finite affirmatio falsa est,nec non erit ex necessitate quod dicitur, quia definite est falsa negatio. Unde fit ut utrumlibet quod est in rebus omnino perimatur utraque enim necessario sunt et ex necessitate con tingunt, et est necessitas illa impossibilis. Nam si quis dicat cras futurum navale bellum,aliusque neget,et pronuntiet non futurum,si utraque sint falsa, necesse quidem erit non essa cras navale bellum, quoniam affirmatio, quas illud dicit futurum, falsa est.Rursus necesse est esse cras navale bellum,quoniam negatio quæ dicit cras non futurum,ipsa quoque mentitur. Quare necesse erit et esse navale bellum,et non esse,quod est impossibile,et præter communem cogitationis naturam.Non est igitur verum utrasque et simul,id est affirmationem negationemque mentiri.Quæ ergo, inquit, contingunt inconvenientia,hæc sunt.et hujusmodi. si quis dicat vel in his quae universalia sunt et universaliter prædicantur, vel in his quæ singularia in propositionibus enuntiantur, unam necessario definite esse veram, definite esse alteram falsam,talia ilium, inquit, inconvenientia conseqlJentur,et alia similia. Hoc scilicet dicens de superioribus argumentis, in quibus ostendebat omnia ex necessitate contingere,si quia unam veram definite, alteram diceret definite mendacem.
the affirmation is false, and what is said will not necessarily not be, because the negation is definitely false. Hence it comes about that what is in things is altogether destroyed as being either-way; for both are necessarily and come about from necessity, and that necessity is impossible. For if someone says that there will be a naval battle tomorrow, and another denies it and pronounces that it will not be, if both are false, it will indeed be necessary that there not be a naval battle tomorrow, since the affirmation which says it will be is false. Again, it is necessary that there be a naval battle tomorrow, since the negation which says that tomorrow it will not be is itself also lying. Wherefore it will be necessary both that there be a naval battle and that there not be, which is impossible and beyond the common nature of thought. It is not therefore true that both are false at the same time, that is, the affirmation and the negation. These, then, he says, are the absurdities that follow, and of this kind. If someone should say either in those things which are universal and are predicated universally, or in those things which are singular and enunciated in propositions, that one is necessarily definitely true and the other definitely false, such absurdities, he says, would follow, and others like them. He says this, namely, concerning the earlier arguments, in which he was showing that all things come about from necessity, if because he said that one is definitely true, the other definitely false.
Quaenam vero asserat alia inconvenientia impossibiliaque concurrere his qui unam definite veram proponunt, haec sunt: si quis enim proponat unam esse veram,alteram esse falsam, tollit (ut supra dictum est) id quod est utrumlibet in rebus,eL omnia esse vel fieri ex necessitate constituit, nihil a casu,ninilque a propria volunLate.Undefit ut neque negotiari sit utiJe,nec inire actum,quæ omnia consilii ratione tractantur, ipsum enim consilium supervacuum est,cum omnia quaecunque futura sint necesse sit evenire. Quid enim unusquisque dicat, Si hoc faciam, illud mihi eveniet atque continget, si vero hæc, illa res eveniet? etenim nihil prohibet quemvis illum affirmare aliquid esse faciendum, alium vero negare,cum omnia vi necessitatis eveniant. Nam si omnia quæ Eunt nunc, ante aliquis vere prædiceret,quis dubitatq:nn illa quæ factasunt,immutabili violentia necessitatis evenerint? Hoc est enim quod ait: Quare ex necessitate erit quodlibet eorum quod tunc verum erat dicere.
But what other inconsistencies and impossibilities follow for those who propose that one [of the two] is definitely true, are these: for if anyone proposes that one is true and the other false, he removes (as was said above) that which is the either-way in things, and establishes that all things are or come to be from necessity, nothing from chance, nothing from one's own will. It follows that neither is it useful to conduct business nor to enter upon action, all of which are handled by the reasoning of counsel; for counsel itself is superfluous, since whatever is going to be must necessarily come about. For what does each person say: "If I do this, that will happen and fall to me; but if this, that thing will happen"? For nothing prevents one person from affirming that something ought to be done, and another from denying it, since all things come about by the force of necessity. For if someone had truly foretold all the things that are now, who doubts that those things which have been done came about by the immutable violence of necessity? For this is what he says: Therefore, whatever of those things which it was then true to say, will be by necessity.
Sed ne illud videatur incongruumquodrerum eventum nonexipsa rerum natura, sed ex propositionum veritate et falsitate judicamus,scrupulum ipse dissolvit dicens.At vero nec hoc differt,si aliqui dixerint contradictionem,vel non dixerint:ad tollendum enim perimendumqueconsilium,quod nihil omnino homines oporteat consiliari,parum valet aliquid ante prædici;sive enim dicatur aliquid,sive non, quidquid vere prædici potest, illud eliam si non praedicatur evenire necesse est;idcirco enim vere prædicitur,quia vere prædici potest;idcirco vere prædici potest,quia immutabiliterfuturum est. Quare futurum est,si prædicitur vere, nec tantum si prædicitur, sed etiam si prædici vere potest; sive enim prædicatur,sive non prædicatur, quidquid vere prædici potest, hoc ex necessitate futurum est. Manifestum est enim, inquit,quod si sic se habeat res,sive unus eam affirmet et alius neget,si eventura est, nihil illi negatio officit; si eventura non est, nihil affirmatio prodest. Non enim,inquit,propternegare etaffirmare erit vel non erit,nec banc vim naturae tempus mutabit.Eodem modo enim evenient,ea quaepost millesimum annum eventura creduntur,his qux post quantumlibet tempus ex necessitate futura sunt:unde Ht,ut si in omni tempore omnia sic se habent, ut unum definite verum dici possit,definite alterum falsum, omnia quæcunque facta sunt, vel fient, immutabili rerum ratione contingant.
But lest this seem incongruous—that we judge the outcome of things not from the nature of the things themselves but from the truth and falsity of propositions—he himself dissolves the scruple, saying: Yet this too makes no difference, whether some have said there is a contradiction or have not said so; for to remove and destroy the counsel that men ought not to deliberate about anything at all, it matters little that something is foretold beforehand; for whether something is said or not, whatever can be truly foretold, even if it is not foretold, must necessarily come to pass; for it is truly foretold because it can be truly foretold; and it can be truly foretold because it will immutably come to be. Wherefore it will come to be, if it is truly foretold—and not only if it is foretold, but also if it can be truly foretold; for whether it is foretold or not foretold, whatever can be truly foretold will necessarily come to be. For it is manifest, he says, that if the matter stands thus—whether one affirms it and another denies it—if it is going to happen, the denial hinders it in nothing; if it is not going to happen, the affirmation profits nothing. For, he says, it will not be or not be because of the denying and affirming, nor will time change this force of nature. For in the same way those things which are believed to be going to happen after a thousand years will come to pass as those which are going to be by necessity after however great a time; whence it follows that if at all times all things stand thus, that one can be called definitely true and the other definitely false, all things whatsoever that have been made or will be made come about by an immutable order of things.
Hoc est enim quod ail, necesse esse fieri unumquodque eorum quae fiunt; id est, si sic se haberet, ut ex necessitate fierent omnia, et hoc superiori argumentatione confirmat dicens:Qllando enim vere dicit quis quoniam erit, non potest non fieri, eventus enim necessitatem, necessitas sequitur veritatem, et quod factum est, verum erat dicere semper quoniam erit, veritas namque propositionis ex rerum necessariis venit eventibus.
Quod si hæc non sunt possibilia. Videmus enim esse principium futurorum, et ab eo quod consultamus, atque agimus aliquid, et quoniam est omnino in his. quæ non semper actu sunt, possibile esse et non esse, similiter, in quibus utrumque contingit et esse et non esse, quare fieri et non fieri. Ac multa nobis manifest!! sunt sic se habentia, ut quoniarn hanc vestem possibile est incidi, et non incidetur,sed priusexteretur. Similiter autem et non incidi possibile est. Non enim esset eam prius exteri,nisi possibile esset non incidi. Quare et in aliis fiendis,quæcunque secundacm potentium hujusmodi dicuntur, Manifestum igitur est quoniam non omnia ex necessitate vel sunt, vel fiunt,sed alia quidem utrumlibet,et non magis vel affirmatio, vel negatio nera est, alia vero magis quidem, et in pluribus alterum, seri contingit fieri et alterum, alterum vero minime.
For this is what he says: that each of the things which come to be must necessarily come to be; that is, if matters stood thus, that all things came to be from necessity, and this he confirms by the preceding argument, saying: For when someone truly says that a thing will be, it cannot not come to be; for the outcome follows necessity, necessity follows truth, and what has been made, it was true to say always that it would be; for the truth of a proposition comes from the necessary outcomes of things.
But if these things are not possible. For we see that there is a beginning of future things, and from the fact that we deliberate and do something, and since it is altogether in those things which are not always in act, that they are possible to be and not to be; similarly, in those in which both being and not being fall out, whence also to come to be and not to come to be. And many things are manifest to us that stand thus, as that it is possible for this garment to be cut, and it will not be cut, but will first be worn out. Similarly, however, it is also possible for it not to be cut. For it would not first be worn out unless it were possible for it not to be cut. Wherefore also in other things that come to be, whatever are said in this way according to powers, it is manifest therefore that not all things either are or come to be from necessity, but some indeed either way, and the affirmation or the negation is no more true, while others indeed more, and in more cases, it happens that one comes to be and the other, but the other not at all.
Longum hyperbaton est, quo'1 nos priuseaponimus, postea continuamus. Liquet enim aliquarum rerum nos esse principium, ut actuum nostrorum. Si quis enim aliquid consilio faciat,quidquid consiliatione peregerit, ejus rei ipse principium est. A consiliante enim incipit,quidquid consilii solertia ministratur.Sunt enim quaedamquæ actunonsunt, sed poteslate,quæ potestasnon fit ex necessitat.e,id es,u possit quem fieri,non tmen necesse s,u hanc vel quamlibet tunicam possibile est quidem ferro incidi, sed non est necesse. Fortasse enim utendo vetustabitur,et ipso quotidiano solyetur attritu.Ergo potest quidem incidi,sed forte non incidetur, sed antequam incidi possit exteritur.Rursus potest fieri utnon dividatur,neque enim exterieam possibile esset,nisi prius esset possibile non incidi, quare possunt quidem quaedam fieri,sed ita contingit fortasse ut non fiant Suntigitur quaedam possibilia non necessaria, et in aliis quoque quae fiunt eadem ratio est.
It is a long hyperbaton, which we first set apart and afterwards continue. For it is clear that we are the principle of certain things, as of our own actions. For if anyone does something by counsel, whatever he has accomplished by counsel, he himself is the principle of that thing. For whatever is supplied by the skill of counsel begins from the one who counsels. For there are certain things which are not in act but in power, which power does not come to be from necessity—that is, so that it could indeed come to be, but not necessarily. For this tunic, or any tunic you please, can indeed be cut with iron, but it is not necessary. For perhaps by use it will grow old and be dissolved by daily rubbing. Therefore it can indeed be cut, but perhaps it will not be cut, but will be worn out before it can be cut. Again, it can happen that it is not divided, for it would not be possible for it to be worn out unless it were first possible for it not to be cut. Wherefore certain things can indeed come to be, but it happens perhaps by chance that they do not come to be. There are therefore certain things which are possible but not necessary, and in other things which come to be the same account holds.
Omne enim quod fit a quolibetconsilio, ipse qui consiliatur illius rei principium est, non necessitas,et quæcunque sunt possibilia, mutabiliter evenient.Quæenimeecundumaliquam possibilitatem dicuntur,non eveniuntsecundum necessitatem, unde fit ut manifestum sit qu oniam non omnia ex necessitate vel sunt, vel fiunt,sed quædam sunt quae aequali modo, vel fiunt,vel non fiunt,et hoc est utrumlibet fieri,alia vero in pluribus quidem fiunt, in paucioribus vero non fiunt, et aequaliter quidem fiunt,ut egredientem domo amicum videre, fit enim hoc et fit æqualiter;quædam vero frequentius fiunt; quam non fiunt,ut sexagenarium canescere frequentius fit,quam non fit.Et tamen ita hoc potestHen, ut non fieri impossibile non sit. Hoc enim est quod ait:Alia vero magis quidem et in pluribus alterum, ut canescere in pluribus sexagenarii quam non canescere. Sed contingit fieri alterum, scilicet ut non canescat,alterum vero minime, scilicet ut canescat. Esl autem hyperbaton hoc modo. Quod si hæc impossibilia videmus,quod sumusenim aliquibus ipsi principium,etquæcunque possibilia sunt,fieri possunt,et nou fieri.Si igitur possibile est et ut sint et non sint, manifestum est non omnia ex necessitate contingere, sed alia æqualiter,alia vero evenire quidem in pluribus, in paucioribus vero non evenire,sed ut non eveniant necesse non est.
For everything that is done by any counsel whatsoever, the one who takes counsel is himself the principle of that thing, not necessity, and all things that are possible come about changeably. For things that are spoken of according to some possibility do not come about according to necessity; hence it is clear that not all things either are or come to be from necessity, but some things there are that in equal measure either come to be or do not come to be, and this is to come to be either way; others, however, come to be in the greater number of cases but not in the fewer, and they come to be equally, as to see a friend upon leaving the house—for this happens and happens equally; but some things happen more frequently than they do not, as for a man of sixty years to grow gray happens more frequently than it does not. And yet this can so happen that not to happen is not impossible. For this is what he says: some things are more and in the greater number of cases one way, as to grow gray in the greater number of cases for a man of sixty rather than not to grow gray. But it happens that the one comes about—namely, that he does not grow gray—while the other does not at all—namely, that he grows gray. And the hyperbaton is in this manner. But if we see that these things are impossible—for we ourselves are the principle of certain things, and whatever things are possible can both come to be and not come to be. If, therefore, it is possible both that they be and that they not be, it is manifest that not all things come about from necessity, but some equally, while others indeed come about in the greater number of cases and do not come about in the fewer, but that they not come about is not necessary.
Igitur esse quod est, quando est, et non esse, quod non est, quando non est, necesse est. Sed non omne quod est,necesse est esse, nee omne quod non est,necesse est non esse.Non enim idem est omne quod est, necessario eSbe, quando est, et simpliciter esse ex necessitate. Similiter autem et in eo quod nan est. Ei In contradictione eadem ratio est,esse quidem vel non esse omne, necesse est,et futurum esse, vel non.Non tamen dividentem dicere alterum necessarium.Dico autem ut necesse est quidem esse futurum bellum navale cras vel non futurum esse. Sed non necesse est futurum esse cras bellum navale, uel non futurum esse. Futurum autem uel esse, vel non esse necesse est.
Nunc quid sit necessarium temporale describit. Ait enim omnisres quando est,ea:n sine dubio esse necesse est. Non enim fieri potest ut cum est, non sit,et rursus res quæ non est, quando non est,eam non esse necesse est, neque enim fieri potest, ut quando non est, sit; sed si quando est, eam esse necesse est, id est, non simplex necessarium,sicul solem oriri simpliciter,sed temporaliter necessa-, rium,utsedeo,non idcirco simpliciter,et sine temporis præsentis descriptione ex necessitate est. Quando enim sedeo, non potest fieri ut non sedeam,et necesse est mihi tunc sedere cum sedeo, sed ipsum sedere mihi non ex necessitate inest,possum enim surgere.
Therefore, that what is, is when it is, and that what is not, is not when it is not, is necessary. But not everything that is, is necessarily, nor is everything that is not, necessarily not. For it is not the same thing for everything that is to be necessarily when it is, and to be simply from necessity. And similarly also in the case of what is not. And in contradiction the same reasoning holds: that everything either is or is not is necessary, and that it will be or will not be. Yet it is not by dividing that one should say that one of the two is necessary. I mean, for example, that it is indeed necessary that there will be a naval battle tomorrow or that there will not be. But it is not necessary that there will be a naval battle tomorrow, or that there will not be. For it is necessary that it either will be or will not be.
Now he describes what is temporally necessary. For he says that every thing, when it is, is without doubt necessarily. For it cannot happen that when it is, it is not; and again, a thing that is not, when it is not, is necessarily not; for it cannot happen that when it is not, it is. But if at some time it is, it is necessary that it be—that is, not a simple necessity, as that the sun rises simply, but a temporal necessity, as that I am sitting is not for that reason simply and without the description of the present time from necessity. For when I am sitting, it cannot happen that I am not sitting, and it is necessary for me then to sit when I am sitting; but the sitting itself is not present in me from necessity, for I can rise.
Rursus cum non sedeo,tunc mihi necesse est non sedere, sed ipsum non sedere, mihi ex necessitate non inest,possum enim sedere;ergo quod est, quando est, ex necessitate est,et quod non est, tunc cum non esl, fieri ut non sit non potest. Non tamen omnia quaecunque sunt aut non sunt,autex necessitate sunt,præter temporis præsentis nuncupationem, aut ex necessitate non sunt, nulla mentione praesentis temporis facta. Quare non est, inquit, idem temporaliter necessarium esse, ut est mihi cum sedeo, et simpliciter ex necessitaleesse, ut homini mortalitas, nec idem est, cum non est necessario non esse, ut mihi cum non sedeo non inest ser!ere,et quod simpliciter ex necessitate non habeo,ut tres oculos vel immortalilatem,atquehoc est quod ait,similiter autem et in eo quod non est. Hoc autem cur dixerit sequitur,et in contradictione eadem ratio est, esse quidem vel non esse omne necesse est,et futurum esse vel non esse.Similis est, inquit,ratio in contradictionibus cuntingentibus,et in his quæ,cum sunt,secundum tempus necessaria Bunt, simpliciter autem necessaria non sunt.
Again, when I am not sitting, then it is necessary for me not to sit, but the not sitting itself is not present in me by necessity, for I can sit. Therefore, what is, when it is, is by necessity, and what is not, when it is not, cannot come to be so that it is not. Yet not all things whatsoever that are or are not are either by necessity, apart from the designation of the present time, or are by necessity not, with no mention made of the present time. Wherefore, he says, it is not the same thing to be necessary in a temporal sense, as it is for me when I sit, and to be simply by necessity, as mortality is for a human being; nor is it the same to be necessarily not, when one is not, as it is for me when I do not sit that not sitting is not present in me, and to have something simply by necessity not, as three eyes or immortality. And this is what he says: similarly also in the case of what is not. But why he said this follows, and in contradiction the same reasoning holds: that everything necessarily is or is not, and that it will be or will not be. The reasoning, he says, is similar in contingent contradictions and in those things which, when they are, are necessary according to time, but are not simply necessary.
Nam in futuris et in contingentibus contradictionibus,totam quidem contradictionem necesseestunam veram habere partem, alteram falsam,utsi quis affirmet cras bellum navale futurum;id ergo non est necesse: et rursus siquis neget non futurum,est quidem aut esse,aut non esse necesse,sed non est neceaseesse, nec rursus necesse est non esse, sed tantum aut esse aut non esse;idcirco tota quidem contradictio, unam habebit partem veram, alteram falsam, sed non erit ipsorum una definite vera, falsa altera definite. In praeteritis enim sic dicimus: Romulus Romam condidit. Romulus Romam non condidit; una quidem vera est,nlterafalsa,sed in his definite vera est affirmatio,definite falsa negatio. Nam quia quod factumesl,fieri ut fa.it,non potest, ideo definite in præterito contradictio vera vel falsa est. In futuris vero propositionibus non idem estin his scilicet uxcontingentia significant utsidicam Philoxenus coenaturus est, Philoxenus coenaturus. non est. In tota quidem contradictione,una vera est, altera falsa,sed nullus potest dividere, ut dicat aut affirmationem constitute et definite veram esse aut negationem.Ante enim quam cænet, indefinitum est et variabile an cænet. Postquam vero cænaverit praeteritum definitur, igitur aut esse aut non esse aliquid in futuris contradictionibus necesse est.
For in future and contingent contradictions, the whole contradiction must indeed have one part true and the other false, as if someone should affirm that there will be a naval battle tomorrow; that, therefore, is not necessary. And again, if someone should deny that it will not be, it is indeed necessary either that it be or that it not be, but it is not necessary that it be, nor again is it necessary that it not be, but only either that it be or that it not be. Therefore the whole contradiction will indeed have one part true and the other false, but one of them will not be definitely true and the other definitely false. For in past things we speak thus: Romulus founded Rome; Romulus did not found Rome. One is indeed true and the other false, but in these the affirmation is definitely true and the negation definitely false. For because what has been done cannot be made not to have been done, therefore in the past the contradiction is definitely true or false. But in future propositions it is not the same, namely in those which signify contingent things, as if I should say: Philoxenus will dine; Philoxenus will not dine. In the whole contradiction one is indeed true and the other false, but no one can divide it so as to say that either the affirmation is established and definitely true or the negation. For before he dines, it is indefinite and variable whether he will dine. But after he has dined, it is defined as past. Therefore in future contradictions it is necessary that something either be or not be.
Ut autem unum fiat, et unum non fiat,non est necesse, in quo igitur similitudo est contingentis contradiclionis et temporalis, neque simplicis necessitatis in eo scilicet, quia sicut necesse est esse quod est quando est,non tamen simpliciter necesse est esse quod est præter temporis adjectionem:ita in contradictione contingenti,affirmationem quidem vel negationem veram esse necesse est, non tamen vel affirmationem simpliciter ac definite veram,vel negationem, sed utramlibet et quam certae veritatis constituerit eventus.
Quare quoniam similiterorationes vera; sunl,quemadmodum et res,manifestum est,quoniam quæcunque sic se habent, ut utrumlibet sint,et contraria ipsorum contingant, necesse est similiter se habere et contradictionem,quod contingit in his quæ non semper sunt,et non semper non sunt. Horum enim necesse est alteram partem contradictionis veram esse vel falsam.Non tamen hoc vel illud, sed tdrumlibet, et magis quidem alteram veram,non tamen jam veram vel falsam. Quare manifestum est,quoniamnon est necesse omnis ajfirmationis et negationis oppositarum hanc quem veram, illam vero talsam esse.Neque enim quemadmodum in his quæ sunt,sic se res habet etiam in his quæ non sunt, possibilibus tamen esse, vel HOM esse, sed quemadmodum dictum est.
But that one thing should come to be and one thing not come to be is not necessary. Therefore, in the case where there is the likeness of a contingent and temporal contradiction, there is not likewise [the likeness] of simple necessity—namely, because just as it is necessary that what is, is when it is, yet it is not simply necessary that what is, is, apart from the addition of time, so in a contingent contradiction it is indeed necessary that the affirmation or the negation be true, yet not that the affirmation be simply and definitely true, nor the negation, but either one, whichever the outcome has established as of certain truth.
Wherefore, since speeches are true in the same way as things are, it is manifest that whatever things are so disposed that they may be either way, and their opposites may come about, the contradiction in their case must likewise be so disposed—which happens in those things that are not always and are not always not. For of these it is necessary that one part of the contradiction be true or false, yet not this one or that one, but either, and indeed one more [likely] true, yet not already [definitely] true or false. Wherefore it is manifest that it is not necessary that of every opposed affirmation and negation this one be true and that one false. For neither in the case of things that are, nor in the case of things that are not but are possible to be or not to be, is the matter as it is in things that are—but as has been said.
Habent,inquit,quamdam cognationem res,et ilia quæ resipsaspropria significatione designant.Quare et oratio quae designat atque significat rem, sic se habebit,quemadmodum res ipsa est.Ergo si res non fuerit,falsa oratio est;si res fuerit, vera oratio est; et si vera vel falsa oratio est,erit id quod diciturvel non erit, ut sibi res et oratio convertantur. Ergo si res constituta non est, nee definita necessitate proveniens, nec illa oratio,quæ rem ipsam designat, definitae est veritatis.Ergo in quibus rebus possibile esnon modo esse,sed euam non esse contingere, in bis affirmatio et negatio utrumlibet sese habel,et quemadmodum rem ipsam,et esse et non esse contingit,ita quoque contradictionem et veram et falsam esse indefinite proveniet. Hoc autem in quibus fiat, ipse declarat,ait enim:ln hisquæ non sempersunt, et non semper non sunt,sola enim sunt quæ etesse et non esse contingunt,quæ non semper sunt, status eo semper non sunt;si enim semper essent, et non rum mutari non posset, atque ideo ex necessitate essent; si autem semper non essent, eas non esse, necesse esset.Etenim sicut ipsa natura rerum evenientium est varia, ita quoque altera pars contradictionis habet variabilem veritatem,et semper quidem vera vel falsa est, non tamen una definite, ut hoc verum sit determinate,aut illud,sed utrumlibet.
Things, he says, have a certain kinship with those things that designate the things themselves by their own proper signification. Wherefore the speech also which designates and signifies a thing will be disposed in such a way as the thing itself is. Therefore, if the thing has not been, the speech is false; if the thing has been, the speech is true; and if the speech is true or false, that which is said will either be or not be, so that the thing and the speech are converted with each other. Therefore, if the thing is not established, nor comes about by a defined necessity, neither is that speech which designates the thing itself of defined truth. Therefore, in those things in which it is possible not only to be but also not to be, in these the affirmation and the negation hold themselves to either side, and just as it is contingent for the thing itself both to be and not to be, so too it will come about indefinitely that the contradiction is both true and false. But in which things this happens, he himself declares, for he says: in those things which are not always and are not always not; for those alone are which are contingent both to be and not to be, which are not always and are not always not; for if they were always, they could not be changed, and therefore they would be by necessity; but if they were always not, it would be necessary for them not to be. For just as the nature itself of things coming to be is various, so too the other part of the contradiction has a variable truth, and indeed it is always true or false, yet not definitely one, so that this is true determinately, or that, but either side.
Et sicutstatus ipse rerum mutabilisest,ita quoqueveritas aut falsitas propositionum dubitabilis sit, et eveniet quidem,ut in aliquibus frequentius una sit vera,non tamen semper, et ut una rarius vera,non tamen eam falsam esse necesse sit semper, quod per hoc demonstravit quod dixit,et magis quidem veram alteram, non tantum jam:emperveram vel falsam. Concludit totam de futuris contingentibus propositionibus quæstionem,et ait:Manifestum est; non necesse esseomnes atfirmaliones et negationes definite veras esse, sed deest definite, atque ideo subaudiendum est.Illarum enim quæ contingentes et futurae Bunt, nunquam definite una vera est,altera, falsa.Neque enim,inquit,quemadmodum in his quae sunt,sic se habet in his quae non sunt,possibilibus tamen esse, aut non esse, sed quemadmodum dictum est. IlIa etenim quae sunt praesentis temporis, sicut ipsorum esse definitum est,ita quoque de his definita est propositionum veritas faisitasque.Ilta vero quae non sunt quidem,possunt tamen esse,et non esse: et ita futura sunt,ut non ex necessitate proveniant, sed possunt ita esse, ut etiam possint et non esse, in his hocmodo se habebitcontradictio quemadmodum dictum est. Dictum autem est quoniam esse quidem vel non esse:omne necesse est, et futurum esse vel non necesse est. ontamen jam divise ac definite alterum eorum esse necesse est.
And just as the state of things itself is changeable, so too the truth or falsity of propositions is doubtful; and it will indeed happen that in some cases one is true more often, yet not always, and that one is true more rarely, yet it is not necessary that it always be false. He demonstrated this by what he said—that the one is more true, but not already always true or false. He concludes the whole question concerning propositions about future contingents, and says: It is manifest that not all affirmations and negations are definitely true, but "definitely" is missing, and therefore must be understood. For of those which are contingent and future, never is one definitely true and the other false. For, he says, it is not as in those things which are, so also in those things which are not but are possible to be or not to be, but as has been said. For those things which are of the present time, just as their own being is definite, so too the truth and falsity of propositions about them is definite. But those things which indeed are not, yet can be and not be, and are future in such a way that they do not come about by necessity, but can be so as also to be able not to be—in these the contradiction will stand in this way, as has been said. And it has been said that to be or not to be is in every case necessary, and to be about to be or not to be is not necessary. Yet it is not the case that one of them must already be dividedly and definitely.
Erant autem quatuor diversitates, ut aut utraeque verae essent, quod sustulit per hoc quod ait, utraeque enim non erunt simul in talibus;aut utraeque falsae essent,quod per hoc evertit quod ait:Atvero nec quoniam neutrum verum est contingit dicere; aut ut una vera definite, altera falsa definite esset, quod illa argumentatione destruxit,per quam omnia ex necessitate docuit evenire, si hoc admitteretur. Quod si res ilis minime sunt,constat unam quidem veram esse, aliam vero in contradictione mend acem; sed sicut res ipsae mutabiliter et indefinite futuræ sunt, ita quoque enuntiationes variabili nec definita veritate et falsitate proferuntur.
LIBER SECUNDUS.
DE ENUNTIATIONIBUS INFINITIS.
Quoniam autem est affirmatio de aliquo significans aliquid, hoc autem est vel nomen vel innominatum, unum autem oportet esse, et de uno, id quod est in affirmatione,nomen autem dictum est,et innominalum prius,non homo enim nomen quidem non dieo, sed nomen infinitum,unum enim signifieat quodammodo infinitum nomen, quemadmodum et non currit, non uerbum dico,sed infinitum verbum; erit omnis affi)matio et negatio,vel ex nomine et verbo,vel ex infinito nomine et verbo.Præter verbum autem nulla affirmatio vel negatio est.Est enim vel erit, velfuit,vel sit, tel quæcunque alia hujusmodi verba,ex his sunt quæ sunt posita. Consignificant enim tempus.
But there were four differences: either that both should be true, which he removed by this, that he says, "for both will not be together in such things"; or that both should be false, which he overturned by this, that he says, "but neither does it happen that one can say that neither is true"; or that one should be definitely true and the other definitely false, which he destroyed by that argumentation through which he showed that all things come about from necessity, if this were admitted. But if these things are not so, it is clear that one is indeed true, but the other is false in a contradiction; yet just as the things themselves are going to be future changeably and indefinitely, so too utterances are brought forth with changeable and indefinite truth and falsity.
BOOK TWO.
ON INDEFINITE ENUNCIATIONS.
Since, then, affirmation is a signification of something about something, and this is either a name or a nameless term, and it is necessary that there be one, and about one, that which is in the affirmation—and a name has been spoken of, and a nameless term earlier; for I do not call "not-man" a name, but an indefinite name, for it signifies in a certain way an infinite name, just as also "does not run" I do not call a verb, but an indefinite verb—every affirmation and negation will be either from a name and a verb, or from an indefinite name and a verb. But apart from a verb there is no affirmation or negation. For "is" or "will be," or "was," or "may be," or whatever other verbs of this kind there are, are among those which have been posited. For they signify time along with.
Postquam de praeteriti ac præsentis, futuri etiam temporisveritateet falsilate disseruit,nunc vim simplicis et praedicative prupositionis informat dicens quoniam simplex affirmatio unam rem de una significat,id est,da uno subjecto unum prædicat, subjeotum autem illud aut nomen est, aut quod apud veteres quidem fuit innominatum, ab Aristotele vero infinitum nomen vocatum est;prius enim dictum est quod homo nomen esset,non homo vero innominatum quidem apud antiquos,sed nunc infinitum nomen. Quoniam igitur manifestum est unum de uno prædicaresimplicem propositionem,omnis erit propositio simplex, aut ex nomine et verbo, aut ex infinito nomine et verho.Quod autem dixit.-Non homo enim nomen quidem non dico,sed infinitum nomen hujus.modi est. Nomen, inquit, omnia definita significat, non homo vero quamvis unum quodlibet eorum designare possit,quæ homines non sunt, tamen quid designet infinitum est et dubium.
After he has discussed the truth and falsity of past and present time, and also of future time, he now sets forth the force of the simple and predicative proposition, saying that a simple affirmation signifies one thing about one thing, that is, it predicates one thing of one subject; and that subject is either a noun, or what among the ancients was indeed unnamed, but by Aristotle was called an infinite noun. For it was said earlier that "man" is a noun, but "not-man" was indeed unnamed among the ancients, but is now an infinite noun. Since, therefore, it is manifest that a simple proposition predicates one thing of one thing, every simple proposition will be either from a noun and a verb, or from an infinite noun and a verb. But as for what he said—"For not-man I do not indeed call a noun, but it is an infinite noun of this sort"—he says that a noun signifies all things defined, whereas "not-man," although it can designate any one whatever of those things which are not men, yet what it designates is infinite and doubtful.
Nam cum multa sint quae homines non sunt,et unum quodlibet eorum significare possit quid significet ignoratur:sicut enim non currit non est verbum simpliciter,sed infinitum verbum,ita nomina cum negatione non sunt nomina,sed infinita nomina.Erunl igitur in propositionibus subjecta aut nomina,aulinfinita nomina,præter verbum autem nulla est affirmatio vel negatio planissime docuit,quæ pars orationis in simplici propositione obtineat principatum.N am si praeterverbum fieri simplex propositio non potest,constat omnemvim simplicis propositionis verba complecti.Omnis au. tem propositio aut esse, aut fuisse, aut futurum esse aut hujusmodi aliquid habebit.Nam qui dicit curro currens est dicit. Et qui dicit cucurrit, currens fuit proponit;et quid dicitcurret, currenserit. Si ergo omnis propositio, aut esse, aut fuisse, aut futurum esse,aut aliquid hujusmodi utsit enuntiatio, retinebit,, manifestum est quod præter verbum esse non possit.Hæc enim,id est,fuit vel est,aut futurum est, verba sunt, ut ex his cognosci possit quae sunt superius posita atque confessa,cum diceremus verba esse quæ coosignificarent tempus. Etenim est,et fuit, et Coetera significationem temporis secum trahunt.
For since there are many things that men are not, and any one of them can signify something, it is unknown what it signifies; for just as "does not run" is not a verb simply, but an infinite verb, so names with negation are not names, but infinite names. Therefore, in propositions the subjects are either names or infinite names, but apart from a verb there is no affirmation or negation—he has most plainly taught which part of speech holds the principal place in a simple proposition. For if a simple proposition cannot be made apart from a verb, it is established that all the force of a simple proposition involves verbs. But every proposition will have either "is," or "was," or "will be," or something of this kind. For he who says "I run" says that he is running. And he who says "I ran" proposes that he was running; and he who says "I will run" that he will be running. If, therefore, every proposition either is, or was, or will be, or announces something of this kind, it will retain it, it is manifest that it cannot be apart from a verb. For these, that is, "was" or "is," or "will be," are verbs, so that from these it can be recognized what was placed and conceded above, when we said that verbs are those which signify time along with their meaning. For "is," and "was," and the rest carry with them the signification of time.
Quare prima erit alfirmatio et negatio,est homo,non est orno, deinde est non homo, non est nora homo. Rursus,est omnis homo,non est omnis homo,est omnis non homo, non est omnis non homo.Et in extrinsecus temporibus eadem est ratio.
Simplicium exempla propositionum apposuit, simplices autem supra diximus esse propositiones quae duobus terminis jungerentur. Quare quoniam omne definitum prius est infiuito nomine, et non homo non est nomen, sed infinitum nomen,homo vero finitum recte priores eas propositiones quae ex definito sunt nomine in eorum pronuntiavit exemplis; ait enim, Quare prima est affirm alia et negalio,est homo, non est hom.o.Deinde infiniti nominis affirmationes et negationes subjunxit dicens, Est non homo, non est non homo. post hæc, universalitatem jungens, easdem rursus iterat propositiones Et prius illas proponit quae ex finito nomine sunt; secundo vero loco eas quæ ex infinito nomine proponuntur, unde fit ut illud intelligere necesse sit, illas quantitates quae universales et particulares determinant, in terminis non haberi.
Therefore the first affirmation and negation will be "is a man," "is not a man," then "is a non-man," "is not a non-man." Again, "is every man," "is not every man," "is every non-man," "is not every non-man." And in the oblique cases of time the same account holds.
He has added examples of simple propositions, but we have said above that simple propositions are those which are joined by two terms. Therefore, since every definite thing is prior to an infinite name, and "non-man" is not a name but an infinite name, while "man" is a finite name, he has rightly pronounced those propositions which are from a definite name first in his examples; for he says, "Therefore the first affirmation and negation is 'is a man,' 'is not a man.'" Then he subjoined the affirmations and negations of the infinite name, saying, "is a non-man," "is not a non-man." After this, joining universality, he again repeats the same propositions, and first he sets forth those which are from a finite name; in the second place, however, those which are proposed from an infinite name, whence it must be understood that those quantities which determine universals and particulars are not had in the terms.
Nam cum duorum terminorum propositio sola simplex sit, inter simplices hujusmodi numerat propositionem quae dicit est omnis homo, cum tres sint partes orationis, quare determinationes non numerantur in terminis.Eodem modo dicit eademque ratione in extrinsecustemporibus simplices fieri propositiones,ut 6sl,fuit homo,non fuit homo, fuit non homo,non fuit non homo.Etin aliis quoque temporibus idem modus est.Extrinsecus vero tempara vocat quæ sunt præter præsens,id est præteritum etfuturum;sed hic de his solis propositionibus locutus est quae unum subjectum habent, alterum prædicatum. Nunc de his loquetur quae unum habent subjeetum,duo prædicata.An vero bæ quoque simplices sint,in secunda? editionis expositione dicendum est. Nunc vero praeter demonstrationem, esse simplices intelligamus.
Quando autem est tertium,adjacens prædicatur,dupUciter tunc dicuntur oppositiones.Dico antem, ut est justus homo est, tertium dico adjacere nomen vel verbum in affirmatione.Quare quatuvr erunt istæ quarum duæ quidem ad affirmationem et negationem se habebunt secundum consequentiam,ut privationes,duæ vero minime.Dico autem quoniam est, aut justo adjecebit, nul non justo,quare etiam negatio. Quatuor ergo erunt.Intelligimus vero quod dicitur ex his quæ subscripta SUllt. Est justus homo.Hujus negafio: Non est justus homo.Est non just us horno.
For since a proposition of two terms alone is simple, he counts among simple propositions of this kind the proposition which says "every man is," although there are three parts of speech, so that determinations are not counted among the terms. In the same way and by the same reasoning he says that propositions are made simple with respect to extrinsic times, as "was a man," "was not a man," "was a non-man," "was not a non-man." And in other times too the same pattern holds. But he calls extrinsic times those which are beyond the present, that is, past and future; but here he has spoken only of those propositions which have one subject and the other predicate. Now he will speak of those which have one subject and two predicates. But whether these too are simple must be said in the exposition of the second edition. For now, without demonstration, let us understand that they are simple.
But when there is a third term, and it is predicated as adjacent, then the oppositions are said in two ways. I say "as is a just man is," I say that a third term, a noun or a verb, is adjacent in the affirmation. Wherefore there will be four of these, of which two will stand in relation to affirmation and negation according to consequence, as privations, but two not at all. I say "is," either it will be added to "just," or to "not just," wherefore also the negation. There will therefore be four. But we understand what is said from those which are written below. "A just man is." Its negation: "A just man is not." "A non-just man is.
Hujus negatio, non est nora jstus homo.Est enim hoc loco et non est justo et non justo adjacet.Hæc igitur,quemadmodum in resolutoriis dictum est,sic sunt disposita.Similiter autem se habent;et si universalis nominis sil affirmatio, ut omnis est homo justus, negatlo, non omnis est homo justus.Omnis est homo non justus, non omnis est homo non Justus. Sed non similiter angulares contingit veras esse. Contingit autem aliquando.
Unum subjectum etduo prædicata,quemadmodum possint esse in propositione commemurat. Si enim hoc modo sit.ut dicamus est justus homo,est eLjustus prædicatum, homo veru subjectum est. Nunc enim non illud aspiciamus,quid prius,quid posterius dictumest,sed quoniam universaliusest justum esse quam hominem,potest enimjustus esse et qui homo non est,ut Deus, et rursus potest esse simpliciter, et quod homo non est,idcirco est atquejustusquanquam primo dicanturin eo quod est,est justus homo, tamen quoniam universaliora sunt, non de his homo,sed hæc de homine prædicantur,ethis homo subjectus est. Ex his igitur duplicem fieri oppositionem dicit,et quatuor propositiones,quarum subterexempla subjecitaddens:Dico au quoniam est aut justo adjacebil,aut non justo.
Its negation is "not every man is just." For here "is" and "is not" are placed alongside "just" and "not just." These things, then, are arranged in this way, as was said in the Resolutoria. They are related similarly also if the affirmation is of a universal name, as "every man is just," and the negation "not every man is just"; "every man is not just," "not every man is not just." But it does not happen that the angular propositions are true in a similar way. Yet it sometimes happens.
One subject and two predicates, how they can be reckoned together in a proposition. For if it is in this way, so that we say "a just man is," "just" is the predicate, but "man" is the subject. For now let us not look at what was said first and what afterward, but since "to be just" is more universal than "man"—for he who is not a man can be just, as God, and again it can be simply, and what is not a man, for that reason it is and is just—although they are said first in "a just man is," nevertheless, since they are more universal, "man" is not predicated of these, but these of "man," and "man" is the subject to these. From these, therefore, he says a double opposition is made, and four propositions, examples of which he set down below, adding: I say "is" is adjacent either to "just" or to "not just.
Si quis enim dicat faciens duas affirmationes, est justus homo,est non justus homo,hæc,cum dux affirmationes sint,duas habebunt negationes.Nam si verbum estinhaepropositione quae dicit,est justus homo, ad justum posuimus. Et in hac rursus propositione quae dicit, est non justus homo, rursus ad non justum idem est verbumjunximus:quoniam negationis oppositionern effecit cura est verbo juncta negatio,id est. non, manifestum est quoniam id quod dicitur non est adjustum rursus et ad nonjustum adjugendum est, ut negationes fiant hujus modi,non est justus homo, non est non justus homo.Rects igitur dixit:Quare si est justo et non justo adjp.cebit,etiam negatio justo et non justo adjacebit Sunt autem propositiones quas dicit quatuor hæ, est justus homo: in hac affirmatione ad justum verbum est adjunximus; hujus est negatio,non est justus homo. In hac quoque negatione quae dicit non est, ad justum rursus adjunximus.Iterum,est non justus bomo.Io hac,est ad non justum jungitur;hujus est negatio,non est non justus homo:etiam in bac quoque negatione quæ dicit, non est,ad non justum ponitur.Quod vero ait: Dico autem, ut est justus homo,est tertium adjacere his nomen vel verbum in affirmatione,hujusmodi est. Tertium,inquit, dico, id est, adjacere verbum est.
For if anyone, making two affirmations, says "a just man is" and "a not-just man is," these, since they are two affirmations, will have two negations. For if we have placed the word "is" in this proposition which says "a just man is" alongside "just," and again in this proposition which says "a not-just man is" we have again joined the same word "is" to "not-just"—since the negation joined to the word "is," that is "not," has produced the opposition of negation—it is clear that what is said "is not" must again be added both to "just" and to "not-just," so that negations of this kind are made: "a just man is not," "a not-just man is not." Rightly, therefore, he said: "Wherefore if 'is' will be adjacent to 'just' and 'not-just,' the negation also will be adjacent to 'just' and 'not-just.'" Now the four propositions of which he speaks are these: "a just man is"—in this affirmation we have joined the word "is" to "just"; its negation is "a just man is not." In this negation too, which says "is not," we have again joined it to "just." Again, "a not-just man is"—in this, "is" is joined to "not-just"; its negation is "a not-just man is not"; and in this negation also, which says "is not," it is placed alongside "not-just." But what he says—"I mean, as 'a just man is,' that a third thing, a noun or a verb, is adjacent in the affirmation"—is of this sort. "A third thing," he says, "I mean," that is, the verb "is" is adjacent.
Homo enim et justus duo sunt,quibus adjiciturverbum est.ldcirco autem dixit nomen vel verbum,quia superius quoque docuit ipsa verba nomina esse,eo scilicetloco ubi ait,Ipsa quidem verba secundum se dicta nomina sunt. Quod autem sequitur continet difficillimum sensum.quem ipse solitabrevitate perstrinxit. In medio namque totius sensus addidit: Quare idcirco quatuor istae erunt, quarum duae ad affirmationem et negationem sese habebunt ad consequentiam,ut privationes,duæ vero minime.Bujus sententiæ multiplex expositio ab Alexandro et Porpbyno, Aspasio quoque et Hermino proditur, in, quibus quid excellentissimus expositorum Porpbyrius dixerit,alias dicemus.Quoniam vero simplicior explanatio Alexandri essevidetur,eam nunc pro brevitate subjecimus. Privatoriæ propositiones sunt quaecunque prædicant privationem.Privatio autem est,ul si quis dicat injustus. privat enim hominem justitia. Ergo affirmatio privat6ria est quæ dicit, homo est injustus.Negatio rursus privatoria est,non est homo injustus. eneque ansignificatione plena affirmatio est (aliquid enim tollit), sed privatoria affirmatio,quoniam formam quidem affirmationis tenet, sed privationem prædicat,et aliquid ab eo cui privationem copulat abjungit,ut in propositione est injustus homo,ab homine justitiam.Nec his rursus pura negatio est.Fugansenim privationem, ut in ea quæ est,non est homo injustus,habitum reti.
For "man" and "just" are two things, to which the verb "is" is added. And for this reason he said "noun or verb," because above he also taught that the verbs themselves are names, namely in that place where he says, "The verbs themselves, spoken by themselves, are names." But what follows contains a very difficult sense, which he himself touched upon briefly. For in the middle of the whole sense he added: "Wherefore for this reason there will be four of these, of which two will stand in relation to affirmation and negation by way of consequence, as privations, but two not at all." The manifold exposition of this sentence is handed down by Alexander and Porphyry, and also by Aspasius and Herminus; in which [expositions], what the most excellent of expositors, Porphyry, said, we shall discuss elsewhere. But since the explanation of Alexander seems simpler, we have now appended it for brevity's sake. Privative propositions are whatever predicate a privation. But a privation is, for example, if someone says "unjust"; for it deprives a man of justice. Therefore the privative affirmation is the one that says, "a man is unjust." Again the privative negation is, "a man is not unjust." For neither is the affirmation full in signification (for it takes something away), but it is a privative affirmation, since it holds indeed the form of an affirmation, but predicates a privation, and separates something from that to which it joins the privation, as in the proposition "an unjust man," it separates justice from the man. Nor again is the negation in these pure. For it shuns the privation, as in that [proposition], "a man is not unjust," it has retained the state.
net,id est justitiam. Sed quoniam quod affirmatio prædicabat., hoc aufert negatio, licet habeat talis negatio,quasi reponendi habitus significationem,tamen quia ipsa privationem subtrahit,privatoria negatio nominatur. Ergo nunc hoc dicit: Cum sint, inquit,qllatuor proposiUonea,quarum dux ex finitimis nominibus sunt., ut est justus homo, non est justus homo, uxex infinitis nominibus, ut est non Justus homo, non est non justus homo, dux, inquit, hæ quarum una affirmatio est, habens infinitum nomen, ut est non justus homo, et una negatio habens rursus infinitum nomen,ut non est non justus homo, sic se habent ad affirmationem et nega.tionem,id est,eamdem formam retinentafnrmationis et negationis,et similes sunt ad affirm andum aliquid vel negandum his quae sunt privatoriæ. Nam quemadmodum privatoria quae dicit est injustud homo non solum affirmatio est, sed privatoria d'firmatio, ita quoque ea quae dicit est non justus homo non solum est affirmatio, sed cum infinito nomine, et cum aliqua privatione affirmatio. Idem enim valet ad intelligentiam quod dicitur injustus, tanquam si dicatur noa justus.Et rursus quemadmodum non est injustus homo,non est solum negatio sed privatoria negatio,quoniam quamquam det habiturn,tamen privationem negat, ita quoque et ea quae est exinfinitio nomine, non est non justus homo, non solum est negatio,sed ex infinito facta nomine, infinitum negans.
not "justice." But since a negation takes away what an affirmation was predicating, although such a negation has, as it were, the signification of a habit that is to be restored, nevertheless, because it itself removes the privation, it is called a privative negation. So now he says this: Since, he says, there are four propositions, of which two are from finite names, as "just man," "not just man," and two from infinite names, as "not just man," "not not just man," these two, he says, of which one is an affirmation having an infinite name, as "not just man," and one a negation having again an infinite name, as "not not just man," stand in the same relation to affirmation and negation, that is, they retain the same form of affirmation and negation, and they are similar for affirming or denying something to those which are privative. For just as the privative proposition which says "unjust man" is not only an affirmation but a privative affirmation, so too the one which says "not just man" is not only an affirmation but an affirmation with an infinite name and with some privation. For what is said as "unjust" has the same force for understanding as if "not just" were said. And again, just as "not unjust man" is not only a negation but a privative negation, since although it grants the habit, it nevertheless denies the privation, so too the one which is from an infinite name, "not not just man," is not only a negation but, made from an infinite name, a negation of the infinite.
Quia igitur infinitum negat, et subjectum infinito negando privat,privatoriæ similis est. Nam si idem valet injustum esse quod non justum, idem valebit non esse injuslum quod non esse non justum.Igitur hae duae quae infinitum nomen habent,quantum ad speciemformamque afCrmalionis et negationis similiter se habent his quæ sunt privatoriæ affirmationes. Duae vero ilIæ quae simplex definitumque praedicant nomen, ab omni similitudine privationum seclusae sunt. Nihil enim similis est illa quae dicit, est justus homo, ei quae dicit, est injustas homo,cum utræque sint affirmationes,sed illa est simplex, illa privatoria.At vero ea qua? dicit, non est justus homo, ad eam quæ dicit, non est injustus homo, nulla rationis similitudine conjungitur,cum sint utraeque negationes; sed illa est simplex, illa privatoria: quare quæ ex infinito nomine sunt,simililer sese habent quemadmodum privationes, similis namque affirmatio est ea quae dicit,esl non justus bomo,ei quæ dicil,est injustus homo. Et rursus ea quae dicit, non est non justus homo, ei qua; dicit, non est injustus bomo, privationesvero simplicibus propositionibus et his quae ex finitis nominibus fiunt, non conjunguntur. Neque enim quisquam dixerit eam quæ dicit, est justus homo, esse comparem ei quæ dicit, est injustus homo,nec vero eam qua: dicit,non est justus homo?
Therefore, because it negates "infinite" and by negating deprives the subject of the infinite, it is similar to a privative. For if "to be unjust" means the same as "not to be just," then "not to be unjust" will mean the same as "not to be not just." So these two [propositions] that contain the infinite name, as regards the species and form of affirmation and negation, stand in the same relation as those which are privative affirmations. But those two which predicate a simple and definite name are cut off from all similarity to privations. For that [proposition] which says "a man is just" is in no way similar to that which says "a man is unjust," although both are affirmations; but the one is simple, the other privative. But that [proposition] which says "a man is not just" is joined to that which says "a man is not unjust" by no similarity of reason, although both are negations; but the one is simple, the other privative. Wherefore those [propositions] that come from an infinite name stand in the same relation as privations; for the affirmation which says "a man is not just" is similar to that which says "a man is unjust." And again, that which says "a man is not not just" [is similar] to that which says "a man is not unjust." But privations are not joined to simple propositions and to those which are formed from finite names. For no one would say that the [proposition] which says "a man is just" is on a par with that which says "a man is unjust," nor indeed that which says "a man is not just.
posse aliquid comparari cum ea quæ dicit, non est injustus homo.Recte ergo dictum est de his quatuor propositionibusduasad affirmationem et negationem ita se habere, ut sunt privationes; duas vero esse simplices,et præter aliquam privationum simHitudinem. Quod autem aaconsequentiam,tanquam dixisset ad similitudinem, ita debet intelligi. Quas enim sibi sunt similia,a se quodammodo non recedunt et se invicem consequuntur.Describuntur ergo duæ prius simplices propositiones,post has duæ privatoriæ,postremo quæ infinitis nominibus constant, utaffirmationes sub.affirmalionibus,negationes sub negationibus constituantur. Sed hæ,inquit,ita sunt dispositae eamdemque ad se simililudinem gerunt,quemadmodum in Analyticis id est resolutoriis. dictum est.Scripsit autem duos resolutorios libros de Syllogismo. In uorum primo de propositionum ex finito nomine et infinito consequentia disseruit.Est vero similitudo affirmativæ quidem simplicis ex finilo nomine, et negativæ ejus quæ habet infinitum nomen.Namque ea quæ dicit; est justus homo,affil'matio,ei quae dicit,non est non justus homo, negationi similis est. Negatio quoque simplex finiti nominis,affirmationi infiniti nominis convenit. Ea enim quae dicit, non est justus homo, similis est ei qua; dicit, est non justus homo.
...that something can be compared with what it states, he is not an unjust man. Correctly, therefore, it has been said concerning these four propositions that two stand to affirmation and negation as privations do, while two are simple and without any resemblance to privations. But what he adds concerning consequence, as if he had spoken by way of resemblance, must be understood thus: for things that are similar to one another do not in some way depart from one another and follow one another in turn. Therefore the two simple propositions are described first, after these the two privative ones, and lastly those that consist of infinite names, so that affirmations are set under affirmations and negations under negations. But these, he says, are so arranged and bear the same resemblance to one another as was said in the Analytics, that is, the Resolutoria. For he wrote two books of Resolutoria concerning the syllogism. In the first of these he discussed the consequence of propositions from a finite name and an infinite name. Now there is a resemblance between the simple affirmative proposition from a finite name and the negative proposition that has an infinite name. For the one that says "he is a just man" is an affirmation, and it is similar to the negation that says "he is not a non-just man." The simple negation of a finite name also agrees with the affirmation of an infinite name. For the one that says "he is not a just man" is similar to the one that says "he is a non-just man.
Sed quemadmodum ista; sibi sint similes,et quomodo in consequentia proprium teneant ordinem,nunc quidem exsequi distulimus,paulisper tamen describantur, ut earum quaedam proprietas ostendatur. Sit enim affirmatio finiti nominis,et sub ea negatio nominis inl1niti.Sit item negatio finiti nominis,et sub ea aFfirmatio nominis infiniti.
Affirmatio. Est justus homo. Non est justus homo. Negatio.
Negatio. Non est homo.non justus
Est non justus. Affirmatio. homo.
Inhacigiturdescriptionenegatioexinfinito nomine sub affirmatione finiti nominis ponitur,et rursus affirmatio infiniti nominis sub negatione finiti,quarum angulares,quoniam sunt indefinitæ,omnes simul in omnibus verae esse possunt, nisi in his tantum quæ aut' naturaliter insunt, aut naturaliter inesse non possunt,ut si quis dicat,est homo animal,nunquam cum hac vera esse potest: illa quae dicit, est homo non animal, uxest angularis, idcirco quoniam animal naturaliterin substantia hominis perspicitur inhærere.Rursus siquis dicat,es homo lapis,est homo non lapis,ne hæc quidem simul veræ esse possunt idcirco quod lapidem inesse homini naturaliter impossibile est. Quod si hujusmodi sunt.
But in what way these are similar to one another, and how they keep their proper order in consequence, we have postponed to pursue for now; yet let them be described for a little while, so that a certain property of them may be shown. For let there be the affirmation of a finite name, and under it the negation of an infinite name. Let there be likewise the negation of a finite name, and under it the affirmation of an infinite name.
Affirmation. A just man is. A just man is not. Negation.
Negation. Not a man, not just.
A non-just [man] is. Affirmation. A man.
In this description, therefore, the negation from an infinite name is placed under the affirmation of a finite name, and again the affirmation of an infinite name under the negation of a finite one; their angular [opposites], since they are indefinite, can all at once be true in all cases, except only in those which either naturally inhere or naturally cannot inhere, as if someone should say, a man is an animal, this can never be true together with that which says, a man is not an animal, which is angular, for the reason that animal is perceived naturally to inhere in the substance of man. Again, if someone should say, a man is a stone, a man is not a stone, not even these can be true at the same time, for the reason that it is naturally impossible for a stone to inhere in a man. But if they are of this sort.
quæ non insint naturaliter, sed inesse possint,ut inhis quae supra posuimus exemplis, angulares verae sunt semper.Polest enim vera esse et ea quæ dicit,estju" atus homo,el ea quae dicit, est nonjustus homo.Rursus potest vera esse quæ dicil,non est justus homo, si hoc de Sylla dicatur,et ea quae dicit, non est non justus homo, Eli hoc de Catone praedicetur. In his igitur quae sunt indefinitæ, si ea quae praedicantur naturaliter non insunt, sed ea ines;e possibile est, semer angulares simul veras esse contingit.Quod si hujusmodi propositiones cum definitione ponamus ita dicendum est:est omnis homo justus,hujus ncgatio,non est omnis homo justus. Rursus,est omnis homo non justus,hujus negatio,non estomnis homo non justus, quae disponantur hoc modo,ut negatio sub affirmatione sit,et sub negatione affirmatio.
Affirmatio. hst omnis homo justus.
But those things which are not present naturally, yet can be present, as in the examples we set out above, the angular propositions are always true. For both what it says can be true—"the man is just"—and what it says—"the man is not just." Again, what it says can be true—"the man is not just"—if this is said of Sylla, and also what it says—"the man is not not-just"—if this is predicated of Cato. In these indefinite propositions, then, if the things predicated are not present naturally but can be present, it happens that the angular propositions are always true together. But if we set down propositions of this kind with a definition, it must be said thus: "every man is just"; its negation, "not every man is just." Again, "every man is not just"; its negation, "not every man is not just"—which are to be arranged in such a way that the negation is under the affirmation, and the affirmation under the negation.
Affirmation: every man is just.
Non est omnis Negatio. homo justus.
Negatio. Non est omnis j justns.homo non
Estomnis homo.Affirmatio. non justus.
In his ergo quamdam dissimilitudinem monstrat. Nam in indefinitis si ea quæ prædicantur naturaliter non inessent,esse tamen in subjectis possent,semper angulares simul veras esse sine dubio contingebat.Nam et affirmationes affirmationibus et negationes negationibus conveniebant. In his autem quae eum diffinitione quantitatis dicuntur,non idem modus est. Affirmationes enim affirmationibus nulla ratione junguntur.Nam si vera sit ea quae dicit,est omnis homojustus,nunquam vera esse potest ea quas dicit,et omnis homo nonjustus,quæ est angularis,et hoc discrepare in nullo reperieturexemplo.Negatione autem particulares, quae sunt sibi angulares, simul veras esse contingit.Potest enim verum esse in his quae naturaliter non sunt,et possibilia sunt in esse, ut negatio particulari negationi particulari ei quæ est angularis conveniat,ut ea quae est,non est omnis homo justus,ei quae est augularis conveniat,non est omnis homo non justus,sed hoc dissimiliterquam in indefinitis. Nam in illis et ea quæ dicit, est justus homo,ei quae dicit, est non justus homo, angulari scilicet, conveniebat.
Not every negation: "man is just."
Negation: "Not every man is just." Man not.
"Every man" — Affirmation: "not just."
In these, therefore, he shows a certain dissimilarity. For in indefinite propositions, if the things predicated were not present naturally, yet could be present in the subjects, it would without doubt always happen that the angular propositions are true together. For both affirmations agreed with affirmations and negations with negations. But in those which are stated with the determination of quantity, the same mode does not hold. For affirmations are joined with affirmations by no reckoning. For if that which says "every man is just" is true, that which says "every man is not just," which is the angular proposition, can never be true, and this will be found to differ in no example. But with a negation, the particular propositions which are angular to it can happen to be true together. For it can be true in those things which are not naturally present and are possible to be, so that a negation agrees with a particular negation that is angular to it—as "not every man is just" agrees with the angular proposition "not every man is not just"—but this dissimilarly than in indefinite propositions. For in those, both what says "the man is just" agreed with what says "the man is not just," namely the angular proposition.
Rursus ea quæ dicit, non est non justus homo,ei quæ est, non est justus homo, angulariter positae congruebat.ln his autem, id est secundum quantitatem definitis,arfirmationes quidem duae universales, quae sunt, est omnis homo justus,et est omnis homo non justus,nunquam simul vera? esse possunt,angulares autem negationes quae particulares sunt, id est, non est omnis bomo justus,et non est omnis homo non justus, in his quæ et esse et non esse possibilia sunt,simul verse sunt., Non ergo similiter in his quae sunt definitæ,angulares sibimet congruunt,ut in his quae definitae sunt. Quod per hoc demonstratquodait: Sed non similiter angulares contingit veras esse.In illis enim sibimet utrasque consentiuntangu]ares,in his autem angulares quidem affirmativas nunquam simul veras esse contingit.Alias vero angulares quae sunt particulares negationes contingit aliquando. Hoc enim ipsius declarant verba dicentis: Sed non:similiter angulares, contingit veras esse.Contingit autem al iquando.Non similiter quidem contingit veras esse, idcirco quod affirmationes universales, 'angulares veræ nunquan sunt,quod in his quæ indefinitæ sunt, conlingebat. Contingereautem aliquando dixit,cum angularium,quæ sunt particulares negationes,facimus comparationem,si ea quæ prædicantur non sint naturalia subjectis,sed tamen inesse possibilia.
Again, the statement "not is not just man" corresponded angularly with the statement "not is just man." But in these, that is, in propositions defined according to quantity, the two universal affirmations, which are "every man is just" and "every man is not just," can never be true at the same time; but the angular negations, which are particular, that is, "not every man is just" and "not every man is not just," in those things which are possible both to be and not to be, are true at the same time. Therefore the angular propositions do not correspond to one another in the same way in those which are defined, as they do in those which are defined. He demonstrates this by what he says: "But it does not happen that angular propositions are true in the same way." For in those, the angular propositions agree with one another on both sides; but in these, it does not happen that the angular affirmations are ever true at the same time. But the other angular propositions, which are particular negations, sometimes do happen to be true. For the words of the one saying this declare it: "But not in the same way do angular propositions happen to be true. But sometimes they do happen." They do not happen to be true in the same way for this reason, that the universal affirmations, which are angular, are never true, which was happening in those which are indefinite. But he said "sometimes happen" when we make a comparison of the angular propositions, which are particular negations, if the things predicated are not natural to the subjects, but are nevertheless possible to be in them.
Hæ igzlur duæ oppositæ sunt, alix autem ad id quod est non homo,quasi subjectum aliquod additum: ut,est justus non homo,non est justus non homo. Est non justus non homo, MOM est non justus non homo. Magis autem plures hisnon sunt oppositiones,hæ autem extra illa ipsæ secundum se erunt ut nomine utentes eo quod est non homo.
Alias nobis rursus esse propositiones ostendit, quarum aliis quidem nos prædicatum,sed subjectum infinitum sit, aliis utrumque. Si quis enim dicat, est justus non homo,quoniam non homo subjectum est, et est infinitum nomen,vocatur propositiofacta ex infinito subjecto:idem est et in negatione quae est, non esustus non homo.At vero sunt aliæ propositiones quae et ex praedicato et ex subjecto infinitis esse videantur, ut est cum dicimus, est non justus non homo, non est nonjustus non homo. In his enim non justus praedicatum ent, non homo subjectum.
These two, then, are opposed; but the others are opposed with respect to "not man" as though it were some added subject: as "just not man is," "just not man is not"; "not just not man is," "not just not man is not." But there are more oppositions than these; these, however, beyond those, will be according to themselves, using "not man" as a name.
He shows again that there are other propositions for us, of which in some the predicate is infinite but the subject is infinite, in others both. For if anyone says "just not man is," since "not man" is the subject and is an infinite name, the proposition is called one made from an infinite subject; the same holds in the negation which is "not just not man is." But there are other propositions which appear to be from both an infinite predicate and an infinite subject, as when we say "not just not man is," "not just not man is not." For in these "not just" will be the predicate, "not man" the subject.
Sed utraque sunt infinita;unde fit ut in his proposltionibus in quibus est verbum tertium prædicatum, magis plures propositionesquam hæ quæ dictæ sunt inveniri non possint.Aut enim ex utrisque erit finitis, praedicato scilicet et subjecto,ut est homo justus,non esthomo justus; aut solum praedicatum habebit infinitum,ut est non justus homo, non est non justus homo;aut praedicatum quidem finitum erit, infinitum'vero subjectum,ut est justus non homo non est Justus non homo;aut et prædicatum et subjectumnna proponuntur, uesnon Justus non bomo, non est non justus non homo; ultra autem propositiones, in quibus est verbum tertium prædicatum sit inveniri non possunt.Sed hæ qua? subjectum infinitum habent, vel utrumque infmitur, praeter illas superiores sunt,quæ aut prædicatum infinitum habent,aut utraque finita,atque ideo extra illas esse dicuntur,et nullam ad eas consequentiam servant, et est ita positum in ea propositione quae dicit,est justus non homo, nomen infinitum quod est non homo, tanquam si finitum nomen aliquod poneretur. Atque hocest quod ait,Utnomine utentes non homo ita enim infinitum nomen positum est,tanquam si finitum nomen esset positum,nominis enim locum tenet;uanuam etiam cum itapositum sit,nihilominus tamen nomen sit:infinitum enim nomen licet simpliciter nomen non sit,tamen cum infinito junctum nomen est.
But both are infinite; hence it comes about that in those propositions in which the verb is the third predicate, more propositions than those that have been stated cannot be found. For either both will be finite, namely the predicate and the subject, as "man is just," "man is not just"; or only the predicate will be infinite, as "not just man is," "not just man is not"; or the predicate will indeed be finite but the subject infinite, as "just not man is," "just not man is not"; or both the predicate and the subject are proposed as infinite, as "not just not man is," "not just not man is not"; but beyond the propositions in which the verb is the third predicate, no more can be found. But these which have an infinite subject, or both infinite, are beyond those former ones which have either an infinite predicate or both finite, and therefore are said to be outside them, and they preserve no consequence to them, and it is so posited in that proposition which says "just not man is," the infinite name which is "not man," just as if some finite name were posited. And this is what he says: "as using the name 'not man'"—for thus the infinite name is posited, just as if a finite name had been posited; for it holds the place of a name, although even when it is so posited, it is nevertheless a name; for an infinite name, although it is not simply a name, yet when joined with an infinite [term] it is a name.
In his vero in quibus est non convenit,ut eo quod est curreve, vel ambulare,idem facit sic positum, ac si est adderetur,ut,Currit omnis homo,noncurrit omnis homo. Currit omnis non homo, non currit omnisnon homo.Non enim dicendum est non omnis homo,sed non negationem ad id quod est homo addendum est. Omnisenim non universate significat,sed quoniam universaliter. Manitestum est autem ex eo quod est:Currit homo,non currit homo. Currit non homo, non currit non. Hæc enim ab illis differunt,eo quod universaliter non sunt.Quare omnis vel nullus, nihil consignificat aliud, nisi quod universaliter de nomine,vei affirmationem,vel negationem.Ergo et cætem eadem oportet opponi.
Sunt,inquit, quaedam propositiones,quæ cum est prædicantur. Aliæ vero quas cum est verbo prædicare non possumus, ut in eoquod dicimus homo ambu]at,homo currit. Sed in his nihil differt an ita quis dicat,ut dicitur, id est homo currit, et homo ambulat,an cum est verbo eas prædicet,idem namque est dicere, homo currit et homo ambulat,tanquam si dicatur,bomo currens est,homo ambulans est.
But in those cases in which "is" does not fit, as in "to run" or "to walk," it makes the same result when put in this way as if "is" were added, for example: "Every man runs," "Every man does not run"; "Every non-man runs," "Every non-man does not run." For one should not say "not every man," but the negation "not" must be added to that which is "man." For "every" signifies not universality but that it is universally. And it is evident from this: "A man runs," "A man does not run"; "A non-man runs," "A non-man does not run." For these differ from those in that they are not universal. Wherefore "every" or "no one" signifies nothing else than that the affirmation or negation is universal concerning the name. Therefore the rest also ought to be opposed in the same way.
He says there are certain propositions which are predicated with "is." But there are others which we cannot predicate with the verb "is," as in what we say: "A man walks," "A man runs." But in these it makes no difference whether someone speaks thus, as is said, that is, "A man runs" and "A man walks," or predicates them with the verb "is"; for it is the same to say "A man runs" and "A man walks" as if it were said "A man running is," "A man walking is.
Quocirca nihil differt in hujusmodi propositionibus utrum cum est verbo,an praeter est adjuncto verbi actu proponatur.Idem quoque est etiam in universalibus.Nam cum dicimus omnis homo curritomnis homo non currit, et rursus omnis non homo currit, omnis non homo non currit, idem est tanquam si dicamus, omnis homo currens est,et omnis homo currens non est, et rursus omnis non homo currens est, omnis non homo currens non est. Docel. autem illud quoque multum differre an ad positum terminum jungatur negatio,an certe ad determinationem: nam si ad subjectum terminum dicitur, fit nomen infinitum, ut est omnis non homo currit, si ad determinationem fit negatio, ut est non omnis homo currit; unde fit ut si non ad determinationem univeraalem, sed ad rem ac terminum negatio ponatur, ait infinitum nomen, ut est non homo. Quod si non ad rem universalem, sed ad determinationem uni.
Therefore in propositions of this kind it makes no difference whether the verb "is" is joined, or whether the act of the verb is set forth without the addition of "is." The same holds also in universal propositions. For when we say "Every man runs," "Every man does not run," and again "Every non-man runs," "Every non-man does not run," it is the same as if we said "Every man is running," "Every man is not running," and again "Every non-man is running," "Every non-man is not running." But it makes a great difference whether the negation is joined to the term that has been posited, or rather to the determination; for if it is spoken with respect to the subject term, an infinite noun results, as in "Every non-man runs"; if the negation is applied to the determination, as in "Not every man runs." Hence it comes about that if the negation is placed not with respect to the universal determination but with respect to the thing and the term, he calls it an infinite noun, as in "non-man." But if not with respect to the universal thing, but with respect to the determination of the uni—
versalem, negatio est: cum enim dicimus,non omnis,omnis quidem universale non est, sed consignificatquoniam illud de quo dicituruniversaliter dicitur, ut cum dicimus, omnis homo, homo quidem ipsum universale est, omnis vero non est quidem universale, sed consignificat, quoniam res universalis,id est homo, u niversaliter dicta est;ergo quoties ad determinationem quæ rem quamlibet universalem universaliter dictam demonstrat,negaLio ponitur,nonnomen infinitum,sed negationem cOlistituit,atque hoc est quod ait: Non enim dicendumest, non omnisbomo,sed nonnegationem ad id quod est homo addendum est, omnis enim non universale signat, sed quoniam universaIiter.lpsum enimomnis non est universalis terminus,nec omnino terminus, sed universali prædicato additum, facit illud universaliter enuntiari, probat autem hos non esse universales terminos, sed tantum determinationes universaliter consignificantes hoc modo:Cum enim dicimus, currit homo, non currit homo, currit non homo,non currit non homo,universaliaquidcm subjecta sunt in his propositionibja, sed non universaliter prædicantur. Distant autem hae ab his propositionibus in quibus sic dicimus: Omnis homo currit, nullus homo currit,eo quod istae quidem universale universaliter prædicant, illæ vero universale non universa)iter.
For the negation is of the universal. For when we say "not every," "every" is indeed not a universal, but it signifies additionally that that of which it is said is said universally—as when we say "every man": "man" itself is indeed the universal, but "every" is not indeed a universal, yet it signifies additionally that the universal thing, that is "man," has been said universally. Therefore, whenever a negation is placed before the determination that shows the thing, whatever universal thing it may be, to have been said universally, it does not make an infinite name but a negation. And this is what he says: for one ought not to say "not every man," but the negation must be added to that which is "man"; for "every" signifies not a universal, but that it is universally [said]. For "every" itself is not a universal term, nor indeed a term at all, but when added to a universal predicate it makes it be enunciated universally. But he proves that these are not universal terms but only determinations signifying universally, in this way: for when we say "man runs," "man does not run," "not-man runs," "not-man does not run," the subjects in these propositions are indeed universal, but they are not predicated universally. But these differ from those propositions in which we speak thus: "every man runs," "no man runs," in that the latter indeed predicate the universal universally, while the former [predicate] the universal not universally.
Manifestum est ergo quoniam omnis et nullus non sunt universalia, sed id quod universale prædicatur faciunt ut universaliter en untietur.Quare eadem omnia ponenda sunt, currit omnis homo, si infinitum nomen volumus facere,non dicamus currit non omnis homo, sed negationem,id est non, nomini addemus,eadem in propositione cuncta servantes, si affirmationem volumus ex munito nomine facere.Quod si ad determinationem universalis rei negationem apiemus,fit non affirmatio nominis infiniti, sed propositionis ex nomine finito negatio.
Quoniam vero contraria est negatio ei quæ est,omne est animal justum,illa qua? significat,quoniam nullum est animal iustum, hæ quidem manifestum est, quod nunquam erunt,neque vere simul,neque in eodem ipso. His vero oppositæ erunt aliquando, ut non omne animal iustum est, et est aliquod animal justum.
Quoniam, inquit, hæ contrariae sunt, simul veras esse non possunt,neque in eodem,et possunt quidem vicissim et cum temporis diversitate esse veræ,simul autem esse non possunt, ut si quis dicat aureo quidem saeculo omnes homines fuissejustos, ferreo vero nullum hominem esse justum; utraeque verae esse pOBsunt,sed non eodem tempore.
It is clear, therefore, that "every" and "none" are not universals, but they make that which is predicated as universal be uttered universally. Wherefore all these things must be posited in the same way: "every man runs." If we wish to make an infinite name, let us not say "not every man runs," but we shall add the negation, that is "not," to the name, preserving all things in the proposition in the same way, if we wish to make an affirmation from an unlimited name. But if we apply the negation to the determination of a universal thing, there comes about not an affirmation of an infinite name, but the negation of a proposition from a finite name.
But since the negation is contrary to that which is "every animal is just"—namely that which signifies that no animal is just—it is manifest that these will never be true at the same time, nor in the same thing. But the opposites of these will sometimes be true, as "not every animal is just" and "some animal is just."
Since, he says, these are contraries, they cannot be true at the same time, nor in the same thing, and they can indeed be true in turn and with a diversity of time, but they cannot be at the same time—as if someone should say that in the golden age all men were just, but in the iron age no man is just; both can be true, but not at the same time.
Hoc est enim quod ait,neque verse simul,quod autem secutus est,neque in eodem in ipso scilicet subjecto,ut dicamus: Est omne vivensjustum, si referamus ad coelestes potestates, vera est.NuIlum vivensjustumest, sireferamus ad equos, utræque sunt veræ,sed non in eodem ipso,illud enim in divinis,istud in equis retinet veritatem. HIs autem quæ sunt oppositæ, id est, parti culares possuntsimul esse veræ,tunccum superiores universales sint simul falsæ. Quæ autem sunt hæ, ipse planissimo monstravit exemplo dicens: Non omneanimal justum est, quod estparticularis negatio, et est aliquod animal justum,quod est particularis affirmatio.
Sequuntur vero hæ,eam quidem qua? est,nullus est homo justus, illa quæ est;omnis est homo non justus. Illam vero quæ est,aliquis homo justus est,opposita, non omnis est homo non justus. Necesse est enim aliquem esse.
For this is what he says: "neither true at the same time"; and what follows, "nor in the same thing," namely in the same subject, so that we may say: "Every living thing is just," if we refer it to the heavenly powers, it is true. "No living thing is just," if we refer it to horses, both are true, but not in the same thing; for the one keeps its truth among divine beings, the other among horses. But of things that are opposed, that is, particulars, they can be true at the same time, when the superior universals are at the same time false. And what these are, he showed most plainly by example, saying: "Not every animal is just," which is a particular negation, and "some animal is just," which is a particular affirmation.
But these follow: the one that is "no man is just" is followed by that which is "every man is not just." But the one that is "some man is just" is followed by its opposite, "not every man is not just." For it is necessary that some man be.
Ostendit superius affirmationem universalemet universalem negationem,quoniamsibi essentcontrariæ, simul veras esse non posse. Nunc autem monstrat universali negationi nominis finiti,consentire universalem affirmationem nominis infiniti,et particulari affirmationi, quae est opposita universali negationi nominis finiti,consentire eam quae est opposita universali affirmationi nominis infiniti,scilicet particularem negationem praedicatum retinentem infinitum. Et prius describantur hoc modo:
Est autem universalis negatio ea quae dicit,nullus homo justus est, huic opposita est, contradictoriæ particularis affirmatio,quidam homo justus est Rursus universalis affirmatioestinfinitum habens prædicatum, ea quae dicit, omnis bomo non justus est, huic contradictoriæ particularis opponiturinfinitum habens prædicatum, ea quæ dicit,non omnis homo non justus est. Hæ igitur sese perimunt,sed universalis affirmatio nominis infiniti, id est, omnis homo non justus est, sequitur negationem eam quae cit, nulius homo justus est. Nam si verum est nullum esse hominem justum, verum est omnem hominem esse non justum. Sed his oppositæ rursus sibiipsaa consentiunt. Nam si verum eat.dicere quoniam quidam homo justus est, verum est dicere non omnis homo non justus est. Si enim non omnis homo non justus est, aliquem justum esse necesse est.
He showed above that the universal affirmation and the universal negation cannot be true at the same time, since they are contrary to each other. But now he shows that the universal affirmation of the infinite name agrees with the universal negation of the finite name, and that the particular affirmation which is opposed to the universal negation of the finite name agrees with that which is opposed to the universal affirmation of the infinite name, namely the particular negation retaining an infinite predicate. And first let them be set out in this way:
Now the universal negation is the one which says, "No man is just"; opposed to it contradictorily is the particular affirmation, "Some man is just." Again, the universal affirmation having an infinite predicate is the one which says, "Every man is not just"; opposed to it contradictorily is the particular [affirmation] having an infinite predicate, the one which says, "Not every man is not just." These, then, destroy each other, but the universal affirmation of the infinite name, that is, "Every man is not just," follows the negation which says, "No man is just." For if it is true that no man is just, it is true that every man is not just. But their opposites again agree with each other. For if it is true to say that some man is just, it is true to say that not every man is not just. For if not every man is not just, it is necessary that some man is just.
Manifestum est quoniam etiam in singularibus, si est verum interrogatum negare,quod et alfirmare verum est, ut, Putasne Socrates sapiens est? Non, Socrates igitur non sapiens est. In unwersalibus vero non est vern quæ similiter dicilur. Vera est aulem nellatio, ut Putasne omnis hnmo sapiens est? Non. Omnis igitur horno non sapiens est, hoc enim est falsum; sed non igitur omnis horno sapiens est,vera est.Hæc enim opposita est, illa vero contraria.
Quoties aliquis, inquit, in singularibus rebus interrogat,et is qui interrogalur,negat, tunc is qui interrogat recte negationem cum singularijungens, ex infinito nomine faciet affirmationem, ut si aliquis dicat: Putasne Socrates sapiens est? contra alius respondeat, Non, erit recta conclusio dicentis: Socrates igitur non sapiens est.Ex negatione ergo respondentis et infinito nomine non sapiens, facta est affirmatio, Socrates non sapiens est, atque hoc quidem in singularibus. Quod si boc in universalibus fiat universaliter prædicatis,negationem potius fieri contingit quam affirmationem,ut si quis interroget: Putasne omnis homo sapiens?
It is clear that this also holds in singular cases: if it is true to deny what was asked, then what is affirmed is true—for example, "Do you think Socrates is wise?" "No." "Therefore Socrates is not wise." But in universal cases what is said in a similar way is not true. The negation, however, is true—for example, "Do you think every man is wise?" "No." "Therefore every man is not wise"—for this is false. But "Therefore not every man is wise" is true. For the latter is the opposite, while the former is the contrary.
Whenever, he says, someone asks about singular matters and the one who is asked denies, then the one who asks, correctly joining the negation with the singular term, will make an affirmation from the infinite name—for example, if someone says, "Do you think Socrates is wise?" and another answers to the contrary, "No," the correct conclusion of the one speaking will be: "Therefore Socrates is not wise." So from the respondent's negation and the infinite name "not wise," the affirmation "Socrates is not wise" has been made, and this indeed in singular cases. But if this is done in universal cases with universally predicated terms, a negation rather than an affirmation comes about—for example, if someone asks, "Do you think every man is wise?
ille respondeat.Non, non necesse est ita concludere ut dicatut,omnis igitur homo non sapiens est, hoc enim falsum est., nec hoc evenit necessario ex interrogati responsione Sed magis illud, non omnis homo sapiens est.Nam cum aliquis interrogat,Putasne omnis homo sapiens est, si ille neget,dicens, Non, tu concludas oportet, non omnis igitur homo sapiens est. Hoc enim ex illius responsione necesse est evenire.Sed hæc contrajacens est interrogationi, id est opposita. Interrogasti enim universalem affirmationem dicens, Putasne omnis homo animal est?respondit,Non,concludes tu particulnrem negationem,non omnis homo animal est, et haec dividit verum vel falsum.Nam si contra eam interrogationem perquam universalem affirmationem interrogasti, ille neget,ettu concludas eam propositionem quæ dicit, omnis homo igiturnon sapiens est, non potius contrajaceatem, sed contrariam facies, hæc enim quae d:eit,omnis homo non sapiens est, consentit l'i quædieit nullus homo sapiens esl.Quare nihil differt,utrum banc aliquis ex infinito numine affirmationem respondeat,an ex finito nomine universalem negationem quae cum affirmatione universali,quam interrogasti,verum falsumque non dividit. Sed illa sola concludenda sunt, in quibus unum.
Let him answer. No, it is not necessary to conclude in such a way as to say, "Therefore every man is not wise"—for this is false, nor does this follow necessarily from the respondent's answer, but rather that other: "Not every man is wise." For when someone asks, "Do you think every man is wise?" if he denies it, saying "No," you ought to conclude, "Therefore not every man is wise." For this must necessarily follow from his answer. But this is the contradictory of the question, that is, its opposite. For you asked the universal affirmation, saying, "Do you think every man is an animal?" He answered, "No"; you conclude the particular negation, "Not every man is an animal," and this divides truth and falsehood. For if you asked that question as a universal affirmation, and he denies it, and you conclude the proposition that says, "Therefore every man is not wise," you make not the contradictory but rather the contrary. For this proposition which says, "Every man is not wise," agrees with that which says, "No man is wise." Wherefore it makes no difference whether someone answers this as an affirmation from an infinite term or as a universal negation from a finite term—which negation, together with the universal affirmation you asked, does not divide truth and falsehood. But only those conclusions are to be drawn in which one [term]...
verum est, alterum fiilsum.Non igitur ita debet fieri in universalibuS, ut interrogata universali affirmatione, si alius negationem respondeat, univeralis affirmatio ex infinito nomine concludalur,sed potius particularis negatio ex nomine finito.
lllæ vera quæ sunt contrajacentes secundum infinita nomina vel verba, ait in eo quod est, non homo, uel non justus, quasi negationes sine nomine et verbo esse videbuntur, sed non sunt: semper enim vei veram esse uel (alsam necesse est negationem.Qui vero dixit non homo, non plus dicente homo, sed etiam minus, uerus uel falsus (uit. si non aliquid addatur. Cum de propositionibus ex infinitis loqueretur nominibus ipse infinita nomina sola sumpsit,et de his qualia videantur esse pertractat.Sermonum,inquit, prolationes, quae secundum contrajacentia nomina vel verba sibi oppositæ sunt,ut in eo quod dicimus, homo,non homo; currit, non currit.,quoties finitum infinito comparatur, videnturquasi quædam esse negationes.Sec ita non est, omnia namque negatio vel vera vel falsa est.Qui autem dicit non currit, et non lahorat,et non homo,neque verum aliquid enuntiavit neque falsum,et fortasse minus aliquid veri vel falsi significavit,quam is qui finitum nomen ponit.
But it is not true; the other is false. Therefore it should not be done thus in universals, that when a universal affirmation has been asked and another answers with a negation, a universal affirmation should be concluded from an infinite name, but rather a particular negation from a finite name.
Those things, however, which are opposed according to infinite names or verbs—he says in the case of "not man" or "not just"—will seem to be, as it were, negations without a name and verb, but they are not; for a negation must always be either true or false. But he who says "not man" has not said more than one who says "man," but even less, and has been true or false only if something is added. When he was speaking about propositions formed from infinite names, he himself took infinite names alone, and discusses what sort of things they appear to be. The utterances of speech, he says, which are opposed to one another according to contrary names or verbs—as when we say "man," "not man"; "runs," "does not run"—whenever a finite is compared with an infinite, appear to be, as it were, certain negations. But it is not so; for every negation is either true or false. But he who says "does not run," and "does not work," and "not man," has enunciated neither anything true nor false, and perhaps has signified something less of truth or falsehood than he who posits a finite name.
Nam qui finitum nomen constituit, nihil quidem adhuc verum falsumve enuntiavit,sed quoniam quiddam finitum posuit,propinquior est hujusmodi prolatio ad veritatem,quæ aliquid finitum ponit, ea prolatione quæ aliquid infinitum.Sicut illa aliquid signant propinquiora sunt ad enuntiationem faciendam his quæ nihil significant, quare in his quæ infinita sunt; minus illa veritas falsitasve perspicitur, quam in his omnibus quæ sunt finita. Ac multo magis nihil adhuc verum falsumve designat, id quod dicitur non homo, vel non currit, nisi aliquid addatur, quod enuntiationem possit efficere.Quod autem dixit,quasi negationes sine nomine et verbo esse videbuntur,idcirco addit quoniam in8nita nomina vel verba, neque nomina sunt simpliciter,neque verba, et videntur non homo, et non currit, negationes esse. Quod si ita est, sine nomine et verbo, esse negationes videntur. Addidit etiam illud nibil magis de homme, sed etiam minus verus fuit vel fa]sus.Qui enim dicit homo,rem constituit,qui dicit non homo,ipsam quidem rem tulit,sed nihiladdidit..Quocirca longe minus quiddam enuntiavit de homine, qui infinitum de homine dixit, quam qui finitum.
For he who sets down a finite name has as yet stated nothing true or false, but since he has posited something finite, a utterance of this kind is closer to the truth—one that posits something finite—than the utterance that posits something infinite. Just as those things that signify something are closer to making a statement than those that signify nothing, so it is in the case of things that are infinite: truth or falsity is discerned less in them than in all those things that are finite. And much more does that which is called "not-man" or "does not run" designate as yet nothing true or false, unless something be added that can make a statement. But as for what he said—that they will seem to be negations without a name and a verb—he adds this for the reason that infinite names or verbs are neither names nor verbs in the simple sense, and "not-man" and "does not run" seem to be negations. But if this is so, they seem to be negations without a name and a verb. He also added that it was no more true or false about man, but even less. For he who says "man" establishes the thing; he who says "not-man" has indeed removed the thing itself, but has added nothing. Wherefore he has stated far less about man who has spoken of man as infinite than he who has spoken of him as finite.
Significat autem, est omnis non hamo justus nulli illarum idem, nec huic opposita ea qllæ est, non est omnis non homo justus.Illa I'ero quæ est, omnis non justus non homo est,illi quæ est,nullus est justus non homo, idem significat.
Illæ propositiones in quibus infinita nomina subjecta sunt, longe aliud,inquit,significant,et non idem his propositionibus quae vel secundum tinita,vel secundum infinita prædicata dicuntur; ea enim quas dicit, est omnis non homojustus, nihil idem significat illi quæ dicit, est omnis homo justus,vel nullus homo justus est, vel iterum, est omnis homo non justus, vel nullus homo non justus,nulli enim similis est earum, ea quas dicit, est omnis non homo justus, nec huic opposita negatio particularis, ea quae dicit, non estomnis nonhomojustus,ulli earum idem significat qua; superius descriptae sunt, vel alicui earum quoe sunt in superius oppositae descriptis.
But "is every not-man just" signifies the same as none of those, nor is that which is opposed to it—"is not every not-man just"—the same. But the one that is "every not-just man is not a man" signifies the same as that which is "no just man is a not-man."
Those propositions in which infinite names are subjects, he says, signify something far different, and not the same as those propositions which are stated either with finite or with infinite predicates; for the one he states—"is every not-man just"—signifies nothing the same as that which states "is every man just," or "is no man just," or again "is every man not-just," or "is no man not-just." For it is similar to none of them—the one he states, "is every not-man just"—nor does the particular negation opposed to it, the one that states "is not every not-man just," signify the same as any of those which were described above, or as any of those which are opposed to the things described above.
Iilæ vero quxex uobus terminis infinitis constituta'sunt, illis sunt similes, quæ universales negationes sunt habentes subjectum infinitum, ut ea quae dicit, est omnis nonjustusnon homo,illi idem significat,eique consentit quæ dicit, est nullus justus non homo, et prior quidem utrosque terminos retinet infinitos, hæc vero secunda prædicatum quidem finitum,subjectum vero infinitum; et illa quidem est affirmatio ex duobus infinitis, hæc vero ex finito prædicato et subjecto infinite negatio universalis.
Transposita vero nomina et verba idem significant,ut est albus Iwmo, est homo albus. Nam si hoc non est, ąjusdem multæ erunt negationes.Sed ostensum est quod una unius est. Ejus enim quæ est, est albus homo,negatio est, non est albus homo, ejus uero guæ est, eSt homo albus,si non eadem est ei qua? est, est albus homo, erit negatio vel ea quæ est, non est non homo albus, vel ea quæ est, non est homo albus. Sed altera quidem est negatio ejus qUÆ est, est non homo albus, altera vero ejus quæ est, est albus homo. Quare erunt dux, unius. Quoniam igitur transposita nomine et verbo eadem fit affirmatio et negatio, manifestum est.
But those [propositions] constituted from two infinite terms are similar to those which are universal negations having an infinite subject, as when one says "every not-just [man] is not a man" signifies the same as that which says "no just man is not a man," and the former indeed retains both terms as infinite, while the latter has a finite predicate but an infinite subject; and the former is an affirmation from two infinite terms, while the latter is a universal negation from a finite predicate and an infinite subject.
Transposed nouns and verbs signify the same, as "white [is] a man" [is the same as] "a man is white." For if this were not so, there would be many negations of the same thing. But it has been shown that there is one [negation] of one [affirmation]. For of that which is "white is a man," the negation is "white is not a man"; but of that which is "a man is white," if it is not the same as that which is "white is a man," the negation will be either that which is "not a not-man is white" or that which is "a man is not white." But the one is the negation of that which is "a not-man is white," while the other is of that which is "white is a man." Wherefore there will be two [negations] of one [affirmation]. Since, therefore, when the noun and verb are transposed, the same affirmation and negation is made, it is manifest.
Quoties, in quit, nomina permutantur etverbo,eæ dem propositionum significationes permanent. Quoties autem negatio permutatur, non eædem,nam si quis dicat: Est non homo albus, et non est horno albus,non idem significat permutata scilicet et transposita negatione. Quoties autem dicitur, est albus homo, et rursus est homo albus, idem transposita verba nominaque significant, et erunt eædem am rmationes: namsi quis hoc negat, contingit ut unius affirmationis, duae negationes sint. Hoc autem monstratum est su p5rius fieri non p08se,sed semper unius affirmationis unam esse negationem.IJlius namque affirmationis quæ dicit, est albus homo, illa negatio est, quae dicil,non est albus homo; illius autem quae propunlt,est homo albus, si non est eadem illi afhrmationi quae enuntiat, est albus homo, sed est ab ea diversa, sit negatio vel ea quæ dicit, non est non homo albus, vel ea quae dicit, non est homo albus; sed ilIa quæ proponit, non est non homo albus, habet suam affirmationem ad quam referri debeat,eam scilicet quæ enuntiat, est non homo albus.IlIa vero quae dicit, non est homo albus, negatio est ejus quæ proponit, est homo albus.
As often, he says, as names and the verb are interchanged, the same meanings of the propositions remain. But as often as the negation is interchanged, they are not the same; for if someone says "a not-man is white" and "a man is not white," he does not signify the same thing, since the negation has been interchanged and transposed. But as often as it is said "a white man is" and again "a man is white," with the words and names transposed they signify the same thing, and they will be the same affirmations; for if someone denies this, it happens that there are two negations of one affirmation. But it has been shown above that this cannot happen, but that there is always one negation of one affirmation. For the negation of that affirmation which says "a white man is" is the one which says "a white man is not"; but of that which proposes "a man is white," if it is not the same as that affirmation which states "a white man is," but is different from it, let its negation be either the one which says "a not-man is not white" or the one which says "a man is not white"; but the one which proposes "a not-man is not white" has its own affirmation to which it ought to be referred, namely that which states "a not-man is white." But the one which says "a man is not white" is the negation of that which proposes "a man is white.
Sed si affirmationes eurum diversae sunt, diversae erunt etiam negationes.Si quis ergo dicat afirmationem quae proponit, est albus homo, diversam esse ab ea, quæ enuntiat, est homo albus, illud quoque concedat necesse estutnegationesquoque ipsarum diversæ sint,est autem negatio illius qua; dicit, est albus homo, ilia scilicet quæ proponit, non est albus homo. Rursus illius quæ enuntiat, est homo albus, est negatio,non est homo albus. Quare hae duae negationes, non est homo albus, et non est albus homo a se diversæ sunt.
But if their affirmations are different, their negations will also be different. If, then, someone says that the affirmation which proposes "a white man is" is different from that which states "a man is white," he must also concede that the negations of these are different as well. Now the negation of that which says "a white man is" is, namely, that which proposes "a white man is not." Again, the negation of that which states "a man is white" is "a man is not white." Wherefore these two negations, "a man is not white" and "a white man is not," are different from each other.
Rursus cum dicimus, est albus homo, et negatur non est albus homo, si de eodem homine utraeque dicantur,unam veram alteram falsam esse necesse est;ut si de Socrate dicatur, est albus homo, non est albus homo, quae cum ita sint, necesse est ut ejus quæ ait est albus homo negatio sit ea quae dicit non est albus homo; sed posita est quidem prius negatio quæ dicit non est albus homo ejus affirmationis esse qua: dicit est albus homo.Nuncvero monstramus illam quoque quae dicit non est albus homo ejus a[ilrmationis negationem esse quae dicit est albus homo, utræque enimverum inter se falsumque dividunt.Neque enim fieri potest ut si de uno eodemque homine dicatur, est albus homo, et non est homo albus, ut utraeque sint verae: quod si itaut nunc sunt positæ aliquando in veritate concordant, hoc idcirco evenit quia indefinitæ sunt, non quia verbi fiunt nominibusque transpo?it)s:quare evenit ut unius affirmationis duplex sit negatio. Quod autem diximus inferiori descriptione magis liquebit.
Again, when we say "a white man is" and it is denied "a white man is not," if both are said of the same man, one must necessarily be true and the other false; as, if it is said of Socrates "a white man is" and "a white man is not," since these things are so, the negation of the one that says "a white man is" must necessarily be the one that says "a white man is not." But the negation that says "a white man is not" was previously posited as belonging to the affirmation that says "a white man is." Now, however, we show that the one that says "a white man is not" is also the negation of the affirmation that says "a white man is," for both divide truth and falsehood between them. For it cannot happen that, if it is said of one and the same man "a white man is" and "a white man is not," both should be true. But if, as they are now posited, they sometimes agree in truth, this happens because they are indefinite, not because the words are transposed into nouns. Wherefore it comes about that a single affirmation has a double negation. What we have said will be made clearer by the description below.
DE CONJUNCTIS ET DIVISIS ENUNTIATIONIBUS.
At vero unum depluribus,velplura deuno affirmare, vel negare, si non est unum ex pluribus, non est affirmatio una, neque negatio. Dico autem unum, non sz unum nomen positum sit: non fit autem unum ex illis, ut homo est fortasse et animal, et bipes, et mansuetum; sed ex his etiam unum fil. Ex alboautemet homine, et ambulare non fitunum. Quare nee si unum aliquid de his affirmet aliquis, erit arfirmalio una, sed vox quidem una,affirmaliones vero mullæ.Nec si de uno ista, sesimiliter plures.
Multa Peripateticis dediscernendis propositionibus quæessentuna, quæ multæ, consideratio fuit.Atque ideo nunc hoc elicit, et si una res, inquit, de pluribus praedicetur in propositionibus vel affirmativis, vel negativis, vel rursus res plures de una iterum prædicentur, et si pluribus illis rebus unum nomen sit positum,vel una res de uno nomine plura significanti prædicetur, si ex illis omnibus rebus unum aliquid non iii, non est una affirmatio, nec una negatio: si quis enim dicat animal rationale bipes homo est, unum hominem pluribus praedicando subjecit: sed haec sigillatim quidem dicta plura sunt, unam vero quamdam substantiam informant. Coeuntibus namque animali, rationali,et pibede fit una substantia animal rationale bipes, quod est homo.
ON CONJUNCT AND DIVIDED ENUNCIATIONS.
But to affirm one thing of many, or many things of one, or to deny, if there is not one thing from the many, is not one affirmation, nor one negation. I say "one," not if one name is posited; for one thing is not made from them, as perhaps "man" is "animal" and "biped" and "tame"; but from these there is also one thing. But from "white" and "man" and "to walk" one thing is not made. Wherefore neither, if someone affirms one thing of these, will there be one affirmation, but the utterance is one, the affirmations many. Nor if one thing is said of one subject, similarly many.
The consideration of distinguishing which propositions are one and which many was a matter of much concern to the Peripatetics. And therefore he now draws this out, and says: if one thing is predicated of many in propositions, whether affirmative or negative, or again many things are predicated of one, and if one name is posited for those many things, or one thing is predicated of one name signifying many things, if from all those things one something does not come to be, it is not one affirmation nor one negation. For if someone says "man is animal rational biped," he has subjected one man by predicating many things; but these, said one by one, are many, yet they inform one certain substance. For when animal, rational, and biped come together, there is made one substance, animal rational biped, which is man.
Et quanquam hæc silligatim dicta multa sint, si quis enim dicat animal,et rursus rationale, et intermisso tempore bipes, discretim multa significantia,tamen juncta in unum unam faciunt naturam, et hoc est quod ait: Ut bomo est fortasse animai, et bipes, et mansuetum; sed ex his unum fit, tanquam si diceret: Homo enim plura significat, sed ita, ei ea quae significantur discerptim dicantur. Nam etanimal, et bipes, et mansuetum designat.Dicimus enim hominem esse animal, et bipedem. et mansuetum; sed hæc juncta in unum corpus efficiunt unum animal mansuetum bipes, quod est homo.Quare quanquam de uno plura prædicata sint, tamen quoniam ex omnibus unum aliquid fit, ex hoc una est affirmatio atque negatio. Quod si duae res tales subjectae sint de quibus una res prædicetur, ut de his unum fieri aliquid nequeat, non est una affirmatio, nec una negatio. Si quis enim candido aliquo homine ambulante dicat, album et ambulans homo est, album et ambulare in unam naturam non conveniunt, nec fit ex utrisque aliquid unum,ita ut alicujus hæc duojunclasubstantiam forment.Quare sive affirmentur, sive negentur, sive subjecta sint, sive prædicata, non erit una affirmatio, nec una negatio, sed vox quidem una est.
And although these things, said syllable by syllable, are many—for if someone should say "animal," and again "rational," and after an interval "two-footed," separately they signify many things—yet joined into one they make one nature, and this is what he says: as "man" is perhaps "animal" and "two-footed" and "tame"; but from these one thing is made, as if he should say: "man" indeed signifies many things, but in such a way that those things which are signified are said separately. For it designates both "animal" and "two-footed" and "tame." For we say that man is an animal, and two-footed, and tame; but these joined into one body effect one tame two-footed animal, which is man. Wherefore, although many things are predicated of one, yet since from all of them some one thing is made, from this there is one affirmation and one negation. But if two such things are subjects of which one thing is predicated, such that from them some one thing cannot be made, there is not one affirmation, nor one negation. For if someone, when some white man is walking, should say "the white [thing] and the walking [thing] is a man," "white" and "walking" do not come together into one nature, nor is anything one made from both, such that these two joined form the substance of something. Wherefore whether they are affirmed or denied, whether they are subjects or predicates, there will not be one affirmation, nor one negation, but the utterance is indeed one.
Tot autem in ea sunt affirmationes et negationes,quot termini sunt positi ex quibus unum non fit, sive autem de pluribus unum praedicetur, siveplurade uno praedicentur,idem'modus est,ut si quis dicat,homo animalrationalebipes est, quoniam e:chis unum quiddam fit, una est propositio. Sin vero quis ducat,homo albus ambulans est, quoniam ex his nibil unum fit, non est una propositio. Amplius quoque si de pluribus rebus unum nomen sit positum, ex quibus conjunctisnullaunanaturasit,et de illo uno nomine unum quodlibet aliud prædicetur, non est una affirmatio, nee una negatio. Marinus namque et hic latrabilis uno vocabulo canes vocantur.Si quis igitur dicat, canis animal est, quoniam ex his quae significat canis in unum junctis nihil unum efficitur (ex cane enim et latrabili et marino junctis nulla una substantia esl), illa propositio multiplex est,et multa significans, et non una. Quare quemadmodum si quis hujusmodi propositiones interroget, debeat responderi, docet dicens:responsionis peti-I
For there are as many affirmations and negations in it as there are terms posited from which one thing does not come to be; whether one thing is predicated of many, or many of one, the mode is the same—as if someone should say, "Man is a rational two-footed animal," since from these one single thing comes to be, it is one proposition. But if someone should say, "Man is white, walking," since from these nothing one comes to be, it is not one proposition. Furthermore, if one name is posited for many things, from which when joined together no single nature arises, and something else whatsoever is predicated of that one name, it is not one affirmation nor one negation. For "marine" and "barking" are called dogs by one word. If, therefore, someone should say, "A dog is an animal," since from those things which "dog" signifies, joined into one, nothing one is effected (for from "dog" and "barking" and "marine" joined together there is no one substance), that proposition is multiple and signifies many things, and is not one. Wherefore, just as if someone should ask about propositions of this kind, one ought to answer, he teaches, saying: of the response, the request—
Si ergo dialectica interrogatio est tio,vel propositionis,vel alterius partis eontradielionis, propositio vero unius contradictionis pars est, non erit una responsio ad hæe. Neque enim est una in lerrogatio,nee si sit vera. Dictum estautem de his in Topicis, simul autem manifestum est, quoniam nec hocipsum, quid est,dialectica interrogatio est. Oportet enim datum esse ut ex interrogatione eligat, utram uelit contradictionis partem enuntiare. Sed oportet interrogantem, determinare, utrum hoc sit homo, an non hoc.
Sensus hujusmodi est, quicunque interrogat si ab arte dialectica non declinet, idcirco interrogat ut ei respondeatur. Respondeatur autem aut tota propositio, aut contradictionis particula. Si quis enim sic dicat interrogans, Animane immortalis est?. Tunc respondens aut est respondebit, aut non. Hoc autem est totius contradictionis una particula. Contradictio enim est, anima immortalis, est, anima immortalis non est, ergo est, et non contradictionis sunt particulæ. Quod si quis interroget, Animane immortalis est an non? tunc ille ita respondeat si velit totam propositionem dicens, Videtur mihi immortalis esse, vel rursus, Videtur mihi non esse immortalis. Ergo quisquis ita responsionem petit,ut illa responsionis petitio vel propositionis petitio sit, vel unius partis contradictionis.
If, then, a dialectical question is a request for either a proposition or the other part of a contradiction, and a proposition is a part of one contradiction, there will not be one answer to these. For there is not one question, nor even if it be true. But these things have been said in the Topics; at the same time it is also clear that this very thing—what a dialectical question is—is not [settled]. For it must be granted that from the question the respondent chooses which part of the contradiction he wishes to state. But the questioner must determine whether this is a man or not this.
The sense of this is as follows: whoever asks a question, if he does not depart from the dialectical art, asks for the purpose that an answer be given to him. But an answer is given either as the whole proposition or as a part of the contradiction. For if someone asks, saying, "Is the soul immortal?" then the respondent will say either "It is" or "It is not." But this is one part of the whole contradiction. For the contradiction is: "The soul is immortal" and "The soul is not immortal"; therefore "It is" and "It is not" are parts of the contradiction. But if someone asks, "Is the soul immortal or not?" then let him answer thus, if he wishes to state the whole proposition: "It seems to me to be immortal," or again, "It seems to me not to be immortal." Therefore whoever seeks an answer in this way, that request for an answer is either a request for a proposition or for one part of the contradiction.
Propositio autem unius contradictionis pars est, id est, omnis affirmatio una unam habebit negationem, et in duabus propositionibus una erit contradictio. Quare quisquis plura significantem propositionem dixerit,ille non facit propositionem ad quam sit una negatio. Quocirca hujusmodi interrogationi quae plura significat, nec si vera sit, debet esse una responsio.Si quis interroget substantiane sit canis, quanquam verum sit dicere substantia est, quoniam et latrabilis et marinus substantiæ sunt, tamen non est ad hanc una facienda responsio.Sed dicendum est de quo cane interroget, quod si ille dixerit de marino, vel rursus de latrabili, tunc cum per illius determinationem definitionemque interrogationis factafuerituna propositio, unumque significans, adhibenda est una responsio. De his autem in Topicis dictum esse commemorat. Similiter autem manifestumest,quoniam nec hoc ipsum quid est, dialectica est interrogatio, quas eeesse modus dlalecticæ interrogationis exsequitur. Ait enim, Si quis interroget quid est animal, hæc non est dialectica inlerrogatio.Oportet enim per dialecticam interrogationemoptionem respondenti dare,utrum affirmare velit,an negare quod dicitur,ut si quis sic interroget, Putasne bonum malo contrarium est? tunc respondenti datur electio utrum affirmare velit an negare.Dicit enim ilIe,aut est, aut non est. Qui autem ita interrogat, quid est animal?
But a proposition is part of one contradiction, that is, every affirmation will have one negation, and in two propositions there will be one contradiction. Therefore whoever states a proposition that signifies several things does not make a proposition to which there may be one negation. Hence to an inquiry of this kind, which signifies several things, even if it is true, there ought not to be one answer. If someone asks whether a dog is a substance, although it is true to say that it is a substance, since both the barking dog and the sea dog are substances, nevertheless one answer is not to be given to this. But it must be said of which dog he is asking; and if he says of the sea dog, or again of the barking dog, then when by his determination and definition of the inquiry one proposition has been made and one thing is signified, one answer is to be applied. He recalls that these matters have been discussed in the Topics. In like manner it is clear that this very question "what is it?" is not a dialectical inquiry, which he sets out as the mode of dialectical inquiry. For he says, If someone asks what an animal is, this is not a dialectical inquiry. For by a dialectical inquiry one ought to give the respondent a choice, whether he wishes to affirm or to deny what is said, as if someone asks thus: Do you think good is contrary to evil? Then a choice is given to the respondent whether he wishes to affirm or to deny. For he says either it is or it is not. But one who asks thus, what is an animal?
nullum illi locum aut affirmationis aut negationis relinquit;quidenim dicturus estinterrogante aliquo. Quid estanima]e?dicturus est.Non? in conveniens erit responsio. Eodem modo quoquesidicat est animat, ad causam.Eola igitur illa est dialectica interrogatio, in qua datur respondenti ex interrogatione optio utrum velit patrem contradictionis eligere, eamque enuntiare vel affirmando scilicet vel negando. Oportet enim interrogantem determinare, utrum, verbi gratia, animal homo sit,an ron, ut ex illa interrogatione, quam velit partem contradictionis possit, is qui respondet eligere.
Quoniam vero hæc quidem prædicantur composita, ut unum sit omne prædicamentum eorum quæ separatim prædicantur, alia vero non,quæ differentia est.De homine enim verum est dicere et separatim animal,et separatim bipes,et hæc ut unum;et hominem,et album, ethæcutunum. Sednonsi citharædus est et bonus,est et citharædus bonus.Si enim quoniam altetrurum dicitur, et utrumque dicetur: multa inconvenientia erunt. De homine enim verum est et hominem etalbum dicere. Quare et omne.Rursus si album, et omne, quare erit homo albus albus,et hoc in infinitum. Et rursus musicus albus ambulans,et hæc eadem frequenterimplicita ill infinitum. Amplius Socrates. Socrates est,et homo, et Socrates Socrates homo.Et si homo et bipes,et homo homo bipes.
It leaves him no place for either affirmation or negation; for what will he say when someone asks, "What is the soul?" He will say, "Not?"—the response will be incongruous. In the same way, too, if someone says "is the soul" in answer to the cause. That dialectical question, then, is the one in which the option is given to the respondent from the question whether he wishes to choose one part of the contradiction and state it, namely by affirming or by denying. For the questioner ought to determine, for example, whether animal is man or not, so that from that question the one who responds can choose whichever part of the contradiction he wishes.
But since some things are predicated as composites, so that every predication of things that are predicated separately is one, while others are not, there is this difference. For concerning man it is true to say both "animal" separately and "two-footed" separately, and these as one; and "man" and "white," and these as one. But it is not so if he is a cithara-player and good—he is also a good cithara-player. For if because each of the two is said, both will also be said, there will be many incongruities. For concerning man it is true to say both "man" and "white." Wherefore also "every." Again, if "white," also "every," wherefore there will be "white white man," and this to infinity. And again "musical white walking," and these same things repeatedly entangled to infinity. Further, Socrates. Socrates is, and man, and Socrates Socrates man. And if man and two-footed, also man man two-footed.
Quoniarn ergo si quis simpliciter dicat complexiones fieri plurima inconvenientia, contingit dicere,manifestum est.Quemadmodum autem ponen. dum sit, nunc dicamus:
Postquam de unitate propositionis explicuit, et quid esset dialectica propositio terminavil.Nunc ad illa venit in quibus plura sæpe de uno sigillatim veraciter prædicant,quæ simul prædicata, alias vera sunt,alias falsa.Si quis enim sic dicat: Marius malus est,fortasse verum est.Rursus: Marius dux est, et hoc verum est.Quæ conjuncta in unum nulla ratione sunt vera, velut si quis dicat: Marius malus dux est,esL namque optimus dux omnium. Rursus homo animal est, varum est, et homo bipes est, verum est, et hæo juncta vera rursus sunt. Si quis enim dicat homo animal bipes est,verum est. Horum ergo qui modus sit, vel quando ea quae singula extra prædicantur,juncta,vera vel falsa sint,regulam daturus aggreditur,et sensus quidem hujusmodi est.
Therefore, since it is clear that if someone were to say without qualification that combinations are formed, many absurdities follow, it is evident. But in what way this should be posited, let us now say.
After he had explained the unity of the proposition and had finished what the dialectical proposition is, he now comes to those cases in which many things are often truly predicated separately of one thing, which, when predicated together, are sometimes true and sometimes false. For if someone says thus: "Marius is bad," perhaps it is true. Again: "Marius is a general," and this is true. But these joined into one are in no way true, as if someone should say: "Marius is a bad general"—for he is the best general of all. Again, "man is an animal" is true, and "man is two-footed" is true, and these joined together are again true. For if someone says "man is a two-footed animal," it is true. Therefore, approaching the task of giving a rule as to what the mode of these is, or when those things which are predicated separately are true or false when joined, he begins; and the sense is of this kind.
Ordo autem sermonum talis est.Quoniam vera, inquit, quaedam sunt, quae ita conjuncta de aliquo prædicantur,ut eorum praedicamentum unum sit,et in unum congruat forma eorum quæ extra vere oterant prædicari,ut in eo quod est animal bipes de homine juncta compositaque dicuntur, et fit una quodammodo prædicatio: cum animal et bipes extra sigillatim valeant prædicari, dicimus enim homo animal est,et rursus homo bipes est, alia vero quæ non sunt eo modo,quæ sigillatim quidem praedicari verum est,composita vero falsum, sed quae horum differentia est, vel quando illud,quando hoc eveniat, dicendum est, et hoc docet exemplis. De homine enim, in quit, verum est dicere extra anima!, extra bipes, et ut unum, ut de eo dicatur, animal bipes. Rursum quemlibet hominem, ut Socratem possumus dicere, ille homo albus est, rursus ille bomo homo est,et haec ut unum juncta dicentes: ille homo homo albus est. Sed aliquoties evenit ut aliquis homo citharcedus sitquidem et iwperitus.Bonusautem homo,et si de ipso dicatur quoniam est citbarædus,verum cst,et quia bonus est hoc quoque verum est.Sed non et si citharœdus estet bonus,idcirco jam bonus est etiam citharœdus,fortasse enim est imperitissimua, homo autem bonus.
Now the order of the discussion is as follows. Since, he says, certain things are true which are predicated of something in such a way that they are joined together, so that their predication is one and the form of those things which can truly be predicated separately converges into one—as when "animal" and "two-footed" are said of man as joined and combined, and the predication becomes in a certain way one, even though "animal" and "two-footed" can be predicated separately; for we say "man is an animal," and again "man is two-footed"—but other things are not of this kind, things which it is true to predicate separately but false to predicate when combined. What the difference between these is, or when the one and when the other occurs, must be stated, and he teaches this by examples. For of man, he says, it is true to say separately "animal," separately "two-footed," and as one, so that "animal two-footed" is said of him. Again, we can say of any man, for instance Socrates, "that man is white," and again "that man is a man," and saying these joined as one: "that man is a white man." But sometimes it happens that some man is a cithara-player and yet unskilled, but a good man; and if it is said of him that he is a cithara-player, it is true, and that he is good is also true. But it is not the case that if he is a cithara-player and good, he is therefore already a good cithara-player; for perhaps he is most unskilled, though a good man.
Si enim quoniam alterutrum dicitur,et utrumque dicetur, multa inconvenientia erunt.Si quis enim sit qui dicat,omnia quaecunque sigiIlatim vere dicuntur,eajuncta etiam vere possunt dici,multa inconvenientia et impossibilia contingunt.Hoc est enim quod att.Si enim quoniam alterutrum dicitur,et utrumquedicitur; si enim aliquis dicat quoniam allerutrum extra vere dicitur. et utrumque simul vere semper posse dici, multa sunlimpossibilia quae contingunt; qua; autem sint impossibilia quæ contingunt,hæc sunt. De homine enim possumus dicere quoniam homo est,et rursus possumus dicere quoniam albus est; dicimus igitur et simul de homine, homo albus est.
For if, because each of the two is said separately, both together will also be said, there will be many absurdities. For if there is anyone who says that all things whatsoever are truly said individually can also truly be said when joined together, many absurdities and impossibilities follow. For this is what he says: "For if, because each of the two is said, both are also said" — that is, if anyone says that because each of the two is truly said separately, both together can always truly be said, many impossibilities follow; and what the impossibilities are that follow, these are they. For of a man we can say that he is a man, and again we can say that he is white; therefore we also say at the same time of the man that the man is white.
Rursus de homine albo possumus dicere quoniam homo est, possumus dicere quoniam albus est; igitur et haec juncta dicuntur,homo homo albus albus est.Nam si verum est dicere de homine quoniam homo est, et de albo quoniam albus est, et omne hoc vere dici potesl,id est homo homo albus albusest.Et si de hoc iterum homine albo,verum est dicerequoniam albus est,et verum est de eo album prædicare, et rursus de homine prædicare album verum est; erit ergo homo albus albus,et rursus de hoc homine album praedicare verum est, erit igitur tertio homo albus aus abus, et hoc in infinitum progreditur.Et rursus si verum est dicere de homine quoniam musicus est,et rursus quoniam albus est, et quoniam ambulans est,et hæc rursus in unum homo dicuntur, quoniam musicus albus ambulans est.Rursus quimusicusalbus ambulansest,et albus est et ambulansest, et musicus est. Dicuntur hæc igitur rursus simul homo albus albus musicus musicus, ambulans ambulans est, et hæc assidue complexa eadem faciunt superfluam locutionem. Nec non in singularibus quod idem eveni.
Again, concerning a white man we can say that he is a man, and we can say that he is white; therefore these things too are said in combination: man man white white is. For if it is true to say of a man that he is a man, and of a white thing that it is white, and all this can be truly said, that is, man man white white is. And if again of this white man it is true to say that he is white, and it is true to predicate white of him, and again it is true to predicate white of the man, then there will be a white white man, and again it is true to predicate white of this man, so there will be a third time a white white white man, and this proceeds to infinity. And again, if it is true to say of a man that he is musical, and again that he is white, and that he is walking, and these again are said together in one, man, that he is musical, white, walking. Again, since he is musical, white, walking, and he is white, and he is walking, and he is musical. These things, then, are again said together: man white white musical musical, walking walking is, and these continually combined make the same superfluous utterance. Nor is it otherwise in the case of singulars.
Si enim Socrates et Socrates est et homo,erit So crates Socrates homo, et si Socrates Socrates est et homo et bipes, erit Socrates Socrates homo bipes; et rursus si hicidem bipes est et homo, erit Socrates Socrates homo bomo bipes bipes.Quæ omnia quam sninconvenientia nullus ignorat.Non igitur dicendum est quoniam omnia quaecunque sigillatim prædicantur,eademjuncta semper potuerunt prædicari, ergo quae juncta vere dici possunt,et quae falso, eorum quae sigillatim atque extra ante vere dicuntur, exponit. Hoc enim solum hactenus demonstratum est quoniam si quis simpliciter et omni modo fieri complexiones dicat, multa inconvenientia evenire necesse est.Quemadmodum autem fiant complexiunes, ponendum atque tractandum est.
Eorum, igitur quæ prædicantur, et de quibus prædicantur,quæcunque secundum accidens dicuntur vel de eodem,vel alterum de altero, hæc non erunt unum, ut homo albus est etmusicus. Sed non est idem album et musicum,accidentia enim utraque eidem,nec si album muscum verum est dicere,tamen erit album musicum unum aliquid.Secundum accidens enim album musicum dicitur.Quare non erit album musicum unum aliquid. Quocirca nec citharædus bonus simpliciter, sed animal bipes. Non enim sunt secundum accidens.
For if Socrates is both Socrates and a man, then Socrates Socrates man will be; and if Socrates is both Socrates and a man and two-footed, then Socrates Socrates man two-footed will be; and again, if this same thing is two-footed and a man, then Socrates Socrates man man two-footed two-footed will be. No one is ignorant of how incongruous all these things are. Therefore it must not be said that, because all things whatsoever that are predicated individually could always be predicated when joined together, consequently those things which can be truly said when joined, and those which can be said falsely, are set forth from among those things which are truly said individually and separately. For this alone has been demonstrated thus far: that if anyone says that combinations come about simply and in every way, many incongruities must necessarily result. But in what manner combinations come about must be set down and treated.
Therefore, of those things which are predicated, and of those things of which they are predicated, whatever are said according to accident, either of the same thing or one of another, these will not be one, as a man is white and musical. But white and musical are not the same; for both are accidents of the same thing, and even if it is true to say that the white thing is musical, nevertheless white musical will not be some one thing. For white musical is said according to accident. Wherefore white musical will not be some one thing. And for this reason neither will a good cithara-player be [one thing] simply, but a two-footed animal. For they are not according to accident.
In his, in quit, quae prædicantur, et de his de qaibus illa ipsa prædicantur, duplex ratio est.Aut enim duo accidentia de uno subjecto dicunlur,ut Marius malus est,Marius duxest; aut unum accidens de uno subjecto praedicantur, aliud vero accidens de illo praedicato accidenti prædicatur, ut si quis dicat: Cicero est calvus,calvus orator est.Hic enim calvus de subjecto Cicerone, orator de calvo pra'dicatur. Hoc est enim quod ait: Quaecunque secundum accidensdicuntur, veeeodem, vel alterum de altero eeodem, usqua uoaccidentia euno prædicentur; alterum de altero, ut si unum accidens de altero accidenti dicatur, ut ipsum accidens de quo dicitur de altero rursus subjecto prædicetur.
In these cases, he says, which are predicated, and concerning those things of which they are themselves predicated, there is a twofold account. For either two accidents are said of one subject, as Marius is bad, Marius is a leader; or one accident is predicated of one subject, but another accident is predicated of that predicated accident, as if someone should say: Cicero is bald, the bald man is an orator. For here bald is predicated of the subject Cicero, and orator of the bald man. For this is what he says: whatever things are said according to accident, either the same is said of the same, or one thing of another of the same, until the accidents come to be predicated; one thing of another, as if one accident is said of another accident, so that the accident itself, of which it is said, is in turn predicated of another subject.
Quod si ita fiat prædicatio, in unum jungi accidentia copuJarique non possunt; etenim si quis sic dicat,bomo albus est, bomo musicus est, hæc juncta simul unum non faciunt,ut est musicus albus,vel si rursus musicum prædicetur de albo, ut a!bumde homine praedicetur et dicatur, ut illud album musicum, est non idem est album musicum,nec in unam substanliam coeunt quaecunque vere praedicari possunt sigi!latim: idcirco enim haec de se invicem videntur posse prædicantur quia de uno eodem que subjecto præ dicantur, non quod ex his unum aliquid fiat, acci dentia enim sunt utraque.Quare non erit album musicum: sed quoniam homo albus idem musicus est, per id quod utraque uni accidunt per accidens album de musico prædicatur. Nee rursus si citbaraedus est et bonus,idcirco jam bonus dici puterit citharædus, neque enim bonus et citharaedus talia sunt ut ex his unum fieri possit.Sed quoniam utraque eidem accid unt,idcirco de sesecundum accidens praedicantur. Sed magis animalfortasse possumus dicere: Homo animal est, homo bipes est,ut hæc junctadicamus, bipes,e! his junctis secundum substantiam non secundum accidens est facta prædicatio.
But if predication is made in this way, accidents cannot be joined and coupled into one; for if someone says thus, "man is white," "man is musical," these joined together do not make one thing, such as "musical white," or again if "musical" is predicated of "white," so that "white" is predicated of "man" and it is said that "that white thing is musical," it is not the same as "white musical," nor do all things that can be truly predicated separately come together into one substance; for they seem able to be predicated of each other for this reason, because they are predicated of one and the same subject, not because some one thing is made from them—for both are accidents. Wherefore "white musical" will not be [one thing]; but since the white man is the same as the musical man, through the fact that both befall one [subject], "white" is predicated of "musical" per accidens. Nor again, if someone is both a cithara-player and good, will the cithara-player therefore be able to be called good; for "good" and "cithara-player" are not such that one thing can be made from them. But since both befall the same [subject], they are therefore predicated of each other according to accident. But perhaps we can speak more properly of "animal": "man is an animal," "man is two-footed," so that we say these joined—"two-footed animal"—and from these joined the predication is made according to substance, not according to accident.
Amplius nec quæcunque insunt inaltero. Quare neque album frequenter, neque homo, homo animal est vel bipes, sunt enzm in homine bipes et animal.
Quæcunque sigillatim secundum accidens prædica. musea simul prædicari nou posse monstravit. Nunc autem illud etiam docet, quoniam illa quoque quae substantialiter prædicantur, non semper simul juncta prædicentur,et haec ratio et accidentibus convenit et substantialibus rebus.Quoties enim inest prædicato aliquid, et nos illud extra volumus prædicare, et in unum rursus duo prædicata conjungere, tunc fit incongrua prædicatio;et hæc aliquoties quidem in ipsa hominum prolatione perspicitur, aliquoties vero in venitur in intellectu, atque in termini continentia. Si quis enim sit homo albus, et de eo dicatur, verbi gratia: Callias homo albus est, et rursus de eo dicatur, Callias albus est, si quis id velit adjungere, inconvenientissime prædicabitur. Dicit enim: Callias homo albus albus est,idcirco quoniam albus in homine albo continebatur, quod ante de CaIliaprædicatum est. Atque hoc est quod ait: Quare neque album frequenter. Alia vero sunt quae hoc in prolatione non habent, sed in natura, si quis enim sic dicat: Socrates So::rates est, et rursus Socrates homo est, et haec simul Jungat, ut dicat Socrates Socrates homo est, non recte fecerit prædicationem. Nam homo in Socrate inerat, et rursus bomo de Socrate praedicatum est.
Further, not even all things that are present in another. Therefore neither "white" repeatedly, nor "man"—"man is an animal" or "two-footed"—for "two-footed" and "animal" are in man.
He has shown that whatever are predicated separately according to accident cannot be predicated together at the same time. But now he teaches this as well: that those things too which are predicated substantially are not always predicated when joined together at the same time, and this reasoning applies both to accidents and to substantial things. For whenever something is present in a predicate, and we wish to predicate that separately, and again to join two predicates into one, then the predication becomes incongruous; and this is sometimes observed in the very utterance of men, sometimes it is found in the understanding and in the content of the term. For if someone is a white man, and it is said of him, for example, "Callias is a white man," and again it is said of him, "Callias is white," if someone wishes to add this, it will be predicated most incongruously. For he says, "Callias is a white man white," because "white" was contained in "white man," which was predicated of Callias before. And this is what he says: "Therefore neither 'white' repeatedly." But there are other things which do not have this in utterance but in nature; for if someone says thus, "Socrates is Socrates," and again "Socrates is a man," and joins these together so as to say "Socrates is Socrates a man," he will not have made a correct predication. For "man" was present in Socrates, and again "man" was predicated of Socrates.
Talis est ergo qui haec juncta, id est, Socratem et hominem, voluerit prædicare de Socrate, tanquam si dicat Socrates homo homo est. Nam in Socrate inest'nominis natura. Vel rursus si de aliquo homine, velit aliquis hominem prædicare, et rursus animal, et dicat, homo, homo et animal. Homo enim idem est quod animal; ergo qui hæc duo juncta componit,nihil differt quam si dicat, homo animal animal est Homo namque animal est.Eodem modo et si de aliquo homine hominem praedicet prædica-aliquis, et rursus bipedem, atque hæc juncta velit dicere, incongruam faciet lionem.Nihil enim aliud dicit, qui dixerit, homo homo bipes est, quam si dicat,homo bipes bipes est, etenim homo bipes est. Quare neque ea quae in ipsa prolatione in altero insunt cum extra prædicantur rectejunguntur, nec ea quae in prolatione quidem non sunt, sed tantum in natura atque substantia. Quod si nec accidentia sint,nec alterum in altero,et ea sigillatim prædicenlur,recte juncta prædicantur; si quis enim dicat de homine quoniam animal est, verum dixerit,et rursus quoniam bipes,verum hoc quoque dixerit.Hæc si jungat,faciet, homo est animal bipes,hic recteprædicatur.Nam neque accidentia dicuntur, nec alterum alteri inest. Non enim sumitur in definitione animalis bipes,ac per hoc non inest ilii substantialiter.
Such, then, is the one who wishes to predicate these things joined together—that is, Socrates and man—of Socrates, as if he were to say "Socrates man man is." For the nature of the name is present in Socrates. Or again, if someone wishes to predicate man of some man, and again animal, and says "man, man and animal." For man is the same as animal; therefore one who combines these two joined together differs in nothing from one who says "man animal animal is." For man is an animal. In the same way, if someone predicates man of some man, and again two-footed, and wishes to say these joined together, he will make an incongruous predication. For one who says "man man two-footed is" says nothing other than if he were to say "man two-footed two-footed is," since man is two-footed. Wherefore neither the things that are present in the other in the very utterance itself are rightly joined when they are predicated externally, nor those that are not present in the utterance but only in nature and substance. But if they are neither accidents, nor the one in the other, and they are predicated individually, they are rightly predicated when joined; for if someone says of man that he is an animal, he will have spoken truly, and again that he is two-footed, he will have spoken this too truly. If he joins these, he will make "man is an animal two-footed"—here it is rightly predicated. For they are not called accidents, nor is the one present in the other. For two-footed is not assumed in the definition of animal, and through this it is not present in it substantially.
Illa autem sola aliquibus insunt substantialiter quæcunque in eorum definitione sumuntur, ut in definitione hominis sumitur animal, et in definitione rursus hominis sumitur bipes: inest ergo et bipes in homine.Quare illa sola sigillatim prædicata recte juncta prædicantur,quæ neque accidentia sunt,nec alterum in altero est, vel prolatione vel natura: idque fiet manifestum,si eorum alterius definitio sumatur,velut squæratur an de homine homo et bipes prædicari simul possint, diffiniendus est homo, etsiinhominisdefinitione bipes incurrerit,dicendum est bipes inessehomini, et utrumque junctum de homine non posse prædicari, quia cum dixeris homo homo bipes, tale est:quasi dicas,homo bipes bipes, quod est incongruum.
Verum eat autem dicere de aliquo et simpliciter,ut quemdam hominem honnnem, aut quemdam album hominem hominem album.
Dudum quæsivit utrum omnia quæ sigillatim vere prædicantur ea juncta veraciter dicerentur. Nunc autem considerat atque perpendit utrum omniaquæcunque simul vere di:,untur,et simpIiciterveræ prædicentur.Dicimus enim Socratem quemdarr, hominem esse, et rursus simpliciter cimus Socratem hominem esse.
But those things alone are present in things substantially, whatever is taken in their definition—as animal is taken in the definition of man, and again two-footed is taken in the definition of man; therefore two-footed is also present in man. Wherefore those things alone, predicated individually, are rightly predicated when joined, which are neither accidents nor one in the other, either in utterance or in nature. And this will become manifest if the definition of one of them is taken—for example, if it is asked whether man and two-footed can be predicated of man at the same time, man must be defined; and even if two-footed has entered into the definition of man, it must be said that two-footed is present in man, and that both joined together cannot be predicated of man, because when you have said "man man two-footed," it is as if you were to say "man two-footed two-footed," which is incongruous.
But it is possible to speak of something both with qualification and simply—as a certain man [is] a man, or a certain white man [is] a white man.
A little earlier he asked whether all things that are truly predicated individually would be truly stated when joined. Now, however, he considers and weighs whether all things whatsoever that are truly said together are also truly predicated simply. For we say that a certain Socrates is a man, and again we say simply that Socrates is a man.
Rursus dicimus, verbi gratia, Calliam album bominem esse, et de eo album simpliciter prædicamus, dicimus enim,Callias albus est.Quærit ergo utrum boc in omnibus esse videatur, ut quascunque verum est juncta prædicare, eadem quoque verum sit simpliciter dicere; sed hoc non in omnibus eveniet.Nam si qua hujusmodi sit præ dicatio,in qua aliquid oppositum addatur ipsi prædicationi,præter illud oppositum,simpliciter illa prædicatio non potest prædicari,ut si quis dicat de Socrate jam mortuo, quoniam hoc quod jacet, bomo mortuus est,vere dicit,simpliciterautem dicere non potest, hoc quod jacet homo est. Idcirco quoniam additum est prædicato, id est homini, id quodhomini oppositum est,id est mortuus. Dictum est enim hoc quod jacet homo mortuus est. Mortuus autem et homo opposita quodammodo Eunl.Nam si eorum definitiones sumamus,facile hoc perspici potest.Homo namque est animatus, mortuus vero præter ani.. mam: atque ideo quoniam quædam est oppositio secundum privationem atque habitum, hominis et mortui et utraque simul vere prædicantur, unum, ipsorum,quod est bomo.,simpliciter et præler mor-tuum de cadavere non potest prædicari, atque hoc est quod ait:
Again we say, for example, that Callias is a white man, and we predicate white of him without qualification; for we say, "Callias is white." The question therefore arises whether this seems to hold in all cases, so that whatever things it is true to predicate jointly, it is also true to state without qualification; but this will not occur in all cases. For if there is some predication of this sort in which something opposed is added to the predicate itself, then apart from that opposed thing the predication cannot be made without qualification—as if someone says of Socrates, now dead, that this thing lying here is a dead man, he speaks truly, but he cannot say without qualification that this thing lying here is a man. The reason is that there has been added to the predicate—that is, to "man"—that which is opposed to man, namely "dead." For it has been said that this thing lying here is a dead man. But "dead" and "man" are in a certain way opposites. For if we take their definitions, this can easily be seen. For man is animate, but dead is without soul; and therefore, since there is a certain opposition according to privation and habit, of man and dead—and both are truly predicated together—one of them, namely "man," cannot be predicated without qualification, apart from "dead," of the corpse; and this is what he says:
Non autem semper, sed quando in agjecto alzquid I quidem oppositorum idest quod consequilur contradictio,non verum,sed falsum est, ut hominem mortuum,, horninemdicere. Quando autem non est, verum est. Vel eliam quando inest, semper non verum est; quando vero nora inest, non semper verum est,!It Homerus est aliquid, ut poeta" ergo eliam est, an non, secundum accidens enim prædicatur esse de Homero quoniam est poeta, sed non secundum se prædicatur de Homero quoniam est.
Quae utraque, id est et prædicatum ef quod additur prædicato, ex ipsa oppositione contradictio comilalur, ut quoniam homo et mortuus opposila sunt, ea quædam comitatur atque consequitur per oppositionem contradictio. Dicimus enim, qui bomo est vivit, qui mortuus est non vivit; vivit autem et non vivit, quasdam conlradiclio esL Ero in hujusmodi prædicationibus non est verum unum simpliciter prædicari. Quando autem hujusmodi oppositioni ei quod prædicatur, non jungitur, potest simpliciter vere prædicari, sed nec hoc semper, magisque illud verius dicitur, quoniam cum ista oppositio est, nunquam verum est eorum qua: juncta vere prædicantur, simpliciter vere aliquid appellari. Cum autem ista oppositio non inest, noa semper vere simpliciter praedicari eorum aliquid, quas de aliquo vere juncta dicuntur.
But not always, but when something of the opposites—that is, what follows from the contradiction—is present in what is added, it is not true but false, as to say "a dead man" of a man. But when it is not present, it is true. Or even when it is present, it is always not true; but when it is not present, it is not always true. If Homer is something, as a poet, therefore he also is, or not? For it is predicated according to accident that he is of Homer, since he is a poet; but it is not predicated according to itself that he is of Homer.
In both of these—that is, both the predicate and what is added to the predicate—the contradiction is brought together from the opposition itself, so that since "man" and "dead" are opposites, a certain contradiction accompanies and follows them through opposition. For we say that he who is a man lives, and he who is dead does not live; but "lives" and "does not live" are a certain contradiction. Therefore in predications of this kind it is not true that one thing is predicated without qualification. But when an opposition of this kind is not joined to what is predicated, it can be predicated simply and truly—but not even this always; and rather that is said more truly, that when this opposition is present, it is never true that any of the things which are truly predicated when joined is called something simply and truly. But when this opposition is not present, it is not always true that any of the things which are truly said when joined of something is predicated simply and truly.
Si quis enim sic dicat: Homerus polea est, verum dixerit; quod si dicat: Homerus est simpliciter praeter poetam, falsum est. Atqui esse et polea, non sunt opposita. Ergo nonsemper quando oppositio non est in prædicalis, verum est aliquid simpliciter prædicari. Qum autem oppositio inest, semper falsum est unum prædicamentorum quae juncta dicunlur, simpliciter et praeter aliud dicere. Nam cum de Homero dicimus quoniam est aliquid, id est quoniam Homerus poeta est, verum est. Nunquid etiam dicendum est per se quoniam est, an potius esse non simpliciter, sed secundum accidens de Homero praedicatum est. Non enim quia est, sed quia poeta est, et quoniam ei et poeta esse accidit. Idcirco esse quoque Homerum aliquid, id est poetam, non per se esse praedicamus; concludit igitur hoc modo: Quare in quibuscunque prædicatis contarietas non inest, si defmitiones pro nominibus dicantur, el secundum se prædicantur, et nou secundum accidens in his aliquid. eG simpliciter verum erit dicere. Quod aulem non est, quoniam opinabile est, non est verum dicere esse aliquid. Opinatio enim ejus est, non quoniam est, sed quoniam non est.
For if someone says thus: "Homer is a poet," he will have spoken truly; but if he says: "Homer is," simply, apart from being a poet, it is false. And yet "to be" and "to be a poet" are not opposites. Therefore it is not always the case that when there is no opposition in the predicates, something is truly predicated simply. But when the opposition is present, it is always false to speak one of the categories that are said in conjunction, simply and apart from the other. For when we say of Homer that he is something, that is, that Homer is a poet, it is true. But should we also say per se that he is, or rather is "to be" predicated of Homer not simply, but according to accident? For it is not because he is, but because he is a poet, and because being a poet happens to him. For this reason we also predicate that Homer is something, that is, a poet, not per se. He concludes therefore in this way: Wherefore in whatever predicates contrariety is not present, if definitions are given in place of names, they are predicated both per se and not according to accident in these, and it will be simply true to say something. But what is not, because it is opinable, it is not true to say that it is something. For the opinion of it is not that it is, but that it is not.
In quibusdam enim nominibus dicds non apparet oppositio: quod si deliniantur, mox sese illa oppositio patefacit, ut in eo quod est homo et mortuus, nomina quidem ipsa opposita non sunt, sed definita inveniuntur opposiLa. In hujusmodi igitur oppositionibus vel quoties non secundum accidens praedicatur aliquid, ut esse de Homero secundum poelam, scilicet quod Homero accidens est, sed per se et secundum ipsum subjectum, manifestum est quoniam quidquid conjuncte vere dici potest, idem vere dicitur et simpliciter praedicatum, ut si quis dicat de aliquo homine quoniam hic homo albus est, verum Fortasse dixerU, el rursus hie albus est. Hoc quoque verum est dicere, idcirco quoniam de eo non ideo album praedicavit, quia dixit illum esse hominem, sicut de Qomero, idcirco esse praedicatur, quia poeta esse dicitur, sed quod per se albus est; sed hoc non secundum accidens prædicatur, sad per se. Quare recte dictum est in quibus junctis praedicationibus neque oppositio quædam inest, nec ipsa per accidens prædicalio est iilasimpliciter etiam posse praedicari. Quod autem non est, quoniam opinabile est, non est verum dicere esse aliquid. Opinato enim non est, quoniam est, sed quoniam non est. Quidam volentes id quod non est, aliquo modo esse monstrare, tali utebantursyljogismo, quod est opinabile est.
For in certain names, the opposition does not at first appear; but if they are defined, that opposition soon reveals itself, as in the case of "man" and "dead": the names themselves are not opposites, but when defined they are found to be opposed. In oppositions of this kind, then, or whenever something is not predicated according to accident—as "to be" is predicated of Homer according to "poet," namely because being a poet is accidental to Homer—but per se and according to the subject itself, it is manifest that whatever can be truly said in conjunction is also truly said when predicated simply. For if someone says of some man that this man is white, he has perhaps spoken truly; and again, "this one is white"—this too it is true to say, for the reason that he did not predicate white of him because he said he was a man, as in Homer's case "to be" is predicated because he is said to be a poet, but because he is white per se; and this is not predicated according to accident, but per se. Therefore it was rightly said that in joined predications in which no opposition is present, and which are not predicated according to accident, they can also be predicated simply. But what is not, because it is opinable, it is not true to say that it is something. For it is opinable not because it is, but because it is not. Certain people, wishing to show that what is not is in some way, used this syllogism: what is opinable is.
Concludebant quod non est igitur est, docentes ea quæ essent, sca potus, non opinabilia esse; quo autem non es, opinioni aum subjacere, nulla etiam scientia claudio Quod Aristoteles hoc modo discutit: ait enim, non idcirco est opinabile, quoniam est, sed idcirco opinabile est, quoniam non est; sed hoc quod non est, est quidem aliquid, sed est non per se, sed opinabile. Et quemadmodum Homerus quidem est quiddam, id est poeta, non tamen est per se, ita id quod non eSI, est quidem aliquid, id est opinabile, vel ignorabile, vel nescibile, non tamen est aliquid per se in natura.
DE ENUNTIATIONIBUS MODORUM, POSSIBILIS, CONTINGEN TIS, INPOSSIBILIS, ET NECESSARII.
lIis vero deferminatis, perspiciendum est quemadmodum sese habent affirmatiane. et negatione. ad se invicem, hæ scilicet quæ sunt de possibili esse et non possibili, de conlingenti et non contingenti, de imp ossibili et necessario. lIabent enim aliquas dubitationes. Propositionum alix sunt quae simpliciter profcruotur, aliae quibus aliquis modus in enuntiatione miscelur. Si quis enim dicat: Socrates disputat, simplicem propositionem fccit; si vero aliquis dicat: Socrates bene disputat, modum propositioni quam enuntiabat adjunxit; quomodo enim disputaret ap-' posuit, cum dixit bene.
They concluded: "What is not, therefore, is"—teaching that the things which exist, or rather the things which are, are not objects of opinion; but that what is not falls under opinion, and is also wholly excluded from knowledge. Aristotle discusses this as follows: for he says that it is not for this reason an object of opinion because it is, but for this reason it is an object of opinion because it is not; but this very thing which is not is indeed something, yet it is not per se, but is an object of opinion. And just as Homer is indeed something, that is, a poet, yet is not per se, so that which is not is indeed something, that is, an object of opinion, or an object of ignorance, or an object of unknowing, yet it is not something per se in nature.
ON ENUNCIATIONS OF MODES: THE POSSIBLE, THE CONTINGENT, THE IMPOSSIBLE, AND THE NECESSARY.
But these matters having been determined, it must be examined how affirmations and negations stand in relation to one another—namely those which concern the possible to be and the not possible, the contingent and the not contingent, the impossible and the necessary. For they involve certain difficulties. Of propositions, some are those which are put forward simply, others are those in which some mode is mixed into the enunciation. For if someone says, "Socrates disputes," he has made a simple proposition; but if someone says, "Socrates disputes well," he has added a mode to the proposition which he was enunciating; for he added how he disputes, when he said "well.
Nunc ergo boc speculatur quemadmodum se habent affirmationr.s et negaLioDes earum propositionum, quae cum modo aliquo proferunlur, ut siquis dicat, possibile est boc fieri, et rursua, non possibile est hoc fieri, quemadmodum sese in his affirmationis habeat negationisque natura. Similiter aulem et in eo quod est impossibile esse, et in eo quod est necesse esse, et in eo quod dicitur contingere esse, et non contingere esse. Quæquc horum sint affirmationes, quæve negationes, aut quam affirmationem cui negationi recte aliquis opponat: De his omnibus perspiciendum, inquit, est, quoniam ea quae de conjunctis et simplicibus prædicationibus dicenda fuerant, (erminala sunt. Nam de earum propositionum quae cum modo proferuntur, oppositionibus, multa causatio est. Quæ autem sint dubitationes, vel quemadmodum in his oppositiones inveniendae sunt, continua disputatione persequitur.
Now therefore he examines how affirmations and their negations stand in the case of those propositions which are uttered with some mode, as if someone should say, "It is possible for this to happen," and again, "It is not possible for this to happen"—how the nature of affirmation and negation stands in these. Similarly also in the case of "it is impossible to be," and in the case of "it is necessary to be," and in the case of what is said to happen to be and not to happen to be. Which of these are affirmations, which are negations, or which affirmation one rightly opposes to which negation—concerning all these things, he says, it must be examined, since the matters that had to be said about conjoined and simple predications have been completed. For concerning the oppositions of those propositions which are uttered with a mode, there is much dispute. But what the doubts are, or how the oppositions in these are to be found, he pursues in continuous discussion.
Nam si eorum quæ complectuntur illæ sibi invicem oppositæ sunt contradictiones, quæcunque secundum esse et non esse disponuntur, ut ejus quæ est, esse hominem, negatio est, non esse hominem, non, esse non hominem. Et ejus quæ est, esse album horninem, negatio est ea quæ est, non esse album hominem, sed non, esse non album hominem. Si enim de omnibus aut diclio est, aut negatio, lignum erit verum dicere esse non album hominem. Quod si hæc hoc modo, et quibuscunque esse non additur, idem faciet id quod pro esse dicitur, ut ejus quæ est, ambulat homo, negatio est, non ea qua? est, ambulat mun homo, sed ea quæ est, MOM ambulat homo. Nihil enim differtdicere hominemambulare, vel hominem ambulantem esse. Quare si hoc modo in omnibus, et eius quæ est, possibileest esse,negaUo est, possibile est non esse, sed non ea quæ est, non possibile est esse; videtur autem idem posse esse et nota esse, omne enim quod est possibile dividi vet ambulare, et non ambulare et non dividi possibile est.
For if those contradictions which are opposed to one another are of the things that are encompassed, whatever are arranged according to being and not being—as of the one which is "to be a man," the negation is "not to be a man," not "to be a non-man." And of the one which is "to be a white man," the negation is that which is "not to be a white man," but not "to be a non-white man." For if concerning all things there is either affirmation or negation, it will be true to say of a piece of wood that it is a non-white man. But if these things are so in this way, then also in whatever cases "not to be" is not added, the same thing will do what is said in place of "to be," as of the one which is "a man walks," the negation is not that which is "a non-man walks," but that which is "a man does not walk." For it makes no difference to say that a man walks or that a man is walking. Wherefore if in all cases in this way, also of the one which is "it is possible to be," the negation is "it is possible not to be," but not that which is "it is not possible to be"; but it seems that the same thing can be and not be, for everything which is possible to be divided or to walk, it is also possible not to walk and not to be divided.
Omnis propositio verborum et nominum complexione formatur;ergo propositionum quæ complectuntur, et quarum natura in complexione est, illæ solæ sunt, inquit, contradictiones. Quaecunque secundum esse et non esse ponuntur, ut in ea propositione quæ dicit, est homo, non est illa negatio hujus affirmationis quae proponit, est. non bomo, sed illa potius quae enuntiat, non est homo, ut sit affirmatio et negatio, est homo, non est homo. Illa vero quae dicit, est non homo, non est negatio ejus quæ enuntiat, est homo, sed est aQrmatio ejus negationis quae est, non esl non homo. Rursus cum dicimus, est albus homo, non est negatio illa hujus affirmationis quæ dicit, est non albus homo, sad illa potius quæ dicit, non est albus homo; hoc autem probatur sic: Necesse est enim in contradictionibus unam veram esse semper, alteram semper falsam: ergo si ejus affirmationis quae dicit, est albus homo, negatio esset, est non albus homo, unam veram, alteram falsam esse, constaret. Nunc autem si quis de ligno dicat, est albus bomo, falsum dixerit; si quis vero de ligno eodem neget dicens, est nou albus homo, hoc quoque falsum est; bæc euim propositio quæ dicit, est non albus homo, hoc sentit, hominem quidem esse non tamen album, quod de ligno falsum est prædicare.
Every proposition is formed by the combination of words and names; therefore, he says, those alone are contradictions which are encompassed and whose nature lies in combination. Whatever are posited according to being and not being—as in the proposition which says "is a man," the negation of this affirmation is not the one which proposes "is not-man," but rather the one which declares "is not a man," so that the affirmation and negation are "is a man" and "is not a man." But the one which says "is not-man" is not the negation of the one which declares "is a man," but is the affirmation of that negation which is "is not not-man." Again, when we say "is a white man," the negation of this affirmation is not the one which says "is a not-white man," but rather the one which says "is not a white man"; and this is proved thus: for in contradictions one must always be true and the other always false. Therefore, if the negation of the affirmation which says "is a white man" were "is a not-white man," it would be established that one is true and the other false. But as it is, if someone says of wood "is a white man," he has spoken falsely; and if someone denies the same of the wood, saying "is a not-white man," this too is false. For this proposition which says "is a not-white man" means that a man indeed exists but is not white, which it is false to predicate of wood.
Ergo et ea quae dicit, est albus homo, et illa quæ proponit, est non albus homo, utræquealiquando falsae sunt, ut in ligno: quare non sunt sibimet apposita?. Igitur nee ea uxdicit est albus non homo, negatio est ejus quæ dicit, est albus homo; quare illa hujus negatio ponenda est, quæ dicit, non est albus homo. In bis namque una semper vera est, semper altera falsa. Quod si ita est, secundum esse semper, et non esse, natura contradictionis efficitur. Nam cum dico, est homo, secundum id quod est esse fit negalio, non est homo. Et rursus cum dico, est albus bomo, secundum id quod est esse rursus negatio fit, non est albus homo. Et sensus quidem totus hujusmodi est. Ipsi autem in oratione sermones propter similitudinem videntur quidem obscuri. Erit autem planius pronunliantibus et subaudientibus sic, Nam si corum quae complectuntur, id est, propositionum quarum natura in complexione est, illae sibi invicem opposita? sunt contradictiones, quæcunquesecundum esse et nou esse disponuntur, ut hae quas supra di. gessimus, quarumque ipse exempla proponit, ut ejus qua? est, esse bominem, negatio est, non esse hominem. Haec enim ipsius affirmationis secundum esse, et non esse negatio est, et hic subaudiendum est, non illa negatio est, per quam dicit esse non hominem, ut sit sensus affirmationis quae est esse bominem, negaLio est non esse bominem. Non illa quae dicit esse non bominem.
Therefore both the statements "is white man" and the one that proposes "is not white man" are sometimes both false, as in the case of wood; why then are they not set in opposition to each other? Therefore neither is the statement "is white not-man" the negation of the one that says "is white man"; wherefore that negation of this one must be posited which says "is not white man." For in these cases one is always true and the other always false. But if this is so, the nature of contradiction is effected according to being and not being. For when I say "is man," the negation is made according to that which is being: "is not man." And again, when I say "is white man," the negation is again made according to that which is being: "is not white man." And indeed the whole sense is of this sort. But the words themselves in the discourse seem obscure because of their similarity. It will be clearer, however, if we pronounce and supply them thus: For if those contradictions which are formed by combinations—that is, of propositions whose nature lies in combination—are opposed to one another, whatever are arranged according to being and not being, such as those we have set out above and of which he himself gives examples, as of the one that is "to be man" the negation is "not to be man." For this is the negation of the affirmation itself according to being and not being, and here one must supply: not that negation by which it says "to be not-man," so that the sense may be: of the affirmation which is "to be man," the negation is "not to be man," not that one which says "to be not-man.
El hoc quidem de simplicibus. Rursus de his in quibus est tertium prædicatur, ejus quae est, esse album hominem, non hic subaudiendum est, illa est negatio quae dicit, esse non album hominem. Sed hic quoque subaudiendum est, ilia quæ dixit,non es.e album omnem, ut sit csensus: Hujusaffirmationis qnæ est, esse album nominem, non est illa negatio quæ dicit esse non album hominem; sed illa potius quoe proponit, non esse album hominem,et hoc approbat ind uclione. Si enim, inquit, de omnibus aut dictio est, id est affirmatio aut negatio vera, cum lignum falsum sit dicere esse album hominem, verum debet esse de eo dicere esse non album hominem, si hæc negatio est superioris affirmationis, sed utræque falsæ sunt. Hæc igitur non est illius affirmationis negatio. Ergo secundum esse etnon esse contradictiones sibimet opponunlur.Quod si hoc modo et quantiscunque esse non additur, idem faciet quod pro esse dicitur. Sunt quædam propositiones in quibus esse non additur, sed id quod in his enuntiatur idem valet tanquam si esse poneretur, ut in ea quæ est, homo ambulat, quod dico ambulat, tale est tanquam si dicatur, homo ambulans est. Ergo in his quoque quæ non habent est verbum junctum, si negationem ad verbum illud junxero, quod pro esse posiLum est, lalis mibi negatio redditur, qualis esset si negatio ad esse poneretur, ut in eo quod est, ambulat homo, ambulat pro esso posilum est.
And this indeed concerning simple statements. Again, in those in which a third term is predicated, in the case of the affirmation "is white man," the negation to be understood here is not the one that says "is not white man." But here too one must understand what he said—"is not white man"—in the sense of "is not every white man," so that the meaning is: of this affirmation which is "is white man," the negation is not the one that says "is not white man," but rather the one that proposes "is not white man," and he confirms this by the division. For if, he says, concerning all things either the statement—that is, the affirmation—or the negation is true, then since it is false to say of wood that it is a white man, it ought to be true to say of it that it is not a white man, if this is the negation of the former affirmation; but both are false. This, therefore, is not the negation of that affirmation. Therefore contradictions are opposed to one another according to "is" and "is not." But if in this way, and in however many cases "is" is not added, the same thing will be done as is said in place of "is." There are certain propositions in which "is" is not added, but what is enunciated in them has the same force as if "is" were posited, as in the one that is "a man walks": what I call "walks" is such as if it were said "a man walking is." Therefore in these too, which do not have the verb "is" joined, if I join the negation to that verb which is posited in place of "is," such a negation is rendered to me as would be the case if the negation were posited with "is," as in the one that is "a man walks": "walks" is posited in place of "is.
IIujus ergo affirmationis, ambulat homo, non estnegatio ea quæ dicit, ambulat non homo, sed illa potius quæ dicit, non ambulat homo. In hac enim ad id quod est ambulat negatio juncta est, quod ambulat homini pro eo quod est esse conjunctum est. Tale enim est dicere, homo ambulat, tanquam si quis dicat, est ambulans homo. Quare si hoc modo in omnibus, et ejus quæest possible est esse, negatio est, possibile est non esse, sed non ea quae est non possible est esse;si nomnibus, inquit, secundum essecontradicto fit, in bis quoque quæ possibilia dicuntur secundum esseet. non esse contradictio facienda est; in eo enim quod dicimus possibile est esse, illa erit negatio quai dicit possibile est non esse, non illa quae est, non' possibile est esse. Nam si ei quæ est possibile est esse, illa opponatur quas est non possibile est esse,. non secundum esse et non esse oppositio facta est. _ Quocirca quoniam supra docuit secundumesseet-non esse, fieri contradictionem, dicendum est ejus quae est., possibile est esse, illam esse oppositionem quae dicit, possibile est non esse. Sed aliud rursus occur. rit, quonos aacopinione dimoveat. omnibus enim aut affirmatio vera est, aut negatio.
Therefore of this affirmation, "a man walks," the negation is not the one that says "a non-man walks," but rather the one that says "a man does not walk." For in this one the negation is joined to that which is "walks," since "walks" is joined to "man" in place of "is." For saying "a man walks" is such as if someone should say "a walking man is." Wherefore if in all cases in this way, also of that which is "it is possible to be," the negation is "it is possible not to be," but not that which is "it is not possible to be"; if, he says, in all cases the contradiction is made according to being and not being, in those things also which are said to be possible, the contradiction must be made according to being and not being. For in that which we say "it is possible to be," the negation will be that which says "it is possible not to be," not that which is "it is not possible to be." For if to that which is "it is possible to be" there is opposed that which is "it is not possible to be," the opposition has not been made according to being and not being. Wherefore, since he taught above that the contradiction is made according to being and not being, it must be said that of that which is "it is possible to be," that opposition is the one which says "it is possible not to be." But again another difficulty occurs, which he removes from us lest it disturb our opinion. For in all cases either the affirmation is true or the negation.
In his enim ulræque sunt veræ, nam quod possibile est esse, possibile est non esse, ut quia possibile est hominem ambulare, possibile est hominem nou ambulare, et quod possibile est videri, possibile est non videri. Rursus quod possibile est secari et dividi, et non secari et nou dividi possibile est. Quare utraeque in eodem verae sunt, possibile est esse et possibile est non esse. Nam quod dicimus, possibile est non esse, ita intelligendum est ut si diceremus, possibile est hodie pluviam non esse, cum si possibile ut sit. Cur autem hoc ita eveniat, ipse demonstrat, dicens:
Ratio autem est quoniam omnequod sic possibile eat, non semper in actu est. Quare inerit ipsi etiam negatio; potest igitur et non ambulare quod est ambulabiles,et: non videri quod est visibile. Al vero impossibile est de eodem oppositas esse veras dictiones. Non igitur ejus quæ est, possibile est esse, negatio est possibile eat non esse. Contingit enim ex his aut idem ipsum affirmare et negare simul de codem, aut non secundum esse et non esse quæ opponuntur, fieri nfirmationes et negationes. Si ergo illud impossibilius est, hocerit magis eligendum.
For in these both are true, for what is possible to be is possible not to be, as because it is possible for a man to walk, it is possible for a man not to walk, and what is possible to be seen is possible not to be seen. Again, what is possible to be cut and divided is also possible not to be cut and not to be divided. Wherefore both are true in the same thing: it is possible to be and it is possible not to be. For what we say, "it is possible not to be," must be understood as if we said, "it is possible that there be no rain today," when it is possible that there be. But why this happens thus, he himself demonstrates, saying:
The reason is that everything which is possible in this way is not always in act. Wherefore negation will also belong to it; therefore what is walkable can also not walk, and what is visible can also not be seen. But it is impossible for opposite statements to be true concerning the same thing. Therefore the negation of that which is "it is possible to be" is not "it is possible not to be." For from these it happens either that the same thing is affirmed and denied at the same time concerning the same thing, or that the affirmations and negations which are opposed are not made according to being and not being. If, therefore, that is more impossible, this is rather to be chosen.
Hoc hujusmodi est, quaecunque ita sunt possibilia ut sint actu et opere, illa nulla ratione possunt non esse, lit caelo semper actu inest moveri. Sernper enim movelur, et dicimus, possibile est caelum moveri, idcirco quoniam caeli motus actu est, hoc est, id illi semper agitur. Movetur enim semper; in hac ergo possibilitate talis propositio non potest eon venire, ut dicamus, possibile est cælum non moveri, hoc euim impossibile est. Ergo in his quæcunque actu sunt, hae duae propositiones possibile est esse, possibile est non esse, nulla ralione conveniunl. In his autem qua? non semper actu sunt, et sunt possibilia esse, convenire possunt propositiones, id est, possibile est esse et possibile est non esse. Non est enim semper actu pluvia, et possibile est esse aliquando, quare possibile est eam aliquando non esse.
This is of the following sort: whatever things are possible in such a way that they exist in act and in deed, these cannot in any way not be—as it is always actually present in the heaven to move. For it is always moved, and we say that it is possible for the heaven to move, because the motion of the heaven is in act, that is, that is always being done to it. For it is always moved; therefore, in this possibility such a proposition cannot come about that we say, "It is possible for the heaven not to move," for this is impossible. Therefore, in those things whatever are in act, these two propositions—"It is possible to be," "It is possible not to be"—in no way agree. But in those things which are not always in act and are possible to be, the propositions can agree, that is, "It is possible to be" and "It is possible not to be." For rain is not always in act, and it is possible for it to be at some time; therefore it is possible for it at some time not to be.
IIæc igitur ratio est cur utræque inveniuntur verae, quod in his possibilitatibus, quæ non semper sunt actu, et esse aliquid, et non esse contingit; quare si ejus quod est possibile est esse, negatio est ea quæ dicit, possibile est non esse, in eodem simul et affirmatio et negalio erunt verge, et cui rei inest affirmatio, ut sit esse possibile, eidem rursus inerit negatio,ut sit possibile non esse, quare et quod ambulabile est, id est quod ambulare potest, potest non ambulare, et quod visibile est, id est quod videri potest, potest etiam non videri; sed impossibile est ut de eodem opposita? et contrajacentes dictiones simul verae sint. In omnibus enim aut affirmatio vera est aut negatio. Si ergo factis negationibus secundum esse et non esse, in his quæ secundum aliquem modum dicuntur, aflirmatio et negalio utræque sunt veræ, quod fieri non potest, illud magis dicendum est, non faciendas secundum esse et non esse negationes, sed potius secundum modum; quod si illud est impossibilius, ut affirmatio et negatio simul verae siut, illud magis est eligendum ut non secundum esseet non esse fiat conlradiclio, sed potius secundum modum. Quod autem digit, si ergo illud impossibilius eSI, hoc erit magis eligendum, non sic dictum est quod utraque impossibilia sint et affirmationem et negationem veram esse, et non secundum esse, vel non esse Geri contradiclionem.
This, then, is the reason why both are found to be true: in those possibilities which are not always in act, it happens that something both is and is not. Wherefore, if the negation of that which is possible to be is what says "it is possible not to be," then in the same thing at the same time both the affirmation and the negation will be true, and to whatever thing the affirmation belongs—namely, that it is possible to be—to the same thing again the negation will belong, namely, that it is possible not to be. Hence also what is walkable, that is, what can walk, can also not walk; and what is visible, that is, what can be seen, can also not be seen. But it is impossible that opposites and contradictory statements about the same thing be true at the same time. For in all cases either the affirmation is true or the negation. If, therefore, with negations made according to "to be" and "not to be," in those things which are said according to some mode, both the affirmation and the negation are true—which cannot happen—then it must rather be said that negations should not be made according to "to be" and "not to be," but rather according to the mode. But if that is more impossible—that the affirmation and the negation be true at the same time—then that is rather to be chosen, that the contradiction not be made according to "to be" and "not to be," but rather according to the mode. But what he says—"If, therefore, that is more impossible, this will be rather to be chosen"—has not been said in the sense that both are impossible, namely that both the affirmation and the negation be true, and that the contradiction not be made according to "to be" or "not to be.
U!ud enim, id est contradictionem simul veram esse, impossibile est. Secundum esse autem et non esse affirmationem non fieri et negationem non esse impossibile est, sed ad hoc retulit, impossibilius est, tanquam si diceret, minuspossibile. Minus enim possibile est ut oppositae in eadem proposiliones veræ sint, quam ut non secundum esse et non esse negaliones ponantur. Quocirca eligendum est huc quod est possibilius, ut secundum modum otius quam secundum esse et non esse negationes fiant. Quod ipse planius exsequitur dicens:
Est igitur negatio ejus quæ est possibile esse, ea quæ est non possibile esse, et non ea quæ est possibile non esse. Eadem quoque ratio est in eo quod est L'ontingens, etenim negatio ejus est non contingens esse.
Hae namque simul vene invenirinonpossunt; nam si quid est possibile esse, ut idem illud impossibile sit, Geri non potest, nec boc in solis possibilibus speculandum est, sed in omnibus quoque eadem ratio est. Nam in eo quod est contingere esse, non est illa negatio quod dicit contingere non esse. Haec enim consentit ei quod est, contingere esse, sed illa quod proponit non contingere esse. Has enim duas simul veras inveniri impossibile est.
For that, namely that a contradiction be true at the same time, is impossible. But that, according to being and not being, an affirmation not be made and a negation not be, is impossible; but he referred this to the more impossible, as if he were saying "less possible." For it is less possible that opposite propositions be true in the same [proposition] than that negations not be posited according to being and not being. Wherefore one must choose here what is more possible, so that negations come about according to the mode of being than according to being and not being. And he sets this forth more plainly, saying:
Therefore the negation of "it is possible to be" is "it is not possible to be," and not "it is possible not to be." The same reasoning holds also in "it is contingent," for its negation is "it is not contingent to be."
For these cannot be found true at the same time; for if something is possible to be, so that the same thing be impossible, it cannot come about, nor is this to be considered only in things possible, but in all things the same reasoning holds. For in "it is contingent to be," that negation which says "it is contingent not to be" is not [its negation]. For this agrees with "it is contingent to be," but that which proposes "it is not contingent to be" [is its negation]. For it is impossible that these two be found true at the same time.
El in aliis quoque simili modo, ul in necessario eL impossibili. Fiunt enim quemadmodum in illis esse et non esse appositiones, subjecta vero res, hoc quidem album, illud uero homo.
Et in aliis, inquit, omnibus idem faciendum est: secundum modum enim negatio ponenda est, ut si contingens est ad contingere, si possibilis ad p05sibile, si impossibilisad impossibile, si necessarium ad necessarium negatio conjungatur. Quemadmodum enim, inquit, in lais quae praeter modum aliquem sunt, et aliquid esse proponunt, esse quidem et non esse appositiones quædam, id est praedicationes sunt, res vero subjectae, ut in eo quod est, homo esl, et homo non est, homo quod est res subjectum est. Appositio autem quædam et praedicatio est et non est, vel in eo quod dicitur album est et album non es, album quidem res subjecta est, appositum autem et praedicatum, est. el non est. Ita quuque in bis quæ secundum aliquem modum diculllur, esse quidem subjectum est, velut quaedam res. Modus autem deesse prædicalur; nam cum dicimus,hodie pluviam esse possibile est, esse subjecimus, possibile præJicamus, et sic totam vim in pl'oposilionibus prædicatio tenet, et simplicibus, et pra--ter modum quones aliquid esse prædicamus, ul in eo quod dicimus, homo est, totam propositionis vim continet.
And in other cases too in a similar way, as in the necessary and the impossible. For just as in those cases being and not being are appositions, while the underlying thing is the subject—this one white, that one man.
And in all other cases, he says, the same must be done; for the negation must be placed according to the mode, so that if it is contingent, the negation is joined to "contingently"; if possible, to "possibly"; if impossible, to "impossibly"; if necessary, to "necessarily." For just as, he says, in those things that are without some mode and propose that something is, "is" and "is not" are certain appositions, that is, predications, while the things themselves are subjects—as in "man is" and "man is not," man, which is the thing, is the subject. But "is" and "is not" are a certain apposition and predication; or in what is said, "white is" and "white is not," white indeed is the underlying thing, while "is" and "is not" are the apposition and predication. So too in those things that are spoken according to some mode, "to be" is the subject, as it were a certain thing. But the mode is said to be lacking as a predicate; for when we say, "it is possible that there is rain today," we have made "to be" the subject and we predicate "possible," and thus the whole force in propositions—both in simple ones and in those according to mode, when we predicate that something is—is held by the predication, as in what we say, "man is," it contains the whole force of the proposition.
verbum est, ita quoque in his quae secundum modum dieuntur, quoniam tetam propositionem continet modus, aut possibilis,aul conlingenlis, aut impossibiJis. aut necessarii, hæc prædicari, res vero alix subjectæ, esse dicuntur. Hoc enim quod ait:
Sic hoc loco, esse quidem et non esse subjecta fiunt, posse vero et contingere appositiones determinantes quemadmodum in illis esse et non esse veritalem et falsitatem, "ie hic in eo quod est, esse possibile, et esse non possibile.
Nam quemadmodum in simplicibus si ad esse et non esse negationes fiant, una semper vera esi, altera semper falsa, ita quoque in his quae secundum modum dicunlur, si ad ipsum modum enuntiatio negationis aptetur, velut ad quasdam apposiliones prædicationesqu6 veritas in appositionibus et falsitas terminata dividitur. Atque hoc est quod ait. Similiter hae etiam in eo quodest esse possibile et esse non possibile. Similiter enim secundum possibile et non possibile facta oppositio, veritatem falsitatem que determinat, sicut in simplicibus et præter modum positis secundum esse et non esse negatio. Hinc in omnibus secundum modum affirmationibus, oppositiones digerit. eonvenientium negationum,dieitenim:
For just as in those cases being and not being are appositions, while the underlying things are subjects—this one white, that one a man—so too in those which are spoken of according to mode, since the mode contains the whole proposition, whether of the possible, or the contingent, or the impossible, or the necessary, these things are said to be predicated, while the things themselves are underlying subjects. For this is what he says:
Thus in this place, being and not being become subjects, while to be possible and to be contingent are determining appositions, just as in those cases being and not being determine truth and falsehood—here, in the case of what is, being possible and being not possible.
For just as in simple propositions, if negations are made with respect to being and not being, one is always true and the other always false, so too in those which are spoken of according to mode, if the enunciation of negation is applied to the mode itself, as to certain appositions and predications, truth and falsehood are divided and determined in the appositions. And this is what he says: Similarly also in the case of being possible and being not possible. For in like manner the opposition made according to possible and not possible determines truth and falsehood, just as in simple propositions placed without mode the negation according to being and not being does. Hence in all affirmations according to mode he sets out the oppositions of corresponding negations, for he says:
Ejus vero quæ est, possibile est non esse, negatio est, non ea quæ est, nun possibile est esse, sed ea quæ est, non possibile est non esse. Et ejus quæ est, possibile est esse, non ea quæ est, possibile est non esse, sed ea quæ est, non possibile est esse. Quare et sequi sese invicem videbuntur,hæc possibile est esse,possibile estnon esse. Idem enim possibile est esse, et non esse. Non enim contradictiones sunt sibi invicem hujusmodi, possibile esse et possibile non esse. Sed possibile est esse, et non possibile est esse, nunquam sirnul in eodem veræ sunt, opponuntur enim. At vero, nec possibile est non esse, et non possibile est non esse,nunquam simul veræ sunl. Similiter aulem et ejus quæ est necessarium esse, MOM ea quæ est, necessarium non esse, negatio est, sed ea quæest, non necessarium esse. Eius vero quæ est, necessariun est non esse, ea quæ est, non necessarium est non esse. Et ejus quæ est, impossibile esse, MOM ea quæ est, impossibile non esse, sed non impossibile est, ejus vero qltæ est, impossibile non esse, ea quæ est, non impossibile est non esse.
But the negation of "it is possible not to be" is not "it is not possible to be," but "it is not possible not to be." And the negation of "it is possible to be" is not "it is possible not to be," but "it is not possible to be." Hence these too will seem to follow one another: "it is possible to be" and "it is possible not to be." For the same thing is possible to be and not to be. For such things as "it is possible to be" and "it is possible not to be" are not contradictions of one another. But "it is possible to be" and "it is not possible to be" are never true at the same time of the same thing, for they are opposed. And indeed neither are "it is possible not to be" and "it is not possible not to be" ever true at the same time. Similarly also the negation of "it is necessary to be" is not "it is necessary not to be," but "it is not necessary to be." And the negation of "it is necessary not to be" is "it is not necessary not to be." And the negation of "it is impossible to be" is not "it is impossible not to be," but "it is not impossible to be"; and of "it is impossible not to be" the negation is "it is not impossible not to be.
Ut demonstrel eam quae dicit, possibile est non esse, non modo non esse negationem ejus quæ est, possibile est esse, sed omnino negationem non esse, bujus aliam invenit negaliorem. Nam eju8 quæ esl, possibile est non esse, quam affirmationis loco posuit, negatio reperitur illa quae dicit, non possibile est non esse, secundum modum sciHcet,addita negatione; unde iit, inquit, ut ea quæ dicit, possibile est esse, et illa quae proponit, possibile est non esse, sese invicem consequantur; idem namque possibile est esse quod est possibile non esse. Cur autem se consequi possunt, haec causa est, quoniam non sunt oppositæ. Nam si essent oppositæ, perimerent se potius quam consequerentur, et dissentirent magis quam consentirent, ut est in his possibile est esse, et non possibile est esse. Hæc enim ita a se disjunclæ sunt, ut simul esse non possint. Idcirco autem oc evenil, quoniam sunt oppositæ; semper igitursecundum modum ponenda negalio est, si integra oppositionis natura fHCienda est, quod planissime exequitur, singulis propositionum modis negationis acconimodaas, atque integras naturaliter efficiens oppositiones. At vero, inquit, ea quæ est possibile est non esse, cum ea quæ dicit, non possibile est non esse, simul esse non poterit. Namque oppositas esse mani-.
So that he may show that the statement "it is possible not to be" is not only not the negation of that which is "it is possible to be," but is altogether not a negation, he finds another negation of this one. For of that which is "it is possible not to be," which he placed in the position of an affirmation, the negation is found to be that which says "it is not possible not to be," with the negation added, of course, according to the mode. Hence it follows, he says, that the statement "it is possible to be" and the one he sets forth, "it is possible not to be," follow one another in turn; for it is the same thing to be possible to be and to be possible not to be. But the reason why they can follow one another is that they are not opposites. For if they were opposites, they would destroy each other rather than follow one another, and would disagree rather than agree, as is the case with "it is possible to be" and "it is not possible to be." For these are so disjoined from one another that they cannot be at the same time. But this happens because they are opposites; therefore the negation must always be posited according to the mode, if the complete nature of opposition is to be effected, which he carries out most clearly, fitting appropriate negations to each of the modes of the propositions, and naturally making the oppositions complete. But, he says, the statement "it is possible not to be" cannot be at the same time as that which says "it is not possible not to be." For it is manifest that they are opposites.
festum est, siquidem harum negatio ad modum est posita, qui est possibile esse, ejus autem quæ est necessarium est esse, non oportet dici illam e3se negationem, per quam dicitur, necessarium est non esse; hujus enim alia negatio inveniri potesl, quoniamest af11rmalio quædam, est autem eus negatio ea quæ dicit, non necessariumest. non esse. Sed potius ei quae dicit necessarium est esse, ea opponenda est quae dicit, non necessarium e"J esse; ad illam namque quae dicil, necessarium est non esse opponitur (ut. dictum est), non necessarium est non esse. Ejus quoque quae est, impossibile est esse, non dicenda est illa esse negatio per quam dicimus, im,possibile est non esse, sed ea poHus quæ proponit, non impossibile est esse. Namque affirmatio quaedam est, impossible est non esse. Hujus cnim invenitur negatio quæ est, non impossibile est non esse.
It has been shown that the negation of these is posited in the manner of that which is "possible to be"; but of that which is "necessary to be," that should not be called its negation through which it is said "it is necessary not to be." For another negation of this can be found, since it is a certain affirmation; but its negation is that which says "it is not necessary to be." But rather, to that which says "it is necessary to be," that which says "it is not necessary to be" ought to be opposed. For to that which says "it is necessary not to be" is opposed, as has been said, "it is not necessary not to be." Also, of that which is "it is impossible to be," that should not be called its negation through which we say "it is impossible not to be," but rather that which proposes "it is not impossible to be." For "it is impossible not to be" is a certain affirmation. For of this is found the negation which is "it is not impossible not to be.
Universaliter vero (quemadmodum dictum est) esse ' quidem et non esse oportet ponere tanquam subjecta, affirmationcm vero et negationem hæc facientem ad esse et non esse apponere, et has putare oportet esse oppositas dictiones, possibile, nnn possibile, contingens non cOnlingens, impossibile, non impossibile, necessarium, non necessarium, verum, nan verum.
Regulam dat uDiversatemdicens:Hoc universaliter in omnibus faciendum esse, quod supra jam diximus, ut subjectum esse et non esse ponatur Affirmationem autem et negationem ipsos modos faciamus. Hoc est. enim quod ait, negalionern vero et affirmationem haec; facientem, modos enim ipsos, idest possibile et con-. tingens et cæteros pro affirmationibus orJinanles, et I ad hos negativo adverbio juncto pro negationibus ł disponentes, aut ad id quod dicimus est, et non est,, apponamus, ut quemadmodum ad unam rem, quod I est. homo, est verbum et non est negatio, prædicatum estin his quoddam propositionibus quæpræpterr modum sunt, ut in ea per quam dicimus, bomo est, sic in his propositionibus quae cum modo sun, esc quidem aut non est, subjecta ponamus, modos vero ipsos aut secundum affirmationem, si simpliciter di.
Universally, however (as has been said), "to be" and "not to be" ought to be posited as subjects, while affirmation and negation, making these [their subjects] with respect to "to be" and "not to be," are to be added; and these should be considered the opposed expressions: possible, not possible; contingent, not contingent; impossible, not impossible; necessary, not necessary; true, not true.
He gives a universal rule, saying: This is to be done universally in all cases, as we have already said above, namely that "to be" and "not to be" be posited as the subject, while we make the modes themselves the affirmation and the negation. For this is what he means by "but the negation and the affirmation making these," namely that we arrange the modes themselves—that is, "possible" and "contingent" and the rest—in place of affirmations, and, joining the negative adverb to them, dispose them in place of negations; or we add them to that which we call "is" and "is not," so that just as in relation to one thing—"is a man"—"is" is the verb and "is not" the negation, so in these propositions which are qualified by a mode, as in the one by which we say "a man is," we should posit "is" or "is not" as the subjects, but the modes themselves according to affirmation, if simply...
canlur, aut secundum negationem, si cum negatione ponantur, facientes ad subjectum, quod secundum esse et non esse, disposuimus prædicemus, ut has, arbitremur esse oppositas dictiones et negationes, quæ secundum modos factæ sint, eorum autem omnium negationes et affirmationes in contrarium dis ponantur.
Quod autem addidit verum, non verum, ad demonstralionem omnium modorum valet. Namsi quis dicat, verum est, non est ipsius negatio verum non est, sed potius non verum est. Alioqui ejus quæ ait verum non est, illa negatio est quod dicit, non verum non est.
Consequentiæ vero secundum ordinem fiunt ita ponentibus. Illi enim quæ est, possibile est esse, sequitur illa quæ est, contingens esse, ethæc illi convertiMur, et non impossibile esse, et non necessarium esse. Illi uero quæ est, possibile non esse, et contingens non esse, ea quæ est, non necessarium non esse, et non impossibile non esse. Illi vero quæ est, non possibile esse, et non contingens esse, ea quæ est, necessarium nora esse, et impossibile esse. Wi vero quæ est, non possibile non esse et non contingens non esse, illa quæ est, nccesse est esse, et impossibile non esse.
...are uttered, or according to negation, if they are posited with a negation, making [them] with respect to the subject that we have laid down according to "to be" and "not to be," we should judge these to be opposed expressions and negations—those, namely, that are made according to the modes—while the negations and affirmations of all of these are set down in opposition.
But the fact that he added "true" and "not true" is of value for the demonstration of all the modes. For if someone says "it is true," its negation is not "it is not true," but rather "it is not true." Otherwise, the negation of that which says "it is not true" is what he states: "it is not not true."
The consequences, however, come about in order when they are posited thus. For upon that which is "it is possible to be" follows that which is "it is contingent to be," and upon this in turn "it is not impossible to be" and "it is not necessary to be." But upon that which is "it is possible not to be" and "it is contingent not to be" follow those which are "it is not necessary not to be" and "it is not impossible not to be." But upon that which is "it is not possible to be" and "it is not contingent to be" follow those which are "it is necessary not to be" and "it is impossible to be." And upon that which is "it is not possible not to be" and "it is not contingent not to be" follow those which are "it is necessary to be" and "it is impossible not to be.
Expeditis omnibus quae de moJorum oppositionibus disputabantur, al consequenlias venit. Hoc enim dicit, quae propositiones supradictorum modorum, quas propositiones consequntur quibusque consentinnt. Nos autem ex hisqualuor fecimus ordines, et consequenlias propositionum sub una serie disposuimus; haec amem prius nota sint, ut quid ab Aristotele dicatur, facilius lector intelligat.
Consideretur autem ex subscriptione quod dicimus: Possibile est esse. Possibile est non esse. Contingit esse. Contingit non esse. Non impossibile est esse. Non impossibile non esse. Non necesse est esse. Non necesse est non esse. Non possibile est esse. Non posssible est non esse. Non contingit esse. Non contingit non esse. Nr,cesse est non esse. Necesse est esse. Impossibile est esse. Impossibile est non esse.
Superius autem descriptas consequentias ipse disponit: nobis autem reddenda est breviter ratio, cur bæc propositiones sese invicem consequantur, quod possibile est esse, contingit aliquando ul sil, et boc est conlingil esse; quod autem contingit esse, non est impossibile esse, et quod non est impossibileessc, non idcirco jam necesse est esse. Non est enim impossibile hodie esse pluviam, sed non idcirco jam esse necesse est. Quod ergo non est impossibile esse,. non necesse est esse. Et hic est unus ordo conse. quenliæ.
With all the matters that were disputed concerning the oppositions of modes now settled, he comes to the consequents. For he says this: which propositions of the aforementioned modes are consequent upon which propositions, and to which they are attached. Now we have made four orders out of these, and we have arranged the consequents of the propositions under a single series; but let these things be known beforehand, so that the reader may more easily understand what is being said by Aristotle.
Let what we say be considered from the following listing: It is possible to be. It is possible not to be. It happens to be. It happens not to be. It is not impossible to be. It is not impossible not to be. It is not necessary to be. It is not necessary not to be. It is not possible to be. It is not possible not to be. It does not happen to be. It does not happen not to be. It is necessary not to be. It is necessary to be. It is impossible to be. It is impossible not to be.
Now he himself sets out the consequents described above; but we must briefly give the reason why these propositions follow one another: that it is possible to be, it happens at some time to be, and this is "it happens to be"; but what happens to be is not impossible to be, and what is not impossible to be is not for that reason already necessary to be. For it is not impossible for there to be rain today, but it is not for that reason already necessary that it be. Therefore what is not impossible to be is not necessary to be. And this is one order of consequence.
Rursus secundus ordo propositionum talem habet consequentiam, quod possibile est non esse, potest. fieri ut non sit, quare contingit aliquando ul non sit, et quod possibile est non esse,contingit non esse; quod autem contingit non esse, potest fieri ut non sit, sed quod potest fieri ut non sit, non est impossibile ut non sit ergo quod contingit non esse, non est impossibile ut sit, sed quod non est impossibile non esse, non idcirco illud jam non esse necesse est; hodie enim pluviam non esse non est irnpossibile. Potest enim esse, sed non idcirco ex necessitate hodie non pluet; quare quod non est impossibile non esse, non est necessarium non esse, et liecundus quidem ordo sese sic habet. Nunc autem ad tertium transeamus: quod non possibile est esse, boc fieri non potest, quod aulem fieri non potest, ut aliquando sil, non contingit, quod ergo non possibile est esse, idem non contingit esse; sed quod non conlingit esse, necesse est ut non sit, quod nunquam contingit, nunquam esse potest, quod nunquam esse potest, necesse est non esse; quod non igitur contingit esse, idem necesse est non esse, sed quod necesse est non esse, hoc fieri non potest, quod autem fieri non potest, impossibile est. ut fiat, quod igitur necesse est, non esse impossibile est esse.
Again, the second order of propositions has this consequence: what is possible not to be can come about that it not be; therefore it happens at some time that it not be, and what is possible not to be, it happens not to be; but what happens not to be can come about that it not be; but what can come about that it not be, it is not impossible that it not be. Therefore what happens not to be, it is not impossible that it be—but what is not impossible not to be, for that reason it is not already necessary that it not be. For today it is not impossible that there be no rain; for it can be, but not for that reason will it necessarily not rain today. Wherefore what is not impossible not to be, it is not necessary not to be; and the second order indeed stands thus. Now let us pass to the third: what is not possible to be, this cannot come about; but what cannot come about, that it be at some time, does not happen; therefore what is not possible to be, the same does not happen to be. But what does not happen to be, it is necessary that it not be; what never happens, can never be; what can never be, it is necessary that it not be. Therefore what does not happen to be, the same it is necessary not to be. But what it is necessary not to be, this cannot come about; but what cannot come about, it is impossible that it come about. Therefore what is necessary not to be, it is impossible to be.
Quarlus eliam ordo ocmodo est: quodnon possibile est non esse, Geri non potest ut non sit; quod fieri non potest ut non sit, non contingit non esse. Ut quoniam non possibile est non esse motum caelo, non contingit cæ]um non moveri, quare quod non vossibile est non esse, idem non contingit non esse, sed quod non contingit non esse, necesse est esse, sicut de coelo. Necesse est enim caelum moveri, quoniam non contingit caelum non moveri, sed quod necesse est esse, ut non sit fieri non potest, quare quod necesse est esse impossibile est non esse. Et haec quidem est ordinata ab Aristotele consequentia proposidonum, de qua paulo post latius disputabit.
Ergo impossibile et non impossibile ad illud quod est contingens et possibile, et non contingens et non possibile, sequntur quidem contradictorie, sed converrim. Illud enim quod est, possibile esse, negatio sequitur impossibilis, negationem vero alfirrnatio. Ad iilud enim quod est non possibile esse, sequitur illud quod est impossibile esse. Affirmatio enim est, impossibile esse, non impossibile vero negatio.
The fourth order also is as follows: what is not possible not to be, cannot come about that it not be; what cannot come about that it not be, does not happen not to be. For example, since it is not possible that motion not be in the heaven, it does not happen that the heaven not move; wherefore what is not possible not to be, the same does not happen not to be, but what does not happen not to be, it is necessary to be, as concerning the heaven. For it is necessary that the heaven move, since it does not happen that the heaven not move; but what is necessary to be, it cannot come about that it not be; wherefore what is necessary to be, it is impossible not to be. And this indeed is the ordered consequence of propositions given by Aristotle, concerning which he will dispute more fully a little later.
Therefore impossible and not impossible follow, in a contradictory way indeed but conversely, upon that which is contingent and possible, and upon not contingent and not possible. For upon that which is possible to be, the negation of impossible follows; but upon the negation, the affirmation. For upon that which is not possible to be, that which is impossible to be follows. For impossible to be is an affirmation, but not impossible is a negation.
Quaedam de superiore consequentium ratione pertractat. In superioribus enim descriptionibus sese sequentium, affirmationem pussibilis sequebatur impossibilis negatio. Rursus negationem possibilis sequebatur impossibilis affirmatio, et de contingenti eodem modo, affirmationem namque impossibilis dicentem impossibile esse, sequebatur negatio possibilis dicens, non possibile est esse. Rursus cum impossibile negaretur erid uod dicebatur non impossibile esse, hanc affirmatio possibilis subsequebatur, ea scilicet quæ dicit possibile esse. Atque hoc idem de contingenti, affirmatio namque Impossibilis ea quae est impossibile esse, sequebatur contangentis negationem eam qua: est, non contingit esse. Negatio vero impossibilis, ea quae dicit, non impossibile est esse, affirmationem contingentis sequebatur eam quae dicit, contingit esae; quare hae pro. positiones sese invicem sequuntur, sed conversæ. Namque affirmatio impossibilis contingentis negationem et possibilis sequitur. Negatio vero impossibilis affirmationem possibilis et contingenLis, ut subjecta descriptio docet. Idcirco namque ait: Sequuntur quidem contradicto-, riæ, sed conversim, quod omnes in contrarium locatae contradictiones sunt. Contradictio namque est impossibile esse et non impossibile esse, contingere esse et non contingere esse, possibile esse et non possibile esse.
He discusses certain matters concerning the reasoning of the consequents above. For in the earlier descriptions of things that follow one another, the affirmation of the possible was followed by the negation of the impossible. Again, the negation of the possible was followed by the affirmation of the impossible, and in the same way concerning the contingent; for the affirmation of the impossible, which says that it is impossible to be, was followed by the negation of the possible, which says that it is not possible to be. Again, when the impossible was denied and what was said was that it is not impossible to be, the affirmation of the possible followed this, namely the one that says that it is possible to be. And the same holds concerning the contingent; for the affirmation of the impossible, which is that it is impossible to be, was followed by the negation of the contingent, which is that it does not happen to be. But the negation of the impossible, which says that it is not impossible to be, was followed by the affirmation of the contingent, which says that it happens to be. Wherefore these propositions follow one another, but in reverse. For the affirmation of the impossible follows the negation of the contingent and of the possible. But the negation of the impossible follows the affirmation of the possible and of the contingent, as the description set out below teaches. For this reason he says: the contradictories follow, but in reverse, because all the contradictions are placed in the contrary order. For the contradiction is: it is impossible to be and it is not impossible to be; it happens to be and it does not happen to be; it is possible to be and it is not possible to be.
Conversae autem se sequuntur, quoniam affirmatio non sequitur affirmationem, et negatio negationem, sed affirmationem negationes, negationefn vero affirmationes, quod ad supradictam descriptionem revertentibus planius liquet; sensus ergo hic est. Ordo autem seriesque sermonum sese sic habel; ergo inquit Aristoteles contradictionem qua; est impossibile et non impossibile, illud quod est contingens et possibile, quæ dux affirmationes sunt ac sese sequuntur. et non contingens et non possibile, quæ duæ sunt negationes, sequuntur quidem contradictoriæ, ut contradictiones sint in contrarium ductæ, sed conversim, ut affirmatio negationem, negatio sequatur affirmalionem. Hujus tali" ratio redditur: illud enim quod est possibile esse, scilicet quod affirmatio est, negationem impossibiiis sequitur, esl autem negatio impossibilis non imposibile esse; quod est ergo possibile esse, sequitur non impossibile esse, negatio vero possibilis affimationem impossibilis sequitur, illud namque quod est non possibile esse, sequitur affirmationem quae est impossibile esse, etenim affirmatio est impossibile esse, non impossibile esse negatio, et in contingentibus eodem modo, atque hoc quidem de possibilium et impossibilium consequentia dictum est. Nunc de necessarii et possibilis consequentia tractat.
But the converses follow one another, since an affirmation does not follow an affirmation, nor a negation a negation, but negations follow an affirmation, and affirmations follow a negation, which becomes clearer to those returning to the description given above; the sense, then, is this. Now the order and series of the propositions stands thus. Therefore Aristotle says that the contradiction consisting of "it is impossible" and "it is not impossible" — that is, the one consisting of "it is contingent" and "it is possible," which are two affirmations — follow one another. And "it is not contingent" and "it is not possible," which are two negations, do indeed follow the contradictory [affirmations], so that the contradictions are drawn toward the contrary, but in reverse, so that an affirmation follows a negation and a negation follows an affirmation. The reason for this is given as follows: for "it is possible to be" — that is, what the affirmation is — follows the negation "it is not impossible"; and the negation of "it is impossible" is "it is not impossible to be." Therefore "it is possible to be" follows "it is not impossible to be." But the negation of "it is possible" follows the affirmation "it is impossible"; for "it is not possible to be" follows the affirmation which is "it is impossible to be." For "it is impossible to be" is an affirmation, and "it is not impossible to be" is a negation. And in the case of contingents the same holds. And this much has been said about the consequence of possibles and impossibles. Now he treats of the consequence of the necessary and the possible.
Necessarium vero quemadmodum sit considerandum est. Manifestumestautemquoniam non eodem modo, sed contrariæ sequnlur, contradictoriæ nutem sunt extra. Non enim est negatio ejus quod est, necesse non esse, non neæsse est esse, contingit enim esseveras utrasque in eodem, quod enim est necessarium non esse non est necessarium esse.
Quod dicit bujusmodi est: in his proposilionibus quae erant impossibilis et non impossibilis, convcniebal non possibile ei quod est impossibile, et possibile consentiebat ei quod est non impossibile, conlradiclionem scilicet impossibilis contradictio non possibilia sequebatur ordine converso; in his aulem quae necessarium praedicant vel affirmative vel negalive, et sequuntur possibilem propositionem ejus quae possibili consentit, contradictio non sequitur contradictionem possibilis, sed polius contraria; necessarias vero nunc proposiliones dico, qua? tametsi nou significent necessitatem, tamen sive armalive, sive negative necessarium prædicant: sensus ergo hic est, M qua ex his quas necessarium praedicant.
It must be considered how the necessary stands. But it is evident that it is not in the same way, but contraries follow, while contradictories lie outside. For the negation of "it is necessary that it is not" is not "it is necessary that it is"; for it happens that both are true in the same case, since what is necessary not to be is not necessary to be.
What he says is of this sort: in those propositions which were of the impossible and the not-impossible, it was fitting that "not possible" agree with "impossible," and "possible" agree with "not impossible"—that is, the contradiction of "impossible," namely "not possible," followed in reverse order. But in those which predicate "necessary" either affirmatively or negatively, and follow the proposition "possible"—that is, the one that agrees with "possible"—the contradiction does not follow the contradiction of "possible," but rather the contrary. By "necessary propositions" I now mean those which, although they do not signify necessity, nevertheless predicate "necessary" either affirmatively or negatively. The sense, therefore, here is: in those which predicate "necessary.
consentit possibili propositioni,ejus quæ necessarium prædicat, contradictio non sequitur possibilis contradiclionem, sed ejus quae necessarium praedicat contradictionis contraria ea consentit possibilis proposiHonis contradictioni; prius autem disponamus quae sunt contradictoriæ,quæve contra riae, ejus enim quae dicit necesse est esse, contradictio est, non nocesse est esse, contraria vero, necesse est non esse; rursus ejus quae est, necesse non esse, contradictio est, non necesse est non esse, contraria vero, necesse est esse. Quare describantur et circa unam eamdemaue contraria et contradictoria disonantur, ut quod a nobis dicendum est, clarius possit liquere. His igitur commode breviterque descriptis, qui in eorum consequentia ad possibiles propositiones modus possit evenire monstrandum est, illam namque qua? est, possibile est esse, sequitur ea quæ est, non necesse est esse; nam quod possibile est esse, non necesse est esse, quod enim possibile est esse, possibile esl et non esse; sed quod possibile est non esse, non necesse est esse. Quare id quod est, possibile est esse, recte sequitur, non necesse cst esso, sed negationem ejus qua? dicit, possibile est esse, id est non possibile est.
It agrees with the possible proposition; from the contradictory of the proposition that predicates necessity, the contradiction of the possible does not follow, but the contrary of the contradiction of the proposition that predicates necessity agrees with the contradiction of the possible proposition. But first let us set out which are contradictories and which are contraries. For of the proposition that says "it is necessary to be," the contradictory is "it is not necessary to be," while the contrary is "it is necessary not to be." Again, of the proposition "it is necessary not to be," the contradictory is "it is not necessary not to be," while the contrary is "it is necessary to be." Therefore let them be described and let the contraries and contradictories be set out around one and the same proposition, so that what we are to say may be able to appear more clearly. Having therefore set these out conveniently and briefly, it must be shown what manner of consequence toward possible propositions can arise in their sequence. For the proposition "it is possible to be" is followed by the proposition "it is not necessary to be"; for what is possible to be is not necessary to be, since what is possible to be is also possible not to be; but what is possible not to be is not necessary to be. Wherefore what is "it is possible to be" is rightly followed by "it is not necessary to be," but by the negation of the proposition that says "it is possible to be," that is, "it is not possible.
esse, non sequitur affirmatio ejus quae dicit, non necesse est esse, quæ est scilicet, necesse est esse; bæe enim est contradictio necessariæ affirmationis, neque enim dici potest coosent-ire propositiones quae dicunt, non possibile est esse, et necesse est esse, sed hujus contraria sequitur, namque ea quae est, non possibile est esse, illa quai dicit, necesse est non esse, comitatur, sed necesse est non esse, non est contradictoria ejus quai est, non necesse est esse; possunt enim utra'que in eodem simul verae inveniri, nam quoniam necesse est non esse ignem frigidum, non necesse est esse ignem frigidum. Quocirca hae contradictoriae non sunt, sed est contraria ea quae dicit, necesse est non esse, ei quae dicit, necesse est esse; quæ neeesse est esse, contradictio est ejus quae ponit, non necesse est esse; quare contradictionem ejus quae dicit, pos. sibile est esse, eam scilicet que proponit, non possibile est esse, non sequitur cOnlradiclio ejus quae est, necesse est esse, sed ea quae est, necesse est non esse, quæ contraria scilicet est ei quae est, necesse est esse, qua: bæc ipsa contradictio est ejus quae proponit, non necesse esse. Hoc autem descriptione melius patebit.
to be, the affirmation of the one that says "it is not necessary to be" does not follow—namely, the affirmation of the one that says "it is necessary to be." For this is the contradictory of the affirmative proposition of necessity. Nor can it be said that the propositions which say "it is not possible to be" and "it is necessary to be" agree; rather, the contrary of the latter follows. For the proposition "it is not possible to be" is accompanied by the one that says "it is necessary not to be." But "it is necessary not to be" is not the contradictory of the one that says "it is not necessary to be"; for both can be found true at the same time in the same subject. For since it is necessary that fire not be cold, it is not necessary that fire be cold. Wherefore these are not contradictories; rather, the one that says "it is necessary not to be" is contrary to the one that says "it is necessary to be." But "it is necessary to be" is the contradictory of the one that posits "it is not necessary to be." Therefore, from the proposition that says "it is possible to be"—namely, the one that proposes "it is not possible to be"—the contradictory of the proposition "it is necessary to be" does not follow, but rather the one that says "it is necessary not to be," which is, of course, contrary to the one that says "it is necessary to be," and this very thing is the contradictory of the one that proposes "it is not necessary to be." But this will be made clearer by a diagram.
Ergo cum sit contradictio possibile esse, et nou possibile esse, sequatur autem possibile esse, non necesse esse, contradictio tamen ejus qua? est, necesse esse, non sequetur contradictionem ejus quae est possibile esse, sed contraria contradicioriæ ejus quae est non necesse esse. Nam si contradictio est non necesse esse ejus quæ est necesse esse, contraria vero ejusdem necesse esse est, ea quæ dicit, necesse est non esse, sequitur necesse est non esse, eam quae est, non possibile esse, quas est contraclio ejus quae est, possibile esse, quam sequitur non necesse esse. Recte ergo dicitur contradictiones quidem extra esse, contrarias vero contradictoriis consentire: nam possibile esse et non possibile esse, quæ sunt contradictoriæ, sequuntur non necesse esse et necesse non esse, quæ non sunt contradictoriæ, quod in eodem ulræque veræ inveniri possunt. Quod si contradictio sequitur, sicut ea quae est, non necesse esse,sequiluream quae est possibile esse, sic eam quæ est non possibile esse, sequeretur necesse esse; sed hoc inconveniens est. Quare quonam hæcamnou sequitur, contraria ipsius sequelur, contraria namque cst ei quae proponit, necesse est esse, illa quæ dicit, necesse est non esse. Eodem quoque modo et in eo quod est possibile uon esse, cujus est contradictio uon possibile non esse, quod Aristoteles reticuit.
Therefore, since the contradiction of "it is possible to be" is "it is not possible to be," and "it is possible to be" is followed by "it is not necessary to be," nevertheless the contradiction of the proposition "it is necessary to be" will not follow the contradiction of the proposition "it is possible to be," but rather the contrary of the contradiction of the proposition "it is not necessary to be." For if the contradiction of "it is necessary to be" is "it is not necessary to be," but the contrary of the same "it is necessary to be" is the proposition that says "it is necessary not to be," then "it is necessary not to be" follows "it is not possible to be," which is the contradiction of "it is possible to be," which in turn is followed by "it is not necessary to be." Rightly, therefore, it is said that contradictions stand outside this sequence, but that contraries agree with the contradictories. For "it is possible to be" and "it is not possible to be," which are contradictories, are followed by "it is not necessary to be" and "it is necessary not to be," which are not contradictories, because both can be found true in the same case. But if a contradiction followed—just as "it is not necessary to be" follows "it is possible to be"—then "it is necessary to be" would follow "it is not possible to be"; but this is inadmissible. Wherefore, since this does not follow, its contrary will follow; for the contrary of the proposition that asserts "it is necessary to be" is the one that says "it is necessary not to be." In the same way also in the case of "it is possible not to be," whose contradiction is "it is not possible not to be," which Aristotle passed over in silence.
Sequitur namque eam quai est, possibile est non esse, illa quai dicit, non necesse est non e"e, sed negationem eam quae est, non possibile est uon esse,ejus affirmationis qua? est, possibile est non esse. Non sequitur affirmatio ejus quae est, non necesse est non esse negationis, ea quae est, necesse est non esse. Negatio enim ejus quae dicit, necesse est non esse, illa est quæ dicit, non necesse est non esse. Sed bujus contraria, id est affirmationis quae est, necesse est non esse, illa scilicet quæ est, necesse est esse, sequitur negationem illam quae esi, non possibile est non esse; hujus quoque sit talis descriptio: Dissimili initur modo evenit quam dudum contingebat in bis quae erant possibilia et quæ impossibilia. Illic enim contradictio contradictionem sequebatur, sed conversim, ut negationem affirmatio, affirmationem negaLio sequeretur. Hic non idem modus est. Nam cum superiores contradictoriæ sint, et;nferior negat.io affirmationem sequatur, negationem non sequi. tur contradictoria affirmatio, sed affirmationis illius contraria, quod si quis legal attentius, integre descriptum esse raliune perspiciet; cur autem hoc eveniat, causam prodit.
For it follows: upon "it is possible not to be" follows that which says "it is not necessary not to be," but the negation, namely "it is not possible not to be," is the negation of the affirmation "it is possible not to be." The affirmation of the negation "it is not necessary not to be" does not follow—namely, "it is necessary not to be." For the negation of that which says "it is necessary not to be" is the one that says "it is not necessary not to be." But its contrary—that is, of the affirmation "it is necessary not to be"—namely, "it is necessary to be," follows that negation which is "it is not possible not to be." Let there also be such a description of this matter: it comes about in a different way than was happening just now in the cases of things possible and impossible. For there, a contradiction followed a contradiction, but in reverse, so that a negation followed an affirmation and an affirmation a negation. Here the mode is not the same. For since the former are contradictory, and the lower negation follows the affirmation, a contradictory affirmation does not follow the negation, but the contrary of that affirmation. If anyone reads this more attentively, he will perceive that the reasoning has been described completely; and why this happens, he discloses the cause.
Causa autem cur non sequatur similiter cœteris est, quoniam contrariæ impossibile necessario redditur idem valens. Nam quod impossibile est esse, necesse est hoc non quidem esse, sed potius non esse. Quod uero impossibile est non esse, hoc necessarium est esse. Quare si illa similiter sequuntur possibile et non possibile, hæc econtrario. Qnoniam non significant idem necessarium et impossibile (sed quemadmodum dictum est) conversim.
Ratio est cur non simili modo consequentia secundum contradictionem propositionis eveniat, sicutin bis qua? sunt imposibilia et non impossibilia hujusmodi, omne necessarium contrario modo impossibile est. Nam quod est impossibile esse, hoc est necessarium non esse,non enim est necessarium esse quod est impossibile esse; nullus enim dixerit, necesse est esse quod impossibile est esse, non ergo necesse est esse, sed potius necesse est non esse quod impossiblle est esse. Ergo conversæ idem potest impossibile, quod necessarium. Quod enim impossibile junctum cum esse effieit, boc efficit necessarium junctum ad id quod est non esse; igitur quod impossibile est esse; hoc necesse est non esse. Rursus quod impossibile estnonesse, hoc necesseest non esse, Rursus quod impossibile est non esse, hoc necesse est esse, ut igni impossibile est non inesse calorem necesse est igitur inesse.
The reason, however, why it does not follow similarly in the other cases is that the contrary of "impossible" is rendered as equivalent to "necessary." For what is impossible to be, it is necessary that this be not indeed to be, but rather not to be. But what is impossible not to be, this is necessary to be. Wherefore if those follow similarly—"possible" and "not possible"—these are the contrary. For "necessary" and "impossible" do not signify the same thing (but, as has been said) convertibly.
The reason why the consequence according to the contradiction of the proposition does not come about in a similar way, as in those cases which are "impossible" and "not impossible" of this sort, is that every necessary thing is impossible in the contrary way. For what is impossible to be, this is necessary not to be; for it is not necessary to be that which is impossible to be. For no one would say "it is necessary to be" of what is impossible to be; therefore it is not necessary to be, but rather it is necessary not to be that which is impossible to be. Therefore "impossible" converted has the same force as "necessary." For what "impossible" joined with "to be" effects, this "necessary" effects joined to "not to be"; therefore what is impossible to be, this is necessary not to be. Again, what is impossible not to be, this is necessary to be. Again, what is impossible not to be, this is necessary to be, as for fire it is impossible that heat not be in it; therefore it is necessary that it be in it.
Quare huic quoque idem convertitur, ut quodimpossibile secundum non esse efficit, idem valeat necessarium secundum esse positum, quare contrario modo necessarium et impossibile idem potest.. Quod si contrario modo impossibile et necessarium idem valet, manifestum est cur non similiter consequitur necessarium possibile et non possibile propositiones, sicut easdem ipsas, id est possibile et non possibile propositiones impossibile, etnonimpossibile sequebatur. Nam si converso ordine necessarium atque impoasibUe idem valet secundum contrarietatem, non similis consequentia est necessarii et impossibilis, ei quae fuit possibilis et impossibilis. Nam quoniam non impossibile esse, sequitur possibile esse. Et hoc rursus, id est possibile esse, non necesse esse comitatur. Rursus id quod est impossibile esse, quoniam sequitur non possibile esse. Necessarium autem, impossibili converso ordine idem valel, sequitur id quod est impossibile est esse, necesse est non esse. Ac per hoc eliam id quod est non possibile esse sequitur, id quod est necesse est non esse. Rursus-quoniam ei quod est non impossibile non esse consentit, id quod est possibile est non esse, et huic convenit, non necesse est non esse. Quoniam id quod dicitur impossibile est. non esse, socium est ei qnod est non possibile est non esse, ei autem quod est impossibile non esse, converso modo redditum necessarium, idem valet.
Therefore here too the same thing is converted, so that what "impossible" effects in respect of not being, the same has force as "necessary" posited in respect of being; hence in a contrary mode "necessary" and "impossible" can be the same. But if in a contrary mode "impossible" and "necessary" have the same force, it is clear why it does not follow similarly that "necessary" [implies] "possible" and "not possible," as the same propositions themselves—that is, "possible" and "not possible"—were followed by "impossible" and "not impossible." For if in converted order "necessary" and "impossible" have the same force according to contrariety, the consequence of "necessary" and "impossible" is not similar to that which was of "possible" and "impossible." For since "not impossible to be" follows "possible to be." And this again—that is, "possible to be"—is accompanied by "not necessary to be." Again, that which is "impossible to be," since it follows "not possible to be." But "necessary," by a converted order, has the same force as "impossible": there follows "it is impossible to be," [and] "it is necessary not to be." And through this also "not possible to be" is followed by "it is necessary not to be." Again, since "not impossible not to be" agrees with "possible not to be," and with this agrees "not necessary not to be." Since that which is said [to be] "impossible not to be" is a companion of that which is "not possible not to be," but to that which is "impossible not to be," "necessary" is rendered in a converted mode, it has the same force.
Sequitur id quod est impossibile est non esse, id quod dicimus necesse est esse, et hanc quoque sequitur id quod proponimus, non impossibile est non esse, non necesse est. non esse; id vero descriptione monstratur.
Consentientes. Consentientes. Non impossibile est esse. Impossibile est esse. Possibile est esse. Non possibile est esse. Non necesse est esse. Necesse est non esse. Consentientes. Consentientes. Non impossib. est non esse. Impossibile est non esse. Possibile est non esse. Non possilJ. est non esse. Non necesse est non esse. Necesse est esse.
Causa igitur diversae consequenliæ est in contrarium propositionum impossibilis et necessarii facta conversio; sed de his hoc modo speculatus, sese quodammodo ipse reprehendit, et ad aliam proprietatis consequentiam disputationem tleclit.
An cerle impossibile est sic poni necessari contradictiones. Nnm quod est necessarium esse, possibile est esse, nam si non, negatio sequetur. Necesse enim est aut affirmare aut negare. Quare si non possibile est esse, impossibile est esse. Igitur impossibile est esse, quod necesse est esse, quod sane est inconveniens.
There follows: "what is impossible is not to be," which we call "it is necessary to be," and this too is followed by what we propose: "it is not impossible not to be," "it is not necessary not to be." This is shown by the description.
Agreeing terms. Agreeing terms. It is not impossible to be. It is impossible to be. It is possible to be. It is not possible to be. It is not necessary to be. It is necessary not to be. Agreeing terms. Agreeing terms. It is not impossible not to be. It is impossible not to be. It is possible not to be. It is not possible not to be. It is not necessary not to be. It is necessary to be.
The cause, then, of the differing consequence is the conversion of the propositions of "impossible" and "necessary" made into the contrary; but having speculated on these matters in this way, he in a certain manner reproaches himself and turns the discussion to another consequence of propriety.
Whether certainly it is impossible that contradictions be posited thus in the case of the necessary. For what is necessary to be, it is possible to be; for if not, the negation will follow. For it is necessary either to affirm or to deny. Wherefore if it is not possible to be, it is impossible to be. Therefore it is impossible to be, which is necessary to be—which is surely incongruous.
Forte, inquit, erravimus ita conseqientias collocantes. Tunc enim disposuirnus,ut id quod esset possibile sequeretur illud quod est non necessarium, ut secundum praecessionem possibilis sequentem negationem necessarii poneremus; nunc autem dicil boc permutari oportere, et non a possibili iDchoandum,et huic subjiciendum necessarii negationem, sed potius primo ponendum esse necessarium, secundo loco possibile, namque illa propositio quae necessarium continet, continere videtur etiam possibilitatem, nam quod necessarium est idem possibile est. Quod enim necesse est esse, idem esse possibile est, nam si quid boc neget, et id quod est necessarium dicat non sequi possibilitatem, negatio possibilitatis id quod est necessarium comitabitur. Nam si id quod necessarium est esse, falsum est dicere possibile est esse, verum est dicere quoniam non possibile est esse. In omnibus enim sut dictio est, id eSlaffirmatio, aut negatio; ut si illa vera est, illa sit falsa, si ilia non est, ii'a mox esse necesse sil, sed non possibile esse sequi diximus, id quod est impossibile esse;igitur id quod dicitur, necesse est esse, impossibile est esse, sed hoc quidem inconveniens esi, non igitur verum est, quoniam ei quod est necessarium esse, id quod est non possibile esse convenit. Quare sequitur id quod est necessarium possibilitas.
Perhaps, he says, we erred in arranging the consequences thus. For then we laid it down that what is possible should be followed by what is not necessary, so that, according to the precedence of the possible, we placed the negation of the necessary as following; but now, he says, this ought to be changed, and we should not begin from the possible and place under it the negation of the necessary, but rather the necessary should be placed first, the possible in the second place. For that proposition which contains the necessary seems also to contain the possible; for what is necessary is the same as possible. For what is necessary to be is the same as possible to be. For if anyone denies this and says that what is necessary does not follow the possible, the negation of the possible will accompany what is necessary. For if, when it is necessary to be, it is false to say "it is possible to be," it is true to say "it is not possible to be." For in all things there is either an expression—that is, an affirmation—or a negation, so that if the one is true, the other is false; if the one is not, the other must immediately be. But we said that "it is not possible to be" is followed by "it is impossible to be." Therefore, what is said to be necessary to be is impossible to be. But this is indeed incongruous; therefore it is not true that "it is not possible to be" agrees with what is necessary to be. Wherefore the possible follows what is necessary.
At uero illud quod est possibile esse, non impossibile esse sequitur, hoc uero illud quod est non necessarium esse. Quare contingit quod est necessarium esse non necessarium esse, quod sane est inconveniens.
Dicimus ei quod est necessarium esse consentire illam propositionem quae dicit possibile esse, sed rursus boc falsum videtur cogitantibus perspicienttbusque, quoniam ei quod est possibile esse, consentit et convenit illa propositio quæ dicit noa impossibile esse, hoc veroillud quod dicitur non impossibile esse sequitur id quod proponimus, non cesse est esse, sed possibile esse consentire proposuimus ei quae dicit, necesse est esse, eamque consequi; sequitur ergo eam quæ est non necesse esse, illam quae dicit, necesse est esse, eique consentit, quod est impossibile. Qui igitur in his dubitationibus est statuendum? non potest consentire quidem possibile esse ei quod est, necesse esse. Alioqui propositionem necesse esse id quod est impossibile esse consequetur, si vero convenerit ei quae est necessarium esse, illa quæ est pessibile esse. Rursus fit ut id quod est necessarium, non necessarium sit, sed hoc falsum est; sed hoc quemadmodum sese habeat paulo poslexplicabilur.
But indeed, "it is possible to be" is followed by "it is not impossible to be," and this by "it is not necessary to be." Hence it comes about that what is necessary to be is not necessary to be, which is certainly incongruous.
We say that the proposition which says "it is possible to be" agrees with "it is necessary to be," but again this seems false to those who think and see clearly, since the proposition which says "it is not impossible to be" agrees and is consonant with "it is possible to be," and this in turn is followed by what we set out—not "it is necessary to be," but we proposed that "it is possible to be" agrees with the proposition which says "it is necessary to be" and follows it. Therefore "it is necessary to be" follows "it is not necessary to be," and agrees with it, which is impossible. What then is to be settled in these doubts? "It is possible to be" cannot indeed agree with "it is necessary to be." Otherwise the proposition "it is necessary to be" will be followed by "it is impossible to be," if indeed "it is possible to be" has agreed with "it is necessary to be." Again it comes about that what is necessary is not necessary, but this is false; yet how this stands will be explained a little later.
Nunc vero priorem sequentiam permutantes hoc dicimus, quoniam id quod est possibile esse non potest consequi quod est necesse esse, nec hæsibi proposiliones consentiunt possibile esse, et necesse esse, quod Aristoteles hoc modo proponit:
At uero neque necessarium esse sequitur ad possibile esse, neque necessarium non esse. Illi enim utraqne contingit accidere,horum aulem utrumlibet verum fuerit, nondum erunt illa vera, simul enim possibile est esse et non esse. Si vero necesse est esse uel non esse, non eril possibile utrumgue. Relinquitur ergo non necessarium non esse sequi ad possibiLe esse,hoc enim verum est et de necesse esse, hæc enim fit contradictio ejus quæ sequitur ad non possibile esse. Illud enim sequitur hoc quod est, impossibile esse, et necesse non esse,cujus negatio est, non necesse non esse. Sequuntur igitur et hæ contradictiones secundum prædictum modum, et rcimpossibile contingit sic positis.
But now, altering the former sequence, we say this: that what is possible to be cannot be followed by what is necessary to be, nor do the propositions "it is possible to be" and "it is necessary to be" agree with each other, which Aristotle sets out in this way:
But indeed neither "it is necessary to be" follows from "it is possible to be," nor "it is necessary not to be." For to the former both can happen; but of these, whichever of the two is true, those will not yet be true; for it is possible at the same time to be and not to be. But if it is necessary to be or not to be, it will not be possible for both. It remains, therefore, that "it is not necessary not to be" follows from "it is possible to be"; for this is true also of "it is necessary to be." For this becomes the contradiction of that which follows from "it is not possible to be." For that which is "it is impossible to be" is followed by "it is necessary not to be," whose negation is "it is not necessary not to be." Therefore these contradictions also follow in the aforesaid manner, and it comes about that it is impossible when these things are posited in this way.
Docet id quod est possibile non consentire ei quod est necessarium esse, nec rursus ei quae est, necessarium est non esse. Nam quod necesse est esse, non potest non esse, quod autem necesse esse non esse, non potest esse. Quod autem dicimus possibile esse, ita dicimus, tanquam si et non esse possibile sit. Utramque igitur naturam habet id quod dicimus possibile esse, ut et sit esse possibile, et sit possibile non esse. Qui vero dicit necesse esse aufert non esse, et quae dicit,necesse est non esse, aufert esse; ita si haec verae sunt, id est necesse esse et rursus necesse non esse, utræque illae falsae sunt qua: dicunt et potest esse, et potest non esse. Illa enim quae proponit necesse esse, posse non esse subruit,; illa vero quæ dicit, necesse est non esse, posse esse subvertit; neutra igitur consequetur eam propositionem quae dicit, possibile est esse, nec ea quae dicit ex necessitate esse, nec illa quæ dicit ex necessitate non esse. Et sensus quidem hujusmodi esl.Sermonum autem ratio talis est; at vero, inquit., neque id quod est necessarium esse, sequitur propositionem illam quae proponil possibile esse, nec rursus illa quae dicit necessarium est non esse. Illi enim, id est possibili, utraque contingit, accidere, id est posse esse et posse non esse. Nam quod potest esse, idem potest non esse.
He teaches that what is possible does not agree with what is necessary to be, nor again with the proposition "it is necessary not to be." For what is necessary to be cannot not be, and what is necessary not to be cannot be. But when we say "it is possible to be," we say it in such a way as if it were also possible not to be. Therefore what we call "possible to be" has both natures: that it be possible to be and that it be possible not to be. But he who says "it is necessary to be" removes "not to be," and the one who says "it is necessary not to be" removes "to be." Thus if these are true—that is, "it is necessary to be" and again "it is necessary not to be"—then both of those are false which say both "it can be" and "it can not be." For the proposition that declares "it is necessary to be" undermines "it can not be," while the one that says "it is necessary not to be" subverts "it can be." Therefore neither of them will follow the proposition that says "it is possible to be"—neither the one that says "it is from necessity to be" nor the one that says "it is from necessity not to be." And the sense is of this kind. But the reasoning of the arguments is as follows: "However," he says, "neither does that which is necessary to be follow that proposition which declares 'it is possible to be,' nor again the one that says 'it is necessary not to be.'" For to that—that is, to the possible—both happen to accrue, namely "it can be" and "it can not be." For what can be, the same can not be.
Harum aut.em, id est vel quae dicit, necessarium est esse, vel quae dicit,necessarium eslnonesse,si utrum libet verum fuerit, non erunt illa vera, id est posse esse et posse non esse; quod enim possibile est esse, idem possibile est non esse; quod si neque necesse est esse, nec necesse non esse propositio, eam quae est possibile esse consequetur, relinquitur ut illa ei consentiat quae dicit, non necessarium est non esse. Hæc enirn sequitur eam quae proponit, possibile est esse. Quidquid enim possibile est esse, non necesse est non esse, ut quoniam hominem possibile est ambulare, non est necesse non ambulare. Hoc enim ve. rum est, inquit, et de eo quod est necesse est non esse, id est haec enim propositio quae dicit non necesse esse non esse, verum est, ut contra eam opponatur conlradiclorie, quae dicit necesse est non esse, unde etiam secutus est. Haec enim fit contradictio ejus quae sequitur, non possibile esse, unde facienda est bujusmodi de,criplio: Hæc enim quæ dicit, non necesse est non esse, contradictio est ejus (luæ proponit, necesse est non esse, uxest sequens. et consentiens ei quæ est, non ossibile est esse, quæ consentitei quæ dicit, impossibile est esse, quae rursus sequitur eam quae est ultima, id est necesse est non esse, cujus conlradielio est, non necesse est non esse; affirmatio enim est uecesse est non esse, negatio non necesse est non esse.
But of these, namely either the one that says "it is necessary to be" or the one that says "it is necessary not to be," if either one is true, those will not be true, namely "it is possible to be" and "it is possible not to be." For what is possible to be, the same is possible not to be. But if neither proposition is "it is necessary to be" nor "it is necessary not to be," the one that is "it is possible to be" will follow, and it remains that it agrees with the one that says "it is not necessary not to be." For this follows the proposition "it is possible to be." For whatever is possible to be, it is not necessary not to be, as, since it is possible for a man to walk, it is not necessary not to walk. For this is true, he says, also concerning that which is necessary not to be, that is, this proposition which says "it is not necessary not to be" is true, so that it is opposed contradictorily to that which says "it is necessary not to be," from which it also follows. For this becomes the contradiction of that which follows, "it is not possible to be," from which the description must be made as follows: for this one which says "it is not necessary not to be" is the contradiction of that which proposes "it is necessary not to be," as it is the consequent and agrees with that which is "it is not possible to be," which agrees with that which says "it is impossible to be," which in turn follows that which is last, namely "it is necessary not to be," whose contradiction is "it is not necessary not to be." For the affirmation is "it is necessary not to be," the negation "it is not necessary not to be.