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In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Duo

Boethius. Severinus · ogl-pl

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stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:1 · narrative
Source · Latin

AN. MANL. SEV. BOETH IN LIBRUM ARISTOTELIS DE INTERPRETATIONE LIBRI DUO

EDITIO PRIMA, SEU MINORA COMMENTARIA.

LIBER PiUMUS.

Magna quidem libri hujus apud Peripateticam, sectam probatur auctoritas.Hic namque Aristoteles simplicium propositionum naturam diligenter egaminat,sed ejus series scrupulosa impeditur semita, et sublimibus pressa sententiis,aditum intelligentiæ facilem non relinquit.Quocirca nos libri hujus enodationem duplici commentatione supplevimus, et quantum simplices quidem intellectus sententiarum oratio brevis obscuraque complectitur,tantum hac operis hujus tractatione digressimus.Quod vero altius acumen considerationis exposcit,secundae series editionis expediet.Nunc a me tantum lector exspectetquantum pedetentim minutatimque secundum orationis ordinem textumque sermonis id quod angustia brevitatis latet intelligat. Et prius quae sit hujus operis intentio breviter demonstrandum est. Inscribitur etenim Graece liber hic Ilept, quod Latine de interpretatione significat.Quid ergo sit interpretatio paucis absolvam. Interpretatio est vox significativa per seipsam aliquid significans.Sive enim nomen sit,quod per se significet,ut est homo. Sive verbum, ut est curro. Sive quod grammatici participium vocant.Sive pronomen.Sive ex his juncta oralio, ut est, Homo currit.

English

AN. MANL. SEV. BOETHIUS, TWO BOOKS ON ARISTOTLE'S DE INTERPRETATIONE

FIRST EDITION, OR THE SHORTER COMMENTARY.

BOOK ONE.

The authority of this book is indeed greatly approved among the Peripatetic sect. For here Aristotle diligently examines the nature of simple propositions, but the course of it is hindered by a scrupulous path, and, pressed by sublime thoughts, it does not leave an easy approach to understanding. Wherefore we have supplied the unknotting of this book with a twofold commentary, and to the extent that the brief and obscure speech of the sentences embraces simple understandings of thoughts, to that extent we have digressed in this treatment of this work. But what the deeper acumen of consideration demands, the course of the second edition will set forth. Now let the reader expect from me only as much as, step by step and little by little, according to the order of the speech and the text of the discourse, he may understand that which lies hidden in the narrowness of brevity. And first what the intention of this work is must briefly be shown. For this book is entitled in Greek Peri, which in Latin means de interpretatione. What therefore interpretation is, I shall set out in a few words. Interpretation is a significant utterance signifying something by itself. For whether it is a noun, which signifies by itself, as is man. Or a verb, as is I run. Or what the grammarians call a participle. Or a pronoun. Or speech joined from these, as is, Man runs.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:2 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sive quolibet alio modo, vel nomen, vel verbum, vel ex his oratio juncta,per se aliquid significet,interpretatio nominatur.Qaare cum sintqujedam in orationis partibus quas per se nihil signifioant,aliis tamen junctae designant,ut sunt conjunctiones vel præpositiones,hæc interpretationes esse non dicimus. Interpretatio enim sive simplex est,ut nomen et verbum, sive composita,ut ex his junctacopulataque oratio, vel per seipsam significare debet,si simplex est, vel ex his quae per se significantjunctaesse,sicomposita est. Quare interpretatio est vox aliquid perseipsamsignificans.Sed quoniam verba nominaque interpretationes sunt, oratio quoque omnis quæ exsignificantibus per se praedicamentis jungitur interpretatio nuncupatur,et quoniamplurimaesuntinterpretat.iones,inter quas illa quoque est oratio,in qua verum falsumve inveniri potest,id est enuntiativa, de qua hoc in libro tractandum est, idcirco Aristoteles de communi nomine et continenti, libro titulum inscripsit.Interpretatio namque est nomen et verbum, et interpretatio etiam est hujusmodi: Omnis homo animal est. Sed in hac verum falsumque auditor intelligit.Hæc enim oratio quae dicit omnis homo animal esl,vera vel falsa est. Interpretatio quoque est etiam hujusmodi oratio: Da mihi codicem. In qua verum falsumque nullus inveniat. Etenim da mihi codicem, neque verum esse potent neque falsum.

English

Or in any other way whatsoever, whether a noun, a verb, or a sentence composed of these, signifies something by itself, it is called an interpretation. Wherefore, since there are certain parts of speech which signify nothing by themselves but, joined to others, do designate something, as are conjunctions or prepositions, we say that these are not interpretations. For an interpretation, whether it is simple, as a noun and a verb, or composite, as a sentence joined and coupled from these, ought either to signify by itself, if it is simple, or to be joined from those things which signify by themselves, if it is composite. Wherefore an interpretation is a utterance signifying something by itself. But since verbs and nouns are interpretations, every sentence also which is joined from predicates that signify by themselves is called an interpretation, and since there are very many interpretations, among which is also that sentence in which the true or the false can be found, that is, the enunciative one, about which this book must treat, for that reason Aristotle inscribed the title of the book concerning the common and containing name. For an interpretation is a noun and a verb, and an interpretation is also of this kind: Every man is an animal. But in this the hearer understands the true and the false. For this sentence which says every man is an animal is true or false. An interpretation is also even a sentence of this kind: Give me the book. In which no one finds the true or the false. For give me the book can neither be true nor false.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:3 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quocirca quoniam de his solis orationibus in quibus verum falsumque reperitur,quas enuntiationes, et propositiones vocamus,quse interpretationes sunt, disputaturus est, quoniamque de nominibus illis verbisque dicendum est, quid sint, quamve vim in significatione retineant.rectelibrum de interpretatione signavit.Nec nos hoc turbet, quod sunt quædam interpretationes de quibus in hoc libro non tractet.Tanquam enim si quis dehominedisputans, titulum operis de animali posuisset, quanquam non de omni animali, tamen quoniam de aliquo disputaturus esset, recte de animali libro nomen imponeret. Ita nunc licet non de omni interpretatione pertractet,tamen quoniam de una quae est enuntiatio,et de nominibus et verbis,quae interpretationes simplices sunt,dicendum erat, de communi et generali vocabulum libro de interpretatione imposuit. Est autem intentio libri hujus de simplici enuntiativa oratione disserere.Simplex autem enuntiativa oratio est,in qua cum verum falsumve sit,illud tamen est ut sine conjunctione totus orationis ordo proponatur,ut est: Homo est, homo animal est, homo currit,homo pavidus currit.

English

Wherefore, since he is about to dispute concerning only those speeches in which truth and falsehood are found—which we call enunciations and propositions, and which are interpretations—and since he must speak of those nouns and verbs, what they are and what force they retain in signification, he rightly titled the book On Interpretation. Nor should this disturb us, that there are certain interpretations with which he does not deal in this book. For just as if someone disputing about man had set the title of the work as On Animal—although not about every animal, yet because he was about to dispute about some animal, he would rightly give the book the name On Animal—so now, although he does not treat of every interpretation, yet because he had to speak of one which is the enunciation, and of nouns and verbs, which are simple interpretations, he imposed on the book the name On Interpretation from the common and general term. Now the intention of this book is to discourse concerning simple enunciative speech. But simple enunciative speech is that in which, although there is truth or falsehood, nevertheless the whole order of the speech is set forth without conjunction, as: Man is, man is an animal, man runs, a fearful man runs.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:4 · narrative
Source · Latin

Hae enim propositiones sine conjunctione propositae sunt, et hae dicuntur praedicativae, quae sunt cum nomine et verbo.IIla vero quæ sunt hujusmodi: Si sol est super terram dies est, duplices atque hypotheticae, nec non etiam conditionales vocantur.Ponitur enim si hoc sit, hoc esse, id est si sol est, esse diem. Quare hae simplices non sunt, soi est eDlm,et ales est, duae propositiones sunt, quas una conjunctio si,copulat atque componit. Sed de his nullus hoc libro tractatus habebitur.Quare quoniam de simplicibus enuntiativis orationibus tractaturus est,id est de simplici affirmatione et simplici negatione,quoniamque affirmationes et negationes verbis ac nominibus conjunguntur,ut in ea quae est: Homo currit, affirmatione, est homo nomen, currit verbum. Et rursum: Uomo non currit, negatio eodem nomine verboque conjungitur.Recte prius de simplici affirmatione et de simplici negatione, omninoque de enuntiatione simplici disputaturus est. Quoniam omnis enuntiatio simplex, verbis nominibusque conjungitur, primam disputationem de nominibus et verbis instituit.His enim prius ad scientiam venientibus, tota facillime natura orationis aperitur. De quibus autem ei in toto dicendum est libro,inchoans ipse sic proponit.

English

For these propositions are set forth without conjunction, and these are called predicative, which consist of a noun and a verb. But those of this sort—"If the sun is above the earth, it is day"—are called compound and hypothetical, and also conditional. For it is laid down that if this is, that is, that if the sun is, it is day. Wherefore these are not simple, for "the sun is" and "it is day" are two propositions, which the one conjunction "if" couples and composes. But no treatment of these will be given in this book. Wherefore, since he is about to treat of simple enunciative speeches, that is, of simple affirmation and simple negation, and since affirmations and negations are joined by verbs and nouns—as in the affirmation "Man runs," "man" is a noun and "runs" a verb; and again, in the negation "Man does not run," the negation is joined by the same noun and verb—he rightly is about to dispute first concerning simple affirmation and simple negation, and altogether concerning simple enunciation. Since every simple enunciation is joined by verbs and nouns, he makes his first disputation concerning nouns and verbs. For when these have first come to knowledge, the whole nature of speech is most easily laid open. But concerning the matters that must be spoken of in the whole book, he himself sets them forth at the beginning as follows.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:5 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE SIGNIS.

Primum oportet constituere quid sit nomen, et quid verbum,postea quid est negatio,et affirmatiotet enuntiatio,et oratio.

In principio, inquit, hujus sermoni3 de enuntiatione instituitur,constituere,id est definire,oportet quid nomen sit,quid verbum.Haec enim (ut dictum est)omnem conjungere orationem valent. Quae oratio genus est aliarum orationum.Sunt enim principales quinque orationum differentiae: Est autem prima oratio deprecativa, ut: Jupiter omnipotens precibus si flecteris ullis.Secunda imperativa, ut: Suggere tela mihi. Tertia interrogativa, ut: Quo te, Mceri,pedes? Quarta vocativa, ut: Huc ades, o Melibaee?Quinta enuntiativa, in qua verum inesse falsumque perspicitur.Hujus autem duae sunt species una affirmatio, altera negatio. Affirmatio est, ut: Homo animal est. Negatio, ut: Homo animal non est. Ergo orationem verba nominaque constituunt. Enuntiationis autem oratio genus est. Enuntiatio vero affirmationis et negationis. Quare elementa quaedam suntquae conjungunt orationem,nominaet verba,et de his disputat primum, dehinc propositionis duas ultimas species sunt, et dicit se de affirmatione et negatione dicturum. Post has harum genus proponit,id est enunliationem.Ultimum vero quod horum maximum est, orationem. Est vero i**♦».i quodammodo conversus ordo ab speciebus usque aa earum genera prima perveniens.

English

ON SIGNS.

First it is necessary to establish what a noun is, and what a verb is, then what negation is, and affirmation, and statement, and speech.

At the beginning, he says, of this discourse on statement, it is established—that is, defined—that one must set out what a noun is and what a verb is. For these (as has been said) have the power to join together every speech. And speech is the genus of the other kinds of speech. For there are five principal differences of speech: the first is the deprecative, as: Almighty Jupiter, if you are moved by any prayers. The second is the imperative, as: Hand me the weapons. The third is the interrogative, as: Whither, Moeris, do your feet carry you? The fourth is the vocative, as: Be present here, O Meliboeus. The fifth is the enunciative, in which truth and falsehood are discerned. Of this there are two species: one affirmation, the other negation. Affirmation is, as: Man is an animal. Negation, as: Man is not an animal. Therefore words and nouns constitute speech. But speech is the genus of statement. And statement is the genus of affirmation and negation. Wherefore there are certain elements which join together speech—nouns and verbs—and he disputes first about these; then the last two species of the proposition, and he says he will speak about affirmation and negation. After these he sets forth their genus, that is, statement. Last, what is greatest of these, speech. And indeed the order is in a certain way reversed, arriving from the species all the way to their first genera.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:6 · narrative
Source · Latin

Proponendo enim ab affirmatione et negatione ad enuntiationem,quod est genus,ascensum est. Ab enuntiatione ad enuntiationis geous,quod est oratio,propositionem operis levavit, diverso tamen modo de cunctis disputat. Prius enim de oratione, post de enuntiatione, deinde de affirmatione,postremo de diffinitione negationis edisserit,converso scilicet ordine. Sed hoc posterius liquebit. Quod autem prius negationem, postea proposuit affirmationem,nihil interest, cum omnes species aequeve sibimet sint, et uni generi aequaliter supponantur. Quocirca si affirmatio et negatio enuntiationis species sunt,rectum est quamlibet earum prius indiscrete proponere.Quemadmodum autem affirmatio et negatio species enuntiationis sint, et hæc earum genus, secunda editione monstrandum est.

Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce, earum quae sunt in anima passionum, notæ, et ea quæ scribuntur,eorum quæ sunt in voce.Ac quemadmodum nec lilterx eædem omnibus,sic nec eædem voces.Quorum autem hseprimo notæ, eædem omnibus passiones animæ sunt, et quorum hæ similitudines, res jam eædem. De his itaque dictum est in his quæ dicta suni de anima.Alterius est enim negotii.'

English

For by proposing [to proceed] from affirmation and negation to statement, which is the genus, he has made an ascent. From statement to the genus of statement, which is speech, he has raised the proposition of the work, yet he disputes about all of these in a different order. For first he discusses speech, afterward statement, then affirmation, and lastly the definition of negation—that is, in reversed order. But this will become clear later. That he set forth negation first and affirmation afterward makes no difference, since all the species are equal to one another and are equally subordinate to one genus. Wherefore, if affirmation and negation are species of statement, it is right to set forth either of them first without distinction. But that affirmation and negation are species of statement, and that the latter is their genus, must be shown in the second edition.

Those things, then, which are in the voice are signs of the passions that are in the soul, and those things which are written are signs of those things which are in the voice. And just as letters are not the same for all, so neither are voices the same. But those things of which these are first signs—the passions of the soul—are the same for all, and those things of which these are likenesses—the things themselves—are also the same. About these matters, then, it has been said in the works that have been written On the Soul. For it belongs to another inquiry.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:7 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quoniam nomen et verbum in definitionibus suis, significativa paulo post propositurus est,primum explicat quorum sint significativa quaecunque significant, id est, qusedesignentipsum nomen et verbum. Tota autem ratio sensus hujusmodi est Tria sunt ex quibus omnis collocutio disputatioque perficitur, res, intellectus, voces. Res sunt quas animi ratione percipimus, intellectuque discernimus. Intellectus vero qui bus res ipsas addiscimus. Voces quibus ad quod intellectu capimus, significamus. Praeter haec autem tria est aliud quiddam quod significat voces, hæ sunt litteræ, harum enim scriptio vocum significatio est. Cum rigitur haec sint quatuor, res,iutellectus, vox, littera; rem concipit intellectus, intellectum vero voces designant, ipsas vero voces litterae significant. Intellectus vero animae quaedam passio est.Nisi enim quamdam similitudinem rei quam quis intelligit in animae ratione patiatur,nullus est intellectus. Cum enim video orbem vel quadratum, figuram ejus mente concipio, et ejus mihi similitudo in animae ratione formatur, patiturque anima rei intellectæ similitudinem, unde fit ut intellectus,et similitudo sit rei,et animae passio.Horum autem rursus quatuor,duæ sunt naturales,duæ secundum hominum positionem.Voces namque etlitteraesecundumhominum positionem sunt. lntellectusautem et res naturaliter.

English

Since he is shortly going to state in their definitions that the noun and the verb are significative, he first explains what those things are of which whatever things signify are significative—that is, what the noun and the verb themselves designate. Now the whole account of this sense is of the following sort: there are three things from which every conversation and disputation is completed—things, intellect, and spoken words. Things are what we perceive by the reasoning of the mind and discern by the intellect. The intellect is that by which we learn the things themselves. Spoken words are that by which we signify what we grasp by the intellect. But besides these three there is another something that signifies spoken words; these are letters, for the writing of these is the signification of spoken words. Since, therefore, these are four—thing, intellect, spoken word, and letter—the intellect conceives the thing, spoken words designate the intellect, and letters signify the spoken words themselves. The intellect is a certain passion of the soul. For unless someone undergoes in the reason of the soul a certain likeness of the thing that he understands, there is no intellect. For when I see a circle or a square, I conceive its figure in the mind, and a likeness of it is formed for me in the reason of the soul, and the soul undergoes a likeness of the thing understood, whence it comes about that the intellect is both a likeness of the thing and a passion of the soul. Of these four, again, two are natural and two are according to human convention. For spoken words and letters are according to human convention, but intellect and thing are natural.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:8 · narrative
Source · Latin

Hoc illo approbatur, quod apud diversas gentes diversis vocibus utuntur et litteris. Idcirco quoniam ipsi sibi voces, quibus uterentur,et litteras quibus scribeient, composuerunt.Intellectus autem et res nullus posuit,sed naturalitersunt.Neque enim quodapudRomanos estequus,apud barbaros cervus est, sed apud diversas gentes eadem rerum natura est.Præterea neque quod nos intelligimus esse equum, canem barbari putant.Sed eadem apud diversissimas gentes substantiarum intellectuumque ratio est constituta.Quare duae harum sunt secundum hominum positionem, id est voces et litterae, duae secundum naturam,res et intellectus.Nunc ergo hoc dicit,quoniam voces quidem significant intellectum, ipsas etiam voces litteræ significant.Sunt autem intellectus animæ passiones,el vocesquidemetlitterse naturales non sunt.Quemadmodum enim vox non eadem apud omnes gentes, ita nee litteræ. Sed intellectus et res easdem apud omnesquamlibetdiversissimasgentes invenies. Atque hoc est quod ait: Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce, earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae, id est, ipsæ, inquit, voces intellectus qui sunt animae passiones significant, eorumquesunt significativae; ergo ea quae sunt in voce significant illas; et earum sunt notas quas sunt animæ passiones.Animae autem passiones intellectus sunt. Igitur ea qua; sunt in voce, intellectum qui sunt in anima passiones, notae sunt eosque significant.

English

This is approved by the fact that among different peoples they use different spoken words and letters. For they themselves composed for themselves the words they use and the letters they write with. But no one established the understandings and the things, but they are by nature. For it is not the case that what is a horse among the Romans is a deer among the barbarians, but among different peoples the same nature of things exists. Moreover, neither do the barbarians think that what we understand to be a horse is a dog. But among the most widely different peoples the same account of substances and understandings is established. Therefore two of these are according to human imposition—namely, spoken words and letters—and two according to nature—things and understandings. Now, then, he says this: that spoken words indeed signify understanding, and letters also signify the spoken words themselves. But understandings are passions of the soul, and spoken words and letters are not natural. For just as the spoken word is not the same among all peoples, so neither are letters. But you will find understandings and things the same among all peoples, however widely different. And this is what he says: "Therefore those things which are in the spoken word are notes of those passions which are in the soul"—that is, he says, the spoken words themselves signify the understandings which are passions of the soul, and they are significative of them; therefore those things which are in the spoken word signify those things; and they are notes of those which are passions of the soul. But the passions of the soul are understandings. Therefore those things which are in the spoken word are notes of the understandings which are passions of the soul, and they signify them.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:9 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quoniam his, id est vocibus, omnis significatur inteJligenliamentisque conceptio. Atvero quod addidit: Et ea quae scribuntur, eorum quae sunt in voce, tantumdem valet quantum si diceret: Notæ sunt litteræ quæ scrihuntur verborum et nominum quae sunt in voce. Monstravit igitur voces intellectuum esse significativas, et litteras vocum; nunc de eorum natura pertractat, dicens: Et quemadmodum nec litterae omnibus eaeaem, sic nec eaedem voces. Hoc ad monstrandum valet voces et litteraspositioneconstitui,non natura. Etenim diversae apud diversos sunt voces et littera, et quemadmodum litterae eædem apud omnes homines non inveniuntur,itaquoque nec voces. Quare hae secundum positionem sunt, quod ipse reticuit velut planum. Manifestum enim est, quod per gentes singulas permutatur,hoc non naturaconstitutum esse, sed positione.Quod vero addidit: Quorum autem hae primum notae sunl,eædem omnibus passiones animæ sunt, et quorum hae similitudines,res etiam eadem, ad hoc pertinet, ut naturales esse res intellectusque declaret.

English

Since by these, that is, by spoken words, every conception of the understanding is signified. But what he added: And those things which are written, of those things which are in the voice, is worth as much as if he had said: The letters which are written are notes of the words and names which are in the voice. He has shown, therefore, that spoken words are significative of understandings, and letters of spoken words; now he treats of their nature, saying: And just as neither are letters the same for all, so neither are the same spoken words. This serves to show that spoken words and letters are established by position, not by nature. For different spoken words and letters exist among different peoples, and just as the same letters are not found among all men, so too neither are the same spoken words. Wherefore these are according to position, which he himself passed over in silence as being plain. For it is manifest that what is changed among individual peoples was not established by nature, but by position. But what he added: Of which, however, these are the first notes, the same passions of the soul are for all, and of which these are likenesses, the things also are the same, pertains to this, that he may declare that things and understandings are natural.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:10 · narrative
Source · Latin

Idem namque (ut dictum est) intellectus passiones animae sunt,rerumverosimilitudines.Ergo nunc quidem hoc dicit: Quorum hæ, id est voces, de quibus supra dixerat,notæ sunt,eædem sunt animæ passiones, et ut nec litterae sunt eaedem, sic nec eaedem voces Quorumergo haevoces significativae sunt, id est passionum animæ, haesuntapudomnesesedem significant autem voces illa quæ sunt intellectus: intellectus igitur animæ passio est,apud omnes ho. mines non diversa. Ergo naturalisapudomneshomines est animi conceptio atque animæ passio.Quorum sunt notæ ea quæ versantur in vocibus.Docet autem et resquarumsuntsimilitudinesintellectusetanimae passiones,eHse non positione,sed naturaliter constitutas.Idcirco quodhse res quarum simililudinessunt intellectus, qui intellectus animae passiones sunt, apud omnes eædem sunt. Hoc est enim quod ait, Et quorum hae similitudinesscilicet animæ passiones. quae sunt similitudines rerum,res etiam eaedem. Ac si diceret: Quorum intellectus sunt similitudines.

English

For the same things (as has been said) are the passions of the soul, that is, the conceptions of the understanding, and the likenesses of things. Therefore he now says this: Of which these, that is, the spoken words, of which he had spoken above, are notes, the same are the passions of the soul, and just as the letters are not the same, so neither are the spoken words the same. Therefore of which these spoken words are significative, that is, of the passions of the soul, these are the same among all. But the spoken words signify those things which are the understanding; the understanding, therefore, is a passion of the soul, not different among all men. Therefore the conception of the mind and the passion of the soul is natural among all men. Of which the things that are employed in spoken words are notes. But he also teaches that the things of which the understanding and the passions of the soul are likenesses are established not by convention but by nature. And for this reason, because these things of which the understanding are likenesses—which understanding are the passions of the soul—are the same among all. For this is what he says: And of which these are likenesses, namely the passions of the soul, which are likenesses of things, the things also are the same. And as if he were to say: Of which the understandings are likenesses.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:11 · narrative
Source · Latin

Qui intellectus animae passionessunt,id est resapud omnes eaedem sunt.Quod autem ita posuit:Quorum autem hae primum notae,hoc sentit: de vocibus enim dicit,quoniamquorum vocas primum notsesunt,apud omneseaedemsuntanimaepassiones.Voxenimetiam intellectum rei significat, et ipsam rem.Utcum dico lapis,et intellectum lapides et ipsum lapidem,id est ipsam substantiam designat.Sed prius intellectum, secundo vero loco rem significat. Ergo non omnia quae voxsignificat passiones animæ sunt,sed illa sola quae primae; primo enim significatur intellectus,secundo vero loco res. Sed intellectus passiones animæ sunt; quorum ergo primum notae sunt voces,eaedem sunt apud omnes homines animae passiones.Esl alia quoque scriptura hoc modo se habens: Quorum autem has primum notæ,hæ omnibus passiones animae sunt, et quorum hae similitudines, res etiam hae. Quod si ita scriptum est, huc dicere videtur: Ostendit enim quorum sint notas voces, et quorum sint rursus animae passiones; tanquam sidiceret:Voces quod significant, et quorum notae sunt, illae sunt animae passiones, et rursus quorum similitudines sunt hæ quae sunt animae passiones, has sunt res; tanquam rursus si diceret: Quorum sunt similitudines ea quae in intellectibus atque animae passionibus sunt, illae res sunt. Sed de his disputationes trahere longius non vult.Aitenim:De his quidem dictum est, in his quae suntdictadeanima.

English

The understandings that are passions of the soul, that is, the things, are the same among all. But what he set down thus: "Of which these are the first notes," he means this: for he is speaking about spoken words, since of which words are the first notes, the passions of the soul are the same among all. For a spoken word also signifies the understanding of a thing, and the thing itself. As when I say "stone," it designates both the understanding of a stone and the stone itself, that is, the substance itself. But it signifies the understanding first, and the thing in the second place. Therefore not all things that a spoken word signifies are passions of the soul, but only those that are first; for the understanding is signified first, and the thing in the second place. But understandings are passions of the soul; therefore of which words are the first notes, the passions of the soul are the same among all men. There is also another reading having itself thus: "Of which, moreover, these are the first notes, these are passions of the soul for all, and of which these are likenesses, these are also things." But if it is written thus, he seems to say this: for he shows of which things words are notes, and of which things again the passions of the soul are; as if he were saying: The words which they signify, and of which they are notes, those are the passions of the soul; and again, of which these things that are passions of the soul are likenesses, these are things; as if again he were saying: Of which those things that are in the understandings and passions of the soul are likenesses, those are things. But he does not wish to draw out disputations about these matters at greater length. For he says: "Concerning these things, indeed, it has been said in those things that are said concerning the soul.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:12 · narrative
Source · Latin

Alterius est enim uegotii.Etenim aliud est principaliter de iutellectibus animae disputare,aliud tantum sibi ad disputationem sumere.quantum ad logicae possit pertinere peritiam. Quare alterius negotii est principaliter de animae passionibus dibputare.

Est autem, quemadmodum in anima, aliquoties quidem intellectus sine vero vel falso,aliquoties autem cui jana necesse est horum alterum inesse,sic etiam in voce. Circa conpositionem enim et divisionem est falsilas et veritas.

De enuntiatione dicturus in qua veritas et falsitas invenitur, recte prius monstrare proponit, in qua prolatione vocum horum alterum, id est aut veritas aut falsitas inveniri queat.,Sed omnis vox animi sensa significat, quare ex animi intellectibus quidquid evenerit vocibus indicatur.Ergo nunc hoc dicit: Similitudo est,inquit,quaedam inter se intellectuum atque vocum: quemadmodum enim sunt quasdam simplicia quae ratione animi concipiuntur,etconstituunturintelligentiamentis,in quibus neque veritas ulla, neque falsitas invenitur,ita quoque in vocibus est. Simplex enim intelleclus,ut, verbi gratia,hominis vel equi, neque falsitatem ullam retinet neque veritatem; cum enim intelligo simpliciter hominem et substantiam ipsam,nihil veri vel falsi in cogitatione retineo.

English

For it belongs to another business. For it is one thing to dispute principally about the understandings of the soul, and another to take up for oneself for disputation only as much as can pertain to the expertise of logic. Wherefore it belongs to another business to dispute principally about the passions of the soul.

But just as in the soul, sometimes indeed there is an understanding without truth or falsity, and sometimes one to which one of these two must already necessarily belong, so also in speech. For falsity and truth are concerned with composition and division.

About to speak of the enunciation in which truth and falsity are found, he rightly proposes first to show in which utterance of words one of these two, that is, either truth or falsity, can be found. But every word signifies the senses of the mind; wherefore whatever has come about from the understandings of the mind is indicated by words. Therefore now he says this: There is, he says, a certain likeness between understandings and words among themselves; for just as there are certain simple things that are conceived by the reason of the mind and are established in the mind of one who understands, in which neither any truth nor falsity is found, so also it is in words. For a simple understanding, as, for example, of man or of horse, retains neither any falsity nor truth; for when I understand simply man and that very substance, I retain nothing true or false in my thought.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:13 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod si cursum rursus animi cogitatione perspexero,cogitatioipsa,quoniamsimplicisreitenet intuitum,veritate et falsitateseclusaest.Sed quando cursum et hominem iunxero. et ex his aliquid intelligentia mea lecero, id quoque si voce proferam, hu- J jusmodi erit: Homo currit. Tunc ex hac substantiae et accidenti compositione etconjunctione hujusmodi intellectus fit, in quo vel falsitas possit esse vel veritas.Ergo quemadmodum in intellectu sunt quædam aliquoties simpliciaverofalsoquecarentia,aliquoties autem cum jam necesse est aut veritatem inesse intellectui aut falsitatem, sic est etiam in voce.Nam si simplicem intellectum vero falsoque carentem vox prseterat, ipsa quoque vox a veritate et falsitate relinquitur. Quod si hujuemodi proterat intellectum, qui in se verum falsum ve contineat, ipsa quoque veri falsique retinet significationem.Docuit autem per hoc quod ait: Circa compositionem enim et divisionem estveritas falsitasque,in qua prolatione vocis enuntiationes possumus invenire.Quoties enim substantiam cum accidenteconjungimusatquecomponimus, vel intellectum intellectui copulamus, ut fieri propositio possit in cogitatione, tunc fit idem in voce. Et est nunc affirmatio, ut: Homo currit. Hominem quippe cursumque composuit atque conjunxit, et inde affirmatio nata est veritatem continens vel mendacium.

English

But if I have again surveyed a course in the thought of the mind, the thought itself, since it retains an intuition of something simple, is excluded from truth and falsehood. But when I have joined a course and a man, and my understanding has brought something out of these, if I express it in speech, it will be of this sort: "A man runs." Then from this composition and conjunction of substance and accident, an understanding of this kind comes to be, in which there can be either falsehood or truth. Therefore, just as in the understanding there are sometimes certain simple things lacking truth and falsehood, but sometimes, when it is now necessary that either truth or falsehood be present in the understanding, so it is also in speech. For if speech brings forth a simple understanding lacking truth and falsehood, that speech itself is also left devoid of truth and falsehood. But if it brings forth an understanding of this kind which contains in itself truth or falsehood, it also retains the signification of truth and falsehood. He taught this, moreover, through what he said: "For truth and falsehood are concerned with composition and division," in which utterance of speech we can find enunciations. For as often as we join and compose a substance with an accident, or couple an understanding with an understanding, so that a proposition can come to be in thought, then the same thing happens in speech. And now it is an affirmation, as: "A man runs." For it has composed and conjoined a man and a course, and from this an affirmation has arisen containing truth or falsehood.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:14 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nunc vero negatio, si huic adverbium negativum non junxero, et substantiam ab accidente divisero atque disjunxero, ut est: Homo non currit, id non quod est adverbium negativum, hominem a cursu divisit atque disjunxit, factaque est inde negatio rursus veritatem falsitatemve significans. Recte igitur dictum est circa compositionem quod est affirmatio, vel divisionem quod est negatio, veras falsitatisque constare naturam.

Nomina igitur ipsa et verba consimilia sunt, sine compositione vel divisione intellectui, ut komo, vel album, quando non additur aliquid, neque enim verum aut falsum est.

Nunc quid sit intellectus sine vero vel falso continuata oratione prosequitur. Ea enim, inquit, quae simplicia dicuntur, similia suntsimplicibus intellectibus, qui sine ulla compositione vel divisione,animi puro capiuntur intuitu. Cum enim homo vel album, ipsaquidem simplicia sint, et significent aliquid, nihil tamen neque verum neque falsum designant. Omne enim simplex nomen vel verbum a veritate et falsitate secluditur. Atqne ideo (quoniam ut dictum est)quaecunquesunt in vocibus,significant animae passiones, simplices voces, et sine compositione vel divisione, similes sunt his intellectibus quos sine compositione et divisione simplex intelligentia concipit.

English

But now negation, if I have not joined the negative adverb to this, and have divided and separated substance from accident, as in "A man does not run," then the negative adverb has divided and separated the man from running, and from this a negation has again been made, signifying truth or falsehood. Rightly, therefore, it has been said that affirmation consists in composition, and negation in division, and that the nature of truth and falsehood rests upon these.

Names, then, and verbs are alike in relation to the intellect without composition or division, as "man" or "white," when nothing is added; for neither is it true or false.

Now he continues in connected discourse what the intellect is without truth or falsehood. For those things, he says, which are called simple are like simple intellects, which are grasped by the pure intuition of the mind without any composition or division. For when [we say] "man" or "white," these indeed are simple, and they signify something, yet they designate nothing either true or false. For every simple name or verb is excluded from truth and falsehood. And therefore (since, as has been said) whatever things are in utterances signify passions of the soul, simple utterances, and those without composition or division, are like those intellects which simple understanding conceives without composition and division.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:15 · narrative
Source · Latin

In his enim atque hujusmodi nulla neque veritas, neque falsitas invenitur: nisi enim aliquid addatur, ut id quod simplex intelligis, vel per seconstituasesseveleialiquidsecundum esseconjungas, in his veritas et falsitas non erit. Cum enim simpliciter dico homo, si non aliquid addidero, ut verbum Est, et fiat hujusmodi compositio: Bomo eat, vel hujusmodi aliquid,ut: Homo vivit,quodidemvalet, tanquam si dicam: Homo vivens est; ergo nisi aliquid hujusmodi fuerit adjunctum, quod intellectam rem vel per se esse coostituat, ut: Homo est, cum dico;per se hominem esse designavi, vel juncto D; accidente tale aliquid apponatur,quod idem ei quod est esse significet,ut est: Homo vivit. Vita enim homini junctaest,et vivit idem significat quod vivens est,nulla veritas nec falsitas valet intelligi. Hoc autem convenientissimo monstrat exemplo.

Signum autem hujus est,et enim hircocervus significat quidem aliquid,sed quod nondum verum vel falsum,si non esse, vel non esse, addatur,vel simpliciter,vel secundum tempus.

English

For in these and things of this kind no truth or falsity is found; for unless something is added, so that what you understand as simple you either establish to be per se or join something according to being, there will be no truth and falsity in these. For when I say simply "man," if I do not add something, such as the verb "is," and a composition of this kind is made—"man is"—or something of this kind, as "man lives," which is worth the same as if I said "man is living"—therefore unless something of this kind has been added, which either establishes the understood thing to be per se, as when I say "man is," I have designated man to be per se, or, with an accident joined, something of this kind is appended which signifies the same as "to be," as is "man lives"—for life is joined to man, and "lives" signifies the same as "is living"—no truth or falsity can be understood. But he shows this by a most fitting example.

Now a sign of this is that "goat-stag" indeed signifies something, but not yet true or false, unless "to be" or "not to be" is added, either simply or according to time.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:16 · narrative
Source · Latin

Magnam vim habet exempli hujus subtilitas, Non enim scIa ilia nomina vel verba falsitate acmendacio separata sunt, quaecunque simplicia sunt,sed etiam iila quaecunque sunt composita,si sint dicta simpli-; citer.Hircocervus enim compositu III nomen est,signi.:, flcans hircum et cervum.Sed nisi et aut esse aut non esse addatur,ut dicamus hircocervus est, vel hircocervus non est, nullus inde veri falsive intellectus poterit provenire. Ipsum enim quanquam sit composilum,tamen simpliciter dictum, veritati vel falsitati proximum non est.Si quis enim dicat tantum hircocervus, nihil enuntiat. Quod si nihil enuntiat præter veritatem falsitatemque,quoddam compositum designans nomen auditor intelligit. Quod vero ait vel simpliciter vel secundum tempus, ad boc valet, ne putaremusluncfierisolum denomineenuntiationem, Cum ei præsens tempus adjicitur,ut cum dicimus: Hircocervus est, vel hircorcervus non est,in his jam veritas est aut falsitas. Sed non solum si praesens tempus designet propositio, sed etiam si praeteritum, ut si quis dicat: Hircocervus fuit; vel futurum,ut si quis dicat: Hircocervus erit, enuntiationem facit.Ergo hoc est quod ait vel simpliciter vel secundum tempus,hujusmodienim simpliciter facta enuntiatio secundum præsens est.

English

The subtlety of this example has great force. For those names or verbs are not separated from falsity and falsehood—whatever ones are simple—but even those whatever ones are composite, if they are spoken simply. For "goat-stag" is a composite name, signifying a goat and a stag. But unless either "is" or "is not" is added, so that we say "a goat-stag is" or "a goat-stag is not," no understanding of truth or falsity can arise from it. For although it is composite, nevertheless when spoken simply it is not close to truth or falsity. For if someone says only "goat-stag," he states nothing. But if he states nothing beyond truth and falsity, the hearer understands it as a name designating something composite. But what he says—"either simply or according to time"—avails for this: that we should not think that an utterance is made from a name alone when the present time is added to it, as when we say "a goat-stag is" or "a goat-stag is not"; in these there is already truth or falsity. But a proposition makes an utterance not only if it designates the present time, but also if the past, as if someone says "a goat-stag was," or the future, as if someone says "a goat-stag will be." Therefore this is what he says—"either simply or according to time"—for an utterance of this kind made simply is according to the present.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:17 · narrative
Source · Latin

Etenim quod praesens dicimus,tempus nonest,sed confinium temporum.Tempus autem est aut futurum autpraeteritum;ergonon potest in eo quod est hircocervus veritas aut falsitas inveniri, nisi ei aut. esse aut non esse addatur, vel praesens significans,qund est simpliciter,vel tempus quod est praeteritum aut futurum.Si quis enim sic dicat: Hircocervus est, simpliciter dixit, id est secundum praesens. Si quis autem, Hircocervus erit vel fuit, secundum tempus, futurum scilicet et praeteritum. Haec igitur quae erant utiliapraelocutus, ad definitionem nominis,disputationis cursu accedit.

DE NOMINE.

Nomen igitur est vox significativa secundum placitum sine tempore,cujus nulla pars est significativa,separala.

Omnis diffinitio genere et differentiis perficitur. Sumpsit ergo ad diffinitionem vocem esse nominis genus.Cætera vero quae exsecutus est, pro ditferentiisaggregavit.Est autem hujus termini talis expositio: Nomen est, inquit, vox. Sed vocum aliae sunt quae significant, aliae quae nihil significant. Nomen autem significat id cujus nomen est. Nomen igitur est vox significativa. Vocum significativarum aliae sunt naturaliter,aliæ non naturaliter.Naturaliterest vox significativa,ut ea quae dolores naturalitermonstrat aut gaudia.Non naturaliter vero significativae voces sunt,quas secundum positionem essedicimus. Secundumpositionem vero sunt;quassibi ipsi homi.

English

For what we call "present" is not time, but the boundary of times. Time, however, is either future or past; therefore in that which is a goat-stag, truth or falsity cannot be found unless either "to be" or "not to be" is added to it, signifying either the present, which is simply, or the time which is past or future. For if someone speaks thus: "A goat-stag is," he has spoken simply, that is, according to the present. But if someone says, "A goat-stag will be" or "was," it is according to time, namely future and past. These things, then, which he had usefully said beforehand for the definition of the name, he approaches in the course of the discussion.

ON THE NAME.

A name, therefore, is a spoken sound significant by convention without time, no part of which is significant when separated.

Every definition is completed by genus and differentiae. He has therefore taken for the definition that "spoken sound" is the genus of the name. But the other things which he has set out, he has gathered as differentiae. Now the exposition of this term is as follows: A name, he says, is a spoken sound. But of spoken sounds, some are those which signify, others which signify nothing. A name, however, signifies that of which it is the name. A name, therefore, is a significant spoken sound. Of significant spoken sounds, some are by nature, others not by nature. A significant spoken sound by nature is, for example, that which naturally indicates pains or joys. But spoken sounds significant not by nature are those which we say are by convention. And they are by convention which [are established] by humans themselves for themselves.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:18 · narrative
Source · Latin

nes posuerunt,ut cum dixit aliquis.Primus qui rebus nomina condidit,hæc substantia dicatur aurum,bic lapis, haec aqua, et alia similia. Tales igitur voces secundum positionem sunt. Et ita secundum positionem, quemadmodum ipsis hominibus placuit, a quibus nomina illa formata sunt. Hujusmodi ergo voces quaesecundum positionem sunt,secundum ponentium placitum Bunt. Sed nomen non naturaliter significat. Apud diversas enim gentas,diversa sunt nomina.Quae autem apud diversos diversa sunt, ea non sunt naturaliter,sedsecundum placitum eorum qui posuerunt,positionemque ponentium.Alioqui si naturaliteressent,quemadmodum ea quæ dulcia sunt apud Romanos,noneadem suntapudScythasamara, nec acida, sed apud ipsos quoque dulcia, et apud omnes gentes sunt eodem modo.Ita quoque omnia nomina;si naturaliter essent,eisdem.omnes homines uterentur. Quare quoniam nomina naturaliter non sunt,nec naturalitersignificant,secundum placitum sunt, scilicet ponentium atque auctorum, et a quibus nomiua ipsa rebus impressa sunt.Est ergo nomenvoxsignificativasecundumplacitum.Secundum placitum autem positionemque signilicantium vocum,aliæ tempus secum ad significationem trahunt, aliae praeter tempus praedicantur. Tempus secum trahunt, ut est curro et lego, vel cucurri et legi, et quaecunque sunt verba. Omne enim verbum cum tempore est. Nomina vero sine tempore sunt.

English

...as they established, as when someone has said "First who assigned names to things, let this substance be called gold, this stone, this water," and other such cases. Voices of this kind, then, exist by convention—and by convention in the way it pleased the humans themselves by whom those names were formed. Therefore voices of this sort, which exist by convention, will be by the pleasure of those who established them. But a name does not signify by nature. For among different peoples, names are different. But things that are different among different peoples are not by nature, but according to the pleasure of those who established them and the convention of those who established them. Otherwise, if they were by nature, just as sweet things are not the same among the Romans as bitter things among the Scythians, nor sour, but are sweet among them too and among all peoples in the same way, so too all names: if they were by nature, all humans would use the same ones. Therefore, since names are not by nature, nor do they signify by nature, they exist by convention—namely, of those who established them and are their authors, and by whom the names themselves were impressed upon things. A name, therefore, is a significant voice by convention. But of voices that signify by convention and establishment, some bring time with them into their signification, while others are predicated without time. Those that bring time with them are, for example, "I run" and "I read," or "I ran" and "I read" (past), and whatever verbs there are. For every verb is with time. Names, however, are without time.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:19 · narrative
Source · Latin

Cum enim dico: bocrates, vel Plato, vel albedo, vel aliquid hujusmodi,temporibus carent.Nomen ergo vox est significativa secundum placitum sine tempore. Vocum significativarum secundum placitum sine tempore,aliae sunt quarum partes aliquid extra significant,aliae quarum partes extra nihil designant. Haec namque vox, quae est, Socrates uum Platone aliisque discipulis, quae est oratio, et significativa est, et secundum placitum. Partas namque ipsius quæ sunt nomina, secundum placitum sunt,et sine tempore.Nu]la namque in eane imaginatio quidem temporis:invenitur,sed habethoc quod partesejusextra significant.Totanamqueoratioest,Socrates cum Platone aliisque discipulis; sed ejus pars Socrates, si a tota oratione disjuncta sit, significat aliquid. Nominis autem pars nihil extra significat; ipsius enim nominis quod est Socrates, quod disjunctum a tota connexione significat, partes nihil extra designant.Neque enim So,nequecra,neque tes,aliquid praeter totum nomen extra designant. Quare rectis-. sime diffinitio constituta est: Nomen essevocemsecundum placitum designativam sine tempore,cujus partes nihil extra significant. Hoc autem propositis docet exemplis.

English

For when I say "Socrates," or "Plato," or "whiteness," or anything of this sort, they are without times. A name, therefore, is a significant utterance by convention, without time. Of significant utterances by convention without time, some are those whose parts signify something extra, others are those whose parts designate nothing extra. For this utterance, which is "Socrates with Plato and the other disciples," which is a sentence, is both significant and by convention. For its parts, which are names, are by convention and without time. For no imagination of time is found in it, but it has this, that its parts signify something extra. For the whole is a sentence: "Socrates with Plato and the other disciples"; but its part "Socrates," if it be separated from the whole sentence, signifies something. But the part of a name signifies nothing extra; for of the name itself, which is "Socrates," which when separated from the whole connection signifies, the parts designate nothing extra. For neither "So," nor "cra," nor "tes" designate anything extra beyond the whole name. Wherefore most rightly has the definition been established: that a name is a significant utterance by convention without time, whose parts signify nothing extra. And this he teaches by the examples set forth.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:20 · narrative
Source · Latin

In nomine enim quod est equiferus,ferus per senihil significat, quemadmodum in oratione quæ est equus ferus. Si enim sit oratio quae dicat equus ferus,duas res significat; equum et ferum. Utrumque enim est, unumsubstantia,alterumquale.Quivero dicit equiferus, unum nomen est, et ei unum quod significat subjectumesl;quocirca unum quoque permistioista significat: quod si unum significat tota permistio, pars inde separata nihil extra designat. In toto enim nomine quod est equiferus,consignificat quidem ferus per se vero nihil significat; quod si per se id quod dicimus ferus aliquid significare;arbitremur,non jam erit pars nominis,sed ipsum erit integrum nomen, et habebit partes fe etrus. Quocirca,quoniam nominibus unum subjectum est,et unum significat totum nomen, vel si sit aequivocum,vel si non sit: canis enim cum sit aequivocum, semel totum latrabilem, secundo totum ccelestem,et rursus totum marinum significat, quare quoniam quodlibet nomen unum aliquid significat totum.pars ejus feparata,et velut a tota compositione se juncta,in qua unum aliquid. consignificabat, nihil extra significat. Dat autem differentias simplicium nominum et compositorum.

English

For in the name "equiferus" (wild horse), "ferus" (wild) signifies nothing by itself, just as in the phrase "equus ferus" (wild horse). For if there were a phrase saying "equus ferus," it signifies two things: horse and wild. For each is a thing—one a substance, the other a quality. But one who says "equiferus" — it is one name, and there is one subject that it signifies; and therefore the whole mixture signifies one thing too. But if the whole mixture signifies one thing, a part separated from it designates nothing besides. For in the whole name "equiferus," "ferus" does indeed co-signify, but by itself it signifies nothing. But if we believe that what we call "ferus" signifies something by itself, it will no longer be a part of the name, but will itself be a complete name, and will have the parts "fe" and "trus." Therefore, since names have one subject, and the whole name signifies one thing—whether it be equivocal or not (for "canis," since it is equivocal, signifies once the whole barking kind, secondly the whole celestial kind, and again the whole marine kind)—therefore, since any name whatsoever signifies one thing as a whole, a part of it separated and, as it were, disjoined from the whole composition in which it co-signified one thing, signifies nothing besides. He gives, moreover, the differences of simple and composite names.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:21 · narrative
Source · Latin

At vern non quemadmodum in simplicibus nominibus, sic se habet eliam in compositis. In aliis enim nullo modo pars significativa est, in his autem vult quidem, sed nihil significat separata, ut in eo quod est, equiferus, ferus.

'Simplicia, inquit, nominis partes, quoniam non constant ex aliis partibus,ne imaginatione quidem significationis aliquid prod unt,ut in eo nominequud est homo, neque ho, neque mo, quidquam significant, neque significare putantur, idcirco quoniam simplex nomen est.In his vero quae composita sunt, quoniam ex duobus signiticativis in unam significantiam rediguntur,vult quidem significare aliquid pars, sed nihil separata designat. In eo enim quod est equiferus, dat quidem imaginationem aliquam significationis, et putatur significare ferus. Hoc est enim quod dicit; vult quidem, sed nihil extra separatumque significat.Si enim boc ipsum ferus ut pars nominis dicatur,dimidium nomen dicitur ejus quod est equiferus, dimidium autem nomen nibil designat. Ergo id quod dicimus ferus, cum alia parte nominis quae est equi unum consignificat, id es equiferus, separatum etiam nihil extra designatt Quod si rursus ipsum nomen extrinsecus,non in al. terius nominis parte ponatur, per se sibi significavelut nomen. Ergo non est similis in simplicibu nominibus compositisque partium consignificatios Sed simplicium quidem nominum partes nec ipsae.

English

But it is not the case that, as in simple names, so also in composite names the situation is the same. For in the former, a part is in no way significant, whereas in the latter it does indeed wish to signify, but when separated it signifies nothing, as in "equiferus" (wild horse), "ferus" (wild).

"Simple parts of a name," he says, "since they do not consist of other parts, produce nothing even by way of the imagination of signification, as in the name 'homo' (man), neither 'ho' nor 'mo' signifies anything, nor are they thought to signify, for the reason that it is a simple name." But in those names which are composite, since they are reduced from two significant parts into one signification, a part does indeed wish to signify something, but when separated it designates nothing. For in "equiferus," it does indeed give some imagination of signification, and "ferus" is thought to signify. For this is what he says: it wishes to, but signifies nothing separately and apart. For if "ferus" itself, as a part of the name, is spoken, it is called half the name of "equiferus," but half a name designates nothing. Therefore what we call "ferus," when it signifies together with the other part of the name, which is "equi," is one thing, that is "equiferus"; but when separated, it also designates nothing apart. But if again the name itself is placed externally, not as part of another name, it will signify by itself for itself, as a name. Therefore the co-signification of the parts is not similar in simple and composite names. But indeed the parts of simple names are not themselves [significant].

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:22 · narrative
Source · Latin

significant,nec significare putantur,Compositorum vero volunt quidem partes aliquid significare, et dant significationis imaginationem, et significare aliquid putantur, sed nullus separatim retinent significationem.

Secundum placitum l'ero. Quoniam naturaliter nomen nullum est,sed quando ftt nota.*

Tunc enim significat nomen secundum placitum, quando fit nota aJicujus rei, id est quando significat aliquam rem,ut scindapsus.Qu.mdiu enim huic voci nihil subjectum est,scindapsus nomen non est. Nam nominis est significare subjectum,scindapsus autem subjectum non significat. Non initur nomen est.Ac rursus est hujus constituere subjectum, nominis autem significare subjectum est. Non enim nomen aliquid diceretur, nisi a subjecti significatione boc traheret, præcipue cum nomen dicatur quasi notamen. Itaque cum scindapsus subjectum significat nomen est. Constat igitur nomen esse secundum placitum, sed tunc quando fit nota, id est quando aliquod subjectum significat.

English

For they are not thought to signify, but the parts of composite names do wish to signify something, and they give an impression of signification, and they are thought to signify something, but separately they retain no signification.

"By convention," then. Since no name is by nature, but when it becomes a token.

For a name signifies by convention when it becomes a token of some thing, that is, when it signifies some thing, as "scindapsus." For as long as nothing is underlying this utterance, "scindapsus" is not a name. For it is the function of a name to signify a subject, but "scindapsus" does not signify a subject. Therefore it is not a name. And again, it is the function of this [utterance] to establish a subject, but it is the function of a name to signify a subject. For it would not be called a name unless it drew this from the signification of a subject, especially since a name is spoken of as, so to speak, a token. Therefore when "scindapsus" signifies a subject, it is a name. It is agreed, then, that a name is by convention, but then when it becomes a token, that is, when it signifies some subject.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:23 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam designant et illitterati soni, ut ferarum, quorum nullus est nomen.

Dixerat superius in diffinitione, nomen esse secundum placitum,non natura. Hoc autem nunc diligentius monstratdicens nihil esse nominum naturaliter. Atque ideo non illi sufficit ad diffinitionem quod est significativa vox,nisi illud quoque adderet quod secundum placitum vox significativa est.Alioqui multi illitterati soni significant, ut sibilus ali" quid interdum significat. Ferarum quoque mutorumque animalium voces interdum aliqua significatione praeditas esse perspicimus. Quaedam enim vox canum iram significat, hinnitus quoque equorum saepe alterius equi consuetudinem quaerit. Sed haec naturaliter significant,atqueideo nomina sunt; quod igitur naturaliter significat, nomen non est. Atque haec hactenus.Nunc quemadmodum facta sit definitio videamus. Quod dixit nomen esse vocem, traxit a genere definitionem.Quod significativam esse consequenter apposuit,nomen ab non significantibus vocibus separavit. Quod secundum placitum, a naturaliter significantibus vocibus natura nominis divisa est.Quod sine tempore,ad verborum discrepantiam respicit.Quod ejus nullam partem extra sL gnificare propositumest,idcircodictum est utnomen ab orationibus distare videretur.

English

For even unlettered sounds, such as those of wild beasts, signify, though none of these is a name.

He had said above in the definition that a name is by convention, not by nature. But now he shows this more carefully, saying that nothing of names is by nature. And for this reason it does not suffice for the definition that it is a significant utterance, unless he also added that it is a significant utterance by convention. Otherwise many unlettered sounds signify, as a hiss sometimes signifies something. We also perceive that the voices of wild beasts and mute animals are sometimes endowed with some signification. For a certain voice of dogs signifies anger, and the neighing of horses often seeks the company of another horse. But these signify by nature, and for that reason they are not names; for what signifies by nature is not a name. And so much for these matters. Now let us see how the definition was made. What he said, that a name is a voice, he drew the definition from the genus. What he added consequently, that it is significant, separated the name from non-significant voices. What he said, by convention, divided the nature of the name from voices that signify by nature. What he said, without time, regards the distinction from verbs. What he proposed, that no part of it signifies separately, was said for this reason, that the name might be seen to differ from sentences.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:24 · narrative
Source · Latin

Hæctenus quidem de tota nominis definitione tractatum est, et quibus differentiis ab aliis vocibus distare possit nomen explicitum est.Nunc autem quæ videntur inde. finitionem nominis incurrere, an nomina sint, diligentius quaerit.

Non homo uero non est nomen. At vero nec posilum est nomen quo itlud oporteat appellare. Nam neque oratio, neque negatio est, sed sit nomen infinitum, quoniam similiter in quolibet est, et quod est, et quod non est.

Nunc disserit qualia esse arbitrari oportet, qua cum sub definitione nominis quidem cadant,integra tamen nomina non esse videantur. Unde fit ut hie diligentissime distributis,integerrima hominis definitio concludatur. Hoc enim quod dicimus non homo quid sit,ambigitur.Oratio enim non est. Omnis enim oratio verbis nominibusque conjungitur. Hoc autemquod dicimus non homo,duabus quidem partibus constat, sed unum in se retinet nomen, verbum vero non habet. Negaiiva enim particula, quae est non,neque nomen est neque verbum. Rursus negatio non est.Omnis enim negatio verum falsumve significat. Non homo vero quod dicimus, neque verum est neque falsum.Nisi enim (ut supra ait) aliquid quod sit proximum ad id quod est esse addatur, nulla veritatis aut falsitatis ratio in qualibet orationis partium compositione perficitur.

English

Thus far indeed the discussion has concerned the whole definition of the name, and it has been explained by what differences a name can be distinguished from other utterances. But now he inquires more carefully whether the things that appear to fall under the definition of a name are names.

“Not-man” however is not a name. But neither is there any name by which it ought to be called. For it is neither a sentence nor a negation, but let it be an infinite name, since it applies alike to anything whatever, both to what is and to what is not.

Now he discusses what sort of things one ought to judge them to be, which, although they fall under the definition of a name, nevertheless appear not to be complete names. Whence it comes about that, with these most carefully distinguished, the fullest definition of man is concluded. For what this is that we call “not-man” is doubtful. For it is not a sentence. For every sentence is joined together from verbs and names. But this that we call “not-man” consists indeed of two parts, but it retains one name in itself and has no verb. For the negative particle, which is “not,” is neither a name nor a verb. Again, it is not a negation. For every negation signifies the true or the false. But what we call “not-man” is neither true nor false. For unless (as he said above) something that is near to that which is, is added, no account of truth or falsity is completed in any composition of the parts of a sentence.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:25 · narrative
Source · Latin

At vero non homo nomen non est.Omne enim nomen unam rem significat definitam, ut cum dicimus homo,substantiam significat nec quamlibet,sed rationalem atque morta]em.Eodem modo et caetera nomina.Qui vero dicit non homo,hominem quidem tollit.Quid autem illa significatione velit ostendere, non definit, potest enim quod homo non est, et equus esse,et canis, et lapsis, et caetera quæcunque homo non fuerint. Quare quoniam id quod definite significare potest, aufert in eo negativa particula, quid vero significare debeat, definite non dicit, sed multa atque infinita unusquisque auditor intelligit. Dicatur, inquit, nomen infinitum. Hoc enim quod dicimus non homo,tam multa significat quam multa, sunt quae a definitione hominis disjunguntur. Sed hoc Aristoteles vocabulum, cum infinitum momen vocaret, primu3 iL venit.Apud antiquiores enim ista quidem erat dubitatio, sed huic differentiae qua ditfertnomen definitum ab hujusmodi nomine quod cum negatione proponitur, impressum vocabulum non erat, quod ipse testatur dicens: At vero nec positum est nomen quo illud oporleat appellari. Nullus enim posuit vocabulum quo oporteat appellari id quod dicimus,non homo;Aristoteles perspicaciter infinitum nomen hujusmodi prædicamentum censuit appellari.

English

But indeed "not-man" is not a name. For every name signifies one definite thing, as when we say "man," it signifies a substance, and not just any substance, but a rational and mortal one. In the same way also the other names. But one who says "not-man" does indeed remove man, but what he wishes to indicate by that signification he does not define; for what is not man can be a horse, and a dog, and a stone, and whatever other things are not man. Wherefore, since he takes away that which can signify something definite by the negative particle in it, but does not definitely say what it ought to signify, but each hearer understands many and infinite things, let it be called, he says, an infinite name. For this that we say, "not-man," signifies as many things as there are that are separated from the definition of man. But Aristotle was the first to come upon this term, when he called it an infinite name. For among the ancients there was indeed this doubt, but no word had been impressed upon this difference by which a definite name is distinguished from a name of this kind which is put forward with a negation, as he himself testifies, saying: But indeed no name has been established by which it ought to be called. For no one has established a word by which it ought to be called that which we say, "not-man"; Aristotle, with keen insight, judged that a designation of this kind should be called an infinite name.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:26 · narrative
Source · Latin

Catonis autem vel Catoni,et quæcunque talia sunt, non sunt nomina, sed casus nominis.

Omnis,inquit,casus alterius casus est. Itaque fit ut quicunque casus sit alterius inflexio videatur. Ergo quod dicimus hujus Catonis,vel huic Catoni, vel alia bujusmodi,casus nominum suot.Unde fit ut hi casus inflexiones quoque dicantur,sed omnis inflexio alicujus inflexio est. Quod autem inflectitur, ab eo quod ipsa inflexio fit prius est, quare cum id quod dicimus Cato nomen sit, et sit primum,distat ab inflexionibus suis.Inflexio autem nominativi genitivus est, et caeteri. Nullus enim dixerit recte nominativum casum esse.Si enim id quod dicimus Cato alicujus casus sit, cujus casus esse possit, oportet ostendi,sed ante id quod dicimus Cato,nullus praedicatur casus: igitur quoniam Cato nomen nullius inflexionis ost, nec omnino casus est.Caeleri autem casus qui dicuntur nominativi inflexione formantur, Catonis, et Catoni, Catonem; quare si distant ea quæ ab inflexione nascunt ab his quae i inflectuntur, distant quoque hi qui omnes casus, quisuntCatonis,Catoni,Catonem,abeo quod est Cato,id est a nomine principali:sed hicCato nomen est, casus igitur nomina non sunt. Aliud enim est ipse casus, aliud cujus est casus.

English

But "Cato's" or "to Cato," and whatever else is of this sort, are not names but cases of a name.

Every case, he says, is the case of another. And so it comes about that whatever case there is appears to be an inflection of another. Therefore what we call "of this Cato," or "to this Cato," or other such things, are cases of names. Hence it comes about that these cases are also called inflections, but every inflection is the inflection of something. Moreover, that which is inflected is prior to that from which the inflection itself is made; wherefore, since what we call "Cato" is a name and is primary, it is distinct from its inflections. But the inflection of the nominative is the genitive, and the rest. For no one would rightly say that the nominative case is a case. For if what we call "Cato" were the case of something, it would be necessary to show of what case it could be a case, but before what we call "Cato" no case is predicated; therefore, since "Cato" is a name, it is the inflection of nothing, nor is it a case at all. But the remaining cases which are called of the nominative are formed by inflection—"Catonis," "Catoni," "Catonem"; wherefore, if those things which are born from inflection differ from those which are inflected, then all these cases which are "Catonis," "Catoni," "Catonem" also differ from that which is "Cato," that is, from the principal name. But this "Cato" is a name; therefore cases are not names. For one thing is the case itself, and another is that whose case it is.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:27 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quocirca si nominis hac omnia casus sunt,hsec nomina non sUnl.Atque ideo prudenter veteres omnes casus genitivum,dativum,accusativum,vocativum, ablativum, suis diversisque nominibus vocaverunt.Primum vero alias rectum,quasi a nullo inflexum,alias nominis ipsius vocabulo nominativum dixerunt. Quare nunc hoc Aristoteles exsequitur, qui casus nominum videantur non esse nomina,sed tantum nominum inflexiones, id est casus.

Ratio autem ejus in aliis quidem eadem est,sed cliffert.Quoniam cum est, vet fuit,erit, adjunctum, neque verum neque falsum est; nomen vero semper, ut Catonis est, vel non est, nondum enim aliquid verum dicit aut falsum.

Ratio,inquit,id est definitio nominis et casus nominis, eadem est,nam sicut nomen vox significativa est secundum placitum sine tempore, ut ejus pars nulla extra significet, sic etiam casus. Nam vox est et secundum placitum designativa,etcujusseparatæ partes nihil extra designanl. Ergo eadem diffinitio ratioque nominis est et casus nomiuis, sed his una additur differentia, quod omne nomen cum eo quod diciturest,autnon est conjunctum,aut affirmativam enuntiationem facit,aut negativam,ut Socrates est, vel Socrates non est.Hic enim quonam ventas aut falsitas incidit, enuntiationem esse necesse est; in casibus vero quamvis addas est, aut non est, nulla inde affirmatio neque negatio fit.Neque enim in hos ulla veritas aut falsitas cadit.

English

Wherefore if all these are cases of a name, they are not names. And therefore the ancients wisely called all the cases—the genitive, dative, accusative, vocative, and ablative—by their own distinct names. But the first they called in one respect the "straight" case, as being inflected from no other, and in another respect they called it by the term of the name itself, the "nominative." Hence Aristotle now pursues this point: which cases of names appear not to be names, but only inflections of names, that is, cases.

But the account of it is indeed the same in the other cases, yet it differs. For when "is" or "was" or "will be" is joined, it is neither true nor false; but a name always, as "Cato's is" or "is not"—for as yet it says nothing true or false.

The account, he says—that is, the definition—of a name and of a case of a name is the same. For just as a name is a significant utterance according to convention without time, such that no part of it signifies separately, so too is a case. For it is an utterance and designative according to convention, and its separate parts designate nothing further. Therefore the definition and account of a name and of a case of a name is the same, but one difference is added to these: that every name, when joined with what is said—"is" or "is not"—either makes an affirmative statement or a negative one, as "Socrates is" or "Socrates is not." For here, since truth or falsity falls upon it, it must be a statement; but in cases, even if you add "is" or "is not," no affirmation or negation is made from it. For neither truth nor falsity falls upon these.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:28 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si quis enim dicat, Socratis est, Socratis non est, vel Catonis est, Catonis non esi,quid sit vel non sit non apponens,cum simplici casu,est,aut non est,jungens,imperfectam faciet orationem a falsitate ac veritate disjunctam. Quare nulla enuntiatio est. Ergo differt nomen a casu, quod nomen quidem cum est, aut non junctum, vel verum vel falsum facit.Casus vero neque verum dicit neque mentitur.Etenim nullo alio addito trunca est atque imperfecta sententia; sed quorsum istuc? ut definitio scilicet nominis integerrima compleretur. Etenim jam nunc definitio nominis hoc modo est: Nomen est vox signiQcativa, secundum placitum, sinetempore,cujusnullapars signiticativa est separata, definitum aliquid significans,cum eat aut non est juncta faciensenuntiationem.Sed de nomine hactenus, Nunc verbum diligentissima definitione determinat.

DE VERBO.

English

For if anyone says “Socrates’ is” or “Socrates’ is not,” or “Cato’s is” or “Cato’s is not,” without adding what it is or is not, joining “is” or “is not” to a simple case, he will make an incomplete sentence divorced from truth and falsity. Wherefore it is no statement. Therefore a name differs from a case in that a name, when joined with “is” or “is not,” makes something true or false. But a case neither says what is true nor lies. Indeed, with nothing else added, the sentence is truncated and incomplete; but why this? Clearly so that the definition of a name might be completed most fully. For even now the definition of a name is as follows: A name is a significant spoken sound by convention, without time, no part of which is significant when separated, signifying something definite, which when joined with “is” or “is not” makes a statement. But about the name, enough so far. Now he determines the verb with a most diligent definition.

ON THE VERB.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:29 · narrative
Source · Latin

Verbum autem est, quod consignificat tempus,cujus pars nihil extra significat, et est semper eorum quæ de altero prædicatur, nota.

Verbum distat a nomine in hoc solo quod nomen sine tempore est,ut supra jam dictum est, verbum vim temporis in significationibus trahit, etesset quidem plena definitio verbi, si alia in eo omnia quæ in nomine posita sunt ponerentur, hoc solo discrepante quod verbum consignificat tempus, essetque definitio ita: Verbum est vox significativa secundum placitum,cujusnulla pars extra significativa est;sed quoniam sunt illa nomini verboque communia,proprium autem verbi est consignificare tempus;a proprietate definiti,scilicet verbi,qua a diffinitione nominissegregratur, verbum voluit diffinire. Diligenter autem ait,consignificat.Nam significat nomina tempus,utdies,ut annus, hæc enim temporum nomina sunt.Verbum autem proprie consignificat tempus, principaliterenim autpassionemdesignat,utactum, utcum dico, accuso vel accusor. Sed cum ipsa actuspassionisque significatione, vim quoque secum temporistrahit, ut ille actus aut passio praeter praesens, aut futurum, aut præteritum,aut quod inter hae est, esse non possit. Et est semper eorum quae de altero praedicantur nota. Sensus hujusmodi est: Omne, inquit, verbum significat aliquod accidens,quod accidens semper de altero prædicatur.

English

But a verb is that which signifies time in addition, no part of which signifies anything separately, and it is always the sign of those things which are predicated of another.

A verb differs from a noun in this alone, that a noun is without time, as has already been said above; a verb draws with it the force of time in its significations. And indeed the full definition of a verb would be if all the other things that are posited in the case of a noun were also posited in its case, differing in this alone, that a verb signifies time in addition; and the definition would be thus: A verb is a significant utterance according to convention, no part of which is significant separately. But since those things are common to noun and verb, while it is proper to the verb to signify time in addition, from the property of the thing defined—namely the verb—by which it is separated from the definition of the noun, he wished to define the verb. Carefully, moreover, he says "signifies in addition." For nouns signify time, as "day," as "year"—for these are names of times. But a verb properly signifies time in addition; for it designates principally either an action or a passion, as "I accuse" or "I am accused." But with the very signification of action and passion, it draws with it also the force of time, so that that action or passion cannot be apart from the present, or the future, or the past, or what is between these. And it is always the sign of those things which are predicated of another. The sense of this is as follows: Every verb, he says, signifies some accident, which accident is always predicated of another.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:30 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam si omne verbum aut actionem aut passionem designat,actio vero et passio in accidentibus numerantur, omne vel'bum vim significat acciJenlis; sed accidens semper de eo prædicatur quod sibi subjectum est,ut. album de corpore, et durum de ferro. Quale omnia verba ejusmodi aliqua designant, quae semper de altero praedicantur, quod per hoc scilicet dixit,quod aitverbum notam esse, id est significationem eorum quae de altero praedicantur, quod idem valet tanquam sidiceret:Verbum semperaccidentia significat, quorum haec natura est ut semper de altero praediceutur;cujus enim quaelibet res nota est,hanc ipsa quæ nota est, designat.

Dico uero quoniam consignifical tempus, ut cursus quidem nomen eSI,currit autem verbum, consignificat enim nunc esse.

Supra in nominis diffinitione proposuit nomen esse sine tempore, quod nunc quoque hoc monstrat exemplo, et diligentissimo quidem.Nam idem praedicamentum ad nomen relatum sine temporis cunsignificatione monstratur, ad verbum vero, videtur esse cum tempore. Cursus enim simpliciter dictus ut nomen et ut res propria, sine tempore est, si vero in actionem, quae verbi semper est. inducatur, mox proprietatem verbi ac temporis in se suscipit. significationem.Curritenimverbumest, etsignificat actionem, et cum eadem tempus ostendit, monstrat enim nunc esse, id est præsens tempus.

English

For if every verb signifies either an action or a passion, and action and passion are counted among accidents, then every verb signifies the force of an accident; but an accident is always predicated of that which is its subject, as white of a body, and hard of iron. And all verbs of this kind signify some such quality, which is always predicated of another—which is what he meant by saying that a verb is a sign, that is, the signification of those things which are predicated of another, which is the same as if he had said: a verb always signifies accidents, whose nature it is always to be predicated of another; for whatever thing a thing is a sign of, it designates that very thing of which it is the sign.

But I say that it additionally signifies time: for instance, "course" is indeed a noun, but "runs" is a verb, for it additionally signifies that it is now.

Above, in the definition of the noun, he proposed that a noun is without time, which he now also shows by this example, and indeed most diligently. For the same predicate, when related to a noun, is shown without the additional signification of time, but when related to a verb, it seems to be with time. For "course," said simply as a noun and as a proper thing, is without time; but if it is brought into an action, which is always the property of a verb, it at once takes upon itself the character of a verb and the signification of time. For "runs" is a verb, and it signifies an action, and together with it shows time—for it shows that it is now, that is, the present time.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:31 · narrative
Source · Latin

Consignificat autem idcirco dictum est, quoniam quod dicimus currit, actum quidem quemdamsignificat,cum eo vero actu in ipsa significatione verbi praesens tempusinducitur,atqueideodiligenter ait consignificat. Et est hæcverborum subtilitas in Aristotele mirabilis.

Et est semper eorum quæ de altero dicuntur nota, ut eorum quæ de subjecto vel in subjecto sunt.

Semper, inquit, Verbum ea significat quae de altero praedicentur. Qua: sint autem haec quanquam brevissima, ipse tamen ostendit.Est autem consuetudo Aristotelis ea quae accidentia sunt, in subjecto esse dicere.Nec non etiam eadem ipsa accidentia de subjecto praedicari, idcirco quod omnia quaecunque accidentia sunt, vel denominative, vel quolibet alio modo et de subjecto praedicantur, et in subjecto sunt. Nunc ergo boc dicit, tale quiddam significat verbum, quod semper accidens sit, quod accidens vel in subjecto semper, vel de suhjecto praedicatur. Est alia quoque expositio hoc modo, de subjecto dicitur genus semper ad species. Ergo eorum quae sunt accidentia, alia sunt individua, alia generalia,et illa quidem quæ sunt individua, in subjecto tantum sunt, ut quodlibet porticulari corpori accidens, alia vero sunt gmeialia accidentia, quae de aliis accidentibus praedicaulur, ut de subjectis, ut est color, namque praedicatur de albedine et nigredine et caeteris.

English

It has been said that a verb signifies together for this reason: because when we say "runs," it signifies a certain action, but along with that action the present tense is brought into the very signification of the verb, and therefore he carefully says "signifies together." And this subtlety of verbs in Aristotle is admirable.

And it is always a mark of those things which are said of another, as of those which are in a subject or of a subject.

"Always," he says, a verb signifies those things which are predicated of another. What these are, although very briefly, he himself nevertheless shows. Now it is Aristotle's custom to say that those things which are accidents are in a subject. And indeed the same accidents are also predicated of a subject, for the reason that all things whatsoever that are accidents, whether denominatively or in any other way, are both predicated of a subject and are in a subject. Now therefore he says this: a verb signifies something of such a kind as is always an accident, which accident is either always in a subject or is predicated of a subject. There is also another exposition in this way: a genus is always said of a subject in relation to species. Therefore of those things which are accidents, some are individual, some are general; and those indeed which are individual are only in a subject, as any accident of a particular body, but others are general accidents, which are predicated of other accidents as of subjects, as is color, for it is predicated of whiteness and blackness and the rest.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:32 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ergo nunc omne, inquit, verwu*x' bum quiddam quod de altero prædicatur,significat. Sed hoc hujusmodi erat, quod aut particulare sit,et in subjecto tantnm, ut est,currit.Cursusenim de nullo alio praedicatur subjecto, nisi tantum in subjecto est,aut generale erit illud accidens et universale, ut de alio rursus accidente prædicetur ut de subjecto, ut sidicam movetur. Hoc enim quod dicimus movetur, de subjecto cursu praedicatur, qui currit enim movetur. Significat igitur verbum aut particulare accidens, quod est tantum in subjecto, aut universale, quod de alio accidente velut de subjecto praedicatur. Hactenus definitionem verbi distribuit. Nunc vero sicut fecit in nomine, ea quae in verbum incidere poterant, et verba non esse, a verbi ratione et propnetate disjungit.

Non currit vero, et non laborat, verbum non dico. Consignificat etenim tempus, et semper de aliquo est. Differentiæ autem huic nomen non est positum, sed fit infinitum verbum.

English

Therefore now, he says, every verb signifies something that is predicated of another. But this was of such a kind as either to be particular and only in a subject, as is "runs." For "running" is predicated of no other subject, except that it is only in a subject; or that accident will be general and universal, so that it is predicated of another accident as of a subject, as if I were to say "is moved." For this that we say, "is moved," is predicated of "running" as of a subject; for what runs is moved. The verb therefore signifies either a particular accident, which is only in a subject, or a universal one, which is predicated of another accident as of a subject. Up to this point he has distributed the definition of the verb. But now, just as he did in the case of the noun, he separates from the nature and property of the verb those things which could fall under "verb" and yet are not verbs.

But "does not run" and "does not labor" I do not call a verb. For it signifies time together, and is always of something. But a name has not been assigned to this difference, but it becomes an indefinite verb.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:33 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sicut in nomine fecit,ita quoque in verbo ad integram definitionem verbi proprietatemque contendit. Ait enim, non currit, non esse verbum. Et idcirco quod verbum omne finitum aliquid designat. Non curritautemquemadmodum infinitum sit, paulo post demonstrabitur quod neque oratio est. In hoc enim quod dicitur non currit, neque duo verba sunt,neque duo nomina, neque nomen et verbum,quae sola possunt jungere orationem.Atvero negatio non est, etenim tota imperfecta sententia est,sed neque huic,, inquit, antiquiores posuere vocabulum. Haec enim differentia quae est non currit, et non laborat,quae a verbo puro et simplici distat, nullo apud antiquiores vocabulo nuncupata est. Differentiam autem vocavit id quod dicitur non currit, et non Jaborat, ab eo quod est currit et Iaborat.Sed quoniam his nullum estnomenab antiquisimpositum,Aristoteles nomen ipse constituit dicens:Sit verbum infinitum.Alioqui maximam rJubitationem facit hujus praedicamenti similitudo, quod ipsumquidempraedicamentumvox est designativa secundum placitum,el de altero praedicatur, et consignificat tempus, idem scilicet quod verbum quod est currit. Sed hoc solo differre perspicitur, quod illud finitum verbum est, hoc infinitum.Curautem hoc infinitum est, continua ratione persequitur.

English

Just as he did in the case of the noun, so too in the case of the verb he strives toward a complete definition and the proper character of the verb. For he says that "does not run" is not a verb. And for this reason, because every verb signifies something definite. But how "does not run" is indefinite will be shown a little later, namely that it is not even a sentence. For in what is said as "does not run," there are not two verbs, nor two nouns, nor a noun and a verb, which alone can join together a sentence. But it is not a negation, for the whole is an incomplete sentence; but nor, he says, did the ancients assign a word to this. For this difference which is "does not run" and "does not labor," which differs from the pure and simple verb, was called by no word among the ancients. But he called "difference" that which is said as "does not run" and "does not labor," from that which is "runs" and "labors." But since no name was imposed on these by the ancients, Aristotle himself established the name, saying: let it be an indefinite verb. Otherwise the similarity of this predication creates the greatest doubt, because the predication itself is indeed a vocal sound significative by convention, and is predicated of another, and consignifies time—namely the same thing as the verb which is "runs." But it is seen to differ in this alone, that the former is a finite verb, the latter an indefinite one. But why this is indefinite, he pursues with continuous reasoning.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:34 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quoniam similiter in quolibet est, et quod est, et quod non est.

Infinitum,inquit, verbum est, quoniam cum de al tero semper praedicetur (non currit enim de altero dicitur), tamen aeque vel de subsistente re,vel de non subsistente praedicari potest,utin eo quod est,homo non currit, homo resestsubsistens.Ergo dicitur id, quod est non currit, de homine, id est de re subsistente. Rursus dicimus, chimaera non currit, chimaera vero non est, nec omnino subsistit.Et potest de ea vere dici, quod omnino non currit. Ergo id quod est, non currit, et de ea re quae su bsistit alque est in rebus dicitur, et de ea quae neque est, neque esse poterit, prædicatur; quare infinitum dicitur verbum. Nec solum hoc, sed illud etiam, quod cui dicit currit, rem quam quisque faciat,definite signiScat. Cum vero dicit, non currit, ipsum quidem cursum videtur auferre, sed utrum sedeat,an jaceat,an ambulet, an aliquid aliud faciat non relinquit.Quare quoniam et ea quae sunt, et ea non sunt, infinita sunt, et de his omnibus praedicatur,quoniamque id quod tollit finitum est, quod vero ponit infinitum, propter hoc, verbum vocabitur infinitum.

English

Since this holds similarly in any case, both what is and what is not.

He says that the infinite verb is so called because, although it is always predicated of something else (for "does not run" is said of something else), nevertheless it can be predicated equally of a subsisting thing or of a non-subsisting thing; as in the case of "man does not run," man is a subsisting thing. Therefore "does not run" is said of man, that is, of a subsisting thing. Again we say, "a chimera does not run," but a chimera is not, nor does it subsist at all. And it can truly be said of it that it does not run at all. Therefore "does not run" is both said of a thing that subsists and exists among things, and predicated of that which neither is nor can be; for which reason the verb is called infinite. Nor is this the only reason, but also because when someone says "runs," he signifies definitely the thing that someone does. But when he says "does not run," he indeed seems to take away the running itself, but he does not leave off whether it sits, or lies, or walks, or does something else. Therefore, since both the things that are and the things that are not are infinite, and it is predicated of all these, and since what it takes away is finite but what it posits is infinite, for this reason the verb will be called infinite.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:35 · narrative
Source · Latin

Similiter autem curret et currebat verbum non est, sed casus verbi. Differt autem a verbo quod hoc quidcm consignificat præsens tempus, illa uero quæ circa sunt.

Ut in nomine fecit cum casusanominibuadistinxit, ita quoque casus verborum nunc averborum ratione disjungit.Curret enim quod futurum est,vel curre. bat quod praeteriti retinet partem,vel cucurrit quod est integrum perfectumque præteritum, non sunt,erba,sed verborum casus, præsens enim aut futurum exspectat,aut praeteritum relinquit.Atque ideo futurum tempus ad præsens tendit, præteritum a praesenti inchoat.Unde fit ut principaliter contineat verbum id quod est præsens, ut sit verbum integrum quod praesens designat.Hæc autem quae præter pra?sens in aliqua significatione Bunt, non sunt verba, sed verborum casus.Hicquoquesicut in nomine fecit, verborum et casuum differentiam prodiLAit enim: Omne verbum praesens significat tempus.Casus verborum illud tempussignificat,quodcircaipsum præsens est,idque comp]ectitur.Complectuntur autem id quod est præsens, circa quod ipsum sunt, futurum et præteritum tempusjinter utraque enim tempara praesens locatur. Quidquid ergo vel futurum tempus, vel praeteritum significat,quæ tempora præsens complectuntur et circa sunt, non verba, sed verborum casusdicuntur.Est ergo integra definitio verbi.

English

Similarly, "will run" and "was running" are not a verb, but a case of a verb. It differs from a verb in that the latter signifies the present time, while those [cases] signify what is around it.

As he did in the case of the noun, when he distinguished cases from nouns, so too now he separates the cases of verbs from the nature of a verb. For "will run," which is future, or "was running," which retains part of the past, or "ran," which is complete and perfect past, are not verbs but cases of verbs; for the present either awaits the future or leaves behind the past. And for this reason the future time tends toward the present, and the past begins from the present. Hence it comes about that a verb principally contains what is present, so that the complete verb is what designates the present. But those which, beyond the present, are in some signification are not verbs but cases of verbs. Here too, as he did in the case of the noun, he brought out the difference between verbs and cases. For he said: Every verb signifies the present time. A case of a verb signifies that time which is around the present itself, and it embraces it. But they embrace what is present, around which they are: future and past time; for the present is placed between both times. Whatever therefore signifies either future time or past time—times which the present embraces and which are around it—is said to be not verbs but cases of verbs. The definition of a verb is therefore complete.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:36 · narrative
Source · Latin

Verbum est vox significativa secundum p)acitum cum tempore,cujus nulla pars extra significativa est separata,dcIJnitum aliquid significans, præsentis significationem tenens. Quoniam vero pars verbi nihil extra designet,ex eo manifestum est quod ne nominis quidem pars quidquam extra significat.

Ipsa itaque secundum se dicta verba, nomina suni, et significant aliquid. Constiluit enim qui dicit intellectum, el gui audit quiescil.

Subtilissimum quidem ini;reditur sensum,sed est hujusmodi:Omne,inquit,verbum per se el sinealterius conjunctione prolatum,nominis quodammodo speciem tenet, et vere nomen est. Cum enim dico, Homo currit,tunc id quod dixi currit, ad hominem referens integrum feci verbum,quoniam sine dubio semper de altero prædicatur.8in vero per se dixero currit,suum quiddam quodammodo facio ipsum currH,cum nullo alio jungens,et fit mibi nomen. Unde Graeci quoque his per se dictis verbis,aliquoties addunt articufaria praepositiva, ut est To, Tou.Si quis enim dicit, velocius est id quod est currere eo quod est ambulare,in illo nominativum junxit articulum,dicens,id quod est currerejin illo vero ablativum,dicens,eo quod est ambulare. Velut i si quis in nomine dicat. id quod est scamnum levius est eo quod est ostium, hoc quod diximus,id quod est scamnum,ad ipsum scamnum articulare praepositivumjunximus,tanquam num. Et quod rursus diximus,eo quod est ostium,ei diceremus,hor.

English

A verb is a significant utterance according to convention, with time, no part of which is significant when separated, signifying something definite, and holding the signification of the present. But since no part of a verb designates anything extra, it is clear from this that not even a part of a noun signifies anything extra.

Thus verbs themselves, spoken according to themselves, are names, and they signify something. For the one who speaks establishes understanding, and the one who hears rests.

He enters upon a most subtle sense, but it is of this sort: Every verb, he says, brought forth by itself and without conjunction with another, holds in a certain way the species of a name, and is truly a name. For when I say "Man runs," then what I said, "runs," referring it to man, I have made a complete verb, since without doubt it is always predicated of another. But if I say "runs" by itself, I in a certain way make that very "to run" something of my own, joining it to nothing else, and it becomes for me a name. Whence the Greeks too, to verbs spoken by themselves, sometimes add prepositive articles, as is "to," "tou." For if anyone says, "to run is swifter than to walk," in the former he has joined the nominative article, saying "that which is to run"; in the latter the ablative, saying "that which is to walk." Just as if someone in a name should say, "that which is a bench is lighter than that which is a door": what we said, "that which is a bench," we have joined the prepositive article to the bench itself, as if a name. And what again we said, "that which is a door," we would say to it, "this.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:37 · narrative
Source · Latin

scamtanquam si diceremus, hoc ostio. Ita quoque cum dicimus,velocius est id quod est currere eo quod est ambulare,hoc quod dicimus,id quod est currere,ita ponimus tanquam si dicamu8,hoc currerejet rursus, eoquod est ambulare,lanquam si diceremus ablativo modo,ambulare,quasi translatum ad nomen sit, dictumque sit hac ambulatione.Quare per se dicta verba nomina sunt.Et est hujus rei probatio quam ipse Aristoteles pan it. Cum enim simplex dicimus nomen,audiloris inchoat intellectus cum nostra prolatione,et dum proferimus,dicentis sequiturvocem, et tunc quiescit,cum illud nomen fuerit expletum. Cum enim dico,Hippocentaurus,ingreditur aprima syllaba audientis inteIlectus,et usque ad finem totius nominis non quiescit. Ubi vero extremam audierit syllabam, mox quid dictum sit auditor intelIigit,et ad ejus intelligentiam conquiescit.Sic ergo et in verbo, cum dicimus currere, intellectus quidem audientis per ejus syllabas qua: sunt, cur, et re, et rursus re, vadit; sed ubi extremam audierit syllabam,mox lotiusverbi capiens signidcationem intellectus quiescit. Ergo verbum per se dictum nomini simile est, et est quodammodo nomen.

English

just as if we were to say "by this door." So too, when we say that running is swifter than walking, we set down what we call "to run" just as if we were to say "this running," and again, what is "to walk" just as if we were to say in the ablative mode "by walking," as though it had been transferred to a noun and expressed as "by this walking." Wherefore verbs, spoken by themselves, are names. And the proof of this matter is what Aristotle himself sets forth. For when we utter a simple name, the hearer's understanding begins with our utterance, and while we are pronouncing it, it follows the speaker's voice, and then comes to rest when that name has been completed. For when I say "Hippocentaur," the hearer's understanding enters at the first syllable, and does not rest until the end of the whole name. But when it has heard the final syllable, the hearer immediately understands what has been said, and comes to rest in the understanding of it. So also in a verb, when we say "to run," the hearer's understanding does indeed pass through its syllables, which are "cur" and "re," and again "re"; but when it has heard the final syllable, the understanding immediately grasps the signification of the whole verb and comes to rest. Therefore a verb spoken by itself is like a name, and is in a certain way a name.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:38 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sicut enim in nomine is qui dicit,intellectum audientis ultimæ syllabae prolatione, et totius nominis perfectione constituit,et is qui audit quiescit,et ultra ejus inteMigentia non progreditur, ita quoque et verbum, si per se dicatur,audientis constituit intellectum,quod si cum alio conjuogatur,nondum tota intelligentia constituitur audientis.Ul cum dico,Socrates ambulat,in solo ambulat,quorl est verbum,oon consistit perfecta sententia, nisi in toto, quod est Socrates ambulat. Rursus cum dico, ambulare, moveri est, non in unoquoque horum verbo sententia constituta est,sed in tota oratione conquiescit, auditor. Idcirco quoniam si verbum de verbo altero subjecto prædicetur, utriusque verbi significationem jungit auditor, et non per se verbum ipsum considerat quod dicitur, sed ad allerum refert, ut ambulare moveri est,ambulationem ad motum,vel Socrates ambu]at,ambu]ationem ad Socratem.Tuncergo integrum verum, cum referturad alterllm.At si sim pliciter prædicetur, verbum nomen est,idcirco quod sicut nomen dictum, ita quoque verbum audientis constituit intellectum.

English

For just as in the case of a noun, the one who speaks establishes the understanding of the hearer by the utterance of the final syllable and the completion of the whole noun, and the one who hears comes to rest and his understanding does not proceed further, so too a verb, if it is spoken by itself, establishes the understanding of the hearer; but if it is joined with something else, the full understanding of the hearer is not yet established. For when I say "Socrates walks," the complete sentence consists not in "walks" alone, which is the verb, but in the whole, which is "Socrates walks." Again, when I say "to walk is to be moved," the sentence is not established in each of these verbs individually, but the hearer comes to rest in the whole utterance. For this reason, because if a verb is predicated of another subject verb, the hearer joins the signification of both verbs, and does not consider the verb itself by itself as what is said, but refers it to another, as "to walk is to be moved," walking to motion; or "Socrates walks," walking to Socrates. Then, therefore, it is a complete true [statement] when it is referred to another. But if it is predicated simply, the verb is a noun, for the reason that just as a noun, when spoken, so too a verb establishes the understanding of the hearer.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:39 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed si est, vel non est, nondum significat, neque enim signum est rei,esse vel non esse.

Sed quanquam nomen sit,inquit, verbum,et aliquid definite significet per se dietum,solum tamen non faciet enuntiationem,neque verum aliquid falsumve conslituet,hoc est enim quod ait:Sed si est, vel non est,nondum significat. Ad affirmationem referens quod dixit, sed siestjad negationem, quod ait, vel non est.Nihil enim horum signifieat verbi perse praedicta prolatio.Cum enim dico,currit,hoc ipsum currit significat queni aliquid,sed sesaunon est nondum signifJcat.Neque enim esse signum est rei, aut non esse. Quod tantum velet, tanquam si dicam, id quod dico currit, non significat esse ipsum cursum,aut non esse. Si enim significaret, ita diceretur: currere est, vel currere non est. Nunc autem currit non designat esse ipsam rem vel non esse.Dicitur enim solum,et est intellectus quidam, sed neque affirmationem signifJcat,neque negationem, idcirco quod neque ponit rem esse, nec eam interimit. Quod per hoe monstravit quod ait: Neque enim esse signum est rei, vel non esse,id est neque enim quodlibet verbum ita prædicatur,utsi. gnum sit rei illius de qua prædicatur,quoniam est, j vel quoniam non est.

English

But if it is or is not, it does not yet signify; for it is not a sign of the thing's being or not being.

But although, he says, the verb is a noun and signifies something definite when spoken by itself, nevertheless by itself it will not make an enunciation, nor will it establish anything true or false. For this is what he says: "But if it is or is not, it does not yet signify"—referring to affirmation what he said, "but if it is," and to negation what he said, "or is not." For none of these things does the utterance of the verb, as previously stated, signify by itself. For when I say "runs," this very word "runs" signifies something, but it does not yet signify that it is or is not. For it is not a sign of the thing's being or not being. This means only as much as if I were to say that what I say, "runs," does not signify that the running itself is or is not. For if it signified that, it would be said thus: "to run is" or "to run is not." But now "runs" does not designate that the thing itself is or is not. For it is spoken alone, and it is a certain understanding, but it signifies neither affirmation nor negation, for the reason that it neither posits the thing to be nor destroys it. He showed this through what he said: "For it is not a sign of the thing's being or not being," that is, for no verb is predicated in such a way that it is a sign of that thing of which it is predicated, that it is or that it is not.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:40 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nec si hoc ipsum,est, purum dixeris, ipsum enim nihil est, consignificat autem quamdam compositionem,quam sine compositis non est intelligere.

Est verbum,juuctum cum alio verba vel nomine, solet facere propositionem, ut, homo est, vpl, currere est.Ipsum autem est purum si dictum,inquit, fuerit,neque verum est,neque falsum,a quo omnes pene enuntiationes fiunt, quæ sunt simplices: ergo nec si hoc ipsum est purum dixeris, esse aliquid, aut non esse significat, id est aut affirmat, aut negat,idcirco quod ipsum est simpliciter dictum nihil est.Non quod omnino nihil significet,sed quod nihil veritatis habeat neque falsitatis,id est non nihil est ad significationem,sed ad veritalis falsitatisque significationem,de qua nunc tractabitur.Cur autem nihil veri falsique monstret,ostendit:est enim duobus modis dicitur,ut verum falsumque designet,aut cum unam rem quamlibetpropriacompositioneconstituit,ut cum dico: homo est, ipsum est cum bomine junctum, atque compositum esse hominem constituit,et fit exinde enuntiatio: aut rursus cum duæ res per ipsius verbi compositionem copulationemque junguntur,ut est, homo animal est.

English

Nor, if you say this very word "is" by itself, is it anything; for it signifies a certain composition, which cannot be understood without the things composed. The verb, joined with another verb or a noun, is accustomed to make a proposition, as "man is," or "to run is." But this word "is" itself, he says, if spoken by itself, is neither true nor false, from which nearly all enunciations that are simple are made. Therefore, if you say this very "is" by itself, it does not signify that something is or is not—that is, it neither affirms nor denies—for the reason that "is" itself, spoken simply, is nothing. Not that it signifies nothing at all, but that it has nothing of truth or falsity—that is, it is not nothing with respect to signification, but with respect to the signification of truth and falsity, about which we shall now treat. But why it shows nothing of true or false, he explains: for "is" is spoken in two ways, so as to designate the true and the false—either when it establishes some one thing by its own composition, as when I say "man is," where "is" joined with "man" and composed establishes that a man is, and from this an enunciation is made; or again when two things are joined by the composition and copulation of the verb itself, as "man is an animal.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:41 · narrative
Source · Latin

Homo namque etanimal copulantur junguntur perid quod dicitur,homo animal est.Ergosiomnisverifalsique in enuntiatione significatio,ejus quod dicitur est,io compositione est,cum aut sua compositione aliquid esse constituit,aut duas res copulat atque componit,vis ejus quae in enuntiationibus propositionibusque monstratur,in veri falsique scilicet designatione,praeter ipsas compositiones,in quibus hoc solet efficere,nulla est;atque hoc est quod ait: Consignificatautem quam dam compositionem,quam sinecompositis non est intelligere.Cum enim dico est, nihil significavi quid sit,aut non sit.Quod si faciam enuntiationem,componam necesse est,ut,homo est, aut,homo animal est.Quare si omnis ejus vis in veri falsique enuntiatione ad compositionem refertur, cum praeter compositionem dicitur,quod in compositione designare potest, irl præter compositionem non designat, potest autcm comi ositione facta verum falsumque in enuntiatione monstrare.Hrr igitur sine compositis in verbo est, nullus valet advertere.Recte igiturdictum est consignificare quamdam compositionem, quæ sine compositis intelligi non valeret.

English

For "man" and "animal" are coupled and joined by what is said, "man is an animal." Therefore, if all the signification of truth and falsity in an enunciation belongs to what is said—that is, "is"—it belongs to composition, since either by its own composition it establishes that something is, or it couples and composes two things. The force of it that is shown in enunciations and propositions—namely, in the designation of true and false—apart from the compositions themselves, in which it is accustomed to effect this, is none; and this is what he says: "But it signifies a certain composition, which cannot be understood without the things composed." For when I say "is," I have signified nothing as to what is or is not. But if I make an enunciation, I must compose, as "man is," or "man is an animal." Wherefore, if all its force in the enunciation of true and false is referred to composition, when it is said apart from composition, it does not designate what it can designate in composition; but when composition has been made, it can show true and false in the enunciation. This, therefore, which is in the verb "is" without things composed, no one can attend to. Rightly, therefore, it was said that it signifies a certain composition, which could not be understood without the things composed.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:42 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE ORATIONE.

Oralio autem est vox significativa, cujus partium aliquid significativum est separatum,ut dictio,non ut affirmatio, vel negatio.

Omne quod compositum esl, eorum suscipit naturam ex quibus totum compositi ipsius corpus efficitur. Quare quoniam oratio verbis constat atque nominibus, quae significativa sunt, recte quoque oratio significativa esse definitur.Sed distat oratio ab his ex quibus ipsa effecta est, id est nominibus atque verbis, quod eorum partes nihil extra designant, orationis vera pars aliquid separata significa!. Nam si nomen et verbum partes orationis sunt,ha?c autem per se significant,non est dubium separatas orationis partes significare. Quid autem designent, sequenti determinatione monstrabit.

English

ON SPEECH.

But speech is a significant utterance, of which some part is significant when separated, as a word, but not as an affirmation or a negation.

Everything that is composite receives the nature of those things from which the whole body of the composite itself is made. Wherefore, since speech consists of verbs and nouns, which are significant, speech is rightly also defined as significant. But speech differs from those things from which it is itself made—that is, from nouns and verbs—in that their parts designate nothing apart from the whole, whereas a part of speech, when separated, does signify something. For if noun and verb are parts of speech, and these signify by themselves, there is no doubt that the separated parts of speech signify. What they designate, however, the following determination will show.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:43 · narrative
Source · Latin

Significant igitur partes orationum,ut dictio semper, non ut affirmatio semper vel negatio.Nunc autem dictionem dicit simplicem verbi aut nominis nuncupationem: sunt enim quaedam orationes, quarum partes ita significant quasi atfirmatio,ut in ea oratione quae est, si dies est,lux est, id quod dicimus lux est,totius orationis pars est,et ita est significativa ut quædam affirmatio.Sed non omnis oratioaffirmationem habet in parte,heec enim ipsa quae dicit lux est, habet in partibus id quod dicimus lux, et rursus id quod dicimus est,sed neutra ipsarum affirmatio est,sed tantum simplex dictio.Omnis ergo oratio dictionem quidem habet in parte, non vero omnis oratio affirmationem.Recte igitur dictum est partes orationis significare,ut dictionem,non ut affirmationem. Quid autem sit dictio,ipse paulo post clarius demonstrabit.

Dico autem, ut homo, significat enim aliquid, sed non quoniam est, aut non est, sed erit affirmatio vel negatio si aliquid addatur. Sed non una hominis syllaba.

English

Significant, therefore, are the parts of speech—always as a word, but not always as an affirmation or a negation. Now he calls a "word" the simple utterance of a verb or a noun; for there are certain speeches whose parts are significant in the manner of an affirmation, as in the speech "if it is day, there is light": the thing we call "there is light" is a part of the whole speech, and it is significant in such a way as a kind of affirmation. But not every speech has an affirmation in its part; for this very speech which says "there is light" has in its parts the thing we call "light," and again the thing we call "is," but neither of these is an affirmation, only a simple word. Every speech, therefore, has a word in its part, but not every speech has an affirmation. Rightly, then, it was said that the parts of speech are significant as a word, not as an affirmation. But what a word is, he himself will show more clearly a little later.

I say, for example, "man" signifies something, but not that it is or is not; but it will be an affirmation or a negation if something is added. But not one syllable of "man.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:44 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod supra posuit dicens, orationis partes ut dictionem significare, non ut affirmationem, boc convenienti monstravit exemplo: Homo, inquit dictio est, et est pars orationis, si in tota oratione ponatur, ut est, homo animal est. Ergo id quod dicimus homo, dictio quaedam est, sed affirmatio non est. Cum ergo nomen hoc, id est homo, pars orationis sit, et affirmatio non sil, docet verum esse quod dicitur, orationis partes significare, ut dictionem, non ut affirmationem. Docet autem illa res nomen hoc affirmationem non esse,quod in affirmatione semper veritas aut falsitas invenitur,nomen vero simpliciter dictum, neque verum neque falsum est. Quare nomen boc, id est homo,ut affirmatio non significat,sed designat aliquid simplex, significat igitur aliquid,ut dictio.Hsec autem dictio si ei addatur aliquid, ut verbum est, aut quodlibet verbum aliud quod enuntiationem possit efficere, erit affirmatio. Si enim quis dicat, homo est,vel bomo vivit, fit affirmatio, atque hoc est quod ait, sed erit affirmatio, vel negatio.si quid addatur.Si enim aliquid ita apponatur vel appositum ita nege. tur,ut enuntiatio constitui possit, affirmatio negatione perficitur. Si quis enim dicat, homo vivit, affirmatio est;bomo non vivit, negatio. Docet autem dictionem esse vocem secundum posilionem per ce significantem per hoc quod ait,sed non una hominis syllaba.

English

What he set down above when he said that the parts of speech signify as a word, not as an affirmation, he showed by a fitting example: "Man," he says, is a word and is a part of speech, if it is placed in a whole speech, as in "man is an animal." Therefore that which we call "man" is a certain word, but it is not an affirmation. Since, then, this noun, that is "man," is a part of speech and is not an affirmation, he teaches that what is said is true—that the parts of speech signify as a word, not as an affirmation. But the fact that this noun is not an affirmation he teaches by this: that in an affirmation truth or falsity is always found, whereas a noun simply uttered is neither true nor false. Wherefore this noun, that is "man," does not signify as an affirmation, but designates something simple; it signifies something, therefore, as a word. But if something is added to this word, as the verb "is," or any other verb that can make an enunciation, there will be an affirmation. For if someone says "man is" or "man lives," an affirmation is made, and this is what he says: "but it will be an affirmation or a negation if something is added." For if something is so added, or, having been added, is so denied, that an enunciation can be constituted, the affirmation is completed by the negation. For if someone says "man lives," it is an affirmation; "man does not live," a negation. But that a word is a utterance significant by convention he teaches by this: that he says "but not one syllable of man.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:45 · narrative
Source · Latin

Una enim hominis syllaba dictio non est, idcirco quod nihil per se separata significat,ut ho, et mo,et in caeteris, ut supra ostendimus. Omnis enim hujusmodi pars quae per se nihil significat, non est dictio,sed tantum in toto nomine quiddam positum designat et consignificat, ut in eo quod ipse ponit exemplo: Neque enim in eo quod est sorex, rex, significat,, sed vox nunc esE sola. In duplicibus vern significat quidem aliquid, sed non secundum se,quemadmodum dictum est.

In eo, inquit,quod est sorex,rex videtur quidem aliquid significare;sed cum toto nomine consignificat potius quam quidquam per seipsum designet quemadmodum supra jam dictum est.Docuit enim supra partes nominis nihil omnino significare separatas.Quod ergo dicit, sed non secul'dum se,id est in eo quod est sorex,rex per se nihil significat,sed tantum quiddam consignificat, quod cum tota nominis compositione designat, cum et so syllaba et rex juncta in unum, id quod est sorex,in tota syllabarum conjunctione designet.

English

For a single syllable of "homo" is not a word, for the reason that by itself, separated, it signifies nothing—as "ho" and "mo" and the rest, as we showed above. For every part of this kind that by itself signifies nothing is not a word, but only designates and consignifies something placed in the whole name, as in the example he himself gives. For in the word "sorex," "rex" does not signify, but is now only a sound. In compound words it does signify something, but not in accordance with itself, as has been said.

In the word, he says, "sorex," "rex" seems indeed to signify something, but it consignifies with the whole name rather than designating anything by itself, as has already been said above. For he taught above that the parts of a name signify nothing at all when separated. What he therefore says—"but not in accordance with itself"—means that in the word "sorex," "rex" by itself signifies nothing, but only consignifies something, which it designates together with the whole composition of the name, since both the syllable "so" and "rex," joined into one, designate that which is "sorex" in the whole conjunction of syllables.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:46 · narrative
Source · Latin

Est autem oratia omnis quidem significativa, non sicut instrumentum, sed quemadmodum dictum est, secundum placitum.

Plato nomina naturalia esse constituit, et hoc hinc probare contendit quod quaedam supellex,et quodammodo instrumentum sit,invicem sensa prodendi. Naturalium vero su pellectiles sunt naturales, ut oculi instrumenta quidem sunt videndi,qui visus res naturalis est. Quare oculos quoque naturales esse necesse est,ita etiam oratorio rerum naturalium supellexest,atque instrumentum,id est sententiarum. Quare ipsa quoque oratio est naturalis.Aristoteles autem dicit, non secundum naturam esse orationem,sed secundum placitum. Quocirca nec orationem esse suppellectilem naturalem. Quod enim dicit, non sicut instrumentum,non dicit non perhoc instrumentum sensa proferri,sed tantum rem esse orationem secundum positionem,per quas proprias sententias demonstremus. Cujus enim rei partes ad placitum sunt,ipsa quoque ad placitum est. Sed orationis partes nomen et verbum sunt,hæc autem sunt ad placitum,non natura.Oratio igitur ipsa secundum placitum positionemqueest,sed non est naturaliter constituta. Est autem integra definiUo orationis: haec:Oratio est vox siguificativa secundum placitum, cujus partes aliquid extra significant.

English

Every oratio is indeed significative, not as an instrument, but, as has been said, according to convention.

Plato established that names are natural, and he strives to prove this from the fact that there is a certain equipment, and in a way an instrument, for mutually producing sensa. But the instruments of natural things are natural, as the eyes are indeed instruments of seeing, which sight is a natural thing. Wherefore the eyes too must be natural; so also the equipment of oratory is of natural things, and an instrument, that is, of thoughts. Wherefore oratio itself is also natural. Aristotle, however, says that oratio is not according to nature, but according to convention. Wherefore neither is oratio a natural piece of equipment. For what he says, "not as an instrument," he does not say that sensa are not produced through this instrument, but only that oratio is a thing according to position, through which we demonstrate our own thoughts. For of whatever thing the parts are according to convention, that thing itself is also according to convention. But the parts of oratio are the noun and the verb, and these are according to convention, not by nature. Oratio itself, therefore, is according to convention and position, but is not constituted naturally. But the complete definition of oratio is this: Oratio is a significative utterance according to convention, whose parts signify something extra.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:47 · narrative
Source · Latin

Enuntiativa vero non omnis, sed illa iia qua verum vel falsum est, non autem omnibus inest, ut deprecatio, oratio quidem est, sed neque vera, neque falsa.

Orationis (ut supra jamdiximus)multæ sunt species: est enim oratio prima optativa,ut.Utinam tibi istam mentem dii immortales dent!Secunda, vocativa, ut Heus tu. Tertia, imperativa,ut Cape,da hoc, Portio. QuartR, deprecativa, ut,Jupiter omnipotens: precibus si flecteris ullis.Quinta,enuntiativa,ut dies est, dies non est. Sed in hac sola specie orationis veritas et falsitas inest,in illis vero cæteris minime Volens autem Aristoteles ostendere multas esse orationes,et non omnem orationem esse enuntiativam, hoc addidit: Deprecatio oratio quidem est,sed neque vera neque falsa Etenim deprecatio in orationis speciebus ponitur, sed nulla in ea veritatis natura falsitatisque cognoscitur.

English

But not every oratio is enuntiative, but only that in which truth or falsehood is present; and this is not present in all, as a prayer is indeed an oratio, but is neither true nor false.

There are many species of oratio, as we have already said above: for the first oratio is optative, as, Would that the immortal gods grant you that mind! The second is vocative, as, Ho there, you! The third is imperative, as, Take this, give this, Portius. The fourth is deprecative, as, Almighty Jupiter: if you are moved by any prayers. The fifth is enuntiative, as, It is day, it is not day. But in this species of oratio alone are truth and falsehood present, while in the other kinds they are by no means present. But Aristotle, wishing to show that there are many orationes and that not every oratio is enuntiative, added this: a prayer is indeed an oratio, but is neither true nor false. For a prayer is placed among the species of oratio, but no nature of truth or falsehood is recognized in it.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:48 · narrative
Source · Latin

Cateræ igitur relinquantur.Rhetoricæ enim vel poeticæ convenientior est consideratio.Enuntiativa vero, præsentis est speculalionis.

Deprecativam, inquit,et optativHm,et vocativam, et imperativam, poetis atque oratoribus relicquamus.lIlis enim vel ad immittendos vel ad movendos affectus cæteræ orationis species assumantur. Nos vero philosophi,quibus veritatis falsitatisque discretio est curæ, de ilia sola oratione tractamus in qua utrumlibet horum possit agnosci. In enuntiatione vero aut veritas inest aut falsitas,quocirca nos quoque de enuntiatione tractemus.

Est aulem una prima oratio enuniiaiiva,affirmatio, deinde negatio; alix varo omnes conjunctione unæ.

Enuntiativarum orationum aliae sunt per se unae, ut est,homo animal est;aliæ conjunctione unae, ut est, si bomo est,animal est.Homo est enim et anmaest,duæ sunt,sed ata conjunctione quæest si,una redditur.Earum autem quæ unae per se sunt prima est affirmatio,secunda negatio.Hoc enim toilit negatio quod affirmatio ante constituit, et hoc negatio dividit quod illaconjunxit.Enuntiativarum igitur orationum earum quae sunt per se unæ,primaest affirmatio, deinde negatio. Aliae vero sunt non per se unae, sed cum plures sint naturaliter, unæ fiunt conjunctione.

English

Let the rest, then, be set aside. For the consideration of them belongs more fittingly to rhetoric or poetry. But the enuntiative [statement-making] kind belongs to the present inquiry.

The deprecative, he says, and the optative, and the vocative, and the imperative, let us leave to the poets and orators. For the other species of oratio are assumed by them either for stirring up or for moving the affections. But we philosophers, whose care is the discernment of truth and falsehood, treat of that oratio alone in which either of these can be recognized. In enuntiation, indeed, there is present either truth or falsehood; wherefore let us also treat of enuntiation.

Now there is one first enuntiative oratio, affirmation, and then negation; but all the others are one by conjunction.

Of enuntiative orationes, some are one by themselves, as "man is an animal"; others are one by conjunction, as "if man is, animal is." For "man is" and "animal is" are two, but by the conjunction "if" they are rendered one. Of those, however, which are one by themselves, the first is affirmation, the second negation. For negation takes away what affirmation has first established, and negation divides what the other has joined together. Of enuntiative orationes, therefore, those which are one by themselves—the first is affirmation, then negation. But the others are not one by themselves, but though they are naturally several, they become one by conjunction.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:49 · narrative
Source · Latin

Necesse est autemomnem orationem enuntiativam ex verbo esse,vel caru verbi.Etenim hominis ratio,si non est, aut erit, aut fuit,aut aliquid huiusmodi addatur, nondum est oralio enuntiativa.

Aristotelis in Graeco textus non habet ita ut os supra posuimus, seocmodo:Etenim hominissi non aut est,aut erit,aut fuit, et cætera. untegendum relinquente philosopho,quod de ratione diceret,id estde diffinitione quam,Græci dicunt. Sed cum suprade oratione tractasset,quæ apud illos similiter vocatur, dum de hominis ratione,id est definitione velletdicere,quoniam non significat verum vel falsum,nisi ei aut est, aut erit, aut fuit, addatur, communione vocabuli usus, ad de quo superius tractabat, retulit, ut non orationem intelligeremus,sed potius rationem.De qua rcnunc illis satisfacimus qui Graecae orationis pertiri nos forte culpabunt,cur quod illic non fuit,nostræ traDsIation: adjecerimus. Nos enim ad faciliorem inteHectum Latinæ orationi famutantesboc apposuimus, quia de oratione loquentibus intellectus ad rationem, nisi idesset adjectum, transferri non poterat. Totum vero quod dicit tale est:en untiativæ orationes si sunt simplices,has verba constituunt. Ex duobus enim nominibus solis enunLiatio non fit,ex nomine autem et verbo iit, ut est, homo vivit.Fit quoque ex solis verbis ut est,arnbulare moveri est.Fit etiam excasu verbi, ut Socrates fuit, vel etiam,dies erit.

English

But every enuntiative [statement-making] utterance must necessarily consist of a verb, or be without a verb. For the reason [definition] of man, if "is not," or "will be," or "was," or something of this sort is not added, is not yet an enuntiative utterance.

The Greek text of Aristotle does not have it as we have set it out above, but rather in this way: "For of man, if he neither is, nor will be, nor was," and so on—the philosopher leaving to be understood what he was saying about reason, that is, about the definition which the Greeks call [logos]. But since he had treated above of utterance, which among them is called by a similar name, when he wished to speak about the reason of man, that is, the definition—since it does not signify the true or the false unless "is," or "will be," or "was" is added to it—using the community of the word, he referred it to that which he was treating of above, so that we would understand not utterance, but rather reason. Concerning which we now satisfy those who will perhaps blame us for having rendered the Greek utterance, [asking] why we have added to our translation what was not there. For we, serving the easier understanding of the Latin utterance, have appended this, because for those speaking about utterance the understanding could not be transferred to reason unless this had been added. But the whole of what he says is such: enuntiative utterances, if they are simple, verbs constitute them. For an enuntiation is not made from two names alone, but it comes to be from a name and a verb, as "man lives." It is also made from verbs alone, as "to walk is to be moved." It is also made with a verb in the past, as "Socrates was," or also "the day will be.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:50 · narrative
Source · Latin

Erit enim et fuit verbicasussunt.Quocircaenuntiativam orationem simplicem sola maxime verba constituunt.Eorumque ponit exemplum,in quo cumplura sint nomina, nisi addito tamen verbo in enuntiationis proprietatem et significantiam non venit, utest definitio hominis.(Ratio enim hominis est speciei detinitio.y Cui si non aut est, aut non est,aul aliquid hujusmodi addatur,enuntiatio esse non poterit.Nam si quis dicat, Animal rationale mortale,nulla in eo adhuc falsitas autveritas intelligitur. Si vero addatur est, utsit,Animal rationale mortale est, enuntiatio sine ulla dubitatione perficitur. Solum igitur verbum enuntiativam simplicem continet orationem.

Quare autem utum quiddam est et nonmulta,animal gressibile bipes,neque enim eo quod propinque dtcuntur, unum erit.Est autem nUerius hoc traclare ne. otii.

Cum de simplicibus atque unis orationibus loqueretur,definitionem hominis interposuit,de qua nunc hoc dicit. Ita quidem interposita est definitiohominis tanquam si una esset oratio.Cur autem una sit oratio nunc, inquit, dicere intermittemus. Neque enim idcirco una esseputanda est, quia continue dicituretsibimet propinque,animal gressibile bipes.

English

For "will be" and "was" are verbal expressions. Therefore it is chiefly verbs alone that constitute a simple enuntiative utterance. And he gives an example of this, in which there are several names, yet without an added verb it does not come into the property and significance of an enuntiation, as is the definition of man. For the reason of man is the definition of the species. But if "is" or "is not," or something of this sort, is not added to it, it cannot be an enuntiation. For if someone says "rational mortal animal," no falsity or truth is yet understood in it. But if "is" is added, so that it is "rational mortal animal is," the enuntiation is completed without any doubt. Therefore the verb alone contains a simple enuntiative utterance.

But why "two-footed walking animal" is something one and not many — for it will not be one because they are spoken closely together — it is more truly a matter of leisure to treat this.

When he was speaking of simple and one utterances, he interposed the definition of man, about which he now says this. The definition of man was indeed interposed as if it were one utterance. But why it is one utterance, he says, we shall now omit to say. For it is not to be thought one for the reason that "two-footed walking animal" is said continuously and closely together with itself.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:51 · narrative
Source · Latin

Posset enim videri horum continua,et sub una prolatione dicta, unam facere enuntiationem; sed hoc Aristoteles negat.Nam non idcirco una oratio est quia propinque et continue dicitur.Cur autem una ait, alterius est hoc tractare negotii,et de eodisputat in his libris quos Metapbysica inscripsit, quod est primi opus philosophi. Nobis autem hoc in ee. ohnda editione monstrandum est.

Est autem una oratio enuntiativa vel quæ unum significat, vel conjunctione utta. Plures autem, qua: pluar, et non unum, vel anconjunetæ.

Duplicem modum unarum multarumque orationum esse denuntiat.Estnamqueunaoralio vel cum unam rem significat,vel cum conjunctione una est,ut est ea quæ dicit, animal ralionale morlale homo est: hancenim hujus orationis sententiam nullus in multas significationes diducere poterit,sed unum quoddam significat,et est præter conjunctionem.Alia vero oratio est una,quæ per conjunclionem una est,ut,Si dies est, lux esl.Est ergo una oratio quæ vel unam rem significat,vel conjunctione jungitur.Plures autem sunt quae plura signifJcant,ut est,canis movetur. Hanc enim potest et adla trabilem et ad marinum et ad cælestem auditor advertere,atque ideo quoniam multa significat,non est unaoratio,sed plures.Sunt quoque orationes per se plures et numero et significalione,quæ nullaconjunctionecopulanlur,utsi quis dicat.sot est.pax erit.nox est coelum volvitur.

English

For it could seem that these, being continuous and spoken in one utterance, make one enuntiation; but Aristotle denies this. For it is not for this reason one utterance because it is spoken closely and continuously. But why he says it is one belongs to another business, and he disputes about this in those books which he inscribed Metaphysics, which is the work of the first philosopher. But we must show this in this edition.

But an enuntiative utterance is one either which signifies one thing, or which is united by conjunction. But there are several, which signify several things and not one, or which are without conjunction.

He declares that there is a twofold mode of one and of many utterances. For an utterance is one either when it signifies one thing, or when it is one by conjunction, as is that which says, "man is a mortal rational animal"; for no one can draw out the sense of this utterance into many significations, but it signifies some one thing, and it is without conjunction. But another utterance is one which is one through conjunction, as, "If it is day, it is light." Therefore an utterance is one which either signifies one thing, or is joined by conjunction. But there are several which signify several things, as is, "a dog is moved." For the hearer can turn this both to the hunting dog and to the sea dog and to the celestial dog, and therefore, because it signifies many things, it is not one utterance, but several. There are also utterances several in themselves both in number and in signification, which are joined by no conjunction, as if someone should say, "the sun is," "peace will be," "night is," "the heaven is turned.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:52 · narrative
Source · Latin

Hæc enim cum plura significent,nulla tamen conjunctione junguntur,atque ideo plures orationes vocantur.In summa igiturorationum unarum,aliæsunt significatione unæ,aliæ conjunctione;non unarum veroorationum aliæ sunt significatione plures,aliæ eo quo niam nulla conjunctione copulantur.

Nomen ergo et verbum dictio sit sola,quoniam non dicere, sic aliquid significantem voce enuntiare, vel aliquo interrogante, vel non, sed ipso proferente.

Per hanc sententiam simplex diclio quid sit expo nit,Dicitenim verbum nomenque dictiones viderisolum,non etiam affirmationes, atque hujus sententiæ causam subnectit. Idcirco enim verba et nomine dictiones solum Bunt, quoniam cum dicta fuerint simplicia, sive aliquo proferente, id est sponte cente, sive ad alterius interrogationem aliquo respondente,neque verum ex his neque falsum valet intelligi. Si quis enim per se dicat: Socrates, vel rursus per se solum simplexque, ambulat, neque verum efficit, neque falsum. Si vero alio interrogante,Socratesne ambulat? ille reepondeat,Ambulat,si huic ipsi verbo per se quisquam velit advertere quod dixit ambulat, enuntiatio nulla eat,quod et cum superiore interrogatione conjungat,tunc ex interrogationisetresponsionis conjunctione nascitur enuntiatio.Solum autem nomen vel verbum neque dicente aliquo, et sponte proferente, nec respondente, potest quisquam dicere, quoniam enuntiatio facta est.

English

For these things, since they signify many things, are nevertheless joined by no conjunction, and for that reason are called several utterances. In sum, then, of unitary utterances, some are one by signification, others by conjunction; and of non-unitary utterances, some are many by signification, others because they are connected by no conjunction.

Therefore a noun and a verb are an expression alone, since it is not to say—by uttering with the voice something that signifies—either when someone asks or when not, but when the speaker himself brings it forth.

Through this sentence he explains what a simple expression is. For he says that a verb and a noun seem to be expressions alone, not also affirmations, and he adds the cause of this sentence. For verbs and nouns are expressions alone for this reason: when simple things have been said, whether by someone speaking, that is, of his own accord, or by someone responding to another's question, neither true nor false can be understood from them. For if someone says by itself: Socrates, or again by itself and alone, the simple word, walks, he makes neither true nor false. But if, when another asks, Does Socrates walk? he answers, He walks—if anyone wishes to attend to this very verb by itself, what he said, walks, is no enuntiation; but when he joins it with the preceding question, then from the conjunction of question and answer an enuntiation is born. But a noun or verb alone, with no one speaking and of his own accord bringing it forth, nor responding, no one can say, because an enuntiation has been made.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:53 · narrative
Source · Latin

Et sensus quidem hujusmodi est. Ordo autem verborum talis est. Nomen ergo et verbum dictio sit sola, quoniam sic aliquid significantem voce, id est nomen aut verbum simpliciter proferentem,non est dicereenuntiare.Nonenim possumus dicere quod aliquid enuntietis "qui simplex nomen aut simplex protulitverbum,sive aliointerrogante, sive non interrogante, sed ipso sponte proferente.

Harum autem, hæc quidem simplex est enunlialio, ut aliquid de aliquo,vel aliquid,ab aliquo.Hæc autem ex his conjuncta,velut oratio quædam jam composita.

Nunc quid oratio sitsimplex compositaque declarat. Est enim simplex oratio quæ duobus terminis constat. Tertimi autem sunt nomina et verba, quae in simplici propositione prædicamus,ut in eo quod est, Socrates disputat,Socrates et disputat termini sunt.et qui minor terminus in enuntiatione proponitur,ut Socrates,subjectus dicitur,et ponitur prior; qui vero major, prædicatur,et locatur posterior,ut disputat. Quaecunque propositio ex uno subjecto et uno prædicato facta est,illa simplex enuntiatio nuncupatur, atque hoc est quod ait. Harum autem,id est enuntiativarum, simplex est enuntiatio, ut aliquid de aliquo, ut unum praedicatum quod est aliquid de uno subjecto quodestdealiquo prapdicetur.

English

And the sense of this is as follows. The order of the words, however, is such. Therefore let a name and a verb be a single expression, since it is not possible to say that one who signifies something by voice in this way—that is, one who simply utters a name or a verb—makes an enunciation. For we cannot say that he enunciates something who has uttered a simple name or a simple verb, whether another is asking or not asking, but he himself is speaking of his own accord.

Of these, however, one is a simple enunciation, as when something is said of something, or something from something. Another is joined from these, as it were a certain already composite speech.

Now he declares what a simple and composite speech is. For a simple speech is one that consists of two terms. The terms, however, are names and verbs, which we predicate in a simple proposition, as in that which is "Socrates disputes," "Socrates" and "disputes" are the terms. And the lesser term that is set forth in the enunciation, as "Socrates," is called the subject and is placed first; but the greater, which is predicated, is placed afterward, as "disputes." Whatever proposition is made from one subject and one predicate, that is called a simple enunciation, and this is what he says: "Of these," that is, of enunciations, "the simple enunciation is, as when something is said of something," that is, one predicate which is something is predicated of one subject which is something.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:54 · narrative
Source · Latin

Hoc autem pertinet ad affirmationem,ut aliquid de aliquo prædices. Ad negationem vero, ut unum aliquid ab uno aliquo praedicando disjungas, ut in eo quod est,;Socrates non disputat, disputare unum terminum,a non Socrate alio termino,prædicando disjunxi.Aliæ vero suntoratione;; enuntiativae, quae compositæ nominantur,quæ ex simplicibus orationibus componuntur, ut est, sesest,lux es; dies est et lux est,duæ sunt simplices enuntiativae orationes, idcirco quod binis terminis constant, ex duabus autem simplicibus orationibus tota haec oratio est,quæ dicit,si dies est,lux est;hoc est enim quod ait.Hæc autem ex his conjuncla,id est ex simplicibus orationibus enuutiativis, velut oratio quaedam jam composita, quippe cujus totum corpus ex his jungitur, quas simplices esse jam supra docui.

Estautem simplexenuntiatio,vox signicativa de eo quod est aliquid,vel non est, quemadmodum tempora divisa sunt.

English

This pertains to affirmation, so that you predicate something of something. To negation, however, so that you separate one thing from one thing by predicating, as in the statement "Socrates does not dispute": I have separated "to dispute" as one term from "Socrates" as another term by predicating. But there are other enunciative expressions of speech, which are called composite, which are composed from simple expressions, as in "light is; day is" and "light is and day is"—these are two simple enunciative expressions, for the reason that they consist of two terms; but the whole expression that says "if day is, light is" is from two simple expressions. For this is what he means. But these things joined from these, that is, from simple enunciative expressions, are as it were already a certain composite expression, since its whole body is joined from those which I have already shown above to be simple.

But a simple enunciation is a significative utterance concerning whether something is or is not, as the times are divided.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:55 · narrative
Source · Latin

Postquam de compositis orationibus simplicibusquetractavit,diffioitionem en untiationis per affirmationem et negationem ingreditur;ait enim:Enuntiatio est vox signidcans affirmationem vel negationem, vel in præteritum,vel in præsens, vel in futurum tempus.Quod enim dixit,de eo quod esl,ad affirmationem retulit; quod addit,vel non est,ad negationem; quod vero secutus est,quemadmodum tempora divisa sunt,ad singulorum,temporum retuMtrationem; sive enim aliquis dicat: Socrates vivit,Socrates non vivit,sive Socrates vixil,Socrates non vixil,vel sic: Socrates victurus est,Socrates victurus non est,quoniam affirmatio est aut negatio,et quoniam quaelibet ipsarum in aliquo temporum est,quæ dividuntur in futurum, praesens ac præteritum, plenam retinet simplicis enuntiationis naturam.

Affirmatio vero est enuntiatio alicujus de aliquo Ne. gatio vero enuntiatio aticuius ab alifjuo.

English

After he has treated of composite and simple expressions, he enters upon the definition of a statement through affirmation and negation; for he says: A statement is a spoken sound signifying an affirmation or a negation, either in past, or in present, or in future time. For what he said, "concerning what is," he referred to affirmation; what he added, "or is not," to negation; but what followed, "in whatever way the times are divided," to the reckoning of each of the times; for whether someone says "Socrates lives," "Socrates does not live," or "Socrates lived," "Socrates did not live," or thus: "Socrates will live," "Socrates will not live," since it is either an affirmation or a negation, and since any one of them is in some one of the times, which are divided into future, present, and past, it retains the full nature of a simple statement.

An affirmation, however, is a statement of something concerning something. A negation, however, is a statement of something apart from something.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:56 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ad affirmationis et negationis determinationem enuntiationis nomen sumpsit,ut generis; est autem affirmatio quoties aliqnid de aliquo eum eo quod est esse prædicamus,utcum dicimus,Homo animal est, animal de homine prædicamus; quoties autem aliquid ab aliquo prædicando disjungimus,nrgaLio est, ut homo lapis non est,lapidem enim ab bomine disjungimus. Quare recta affirmationis et negationis facta est diff'initio.

DE SUBJECTIS ET PRÆDICATIS ENUNTIATIONUM.

Quoniam autem ext enuntiare,et quod est,non esse: et qnod non est, esse:: et quod est,esse: et quod non est,non esse; et circa ea quæ sunt extra præsens tempora, similiter omne conlingit quod quis affirmaverit, negare,et quod quis negaverit. affirmare; quare manifestum est quoniam omni affirmationi est negatio opposita,et omni negationi affirmatio.Et sit hoc cont, adic/is et negalio oppositæ.

English

He took the name of statement as a genus for the determination of affirmation and negation. Now there is an affirmation whenever we predicate something of something together with the fact that it is, as when we say, Man is an animal, we predicate animal of man; but whenever by predicating we separate something from something, it is a negation, as, Man is not a stone, for we separate stone from man. Wherefore the definition of affirmation and negation has been correctly made.

ON THE SUBJECTS AND PREDICATES OF STATEMENTS.

Since it is possible to enunciate both that what is, is not, and that what is not, is, and that what is, is, and that what is not, is not, and likewise concerning things outside the present time, it comes about in every case that whatever someone has affirmed he may deny, and whatever someone has denied he may affirm; wherefore it is evident that every affirmation has a negation opposed to it, and every negation an affirmation. And let this be laid down, that affirmation and negation are opposites.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:57 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nunc dividit enunliationes,ve] quæ de his possunt fieri rebus,quæ sunt,vel quae de iis quae non sunt, sive in affirmatione, sive in negatione. Dicit enim quoniam est enuntiare quod est non esse,ut si quis dicat, Nullus homo animal est.Hoc enim quod est, non esse proposuit. Hæc est falsa negatio.Et quod non est esse,ut si quis dicat,Omnis lapis animal est, quod enim non est esse constituit, et bæc eat falsa affirmatio. Et quod est esse, ut si quis dicat,Omnis homo animal est.Quod enim est, esse confirmal,et hæc est affirmatio vera. Et quod non est, non esse, ut si quis dicat,NuIlus lapis animal est.Quod enim non eat,non esse proposuit,et haec est vera negatio. Et non solum hoc in præsenti tempore,sed circaea quoque quae praeter praesens sunt tempora.Hocautem tantum valet ac si diceret, hoc non modo in praesenti tempore ita enuntiari potest, ut sit vera falsaque negatio,et rursus vera falsaque affirmatio, aed etiam in præteritum et futurum,quæ extra præsens tempora sUDt.Similiter etenim omne contingit quod affirmatur negare, et quod negatur ab alio, alium rursus affil'mare.Quod si omni veritali falsitas opponitur,omni etiam falsilati veritas;est autem et affirmationis et negationis falsa proferre,constat quod omni negationi affirmatio,etomni affirmationi negatio opponitur.

English

Now he divides statements, namely those that can be made about things that are, or about those that are not, whether in affirmation or in negation. For he says that it is possible to state that what is, is not, as if someone should say, No man is an animal. For he has proposed that what is, is not. This is a false negation. And that what is not, is, as if someone should say, Every stone is an animal; for he has established that what is not, is, and this is a false affirmation. And that what is, is, as if someone should say, Every man is an animal. For he confirms that what is, is, and this is a true affirmation. And that what is not, is not, as if someone should say, No stone is an animal. For he has proposed that what is not, is not, and this is a true negation. And this applies not only in the present time, but also in regard to those times that are beyond the present. Now this is as much as to say: this can be stated not only in the present time, so that there is a true and false negation, and again a true and false affirmation, but also with respect to the past and the future, which are outside the present times. For in like manner it happens that whatever is affirmed can be denied, and what is denied by one person, another in turn can affirm. But if falsity is opposed to every truth, then truth is also opposed to every falsity; and since it is possible to utter both a false affirmation and a false negation, it is evident that to every negation an affirmation is opposed, and to every affirmation a negation.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:58 · narrative
Source · Latin

Hinc ergo quid sit quod dicitur contradictio,declaratur.Est e[]im contradictio affirmationis et negationis oppositio.Cum enim quis atfirmat quod alius negat,ipsa utrarumque propositionum pugna contraditio nominatur.Atque hoc est quod ait.Et sit boc contradictio,affirmatio et negatio,opposita.Cum enim affirmatio negationi opponitur,contradictio est.Sed quas sit affirmatio opposita negationi,aut quae sit harum propositionum oppositio,m sequentibus prodit.Neque enim quaelibet negatio cuilibet affirmationi opposita est,sed tantum hæc quas in sequentibus ipse determinat.Quocirca erit contradictio,affirmatio et negatio oppositæ; quae sint autem oppositæ,sequens expositionis ordo conext.

Dico autem opponi ejusdem de eodem. Non autem æquivoce,et quæcunque cætera talium determinavimus contra sophisticas imporlunilales.

Fierituncoppositionem in affirmationibus negationibusque demonstrat,cum idem subjectum idem que praedicatum in negatione sit, quod quilibet in affirmatione proposuit: oportet enim semper, si opposita est affirmatio negationi, unam essse veram,alteram falsam. Quod si utræque falsae sunt, aut utraeque verae, non sunt oppositæ.Neque enim se perimunt. Si autem una sit falsa, alia vera, tunc vera perlmit falsam. Et si illa fuerit vera, alia mox a veritate discedit. Quod si in qualibet affirmatione aut subjectum aut prædicatum fuerit aequivocum non sunt oppositæ.

English

Hence it is made clear what a contradiction is. For a contradiction is the opposition of affirmation and negation. For when one person affirms what another denies, the very clash of the two propositions is called a contradiction. And this is what he says: And let this be a contradiction, affirmation and negation, opposites. For when affirmation is opposed to negation, it is a contradiction. But which affirmation is opposed to which negation, or what the opposition of these propositions is, he sets forth in what follows. For not every negation is opposed to every affirmation, but only those which he himself determines in what follows. Wherefore there will be a contradiction, affirmation and negation being opposites; but which are opposites, the following order of exposition will make clear.

But I say that they are opposed when they are of the same thing, about the same thing. Not, however, equivocally, and whatever other such conditions we have determined against sophistical importunities.

Here he demonstrates what the opposition in affirmations and negations consists in, since the same subject and the same predicate is in the negation as anyone proposed in the affirmation. For it must always be that, if the affirmation is opposed to the negation, one is true and the other false. But if both are false, or both are true, they are not opposed. For they do not destroy each other. But if one is false and the other true, then the true destroys the false. And if that one is true, the other at once departs from the truth. But if in any affirmation either the subject or the predicate is equivocal, they are not opposed.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:59 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si quis enim dicat; Alexander Helenam rapuit, et hoc aliquis neget dicens: Alexander Helenam non rapuit,quoniam Alexander aequivocum nomen est, potest utrumque esse verum, et negatio, si de Alexandra Magno loqualur,etalfirmatio,si de Alexandro Trojano proponat.Quare non sunt. hae oppositæ. Hlasautem esse dicitoppositas,quæcunque ejusdem praedicati habentoppositionem de eodem subjecto,ut ibi nulla aequivocatio diversitatis causa sit; hoc euim est quod ait: Dico autem opponi ejusdem de eodem. Non autem æquivoce,ut ejusdem praedicati sit oppositio in negatione, qui fuit in affirmatione, et de eo subjecto fiat negatio,de quo ante facta et affirmatio. Sed diligentius bæc in libro quem inscribit edisserit; illic enim sophistarum, quos fallaces argumentatores Latine possumus dicere, qui per hujusmodipropositiones quae verum inter se falsumque non dividunt, mendaces colligunt syllogismos, argumenta distinxit, quibus capere respondentem atque innectere consueverunt. Ergo nunc hoc dicit etiam illa esse observanda quae contraargumentorumimportunitatem determinata sunt. Quae vero sint illa, dicenda a me secundae editionis textus exspectet.

English

For if someone says, "Alexander ravished Helen," and someone else denies this, saying, "Alexander did not ravish Helen," since "Alexander" is an equivocal name, both can be true—the negation if he is speaking of Alexander the Great, and the affirmation if he is proposing it of Alexander the Trojan. Wherefore these are not opposed. But those things should be called opposed, whatever have the opposition of the same predicate concerning the same subject, so that there no equivocation is the cause of difference. For this is what he says: "I say that they are opposed, of the same concerning the same; not, however, equivocally," so that the opposition of the same predicate may be in the negation which was in the affirmation, and the negation may be made concerning that subject concerning which the affirmation was also made before. But he discusses these things more diligently in the book which he entitles the Sophistical Refutations; for there he distinguished the arguments of the sophists—whom we may call in Latin "deceitful arguers"—who through propositions of this kind, which do not divide truth from falsehood among themselves, gather lying syllogisms, by which they are accustomed to trap and entangle the respondent. Therefore he now says that even those things are to be observed which have been determined against the importunity of counter-arguments. But what those things are, let him expect from me to be said in the text of the second edition.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:60 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quoniam autemsunt hæc quidem rerumuniversalia, illa uero singularia. Dico autem universale, quod de pluribus natum est prædicari,singulare vero quod non, ut,homo quidem universale est,Plato vero eorumquæ singularia sunt.

Omnis propositio quemadmodum fiat ostendit.Secundum enim res quae significantur, propositionis natura perficitur.Rerum autem alia sunt universalia, alia particularia. Universale est quod de pluribus prædicatur,ut homo de pluribus dicitur, et est univeraalia. Singulare vero est, ut quaelibet res iodivi. dua, cujus nulla praedicatio ad sibimet subjecta perveniat, ut Plato vel Socrates; horum autem naturam docet exemplis, ait enim: Ut bomo quidem un iversale, Plato vero eorum quæ sunt singularia. Nam si hoc est universale quod de pluribus prædicatur, homo universale est, de pluribus enim individuis dicitur. Quod si hoc rursus est singulare, quod de nullo alio prædicantur,Plato singulare est.Individua namque de nullis aliis prædicantur. Quoniam ergo sunt quaedam rerum universalia,alia vero singularia,manifestum est quoniam omnis affirmatio aut negatio per haec constituitur.

English

Since some of these things are universal and others singular. I call universal that which is naturally predicated of many things, and singular that which is not, as "man" is indeed universal, but "Plato" is among things that are singular.

He shows how every proposition comes to be. For the nature of a proposition is completed according to the things that are signified. Now of things, some are universal and others particular. Universal is that which is predicated of many, as "man" is said of many, and these are universals. But singular is, as any one individual thing, whose predication reaches to no things subject to it, as Plato or Socrates; he teaches the nature of these by examples, for he says: as "man" is indeed universal, but "Plato" is among things that are singular. For if that is universal which is predicated of many, "man" is universal, for it is said of many individuals. But if again that is singular which is predicated of no other, "Plato" is singular. For individuals are predicated of no other things. Since, therefore, some things are universal and others singular, it is manifest that every affirmation or negation is constituted through these.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:61 · narrative
Source · Latin

Necesse est autem enuntiare quoniam inest aliquid, aut non.Aliquoties quidemeorum alicuiquæ universalia sunt,aliquoties autem alicui eorum quæ sunt singularia.

Omnis namque propositio, aut sinnulare habet, aut universale subjectum, sive affirmatione annuat, sive abnuat negatione. Si quis enim dicat, Homo animal est, Homo animal non est, universalem rem, id est hominem, animal aut esse aut non esse proposuit. Atque hoc est quod ait, Necesse est autem enuntiare quod inest aIiquid,aut non,aliquoties quidem eorum alicui quae sunt universalia. Homo enim cum sit universale animal illi inesse affirmatio proposuit. Quae dixit, Homo animal est, et non inesse negatio quae ait, Homo animal non est. Si vero aliquis SiD dicat: Socrates disputat, Socrates non disputat, alicui eorum quae sunt singularia esse et non esse conjunxit. Et boc est quodait: AHquotiesautem eorum quae sunt singularia. Nam cum Socrates singulare quiddam sit,disputatio ei ab affirmationejuncta est, sed a negatione sejuncta.

English

It is necessary, however, to state that something is present or is not. Sometimes indeed [we speak] of some one of the things that are universal, sometimes of some one of the things that are singular.

For every proposition has either a singular or a universal subject, whether it assents by affirmation or denies by negation. For if anyone says, "Man is an animal," "Man is not an animal," he has proposed that a universal thing, that is, man, either is or is not an animal. And this is what he says: "It is necessary, however, to state that something is present or is not, sometimes indeed of some one of the things that are universal." For since man is a universal, the affirmation has proposed that an animal is present to him—the one that said, "Man is an animal"—and the negation that it is not present—the one that said, "Man is not an animal." But if someone says, "Socrates disputes," "Socrates does not dispute," he has joined being and not being to some one of the things that are singular. And this is what he says: "sometimes of the things that are singular." For since Socrates is something singular, disputing has been joined to him by affirmation, but separated from him by negation.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:62 · narrative
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Si ergo universaliter enuntiet de universali, quoniam est,aut non., erunt hæ contrariæ enuntiationes. Dico autem de universali enuntiationem universalem, ut omnis homoalbusest,nullus homo albus est. Quando autem de Itniversalibus, non universaliter, non sunt hæ contrariæ, quæ autem significantur est esse aliquando oontraria.

Omnis affirmatioomnisquenegatio aut universalis est, aut particularis, aut indefinita. Universalis est. affirmatio, ut si quis dicat, Omnis homo animal est. Cum sit enim universale subjectum homo(de multis enim pra'dicari aliis poteat), universaliter praedicatum esl.Diximus enim,Omnis homo est animal. Nec solum hominem,quod est universale,posuimus, sed etiam omne universale, id est omne adjecimus universali, id est homini, et hæc est affirmatio universalis; sin vero dicat aliquis,Nullus homo animal est, rursus homini, universali rei determinationem universalem,id quod dicitur nullus,adjecit.Siveergo in affirmatione, sive in negatione, si eas universatiter aliquis proferat, universale universali proponit.

English

If, then, one enunciates universally concerning a universal, that it is or is not, these enunciations will be contrary. I call an enunciation universal concerning a universal, for example, "Every man is white," "No man is white." But when [one speaks] concerning universals not universally, these are not contrary; yet the things that are signified are sometimes contrary.

Every affirmation and every negation is either universal, or particular, or indefinite. It is a universal affirmation, for example, if someone says, "Every man is an animal." For since the subject "man" is universal (for it can be predicated of many other things), the predicate is [stated] universally. For we have said, "Every man is an animal." Nor have we posited only "man," which is a universal, but we have also added "every" to the universal, that is, to "man," and this is a universal affirmation. But if someone says, "No man is an animal," again to "man," a universal thing, he has added a universal determination, namely what is said [by] "no one." Whether, therefore, in affirmation or in negation, if someone utters them universally, he proposes a universal of a universal.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:63 · narrative
Source · Latin

Non proponit autem universale universali quoties ita dicit: Homo animal est,homo animal non est.Cum enim homo sit res universaIis,nulla adjectio univerHaiitatis, quæ est nullus, aut omnis, affirmationem vel negationem fecit.Quocirca repetendum est,affirmatio universalis est,in qua universale universaliter praedicatur affirmative.Et negatio universalis,in qua rursusuniversale universaliter prædicatur negative. Et hae bujusmodi contrariæ sunt. Fieri enim non potest ut ubi vera affirmatio universalis,illic universalis negatio vera sit, et econtrario, fieri tamen potest ut utraeque falsæinveniri possint,utOmnis homo justus est,nullus homo justus est; hic enim utraeque sunt falsæ,sed una quidem vera,aItera. falsa reperitur,utin eo quod est,Omnis homo animal esl,nullus homo animal est. Hic una vera est, altera falsa, ut vero utraeque verae sint, fieri non potest, quocirca quoniam utræque falsæ inveniuntur, oppositæ non sunt, sed sunt contrariæ. Cur autem contrariae dicantur, alio loco nobis erit dicendum. Particulares vero propositi ones sunt hujusmodi, Quidam homo animal est, quidam bomo animal non est; hae dicuntur Bubalternæ,affirmatio enim particularis,sub af. firmatione universali, subalterna est.Rursus eodem modo particularis negatio,sub universali negatione, subalterna est.

English

But he does not set forth a universal concerning a universal whenever he speaks thus: "Man is an animal," "Man is not an animal." For since man is a universal thing, no addition of universality—which is "no" or "every"—has made the affirmation or the negation. Wherefore it must be repeated: a universal affirmation is one in which a universal is predicated universally and affirmatively. And a universal negation is one in which again a universal is predicated universally and negatively. And these of this kind are contraries. For it cannot happen that where the universal affirmation is true, the universal negation is true there, and conversely; yet it can happen that both are found to be false, as "Every man is just," "No man is just"; for here both are false. But one is found true and the other false, as in "Every man is an animal," "No man is an animal." Here one is true, the other false. But that both should be true cannot happen. Wherefore, since both are found to be false, they are not opposites but are contraries. But why they are called contraries, we shall have to say in another place. Particular propositions, however, are of this kind: "Some man is an animal," "Some man is not an animal"; these are called subaltern. For a particular affirmation is subaltern under a universal affirmation. Again, in the same way, a particular negation is subaltern under a universal negation.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:64 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed hae utræque verae sint aut una vera, alia falsa fieri potest, ut utræque falsae sint, non potest inveniri, ut in eo quod est, Quidam homo justus est,quidam homo justus non est,utræque sunt veræ. Cum vero dicimus, Quidam homo animal est, quidam homo animal non est, una vera est, altera falsa, et dicuntur affirmatio et negatio particulares, subcontrariæ. Quarenec istae etiam vocantur oppositæ, idcirco quia utraeque veræ inveniuntur interdum; sit autem barum talis descriptio: Ergoneque superiores universales, nequc inferiores. particulares opposita? sunt, idcirco quod inferiores quidem utraeque vera?, superiores autem utraeque falsæ eese possunt. Sunt autem oppositæ contradictoriæ(ul ipsæ ait)si quis aspiciat angulares,ut affirmationem universalem particulari comparet negationi, ut est Omnis homojustus est,quidam homojustus non est;hæ enim neque verae possunt inveniri, neque falsæ,sed in omnibus una vera est,altera falsa. Et rursus si universalis negatio particulari affirmationi,comparclur,reperiuntur oppositae: ut est, Nullus homo justus est, quidam homo justus est. Semper enim una vera est, altera falsa. Et hoc in quibuslibet terminis si despexeris,oratio nostra non dtscrepabit. Sit autem plenissima hoc modo descripto. Affirmatio universalis Negatio universali Sunt.ergo determinationes,universlium quidem omnis et nullus, particularium vero, quidam.

English

But both of these can be true, or one true and the other false; yet it cannot be found that both are false, as in the case of "Some man is just, some man is not just," where both are true. But when we say "Some man is an animal, some man is not an animal," one is true and the other false, and they are called particular affirmation and negation, subcontraries. Wherefore these too are not called opposites, for the reason that both are sometimes found to be true. But let there be this description of them: Are, then, neither the superior universals nor the inferior particulars opposites? They are, for the reason that the inferior particulars can both be true, while the superior universals can both be false. But those are contradictory opposites (as he himself says) if one looks at the diagonal corners, comparing the universal affirmation with the particular negation, as in "Every man is just, some man is not just"; for these can neither be found both true nor both false, but in all cases one is true and the other false. And again, if the universal negation is compared with the particular affirmation, they are found to be opposites, as in "No man is just, some man is just." For always one is true and the other false. And if you examine this in any terms whatsoever, our account will not disagree. But let the fullest description be in this way: universal affirmation, universal negation. These, then, are the determinations: of universals, "every" and "no one"; of particulars, "some.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:65 · narrative
Source · Latin

IlIæ autem propositiones quae neque universale habent additum,neque particulare, indefinitæ vocantur, et particularibus similes sunt,ut est,Homojustus est, homo justus non est. Possunt enim utra'que esse veræ,ut in hoc ipso exemploquod dicimus,et potest una esse vera, altera falsa, ut, Homo animal est, bomo animal non est, utraeque vero ut falsae sunt, non potest inveniri,et hae (ut dictum est) vocantur indefinitae. Praeter bas autem omnes singulares sunt, in quibus contradictio potest inveniri, ut in eo quod est, Socrates animal est, Socrat-es animal non est,Socrates justus est, Socrates Justus non est.Nam si nulla eas aequivocatio vel prædicati,vel subjecti, vel alterius temporis,vel aliquid eorum quae singulas determinant,impediat,semperunavera est,altera falsa.Quare,quoniam de omnibus in commune speculati sumus,et quid quaeque esset, quantum brevitas patiebatur,expressimus;arj textum nunc,quoniam tempus est,revertamur.

English

But those propositions which have neither a universal nor a particular term added are called indefinite, and they are similar to particular propositions, as for example "A man is just," "A man is not just." For both of these can be true, as in this very example that we give, and one can be true and the other false, as "A man is an animal," "A man is not an animal"; but that both be true or both be false cannot be found, and these (as has been said) are called indefinite. But besides these, all are singular in which a contradiction can be found, as in "Socrates is an animal," "Socrates is not an animal," "Socrates is just," "Socrates is not just." For if no equivocation either of the predicate or of the subject, or of another time, or of any of the things that determine singular propositions, hinders it, one is always true and the other false. Wherefore, since we have examined all these in common, and have expressed what each one is, as far as brevity allowed, let us now return to the text, since it is time.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:66 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si ergG, inquit, universaliter enuntiet in universali, quoniam est, aut non, erunt contrariae enuntiationes, universaliter enim enuntiat aliquis in universali,quoties universalem affirmationem,aut universalem fecerit negationem.Cumenim dicit,Omnis homo animal est,universalem hominem universaliter enuntiavit per id quod addiditomnis;quod si rursus dicat,nullushomo animal est,eodem modo universalem hominem universaHter enuntiat per id quod ait,Nullus, et sunt contrariæ.

English

If, then, he says, one enunciates universally in a universal [term], that it is or is not, the enunciations will be contraries. For someone enunciates universally in a universal whenever he makes either a universal affirmation or a universal negation. For when he says "Every man is an animal," he has enunciated "man" universally and in a universal way through the addition of "every"; and if again he says "No man is an animal," in the same way he enunciates "man" universally and in a universal way through what he says, "No one," and these are contraries.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:67 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quas autem dicatesse contrarias,subjecto declaratexemp]o.Dico autem in universali enuntiationem universalem,ut,Omnis homo albus est,nullus homo albus est;una quidem est affirmatio universalis,altera negatio universalis, quas contrarias esse supra in descriptione docuimus-Quando autem in universalibus non universaliter,non suntcontrariæ.Quoties autem,inquit,indennitæ sunt propositio nes,et universalitpr universale non proponitur,contrariae non sunt,ea enim affirmatio quae dicit,homo justus est,et quæ dicit,homojustus non est,contraria non est.Possunt enim utræque simul esse veræ, et in eodem,id est homine, quod in contrariis fieri impossibile est.Quodvero addidit,quæ autem significantur est esse contraria,tale est:ipsæ quidem propositiones contrariae non sunt, significant tamen aliquando contraria.Si quis enim dicat,bomo albus est,et alius neget,homo albus non est,ipsæ quidem contrariæ non sunt.Quod autem dicilur,homo albus non est,potest quiddam significare contrarium.Nam designat hoc quod dicitur, homo albus non est, et rubri colora esse et pallidi,et fusci,designat etiam nig:i,quod estalbo contrarium.Potest igiturid quod non est album esse nigrum.

English

But which ones he calls contraries, he makes clear by an example. I say that an enunciation is universal in a universal [term], as: Every man is white; no man is white. One indeed is a universal affirmation, the other a universal negation, which we have shown above in the description to be contraries. But when [the terms] are in universals not universally, they are not contraries. Whenever, he says, the propositions are indefinite, and a universal is not predicated universally, they are not contraries. For the affirmation which says "man is just" and the one which says "man is not just" are not contraries. For both can be true at the same time, and in the same [subject], that is, in man, which in contraries is impossible to happen. But what he adds, "but the things signified are contraries," is such: the propositions themselves are not contraries, yet they sometimes signify contraries. For if someone says "man is white" and another denies "man is not white," these themselves are not contraries. But what is said, "man is not white," can signify something contrary. For what is said, "man is not white," designates both that he is of a red color and of a pale one, and of a dark one; it designates also black, which is contrary to white. Therefore what is not white can be black.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:68 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ergo quanquam ipsae contrariæ non sunt, tamen potest aliquando quod dixit contrarium significare, priori affirmationi, ut in eo quod diximus.Nam si id quod dicitur,non est homo a]bus,nigrum esse designet, quoniam is ui niger est albus non est,contrariæ quidem propoaitiones non sunt,quoniam possunt esse utraeque veræ.Quæ autem significantur,interdum contraria reperiuntur:quæ autem sint hujusmodi propositiones exemplorum subjectione monstravit.

Dico autem non universaliter enunliare de his quæ sunt universalia,utest albus homo,non est albus homo.

Et quod dicat esse universale, non universaliter prædicare,planissime demonstravit dicens:

Cum enim universale sit homo, non universaliter utitur enunliatione.Omnis namque non universale significat, sed quoniam univeTsallter.

Nam id quod dicitur omnis,illud ad quod prædicatur colligit,atque in unum corpus adducit,ut cum dicitur,omnis homoustus est, nullum excipit horninem.Sed totam colligit humanitalem,et fit de re universali,homine, prædicatio universali8,cum dicimus,omnis homo.:Vam cum sit universale homo, huic universali universalitatem consignificat; id quod additur omnis,et res universalis universaliter prædicatur.

English

Therefore, although they are not themselves contraries, nevertheless what he said can sometimes signify a contrary to the earlier affirmation, as in the case we mentioned. For if what is said—not man is white—designates being black, since he who is black is not white, they are indeed not contrary propositions, because both can be true. But the things signified are sometimes found to be contraries; and he showed by the addition of examples what sort of propositions these are.

But I say that one does not enunciate universally about the things that are universal, as: white man, not white man.

And that he says "to be universal" means not to predicate universally, he demonstrated most plainly, saying:

For although man is universal, he does not use the enunciation universally. For "every" does not signify something universal, but [signifies] that [it is said] universally.

For what is said [by] "every" gathers together that to which it is predicated and brings it into one body, as when it is said, "Every man is a being," it excepts no man. But it gathers the whole of humanity, and the predication of a universal thing, man, becomes universal when we say "every man." For since man is universal, [the word] "every" signifies universality together with this universal; and what is added—"every"—means that the universal thing is predicated universally.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:69 · narrative
Source · Latin

In eo vero quod universale prædicatur, id quod est universaliter prædicare,non est verum.

Hac nos sententia quem ad locum universalitatis determinationem recte ponamus,instituit. Docetenim semper istam universalilatem,quam determinatiotemuniversalemvocamus, ad subjectum poni debere terminum, nunquam ad prædicatum.Si quis enim sic dicat, omnis homo animal est, recte dixerit, omnis ad subjectum, id est ad hominem ponens. Quod si sic dicat, omnis homo omne animal est, falsum dixeritErgo hoc non dicit, in eo vero quod universale prædicatur, ut animal de homme. Ani. mal enim universale est. De omni homine prædicatur,non est verum,hoc ipsum universale, quod est animal,universaliter prædicare,utdicatur,omne animal esse hominem,nec solum in his,sed in nulla recte fieri affirmatione concedit; ait enim:

Nulla enim affirmatio vera erit, in qua universale prædicatum universaliter prædicatur,ut omnis homo est omne animal.

English

But in the case where a universal is predicated, to predicate it universally is not true.

By this sentence he instructs us where we may rightly place the determination of universality. For he teaches that this universality—which we call universal determination—must always be placed on the subject term, never on the predicate. For if someone says, "Every man is an animal," he has spoken correctly, placing "every" on the subject, that is, on "man." But if he says, "Every man is every animal," he has spoken falsely. Therefore he does not say this—that in the case where a universal is predicated, as "animal" of "man." For "animal" is a universal. It is predicated of every man, but it is not true to predicate this very universal, which is "animal," universally, so that it is said that every animal is a man; and he grants that this happens rightly not only in these cases but in no affirmation at all. For he says:

For no affirmation will be true in which a universal predicate is predicated universally, as "every man is every animal.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:70 · narrative
Source · Latin

Hoc autem cur eveniat, paucis absolvam. Prædicatum semper majus est subjecto vel æquum, majus:ut cum dico,bomo animal pst,animal prædicatur,bomo subjicitur. Sed majus est animal homine. De pluribus enim quam ipse homo prædicatur. Rursus aequale est,cum sic dicimus,bomo risibilis est,homo subjectum est, risibile praedicitum. Sed homo atque risibile aequalia sunt, proprium namque est bominis,quod est risibile, ut autem minus praedicatum inveniatur, quam subjectum Heri non polest. Sive ergo majus sit prædicatum, falsum est universale adjicere praedicato, ut in eo quod ipso posuit exemplo,Omnis bomo omne animal est,sive aequale git,superfluum est.ut si quis sic dicat, omnis homo,omne risibile est,quare universale prædicatum praedicare umversaliter non oportet.

Opponi itaque dico affirmationem negationi contra- I dictorie,quæ universaliter significat ei qua? non univerJaliter, ut omnis homo albus est, non omnis homo albus est,nullus homo albus est, quidam homo albus est.

English

But why this happens, I will set out briefly. The predicate is always greater than the subject or equal to it. Greater, as when I say "man is an animal": animal is predicated, man is the subject. But animal is greater than man; for it is predicated of more things than man himself. Again, it is equal when we speak thus: "man is capable of laughter": man is the subject, capable of laughter is the predicate. But man and capable of laughter are equal, for it is a property of man to be capable of laughter. But that the predicate be found less than the subject cannot happen. Whether, then, the predicate is greater, it is false to add "universally" to the predicate, as in the example he himself gave: "every man is every animal"; or whether it is equal, it is superfluous, as if someone were to say thus: "every man is every thing capable of laughter." Wherefore a universal predicate ought not to be predicated universally.

I say, therefore, that the affirmation is opposed contradictorily to the negation—the one that signifies universally to the one that does not signify universally—as "every man is white," "not every man is white," "no man is white," "a certain man is white.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:71 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quid sit proprie contradictio consequenter eaponit:aitenimopponi contradictorie propositiones,quolies universalem affirmationem particularis abnuit negatio,et quoties universalem negationem parlicu. laris affirmatio destruxerit.Cum enim dicitur,omnis homo albus eSl,de eodem homine universaliter tollit quod universaliter affrmatioconstituerat.Illaenim omnem hominem esse album ponit. lata dicit non omnelu,tanquam si concedat aliquem,sed ei tantum auferat universalitatem.Hoc est enim quod ait,quæ universale significat eidem quoniam non universaliter. Nam sicut universale significataffirmatio dicens hominem,ita quoque negatio universale significat, habet enim et ipsa hominem.Sed idem ipsum uni versale docet non esse universaliter,id est non omne esse album,quod affirmatio universalileresse posuerat,omnem hominem esse album proponens.Rodem modo etiam in negatione,quas nos supra angulares posuimus, et contradictorias in descriptione. Hic nunc easdem oppositas contradictorie vocat. Quod autem universali affirmationi,quæ est,omnis homo albus est, particularem negationem opposuit, quae cst,non omnis homo albus esl,tantumdem est tanquam sidiceret,quidam homo albus non est.Nam si non omnis homo albus est,et quidam bomo albus non est.

English

He next sets out what contradiction properly is: for he says that propositions are opposed contradictorily whenever a particular negation denies a universal affirmation, and whenever a particular affirmation destroys a universal negation. For when it is said, "every man is white," it removes universally from the same man what the universal affirmation had established. For that affirmation posits that every man is white. But the other says "not every," as if it were to concede that some one is, but only to remove universality from it. For this is what he says: the proposition that signifies universally is the same, because it does not signify universally. For just as the affirmation that signifies universally by saying "man," so too the negation signifies universally, for it also has "man." But it teaches that the same universal is not universally, that is, that not every man is white, which the affirmation had posited to be universally, proposing that every man is white. In the same way also in negation, which we placed above as the angular ones, and as contradictory in the description. Here now he calls these same ones opposed contradictorily. But that he opposed to the universal affirmation, which is "every man is white," the particular negation, which is "not every man is white," is just as if he were to say "a certain man is not white." For if not every man is white, also a certain man is not white.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:72 · narrative
Source · Latin

Contrarie velo uniuersalem atfirmationem et universalem negationem,ut,omnis homo justus est. Quocirca has quidem impossibile est simul esse veras.His vero oppositas,contingit aliquando in eodem, ut, non omnis homo albus eat,et, quidam homo albus est.

Plenissime omnes exsequitur dicitque contrarias universalem affirmationem,et universalem negationem.Has enim nos quoque supra descripsimus.Нic vero nunc easdem contrarie demonstrat opponi. IIlud quoque addidit;quod eas impossibile sit in eodem veras aliquando cognosci. Nam sicut contrariorum natura in eodem non potest inveniri,neque enim uno eodemque tempore aliquid nigrum est atque album,sic quoque neo contrarie, ut utraeque simul sint verae fieri potest. Quod autem adjecit, his vero oppositas, contingit aliquando in eodem, particularem affirmationem et particularem negationem designat. Particularis namque affirmatio universali negationi opposita est contradictorie, particularis vero negatio universali affirmationi. Contrariarum igitur oppositae possunt in eodem verae aliquoties inveniri,id est particularis affirma. tio et particularis negatio, verae ut sint aliquoties fieri potest,ut est,quidam homo albus est, quidam homo albus non est, ulræque sunt veræ.

English

He sets out contraries: a universal affirmation and a universal negation, as "every man is just." Hence it is impossible for these to be true at the same time. But the propositions opposed to these can sometimes be true of the same thing, as "not every man is white" and "some man is white."

He treats all these points most fully and says that the contraries are the universal affirmation and the universal negation. For we too have described these above. But here he now shows that these same propositions are opposed as contraries. He also adds that it is impossible for them ever to be found true of the same thing. For just as the nature of contraries cannot be found in the same thing—for something cannot be black and white at one and the same time—so too it cannot happen that contraries are both true at the same time. But when he adds "the propositions opposed to these can sometimes be true of the same thing," he designates the particular affirmation and the particular negation. For the particular affirmation is opposed contradictorily to the universal negation, and the particular negation to the universal affirmation. Therefore the propositions opposed to the contraries can sometimes be found true of the same thing—that is, the particular affirmation and the particular negation can sometimes be true, as "some man is white" and "some man is not white" are both true.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:73 · narrative
Source · Latin

.DE REGULIS OPPOSITORUM.

Quæcunque igitur contradictiones universalium sum universaliter,necesse est alteram esse veram vel jalsam.Et quæcunque in singularibus sunt,ut Socrates albus est,non est Socrates albus.

De contradictorie oppositis Joquitur,et de aingularibus proposilionibus,quod unam semper veram, falsam semper alteram necesse est inveniri. Hoc enim dicit contradictiones eorum,q uæ sunt universalium universaliter prædicatorum,una semper vera est,altera falsa. Universalium autem universaliter prædicatorum sunt contradictiones universalium particulariter praedicatorum. Nam affirmatio universalis,vel negatio universalis, universaliter prædicantur, harum contradictoriæ particulares affirmationes vel negationes sunt, sihi angulariter comparentur. Harum igitur contradictionum, quas sunt universalium universaliter prædicatoru rn,una semper vera est,semper altera falsa reperitur. In singularibus quoque idem est.Nam si nulla,ut dictum est,varielas aequivocationis impediat,idemque siL prædicaturu,idemque subjectum,ad unum idemque tempus,ad unam eamdemque partem,ad unum idomque relatum,uno atque eodem. modo,una semper vera est,aItpra falsa, et veritatis inter se naturam et mendacii partiuntur.

English

ON THE RULES OF OPPOSITES.

Therefore, whatever contradictions there are of universals predicated universally, one of them must be true and the other false. And whatever contradictions there are in singulars, as "Socrates is white," "Socrates is not white."

He speaks of contradictory opposites, and of singular propositions, that one must always be found true and the other always false. For he says that of the contradictions of those things which are predicated universally of universals, one is always true and the other false. But the contradictions of universals predicated universally are those of universals predicated particularly. For a universal affirmation or a universal negation is predicated universally; the contradictories of these are particular affirmations or negations, if they are compared singularly. Therefore of these contradictions, which are of universals predicated universally, one is always true and the other is always found false. The same holds also in singulars. For if, as has been said, no variety of equivocation hinders it, and the same thing is predicated, and the same subject, at one and the same time, in one and the same respect, in relation to one and the same thing, in one and the same way, one is always true and the other false, and they share between themselves the nature of truth and of falsehood.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:74 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quæcunque autem universalium non universaliter, non semper hæc quidem tera est,illa vero falsa.

Quae vero sunt, inquit, definitæ, ut neque universalem habeant, neque particularem determinationem, quod tacuit, non semper una vera est, altera falsa, sed utraeque interdum inveniuntur veræ. In universalibus autem non universaliter praedicatur aliquid hoc modo. Homo albusest, homo albus non est, in quo uno eodemque tempore utrasque veras esse contingit. Hic enim cum universale sit homo, non universaliter praedicatum est nomen. At vero nec particulariter. Neque enim quidam,aut nulIus,aut omnisadjectum est. Docet autem hujusmodi propositiones non inter se dividere veritatem atque mendacium, hoc modo:

Simul enim verum est dicere quoniam est homo albus, et non est homo albus; et quoniam est homo pulcher. et non est homo pulcher. Si enim fædus, etnon pulchen: et si fil aliquid, nondum eat.

English

But whatever contradictions there are of universals not predicated universally, these are not always one true and the other false.

But those which are, he says, indefinite, so that they have neither a universal nor a particular determination—which he passed over in silence—are not always one true and the other false, but sometimes both are found to be true. In universals, however, something is predicated not universally in this way: "Man is white," "Man is not white," in which it happens that both are true at one and the same time. For here, although "man" is universal, the name has not been predicated universally. But neither has it been predicated particularly. For neither "a certain one" nor "no one" nor "every one" has been added. He teaches, moreover, that propositions of this kind do not divide truth and falsehood between themselves, in this way:

For at the same time it is true to say that man is white and that man is not white; and that man is beautiful and that man is not beautiful. For if he is ugly, he is also not beautiful; and if he is something, he is not yet [nothing].

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:75 · narrative
Source · Latin

Documentum autem est-hujusmodi dictum,indefinitam affirmationem negationemque veras utrasque posse inveniri; verum enim dicere est, est homo al bus, et non est homo albus, hujus autem rei probatio est: nam si verum est dicere, est homo niger, et est homo albu8,uno eodemque tempore; qui autem niger est, albus non est, verum est dicere uno eodemque tempore quoniam est homo albus,et non est homo albus.Rursus si verum est dicerequoniam est homo pulcher,et est homo faedus uno eodemque tempore, qui autem fædus est,pulcbernon est, verum est dicere hominem essepulchrum et bominem esse fædum, uno eodemque tempore. Cum enim Achilles esset pulcher,claudusThersites eratfædus. Rursus si verum est dicere esse hominem album,et rursus uno eodemque tempore fieri hominem album, nec hoc ulla contrarietas vetat ut sit homo albus, et rursus fiat homo albus, sed qui fit albus nondum albus est, verum est igitur dicere quoniam est homo albus,et non est homo albus.Hoc est enim quod ait, et si fit aliquid,et non est: cum enim fit, non est, sed potest dici quoniam est homo albus,el fit homo albus, ut utrumque vere dicatur. Potest igitur vere utrumque dici, Etest homo albus, et non est homo albus.

English

But a proof of this is a statement of this sort: that an indefinite affirmation and negation can both be found to be true. For it is true to say "a man is white" and "a man is not white." And the proof of this matter is: for if it is true to say "a man is black" and "a man is white" at one and the same time—yet he who is black is not white—then it is true to say at one and the same time that a man is white and that a man is not white. Again, if it is true to say that a man is beautiful and that a man is ugly at one and the same time—yet he who is ugly is not beautiful—then it is true to say that a man is beautiful and that a man is ugly at one and the same time. For when Achilles was beautiful, Thersites the lame was ugly. Again, if it is true to say that a man is white, and again at one and the same time that a man is becoming white—nor does any contrariety prevent this, that a man is white and again becomes white, but he who is becoming white is not yet white—therefore it is true to say that a man is white and that a man is not white. For this is what he says: even if something is coming to be, it also is not; for while it is coming to be, it is not, yet it can be said that a man is white and is becoming white, so that each is truly said. Therefore each can truly be said: "a man is white" and "a man is not white.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:76 · narrative
Source · Latin

Videbitur autem subito inconveniens esse. Mcirco quoniam videtur significare, non est homo albus, simul eliam quoniam nemo homo albus. Hoc autem neque idem significat, neque simul neeessario.

Tacita? hominum dubitationi respondet.Quod enim dicimus, est albus homo, et non est albus homo, utrumque vero esse videtur, sed aliquoties inconveniens esse. Si enim verum est dicere, est albus homo,quemadmodum fieri potest utverum sit dicere, non est albus homo. Hoc autem videtur quibusdam inconveniens,idcirco quoniam apparetquibusdamid quod dicimus, non est bomo albus, hoc significare, tanquam si dicamus,nullus homo albus est, sed boc verum non est. Neque enim idem est dicere,non est albus homo,et nullus homo albus est. Et quanquam cum dicimus,nullus homo albus est,simul significamus quoniam non est homo albus, non tarr,en ex necessitate idem utraque significat.Cum enim dicimus,non est homoalbus, simul nondicere,quoniam nullus homo albus est, non oportet intelligi, neque enim semper simul est,non est homo albuB,et nullus homo albus est. Nam aliquoties simul est, scilicet cum prius dicitur universalis negatio. Cum vero indefinita dicitur prius,non est simul negatio univcrsalisconjuncta negationi indefinitæ. Nam si dicam, nullus borno albus est, simul dixi, quoniam homo albus non est.

English

But this will seem suddenly inconvenient. Therefore, because it seems to signify "a man is not white," and at the same time also "no man is white." But this signifies neither the same thing nor necessarily at the same time.

He responds to the silent doubt of people. For what we say, "a man is white," and "a man is not white," both seem to be true, but sometimes it seems inconvenient. For if it is true to say "a man is white," how can it be possible that it is true to say "a man is not white"? But this seems inconvenient to some, for this reason: because it appears to some that what we say, "a man is not white," signifies this, as if we were to say "no man is white," but this is not true. For it is not the same to say "a man is not white" and "no man is white." And although when we say "no man is white," we at the same time signify that a man is not white, nevertheless both do not signify the same thing by necessity. For when we say "a man is not white," we do not at the same time say that no man is white, nor is it necessary to understand this; for "a man is not white" and "no man is white" are not always at the same time. For sometimes they are at the same time, namely when the universal negation is stated first. But when the indefinite is stated first, the universal negation is not at the same time conjoined with the indefinite negation. For if I say "no man is white," I have at the same time said that a man is not white.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:77 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod si dicam, homo albus non est, non est simul dicta negatio universalis, quae est, nullus bomo albus est, quoniam potest quidam esee non albus de quo dicatur,homo albus non est,neque tamenomnesesse nonaibi. Non igitursimulnecessario sunt, non est homo albus, et nullus homo albus est.

Manifestum est autem 1uoniam una negatio unius affirmationis est, idem enim oportetnegarenegalionem, quod affirmauit affirmalio, et de eodem, vel de aliquo singularium, uel de aliquo universalium, vel universaliter, vel non universaliter.

Boc quoque argumentum et negationem indefinitam et universalem idem non significare, et eas a se esse diversas. Nam si unius affrmationis una negatio est, contra eam quae dicit, Ban est homo albus, illa est aftirmatio quae dicit, est homo albus. Et conLraeam quae dicit,nuIlus homo albus est, illa est affirmatio quae dicit,quidam homo albus sed hae aflirmationes diversae sunt,id est, est homo albus,et quidam homo albus est; diversae igitur illae quoque sunt quae his proportionaliter opponuntur. Diversa igitur est negatio quae dicit, nullus homo albus est, et ea quae dicil,non est homo albus.Docet autem nos uniusaffirmationis unam esse negationem,idquehac ratione demonstrat: Oportetenim praedicatum negare negationem, quod prædicaverit affirmatio, et rursus de eodem subjecto auferre praedicatum negationem oportet id quod affirmatio ante conjunxerat.

English

But if I say, "a white man is not," the universal negation "no white man is" is not thereby stated at the same time, since it can be that some one is not white, of whom it is said "a white man is not," and yet not all are not white. Therefore "a man is not white" and "no man is white" are not necessarily simultaneous.

But it is manifest that there is one negation of one affirmation; for the negation must deny the same thing that the affirmation affirmed, and concerning the same subject, whether of some one of the singulars or of some one of the universals, and either universally or not universally.

This argument also shows that the indefinite and the universal negation do not signify the same thing, and that they are distinct from one another. For if there is one negation of one affirmation, then opposed to the one that says "a white man is not" is the affirmation that says "a white man is." And opposed to the one that says "no white man is" is the affirmation that says "some white man is." But these affirmations are distinct, that is, "a white man is" and "some white man is"; therefore those too are distinct which are opposed to them in corresponding relation. Therefore the negation that says "no white man is" is distinct from that which says "a white man is not." But he teaches us that there is one negation of one affirmation, and he demonstrates this by this reasoning: for the negation ought to deny the predicate that the affirmation predicated, and again the negation ought to remove from the same subject the predicate that the affirmation had joined to it.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:78 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod si fit, dubium non est uniusesse affirmationis unam negationem, sive autem ia universalibus hoc fiat universaliter prædicatis, sive indefinite, et non universaliter, aive in singularibus, una eademque propositionum natura est, ut unius affirmationis sit tantum naturaliter una negatio. Hoc autem induetione probat.

Dico autem, ut est Socrates albus, non est Socrates albus.

In hac enim propositione idem subjectum est, idem prædicatum,et in medio exemplorum subjecit.

Si autem aliud aliquid de eodem vel de alio, idem, non opposita erit, sed ab ea diuersa.

Sensus huj usmodi est,si autem aliud aliquid prædicaverit negatio quam affirmatio prædicavit, vel si de alio subjecto idem negatio prædicaverit quod in affirmatione fuerit prædicatum, non sunt sibi oppositae, sed a se tantum diversæ sunt.si quis enim dicat, Socrates disputat, et aliud respondeat, Socrates non ambulat, diversum prædicatum est, etdiversæ sunt propositiones, et non oppositæ,et hoc est quod dixit.Si autem aliud aliquid, aliud enim praedicavit negatio quam affirmatio praedicaverat.Quod si quis sic dicat, Socrales disputat, aliusque respondeat, Plato non disputat,dealio subjecto idem prædicavit,. et sunt a se diversae propositiones,et non oppositæ. Eterit id quod ait aliquis, vel de alio idem.

English

But if this happens, there is no doubt that there is one negation of one affirmation; whether this is done in universals predicated universally, or indefinitely and not universally, or in singulars, the nature of propositions is one and the same, so that naturally there is only one negation of one affirmation. And he proves this by induction.

I mean, for example, "Socrates is white," "Socrates is not white."

For in this proposition the subject is the same, the predicate is the same, and he has set this forth among the examples.

But if the negation predicates something else about the same subject, or the same thing about another subject, it will not be opposed to it, but different from it.

The sense of this passage is as follows: but if the negation has predicated something other than the affirmation predicated, or if the negation has predicated about another subject the same thing that was the predicate in the affirmation, they are not opposed to each other, but are only different from each other. For if someone says, "Socrates is disputing," and another answers, "Socrates is not walking," the predicate is different, and the propositions are different and not opposed, and this is what he said. But if [it predicates] something else—for the negation has predicated something other than the affirmation had predicated. But if someone says thus, "Socrates is disputing," and another answers, "Plato is not disputing," he has predicated the same thing about another subject, and the propositions are different from each other and not opposed. And that will be what someone said, either "something else" or "the same thing about another.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:79 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod si utraque sint diversa, multo magis propositiones diversae fiunt, quibus positis ad proposita rursus exempla conlendit, et uni aFfirmationi uuam enuntiationem negationis opponit,angularibus angulares, af'firmativis negativas, particularibus universales, indefinitis indefinitas opponens et comparans.

Huic autem quæ est, omnis homo albus est, contradicit illa quæ est, non omnis homo albus est. Illi autem quæ est, aliquis homo albus est, ilia quæ est, nullus homo albus est. Illi autem quæ est, homo albus est, illa quæ est, homo albus non est.

Et post haec concludit sententiam dicens: Quod igitur una affirmatio uni negationi opponitur contradictorie, et quæ sunt hæ, dictum est. Et quod sunt aliæ contrariæ, et quæ sint hæ, dictum est, et quod non omnis vera vel falsa contradictio, et quare, et quando vera, vel falsa.

Revolvit quoque breviter, quoniam aliae sunt contrariæ, alix contradictoriae, dicitque se quae sint hae diligentius in superiori disputatione monstrasse. Illud quoque patet non omnem esse veram vel falsam aftirmationis et negationis opposilionem,quam nunc communiter et improprie contradictionem vocat. Et quando non sint verae vel falsae, vel cur, se exposuisse commemorat.

English

But if both are different, much more do the propositions become different; and when these are set down, he again has recourse to the examples already given, and opposes to one affirmation one enunciation of negation, opposing and comparing singulars to singulars, negatives to affirmatives, universals to particulars, and indefinites to indefinites.

Now to the one that is "every man is white," that one contradicts which is "not every man is white." But to that which is "some man is white," that one which is "no man is white." And to that which is "man is white," that one which is "man is not white."

And after these things he concludes his meaning, saying: "That therefore one affirmation is opposed contradictorily to one negation, and which these are, has been said. And that there are other contraries, and which these are, has been said; and that not every contradiction is true or false, and why, and when it is true or false."

He also briefly reviews that some are contraries and others contradictories, and says that he has shown more carefully in the preceding discussion which these are. It is also evident that not every opposition of affirmation and negation is true or false, which he now calls contradiction in a common and improper sense. And when they are not true or false, or why, he recalls that he has set forth.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:80 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE AFFIRMATIONE ET NEGATIONE UNA.

Una autem affirmatio et negatio est, quæ unum de uno significat, vel cum sit universale universaliter, uel i non similiter.

Quid sit una affirmatio et supra jam diximus, et nunc quoque idem docere non piget.Cum idem Aristoteles revolverit, una enim affirmatio est, quas unam rem de uno significat, id est quas bujusmodi habet prædicatum,et hujusmodi subjectum,ut utrumque singula significet.Nam si unum aliquid significet prædicatum simplex atque unum est. Quod si rursus unum aliQuid significet subjectum, et non plura, simplex rursus est atque unum. Quocirca si unum prædicatum de uno erit subJecto, utraque singula significabunt et non plura. Eoque tit,ut non sit simplex propositionis significatio, et quae unum significet una sit. Idem autem oportet esse etiam in universalibus universaliter prædicatis,et in particularibus, quas universalibus opponi necesse est, quorum etiam subdit exempla.

English

ON ONE AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION.

But an affirmation and a negation is one which signifies one thing of one thing, either when the universal is taken universally, or when it is not taken in like manner.

What a single affirmation is, we have already said above, and now too it is no burden to teach the same again. For since the same Aristotle has gone over it, an affirmation is one which signifies one thing of one thing, that is, which has a predicate of this kind and a subject of this kind, so that each signifies something single. For if it signifies some one thing, the predicate is simple and one. But if again the subject signifies some one thing and not several, it is again simple and one. Wherefore if there is one predicate of one subject, each will signify single things and not several. And hence it comes about that the signification of the proposition is not simple, and that the proposition which signifies one thing is one. But the same must hold also in universals predicated universally, and in particulars which must be opposed to universals, examples of which he also sets down.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:81 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ut omnis homo albus est, non omnis homo albus esi, est homo albus, non est humo albus, nullus homo albus est, quidam homo albus est.

Dicit enim unam esse propositionem,Omnis homo albus est, et rursus ei oppositam unam esse, non est omnis homo albus.

Si album unum significat. Sin autem duobus unum nomen positum est, ex quibus non est unum, non est una affirmatio, neque una negatio.

Si album, inquit, unum significat, quod si plura designat non est una affirmatio, nec una negatio. Hoc autem et in subjecto convenit custodire, scilicet ut subjecti quoque simplex significatio servet. Docet autem non esse unam propositionem,si prædicatum vel quodlibet in propositi one verbum multa significet hoc modo.

Sin vero duobus unum non est positum ex quibus non est unum, non est una affirmatio, neque negatio.

Sunt quaedam res quæ plura quidem signitJcent, ex quibus omnibus junctis unum quiddam valeat effici, hominis quidem nomen significat animal, signif1cat mortale, rationale quoque designat, sed haec juncta unum quiddam efficiunt, quod est animal rationale mortale. Hæc namque omnia unum hominem complent. Sunt quoque alia qua; duas vel plures hujusmodi res designant, ex quibusjunctis unum aliquid esse non possit, ut liber. Dicitur namque et Dionysius liber, et ingenuus, sed ingenuus et Dionysius juncti; nihil efficiunt.

English

As, for example, "every man is white," "not every man is white," "man is white," "man is not white," "no man is white," "some man is white."

For he says that "every man is white" is one proposition, and again that its opposite, "not every man is white," is one.

If "white" signifies one thing. But if one name is posited for two things, from which no one thing results, there is not one affirmation nor one negation.

If "white," he says, signifies one thing; but if it designates more things, there is not one affirmation nor one negation. This also ought to be observed in the subject, namely that the simple signification of the subject likewise be preserved. But he teaches that a proposition is not one if the predicate, or any word whatever in the proposition, signifies many things, in this way.

But if one name is not posited for two things from which no one thing results, there is not one affirmation nor one negation.

There are certain things that signify several things, from all of which taken together some one thing can be produced. For the name "man" signifies animal, signifies mortal, and designates rational as well, but these joined together produce some one thing, which is a mortal rational animal. For all these complete one man. There are also other things that designate two or more things of this sort, from which, when joined, one thing cannot be, as "free." For Dionysius is called free, and a freeborn man is called free, but "freeborn" and "Dionysius" joined together produce nothing.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:82 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quare si quid tale sit, inquit, aut subjectum aut prædicatum quod plura significet, ex quibus unum aliquid esse non possit, non est illa una affirmatio, neque una negatio. Et hoc fictitii exempli ratione confirmat.

Ut si quis ponat hoc nomen tunica, homini et equo, et dicat tunica est alba. hæc non est una affirmatio, nec una negatio. Nihil enim differt hoc quam dicere, est homo equus albus. Hoc autem nihil differt quam dicere, est homo albus, et est equus albus.

Dicatur enim, inquit, equus et homo tunica. Et habeant, verbi gratia, hoc nomen, si quis enim dicat, et tunica alba quoniam tunica equum atque hominem designat, videtur dicere quoniam est equus et homo alus, seoclae es, tanquam dicat,es equus albus, et est homoalbus. Sed bæ duae propositiones sunt, et non una; duplexigitur illa quoque propositio est, est bomo et equus albus; quare duplex illa quoque quae dicit, est tunica alba. Etenim subjecti hujus,id est tunicæ, duplex significatio propositiones fecit esse duplices. Quod si quid dicat unum quiddam significare, est tunica alba, quia signincat, est homo et equus albus; impossibile est. Naque enim ex homine et equo quiddam unum fit, ut haec propositio unum aliquiddesignet; quare aut hæc propositio multa significat, aut si non multa, nihil omnino designat. Nihil enim est homo equus, uL simul dicatur atque intelligatur, hoc est enim quod ait:

English

Therefore, he says, if there is any such thing, either as subject or as predicate, that signifies several things from which no single thing can be, that is not one affirmation nor one negation. And he confirms this by the account of a fictitious example.

As if someone were to assign this name "tunic" to a man and a horse, and say "the tunic is white." This is not one affirmation, nor one negation. For it differs in nothing from saying "a man is a white horse." But this differs in nothing from saying "a man is white" and "a horse is white."

For let it be said, he says, that "horse" and "man" are "tunic." And let them have, for example, this name; for if someone says "the tunic is white," since "tunic" designates a horse and a man, he seems to say that a horse and a man are white—that is, as if he were to say "a horse is white" and "a man is white." But these are two propositions, and not one; therefore that proposition too is double, "a man and a horse is white"; wherefore that one also is double which says "the tunic is white." For indeed the double signification of this subject, that is, of the tunic, has made the propositions double. But if someone says that it signifies one single thing, "the tunic is white," because it signifies "a man and a horse is white," it is impossible. For neither does some one thing come to be from a man and a horse, so that this proposition should designate some one thing; wherefore either this proposition signifies many things, or, if not many, it designates nothing at all. For "a man horse" is nothing, such that it be spoken and understood at once; for this is what he says:

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:83 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si ergo æ multa significant, esunt ptures, manifestum est quoniam et prima multa vel nihil significat, neque enim ext aliquis homo equus.

Si ergo hæ multa significantet sunt plures, man ifestum est quod et prima, id est ea quae dicit, est tunica alba, multa vel nihil significat.Nihil autem idcirco quoniam Hi non multa designet propositio cujus quilibet terminus æquivocus est, cum illa quae nomine aequivoco significanturjuncta fuerint,neque in unam substantiam convenerint, talis juncturae quae res sibimet incontextas copulant,non erit nullus intellectus: ut in ea quæest, tunica alba est,aliteresse una non potest, si tunica equum hominemque significet., nisi equus atque homo,juncti unum aliquid efficiant; sed hiterminitales sunt, ut necesse sit hanc propositionem vel multiplicem esse, vel nibil significare: nam si jungantur bomo et equus, fit nihil. Nibil enim est humo equus, quod per hoc monstravit, quod ait: Neque enim est aliquid homo equus, hoc autem cur nunc ab ipso propositum sit, lucidissime demonstravit; cum enim de his propositionibus loqueretur quae verumintersefalsumque dividerent, hoc addidit, quod etiam hae quas habent vel prædicatum æquivocum, vel subjectum, verum falsumque non dividunt, utraeque enim esse verse possunt, ut haec quae dicunt, est liber homo si ad ingenuitatem referas, et non est liber homo, si ad Dionysium. Recte igitur dictum est:

English

If therefore these signify many things and are many, it is evident that the first also signifies many things or nothing; for neither is any man a horse.

If therefore these signify many things and are many, it is evident that the first also—that is, what he says, "the tunic is white"—signifies many things or nothing. But it signifies nothing for this reason: that a proposition is not a designation of many things when any one of its terms is equivocal, since the things signified by an equivocal name, when joined together, have not come together into one substance; of such a joining as couples things interconnected with one another there will be no single understanding. For example, in the proposition "the tunic is white," it cannot be one in any other way, if "tunic" signifies a horse and a man, unless horse and man joined together make one thing. But these are terminal, so that it is necessary that this proposition be either multiple or signify nothing; for if man and horse are joined, nothing is made. For "man horse" is nothing, which he showed by this, that he said: "For neither is any man a horse." But why this has now been proposed by him, he has demonstrated most clearly; for when he was speaking about those propositions which divide the true and the false between them, he added this, that even those which have either an equivocal predicate or an equivocal subject do not divide the true and the false. For both can be true, as these which say "a free man is" if you refer it to free birth, and "a free man is not" if you refer it to Dionysius. Rightly therefore it has been said:

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:84 · narrative
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Quare nec in his necesse est hanc quidem contradictionem veram esse, illam vero falsam.

Cum enim m:Jlta significat, multiplex significatio in negationeatque affirmationese invicem non perimit, quod si una sit affirmatio et una negatio, quoniam utræque in eodem esse non possunt., unam veram semper, falsam alteram esse necesse est.

DE FUTURIS CONTINGENTIBUS.

lit his ergo quæ sunt, et facta sunt, necesse est affirmationem, vel negationem, veram esse vel falsam. Acin universalibus quidem universaliter semper hancveram, illam vero falsam esse, et in his quæ sunt singularia, quemadmodum dictum est. In his vero quæ in universalibus non universaliter dicuntur, non est necesse, dictum est autem et de his.

In praesentibus rebus et in praeteritis Factas contradictorias enuntiationes dicit definite, unam semper veram, alteram definite semper esse mendacem, ut si quis dicat: OmnesFabn perierunt, qui ad pugnam contraVeientesprivataconspirationeprogressi sunt. Hoc si negetur sic, non omnes Fabii perierant, qui ad pugnamcontra Veientes privata conspiratione progressi sunt, necesseestquidemunam veram, alteram esse falsam, sed del1nite vera affirmatio est, definite falsa, negatio.

English

Therefore neither in these is it necessary that this one of the contradiction be true and that one false. For when it signifies many things, the multiple signification in the negation and the affirmation does not destroy one another; but if the affirmation is one and the negation one, since both cannot be in the same, it is necessary that one always be true and the other false.

ON FUTURE CONTINGENTS.

In those things therefore which are and have been done, it is necessary that the affirmation or the negation be true or false. And in universals indeed, universally, it is always necessary that this one be true and that one false, and in those things which are singular, as has been said. But in those things which are said in universals not universally, it is not necessary; and it has been said also concerning these.

In present things and in past things he says that contradictory statements are definite: that one is always true, the other definitely always false; as if someone should say: All the Fabii perished who went forth to battle against the Veientes in a private conspiracy. If this is denied thus — not all the Fabii perished who went forth to battle against the Veientes in a private conspiracy — it is indeed necessary that one be true and the other false, but the affirmation is definitely true and the negation definitely false.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:85 · narrative
Source · Latin

Cum enim id quod factum est dicitur factum, definite verum est, quod si id factum esse denegetur, falsum est definite; siveergo in universalibus universaliter prædicatis contradictio per oppositionem particularitatis fiat, sive in singularibus, ut in Socrate et in cæteris individuis in his quoque quæ sunt præterita, semper una vera est, altera falsa, ut in eo quod est, Socrates veneno peremptus est. Socrates veneno peremptus non est, vera est affirmatio definite, et ita rursus falsa negatio est in præsentibus quoque idem esse necesse est. Si enim, disputante Socrate, dicat aliquis: Socrates disputat, et hoc alius neget, sicut disputare Socratem præsentis lemporis ratione definitura est, ita quoque definite affirmatio retinet et veritatem, negatio definite mendacium. Et in universalibus quidem vel affirmatis vel negativis, in quibus vel affirmatio particularis, vel negatio particularis opponitur idem est. Hoc est enim quod ait: In his quae sunt, et quae facta sunt, id est in praesentibus atque in præteritis, una semper defir.ite vera est, semper altera falsa definite, sive universalis sit una, altera particularis. Quod per hoc monstratur, quod ait: In universalibus quidem universaliler, semper hanc esse veram, illam vero falsam, sive in singularibus atque individuis prædicamentis.

English

For when what has been done is said to have been done, it is definitely true; but if it is denied that it has been done, it is definitely false. Therefore, whether the contradiction arises through opposition of particularity in universals predicated universally, or in singulars—as in Socrates and the other individuals, and in these also which are past—always one is true and the other false; as in "Socrates has been killed by poison" and "Socrates has not been killed by poison": the affirmation is definitely true, and so again the negation is false. In present things too it must be the same. For if, while Socrates is disputing, someone says "Socrates is disputing," and another denies this, just as "Socrates is disputing" will be defined by the reckoning of present time, so too the affirmation definitely retains truth and the negation definitely falsehood. And in universals, whether affirmed or denied, in which either a particular affirmation or a particular negation is opposed, the same holds. For this is what he says: in things which are and which have been done, that is, in present and in past things, one is always definitely true and the other always definitely false, whether one is universal and the other particular. This is shown by what he says: in universals indeed universally, this one is always true and that one false, whether in singulars and individual predicates.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:86 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod per hoc designat quod addidit: Et in his quae sunt singularia, una vera est, altera falsa; sed postquam dixit de contradictoriis, adjecit, in his autem quas indefinitæ sunt, non necesse est semper hanc quidem veram, illam vero esse mendacem. Hoc scilicet designans quod ait: In his vero qua? in universalibus non universaliter dicuntur, non est necesse in his unam veram, alteram falsam proponi, potest enim fieri ut utraeque sint verae quae fuerint indefinitæ.

In singularibus vero, et (uturis non similiter.Propositionum aliæ sunt tantum inesse significantes, ut si quis Socrate vivo dixisset: Socrates calvus est, alius negaret, Socrates calvus non est. Illa enim inesse posuit Socrati calvitiem, illa calvitiem a 80crate disjunxit. Aliae vero sunt necessariæ, ut si quis dicat, Necesse est solem annis omnibus in Arietem rursus redire. Rem namque necessariam et ex necessitate evenientem prædicaus, totam fecit necessariam propositionem. Aliae autem sunt contingentes, quae cum non sint, eas tamen in futurum evenire possibile est, ut si quis dicat: Hodie Alexander pransurus est, hodie Alexander pransurus non est. Etenim cum ista dicantur, quoniam illi adhuc prandere non inest, inesse tamen contingit,, et potest fieri ut oeprandeat, idcirco dicimus eas contingentes, contingit enim fieri, quoniam adhuc nondum facta est. Sed hæ non insunt quidem, ut dictum est.

English

He indicates this by what he added: "And in those things which are singular, one is true, the other false." But after he spoke about contradictories, he added: "In those, however, which are indefinite, it is not necessary that one be true and the other false." He indicates this, namely, by what he said: "In those, however"—which?—"that are said of universals not universally," it is not necessary that one be proposed as true and the other as false; for it can happen that both are true, being indefinite.

In singulars, however, and in future things it is not similarly so. Some propositions signify only that something is present, as if someone, while Socrates is alive, should say, "Socrates is bald," and another should deny, "Socrates is not bald." For the one posited baldness as present in Socrates, the other separated baldness from Socrates. Others are necessary, as if someone should say, "It is necessary that the sun return again to Aries in all years." For by predicating a necessary thing and one that comes about from necessity, he made the whole proposition necessary. Others, however, are contingent, which, though they are not, it is nevertheless possible for them to come about in the future, as if someone should say, "Today Alexander is going to dine," "Today Alexander is not going to dine." For when these things are said, since dining is not yet present in him, yet it can be present, and it can happen that he dines, for that reason we call them contingent; for it can happen to come about, since it has not yet been done. But these are not present, as has been said.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:87 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sunt enim futuri temporis. Quae autem non insunt, sed inesse possunt, necessarias non sunt, quoniam hujusmodi retinent naturam, ut eas et esse, et non esse possibile sit, potest enim feri ut hodie Alexander prandeat, et rursus fieri ut hodie non prandeat. Et hanc eveniendi vel non eveniendi possibilitatem, utrumlibet vocamus. In hujusmodi enim rebus utrumlibet contingit, aut affirmatio, aut negatio, et non est necesse aut affirmationem fieri, aut negationem. Nam cum non sit affirmatio necessaria, non interclusum est contingere negationem. Rursus cum negatio necessaria non sit, interdum accidit, ut affirmatio contingat. Quare hæc hujusmodi eveniendi et non eveniendi potentia, utrumlibet vocatur. Quod in his utrumlibet, id est vel atfirmationes vel negationes, evenire conceditur. Nunc ergo Aristoteles hoc validissima argumentatione contendit astruere, quod quemadmodum:n præteritis, et in his quæ sunt præsentia, non modoin affirmatione et negatione, unam veram, alteram falsam esse necesse est, sed definite una vera est, definite altera suscipit falsitatem, non ita in his quae contingentes vocantur. Necesse enim est utaut affirmatio vera sit, aut negatio, sed non ut definite quælibet earum vera sit, altera falsa definite.

English

For they are of future time. But those things which are not present but can be present are not necessary, since things of this kind retain a nature such that it is possible for them both to be and not to be; for it can happen that Alexander dines today, and again it can happen that he does not dine today. And this possibility of coming about or not coming about we call "either of the two." For in things of this kind either the affirmation or the negation happens as "either of the two," and it is not necessary that either the affirmation come about or the negation. For since the affirmation is not necessary, it is not excluded that the negation may happen. Again, since the negation is not necessary, it sometimes happens that the affirmation comes about. Wherefore this power of coming about and not coming about in things of this kind is called "either of the two." For in these it is granted that "either of the two," that is, either affirmations or negations, may come about. Now, therefore, Aristotle strives to establish by the strongest argument that, just as in past things and in those which are present, not only in affirmation and negation is it necessary that one be true and the other false, but one is definitely true and the other definitely receives falsity, it is not so in those things which are called contingent. For it is necessary that either the affirmation be true or the negation, but not that each of them be definitely true and the other definitely false.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:88 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam quod dicimus Alexander lavandus est, id si alius neget, dicatque: Alexander lavandus non est, tolum quidem hoc necesse est evenire, ut aut lavetur, aut non lavetur, et necesse est unam esse veram, alteram si lotus fuerit, aut si lotusfalsam, aut affirmationem, non fuerit, negationem. Sed non est necesse ut definite affirmatio vera sit, idcirco quod in hujusmodi rebus poterit evenire negatio. Sed nec unquam definitum est, ut negatio vera sit, falsa affirmatio. idcirco quoniam potest non evenire negatio. Quare in tota contradictione, unam quidem veram, falsam alteram esse necesse est. Ut autem definite una vera sit, altera falsa definite, sicut in his quae sunt præterita quæque præsentia, nulla ratione rerum possi bile est. Sed hoc prius Aristoteles in -singularium praedicamentorum propositionibus probat. Post autem idem debere in universalibus docet intelligi. Idcirco enim ait, in singularibus vero et futuris non similiter. Id est in singularibus propositionibus, et de quibus prius tractat, et in futuris, id est in contingentibus, non idem modus est verarum falsarumque propositionum, qui est in præsenteritis atque præsentibus.

English

For what we say, "Alexander is to be bathed," if another denies it and says, "Alexander is not to be bathed," the whole of this must necessarily come about, that he is either bathed or not bathed, and one of them must be true and the other false—either the affirmation if he has been bathed, or the negation if he has not been bathed. But it is not necessary that the affirmation be definitely true, for the reason that in matters of this kind the negation can come about. Nor is it ever definite that the negation is true and the affirmation false, for the reason that the negation can fail to come about. Wherefore in the whole contradiction it is necessary that one be true and the other false. But that one be definitely true and the other definitely false, as in things past and present, is in no way possible by the nature of things. But Aristotle first proves this in propositions about singular predicates. Afterwards he teaches that the same must be understood in universal propositions. For this reason he says, "but in singulars and futures it is not similarly"—that is, in singular propositions, both those about which he treated earlier and those about the future, that is, in contingent matters, the mode of true and false propositions is not the same as it is in past and present things.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:89 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quoniam in præteritis atque præsentibus, et to tum contradictionis corpus in veritatem falsi tatemque dividitur, et vera est una definite, ut possit exhis certus aliquis nul-ac sciens dicere quoniam affirmatio vera sit, vel rursus, quoniam negatio; vel si id nul lus dixerit, certa jam præteriti temporis vel præsentis secundum sui naturam ratio, certusque eventus est, in his vero in quibus contingens est et futurum, idestvariabile etinslabile, totum quidem corpus contradictionis veritatem falsitalemque partitur,sed hæc veritas atque falsilas indiscreta est atque volubilis. Nullus enim potest dicere quoniam affirmatio vera est. N on est enim necesse veram esse affirmationem, idcirco quoniam negationem fieri possibile est, nec rursus negationem, quoniam non est impossibile affirmationem contingere, et postremo quoniam utrumlibet ipsorum contingit, idcirco una earum, vera esse definite et certa, naturaliter non potest, quibusautem id argumentationibusexsequatur, manifestum erit hoc modo:

English

Since in past and present things both the whole body of the contradiction is divided into truth and falsity, and one of them is definitely true, so that from these someone who knows can state with certainty that the affirmation is true, or again that the negation is; or if no one has said so, the reason of past or present time is already certain according to its own nature, and the outcome is certain—but in those things in which there is contingency and a future, that is, what is variable and unsettled, the whole body of the contradiction is indeed divided into truth and falsity, but this truth and falsity is indistinct and shifting. For no one can say that the affirmation is true. For it is not necessary that the affirmation be true for the reason that it is possible for the negation to come about, nor again that the negation be true for the reason that it is not impossible for the affirmation to happen; and finally, because either of them can happen, for that reason one of them cannot naturally be definitely and certainly true. But by what arguments this is worked out will be clear in this way:

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:90 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam si omnis affirmatio vel negatio, vera vel falsa est, et omne necesse est vei esse vel non esse. Quare si hic quidem dicat futurum aliquid, ille vero non dicat hoe idem ipsum, manifestum est quoniarn necesse est verum dicere alterum ipsorum, si omnis affirmatio vel negatio vera vel alsa est. Utræque enim non erunt simul in talibus.

Si quidquid in affirmationibus negationibusque proponitur, verum vel falsum est definite, sequitur ut quod ilIænegationes affirmationesque significant, aut evenire, aut non evenire necesse sit; hoc est enim quod dicit: Nam si omnis affirmatio vel negatio vera vel falsa est definite; idcirco enim addit omnis. In his enim quae sunt futura vel contingentia, non esse affirmationes et negationes veras vel falsas definite probare contendit. Nam si unus dicat aliquid futurum, alius neget, ut utraque eveniant, fieri non potest; quis enim dixerit, dicente aliquo Socrates cœnaturus est, alioque negante Socrates crenaturus non est, utrasqueveras in uno eodemque contingere? Hoc igitur fieri non potest; unus ergo eorum verum dicturus. est alius mentietur: ponatur enim una eorum definite vera esse, vel falsa, si ergo omnis affirmafio et negatio vera vel falsa est definite, et uterque negans affirmansque veri in contradictionibus esse non possunt, necesse est unum verum dicere. alterum falsum, et unum definite verum, alterum definite falsum.

English

For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, and everything must either be or not be. Therefore if one person says that something will be and another says that this same thing will not be, it is clear that one of them must speak the truth, if every affirmation or negation is true or false. For both will not be true at the same time in such cases.

If whatever is proposed in affirmations and negations is definitely true or false, it follows that what those negations and affirmations signify must either happen or not happen; for this is what he says: For if every affirmation or negation is definitely true or false; for that reason he adds "every." For in those things which are future or contingent, he contends that affirmations and negations are not definitely true or false. For if one person says that something will be and another denies it, it cannot happen that both come about; for who would say that, when one person says "Socrates will dine" and another denies it, saying "Socrates will not dine," both are true in one and the same case? This, then, cannot happen; therefore one of them will speak the truth, the other will lie. For let it be supposed that one of them is definitely true or false; if, therefore, every affirmation and negation is definitely true or false, and both the one denying and the one affirming cannot be in the truth in contradictions, it is necessary that one speak the truth, the other falsehood, and that one be definitely true, the other definitely false.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:91 · narrative
Source · Latin

Hoc si estin omnibus affirmationibus atque negationibus, ut una definite falsa sit, altera vera definite, quidquid vera dicit eventurum eve. nire necesse est, quidquid non eventurum non evenire necesse est, boc est enim quod ait: Manifestum est quoniam necesse est verum dicere alterum ipsorum; neque enim potest fieri ut affirmatio negatioque consentiant in talibus, id est in contradictionis propositionibus. Necesse esautem evenire quaecunque vera definite affirmatio loquitur, et non evenire quod profert definite vera negatio, quod sic probat.

Nam si verum est dicere, quoniam est album vel non album, necesse est esse album uel non album. Bt si est album vel non album, verum est atfirmare vel negare, et si non est, mentitur, et si mentitur, non est. Quare necesse est aut affirmationem, aut negationem veram esse vel falsam.

Quod de futuropossitesse judicium, a præsentibus trahit exemplum: ait enim hanc esse rerum consequentiam, utrem subsistentem propositionis veritasconsequatur, veritatem propositionis rei, de qua 10quitur propositio, essentia comitetur. Nam si hic lapis vequodlibet aualbum est, verum est de eo dicere quoniam album est, et hoc convertitur. Nam si verum est dicere de eo quoniam album est, sine dubio album est, et album esse necesse est, itaque fit ut res veritatem, et veritas rem, de qua proponitur, subsequatur.

English

If this holds for all affirmations and negations—that one is definitely false and the other definitely true—then whatever the true statement says will happen must necessarily happen, and whatever it says will not happen must necessarily not happen. For this is what he means when he says: It is manifest that one of them must speak the truth; for it cannot happen that affirmation and negation agree in such cases, that is, in propositions that form a contradiction. But whatever a definitely true affirmation states must necessarily happen, and whatever a definitely true negation states must necessarily not happen, which he proves as follows.

For if it is true to say that something is white or is not white, it is necessary that it be white or not be white. And if it is white or not white, it is true to affirm or deny it; and if it is not, the statement lies, and if it lies, it is not. Therefore it is necessary that either the affirmation or the negation be true or false.

That there can be a judgment about the future, he draws an example from present things; for he says that this is the consequence of things: that the truth of a proposition follows upon the thing's existing, and the existence of the thing about which the proposition speaks accompanies the truth of the proposition. For if this stone or any white thing whatsoever is white, it is true to say of it that it is white, and this converts. For if it is true to say of it that it is white, without doubt it is white, and it is necessary that it be white. And so it comes about that the thing follows the truth, and the truth follows the thing about which the proposition is made.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:92 · narrative
Source · Latin

Rursus si hic lapis albus non est, verum est de eo dicere quoniam non est albus, et si de eo verum est dicere quoniam non est albus, ut sit albus fieri non potest, cum vere dicatur quoniam non est albus.Idem quoque etiam in mendaciis valet. Nam si quid non est, cum hoc aliquis esse proposuit, mentietur. Et si quis de alio mentietur, illud de quo fit mendacium non est, ut si quam rem cum alba non sit dicat, aliquis esse albam mentitus est, quocirca necesse est illud quoque non esse de quo mentitus est. Ita igitur veritas quidem rei quae est, et res quæ est veritati, falsitas vero rei quae non est, et res quae non est, falsitati convertitur, quod si hoc est in omnibus rebus, quidquid dioitur cum veritate vel falsitate, ad rem quae est vel non est convertitur. sive negatio sil, sive affirmatio, et unam veram semper, alteram falsam esse necesse est; si una definite vera est, impossibile quiddam ex bac positione continget. Evenient namque omnia, quaecunque sunt vel fiuntexnecessitatefieri, etnihil a casu, nihil que esse possibile quod sit, et non esse possibile. Nihil etiam in liberi arbitrii moderamine relinquetur, sed totum erit ex necessitate. quidquid evenerit. Nam si verum est definilede qualibet re dicere quoniamerit, illam rem sine dubio futuram esse necesse est, et ut non fiat non potest evenire.

English

Again, if this stone is not white, it is true to say of it that it is not white; and if it is true to say of it that it is not white, it cannot come about that it is white, since it is truly said that it is not white. The same holds also in the case of falsehoods. For if something does not exist, when someone has proposed that it does exist, he will lie. And if someone lies about something else, that about which the lie is made does not exist; so if someone says that a thing is white when it is not white, he has lied that it is white, and therefore it is necessary that that also, about which he lied, does not exist. Thus, then, truth is converted with the thing that exists, and the thing that exists with the truth; while falsehood is converted with the thing that does not exist, and the thing that does not exist with falsehood. But if this holds in all things, whatever is said with truth or falsehood is converted to the thing that exists or does not exist, whether it be a negation or an affirmation, and one must always be true and the other false. If one is definitely true, something impossible will follow from this position. For all things whatsoever that are or come to be will come to be by necessity, and nothing will be by chance, and nothing will be possible that is, and not be possible. Nothing will even be left in the governance of free will, but everything whatsoever that has happened will be from necessity. For if it is true to say definitely of any thing that it will be, that thing must without doubt be going to exist, and it cannot come about that it not happen.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:93 · narrative
Source · Latin

Verum enim est dicere de ea quouiam futura est, nee verum de ea quoniam futura est poterat dici,nisi eam fore esset necesse; quare si in omni affirmatione ct negatione,aut affirmatio aut negatio in futurum definite,vera vel falsa est, necesse est val quod ab affirmatione vera defi. nite,vel quod a negatione dicitur falsum evenire.ln falsitate quoque similis causa est. Nam quod non erit,falsum est dicere quoniam erit.Et quod falsum est dicere quoniam erit, ex necessitate non erit. Item quod erit,fa]sum est dicere quoniam non erit, et quod falsum est dicere quoniam non erit necessarioerit. Ut igitur veras propositionesnecessarifs sequitur eventus ut fiat, quod dicitur, ita et falsas propositiones necessarius sequitur eventus,ut non fiat, quod dicitur afalsapropositione.Quod si in futurum omnis affirmatio vel negatio definite semperdividunt veritatem et falsitatem,erit rerum qua? prædicantur necessarius eventus,et omnia ex necessitate contingent, vel non contingent,emaque et casus,et possibilitas,et liberum perit arbitrium. Syllogismus aut hujusmodi est: si omnis affirmatio vera est aut falsa definite, et eodem modo negatio eveniet, ut omnia inevitabili necessitatis ratione contingant, quod si hoc est, liberum perit arbitrium.

English

For it is true to say of it that it will be, and it could not be said to be true of it that it will be unless it were necessary that it should be; wherefore if in every affirmation and negation, either the affirmation or the negation concerning the future is definitely true or false, it is necessary that whatever is definitely stated by a true affirmation, or whatever is stated by a negation, should come about. In falsity too the cause is similar. For what will not be, it is false to say that it will be. And what it is false to say will be, will necessarily not be. Likewise, what will be, it is false to say will not be; and what it is false to say will not be, will necessarily be. Therefore, just as true propositions are followed by the necessary outcome that what is said should happen, so also false propositions are followed by the necessary outcome that what is said by a false proposition should not happen. But if, concerning the future, every affirmation or negation always definitely divides truth and falsity, there will be a necessary outcome of the things that are predicated, and all things will come about by necessity, or will not come about, and thus chance, possibility, and free will perish. And the syllogism is of this sort: if every affirmation is definitely true or false, and the negation comes about in the same way, then all things will come about by the principle of inevitable necessity; but if this is so, free will perishes.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:94 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed hoc impossibile est; non igitur verum est omnem affirmationem vel negationem veram esse definite vel falsam.Omnia autem ex necessitatecontingere, si illæ detmite verae vel falsae sunt,talis syllogismus ostendit: omnisin futurum definita veritas vel falsitas eventum rei vel futurum vel non futurum ex necessitate conslituit, sed omnes propositiones futurae definite veræ vel falsae sunt.ln omnibus igitur eveniendi, vel non eve. niendi necessitas erit, pro qua conclusione illud Aristoteles intulit, quod ait:

Nihil igitur neque est, neque fit, nee a casu, nee utrumlibet, nec erit, nec non erit, sed ex necessitate omnia et non utrumlibet, aut enim qui dicit; verus est, aut qui negat.

Casus namque,et id quod est utrumlibet exstinguitur,liberaetiam voluntas adimitur,si omnia quæcunque fient; ex necessitate futura sunt; et probat superiorem conclusionem, quae dicit omnia ex neessitate contingere, per hoc quod ait: aut enim ui, dicit verus est,aut qui negat; si ergo veritus rerum necessitati eonvertitur,aut qui negat verus est, aut qui affirmat omnia fieri et necessitate necesse est. Nam si non erunt ex necessitate,non erunt verae definite, id quod ipse subjunxit:

English

But this is impossible; therefore it is not true that every affirmation or negation is definitely true or false. But that all things come about by necessity, if those [propositions] are definitely true or false, such a syllogism shows: every definite truth or falsity concerning the future establishes the outcome of the matter as either going to be or not going to be by necessity, but all propositions about the future are definitely true or false. In all things, therefore, there will be necessity of coming about or not coming about, for which conclusion Aristotle inferred that which he says:

Nothing, therefore, either is or comes about, neither by chance nor as either of two outcomes, nor will it be nor will it not be, but all things are by necessity and not as either of two outcomes; for either the one who says it is true, or the one who denies it.

For chance, and that which is either of two outcomes, is extinguished, and free will is also taken away, if all things whatsoever that will come about are going to be by necessity; and he proves the superior conclusion, which says that all things come about by necessity, through this that he says: for either the one who says it is true, or the one who denies it; if therefore truth is turned into the necessity of things, either the one who denies is true, or the one who affirms that all things come about by necessity. For if they will not be by necessity, they will not be definitely true, which he himself added:

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:95 · narrative
Source · Latin

Similiter enim, vel fient, vel non fieret, utrumlibet enim nihil magis sie ved non sic se hahet, aut habebit.

Exponit enim quæ sit contingentis natura, cum quid sit utrumlibet exponit,utrumlibet est id cujus indiscretus eventus est,id est, quod æqualiter esse vel non esse contingit.Hoc est enim quod ait,similiter enim fieret vel non fieret. Neque enim directam viam necessariamquebabet unam vel aMrmationem vel negationem,sed nihil se magis sic habet,vel sio non habet, et est utrumlibet quod æqualem cursum et ad evenire retinet, et ad non evenire.Nihil enim se magis vel sic habet, vel sic non habet, id est aequaliter se habet ad esse,et ad non esse. Nihil enim magis sese habet, ut fiat quam ut non fiat.

Amplius si est album nunc, verum erat dicere prius quoniam erit album, quare semper verum fuit dicere quodlibet eorum quæ facta sunt, quoniam est vel erit.

English

For in like manner it will either come about or will not come about; for in the case of the contingent, nothing is more disposed thus or not thus, nor will be.

For he sets forth what the nature of the contingent is, when he explains what "either of the two" is. "Either of the two" is that whose outcome is undetermined, that is, what can equally come to be or not come to be. For this is what he says: "for in like manner it would come about or would not come about." For neither an affirmation nor a negation has one direct and necessary path, but nothing is more disposed thus or not thus, and it is "either of the two" that keeps an equal course both toward coming about and toward not coming about. For nothing is more disposed thus or not thus, that is, it is equally disposed toward being and toward not being. For nothing is more disposed to come about than not to come about.

Moreover, if it is white now, it was true to say before that it will be white; therefore it was always true to say of any of the things that have come about that it is or will be.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:96 · narrative
Source · Latin

Validam sibi ipsi vim argumentationis opponit,qua possit ostendere affirmationes negationesque veras vel falsas esse definite, et ait providendum esse ne forte necesse sit suspicari id quod jam factum est vere dici potuisse antequam fieret,esse faciendum, ut si Socrates hesterna nocte cænavit, verum fuit hesterna matutina dicere, quoniam coenaturus est; quocirca definite quoque verum fuisset, seeo pra'diceretur. Omnia igi).ur ea quae fiunt definite poterant vera prædicari. Hoc est enim quod dicit,Bi est album nunc, verum erat dicere prius quoniam erit albu:n.Nam si qua res nunc alba est,verum erat ante dicere quoniam erit alba, quare definite quoque fuit quodlibeteorum quae facta sunt vere prædicere. Hoc enim rei ipsius exitus comprobavit. Huic oppositioniper eadem rursus occurit.Nam enim quid hæc dicit, licet ei laqueum superioris argumentationis effugere,rursus enim eadem illum cuncta circumveniunt,et eisdem iterum urgetur incommodis.

English

He sets against himself the strong force of an argument by which he can show that affirmations and negations are definitely true or false, and says that care must be taken lest perhaps one must suspect that what has already happened could truly have been said before it happened that it was going to happen; so that if Socrates dined last night, it was true yesterday morning to say that he was going to dine; and for that reason it would also have been definitely true if it had been foretold. All things, therefore, that come about could definitely have been truly foretold. For this is what he says: if it is white now, it was true to say beforehand that it will be white. For if some thing is white now, it was true to say before that it will be white; therefore it was also definite to truly foretell whatever of those things that have been done. For the outcome of the thing itself has proved this. Against this objection he again meets them by the same means. For what does he say to this? Although he may escape the snare of the earlier argument, the same considerations again surround him on all sides, and he is again pressed by the same difficulties.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:97 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod si semper verum (uit dIcere quoniam est vel erit, non potest hoc non esse vel non (uturum esse. Quoi autem non potest non fieri impossibile est non fieri; et quod impossibile est non fieri, necesse est fieri. Omnia ergo quæ futura sUnl, necesse est fieri, nihil igitur utrumlibet, neque casu erit; nam si casu, non ex necessitate.

Mira ratione superiorum argumentationem dicentis ad idem reduxit incommodum dicens: Siverum est omnia quaecunque facta sunt, definite vere potuisse prædici,quoniam veritatem propositionis rei necessitas sequitur, quod vere definite praedicatum erat non evenire non poterat; sed si non evenire non poterat,ut non eveniret erat impossibile. Quod autem non fieri impossibile est, fieri necesse est. Eventus igitur ejus ex necessitate consequitur.Nihil ergo utrumlibet, neque a casu erit. Nam si a casu esse poterit, non ex necessitate futurum est;quod si non es ex necessitate tuturum,non non fieri; si non est impossibile non fieri,potestnon fieri; si potest non fieri, non potest definite vere prædici. Quod enim vere definite prædicetur,ex necessitate futurum est, quod autem a casu est, ex necessitate non evenit.

English

But if it is always true to say that a thing is or will be, then it cannot not be or not be going to be. But what cannot not happen, it is impossible not to happen; and what is impossible not to happen, it is necessary that it happen. Therefore all things that are future must necessarily happen; nothing, then, is a matter of either outcome, nor will it be by chance; for if by chance, not from necessity.

By a remarkable argument he reduced the reasoning of the one speaking above to the same difficulty, saying: If it is true that all things whatsoever that have been done could have been definitely and truly predicted, then, since the necessity of the thing follows from the truth of the proposition, what had been truly and definitely predicted could not fail to happen; but if it could not fail to happen, it was impossible that it not happen. But what it is impossible not to happen, it is necessary that it happen. The outcome of it, therefore, follows from necessity. Nothing, then, will be a matter of either outcome, nor will it be by chance. For if it can be by chance, it will not be going to happen from necessity; but if it is not going to happen from necessity, it is not impossible not to happen; if it is not impossible not to happen, it can not happen; if it can not happen, it cannot be definitely and truly predicted. For what is truly and definitely predicted is going to happen from necessity, whereas what is by chance does not happen from necessity.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:98 · narrative
Source · Latin

At veronec quoniam neutrum verum est, contingit dicere ut quoniam neque erit, neque non erit; primum enim cum sit affirmatio falsa, erit negatio non vera, et cum hæc sis falsa, contingit affirmationem esse non veram.

Quatuor differentiis contingentium futurorum diversitas constat.Autenim id quod affirmatur etnegatur in futurum,utrumque erit verum aut utrumque fal- Į sum; aut unum verum, falsum alterum definite; aut unum verum, falsum alterumindetinite.Non enimesse quidem et affirmationem et negationem veram in hispropositionibus,quæ de rebus contingentibus in futurum proponuntur per hoc demonstravit superius quod ait: Manifestum est quoniam necesse est verum dicere,alterum ipsorum, si omnis affirmatio vera vel Falsa est.Utraque enim non erunt simul in talibus.Neque enim fieri potest ut in contradictoria propositionum oppositione, utrasque veras quisquam valeat invenirc.Nunc autem monstratur quo niam ne hoc quidem fieri potest ut utraeque sint falsæ,ait enim: At vero,ne hocquidem nobis contingit dicere quoniam neutrum verum est,id est nee a[firmatio,nec negatio; contingeret autam utraque esse falsam affirmationem scilicet et negationem, si nec quod diceret affirmatio, futurum esset,nec,non esse.negatio diceret non esset. Ita enim fieret,ut nec esset. quod affirmatio, esse prædieavit, nec non esset quod negatio non esse proposuit.

English

But neither can we say that neither is true, namely that it will neither be nor not be; for first, since the affirmation is false, the negation will not be true, and since this is false, it follows that the affirmation is not true.

The diversity of contingent future things consists in four differences. For what is affirmed and denied with respect to the future is either both true or both false; or one is true and the other false definitely; or one is true and the other false indefinitely. For that both the affirmation and the negation are not true in those propositions which are put forward concerning contingent future things, he demonstrated above by this, when he said: It is manifest that it is necessary to say what is true, one of them, if every affirmation is true or false. For both will not be together in such cases. Nor indeed can it happen that in the contradictory opposition of propositions anyone be able to find both true. But now it is shown that not even this can happen, that both be false; for he says: But neither can we say this, that neither is true, that is, neither the affirmation nor the negation; but it would follow that both are false, namely the affirmation and the negation, if neither what the affirmation said would be, nor what the negation said would not be. For thus it would come about that neither would be what the affirmation declared to be, nor would not be what the negation proposed not to be.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:99 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si quis ergo hoc ita dicat, primum,inquit, illud inconveniens atque impossibile est,quod in contradictoria propositione, cum affirmatio falsa sit non est vera negatio,et rur sus cum negatio falsa sit, falsa quoque affirmatio sit.Hoe enim in solis contrariis contingebat, non etiam in contradictoria oppositione.In hac enim unam semper veram esse necesse est, semperalteram falsam.

Ad hæc si verum est dicere quoniam albuni est et magnum, oportet esse utrumque. Si vero erit cras, oportet esse cras Si autem.nequc erit, neque non erit cras non erit.utrumlibet, ut navale bellum. Oportebit enim neque fieri navale bellum, neque non fieri. Quæ ergo contingunt inconvenientia hæc sunt,,et hujusmodi alia,siomnis affirmationis el negationis,vel in his quæ de universalibus dicuntur universaliter, in his quæ sunt singularia,necesse est, esse, opposilarum hanc quidem veram esse illam vero falsam. Nihil autem utrumtibet esse in his quæ fiunt, sed omnia esse et fieri ex necessitate. Quare non oportebit neque consulere, neque negotiari,ut si facimus, erit hoc,si veronon hoc, non eritNihilenim prohibet in millesimum an num hunc quidem dicere hoc futurum esse, illum vero non dicere. Quare ex necessitate erit quodlibet eorum, unc ab eo verum erat dicere. At vero neque hoc differt,si aliquis dixerit dixerit contradictionem, vel non di xerit.

English

If anyone, then, says this, he says, first, that that is incongruous and impossible: that in a contradictory proposition, when the affirmation is false, the negation is not true, and again when the negation is false, the affirmation is also false. For this used to happen only in contraries, not also in contradictory opposition. For in this, one must always be true, and the other always false.

In addition to these things, if it is true to say that it is white and large, both must be. But if it will be tomorrow, it must be tomorrow. But if it will neither be nor not be, tomorrow it will not be, whichever of the two. For example, a naval battle. For it will be necessary that a naval battle neither happen nor not happen. These, then, are the incongruities that follow, and others of this sort, if of every affirmation and negation, both in those things that are said universally of universals and in those that are singular, it is necessary that of the opposites one be true and the other false. But nothing is to be whichever of the two in things that come to be, but all things are and come to be from necessity. Therefore it will not be necessary either to deliberate or to conduct business, as if, if we do this, this will be, but if we do not do this, it will not be. For nothing prevents someone from saying at the thousandth year that this will be, and another from saying that it will not. Therefore whichever of them it is will be from necessity, since it was true to say it then. But indeed it makes no difference whether someone has stated a contradiction or has not stated it.

stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:100 · narrative
Source · Latin

Manifestum est eaim quoniam se habentres, etiamsi non hic quidem affirmaverit ille vero negaverit, Non enim propter negare vel affirmare erit vet non erit, MCC in millesimum annum magis quam in quantolibet tempore. Quare si in omni tempore sic se habebat, ut unum diceretur vere, necesse erathoc fieri, et unumquodque eorum quæ (tunt sic semper se habebat, ut ex necessitate fieret. Quando enim vere dicit quis quoniam erit, non potest non fieri; et quod jactum est,verum erat dicere semper quoniam erit.

Addidit quoque aliud, quo magis id quod dicitur videatur incongruum.Omne enim idquod praedicitur in futurum, si vere prædicitur, erit. Si quis enim dicat in praesenti tempore, hoc animal quodlibet albumest, vel magni corporis,et ocvere pronuntiet, album et magnum illud animal esse necesse est.Ita etiam in futuro si quis vere dicat quoniam hocanimal cras album fiet, et corporis vastioris, necesse est cras utraque contingere,ut et album fiat et corporis vastioris. Sin vero falso aliquid prædicatur, necesse est non esse quod dicitur,si sit affirmatio:ut si quis affirmet falso futurum navale bellum,necesse est non fieri quod a falsa affirmatione prædicitur.At si sit falsa negatio,necesse est fieri quod falsa negatio futurum non esse prædixit; sin vero utraque falsa sunt, non erit ex necessitate quod dicitur, quia de.

English

For it is evident that things are so disposed that, even if this one affirms and that one denies, it will not be because of the denying or affirming that it will be or not be—more in the thousandth year than in any whatever time. Wherefore if in every time it was so disposed that one thing was truly said, it was necessary that this come about, and each one of those things which are was always so disposed that it came about by necessity. For when someone truly says that a thing will be, it cannot not come about; and what has been said, it was true to say always that it will be.

He added also another point, by which what is said may seem more incongruous. For everything that is foretold for the future, if it is truly foretold, will be. For if anyone says in the present time that this or that animal is white, or of large body, and pronounces it truly, that animal must be white and large. So also in the future, if anyone truly says that this animal will become white tomorrow, and of a more massive body, both must come about tomorrow, so that it both becomes white and becomes of a more massive body. But if something is foretold falsely, it is necessary that what is said not be, if it is an affirmation: as if anyone falsely affirms that a naval battle will be in the future, it is necessary that what is foretold by the false affirmation not come about. But if it is a false negation, it is necessary that what the false negation foretold would not be come about; but if both are false, what is said will not be by necessity, because concerning

Citation. Tergwame, “In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Duo”, stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2:1, machine-draft, 2026. https://naxiai.com/christian/works/stoa0058.stoa022.opp-lat2#s1
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