not always in act, and it is possible for it to be at some time; therefore it is possible for it at some time not to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":174,"ref":"p174","source":"IIæc igitur ratio est cur utræque inveniuntur verae, quod in his possibilitatibus, quæ non semper sunt actu, et esse aliquid, et non esse contingit; quare si ejus quod est possibile est esse, negatio est ea quæ dicit, possibile est non esse, in eodem simul et affirmatio et negalio erunt verge, et cui rei inest affirmatio, ut sit esse possibile, eidem rursus inerit negatio,ut sit possibile non esse, quare et quod ambulabile est, id est quod ambulare potest, potest non ambulare, et quod visibile est, id est quod videri potest, potest etiam non videri; sed impossibile est ut de eodem opposita? et contrajacentes dictiones simul verae sint. In omnibus enim aut affirmatio vera est aut negatio. Si ergo factis negationibus secundum esse et non esse, in his quæ secundum aliquem modum dicuntur, aflirmatio et negalio utræque sunt veræ, quod fieri non potest, illud magis dicendum est, non faciendas secundum esse et non esse negationes, sed potius secundum modum; quod si illud est impossibilius, ut affirmatio et negatio simul verae siut, illud magis est eligendum ut non secundum esseet non esse fiat conlradiclio, sed potius secundum modum. Quod autem digit, si ergo illud impossibilius eSI, hoc erit magis eligendum, non sic dictum est quod utraque impossibilia sint et affirmationem et negationem veram esse, et non secundum esse, vel non esse Geri contradiclionem.","english":"This, then, is the reason why both are found to be true: in those possibilities which are not always in act, it happens that something both is and is not. Wherefore, if the negation of that which is possible to be is what says \"it is possible not to be,\" then in the same thing at the same time both the affirmation and the negation will be true, and to whatever thing the affirmation belongs—namely, that it is possible to be—to the same thing again the negation will belong, namely, that it is possible not to be. Hence also what is walkable, that is, what can walk, can also not walk; and what is visible, that is, what can be seen, can also not be seen. But it is impossible that opposites and contradictory statements about the same thing be true at the same time. For in all cases either the affirmation is true or the negation. If, therefore, with negations made according to \"to be\" and \"not to be,\" in those things which are said according to some mode, both the affirmation and the negation are true—which cannot happen—then it must rather be said that negations should not be made according to \"to be\" and \"not to be,\" but rather according to the mode. But if that is more impossible—that the affirmation and the negation be true at the same time—then that is rather to be chosen, that the contradiction not be made according to \"to be\" and \"not to be,\" but rather according to the mode. But what he says—\"If, therefore, that is more impossible, this will be rather to be chosen\"—has not been said in the sense that both are impossible, namely that both the affirmation and the negation be true, and that the contradiction not be made according to \"to be\" or \"not to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":175,"ref":"p175","source":"U!ud enim, id est contradictionem simul veram esse, impossibile est. Secundum esse autem et non esse affirmationem non fieri et negationem non esse impossibile est, sed ad hoc retulit, impossibilius est, tanquam si diceret, minuspossibile. Minus enim possibile est ut oppositae in eadem proposiliones veræ sint, quam ut non secundum esse et non esse negaliones ponantur. Quocirca eligendum est huc quod est possibilius, ut secundum modum otius quam secundum esse et non esse negationes fiant. Quod ipse planius exsequitur dicens:\n\nEst igitur negatio ejus quæ est possibile esse, ea quæ est non possibile esse, et non ea quæ est possibile non esse. Eadem quoque ratio est in eo quod est L'ontingens, etenim negatio ejus est non contingens esse.\n\nHae namque simul vene invenirinonpossunt; nam si quid est possibile esse, ut idem illud impossibile sit, Geri non potest, nec boc in solis possibilibus speculandum est, sed in omnibus quoque eadem ratio est. Nam in eo quod est contingere esse, non est illa negatio quod dicit contingere non esse. Haec enim consentit ei quod est, contingere esse, sed illa quod proponit non contingere esse. Has enim duas simul veras inveniri impossibile est.","english":"For that, namely that a contradiction be true at the same time, is impossible. But that, according to being and not being, an affirmation not be made and a negation not be, is impossible; but he referred this to the more impossible, as if he were saying \"less possible.\" For it is less possible that opposite propositions be true in the same [proposition] than that negations not be posited according to being and not being. Wherefore one must choose here what is more possible, so that negations come about according to the mode of being than according to being and not being. And he sets this forth more plainly, saying:\n\nTherefore the negation of \"it is possible to be\" is \"it is not possible to be,\" and not \"it is possible not to be.\" The same reasoning holds also in \"it is contingent,\" for its negation is \"it is not contingent to be.\"\n\nFor these cannot be found true at the same time; for if something is possible to be, so that the same thing be impossible, it cannot come about, nor is this to be considered only in things possible, but in all things the same reasoning holds. For in \"it is contingent to be,\" that negation which says \"it is contingent not to be\" is not [its negation]. For this agrees with \"it is contingent to be,\" but that which proposes \"it is not contingent to be\" [is its negation]. For it is impossible that these two be found true at the same time.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":176,"ref":"p176","source":"El in aliis quoque simili modo, ul in necessario eL impossibili. Fiunt enim quemadmodum in illis esse et non esse appositiones, subjecta vero res, hoc quidem album, illud uero homo.\n\nEt in aliis, inquit, omnibus idem faciendum est: secundum modum enim negatio ponenda est, ut si contingens est ad contingere, si possibilis ad p05sibile, si impossibilisad impossibile, si necessarium ad necessarium negatio conjungatur. Quemadmodum enim, inquit, in lais quae praeter modum aliquem sunt, et aliquid esse proponunt, esse quidem et non esse appositiones quædam, id est praedicationes sunt, res vero subjectae, ut in eo quod est, homo esl, et homo non est, homo quod est res subjectum est. Appositio autem quædam et praedicatio est et non est, vel in eo quod dicitur album est et album non es, album quidem res subjecta est, appositum autem et praedicatum, est. el non est. Ita quuque in bis quæ secundum aliquem modum diculllur, esse quidem subjectum est, velut quaedam res. Modus autem deesse prædicalur; nam cum dicimus,hodie pluviam esse possibile est, esse subjecimus, possibile præJicamus, et sic totam vim in pl'oposilionibus prædicatio tenet, et simplicibus, et pra--ter modum quones aliquid esse prædicamus, ul in eo quod dicimus, homo est, totam propositionis vim continet.","english":"And in other cases too in a similar way, as in the necessary and the impossible. For just as in those cases being and not being are appositions, while the underlying thing is the subject—this one white, that one man.\n\nAnd in all other cases, he says, the same must be done; for the negation must be placed according to the mode, so that if it is contingent, the negation is joined to \"contingently\"; if possible, to \"possibly\"; if impossible, to \"impossibly\"; if necessary, to \"necessarily.\" For just as, he says, in those things that are without some mode and propose that something is, \"is\" and \"is not\" are certain appositions, that is, predications, while the things themselves are subjects—as in \"man is\" and \"man is not,\" man, which is the thing, is the subject. But \"is\" and \"is not\" are a certain apposition and predication; or in what is said, \"white is\" and \"white is not,\" white indeed is the underlying thing, while \"is\" and \"is not\" are the apposition and predication. So too in those things that are spoken according to some mode, \"to be\" is the subject, as it were a certain thing. But the mode is said to be lacking as a predicate; for when we say, \"it is possible that there is rain today,\" we have made \"to be\" the subject and we predicate \"possible,\" and thus the whole force in propositions—both in simple ones and in those according to mode, when we predicate that something is—is held by the predication, as in what we say, \"man is,\" it contains the whole force of the proposition.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":177,"ref":"p177","source":"verbum est, ita quoque in his quae secundum modum dieuntur, quoniam tetam propositionem continet modus, aut possibilis,aul conlingenlis, aut impossibiJis. aut necessarii, hæc prædicari, res vero alix subjectæ, esse dicuntur. Hoc enim quod ait:\n\nSic hoc loco, esse quidem et non esse subjecta fiunt, posse vero et contingere appositiones determinantes quemadmodum in illis esse et non esse veritalem et falsitatem, \"ie hic in eo quod est, esse possibile, et esse non possibile.\n\nNam quemadmodum in simplicibus si ad esse et non esse negationes fiant, una semper vera esi, altera semper falsa, ita quoque in his quae secundum modum dicunlur, si ad ipsum modum enuntiatio negationis aptetur, velut ad quasdam apposiliones prædicationesqu6 veritas in appositionibus et falsitas terminata dividitur. Atque hoc est quod ait. Similiter hae etiam in eo quodest esse possibile et esse non possibile. Similiter enim secundum possibile et non possibile facta oppositio, veritatem falsitatem que determinat, sicut in simplicibus et præter modum positis secundum esse et non esse negatio. Hinc in omnibus secundum modum affirmationibus, oppositiones digerit. eonvenientium negationum,dieitenim:","english":"For just as in those cases being and not being are appositions, while the underlying things are subjects—this one white, that one a man—so too in those which are spoken of according to mode, since the mode contains the whole proposition, whether of the possible, or the contingent, or the impossible, or the necessary, these things are said to be predicated, while the things themselves are underlying subjects. For this is what he says:\n\nThus in this place, being and not being become subjects, while to be possible and to be contingent are determining appositions, just as in those cases being and not being determine truth and falsehood—here, in the case of what is, being possible and being not possible.\n\nFor just as in simple propositions, if negations are made with respect to being and not being, one is always true and the other always false, so too in those which are spoken of according to mode, if the enunciation of negation is applied to the mode itself, as to certain appositions and predications, truth and falsehood are divided and determined in the appositions. And this is what he says: Similarly also in the case of being possible and being not possible. For in like manner the opposition made according to possible and not possible determines truth and falsehood, just as in simple propositions placed without mode the negation according to being and not being does. Hence in all affirmations according to mode he sets out the oppositions of corresponding negations, for he says:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":178,"ref":"p178","source":"Ejus vero quæ est, possibile est non esse, negatio est, non ea quæ est, nun possibile est esse, sed ea quæ est, non possibile est non esse. Et ejus quæ est, possibile est esse, non ea quæ est, possibile est non esse, sed ea quæ est, non possibile est esse. Quare et sequi sese invicem videbuntur,hæc possibile est esse,possibile estnon esse. Idem enim possibile est esse, et non esse. Non enim contradictiones sunt sibi invicem hujusmodi, possibile esse et possibile non esse. Sed possibile est esse, et non possibile est esse, nunquam sirnul in eodem veræ sunt, opponuntur enim. At vero, nec possibile est non esse, et non possibile est non esse,nunquam simul veræ sunl. Similiter aulem et ejus quæ est necessarium esse, MOM ea quæ est, necessarium non esse, negatio est, sed ea quæest, non necessarium esse. Eius vero quæ est, necessariun est non esse, ea quæ est, non necessarium est non esse. Et ejus quæ est, impossibile esse, MOM ea quæ est, impossibile non esse, sed non impossibile est, ejus vero qltæ est, impossibile non esse, ea quæ est, non impossibile est non esse.","english":"But the negation of \"it is possible not to be\" is not \"it is not possible to be,\" but \"it is not possible not to be.\" And the negation of \"it is possible to be\" is not \"it is possible not to be,\" but \"it is not possible to be.\" Hence these too will seem to follow one another: \"it is possible to be\" and \"it is possible not to be.\" For the same thing is possible to be and not to be. For such things as \"it is possible to be\" and \"it is possible not to be\" are not contradictions of one another. But \"it is possible to be\" and \"it is not possible to be\" are never true at the same time of the same thing, for they are opposed. And indeed neither are \"it is possible not to be\" and \"it is not possible not to be\" ever true at the same time. Similarly also the negation of \"it is necessary to be\" is not \"it is necessary not to be,\" but \"it is not necessary to be.\" And the negation of \"it is necessary not to be\" is \"it is not necessary not to be.\" And the negation of \"it is impossible to be\" is not \"it is impossible not to be,\" but \"it is not impossible to be\"; and of \"it is impossible not to be\" the negation is \"it is not impossible not to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":179,"ref":"p179","source":"Ut demonstrel eam quae dicit, possibile est non esse, non modo non esse negationem ejus quæ est, possibile est esse, sed omnino negationem non esse, bujus aliam invenit negaliorem. Nam eju8 quæ esl, possibile est non esse, quam affirmationis loco posuit, negatio reperitur illa quae dicit, non possibile est non esse, secundum modum sciHcet,addita negatione; unde iit, inquit, ut ea quæ dicit, possibile est esse, et illa quae proponit, possibile est non esse, sese invicem consequantur; idem namque possibile est esse quod est possibile non esse. Cur autem se consequi possunt, haec causa est, quoniam non sunt oppositæ. Nam si essent oppositæ, perimerent se potius quam consequerentur, et dissentirent magis quam consentirent, ut est in his possibile est esse, et non possibile est esse. Hæc enim ita a se disjunclæ sunt, ut simul esse non possint. Idcirco autem oc evenil, quoniam sunt oppositæ; semper igitursecundum modum ponenda negalio est, si integra oppositionis natura fHCienda est, quod planissime exequitur, singulis propositionum modis negationis acconimodaas, atque integras naturaliter efficiens oppositiones. At vero, inquit, ea quæ est possibile est non esse, cum ea quæ dicit, non possibile est non esse, simul esse non poterit. Namque oppositas esse mani-.","english":"So that he may show that the statement \"it is possible not to be\" is not only not the negation of that which is \"it is possible to be,\" but is altogether not a negation, he finds another negation of this one. For of that which is \"it is possible not to be,\" which he placed in the position of an affirmation, the negation is found to be that which says \"it is not possible not to be,\" with the negation added, of course, according to the mode. Hence it follows, he says, that the statement \"it is possible to be\" and the one he sets forth, \"it is possible not to be,\" follow one another in turn; for it is the same thing to be possible to be and to be possible not to be. But the reason why they can follow one another is that they are not opposites. For if they were opposites, they would destroy each other rather than follow one another, and would disagree rather than agree, as is the case with \"it is possible to be\" and \"it is not possible to be.\" For these are so disjoined from one another that they cannot be at the same time. But this happens because they are opposites; therefore the negation must always be posited according to the mode, if the complete nature of opposition is to be effected, which he carries out most clearly, fitting appropriate negations to each of the modes of the propositions, and naturally making the oppositions complete. But, he says, the statement \"it is possible not to be\" cannot be at the same time as that which says \"it is not possible not to be.\" For it is manifest that they are opposites.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":180,"ref":"p180","source":"festum est, siquidem harum negatio ad modum est posita, qui est possibile esse, ejus autem quæ est necessarium est esse, non oportet dici illam e3se negationem, per quam dicitur, necessarium est non esse; hujus enim alia negatio inveniri potesl, quoniamest af11rmalio quædam, est autem eus negatio ea quæ dicit, non necessariumest. non esse. Sed potius ei quae dicit necessarium est esse, ea opponenda est quae dicit, non necessarium e\"J esse; ad illam namque quae dicil, necessarium est non esse opponitur (ut. dictum est), non necessarium est non esse. Ejus quoque quae est, impossibile est esse, non dicenda est illa esse negatio per quam dicimus, im,possibile est non esse, sed ea poHus quæ proponit, non impossibile est esse. Namque affirmatio quaedam est, impossible est non esse. Hujus cnim invenitur negatio quæ est, non impossibile est non esse.","english":"It has been shown that the negation of these is posited in the manner of that which is \"possible to be\"; but of that which is \"necessary to be,\" that should not be called its negation through which it is said \"it is necessary not to be.\" For another negation of this can be found, since it is a certain affirmation; but its negation is that which says \"it is not necessary to be.\" But rather, to that which says \"it is necessary to be,\" that which says \"it is not necessary to be\" ought to be opposed. For to that which says \"it is necessary not to be\" is opposed, as has been said, \"it is not necessary not to be.\" Also, of that which is \"it is impossible to be,\" that should not be called its negation through which we say \"it is impossible not to be,\" but rather that which proposes \"it is not impossible to be.\" For \"it is impossible not to be\" is a certain affirmation. For of this is found the negation which is \"it is not impossible not to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":181,"ref":"p181","source":"Universaliter vero (quemadmodum dictum est) esse ' quidem et non esse oportet ponere tanquam subjecta, affirmationcm vero et negationem hæc facientem ad esse et non esse apponere, et has putare oportet esse oppositas dictiones, possibile, nnn possibile, contingens non cOnlingens, impossibile, non impossibile, necessarium, non necessarium, verum, nan verum.\n\nRegulam dat uDiversatemdicens:Hoc universaliter in omnibus faciendum esse, quod supra jam diximus, ut subjectum esse et non esse ponatur Affirmationem autem et negationem ipsos modos faciamus. Hoc est. enim quod ait, negalionern vero et affirmationem haec; facientem, modos enim ipsos, idest possibile et con-. tingens et cæteros pro affirmationibus orJinanles, et I ad hos negativo adverbio juncto pro negationibus ł disponentes, aut ad id quod dicimus est, et non est,, apponamus, ut quemadmodum ad unam rem, quod I est. homo, est verbum et non est negatio, prædicatum estin his quoddam propositionibus quæpræpterr modum sunt, ut in ea per quam dicimus, bomo est, sic in his propositionibus quae cum modo sun, esc quidem aut non est, subjecta ponamus, modos vero ipsos aut secundum affirmationem, si simpliciter di.","english":"Universally, however (as has been said), \"to be\" and \"not to be\" ought to be posited as subjects, while affirmation and negation, making these [their subjects] with respect to \"to be\" and \"not to be,\" are to be added; and these should be considered the opposed expressions: possible, not possible; contingent, not contingent; impossible, not impossible; necessary, not necessary; true, not true.\n\nHe gives a universal rule, saying: This is to be done universally in all cases, as we have already said above, namely that \"to be\" and \"not to be\" be posited as the subject, while we make the modes themselves the affirmation and the negation. For this is what he means by \"but the negation and the affirmation making these,\" namely that we arrange the modes themselves—that is, \"possible\" and \"contingent\" and the rest—in place of affirmations, and, joining the negative adverb to them, dispose them in place of negations; or we add them to that which we call \"is\" and \"is not,\" so that just as in relation to one thing—\"is a man\"—\"is\" is the verb and \"is not\" the negation, so in these propositions which are qualified by a mode, as in the one by which we say \"a man is,\" we should posit \"is\" or \"is not\" as the subjects, but the modes themselves according to affirmation, if simply...","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":182,"ref":"p182","source":"canlur, aut secundum negationem, si cum negatione ponantur, facientes ad subjectum, quod secundum esse et non esse, disposuimus prædicemus, ut has, arbitremur esse oppositas dictiones et negationes, quæ secundum modos factæ sint, eorum autem omnium negationes et affirmationes in contrarium dis ponantur.\n\nQuod autem addidit verum, non verum, ad demonstralionem omnium modorum valet. Namsi quis dicat, verum est, non est ipsius negatio verum non est, sed potius non verum est. Alioqui ejus quæ ait verum non est, illa negatio est quod dicit, non verum non est.\n\nConsequentiæ vero secundum ordinem fiunt ita ponentibus. Illi enim quæ est, possibile est esse, sequitur illa quæ est, contingens esse, ethæc illi convertiMur, et non impossibile esse, et non necessarium esse. Illi uero quæ est, possibile non esse, et contingens non esse, ea quæ est, non necessarium non esse, et non impossibile non esse. Illi vero quæ est, non possibile esse, et non contingens esse, ea quæ est, necessarium nora esse, et impossibile esse. Wi vero quæ est, non possibile non esse et non contingens non esse, illa quæ est, nccesse est esse, et impossibile non esse.","english":"...are uttered, or according to negation, if they are posited with a negation, making [them] with respect to the subject that we have laid down according to \"to be\" and \"not to be,\" we should judge these to be opposed expressions and negations—those, namely, that are made according to the modes—while the negations and affirmations of all of these are set down in opposition.\n\nBut the fact that he added \"true\" and \"not true\" is of value for the demonstration of all the modes. For if someone says \"it is true,\" its negation is not \"it is not true,\" but rather \"it is not true.\" Otherwise, the negation of that which says \"it is not true\" is what he states: \"it is not not true.\"\n\nThe consequences, however, come about in order when they are posited thus. For upon that which is \"it is possible to be\" follows that which is \"it is contingent to be,\" and upon this in turn \"it is not impossible to be\" and \"it is not necessary to be.\" But upon that which is \"it is possible not to be\" and \"it is contingent not to be\" follow those which are \"it is not necessary not to be\" and \"it is not impossible not to be.\" But upon that which is \"it is not possible to be\" and \"it is not contingent to be\" follow those which are \"it is necessary not to be\" and \"it is impossible to be.\" And upon that which is \"it is not possible not to be\" and \"it is not contingent not to be\" follow those which are \"it is necessary to be\" and \"it is impossible not to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":183,"ref":"p183","source":"Expeditis omnibus quae de moJorum oppositionibus disputabantur, al consequenlias venit. Hoc enim dicit, quae propositiones supradictorum modorum, quas propositiones consequntur quibusque consentinnt. Nos autem ex hisqualuor fecimus ordines, et consequenlias propositionum sub una serie disposuimus; haec amem prius nota sint, ut quid ab Aristotele dicatur, facilius lector intelligat.\n\nConsideretur autem ex subscriptione quod dicimus: Possibile est esse. Possibile est non esse. Contingit esse. Contingit non esse. Non impossibile est esse. Non impossibile non esse. Non necesse est esse. Non necesse est non esse. Non possibile est esse. Non posssible est non esse. Non contingit esse. Non contingit non esse. Nr,cesse est non esse. Necesse est esse. Impossibile est esse. Impossibile est non esse.\n\nSuperius autem descriptas consequentias ipse disponit: nobis autem reddenda est breviter ratio, cur bæc propositiones sese invicem consequantur, quod possibile est esse, contingit aliquando ul sil, et boc est conlingil esse; quod autem contingit esse, non est impossibile esse, et quod non est impossibileessc, non idcirco jam necesse est esse. Non est enim impossibile hodie esse pluviam, sed non idcirco jam esse necesse est. Quod ergo non est impossibile esse,. non necesse est esse. Et hic est unus ordo conse. quenliæ.","english":"With all the matters that were disputed concerning the oppositions of modes now settled, he comes to the consequents. For he says this: which propositions of the aforementioned modes are consequent upon which propositions, and to which they are attached. Now we have made four orders out of these, and we have arranged the consequents of the propositions under a single series; but let these things be known beforehand, so that the reader may more easily understand what is being said by Aristotle.\n\nLet what we say be considered from the following listing: It is possible to be. It is possible not to be. It happens to be. It happens not to be. It is not impossible to be. It is not impossible not to be. It is not necessary to be. It is not necessary not to be. It is not possible to be. It is not possible not to be. It does not happen to be. It does not happen not to be. It is necessary not to be. It is necessary to be. It is impossible to be. It is impossible not to be.\n\nNow he himself sets out the consequents described above; but we must briefly give the reason why these propositions follow one another: that it is possible to be, it happens at some time to be, and this is \"it happens to be\"; but what happens to be is not impossible to be, and what is not impossible to be is not for that reason already necessary to be. For it is not impossible for there to be rain today, but it is not for that reason already necessary that it be. Therefore what is not impossible to be is not necessary to be. And this is one order of consequence.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":184,"ref":"p184","source":"Rursus secundus ordo propositionum talem habet consequentiam, quod possibile est non esse, potest. fieri ut non sit, quare contingit aliquando ul non sit, et quod possibile est non esse,contingit non esse; quod autem contingit non esse, potest fieri ut non sit, sed quod potest fieri ut non sit, non est impossibile ut non sit ergo quod contingit non esse, non est impossibile ut sit, sed quod non est impossibile non esse, non idcirco illud jam non esse necesse est; hodie enim pluviam non esse non est irnpossibile. Potest enim esse, sed non idcirco ex necessitate hodie non pluet; quare quod non est impossibile non esse, non est necessarium non esse, et liecundus quidem ordo sese sic habet. Nunc autem ad tertium transeamus: quod non possibile est esse, boc fieri non potest, quod aulem fieri non potest, ut aliquando sil, non contingit, quod ergo non possibile est esse, idem non contingit esse; sed quod non conlingit esse, necesse est ut non sit, quod nunquam contingit, nunquam esse potest, quod nunquam esse potest, necesse est non esse; quod non igitur contingit esse, idem necesse est non esse, sed quod necesse est non esse, hoc fieri non potest, quod autem fieri non potest, impossibile est. ut fiat, quod igitur necesse est, non esse impossibile est esse.","english":"Again, the second order of propositions has this consequence: what is possible not to be can come about that it not be; therefore it happens at some time that it not be, and what is possible not to be, it happens not to be; but what happens not to be can come about that it not be; but what can come about that it not be, it is not impossible that it not be. Therefore what happens not to be, it is not impossible that it be—but what is not impossible not to be, for that reason it is not already necessary that it not be. For today it is not impossible that there be no rain; for it can be, but not for that reason will it necessarily not rain today. Wherefore what is not impossible not to be, it is not necessary not to be; and the second order indeed stands thus. Now let us pass to the third: what is not possible to be, this cannot come about; but what cannot come about, that it be at some time, does not happen; therefore what is not possible to be, the same does not happen to be. But what does not happen to be, it is necessary that it not be; what never happens, can never be; what can never be, it is necessary that it not be. Therefore what does not happen to be, the same it is necessary not to be. But what it is necessary not to be, this cannot come about; but what cannot come about, it is impossible that it come about. Therefore what is necessary not to be, it is impossible to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":185,"ref":"p185","source":"Quarlus eliam ordo ocmodo est: quodnon possibile est non esse, Geri non potest ut non sit; quod fieri non potest ut non sit, non contingit non esse. Ut quoniam non possibile est non esse motum caelo, non contingit cæ]um non moveri, quare quod non vossibile est non esse, idem non contingit non esse, sed quod non contingit non esse, necesse est esse, sicut de coelo. Necesse est enim caelum moveri, quoniam non contingit caelum non moveri, sed quod necesse est esse, ut non sit fieri non potest, quare quod necesse est esse impossibile est non esse. Et haec quidem est ordinata ab Aristotele consequentia proposidonum, de qua paulo post latius disputabit.\n\nErgo impossibile et non impossibile ad illud quod est contingens et possibile, et non contingens et non possibile, sequntur quidem contradictorie, sed converrim. Illud enim quod est, possibile esse, negatio sequitur impossibilis, negationem vero alfirrnatio. Ad iilud enim quod est non possibile esse, sequitur illud quod est impossibile esse. Affirmatio enim est, impossibile esse, non impossibile vero negatio.","english":"The fourth order also is as follows: what is not possible not to be, cannot come about that it not be; what cannot come about that it not be, does not happen not to be. For example, since it is not possible that motion not be in the heaven, it does not happen that the heaven not move; wherefore what is not possible not to be, the same does not happen not to be, but what does not happen not to be, it is necessary to be, as concerning the heaven. For it is necessary that the heaven move, since it does not happen that the heaven not move; but what is necessary to be, it cannot come about that it not be; wherefore what is necessary to be, it is impossible not to be. And this indeed is the ordered consequence of propositions given by Aristotle, concerning which he will dispute more fully a little later.\n\nTherefore impossible and not impossible follow, in a contradictory way indeed but conversely, upon that which is contingent and possible, and upon not contingent and not possible. For upon that which is possible to be, the negation of impossible follows; but upon the negation, the affirmation. For upon that which is not possible to be, that which is impossible to be follows. For impossible to be is an affirmation, but not impossible is a negation.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":186,"ref":"p186","source":"Quaedam de superiore consequentium ratione pertractat. In superioribus enim descriptionibus sese sequentium, affirmationem pussibilis sequebatur impossibilis negatio. Rursus negationem possibilis sequebatur impossibilis affirmatio, et de contingenti eodem modo, affirmationem namque impossibilis dicentem impossibile esse, sequebatur negatio possibilis dicens, non possibile est esse. Rursus cum impossibile negaretur erid uod dicebatur non impossibile esse, hanc affirmatio possibilis subsequebatur, ea scilicet quæ dicit possibile esse. Atque hoc idem de contingenti, affirmatio namque Impossibilis ea quae est impossibile esse, sequebatur contangentis negationem eam qua: est, non contingit esse. Negatio vero impossibilis, ea quae dicit, non impossibile est esse, affirmationem contingentis sequebatur eam quae dicit, contingit esae; quare hae pro. positiones sese invicem sequuntur, sed conversæ. Namque affirmatio impossibilis contingentis negationem et possibilis sequitur. Negatio vero impossibilis affirmationem possibilis et contingenLis, ut subjecta descriptio docet. Idcirco namque ait: Sequuntur quidem contradicto-, riæ, sed conversim, quod omnes in contrarium locatae contradictiones sunt. Contradictio namque est impossibile esse et non impossibile esse, contingere esse et non contingere esse, possibile esse et non possibile esse.","english":"He discusses certain matters concerning the reasoning of the consequents above. For in the earlier descriptions of things that follow one another, the affirmation of the possible was followed by the negation of the impossible. Again, the negation of the possible was followed by the affirmation of the impossible, and in the same way concerning the contingent; for the affirmation of the impossible, which says that it is impossible to be, was followed by the negation of the possible, which says that it is not possible to be. Again, when the impossible was denied and what was said was that it is not impossible to be, the affirmation of the possible followed this, namely the one that says that it is possible to be. And the same holds concerning the contingent; for the affirmation of the impossible, which is that it is impossible to be, was followed by the negation of the contingent, which is that it does not happen to be. But the negation of the impossible, which says that it is not impossible to be, was followed by the affirmation of the contingent, which says that it happens to be. Wherefore these propositions follow one another, but in reverse. For the affirmation of the impossible follows the negation of the contingent and of the possible. But the negation of the impossible follows the affirmation of the possible and of the contingent, as the description set out below teaches. For this reason he says: the contradictories follow, but in reverse, because all the contradictions are placed in the contrary order. For the contradiction is: it is impossible to be and it is not impossible to be; it happens to be and it does not happen to be; it is possible to be and it is not possible to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":187,"ref":"p187","source":"Conversae autem se sequuntur, quoniam affirmatio non sequitur affirmationem, et negatio negationem, sed affirmationem negationes, negationefn vero affirmationes, quod ad supradictam descriptionem revertentibus planius liquet; sensus ergo hic est. Ordo autem seriesque sermonum sese sic habel; ergo inquit Aristoteles contradictionem qua; est impossibile et non impossibile, illud quod est contingens et possibile, quæ dux affirmationes sunt ac sese sequuntur. et non contingens et non possibile, quæ duæ sunt negationes, sequuntur quidem contradictoriæ, ut contradictiones sint in contrarium ductæ, sed conversim, ut affirmatio negationem, negatio sequatur affirmalionem. Hujus tali\" ratio redditur: illud enim quod est possibile esse, scilicet quod affirmatio est, negationem impossibiiis sequitur, esl autem negatio impossibilis non imposibile esse; quod est ergo possibile esse, sequitur non impossibile esse, negatio vero possibilis affimationem impossibilis sequitur, illud namque quod est non possibile esse, sequitur affirmationem quae est impossibile esse, etenim affirmatio est impossibile esse, non impossibile esse negatio, et in contingentibus eodem modo, atque hoc quidem de possibilium et impossibilium consequentia dictum est. Nunc de necessarii et possibilis consequentia tractat.","english":"But the converses follow one another, since an affirmation does not follow an affirmation, nor a negation a negation, but negations follow an affirmation, and affirmations follow a negation, which becomes clearer to those returning to the description given above; the sense, then, is this. Now the order and series of the propositions stands thus. Therefore Aristotle says that the contradiction consisting of \"it is impossible\" and \"it is not impossible\" — that is, the one consisting of \"it is contingent\" and \"it is possible,\" which are two affirmations — follow one another. And \"it is not contingent\" and \"it is not possible,\" which are two negations, do indeed follow the contradictory [affirmations], so that the contradictions are drawn toward the contrary, but in reverse, so that an affirmation follows a negation and a negation follows an affirmation. The reason for this is given as follows: for \"it is possible to be\" — that is, what the affirmation is — follows the negation \"it is not impossible\"; and the negation of \"it is impossible\" is \"it is not impossible to be.\" Therefore \"it is possible to be\" follows \"it is not impossible to be.\" But the negation of \"it is possible\" follows the affirmation \"it is impossible\"; for \"it is not possible to be\" follows the affirmation which is \"it is impossible to be.\" For \"it is impossible to be\" is an affirmation, and \"it is not impossible to be\" is a negation. And in the case of contingents the same holds. And this much has been said about the consequence of possibles and impossibles. Now he treats of the consequence of the necessary and the possible.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":188,"ref":"p188","source":"Necessarium vero quemadmodum sit considerandum est. Manifestumestautemquoniam non eodem modo, sed contrariæ sequnlur, contradictoriæ nutem sunt extra. Non enim est negatio ejus quod est, necesse non esse, non neæsse est esse, contingit enim esseveras utrasque in eodem, quod enim est necessarium non esse non est necessarium esse.\n\nQuod dicit bujusmodi est: in his proposilionibus quae erant impossibilis et non impossibilis, convcniebal non possibile ei quod est impossibile, et possibile consentiebat ei quod est non impossibile, conlradiclionem scilicet impossibilis contradictio non possibilia sequebatur ordine converso; in his aulem quae necessarium praedicant vel affirmative vel negalive, et sequuntur possibilem propositionem ejus quae possibili consentit, contradictio non sequitur contradictionem possibilis, sed polius contraria; necessarias vero nunc proposiliones dico, qua? tametsi nou significent necessitatem, tamen sive armalive, sive negative necessarium prædicant: sensus ergo hic est, M qua ex his quas necessarium praedicant.","english":"It must be considered how the necessary stands. But it is evident that it is not in the same way, but contraries follow, while contradictories lie outside. For the negation of \"it is necessary that it is not\" is not \"it is necessary that it is\"; for it happens that both are true in the same case, since what is necessary not to be is not necessary to be.\n\nWhat he says is of this sort: in those propositions which were of the impossible and the not-impossible, it was fitting that \"not possible\" agree with \"impossible,\" and \"possible\" agree with \"not impossible\"—that is, the contradiction of \"impossible,\" namely \"not possible,\" followed in reverse order. But in those which predicate \"necessary\" either affirmatively or negatively, and follow the proposition \"possible\"—that is, the one that agrees with \"possible\"—the contradiction does not follow the contradiction of \"possible,\" but rather the contrary. By \"necessary propositions\" I now mean those which, although they do not signify necessity, nevertheless predicate \"necessary\" either affirmatively or negatively. The sense, therefore, here is: in those which predicate \"necessary.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":189,"ref":"p189","source":"consentit possibili propositioni,ejus quæ necessarium prædicat, contradictio non sequitur possibilis contradiclionem, sed ejus quae necessarium praedicat contradictionis contraria ea consentit possibilis proposiHonis contradictioni; prius autem disponamus quae sunt contradictoriæ,quæve contra riae, ejus enim quae dicit necesse est esse, contradictio est, non nocesse est esse, contraria vero, necesse est non esse; rursus ejus quae est, necesse non esse, contradictio est, non necesse est non esse, contraria vero, necesse est esse. Quare describantur et circa unam eamdemaue contraria et contradictoria disonantur, ut quod a nobis dicendum est, clarius possit liquere. His igitur commode breviterque descriptis, qui in eorum consequentia ad possibiles propositiones modus possit evenire monstrandum est, illam namque qua? est, possibile est esse, sequitur ea quæ est, non necesse est esse; nam quod possibile est esse, non necesse est esse, quod enim possibile est esse, possibile esl et non esse; sed quod possibile est non esse, non necesse est esse. Quare id quod est, possibile est esse, recte sequitur, non necesse cst esso, sed negationem ejus qua? dicit, possibile est esse, id est non possibile est.","english":"It agrees with the possible proposition; from the contradictory of the proposition that predicates necessity, the contradiction of the possible does not follow, but the contrary of the contradiction of the proposition that predicates necessity agrees with the contradiction of the possible proposition. But first let us set out which are contradictories and which are contraries. For of the proposition that says \"it is necessary to be,\" the contradictory is \"it is not necessary to be,\" while the contrary is \"it is necessary not to be.\" Again, of the proposition \"it is necessary not to be,\" the contradictory is \"it is not necessary not to be,\" while the contrary is \"it is necessary to be.\" Therefore let them be described and let the contraries and contradictories be set out around one and the same proposition, so that what we are to say may be able to appear more clearly. Having therefore set these out conveniently and briefly, it must be shown what manner of consequence toward possible propositions can arise in their sequence. For the proposition \"it is possible to be\" is followed by the proposition \"it is not necessary to be\"; for what is possible to be is not necessary to be, since what is possible to be is also possible not to be; but what is possible not to be is not necessary to be. Wherefore what is \"it is possible to be\" is rightly followed by \"it is not necessary to be,\" but by the negation of the proposition that says \"it is possible to be,\" that is, \"it is not possible.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":190,"ref":"p190","source":"esse, non sequitur affirmatio ejus quae dicit, non necesse est esse, quæ est scilicet, necesse est esse; bæe enim est contradictio necessariæ affirmationis, neque enim dici potest coosent-ire propositiones quae dicunt, non possibile est esse, et necesse est esse, sed hujus contraria sequitur, namque ea quae est, non possibile est esse, illa quai dicit, necesse est non esse, comitatur, sed necesse est non esse, non est contradictoria ejus quai est, non necesse est esse; possunt enim utra'que in eodem simul verae inveniri, nam quoniam necesse est non esse ignem frigidum, non necesse est esse ignem frigidum. Quocirca hae contradictoriae non sunt, sed est contraria ea quae dicit, necesse est non esse, ei quae dicit, necesse est esse; quæ neeesse est esse, contradictio est ejus quae ponit, non necesse est esse; quare contradictionem ejus quae dicit, pos. sibile est esse, eam scilicet que proponit, non possibile est esse, non sequitur cOnlradiclio ejus quae est, necesse est esse, sed ea quae est, necesse est non esse, quæ contraria scilicet est ei quae est, necesse est esse, qua: bæc ipsa contradictio est ejus quae proponit, non necesse esse. Hoc autem descriptione melius patebit.","english":"to be, the affirmation of the one that says \"it is not necessary to be\" does not follow—namely, the affirmation of the one that says \"it is necessary to be.\" For this is the contradictory of the affirmative proposition of necessity. Nor can it be said that the propositions which say \"it is not possible to be\" and \"it is necessary to be\" agree; rather, the contrary of the latter follows. For the proposition \"it is not possible to be\" is accompanied by the one that says \"it is necessary not to be.\" But \"it is necessary not to be\" is not the contradictory of the one that says \"it is not necessary to be\"; for both can be found true at the same time in the same subject. For since it is necessary that fire not be cold, it is not necessary that fire be cold. Wherefore these are not contradictories; rather, the one that says \"it is necessary not to be\" is contrary to the one that says \"it is necessary to be.\" But \"it is necessary to be\" is the contradictory of the one that posits \"it is not necessary to be.\" Therefore, from the proposition that says \"it is possible to be\"—namely, the one that proposes \"it is not possible to be\"—the contradictory of the proposition \"it is necessary to be\" does not follow, but rather the one that says \"it is necessary not to be,\" which is, of course, contrary to the one that says \"it is necessary to be,\" and this very thing is the contradictory of the one that proposes \"it is not necessary to be.\" But this will be made clearer by a diagram.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":191,"ref":"p191","source":"Ergo cum sit contradictio possibile esse, et nou possibile esse, sequatur autem possibile esse, non necesse esse, contradictio tamen ejus qua? est, necesse esse, non sequetur contradictionem ejus quae est possibile esse, sed contraria contradicioriæ ejus quae est non necesse esse. Nam si contradictio est non necesse esse ejus quæ est necesse esse, contraria vero ejusdem necesse esse est, ea quæ dicit, necesse est non esse, sequitur necesse est non esse, eam quae est, non possibile esse, quas est contraclio ejus quae est, possibile esse, quam sequitur non necesse esse. Recte ergo dicitur contradictiones quidem extra esse, contrarias vero contradictoriis consentire: nam possibile esse et non possibile esse, quæ sunt contradictoriæ, sequuntur non necesse esse et necesse non esse, quæ non sunt contradictoriæ, quod in eodem ulræque veræ inveniri possunt. Quod si contradictio sequitur, sicut ea quae est, non necesse esse,sequiluream quae est possibile esse, sic eam quæ est non possibile esse, sequeretur necesse esse; sed hoc inconveniens est. Quare quonam hæcamnou sequitur, contraria ipsius sequelur, contraria namque cst ei quae proponit, necesse est esse, illa quæ dicit, necesse est non esse. Eodem quoque modo et in eo quod est possibile uon esse, cujus est contradictio uon possibile non esse, quod Aristoteles reticuit.","english":"Therefore, since the contradiction of \"it is possible to be\" is \"it is not possible to be,\" and \"it is possible to be\" is followed by \"it is not necessary to be,\" nevertheless the contradiction of the proposition \"it is necessary to be\" will not follow the contradiction of the proposition \"it is possible to be,\" but rather the contrary of the contradiction of the proposition \"it is not necessary to be.\" For if the contradiction of \"it is necessary to be\" is \"it is not necessary to be,\" but the contrary of the same \"it is necessary to be\" is the proposition that says \"it is necessary not to be,\" then \"it is necessary not to be\" follows \"it is not possible to be,\" which is the contradiction of \"it is possible to be,\" which in turn is followed by \"it is not necessary to be.\" Rightly, therefore, it is said that contradictions stand outside this sequence, but that contraries agree with the contradictories. For \"it is possible to be\" and \"it is not possible to be,\" which are contradictories, are followed by \"it is not necessary to be\" and \"it is necessary not to be,\" which are not contradictories, because both can be found true in the same case. But if a contradiction followed—just as \"it is not necessary to be\" follows \"it is possible to be\"—then \"it is necessary to be\" would follow \"it is not possible to be\"; but this is inadmissible. Wherefore, since this does not follow, its contrary will follow; for the contrary of the proposition that asserts \"it is necessary to be\" is the one that says \"it is necessary not to be.\" In the same way also in the case of \"it is possible not to be,\" whose contradiction is \"it is not possible not to be,\" which Aristotle passed over in silence.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":192,"ref":"p192","source":"Sequitur namque eam quai est, possibile est non esse, illa quai dicit, non necesse est non e\"e, sed negationem eam quae est, non possibile est uon esse,ejus affirmationis qua? est, possibile est non esse. Non sequitur affirmatio ejus quae est, non necesse est non esse negationis, ea quae est, necesse est non esse. Negatio enim ejus quae dicit, necesse est non esse, illa est quæ dicit, non necesse est non esse. Sed bujus contraria, id est affirmationis quae est, necesse est non esse, illa scilicet quæ est, necesse est esse, sequitur negationem illam quae esi, non possibile est non esse; hujus quoque sit talis descriptio: Dissimili initur modo evenit quam dudum contingebat in bis quae erant possibilia et quæ impossibilia. Illic enim contradictio contradictionem sequebatur, sed conversim, ut negationem affirmatio, affirmationem negaLio sequeretur. Hic non idem modus est. Nam cum superiores contradictoriæ sint, et;nferior negat.io affirmationem sequatur, negationem non sequi. tur contradictoria affirmatio, sed affirmationis illius contraria, quod si quis legal attentius, integre descriptum esse raliune perspiciet; cur autem hoc eveniat, causam prodit.","english":"For it follows: upon \"it is possible not to be\" follows that which says \"it is not necessary not to be,\" but the negation, namely \"it is not possible not to be,\" is the negation of the affirmation \"it is possible not to be.\" The affirmation of the negation \"it is not necessary not to be\" does not follow—namely, \"it is necessary not to be.\" For the negation of that which says \"it is necessary not to be\" is the one that says \"it is not necessary not to be.\" But its contrary—that is, of the affirmation \"it is necessary not to be\"—namely, \"it is necessary to be,\" follows that negation which is \"it is not possible not to be.\" Let there also be such a description of this matter: it comes about in a different way than was happening just now in the cases of things possible and impossible. For there, a contradiction followed a contradiction, but in reverse, so that a negation followed an affirmation and an affirmation a negation. Here the mode is not the same. For since the former are contradictory, and the lower negation follows the affirmation, a contradictory affirmation does not follow the negation, but the contrary of that affirmation. If anyone reads this more attentively, he will perceive that the reasoning has been described completely; and why this happens, he discloses the cause.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":193,"ref":"p193","source":"Causa autem cur non sequatur similiter cœteris est, quoniam contrariæ impossibile necessario redditur idem valens. Nam quod impossibile est esse, necesse est hoc non quidem esse, sed potius non esse. Quod uero impossibile est non esse, hoc necessarium est esse. Quare si illa similiter sequuntur possibile et non possibile, hæc econtrario. Qnoniam non significant idem necessarium et impossibile (sed quemadmodum dictum est) conversim.\n\nRatio est cur non simili modo consequentia secundum contradictionem propositionis eveniat, sicutin bis qua? sunt imposibilia et non impossibilia hujusmodi, omne necessarium contrario modo impossibile est. Nam quod est impossibile esse, hoc est necessarium non esse,non enim est necessarium esse quod est impossibile esse; nullus enim dixerit, necesse est esse quod impossibile est esse, non ergo necesse est esse, sed potius necesse est non esse quod impossiblle est esse. Ergo conversæ idem potest impossibile, quod necessarium. Quod enim impossibile junctum cum esse effieit, boc efficit necessarium junctum ad id quod est non esse; igitur quod impossibile est esse; hoc necesse est non esse. Rursus quod impossibile estnonesse, hoc necesseest non esse, Rursus quod impossibile est non esse, hoc necesse est esse, ut igni impossibile est non inesse calorem necesse est igitur inesse.","english":"The reason, however, why it does not follow similarly in the other cases is that the contrary of \"impossible\" is rendered as equivalent to \"necessary.\" For what is impossible to be, it is necessary that this be not indeed to be, but rather not to be. But what is impossible not to be, this is necessary to be. Wherefore if those follow similarly—\"possible\" and \"not possible\"—these are the contrary. For \"necessary\" and \"impossible\" do not signify the same thing (but, as has been said) convertibly.\n\nThe reason why the consequence according to the contradiction of the proposition does not come about in a similar way, as in those cases which are \"impossible\" and \"not impossible\" of this sort, is that every necessary thing is impossible in the contrary way. For what is impossible to be, this is necessary not to be; for it is not necessary to be that which is impossible to be. For no one would say \"it is necessary to be\" of what is impossible to be; therefore it is not necessary to be, but rather it is necessary not to be that which is impossible to be. Therefore \"impossible\" converted has the same force as \"necessary.\" For what \"impossible\" joined with \"to be\" effects, this \"necessary\" effects joined to \"not to be\"; therefore what is impossible to be, this is necessary not to be. Again, what is impossible not to be, this is necessary to be. Again, what is impossible not to be, this is necessary to be, as for fire it is impossible that heat not be in it; therefore it is necessary that it be in it.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":194,"ref":"p194","source":"Quare huic quoque idem convertitur, ut quodimpossibile secundum non esse efficit, idem valeat necessarium secundum esse positum, quare contrario modo necessarium et impossibile idem potest.. Quod si contrario modo impossibile et necessarium idem valet, manifestum est cur non similiter consequitur necessarium possibile et non possibile propositiones, sicut easdem ipsas, id est possibile et non possibile propositiones impossibile, etnonimpossibile sequebatur. Nam si converso ordine necessarium atque impoasibUe idem valet secundum contrarietatem, non similis consequentia est necessarii et impossibilis, ei quae fuit possibilis et impossibilis. Nam quoniam non impossibile esse, sequitur possibile esse. Et hoc rursus, id est possibile esse, non necesse esse comitatur. Rursus id quod est impossibile esse, quoniam sequitur non possibile esse. Necessarium autem, impossibili converso ordine idem valel, sequitur id quod est impossibile est esse, necesse est non esse. Ac per hoc eliam id quod est non possibile esse sequitur, id quod est necesse est non esse. Rursus-quoniam ei quod est non impossibile non esse consentit, id quod est possibile est non esse, et huic convenit, non necesse est non esse. Quoniam id quod dicitur impossibile est. non esse, socium est ei qnod est non possibile est non esse, ei autem quod est impossibile non esse, converso modo redditum necessarium, idem valet.","english":"Therefore here too the same thing is converted, so that what \"impossible\" effects in respect of not being, the same has force as \"necessary\" posited in respect of being; hence in a contrary mode \"necessary\" and \"impossible\" can be the same. But if in a contrary mode \"impossible\" and \"necessary\" have the same force, it is clear why it does not follow similarly that \"necessary\" [implies] \"possible\" and \"not possible,\" as the same propositions themselves—that is, \"possible\" and \"not possible\"—were followed by \"impossible\" and \"not impossible.\" For if in converted order \"necessary\" and \"impossible\" have the same force according to contrariety, the consequence of \"necessary\" and \"impossible\" is not similar to that which was of \"possible\" and \"impossible.\" For since \"not impossible to be\" follows \"possible to be.\" And this again—that is, \"possible to be\"—is accompanied by \"not necessary to be.\" Again, that which is \"impossible to be,\" since it follows \"not possible to be.\" But \"necessary,\" by a converted order, has the same force as \"impossible\": there follows \"it is impossible to be,\" [and] \"it is necessary not to be.\" And through this also \"not possible to be\" is followed by \"it is necessary not to be.\" Again, since \"not impossible not to be\" agrees with \"possible not to be,\" and with this agrees \"not necessary not to be.\" Since that which is said [to be] \"impossible not to be\" is a companion of that which is \"not possible not to be,\" but to that which is \"impossible not to be,\" \"necessary\" is rendered in a converted mode, it has the same force.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":195,"ref":"p195","source":"Sequitur id quod est impossibile est non esse, id quod dicimus necesse est esse, et hanc quoque sequitur id quod proponimus, non impossibile est non esse, non necesse est. non esse; id vero descriptione monstratur.\n\nConsentientes. Consentientes. Non impossibile est esse. Impossibile est esse. Possibile est esse. Non possibile est esse. Non necesse est esse. Necesse est non esse. Consentientes. Consentientes. Non impossib. est non esse. Impossibile est non esse. Possibile est non esse. Non possilJ. est non esse. Non necesse est non esse. Necesse est esse.\n\nCausa igitur diversae consequenliæ est in contrarium propositionum impossibilis et necessarii facta conversio; sed de his hoc modo speculatus, sese quodammodo ipse reprehendit, et ad aliam proprietatis consequentiam disputationem tleclit.\n\nAn cerle impossibile est sic poni necessari contradictiones. Nnm quod est necessarium esse, possibile est esse, nam si non, negatio sequetur. Necesse enim est aut affirmare aut negare. Quare si non possibile est esse, impossibile est esse. Igitur impossibile est esse, quod necesse est esse, quod sane est inconveniens.","english":"There follows: \"what is impossible is not to be,\" which we call \"it is necessary to be,\" and this too is followed by what we propose: \"it is not impossible not to be,\" \"it is not necessary not to be.\" This is shown by the description.\n\nAgreeing terms. Agreeing terms. It is not impossible to be. It is impossible to be. It is possible to be. It is not possible to be. It is not necessary to be. It is necessary not to be. Agreeing terms. Agreeing terms. It is not impossible not to be. It is impossible not to be. It is possible not to be. It is not possible not to be. It is not necessary not to be. It is necessary to be.\n\nThe cause, then, of the differing consequence is the conversion of the propositions of \"impossible\" and \"necessary\" made into the contrary; but having speculated on these matters in this way, he in a certain manner reproaches himself and turns the discussion to another consequence of propriety.\n\nWhether certainly it is impossible that contradictions be posited thus in the case of the necessary. For what is necessary to be, it is possible to be; for if not, the negation will follow. For it is necessary either to affirm or to deny. Wherefore if it is not possible to be, it is impossible to be. Therefore it is impossible to be, which is necessary to be—which is surely incongruous.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":196,"ref":"p196","source":"Forte, inquit, erravimus ita conseqientias collocantes. Tunc enim disposuirnus,ut id quod esset possibile sequeretur illud quod est non necessarium, ut secundum praecessionem possibilis sequentem negationem necessarii poneremus; nunc autem dicil boc permutari oportere, et non a possibili iDchoandum,et huic subjiciendum necessarii negationem, sed potius primo ponendum esse necessarium, secundo loco possibile, namque illa propositio quae necessarium continet, continere videtur etiam possibilitatem, nam quod necessarium est idem possibile est. Quod enim necesse est esse, idem esse possibile est, nam si quid boc neget, et id quod est necessarium dicat non sequi possibilitatem, negatio possibilitatis id quod est necessarium comitabitur. Nam si id quod necessarium est esse, falsum est dicere possibile est esse, verum est dicere quoniam non possibile est esse. In omnibus enim sut dictio est, id eSlaffirmatio, aut negatio; ut si illa vera est, illa sit falsa, si ilia non est, ii'a mox esse necesse sil, sed non possibile esse sequi diximus, id quod est impossibile esse;igitur id quod dicitur, necesse est esse, impossibile est esse, sed hoc quidem inconveniens esi, non igitur verum est, quoniam ei quod est necessarium esse, id quod est non possibile esse convenit. Quare sequitur id quod est necessarium possibilitas.","english":"Perhaps, he says, we erred in arranging the consequences thus. For then we laid it down that what is possible should be followed by what is not necessary, so that, according to the precedence of the possible, we placed the negation of the necessary as following; but now, he says, this ought to be changed, and we should not begin from the possible and place under it the negation of the necessary, but rather the necessary should be placed first, the possible in the second place. For that proposition which contains the necessary seems also to contain the possible; for what is necessary is the same as possible. For what is necessary to be is the same as possible to be. For if anyone denies this and says that what is necessary does not follow the possible, the negation of the possible will accompany what is necessary. For if, when it is necessary to be, it is false to say \"it is possible to be,\" it is true to say \"it is not possible to be.\" For in all things there is either an expression—that is, an affirmation—or a negation, so that if the one is true, the other is false; if the one is not, the other must immediately be. But we said that \"it is not possible to be\" is followed by \"it is impossible to be.\" Therefore, what is said to be necessary to be is impossible to be. But this is indeed incongruous; therefore it is not true that \"it is not possible to be\" agrees with what is necessary to be. Wherefore the possible follows what is necessary.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":197,"ref":"p197","source":"At uero illud quod est possibile esse, non impossibile esse sequitur, hoc uero illud quod est non necessarium esse. Quare contingit quod est necessarium esse non necessarium esse, quod sane est inconveniens.\n\nDicimus ei quod est necessarium esse consentire illam propositionem quae dicit possibile esse, sed rursus boc falsum videtur cogitantibus perspicienttbusque, quoniam ei quod est possibile esse, consentit et convenit illa propositio quæ dicit noa impossibile esse, hoc veroillud quod dicitur non impossibile esse sequitur id quod proponimus, non cesse est esse, sed possibile esse consentire proposuimus ei quae dicit, necesse est esse, eamque consequi; sequitur ergo eam quæ est non necesse esse, illam quae dicit, necesse est esse, eique consentit, quod est impossibile. Qui igitur in his dubitationibus est statuendum? non potest consentire quidem possibile esse ei quod est, necesse esse. Alioqui propositionem necesse esse id quod est impossibile esse consequetur, si vero convenerit ei quae est necessarium esse, illa quæ est pessibile esse. Rursus fit ut id quod est necessarium, non necessarium sit, sed hoc falsum est; sed hoc quemadmodum sese habeat paulo poslexplicabilur.","english":"But indeed, \"it is possible to be\" is followed by \"it is not impossible to be,\" and this by \"it is not necessary to be.\" Hence it comes about that what is necessary to be is not necessary to be, which is certainly incongruous.\n\nWe say that the proposition which says \"it is possible to be\" agrees with \"it is necessary to be,\" but again this seems false to those who think and see clearly, since the proposition which says \"it is not impossible to be\" agrees and is consonant with \"it is possible to be,\" and this in turn is followed by what we set out—not \"it is necessary to be,\" but we proposed that \"it is possible to be\" agrees with the proposition which says \"it is necessary to be\" and follows it. Therefore \"it is necessary to be\" follows \"it is not necessary to be,\" and agrees with it, which is impossible. What then is to be settled in these doubts? \"It is possible to be\" cannot indeed agree with \"it is necessary to be.\" Otherwise the proposition \"it is necessary to be\" will be followed by \"it is impossible to be,\" if indeed \"it is possible to be\" has agreed with \"it is necessary to be.\" Again it comes about that what is necessary is not necessary, but this is false; yet how this stands will be explained a little later.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":198,"ref":"p198","source":"Nunc vero priorem sequentiam permutantes hoc dicimus, quoniam id quod est possibile esse non potest consequi quod est necesse esse, nec hæsibi proposiliones consentiunt possibile esse, et necesse esse, quod Aristoteles hoc modo proponit:\n\nAt uero neque necessarium esse sequitur ad possibile esse, neque necessarium non esse. Illi enim utraqne contingit accidere,horum aulem utrumlibet verum fuerit, nondum erunt illa vera, simul enim possibile est esse et non esse. Si vero necesse est esse uel non esse, non eril possibile utrumgue. Relinquitur ergo non necessarium non esse sequi ad possibiLe esse,hoc enim verum est et de necesse esse, hæc enim fit contradictio ejus quæ sequitur ad non possibile esse. Illud enim sequitur hoc quod est, impossibile esse, et necesse non esse,cujus negatio est, non necesse non esse. Sequuntur igitur et hæ contradictiones secundum prædictum modum, et rcimpossibile contingit sic positis.","english":"But now, altering the former sequence, we say this: that what is possible to be cannot be followed by what is necessary to be, nor do the propositions \"it is possible to be\" and \"it is necessary to be\" agree with each other, which Aristotle sets out in this way:\n\nBut indeed neither \"it is necessary to be\" follows from \"it is possible to be,\" nor \"it is necessary not to be.\" For to the former both can happen; but of these, whichever of the two is true, those will not yet be true; for it is possible at the same time to be and not to be. But if it is necessary to be or not to be, it will not be possible for both. It remains, therefore, that \"it is not necessary not to be\" follows from \"it is possible to be\"; for this is true also of \"it is necessary to be.\" For this becomes the contradiction of that which follows from \"it is not possible to be.\" For that which is \"it is impossible to be\" is followed by \"it is necessary not to be,\" whose negation is \"it is not necessary not to be.\" Therefore these contradictions also follow in the aforesaid manner, and it comes about that it is impossible when these things are posited in this way.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":199,"ref":"p199","source":"Docet id quod est possibile non consentire ei quod est necessarium esse, nec rursus ei quae est, necessarium est non esse. Nam quod necesse est esse, non potest non esse, quod autem necesse esse non esse, non potest esse. Quod autem dicimus possibile esse, ita dicimus, tanquam si et non esse possibile sit. Utramque igitur naturam habet id quod dicimus possibile esse, ut et sit esse possibile, et sit possibile non esse. Qui vero dicit necesse esse aufert non esse, et quae dicit,necesse est non esse, aufert esse; ita si haec verae sunt, id est necesse esse et rursus necesse non esse, utræque illae falsae sunt qua: dicunt et potest esse, et potest non esse. Illa enim quae proponit necesse esse, posse non esse subruit,; illa vero quæ dicit, necesse est non esse, posse esse subvertit; neutra igitur consequetur eam propositionem quae dicit, possibile est esse, nec ea quae dicit ex necessitate esse, nec illa quæ dicit ex necessitate non esse. Et sensus quidem hujusmodi esl.Sermonum autem ratio talis est; at vero, inquit., neque id quod est necessarium esse, sequitur propositionem illam quae proponil possibile esse, nec rursus illa quae dicit necessarium est non esse. Illi enim, id est possibili, utraque contingit, accidere, id est posse esse et posse non esse. Nam quod potest esse, idem potest non esse.","english":"He teaches that what is possible does not agree with what is necessary to be, nor again with the proposition \"it is necessary not to be.\" For what is necessary to be cannot not be, and what is necessary not to be cannot be. But when we say \"it is possible to be,\" we say it in such a way as if it were also possible not to be. Therefore what we call \"possible to be\" has both natures: that it be possible to be and that it be possible not to be. But he who says \"it is necessary to be\" removes \"not to be,\" and the one who says \"it is necessary not to be\" removes \"to be.\" Thus if these are true—that is, \"it is necessary to be\" and again \"it is necessary not to be\"—then both of those are false which say both \"it can be\" and \"it can not be.\" For the proposition that declares \"it is necessary to be\" undermines \"it can not be,\" while the one that says \"it is necessary not to be\" subverts \"it can be.\" Therefore neither of them will follow the proposition that says \"it is possible to be\"—neither the one that says \"it is from necessity to be\" nor the one that says \"it is from necessity not to be.\" And the sense is of this kind. But the reasoning of the arguments is as follows: \"However,\" he says, \"neither does that which is necessary to be follow that proposition which declares 'it is possible to be,' nor again the one that says 'it is necessary not to be.'\" For to that—that is, to the possible—both happen to accrue, namely \"it can be\" and \"it can not be.\" For what can be, the same can not be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":200,"ref":"p200","source":"Harum aut.em, id est vel quae dicit, necessarium est esse, vel quae dicit,necessarium eslnonesse,si utrum libet verum fuerit, non erunt illa vera, id est posse esse et posse non esse; quod enim possibile est esse, idem possibile est non esse; quod si neque necesse est esse, nec necesse non esse propositio, eam quae est possibile esse consequetur, relinquitur ut illa ei consentiat quae dicit, non necessarium est non esse. Hæc enirn sequitur eam quae proponit, possibile est esse. Quidquid enim possibile est esse, non necesse est non esse, ut quoniam hominem possibile est ambulare, non est necesse non ambulare. Hoc enim ve. rum est, inquit, et de eo quod est necesse est non esse, id est haec enim propositio quae dicit non necesse esse non esse, verum est, ut contra eam opponatur conlradiclorie, quae dicit necesse est non esse, unde etiam secutus est. Haec enim fit contradictio ejus quae sequitur, non possibile esse, unde facienda est bujusmodi de,criplio: Hæc enim quæ dicit, non necesse est non esse, contradictio est ejus (luæ proponit, necesse est non esse, uxest sequens. et consentiens ei quæ est, non ossibile est esse, quæ consentitei quæ dicit, impossibile est esse, quae rursus sequitur eam quae est ultima, id est necesse est non esse, cujus conlradielio est, non necesse est non esse; affirmatio enim est uecesse est non esse, negatio non necesse est non esse.","english":"But of these, namely either the one that says \"it is necessary to be\" or the one that says \"it is necessary not to be,\" if either one is true, those will not be true, namely \"it is possible to be\" and \"it is possible not to be.\" For what is possible to be, the same is possible not to be. But if neither proposition is \"it is necessary to be\" nor \"it is necessary not to be,\" the one that is \"it is possible to be\" will follow, and it remains that it agrees with the one that says \"it is not necessary not to be.\" For this follows the proposition \"it is possible to be.\" For whatever is possible to be, it is not necessary not to be, as, since it is possible for a man to walk, it is not necessary not to walk. For this is true, he says, also concerning that which is necessary not to be, that is, this proposition which says \"it is not necessary not to be\" is true, so that it is opposed contradictorily to that which says \"it is necessary not to be,\" from which it also follows. For this becomes the contradiction of that which follows, \"it is not possible to be,\" from which the description must be made as follows: for this one which says \"it is not necessary not to be\" is the contradiction of that which proposes \"it is necessary not to be,\" as it is the consequent and agrees with that which is \"it is not possible to be,\" which agrees with that which says \"it is impossible to be,\" which in turn follows that which is last, namely \"it is necessary not to be,\" whose contradiction is \"it is not necessary not to be.\" For the affirmation is \"it is necessary not to be,\" the negation \"it is not necessary not to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":201,"ref":"p201","source":"Quocirca secundum contradictionem fit hæc quoque consequentia, nam impossibile esse et non impossibile esse contradictio est, sed affirmationem, id est impossibile esse, sequitur negatio non possibile esse. Negalionem vero, id est non impossibile esse, sequitur affirmatio possibile est esse, sed non possibile est esse, et possibile est esse, contradictio est, sed negationem possibilis, id est non possibile esse consequetur necesse est. non esse afOrmalio, sed affirmalionem possibilis, id est possibile esse sequetur non necesse est non esse negatio. Quare ita positis nibil evenit impossibile, sed omnia conveniunt et consentiunt, et secundum superiorem possibilis et impossibilis modum afHrmaLiones et negationes converso ordine contradictone se sequuntur. Et sensus quidem totius hujusmodi est, ordo autem verborum sic. Quoniam, inquit, ei quod est possibile esse, nec illud quod est necesse esse, nec illud quod est necesse non esse consentit, relinquitur ut id quod est non necessarium non esse sequatur possibile esse. Hoc enim quod dicitur non necessarium non esse verum est dicere do necesse est non esse, et subaudimus quoniam est ejus contradictio. Haec enim quae dicit, non necesse est non esse, contradictio fit ei quae sequitur negationem possibilis, id est non possibile esse.","english":"Wherefore by contradiction this consequence also comes about; for \"it is impossible to be\" and \"it is not impossible to be\" are a contradiction, but the negation \"it is not possible to be\" follows the affirmation, that is, \"it is impossible to be.\" But the affirmation \"it is possible to be\" follows the negation, that is, \"it is not impossible to be.\" But \"it is not possible to be\" and \"it is possible to be\" are a contradiction, but the affirmation \"it is necessary not to be\" will follow the negation of \"possible,\" that is, \"it is not possible to be.\" But the negation \"it is not necessary not to be\" will follow the affirmation of \"possible,\" that is, \"it is possible to be.\" Wherefore, when these things are thus posited, nothing impossible results, but all things agree and are in harmony, and according to the higher mode of \"possible\" and \"impossible\" the affirmations and negations follow one another by contradiction in reversed order. And indeed the sense of all this is of such a kind, but the order of the words is as follows. Since, he says, neither that which is \"it is necessary to be\" nor that which is \"it is necessary not to be\" agrees with that which is \"it is possible to be,\" it remains that \"it is possible to be\" follows that which is \"it is not necessary not to be.\" For this which is said, \"it is not necessary not to be,\" it is true to say of \"it is necessary not to be,\" and we understand that it is its contradiction. For these things which it says, \"it is not necessary not to be,\" become a contradiction to that which follows the negation of \"possible,\" that is, \"it is not possible to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":202,"ref":"p202","source":"Hæc est autem ea quae dicit, necesse est non esse, illud enim quod est non possibile esse, utrumque horum sequitur, et quod est impossibile esse, et quod est, necesse est non esse. Cujus affirmationis, id est necesse est non esse, negatio est, non necesse est non esse. Sed haee sequitur non impossibile esse et possibile esse; igitur hae contradictiones secundum praedictum modum se sequuntur, seiticet contradictorie, sed conversim, et his positis atque ita ol'dinalis nihil contingit impossibile.\n\nDubitabitautem aliquis si ad illud quod necessarium esse, possibile esse sequatur. Nam si non sequitur, contradictio sequetur, non possibile esse, et si quia dicat non hunc esse contradictionem, necesse esse est ipsum dicere possibile non esse, sed utræque (alsæ sunt de necesse esse. At vero rursus, idem videtur esse possibile incidi et non incidi, et esse et non esse. Quare erit nece.5se esse, contingens non esse, hoc autem falsum est.","english":"But this is the one that says \"it is necessary not to be.\" For \"it is not possible to be\" is followed by both of these: both \"it is impossible to be\" and \"it is necessary not to be.\" The negation of this affirmation, that is, of \"it is necessary not to be,\" is \"it is not necessary not to be.\" But this is followed by \"it is not impossible to be\" and \"it is possible to be.\" Therefore these contradictions follow one another in the manner stated above, namely contradictorily, but in reverse order; and when these are posited and thus ordered, nothing impossible results.\n\nBut someone will ask whether \"it is possible to be\" follows from \"it is necessary to be.\" For if it does not follow, the contradiction will follow: \"it is not possible to be\"; and if someone says that this is not the contradiction, he must say that \"it is possible not to be\" is the contradiction of \"it is necessary to be\"—but both of these are about \"it is necessary to be.\" Yet again, \"it is possible to happen\" and \"not to happen,\" and \"to be\" and \"not to be,\" seem to be the same. Wherefore it will be necessary to be, and contingent not to be—but this is false.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":203,"ref":"p203","source":"Ad superiorem possibilis et necessarii consequen'tiae reversus est quaestionem. Dicit enim dubitari posse, si id quod est possibile esse consentiat ei propositioni, quae est necessarium esse, sive enim consentire dicatur, sive non consentire, aliquid impossibile et inconveniens utroque modo contingit; nam si quis dicat id quod dicitur possibile esse non consenlire ei quod est necessarium esse, consentiet ei negatio possibilis, ea quæ est non possibile esse; sed si ista consenliet, erit idem necessarium esse quod est non possibile esse. Quod si hoc rursus aliquis neget, el dical nou esse negalioDem ejus propositionis quæ est possibile esse, eam quæ dicit non possibile esse, sed illam potius quæ proponit, possibile est uon esse, quamquam falsum sit, tamen ne hæc quidem ei quo est necessarium esse convenire potest. Fit enim negatio ejus quae est possibile esse, ea quae dicit, possibile est non esse, si affirmatio possibile esse non sequitur affirmationem quae dicit, necesse est esse, sequitur negatio ea quæ est, possibile est non esse, sed quod necesse est esse, falsum est dicere quoniam possibile est non esse. Quod enim necesse esl esse, dici non polesl fieri posse ut non sit, sed potius non posse Seri ut non sit: quod si quis dicat rursus sequi id quod dicitur necesse esse, et consenlire ei quæ dicit possibile esse, sic quoque aliquid inconveniens reperietur.","english":"He returns to the earlier question of the consequence of \"possible\" and \"necessary.\" For he says it can be doubted whether \"it is possible to be\" agrees with the proposition \"it is necessary to be.\" For whether it is said to agree or not to agree, something impossible and incongruous follows in either case. For if someone says that \"it is possible to be\" does not agree with \"it is necessary to be,\" the negation of \"possible,\" namely \"it is not possible to be,\" will agree with it. But if that agrees, it will be the same thing for it to be necessary to be and not possible to be. But if someone again denies this and says that the negation of the proposition \"it is possible to be\" is not \"it is not possible to be,\" but rather \"it is possible not to be\"—although this is false, still not even this can agree with \"it is necessary to be.\" For the negation of \"it is possible to be\" becomes that which says \"it is possible not to be.\" If the affirmation \"it is possible to be\" does not follow the affirmation which says \"it is necessary to be,\" the negation \"it is possible not to be\" follows. But it is false to say of what is necessary to be that it is possible not to be. For what is necessary to be cannot be said to be able not to be, but rather to be unable not to be. But if someone again says that \"it is necessary to be\" follows and agrees with \"it is possible to be,\" in this way too something incongruous will be found.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":204,"ref":"p204","source":"Quod enim possibile est esse, idem possibile est non esse, erit igitur quod necesse est esse, possibile non esse, et erit contingensquod necessarium est. Possibile autem et contingens ill utramque partem facile vertitur, et ad esae et ad non esse. Quod autem necesse est esse, interclusum habet eventum ad contrariam dictionem. Ut si necesse est esse, ut non sit, fieri non potest, et si necesse est non esse, ut sil, impossibile est. Quare qui dicit possibile esse consentire ei quod est necesse esse, quoniam id quod est possibile est potest etiam non esse, et hoc est contingens, dicit id quod esse necesse est, posse non esse, et esse conlingens, quod est inconveniens. Hanc igitur dnbitationem solvens, ita sequitur:\n\nManifestum est autem quoniam non omne possibile, vel esse, vel ambulare, et opposita valet. Sed est in quibus non sit verum. At primum quidem in his quæ. non secundum rationem possunt, tat ignis calefactibilis est, et habet vim irrationabilem, ergo secundum I'ationem polestales eædem plurimum ctiam contrariorum sunt,irrationabiles vero non omnes,sedquemadmodum dictum est, ignem non est possibile calefacere, et non calefacere, neque qllæcunque alia semper agunt. Alia vero possunt et secundum irrationabiles potestates simul opposita suscipere, sed hoc idcirco dictum est quoniam non omnis potestas oppositorum est, neque quæcunque secundum eamdem speciem dicantur.","english":"For what is possible to be is the same as possible not to be; therefore, what is necessary to be will be possible not to be, and what is necessary will be contingent. But \"possible\" and \"contingent\" are easily turned toward either part, both to be and not to be. But what is necessary to be has its outcome closed off from the contrary statement. For example, if it is necessary to be, it cannot happen that it not be; and if it is necessary not to be, it is impossible that it be. Therefore, one who says that \"possible to be\" agrees with \"necessary to be\"—since what is possible is also able not to be, and this is contingent—says that what is necessary to be can not be and is contingent, which is absurd. Resolving this doubt, then, he continues thus:\n\nBut it is evident that not every possible thing—whether to be or to walk—is also capable of the opposites. Rather, there are cases in which this is not true. And first, indeed, in those things which are not capable according to reason, as fire is capable of heating and has an irrational power. Therefore, powers according to reason are for the most part also of contraries; but irrational powers are not all so, but, as was said, it is not possible for fire to heat and not to heat, nor for whatever other things always act. But other things can also receive opposites at the same time according to irrational powers. But this was said for the reason that not every power is of opposites, nor whatever things are spoken of according to the same species.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":205,"ref":"p205","source":"Multa,inquit, sunt quæ unum esse possunt id quod suut, non etiam aliud aliquid quod non sunt. Plura enim sunt quæ ab eo quod sunt non mutantur. Alia vero sunt quae mutari possunt. III coelum unam rem solam potest, id est. moveri, huic vero oppositum, id est non moveri non polest; ergo non omue quod est possibile vel esse vel ambulare, id est non omne de quo quaelibet possibilitas prædicatur, etiam opposila valet, ut utrumque possit tieri et facere quod facit, et huic opposhum, id est non facere quod facit; sed sunt quaedam in quibus ila poteslates predicentur, ut non sit verum de his dici quoniam et opposita possuul, ut etiam in his quas praeter rationem aliquam possunt; ut ignis. Namque ignis praeter rationem aliquam calidus est, non est enim reddere rationem cur ignis sit calidus, natura enim est calidus, et cum possit esse calidus, non tamen potest id quod est oppositum. id est non potest non calere, quod est oppositum ei, scilicet quod est calere; ergo secundum rationem potestates ipsae easdem plurimorum etiam contrariorum sunt.","english":"He says: Many things can be that one thing which they are, but not also something else which they are not. For there are more things that are not changed from what they are. But there are others that can be changed. Heaven can be one thing only, that is, to be moved; but it cannot be its opposite, that is, not to be moved. Therefore not everything that is possible either to be or to walk—that is, not everything of which any possibility whatsoever is predicated—is also capable of the opposite, so that it can both come to be and do what it does, and also its opposite, that is, not do what it does. But there are certain things in which those possibilities are predicated in such a way that it is not true to say of them that they can also be their opposites, as even in those things which are possible apart from some reason, such as fire. For fire is hot apart from some reason—for it is not possible to give a reason why fire is hot, since it is hot by nature—and although it can be hot, it nevertheless cannot be what is opposite to it, that is, it cannot not be hot, which is the opposite of being hot. Therefore, according to reason, those very possibilities are of the same things, even of many contraries.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":206,"ref":"p206","source":"Poleslales, inquit, quae sunt secundum rationem, id est in quibus est aliqua ratio, non unius possibilitatis, sed plurimorum sunt atque oppositorum, ut possibilitas medicinæ esl curare, quae quoniam secundum rationem fit, ut curet medicus, et est rationabilis potestas medico curandi, non solum potest curare, sed etiam non curare, et potest aliquid plusquam unum, et ipsum quod potesL oppositum est, id est non curare. Oppositum namque est ei quod est curare id quod dicitur non curare, quae opposita contraria vocantur. Affirmatio namque et negatio contrarietatibus discernuntur. Irrationabilis vero nou omnis, sed quemadmodum dictum est, ignem non est possibile calefacere, et non omnis, inquil, secundum rationem potestas opposita quoque valet. Irrationabilium vero non omnis hujus. modi poleslas est, ut opposita non valeat: nam cum ferrum calere sine ratione potestas sit (non enim ex ratione calet, quoniam rationem non habe)), potest etiam non calere, ignis autem cum irrationabilis potestas sit calefacere non potest, et non calefacere. Quare recte dictum est irrationabiles potestates non omnes non posse contraria, sed quasdam, ut ignem, qui cum sit calefactibilis, non calefactibilis non est. Quæ autem sint irrationabilia, qnæ unam tantum habeant potestatem non eliam oppositam, sic demonstrat dicens, nec quæcunque alia semper agunt.","english":"He says that those capacities which are in accordance with reason, that is, in which there is some account, are not of one possibility but of many and of opposites, as the possibility of medicine is to heal; and since this comes about according to reason, so that the doctor heals, and it is a rational power in the doctor for healing, he can not only heal but also not heal, and can do more than one thing, and the very thing that he can do has its opposite, that is, not to heal. For \"not to heal\" is opposed to \"to heal,\" and these opposites are called contraries. For affirmation and negation are distinguished by contrarieties. But not every irrational capacity is of this sort, but, as has been said, it is not possible for fire to heat; and he says that not every power according to reason is also capable of opposites. But not every irrational capacity is of this kind, such that it is not capable of opposites; for since the power of iron to be hot is without reason (for it is not heated from reason, since it does not have reason), it can also not be hot; but fire, since it is an irrational power, cannot heat and not heat. Therefore it was rightly said that not all irrational powers are incapable of contraries, but some are, such as fire, which, since it is capable of heating, is not capable of not heating. But what things are irrational, which have only one power and not also its opposite, he shows thus, saying, nor any other things whatsoever always act.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":207,"ref":"p207","source":"Ignis enim opposita non potest, sed non solum ignis, sed itia quoque omnia unum possunl, el non multa neo opposi)a, quaecunque actu semper sunt, ut sol semper actu est lucidus, idcirco non potest non lucere; et nix semper actu frigida est, et ideo nunquam potest esse non frigida; ergo quæcunque semper agunt, id est in eo quod sunl, semper in actu sunt. Manifestum est, quoniam sicut ignis non capit frigus, ita nec illa quoque opposita possunt. Idcirco enim ignis qooque opposita non potest, quia semper in actu habet propriam potestatem. Semper enim est ca)idus, sed non omnia irralionabilia (ut. dictum esl) unam tantum habent potestatem, ut opposita non possint, sed sunt quaedam irralionabiles potestates, quae utrumque possunt, ut in eo quod est secari pellem vel non secari pellem. Potest namque secari pellis, po!est etiam non secari, sed haec sunt opposta; secundum gur irrationabiles quoque poleslates possunt quaedam opposita; sed idcirco superiora sunt dicta, inquit, quibus monstravimus quoniam ignis et quæcunque semper sunt actu, non possunt opposita, ut doceremus non omnem potestatem oppositorum esse potentiam, sed alias veras esse hujusmodi potestates quae actu essent, et unam rem solam possent, ab oppositorum vero paleslale discederent. Hoc autem non solum in his quai secundum rationem potestates dicuntur, sed eliam secundum eam spe-ciem qua: irrationabilis dicitur.","english":"For fire cannot [do] opposites, but not only fire, but all those things too can [do] one thing, and not many nor opposites, whatever things are always in act, as the sun is always in act shining, and therefore cannot not shine; and snow is always in act cold, and therefore can never be not cold; therefore whatever things always act, that is, are always in act in respect of what they are. It is manifest that just as fire does not admit cold, so neither can those things [do] opposites. For fire too cannot [do] opposites for this reason, that it always has its proper capacity in act. For it is always hot, but not all irrational things (as has been said) have only one capacity, so that they cannot [do] opposites, but there are certain irrational capacities which can do both, as in the case of a skin being cut or not being cut. For a skin can be cut, it can also not be cut, but these are opposites; accordingly even irrational capacities can [do] certain opposites. But for this reason, he says, the things above were stated, by which we showed that fire and whatever things are always in act cannot [do] opposites, so that we might teach that not every capacity is a capacity of opposites, but that some capacities of this kind are true which were in act and could [do] one single thing alone, but departed from the capacity of opposites. But this not only in those things which are called capacities in accordance with reason, but also in accordance with that species which is called irrational.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":208,"ref":"p208","source":"Suutenim quaedam eorum quae irrationabiles potestates esse dicuntur, quae non solum id quod sunt, verum etiam opposita possint, alia vero unum tantum possunt. Pellis enim potest secari et non secari. et idcirco opposita otest; ignis vero, cum sit calidus, frigidus esse non potest. Et idcirco nulla oppositorum est illi poleslas.\n\nQuædam vero potestates æquivoce sunt. Possibile enim non similiter dicetur, sed hoc quidem quoniam verum est, ut in actu, ut possibile est ambulare, quoniam ambulat, et omnino possibile est esse,quoniam est jam actu, quod dicitur possibile. Illud uero quoniam forsitan agel, ut possibile est ambulare,quoniam forsitan ambulabit,et hæcquidem in solia mobilibus esl potestas.Illa vero et immobilibus. In utrisque vero uerum eat dicere, non impossibile est ambulare vel esse, et quod ambulcd jam et agit, et ambulabile est. Sic igitur passibile non est verum de necessario simpliciter dicere, alterum autem verum est. Quare quonam partem universale sequitur, ilLud quod ex necessitate est, consequitur posse esse, sed nan omnino.","english":"For some of those things which are said to be irrational powers can do not only what they are, but also opposites, while others can do only one thing. For skin can be cut and not be cut, and therefore it can do opposites; but fire, since it is hot, cannot be cold. And therefore no power of opposites belongs to it.\n\nBut some powers are spoken of equivocally. For \"possible\" is not said in the same way, but in one sense because it is true, as in act—for example, it is possible to walk because he walks, and generally it is possible to be because it already is in act, which is called possible. But in another sense because it will perhaps act—for example, it is possible to walk because he will perhaps walk—and this power is in movable things only. But that other sense is also in immovable things. In both, however, it is true to say that it is not impossible to walk or to be, and that he who already walks and acts is able to walk. So, therefore, it is not true to say that the passible is [said] of the necessary without qualification, but the other is true. Wherefore, insofar as the universal follows, that which is from necessity is followed by being able to be, but not altogether.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":209,"ref":"p209","source":"Possibilitalis breviter divisio facienda est, possibile enim duobus dicitur modis. Est enim unum possibile quod cum non sit, esse possit, ut homo cum sedet, non quidem ambulat, sed ambulare polesl. Aliud possibile est quod cum sit, esse possibile est, ut quoniam ignis calet, potest esse calidus, et quoniam homo sedet, potest sedere. Hujus autem posstbilis duae sunt species, una cum est quidem, potest tamen non esse, ut si quis sedeat, ita quidem potest sed ere, ut possit etiam non sddere. Alia vero ut cum sit, non esse non possit, ut ignis calidus est, sed non potest esse non calidus. Atque hoc est quod ait,quædam vero potestates aequivoce sunt. Possibile enim non simpliciter dicUur, sed hoc quidem quoniam verum est, ut in actu, id est quod ost et fil, quod dicitur esse possibile, ut in actu possibile est ambulare, quoniam jam ambulat, et est in actu et omnino possibile est esse quidquid in actu est. Illud vero quod forsitau aget,ut possibile est ambulare quoniam ambulabil,id est quod non est quidem, sed esse poterit ut possibile est ambulare, non quoniam DUnC quidem ambulat, sed quoniam ambulaturus esl aliquis, lWc autem suut quaecunque non secundum actum dicuntur,sed secaudum potestatem tantum, quæ nondum quidem in actu sit, esse tamen possit. Haec quidem in solis mobilibus est possibilitas, illa vero et in immobilihus.","english":"A brief division of possibility must be made, for \"possible\" is said in two ways. For one kind of possible is that which, though it is not, can be, as when a man is sitting, he is indeed not walking, but he can walk. Another possible is that which, though it is, can be, as because fire is hot, it can be hot, and because a man is sitting, he can sit. But of this possible there are two species: one when a thing indeed is, yet can not be, as if someone is sitting, he can indeed sit in such a way that he can also not sit. The other, however, is when a thing is, and cannot not be, as fire is hot, but cannot be not hot. And this is what he says, that certain powers are equivocal. For \"possible\" is not said simply, but this one indeed because it is true, as in act, that is, what is and is done, which is said to be possible, as in act it is possible to walk, because he is already walking, and it is in act, and absolutely whatever is in act is possible to be. But that which perhaps will act, as it is possible to walk because he is walkable, that is, what indeed is not, but will be able to be, as it is possible to walk, not because he is now walking, but because someone is going to walk—these, however, are whatever things are said not according to act, but according to power only, which is not yet indeed in act, but can be. This possibility is in movable things alone, but that one also in immovable things.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":210,"ref":"p210","source":"Mobilia vocat fJuæcunque sunt naturalia, et in generatione et in corruptione.Quæcunque enim generata sunt et corrumpi possunl, ea semper in motu sunt, ipsa etenim generatio motus quidam est, atque ipsa corruptio. Ergo in hujusmodi rebus quaecunque generata sunt atque mortalia, in his vera est illa potestas, quae non secundum actum dicitur, sed secundum id quod non esl quidem,sed esse potest. Nusquam enim evenit hujusmodi potestas nisi in his quae nascuntur et mortem oppetunt, illa vero quæ sunt immobilia, id est quae in sua natura fixa sunt et constituta, ut mutari moverique non possint, id est divina solam illam habent potentiam quae secundum actum dicitur,ut sol immobilis quidem ad subbtantiam quanquam sit mobilis secundum locum. Quoniam ergo est immobilis secundum suhstautiam et ab ea non permutatur,neque movetur,babet in selumen, quod ita habere potest, ut non habere non possit. Sed in utrisque his vel mobilibus vel immobilibus illud verum est qnod de his dicitur, non impossibile est esse. Nam et quod actu quidem non est, esse tamen poleril,ut homo cum non ambulat, ambulandi tamen retinet potestatem. Non est enim hominem imposMbile ambulare, et solem non est impossibile habere lucem, quam actu retinet sempiterno. In utrisque igitur et mobilibus et immobilibus, verum illud est quod dicitur, non impossibile esse.","english":"He calls \"mutable\" all things that are natural, both in generation and in corruption. For whatever things have been generated and can be corrupted are always in motion, since generation itself is a kind of motion, and so is corruption itself. Therefore in things of this sort—whatever have been generated and are mortal—that potentiality is true which is spoken of not according to act, but according to what indeed is not, yet can be. For a potentiality of this sort never occurs except in those things which are born and meet death. But those things which are immovable, that is, which are fixed and established in their own nature so that they cannot be changed or moved—that is, divine things—have only that power which is spoken of according to act, as the sun is indeed immovable in respect of substance, although it is movable in respect of place. Since, therefore, it is immovable in respect of substance and is not changed from it nor moved, it has light in itself, which it can possess in such a way that it cannot not possess it. But in both these cases, whether in movable or in immovable things, that which is said of them is true: it is not impossible for them to be. For even what is not in act can nevertheless be, as when a man is not walking, he nonetheless retains the power of walking. For it is not impossible for a man to walk, and it is not impossible for the sun to possess the light which it retains in act eternally. In both, therefore—both movable and immovable things—that which is said is true: it is not impossible to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":211,"ref":"p211","source":"Nam et de eo quod agit, et de eo quod agere potest, de utrisque idem vero dicitur, quoniam non est impossibile esse. Nam et quod ambulat, non est impossibile ambulare, et quod est ambulabile, id est qnod ambulare potest, non illi est impossibile ambulare.Sed quoniam diximus eam quae secundum aclum est potestatem duas habere species,unam quidem cum in actu quidem sit et nunquam possit non esse, ut igni actu est calere et nunquam esse non potest. calidus; aliam vero secundum id quod dicimus esse quidem actu, posse tamen non esse, ut aliquis cum sedet,polest quidem sedere, sed potest eliam non sedere. Hujusmodi quidem secundum actum possibile de necessario nullo modo prædicatur, quod enim in actu est, et neces. sarium est esse, est quidem, sed ita est ut non esse non possit. Hoc est enim quod ait. Sic igitur possibile, id est quod cum aclu sit, possit tamen non esse, non est verum de necessario simpliciter dicere, Alterum autem verum est, nam quodita est actu, ut non esse non possit, et semper actu est, hoc juste de necessario prædicatur. Quod enim necesse est esse, est quidem, sed non esse non potest. Quare quoniam partem id quod est universale sequitur, illud quod ex necessitate est, consequens est id quod est posse esse, sed non omnino. Quoniam semper, inquit, speciem sequitur gelJus, et partem suam sequitur universalitas.","english":"For both concerning that which acts and concerning that which can act, the same thing is said truly of both, namely that it is not impossible for it to be. For both what walks—it is not impossible for it to walk—and what is walkable, that is, what can walk, it is not impossible for that to walk. But since we have said that the potency according to act has two species: one, indeed, when it is in act and can never not be, as it is in act for fire to be hot and it can never not be hot; the other, however, according to what we say is indeed in act, yet can not be, as when someone sits, he can indeed sit, but he can also not sit. The possible of this kind according to act is in no way predicated of the necessary. For what is in act and is necessary to be, is indeed, but it is in such a way that it cannot not be. For this is what he says. Thus, therefore, the possible, that is, what, when it is in act, can nevertheless not be, it is not true to say simply of the necessary. The other, however, is true, for what is so in act that it cannot not be, and is always in act, this is rightly predicated of the necessary. For what is necessary to be, is indeed, but cannot not be. Wherefore, since the part follows what is universal, that which is from necessity—the consequence is that which is able to be, but not altogether. For always, he says, the genus follows the species, and universality follows its part.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":212,"ref":"p212","source":"Si enim homo est, animal est, id est si pars ei species est, universalitatem et genus esse necesse est. Quod si ita est, sequitur scilicet eum propositionem quae dicit necesse esse, illa propositio quae dicit possibile esse, eique consentit, sed non omnis significatio possibiliLalis sequitur necessarium.Illa enim quæ ita possunt, ut non sint quidem, esse tamen possint., nulla raone enecessario prædicantur. Necessarium vero non modo necesse est, sed etiam est, hoc est enim quod ait, sed non omnino. Etenim de necessario quod jam est, non potest illud possibile prædicari,quod non est adhuc quidem, sed esse poterit.\n\nEt est quidem fortasse principium quod necessarium est et quod non necessarium est omnium, vel esse vet non esse. Et alia ut horum consequentia considerare oportet.\n\nPrincipium, inquH, esL fortasse harum propositionum consequentias inveniendi. Si quis primo in loco necessarium ponat,el non necessarium,secundo vero in loco possibile esse et caetera, naturaliter enim id quod necessarium est prius est, nam si necessaria sunt ea quæ semper actu sun, quæ autem semper acu sun sempneraa, rerum omnium principia sunt, recte initium quoque speculandi, quae barum propositionum consequentia sit, ex his sumemus quae sunt necessariae, et propter has ex necessarii negationibus, id est ex non necessaria.","english":"For if a man is, he is an animal, that is, if a species is a part of him, it is necessary that there be universality and genus. But if this is so, it follows, of course, that the proposition which says \"it is necessary to be\" agrees with that proposition which says \"it is possible to be,\" and the latter consents to the former; but not every signification of \"possible\" follows upon \"necessary.\" For those things which can be in such a way that they are not indeed, yet are able to be, are predicated of the necessary on no account. But the necessary is not only necessary but also is—this is what he says—but not wholly. For concerning the necessary which already is, that possible cannot be predicated which is not yet indeed, but will be able to be.\n\nAnd perhaps the principle of all things, both of being and of not being, is what is necessary and what is not necessary. And other consequentia of these ought to be considered.\n\nThe principle, he says, perhaps of discovering the consequentia of these propositions. If someone places in the first place the necessary and the not necessary, but in the second place \"it is possible to be\" and the rest—for naturally that which is necessary is prior, for if those things are necessary which are always in act, but those things which are always in act are eternal, they are the principles of all things—rightly we shall take the beginning also of speculating what the consequentia of these propositions is from those things which are necessary, and on account of these from the negations of the necessary, that is, from the not necessary.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":213,"ref":"p213","source":"Constat igitur a necessario et non necessario harum consequentias inveniendi sumeuda esse principia. Illae enim, id est possibile esse et contingens esse, et esse necessarium et non necessarium, velut in natura ipsa praecedentes subsequuntur. Atque ideo ait.: Et alia, id esl possibile esse,el contingens esse,ul horum cOilsequenlia considerare oporlet.Hoc est, ita bæ considerari debent, tanquam si quod cst necessarium, et non necessarium praecedant, consequantur vero possibile et contingens, et caera.\n\nManifestum est autem ex his qua? dieta sunt, quoniam quod ex necessitate est, seeundum actum est. Quare si priora sunt sempiterna, et quæ actu sunt, potestate priora sunt; et hæc quæ sine potestate sunt, actu suut, ut prima? substantiæ. Alia vero sunt actu cum possibilitate, quæ natura quidem priora sunt, tempore vero posteriora, alia uero nunquam sunt actu, sed potestate tantum.","english":"It is established, therefore, that the principles for discovering the consequences of these—the necessary and the non-necessary—must be taken as starting points. For those, namely \"possible to be\" and \"contingent to be,\" and \"necessary to be\" and \"not necessary,\" follow as subsequent in the manner of things that precede in nature itself. And therefore he says: \"And the others, that is, possible to be and contingent to be, one ought to consider their consequence.\" That is, these ought to be considered as if whatever is necessary and not necessary precede, while possible and contingent and the rest follow.\n\nIt is clear, moreover, from what has been said that what exists by necessity exists according to act. Wherefore, if eternal things are prior, and things that exist in act are prior in potency, these also that are without potency exist in act, as the first substances. But others exist in act with possibility, which are prior in nature indeed but posterior in time; while others never exist in act, but only in potency.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":214,"ref":"p214","source":"Palel, inquit, ac liquet omnia quaecunque secundum necessitatem sunt, semper esse secundum actum. Quoniam enim ignis ex uecessitaLe calidus est,actu quoque semper calidus est. Quocirca si quae sempiterna sunt omnibus quæ non sunt sempiterna priora sunt,eliam ea quae semper aclu sunt, his quæ sunt potestate priora sunt. Horum autem omnium divisionem facit: sunt enim,inquil,alia quidem praeter potestatem, actu tantum, ut sol non potestate movetur, sed acLu, et illam movendi poteslalem non babel, quae non est quidem, sed esse potest, sed actum habet solum, a potestate vero quae praeter actum solet esse, relinquitur. Primae etiam substantiae actu quidem sont, nunquam vero po. testate, primas autem substantias dicit, divinas scilicet et sempiternas, non eas quas in praedicamentis primas esse monstravit, id est individuas. Tunc enim de his loquebatur primis, qua? nobis primae sunt, nunc de his quænatura sunt primæuxdivinae sunt scilicet et sempilernæ. Alia vero, ait,sunt quae sunt actu cum potestate, id est quae et actum habent, et aliquando habuerunt potestatem, ut fabricala jam domus, aliquando potuit fabricari, et prius habuit potestatem secundum tempus, postea vero actum; sed natura actus prior est potestate. Ars vero ipsa actum cogitatione praecipit, formamque domus prius sibi ipsa designat et efticit: quare natura actus prior est potestate, potestas actu prior est tempore.","english":"He says, \"It is clear and evident that all things whatsoever which exist according to necessity are always in actuality. For since fire is hot by necessity, it is also always actually hot. Wherefore if those things which are eternal are prior to all things which are not eternal, then also those things which are always in actuality are prior to those which are in potentiality. But he makes a division of all these: for, he says, some things exist apart from potentiality, in actuality alone, as the sun is not moved in potentiality but in actuality, and does not possess that potentiality of moving which is not indeed but can be, but has only actuality, and is left without the potentiality which is accustomed to exist apart from actuality. Also the primary substances are in actuality indeed, but never in potentiality. But he calls primary substances the divine, namely, and eternal ones, not those which he showed to be primary in the Categories, that is, individuals. For then he was speaking of those things which are primary for us; now he speaks of those which are primary by nature, namely the divine and eternal. But others, he says, are those which exist in actuality together with potentiality, that is, which both have actuality and at some time had potentiality, as a house already built could at some time be built, and first had potentiality according to time, but afterward actuality; but by nature actuality is prior to potentiality. But art itself anticipates the actuality by thought, and first designates and produces for itself the form of the house: wherefore by nature actuality is prior to potentiality, but potentiality is prior to actuality in time.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":215,"ref":"p215","source":"Alia vero sun!, inquit, quæ aclu quidem nunquam sunt, semper autem sunt potestate, ut numerus infinitus quidem est, quod cum semper in infinitum possis augere, sed actu infinitus non est, Quemcunque enim numerum sumpseris,actu finilu3 est; quemlibet enim dicas numerum, finita illum numerositas necesse esl complectatur, ut decem vel centum. Infinitus vero idcirco est potestate, quod eum possis facere in infinitum concrescere, non lamen ut quilibet actu sil nnmerus infinitus.\n\nQUÆ MAGIS APTÆ ENUNTIATIONES CONTRARIÆ DICANTUR.\n\nUtrum autem contraria est affirmatio negationi,an * atfirmatio atfirmationi, et oratio, ut quæ dicit omnis, homo iustus est, ei quæ ast, nullus homo justus est, an omnis homo justus est, ei quæ est,omnis homo injustus est, ut CaLlias iustus est, Callias justus non est, Callias injustus est. Quænam harum contraria est. Nam si ea qua sunt in uoce sequuntur ea quæ sunt in anima, itlic autem contraria est opinio contrarii, ut omnis homo justus est, ei quæ est, omnis homo injustus est, etiam squæ sunt voce affirmationibus, necesse est similiter esse habere. Quod si neque illic contrarii opinatio contraria est, nec affirmulio affirmationi contraria erit, sed ea que dicta est, negatio. Quare considerandum est quæ opinio falsa opinioni veræ contraria sit, utrum negationis, an certe ea quæ contrarium esse opinatur.","english":"Other things, he says, are never in actuality but are always in potentiality, as an infinite number: for while you can always increase it toward infinity, it is not infinite in actuality. For whatever number you take, it is finite in actuality; for whatever number you name, its quantity must be comprehended as finite, such as ten or a hundred. It is therefore infinite in potentiality because you can make it grow without limit, yet not so that any number is infinite in actuality.\n\nWHICH STATEMENTS ARE MORE PROPERLY CALLED CONTRARIES.\n\nBut whether the contrary of an affirmation is a negation, or an affirmation is contrary to an affirmation, and a statement—such as the one that says \"every man is just\"—is contrary to the one that says \"no man is just,\" or \"every man is just\" is contrary to \"every man is unjust\"; as \"Callias is just,\" \"Callias is not just,\" \"Callias is unjust.\" Which of these is the contrary? For if the things that are in the voice follow the things that are in the soul, and there the opinion of a contrary is contrary to the opinion of its contrary—as \"every man is just\" is contrary to \"every man is unjust\"—then the affirmations that are in the voice must likewise be related in the same way. But if neither is the opinion of a contrary contrary to the contrary opinion, nor will an affirmation be contrary to an affirmation, but rather the negation that has been mentioned. Wherefore it must be considered which false opinion is contrary to a true opinion: whether that of the negation, or certainly that which opines the contrary.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":216,"ref":"p216","source":"Dico autern hoc modo, est quædam opinalio vera boni, quoniam bonum est. Alia vero falsa, quoniam bonum non est, alia quoniam malum est, quænam harum contraria est veræ, et si est una, secundum quam contraria.\n\nPropositio quidem quaestionis talis est.Quærit enim quoniam huic propositioni quæ dicit, omnis homo justus eSl,ea quae proponit, nullus horno justus est, et rursus ea quae dicit,omnis homo injuslusesL,videntur oppositæ, quae harum mais superiori affirmalioni, qua: dicit, omnis bomo justus est, conlraria est, utrum ea per quam proponimus, omnis homo injustus est, an certe negatio universalis, ea quae es), nullus homo justus est. Similiter etiam huic propositioni quae est, Callias justus eSI, propositio quæ proponit, Callias injustus est, an ea quae dicit, Callias juslus non est, contraria est. De quare hanc viam disputationis ingreditur: nam si ea, inquit., qua; sunt in voce illis quae sunt in anima famulantur, hisque in significatione consentiunt, necesse est ut quod in opinionibus animæ reperitur, hoc idem evenire videatur in voce, quod si illic ei opinioni quae arbitratur omnem hominem justum esse illa opinio opposita est, et illa est maxime contraria quae putat omnem hominem injustum esse, et in vocibus quoquo affirmatio ea quae est, omnis homo justus est., ei affirmationi magis contraria est qua: dixit, omnis bomo injuslus est.","english":"I say this in the following way: there is a certain true opinion of the good, that it is good; another false, that the good is not; another, that it is evil. Which of these is contrary to the true one, and if there is one, according to which it is contrary?\n\nThe question is posed as follows. For he asks whether, to this proposition which says \"every man is just,\" the proposition which states \"no man is just,\" and again the one which says \"every man is unjust,\" seem to be opposed; and which of these is contrary to the superior affirmation which says \"every man is just\"—whether it is the one by which we propose \"every man is unjust,\" or certainly the universal negation, the one which is \"no man is just.\" Similarly also to this proposition which is \"Callias is just,\" whether the proposition which proposes \"Callias is unjust\" is contrary, or the one which says \"Callias is not just.\" Concerning this he enters upon the following path of disputation: for if, he says, the things which are in the voice are servants of those which are in the soul, and agree with them in signification, it is necessary that what is found in the opinions of the soul should appear to happen the same in the voice. But if there that opinion which judges every man to be just is opposed to that opinion, and that one is most contrary which thinks every man to be unjust, then also in voices the affirmation which is \"every man is just\" is more contrary to that affirmation which said \"every man is unjust.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":217,"ref":"p217","source":"Quod si in opinionibus non hæc magis opponitur potius quam illa quæ dicil, nullus bomo justus est, et in vocibus quoque a(firmalio universalis videatur esse contraria, utraeque ergo et affirmatio quas dicit, omnis homo injustus est, et negatio quae dicit, nullus bomo justus est, erunt contrariae ei quae dicit, omnis bomo justus est. Quod autem dicit, quod si neque illic contrarii opinatio contraria est. Tale est enim justum esse et injustum esse, quanquam sit se. cundum habitum et privationem, praedicatio tamen hæc nunc, id est injustum csse, pro contrario sumitur. Ergo si in opinionibus contrarii, id est injusti affirmatio contraria non est, non erit et in vocibus conlraria affirmatio, sed potius negatio quae est, nullus homo justus est. Quare, inquit, considerandum est cui opinioni falsa? opinio vera sit contraria, nam si qua res bona sit,verum est de ea dicere, quoniam bonum est, contra quam propositionem falsum est dicere, quia malum est,falsum eliam quia non bonum est. Ped videndum est quæ harum sit magis contraria verae affirmationi, quae dicit bonum esse quod bonum est; utrum falsa illa contraria est,quæ id quod bonum est dicit esse malum, an ea quæ id quod bonum est dicit esse non bonum. Atque hoc est quod ait, dico autem boc modo: est quaedam opinatio vera boni, quoniam bonum est., alia vero falsa, quoniam non bonum est, alia vero, quoniam malum est.","english":"But if in opinions this one is not more opposed than that one which says, no man is just, and in words too the universal affirmation seems to be contrary, then both the affirmation which says, every man is unjust, and the negation which says, no man is just, will be contrary to that which says, every man is just. But as for what he says, that if neither there is the contrary opinion, the contrary opinion is not contrary. For such is to be just and to be unjust, although it is according to habit and privation, yet this predication now, that is, to be unjust, is taken as the contrary. Therefore if in opinions the affirmation of the contrary, that is, of the unjust, is not contrary, neither will the affirmation in words be contrary, but rather the negation which is, no man is just. Wherefore, he says, it must be considered to which opinion the false opinion is contrary to the true one; for if some thing is good, it is true to say of it that it is good, against which proposition it is false to say that it is evil, and false also that it is not good. But it must be seen which of these is more contrary to the true affirmation which says that what is good is good; whether that false one is contrary which says that what is good is evil, or that which says that what is good is not good. And this is what he says, I speak in this way: there is a certain true opinion of the good, that it is good, another false, that it is not good, another, that it is evil.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":218,"ref":"p218","source":"Quænamergo harumeoutraria est verae, id est. utrum ea quae negat id quod esl, an ea quae ponitid quod non est, quae magis harurn ei quae dicit esse, id quod est videalur esse cOnlraria, requirendum est. Sed quod his adjecit et si est una, secundum quam contraria, tale est. Contrariorum alia sunt habentia medium, alia vero sunt non habenlia. Et illorum quae habent, si quis unum contrarium neget, non necesse est per illam negationem illud aliud contrarium inlelligere. Nam quoniam interalbum el nigrum est aIiquid,si quis dicat, non est album, non idcirco nigrum esse monstravit. Potest enim esse et rubrum. Et quidquid aliud in talium contrariorum mediLate localum est. In illis vero conlrariis quae medio carent, nihil differt nej gare rem propositam, an affirmare contrariam. Nihil enim differt dicere diem non esse quam dicere noctem esse. Hoc est enim diem non esse, qnod esse noctem. Nihil anim est inter noctem atque diem. Ergo in his affirmatio contrarii idem valet, quod rei propositae negatio; ergo nunc boc dicit: etiamsi in aliquibus, inquit, tales propositiones inveniuntur, ut et negatio rei propositæ, et. affirmatio contrarii idem valeat, et sint unæ significatione. Quærendum est secundum quam enuntiationem propositio magis est contraria, an secundum eam quæ dicit non esse diem, an secundum eam quae proponit esse noctem.","english":"Which of these, then, is contrary to the true one—that is, whether the one which denies what is, or the one which affirms what is not—and which of these seems more contrary to the one that says that what is, is—this must be asked. But what he added, \"and if it is one, according to which it is contrary,\" is of this sort. Of contraries, some have a middle, others do not have one. And of those which have a middle, if someone denies one contrary, it is not necessary through that negation to understand the other contrary. For since there is something between white and black, if someone says, it is not white, he has not for that reason shown it to be black. For it can also be red, and whatever else is situated in the middle of contraries of this kind. But in those contraries which lack a middle, it makes no difference to deny the proposed thing or to affirm the contrary. For it makes no difference to say that it is not day and to say that it is night. For this is \"it is not day,\" namely \"it is night.\" For there is nothing between night and day. Therefore in these, the affirmation of the contrary has the same force as the negation of the proposed thing; therefore now he says this: even if in some cases, he says, such propositions are found that both the negation of the proposed thing and the affirmation of the contrary have the same force, and are one in signification, it must be asked according to which enunciation the proposition is more contrary—whether according to that which says \"it is not day,\" or according to that which proposes \"it is night.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":219,"ref":"p219","source":"Investigandum igitur est quae harum, quanquam unum utraque significet, mais est contraria ei qua; dicit esse diem; boc est enim quod ait. Et si est una secundum quam contraria, id est, et si unum significabunt aliquando rei negatio et contrarii affirmatio, secundum quam barum magis est contraria propositio superiori propositae enuntiationi.\n\nNam arbitrari contrarias opinwnes definiri in eo quod contrariorum sunt, falsum est. Boni enim quoniam bonum est, et mali quoniam malum est, eadem fortasse opinio est et vera, sive plures, siue una sit. Sunt autem ista contraria, sed non in eo quod contrariorum sunt contraria, sed magis in eo quod con trarie.\n\nContrariorum naturam prius recte determinat, qui de contrariis proposilionibus tracta. Quidam enim putaverunt contrarias es;e opiniones, quæ sint contrariarum rerum, quod Arisloleles negat: I dicitenim falsem esse definitionem, quæ determinat eas esse contrarias opiniones, quae sunt contrariarum rerum. Nam cum sit contrarium bonum malo, possumus habere opinionem de bono quoniam bonum est, et haec vera est; possumus rursus id quod malum est putare malum, et haec rursus vera est, et opiniones quidem boni, quoniam bonum est, et mali quoniam malum est, contrariarum rerum sunt; lamen ulræque sunt vera?. Sed contrariæ utræque veræ esse non possunt. Falso igilur definitum est eas esse contrarias opiniones, qua? contrariarum sint rerum.","english":"It must therefore be investigated which of these, although each signifies one thing, is contrary to the one which says that it is day—for this is what it says. And if there is one according to which it is contrary—that is, if the negation of a thing and the affirmation of its contrary will sometimes signify one thing—according to which of these is the proposition more contrary to the proposition previously stated.\n\nFor to think that contrary opinions are defined by the fact that they concern contraries is false. For the opinion that good is good, and the opinion that evil is evil, is perhaps the same opinion and true, whether there are several or one. These things are indeed contraries, but they are not contrary in that they concern contraries, but rather in that they are contrarily disposed.\n\nHe rightly determines the nature of contraries first, who treats of contrary propositions. For some have thought that those opinions are contrary which concern contrary things, which Aristotle denies; for he says that the definition is false which determines those opinions to be contrary which concern contrary things. For since good is contrary to evil, we can have an opinion about good, that it is good, and this is true; we can again think that what is evil is evil, and this again is true; and the opinions of good, that it is good, and of evil, that it is evil, concern contrary things; yet both are true. But both cannot be true as contraries. Therefore it has been falsely defined that those opinions are contrary which concern contrary things.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":220,"ref":"p220","source":"Quod autem ait, boni enim quoniam bonum est, et mali quoniam malum est, eadem fortasse opinio est et vera. Aut id quod dixit eadem ad id retulit quod post secuLus est, vera namque verae in eo quod verae sunt eadem sunt., aut certes quod ejusdem esset opinionis, quod bonum esset, bonum putare, quod malum esset, malum. Siveautem eadem sint, sive plures, contraria esse non poterunt, idcirco quoniam simul verae sunt. Sunt aulem ista contraria, sed non eo quod contrariorum sint conlrariæ sunl, sed magis eo quod conlrariæ. Sunt autem, inquit, isLa, scilicet quae sunt in opinionibus contra ria, non tamen conlraria quando contrariorum sunt, sed potius quando de uno eodemque diverso modo et contrariæ suspicantur, hoc est enim quod ait. Sunt autem ista contraria, ea scilicet quae in animae opinionibus posita sunt, quorum propositiones sunt contrariæ, non eo quod sunt contrariorum, sed potius eo quod de uno eodemque subjecto contrariae suspicantur, ut si quis de bono suspicetur quoniam bonum est, et rursus alius de eodem bono quoniam malum est, bæc sunt contraria quae veræ simul esse non possunt. Et de eodemsulijecto, id est bono, nunc bene, nunc vero male, id est contrariæ suspicantur.","english":"But what he says—\"of the good, that it is good, and of the evil, that it is evil\"—is perhaps the same opinion and true. Or he referred what he said as \"the same\" to what follows: for true opinions, insofar as they are true, are the same. Or certainly he meant that it belongs to the same opinion to think the good to be good and the evil to be evil. But whether they are the same or several, they cannot be contrary, for the reason that they are true at the same time. But these things are contrary—not because they are of contraries are they contrary, but rather because they are contrary. But these things, he says—namely, the things that are contrary in opinions—are not contrary when they are of contraries, but rather when concerning one and the same thing they opine in a different and contrary way; for this is what he says. But these things are contrary—namely, those things that are placed in the opinions of the soul, whose propositions are contrary—not because they are of contraries, but rather because concerning one and the same subject they opine contraries; as if someone should opine concerning the good that it is good, and again another concerning the same good that it is evil—these are contrary things, which cannot be true at the same time. And concerning the same subject, that is, the good, now well, now truly ill—that is, they opine contraries.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":221,"ref":"p221","source":"Si ergo boni, quoniam bonum est, opinalio est, alia vero, quoniam non est bonum. Est vero et alia quoniam aliud aliquid est, quod non est, neque potest esse. Aliarum quidem nulla ponenda est, neque quæcunque esse quod non est opinantur, neque quæcunque non esse quod est. (Infinitæ enim utræque sunt, et quæ esse opinantur quod non est, et qllæ non esse quod est) sed in quibus fallacia est. Hæc autem sunt, ex quibus sunt generationes, e.v oppositis vero sunt generationes. Quare eliam fallaciæ.\n\nHujus argumenti principium est, quo pro confesso utitur et probato, quod unius rei plura alque inlinita non possint esse contraria, quare unius rei unum erit contrarium. Eat ergo opinio boni quoniam bonum est, et hæc vera est; est rursus boni quoniam bonum non es), et haec falsa est. Potest etiam esse quæ putet, esso bonum id quod non est, ut si quis dicat id quod est bonum quoniam malum est, vel quoniam quantitas est, vel quoniam aliquid quod non esi. Sed hæc quae de bono dici possunt, quæ ipsum bonum nOnlsinl, infinita sunt. Rursus possumus de bono arbilrari mulla non esse, quae sunt. Bonum enim quod honestum est possumus dicere quonam honestum non est, possumus icere quoniam utile non est, possumus quoque dicere quoniam expetendum non eSI, cLalia plura. Infinita ergo sunt et ea quæ possumus arbitrari de bono, quoniam est id quod bonum ipsum non est.","english":"If, therefore, there is an opinion of the good, that it is good, and another, that it is not good. But there is also another, that it is something else, which is not, nor can be. Of the others, indeed, none is to be posited—neither those which opine that what is not is, nor those which opine that what is is not. (For both are infinite: both those which opine that what is not is, and those which opine that what is is not)—but those in which there is fallacy. And these are the things from which generations come; but generations come from opposites. Wherefore also fallacies.\n\nThe principle of this argument is what he uses as conceded and proved: that of one thing there cannot be many and infinite contraries; wherefore of one thing there will be one contrary. Let there be, then, an opinion of the good, that it is good, and this is true; there is again an opinion of the good, that it is not good, and this is false. There can also be one which thinks that to be good which is not, as if someone should say that what is good is evil, or that it is quantity, or that it is something which is not. But these things which can be said of the good, which do not belong to the good itself, are infinite. Again, we can judge many things not to be of the good, which are. For the good, which is the honorable, we can say that it is not honorable; we can say that it is not useful; we can also say that it is not to be sought, and many other things. Infinite, therefore, are both those things which we can judge of the good, that it is what the good itself is not.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":222,"ref":"p222","source":"Et eaquæ opinamur non esse bonum quod est, ea quoque sunt infi. nila. Quare nec ea quæ putat opinio bonum esse quod non est, nec ea quæ putat non esse quod est, ei opinioni ponenda est esse contra ria, qua? putat bonum esse quod bonum est. Hoc enim est quod ait: Aliarum quidem nulla ponenda est, neque quæcunque esse quod uon est opinatur, ut dicamus de bono quoniam malum est, vel inutile, vel turpe, neque quæcunqne non esse quod est, ut si de eodem bono dicamus, bonum expetendum non est, bonum bonestum non est. Infinitae enim ulræqne sunt, et quæ esse opinantur quod non est, et quæ non esse quod est. Hae igitur rejiciendæ sunt, et ad nullam contrarii opinionum sumendæ, quoniam infinilæ sunt,cum semper contrariorum oppositio sit tlnita. Quaecunque autem contrariae ponendae sint opiniones, sequitur dicens: Sed in quibus est fallacia, hae autem sunt ex his ex quibus sunt et gencraliones. Ex oppositis vero generationes, quare eliam fallacia opinioni, inquit, de bono quoniam bonum est, contraria illa sola ponenda est, in qua primum fallacia reperitur. In qua autem fallacia primum reperiatur, ostendit per id quod dixit: Ex quibus sunt. et generationes fallacia facillime reperitur. Generatio enim semper ex oppositis est; quoties enim aliquid fit album, non fit ex dulci, nec ex duro, nec ex liquido, sed ex non albo.","english":"And those things which we opine not to be good, when they are, are also unlimited. Wherefore neither those things which opinion thinks to be good when they are not, nor those which it thinks not to be when they are, are to be posited as contrary to that opinion which thinks the good to be good. For this is what he says: Of the others, indeed, none is to be posited, neither whatever it opines to be what is not—so that we should say of the good that it is evil, or useless, or base—nor whatever [it opines] not to be what is, as if we should say of the same good that the good is not to be sought, that the good is not honorable. For both are unlimited: both those which opine to be what is not, and those which [opine] not to be what is. These, therefore, are to be rejected, and are to be taken as contrary to no opinion, since they are unlimited, whereas the opposition of contraries is always limited. But whatever opinions are to be posited as contrary, he then adds, saying: But in those in which there is fallacy, these are from those from which also generations [arise]. But generations are from opposites; wherefore, he says, the fallacy of the opinion about the good, that it is good, has only that one posited as contrary in which the fallacy is first found. But in what the fallacy is first found he shows through what he said: from those from which they are, and generations of fallacy are most easily found. For generation is always from opposites; for as often as something becomes white, it does not become so from sweet, nor from hard, nor from liquid, but from not-white.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":223,"ref":"p223","source":"Et quod dulce tit, non fit ex calido, neque frigido, nec nigro, nec ex ulla alla alia qualitate, nisi ex sibi opposito, id est non dulci. Eodemque modo in aliis sese res habet. Omnis ergo generatio ex eo fil quod non fuit, ut duice ex non dulci, album ex non albo, calidum ex non calido. Quare si generationes quidem ex oppositis sunt, in his autem est fallacia in quibus sunt generationes, erit in oppositis prima fallacia. Prima namque fallacia est nou putare aliquid esse quod est. Secunda putare esse quod noa est, ut in eo quod est bonum prima fallacia est putare illud non esse bonum. Secunda malum esse arbit.rari quod bonum est. Quocirca illic maxime ponenda est contrarietas ubi est prima fallacia, in bis autem est prima fallacia ex quibus generationes oriuntur. Generationes vero dico esse quae fiunt ex his qua? id fiunt non fuerunt. Generationes autem fiunt ex oppositis, in oppositis est igitur prima fallacia; sed in quibus est prima fallacia, maxime conlraria ilia ponenda sunt: opposita igitur maxime contraria sunt, sed bonum esse et bonum non esse opposita sunt. Bonum igitur non esse ei quod est bonum esse contrarium est, non illud quod est malum esse, quod majori argumentatione confirmat.","english":"And what is sweet does not come to be from hot, nor from cold, nor from black, nor from any other quality, except from its opposite, that is, from not-sweet. And in the same way matters stand in other cases. Every generation, therefore, is from that which was not, as sweet from not-sweet, white from not-white, hot from not-hot. Wherefore, if generations are indeed from opposites, and the fallacy lies in those things in which there are generations, the first fallacy will be in opposites. For the first fallacy is to think that something is not which is. The second is to think that to be which is not, as in the case of what is good the first fallacy is to think that it is not good. The second is to judge that what is good is evil. Wherefore contrariety must be posited most of all there where the first fallacy is; and the first fallacy is in those things from which generations arise. But I say that generations are those which come to be from those things which, when they come to be, were not. But generations come to be from opposites; therefore the first fallacy is in opposites. But in those things in which the first fallacy is, those things must be posited as most contrary. Therefore opposites are most contrary. But to be good and not to be good are opposites. Therefore not to be good is contrary to that which is to be good, not that which is to be evil, which he confirms by a greater argument.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":224,"ref":"p224","source":"Si ergo quod bonum est, et bonum et non malum est, el hoc quidem secundum se, illud vero secundum accidens. Accidit enim ei malum non esse, magis autem in unoqlloque vera est, quæ secundum se ext, et falsa, siquidem et vera,ergo ea quæ est, quoniam aion est bonum quod bonum est, secundum se falsa est. Illa vero quæ est, quoniam malum, est ejus quæ est secundum accidens. Quare magis erit falsa de bono ea quæ est negationis opinio, quam ea quæ est contrarii.\n\nPersubtilis argumentatio tati ratione formata est: bonum, inquit, et bonum est, et non malum, quorum unum secundum se et proxime, et naturaliter est, hoc scilicet quod bonum eht, alterum vero est accidenlaliter, id est quod malum non est. Accidit enim ei quod bonum est, ut malum non sit; ergo quod bonum est naluraJius habet bonum esse quam non esse maJum.illud enim secundum se inest, illud (Ul dictum est) secundum accidens. Quod si boc eat, verior est ea propositio quae affirmat quod secundum se est quam illa quæ affirmat quod secundum accidens est. Est aulem secundum se bonum esse quod bonum est, secundum accidens vero malum non esse quod bonum est: verius igitur et propinquius est dicere de bono quoniam bonum est, quam dicere de bono quoniam malum non est; quod si hoc est, etiam opinio qua? secundum se falsa est mendacior juste videbitur ea quae secundum accidens mentitur.","english":"If, then, what is good is both good and not evil, and this indeed is so according to itself, but that according to accident—for it happens to it that it is not evil—yet in each case the statement that is according to itself is more true, and the one that is not is false. Therefore the statement that what is good is good, since it is good, is false according to itself. But the statement that it is not evil is of the kind that is according to accident. Wherefore the opinion of the negation concerning the good will be more false than the opinion of the contrary.\n\nThis most subtle argument is formed by the following reasoning: the good, he says, is both good and not evil, of which one is according to itself and immediately and naturally—namely, that it is good—while the other is accidental, namely, that it is not evil. For it happens to what is good that it is not evil; therefore what is good has more naturally that it is good than that it is not evil. For the former is present according to itself, the latter, as has been said, according to accident. But if this is so, that proposition which affirms what is according to itself is more true than that which affirms what is according to accident. Now it is according to itself that what is good is good, but according to accident that what is good is not evil. More truly, therefore, and more closely does one say of the good that it is good than say of the good that it is not evil. But if this is so, then also the opinion which is false according to itself will rightly be seen to be more mendacious than the one which lies according to accident.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":225,"ref":"p225","source":"Nam si illa vera est, propinqnius quae secundum se est, illa erit falsa propinquius quae secundum se est. Hoc est enim quod ait, magis au!em in unoquoque est vera, quae secundum se est etiam falsa, sicut et vera, si illa Wagis vera est quae secundum se est, recte a magis falsadictur, quae secundum se falsa est, id est quæ id negat quod secundum se verum est. Ergo ea quae est quoniam non est bonum quod bonum est, secundumse consislenLis falsa est. Ad quod tendit tota superior argumentatio conHnua disputatione subnectit. Superius euim diclum est opinionem eam quae putat bonum esse, quod bonum est, secundum se esse vquare ilia opinio quae dicit non esse bonum quod bonum est, falsa est, et de ea rcfalsa est, qua? secundum se vera est. Secundum se enim vera est opinio quae putat bonum esse quod bonum est, quae vero arbitratur non esse bonum quod bonum est, ejus quae secundum se est, veritatem opinionis intercipit.. Nam bonum esse quod bonum est, quisquis opinatur secundum ipsius boni naturam habet opinionem, atque ideo secundum se opiniones hujusmodi nominantur; quare erit hæc quoque secundum se falsa, quoniam secundum se veritatis Vldelur auferreproposilionem; idem autem bonum secundum accidens est, non malum. Et boc de bono verum est-dicere, quoniam non est malum, sed accidentaliter. Bono enim accidit non esse malum, illa vero quae putat malum esse quod bonum.","english":"For if that [statement] is true, the one that is closer—the one that is according to itself—then that one will be false which is closer, the one that is according to itself. For this is what he says: but in each thing the statement that is according to itself is more truly [true], and also [more truly] false, just as also [more truly] true. If, then, that statement is more true which is according to itself, it is rightly said to be more false which is according to itself false, that is, which denies what is true according to itself. Therefore the statement that what is good is not good, being consistent according to itself, is false. To this the whole preceding argument tends, and he adds it in continuous disputation. For it was said above that the opinion which thinks that what is good is good is according to itself; wherefore that opinion which says that what is good is not good is false, and it is false concerning that which is true according to itself. For the opinion which thinks that what is good is good is true according to itself; but the one which judges that what is good is not good cuts off the truth of the opinion that is according to itself. For whoever opines that what is good is good has his opinion according to the nature of the good itself, and therefore opinions of this kind are called according to themselves; wherefore this one too will be false according to itself, since it seems to remove the proposition of truth according to itself. But the same good is according to accident, not evil. And it is true to say this concerning the good, that it is not evil, but accidentally. For it happens to the good that it is not evil; but that [opinion] which thinks that what is good is evil.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":226,"ref":"p226","source":"est, aufert non malum ab eo quod bonum est, et interimit rem secundum accidens veram, vera namque est opinio quæ dicit non esse malum quod bonum est, sed secundum accidens; quare secundum accidens falsa eril ea quae dicit malum esse quod bonum est. Illam enim propositionem tollit quae secundum accidens vera est. Quare quoniam propior est ea quae secundumse est quam ea quæ secundum accidens, falsitas ejus quæ secundum se est fa)!acior erit ea falsitate quae secundum accidens est. Sed ea quae putat non esse bonum quod bonum est, secundum se veritatis peremptoria est ea, vero quae dicit malum esse quod bonum est, ejus quod est non esse malum quod bonum est, secundum accidens rei veras peremptoria est. Quare falsior est ea qua? dicit non esse bonum quod bonum est, quam ea quæ dicit esse malum id quod est bonum.\n\nFalsus autem est maxime circa singula qui habet contrariam opinionem. Contraria enim sunt eorum quæ plurimum circa idem differunt. Quod si harum contraria quidem est altera, magis uero contraria est contradictio, manifestum est quoniam hæc erit centraria.","english":"For it does not take away the evil from that which is good, and it destroys the true thing according to accident; for the opinion is true which says that what is good is not evil, but [only] according to accident. Wherefore that [opinion] will be false according to accident which says that what is good is evil. For it removes that proposition which is true according to accident. Wherefore, since the one that is according to itself is closer than the one that is according to accident, the falsity of the one that is according to itself will be more false than the falsity that is according to accident. But the one that thinks that what is good is not good is, according to itself, destructive of truth; whereas the one that says that what is good is evil is, according to accident, destructive of the truth of the thing, namely that what is good is not evil. Wherefore the one that says that what is good is not good is more false than the one that says that what is good is evil.\n\nBut he is most false concerning individual things who holds the contrary opinion. For those things are contrary which differ most concerning the same thing. But if of these the one is contrary, and the contradiction is more truly contrary, it is manifest that this will be contrary.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":227,"ref":"p227","source":"Quærebatur utrum affirmatio contrarii, an negatio propositae rei, eidem propositæ rei affirmationi magis possit esse contraria. Sed nunc hoc dicit quod quae falsa sunt magis, ea sunt magis contraria. Contraria enim sunt quæcunque circa eamdem rem plurimum differunt, ut circa colorem album et nigrum; ergo quae maxime falsa sunt et maxime vera, ea plurimum a se distant. Maxime autem vera est secundum se consistentis reienunliatio. Maxime autem falsasecundum se consistentis veritatis perempIa ria. Necesse est autem inter affirmationem contraru et negationem propositæ rei unam magis esse contrariam. Falsior autem et magis contraiia est opinio illa quae contradictionem cogitat, ut, ea quæ est non esse bonum quod bonum est, quam ea opinio quae habet malum esse quod bonum est, quoniam ea quae sunt in vocibus opiniones sequuntur; simili modo negatio ejus quae est omne bonum bonum est, ea scilicet quae dicit nullum bonum bonum est, magis est contraria quam ea quae proponit omne bonum malum est. Quocirca et in aliis quoque ut in ea quae est omnis homo justus est, magis est contraria illa qua; dicit, nullus homo justus esl, quam ea ques dicit, omnis homo injustus est.","english":"It was asked whether the affirmation of the contrary, or the negation of the proposed thing, can be more contrary to the same proposed affirmation. But now he says that those things which are more false are more contrary. For all things are contrary which differ most concerning the same thing, as concerning color, white and black; therefore those things which are most false and most true differ most from each other. But the enunciation of a thing consistent in itself is most true. But the destruction of truth consistent in itself is most false. Now it is necessary that between the affirmation of the contrary and the negation of the proposed thing, one be more contrary. But that opinion is more false and more contrary which thinks the contradiction, as, that what is good is not good, than that opinion which holds that what is good is evil, since opinions follow the things which are in words; in like manner the negation of that which is \"every good thing is good,\" namely that which says \"no good thing is good,\" is more contrary than that which proposes \"every good thing is evil.\" Wherefore also in other cases, as in that which is \"every man is just,\" that is more contrary which says \"no man is just\" than that which says \"every man is unjust.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":228,"ref":"p228","source":"llla vero quæ esi, quoniam malum est quod bonum est, implicita est. Etenim quoniam MOM bonum est, necesse est forte idem ipsum opinari.\n\nAddit ad demonstrationem superiorem argumentum quod demonst.ret magis esse contrariam eam quas negat potius quam eam quae conlrariam afiimat; implicita est, inquit, affirmatio contrarii. Quisquis enim putat id quod bonum est malum esse, fieri aliter non potest, nisi illud quoque putet non esse bonum. Quare duplex quodammodo propositio est ea quae dicit malum esse quod bonum est. Nam etiam illud in se contine!, quod bonum non est. Simplex autem est propositio, bonum esse quod bonum est, et simplici simplex potest magis esse contraria, simplexque est negatio quod bonum est, non esse bonum. Hæc igitur magis conlraria est.\n\nAmplius si etiam in aliis similiter oportet se habere, et hic videtur bene esse dictum, aut enim ubique ea quæ est contradictio, aut nusquarn, quibus uero nota est conlrarium, de lais quidem est falsa ea quæ est veræ opposita, ut qui hominem non pulat hominem, falsus est; ergo si hæ contrariæ sunt, et alia quæ sunt contradictiones.","english":"But that affirmation which says that what is good is evil is implicit. For since it is not good, one must perhaps also hold this very same thing.\n\nHe adds to the earlier demonstration an argument showing that the one which denies is more contrary than the one which affirms the contrary. The affirmation of the contrary, he says, is implicit. For whoever thinks that what is good is evil cannot do otherwise unless he also thinks that it is not good. Wherefore the proposition which says that what is good is evil is in a way twofold. For it also contains within itself that it is not good. But the proposition that what is good is good is simple, and a simple thing can be more contrary to a simple thing, and the negation that what is good is not good is simple. This one, therefore, is more contrary.\n\nMoreover, if in other cases too things must stand similarly, here also it seems to have been well said; for either everywhere the things which are contradiction, or nowhere; but in those cases where the contrary is known, concerning these the one opposed to the true one is false, as he who does not think that a man is a man is false; therefore if these are contraries, so too are the others which are contradictions.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":229,"ref":"p229","source":"Aut in omnibus, inquit, vere dicilur contradicLionem magis esse contrariam quam contrarii affirmalionem, aut nusquam. Aut enim et in aliis quoque idem evenire oporLet., aut ne hic quidem verum est., quod dicitur, contrariam esse eam quae contradictionis est, id est negationis potius quam contrarii affirmationem. Hoc autem speculemur, inquit, in his quae contrarium non habent, ut in homine. Si quis enim putet hominem hominem esse, vera esse, verum est; si quis vero hominem putet non esse hominem, falsa. Si quis autem putet hominem equum esse, nullus dixerit hanc magis esso contrariam quae putat hominem equum esse quamuxhominem non esse hominem arbitratur. Quare si in bis quæ contraria non habent, illa contraria est quae contradicMone formatur, in tis quoque quae habent contrana, non contrarii affirmationis, sed negationis propositio magis contraria est.","english":"Or, he says, in all cases it is truly said that a contradiction is more contrary than the affirmation of the contrary, or in no case. For either this same thing must also occur in other cases, or not even here is what is said true—that the one belonging to contradiction, that is, of negation, is contrary rather than the affirmation of the contrary. But let us consider this, he says, in those things which have no contrary, as in man. For if anyone thinks that man is man, it is true that it is true; but if anyone thinks that man is not man, it is false. If, however, anyone thinks that man is a horse, no one would say that this—which thinks man is a horse—is more contrary than the one which judges man not to be man. Wherefore, if in those things which have no contrary, that is contrary which is formed by contradiction, in those things also which have a contrary, the proposition of the negation, not the affirmation of the contrary, is more contrary.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":230,"ref":"p230","source":"Amplius similiter se habent bOl'ii quoniam bonum est, et non boni quoniam non bonum est. Et ad has boni quoniam non bonum est, etnon boni quoniam bonum est. Illi ergo quæ est non boni quoniam non bonum est, veræ opinationi quænam est contraria. Non enim ea quæ dicit quoniam malum est. Simul enim aliquando erunt veræ, nunquam autem vel a veræ est contra ria. Est enim quiddam non bonum, malum. Quare contingit simul esse veras. At veto nec illa quæ est, quo. nam non malum, vern enim et hæc, simul enim et hæ erunt. Relinquitur ergo ei qllæ est non bonum quoniam non bonum esl, contraria ea quæ est non bonum quoniam bonum est. Falsa enim hæc, quare et ei quæ est boni quoniam bonum est, ea quæ est boni quoniam non bonum est.\n\nEx similitudine et proportione contrarietatis vim proposilionum vestigare conatur. Sed bas prepositiones prius disponamus, post autem quantum possumus breviter vim Arislolelicæ argumentationis exsequamur.","english":"Further, the expressions \"of the good, that it is good\" and \"of the not-good, that it is not good\" are related in a similar way. And to these [are opposed] \"of the good, that it is not good\" and \"of the not-good, that it is good.\" Therefore, to that [opinion] which is \"of the not-good, that it is not good,\" which true opinion is contrary? For it is not the one which says \"that it is bad.\" For at some time they will be true at the same time, but never is a true [opinion] contrary to a true one. For there is a certain not-good thing, namely evil. Wherefore it happens that they are true at the same time. But neither is that [contrary] which is \"of the not-good, that it is not bad,\" for this too is true, and they will be [true] at the same time. It remains, therefore, that to the one which is \"of the not-good, that it is not good,\" the contrary is the one which is \"of the not-good, that it is good.\" For this is false; wherefore also to the one which is \"of the good, that it is good,\" [the contrary is] the one which is \"of the good, that it is not good.\"\n\nFrom similarity and proportion of contrariety he attempts to trace the force of the propositions. But let us first set out these propositions, and afterwards, as briefly as we can, follow out the force of Aristotle's argument.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":231,"ref":"p231","source":"Vera boni quoniam bonum est.\n\nFalsa boni quoniam bonum non est.\n\nVera non boni quoniam non bonum est.\n\nFalsa non boni quoniam bonum est.\n\nHarum quatuor opiniorum dux vera; sunt, dum falsæ. Illa quae est boni quoniam bonum est,vera est; illa quae est boni quoniam bonum non est, falsa est. Rursus illa quæ est non boni quoniam bonum non est, vera est; illa quæ est non boni quoniam bonum est, falsa est. Ergo hæc est similitudo et proporlio harum quatuor propositionum.Nam quemadmodum se habet opinio boni quoniam bonum est, ad cam opinionem quæ est boni quoniam bonum non est, eodem modo sese babet et opinio qum est non boni quonil;m non bonum est, ad eam quae est non boni quoniam bonum est. Nam sicut illic vera una est, alLera falsa, ita quoque hic una vera est, altera falsa. Capit igitur exemplum prius ab ea qua? est non boni quoniam non bonum esL Hsc enim, inquil, cum vera sit, quam huic ponemus esse contrariam? eamne qua: dicit, malum est? sed non est contraria. Potest enim simul esse vera, et ea quae dicit non esse bonum quod bonum non est, ut ea quæ dicit malum esse quod bonum non est. Sunt enim quædam non bona quoe mala sunt. Quocirca conlrariæ non sunt, in quibus ponitur quod non bonum est, bonum non esse, et quod non est bonum, malum esse.","english":"True: of the good, that it is good.\n\nFalse: of the good, that it is not good.\n\nTrue: of the not-good, that it is not good.\n\nFalse: of the not-good, that it is good.\n\nOf these four opinions the true one is the leader; they exist, so long as they are false. That one which is of the good, that it is good, is true; that one which is of the good, that it is not good, is false. Again, that which is of the not-good, that it is not good, is true; that which is of the not-good, that it is good, is false. Therefore this is the similarity and proportion of these four propositions. For just as the opinion of the good, that it is good, stands to that opinion which is of the good, that it is not good, in the same way also the opinion which is of the not-good, that it is not good, stands to that which is of the not-good, that it is good. For just as there one is true, the other false, so also here one is true, the other false. The example therefore begins first from that which is of the not-good, that it is not good. For this, he says, since it is true, which one shall we set as contrary to it? Shall it be the one which says, it is evil? But it is not contrary. For it can be true at the same time, both the one which says that what is not good is not good, and the one which says that what is not good is evil. For there are certain not-good things which are evil. Wherefore they are not contrary, in which it is posited that what is not good is not good, and that what is not good is evil.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":232,"ref":"p232","source":"Contrariæ enim verae simul neqnenL inveniri, et vera veras contraria nunquam est, sed nec illa poterit esse contraria huic, quai dicit malum esse quod bonum non est. Possunt enim quaedam non quidem esse pona, non esse lamen mala, ut ex arbore nullius utilitatis causa ramum defringere, si arborem uihil lædat,neque malum neque bonum est. Quare verae simul possunt esse, et haec quoque quae opinantur id quod est non bonum quoniam non bonum est, ei id quod est non bonum quoniam malum non est. Quare nec hae eontrariæ sunt; restat. ighur ut ejus opinionis quæ est non boni quoniam non bonum est, ea sit contraria quae est non boni quoniam bonum est. Quod si in his quatuor propositionibus quæ supra descripsimus similitudo servatur, et sicut est opinio non boni quoniam non bonum est, ad eam quæ est non boni quoniam bonum est, sic opinio boni quoniam bonum est ad opinionem boni quoniam bonum non est. Contraria autem est opinio non boni quoniam bonum non est, opinio non boni quoniam bonum est; contraria igitur erit opinioni boni quoniam bonum est, opinio boni quoniam bonum non est.","english":"For contrary true opinions cannot be found together, and a true opinion is never contrary to true opinions, but neither can that opinion be contrary to this one which says that what is not good is bad. For certain things can indeed not be good and yet not be bad—as, for the sake of no usefulness, to break a branch from a tree, if it harms the tree in no way, is neither bad nor good. Wherefore they can be true together: both the opinion that thinks that what is not good is not good, and the opinion that what is not good is not bad. Wherefore neither are these contrary; it remains, therefore, that to the opinion which holds that what is not good is not good, that opinion is contrary which holds that what is not good is good. But if in these four propositions which we described above the likeness is preserved, and just as the opinion of the not-good, that it is not good, stands to the opinion of the not-good, that it is good, so the opinion of the good, that it is good, stands to the opinion of the good, that it is not good. But the opinion of the not-good, that it is not good, is contrary to the opinion of the not-good, that it is good; therefore the opinion of the good, that it is not good, will be contrary to the opinion of the good, that it is good.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":233,"ref":"p233","source":"Manifestum est autem quoniam nihil interest, ner: si ttniversaliter, ponamus affirmationem. Huic enim universalis negatio erit contraria,ut opinioni quæ opinatur quoniam omne quod c81 bonum benum est, ea quæ est, quoniam nihil horum quæ bona stint, bonum est. Nam ejus quæ est boni quoniam bonum est, si wtiversaliter sit bonum, eadem est ei quæ opinatur, ici quod bonum est quoniam bonum est. floc autem nihil differt nb eo quod est, quoniam omne quod est bonum honum est. Similiter autem et in non bono. Quare si in opinione sic se habet. Sunt autem hæ quæ sunt in uoce affirmationes et negationes nolæ eorum quæ sunt in anima. Manifestum est, quoniam affirmationi contraria quidem negationi est circa idem universalis, ut ei quæ est quoniam omne bonum bonum est, vel quoniam omnis homo bonus est, ea quæ est. quoniam nullum, vel nullus, contradictoriæ autem, quoniam non omne, aut non omnis.","english":"But it is manifest that it makes no difference whether we set down the affirmation universally or not. For the universal negation will be contrary to it, as to the opinion which opines that everything that is good is good, the opinion which is that none of the things that are good is good. For the opinion that the good is good, if the good be universal, is the same as the opinion that what is good is good. But this differs in no way from the opinion that everything that is good is good. And similarly also in the case of what is not good. Wherefore, if this is how it stands in opinion, and the affirmations and negations in speech are symbols of those things that are in the soul, it is manifest that the universal negation about the same thing is contrary to the affirmation, as to the affirmation that every good is good, or that every man is good, the negation that no good is good, or that no man is good; but the contradictory is that not every good is good, or that not every man is good.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":234,"ref":"p234","source":"Illud quoquo recte commemorat. quod nibil differt. in opinionibus hæc esse contraria non universaliter conslitulis, et in iis quae sibi universalit.er opponuntur. Similiter enim in ea quoque opinione quae arbitratur omne bonum bonum esse, illa contraria est quæ putat nullum bonum bonum esse.Nam quod dicimus bonum osse id quod bonum est, id si in opinione universaliter affirmetur; ita putandum est, quidquid bonum est bonum esse, Hoc autem nibil differt, tanquam si dicamus, omne bonum bonum est. Quae opinio cum sit vera, illa ei contrarie opponilur quæ dicit quiquid bonum est bonum non est. Hoc autem nihil differt,tanquam si opinemur nullum bonum bonum esse, et in non bono quoque eodem modo,ulsi ita dicamus, omne quod non bonum est non est bonum,et rursus, omne quod non bonum est bonum est, eodem modo sibi sunt istae contrariae, ut una vera sit, altera falsa. Quod in contrariis maxime reperitur; quare tota disputatio quaestioque ita concluditur: Nam si ea quae sunl in anima principia, quaedam sunt eorum quae significantur in voce, vox autem nota quaedam est animae passionum, quidquid contingit in anima, idem quoque ad vocem redire necesse est.","english":"He also rightly recalls that it makes no difference that in opinions these things are contrary when not set down universally, and in those which are opposed to one another universally. For similarly in that opinion too which judges that every good thing is good, the contrary is that which thinks that no good thing is good. For what we say—that a good thing is what is good—if this is affirmed universally in opinion, it must be understood thus: whatever is good is good. But this makes no difference from saying that every good thing is good. Since this opinion is true, the one opposed to it as contrary is that which says that whatever is good is not good. But this makes no difference from opining that no good thing is good. And in the case of the non-good in the same way, as if we should say that everything which is not good is not good, and again that everything which is not good is good—in the same way these are contrary to one another, so that one is true and the other false. This is found most of all in contraries; wherefore the whole disputation and inquiry is concluded thus: for if the principles which are in the soul are certain likenesses of those things which are signified in speech, and speech is a certain token of the soul's affections, whatever happens in the soul must also return to speech in the same way.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":235,"ref":"p235","source":"Quod si universalis affirmatio et universalis negatio sunt in opinione contrariæ, eodem quoque in vocibus erunt, id est, non crit ea contraria quæ contrarium affirmat, sed ea quæ id quod ante propositum est per universalitalis contrarietatem negat, ut est omne bonum bonum est, vel omnis homo bonus est: bis contraria est nullum bonum bonum est, vel nullus homo bonus est. Hoc est enim quod ait, vel quoniam nullum, vel nullus, nullum ad illam referens propositionem,quæ dicit omne bonum bonum est. Nullus illi scilicet opponit quae dicit omnis homo bonus est, ut sint hoc modo, omne bonum bonum est, huic contraria est nullum bonum bonum est. Rursus omnis homo bonus est, huic cOnlrari., nullus homo bonus est. Contradictorias autem dicit cas esse quas supra posuit, dum de universalibus ac particularibus toquerclur, eas scilicet quae suut angulares. Universalis enim affirmatio particulari negationi, et particularis arfirmalio universali negationi per contradictionem opponi monstrata est.","english":"But if the universal affirmation and the universal negation are contrary in opinion, they will likewise be contrary in spoken expressions—that is, it will not be the one that affirms the contrary that is contrary, but the one that denies, through the contrariety of universality, that which was proposed beforehand; as, for example, \"every good thing is good,\" or \"every man is good\": to these is contrary \"no good thing is good,\" or \"no man is good.\" For this is what he says, either \"no thing\" or \"no man,\" referring \"no thing\" to that proposition which says \"every good thing is good.\" \"No man,\" of course, is opposed to the one that says \"every man is good,\" so that in this way: to \"every good thing is good\" is contrary \"no good thing is good\"; again, to \"every man is good\" is contrary \"no man is good.\" But he calls those contradictory which he set down above, when he was speaking about universals and particulars—namely, those which are the angular ones. For the universal affirmation has been shown to be opposed by contradiction to the particular negation, and the particular affirmation to the universal negation.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":236,"ref":"p236","source":"Manifestum est autem quoniam et veram veræ raon contingit esse contrariam, nee opinionem, nec contra. dictionem. Contrariæ enim sunt quæ circa opposita sunt,circa eadem autem contingit verum dicere eumdem. Simul autem non contingit eidem inesse contraria. Ex his quae supra sunt dicta illud quoque colligit, quod nec ea quæ sunt contraria vera simul esse possint, nec ea quae vera sunl sibi possint esse contraria, et hoc non solum in opinionibus esse, ut vnra opinio verae opinioni contraria sit, sed in proposilionibus quoque; neque enim fieri potest ut duas contrarias simul veras esse contingit. Et hoc per syllogismum colligit hujusmodi. Omnia contraria sunt opposita. Quae aulem opposita sunt, simul eidem inesse non possunt, contraria igitur in uno eodemque esse natura non patitur, quare si duo vera de eodem prædicari possunt,duo autem conlraria eidem inesse non possunt.. Quae contraria sunt, vera esse nulla naturae ratione permittitur. Hoc est enim quod ait, contraria enim sunt quae circa opposita sunt, id est omneconlrarium oppositum est, nec fien potest ut quæ sunt contraria in oppositis non contineantur: sicut euim in prædicamentis edocuit, contrariorum genus quoddam est oppositio, circa eadem autem contingit verum dicere eumdem, id est. duo vera pos.","english":"It is evident, moreover, that a true statement can also be contrary to a true one—and neither an opinion nor a contradiction [is at issue here]. For things that are contrary are those that concern opposites, but concerning the same things it is possible for the same person to speak the truth. At the same time, however, it is not possible for contraries to be present in the same thing. From what has been said above he also gathers this point: that neither can things that are contrary be true at the same time, nor can things that are true be contrary to one another—and this applies not only in opinions, as when one true opinion is contrary to another true opinion, but also in propositions; for it cannot happen that two contrary propositions are true at the same time. And he gathers this by a syllogism of the following kind: all contraries are opposites; but things that are opposites cannot be present in the same thing at the same time; therefore nature does not allow contraries to exist in one and the same thing. Hence, if two true things can be predicated of the same subject, but two contraries cannot be present in the same thing, then by no principle of nature is it permitted that things which are contrary be true. For this is what he says: for things that are contrary are those that concern opposites—that is, every contrary is an opposite, nor can it happen that things which are contrary are not contained among opposites; for, as he taught in the Categories, opposition is a kind of genus of contraries. But concerning the same things it is possible for the same person to speak the truth—that is, two true things can be posited.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":237,"ref":"p237","source":"sunt simul esse, et de eodem simul vere prædicari, ut cum dicimus aliquid bonum non esse, et malum esse, utraque simul vere dici possunt. Possunt. enim quaedam quæ cum bona non sint, tamen mala esse,ul turpitudo bona quidem non est, malum tamen est. Ergo ea quae vera sunt, simul ut praedicentur vere fieri potest, et ut in eodem sint, simul autem eidem non contingit inesse contraria. Quocirca si vera quidem possunt eidem inesse, contraria autem eidem inesse non possunt, ea quas contraria sunt, vera simul esse non possunt: quare convertitur nec quæ vera simul sunt contraria esse possunl. Non igitur fieri potest ut, vel in opinionibus vel in propositionibus ea quae vera sunt, possit aliquis recte contraria suspicari. Hæc autem quantum brevitas espostt.ionis permittebat expressimus. Quid aulem allior hujus libri tractatus edoceat, secundæ editionis series explicabit.","english":"They can be at the same time, and be truly predicated of the same thing at the same time, as when we say that something is not good and is evil, both can be said truly at the same time. For certain things can be evil although they are not good, as shamefulness is indeed not good, yet it is evil. Therefore it can happen that things which are true are both truly predicated at the same time and are in the same thing, but contraries cannot at the same time be present in the same thing. Wherefore, if true things can indeed be present in the same thing, but contraries cannot be present in the same thing, those things which are contraries cannot be true at the same time; hence it is converted: nor can those things which are true at the same time be contraries. It cannot therefore happen that, either in opinions or in propositions, someone can rightly suppose contraries of those things which are true. But these things we have expressed as far as the brevity of the exposition permitted. What the deeper treatment of this book teaches, however, the sequence of the second edition will explain.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]}]}