Treatise of Treatises, Book 1

First Proemium Preface The preface that precedes logic and demonstration is the treatise itself. First chapter: On simple terms. And these are five universals. Second chapter: On the composition of all the categories of predication. And on those that follow them, the post-predicaments. Third chapter: On the second composition of assertoric propositions. Fourth chapter: On demonstrative syllogism in particular. Fifth chapter: On sophistical syllogism, that is, fallacious, with the instrumental means of being, by which all goods are accomplished. This is the book of the Treatise of Treatises on rational philosophy and ethical example, which I have approached to write. From the collection of the venerable Mār Gregory, who is Abū al-Faraj Bar ʿEbrāyā. First Proemium: The treatise itself is the beginning of this composition. Bless, O Lord, Lord of lords, Creator of the eternal light, and Discoverer of the discovery of the heavens. Unite the beauties to your encounter, and do not let them be separated when you appear. Purify those who know you. Conquer those who are known to you. Make essences with the perfect substances, and substances with the luminous essences, hypostases with the distinct ones, and thoughts with the holy ones. For you are the sea of graces that is not agitated, and the abyss of mercies that is not disturbed. Bless your son by your nature and your spirit, the emanation from you. For you are the divine nature exalted above the worlds, and above your being with all the categories. For speech cannot exalt you as you exalt yourself and from you you are exalted. For your knowledge is the knowledge of knowledges, and the perfection in it is the perfection of perfections. For it is good that from all to its end it is perfected, and the fullness of reason is manifested. It is not subject to change in the changes of the modes, for neither are you changed.

that is above it, now the word, as in you, a pattern is tried for the word. And that which is above it from the ancients was for reflection, as in you, it is possible to come for elevation. As in a measured path, it is guided to the division of the categories. And by its beautiful meanings, it is followed. And because it is not careful that as it comes to the errors of deceits, it is stretched out. From the door of logical introductions, it enters. And from this, it is occupied with physiological knowledge. That is, it stands on the height of theology. And thus, the triopragmatic is by demonstrations and proofs in the word seen and measured for the word, as this of the epistle of epistles has come to be called, to be joined. As for the decision, it hastens the thoughts, and the extension separates the meanings to leave behind. The preparation that precedes logic and demonstration is the treatise itself. All knowledge or certainty is either apprehension, which is the simple perception of that which is known, or faith. Or it is for apprehension a limit of finality, or it follows elevation. And each one of these two is either by nature or by learning. By nature, it is without thought. Thought, however, I call here the composition of the mind from known things with unknown things. Or by learning, as that which is established by thought. And certainty is by nature, like that which is established from the existence of earth and water. And by learning, like that which is established from the existence of an angel or a soul. And faith is by nature, like that which believes that the great All is from matter. And by learning, like that which believes that for this All there is a creator. And knowledge is by nature, a matter that is of a primary limit, which is also called rationality. And because of this, it is not receptive to excess and deficiency. That which is by learning, however, is guided by it.

Another from another can become according to the mode of investigation and the precision of thought. And not all definitions, unless knowledge has emerged. Nor all syllogisms, unless something is learned. For there is no one that is like that which is learned from the foundations. And perfection from the beginning in knowledge is clearly defined. But not all are perfect. And this one, by thought, as was said, is called a treatise, so that it may be. And this one, not in its essence does it perish, nor is it opposed to the wise. Thoughts and reflections from definition arise from necessity. And the cause approached the organon, something like a tool of discipline, by which the mind, when its reflections are measured, and as if by a measure it is balanced, from the parts it proceeds. For that which is like this was called logic. Interpretation and solution: not said. If knowledge is learned about logic, it is inquired. Also logic, because it is knowledge learned about another logic, will be inquired. And that other about another. And thus ad infinitum. In that which is said, this would be preserved above. If it were learned in its entirety. And when a part of it is definition, like a syllogism that is complete. And a part of it is learned, like a syllogism that is not complete. Its learned part by its definitional part is definitionally learned, and not by another logic. Demonstration: and induction from that which is with the certainty of what is learned is a limit, and that is when it is like that which is known. That which is with the faith of what is learned is a syllogism, and that is when it is like that which is known. And because certainty is prior in nature to faith, it is. For this cannot be except after three certainties: that which is about which was a section of that which is placed is called.

And that in which occurs the division of that which is defined is understood. And the property of the division. Even in order it is fitting that it be preceded. And from the boundary of ten, when preceding and approaching the species of that which is, also he and his brothers are composed. First chapter on simple words, and these are five in total: Division: Knowledge is either a vocal sound, or it is the whole concept. And knowledge is the comprehension, like the signification of the name "human" for a rational animal, or for its species. And knowledge is the specific difference, like the signification of the name "house" for a roof or for a foundation, or for that which is externally attached. And knowledge is the attachment, like the signification of the name "roof" for a foundation. And knowledge is the comprehension which is the principal. For it gives the concept perfectly. These two, however, are questions in that they are not perfect. More, however, is the question of attachment, in that it is not the nature of that which is named or its species that is conceived, but the quality of that which is external. Division: Every single word, or a single signified action, like proper names, or many actions. And these actions, if they are equal in substance, are called with the name. If, however, they are not equal in substance, they are called with the name equally. And these are like the participation of human and ox in the name together and the boundary of animal. These, however, are like the participation of intellect, sword, and poison in the name of sharpness. Many words, however, or again many signified actions, are called by one name, or a single action is called by many names. And these are like each of the names of the elements for each of them. These, however, are like extended names: stone, lime, and plaster for hard substance.

There is, then, a middle genus of the species of the name and with the name. In that which is not entirely a substance in the nature upon which the name indicates, and is not entirely participating and equal. And these are like a relation. And the accident which is upon them is the name of that which is the predicate. Not, however, equally, but more with that one, and less with that one. Example and division: And because names are sometimes attached from one to another, etymologies are indicated. And these indicate either that from which they come more, like the name of lion to the king of beasts, or that to which they belong, like daughter of voice of the reed to wine. And these again are either with the interior of the things that are used, like those which are taken for the sake of demonstration, or with the possessives. And these are like daughter of voice of the body with logic, or of discipline with grammar. Division: Every daughter of voice either indicates something from its mother when it is distinguished, or does not indicate. And that first one, either indicates the mother with its action, and the daughter of voice is a composite simply, and a word and a prothesis, like that which walks at the head, or does not indicate the mother with its action, and is indicated as a composite simple of meaning, like that which is immeasurable and its compassion. And that which does not indicate something from its mother is simply called simple, like Socrates and Plato. Solution and beginning: It is not said that when it is said that at the head is a walker, if equal and at the head and walker, to what end is that which is placed? That which is predicated, then, is properly. If, however, it is a substance, how again is it true that an action is something when it is substantiated? Or it rests upon it its existence. In that it is said that something else third outside of these which is killed by the search.

In the word that says "of the genus," the genus is that upon which the true definition of the genus is established. Upon it, as upon it. And that which is truly a genus is not the genus of the genus that it indicates, or that it is itself that same thing. And thus there is not one true reality of accident. Division: Every simple utterance is either bound in its meaning to that which is bound in its meaning to another. And the former, if it does not indicate time, is called a name, like "genus." But if it indicates a word like "walks." And that which is bound in its meaning to another is called a conjunction, like "because." For, however, "yesterday" and "tomorrow" and "later" are not said when the names indicate time. And again, if a name does not indicate time, neither does it indicate time as a name of time. In that it is said without qualification that a name is not a name of time or of temporal things, but that it is not with time or by time that it indicates what it indicates. Clarification: And a name is placed as in the majority. A word, however, is conjugated. There is, then, a time when even that which is placed is conjugated. But with the verbal forms and also the accents, like "that which walks is an animal." Division: Every utterance is either applied to many so as to be conjugated and is predicated commonly, like "animal" or "white," or not to many and is predicated individually, like "Socrates." Clarification: And an utterance with a common term ought not only to be seen in that all or the majority of those that are found in its actuality are found, but also for every utterance, the determination of its meaning is not limited to those that participate in it in many, and also are not found in the actuality of those many. For by nature, the common meanings of the term are found in many.

in that which says "of the genus," or from a principle that does not exist, like another god besides the Lord of all worship, or not from a principle that does not exist. And this one either does not exist, it is also possible, like the sea from a pair and a mountain from a fortress, or it exists. And this one either is one alone or more than one. And the first is either from a principle that does not exist, another nature similar to it, like God, glory to his grace, or not from a principle that does not exist, like the sun in respect of the notion of the possibility of another existence of the sun. And the second is either a continuum, which is multiplicity, like the stars in the firmament, or not a continuum, like rational souls. Clarification: And "from what" is said to every subject of which the definition of the genus is limited from that which participates in it, like the definition of Socrates. It is said, moreover, "from what" and to every subject under which a nature that is limited from it is ordered. And also the generic something is itself also in its nature. And in that first "from what," principal "from whats" are called actions. In this second, however, "from whats" are material and hylic. They are distinguished from each other by substantiality and propriety, in that every principal "from what" is also a substance. A "from what" is also hylic. In the matter of its seal. For Socrates, when he is a principal "from what" in his definition, he is also a hylic "from what" in the matter of the seal that is on his head. But not, moreover, is every hylic "from what" also a principal "from what." For the head, when it is a hylic "from what" in the matter of the animal that is from it, it is not a principal "from what" in its definition, but generic. Division: Every simple utterance.

or it is a genus that is predicated of that which is under it and indicates an essence, like "animal" of "man" and "rational" of "mortal." And because of this, a genus can never be conceived of before the species. For as much as in actuality the genus is prior to everything, in that image and in thought it ought to be prior. Or it is not a genus that is predicated of that which is under it, but rather it is attached to it from outside, and indicates an accident, like "whiteness" which is predicated of a species. For it is evident that the essence and the accident are said of everything that is placed under that which is attached to it, like "whiteness" of "snow." But the two genera of essence are distinguished in that that which is placed is defined by a boundary, while this one is defined by its own boundary. For that which is not defined is subject to whiteness, and it cannot be said of it except that it is something perishable and snow-like. Division: That which is attached to that which is placed is attached either as a constitutive genus of nature or essentially, or not essentially. And the first is attached either through a medium or not through a medium. And the first is attached either through a medium that is internal to that which is placed, or through a medium that is external to it, or through a medium that is equal to it. And the first is like the attachment of sensation to a species through the medium of animality. The second is like the attachment of laughter to animality through the medium of a species. The third is like the attachment of laughter to a species through the medium of wonder. And that which is attached without a medium is attached essentially and is called an essential attachment. And this is like the attachment of wonder to a species, in that when it is asked why a species is wondered at, it is because the species itself causes wonder, and not because of something else.

that which is not essentially predicated, or is only in thought, is conceivable. And this is like whiteness in a crow, or again in a movement. And this is conceived either slowly or quickly: and each of these is either manifestly or latently. And that which is conceived manifestly is like youth; that which is latently is like the element of fire. That which is conceived quickly and manifestly is like the sixth day; that which is latently is like the sixth element. Clarification: For the category of movements is something other than their essence or their existence. For many times, when the category is something, the nature is known, but if it is seen, it is not certainly known. And that which is known is other than that which is not clearly known. For every predication is either to the category of movement or to its existence. And the first is like writing to a human; the second is like whiteness to a crow. Division: And the accident from the substance is like the first; or to the completion of the general category it is indicated. And this, if it is predicated of things differing in nature, is called genus; if of things equal in nature, species. And both are in that they are predicated of many; or to the completion of the particular category it is indicated. And this is called difference; and in that it is predicated of one. And the accident again is either common, or of things sharing in nature only, that it may be predicated and the particular is indicated; or not only of these, but the common accident is indicated. And from this division the five universal words of all accidents were born: genus, species, difference, property, and accident. Intention and the remaining chapters and in the name of logic.

When they heard the philosopher say that genus is predicated in the category of substance upon species, they supposed that also upon each one of the species individually in the category of substance it is predicated. And thus they wrote and taught. And they erred from the truth. For how is it not known that the category of substance is a sound? It is a question. And it seeks the completeness of the essentiality of something. And when genus is not the completeness of the essentiality of each one of the species, but rather a part of it—since there is another part which is the differentia, concerning which genus is not indicative—how then is it predicated upon each one of them individually in the category of substance, just as it is predicated upon all of them together in the category of substance? For the completeness of the essentiality of all of them is indicated by the category of substance. Division: The sound of the category of substance is predicated either essentially alone, and cannot be said individually, like genus upon species; or individually alone, like limit upon that which is limited; or essentially and individually, like species upon individual substances. For upon all of them essentially, when it is asked what they are, they are answered by the categories. In the same way also upon one alone. For first the completeness of the essentiality of all of them together, and of each one of them individually, is indicated. For there is one essential part for Socrates, which is not also for Plato and for the rest. Theory concerning genus: And genus is defined as that which is a whole, which is predicated of many differing in species, in the category of substance. And the sound of the whole is predicated generically upon the five of them. And the first differentia distinguishes it from species. The second from the three that remain.

Solution and Beginning: It is not said that the universal is a species, that it is the genus of the five sounds. Genus is something that is predicated. And again, genus is one of the five sounds. Genus is simply that in which its genericness is not predicated of anything. Therefore, the interior intellect ought to be with the genus of the five sounds. And how does the intellect know that the one which is particular to it is the simple genus of the universal species, in that it is said that the universal species is something that has happened to it, that it should be the genus of the five sounds? Because in its particularity it is with the interior from the genus here, in that every genus is a universal species, but not conversely. But in the accident that happens to it, it is particular from the genus here, in that every genus of the five sounds is a genus, but not conversely. And because of this, there is not one truth in that by its particularity the universal species is said to be a genus to the genus here, and not in the accident that happens to it, by which it is particular from it. Division: And genus is either with its subordinate alone, and is called a genus of genera, like substance; or above it alone, and is called a subordinate genus, like animal; or above it and below it, and is called a middle genus, like body; or neither above it nor below it, and is called a singular genus, like the being that is predicated of each one of the created beings. For if not, their genus is substance, and the investigation of a question like this is not for the pragmateia of this bread. Theory concerning the sign and the sign from the outlines, which is the universal that is over many that differ in species only, in that it is predicated of what. Distinction from the first: he distinguished it from genus. But that of the second from the remaining three.

Demonstration: It is said again that the same thing is predicated of that which is above it and of other genera, and that it is the first. Or the relative is shown. As in the case of the head. When that which is with it is called a head. This second head is called a relative, like the head. When in relation to the animal it is called a head. And these two species are distinguished from each other by the relative differences that are shown in them. In that the relative genus is not always shown to be. That which is relative exists at some time. And again, that the relative is a genus. In relation to those which are under it, its relativity is. That which is relative, in relation to that which is above it. There is a difference and individuals between the commonality and the peculiarity of the two species. In that they saw the lower differences, that when they are differences, they are relative. They are also differences in relation to their genera. Middle differences, when they are differences in relation to their genera, they are not relative differences. In that they are not predicated of many that differ in species. For they gave commonality to the difference which is relative, and they did not think well. In that not every relative difference is also a relative difference. As in the case of simple and composite substances, which have no genera but are composed from them and from differences. Therefore, there is not one commonality or peculiarity between the two species. There is a difference between Porphyry and that form, when he did not distinguish between the two species. And hear again the philosopher, who marks the genus by the difference when he says: that genus is that which is predicated of many that differ in species. In the same way, and the difference by the genus. When he says that the difference is that which is predicated of that which is above it and of other genera.

He says that genus and difference are among those things that are with something. For in the case of both of them, in both of their terms, it is necessary to be useful. And the wonder leads him astray. For the knowledge of the philosopher was great compared to that which is unknown, showing by that which is unknown. And difference marks the genus by that in which it is. Is it not the case that when it is that which is for it, it marks the genus by turning? With relation it marks the genus. And it shows the species by the genus. And that these are among those things that are with something cannot be shown clearly by each other, because they are together in nature. And the demonstration of the prior becomes known from the demonstration. For in the case of father, it is not shown by son, nor son by father, but by another demonstration in which both are known together, when it is said that father is a living thing that has a certain addition, another that is like it in substance, born. Clarification: And difference is that which is one among these five, it is the relation, not the species. Otherwise, the fifth mean would be found lacking, because it would not hold all the categories. For the simple substances of differences, only relations are said, not species, because they have no genera. Division: And for differences, again, there are species orders just as for genera. Because every difference either above itself alone has a difference and is called a difference of differences, like that of head, or below it alone and is called a higher difference, like that of body, or above itself and below it and is called a middle difference, like that of animal, or neither above itself nor below it and is called a singular difference, like that of angel. Theory concerning change: For change, they define that it is a category that which is predicated substantially. And the distinction from the prior distinguishes it from genus and difference.

He says that these two are among those things that are of the remainder. And wonder: and difference is from the categories of substance, something known and not brevity. In that it is a genus of which it is a species. Brevity, however, is a species of something that can be a genus. For in the case of the genus, difference is not a species, but a species. And wonder: for every genus, one constitutive difference ought to be. In that if there were two constitutive differences of some genus, when it is constituted by one of them, it is not possible that it be constituted by that other. And thus when it is constituted by that other, and from here it is necessary that one of them be a superfluous constituent. In that the constituent is the same, without which it cannot be constituted. And wonder: and species, when it is predicated of man and angel, is not predicated in one sense. In that the rationality of man is different from that of angels, but equivocally. For in the case of the genus, it is more appropriate to add in the human boundary the rational voice of animal, as for the distinction from angel. And wonder: and not every animal is composite of body and difference from category to be composed. For indeed the animal of ten is composed of monads, which are such that not one of them is body or difference properly. And wonder: every difference is a division of genus. It is constitutive of species and conversely. And every constitutive difference of genus is constitutive of species and not conversely. And every division of species is a division of genus and not conversely. And wonder: and difference is to be known from the constituent of man to species, not to that rationality which is not properly but equivocally predicated of it. Thus also laughter is to be predicated of man, not of laughableness and white and whiteness.

The Theory of Proprieties Propriety is a sign that it is a predicate which is predicated of one species in a non-essential manner. The distinction from the first distinguishes it from common accident. That which is of the second from these three of the remainder. Wonder: and propriety is from the category that which is of the whole species and of it alone and not essentially, like the capacity for laughter in man. But not of the whole, like the capacity for neighing. Or not of it alone, like the capacity for walking. Or not essentially, like the capacity for writing in a craftsman. And questionably, proprieties are known. Wonder: and how many of the lower species of proprieties there are: in that same manner and to those intermediate and higher and to genera of genera there are. That as, for example, the capacity for neighing to the horse and the capacity for growth to the body from the soul. And the third of the standings to the body. And that which is not in that which is placed becomes for the essence. Wonder: and propriety is either simple, like the capacity for laughter, or composite, like the state of being a writer of the sounds of each one of which is a common accident in itself. As, for example, the bipedality and the uprightness of stature and the breadth of nails and the whiteness of the complexion in man. The Theory of Common Accident And common accident is defined as that which is a predicate that is predicated of many species in a non-essential manner. And the distinction from the first distinguishes it from propriety. That which is of the second from the three of the remainder. Wonder: and accident is that which is here remembered. It is not that which is opposed to essence and divided. In that that is upon essence and does not cease to subsist except in essence essentially it is, like whiteness in body. This, however, upon essence subsists, like white upon body. For body is white, it is said, and not whiteness. And if white were an accident, it would be.

It is found that substance is both essence and accident, that which is common. Accidentally, then, it is called accident, this one from the others. And accident is divided in opposition to essence. Accident, then, in opposition to essence, is like substance. And substance is either accident, like color in relation to whiteness. For color, when it is an accident in its substance, is naturally predicated of whiteness. Or it is essence, like rational in relation to man. And accident again: or it is accident, like whiteness in relation to snow. And that which is accidental is generic whiteness in relation to snow, known from that which is also said of taste, whiteness, and sound, whiteness. Or essence is like white in relation to man. And that white is essence and not accident, as was previously understood. Demonstration: And accident from the generic, when it is predicated of many individuals, lacks nothing of its generic nature, which does not hold for all the individuals of each one of the individuals. And this again: or it is possible, or it is not possible. And possible is either in thought or in action. And that in action is either delayed or hasty. And each of them is either by day or by night, as you heard above. Demonstration: And one of the species is voice, and it, when it is, is able to be without other, genus, individual, difference, property, and generic accident, such as color, which is the genus of black, and individual of essence, and difference of body in relation to hand, and property of body, and generic accident of man and of black. Difference is of body in relation to hand, and property of body is known from that which body without black is able to be thought. Body, then, in relation to hand without black, and not.

Substance: And from its definitions, then, that these five universals and their commonalities and their differences are well understood in that which is in the genus that in which two of them are individually common. In it, from these, it is distinguished from the rest. Theory concerning definition. Definition is an indicative statement of the completeness of the essence that is its own definition. And from the categories, every definition is composed from all the essential predicates that are defined. In that not only the difference of activities follows definition, but that definition is the property alone. Nor again is it distinguished essentially, but change alone is definition. For I have shown that definition is indicative of the completeness of the essence that is defined, for that which is for indication like this. Thus, differences follow categorically. And because of this, fittingly, a proximate genus is arranged; thus, change follows it. Solution and resolution: It is not said that when I have shown definition by means of definition, it is necessary that this also be shown by another. And thus, to infinity, in that which is said, that demonstration like this is not definition, but the resolution of the name of definition. For definition is from the predicates that are categorically their knowledge, and not from these didactic ones, as that by definition it is established to acquire its knowledge. Substance: To the genus of genera, then, and not one definition can be. For it has no genus from which and from change definition is composed. In that same manner, neither for simple substances, but they are composite. Intention: And the elements, then, in the demonstration of definition, are in the voice that is used in propositions and are said: Definition is a statement that in propositions indicates the nature of every activity. And not well.

in that it is the equality of all actions and never receptive, it is the excess and deficiency. And when the definition makes it known, it is that of equality. How excess and deficiency, breadth and narrowness, are to be received. For the nature of every nature is neither diminished nor increased. It is corrupted, however, either by time or by being. Example: And if it is seen that something happens to it, when it is for the sake of the body that it errs in its definition in place of its name, and it is necessary to say as it is. In the first place, a body is a substance, animate, sentient, rational. It is not many, as it is understood. In that it is the breadth of words. And not one excess in the nature that is defined as an action. Example: Concerning the elevation of the definition of limits. And the distinction between substantial changes. For the individual rational theories, there are extensions that do not require causes such as these. A theory concerning definition and definition is a statement that makes known natures by means of these that happen to them individually and are attached. And because that definition is the sole distinction of actions that is followed, and not the knowledge of their equality, as the addition of individuals occurs in it. This entire certain knowledge is when it becomes. And it is better than definitions. It is that by which the body is formed. And that by which individuals and accidents of everything are made manifest in it, as it is said in the definition of the first principle, which is life, breadth, nails, upright stature, pure color. Example concerning the rays of sinners or in the knowledges that pass to happen that in the houses of sounds from the instruments and not of the heads together, and not the accustomed to the definition, the drunkard distinguishes well. In that, if it happens and is not established, the echo of the house and the one who strikes that which is defined. It is fitting for its creator. For in that same manner they understand and are that which is not known.

in that it is equal to it without knowledge, it is excessive for showing. When it is to be said of the pair, in that which is not a pair, it is made known. Or the father through the son. Thus also the state of that which is unknown: in that which is deep, its state is made known, as it is said that the element of fire is that which dies to itself. In that likeness, the state of that which is unknown is made known when, through it, only the sounds are changed. As it is said that motion is something equal, or in the head, life is something human. Likewise, those who are foolish and the state of that which is unknown, in that it is not known except through it, it is made known. And when they are asked what essence is, they answer that it is that which receives likeness and unlikeness. And when again in discussion they are asked what likeness is, they turn and answer that it is the cause of essences, just as equality is the cause of quantities. Solution and dissolution: It is not said that actions are with that which is unknown. How does it ascend upon the mind, the request for its being known? If it is known to the mind, how do you wish that the ignorance of its being known? And as both, and not one, necessity is upon the known signs. In that which you say that actions are not in every respect known to the mind, nor in every respect unknown. But in the sign by which they are known to the mind, they ascend upon the minds that seek the certainty of their knowledge. If again you turn and say that in the sign by which they are known to you, you do not seek their being known, and in the sign by which they are not known to you, how can you seek their knowledge, when you do not know the sign itself? You turn and answer that this is a difficulty against those who, in a simple manner, each one knows his own pain. But it is not always equal to the answer.

Here then to the self from the cause something is known, that which is its being. But then something else prevents it from being graduated from this knowledge, towards that which knows that it is the mother of movements. And from this, that it is not a composition. And from this, towards that which is not mixed in bodies like corporeal powers. And that which is pure for the contemplation of the distinction which is said concerning their definition from actions which are more deficiently preserved. Concerning their substantiation, however, it does not think. As the examiners of demonstrations in the investigation of every definition of a substance, and not one definition is substantial, and even the opinions of the ancients are not sufficient for a conception like this. Seal. And these from sufficient quantities analogically concerning the species which lead towards the knowledge of definitions. The instrument, however, from here and henceforth which leads towards faith, they accomplish while being guided. The conclusion of the second. On the composition of every species of protasis. And on these which follow them, the sequents. Division: Every proposition which also has a predicate, a composition, and a protasis, is able to be considered. Either a question of whether something is being performed, or not a question of something. And that is the first. Or it seeks the quality of actions. And it is considered an inquiry. Or not their quality. And that is the second. Or it seeks a substance and is considered a predicate, or the activity of the substance. And that is the second. If the one who seeks is superior, it is considered a command, that is a proposition. If not, it is considered a supplication. If not, the equals of the species, both of them are sides of seeking. And that which is not a question of something being performed, but of the cutting off of the termination of something from something, or the elevation of something from something, is called a proposition, a cutting off, and an apophatikos. And in that which in it alone truth is able to be distinguished from falsehood, upon it alone is logical vanity.

Clarity: And because the continuity of that which is predicated, or its non-continuity, is cut off from that which is set as the subject, that continuity is either in actions, like the proximity of a key to a door, or in thoughts, when they are applied to this theory of operations, or in voice, when that which is articulated is embodied in a word, or in letters, when that which is spoken is delineated by forms. And each one of these is a signifier of that which is before it, and is signified by that which is after it, in the manner of signs. Signifiers or signifieds alone, but intermediaries are both signifiers and signifieds together. And these are from the two former, in that they are naturally for all, their existence when they exist. But these latter two, in that they are not naturally for all, are divided according to their completeness and their accidents. Clarity: For in every proposition it is necessary that there be that concerning which the predication occurs and that in which the predication occurs. And these are either in simple terms or in the power of simple terms, which is the proposition that is composed from them, called categorical, like “a living being is a head,” or “a rational life is a body with a sentient soul.” But these are not simple, nor in the power of simple terms, but it is a proposition of which each one of them is not called a simple hypostasis, but a bond of continuity binds them, like “the sun is above the earth, it is day,” or a distinct hypostasis, but a bond of division binds them, like “this is a man, or a pair, or a couple.” Clarity: And the proposition from the categorical, that concerning which the predication occurs is called the subject, and that in which the predication occurs is called the predicate.

In the case of the hypothetical propositions, that which was the subject of the section is called the first. That which is in the consequence, and in the protasis, is either categorical or hypothetical; that section is called the cataphasis, like that which is "a living being in the head." Or that of "height," the apophasis, like that which is "a living being not in the head." In the case of the hypothetical propositions, the section which is in the premises or the hypothesis of the conjunction is called the cataphasis, like that which is "if the sun is above the earth, it is day." Or that of the "height" of the conjunction, the apophasis, like that which is "if the sun is not above the earth, it is day." In the distinctions, moreover, if that section is a hypothesis of a division, the protasis is a cataphasis, like that which is "this is a man or a pair or a couple." Or that of the "height" of the division, it is an apophasis, like that which is "not a pair or a couple is this man." Division: Every categorical protasis or substance has a single subject that is set, and the protasis of each is called, like "Socrates is in the head," or it has a whole that is set. And this, if it is found in the utterance, is called a quantitative prosdiorismos, and the prosdiorismoi are four: in quantity, or it is universal or particular. And each of them is either cataphasis or apophasis, and the universal prosdiorismos is cataphasis, like "all"; the apophasis, like "not one." The particular prosdiorismos is cataphasis, like "something or one"; the apophasis, like "not all.

It is evident that in the case of the hypothetical proposition, the quantitative predicate is not exhibited as a prosdiorismotic, like that which is in the first living being. For the reason that the equal in power is not a prosdiorismotic, and the protasis is not prosdiorismotically discussed with the conclusion. For in the natural something is taken in it, that which is both conclusive and material tends to be. In the case of the other, its proper arrangement is fitting, except that the quantitative predicate ought not to show it as conclusive, but rather the conclusion would enter into the material of the first. And it ought not to be that Socrates in the first is in that which is not conclusive. Therefore, as was said, the natural is every conclusive natural that tends to receive both together. And when it is taken conclusively, it also begins materially; but when it is taken materially, it cannot again begin conclusively in every case. And when it begins materially in both together, it is not, however, conclusively in both. For the material protasis it is necessary to admit that the equal in power is not prosdiorismotic, and it is inquired with the discourses of others. Division: of the categorical protasis into the simple and the transposed. And in the protasis with the categorical. That which is of the nature of possibility is something that is predicated simply; the protasis is exhibited like that which is in the first living being. But that which is of the nature of necessity is something that is transposed, exhibited and composite, like that which is in the first not living being. Moreover, it is also necessary that for that which is set as a necessary thing, they make it, and they show the transposed to the protasis. But not much, like that which is not in the first living being. There are, therefore, four protases like these: two categorical, which are limited, and the transposed and the apophatic of them, two.

It is evident, and it will be further understood, that the simple apophasis of the statement, "in the first living being it is not," and the cataphasis of the metastasis of the statement, "in the first of the first it is not a living being," are such that together they contradict that which is predicated of that which is posited. Their equalities in power are not well distinguished, either in word or in concept. And in word, as in the simple apophasis, the bond is tight, not a denial. In the cataphasis of the metastasis, however, of that which is predicated, and in concept as well, there is a distinction between the generic and the specific. The generic is the simple apophasis, and the specific is the cataphasis of the metastasis. For this reason, every term that posits the cataphasis of the metastasis also posits the simple apophasis, as concerning those things that exist or are capable of being. But a term that posits a determinate apophasis cannot posit the cataphasis of the metastasis, as concerning those things that do not exist and are not capable of being. For concerning Azazel, one can say that it is not a living being, but one cannot say that it is a non-living being, because this determination indicates something. And concerning that which is not found, that which is, what determination posits except for elevation alone? And these, in the two-sided protases, are hindered from distinction in word, but not in concept. In the other [protases], however, which are distinguished in a non-possessive manner: a division: of the protases that are subject-based, general and specific, for that of "all" and that of "none," and the protasis with that of "each one" in these general [protases] is present. That which in time something occurs, in that is the section of tightness. The remaining protases are those from which the composite is composed, or the remaining ones, like that which says, "if in evils they find friends, six.

The apophasis of it, that which is not a day, and the cataphasis of the whole, that which is, in a time more than one, there occurs in it the section of conjunction, that each of the things that are is a protasis of the things that are composed from them, or not each, as that which, whenever I see your sun, in that likeness and in these distinct things, the protasis of each one is that which, in a time, something is in it, the section of division, that all the things that are are protases of the things that are composed from them, or not the whole, as that which, tomorrow, either the sun rises or the lights appear. The apophasis of it is that which is not tomorrow. The cataphasis of the whole is that which is in them in the distinct things, that which, in a time more than one, there occurs in it the section of division, that all the things that are are protases of the things that are composed from them, or of each one, as that which, in ambiguity, every middle or pair or even pair is. The apophasis of it is that which is not in ambiguity, and the prosdiorismos with these hypothetic things is a sound indicating the quantity of time, in which there occurs the section of conjunction or of division, not that which indicates the quantity of that which is placed. And the prosdiorismos with the categorical universal is a sound that is always or at every time. The middle categorical is as that which is sometimes, and the universal apophatic is as that which is never or does not cease. The middle apophatic is as that which is not always or not at every time. The hypothetic prosdiorismatic is that which is nothing of that which is like these in it, as that which, if the sun is above the earth, it is day, and it is color or white or black, and so on. For this was equal in power to the middle in that likeness and here.

The manifestation, because it is composed in several times, the hypothetic substance, and the hypothetic from the substance is composed ninthly in that which is a protasis of the composed from it. Or from both of its categories, or both of its substances, or both of its divisions, or that from the first category, that which is the latter substance, or that from the first substance, that which is the latter category, or that from the first category, that which is the latter division, or that from the first division, that which is the latter category, or that from the first substance. First time: as that whenever the sun is above the earth, it is day. Second time: as that whenever the sun is above the earth, it is day. Whenever it is below the earth, it is not day. Third time: as that whether every animal is either rational or non-rational. Every soul is either rational or non-rational. Fourth time: as that whether measure is the cause of fire. Or whenever fire exists, measure also exists. Fifth time: as that whenever the light of the sun exists, it is day. The light of the sun is the cause of day. Sixth time: as that whether fire produces heat, it is either with matter or without matter. Seventh time: as that whether fire produces either moisture or dryness, it is heat. Eighth time: as that whenever the sun is above the earth, it is day. Or the sun is above the earth. Or night is not.

The ninth mode: as in whether every motion or pair or opposite is. Whatever this motion is, it is either a pair or an opposite. The manifestation, because it is composed in several times, the true substance and the false substance are together for the necessity of knowledge of the truth of these substances. Not in the truth that is of the protasis of that which is composed from it. Nor in its falsehood in its falsehoods. In that there is when from true falsehoods it is composed. And from false true ones as is shown. And a true one is composed from a fourth, or from two true ones, or from two false ones, or from a first false and a following true. And from the opposite of this, a true one cannot be composed as is shown. Or from two whose truth is unknown. And the first mode: as in whether the sun is above the earth, it is day. The second mode: as in whether a stone is a head, it is not a soul. The third mode: as in whether a horse is a head, it is an animal. And it cannot be said that if it is an animal, it is a horse. In that animal is generic. The fourth mode: as in whether Socrates wrote, he moved his fingers. And this is when it is absolutely true. And it is not known whether he wrote or did not write, he moved his fingers or did not move. And likewise, a false substance is composed from a fourth, or from two true ones, or from two false ones, or from a first true and a following false. And from its opposite, a false one cannot be, as was shown. Or from two whose falsehood is unknown. And the first mode: as in whenever Homer is an animal, he is a head.

And these two true propositions concerning Homer: the proposition that the composite is not true in nature is itself. In that it is not a living thing, it is the cause of falsehood. But every living thing is a substance. That which is drunk. The second mode: as in that whenever a white man is a substance, he is. The third mode: as in that if a living thing is a substance, it is a horse. And it is not possible that this falsehood should persist. The fourth mode: as in that if Socrates wrote letters with his fingers. And this proposition, when it is false, the modes of the earth are not known in the time in which the discourse is composed, whether falsehoods are upon it or not. Demonstration because it is the third genus: the hypothetical proposition is distinguished. For the proposition that is composed from the hypothetical proposition is distinguished, either it is not possible that together truths or falsehoods, and the distinguished subject is complete. As in that every motion is either a pair or an opposite. Or it is not possible that together falsehoods. It is possible, however, that together truths. And the distinguished subject is complete with emptiness. As in that Socrates is either in the sea or is not sought. And this occurs when one mode of the distinguished subject is generic with the antithesis of the other. And it is apophatic. For behold, when that which is in the sea occurs, the generic is with that which is sought. The particularity of this which is proper to that which is sought is that it is not sought. The generic is with that which is in the sea, which ought not to be. That which is in the sea is the generic with that which is sought. And that which is not sought is generic with that which is not in the sea. The proper ones of both, however, are at the time that which is in the sea occurs, and at the time that which is sought occurs.

In that which is naturally not extended in the sea, it is. And that which is not naturally capable of being in part in the sea and in part on dry land and is not naturally so, or is not capable of being together in parts. It is capable, however, of being together in false parts. And the particular substance is entirely separated from composition, like this body or stone or tree. And this is from being when that one part of the particular substance of a tree is from the antityposis of that other. And it will be a kataposis. For behold, a stone of a tree from the antityposis of a tree which is not a tree. In that it is not a tree, it is predicated both of stone and of not-stone. In that likeness and not-stone. Of tree and of not-tree. The demonstration is because how many parts are possible for the principal substance? And it is from this or from two parts. And this when one of its parts is equal in power to the antityposis of that other. As every composite is either a pair or an odd pair. Or three parts. And this when one of its parts is equal in power to the antityposis of those two. As every composite is either greater or lesser or equal. Or four parts. And this when one of its parts is such that it is equal in power to the antityposis of those other three. As every composite is either an odd pair or a pair. Or a pair of pairs. Or a pair of pairs and of an odd pair. A pair like two. And a pair of pairs like four. And a pair of pairs and of an odd pair like six, which is a pair of three that contains a pair and an odd pair. Or a substance of parts without end. And this when one of its parts is equal in power to the antityposis of those other parts without end. As every composite.

or one or two or three and so on without end. The demonstration is because of that which is composed of several species: the distinct hypostatic nature, and this again is substantially and not accidentally, as the essences are composed. In that which is, the one is a co-relative, the other is a quality. And because of this, it is not safe that they change, except for a change of sense. Here, however, they also change, and the change is not one in their sense, as is shown. And it is composed from or from two categories, or from two essences, or from two distinct natures, or from a category and an essence, or from a category and a distinct nature, or from an essence and a distinct nature. And the first species is like that which is either a relation or a pair or a couple. The second species is like that which is either whenever the sun is above the earth, it is day, or whenever the sun is above the earth, it is not night. The third species is like that which is this fire with smoke or with a shadow or with a nature, or with a half-shadow or with a partial shadow. And this is from nature, but from the physicians it is completed that there is not one humor outside of them. The fourth species is like that which is either the sun is the cause of day, or not whenever the sun shines is it day. The fifth species is like that which is either this relation is not or it is a pair or a couple. And the sixth species is like that which is either if the sun is above the earth, it is day, or the sun is above the earth, or it is not day. And the seventh species is a sign indicating how it is for that which is predicated against that which is placed.

it differs from prosdiorismos, because prosdiorismos, quantity, and quality indicate. For as in the case of a general and particular predicate, or an apophatic quality, it indicates quality alone. The demonstration is because of the hylai of the protasis and its qualities, which are in a distinct manner, these hylai from quality. For in every protasis from the hyle of the substance, something will be between that which is posited and that which is predicated, which are opposed to each other in it. It is indeed from the substance that which is indicated in these actions. And when the predicate is resolved, quality. And because there are three hylai. In that same manner and three qualities. In that which is predicated, either from the hyle it is attached to that which is posited, and these are necessary and are indicated, and its quality is from the necessities that it may be. Or from the hyle it is not attached, and these are not possible and are indicated, and its quality is not possible that it may be, as in the case of the word "every" that it may be. As also the predicate, as also the categorical syllogism teaches. Or not from the hyle attached, nor from the hyle not attached, and these are such as possible or contingent and are indicated, and its quality is possible that it may be, or contingent that it may be. Demonstration concerning the difference of qualities of the hyle. And the hylai are five. One is the simple hyle, complete, as that which says that the first truth is necessary in itself, in that which is always thus without limit. And the limited hyle, existential, as that which is in the first living being, as it is said how it is in the first living being. And the limited hyle, generic, as that which is everything that moves is moved, as it is said how it moves. And the limited hyle, specific, as that which is everything that writes moves his fingers, as it is said how he writes, not how his essence is. And this specific is from that which is before it.

in that it begins from it. But this is about that and does not cease. Because that is true concerning the predicate that is attached either affirmatively or negatively to the subject that is posited. But this is about that which is attached not affirmatively to the subject alone. And the quality is determined by the sign. And this is twofold: in that the sign is either known, as in every partial eclipse at the time of the new moon, or every lunar eclipse at the time when the earth is interposed between it and the sun, or the sign is unknown, as in every comet. For quality is in some sign, and not as its substance is. The demonstration is concerning the difference of the species of mediation. And the first ones found two species of predicate: mediate and immediate. And in the mediate they included the predicate affirmative and negative. And because of this, the genus of their mediation was shown. And the immediate said that the predicate which is affirmative cannot be attached to that which is predicated of the subject that is posited. The latter, however, were a third party with them: the division of the predicate, which is attached affirmatively and its name is negative, and that which is attached affirmatively not and its name is immediate, and that whose attachment is not affirmative nor is its non-attachment, and its name is mediate. And because of this, their mediation of the particular was shown. For it does not include the affirmative like the other. And the superiority is that the genus is true concerning the immediate, in that it is a second division. The superiority, however, of the particular and not the genus is true concerning the immediate, nor is its conclusion concerning the affirmative. In that the third genus is of the immediate, raising from it the affirmative. And thus the error is resolved which was widespread among many of the first ones, which even the philosopher remembered, as if from them it is known.

that which is from necessity is able to be. And that which is able to be is able not to be. And it is disputed that that which is from necessity is able not to be. That is absurd. For it is not possible for that which is from necessity to be at the same time able not to be. And everything that is able not to be is from necessity not that which is from necessity. And it is disputed that that which is from necessity is from impossibility not to be, which is more absurd. For this error arises from the confusion of the name of accident. For it is possible to apply the name of accident homonymously to both concepts that have been mentioned. For it is said that that which is from necessity is able to be in a generic sense that is not true concerning it, that which is able not to be, in that it binds the impossibility. And it is not possible for it to be again in that specific sense that is not true concerning it, that which is able not to be from necessity. Demonstration: And because everything that is impossible is also possible, it is not right to think that everything that is possible is also impossible. But something generic must be understood for the possible proposition, not that which is impossible. For behold, the blackness of the Ethiopian, when it is possible for its existence to be predicated, is not impossible for it, in that it is impossible for that same thing alone to be said, that by the coming of the nature of the acts, the demonstration is because of the predicates of the first propositions. For all of them are either predicates or subjects for their predicates. And because of this, they are converted or generic. And because of this, they are not converted. For the propositions that are equally predicated of each other, their antiphasis also are equal. But those that are generically predicated, their antiphasis is that which is generic in them. The specific must be from the antiphatikē of the specific, as in the case of non-animal.

of the particular from not by choice, as was also previously understood. And the statement will be more deficient in syllogism for this series: Syllogism of Equalities From necessity it is. Not from necessity it is. It is possible that it not be substantially. It is possible that it not be substantially. It is impossible that it not be. It is not impossible that it not be. Syllogism of Inequalities And these are of the particular things. From necessity it is. Not from necessity it is. It is possible that it be substantially. It is not possible that it be substantially. It is impossible that it be. It is not impossible that it be. And possibility is from among all these: that substantially is, and not that particularly. For to this one and not one of these others does equality apply. In that its affirmation is equal to its negation, while its own substance of accident applies to the others substantially. Behold, these are syllogisms of those which apply substantially to the possibility of the particular. It is possible that it be or not possible, and that it be particular. It is possible that it be substantially; it is possible that it not be substantially. Not from necessity it is; not from necessity it is not. It is not impossible that it be; it is not impossible that it not be. Clarification: Three things of equal conversion. Simple affirmation. And the negation of transposition of possibility substantially. And the affirmation of transposition of impossibility. For each one of them, when you take it with its counterpart, turns a conversion upon itself, as when you say: Everything that is from necessity cannot not be. And everything that cannot not be is from necessity. In the same way, when you say: Everything that is from necessity is impossible not to be. And everything that is impossible not to be is from necessity. In the same way, when you say: Everything that is not possible not to be is impossible not to be. And everything that is impossible not to be is not possible not to be.

Thus there are three pairs of equal protases that are convertible, and three other pairs of apodoses that belong to them. The solution and resolution: It is not said whether everything is from necessity or not. Where is the possibility? That which can both be and not be, in that which is said: that which tomorrow is from necessity or not—this necessity is not attached to the nature of the rain, but to its possibility, or to the impossibility of the efficient cause. In that which is from necessity, the possibility of the efficient cause is the possibility of the cause that prevails, as is shown in the divine matters. For natural rain, as much as it is able to receive that which comes, in that same manner it also receives that which does not come. In contrast to animate nature, which from necessity does not receive that which is of a stony nature, and again of a fiery nature, which from necessity receives that which is of an animate nature. For in general, actions are according to their threefold natures: they are necessary to say, and hindering, and possible. According to their efficient causes, they are twofold: necessary to say if their causes are possible, and hindering if they are not possible. The demonstration concerning the universal categorical proposition is that simple one. It is right to know that categoricality is an accident that attaches to categories. In that which is a living nature, something is that is uniquely actualized. When, however, that nature is found in which many participate, then it comes to be named a category. For in general, the categorical proposition is that which is predicated concerning the substances under it according to their natures, and not according to the accidents that happen to them. And because of this, when a living thing is predicated concerning a human, it is not in that which is categorical that something is a human, but the beginning is upon him.

And it would not be proper to release also concerning Socrates, that he is not a man. But in that which is something of a nature, it is said that he is a rational being. And because of this, also concerning all those upon whom the definition of rational being is truly predicated, it is again released. For when it is said that every house is simply an aleph, it does not require the house of humanity. In that which is not everything that is predicated of man, in that which is man, it is also predicated of these, each according to the indication of rational man. Nor for the whole of the house. In that which is not everything that is predicated of all, in that which is all, it is also predicated of species, like the pairing of the number ten. But that each one of the things upon which the house is truly predicated, in that same manner and the aleph is true. And this is the protasis in which nothing of the species is remembered in it. For the answer must be from all sides, from the two possibilities. In a true answer concerning those that are contingent and not contingent, and possible and not possible. And concerning this again, the categorical of it is by the force of the apophasis. In that it is possible to predicate together, like that every horse runs, and not one horse runs, and both are true. In that it is not by one of them that possibility is determined. And this is the protasis which is called the simple general. And the philosopher has a name for it, which is known and another simple one, which is called the hypothetical. Like that which says that every house is not in possibility, but in actuality. And this simple one is also called the Alexandrian. And the two simple ones are distinguished, in that it is from the hypothetical. If all the things of the side of the human indication are raised, the actuality is released when it is said that every animal is rational.

In the syllogism, that universal proposition is not appropriate in this way. In that there are here natural substances, it does not say that only possible things, if they are found, are not in the head. In the simple universal genus with possibility. From that, the generic potentiality of matter. In that it includes and excludes those that are not possible in actuality, and this does not include but excludes those that are in actuality either continuously or not continuously. And from that potentiality of matter, the generic potentiality. In that it includes those that are and those that are not. Apart from those that stand. And when the meaning of the simple universal category was understood, it is fitting likewise for the simple substance and for the rest. The theory concerning antiphysis. And antiphysis is what is it to the opposition of proposition, categorically and apophatically in power and in actuality. As in nature it is from the true one. The other, however, is of deception, either privatively or not privatively. And to the opposition from as a taken genus. In that it includes antiphysis and opposites and with something and privation and possession. And categorical and apophatic are said to be distinguished antiphysis from these others, and again in power and in actuality it is said. In that there are actions that are not even in actuality but in power, like antipathetic ones such as coupling and uncoupling. That one, however, is not a coupling that is in it a coupling in power antipathetic. It is thus also not an uncoupling that is in it an uncoupling in power antipathetic. And in nature again it is said in that there are two actions that by accident and not by nature antiphysis makes, like animal and not body.

of body, for in that which is of the genus with animal, by its being predicated, it also is predicated. And because of this, it is not possible that together they be established: animal and body. And it is said either categorically or non-categorically, in that it is necessarily, and in cessation, and in possibility, in time that is present and that which passes alone. Truth and falsehood are distinguished categorically. In time, however, that is future and possible, neither truth nor falsehood are categorically determined. A demonstration concerning the categories of the antiphysis. Concerning the categories, something necessary for the antiphysis to be. They are those which, if they are assumed, the axiom proper to it is extended, and these are three: the hypokeimenon of that which is posited, and the hypokeimenon of that which is predicated, and the hypokeimenon of time. And in the hypokeimenon of that which is posited, the hypokeimenon of the whole and the part, and the hypokeimenon of the limit are contained. These, by their change, also the hypokeimenon of that which is posited is changed. In the hypokeimenon, however, of that which is predicated, the hypokeimenon of place, and the hypokeimenon of disposition, and the hypokeimenon of power and of activity are contained. In that, in the same manner, by their change, also the hypokeimenon of that which is predicated is changed. And thus the remaining ones to the nine categories of the first ones. Into three only they entered and contained them. The remaining ones, however, from those which are in the series: one category which suffices to hold, by its excess, the axiom of the antiphysis, they compressed, placed, and said: that when there is no relation of that which is predicated to that which is posited in the kataphasis, a hyper apophasis is raised. Confusion, and not one, is to be feared in the antiphysis.

And these categories are sufficient in the apodictic science of the protasis of each one, or rather of the whole, likewise in the prosdiorismatic manner concerning another category, a necessary apophasis is toward that which is to be: the variation in quantity of the leptopsis from the whole. Apophasis of the middle will be apophasis. In that these wholes together in these that are possible and in the protases of that which is placed, they have that of the genus with that which is contradicted. They are possible to falsify. In that same manner, the leptopsis of the middle is the apophasis of the whole. In that these middles together in possible wholes are true. And these wholes are great opposites that are known. In that their like are never together possible to be true. They are possible, however, together to be false. These middles, then, under the opposites are called. In that they are elevated toward these. Apophasis with leptopsis is that simple generic, not apophasis simple generic it is. In that as was said, it is possible that together they be true without limit in one of them, some quality or time. But apophasis of quality, in that this is the same as the predicate of the leptopsis of quality and of non-quality: that every alpha simply is not every alpha qualitatively, and that not one simply is something qualitatively. And apophasis of that which says possibly every alpha, that which says not possibly every alpha. But either something qualitatively alpha, or qualitatively not every alpha. In that leptopsis is that when not the quality of the contradiction, but in some time something is known either true or false, so that it may release the apophasis of quality or so that it may release: the conclusion not of quality. So that it may falsify the apophasis of quality.

In that same manner and for that which is said, "possibly something between alpha," the antithesis is that which is said, "not possibly something between alpha," but universally everything, or universally and not one in that same manner, and the antithesis of that which is said "from necessities" is that which is said "not from necessities," and for that which is able is that which is not able, and for that which ceases is that which does not cease. The theory concerning the conversion of the protasis and the conversion from the protasis is the differentiation of each one from the boundaries. That which posits says "I say," and that which is predicated is together. With the nature of substance and truth, and protases from simple categories, both and complex, apart from these are the possible. All things are either substances or accidents. In quantity from accidents are conversions. In that which is able, that which is predicated is within that which posits, and in the interior it is not able that over the whole that which is predicated that which posits is converted to be predicated. As in the case of "every rational animal." In substance, however, for the simple interior, in that if this does not permit, the antithesis of it, which is the universal negative apophasis, and the converse like itself, as is shown, and from here it is necessary the co-truth of the antithesis which is possible, like that which says "every rational animal," as that. Apart from these are the possible. For something is "animal rational" in the simple interior, and not true is the antithesis of it which says "not one animal rational" universally, and the converse like itself, as it says "not one rational animal" universally. And it would be that "every rational animal" in the simple interior is that which is possible. And it is shown again the truth of this conversion. And in this is the elevation of something from itself that which is possible. For it is said "every rational animal.

something of an animal in a head in a simple general manner. And not the true hypothesis of it is that which says that not one animal in a head specifically. And it was every animal in a head. It is refuted that not one in a head in a head that which is common. And the categories again are possible both of them in that likeness in quantity from the addition of opposites as was said. And in substance to possibility generally. And not the beginning of the hypothesis of this which is the apophasis total specific and opposite as itself and the refuted commonalities that were said. And specifics from categories do not become opposites. Nor do middles middles in that which there is when that which is placed of particularity will be that which is predicated of it alone and not of the whole series. For that which is predicated specifically and middlingly is predicated of it. That which is upon it not specifically or middlingly. As that which says: from specific every physician in a head. And it is not true that which is opposite and says: from specific one in a head physician. In that likeness and possibility of particularity cannot be converted upon itself. From the end of that which was said: that it is possible to say that possibly in a head physician he is. And it is not possible to say that possibly physician in a head he is. In that from specific he is. And possibility from general is converted upon itself. In that there is when the specific is converted. As when in a head was that which is placed and physician that which is predicated. And there is again when the possibility of particularity is converted. As when physician was that which is placed to a head. And that which binds both of them is the possibility general. And these from those categories.

These then are the apophatical propositions, simple and not at all convertible. For that which is predicated of the particular well is not with that which is posited of the universal. And the universal cannot be raised with the particular as the particular can with the universal. Otherwise, particularity is entirely abolished, as in the statement that not every animal is in a head. And it is not true that says that not every head is an animal. For when every is posited, it is all. The apophatical propositions, however, are universal. These are simple and mediate and temporal. But all these are propositions that do not admit of conversion. For that which says that not one head is a writer or a poet is not true. And that which says that not one writer or poet is a head is not true. For when every writer and every poet is in a head truly. These then are posited and true in themselves, convertible. Otherwise, there occurs the raising of something from itself, which is absurd. For as that which says that not one moving thing is at rest while moving, it converts to that which says that not one resting thing is moving while at rest. But the true hypothesis is that which says that something at rest is moving while at rest. And it is that which is not one moving thing at rest while moving. And it is refuted that something at rest is not at rest while at rest, or that not every resting thing is at rest while at rest. This is absurd. And the weakness of this conversion is again shown. And by the force of the impossibility of the relation to the impossible, as in that which says that which is posited universally or truly is not one stone in a head. It converts to that which says that universally or truly not one stone is in a head. But the true hypothesis is that which says that something stone in a head is mediately or simply.

And conversely, concerning the thing itself, it is either potentially or simply a stone. And it is not one stone substantially, or truly, that which is composite. And it is less than that which is universal, like a substance, it is known by that which is not something else, its whole meaning, but that which is substantial is not. Third Section On the second composition of demonstration The elucidation of syllogism and its parts And it is fitting to know that faith is like that which is said in a small matter, either principal or not principal, by means of a statement that is something composed of statements. And thus it is fitting for every inquiry of whatever kind. And when this is so, its many divisions are in syllogism alone, thus truth is to be examined principally. And when for this, as it is possible to act, it is also fitting to consider those things logically. And a syllogism is a statement composed of propositions such that when they are completed, another statement necessarily follows. And the composition of propositions distinguishes a syllogism from a proposition, which is one that follows for its truth the truth of its converse. And of the falsehood of its antiphasis. And of when they are completed, it is said that it is not necessary that the propositions be true in their nature; thus truth is sought from them. But it is possible that when they are not true, yet as if they were true, something else is truly sought from them substantially. And again it is said naturally, as it is distinguished, a true syllogism from false ones, those which do not seek from the end of the nature of hyle, nor the nature of a true syllogism do they seek. Elucidation: And a proposition, when it is a part of a syllogism, its parts are the natural terms from which the boundaries are set.

And naturally, the said prosodyrismos and the small and the bond are not natural matters of protasis. For every Beth is a Gamal, and every Gamal is an Alaph. Two things are protaseis, and Beth and Gamal and Alaph are boundaries. And their conjunction is a syllogism. And that which adheres to them, which is every Beth Alaph, is a syzygy. And it is either a syllogism or a syncategorema. For that which is in potentiality has that in it for a syzygy, or for its own antitypasis, like this which is said or a definition. Or that which is in actuality is accustomed in it to one of them as it is to show. And in a syncategorema with a boundary, that which together in both protaseis is found, a middle boundary is shown. And it is the aim of that which is placed in a syzygy, a small boundary. And the protasis in which it is, is a small protasis. And that which is accused in a syzygy is a large boundary. And the protasis in which it is, is a large protasis. And as the placing of a middle boundary with aims, a first schema is shown. Division: And this middle boundary, if it is that which is accused in the small one and that which is placed in the large one, the first schema is the schema shown. In that which shows its house, it is. And also others are shown in it. Or conversely, that which is of this, that which is placed in the large one, the schema is the schema shown, the fourth. And in that which is far from nature, from the first ones, it is not equal for remembrance. Or in both, the accused schema is the second schema. Or in both, the placed schema is the third schema. And these with the second are when the natures are sharp without teaching, they know them. And because they are not as they come, the schemata are not confused, but in their own species, like types.

And the categories from the genera are not from their four. For not one of them from the two protaseis can be a prosodyrismos that is concealed. Nor from the small apophatike and the great protasis, nor from the two apophatikai. Theory on the first schema. And to this, from the schema of categories there are two that are proper: kataphatike, which is the small, such that a conclusion passes from the great limit to the small one. And the two are the apophatike, which is the great. And it is not possible that the one that is concluded upon the small limit be the middle, nor the one upon which the great limit is concluded. And because of this, a conclusion does not pass from the great to the small. And if in place of a concealed schema this schema were in a genus that does not preserve these categories, it would not be fitting to know their force properly. And because of this, not in all concealed things are these truths. They are concealed according to the nature of the hylai that are composed. And because it is possible for the species to be dispersed in every schema, as follows from the prosodyrismatic composition, when these categories are two, they are concluded. Only four remain in it as species that are concealed. In that kataphatike apophatike with its two apophatikai, it makes two species. And that protasis with its two, along with two others. The first species from kataphatike apophatike is the small, and kataphatike apophatike is the great. Kataphatike apophatike is concealed, as that every individual is a body, and every body is an ousia. Therefore every individual is an ousia. The second species from kataphatike apophatike is the small, and apophasis apophatike is the great. Apophasis apophatike is concealed, as that every individual is an animal, and not one animal is a stone. Therefore not one individual is a stone. The third species from kataphatike protasis is the small.

And the universal kataphasis is the great one. The concealed kataphasis is the middle one, like that of something animal in a rational being, and every rational being is an animal. Therefore, something animal is rational. The fourth figure is from the middle kataphasis, which is the small one, and the universal apophasis is the great one. The concealed apophasis is the middle one, like that of something animal in a rational being, and not one rational being is a horse. Therefore, not every animal is a horse. Theory concerning the second figure. And for the second figure, there are again two necessary rules: the conversion of the identity of the two protaseis, in that from the apophatike of both of them, not one syllogism is produced intrinsically, nor from their kataphatike, which is particular. Here, in that the great one, if it is again kataphatike, its own conversion is that which is this, just as the middle one is converted. And you have already known that the middle of the great one is not concealed in that first one, and the universality of the purpose is that great one, in that these two middle ones are from it and are not converted. That which is middle is converted, and because of this, it is not concealed in that first one. And when these two rules are added, the remaining four concealed figures are produced, in that the universal kataphasis, which is the great one, together with these two small apophaseis, makes two figures. And the universal apophasis, which is the great one, together with these two kataphatikai, makes two figures. The first figure is from the universal kataphasis, which is the small one, and the universal apophasis, which is the great one. The concealed universal apophasis, like that of every rational being is an animal, and not one stone is an animal. Therefore, not one rational being is a stone. And it is demonstrated by means of the conversion of the great one, and it becomes the second figure, the first one. The second figure is from the universal apophasis, which is the small one, and the universal kataphasis, which is the great one.

The universal apophasis is concealed, like that of one stone, animal. And every rational being is animal. Therefore, not one stone is rational. And it is shown by the conversion of the great to the small, and by the conversion of the subprism and being in that likeness, a second genus of the first. A third genus from the mediate kataphasis, which is the small, and the universal apophasis, which is the great. The mediate apophasis is concealed, like that of something animal in a rational being, and not one horse in a rational being. Therefore, not every animal is a horse. And it is shown by the conversion of the great, and it becomes a fourth genus of the first. A fourth genus from the mediate apophasis, which is the small, and the universal kataphasis, which is the great. The mediate apophasis is concealed, like that of not every animal in a rational being, and every rational being is a rational being. Therefore, not every animal is rational. And this from the genus now cannot be shown by the conversion of the great, because in the mediateness, even when together they are changed, the great and the small, because then the conversion does not become the great. For it is necessary that in other genera it be arranged toward its demonstration, that from it there is a transference toward the impossibility which is its being thus. For if it is not true that not every animal is rational, it is true the antitypesis which is every animal is rational, and it would be with every rational being a rational being. It is concealed, therefore, that every animal is a rational being, and it would be that not every animal is a rational being, which is false. And it is shown again in another genus. For it is said that for that from something from animal which is not a rational being, the name horse is placed. And then it is fitting to say that not one horse is a rational being, and every rational being is a rational being. Therefore, not one horse is rational, which is a second genus of the second. And it begins and says that something animal is a horse.

And not one horse is rational. It is shown that not every animal is rational, which is the third figure. The theory concerning the third figure. And here, from the figures again, there are two modes. The categorical from the minor, in that by its conversion it converts to the first. And the apophatic from the minor is not a contradictory, as it was shown in the first. And the conclusion of one of the two is from the two premises. And not one syllogism. And when these from the two are hindered, the remaining six figures are its contradictories, in that the categorical conclusion is the minor with the four prosodic fours makes figures. And the categorical is the premise with the two conclusions two others. The first figure from the categorical conclusion is the minor. And the categorical conclusion is the major categorical premise is concealed, like that every human is animal. And every human is risible. Therefore, something animal is risible. It is shown by the conversion of the minor, and it becomes the third figure of the first. The second figure from the categorical conclusion is the minor. And the apophatic conclusion is the major apophatic premise is concealed, like that every human is animal. And not one human is stone. Therefore, not every animal is stone. It is shown in the same manner as that before it. And it becomes the fourth figure of the first. The third figure from the categorical conclusion is the minor and the categorical premise is the major categorical premise is concealed, like that every human is animal. And something human is literate. Therefore, something animal is literate. And it is shown by the variation of the minor to the major, and by the conversion of the supposition. And it becomes the third figure of the first.

The fourth figure from the categorical premise, that is the minor one. And the categorical premise is the major one. The categorical premise is concealed, like that which is: some man is black, and every man is laughing; therefore some man is black laughing. And it is shown by the conversion of that minor one. And that is the third figure of the first. The fifth figure from the categorical premise, that is the minor one. And the apophatic premise, that is the major one. The apophatic premise is concealed, like that which is: every man is an animal, and not every man is a horse; therefore not every animal is a horse. And this figure is not shown by the conversion of that minor one into that which is the opposite of the concealed one. And not one syllogism from two concealed ones. Nor in the alternation of the major and the minor, in that the apophatic premise is not convertible. For it is necessary to show the truth of its force by means of reduction to the impossible. They say that if the force that not every animal is a horse is not true, the assumption that every animal is a horse is accepted. And there was with it every man is an animal. It makes, then, the minor one. And it forces from it and from the assumption that the force is contradictory, that every man is a horse. And it was that not every man is a horse, which is accepted. It is shown, then, again in another figure, that which is placed or that which is placed, from that which is called the philosopher, that like as for the proposition from that which is man who is not black, a name is placed, Ethiopian. And then it is true to say: not one Ethiopian is a horse. And every Ethiopian is a man. It follows, then, the minor of the figure, which is every man is an animal. And it is concealed that every Ethiopian is an animal. And it follows again to this, to the protasis that is placed, which is: not one Ethiopian is a horse.

And it is concealed that not every animal is black, by the conversion of that minor premise, and it becomes the fourth figure of the first. The sixth figure from the categorical premise, that is the minor one. And the apophasis is the major one, the categorical premise is the concealed one. Like that which is: some man is a writer, and no man is a stone; therefore not every writer is a stone. And it is shown by the conversion of that minor premise, and it becomes the fourth figure of the first. Theory concerning the fourth figure. And this figure is from the end, by its distance from the first. Moreover, it is not equal to the first ones, the later ones, when they are arranged. Some have found that by their excess it is concealed. And these from the two are not to be taken, because the categorical premise is entirely in it, in that it is not convertible. And the argument of both propositions together is converted to demonstration, or each one is changed by its counterpart. For if the minor is the end of its categoricality, it is not fitting that it be major; and if the major is the end of its apophaticity, it is not fitting that it be minor. As it is said in the first figure. And the apophaticity is the major one, while the minor is the categorical one, in that these categoricals are converted and not one syllogism from the two categoricals. And the categorical premise is entirely not convertible. And the argument is that the major is converted in demonstration. For thus the remaining five figures of this figure are concealed, in that it is from the minor. If the categorical is the major, with those two categoricals it makes two figures, and with the major apophasis it makes one figure, in that it is established that the categorical premise is entirely not to be taken. Therefore the categorical is the minor, with the major apophasis it makes another figure.

And the apophasis universal with the kataphasis universal minor another figure. The first figure from the two categorical universals. The categorical minor is concealed, like that: every animal is a head; and every laugher is a head; therefore some animal is a laugher. And it is shown by the conversion of the propositions and by the inversion of the syllogism, and it becomes the third figure of the first. The second figure from the universal kataphasis, that is the minor, and the categorical premise, that is the major. The categorical minor is concealed, like that: every head is a laugher; and some animal is a head; therefore some animal is a laugher. And it is shown like that which preceded it, and it becomes the third figure of the first. The third figure from the universal apophasis, that is the minor, and the universal kataphasis, that is the major. The universal apophasis is concealed, like that: no stone is an animal; and every head is an animal; therefore no stone is a head. And it is shown by the conversion of the propositions and by the inversion of the syllogism, and it becomes the second figure of the first. The fourth figure from the categorical minor, that is the minor, and the universal apophasis, that is the major. The categorical apophasis is concealed, like that: some physician is a head; and no stone is a head; therefore not every physician is a stone. It is shown by means of the inversion of both propositions, and it becomes the fourth figure of the first. The fifth figure from the universal kataphasis, that is the minor, and the universal apophasis, that is the major. The universal apophasis is concealed, like that: every head is rational; and no stone is a head; therefore not every rational is a stone. And it is shown by the inversion of both terms, and that is the fourth figure of the first. End of the chapter: And the conjunctions with that first schema and with the second two.

The whole of that major and the concealment of the force of the universals. And with the first and with the third. In that same figure, two. The categorical minor and the concealment of the force of the categoricals. And with the first and with the fourth, one is the concealment of the force of the categoricals and the universals together. But the first is distinguished from the three together in two ways: by the concealment of the forces of the four προδιορισμοί, and by that which shows between itself. But the second is distinguished from the three in a different way, without the concealment of the force of the equalities in the substance. And the third from the three without the concealment of the force of the universals. And the fourth from the three without the reception of that apophasis universal. A conclusive demonstration concerning the mixtures. For the knowledge of the necessity in that first schema, when the minor term enters under the middle term. From the fact that also under that middle term enters. And it enters in every term which it is. By the way of all the συλλογισμοί which are in it, for the term of that major it is right that they follow in its terms. Until that which also if it says. Possibly every body is movable. And actually every movable is an animal. It is concluded that actually every body is an animal. In that animal, when it entered upon movable, was predicated, not as movable was predicated. For this distinguishes actuality. Just as when movability is removed from body, animal also is removed. But not as its essence is. And thus in the other mixtures, for that same, when for that same major the force follows in its term. Apart from something from the mixtures of that minor follows in them the force, when that minor is possible and that major as it is moved, like that which is possibly every man is movable.

And from the particular, every mobile thing is mutable. As it moves, in the genus of mutable things, it is not predicated of the subject except insofar as motion is found in it. For it is potentiality for it, and then it is possible that motion is not found in it. And potentially, mutability is predicated of it. In that same manner, when it is particular, that which is small and that which is large, as it is mobile. And then it is necessary that the particular be the force, like that which from the particular something corporeal is mobile. And every mobile thing is mutable as it moves. Therefore, from the particular something corporeal is mutable. That which, as it is, is mobile. This, however, which as it is, is mutable. Therefore, without ambiguity, the great name is determined, which has particularity. It begins, each of the two protases with its counterpart, because that small one has the ambiguity of the middle term known, and this great one does not have its ambiguity. Mixtures in the second schema. In this schema, however, not one syllogism is hindered from both the simple ones in the second figure, nor from the two potentialities, nor from the mixture, when their substances are mutable or not mutable. In that one thing can be predicated of different subjects, like whiteness of a head and a horse, simply or potentially, or from this one from both. From this one, however, not or from both both. And it is not possible except their elevation from each other. In that same manner, when you predicate whiteness of participants, like of a head and a rational being, or you elevate it from them together, or from this one it is elevated from that one, however, not. And it is not possible except their conjunction to each other. And when not one of them is particular in these figures.

is that of elevation or composition, and not a single syllogism is found to be deficient in this schema. The species that are from their mixtures are these. And thus, when they are from species that are not held or are held together with one another. And one of them is deficient. It is fitting that the force also be deficient in elevation, just as when it is deficiently every animal in the head. And it is completed from potentiality proper, or from the duality of species of simplicity. It is evident that the natures of the elements are in the head and the white, in that if the white enters under the head and also potentially, then deficiently the animal would be predicated of it just as of the head, as was learned in that first schema. And if potentially, and if again the head enters under the white, so that the animal is predicated of it potentially, then the animal would not be predicated of it deficiently. It remains, therefore, that the natures of the elements are deficiently in the head and the white, and are deficiently raised together with one another. In that same manner, and when one of the propositions is deficient, the other, in the genus of interior from the deficient, is like interior potentiality or interior simplicity, and the essence is changed. That force of deficient elevation it is fitting that it be as was understood. The mixtures in the third schema, and in this from the schema, when the smaller is the same as that by whose inversion the schema turns to the first, and the larger is as it is in its genus abiding. For it, it is fitting that the force adhere as was shown in that first schema. And when it adheres to the smaller, it is disturbed. Here to its inversion. And the mixtures from that fourth schema. But they do not pertain to the causes that are like these.

The species: concerning hypothetical syllogisms and syllogisms from hypothetical propositions are composed in a fifth way from two species or from two divisions, or from a species and a division, or from a species and a categorical, or from a division and a categorical. And because these are turned into extended figures, not all of them are useless for the meaning for those near in nature; it is fitting to bring some of them. And the first figure of composition, and this figure of composition from the composition of categoricals is brought in it, in which one premise is from a proposition. If the conclusion is in the minor and the major in the major, the first schema occurs and its converse is the fourth. If the conclusion is in both, the second schema. If the major is in both, the second schema. If the major is in both, the third schema. And in the first, thus: Whenever the sun is above the earth, it is day. And whenever it is day, the stars are not visible. Therefore, whenever the sun is above the earth, the stars are not visible. In the second, thus: Whenever the sun is above the earth, it is day. And never when it is night is it day. Therefore, never when the sun is above the earth is it night. In the third, thus: Whenever a man is a writer, he is moved. And whenever a man is a writer, he is not at rest. Therefore, there is a time when a man is moved and is not at rest.

And in that fourth [figure] thus: Whenever a rational animal is a body. And whenever a rational animal is a writing. Therefore, there is a time when a rational animal is a body [and] a writing. The second species of composition. And this species is that in which syllogisms are composed from these distinct [propositions]. And these are from those that are near to nature and clear. These are composed in the first schema. As that every proposition is either a pair or an odd-pair. And every odd-pair is either one or divided into unequal [parts]. It is concluded that every proposition is either a pair or one or divided into unequal [parts]. The third species of composition. And this again is a species in which syllogisms are composed from simple and distinct [propositions]. And these are evident. Those are composed in the first schema. When the simple [proposition] is the minor, and the distinct [proposition] the major. As that this proposition, if it is divided into equal [parts], is a pair. And every pair is either a pair of a pair, or a pair of an odd-pair, or a pair of a pair and of an odd-pair. It is concluded that if this proposition is divided into equal [parts], it is either a pair of a pair, or a pair of an odd-pair, or a pair of a pair and of an odd-pair. The fourth species of composition. And this is a species in which syllogisms are composed from categorical simple [propositions]. And this in two ways: In that the categorical is the minor and the simple is the major, or the opposite. And the first: As that this action is good. And whenever an action is good, it is worthy of praise. The second: As that this action is unjust; this is a thing of blame.

And everything that is a valid syllogism is refuted if this proposition is a false syllogism. The fifth species of composition. And this species is again that in which, from categorical and hypothetical propositions, composite syllogisms are composed. And from these, that which is near to nature is that in which the categorical proposition is the minor and the hypothetical proposition is the major. As when one says that this thing is a substance. And every substance is either a body or a spirit. Therefore, this substance is either a body or a spirit. An example of syllogisms that are invalid. And an invalid syllogism is that in which its subsumption or assumption is found in the predicate. It is composed, then, from two propositions: one categorical and the other a conditional invalid, one from the terms of which a subsumption is born. And this is composed either from terms or from propositions. An example of an invalid syllogism from terms. And the invalid syllogism from terms, the first does not refute the second, as when one says: If this is a head, it is an animal. And it is a head. Therefore, it is an animal. But the invalid syllogism of the second cannot refute the first, because there is a time when the second is contained in the first, and it is not necessary that from the existence of the container, the existence of the contained follows. And even when both are equal to each other, they follow. Not, however, in a true schema, but according to the matter that is posited, when the schema is false. In the same way, the invalid syllogism of the assumption of the second refutes the assumption of the first. As when one turns and becomes invalid in the syllogism that preceded, that an animal is not. It is refuted that it is not a head. But the invalid syllogism of the assumption of the first does not at all refute the assumption of the second.

in which, as was said, the universal affirmative can be from the first. For in the universal affirmative of the first universal, then it is necessary that it be from the affirmative of the particular. And it is not necessary that from the universal possibility the possibility of the particular be, as that which is turned and becomes in the syllogism that preceded. For at the beginning it is not. And it is not refuted that an animal is not. For here a horse, when at the beginning it is not, is an animal. Nor is it an animal in that a tree, when at the beginning it is not, is again not an animal. The demonstration concerning the composition from divided propositions. And that which is from divided propositions is a composition of which one proposition is the antithesis of the other. If two propositions are refuted, in that same manner and antithesis of which one proposition is to the others, as that every number is either even or odd. And this number is even. Therefore it is not odd. And it is odd, therefore it is not even. And it is not even, therefore it is odd. And it is not odd, therefore it is even. And so with many propositions. As that which says every sound is either a noun or a verb or a conjunction. And this sound is a noun. Therefore it is not a verb or a conjunction. And it is not a noun, therefore it is a verb or a conjunction. The demonstration concerning the composition from a divided universal with a particular. And this is from the composition of antithesis of which one proposition refutes the other. And if not, it would be a universal with a particular. For this is a divided from a division that does not suffice that which is placed from one of its propositions. As that which says Socrates is either in the sea or not to be sought. And he is not in the sea. Therefore he is not to be sought.

It is then inquired whether it is in the sea. The error, however, of which of these two is the antithesis of the other cannot be concealed. Otherwise, it would not be possible for both to be concealed together. For that which is in the sea does not conceal that which is inquired, since it is possible for it to be found. Nor does that which is not inquired conceal that which is not in the sea. The demonstration, therefore, of the error is complete with the concealment of the distinct. And this is the opposite of the preceding. For the error of which of them is the antithesis of the other is concealed. Otherwise, it would be possible for both to be concealed together. And this is like that which one would syllogize and say: This is a body, or a tree, or a stone. And if it is a tree, then it is not a stone. And if it is a stone, then it is not a tree. The error, however, of the antithesis of one of them cannot conceal the other. For the antithesis of each of them is, as was shown above, the interior of the other. And it is not compelled by the existence of the interior to the existence of the exterior. And because of this, the error of that which says "it is not a tree" cannot conceal that which says "it is a stone." Nor can that which says "it is not a stone" conceal that which says "it is a tree." Demonstration: And it is from the minor syllogistics. And it is a hypothetical demonstration. And this is a section on the universal, when it is found in its particulars, like that which is said: Every animal moves its lower jaw when it chews. For humans, oxen, and horses move when they chew. And this is weak. For some animals, such as the crocodile, do not move something which they do not see. And because of this, it is not true that every animal moves its lower jaw when it chews. And there is again a paradigm.

And this is the section concerning the demonstration of something in that other demonstration which in some way strikes it as possible. As it is said that the sky is a composition. Is it then a beginning, as it is also possible that it is a composition and a beginning? And that which is attached to its beginning is the sky. And the end is concealed. And that to which completion is attached as its beginning is the house, and the root is concealed. And the something by which the striking is established is composition, and the cause is concealed. And the beginning of this very problem is a concealed section. And in this demonstration, dialecticians are occupied. And to it, a syllogism is indicated, and it is said that every syllogism from a premise ought to have these four elements. And this demonstration again is in a similar weak manner, in that it does not compel from the participation of actions in something, their participation in everything. But they are contraries while they exist in that which strikes in their bodies, which is common. And the accursed ones among them, when they were perplexed by the weakness of this demonstration, they entered into this being completed. While the something by which the demonstration is established is the cause of the section. In the pair from the premise mentioned, that it might be found, it is found. By the duality of something, they ceased to confirm the causality of the cause for the section. These, then, are composition to beginning. One of the something which they called equality of flow and reversal, which is the possibility of a section in the possibility of a cause, or not in all. If in all, then also in the action upon it, it is the other. And if in this demonstration from the more excellent ones it is for you to remember another side from it. O, for that root, I have concealed it, and not one of the signs from its remembrance.

And if not in all of them, then the demonstration concerning you has remained in the possible action, and nothing helps you with its demonstration in that other, impossible one. The argument of yours, that which they call "mobility and division," is thus. For they say that "beginning" is attached to possibility: either in that which it is, or in that which it is not, or in that which it is a body. And it is not in that which it is or is not that beginning is attached to it, but everything that is thus begun ought to be that which it is. The remainder, then, is that in that which it is a body, it is begun. And the sky is a body; therefore it is begun. And this argument again is refuted in a fourth way. One of the things they say is that it is not right that every attachment be through a medium, that is, a cause, attached to its being attached, as is known in Isagoge. For it is possible that beginning is attached to it not in that which it agrees, but in that which it is. As for the argument that that division can be extended, it is possible that the cause of beginning might be something else, apart from those three, which cannot be found in the sky, nor is it fitting for them that which prevents its being said. For if there were something else, they would have apprehended it, in that it is from the impossibilities that a bare cause would be found and not known, just as it is also not possible that it be a prior elephant, nor that it be seen in the first place; but they see it, in that they say, "What charcoal is to the elephant is perceived by the senses, to the intellects which, after many tracks and searches, apprehend them." Nor again are they helped by that which they say to their opponent: "If there is another cause or not, you do not know; you ought to deny it, since not all things that exist are known." This is the argument of the third.

They say that even if it is possible for you that there is another cause besides these three, yet it is possible that all three together are the cause of the section. And when they are found together in possibility, in heaven it is possible that they are not all found together. The small one, then, of the fourth. They say that the third of the dispute is the cause of the beginning. But that itself is possible not simply, but in a small way it becomes a cause. That which is found in possibility, in heaven, then, and not otherwise. That, then, of corporeality is not simple, but that which is in matter is receptive of generation and corruption, and not that which is without their receptivity. And in all these the irrationality of the demonstrative paradigm is examined. And from them again that the irrational demonstrations are. And that which is indicated by syllogism of sign, in that which is for the sake of the great end, it indicates a sign and does not remember from the end of its clarity. As that which says that in the beginning the animal is a body, then it is a body. Or from the end that which is not cut off from its emptiness. As that which goes out from the circle in the night, then it is a thief. And from them again that which is indicated by crisis, in that which the middle is the known one, that of the great end and the first schema. When it is syllogized, as that which they say that this woman is a milkmaid, then she has given birth. And from them again that which is indicated by the sign that it is a syllogism of sign of the limit, that middle is either internal from the ends. It is the second schema when it is syllogized. As that which they say that this woman is pregnant, her face is pale, then she is barren. Or that which is from the ends, the third schema, when it is examined, as that which they say that men are just, in that which Goliath was a man and just.

And again, the sophistry of this same prosogogmikē, which is the syllogism that has a middle term, has some physical example that is possible for a human and for something from animals, like the form of a lion and a human being. For in the demonstration of these examples, the demonstration of some animal affections is sophistically argued. And this and the one before it are opposite to the paradigm. And again, that the syllogism of the intellect is concealed, like that which is said: beautiful women are queens, and ugly ones are eaters of lice. And as in many cases, the protases are not prosdiorismoi, like these. The demonstration concerning these protases, which are the hylē of syllogistic demonstrations. For in every composite there are two actions: the composition, I say, which is the form that is concealed, and that in which the composition occurs, which is called hylē. And because the syllogistic demonstration is also from composites, these necessarily follow it. And concerning its composition, the word has already been spoken. Now, concerning those in which it is composed, which are called hylē, it is necessary to speak, while dividing the protases according to their natures and saying that these protases are either perfective, or probable, or apparent, or deceptive. And the perfective ones are either confessional or completive. And the confessional ones are either necessary for acceptance or natural or habitual. And the necessary for acceptance are either primary or perceptible or experiential or intellectual or deliberative, or protases of the syllogism of their own with them.

Because of the first ones. And these are the propositions whose truth is known naturally, when the limits of their compounds are set. And if it happens that in some place one of the limits is not set, this happens to it by chance and not because of something else. And these are like the one that the whole is greater than its part. And one body cannot be in two places at the same time. Because of the perceptible ones. And these are the propositions whose truth is cut off by the perception of the senses, something external or internal. Like the one that the sun is bright. And that it has affection, desire, and anger. Because of the practical ones. And these are the propositions whose limit is that in them are dense compressions known from the experience of mastery or from the traditions of the deception of expectation. And they are the examinations of mastery that are properly in the rational teachings of the causes. And they are quickly applied to actions that are generally useful. When some divine signs are attached to the compressions. Like the one that the blow of a staff is painful. And the sharp sword is cutting. And in this kind of limit, the hidden syllogistic is helpful. Like the one that if it were a dog, it would not be an animal. It would not be known by its name. And the error of the hypothesis that is attached to the first one is refuted. And the logician is not compelled to investigate the cause of the firmness of the attachment of this kind. But it is known that it is so. Because of the intellectual ones. And these are the propositions whose limit is that in them the intellect is sharp of itself. With it every sharp one is equal. Like the one that says that the moon receives light from the sun.

Because of the one that is changed, the schemata of the light vary according to its proximity to and distance from the sun. And these are from the intelligibles that are well known to the sensibles. But they are distinguished in that the intelligibles are sometimes, at one time, an immediate certainty of truth for them. The sensibles, however, are not so, except after many times, because of the experiences. And these again are propositions of the kind that are from the limit of heard experiences and simple testimonies, and confessions that are not considered a decisive judgment of their own authority, like that which decides the possibility of the existence of the island named Cyprus, and that there was in the world a physician named Galen, and that he saw a lion. And from the testimonies, nothing is determined that ought to be in that which is sometimes testimonies of nights that are nocturnal, not like that which is immediate and reveals deceits to itself. These are extensions and not limited. And this is from an event when, in many subjects like these, something is considered by itself, and in these lesser ones, it is not considered. And the certainty of truth is that which, by means of experience or sense or intellect, becomes external to each person, and cannot but incline towards that which is established. But it can happen that this certainty, like this, is not perceived, and cannot be concealed by another demonstration, because of the propositions and their syllogisms. And these are propositions of the kind that decide a judgment for them that occurs by means of a mean term which cannot but be perceived from thought when the limits are perceived, like the judgment that two is half of four. And the mean term here is that one is half of two, which is equal to the other half of four. And again, like that judgment that four is a pair, in that it is divided into equals.

This one, however, is distinct from those earlier ones. For those are apprehended without intermediaries in the certainty of their truth. This one, however, is through an intermediary and is also quite clear. Because of the material causes, the material things from their very being are the *protesis* of those things whose necessary verification is from the extremity of the corporeality of the acknowledgment of the truth of the things that are in the fire. Or the acknowledgment of the people of something. For in the meantime, when it was and was not, it was a thing without that which is formed from error or from affections. Or other psychic passions that are by custom or by laws external to it. It is able to be empty of their truth by the inversion of those necessary things of opposition. And those are like that which Ptolemy the Stoic was. And the distribution of the small fire. And the rest of those that are similar to them, when at the beginning of their being, that of the human being was and was not established. Or a part of knowledge apart from that speculative one. Not for the others, that if they are like the stars. And not every true cause. Nor every manifest denial. For there is a cause that is empty and a denial that is true. And that is like the totality of the sacrifice of animals to the human beings, that which even the law commanded. That one, however, is like the impossibility of the creation of all for the work. This one, however, is also a denial, for the simple ones, not true it is. For it is not that which is similar to it that is able to create. Because of the material things, and those are from their being the *protesis* of those things that are necessarily true, which are known from that power which is called *w-h-m*. Not from what was. And this one is in that which nothing apart from those that are from the senses is able to be apprehended by it. And because of this, in every zeal it denies the non-sensible with difficulty. And those are either true ones, like the sensible actions in which there is necessary opposition of causes.

or of falsehoods, like natures that are not perceived, of the bound with bodies or not bound, like that which the definition of everything that is, from the particularity of the place, becomes for it that in which it is. And like that which, after the sphere, gathered everything. There is breadth without being limited. And if there were no law, it would cry out, crying out from those earlier ones that are being defined. And that which is from them is covered and does not cease from that which is needed in actions and passions. And it is known that their clarity is from that of many times, when syllogism was something composite of the Lord. That is the one that fights the fight that hides the providence of the mind. This one, then, when it has finished with those protases from the fight, begins and is not true that it is from it. And it is clear that from the true, but the true cannot fight it. In that same manner, when it is from those that are, it is not perceived; it is not. In truth, not everything that is not perceived, like that which is not, ought to be known. In that same manner, other internal powers, such as fear, anger, and desire, cannot perceive themselves. But like the habits of bodies, they are in a place. And when they are not for these, they are not perceived as they are. How, then, do the heavy-hearted men become with that which they know that everything that is perceived ought to be, and if not, it is not? Because of the completions, and these from their being are those protases that are equal with men to be trusted from the end of good hope that is established over them. By means of some virtues and heavenly signs, or by the sublime wisdom of the established, they receive and are completed. Or from that which is discussed, it is completed. Or those protases that are in teachings that are brought cannot have demonstration over them.

in the same way, from the swiftness of receiving, that which learns, until it arrives at the universal teaching by which it is able to be confirmed in its truth. And these, if they are received with the senses, are called sensible accidents; or if with the foundations of the intellect, they are called intellectual, as was shown earlier. Because of the propositions. And these are the protases which, by their division, attach themselves to the proposition itself. The proposition, however, is a division concerning something that is thus, together with the comprehension of the possibility of the occurrence of the hypothesis of that division, like the division that came out at night, that very circuit. The circuit, then, is the region that intends to complete. And from these again, these are the protases, the practical ones that are known to themselves at the beginning of the deliberation. And when one reflects a little upon them, they turn from them into a free one, like that which is said: "Help your brother," whether he is an oppressor or oppressed. Because of the reasons. And these are the protases to which is attached a division from the end of their reason, in which are necessary acceptances or the opposite of them. And this reason is either in the aftermath of a sound or in a concept, as is shown a little. Because of the demonstrations. And these are the protases of desire, something, or of contraction, when they are completed in themselves, they act like that which says: "Do not taste this which is bad." In that it is a matter of bitterness and at once a contraction from it itself. And also the knowledge that it is not a matter of bitterness. And like that again which is said: "This is a lion in strength. This is the moon in beauty." And at once that one is disturbed. That one, however, is adorned, sitting in inquiry. And also the intellect distinguishes that in the beginning it is neither a lion nor the moon, but it is deceived by the imagination. And many from among the wicked despise certain actions, and some from among others leap into them.

moreover, the active faculties produce it, that which is said to be probable, and along with quantity also in the common letters they are adorned, and it is not necessary that they be false in nature. For even those which are more true, when it is possible that they be arranged in this way, they are. And the light upon the comprehension of these, of each one from the terms of the syllogisms and their hypotheses, and the propositions from those necessary acceptances, these are the apodictic syllogisms. The apodictic propositions are those in their nature. ... And the proposition and the error is that which I have explained, that in the apodictic only the apodictic propositions enter. For also from the potentialities, the potentialities are added to be confirmed apodictically, when the principal syllogistic terms are arranged. Thus also from the universals, and the hypotheses from the apodictic syllogism, the principal test of truth is a necessary possibility. These, however, of the syllogisms are those of dialectic. The propositions are artificial and the hypotheses are complete. These necessary acceptances are causes only in that which is artificial, or their completions, and to that from dialectic the hypothesis has something. The first, when a man is a seeker after new things which are not sufficient to be guided in the path of truth, and again he casts his understanding from that which is known to truth by means of apodixis, by means of the artificial propositions of necessary acceptance for him, he is compelled to falsify his thought, not rightly. The second, however, when there is a cause for examining the principal thoughts for a man weak in knowledge, who is from the order of the judge, and it is not possible that they be like them by means of a rhetorical cause.

And the demonstrative syllogisms prove truth by means of these dialectical syllogisms, which are able to demonstrate it through the confession of the opponent. Thirdly, again, of the premises that are from the sciences, not all are known apodictically, but many of the propositions of these sciences are not even known from a proximate cause. For by means of dialectical syllogisms they persuade the disputants of their positions, until they arrive at that universal knowledge by which they can be known apodictically. Fourthly, again, these dialectical syllogisms are useful for refuting both sides of an antiphrasis; and when they are examined accurately, the truth is revealed and made manifest. And when this art is a written one, it is not necessary for its practitioner to be deceived in its secret. The propositions of the sophistical syllogisms are those that are apparent and those that are also plausible, but they are not true; and not one of them is from the disputation of the sophistical, except that by which the conclusion is not attained. There is, moreover, also when it is able to choose which of the two is not accurately wise, but the strength or weakness of the demonstrative sciences is examined, when one sees the caution of the one and the rashness of the other. And then it is called a sophistical syllogism … a foolish man who strikes a blow against a wall, as one who is beaten. And when it is refuted, its folly is revealed, and it is denied by its own consequences. And then it is called a sophistical syllogism. The propositions of the rhetorical syllogisms are those that are probable and something from those that are accepted, and the conclusion from them is that which is able to persuade concerning actions that are seemly and to dissuade from those that are not seemly, according to laws and judicial confessions.

And other demonstrative premises. Again, the apodictic syllogisms are only those of the poetic and rhetorical kind, and they show the surface of meaning and self-contradiction or its contradiction with natural and emotional or passionate things. And with rhetorical syllogisms, they can persuade the weak in knowledge about truth. But these are dialectical means. And the fifth is the false syllogism. In that every syllogism either establishes truth and is called apodictic, or establishes falsehood and is called poetic, or is intermediate. And this one, if it is intermediate, is called rhetorical when it is fitting; if it is for the sake of truth, it is called dialectical when it is more fitting; if it is for falsehood, it is called sophistical. Fourth chapter On the apodictic syllogism in particular And first on the material problems. For there are four kinds of inquiry: in that every inquiry is examined by demonstration, either whether it exists is sought, or what it is, or which it is, or why it is. And the inquiry of whether something exists, if it is simple, is called that; but that of whether it is in such a way or such, likewise in everything outside of existence, is called composite. And again, the inquiry of what it is is also twofold: in that either its definition is sought or the understanding of its essence. And that whose definition is sought is prior to the inquiry of whether it is simple; but that of the understanding of its essence is posterior to it. And thus it is ordered. The thought of the things in the chapters from the particular to that of whether it is, as it came, is prior to that of what it is of its kind.

And another inquiry: what distinction is sought in the actions naturally from these others? And another inquiry: why? The cause of the demonstration of the limits of the syllogism is sought in it, that is, the middle term, or the causality of the cause is sought from it. And this inquiry is distinct from the other one, that is, from that which is in the treatise. For there are also other inquiries, such as: where? and whence? and when? And all of them are in that which: what are the causes? In general, these four are the mothers, of which two are in the propositions of causes and two in the conclusions. The light upon the duality of the figures of apodeixis and apodeixis, when it is something of the syllogism that is composed from premises of true certainty. That middle term in apodeixis or in action and thought together. It is the cause of the demonstration of the signs of the argument. And this is the apodeixis that is called "why?" Or in thought alone, it is the cause of the demonstration of the effect of the cause, which is the conclusion alone and not that of the action itself. And this is the apodeixis that is called "that." And the former shows from cause to effect. And because of this, it is fitting, as it is said: "This wood is heavy for fire, and everything heavy for fire burns; therefore, this wood burns." Behold, the heaviness of the fire. Both in action and in thought, that is, in the conclusion, the cause is the burning. The latter, however, is like that which is said: "This wood is burning, and everything burning is heavy for fire; therefore, this wood is heavy for fire." And it is clear that burning is also the cause of the predicate of that major over the minor in the thought of the conclusion, not also in the action is the cause the heaviness of the fire, but the effect. And in apodeixis, it is that which is "why?

It is not necessary that the middle term be like the cause for the sake of the great end, but that its discovery be in the small, and also that it be its cause, as every rational animal and every animate body are the light upon the matters of the disciplines. For every discipline has that which is set, and principles and inquiries, and that which is set is that every discipline is that by which those things that are essentially attached to it are demonstrated, like measurement to geometry, and number to arithmetic, and natural bodies in that they are healthy or ill to medicine. And "essences" here are said of that which is attached to something in that it is what it is, like equality to quantity, or opposition to quality. And the principles are the limits and the premises from which the syllogisms in it are composed. And the inquiries, again, are the premises themselves whose mutual relations are sought in that discipline. And those disciplines are distinguished by the differences of those things that are set for them, or by the differences of their accidents. And if those things that are set for them differ in every respect, the disciplines are said to be utterly separate. And when that which is set for something from the disciplines is interior to that which is set for another, by subalternation, like higher geometry with the knowledge of bodies, or without limitation, like the moving spheres of the lower with the sphere, it is said that the particular is placed under the general. In this manner, and when those things that are set for them are different, and one is concerned with those things that are essentially attached to the other, like it is said that music is under arithmetic, for the whole foundation of the lower is set in those things that are above them, and the apodeixis occurs.

And there is also when something from the foundations of these higher things is shown in the lower things. However, it is not in the nature of the lower foundations that they are shown. As when a cycle follows and drunkenness is disturbed and teachings are arranged one above the other according to that for which they are intended, until they reach first philosophy. For that which is intended has that which has no intermediary with it. And in that which is shown in its house, it is. It is not necessary that it be shown in another. And these are from being and corruption, and not one apodeixis can be made concerning them, because from the end neither their essence nor a division concerning them remains permanently. And again, because in the sensible substance that stands and is destined to fall into corruption they are placed. And according to both, not one apodeixis but rather many categories are formed. And then they are not from them. And concerning the possible, an apodeixis is made concerning their possibility, but not concerning their essence. And for the possible, as in the majority, there is a confirmation that necessitates the probability of the essence, like the youth of a boy in the stature of youth. And the limit from the middle here is the knot of crowns and the continuity of the rows of faces. And a demonstration concerning that the limit cannot be fixed by apodeixis, and that in distinct matters the limit is not fixed by apodeixis, because when it is fixed, then concerning the middle it is necessary. And that the limit from the end is great and the limited end is small. And here from the three, the limits should be equal, because if the middle limit were internal with the limited, it would be necessary that also the limit of that great end be internal with it. And it is shown that it is not a limit, because when it is fixed, it would be an equal limit to the limited.

And the distinction between apodeixis and definition is that there is sometimes also a cause. For what and on account of what are distinguished. And here, when a definition is intermediate in apodeixis, the causes are the foundations of actions. As when it is asked why the moon is darkened, and it is answered because the earth is interposed between it and the sun. And every interposition of this kind is strictly a privation that produces the obscuration of the moon. And it is asked again what an eclipse is, and it is answered that it is a privation of lunar light due to the interposition of the earth between it and the sun. They are distinguished from each other in that what comes first in definition is found in another apodeixis. And it is necessary to know that causes are of four kinds: material, as wood for a chair; formal, as the shape of a chair; efficient, as the carpenter for a chair; and final, as the sitting upon it. When the causes are found, their effects are also found. And because these last two are the more honorable, they are especially taken up in definitions as demonstrations. And there is also when all four are taken up together, as in the statement that a sword is an instrument for cutting, taken from iron that is long, broad, and sharp on both sides, as for killing something from animals. And the instrument is from the relation that its cause is the efficient cause. And the third of the remaining three, and the cause of the privation of the effect, is taken up in its definition. And its divisions are not taken up in its definition but in the definition of its form, as in the measurement of one of the causes of fire. For in the case of a torch, it is not proper that it be taken up in its definition but in the definition of something from its form, whether one says "triton" or "tetarton." And when the causes are many, they are established for something from the actions.

And the proximate causes, not the remote ones, ought to be employed in demonstrations. For when it is asked why the vine was pruned, it is not because the pruning of vineyards ought to be done as Chrysostom also did, but because it is the pruning of the vine. Or again, proximately, as when we say why, because it does not intoxicate, and also it is not apodeictic that the judgment of the wicked is sufficient for examination. Chapter Five: On Sophistic Syllogism, that is, Deceit and Error with Syllogism, or with Falsehood, or with the Matter of which it is composed. And the first is like that which occurs with things that are not contradictory, with one schema. And the second, when the matter is false in its nature, and like a true one from what is plausible, when there is some likeness to the truth in the matter itself, and that likeness is either verbal or conceptual. And the first, either when it is simple in word or when it is composite. And that again is the first, either in matter, that is, in terms together and in falsehood, or in their composition, like homonyms, or in matter alone, like the word of stone and stone, or in falsehood alone, like the word that is changed of the concept that is perceived by the mind, when in its nature the perception is known. And that which is composite, either by a schema of something that adheres to the composition, a cause of likeness, and a deceptive adherence, like that which is said of Jezebel, daughter of Jerusalem the madwoman, and like that again of everything that the philosopher knows, as that which he knows is what it is, and he knows that a stone is a stone. Or when the schema of the composition is changed deceptively. And this is twofold: either when it is plausibly true that it is also specifically true, or the opposite.

that which is like that which is said concerning a good man by his art, not by his nature, that the art is good, and it is not true that he who distinguishes and says that he is good. But that which is like that which is said concerning a man who is not good by his art, but good by his nature, that he is an artisan and good, and it is not true that he who compounds and says that he is a good artisan. And these are like the fallacies of the post-sound. But that which is in the syllogism occurs, or when the protasis is not converted simply, like the conversion of apophasis which is the middle term, or when that which is by accident, like that which is by nature, they take and say that he who sits in a ship that is being rowed is moved, and everything that is moved does not remain in one place by its motions, and thus they produce emptiness. Or when the consequent is substituted for the antecedent, they take and say that a man when he is rational is a speaking being, therefore every rational being is speaking. Or when that which is by force, like that which is by activity, is taken, like the meditation of a philosopher is worthy of being deliberated upon, and a youth is a philosopher, therefore it is worthy of being deliberated upon. There are also errors and fallacies, and not the definitions of each of the categories that were established in the being of antiphysis. In the judgment they are considered to begin together or to deceive the antipathetics. There are also, and by means of these four species, the boundaries in which they are limited, and in these also they are limited in syllogism. There are also fallacies, and when without prosdiorismoi, as in prosdiorismos they are used and say that a man is a body, in that he is an animal. There are also fallacies, and when the cause is substituted for the effect, they take and say that the soul is not mortal, in that it moves motions.

Again, there is error and ignorance of the changes of prosōpa, like that which changes that which is not one nature in species, that which is not one species in nature. And they do not know that that which is accused in the first is not the species but in the species. Again, there is error and by a change of the sign without denial in prosōpon, when they err that in no way is that which is from that which is not to be distinguished from that which is not from that which is to be. For as this is loosed upon that which is able to be loosed, so also that. Again, there is error. And when that which is not a cause, like that which is a cause, they suppose and say that it is not more than that in creation in the beginning it was fitting that air should ascend after they were mutually united in life. Again, there is error. And when that which stands, like that which is able, they suppose and say that it is able to cut that in the beginning a stone is in word and not in deed. And from that which is not a stone in the beginning, it is shown that from that which is not in the beginning it is not. Again, there is error and from the non-repetition of the manner of the category. For they say that whiteness of accident is the entry of white into the substance by its coming. Therefore accident enters by the coming of the substance. And they do not distinguish that white in that which is white is the entry of whiteness by its coming and not in that which is substance. Again, there is error and from the smallness of the likeness, like that which they say that that which is like something ought also to be like that which that thing is like. And a house is like snow. Therefore also a glacier ought to be like. Again, there is error. And when for gluttony in place of apathēsis they suppose and say that he who does not see is blind. And a physician does not see. Therefore she is blind.

Again, there is also error in this, that which says that every composition of equal natures makes a single schema, and that it is right that that also be equal to the schema of its natures. And a circle is composed of two equal arcs; therefore, that also is arc-like. And this error is only in schemata. And these are among many erroneous errors, like that from the extension of matter together and from the impression of the syllogism, how many also of those that enter into the division of both are distributed. So that they are not in conjunction, while a man is preserved and there is no one who errs. But if, with that which this does, it again seeks to accomplish, wisdom provides a remedy for it, since it is from its own time. The Logic is completed. Again, by God, we begin in the Pragmateia of the Second, that which is called natural speech. First Preparation Wisdom, for it is the perfection of the human soul, through the comprehension of all those things that are as they are, according to the division that is from nature for it. And these things, either knowledge of them alone suffices without their actuality, or with their knowledge also their actuality. And the first knowledge is called theoretical philosophy; the second, practical philosophy. And that from the second is divided into a third. Wisdom is divided into ethical, natural, and logical. In that which is established by the head towards knowledge of virtues, as things to be pursued, and of vices, as things to be avoided. And this is by ethical wisdom, which is called Ethics, so that it may be. In the same manner, it is established towards knowledge of the beauty of the order of those things that are in nature and the manner of the union of pairs, male and female, and children and offspring, and masters and servants.

And this is by that wisdom which is called economic, which is known. Thus he reasoned, and with the knowledge of the likeness of the participation with the interior of the elements. And the proper conduct of the nature of the human being. And again, this is by that wisdom which is called political, which is known. In that same form, and that philosophy which is called theoretical, there are three parts. And that part which is about practical actions, which are continuous. Those are the first principles from that which is without end. Like the first truth and the beings, and those of the remainder which are similar. And the divisions of that which is simple. So that also something from them is mixed with that which is without end, it understands. Not in that which is necessary for it, its mixed existence. The first and interior philosophy is known. In that which is set, it has like it was said that interior from all that which falls under the heel. That which is that which is simple. Because it distinguishes over its natural substances, it chooses. And this is the second division. From it, from that knowledge which is universal, in which there are divisions of that which is. From it, from that which is properly called theology. And a part from that which is about practical actions, mixed with that which is without end, those which are such that it is able to create them from that which is called apolaustic, like the four teachings. And again, a part is that which mixes the mixed in that practical actions with that which is without end. And never is it found to create them, which is called physiology. And that which is set has the body of the world. In that it is moved and is at rest and changes, concerning which the word in the beginning is added to be understood. A secret warning, because it distinguishes or these secrets are trusted. Guard them from every meaning that is possible. And from every thought that has not been moved, the divisions of these philosophers are changed. But seek in them.

All that was entrusted to the purity of the air by which it was established. And when the substance came to them divisively and by degrees, they became a moth or a weevil through the enmity of the dust toward their stability, they were consumed. While the whole fullness of their opinion testified in them, that they also in life followed after the tracks. Then the flesh revealed concerning this treasure of sanctities. To him who seeks the rational spirits for the investigation of your knowledge, the circle suffices.