{"slug":"dsc-538","id":"syriac:dsc:dsc-538","title":"Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","title_source":"Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","author":"Gregorius bar Hebraeus","genre":"other","date":"Mid-13th century CE","tradition":"syriac","coverage":"not-located","coverage_claim":{"status":"not-located","text":"No English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed."},"publication":{"status":"machine-draft","reviewed_by":null,"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash:floor","provider":"Relace","generated":"2026-11-15T07:24:22Z","cost_usd":0.051645},"source":{"registry_id":"syriac:dsc:dsc-538","work_id":"dsc-538","edition":"syriac","language":"","license":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"},"stats":{"passages":81,"english_words":26903,"coptic_letters":0,"source_letters":72379,"commentary_units":457,"commentary_kinds":7,"derived_notes":1,"ambiguities":143,"work_notes":5,"external_links":0,"timeline":5},"summary":{"work":"dsc-538","abstract":"Gregorius bar Hebraeus's 'Treatise of Treatises, Book 1' is a philosophical-theological work in Syriac, structured as a series of dialogues or disputations. The title suggests a synthetic or summary intent within his corpus. The work is dated to the mid-13th century based on internal references and manuscript colophons, though no precise year is given. The source edition relies on a single Syriac manuscript, leaving the textual tradition incompletely known. Bar Hebraeus, a Syriac Orthodox scholar, integrates Aristotelian logic with Christian theology. The English draft is a modern rendering that may not capture all Syriac technical terms.","historical_context":"Gregorius bar Hebraeus (also known as Bar ‘Ebroyo) flourished in the late 13th to early 14th century, likely in the Syriac Orthodox community of northern Mesopotamia or Syria. His works were widely copied in both Syriac Orthodox and East Syriac circles, reflecting the broader intellectual milieu of the Syriac Renaissance. The 'Treatise of Treatises' is a philosophical-theological dialogue, drawing on Aristotelian logic and Christian theology. Its transmission is based on a single manuscript, with no recorded variant readings or lacunae from other witnesses. The work is cited in later philosophical compendia, but its direct liturgical or canonical use is not attested. The dating of Book 1 rests on internal references and manuscript colophons, but no precise year is given in the source edition.","significance":"The 'Treatise of Treatises' represents a synthetic effort within Bar Hebraeus's corpus, integrating Aristotelian logic with Christian theology in a dialogic format. It reflects the intellectual currents of the Syriac Renaissance and was influential in later philosophical compendia. The work's reliance on a single manuscript highlights the need for further textual criticism.","timeline":[{"date":"Mid-13th century","event":"Composition of 'Treatise of Treatises, Book 1' by Gregorius bar Hebraeus."},{"date":"Late 13th–early 14th century","event":"Flourishing of Gregorius bar Hebraeus."},{"date":"13th–14th centuries","event":"Wide copying of Bar Hebraeus's works in Syriac Orthodox and East Syriac circles."},{"date":"Undated","event":"Citation of the treatise in later philosophical compendia."},{"date":"Modern period","event":"English translation produced; source edition based on a single Syriac manuscript."}],"relations":[{"work":"Aristotelian logical corpus","relation":"Influences the treatise's structure and terminology (e.g., essences, substances).","key":"","label":null,"url":null},{"work":"Syriac philosophical compendia","relation":"Later compendia cite this treatise.","key":"","label":null,"url":null},{"work":"Other works by Gregorius bar Hebraeus","relation":"Part of a larger corpus; the title signals a synthetic or summary intent.","key":"","label":null,"url":null},{"work":"Syriac Orthodox theological tradition","relation":"Reflects integration of Aristotelian logic with Christian theology.","key":"","label":null,"url":null}],"external_links":[],"cautions":["The dating of Book 1 rests on internal references and manuscript colophons, but no precise year is given in the source edition.","The source edition is based on a single Syriac manuscript; variant readings or lacunae in other witnesses are not recorded, so the textual tradition remains incompletely known.","The English draft is a modern rendering; it may not capture all Syriac technical terms or rhetorical nuances.","The phrase 'the treatise itself is the beginning of this composition' is ambiguous: it may mean the preface is part of the treatise, or that the treatise's content begins here."],"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash:floor","provider":"Relace","cost_usd":0.000469,"generated":"2026-11-15T07:24:22Z"},"links":[{"kind":"source","label":"Digital Syriac Corpus text","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"},{"kind":"authority","label":"syriaca.org work record","url":"http://syriaca.org/work/9029"},{"kind":"authority","label":"syriaca.org author record","url":"http://syriaca.org/person/239"}],"checks":{"work":"dsc-538","status":"pass","blocking":[],"warnings":[],"stats":{"passages":81,"translated":81,"commentary_passages":81,"commentary_units":457,"english_words":26903,"source_letters":73836,"commentary_kinds":7},"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash:floor"},"work_notes":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The work is a philosophical-theological treatise in Syriac, structured as a series of dialogues or disputations. Its title, 'Treatise of Treatises', signals a synthetic or summary intent within Bar Hebraeus’s corpus.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"dating","kind":"chronology","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Gregorius bar Hebraeus (also known as Bar ‘Ebroyo) flourished in the late 13th to early 14th century. The dating of Book 1 rests on internal references and manuscript colophons, but no precise year is given in the source edition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"transmission","kind":"transmission","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The source edition is based on a single Syriac manuscript. Variant readings or lacunae in other witnesses are not recorded, so the textual tradition remains incompletely known.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus’s works were widely copied in Syriac Orthodox and East Syriac circles. This treatise is cited in later philosophical compendia, but its direct liturgical or canonical use is not attested in the source edition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The English draft provided is a modern rendering; it may not capture all Syriac technical terms or rhetorical nuances. Readers should consult the Syriac text for precise philosophical vocabulary.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"derived_work_notes":[{"kind":"coverage","severity":"info","text":"No English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed."},{"kind":"limit","severity":"caution","text":"The English is a machine draft produced passage by passage from the transcribed Coptic; no human has verified it. The commentary is model-written and cites only keys the pipeline could resolve."},{"kind":"register","severity":"info","text":"Register: other in classical Syriac; the English keeps the liturgical formulae and the vocatives rather than normalising them."},{"kind":"structure","severity":"info","text":"Passages: 81 narrative."},{"kind":"caution","severity":"caution","text":"1 passage(s) are fragmentary in the source; the English bridges each break and says so in the note."},{"kind":"source","severity":"info","text":"Source edition: syriac — CC BY 4.0"}],"derived_structure":{"narrative":81},"term_index":[],"citations":{"ed:dsc-538":{"label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}},"segments":[{"i":1,"ref":"p1","source":"ܦܪܓܡܛܝܐ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ\nܥܘܬܕܐ\nܥܘܬܕܐ ܕܩܕܡ ܠܘܓܝܩܝ ܘܕܡܢܐ ܗܘ ܗܢܝܢܐ ܕܡܢܗܿ\nܩܦܠܐܘܢ ܩܕܡܝܐ: ܡܛܠ ܒܢ̈ܬ ܩ̈ܠܐ ܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ. ܘܗܠܝܢ ܚܡܫ ܟܠܢܝ̈ܬܐ\nܩܦܠܐܘܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ: ܥܠ ܪܘܟܒܐ ܕܟܠ ܙܢ̈ܝ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ. ܘܥܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܡܩܦ ܠܗ ܢܩ̈ܦܢ. ܩܦܠܐܘܢ ܕܬܠܬܐ: ܥܠ ܪܘܟܒܐ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܕܡܫܬܪܪܢܘܬܐ\nܩܦܠܐܘܢ ܕܐܪܒܥܐ: ܥܠ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܐܦܘܕܝܩܛܝܩܝܐ ܕܝܠܢܐܝܬ\nܩܦܠܐܘܢ ܕܚܡܫܐ: ܥܠ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܣܘܦܝܣܛܝܩܝܐ ܐܘܟܝܬ ܡܛܥܝܢܐ. ܟܕ ܒܣܘܝ̈ܥܐ ܡܥܫܢ̈ܢܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܬܐ ܥܠܬ ܟܠ ܛܒ̈ܢ ܡܬܣܝܥ ܐܢܐ. ܟܬܒܐ ܗܘ ܕܬܓܪܬ ܬܓܪ̈ܬܐ ܥܠ ܦܪܓܡܛܝܐ ܡܠܝܠܬܐ ܘܕܘܓܡܐ ܚܟܡܬܢܝܐ ܩܪܒ ܐܢܐ ܐܟܬܘܒ. ܡܢ ܣܝܡܐ ܕܡܫܒܚܐ ܡܪܝ ܓܪܝܓܘܪܝܘܣ ܕܗܘ ܐܒܘ ܐܠܦܪܓ ܒܪ ܐܗܪܘܢ. ܩܕܡܝܐ ܦܪܘܡܝܘܢ:\nܕܡܢܐ ܗܘ ܢܝܫܐ ܕܡܟܬܒܢܘܬܐ ܗܕܐ\nܡܒܪܟ ܐܢ̱ܬ ܡܪܝܐ ܡܪܐ ܡܪ̈ܘܢ ܒܪܘܝܐ ܕܢܘܗܪܐ ܡܬܘܡܝܐ. ܘܡܫܟܚܢܐ ܕܫܟܝܚܘܬ ܝܬ ܫܡܝܐ. ܙܘܢܝܢ ܝܐܝܒܘܬܐ ܕܠܘܬ ܦܓܥܟ. ܘܠܐ ܬܕܘܢܝܢ ܟܕ ܢܐܪܥܟ. ܕܟܢܝ ܕܢܕܥܟ. ܙܟܢ ܕܢܫܬܘܕܥܟ. ܥܒܕ ܝܬܝ̈ܢ ܡܢ ܗܢܝܢ ܕܓܡܝܪ̈ܢ. ܘܐܘܣ̈ܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܢܗܝܪ̈ܢ. ܗܘ̈ܢܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܡܦܪܫܝܢ. ܘܚܘܫ̈ܒܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܩܕܝܫܝܢ. ܐܢ̱ܬ ܗْܘ ܓܝܪ ܝܡܐ ܕܛܝܒܘ̈ܬܐ ܕܠܐ ܡܬܬܓܝܫ: ܘܬܗܘܡܐ ܕܫܘܟܢ̈ܐ ܕܠܐ ܡܬܬܡܝܫ،ܕܒܪܟ ܒܪ ܟܝܢܟ ܘܪܘܚܟ ܢܦܘܩܐ ܕܡܢܟ. ܡܪܡܪܡܐ ܐܢ̱ܬ ܓܝܪ ܟܝܢܐ ܐܠܗܝܐ ܠܥܠܡܝܢ. ܘܠܥܠ ܐܝܬܝܟ ܡܢ ܟܠ ܐܩܡܝ̈ܢ. ܒܕ ܠܐ ܡܫܟܚܐ ܡܠܬܐ ܬܪܡܪܡܟ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܢ̱ܬ ܒܟ ܘܡܢܟ ܡܪܡܪܡ ܐܢ̱ܬ. ܝܕܥܬܟ ܓܝܪ ܝܕܥܬ ܝܕܥ̈ܬܐ ܗܝ. ܘܓܡܝܪܘܬܐ ܕܒܗܿ ܓܡܝܪܘܬ ܓܡܝܪ̈ܘܬܐ. ܗܝ. ܗܝ ܓܝܪ ܛܒ ܡܢ ܟܠ ܠܩܢܝܗܿ ܡܥܕܐ ܕܬܟܠܠ. ܘܡܠܐ ܕܣܘܟܠܐ ܬܕܠܠ. ܠܐ ܡܬܚܠܦܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܒܚܘ̈ܠܦܝ ܡܘ̈ܙܠܬܐ. ܒܕ ܐܦܠܐ ܐܢܬ ܡܬܚܠܦ ܐܢܬ.","english":"First Proemium\n\nPreface\n\nThe preface that precedes logic and demonstration is the treatise itself.\n\nFirst chapter: On simple terms. And these are five universals.\n\nSecond chapter: On the composition of all the categories of predication. And on those that follow them, the post-predicaments.\n\nThird chapter: On the second composition of assertoric propositions.\n\nFourth chapter: On demonstrative syllogism in particular.\n\nFifth chapter: On sophistical syllogism, that is, fallacious, with the instrumental means of being, by which all goods are accomplished.\n\nThis is the book of the Treatise of Treatises on rational philosophy and ethical example, which I have approached to write. From the collection of the venerable Mār Gregory, who is Abū al-Faraj Bar ʿEbrāyā. First Proemium:\n\nThe treatise itself is the beginning of this composition.\n\nBless, O Lord, Lord of lords, Creator of the eternal light, and Discoverer of the discovery of the heavens. Unite the beauties to your encounter, and do not let them be separated when you appear. Purify those who know you. Conquer those who are known to you. Make essences with the perfect substances, and substances with the luminous essences, hypostases with the distinct ones, and thoughts with the holy ones. For you are the sea of graces that is not agitated, and the abyss of mercies that is not disturbed. Bless your son by your nature and your spirit, the emanation from you. For you are the divine nature exalted above the worlds, and above your being with all the categories. For speech cannot exalt you as you exalt yourself and from you you are exalted. For your knowledge is the knowledge of knowledges, and the perfection in it is the perfection of perfections. For it is good that from all to its end it is perfected, and the fullness of reason is manifested. It is not subject to change in the changes of the modes, for neither are you changed.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪܓܡܛܝܐ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The heading 'First Proemium' introduces the work's preface, which Bar Hebraeus distinguishes from the logical treatise proper.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܦܠܐܘܢ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term 'qap̄lāwṯ' (chapters) structures the treatise into five sections, each treating a distinct logical topic from simple terms to sophistical syllogism.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪܘܡܝܘܢ","severity":"info","text":"The 'proemium' (προοίμιον) is a standard rhetorical preface in Syriac philosophical works, often invoking divine blessing before logical exposition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܘܣ̈ܝܢ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac 'ʾwṣyʾ' (essences) and 'hṭyʾ' (substances) reflect Aristotelian ontology, distinguishing ousia as primary substance from hypostasis.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܪܝ ܓܪܝܓܘܪܝܘܣ ܕܗܘ ܐܒܘ ܐܠܦܪܓ ܒܪ ܐܗܪܘܢ","severity":"info","text":"The author is identified as Gregory bar Hebraeus (Abū al-Faraj Bar ʿEbrāyā), a 13th-century Syriac Orthodox scholar known for integrating Aristotelian logic with Christian theology.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܕܡܢܐ ܗܘ ܢܝܫܐ ܕܡܟܬܒܢܘܬܐ ܗܕܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The phrase 'the treatise itself is the beginning of this composition' is ambiguous: it may mean the preface is part of the treatise, or that the treatise's content begins here.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The relationship between the preface and the logical treatise proper is unclear: the preface may be considered part of the treatise or a separate introduction.","The phrase 'ܕܡܢܐ ܗܘ ܢܝܫܐ ܕܡܟܬܒܢܘܬܐ ܗܕܐ' could be read as 'the treatise itself is the beginning of this composition' or 'the treatise is the beginning of this composition'."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":2,"ref":"p2","source":"ܕܥܠܝܗܿ ܗܐ ܗܫܐ ܡܠܬܐ ܟܕ ܒܟ ܛܦܣܐ ܡܢܣܝܐ ܠܡܠܬܡ. ܘܗܿܘ ܡܐ ܕܥܠܝܗܿ ܡܢ ܥܬܝ̈ܩܐ ܗܘܬ ܠܡܬܪܥܝܘ،ܟܕ ܒܟ ܡܣܬܝܥܐ ܐܬܝܐ ܠܡܪܬܡ. ܟܕ ܒܐܘܪܚܐ ܢܩܝܠܬ ܠܦܠܓܐ ܦܐܪܝܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܬܗܕܝܐ. ܘܒܠܡܐܢܝ̈ܗܿ ܫܦܝܪ̈ܐ ܡܬܠܘܝܐ. ܘܡܛܠ ܕܠܘ ܙܗܝܪܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܕܐܬܝܐ ܠܬܘ̈ܢܐ ܕܓ̈ܠܐ ܬܬܡܬܚ. ܡܢ ܬܪܥܐ ܒܡܥܠܢ̈ܐ ܠܘܓܝܩܝ̈ܐ ܥܐܠܐ. ܘܡܢ ܗܕܐ ܠܝܕܥܬܐ ܦܘܣܝܘܠܘܓܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܬܡܢܥܐ. ܐܝܛܐ ܥܠ ܪܘܡܐ ܕܬܐܘܠܘܓܝܐ ܩܝܡܐ. ܘܗܟܢܐ ܛܪܝܘܦܪܓܡܛܝܐ ܒܝܕ ܢܘܗܪ̈ܐ ܘܡܚܘܝܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܒܡܠܬܐ ܚܙܝܬܐ ܘܡܡܫܚܬܐ ܠܡܠܬܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ ܕܬܐܓܪܬ ܬܐܓܪ̈ܬܐܡܛܬ ܠܗܿ ܠܡܫܬܡܝܘ ܡܨܡܕܐ. ܟܕ ܠܦܣܝܩܘܬܐ ܙܪܒܬ ܪ̈ܥܝܢܐ: ܘܫܛܝܚܘܬܐ ܡܦܠܗܕܬ ܣܘܟ̈ܠܐ ܠܗܠ ܫܒܩܐ. ܥܘܬܕܐ ܕܩܕܡ ܠܘܓܝܩܝ ܘܕܡܢܐ ܗܘ ܗܢܝܢܐ ܕܡܢܗܿ\nܟܠ ܝܕܥܬܐ ܐܘ ܡܬܝܩܢܢܘܬܐ ܗܝ ܐܢܗܘ ܕܡܕܪܟܢܘܬܐ ܗܝ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܝܕܥ: ܐܘ ܗܝܡܢܘܬܐ. ܐܢܗܘ ܕܠܗܿ ܠܡܕܪܟܢܘܬܐ ܦܣܩܐ ܕܣܝܘܡܘܬܐ. ܐܘ ܕܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܢܩܦ. ܘܟܠ ܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܐܘ ܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܐܢܗܘ ܕܟܝܢܐܝܬ ܗܝ ܠܢ ܕܢܕܥܝܗܿ ܒܠܥܕ ܚܘܫܒܐ. ܚܘܫܒܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܡܪ ܐ̱ܢܐ ܗܪܟܐ ܠܡܬܬܝܬܝܢܘܬܐ ܕܡܕܥܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܝܕܝ̈ܥܢ ܠܘܬ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܠܐ ܝܕܝ̈ܥܢ. ܐܘ ܡܬܝܠܦܢܝܬܐ ܐܢܗܘ ܕܒܚܘܫܒܐ ܡܬܩܢܝܐ. ܘܡܬܝܩܢܢܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ،ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܬܝܩܢ ܡܢܝܘܬ ܐܪܥܐ ܘܡܝ̈ܐ. ܘܡܬܝܠܦܢܝܬܐ: ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܬܝܩܢ ܡܢܝܘܬ ܡܠܐܟܐ ܐܘ ܢܦܫܐ. ܘܗܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܗܝܡܢ ܕܟܘܠܐ ܪܒ ܡܢ ܡܢܬܐ. ܘܡܬܝܠܦܢܝܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܗܝܡܢ ܕܠܗܢܐ ܟܠ ܐܝܬ ܡܫܟܚܢܐ. ܘܝܕܥܬܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܡܢܬܐ ܗܝ ܕܬܚܘܡܐ ܐܢܫܝܐ: ܗܿܝ ܕܐܦ ܡܠܝܠܘܬܐ ܡܬܩܪܝܐ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܠܐ ܡܩܒܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܕܝܬܝܪܘܬܐ ܘܒܨܝܪܘܬܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ ܡܬܝܠܦܢܝܬܐ ܒܗ ܪܕܝܐ.","english":"that is above it, now the word, as in you, a pattern is tried for the word. And that which is above it from the ancients was for reflection, as in you, it is possible to come for elevation. As in a measured path, it is guided to the division of the categories. And by its beautiful meanings, it is followed. And because it is not careful that as it comes to the errors of deceits, it is stretched out. From the door of logical introductions, it enters. And from this, it is occupied with physiological knowledge. That is, it stands on the height of theology. And thus, the triopragmatic is by demonstrations and proofs in the word seen and measured for the word, as this of the epistle of epistles has come to be called, to be joined. As for the decision, it hastens the thoughts, and the extension separates the meanings to leave behind. The preparation that precedes logic and demonstration is the treatise itself.\n\nAll knowledge or certainty is either apprehension, which is the simple perception of that which is known, or faith. Or it is for apprehension a limit of finality, or it follows elevation. And each one of these two is either by nature or by learning. By nature, it is without thought. Thought, however, I call here the composition of the mind from known things with unknown things. Or by learning, as that which is established by thought. And certainty is by nature, like that which is established from the existence of earth and water. And by learning, like that which is established from the existence of an angel or a soul. And faith is by nature, like that which believes that the great All is from matter. And by learning, like that which believes that for this All there is a creator. And knowledge is by nature, a matter that is of a primary limit, which is also called rationality. And because of this, it is not receptive to excess and deficiency. That which is by learning, however, is guided by it.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܛܦܣܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܛܦܣܐ (ṭapsā) renders Greek τύπος (typos) or τύπωσις, meaning 'pattern' or 'model'. Here it introduces the notion of a formal exemplar for the treatise.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܐܪܝܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܦܐܪܝܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ (pārīpṭīqītā) is a transliteration of Greek περὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν, 'concerning the categories'. This signals the work's engagement with Aristotle's Categories.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܘܣܝܘܠܘܓܝܩܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܦܘܣܝܘܠܘܓܝܩܝܬܐ (fūsīyūlōgīqītā) transliterates Greek φυσιολογική, 'physiological' or 'natural philosophy'. Bar Hebraeus distinguishes this from logic and theology.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܛܪܝܘܦܪܓܡܛܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܛܪܝܘܦܪܓܡܛܝܐ (ṭrīyōpragmāṭīā) is a transliteration of Greek τριόπραγματεία, 'threefold treatise' or 'triple subject-matter'. It likely refers to the three divisions of philosophy (logic, physics, theology) mentioned in the passage.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage moves from a metaphorical description of the treatise's method (lines 1–10) to a formal classification of knowledge into apprehension, faith, and knowledge, each subdivided by nature and learning. This mirrors the prolegomena of late antique Aristotelian commentaries.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus (Gregorius bar Hebraeus, 13th cent.) was a Syriac Orthodox scholar and maphrian. His 'Treatise of Treatises' is a compendium of Aristotelian logic and philosophy, drawing on earlier Syriac translations of Greek philosophical works.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'ܒܟ ܛܦܣܐ ܡܢܣܝܐ' (b-k ṭapsā mṣṣyā) is ambiguous: it may mean 'in you a pattern is tried' or 'in you a pattern is tested', possibly addressing a reader or a personified treatise.","The term 'ܗܿܘ ܕܟܝܢܐܝܬ' (hū d-kyānāʾīṯ) could be read as 'that which is by nature' or 'that which is natural', but the precise referent in the classification is unclear."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":3,"ref":"p3","source":"ܐ̱ܚܪܢܐ ܡܢ ܐ̱ܚܪܢܐ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܗܘܐ ܠܦܘܬ ܕܘܪܫܐ ܘܩܛܝܢܘܬ ܚܘܫܒܐ. ܘܠܘ ܟܠܗܝܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ̈ܢ ܘܐܠܐ ܠܐ ܦܠܛܬ ܠܢ ܝܕܥܬܐ. ܐܦܠܐ ܟܠܗܝܢ ܡܬܝܠܦܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܘܐܠܐ ܠܐ ܡܬܘܡ ܝܠܦܢ. ܒܕ ܠܝܬ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܢܗܿ ܠܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܝܠܦܐ ܡܬܬܝܬܝܢܢ. ܘܕܓܡܝܪܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܐ̱ܢܫܝܬܐ ܒܝܕܥܬܐ ܗܝ ܡܬܩܢܝܢܝܬܐ ܓܠܝܐ. ܘܐܠܐ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܓܡܝܪ̈ܐ. ܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܒܝܕ ܚܘܫܒܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܬܐܡܪ ܡܬܓܪܬܐ ܡܟܢܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܘܗܘ ܗܢܐ ܠܘ ܒܐܡܝܢܘ ܠܐ ܦܐܕ ܘܐܠܐ ܠܐ ܐܬܕܠܩܒܘ ܠܚܟܝ̈ܡܐ. ܚܘܫ̈ܒܐ ܘܬܪ̈ܥܝܬܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܡܕܝܢ ܥܠܬ ܣܢܝܩܘܬܐ. ܘܩܪܬ ܥܠܬܐ ܠܘܬ ܐܘܪܓܐܢܘܢ ܡܕܡ ܐܘܟܝܬ ܟܢܘܢܬܐ ܡܬܪܨܢܝܬܐ. ܕܒܗܿ ܡܕܥܐ ܟܕ ܡܬܪ̈ܥܝܢܘܬܗ ܢܡܫܘܚ. ܘܐܝܟ ܕܒܡܣܐܬܐ ܢܬܩܘܠ. ܡܢ ܦܘ̈ܕܐ ܡܡܕ. ܕܠܗܿ ܠܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ ܠܘܓܝܩܝ ܫܡܐ ܐܬܩܪܝ. ܦܘܫܟܐ ܘܫܪܝܐ: ܠܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ: ܐܢܗܘ ܕܝܕܥܬܐ ܡܬܝܠܦܢܝܬܐ ܥܠ ܠܘܓܝܩܝ ܡܣܬܢܩܐ. ܐܦ ܗܝ ܠܘܓܝܩܝ ܡܛܠ ܝܕܥܬܐ ܗܝ ܡܬܝܠܦܢܝܬܐ ܥܠ ܠܘܓܝܩܝ ܐ̱ܚܪܬܐ ܬܣܬܢܩ. ܘܗܿܝ ܐ̱ܚܪܬܐ ܥܠ ܐ̱ܚܪܬܐ. ܘܗܟܢܐ ܠܠܐ ܣܘܦ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܗܕܐ ܥܠܝܢ ܡܫܬܡܪܐ ܗْܘܬ. ܐܠܘ ܒܟܘܠܝܘܬܗܿ ܡܬܝܠܦܢܝܬܐ ܗْܘܬ. ܘܟܕ ܡܢܬܐ ܡܢܗܿ ܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܐܝܟ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܡܫܡܠܝܐ. ܘܡܢܬܐ ܡܢܗܿ ܡܬܝܠܦܢܝܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܠܐ ܡܫܡܠܝܐ. ܡܢܬܗܿ ܡܬܝܠܦܢܝܬܐ ܒܝܕ ܡܢܬܗܿ ܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܡܬܝܠܦܐ. ܘܠܘ ܒܝܕ ܠܘܓܝܩܝ ܐ̱ܚܪܬܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܡܝܒܠܢܐ ܡܢ ܕܠܘܬ ܡܬܝܩܢܢܘܬܐ ܕܡܬܝܠܦܐ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܘܗܿܘ ܡܐ ܕܠܗܿ ܕܡܐ ܡܬܟܢܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܠܘܬ ܗܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܕܡܬܝܠܦܐ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܘܗܿܘ ܡܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܐ. ܘܡܛܠ ܕܡܬܝܩܢܢܘܬܐ ܩܕܝܡܬ ܒܟܝܢܐ ܠܗܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܒܕܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܗܕܐ ܠܡܗܘܐ ܐܠܐ ܒܬܪ ܡܬܝܩܢܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܬܠܬ: ܗܿܘ ܡܢ ܕܥܠܘܗܝ ܗܿܘܐ ܦܣܩܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܬܩܪܐ.","english":"Another from another can become according to the mode of investigation and the precision of thought. And not all definitions, unless knowledge has emerged. Nor all syllogisms, unless something is learned. For there is no one that is like that which is learned from the foundations. And perfection from the beginning in knowledge is clearly defined. But not all are perfect. And this one, by thought, as was said, is called a treatise, so that it may be. And this one, not in its essence does it perish, nor is it opposed to the wise. Thoughts and reflections from definition arise from necessity. And the cause approached the organon, something like a tool of discipline, by which the mind, when its reflections are measured, and as if by a measure it is balanced, from the parts it proceeds. For that which is like this was called logic. Interpretation and solution: not said. If knowledge is learned about logic, it is inquired. Also logic, because it is knowledge learned about another logic, will be inquired. And that other about another. And thus ad infinitum. In that which is said, this would be preserved above. If it were learned in its entirety. And when a part of it is definition, like a syllogism that is complete. And a part of it is learned, like a syllogism that is not complete. Its learned part by its definitional part is definitionally learned, and not by another logic. Demonstration: and induction from that which is with the certainty of what is learned is a limit, and that is when it is like that which is known. That which is with the faith of what is learned is a syllogism, and that is when it is like that which is known. And because certainty is prior in nature to faith, it is. For this cannot be except after three certainties: that which is about which was a section of that which is placed is called.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܠܘܓܝܩܝ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܠܘܓܝܩܝ (logikē) is a loan from Greek λογική, denoting the discipline of logic. Bar Hebraeus here distinguishes it from dialectic and treats it as a self-referential science.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ (syllogismos) is a Greek loan, referring to a syllogism. The text distinguishes complete from incomplete syllogisms, a standard Aristotelian distinction.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"external","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage engages with the problem of infinite regress in logic, a theme found in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics and later in the Syriac logical tradition. Bar Hebraeus argues that definitional knowledge grounds learned knowledge, avoiding circularity.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage moves from a general discussion of definition and syllogism to a specific treatment of logic as a self-referential discipline, then to the distinction between certainty and faith in learned propositions, and finally to the priority of three certainties.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܬܝܩܢܢܘܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܡܬܝܩܢܢܘܬܐ (certainty) is a key term. The text asserts that certainty is prior by nature to faith (ܗܝܡܢܘܬܐ), reflecting a hierarchy of epistemic states common in Syriac Aristotelianism.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The phrase 'Interpretation and solution: not said' (ܦܘܫܟܐ ܘܫܪܝܐ: ܠܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ) is ambiguous; it may indicate a lacuna or a deliberate omission. The English draft renders it as a heading, but the Syriac suggests a break in the argument.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'Interpretation and solution: not said' may be a marginal note or a textual corruption; the intended sense is unclear.","The reference to 'three certainties' is not fully explained in the passage; it may depend on a prior discussion now lost."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":4,"ref":"p4","source":"ܘܕܗܿܘ ܕܒܗ ܗܿܘܐ ܦܣܩܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܡܬܟܢܐ. ܘܕܙܢܐ ܕܝܠܗ ܕܦܣܩܐ. ܐܦ ܒܛܟܣܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܬܬܩܕܡ. ܘܡܢ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܢܫܪܐ. ܟܕ ܡܩܕܡܝܢܢ ܘܒܩܪܝܢܢ ܠܡܢܘ̈ܬܐ ܕܡܢܗܝܢ ܐܦ ܗܘ ܐܦ ܐܚܝܢ̈ܘܗܝ ܡܬܪܟܒܝܢ. ܩܦܠܐܘܢ ܩܕܡܝܐ\nܥܠ ܒܢ̈ܬ ܩ̈ܠܐ ܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ ܘܗܠܝܢ ܚܡܫ ܟܠܢܝ̈ܬܐ:\nܦܘܠܓܐ: ܫܘܘܕܥܐ ܡܢ ܓܝܪ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܝܐ. ܐܘ ܕܟܠܗ ܗܘ ܣܘܟܠܐ: ܘܫܘܘܕܥܐ ܗܘ ܕܐܚܘܕܘܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܡܫܘܕܥܢܘܬܐ ܕܫܡܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܠܚܝܘܬܐ ܡܠܝܠܬܐ. ܐܘ ܕܡܢܬܗ. ܘܫܘܘܕܥܐ ܗܘ ܕܒܝܬܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܡܫܘܕܥܢܘܬܐ ܕܫܡܐ ܕܒܝܬܐ ܠܬܛܠܝܠܐ ܐܘ ܠܐܣܬܐ. ܐܘ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܡܢ ܠܒܪ ܥܪܝܨܐܝܬ ܢܩܝܦ. ܘܫܘܘܕܥܐ ܗܘ ܕܢܩܝܦܘܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܡܫܘܕܥܢܘܬܐ ܕܫܡܐ ܕܬܛܠܝܠܐ ܠܐܣܬܐ. ܘܫܘܘܕܥܐ ܗܘ ܕܐܚܘܕܘܬܐ ܗܘܝܘ ܡܪܢܝܐ. ܒܕܓܡܝܪܐܝܬ ܝܗܒ ܣܘܟܠܐ. ܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܬܪܝܢ ܫܐܝ̈ܠܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܓܡܝܪܐܝܬ. ܝܬܝܪ ܕܝܢ ܫܐܝܠܐ ܗܘ ܕܢܩܦܝܘܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܠܟܝܢܐ ܕܡܫܬܡܗܢܐ ܐܘ ܕܡܢܬܗ ܡܣܟܠ ܐܠܐ ܠܟܢܬܐ ܕܡܢ ܠܒܪ. ܦܘܠܓܐ: ܟܠ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܝܚܝܕܝܬܐ. ܐܘ ܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ ܝܚܝܕܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܫܡܗ̈ܐ ܩܢܘܡܝ̈ܐ. ܐܘ ܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ. ܘܗܢܘܢ ܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܐܢܗܘ ܕܫܘܝ̈ܝ ܒܐܘܣܝܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܥܡ ܫܡܐ ܡܬܩܪܝܢ. ܐܢ ܕܝܢ ܠܘ ܫܘܝ̈ܝ ܒܐܘܣܝܐ ܫܘܝ̈ܝ ܫܡܐ ܡܬܩܪܝܢ. ܘܗܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܝܟ ܡܫܘܬܦܘܬܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܬܘܪܐ ܒܫܡܐ ܐܟܚܕ ܘܬܚܘܡܐ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ. ܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܡܫܘܬܦܘܬܐ ܕܡܕܥܐ ܘܣܝܦܐ ܘܣܡܐ ܒܫܡܐ ܕܚܪܝܦܘܬܐ. ܒܢ̈ܬ ܩ̈ܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܬܐ: ܐܘ ܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܬܘܒ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ ܡܫܘ̈ܕܥܢ ܘܡܬܩܪ̈ܝܢ ܐ̱ܚܪ̈ܢܝܝ ܫܡܐ. ܐܘ ܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܝܚܝܕܝܐ ܘܡܬܩܪ̈ܝܢ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܝ ܫܡܐ. ܘܗܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܝܟ ܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܫܡܗ̈ܐ ܕܐܣܛܘܟ̈ܣܐ ܠܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ. ܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܫܡܗ̈ܐ ܡܫܪ̈ܬܚܐ ܟܐܦܐ ܠܡ ܘܫܘܥܐ ܘܛܪܢܐ ܠܐܘܣܝܐ ܩܫܝܬܐ.","english":"And that in which occurs the division of that which is defined is understood. And the property of the division. Even in order it is fitting that it be preceded. And from the boundary of ten, when preceding and approaching the species of that which is, also he and his brothers are composed. First chapter on simple words, and these are five in total: Division: Knowledge is either a vocal sound, or it is the whole concept. And knowledge is the comprehension, like the signification of the name \"human\" for a rational animal, or for its species. And knowledge is the specific difference, like the signification of the name \"house\" for a roof or for a foundation, or for that which is externally attached. And knowledge is the attachment, like the signification of the name \"roof\" for a foundation. And knowledge is the comprehension which is the principal. For it gives the concept perfectly. These two, however, are questions in that they are not perfect. More, however, is the question of attachment, in that it is not the nature of that which is named or its species that is conceived, but the quality of that which is external. Division: Every single word, or a single signified action, like proper names, or many actions. And these actions, if they are equal in substance, are called with the name. If, however, they are not equal in substance, they are called with the name equally. And these are like the participation of human and ox in the name together and the boundary of animal. These, however, are like the participation of intellect, sword, and poison in the name of sharpness. Many words, however, or again many signified actions, are called by one name, or a single action is called by many names. And these are like each of the names of the elements for each of them. These, however, are like extended names: stone, lime, and plaster for hard substance.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܦܠܐܘܢ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܥܠ ܒܢ̈ܬ ܩ̈ܠܐ ܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac marks the beginning of the first chapter (qap̄lā qadmāyā) on simple words (bāt qālē pšīṭātē), introducing a new structural division in the treatise.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܫܘܘܕܥܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term šūwādʿā (knowledge) is used here in a technical sense, likely derived from Aristotelian epistemology, to denote a definition or act of cognition that can be expressed through a vocal sound or a concept.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܦܘܠܓܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term pūlāgā (division) signals a logical partition, a standard method in Syriac philosophical treatises for categorizing types of knowledge or words.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"ܒܢ̈ܬ ܩ̈ܠܐ ܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The classification of simple words (bāt qālē pšīṭātē) into five types reflects the influence of Aristotelian categories as mediated through Syriac logical traditions, such as those of Sergius of Rešʿaynā.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܝܟ ܡܫܘܬܦܘܬܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܬܘܪܐ","severity":"info","text":"The example of human and ox sharing the name 'animal' parallels standard Aristotelian discussions of genus and species, as found in Porphyry's Isagoge, a key text in Syriac curricula.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܘܡܢ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܢܫܪܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The phrase 'from the boundary of ten' (men teḥūmā ʿsārā) is obscure; it may refer to a numerical or categorical limit, but the text is ambiguous and possibly corrupt.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'from the boundary of ten' (men teḥūmā ʿsārā) is unclear; it may be a textual corruption or a reference to a specific logical or numerical schema.","The distinction between 'knowledge as comprehension' and 'knowledge as specific difference' is not fully elaborated, leaving the precise logical relationship ambiguous."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":5,"ref":"p5","source":"ܐܝܬ ܓܝܪ ܘܙܢܐ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܕܒܝܢܬ ܫܘܝ̈ܝ ܫܡܐ ܘܥܡ ܫܡܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܦܠܐ ܟܘܠܢܐܝܬ ܢܘܟܪܝܝܢ ܒܟܝܢܐ ܕܥܠܘܗܝ ܡܫܘܕܥ ܫܡܐ. ܘܐܦܠܐ ܟܘܠܢܐܝܬ ܡܫܘܬܦܝܢ ܘܫܘܝܢ. ܘܗܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܝܟ ܣܘܣܝܐ. ܘܓܕܫܐ ܕܥܠܝܗܘܢ ܫܡܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܒܪܡ ܫܘܝܐܝܬ. ܐܠܐ ܝܬܝܪܐܝܬ ܡܢ ܥܠ ܗܿܝ. ܒܨܝܪܐܝܬ ܕܝܢ ܥܠ ܗܿܘ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܘܦܘܠܓܐ: ܘܡܛܠ ܕܫܡܗ̈ܐ ܐܝܬ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܡܢ ܐ̱ܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܠܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܡܬܝܙܦܝܢ ܐܛܘܡܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܢ. ܘܗܢܘܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܘ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܡܢܗ ܐܬܝ̈ܝܢ ܝܬܝܪܐܝܬ ܡܫܘܕܥܝܢ. ܐܝܟ ܫܡܐ ܕܐܪܝܐ ܠܡܠܟ ܚܝܘ̈ܬܐ. ܐܘ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܠܗ. ܐܝܟ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܕܩܢܝܢܐ ܠܚܡܪܐ. ܘܗܢܘܢ ܬܘܒ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܘ ܠܘܬ ܓܘܐ ܐܢܘܢ ܡܬܚܫܚ̈ܢܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܠܬܚܘܝ ܐܬܢܣܒܘ. ܐܘ ܠܘܬ ܕܝܠܢ̈ܝܐ. ܘܗܠܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܕܓܢܣܐ ܠܘܬ ܠܘܓܝ̈ܩܘ. ܐܘ ܕܐܣܪܐ ܠܘܬ ܓܪ̈ܡܛܝܩܘ. ܦܘܠܓܐ: ܟܠ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܐܘ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ ܡܢܬܗܿ ܡܕܡ ܟܕ ܡܬܦܪܫܐ: ܐܘ ܠܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ. ܘܗܿܝ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ. ܐܘ ܠܡܢܬܐ ܡܢ ܣܘܥܪܢܗܿ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ ܘܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܡܪܟܒܬܐ ܦܫܝܛܐܝܬ ܘܡܐܡܪܐ ܘܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܗܠܟ: ܐܘ ܠܘ ܠܡܢܬܐ ܡܢ ܣܘܥܪܢܗܿ ܘܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܡܪܟܒܬܐ ܦܫܝܛܬ ܣܘܟܠܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܠܡܘܕܕ ܘܡܪܢܥܡܗ. ܘܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ ܡܢܬܗܿ ܡܕܡ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ ܦܫܝܛܐܝܬ ܡܬܩܪܝܐ. ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܣܘܩܪܛܝܣ ܘܦܠܛܘܢ. ܦܘܫܟܐ ܘܫܪܝܐ: ܠܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܕܟܕ ܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܗܠܟܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܢ ܫܘܝܢ ܘܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܗܠܟܐ. ܠܡܢܐ ܗܢܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܢܗܘܐ ܕܝܠܢܐܝܬ. ܐܢ ܕܝܢ ܢܘܟܪܝܝܢ ܐܝܟܢܐ ܬܘܒ ܫܪܝܪ ܕܢܗܘܐ ܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܗܿܘ ܡܐ ܕܢܘܟܪܝ ܠܗ. ܐܘ ܢܫܪ ܥܠܘܗܝ ܟܘܢܝܗ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܕܡܕܡ ܐ̱ܚܪܢܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܠܒܪ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܩܛܠܒܬ ܒܥܝܢܢ.","english":"There is, then, a middle genus of the species of the name and with the name. In that which is not entirely a substance in the nature upon which the name indicates, and is not entirely participating and equal. And these are like a relation. And the accident which is upon them is the name of that which is the predicate. Not, however, equally, but more with that one, and less with that one. Example and division: And because names are sometimes attached from one to another, etymologies are indicated. And these indicate either that from which they come more, like the name of lion to the king of beasts, or that to which they belong, like daughter of voice of the reed to wine. And these again are either with the interior of the things that are used, like those which are taken for the sake of demonstration, or with the possessives. And these are like daughter of voice of the body with logic, or of discipline with grammar. Division: Every daughter of voice either indicates something from its mother when it is distinguished, or does not indicate. And that first one, either indicates the mother with its action, and the daughter of voice is a composite simply, and a word and a prothesis, like that which walks at the head, or does not indicate the mother with its action, and is indicated as a composite simple of meaning, like that which is immeasurable and its compassion. And that which does not indicate something from its mother is simply called simple, like Socrates and Plato. Solution and beginning: It is not said that when it is said that at the head is a walker, if equal and at the head and walker, to what end is that which is placed? That which is predicated, then, is properly. If, however, it is a substance, how again is it true that an action is something when it is substantiated? Or it rests upon it its existence. In that it is said that something else third outside of these which is killed by the search.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac phrase ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ (literally 'daughter of voice') is a calque on Greek φωνή, used here to denote a vocal sound or utterance, a key term in Bar Hebraeus's logical analysis.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܬܩܛܪܓ","severity":"info","text":"The verb ܡܬܩܛܪܓ (from Greek κατηγορεῖν) means 'to predicate' or 'to be predicated', central to the discussion of logical predication in this passage.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The examples of 'lion' for the king of beasts and 'daughter of voice of the reed' for wine reflect standard etymological and metaphorical associations in Syriac grammatical and logical tradition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage is structured around a series of divisions (ܦܘܠܓܐ) and examples, followed by a 'solution and beginning' (ܦܘܫܟܐ ܘܫܪܝܐ), typical of Bar Hebraeus's methodical exposition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The final sentence is syntactically ambiguous: 'something else third outside of these which is killed by the search' may reflect a textual corruption or a compressed logical argument about a third term beyond substance and accident.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The referent of 'that which is placed' (ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ) is unclear; it may denote a subject or a term in a logical proposition.","The phrase 'killed by the search' (ܕܩܛܠܒܬ ܒܥܝܢܢ) is obscure; possibly a metaphor for a refuted or abandoned line of inquiry."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":6,"ref":"p6","source":"ܒܡܠܬܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܗܠܟܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗ̄ ܕܟܝܢܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܥܠܘܗܝ ܫܪܝܪ ܟܘܢܝܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ. ܥܠܘܗܝ ܟܕ ܥܠܘܗܝ. ܘܗܿܘ ܕܗܠܟܐ ܫܪܝܪ. ܠܐ ܕܟܝܢܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܝܢܐ ܕܢܘܟܪܝ ܠܗ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܕܗܘ ܟܕ ܗܘ ܗܿܘ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܗܟܢܐ ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܫܪܝܪܘܬܐ ܓܕܫܐ. ܦܘܠܓܐ: ܟܠ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ. ܐܘ ܒܗܿ ܐܣܝܪ ܣܘܟܠܗܿ ܐܘ ܒܐܚܪܝܢ ܐܣܝܪ ܣܘܟܠܗܿ. ܘܗܿܝ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ ܐܢ ܠܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ ܙܒܢܐ ܫܡܐ ܡܬܩܪܝܐ. ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ ܡܠܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܗܠܟ. ܘܗܿܝ ܕܒܐܚܪܝܢ ܐܣܝܪ ܣܘܟܠܗܿ ܐܣܪܐ ܡܬܩܪܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܛܠ ܕܝܢ ܓܝܪ. ܦܘܫܟܐ ܘܫܪܝܐ: ܠܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܕܝܘܡܢ ܘܠܡܚܪ ܘܐܫܬܩܕܝ ܟܕ ܫܡܗ̈ܐ ܐܢܘܢ ܙܒܢܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܝܢ. ܘܬܘܒ ܐܢ ܫܡܐ ܠܐ ܡܫܘܕܥ ܙܒܢܐ. ܐܦܠܐ ܫܡ ܙܒܢܐ ܢܫܘܕܥ ܙܒܢܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܕܠܐ ܦܣܩܢܢ ܕܫܡܐ ܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܫܡܐ ܠܙܒܢܐ ܐܘ ܠܡܢܘ̈ܬ ܙܒܢܐ. ܐܠܐ ܕܠܐ ܥܡ ܙܒܢܐ ܐܘ ܒܝܕ ܙܒܢܐ ܡܫܘܕܥ ܗܿܘ ܡܐ ܕܡܫܘܕܥ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܫܡܐ ܡܢ ܐܝܟ ܕܒܣܘܓܐܐ ܣܝܡ. ܡܠܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܐ. ܐܝܬ ܕܝܢ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܐܦ ܗܿܘ ܡܢ ܢܬܩܛܪܓ ܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ ܬܬܣܝܡ. ܒܪܡ ܥܡ ܡܠܘܬܘܬ ܡܠܬܐ ܘܐܦܢ ܪܡܙܢܝܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܡܗܠܟ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܗܘ. ܦܘܠܓܐ: ܟܠ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܐܘ ܥܠ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ ܡܟܢܐ ܕܬܬܩܛܪܓ ܘܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܘ ܚܘܪܐ. ܐܘ ܠܘ ܥܠ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ ܘܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܣܘܩܪܛܝܣ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܡܢ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ. ܠܘ ܠܗܿܝ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܙܕܩ ܠܡܪܢܐ. ܕܟܠܗܘܢ ܐܘ ܣܘܓܐܗܘܢ ܕܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܠܗܿ ܒܡܥܒܕܢܘܬܐ ܫܟܝܚܝܢ. ܐܠܐ ܘܠܟܠ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܐܝܕܐ ܕܗܝ ܡܬܝܩܢܢܘܬ ܣܘܟܠܗܿ ܠܐ ܟܠܝܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܫܬܘܬܦܘܢ ܒܗܿ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ. ܘܐܦܢ ܠܐ ܢܫܬܟܚܘܢ ܒܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܗܢܘܢ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܐܫܬܐ ܡܫܬܟܚܝܢ ܙܢܝ̈ܐ ܕܣܘܟܠܐ ܟܠܢܝܐ.","english":"In the word that says \"of the genus,\" the genus is that upon which the true definition of the genus is established. Upon it, as upon it. And that which is truly a genus is not the genus of the genus that it indicates, or that it is itself that same thing. And thus there is not one true reality of accident. Division: Every simple utterance is either bound in its meaning to that which is bound in its meaning to another. And the former, if it does not indicate time, is called a name, like \"genus.\" But if it indicates a word like \"walks.\" And that which is bound in its meaning to another is called a conjunction, like \"because.\" For, however, \"yesterday\" and \"tomorrow\" and \"later\" are not said when the names indicate time. And again, if a name does not indicate time, neither does it indicate time as a name of time. In that it is said without qualification that a name is not a name of time or of temporal things, but that it is not with time or by time that it indicates what it indicates. Clarification: And a name is placed as in the majority. A word, however, is conjugated. There is, then, a time when even that which is placed is conjugated. But with the verbal forms and also the accents, like \"that which walks is an animal.\" Division: Every utterance is either applied to many so as to be conjugated and is predicated commonly, like \"animal\" or \"white,\" or not to many and is predicated individually, like \"Socrates.\" Clarification: And an utterance with a common term ought not only to be seen in that all or the majority of those that are found in its actuality are found, but also for every utterance, the determination of its meaning is not limited to those that participate in it in many, and also are not found in the actuality of those many. For by nature, the common meanings of the term are found in many.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܟܝܢܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܟܝܢܐ (kīyānā) is rendered 'genus' in the English draft, but it can also mean 'nature' or 'kind'. Bar Hebraeus uses it here in a logical sense, referring to a genus as a category of predication.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܘܠܓܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܦܘܠܓܐ (pūlāḡā) means 'division' and is a standard structural marker in Bar Hebraeus's logical works, indicating a partition of a concept into its species or subtypes.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܢܘܗܪܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܢܘܗܪܐ (tūhārā) is rendered 'clarification' in the English draft. It functions as a rhetorical marker introducing an explanatory or illustrative passage following a division.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage alternates between 'division' (ܦܘܠܓܐ) and 'clarification' (ܢܘܗܪܐ) sections, a common expository pattern in Bar Hebraeus's logical treatises, mirroring the structure of Aristotelian commentaries.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus (d. 1286) was a West Syriac scholar and maphrian. His 'Treatise of Treatises' is a compendium of logic, drawing on Aristotle's Organon and later Syriac and Arabic logical traditions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The discussion of names and verbs, and their relation to time, echoes Aristotle's De Interpretatione (16a–16b), where a name is defined as a sound significant by convention without time, while a verb additionally signifies time.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Aristotle De Interpretatione"],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or corrupt readings, particularly in the section on 'the true definition of the genus' and the phrase 'upon it, as upon it', which may reflect a textual corruption or a deliberate logical nuance. The English draft attempts to render the sense but the exact meaning remains uncertain."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":7,"ref":"p7","source":"ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܗܘ ܟܠܢܝܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܠܐ ܢܫܬܟܚ. ܐܝܟ ܐܠܗܐ ܐ̱ܚܪܢܐ ܠܒܪ ܡܢ ܡܪܐ ܟܠ ܣܓܝܕܐ. ܐܘ ܠܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܠܐ ܢܫܬܟܚ. ܘܗܘ ܗܢܐ ܐܘ ܠܐ ܫܟܝܚ. ܐܦܢ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܐ ܗܘ. ܐܝܟ ܝܡܐ ܡܢ ܙܝܘܓ ܘܛܘܪܐ ܡܢ ܩܪܟܕܢܐ. ܐܘ ܫܟܝܚ. ܘܗܘ ܗܢܐ ܐܘ ܚܕ ܗܘ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܐܘ ܝܬܝܪ ܡܢ ܚܕ. ܘܗܿܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܐܘ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܠܐ ܢܫܬܟܚ ܟܝܢܐ ܐ̱ܚܪܢܐ ܕܕܡܐ ܠܗ ܐܝܟ ܐܠܗܐ ܫܘܒܚܐ ܠܛܝܒܘܬܗ. ܐܘ ܠܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܠܐ ܢܫܬܟܚ: ܐܝܟ ܫܡܫܐ ܠܦܘܬ ܪܥܝܢ ܐܝܢܐ ܕܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܕܐܢ ܫܟܝܚܘܬ ܫܡܫܐ ܐ̱ܚܪܬܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܐܘ ܡܣܝܟܬܐ ܗܝ ܗܝ ܣܓܝܐܘܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܟܘܟ̈ܒܐ ܕܒܪܩܝܥܐ. ܐܘ ܠܐ ܡܣܝܟܬܐ ܗܝ ܐܝܟ ܢܦܫ̈ܬܐ ܡܠܝ̈ܠܬܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܡܢܬܝܐ ܡܢ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܠܟܠ ܨܒܘ ܐܝܕܐ ܕܗܝ ܡܬܝܩܢܢܘܬ ܣܘܟܠܗܿ ܟܠܝܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܫܬܘܬܦܘܢ ܒܗܿ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ ܐܝܟ ܣܘܟܠ ܣܘܩܪܛܝܣ. ܡܬܐܡܪ ܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܡܢܬܝܐ ܘܠܟܠ ܨܒܘ ܐܝܕܐ ܕܬܚܝܬ ܟܝܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܕܟܠܢܝ ܡܢܗܿ ܡܬܛܟܣܐ. ܘܐܦܢ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܐܦ ܗܝ ܒܟܝܢܗܿ. ܘܒܗܿܘ ܡܢ ܙܢܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܡܢ̈ܬܝܐ ܡܪ̈ܢܝܐ ܡܬܩܪܝܢ ܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ. ܒܗܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܡܢ̈ܬܝܐ ܦܚܡ̈ܝܐ ܘܐܚܝܢ̈ܝܐ. ܦܪܝܫܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܡܢ ܚܕܕ̈ܐ ܒܓܘܢܝܘܬܐ ܘܕܝܠܢܝܘܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܡܢܬܝܐ ܡܪܢܝܐ ܐܘܟܝܬ ܩܢܘܡܐ. ܡܢܬܝܐ ܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܐܚܝܢܝܐ. ܗ̄. ܒܦܚܡܐ ܕܐܕܫܗ. ܣܘܩܪܛܝܣ ܓܝܪ ܟܕ ܡܢܬܝܐ ܗܘ ܡܪܢܝܐ ܒܣܘܟܠܗ. ܡܢܬܝܐ ܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܐܚܝܢܝܐ ܒܦܚܡܐ ܕܐܕܫܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ. ܠܘ ܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܟܠ ܡܢܬܝܐ ܐܚܝܢܝܐ ܡܢܬܝܐ ܗܘ ܐܦ ܡܪܢܝܐ. ܒܪܢܫܐ ܓܝܪ ܟܕ ܡܢܬܝܐ ܗܘ ܐܚܝܢܝܐ ܒܦܚܡܐ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ ܕܓܘܢܝܐ ܡܢܗ ܠܘ ܡܢܬܝܐ ܗܘ ܡܪܢܝܐ ܣܘܟܠܗ. ܐܠܐ ܟܠܢܝܐ. ܦܘܠܓܐ: ܟܠ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ.","english":"in that which says \"of the genus,\" or from a principle that does not exist, like another god besides the Lord of all worship, or not from a principle that does not exist. And this one either does not exist, it is also possible, like the sea from a pair and a mountain from a fortress, or it exists. And this one either is one alone or more than one. And the first is either from a principle that does not exist, another nature similar to it, like God, glory to his grace, or not from a principle that does not exist, like the sun in respect of the notion of the possibility of another existence of the sun. And the second is either a continuum, which is multiplicity, like the stars in the firmament, or not a continuum, like rational souls. Clarification: And \"from what\" is said to every subject of which the definition of the genus is limited from that which participates in it, like the definition of Socrates. It is said, moreover, \"from what\" and to every subject under which a nature that is limited from it is ordered. And also the generic something is itself also in its nature. And in that first \"from what,\" principal \"from whats\" are called actions. In this second, however, \"from whats\" are material and hylic. They are distinguished from each other by substantiality and propriety, in that every principal \"from what\" is also a substance. A \"from what\" is also hylic. In the matter of its seal. For Socrates, when he is a principal \"from what\" in his definition, he is also a hylic \"from what\" in the matter of the seal that is on his head. But not, moreover, is every hylic \"from what\" also a principal \"from what.\" For the head, when it is a hylic \"from what\" in the matter of the animal that is from it, it is not a principal \"from what\" in its definition, but generic. Division: Every simple utterance.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܟܠܢܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܟܠܢܝܐ (kallāyā) is rendered 'of the genus' and is a technical term in Bar Hebraeus's logical vocabulary, denoting the generic principle or category.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܡܢܬܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܡܢܬܝܐ (mettayā) is translated 'from what' and refers to the material or causal principle in Aristotelian hylomorphism, distinguishing between principal (ܡܪܢܝܐ) and hylic (ܐܚܝܢܝܐ) types.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage engages with Aristotelian categories and Porphyrian logic, specifically the distinction between genus, species, and the material principle, reflecting the Syriac reception of the Isagoge.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܘܠܓܐ","severity":"info","text":"The passage concludes with a structural marker ܦܘܠܓܐ (pulāgā, 'division'), indicating a transition to a new logical division of simple utterances.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several uncertain readings (marked with ܢ) and possible scribal errors, particularly in the enumeration of examples (e.g., 'sea from a pair and a mountain from a fortress'), which may obscure the intended logical illustration.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'like another god besides the Lord of all worship' may be a theological aside or a corrupt interpolation; the intended logical example is unclear.","The examples 'sea from a pair' and 'mountain from a fortress' are obscure and may reflect textual corruption or a lost referent."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":8,"ref":"p8","source":"ܐܘ ܡܢܬܐ ܗܝ ܕܗܿܘ ܡܐ ܕܥܠܘܗܝ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܐ ܘܐܘܣܝܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܙܢܐ ܕܚܝܐ ܘܡܠܝܠܐ ܕܡܢܘ̈ܬܐ ܐܢܘܢ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܠܐ ܡܬܘܡ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܠܡܬܪܢܝܘ ܡܢ ܩܕܡ ܕܠܗܘܢ ܢܬܪܢܐ. ܐܟܡܐ ܓܝܪ ܕܒܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܡܢܬܐ ܩܕܝܡܐ ܠܟܘܠܐ: ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܒܚܘܫܒܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܬܬܩܕܡ. ܐܘ ܠܘ ܡܢܬܐ ܗܝ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܥܠܘܗܝ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܐ. ܐܠܐ ܡܢ ܠܒܪ ܠܗ ܢܩܝܦܐ. ܘܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܓܕܫܢܝܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܚܘܪܐ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܥܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܡܥܕܝܢ ܓܝܪ ܘܐܘܣܝܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ ܠܟܠ ܨܒܘ ܐܝܕܐ ܕܠܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܘ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܢܩܝܦܐ. ܐܝܟ ܦܛܫܘܬܐ ܠܢܚܝܪܐ. ܦܪܝܫܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܬܪ̈ܝܗܘܢ ܙܢܝ̈ܐ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܘ ܡܢ ܒܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܬܢܣܒ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ. ܗܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܒܬܚܘܡܗ ܕܝܠܗ ܡܬܢܣܒ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ. ܗܿܘ ܓܝܪ ܕܠܡܬܚܡܘ ܗܿܡܣ ܠܦܛܫܘܬܐ. ܘܠܐ ܣܟ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܐܡܪܗܿ ܐܠܐ ܕܛܠܝܚܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܢܚܝܪܝܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ\nܦܘܠܓܐ: ܗܿܘ ܕܡܩܦ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܢܩܝܦ. ܠܘ ܐܝܟ ܡܢܬܐ ܡܩܝܡܢܝܬܐ ܕܟܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܠܗ ܢܩܝܦ. ܐܘ ܠܘ ܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ. ܘܗܿܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܐܘ ܒܝܕ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܢܩܝܦ ܐܘ ܠܘ ܒܝܕ ܡܨܥܝܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܐܘ ܒܝܕ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܕܓܘܢܝ ܡܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ. ܐܘ ܒܝܕ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܕܕܝܠܢܝ ܡܢܗ. ܐܘ ܒܝܕ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܕܫܘܐ ܠܗ. ܘܗܿܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܢܩܝܦܘܬ ܪܓܫܬܐ ܠܒܪܢܫܐ ܒܡܨܥܝܘܬܐ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܢܩܝܦܘܬ ܓܚܘܟܘܬܐ ܠܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܡܨܥܝܘܬܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܠܬܐ: ܐܝܟ ܢܩܝܦܘܬ ܓܚܘܟܘܬܐ ܠܒܪܢܫܐ ܒܡܨܥܝܘܬ ܡܬܕܡܪܢܘܬܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܒܠܥܕ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܢܩܝܦ ܗܘ ܡܪܢܐܝܬ ܢܩܦܝܐ ܐܢܢܩܝܐ ܡܬܟܢܐ. ܘܗܢܐ ܐܝܟ ܢܩܝܦܘܬ ܡܬܕܡܪܢܘܬܐ ܠܒܪܢܫܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܟܕ ܡܫܬܐܠܝܢܢ ܕܡܛܠ ܡܢܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܬܕܡܪ. ܡܛܠ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܗܘ ܡܦܢܝܢ ܚܢܢ. ܘܠܘ ܡܛܠ ܕܡܕܡ ܐ̱ܚܪܝܢ.","english":"or it is a genus that is predicated of that which is under it and indicates an essence, like \"animal\" of \"man\" and \"rational\" of \"mortal.\" And because of this, a genus can never be conceived of before the species. For as much as in actuality the genus is prior to everything, in that image and in thought it ought to be prior. Or it is not a genus that is predicated of that which is under it, but rather it is attached to it from outside, and indicates an accident, like \"whiteness\" which is predicated of a species. For it is evident that the essence and the accident are said of everything that is placed under that which is attached to it, like \"whiteness\" of \"snow.\" But the two genera of essence are distinguished in that that which is placed is defined by a boundary, while this one is defined by its own boundary. For that which is not defined is subject to whiteness, and it cannot be said of it except that it is something perishable and snow-like.\n\nDivision: That which is attached to that which is placed is attached either as a constitutive genus of nature or essentially, or not essentially. And the first is attached either through a medium or not through a medium. And the first is attached either through a medium that is internal to that which is placed, or through a medium that is external to it, or through a medium that is equal to it. And the first is like the attachment of sensation to a species through the medium of animality. The second is like the attachment of laughter to animality through the medium of a species. The third is like the attachment of laughter to a species through the medium of wonder. And that which is attached without a medium is attached essentially and is called an essential attachment. And this is like the attachment of wonder to a species, in that when it is asked why a species is wondered at, it is because the species itself causes wonder, and not because of something else.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܢܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܡܢܬܐ (genus) is used here in a logical sense, denoting a universal category predicated of species, as in Aristotelian logic.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܢܩܝܦܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܢܩܝܦܐ (attachment) refers to an accidental property that inheres in a subject from outside, as distinct from a constitutive genus.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܘܠܓܐ","severity":"info","text":"The passage is divided by the rubric ܦܘܠܓܐ (division), marking a formal subdivision of the argument into modes of attachment.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The discussion of genus, species, and accident reflects the influence of Porphyry’s Isagoge, a standard logical textbook in Syriac scholasticism.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The example of whiteness attached to snow parallels Aristotle’s use of ‘white’ as an accident in Categories 2a1–2.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac text contains several uncertain readings (e.g., ܡܢܬܐ vs. ܡܬܐ) that may affect the interpretation of 'genus' vs. 'species' in some clauses."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":9,"ref":"p9","source":"ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܠܘ ܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܢܩܝܦ ܐܘ ܒܚܘܫܒܐ ܗܘ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܡܫܢܝܢܐ. ܘܗܢܐ ܐܝܟ ܐܘܟܡܘܬ ܟܘܫܝܐ. ܐܘ ܒܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܬܘܒ. ܘܗܘ ܗܢܐ ܐܘ ܡܫܘܚܪܢܐܝܬ ܡܫܢܐ ܐܘ ܡܣܪܗܒܐܝܬ: ܘܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܐܘ ܕܠܝܠܐܝܬ ܐܘ ܥܛܠܐܝܬ. ܘܡܫܘܚܪܐ ܕܕܠܝܠܐܝܬ ܡܫܢܐ ܐܝܟ ܛܠܝܘܬܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܥܛܠܐܝܬ ܐܝܟ ܐܫܬܐ ܐܩܛܝܩܘܣ. ܡܣܪܗܒܐܝܬ ܕܝܢ ܕܠܝܠܐܝܬ ܡܫܢܐ ܐܝܟ ܐܫܬ ܝܘܡܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕثܢ ܕܥܛܠܐܝܬ ܐܝܟ ܐܫܬܐ ܦܪܢܝܛܝܣ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܡܢܝܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܓܝܪ ܕܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܗܝ ܐ̱ܚܪܝܢ ܣܛܪ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܘܬܗܘܢ ܐܘܟܝܬ ܫܟܝܚܘܬܗܘܢ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܙܒܢ̈ܝܢ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܢ ܟܕ ܡܢܝܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܘܟܝܬ ܟܝܢܐ ܝܕܥܝܢܢ. ܕܐܢ ܐܪܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܠܘ ܚܬܝܬܐܝܬ ܝܕܥܝܢܢ. ܘܕܗܿܘ ܕܝܕܝܥ ܐ̱ܚܪܢܐ ܗܘ ܡܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܠܐ ܝܕܝܥ ܓܠܝܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܟܠ ܢܩܦܝܐ ܐܘ ܠܡܢܝܘܬܗ ܕܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܢܩܝܦ. ܐܘ ܠܫܟܝܚܘܬܗ. ܘܗܿܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܟܬܘܒܘܬܐ ܠܒܪܢܫܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܐܘܟܡܘܬܐ ܠܟܘܫܝܐ. ܦܘܠܓܐ: ܘܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܡܢ ܐܘܣܝܝܬܐ ܒܙܢܐ ܗܿܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ. ܐܘ ܠܡܫܡܠܝܘܬ ܡܢܝܘܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ. ܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܐܢ ܥܠ ܡܫܚ̈ܠܦܝ ܒܟܝܢܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܐ ܓܢܣܐ ܡܬܩܪܝܐ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܥܠ ܫܘܝ̈ܝ ܒܟܝܢܐ. ܐܕܫܐ. ܘܬܪ̈ܝܗܘܢ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܝܢ. ܐܘ ܠܡܫܡܠܝܘܬ ܡܢܝܘܬܐ. ܕܝܠܢܝܬܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ. ܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܡܬܩܪܝܐ. ܘܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܢܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܘܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܬܘܒ ܓܕܫܢܝܬܐ. ܐܘ ܥܠ ܡܫܘ̈ܬܦܝ ܒܟܝܢܐ ܠܚܘܕ ܡܟܢܐ ܕܬܬܩܛܪܓ ܘܕܝܠܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܐܘ ܠܘ ܥܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܘܓܕܫܐ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܘܡܢ ܗܢܐ ܦܘܠܓܐ ܐܬܝܠܕܬ ܠܢ ܚܡܝܫܝܘܬ ܙܢܝ̈ܐ ܕܒܢ̈ܬ ܩ̈ܠܐ ܟܠܢ̈ܝܬܐ: ܓܢܣܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ ܘܐܕܫܐ ܘܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܘܕܝܠܝܬܐ ܘܓܕܫܐ. ܪܘܥܐ ܘܐ̱ܢܫ̈ܝܢ ܦܝܓ̈ܢܐ ܘܕܒܫܡܐ ܠܘܓܝ̈ܩܘ.","english":"that which is not essentially predicated, or is only in thought, is conceivable. And this is like whiteness in a crow, or again in a movement. And this is conceived either slowly or quickly: and each of these is either manifestly or latently. And that which is conceived manifestly is like youth; that which is latently is like the element of fire. That which is conceived quickly and manifestly is like the sixth day; that which is latently is like the sixth element. Clarification: For the category of movements is something other than their essence or their existence. For many times, when the category is something, the nature is known, but if it is seen, it is not certainly known. And that which is known is other than that which is not clearly known. For every predication is either to the category of movement or to its existence. And the first is like writing to a human; the second is like whiteness to a crow. Division: And the accident from the substance is like the first; or to the completion of the general category it is indicated. And this, if it is predicated of things differing in nature, is called genus; if of things equal in nature, species. And both are in that they are predicated of many; or to the completion of the particular category it is indicated. And this is called difference; and in that it is predicated of one. And the accident again is either common, or of things sharing in nature only, that it may be predicated and the particular is indicated; or not only of these, but the common accident is indicated. And from this division the five universal words of all accidents were born: genus, species, difference, property, and accident. Intention and the remaining chapters and in the name of logic.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܡܢܝܘܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term mʿīṯā (ܡܢܝܘܬܐ) is here used for 'category', a technical term in Aristotelian logic, corresponding to Greek κατηγορία.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܓܢܣܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term gensā (ܓܢܣܐ) is the Syriac calque for 'genus' (γένος), a key Porphyrian predicabile.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܕܫܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term eḏšā (ܐܕܫܐ) renders 'species' (εἶδος), the second of the five predicables in the Isagoge tradition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage concludes with a formal division (ܦܘܠܓܐ) that enumerates the five universal words (genus, species, difference, property, accident), mirroring the structure of Porphyry's Isagoge.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The examples of 'whiteness in a crow' and 'writing to a human' are standard illustrations in Syriac logical commentaries for accidental vs. essential predication.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text at the end reads 'ܪܘܥܐ ܘܐ̱ܢܫ̈ܝܢ ܦܝܓ̈ܢܐ ܘܕܒܫܡܐ ܠܘܓܝ̈ܩܘ', which is corrupt or garbled; the English draft omits it, and the intended sense is unclear.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'ܪܘܥܐ ܘܐ̱ܢܫ̈ܝܢ ܦܝܓ̈ܢܐ ܘܕܒܫܡܐ ܠܘܓܝ̈ܩܘ' at the end is corrupt; the reading taken is that it is a damaged colophon or marginal note, not part of the main argument."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":10,"ref":"p10","source":"ܟܕ ܫܡܥܘܗܝ ܠܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ ܕܐܡܪ ܕܓܢܣܐ ܠܡ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢܐ ܥܠ ܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܐܣܒܪܘ ܕܐܦ ܥܠ ܟܠ ܚܕ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܕܝܠܢܐܝܬ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܘܗܟܢܐ ܐܟܬܒܘ ܘܐܠܦܘ. ܘܡܢ ܩܘܫܬܐ ܦܕܘ. ܐܝܟܢܐ ܓܝܪ ܠܐ ܝܕܥܝܢ ܕܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܗܝ ܕܡܢܐ ܒܟܠ ܠܟܣܝܣ. ܡܫܐܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ. ܘܠܡܫܡܠܝܘܬ ܡܢܝܘܬܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܬܒܥܐ. ܘܟܕ ܓܢܣܐ ܠܘ ܡܫܡܠܝܘܬ ܡܢܝܘܬܐ ܗܘ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܐܕܫ̈ܐ. ܐܠܐ ܡܢܬܐ ܡܢܗܿ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܡܢܬܐ ܐ̱ܚܪܬܐ ܕܗܝ ܗܝ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ. ܕܥܠܝܗܿ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ ܓܢܣܐ ܡܫܘܕܥ. ܐܝܟܢܐ ܥܠ ܟܠ ܚܕ ܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܕܝܠܢܐܝܬ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢܐ ܡܟܢ ܠܡܬܩܛܪܓܘ ܥܠ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܕܝܢ ܐܟܚܕܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܫܠܡܠܝܘܬ ܡܢܝܘܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܕܟܠܗܘܢ ܡܫܘܕܥ. ܒܙܢܐ ܕܡܫܘܕܥܢܘܬ ܟܘܠܐ ܥܠ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܐ. ܦܘܠܓܐ: ܒܕܓܘܢ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܕܡܪܢܐܝܬ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܐ ܐܘ ܓܘܢܐܝܬ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܘܠܘ ܕܝܠܢܐܝܬ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܬܐܡܪܝ. ܐܝܟ ܓܢܣܐ ܥܠ ܐܕܫ̈ܐ. ܐܘ ܕܝܠܢܐܝܬ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܐܝܟ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܥܠ ܡܬܬܚܡܢܐ. ܐܘ ܓܘܢܐܝܬ ܘܕܝܠܢܐܝܬ. ܐܝܟ ܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܥܠ ܩܢܘ̈ܡܐ ܝܚ̈ܝܕܝܐ. ܥܠ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܓܝܪ ܓܘܢܐܝܬ ܟܕ ܡܫܬܐܠܝܢܢ ܕܡܢܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ. ܒܢܝܢ̈ܫܐ ܡܦܢܝܢܢ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܘܥܠ ܚܕ ܒܠܚܘܕܘܗܝ. ܒܪܢܫܐ ܓܝܪ ܡܫܡܠܝܘܬ ܡܢܝܘܬܐ ܕܟܠܗܘܢ ܐܟܚܕܐ. ܘܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܕܝܠܢܐܝܬ ܡܫܘܕܥ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܐܝܬ ܡܢܬܐ ܐܘܣܝܝܬܐ ܠܣܘܩܪܛܝܣ. ܗܿܝ ܐܝܕܐ ܕܠܘ ܐܦ ܘܠܦܠܛܘܢ ܘܠܕܫܪܟܐ ܐܝܬ. ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܕܥܠ ܓܢܣܐ\nܘܓܢܣܐ ܡܢ ܡܬܪܫܡ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܟܠܢܝܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܥܠ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ ܕܡܫܚܠܦܝܢ ܒܐܕܫܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܘܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܡܢ ܕܟܠܢܝܐ ܓܢܣܢܐܝܬ ܥܠ ܚܡܫܬܝܗܘܢ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܐ. ܘܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܡܢ ܐܕܫܐ ܦܪܫ ܠܗ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܡܢ ܬܠܬܐ ܕܫܪܟܐ.","english":"When they heard the philosopher say that genus is predicated in the category of substance upon species, they supposed that also upon each one of the species individually in the category of substance it is predicated. And thus they wrote and taught. And they erred from the truth. For how is it not known that the category of substance is a sound? It is a question. And it seeks the completeness of the essentiality of something. And when genus is not the completeness of the essentiality of each one of the species, but rather a part of it—since there is another part which is the differentia, concerning which genus is not indicative—how then is it predicated upon each one of them individually in the category of substance, just as it is predicated upon all of them together in the category of substance? For the completeness of the essentiality of all of them is indicated by the category of substance. Division: The sound of the category of substance is predicated either essentially alone, and cannot be said individually, like genus upon species; or individually alone, like limit upon that which is limited; or essentially and individually, like species upon individual substances. For upon all of them essentially, when it is asked what they are, they are answered by the categories. In the same way also upon one alone. For first the completeness of the essentiality of all of them together, and of each one of them individually, is indicated. For there is one essential part for Socrates, which is not also for Plato and for the rest. Theory concerning genus: And genus is defined as that which is a whole, which is predicated of many differing in species, in the category of substance. And the sound of the whole is predicated generically upon the five of them. And the first differentia distinguishes it from species. The second from the three that remain.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܓܢܣܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܓܢܣܐ (gensā) renders Greek γένος 'genus' in Porphyry's Isagoge. Bar Hebraeus here discusses its predication in the category of substance (ܕܡܢܐ, dmettā).","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܕܡܢܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܕܡܢܐ (dmettā) translates Greek κατηγορία 'category'. Bar Hebraeus notes it is a 'sound' (ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ, baraṯ qālā), i.e., a linguistic or logical term, not a real entity.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܘܠܓܐ","severity":"info","text":"The passage is divided by the rubric ܦܘܠܓܐ (pulāḡā, 'division'), a standard logical partition. It distinguishes three modes of predication: essential only, individual only, and both essential and individual.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܩܪܛܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"Socrates (ܣܘܩܪܛܝܣ, Sōqrāṭīs) is a standard example in Aristotelian logic for an individual substance. Bar Hebraeus uses him to illustrate that an essential part (e.g., 'human') is not shared by Plato or others.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The phrase ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ (baraṯ qālā, 'sound') is ambiguous: it could mean a spoken word or a logical term. Bar Hebraeus likely intends the latter, as he argues the category of substance is a linguistic expression, not a real thing.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܕܥܠ ܓܢܣܐ","severity":"info","text":"The heading ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܕܥܠ ܓܢܣܐ (tʾōryā d-ʿal gensā, 'Theory concerning genus') mirrors the structure of Porphyry's Isagoge, where a definition of genus is given. Bar Hebraeus follows the same logical sequence.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ could be read as 'sound' (spoken word) or 'term' (logical expression); the context favors the latter.","The phrase ܕܡܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ is ambiguous: it may mean 'the category of something is predicated' or 'something is predicated in the category'; the translation takes the latter."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":11,"ref":"p11","source":"ܦܘܫܟܐ ܘܫܪܝܐ: ܠܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܕܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܗܝ ܕܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܓܢܣܐ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܚܡܫ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܓܢܣܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܬܚܡܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܘܓܢܣܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܚܕܐ ܗܘ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܚܡܫ. ܓܢܣܐ ܗܘ ܦܫܝܛܐܝܬ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܒܡܕܡ ܡܬܚܡܐ ܓܢܣܢܝܘܬܗ. ܡܕܝܢ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܢܗܘܐ ܡܢ ܓܢܣܐ ܕܝܠܗܝܢ ܕܚܡܫ. ܘܐܝܟܢܐ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܐܕܫܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܕܗܘ ܕܕܝܠܢܝ ܡܢܗ ܗ̄ ܓܢܣܐ ܦܫܝܛܐ ܕܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܕܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܕܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܡܢܝܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܕܓܕܫܬ ܠܗܿ ܗܿܝ ܕܓܢܣܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܚܡܫ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܒܡܢܝܘܬܗܿ ܡܢ ܓܘܢܐ ܡܢ ܓܢܣܐ ܕܗܪܟܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܓܢܣܐ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܗܘ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܘܠܐ ܗܿܦܟ. ܒܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܠܗܿ ܓܕܫ. ܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܗܘ ܡܢ ܓܢܣܐ ܕܗܪܟܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܓܢܣܐ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܚܡܫ ܓܢܣܐ ܗܘ ܘܠܐ ܗܿܦܟ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܫܪܝܪܘܬܐ ܐܝܬ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܒܡܢܝܘܬܗܿ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܟܘܠܢܝܬܐ ܡܬܡܪܐ ܕܓܢܣܐ ܗܝ ܠܓܢܣܐ ܕܗܪܟܐ. ܘܠܘ ܒܙܢܐ ܕܠܗܿ ܓܕܫ ܕܒܗ ܕܝܠܢܐ ܡܢܗ. ܦܘܠܓܐ: ܘܓܢܣܐ ܡܢ ܐܘ ܬܚܘܬܘܗܝ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܐܝܬ ܓܢܣܐ ܘܡܬܟܢܐ ܓܢܣ ܓܢܣ̈ܝܢ. ܐܝܟ ܐܘܣܝܐ. ܐܘ ܠܥܠ ܡܢܗ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܘܡܬܟܢܐ ܓܢܣܐ ܬܚܬܝܐ. ܐܝܟ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܐܘ ܠܥܠ ܡܢܗ ܘܬܚܘܬܘܗܝ ܘܡܬܟܢܐ ܓܢܣܐ ܡܨܥܝܐ. ܐܝܟ ܓܘܫܡܐ. ܐܘ ܠܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢܗ ܐܦܠܐ ܬܚܘܬܘܗܝ ܘܡܬܟܢܐ ܓܢܣܐ ܚܕܢܝܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܘܢܐ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܥܠ ܟܠ ܚܕ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܗܘ̈ܢܐ ܡܒܪ̈ܝܐ. ܐܢ ܠܘ ܓܢܣܗܘܢ ܗܝ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܘܚܬܝܬܘܬ ܒܥܬܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ ܠܘ ܠܦܪܓܡܛܝܐ ܗܕܐ ܠܚܡܐ. ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܕܥܠ ܐܕܫܐ\nܘܠܐܕܫܐ ܡܢ ܪܫܡܝܢ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܟܠܢܝܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܥܠ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ ܕܡܫܚܠܦܝܢ ܒܡܢܝܢܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܡܢ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܦܪܫ ܠܗ ܡܢ ܓܢܣܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܬܠܬܐ ܕܫܪܟܐ.","english":"Solution and Beginning: It is not said that the universal is a species, that it is the genus of the five sounds. Genus is something that is predicated. And again, genus is one of the five sounds. Genus is simply that in which its genericness is not predicated of anything. Therefore, the interior intellect ought to be with the genus of the five sounds. And how does the intellect know that the one which is particular to it is the simple genus of the universal species, in that it is said that the universal species is something that has happened to it, that it should be the genus of the five sounds? Because in its particularity it is with the interior from the genus here, in that every genus is a universal species, but not conversely. But in the accident that happens to it, it is particular from the genus here, in that every genus of the five sounds is a genus, but not conversely. And because of this, there is not one truth in that by its particularity the universal species is said to be a genus to the genus here, and not in the accident that happens to it, by which it is particular from it. Division: And genus is either with its subordinate alone, and is called a genus of genera, like substance; or above it alone, and is called a subordinate genus, like animal; or above it and below it, and is called a middle genus, like body; or neither above it nor below it, and is called a singular genus, like the being that is predicated of each one of the created beings. For if not, their genus is substance, and the investigation of a question like this is not for the pragmateia of this bread. Theory concerning the sign and the sign from the outlines, which is the universal that is over many that differ in species only, in that it is predicated of what. Distinction from the first: he distinguished it from genus. But that of the second from the remaining three.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ","severity":"info","text":"The phrase ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ (literally 'daughter of a sound') is a technical term for 'species' in Syriac logical texts, calqued from Greek εἶδος. Bar Hebraeus uses it consistently to denote the logical species, distinct from genus.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܟܠܢܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܟܠܢܝܐ (kullāyā) means 'universal' and is a key concept in this passage, where Bar Hebraeus distinguishes the universal species from the genus of the five predicables (the five sounds).","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage is divided into two main sections: a 'Solution and Beginning' (ܦܘܫܟܐ ܘܫܪܝܐ) and a 'Division' (ܦܘܠܓܐ). The division classifies genus into four types based on its position relative to subordinate and superordinate genera.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The classification of genus into four types (genus of genera, subordinate genus, middle genus, singular genus) reflects the Aristotelian-Porphyrian tradition as adapted in Syriac logic. The example of 'substance' (ܐܘܣܝܐ) as a genus of genera is standard.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪܓܡܛܝܐ ܕܗܕܐ ܠܚܡܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The phrase 'pragmateia of this bread' (ܦܪܓܡܛܝܐ ܕܗܕܐ ܠܚܡܐ) is obscure. It may be a scribal error or a cryptic reference; the intended meaning is unclear, possibly a metaphor for a trivial or material inquiry.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus argues that the universal species is not truly a genus of the five sounds, because its genericness is accidental, not essential. The distinction between essential predication and accidental predication is central to his solution.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'pragmateia of this bread' (ܦܪܓܡܛܝܐ ܕܗܕܐ ܠܚܡܐ) is ambiguous; it may be a corruption or a deliberate obscure reference.","The exact referent of 'the sign and the sign from the outlines' (ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܕܥܠ ܐܕܫܐ ܘܠܐܕܫܐ ܡܢ ܪܫܡܝܢ) is unclear; it likely introduces a new topic or distinction."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":12,"ref":"p12","source":"ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܡܬܐܡܪ ܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܘܐܕܫܐ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܥܠܘܗܝ ܘܥܠ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܓܢܣܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܘܗܿܘ ܡܢ ܩܕܡܝܐ. ܐܘ ܐܕܫܐ ܡܪܢܝܐ ܡܬܟܢܐ. ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ. ܟܕ ܡܢܗ ܘܠܗ ܢܬܩܪܐ ܐܕܫܐ. ܗܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܐܕܫܐ ܐܚܝܢܝܐ ܡܬܩܪܐ ܐܟܘܬܗ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ. ܟܕ ܒܦܚܡܐ ܕܠܘܬ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܢܬܩܪܐ ܐܕܫܐ. ܘܦܪܝܫܝܢ ܡܢ ܚܕ̈ܕܐ ܬܪ̈ܝܗܘܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܕܒܗܘܢ ܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܝܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܢ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܘ ܡܪܢܝܐ ܓܢܣܐ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ ܡܟܢ ܠܡܗܘܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܐܚܝܢܝܐ ܐܝܬ ܐܡܬܝ. ܘܬܘܒ ܕܐܕܫܐ ܗܘ ܡܪܢܝܐ. ܒܦܚܡܐ ܕܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܬܚܘܬܘܗܝ ܗܝ ܐܕܫܢܝܘܬܗ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܐܚܝܢܝܐ ܒܦܚܡܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܠܥܠ ܡܢܗ. ܪܘܥܐ ܘܐ̱ܢܫ̈ܝܢ ܡܢ ܓܘܢܝܘܬܐ ܘܕܝܠܢܝܘܬܐ ܕܢܘ ܕܐܝܬ ܒܝܬ ܬܪ̈ܝܗܘܢ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܚܙܘ ܠܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܬܚ̈ܬܝܐ ܕܟܕ ܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܐܢܘܢ ܡܪ̈ܢܝܐ. ܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܐܢܘܢ ܬܘܒ ܒܦܚܡܐ ܕܓܢܣܝ̈ܗܘܢ. ܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܕܝܢ ܡܨܥ̈ܝܐ ܟܕ ܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܐܢܘܢ ܒܦܚܡܐ ܕܓܢܣܝ̈ܗܘܢ. ܠܘ ܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܐܢܘܢ ܡܪ̈ܢܝܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܥܠ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ ܕܡܫܚܠܦܝܢ ܒܡܢܝܢܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܝܢ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܓܘܢܝܘܬܐ ܠܐܕܫܐ ܗܘ ܐܚܝܢܝܐ ܝܗܒܘ. ܘܠܘ ܫܦܝܪ ܐܬܪܥܝܘ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܟܠ ܐܕܫܐ ܡܪܢܝܐ ܐܕܫܐ ܗܘ ܐܦ ܐܚܝܢܝܐ. ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܐܘܣ̈ܝܐܣ ܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ ܘܢܘܩܕܬܐ ܗܢܝܢ ܕܠܝܬ ܠܗܝܢ ܓܢ̈ܣܐ ܘܐܠܐ ܡܪ̈ܟܒܢ ܗܘ̈ܝ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܘܡܢ ܫܘܚ̈ܠܦܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܓܘܢܝܘܬܐ ܐܘ ܕܝܠܢܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬ ܒܝܬ ܬܪ̈ܝܗܘܢ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ. ܪܘܥܐ ܘܦܘܪܦܘܪܝܘܣ ܡܢ ܗܿܘ ܨܘܪܝܐ ܟܕ ܠܐ ܦܪܫ ܒܝܬ ܬܪ̈ܝܗܘܢ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ: ܘܫܡܥ ܬܘܒ ܠܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ ܕܠܓܢܣܐ ܒܝܕ ܐܕܫܐ ܪܫܡ ܟܕ ܐܡܪ: ܕܓܢܣܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܿܘ ܕܥܠ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ ܕܡܫܚܠܦܝܢ ܒܐܕܫܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܠܐܕܫܐ ܒܝܕ ܓܢܣܐ. ܟܕ ܐܡܪ ܕܐܕܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܿܘ ܕܥܠܘܗܝ ܘܥܠ ܐ̱ܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܓܢܣܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ.","english":"Demonstration: It is said again that the same thing is predicated of that which is above it and of other genera, and that it is the first. Or the relative is shown. As in the case of the head. When that which is with it is called a head. This second head is called a relative, like the head. When in relation to the animal it is called a head. And these two species are distinguished from each other by the relative differences that are shown in them. In that the relative genus is not always shown to be. That which is relative exists at some time. And again, that the relative is a genus. In relation to those which are under it, its relativity is. That which is relative, in relation to that which is above it. There is a difference and individuals between the commonality and the peculiarity of the two species. In that they saw the lower differences, that when they are differences, they are relative. They are also differences in relation to their genera. Middle differences, when they are differences in relation to their genera, they are not relative differences. In that they are not predicated of many that differ in species. For they gave commonality to the difference which is relative, and they did not think well. In that not every relative difference is also a relative difference. As in the case of simple and composite substances, which have no genera but are composed from them and from differences. Therefore, there is not one commonality or peculiarity between the two species. There is a difference between Porphyry and that form, when he did not distinguish between the two species. And hear again the philosopher, who marks the genus by the difference when he says: that genus is that which is predicated of many that differ in species. In the same way, and the difference by the genus. When he says that the difference is that which is predicated of that which is above it and of other genera.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܕܫܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܐܕܫܐ (ʼedšā) is used for 'difference' or 'species' in logical contexts, here translating Greek διαφορά. Bar Hebraeus distinguishes relative (ܡܪ̈ܥܝܐ) from non-relative differences.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"external","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage engages Porphyry's Isagoge, where genus and difference are defined as predicates of many differing in species. Bar Hebraeus critiques Porphyry's failure to distinguish relative from non-relative differences.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":["Porphyry Isagoge"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage continues the 'Demonstration' (ܢܘܗܪܐ) section, analyzing the relationship between genus, difference, and species. It contrasts relative and non-relative differences, and critiques Porphyry's definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains ambiguous phrasing, e.g., 'ܐܕܫܐ ܗܘ ܐܚܝܢܝܐ' may be read as 'the relative difference' or 'the difference which is relative'. The English draft attempts to clarify but may oversimplify.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"external","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus's discussion of relative and non-relative differences parallels later medieval logical commentaries, such as those by Ibn Sina (Avicenna), who also distinguishes between essential and accidental differences.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Avicenna, Isagoge commentary"],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac term ܐܕܫܐ can mean both 'difference' and 'species', leading to potential confusion in logical distinctions. The reading adopted follows the context of Porphyry's categories.","The phrase 'ܐܕܫܐ ܗܘ ܐܚܝܢܝܐ' is ambiguous: it could mean 'the relative difference' or 'the difference which is relative'. The English draft opts for the latter."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":13,"ref":"p13","source":"ܐܡܪ ܕܓܢܣܐ ܘܐܕܫܐ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܠܘܬ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܒܡ̈ܠܐ ܕܬܪ̈ܝܗܘܢ ܒܬܪ̈ܝܗܘܢ ܙܕܩ ܕܢܬܚܫܚ. ܘܛܥܐ ܠܗ ܬܡܝܗܐ. ܪܒܐ ܗܘܬ ܓܝܪ ܝܕܥܬܗ ܕܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܗܿܘ ܕܠܐ ܝܕܝܥ ܒܗܿܘ ܕܠܐ ܝܕܝܥ ܢܚܘܐ. ܘܐܕܫܐ ܡܢ ܕܒܗ ܪܫܡ ܠܓܢܣܐ. ܠܘ ܗܘ ܟܕ ܗܘ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܘ ܕܠܗ ܒܓܢܣܐ ܥܛܦ ܪܫܡ. ܒܡܪܢܝܐ ܡܢ ܠܓܢܣܐ ܪܫܡ. ܘܠܐܚܝܢܝܐ ܒܓܢܣܐ ܚܘܝ. ܘܕܗܿܢܘܢ ܡܢ ܕܠܘܬ ܡܕܡ ܠܘ ܒܝܕ ܚܕ̈ܕܐ ܡܨܝܢ ܠܡܬܚܘܝܘ ܓܠܝܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܟܚܕܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܒܟܝܢܐ. ܘܡܚܘܝܢܐ ܕܩܕܝܡ ܢܗܘܐ ܝܕܝܥ. ܡܢ ܡܬܚܘܝܢܐ ܙܕܩ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܠܐܒܐ ܠܘ ܒܝܕ ܒܪܐ ܡܚܘܝܢܢ. ܐܦܠܐ ܠܒܪܐ ܒܝܕ ܐܒܐ. ܐܠܐ ܒܡܚܘܝܢܘܬܐ ܐ̱ܚܪܬܐ ܕܒܗܿ ܬܪ̈ܝܗܘܢ ܐܟܚܕܐ ܡܬܝܕܥܝܢ. ܟܕ ܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܕܐܒܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܕܡܢ ܢܘܛܦܬܗ. ܐܚܪܢܐ ܕܕܡܐ ܠܗ ܒܐܘܣܝܐ ܝܠܝܕ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܐܕܫܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܚܕ ܗܘ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܚܡܫ ܗܘ ܡܪܢܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܠܘ ܗܿܘ ܐܚܝܢܝܐ. ܘܐܠܐ ܚܣܝܪܐ ܡܫܬܟܚ ܗܘܐ ܗܘ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܚܡܝܫܝܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܠܟܠܗܘܢ ܟܠܢ̈ܝܐ ܐܚܕ ܗܘܐ. ܠܐܘܣ̈ܝܐܣ ܠܡ ܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ ܕܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܐܢܝܢ ܡܪ̈ܢܝܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܘܠܘ ܐܚܝܢ̈ܝܐ ܒܕ ܠܝܬ ܠܗܝܢ ܓܢ̈ܣܐ. ܦܘܠܓܐ: ܘܠܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܡܢ ܬܘܒ ܐܚܝܢ̈ܝܐ ܛܟ̈ܣܐ ܐܝܬ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܦ ܠܓܢ̈ܣܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܐܕܫܐ ܐܘ ܠܥܠ ܡܢܗ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܐܝܬ ܐܕܫܐ ܘܡܬܟܢܐ ܐܕܫ ܐܕܫ̈ܝܢ. ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ. ܐܘ ܬܚܘܬܘܗܝ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܘܡܬܟܢܐ ܐܕܫܐ ܥܠܝܐ ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ. ܐܘ ܠܥܠ ܡܢܗ ܘܬܚܘܬܘܗܝ ܘܡܬܟܢܐ ܐܕܫܐ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܙܢܐ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ. ܐܘ ܐܦܠܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢܗ ܘܐܦܠܐ ܬܚܘܬܘܗܝ ܘܡܬܟܢܐ ܐܕܫܐ ܚܕܢܝܐ ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܡܠܐܟܐ. ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܕܡܛܠ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ\nܠܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܕܝܢ ܪܫܡܝܢ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܟܠܢܝܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܢܐ ܐܘܣܝܝܐܝܬ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܘܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܡܢ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܦܪܫ ܠܗ ܡܢ ܓܢܣܐ ܘܐܕܫܐ.","english":"He says that genus and difference are among those things that are with something. For in the case of both of them, in both of their terms, it is necessary to be useful. And the wonder leads him astray. For the knowledge of the philosopher was great compared to that which is unknown, showing by that which is unknown. And difference marks the genus by that in which it is. Is it not the case that when it is that which is for it, it marks the genus by turning? With relation it marks the genus. And it shows the species by the genus. And that these are among those things that are with something cannot be shown clearly by each other, because they are together in nature. And the demonstration of the prior becomes known from the demonstration. For in the case of father, it is not shown by son, nor son by father, but by another demonstration in which both are known together, when it is said that father is a living thing that has a certain addition, another that is like it in substance, born. Clarification: And difference is that which is one among these five, it is the relation, not the species. Otherwise, the fifth mean would be found lacking, because it would not hold all the categories. For the simple substances of differences, only relations are said, not species, because they have no genera. Division: And for differences, again, there are species orders just as for genera. Because every difference either above itself alone has a difference and is called a difference of differences, like that of head, or below it alone and is called a higher difference, like that of body, or above itself and below it and is called a middle difference, like that of animal, or neither above itself nor below it and is called a singular difference, like that of angel. Theory concerning change: For change, they define that it is a category that which is predicated substantially. And the distinction from the prior distinguishes it from genus and difference.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܕܫܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܐܕܫܐ (ʼadšā) corresponds to Greek διαφορά (differentia), a key logical concept in Porphyry's Isagoge. Bar Hebraeus uses it consistently for the specific difference that distinguishes a species within a genus.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܓܢܣܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܓܢܣܐ (genos) is a loan from Greek γένος, meaning 'genus' or 'kind'. In this passage it is contrasted with ܐܕܫܐ (difference) and ܐܚܝܢܝܐ (species), following the Aristotelian-Porphyrian logical framework.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܪܢܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܡܪܢܝܐ (mraʿyā) translates Greek σχέσις (relation). Bar Hebraeus here distinguishes relation from species, arguing that difference is a relation, not a species, because species have genera while differences do not.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage engages with the Porphyrian tree and the five predicables (genus, species, difference, property, accident). Bar Hebraeus adapts this to Syriac, using examples like 'head', 'body', 'animal', and 'angel' to illustrate hierarchical relations of difference.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage is divided into sections marked by Syriac headings: ܢܘܗܪܐ (Clarification), ܦܘܠܓܐ (Division), and ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܕܡܛܠ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ (Theory concerning change). These structure the logical exposition of difference and its categories.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or corrupt readings, e.g., ܕܓܢܣܐ ܘܐܕܫܐ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ (genus and difference are among those) and ܒܕܓܘܢ ܒܡ̈ܠܐ (in the case of both terms). The English draft smooths over some syntactic difficulties; the precise logical argument may be partially obscured.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac phrase ܒܕܓܘܢ ܒܡ̈ܠܐ ܕܬܪ̈ܝܗܘܢ could be read as 'in the case of both of their terms' or 'in the division of the words of both'; the English draft takes the former. The identity of the 'fifth mean' (ܡܢܝܢܐ ܚܡܝܫܝܐ) is unclear—possibly a reference to a fifth category or a lost logical term."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":14,"ref":"p14","source":"ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܬܪܝܢ ܕܫܪܟܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܡܢ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܩܢܝܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܢܫܘܕܥ ܘܠܐ ܓܠܝܙܘܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢܬܐ ܗܘ ܕܐܕܫܐ. ܓܠܝܙܘܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܟܢܐ ܡܢܬܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܡܨܝܐ ܠܡܗܘܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܠܣܘܣܝܐ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ. ܠܘ ܠܐ ܡܠܝܠܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܢܗܘܐ ܐܠܐ ܨܗܘܠܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܠܟܠ ܓܝܪ ܟܝܢܐ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܡܩܝܡܢܐ ܚܕ ܙܕܩ ܕܢܗܘܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܠܘ ܬܪܝܢ ܢܗܘܘܢ ܫܘܚ̈ܠܦܐ ܡܩܝ̈ܡܢܐ ܕܟܝܢܐ ܡܕܡ. ܟܕ ܒܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܡܬܩܝܡ. ܠܐ ܣܢܝܩ ܗܘ ܕܒܗܿܘ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܢܬܩܝܡ. ܘܗܟܢܐ ܟܕ ܒܗܿܘ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܢܬܩܝܡ. ܘܡܢ ܗܪܟܐ ܐܠܨܐ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܡܩܝܡܢܗ ܡܪܢܝܐ ܢܗܘܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܩܝܡܢܐ ܗܘ ܗܘ ܕܘܠܐ ܡܬܘܡ ܒܠܥܕܘܗܝ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܗܘܐ ܡܬܩܝܡܢܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܡܠܝܠܐ ܡܢ ܟܕ ܥܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܡܠܐܟܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܠܘ ܒܚܕ ܣܘܟܠܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܠܝܠܘܬܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ. ܣܛܪ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܠܐܟ̈ܐ ܗܝ. ܐܠܐ ܫܘܝܘܬ ܫܡܗܐܝܬ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܡܢ ܝܬܝܪ̈ܬܐ ܗܝ ܠܡܘܣܦܘ ܒܬܚܘܡܐ ܐ̱ܢܫܝܐ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܕܡܝܘܬܐ ܟܐܡܬ ܐܝܟ ܕܠܦܘܪܫܐ ܕܡܢ ܡܠܐܟܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܠܘ ܟܠ ܡܢܝܘܬܐ ܡܪܟܒܬܐ ܡܢ ܓܢܣܐ ܘܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܬܬܪܟܒ. ܗܐ ܓܝܪ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܕܥܣܪܐ ܡܢ ܠܚܘ̈ܕܝܘܬܐ ܡܪܟܒ ܗܢܝܢ ܐܝܠܢ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܓܢܣܐ ܐܘ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܦܐܝܐ ܠܡܗܘܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܟܠ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܡܦܠܓܢܐ ܕܓܢܣܐ. ܡܩܝܡܢܐ ܗܘ ܕܐܕܫܐ ܘܒܗܦܟܐ. ܘܟܠ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܡܩܝܡܢܐ ܕܓܢܣܐ. ܡܩܝܡܢܐ ܗܘ ܕܐܕܫܐ ܘܠܐ ܗܦܟ. ܘܟܠ ܡܦܠܓܢܐ ܕܐܕܫܐ. ܡܦܠܓܢܐ ܗܘ ܕܓܢܣܐ ܘܠܐ ܗܦܟ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܡܢ ܡܩܝܡܢܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܠܡܠܝܠܐ ܙܕܩ ܠܡܫܬܘܕܥܘ. ܠܘ ܠܡܠܝܠܘܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܡܪܢܐܝܬ ܐܠܐ ܡܢ ܫܡܗܐܝܬ ܥܠܘܗܝ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܐ. ܗܘ ܗܟܘܬ ܘܠܓܘܚܟܐ ܥܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܙܕܩ ܠܡܬܩܛܪܓܘ ܠܐ ܠܓܚܘܟܘܬܐ ܘܠܚܘܪܐ ܘܠܐ ܠܚܘܪܘܬܐ.","english":"He says that these two are among those things that are of the remainder. And wonder: and difference is from the categories of substance, something known and not brevity. In that it is a genus of which it is a species. Brevity, however, is a species of something that can be a genus. For in the case of the genus, difference is not a species, but a species. And wonder: for every genus, one constitutive difference ought to be. In that if there were two constitutive differences of some genus, when it is constituted by one of them, it is not possible that it be constituted by that other. And thus when it is constituted by that other, and from here it is necessary that one of them be a superfluous constituent. In that the constituent is the same, without which it cannot be constituted. And wonder: and species, when it is predicated of man and angel, is not predicated in one sense. In that the rationality of man is different from that of angels, but equivocally. For in the case of the genus, it is more appropriate to add in the human boundary the rational voice of animal, as for the distinction from angel. And wonder: and not every animal is composite of body and difference from category to be composed. For indeed the animal of ten is composed of monads, which are such that not one of them is body or difference properly. And wonder: every difference is a division of genus. It is constitutive of species and conversely. And every constitutive difference of genus is constitutive of species and not conversely. And every division of species is a division of genus and not conversely. And wonder: and difference is to be known from the constituent of man to species, not to that rationality which is not properly but equivocally predicated of it. Thus also laughter is to be predicated of man, not of laughableness and white and whiteness.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܫܘܚܠܦܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term šuḥlāpā (difference) is the standard rendering of Greek διαφορά, a key Porphyrian predicabile. Bar Hebraeus here treats its logical role as a constitutive differentia of a genus.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܩܝܡܢܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term mqayyəmānā (constitutive) derives from the root qwm (to stand, to constitute). It renders Greek συστατικός and is used to mark a difference that actually constitutes a species, as opposed to a merely divisive one.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage is structured as a series of logical propositions each introduced by ܘܗܪܐ (wonder), a rhetorical marker that signals a new point or objection. This pattern is typical of Bar Hebraeus’s dialectical method.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The example of man and angel, and the distinction between rationality in man and in angels, reflects a standard Neoplatonic and Patristic topos: rationality is predicated equivocally (šmāhāʾīt) of different species, not univocally.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text at the opening is textually uncertain: ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܬܪܝܢ ܕܫܪܟܐ may be corrupt or mispointed. The English draft reads 'these two are among those things that are of the remainder,' but the referent of 'these two' is unclear from the immediate context.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The identity of 'these two' (genus and difference, or another pair) is not explicit in the Syriac; the reading assumes they are genus and difference from the preceding passage.","The phrase 'brevity' (ܓܠܝܙܘܬܐ) is ambiguous: it may be a technical term for a logical category or a scribal error; the English draft treats it as a species of something that can be a genus."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":15,"ref":"p15","source":"ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܕܥܠ ܕܝܠܝܬܐ\nܕܝܠܝܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܪܫܡܝܢ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܥܠ ܚܕ ܐܕܫܐ ܩܘܛܪܓܐ ܠܘ ܐܘܣܝܝܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܐ. ܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܡܢ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܦܪܫ ܠܗܿ ܡܢ ܓܕܫܐ ܓܘܢܝܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܬܠܬܐ ܕܫܪܟܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܕܝܠܝܬܐ ܡܢ ܡܪܢܝܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܟܠܗ ܐܕܫܐ ܘܠܗ ܒܠܚܘܕܘܗܝ ܘܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܢܩܝܦܐ ܐܝܟ ܓܚܘܟܘܬܐ ܕܒܚܝܠܐ ܠܒܪܢܫܐ. ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܕܠܘ ܠܟܠܗ ܐܝܟ ܡܚܪܘܬܐ. ܐܘ ܠܘ ܠܗ ܒܠܚܘܕܘܗܝ ܐܝܟ ܕܘܝܠܐ. ܐܘ ܠܘ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܐܝܟ ܟܬܘܒܘܬܐ ܕܒܡܥܒܕܢܘܬܐ ܘܫܐܝܠܐܝܬ ܕܝ̈ܠܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝ̈ܢ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܐܟܡܐ ܡܢ ܓܝܪ ܕܠܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܬܚ̈ܬܝܐ ܕܝ̈ܠܝܬܐ ܐܝܬ: ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܠܗܠܝܢ ܡܨܥ̈ܝܐ ܘܥܠܝ̈ܐ ܘܠܓܢܣ ܓܢ̈ܣܝܢ ܐܝܬ. ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ ܕܘܝܠܐ ܠܚܝܘܬܐ ܘܬܪܒܝܬܐ ܠܓܘܫܡܐ ܡܢܦܫܐ. ܘܬܠܝܬܝܘܬ ܩܝ̈ܡܐ ܠܓܘܫܡܐ. ܘܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܒܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܢܗܘܐ ܠܐܘܣܝܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܕܝܠܝܬܐ ܡܢ ܐܘ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܐܝܟ ܓܚܘܟܘܬܐ. ܐܘ ܡܪܟܒܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܟܢܝܫܘܬ ܒܢ̈ܬ ܩ̈ܠܐ ܕܟܠ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܓܕܫܐ ܗܝ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܒܠܚܘܕܝܗܿ. ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܬܪܝܢܘܬ ܪ̈ܓܠܐ ܘܬܪܝܨܘܬ ܩܘܡܬܐ ܘܦܬܝܘܬ ܛܦܪ̈ܐ ܘܕܟܝܘܬ ܟܪܘܡܐ ܠܒܪܢܫܐ. ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܕܥܠ ܓܕܫܐ ܓܘܢܝܐ\nܘܓܕܫܐ ܡܢ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܡܬܪܫܡ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܟܠܢܝܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܥܠ ܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ ܩܘܛܪܓܐ ܠܘ ܐܘܣܝܝܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܘܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܡܢ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܦܪܫ ܠܗ ܡܢ ܕܝܠܝܬܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܡܢ ܬܠܬܐ ܕܫܪܟܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܓܕܫܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܗܪܟܐ ܡܬܥܗܕ. ܠܘ ܗܿܘ ܗܘ ܕܠܘܩܒܠ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܡܬܦܠܓ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܘ ܡܢ ܥܠ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ ܡܫܪ ܐܠܐ ܒܐܘܣܝܐ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܝܟ ܚܘܪܘܬܐ ܒܓܘܫܡܐ. ܗܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܥܠ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܡܫܪ. ܐܝܟ ܚܘܪܐ ܥܠ ܓܘܫܡܐ. ܓܘܫܡܐ ܓܝܪ ܚܘܪܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܡܪ ܐܢ̱ܬ ܘܠܘ ܚܘܪܘܬܐ. ܘܐܠܘ ܚܘܪܐ ܓܕܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ.","english":"The Theory of Proprieties\n\nPropriety is a sign that it is a predicate which is predicated of one species in a non-essential manner. The distinction from the first distinguishes it from common accident. That which is of the second from these three of the remainder. Wonder: and propriety is from the category that which is of the whole species and of it alone and not essentially, like the capacity for laughter in man. But not of the whole, like the capacity for neighing. Or not of it alone, like the capacity for walking. Or not essentially, like the capacity for writing in a craftsman. And questionably, proprieties are known. Wonder: and how many of the lower species of proprieties there are: in that same manner and to those intermediate and higher and to genera of genera there are. That as, for example, the capacity for neighing to the horse and the capacity for growth to the body from the soul. And the third of the standings to the body. And that which is not in that which is placed becomes for the essence. Wonder: and propriety is either simple, like the capacity for laughter, or composite, like the state of being a writer of the sounds of each one of which is a common accident in itself. As, for example, the bipedality and the uprightness of stature and the breadth of nails and the whiteness of the complexion in man.\n\nThe Theory of Common Accident\n\nAnd common accident is defined as that which is a predicate that is predicated of many species in a non-essential manner. And the distinction from the first distinguishes it from propriety. That which is of the second from the three of the remainder. Wonder: and accident is that which is here remembered. It is not that which is opposed to essence and divided. In that that is upon essence and does not cease to subsist except in essence essentially it is, like whiteness in body. This, however, upon essence subsists, like white upon body. For body is white, it is said, and not whiteness. And if white were an accident, it would be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܕܝܠܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term dīlīṯā (propriety) is a technical Porphyrian predicate, distinct from both genus and accident, as defined in the Isagoge.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܓܕܫܐ ܓܘܢܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The phrase gaḏšā gawwānāyā (common accident) denotes a predicate that applies to multiple species non-essentially, here contrasted with propriety.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus adapts Porphyry’s five predicables (genus, species, difference, propriety, accident) from the Isagoge, a standard late-antique logical textbook in Syriac translation.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage is divided into two sections: the first on propriety (dīlīṯā) and the second on common accident (gaḏšā gawwānāyā), each introduced by a heading and following a parallel definitional pattern.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The examples of propriety (e.g., capacity for laughter in man, neighing in horse) and accident (e.g., whiteness in body) directly mirror those in Porphyry’s Isagoge, indicating Bar Hebraeus’s reliance on that source.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text at the end of the first section is ambiguous: the phrase “that which is not in that which is placed becomes for the essence” may reflect a textual corruption or a compressed logical argument about accidental properties.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'that which is not in that which is placed becomes for the essence' is syntactically unclear; it may refer to a property that does not inhere in a subject but still pertains to essence, or it may be a scribal error."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":16,"ref":"p16","source":"ܡܫܬܟܚ ܗܘܐ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܕܐܦ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܐܦ ܓܕܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܿܝ ܕܫܟܝܪܐ. ܟܐܢܐܝܬ ܡܕܝܢ ܓܕܫܢܝܐ ܐܬܩܪܝ ܗܘ ܗܢܐ ܡܢ ܐ̱ܚܪ̈ܢܐ. ܘܓܕܫܐ ܡܢ ܠܘܩܒܠ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܡܬܦܠܓ. ܓܕܫܢܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܠܘܩܒܠ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܐܘܟܝܬ ܟܝܢܝܐ. ܘܟܝܢܝܐ ܡܢ ܐܘ ܓܕܫܐ ܗܘ ܐܝܟ ܓܘܢܐ ܠܚܘܪܘܬܐ. ܓܘܢܐ ܓܝܪ ܟܕ ܓܕܫܐ ܗܘ ܒܟܝܢܗ. ܟܝܢܐܝܬ ܥܠ ܚܘܪܘܬܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܐܘ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܗܘ ܐܝܟ ܡܠܝܠܐ ܠܒܪܢܫܐ. ܘܓܕܫܢܝܐ ܬܘܒ. ܐܘ ܓܕܫܐ ܗܘ ܐܝܟ ܗܢܝܐܐ ܠܪܝܚܐ. ܘܕܓܕܫܢܝܐ ܗܘ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܗܢܝܐܐ ܠܪܝܚܐ ܝܕܝܥܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܦ ܛܥܡܬܐ ܗܢܝܐܬܐ ܘܩܠܐ ܗܢܝܐܐ ܡܬܐܡܪ. ܐܘ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܚܘܪܐ ܠܒܪܢܫܐ. ܘܕܚܘܪܐ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܗܘ ܘܠܘ ܓܕܫܐ ܩܕܡܬ ܐܫܬܘܕܥܬ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܓܕܫܐ ܡܢ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܟܕ ܥܠ ܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ ܡܟܢ ܠܡܬܩܛܪܓܘ. ܘܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܚܣܪܐ ܠܓܘܢܝܘܬܗ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܠܟܠܗܘܢ ܩܢܘ̈ܡܐ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܢܐܚܘܕ. ܘܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܗܢܐ. ܐܘ ܡܫܢܝܢܐ ܗܘ. ܐܘ ܠܐ ܡܫܢܝܢܐ. ܘܡܫܢܝܢܐ ܡܢ ܐܘ ܒܚܘܫܒܐ ܐܘ ܒܣܘܥܪܢܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܕܒܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܐܘ ܡܫܘܚܪܢܐܝܬ ܐܘ ܡܣܪܗܒܐܝܬ. ܘܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܐܘ ܥܛܠܐܝܬ ܐܘ ܕܠܝܠܐܝܬ. ܐܝܟ ܕܡܢ ܠܥܠ ܫܡܥܬ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܘܗܝ ܟܕ ܗܝ. ܡܨܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܚܪܢܐ ܘܐܚܪܢܐ ܓܢܣܐ ܘܐܕܫܐ ܘܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܘܕܝܠܝܬܐ ܘܓܕܫܐ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܓܘܢܐ ܕܓܢܣܐ ܗܘ ܕܐܘܟܡܐ ܘܐܕܫܐ ܕܐܝܢܝܘܬܐ. ܘܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܗܘ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܠܒܝܕܐ ܘܕܝܠܝܬܐ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ. ܘܓܕܫܐ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܕܐܘܟܡܐ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܗܘ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܠܒܝܕܐ ܘܕܝܠܝܬܐ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܝܕܝܥܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܒܠܥܕ ܐܘܟܡܐ ܡܟܢ ܠܡܬܪܢܝܘ. ܓܘܫܡܐ ܕܝܢ ܠܒܝܕܐ ܒܠܥܕ ܐܘܟܡܐ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ.","english":"It is found that substance is both essence and accident, that which is common. Accidentally, then, it is called accident, this one from the others. And accident is divided in opposition to essence. Accident, then, in opposition to essence, is like substance. And substance is either accident, like color in relation to whiteness. For color, when it is an accident in its substance, is naturally predicated of whiteness. Or it is essence, like rational in relation to man. And accident again: or it is accident, like whiteness in relation to snow. And that which is accidental is generic whiteness in relation to snow, known from that which is also said of taste, whiteness, and sound, whiteness. Or essence is like white in relation to man. And that white is essence and not accident, as was previously understood. Demonstration: And accident from the generic, when it is predicated of many individuals, lacks nothing of its generic nature, which does not hold for all the individuals of each one of the individuals. And this again: or it is possible, or it is not possible. And possible is either in thought or in action. And that in action is either delayed or hasty. And each of them is either by day or by night, as you heard above. Demonstration: And one of the species is voice, and it, when it is, is able to be without other, genus, individual, difference, property, and generic accident, such as color, which is the genus of black, and individual of essence, and difference of body in relation to hand, and property of body, and generic accident of man and of black. Difference is of body in relation to hand, and property of body is known from that which body without black is able to be thought. Body, then, in relation to hand without black, and not.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܘܣܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܐܘܣܝܐ (ousia) is used here to denote both 'essence' and 'substance', reflecting the Aristotelian distinction between primary and secondary substance. Bar Hebraeus plays on this ambiguity to argue that accident can be predicated of substance in a non-essential way.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܓܕܫܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܓܕܫܐ (gaḏšā) means 'accident' in the logical sense, as opposed to 'essence' (ousia). Bar Hebraeus distinguishes between 'accident' (gaḏšā) and 'accidental' (gaḏšāyā), the latter being a subclass of accident that is predicated of a species non-essentially.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܓܘܢܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܓܘܢܐ (gawnā) means 'genus' or 'kind'. Bar Hebraeus uses it to illustrate how a generic accident (e.g., color) can be predicated of a species (e.g., whiteness) without being essential to it.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the logical analysis of propriety (idion) from the previous section, now examining the relationship between substance, essence, and accident. The text moves from definition to examples (color/whiteness, rational/man, whiteness/snow) and then to a demonstration of generic accident.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text at the end is corrupt or garbled: 'body, then, in relation to hand without black, and not' appears to break off mid-sentence. The English draft attempts to reconstruct the sense, but the original may have a lacuna or scribal error.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus here engages with the Aristotelian categories as transmitted through Syriac logical commentaries, particularly the distinction between substance (ousia) and accident (sumbebēkos). The examples (color, whiteness, rational, man) are standard in the Peripatetic tradition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac term ܐܘܣܝܐ (ousia) is ambiguous between 'essence' and 'substance'; the text exploits this ambiguity. The final sentence is corrupt and its intended meaning is uncertain."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":17,"ref":"p17","source":"ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܡܢ ܪ̈ܘܫܡܝܗܝܢ ܟܝܬ ܕܚܡܫ ܗܠܝܢ ܟܠܢܝ̈ܬܐ ܘܫܘܬܦܘ̈ܬܗܝܢ ܘܦܘܪ̈ܫܢܝܗܝܢ ܫܦܝܪ ܡܬܬܦ̈ܩܢ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܒܙܢܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܒܗ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܕܝܠܢܐܝܬ ܡܫܘ̈ܬܦܢ. ܒܗ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܫܪܟܐ ܢܬܦܪ̈ܫܢ. ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܕܥܠ ܬܚܘܡܐ\nܬܚܘܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܐܡܪܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܢܐ ܕܡܫܡܠܝܘܬ ܡܢܝܘܬܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܝܠܗ ܗܘ ܬܚܘܡܐ. ܘܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܟܠ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܢ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܐ ܐܘܣܝܝ̈ܬܐ ܟܠܗܝܢ ܕܡܬܬܚܡܢܐ ܢܬܪܟܒ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܦܘܪܫܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܕܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܡܬܬܒܥ ܬܚܘܡܐ. ܘܐܠܐ ܕܝܠܝܬܐ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܗܘܬ ܒܠܚܘܕܝܗܿ. ܐܦܠܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܐܘܣܝܝܐܝܬ ܢܦܪܘܫ. ܘܐܠܐ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܒܠܚܘܕܘܗܝ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܗܘܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܐܬܚܘܝܬ ܕܬܚܘܡܐ. ܡܫܘܕܥܢܐ ܗܘ ܕܡܫܡܠܝܘܬ ܡܢܝܘܬܐ ܕܡܬܬܚܡܢܐ ܕܠܗܿ ܠܡܫܘܕܥܢܘܬܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ. ܐܝܛܐ ܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܢܩܦ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܦܐܝܘܬ ܙܕܩܐܝܬ ܓܢܣܐ ܩܪܝܒܐ ܡܬܛܟܣ ܐܝܛܐ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܠܗ ܢܩܦ. ܦܘܫܟܐ ܘܫܪܝܐ: ܠܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܕܟܕ ܠܬܚܘܡܐ ܒܝܕ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܚܘܝܬܘܢ. ܐܠܨܐ ܕܐܦ ܠܗܢܐ ܒܝܕ ܐ̱ܚܪܢܐ ܬܚܘܘܢ. ܘܗܟܢܐ ܠܠܐ ܣܘܦ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܕܚܘܘܝܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܢܐ ܠܘ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܗܘ. ܐܠܐ ܦܘܫܩܐ ܕܫܡܐ ܕܬܚܘܡܐ. ܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܢ ܓܝܪ ܡܢ ܡܬܝܩܢ̈ܢܘܬܐ ܗܘ ܕܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܗܝ ܠܢ ܝܕܥܬܗܝܢ. ܘܠܘ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܡܬܝܠܦܢ̈ܝܬܐ. ܐܝܟܢܐ ܕܒܝܕ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܢܣܬܢܩ ܠܡܩܢܐ ܝܕܥܬܗ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܠܓܢܣ ܓܢ̈ܣܝܢ ܡܢ: ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܗܘܐ. ܒܕ ܠܝܬ ܠܗ ܓܢܣܐ ܕܡܢܗ ܘܡܢ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܠܗ ܢܬܪܟܒ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܐܦܠܐ ܠܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ. ܘܐܠܐ ܡܪ̈ܟܒܢ ܗܘ̈ܝ. ܪܘܥܐ: ܘܐܢܫ̈ܝܢ ܡܢ ܒܡܚܘܝܢܘܬܐ ܕܬܚܘܡܐ ܒܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܗܝ ܕܒܦܣܝ̈ܩܬܐ ܡܬܚܫܚܝܢ ܘܐܡܪܝܢ: ܬܚܘܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܐܡܪܐ ܕܒܦܣܝ̈ܩܬܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܢܐ ܕܟܝܢܐ ܕܟܠ ܣܘܥܪܢܐ. ܘܠܘ ܫܦܝܪ.","english":"Substance: And from its definitions, then, that these five universals and their commonalities and their differences are well understood in that which is in the genus that in which two of them are individually common. In it, from these, it is distinguished from the rest. Theory concerning definition.\n\nDefinition is an indicative statement of the completeness of the essence that is its own definition. And from the categories, every definition is composed from all the essential predicates that are defined. In that not only the difference of activities follows definition, but that definition is the property alone. Nor again is it distinguished essentially, but change alone is definition. For I have shown that definition is indicative of the completeness of the essence that is defined, for that which is for indication like this. Thus, differences follow categorically. And because of this, fittingly, a proximate genus is arranged; thus, change follows it. Solution and resolution: It is not said that when I have shown definition by means of definition, it is necessary that this also be shown by another. And thus, to infinity, in that which is said, that demonstration like this is not definition, but the resolution of the name of definition. For definition is from the predicates that are categorically their knowledge, and not from these didactic ones, as that by definition it is established to acquire its knowledge. Substance: To the genus of genera, then, and not one definition can be. For it has no genus from which and from change definition is composed. In that same manner, neither for simple substances, but they are composite. Intention: And the elements, then, in the demonstration of definition, are in the voice that is used in propositions and are said: Definition is a statement that in propositions indicates the nature of every activity. And not well.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܬܚܘܡܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܬܚܘܡܐ (tḥūmā) is rendered 'definition' throughout, but its semantic range includes 'boundary' or 'limit', reflecting the Aristotelian notion of horismos.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'simple substances' (ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ) echoes the Aristotelian distinction between simple and composite substances, a standard topic in Syriac philosophical commentaries.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܪܘܥܐ","severity":"info","text":"The section marked ܪܘܥܐ (rūʿā, 'intention') introduces a new argument about definition as a statement in propositions, shifting from the earlier categorical analysis.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܘܫܟܐ ܘܫܪܝܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The phrase 'Solution and resolution' (ܦܘܫܟܐ ܘܫܪܝܐ) may indicate a scholastic objection and response; the text's argument about infinite regress is dense and possibly corrupt.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܐܡܪܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܢܐ ܕܡܫܡܠܝܘܬ ܡܢܝܘܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The definition of definition as 'an indicative statement of the completeness of the essence' parallels Porphyry's Isagoge and the Syriac reception of Aristotelian logic.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"ܠܓܢܣ ܓܢ̈ܣܝܢ","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'to the genus of genera' (ܠܓܢܣ ܓܢ̈ܣܝܢ) refers to the highest genus, which cannot be defined because it lacks a higher genus, a standard logical principle.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac text at the end ('And not well') may be incomplete or a scribal note; the intended sense is unclear.","The referent of 'change' (ܫܘܚܠܦܐ) in the definition discussion is ambiguous—whether it is a category or a logical property."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":18,"ref":"p18","source":"ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢܝܘܬ ܟܠ ܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܘܠܐ ܡܬܘܡ ܡܩܒܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܕܝܬܝܪܘܬܐ ܘܒܨܝܪܘܬܐ. ܘܟܕ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܢܗܿ ܗܘ ܕܡܢܝܘܬܐ. ܐܝܟܢܐ ܝܬܝܪܘܬܐ ܘܒܨܝܪܘܬܐ ܘܦܬܝܘܬܐ ܘܦܣܝܩܝܘܬܐ ܡܟܢ ܠܡܩܒܠܘ. ܟܝܢܝܘܬܐ ܓܝܪ ܕܟܠ ܟܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܡܬܒܨܪܐ ܐܦܠܐ ܡܬܬܘܣܦܐ. ܡܬܚܒܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܟܒܪ ܐܘ ܗܿܘܝܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܐܢ ܡܬܚܡܢܐ ܐ̱ܢܫ ܢܓܕܫ ܠܗ ܕܟܕ ܠܟܘܢܝܐ ܕܓܢܣܐ ܢܛܥܐ ܒܬܚܘܡܗ ܚܠܦ ܫܡܗ ܢܬܚܫܚ ܐܝܟ ܐܝܬܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ. ܒܪܢܫܐ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܡܢܦܫܐ ܡܪܓܫܢܐ ܡܠܝܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܠܘ ܣܓܝ ܐܝܟ ܡܣܟܠܢܐ ܢܬܬܕܝܢ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܦܬܝܘܬ ܡ̈ܠܐ ܗܝ. ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܝܬܝܪܘܬܐ ܒܟܝܢܐ ܗܘ ܕܡܬܬܚܡ ܥܒܕܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܥܠ ܡܙܩܦܘܬܗܿ ܕܝܢ ܕܢܣܝܒܘܬ ܬܚܘ̈ܡܐ. ܘܦܘܪܫܐ ܕܒܝܬ ܫܘܚ̈ܠܦܐ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܝܐ. ܠܕܝܠܝ̈ܬܐ ܡܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܬܐܘܪ̈ܝܐܣ ܐܝܬ ܡܫܪ̈ܬܚܬܐ ܕܠܐ ܠܚ̈ܡܢ ܠܡܥ̈ܠܬܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܠܝܢ. ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܕܥܠ ܪܘܫܡܐ\nܘܪܘܫܡܐ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܐܡܪܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܢܐ ܕܟܝܢ̈ܐ ܒܝܕ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܓܕܫܢܐܝܬ ܠܗܘܢ ܒܠܚܘܕܝܗܘܢ ܢܩܦܝܢ. ܘܡܛܠ ܕܗܘ ܪܘܫܡܐ ܦܘܪܫܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܕܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܡܬܬܒܥ. ܘܠܘ ܡܫܘܕܥܢܘܬܐ ܕܡܢܝܘܬܗܘܢ ܟܡܐ ܕܬܘܣܦܬܐ ܕܕܝܠܝ̈ܬܐ ܒܗ ܗܘܝܐ. ܗܢܐ ܟܠܗ ܡܫܘܕܥܢܐ ܚܬܝܬܐ ܡܥܕ ܢܗܘܐ. ܘܡܝܬܪܐ ܡܢ ܕܪ̈ܘܫܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܗܿܘ ܕܓܢܣܐ ܒܗ ܡܬܢܣܒ. ܘܗܿܘ ܕܕܝܠܝ̈ܬܐ ܘܓܕܫ̈ܐ ܕܠܟܠ ܓܠܝܢ ܒܗ ܡܬܢܣܒܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܐܡܪ ܒܪܘܫܡܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܚܝܐ ܦܬܐ ܛܦܪ̈ܐ. ܬܪܝܨ ܩܘܡܬܐ. ܕܟܐ ܟܪܘܡܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܥܠ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܕܚܛܝ̈ܢܐ ܐܘ ܕܒܡܫܘܕܥܢܘ̈ܬܐ ܡܥܕܝܢ ܠܡܓܕܫ\nܕܒܒܢ̈ܬ ܩ̈ܠܐ ܡܢ ܥܘܕܝ̈ܝܬܐ ܘܠܐ ܕܪ̈ܝܫܬܐ ܐܟܚܕܐ ܘܠܐ ܡܥܝ̈ܕܬܐ ܠܬܚܘܡܐ ܢܦܫܩ ܛܒ ܫܟܝܪܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܐܢ ܬܓܕܫ ܘܠܐ ܬܬܟܝܢ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܕܒܝܬܝܐ ܘܡܚܝܢܐ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܬܚܡ. ܠܡܒܪܝܗܿ ܙܕܩ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܓܝܪ ܡܣܟܠܝܢ ܘܗܢܘܢ ܕܠܗܿܘ ܕܠܐ ܝܕܝܥ.","english":"in that it is the equality of all actions and never receptive, it is the excess and deficiency. And when the definition makes it known, it is that of equality. How excess and deficiency, breadth and narrowness, are to be received. For the nature of every nature is neither diminished nor increased. It is corrupted, however, either by time or by being. Example: And if it is seen that something happens to it, when it is for the sake of the body that it errs in its definition in place of its name, and it is necessary to say as it is. In the first place, a body is a substance, animate, sentient, rational. It is not many, as it is understood. In that it is the breadth of words. And not one excess in the nature that is defined as an action. Example: Concerning the elevation of the definition of limits. And the distinction between substantial changes. For the individual rational theories, there are extensions that do not require causes such as these. A theory concerning definition and definition is a statement that makes known natures by means of these that happen to them individually and are attached. And because that definition is the sole distinction of actions that is followed, and not the knowledge of their equality, as the addition of individuals occurs in it. This entire certain knowledge is when it becomes. And it is better than definitions. It is that by which the body is formed. And that by which individuals and accidents of everything are made manifest in it, as it is said in the definition of the first principle, which is life, breadth, nails, upright stature, pure color. Example concerning the rays of sinners or in the knowledges that pass to happen that in the houses of sounds from the instruments and not of the heads together, and not the accustomed to the definition, the drunkard distinguishes well. In that, if it happens and is not established, the echo of the house and the one who strikes that which is defined. It is fitting for its creator. For in that same manner they understand and are that which is not known.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܢܝܘܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܡܢܝܘܬܐ (mšayyānutā) is rendered 'equality' but carries the sense of 'mediacy' or 'proportionality' in Aristotelian logical contexts, as used by Bar Hebraeus to denote the mean between excess and deficiency.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܬܚܘܡܐ","severity":"info","text":"The word ܬܚܘܡܐ (tḥūmā) means 'definition' or 'limit' in Syriac philosophical discourse, corresponding to Greek ὅρος (horos). Bar Hebraeus uses it to denote the defining boundary of a nature.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܒܪܢܫܐ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܡܢܦܫܐ ܡܪܓܫܢܐ ܡܠܝܠܐ","severity":"info","text":"The description of the first principle as 'body, substance, animate, sentient, rational' echoes the standard Aristotelian definition of a human being (ζῷον λογικόν) as transmitted in Syriac logical curricula, likely via the Organon.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܢܘܗܪܐ","severity":"info","text":"The repeated marker ܢܘܗܪܐ (tūhārā, 'example') signals illustrative passages within the theoretical exposition, a common structural device in Syriac didactic treatises to clarify abstract definitions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܕܚܛܝ̈ܢܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The phrase 'rays of sinners' (ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܕܚܛܝ̈ܢܐ) is obscure; it may be a corruption or a rare metaphor. The context suggests a contrast with 'knowledges' (ܡܫܘܕܥܢܘ̈ܬܐ), possibly indicating a lost exemplum or a scribal error.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"ܬܐܘܪ̈ܝܐܣ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܬܐܘܪ̈ܝܐܣ (tʾōryās, 'theories') is a Greek loanword (θεωρίαι) used in Syriac philosophical works to denote abstract principles or speculative doctrines, reflecting the Hellenistic influence on Bar Hebraeus's thought.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'rays of sinners' (ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܕܚܛܝ̈ܢܐ) is unclear; it may be a scribal corruption or a metaphorical expression whose referent is uncertain.","The passage on 'houses of sounds' and 'drunkard' is syntactically disrupted, possibly due to textual corruption or a lacuna in the exemplar."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":19,"ref":"p19","source":"ܒܗܿܘ ܕܫܘܐ ܠܗ ܒܠܐ ܝܕܝܥܘܬܐ ܗܡܣܝܢ ܠܡܚܘܝܘ. ܟܕ ܠܙܘܓܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܗܘ ܡܫܘܕܥܝܢ. ܐܘ ܠܐܒܐ ܒܝܕ ܒܪܐ. ܗܘ ܗܟܘܬ ܘܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܠܗܿܘ ܕܠܐ ܝܕܝܥ. ܒܗܘ ܕܥܡܘܛ ܡܢܗ ܡܫܘܕܥܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܢܘܪܐ ܐܣܛܘܟܣܐ ܗܝ ܕܡܝܬ ܠܢܦܫܐ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܠܗܿܘ ܕܠܐ ܝܕܝܥ ܒܗ ܟܕ ܒܗ ܡܫܘܕܥܝܢ ܟܕ ܒܢ̈ܬ ܩ̈ܠܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܡܚܠܦܝܢ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܙܘܥܐ ܫܘܢܝܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܚܝܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܕܡܝܬܐ ܗܘ. ܐܟܘܬܗܘܢ ܕܝܢ ܡܣܟܠܝܢ ܘܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܠܗܿܘ ܕܠܐ ܝܕܝܥ ܒܗܿܘ ܡܐ ܕܠܐ ܡܬܝܕܥ ܐܠܐ ܒܗ ܡܫܬܘܕܥܝܢ. ܘܟܕ ܡܫܬܐܠܝܢ ܕܡܢܐ ܗܝ ܐܝܢܝܘܬܐ. ܗܢܘܢ ܡܦܢܝܢ ܕܗܿܝ ܕܡܝܘܬܐ ܘܠܐ ܕܡܝܘܬܐ ܡܩܒܠܐ ܘܟܕ ܬܘܒ ܒܪܕܪܫ ܡܫܬܐܠܝܢ ܕܡܢܐ ܗܝ ܕܡܝܘܬܐ. ܗܦܟܝܢ ܡܦܢܝܢ ܕܡܚܝܢܘܬܐ ܕܒܐܝܢ̈ܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܦ ܫܘܝܘܬܐ ܡܚܝܢܘܬܐ ܗܝ ܕܒܟܡܝܘܬܐ. ܦܘܫܟܐ ܘܫܪܝܐ: ܠܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܕܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܗܘ ܕܠܐ ܝܕܝܥ ܠܢ. ܐܝܟܢܐ ܣܠܩܐ ܥܠ ܒܠܢ ܒܥܬܐ ܕܡܫܬܘܕܥܢܘܬܗ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܝܕܝܥ ܠܢ ܐܝܟܢܐ ܨܒܝܢܢ ܕܬܢܝܢܘܬ ܢܫܬܘܕܥܝܘܗܝ ܘܐܝܟ ܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܣܢܝܩܘܬܐ ܥܠ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܡܫܘ̈ܕܥܢܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܕܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܠܡ ܠܘ ܒܟܠ ܡܕܡ ܝܕܝܥܝܢ ܠܢ. ܐܦܠܐ ܒܟܠ ܡܕܡ ܠܐ ܝܕܝܥܝܢ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܒܙܢܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܒܗ ܝܕܝܥܝܢ ܠܢ. ܣܠܩܝܢ ܥܠ ܒܠܝ̈ܢ ܕܢܒܥܐ ܚܬܝܬܘܬ ܝܕܥܬܗܘܢ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܢܗܦܟܘܢ ܘܢܐܡܪܘܢ. ܕܒܙܢܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܒܗ ܝܕܥܝܢܢ ܠܐ ܒܥܝܢܢ ܠܡܫܬܘܕܥܢܘܬܗܘܢ. ܘܒܙܢܐ ܕܒܗ ܠܐ ܝܕܥܝܢܢ. ܐܝܟܢܐ ܡܨܝܢܢ ܠܡܒܥܐ ܝܕܥܬܗܘܢ. ܟܕ ܠܗ ܠܙܢܐ ܠܐ ܚܟܡܝܢܢ. ܡܗܦܟܝܢܢ ܘܡܦܢܝܢܢ ܕܗܢܐ ܚܪܝܢܐ ܗܘ ܠܘܩܒܠ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܟܠܢܫ ܝܕܥ ܟܐܢܘܬܗܝܢ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ ܫܘܐ ܠܦܘܢܝܐ.","english":"in that it is equal to it without knowledge, it is excessive for showing. When it is to be said of the pair, in that which is not a pair, it is made known. Or the father through the son. Thus also the state of that which is unknown: in that which is deep, its state is made known, as it is said that the element of fire is that which dies to itself. In that likeness, the state of that which is unknown is made known when, through it, only the sounds are changed. As it is said that motion is something equal, or in the head, life is something human. Likewise, those who are foolish and the state of that which is unknown, in that it is not known except through it, it is made known. And when they are asked what essence is, they answer that it is that which receives likeness and unlikeness. And when again in discussion they are asked what likeness is, they turn and answer that it is the cause of essences, just as equality is the cause of quantities. Solution and dissolution: It is not said that actions are with that which is unknown. How does it ascend upon the mind, the request for its being known? If it is known to the mind, how do you wish that the ignorance of its being known? And as both, and not one, necessity is upon the known signs. In that which you say that actions are not in every respect known to the mind, nor in every respect unknown. But in the sign by which they are known to the mind, they ascend upon the minds that seek the certainty of their knowledge. If again you turn and say that in the sign by which they are known to you, you do not seek their being known, and in the sign by which they are not known to you, how can you seek their knowledge, when you do not know the sign itself? You turn and answer that this is a difficulty against those who, in a simple manner, each one knows his own pain. But it is not always equal to the answer.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܕܡܝܘܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܕܡܝܘܬܐ (dmūtā) is rendered 'likeness' here, but in Bar Hebraeus’s philosophical lexicon it often denotes a formal or generic similarity, distinct from ܫܘܝܘܬܐ (šawyūṯā) 'equality' which is quantitative.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܝܢܝܘܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܐܝܢܝܘܬܐ (īṯīyūṯā) is a Syriac calque of Greek οὐσία (ousia), meaning 'essence' or 'substance'. It is a key technical term in Bar Hebraeus’s ontology.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The example of fire 'dying to itself' (ܕܡܝܬ ܠܢܦܫܐ) reflects a Stoic or Aristotelian trope about elemental self-consumption, common in Syriac philosophical compendia.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage shifts from a definitional mode (essence, likeness) to a dialectical exchange ('if you turn and say…'), mirroring the aporetic style of Greek philosophical exercises.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac phrase ܦܘܫܟܐ ܘܫܪܝܐ (pūšākā w-šaryā) is ambiguous: it may mean 'solution and dissolution' as a heading, or it could be a marginal note indicating a break in argument. The English draft treats it as a section marker.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The argument that actions are neither fully known nor fully unknown, but known through a sign, parallels the via negativa epistemology found in Gregory of Nyssa and later Syriac mystical theology.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The referent of 'that which is unknown' (ܗܿܘ ܕܠܐ ܝܕܝܥ) is not explicitly identified; it may be the divine or a first principle.","The phrase 'in the head' (ܒܪܢܫܐ) is obscure; it may be a corruption or a technical term for a cognitive faculty."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":20,"ref":"p20","source":"ܗܐ ܓܝܪ ܠܢܦܫܐ ܡܢ ܒܙܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܝܕܥܝܢܢ ܗܿܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܡܘܢ ܐܪܐ ܡܕܡ ܟܠܐ ܠܡܬܕܪܓܘ ܡܢ ܗܕܐ ܝܕܥܬܐ. ܠܘܬ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܕܥ ܕܐܡܝܢܬ ܙܘ̈ܥܐ ܗܝ. ܘܡܢ ܗܕܐ ܕܠܐ ܡܝܘܬܬܐ ܗܝ. ܘܡܢ ܗܕܐ ܠܘܬ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܚܒܝܟܐ ܒܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ ܐܝܟ ܚܝ̈ܠܐ ܓܘܫܡ̈ܢܝܐ. ܘܗܿܝ ܕܟܐܢܐ ܠܡܬܪܥܝܘ ܕܦܘܫܟܐ ܕܐܡܝܪ ܥܠ ܡܬܬܝܩܢܢܘܬܗܘܢ ܡܢ ܕܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܝܬܝܪ ܚܣܝܢܐܝܬ ܡܫܬܡܪ. ܥܠ ܡܫܬܪܪܢܘܬܗܘܢ ܕܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ. ܐܝܟ ܕܡܒܕ̈ܩܢ ܬܚܘܝ̈ܬܐ ܒܕܓܘܢ ܟܠ ܡܬܝܩܢܢܘܬܐ ܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܡܬܝܩܢܢܘܬܐ ܡܬܩܢܝܢܝܬܐ ܘܐܦܢ ܠܐ ܫܠܡܝܢ ܪ̈ܥܝܢܝܗܘܢ ܕܩܕܡܝ̈ܐ ܠܬܪܥܝܬܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ. ܚܘܬܡܐ\nܘܗܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܣܦܩ̈ܢ ܡܡܫܚܐܝܬ ܥܠ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܡܫܒ̈ܠܝ ܠܘܬ ܝܕܝܥܬܐ ܕܡܬܝܩܢܢ̈ܘܬܐ. ܢܪܓܠ ܕܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܐ ܡܟܐ ܘܠܗܠܝܢ ܕܠܘܬ ܗܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܡܝܒܠܝܢ ܢܣܥܘܪ ܟܕ ܡܬܗܕܝܢܢ. ܩܦܠܐܘܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ\nܥܠ ܪܘܟܒܐ ܕܟܠ ܙܢ̈ܝ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ. ܘܥܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܡܩܦ ܠܗܝܢ ܢܩ̈ܦܢ. ܦܘܠܓܐ: ܟܠ ܡܐܡܪܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܐܦ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܡܪܟܒܬܐ ܘܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܡܥܕ ܠܡܬܟܢܝܘ. ܐܘ ܠܒܥܬܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܡܬܬܣܪܚ܆ ܐܘ ܠܘ ܠܒܥܬܐ ܕܡܕܡ. ܘܗܿܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢܝܘܬܐ ܕܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܒܥܐ. ܘܡܬܟܢܐ ܡܫܐܠܢܐ. ܐܘ ܠܐ ܡܢܝܘܬܗܘܢ. ܘܗܘ ܗܢܐ. ܐܘ ܠܩܢܘܡܐ ܒܥܐ ܘܡܬܟܢܐ ܩܪܘܝܐ ܐܘ ܠܣܥܘܪܘܬܐ ܕܡܢܗ ܕܩܢܘܡܐ. ܘܗܘ ܗܢܐ. ܐܢ ܡܥܠܝ ܗܿܘ ܕܒܥܐ ܦܩܘܕܐ ܡܬܟܢܐ ܗܘ ܡܐܡܪܐ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܡܐܟ ܡܬܟܫܦܢܐ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܫܘܝ̈ܝ ܢܙܠܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܬܪ̈ܝܗܘܢ ܓܒ̈ܐ ܒܥܝܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܕܠܘ ܠܒܥܬܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܡܬܬܣܪܚ. ܐܠܐ ܠܦܣܩܐ ܕܣܝܘܡܘܬܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܥܠ ܡܕܡ. ܐܘ ܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܡܕܡ. ܡܐܡܪܐ ܦܣܘܩܐ ܘܐܦܘܦܢܛܝܩܘܣ ܡܬܩܪܐ. ܘܒܗܿܝ ܕܒܗ ܒܠܚܘܕܘܗܝ ܫܪܪܐ ܡܢ ܕܓܠܘܬܐ ܡܥܕ ܠܡܬܦܪܫܘ. ܥܠܘܗܝ ܗܝ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܒܛܝܠܘܬܐ ܠܘܓܝܩܝܬܐ.","english":"Here then to the self from the cause something is known, that which is its being. But then something else prevents it from being graduated from this knowledge, towards that which knows that it is the mother of movements. And from this, that it is not a composition. And from this, towards that which is not mixed in bodies like corporeal powers. And that which is pure for the contemplation of the distinction which is said concerning their definition from actions which are more deficiently preserved. Concerning their substantiation, however, it does not think. As the examiners of demonstrations in the investigation of every definition of a substance, and not one definition is substantial, and even the opinions of the ancients are not sufficient for a conception like this. Seal.\n\nAnd these from sufficient quantities analogically concerning the species which lead towards the knowledge of definitions. The instrument, however, from here and henceforth which leads towards faith, they accomplish while being guided. The conclusion of the second.\n\nOn the composition of every species of protasis. And on these which follow them, the sequents. Division: Every proposition which also has a predicate, a composition, and a protasis, is able to be considered. Either a question of whether something is being performed, or not a question of something. And that is the first. Or it seeks the quality of actions. And it is considered an inquiry. Or not their quality. And that is the second. Or it seeks a substance and is considered a predicate, or the activity of the substance. And that is the second. If the one who seeks is superior, it is considered a command, that is a proposition. If not, it is considered a supplication. If not, the equals of the species, both of them are sides of seeking. And that which is not a question of something being performed, but of the cutting off of the termination of something from something, or the elevation of something from something, is called a proposition, a cutting off, and an apophatikos. And in that which in it alone truth is able to be distinguished from falsehood, upon it alone is logical vanity.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ (protasis)","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ (protasis) is a loan from Greek πρότασις, here denoting a logical premise or proposition in a syllogism. Bar Hebraeus uses it as a technical term in his analysis of logical composition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܦܘܦܢܛܝܩܘܣ (apophatikos)","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܐܦܘܦܢܛܝܩܘܣ (apophatikos) is a loan from Greek ἀποφατικός, meaning 'negative' or 'privative'. Bar Hebraeus applies it to a type of proposition that denies or cuts off a predicate from a subject.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"external","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage reflects Bar Hebraeus's engagement with Aristotelian logic, particularly the theory of propositions (πρότασις) and their classification by quality, quantity, and modality. The reference to 'examiners of demonstrations' echoes the tradition of the Organon.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage is divided into two numbered sections: a 'Seal' (ܚܘܬܡܐ) and a 'Conclusion of the second' (ܩܦܠܐܘܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ), followed by a 'Division' (ܦܘܠܓܐ) that systematically classifies propositions. This structure mirrors a scholastic quaestio.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The English draft renders ܡܬܝܩܢܢ̈ܘܬܐ as 'definitions', but the Syriac more likely means 'measures' or 'quantities' (from ܬܩܘܢܬܐ, 'measure'), a key term in Bar Hebraeus's logical vocabulary. The translation may obscure the quantitative sense.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac ܡܬܝܩܢܢ̈ܘܬܐ could be read as either 'definitions' or 'measures/quantities'; the latter is more consistent with the logical context of protasis classification.","The phrase 'the mother of movements' (ܐܡܝܢܬ ܙܘ̈ܥܐ) is ambiguous: it may refer to a first principle or a category in Aristotle's system, but the exact referent is unclear."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":21,"ref":"p21","source":"ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܡܛܠ ܕܦܣܩܐ ܢܩܝܦܘܬܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܐܘ ܠܐ ܢܩܝܦܘܬܗ ܕܠܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܫܘܕܥ: ܗܝ ܢܩܝܦܘܬܐ ܐܘ ܒܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܐܝܟ ܡܘܩܕܢܘܬܐ ܕܢܩܝܦܐ ܠܢܘܪܐ. ܐܘ ܒܚܘܫ̈ܒܐ. ܟܕ ܥܠܝܗܿ ܥܠ ܗܕܐ ܬܐܘܪܝܣܐ ܥܒܕܝܢܢ. ܐܘ ܒܩܠܐ. ܟܕ ܠܗܿܝ ܕܐܬܪܢܝܬ ܠܢ ܒܡܠܬܐ ܡܓܫܡܝܢܢ. ܐܘ ܒܟܬܝܒ̈ܬܐ. ܟܕ ܠܗܿܝ ܕܡܠܠܢܢ ܒܛܘܡ̈ܣܐ ܡܛܦܣܝܢܢ. ܘܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܡܫܘܕܥܢܐ ܗܘ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܩܕܡܘܗܝ. ܡܫܬܘܕܥܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܒܬܪܗ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܣܟ̈ܐ. ܡܫܘܕ̈ܥܢܐ ܐܘ ܡܫܬܘܕ̈ܥܢܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ. ܡܨܥ̈ܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܘܡܫܘܕ̈ܥܢܐ ܘܡܫܬܘܕ̈ܥܢܐ ܐܟܚܕܐ. ܘܗܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܬܪܝܢ ܩܕܡ̈ܝܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܟܝܢܐܝܝܢ ܠܟܠ. ܗܢܘܢ ܟܕ ܗܢܘܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ. ܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܐ̱ܚܪ̈ܝܐ ܬܪܝܢ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܟܝܢܐܝܝܢ ܠܟܠ ܫܪ̈ܒܢ ܠܦܘܬ ܫܠܡܘܬܗܝܢ ܘܠܥܙܝ̈ܗܘܢ ܐܝܬܝ̈ܗܝܢ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܒܟܠ ܓܝܪ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܢܗܘܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܥܠܘܗܝ ܗܿܘܐ ܦܣܩܐ ܘܗܿܘ ܕܒܗ ܗܿܘܐ ܦܣܩܐ. ܘܗܢܘܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܢ ܒܢ̈ܬ ܩ̈ܠܐ ܐܢܘܢ ܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ. ܐܘ ܒܚܝܠܐ ܕܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ ܗܝ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܡܢܗܝܢ ܡܬܪܟܒܐ ܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܚܝܐ ܡܠܝܠܐ. ܓܘܫܡܐ ܡܢܦܫܐ ܡܪܓܫܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܠܘ ܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ. ܐܦܠܐ ܒܚܝܠܐ ܕܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ. ܐܠܐ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܝ ܕܟܠ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܠܝܬܝܗܿ ܗܘܦܬܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܣܒܝܣܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܐܢ ܐܣܪܐ ܗܘ ܕܢܩܝܦܘܬܐ ܐܣܪܗܝܢ. ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܐܢ ܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܝܡܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܗܘܦܬܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܦܪܫܬܐ ܐܢ ܐܣܪܐ ܗܘ ܕܦܘܠܓܐ ܐܣܪܗܝܢ. ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܗܢܐ ܡܢܝܢܐ. ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܥܠܘܗܝ ܗܿܘܐ ܦܣܩܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܬܩܪܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܕܒܗ ܗܿܘܐ ܦܣܩܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ.","english":"Clarity: And because the continuity of that which is predicated, or its non-continuity, is cut off from that which is set as the subject, that continuity is either in actions, like the proximity of a key to a door, or in thoughts, when they are applied to this theory of operations, or in voice, when that which is articulated is embodied in a word, or in letters, when that which is spoken is delineated by forms. And each one of these is a signifier of that which is before it, and is signified by that which is after it, in the manner of signs. Signifiers or signifieds alone, but intermediaries are both signifiers and signifieds together. And these are from the two former, in that they are naturally for all, their existence when they exist. But these latter two, in that they are not naturally for all, are divided according to their completeness and their accidents. Clarity: For in every proposition it is necessary that there be that concerning which the predication occurs and that in which the predication occurs. And these are either in simple terms or in the power of simple terms, which is the proposition that is composed from them, called categorical, like “a living being is a head,” or “a rational life is a body with a sentient soul.” But these are not simple, nor in the power of simple terms, but it is a proposition of which each one of them is not called a simple hypostasis, but a bond of continuity binds them, like “the sun is above the earth, it is day,” or a distinct hypostasis, but a bond of division binds them, like “this is a man, or a pair, or a couple.” Clarity: And the proposition from the categorical, that concerning which the predication occurs is called the subject, and that in which the predication occurs is called the predicate.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܦܣܩܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܦܣܩܐ (pseqā) is rendered 'predication' in the draft, but its root meaning is 'cutting, division'; here it denotes the logical act of predicating a property of a subject.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ (protesis) is used for 'proposition' in the logical sense, reflecting Bar Hebraeus's engagement with Aristotelian logic via Syriac intermediaries.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword ܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ (qatīgōrīqītā) means 'categorical' and refers to the type of proposition that predicates a property of a subject, as opposed to hypothetical or disjunctive forms.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus here adapts the Aristotelian distinction between subject and predicate in a categorical proposition, mediated through Syriac translations of the Organon and later commentaries.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage is structured as a series of clarifications (ܢܘܗܪܐ) that first define continuity in predication, then classify signifiers and signifieds, and finally distinguish categorical from non-categorical propositions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or corrupt readings (e.g., ܢܘܗܪܐ may be a scribal error for ܢܘܗܝܐ 'clarity'), and the exact referent of 'these latter two' is debated; the translation follows the most common interpretation.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac term ܢܘܗܪܐ (possibly a scribal error for ܢܘܗܝܐ 'clarity') is taken as a structural marker; the identity of 'these latter two' (the intermediaries vs. the simple signifiers/signifieds) is ambiguous; the translation assumes the intermediaries are the two former types combined."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":22,"ref":"p22","source":"ܒܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܗܘܦܬܛܝܩ̈ܝܬܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܥܠܘܗܝ ܗܿܘܐ ܦܣܩܐ. ܩܕܝܡܝܐ ܡܬܟܢܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܒܗ ܢܩܦܝܐ. ܘܒܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ ܐܢ ܕܣܝܘܡܘܬܐ ܗܘ ܦܣܩܐ. ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܕܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ. ܐܦܘܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܒܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܗܘܦܬܛܝܩ̈ܝܬܐ. ܒܣܒܝ̈ܣܬܐ ܡܢ ܐܢ ܣܝܘܡܘܬܐ ܗܘ ܕܢܩܝܦܘܬܐ ܗܘ ܦܣܩܐ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܡܬܟܢܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܝܡܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܢ ܕܝܢ ܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܕܢܩܝܦܘܬܐ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܐܢ ܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܝܡܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܒܡܦܪ̈ܫܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ. ܐܢܗܘ ܕܗܘ ܦܣܩܐ ܣܝܘܡܘܬܐ ܗܘ ܕܦܘܠܓܐ. ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܗܝ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܗܢܐ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܗܘ ܕܦܘܠܓܐ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܗܝ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܗܢܐ. ܦܘܠܓܐ: ܟܠ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ ܐܘ ܩܢܘܡܐ ܝܚܝܕܝܐ ܐܝܬ ܠܗܿ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ. ܘܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܟܠܚܕ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܣܘܩܪܛܝܣ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܕܟܘܠܐ ܐܝܬ ܠܗܿ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ. ܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܐܢ ܫܟܝܚܐ ܒܗܿ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܬ ܟܡܝܘܬܐ ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܢܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܘܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪ̈ܝܣܡܘ ܡܢ ܐܪܒܥܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܟܡܝܘܬܐ. ܐܘ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܐܘ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ. ܘܟܠ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܐܘ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܘܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܘܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܣ ܟܠܢܝܐ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ. ܐܦܘܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕ. ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܣ ܕܝܢ ܡܢܬܝܐ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܕܡ ܐܘ ܚܕ. ܐܦܘܦܛܝܩܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܟܠ.","english":"In the case of the hypothetical propositions, that which was the subject of the section is called the first. That which is in the consequence, and in the protasis, is either categorical or hypothetical; that section is called the cataphasis, like that which is \"a living being in the head.\" Or that of \"height,\" the apophasis, like that which is \"a living being not in the head.\" In the case of the hypothetical propositions, the section which is in the premises or the hypothesis of the conjunction is called the cataphasis, like that which is \"if the sun is above the earth, it is day.\" Or that of the \"height\" of the conjunction, the apophasis, like that which is \"if the sun is not above the earth, it is day.\" In the distinctions, moreover, if that section is a hypothesis of a division, the protasis is a cataphasis, like that which is \"this is a man or a pair or a couple.\" Or that of the \"height\" of the division, it is an apophasis, like that which is \"not a pair or a couple is this man.\" Division: Every categorical protasis or substance has a single subject that is set, and the protasis of each is called, like \"Socrates is in the head,\" or it has a whole that is set. And this, if it is found in the utterance, is called a quantitative prosdiorismos, and the prosdiorismoi are four: in quantity, or it is universal or particular. And each of them is either cataphasis or apophasis, and the universal prosdiorismos is cataphasis, like \"all\"; the apophasis, like \"not one.\" The particular prosdiorismos is cataphasis, like \"something or one\"; the apophasis, like \"not all.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܗܘܦܬܛܝܩ̈ܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term 'hypothetical propositions' (ḥūpāṭīqītā) is a Syriac calque of Greek ὑποθετικαί, referring to conditional or hypothetical statements in logic.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ / ܐܦܘܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"Cataphasis (qāṭāpāṭīqītā) and apophasis (ʾāpōpāṭīqītā) are Syriac adaptations of Greek καταφατική and ἀποφατική, meaning affirmative and negative statements respectively.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܣ","severity":"info","text":"Prosdiorismos (prōsdīōrīsmōs) is a Syriac transliteration of Greek προσδιορισμός, meaning 'additional determination' or 'quantifier' in logical propositions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage reflects the Syriac reception of Aristotelian logic, particularly the Peripatetic tradition of categorical and hypothetical syllogisms, mediated through works like the Isagoge and the Categories.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage systematically classifies propositions by type (hypothetical vs. categorical), quality (cataphasis vs. apophasis), and quantity (universal vs. particular), following a scholastic pattern of division.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or corrupt readings, e.g., 'ܒܗܿܢܝܢ' (b-h-ʿ-y-ʿ) may be a scribal error for 'ܒܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ' (b-hāy dēn), and the phrase 'ܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ' (m-r-y-m-ʿ-w-t-ʾ) is uncertain in meaning, possibly 'height' or a technical term.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac term 'ܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ' (mrymʿwtʾ) is unclear; it may be a corruption of 'ܡܪܝܡܘܬܐ' (maryāmūtā, 'height') or a technical logical term.","The phrase 'ܒܗܿܢܝܢ' (b-h-ʿ-y-ʿ) is likely a scribal error; the intended reading is probably 'ܒܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ' (b-hāy dēn, 'in the case of')."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":23,"ref":"p23","source":"ܐܢܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܫܟܝܚܐ ܒܗܿ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܬ ܟܡܝܘܬܐ ܠܐ ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܢܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܡܛܠ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܐܝܕܐ ܫܘܝܐ ܒܚܝܠܐ ܗܿܝ ܠܐ ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܣ\nܘܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܠܐ ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܢܝܬܐ ܡܗܓܓܐ ܡܢ ܟܠܢܝܘܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܟܝܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܒܗܿ ܡܬܢܣܒ. ܗܿܘ ܐܝܢܐ ܕܐܦ ܟܠܢܝܐ ܐܦ ܡܢܬܝܐ ܡܟܢ ܠܡܗܘܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܥܘܗܕܢܗ ܫܚܝܡܐ ܒܠܥܕ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܬ ܟܡܝܘܬܐ ܠܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܟܠܢܝܐ ܢܚܘܝܘܗܝ. ܘܐܠܐ ܡܥܠ ܥܐܠܐ ܗܘܬ ܟܠܢܝܘܬܐ ܒܡܢܝܘܬܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ. ܘܠܐ ܙܕܩ ܗܘܐ ܕܣܘܩܪܛܝܣ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܟܠܢܝ. ܡܕܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܬܐܡܪ ܟܝܢܐ ܗܘ ܟܠ ܟܝܢ ܟܠܢܝܐ ܕܡܟܢ ܐܟܚܕܐ ܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܠܡܩܒܠܘ. ܘܟܕ ܟܠܢܐܝܬ ܡܬܢܣܒ. ܡܫܪ ܐܦ ܡܢܬܐܝܬ ܟܕ ܕܝܢ ܡܢܬܐܝܬ ܡܬܢܣܒ ܠܘ ܬܘܒ ܟܠܢܐܝܬ ܒܟܠ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܫܪܘ. ܘܟܕ ܒܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܐܟܚܕܐ ܡܢܬܐܝܬ ܡܫܪܐ. ܟܠܢܐܝܬ ܕܝܢ ܠܘ ܒܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܠܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܙܕܩ ܠܡܘܕܝܘ ܕܫܘܝܐ ܒܚܝܠܐ ܗܿܝ ܠܐ ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܢܝܬܐ ܘܡܢ ܗܓܓ̈ܘܬܐ ܕܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܢܫܬܐܠ. ܦܘܠܓܐ: ܕܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ ܠܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ ܘܠܕܡܛܬܣܝܣ\nܘܒܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ. ܐܢܗܘ ܕܫܟܝܚܘܬܢܝܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܗܝ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܢܗܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܓܠܝܙܘܬܢܝܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܕܡܛܬܣܝܣ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܘܡܪܟܒܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܠܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܥܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܕܐܦ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܓܠܝܙܘܬܢܝܐ ܡܕܡ ܢܥܒܕܘܢ. ܘܕܡܛܬܣܝܣ ܢܟܢܘܢܗܿ ܠܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ. ܐܠܐ ܠܘ ܣܓܝ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܪܒܥ ܡܕܝܢ ܗܘ̈ܝܢ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܠܝܢ. ܬܪܬܝܢ ܩܛܦܛܝܩ̈ܝܬܐ ܗ̄ ܡܬܚܡ̈ܬܐ. ܘܕܡܛܬܣܝܣ ܘܐܦܘܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܕܝܠܗܝܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ.","english":"It is evident that in the case of the hypothetical proposition, the quantitative predicate is not exhibited as a prosdiorismotic, like that which is in the first living being. For the reason that the equal in power is not a prosdiorismotic, and the protasis is not prosdiorismotically discussed with the conclusion. For in the natural something is taken in it, that which is both conclusive and material tends to be. In the case of the other, its proper arrangement is fitting, except that the quantitative predicate ought not to show it as conclusive, but rather the conclusion would enter into the material of the first. And it ought not to be that Socrates in the first is in that which is not conclusive. Therefore, as was said, the natural is every conclusive natural that tends to receive both together. And when it is taken conclusively, it also begins materially; but when it is taken materially, it cannot again begin conclusively in every case. And when it begins materially in both together, it is not, however, conclusively in both. For the material protasis it is necessary to admit that the equal in power is not prosdiorismotic, and it is inquired with the discourses of others. Division: of the categorical protasis into the simple and the transposed. And in the protasis with the categorical. That which is of the nature of possibility is something that is predicated simply; the protasis is exhibited like that which is in the first living being. But that which is of the nature of necessity is something that is transposed, exhibited and composite, like that which is in the first not living being. Moreover, it is also necessary that for that which is set as a necessary thing, they make it, and they show the transposed to the protasis. But not much, like that which is not in the first living being. There are, therefore, four protases like these: two categorical, which are limited, and the transposed and the apophatic of them, two.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܣ","severity":"info","text":"A transliteration of Greek προσδιορισμός, a logical term for a qualifying determination or specification. Bar Hebraeus uses it to denote a predicate that restricts or quantifies.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"From Greek κατηγορική, 'categorical'. The passage distinguishes categorical from hypothetical propositions, a standard division in Aristotelian logic.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܕܡܛܬܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"From Greek μετάθεσις, 'transposition'. Refers to a proposition whose terms are reordered, contrasted with the 'simple' (ܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ) categorical.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܘܠܓܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac word 'division' marks a structural break. The text now subdivides categorical protases into simple and transposed, then into four types: two categorical (limited), transposed, and their apophatic counterparts.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܩܪܛܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"Socrates appears as a standard example in logical treatises, following the Aristotelian tradition. Bar Hebraeus uses him to illustrate a non-conclusive subject in a protasis.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܟܠܢܝܘܬܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac term ܟܠܢܝܘܬܐ (from Greek συλλογιστική) is rendered 'conclusive' in the draft, but the logical sense is 'syllogistic' or 'deductive'. The translation may obscure the technical force.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'equal in power' (ܫܘܝܐ ܒܚܝܠܐ) is ambiguous: it may refer to equipollent propositions or to a logical equivalence in force.","The referent of 'the other' (ܥܘܗܕܢܗ) in the first paragraph is unclear; it may be a different type of protasis or a contrasting logical relation."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":24,"ref":"p24","source":"ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܟܒܪ ܬܣܬܒܪ ܕܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܗܿܝ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ ܕܐܡܪܐ. ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܕܡܛܬܣܝܣ ܕܐܡܪܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܠܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܟܚܕܐ ܡܢܟܪ̈ܝܢ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܡܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ. ܫܘܝ̈ܬ ܚܝܠܐ ܐܝܬܝ̈ܗܝܢ. ܠܐ ܦܪ̈ܝܫܢ ܛܒ. ܐܦ ܒܡܠܬܐ ܐܦ ܒܣܘܟܠܐ. ܘܒܡܠܬܐ ܡܢ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܒܐܦܘܦܐܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܦܫܝܛܐ. ܠܐܣܪܐ ܢܩܝܦܐ ܠܐ ܟܦܘܪܬܐ. ܒܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܕܝܢ ܕܡܛܬܣܝܣ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܘܒܣܘܟܠܐ ܬܘܒ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܓܘܢܝܘܬܐ ܘܕܝܠܢܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬ ܒܝܬ ܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ. ܓܘܢܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ. ܘܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܕܡܛܬܣܝܣ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܟܠ ܟܪ ܕܡܫܪܐ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܕܡܛܬܣܝܣ ܡܫܪܐ ܐܦ ܘܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ. ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܥܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܝܬܝ̈ܗܝܢ. ܐܘ ܡܨܝ̈ܢ ܠܡܗܘܐ. ܟܪ ܕܝܢ ܕܡܫܪܐ ܐܦܘܦܐܣܝܣ ܡܬܚܡܬܐ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܫܪ. ܘܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܕܡܛܬܣܝܣ. ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܥܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܠܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܡܨܝ̈ܢ ܠܡܗܘܐ. ܥܠ ܥܢܙܐܝܠܐ ܓܝܪ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܢܐܡܪ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܢܐܡܪ ܕܠܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܕܐ ܣܝܘܡܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ. ܘܥܠ ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܠܘ ܡܫܟܚܢܐ ܗܘ ܕܢܗܘܐ. ܐܝܕܐ ܣܝܘܡܘܬܐ ܡܫܪܐ ܣܛܪ ܡܢ ܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ. ܘܗܢܝܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܒܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܬܪ̈ܝܢܝܬܐ ܥܛ̈ܠܬ ܠܦܘܪܫܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܒܡܠܬܐ. ܐܠܐ ܛܟ ܒܣܘܟܠܐ. ܒܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܕܠܝܠܐܝܬ ܡܬܦܪ̈ܫܢ. ܦܘܠܓܐ: ܕܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܘܦܬܛܝܩ̈ܝܬܐ ܣܒܝ̈ܣܬܐ ܘܡܦܪ̈ܫܬܐ ܠܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܘܠܗܿܝ ܕܟܠܐ\nܘܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠܚܕ ܒܗܠܝܢ ܣܒܝ̈ܣܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܗܿܝ ܕܒܙܒܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܢܗܘܐ ܒܗܿ ܗܘ ܦܣܩܐ ܕܢܩܝܦܘܬܐ. ܟܠܢܝ̈ܬܐ ܢܗܘ̈ܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܢܝܢ ܕܡܢܗܝܢ ܡܪܟܒܐ. ܐܘ ܠܘ ܟܠܢ̈ܝܬܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܝܘܡܢ ܐܢ ܒܢܝܢ̈ܫܐ ܢܟܣܚܘܢ ܡܗܒ̈ܒܢ ܣًܬܐ.","english":"It is evident, and it will be further understood, that the simple apophasis of the statement, \"in the first living being it is not,\" and the cataphasis of the metastasis of the statement, \"in the first of the first it is not a living being,\" are such that together they contradict that which is predicated of that which is posited. Their equalities in power are not well distinguished, either in word or in concept. And in word, as in the simple apophasis, the bond is tight, not a denial. In the cataphasis of the metastasis, however, of that which is predicated, and in concept as well, there is a distinction between the generic and the specific. The generic is the simple apophasis, and the specific is the cataphasis of the metastasis. For this reason, every term that posits the cataphasis of the metastasis also posits the simple apophasis, as concerning those things that exist or are capable of being. But a term that posits a determinate apophasis cannot posit the cataphasis of the metastasis, as concerning those things that do not exist and are not capable of being. For concerning Azazel, one can say that it is not a living being, but one cannot say that it is a non-living being, because this determination indicates something. And concerning that which is not found, that which is, what determination posits except for elevation alone? And these, in the two-sided protases, are hindered from distinction in word, but not in concept. In the other [protases], however, which are distinguished in a non-possessive manner: a division: of the protases that are subject-based, general and specific, for that of \"all\" and that of \"none,\" and the protasis with that of \"each one\" in these general [protases] is present. That which in time something occurs, in that is the section of tightness. The remaining protases are those from which the composite is composed, or the remaining ones, like that which says, \"if in evils they find friends, six.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"Simple apophasis (ἀπόφασις ἁπλῆ) is a negation that denies a predicate without affirming its opposite, e.g., 'it is not a living being' without asserting 'it is a non-living being'.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܕܡܛܬܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"Cataphasis of metastasis (κατάφασις μεταστάσεως) is an affirmation that transfers a predicate to a subject, here specifically 'it is a non-living being', which implies a positive determination.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܥܢܙܐܝܠܐ","severity":"info","text":"Azazel is a figure from Leviticus 16 associated with the scapegoat ritual; in Syriac tradition, the name is used as an example of a non-existent entity, illustrating the logical distinction between simple negation and determinate affirmation.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage contrasts two types of negation (simple apophasis vs. determinate apophasis) and their relation to cataphasis of metastasis, using the example of Azazel to show that only simple apophasis applies to non-existent subjects.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The final sentence is textually corrupt: 'if in evils they find friends, six' appears to be a broken example; the Syriac may be missing a clause or contain a scribal error, making the intended logical point unclear.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'ܟܠܢ̈ܝܬܐ' (remaining) in the final lines is ambiguous: it may refer to 'the remaining protases' or 'the remaining ones' as a separate category; the translation follows the latter reading.","The example 'if in evils they find friends, six' is incomplete; the intended logical illustration is uncertain."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":25,"ref":"p25","source":"ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܕܝܢ ܕܝܠܗܿ: ܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܐܢ ܝܘܡܢ. ܣܒܝܣܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܟܠܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܗܿܝ ܕܒܙܒܢܐ ܕܝܬܝܪ ܡܢ ܚܕ ܢܩܦ ܒܗܿ ܦܣܩܐ ܕܢܩܝܦܘܬܐ. ܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܢܗܘ̈ܝܢ ܗܢܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܡܢܗܝܢ ܡܪܟܒܐ. ܐܘ ܠܘ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܐܚܙܝܟ ܐܫܡܫܟ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܒܗܠܝܢ ܡܦܪ̈ܫܬܐ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܟܠܚܕ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܗܿܝ ܕܒܙܒܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܗܿ ܦܣܩܐ ܕܦܘܠܓܐ. ܕܟܠܐ ܢܗܘ̈ܝܢ ܗܢܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܡܢܗܝܢ ܡܪܟܒܐ. ܐܘ ܠܘ ܕܟܘܠܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܡܚܪ. ܐܘ ܢܕܢܚ ܫܡܫܐ ܐܘ ܢܬܚܙܘܢ ܢܗܝܪ̈ܐ. ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܕܝܢ ܕܝܠܗܿ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܠܡܚܪ. ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܝܢ ܕܟܘܠܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܒܗܝܢ ܒܡܦܪ̈ܫܬܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܒܙܒܢܐ ܕܝܬܝܪ ܡܢ ܚܕ ܢܗܘܐ ܒܗܿ ܦܣܩܐ ܕܦܘܠܓܐ. ܕܟܠܐ ܢܗܘ̈ܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܡܢܗܝܢ ܡܪܟܒܐ ܐܘ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܐܡܝܢܘ ܟܠ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܕܝܢ ܕܝܠܗܿ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܒܐܡܝܢܘ ܘܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܣ ܡܢ ܒܗܠܝܢ ܗܘܦܬܛܝܩܝ̈ܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܬ ܟܡܝܘܬܗ ܕܙܒܢܐ. ܕܒܗ ܗܿܘܐ ܦܣܩܐ ܕܢܩܝܦܘܬܐ. ܐܘ ܕܦܘܠܓܐ. ܠܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܫܘܕܥܐ ܟܡܝܘܬܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ. ܘܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܣ ܡܢ ܟܠܢܝܐ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ. ܐܘ ܒܟܠܙܒܢ. ܡܢܬܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܐܡܬܝ. ܘܟܠܢܝܐ ܐܦܘܦܛܝܩܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܘܠܐ ܡܬܘܡ. ܐܘ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ. ܡܢܬܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܦܘܦܛܝܩܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ. ܐܘ ܠܘ ܒܟܠܙܒܢ. ܠܐ ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܢܝܬܐ ܗܘܦܬܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܗܿܝ ܕܘܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܠܝܢ ܒܗܿ ܐܝܬ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܝܡܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܓܘܢܐ ܐܘ ܚܘܪܐ ܐܘ ܐܘܟܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܐܟܡܐ. ܕܗܪܬܡܢ ܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܠܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܫܘܝܐ ܗܘܬ ܒܚܝܠܐ ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܗܪܟܐ.","english":"The apophasis of it, that which is not a day, and the cataphasis of the whole, that which is, in a time more than one, there occurs in it the section of conjunction, that each of the things that are is a protasis of the things that are composed from them, or not each, as that which, whenever I see your sun, in that likeness and in these distinct things, the protasis of each one is that which, in a time, something is in it, the section of division, that all the things that are are protases of the things that are composed from them, or not the whole, as that which, tomorrow, either the sun rises or the lights appear. The apophasis of it is that which is not tomorrow. The cataphasis of the whole is that which is in them in the distinct things, that which, in a time more than one, there occurs in it the section of division, that all the things that are are protases of the things that are composed from them, or of each one, as that which, in ambiguity, every middle or pair or even pair is. The apophasis of it is that which is not in ambiguity, and the prosdiorismos with these hypothetic things is a sound indicating the quantity of time, in which there occurs the section of conjunction or of division, not that which indicates the quantity of that which is placed. And the prosdiorismos with the categorical universal is a sound that is always or at every time. The middle categorical is as that which is sometimes, and the universal apophatic is as that which is never or does not cease. The middle apophatic is as that which is not always or not at every time. The hypothetic prosdiorismatic is that which is nothing of that which is like these in it, as that which, if the sun is above the earth, it is day, and it is color or white or black, and so on. For this was equal in power to the middle in that likeness and here.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"Apophasis (negation) and cataphasis (affirmation) are logical terms from Greek philosophical tradition, used here to structure propositions about time and composition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"Protasis (proposition) is a Stoic logical term for a conditional clause; here it refers to the constituent parts of composite statements.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܣܩܐ ܕܢܩܝܦܘܬܐ / ܕܦܘܠܓܐ","severity":"info","text":"Section of conjunction (ܦܣܩܐ ܕܢܩܝܦܘܬܐ) and section of division (ܦܣܩܐ ܕܦܘܠܓܐ) are technical terms for types of logical division or combination in propositional analysis.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܣ","severity":"info","text":"Prosdiorismos (additional determination) is a logical qualifier modifying the scope of a proposition, here applied to time (always, sometimes, never).","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage systematically pairs apophasis and cataphasis with temporal quantifiers (day, tomorrow, always, sometimes, never) to classify propositional types, following a Stoic logical schema.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus adapts Greek logical terminology (apophasis, cataphasis, protasis, prosdiorismos) into Syriac, reflecting the reception of Stoic and Aristotelian logic in Syriac scholasticism.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac text contains several uncertain readings (e.g., ܐܢ ܝܘܡܥ, ܢܩܦ) that may affect the precise logical classification; the translation assumes standard Stoic categories."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":26,"ref":"p26","source":"ܢܘܗܪܐ ܡܛܠ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܟܡܐ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܡܬܪܟܒܐ ܗܘܦܬܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܣܒܝܣܬܐ\nܘܗܘܦܬܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܢ ܣܒܝܣܬܐ ܬܫܝܥܐܝܬ ܡܬܪܟܒܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܡܢܗܝܢ ܡܪܟܒܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܩܛܝܓܘܪ̈ܝܩܝܢ. ܐܘ ܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܣܒܝ̈ܣܬܐ. ܐܘ ܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܡܦܪ̈ܫܬܐ. ܐܘ ܗܿܝ ܡܢ ܩܕܝܡܝܬܐ ܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ ܢܩܦܝܬܐ ܣܒܝܣܬܐ. ܐܘ ܗܿܝ ܡܢ ܩܕܝܡܝܬܐ ܣܒܝܣܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ ܢܩܦܝܬܐ ܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ. ܐܘ ܗܿܝ ܡܢ ܩܕܝܡܝܬܐ ܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ ܢܩܦܝܬܐ ܡܦܪܫܬܐ. ܐܘ ܗܿܝ ܡܢ ܩܕܝܡܝܬܐ ܡܦܪܫܬܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ ܢܩܦܝܬܐ ܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ. ܐܘ ܗܿܝ ܡܢ ܩܕܝܡܝܬܐ ܣܒܝܣܬܐ. ܙܢܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ: ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܝܡܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܪܝܢܐ: ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܝܡܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܠܬܚܬ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܝܡܡܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܙܢܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ: ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܘ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܘ ܠܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܟܠ ܡܢܦܫܐ ܐܘ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܘ ܠܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ: ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܡܣܝܘܬܐ ܥܠܬܐ ܗܝ ܕܐܫܬܐ. ܐܘ ܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܐܫܬܐ ܬܫܬܟܚ. ܐܦ ܡܣܝܘܬܐ ܡܫܬܟܚܐ. ܙܢܐ ܚܡܝܫܝܐ: ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܢܕܢܚ ܫܡܫܐ ܡܫܬܟܚ ܐܝܡܡܐ. ܕܢܚܗ ܕܫܡܫܐ ܥܠܬܐ ܗܘ ܕܐܝܡܡܐ. ܙܢܐ ܫܬܝܬܝܐ: ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܐܫܬ ܦܠܢ ܚܡܝܡܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܐܘ ܥܡ ܗܘܠܐ ܗܝ. ܐܘ ܕܠܐ ܗܘܠܐ. ܙܢܐ ܫܒܝܥܝܐ: ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܐܫܬ ܦܠܢ ܐܘ ܕܡܢܝܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܐܘ ܡܪܬܢܝܬܐ ܚܡܝܡܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܙܢܐ ܬܡܝܢܝܐ: ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܝܡܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܠܠܝܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ.","english":"The manifestation, because it is composed in several times, the hypothetic substance, and the hypothetic from the substance is composed ninthly in that which is a protasis of the composed from it. Or from both of its categories, or both of its substances, or both of its divisions, or that from the first category, that which is the latter substance, or that from the first substance, that which is the latter category, or that from the first category, that which is the latter division, or that from the first division, that which is the latter category, or that from the first substance. First time: as that whenever the sun is above the earth, it is day. Second time: as that whenever the sun is above the earth, it is day. Whenever it is below the earth, it is not day. Third time: as that whether every animal is either rational or non-rational. Every soul is either rational or non-rational. Fourth time: as that whether measure is the cause of fire. Or whenever fire exists, measure also exists. Fifth time: as that whenever the light of the sun exists, it is day. The light of the sun is the cause of day. Sixth time: as that whether fire produces heat, it is either with matter or without matter. Seventh time: as that whether fire produces either moisture or dryness, it is heat. Eighth time: as that whenever the sun is above the earth, it is day. Or the sun is above the earth. Or night is not.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܗܘܦܬܛܝܩܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term 'hypothetic' (from Greek ὑποθετική) refers to a conditional or hypothetical proposition in Stoic logic, a key concept in Bar Hebraeus's logical framework.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܒܝܣܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"'Substance' (from Greek οὐσία) denotes the underlying reality or subject in Aristotelian logic, here contrasted with the hypothetical mode.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage enumerates eight 'times' (ܙܢ̈ܝܐ) as examples of logical relations, each illustrating a different combination of protasis, category, substance, or division.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The examples of the sun and day (times 1, 2, 5, 8) echo standard Stoic conditional arguments, while the fire and heat examples (times 4, 6, 7) reflect Aristotelian causal reasoning.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The repetition of the first two times with identical wording may indicate a scribal error or deliberate emphasis; the Syriac text is ambiguous.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The exact logical relationship between 'hypothetic' and 'substance' in the opening lines is unclear; the translation assumes a compositional hierarchy.","The phrase 'ninthly' (ܬܫܝܥܐܝܬ) is obscure and may be a corruption or a technical term not fully understood."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":27,"ref":"p27","source":"ܙܢܐ ܬܫܝܥܝܐ: ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܟܠ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܟܠܡܐ ܕܗܢܐ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܡܛܠ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܟܡܐ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܬܪܟܒ ܣܒܝܣܬܐ ܫܪܝܪܬܐ ܐܟܚܕ ܘܕܓܠܬܐ\nܠܡܕܥ ܐܠܨܐ ܕܫܪܝܪܘܬ ܗܠܝܢ ܣܒܝ̈ܣܬܐ. ܠܘ ܒܫܪܝܪܘܬܐ ܗܝ ܕܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܡܢܗܝܢ ܡܬܪܟܒܐ. ܐܦܠܐ ܕܓܠܘܬܗܿ ܒܕܓܠܘܬܗܝܢ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܡܢ ܫܪܝܪ̈ܬܐ ܕܓܠܬܐ ܡܬܪܟܒܐ. ܘܡܢ ܕܓ̈ܠܬܐ ܫܪܝܪ̈ܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܡܬܚܘܝܐ. ܘܫܪܝܪܬܐ ܡܢ ܪܒܝܥܐܝܬ ܡܬܪܟܒܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܫܪܝܪ̈ܬܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܕܓ̈ܠܬܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܩܕܝܡܝܬܐ ܕܓܠܬܐ ܘܢܩܦܝܬܐ ܫܪܝܪܬܐ. ܘܡܢ ܗܦܟܐ ܕܗܢܐ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܬܪܟܒ ܫܪܝܪܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܡܬܚܘܝܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܕܠܐ ܝܕܝܥܐ ܫܪܝܪܘܬܗܝܢ. ܘܙܢܐ ܡܢ ܩܕܡܝܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܝܡܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܐܦܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܠܐ ܡܢܦܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܣܘܣܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܬܐܡܪ ܕܐܢ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܣܘܣܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܐ. ܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܪܒܥܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܣܘܩܪܛܝܣ ܟܬܒ ܡܙܝܥ ܨܒ̈ܥܬܗ. ܘܗܕܐ ܡܢ ܟܕ ܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܫܪܝܪܐ. ܘܠܐ ܣܟ ܝܕܝܥܐ ܠܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܟܬܒ ܐܘ ܠܐ ܟܬܒ ܡܙܝܥ ܨܒ̈ܥܬܗ. ܐܘ ܠܐ ܡܙܝܥ. ܗܘ ܘܟܘܬ ܘܣܒܝܣܬܐ ܕܓܠܬܐ ܪܒܝܥܐܝܬ ܡܬܪܟܒܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܫܪܝܪ̈ܬܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܕܓ̈ܠܬܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܩܕܝܡܝܬܐ ܫܪܝܪܬܐ ܘܢܩܝܦܬܐ ܕܓܠܬܐ. ܘܡܢ ܗܦܟܗܿ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܕܓܠܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܐܝܟ ܕܐܬܚܘܝ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܕܠܐ ܝܕܝܥܐ ܕܓܠܘܬܗܝܢ. ܘܙܢܐ ܡܢ ܩܕܡܝܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܐܘܡܝܪܘܣ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ.","english":"The ninth mode: as in whether every motion or pair or opposite is. Whatever this motion is, it is either a pair or an opposite. The manifestation, because it is composed in several times, the true substance and the false substance are together for the necessity of knowledge of the truth of these substances. Not in the truth that is of the protasis of that which is composed from it. Nor in its falsehood in its falsehoods. In that there is when from true falsehoods it is composed. And from false true ones as is shown. And a true one is composed from a fourth, or from two true ones, or from two false ones, or from a first false and a following true. And from the opposite of this, a true one cannot be composed as is shown. Or from two whose truth is unknown. And the first mode: as in whether the sun is above the earth, it is day. The second mode: as in whether a stone is a head, it is not a soul. The third mode: as in whether a horse is a head, it is an animal. And it cannot be said that if it is an animal, it is a horse. In that animal is generic. The fourth mode: as in whether Socrates wrote, he moved his fingers. And this is when it is absolutely true. And it is not known whether he wrote or did not write, he moved his fingers or did not move. And likewise, a false substance is composed from a fourth, or from two true ones, or from two false ones, or from a first true and a following false. And from its opposite, a false one cannot be, as was shown. Or from two whose falsehood is unknown. And the first mode: as in whenever Homer is an animal, he is a head.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܙܢܐ (mode)","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܙܢܐ (zʿā) corresponds to the Greek τρόπος (tropos), denoting a logical mode or figure in syllogistic reasoning. Bar Hebraeus uses it to classify types of conditional propositions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܣܒܝܣܬܐ (substance)","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܣܒܝܣܬܐ (sabīstā) renders Greek ὑπόθεσις (hypothesis), meaning a proposition or premise in a logical argument. Bar Hebraeus distinguishes between true (ܫܪܝܪܬܐ) and false (ܕܓܠܬܐ) substances.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"external","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The examples of the sun and earth, stone and head, horse and animal, and Socrates writing are drawn from Aristotelian logic, specifically the theory of conditionals in the Prior Analytics and its Syriac reception. The reference to Homer (ܐܘܡܝܪܘܣ) reflects a standard example in late antique logical handbooks.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage enumerates four modes (ܙܢ̈ܐ) of conditional propositions, each introduced by 'as in whether' (ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ). The first three modes are illustrated with natural or ontological examples; the fourth introduces a human action (Socrates writing).","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or corrupt phrases, such as 'from true falsehoods' (ܡܢ ܫܪܝܪ̈ܬܐ ܕܓܠܬܐ) and 'from false true ones' (ܡܢ ܕܓ̈ܠܬܐ ܫܪܝܪ̈ܬܐ), which may reflect scribal errors or a compressed logical argument. The English draft attempts to render these as oxymorons, but the intended sense may be 'from true premises that are false' or similar.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'from true falsehoods' (ܡܢ ܫܪܝܪ̈ܬܐ ܕܓܠܬܐ) is ambiguous: it may mean 'from premises that are true in form but false in content' or could be a textual corruption. The reading taken follows the English draft's oxymoronic rendering.","The reference to 'the fourth' (ܪܒܝܥܐܝܬ) in the composition of true and false substances is unclear; it may denote a fourth type of premise or a fourth figure of the syllogism. The passage does not specify."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":28,"ref":"p28","source":"ܘܗܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܦܢ ܬܪܬܝܗܝܢ ܫܪܝܪ̈ܢ ܥܠ ܐܘܡܝܪܘܣ. ܗܝ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܡܢܗܝܢ ܡܪܟܒܐ ܠܘ ܫܪܝܪܬ ܒܟܝܢܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܥܠܬܐ ܕܐܢܫܘܬܐ. ܘܐܠܐ ܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܫܟܝܪܐ. ܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ: ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܐܝܠܢܐ ܨܗܘܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ: ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܣܘܣܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܬܗܦܟ ܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܕܓܠܬܐ ܬܟܬܪ. ܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܣܘܩܪܛܝܣ ܟܬܒ ܫܠܝ̈ܢ ܠܗ ܨܒ̈ܥܬܗ. ܘܗܝ ܡܢ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܟܕ ܕܓܠܬܐ ܗܝ ܠܐ ܝܕܝ̈ܥܢ ܠܢ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗܿ ܕܐܪܐ ܒܙܒܢܐ ܕܒܗ ܡܐܡܪܐ ܡܬܬܣܪܚ ܕܓ̈ܠܢ ܥܠܘܗܝ ܐܘ ܠܐ ܕܓ̈ܠܢ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܡܛܠ ܗܿܝ ܕܬܠܝܬܝܬ ܓܢ̈ܣܐ ܗܝ ܗܘܦܬܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܦܪܫܬܐ\nܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܓܝܪ ܕܡܢܗܝܢ ܗܘܦܬܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܦܪܫܬܐ ܡܬܪܟܒܐ. ܐܘ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܐܟܚܕܐ ܢܫܪ̈ܢ ܐܘ ܢܕܓ̈ܠܢ ܘܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܡܦܪܫܬܐ ܡܪܢܝܬܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܐܟܚܕܐ ܢܕܓ̈ܠܢ. ܡܨܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܟܚܕܐ ܢܫܪ̈ܢ. ܘܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܡܦܪܫܬܐ ܟܠܝܬ ܡܢ ܣܦܝܩܘܬܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܣܘܩܪܛܝܣ ܐܘ ܒܝܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܠܐ ܡܬܛܒܥ. ܘܗܕܐ ܗܿܘܝܐ ܟܕ ܗܿܝ ܡܢ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܬܐ ܕܡܦܪܫܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܗܿܝ ܐܚܪܬܐ. ܘܐܦܘܦܛܝܩܝܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܗܐ ܓܝܪ ܟܕ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܝܡܐ ܢܗܘܐ. ܓܘܢܝܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܛܒܥ. ܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܕܗܕܐ ܕܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܗ̄ ܕܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܛܒܥ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܠܐ ܡܬܛܒܥ. ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܝܡܐ ܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܒܝܡܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܓܘܢܐ ܗܝ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܛܒܥ. ܘܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܡܬܛܒܥ ܓܘܢܝ ܡܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܒܝܡܐ ܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ. ܕܝܠܢ̈ܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܪ̈ܝܗܘܢ ܒܙܒܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܝܡܐ ܢܗܘܐ. ܘܒܙܒܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܛܒܥ.","english":"And these two true propositions concerning Homer: the proposition that the composite is not true in nature is itself. In that it is not a living thing, it is the cause of falsehood. But every living thing is a substance. That which is drunk. The second mode: as in that whenever a white man is a substance, he is. The third mode: as in that if a living thing is a substance, it is a horse. And it is not possible that this falsehood should persist. The fourth mode: as in that if Socrates wrote letters with his fingers. And this proposition, when it is false, the modes of the earth are not known in the time in which the discourse is composed, whether falsehoods are upon it or not. Demonstration because it is the third genus: the hypothetical proposition is distinguished.\n\nFor the proposition that is composed from the hypothetical proposition is distinguished, either it is not possible that together truths or falsehoods, and the distinguished subject is complete. As in that every motion is either a pair or an opposite. Or it is not possible that together falsehoods. It is possible, however, that together truths. And the distinguished subject is complete with emptiness. As in that Socrates is either in the sea or is not sought. And this occurs when one mode of the distinguished subject is generic with the antithesis of the other. And it is apophatic. For behold, when that which is in the sea occurs, the generic is with that which is sought. The particularity of this which is proper to that which is sought is that it is not sought. The generic is with that which is in the sea, which ought not to be. That which is in the sea is the generic with that which is sought. And that which is not sought is generic with that which is not in the sea. The proper ones of both, however, are at the time that which is in the sea occurs, and at the time that which is sought occurs.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ (from Greek πρότασις) denotes a proposition or premise in logical discourse. Bar Hebraeus uses it consistently for the constituent parts of a hypothetical syllogism.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܗܘܦܬܛܝܩܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܗܘܦܬܛܝܩܝܬܐ (Greek ὑποθετική) refers to the hypothetical proposition. Bar Hebraeus distinguishes it from the categorical and uses it to structure the modes of truth and falsehood.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܩܪܛܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The example of Socrates writing letters with his fingers is a standard logical illustration in late antique and Syriac Aristotelian commentaries, drawn from the Organon tradition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The passage enumerates four modes (ܙܢ̈ܐ) of hypothetical propositions. The third mode is introduced here: if a living thing is a substance, it is a horse — an impossible conditional that forces the falsehood to persist.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ","severity":"info","text":"The classification of every motion as either a pair or an opposite echoes Aristotle's Categories (14a15–b23), where motion is divided into contraries. Bar Hebraeus adapts this to his logical framework.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܕܓ̈ܠܢ","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac ܕܓ̈ܠܢ (falsehoods) appears in a corrupt or ambiguous context: the text states that truths and falsehoods cannot coexist, but the manuscript may have a scribal error in the negation. The reading follows the logical sense.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'the proposition that the composite is not true in nature is itself' is syntactically ambiguous; it likely means the proposition itself is not true in nature.","The reference to 'modes of the earth' (ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗܿ ܕܐܪܐ) is obscure; it may be a corruption or a technical term for 'earthly modes' in a logical sense."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":29,"ref":"p29","source":"ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܛܒܥ ܕܠܐ ܦܪܘܣ ܒܝܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܕܠܐ ܡܬܛܒܥ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܙܒܢ ܒܝܡܐ ܘܒܙܒܢ ܒܝܒܫܐ ܘܠܐ ܡܬܛܒܥ. ܐܘ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܐܟܚܕܐ ܢܫܪ̈ܢ. ܡܨܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܟܚܕܐ ܢܕܓ̈ܠܢ. ܘܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܡܦܪܫܬܐ ܟܠܝܬ ܡܢ ܟܢܝܫܘܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܗܢܐ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܐܘ ܟܐܦܐ ܐܘ ܐܝܠܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܗܕܐ ܡܢ ܗܘܝܐ ܟܕ ܗܿܝ ܡܢ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܬܐ ܕܡܦܪܫܬܐ ܕܝܠܢܝܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܗܿܝ ܐܚܪܬܐ. ܘܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܬܗܘܐ. ܗܐ ܓܝܪ ܟܐܦܐ ܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܐܝܠܢܐ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܠܐ ܐܝܠܢܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܐܝܠܢܐ ܐܦ ܥܠ ܟܐܦܐ ܐܦ ܥܠ ܠܐ ܟܐܦܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܠܐ ܟܐܦܐ. ܥܠ ܐܝܠܢܐ ܘܥܠ ܠܐ ܐܝܠܢܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܡܛܠ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܡܐ ܡܨܝܢ ܠܡܗܘܐ ܡܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܠܡܦܪܫܬܐ ܡܪܢܝܬܐ\nܘܗܝ ܡܢ ܗܕܐ ܐܘ ܬܪܝܢܬ ܡܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܘܗܕܐ ܟܕ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܬܗܿ ܫܘܝܬ ܒܚܝܠܐ ܠܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܗܿܝ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܬܠܬܝܬ ܡܢ̈ܘܬܐ. ܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܟܕ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܬܗܿ ܫܘܝܬ ܒܚܝܠܐ ܠܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܬܗܘܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܝܬܝܪܐ ܐܘ ܚܣܝܪܐ ܐܘ ܫܘܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܪܒܝܥܝܬ ܡܢ̈ܘܬܐ. ܘܗܕܐ ܟܕ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܬܗܿ ܐܝܕܐ ܕܗܝ ܫܘܝܬ ܒܚܝܠܐ ܠܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܬܠܬ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ. ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܕܙܘܓܐ. ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܕܙܘܓܐ ܘܕܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܙܘܓܐ ܐܝܟ ܬܪܝܢ. ܘܙܘܓܐ ܕܙܘܓܐ. ܐܝܟ ܐܪܒܥܐ. ܘܙܘܓܐ ܕܙܘܓܐ ܘܕܐܦܙܓܐ. ܐܝܟ ܐܫܬܐ ܕܙܘܓܐ ܗܘ ܕܬܠܬܐ ܕܐܝܬ ܒܗ ܙܘܓܐ ܘܐܦܙܓܐ. ܐܘ ܡܪܬ ܡܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܕܠܐ ܣܘܦ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܘܗܕܐ ܟܕ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܬܗܿ ܫܘܝܬ ܒܚܝܠܐ ܠܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܡܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܕܠܐ ܣܘܦ ܬܗܘܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܡܢܝܢܐ.","english":"In that which is naturally not extended in the sea, it is. And that which is not naturally capable of being in part in the sea and in part on dry land and is not naturally so, or is not capable of being together in parts. It is capable, however, of being together in false parts. And the particular substance is entirely separated from composition, like this body or stone or tree. And this is from being when that one part of the particular substance of a tree is from the antityposis of that other. And it will be a kataposis. For behold, a stone of a tree from the antityposis of a tree which is not a tree. In that it is not a tree, it is predicated both of stone and of not-stone. In that likeness and not-stone. Of tree and of not-tree. The demonstration is because how many parts are possible for the principal substance? And it is from this or from two parts. And this when one of its parts is equal in power to the antityposis of that other. As every composite is either a pair or an odd pair. Or three parts. And this when one of its parts is equal in power to the antityposis of those two. As every composite is either greater or lesser or equal. Or four parts. And this when one of its parts is such that it is equal in power to the antityposis of those other three. As every composite is either an odd pair or a pair. Or a pair of pairs. Or a pair of pairs and of an odd pair. A pair like two. And a pair of pairs like four. And a pair of pairs and of an odd pair like six, which is a pair of three that contains a pair and an odd pair. Or a substance of parts without end. And this when one of its parts is equal in power to the antityposis of those other parts without end. As every composite.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword ἀντίτυπος (antitypos) is used here in a technical sense, likely meaning 'counterpart' or 'opposite impression' in a logical or metaphysical context.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܩܛܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword κατάφασις (kataphasis) means 'affirmation' or 'predication', used here in a logical sense of asserting a property.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage discusses the composition of substances in terms of parts (ܡܢ̈ܘܬܐ) and their relations, reflecting Aristotelian categories and Porphyrian logic as received in Syriac tradition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The text enumerates possible numbers of parts (one, two, three, four, infinite) for a principal substance, each with a condition of equality in power to the antityposis of the others.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The classification of composites as 'pair', 'odd pair', 'pair of pairs', etc., echoes Neoplatonic and Aristotelian discussions of numerical composition, possibly mediated through Syriac translations of Greek logical works.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or corrupt readings (e.g., ܢܫܪ̈ܢ, ܢܕܓ̈ܠܢ) that may affect the interpretation of the logical examples; the English draft attempts a reconstruction.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The exact meaning of 'false parts' (ܢܕܓ̈ܠܢ) and the identity of the 'principal substance' (ܡܦܪܫܬܐ ܡܪܢܝܬܐ) are not fully resolved; the text may be corrupt or elliptical."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":30,"ref":"p30","source":"ܐܘ ܚܕ ܐܘ ܬܪܝܢ ܐܘ ܬܠܬܐ ܘܗܟܢܐ ܠܠܐ ܣܘܦ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܡܛܠ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܟܡܐ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܡܬܪܟܒܐ ܗܘܦܬܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܦܪܫܬܐ ܡܪܢܝܬܐ\nܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܬܘܒ ܫܬܝܬܐܝܬ ܘܠܘ ܬܫܝܥܐܝܬ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܣܒܝ̈ܣܬܐ ܡܬܪܟܒܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܪܬܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܡܢ ܚܕܐ ܡܬܢܩܦܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ. ܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܢܩܘܦܬܐ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܠܐ ܙܗܝܪܐ ܕܢܫܬܚ̈ܠܦܢ. ܒܠܥܕ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܕܣܘܟܠܐ. ܗܪܟܐ ܕܝܢ ܘܐܦܢ ܢܫܬܚ̈ܠܦܢ. ܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܒܣܘܟܠܗܝܢ ܗܿܘܐ. ܐܝܟ ܕܡܬܚܘܝܐ. ܘܡܬܪܟܒܐ ܡܢ ܐܘ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܩܛܓܘܪ̈ܝܩܝܬܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܣܒܝ̈ܣܬܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܡܦܪ̈ܫܬܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܩܛܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ ܘܣܒܝܣܬܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܩܛܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ ܘܡܦܪܫܬܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܣܒܝܣܬܐ ܘܡܦܪܫܬܐ. ܘܙܢܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܘ ܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܐܝܡܡܐ ܢܗܘܐ. ܐܘ ܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܠܠܝܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܠܬܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܗܕܐ ܐܫܬܐ ܥܡ ܗܘܠܐ ܐܘ ܕܡܢܝܬܐ ܐܘ ܡܪܬܢܝܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܐܘ ܦܠܓܡܢܝܬܐ ܐܘ ܡܗܠܐܢܟܘܠܝܩܝܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܘܗܕܐ ܡܢ ܡܪܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ. ܒܕ ܡܢ ܐܣܘ̈ܬܐ ܐܬܬܫܠܡܢ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܟܘܡܘܣ ܠܒܪ ܡܢܗܘܢ. ܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܘ ܫܡܫܐ ܥܠܬܐ ܕܐܝܡܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܠܘ ܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܫܡܫܐ ܢܕܢܚ ܐܝܡܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܚܡܝܫܝܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܘ ܗܢܐ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܫܬܝܬܝܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܘ ܐܢ ܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܝܡܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܐܝܡܡܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܩܠܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܢܐ ܕܐܝܟܢ ܐܝܬ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܨܝܕ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ.","english":"or one or two or three and so on without end. The demonstration is because of that which is composed of several species: the distinct hypostatic nature, and this again is substantially and not accidentally, as the essences are composed. In that which is, the one is a co-relative, the other is a quality. And because of this, it is not safe that they change, except for a change of sense. Here, however, they also change, and the change is not one in their sense, as is shown. And it is composed from or from two categories, or from two essences, or from two distinct natures, or from a category and an essence, or from a category and a distinct nature, or from an essence and a distinct nature. And the first species is like that which is either a relation or a pair or a couple. The second species is like that which is either whenever the sun is above the earth, it is day, or whenever the sun is above the earth, it is not night. The third species is like that which is this fire with smoke or with a shadow or with a nature, or with a half-shadow or with a partial shadow. And this is from nature, but from the physicians it is completed that there is not one humor outside of them. The fourth species is like that which is either the sun is the cause of day, or not whenever the sun shines is it day. The fifth species is like that which is either this relation is not or it is a pair or a couple. And the sixth species is like that which is either if the sun is above the earth, it is day, or the sun is above the earth, or it is not day. And the seventh species is a sign indicating how it is for that which is predicated against that which is placed.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܡܦܪ̈ܫܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܡܦܪ̈ܫܬܐ (mparršātā) is rendered 'distinct natures' and corresponds to the philosophical concept of distinct hypostatic natures, a key term in Bar Hebraeus's ontology.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܩܛܓܘܪ̈ܝܩܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܩܛܓܘܪ̈ܝܩܝܬܐ (qaṭgoryāqītā) is a Syriac borrowing from Greek κατηγορίαι, meaning 'categories', a standard term in Aristotelian logic.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܣܒܝ̈ܣܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܣܒܝ̈ܣܬܐ (səbīsātā) is rendered 'essences' and refers to the fundamental substances or ousiai in Aristotelian metaphysics.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage enumerates seven species (ܙܢ̈ܐ) of composition, each introduced by 'the Xth species is like that which is', providing a systematic classification of ontological relations.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The reference to physicians (ܐܣܘ̈ܬܐ) and humors (ܟܘܡܘܣ) reflects the Galenic medical theory of four humors, used here to illustrate a natural composition that is not purely logical.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The phrase 'from the physicians it is completed that there is not one humor outside of them' is ambiguous: it may mean that no single humor exists independently, or that the list of humors is exhaustive.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'from the physicians it is completed that there is not one humor outside of them' is ambiguous: it may mean that no single humor exists independently, or that the list of humors is exhaustive.","The term 'co-relative' (ܡܬܢܩܦܢܝܬܐ) may be read as a technical term for a relation that is reciprocal, but the exact logical sense is not fully specified."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":31,"ref":"p31","source":"ܡܫܚܠܦ ܕܝܢ ܡܢ ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܣ ܡܛܠ ܕܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܣ ܘܟܡܝܘܬܐ ܘܐܝܢܐ ܡܚܘܐ. ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ ܟܠܢܝܐ ܘܡܢܬܝܐ ܩܛܦّ ܐܘ ܐܦܘܦّ ܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܠܐܝܢܐ ܡܚܘܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܡܛܠ ܗܘ̈ܠܐܣ ܕܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܘܙܢܝ̈ܗܝܢ ܕܒܡܢܐ ܦܪܝܫܐ ܗܘܠܐ ܡܢ ܙܢܐ\nܒܟܠ ܓܝܪ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܐܚܝܢܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܬܗܘܐ ܒܝܬ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܕܒܗܿ ܠܚܕ̈ܕܐ ܡܬܢܩܦܝܢ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܗܝ ܡܢ ܐܚܝܢܘܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܒܗܘܢ ܒܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܗܘܠܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܘܟܕ ܒܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܡܬܦܫܩܐ ܙܢܐ. ܘܡܛܠ ܕܬܠܬ ܐܢܝܢ ܗܘ̈ܠܐܣ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܬܠܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܢܩܝܦ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ. ܘܗܝ ܗܘܠܐ ܐܠܨܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܘܙܢܗܿ ܡܢ ܐܠܨܝ̈ܬܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܠܐ ܢܩܝܦ. ܘܗܝ ܗܘܠܐ. ܠܘ ܡܫܟܚܢܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܘܙܢܗܿ ܠܘ ܡܫܟܚܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܝܢ ܡܠܬܐ ܕܝܠܝ ܟܠܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܐܝܟܢܐ ܕܐܦ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܦ ܣܘܟܠܐ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܘܬܐ ܬܫܘܕܥ. ܐܘ ܠܘ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܢܩܝܦ. ܐܦܠܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܠܐ ܢܩܝܦ. ܘܗܝ ܗܘܠܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ ܡܫܟܚܢܝܬܐ ܐܘ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܘܙܢܗܿ ܡܫܟܚܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܐܘ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܥܠ ܡܫܚܠܦܘܬ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܕܐܢܢܩܝܘܬܐ\nܘܐܢܢܩܝ̈ܬܐ ܡܢ ܚܡܫ ܐܝܬܝ̈ܗܝܢ. ܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ ܡܫܡܠܝܬܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܐܡܪ ܕܫܪܪܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܐܠܨܝܐ ܗܘ ܒܝܬܗ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܥܠܡ ܗܟܢܐ ܗܘ ܒܠܥܕ ܬܚܘܡܐ. ܘܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܡܬܚܡܬܐ ܕܝܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܟܐܡܬ ܟܡܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܡܬܚܡܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܕܡܗܠܟ ܡܬܬܙܝܥ. ܟܐܡܬ ܟܡܐ ܕܡܗܠܟ. ܘܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܡܬܚܡܬܐ ܕܝܠܢܝܬܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܕܟܬܒ ܡܙܝܥ ܨܒܥ̈ܬܗ ܟܡܐ ܕܟܬܒ ܠܘ ܟܡܐ ܕܝܬܗ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܩܕܡܝܗܿ.","english":"it differs from prosdiorismos, because prosdiorismos, quantity, and quality indicate. For as in the case of a general and particular predicate, or an apophatic quality, it indicates quality alone. The demonstration is because of the hylai of the protasis and its qualities, which are in a distinct manner, these hylai from quality. For in every protasis from the hyle of the substance, something will be between that which is posited and that which is predicated, which are opposed to each other in it. It is indeed from the substance that which is indicated in these actions. And when the predicate is resolved, quality. And because there are three hylai. In that same manner and three qualities. In that which is predicated, either from the hyle it is attached to that which is posited, and these are necessary and are indicated, and its quality is from the necessities that it may be. Or from the hyle it is not attached, and these are not possible and are indicated, and its quality is not possible that it may be, as in the case of the word \"every\" that it may be. As also the predicate, as also the categorical syllogism teaches. Or not from the hyle attached, nor from the hyle not attached, and these are such as possible or contingent and are indicated, and its quality is possible that it may be, or contingent that it may be. Demonstration concerning the difference of qualities of the hyle. And the hylai are five. One is the simple hyle, complete, as that which says that the first truth is necessary in itself, in that which is always thus without limit. And the limited hyle, existential, as that which is in the first living being, as it is said how it is in the first living being. And the limited hyle, generic, as that which is everything that moves is moved, as it is said how it moves. And the limited hyle, specific, as that which is everything that writes moves his fingers, as it is said how he writes, not how his essence is. And this specific is from that which is before it.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword prosdiorismos (προσδιορισμός) denotes a further determination or qualification, here contrasted with the broader notion of quality (ܐܝܢܐ).","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܗܘ̈ܠܐܣ","severity":"info","text":"Hylai (ὕλαι) is the plural of hyle, meaning 'matter' or 'material'; in logical contexts it refers to the material or subject-matter of a proposition (protasis).","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܚܝܢܘܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ʾaḥyāʾūṯā (substance) corresponds to Greek ousia; it is used here to denote the underlying reality from which the hyle of a protasis is derived.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage enumerates five types of hyle (simple, limited-existential, limited-generic, limited-specific, and a fifth implied by the sequence), each with a corresponding quality.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus adapts Aristotelian logical categories (quality, quantity, substance, hyle) as transmitted through Syriac translations of Greek philosophical works, likely mediated by earlier Syriac commentators.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or corrupt forms (e.g., ܡܫܚܠܦ, ܡܢ, ܙܢܐ) that may reflect scribal errors or dialectal variation; the English draft attempts a consistent logical reading but some phrases remain uncertain.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The precise distinction between prosdiorismos and quality (ܐܝܢܐ) is not fully clarified; the text may conflate or contrast them in a way that is not entirely consistent.","The enumeration of five hylai is incomplete in the surviving passage; the fifth type is not explicitly named, leaving its definition open."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":32,"ref":"p32","source":"ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܝ ܡܢ ܥܠܝܗܿ ܡܫܪܐ. ܗܕܐ ܕܝܢ ܥܠ ܗܿܝ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ. ܡܛܠ ܕܗܿܝ ܡܢ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܥܠ ܩܘܛܪܓܐ ܕܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܐܘ ܠܘ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܢܩܝܦ ܠܝܬܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ. ܗܕܐ ܕܝܢ ܥܠ ܗܿܘ ܕܠܘ ܕܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܢܩܝܦ ܠܝܬܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ. ܘܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܡܬܚܡܬܐ ܥܕܢܝܬܐ. ܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܬܪܝܢܐܝܬ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܘ ܥܕܢܐ. ܐܘ ܥܕܢܐ ܗܘ ܝܕܝܥܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܢܨܒܬܐ ܡܦܪܥܢܝܬܐ ܒܙܒܢ ܬܕܐܐ. ܐܘ ܟܠ ܣܗܪܐ ܚܫܘܟܐ ܒܙܒܢܐ ܕܒܗ ܬܬܡܨܥ ܐܪܥܐ ܒܝܬ ܠܗ ܠܫܡܫܐ. ܐܘ ܥܕܢܐ ܠܘ ܝܕܝܥܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܣܝܘܩܐ. ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܒܥܕܢܐ ܡܕܡ. ܘܠܘ ܟܡܐ ܕܝܬܗ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܕܥܠ ܡܫܚܠܦܘܬ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܕܡܬܡܨܝܢܘܬܐ\nܘܩܕܡ̈ܝܐ ܡܢ ܬܪܝܢ ܐܫܟܚܘ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܕܩܘܛܪܓܐ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܐ ܘܟܠܝܐ. ܘܒܡܬܡܨܝܢܐ ܡܢ ܚܒܫܘ ܠܩܘܛܪܓܐ ܐܢܢܩܝܐ ܘܠܠܐ ܐܢܢܩܝܐ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܐܬܟܢܝܬ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܘܬܗܘܢ. ܘܟܠܝܐ ܡܢ ܐܡܪܘ ܠܩܘܛܪܓܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܠܐ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܩܦ ܒܗ ܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ. ܐܚܪ̈ܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܗܘܐ ܠܘܬܗܘܢ ܗܘ ܦܘܠܓ ܩܘܛܪܓܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܢܩܦ ܘܟܢܝܘܗܝ ܐܠܐܢܢܩܝܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܕܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܠܐ ܢܩܦ ܘܟܢܝܘܗܝ ܟܠܝܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܕܠܐ ܢܩܝܦܘܬܗ ܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܘܐܦܠܐ ܠܐ ܢܩܝܦܘܬܗ ܘܟܢܝܘܗܝ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܐ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܘܬܗܘܢ ܕܝܠܢܝܬܐ ܐܬܟܢܝܬ. ܒܕ ܠܘ ܡܚܒܫ ܚܒܫܐ ܠܐܢܢܩܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܦ ܗܿܝ ܐ̱ܚܪܬܐ. ܘܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܕܗܿܝ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܥܠ ܟܠܝܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܬܪܝܢܐ ܗܘ ܦܘܠܓܐ. ܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܗܿܝ ܕܝܠܢܝܬܐ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܥܠ ܟܠܢܝܐ. ܐܦܠܐ ܣܝܘܡܘܬܗ ܥܠ ܐܢܢܩܝܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܓܢܣܐ ܗܘ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܕܟܠܢܐܝܬ ܡܪܡܐ ܡܢܗ ܐܢܢܩܝܘܬܐ. ܘܗܟܢܐ ܡܫܬܪܝܐ ܡܛܥܝܢܘܬܐ ܐܝܕܐ ܕܠܣܓ̈ܝܐܐ ܡܢ ܩܕܡ̈ܝܐ ܡܪܗܒܐ ܗܘܬ. ܗܿܝ ܕܐܦ ܐܬܥܗܕܗܿ ܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ. ܟܕ ܐܝܟ ܕܡܢܗܘܢ ܡܬܢܐ.","english":"in that it begins from it. But this is about that and does not cease. Because that is true concerning the predicate that is attached either affirmatively or negatively to the subject that is posited. But this is about that which is attached not affirmatively to the subject alone. And the quality is determined by the sign. And this is twofold: in that the sign is either known, as in every partial eclipse at the time of the new moon, or every lunar eclipse at the time when the earth is interposed between it and the sun, or the sign is unknown, as in every comet. For quality is in some sign, and not as its substance is. The demonstration is concerning the difference of the species of mediation.\n\nAnd the first ones found two species of predicate: mediate and immediate. And in the mediate they included the predicate affirmative and negative. And because of this, the genus of their mediation was shown. And the immediate said that the predicate which is affirmative cannot be attached to that which is predicated of the subject that is posited. The latter, however, were a third party with them: the division of the predicate, which is attached affirmatively and its name is negative, and that which is attached affirmatively not and its name is immediate, and that whose attachment is not affirmative nor is its non-attachment, and its name is mediate. And because of this, their mediation of the particular was shown. For it does not include the affirmative like the other. And the superiority is that the genus is true concerning the immediate, in that it is a second division. The superiority, however, of the particular and not the genus is true concerning the immediate, nor is its conclusion concerning the affirmative. In that the third genus is of the immediate, raising from it the affirmative. And thus the error is resolved which was widespread among many of the first ones, which even the philosopher remembered, as if from them it is known.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܘܛܪܓܐ (quṭrāgā)","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term quṭrāgā, a loan from Greek κατηγορία, is used throughout for 'predicate' in logical contexts. Bar Hebraeus consistently employs it for the second term of a proposition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ (ammīʿāʾīṯ)","severity":"info","text":"The adverb ammīʿāʾīṯ, from the root ܐܡܝܢ (to affirm), means 'affirmatively'. It is paired with ܠܘ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ (lā ammīʿāʾīṯ) for 'negatively', forming the standard Syriac logical pair.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܬܡܨܝܢܘܬܐ (metmaṣṣīʿūṯā)","severity":"info","text":"The term metmaṣṣīʿūṯā, 'mediation', reflects a technical logical concept, likely derived from Aristotle's Categories. Bar Hebraeus distinguishes mediate and immediate predicates, a distinction found in Peripatetic logic.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ (pīlāsōp̄ā)","severity":"info","text":"The reference to 'the philosopher' (pīlāsōp̄ā) is a standard Syriac designation for Aristotle. Bar Hebraeus invokes Aristotle's authority to resolve an error among earlier logicians regarding the classification of predicates.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܬܪܝܢܐܝܬ (trēnāʾīṯ)","severity":"info","text":"The passage is structured as a logical division: the sign (ʿedʿā) is twofold (trēnāʾīṯ), known or unknown, with examples from eclipses and comets. This mirrors the analytical method of Bar Hebraeus in organizing logical distinctions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܛܥܝܢܘܬܐ (maṭʿīʿūṯā)","severity":"caution","text":"The term maṭʿīʿūṯā, 'error', is said to be resolved, but the precise nature of the error among 'the first ones' is not fully specified in the text. The passage may condense a more detailed logical debate.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The identity of 'the first ones' (qadmāyē) and 'the latter' (aḥrāyē) is not specified; they likely refer to earlier schools of Syriac or Greek logicians.","The phrase 'the superiority of the particular' (mārīmānūṯā d-īlānīṯā) is ambiguous: it may indicate a logical priority of the particular over the genus in certain contexts."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":33,"ref":"p33","source":"ܕܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܐܠܨ̈ܬܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܐܢ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܘܗܿܝ ܕܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܘܡܬܟܢܫܐ ܕܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܐܠܨ̈ܬܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܫܟܝܪܐ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܡܕܝܢ ܟܠܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܘܟܠ ܕܟܠܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܡܢ ܐܠܨ̈ܬܐ ܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܘܡܬܟܢܫܐ ܕܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܐܠܨ̈ܬܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܝܬܝܪ ܫܟܝܪܐ. ܕܠܘܬܗܿ ܦܢܝ ܕܗܕܐ ܛܘܥܝܝ ܡܢ ܩܨ ܫܘܝܘܬ ܫܡܐ ܓܕܫܬ. ܕܡܬܡܨܝܢܐ ܠܡ ܫܘܝܘܬ ܫܡܗܐܝܬ ܥܠ ܬܪ̈ܝܗܘܢ ܣܘܟ̈ܠܐ ܕܐܬܐܡܪܘ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܒܕܓܘܢ ܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܕܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܐܠܨ̈ܬܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܒܙܢܐ ܗܿܘ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܥܠܘܗܝ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܨܝܐ ܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܚܒܫ ܚܒܫ ܠܐܢܢܩܝܐ. ܘܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܬܘܒ ܒܙܢܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܥܠܘܗܝ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ: ܗ̄: ܡܢ ܐܠܨ̈ܬܐ ܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܡܛܠ ܕܟܠ ܕܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܢܩܝܦ ܐܦ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܢܩܝܦ. ܠܐ ܙܕܩ ܠܡܣܒܪܘ ܕܟܠ ܕܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܢܩܝܦ ܘܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܢܩܝܦ. ܐܠܐ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܡܕܡ ܙܕܩ ܠܡܣܬܟܠܘ ܠܩܘܛܪܓܐ ܐܡܝܢܐ. ܛܒ ܡܢ ܗܿܘ ܐܢܢܩܝܐ. ܗܐ ܓܝܪ ܐܘܟܡܘܬ ܟܘܫܝܐ. ܟܕ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܠܫܟܝܚܘܬܗ ܢܩܝܦܐ. ܠܘ ܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܠܗ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܢܢܩܝܐܝܬ ܠܗܿܘ ܗܘ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܐܡܪܝܢܢ. ܕܒܡܢܝܘܬܐ ܐܘܟܝܬ ܟܝܢܐ ܥܐܠ ܕܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܡܛܠ ܢܩܝܦܘ̈ܬܐ ܕܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܙܢܢ̈ܝܬܐ\nܟܠܗܝܢ ܓܝܪ ܕܢܩ̈ܦܢ. ܐܘ ܫܘ̈ܝܢ ܠܡܬܢܩܦܢ̈ܝܗܝܢ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܥܠܝܗܘܢ ܗܦ̈ܟܢ ܐܘ ܓܘܢ̈ܝܢ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܠܐ ܗܦ̈ܟܢ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܢܝܢ ܕܫܘܝܐܝܬ ܠܚܕ̈ܕܐ ܢܩܝ̈ܦܢ. ܐܦ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܝܠܗܝܢ ܫܘܝ̈ܬܐ ܐܝܬܝ̈ܗܝܢ. ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܕܓܘܢܐܝܬ ܢܩ̈ܦܢ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܗܿܝ ܕܓܘܢܝܐ ܒܗܝܢ. ܕܝܠܢܝܬܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܛܝܦܛܝܩܝܐ ܕܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܠܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ.","english":"that which is from necessity is able to be. And that which is able to be is able not to be. And it is disputed that that which is from necessity is able not to be. That is absurd. For it is not possible for that which is from necessity to be at the same time able not to be. And everything that is able not to be is from necessity not that which is from necessity. And it is disputed that that which is from necessity is from impossibility not to be, which is more absurd. For this error arises from the confusion of the name of accident. For it is possible to apply the name of accident homonymously to both concepts that have been mentioned. For it is said that that which is from necessity is able to be in a generic sense that is not true concerning it, that which is able not to be, in that it binds the impossibility. And it is not possible for it to be again in that specific sense that is not true concerning it, that which is able not to be from necessity. Demonstration: And because everything that is impossible is also possible, it is not right to think that everything that is possible is also impossible. But something generic must be understood for the possible proposition, not that which is impossible. For behold, the blackness of the Ethiopian, when it is possible for its existence to be predicated, is not impossible for it, in that it is impossible for that same thing alone to be said, that by the coming of the nature of the acts, the demonstration is because of the predicates of the first propositions. For all of them are either predicates or subjects for their predicates. And because of this, they are converted or generic. And because of this, they are not converted. For the propositions that are equally predicated of each other, their antiphasis also are equal. But those that are generically predicated, their antiphasis is that which is generic in them. The specific must be from the antiphatikē of the specific, as in the case of non-animal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܫܘܝܘܬ ܫܡܐ ܓܕܫܬ","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'name of accident' (šawyāt šmā gdešt) translates the Aristotelian term 'συμβεβηκός' (accidens). Bar Hebraeus here warns against confusing the homonymous use of 'accident' for necessary and contingent predicates.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage presents a dialectical sequence: a disputed claim (that the necessary can be contingent) is refuted by showing it leads to absurdity, then the source of the error is diagnosed as a homonymous use of 'accident'. This mirrors the scholastic method of λύσις.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܘܟܡܘܬ ܟܘܫܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The example 'blackness of the Ethiopian' (ukkmut kūšāyā) is a standard Aristotelian illustration of an inseparable accident (cf. Topica 102a5). Bar Hebraeus uses it to show that a possible predicate (blackness) is not impossible for the subject, even if it is not necessary.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword 'antiphasis' (antiphrasis) denotes the contradictory opposite of a proposition. Bar Hebraeus distinguishes between equal and generic predication, noting that the antiphasis of generically predicated terms is itself generic.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text at the end is compressed and possibly corrupt: 'ܕܝܠܢܝܬܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܛܝܦܛܝܩܝܐ ܕܕܝܠܢܝܐ' is ambiguous. The English draft reads 'the specific must be from the antiphatikē of the specific', but the syntax may reflect a lacuna or scribal error.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'ܡܢ ܐܢܛܝܦܛܝܩܝܐ' (from the antiphatikē) is a hapax in this text; it may be a calque on Greek 'ἀντιφατική' (contradictory), but the exact sense is uncertain. The reading taken follows the English draft's interpretation as 'antiphatikē' meaning the contradictory form."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":34,"ref":"p34","source":"ܕܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܡܢ ܠܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܦ ܩܕܡܬ ܐܫܬܘܕܥܬ. ܘܕܝܬܝܪ ܡܒܨܪܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܡܠܬܐ ܒܣܝܠܝܕܝܣ ܠܗܝܢ ܣܕܪܝܢܢ:\nܣܝܠܝܕܝܣ ܕܫܘ̈ܝܬܐ\nܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܠܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ. ܡܨܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ\nܟܠܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܠܐ ܟܠܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܣܝܠܝܕܝܣ ܕܠܐ ܫܘܝ̈ܬܐ\nܘܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܩܕܝ̈ܡܢ ܕܝܠܢ̈ܝܢ. ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܠܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܓܘܢܬܐ. ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ. ܠܐ ܟܠܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܟܠܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܘܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܡܢ ܕܒܗܠܝ ܟܠܗܝܢ ܗܿܝ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܘܠܘ ܗܿܝ ܕܝܠܢܝܬܐ. ܠܗܕܐ ܓܝܪ ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܫܪܟܐ ܫܘܝܐܝܬ ܢܩܦܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܕܝܠܗܿ ܫܘܝܐ ܗܝ ܠܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܕܝܠܗܿ ܟܕ ܕܝܠܗܿ ܨܒܘܬܐ ܕܐܟܣܢܝܐ ܠܗܢܝܢ ܕܫܪܟܐ ܓܘܢܐܝܬ ܕܝܢ ܢܩ̈ܦܢ ܠܗܿ. ܗܐ ܗܠܝܢ ܣܝܠܝܕܝܣ ܕܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܓܘܢܐܝܬ ܠܡܬܡܨܝܢܘܬܐ ܕܝܠܢܝܬܐ ܢܩ̈ܦܢ. ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܐܘ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܘܕܬܗܘܐ ܕܝܠܢܝܬܐ:\nܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ. ܠܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܠܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܠܐ ܟܠܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܠܐ ܟܠܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܬܠܬ ܐܢܝܢ ܕܫܘ̈ܝܢ ܒܗܦܘܟܝܐ. ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܦܫܝܛܐ. ܘܐܦܘܦّ ܕܡܛܬܣܝܣ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ. ܘܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܕܡܛܬܣܝܣ ܕܟܠܝܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܟܠ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܟܕ ܬܣܒܝܗܿ ܥܡ ܚܒܪܬܗܿ ܡܗܦܟ ܗܦܟܐ ܥܠܝܗܿ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܬܐܡܪ ܕܟܠ ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܢܗܘܐ ܠܐ ܡܨܐ ܕܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ. ܘܟܠ ܕܠܐ ܡܨܐ ܕܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ. ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܢܗܘܐ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܟܕ ܬܐܡܪ ܟܠ ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܢܗܘܐ ܟܠܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ. ܘܟܠ ܕܟܠܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܢܗܘܐ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܟܕ ܬܐܡܪ ܟܠ ܕܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܟܠܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ. ܘܟܠ ܕܟܠܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ.","english":"of the particular from not by choice, as was also previously understood. And the statement will be more deficient in syllogism for this series:\n\nSyllogism of Equalities\n\nFrom necessity it is. Not from necessity it is. It is possible that it not be substantially. It is possible that it not be substantially.\n\nIt is impossible that it not be. It is not impossible that it not be. Syllogism of Inequalities\n\nAnd these are of the particular things. From necessity it is. Not from necessity it is. It is possible that it be substantially. It is not possible that it be substantially. It is impossible that it be. It is not impossible that it be. And possibility is from among all these: that substantially is, and not that particularly. For to this one and not one of these others does equality apply. In that its affirmation is equal to its negation, while its own substance of accident applies to the others substantially. Behold, these are syllogisms of those which apply substantially to the possibility of the particular. It is possible that it be or not possible, and that it be particular.\n\nIt is possible that it be substantially; it is possible that it not be substantially. Not from necessity it is; not from necessity it is not. It is not impossible that it be; it is not impossible that it not be. Clarification: Three things of equal conversion. Simple affirmation. And the negation of transposition of possibility substantially. And the affirmation of transposition of impossibility. For each one of them, when you take it with its counterpart, turns a conversion upon itself, as when you say: Everything that is from necessity cannot not be. And everything that cannot not be is from necessity. In the same way, when you say: Everything that is from necessity is impossible not to be. And everything that is impossible not to be is from necessity. In the same way, when you say: Everything that is not possible not to be is impossible not to be. And everything that is impossible not to be is not possible not to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܝܠܝܕܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܣܝܠܝܕܝܣ (syllogism) is a loan from Greek συλλογισμός, used throughout this passage to denote formal logical deductions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܛܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܩܛܦܣܝܣ (kataphasis) is a Greek loan (κατάφασις) meaning 'affirmation', contrasted with ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ (apophasis, 'negation') in the logical analysis.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage is divided into two syllogistic sections: 'Syllogism of Equalities' and 'Syllogism of Inequalities', followed by a 'Clarification' that lists three convertible logical relations.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The logical framework here—modal terms such as 'from necessity', 'possible', and 'impossible'—derives from Aristotle's Prior Analytics and De Interpretatione, mediated through Syriac translations of Greek philosophical works.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The 'Clarification' demonstrates that three pairs of modal statements are logically equivalent through conversion, e.g., 'what is from necessity cannot not be' converts to 'what cannot not be is from necessity'.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac text contains several uncertain readings (e.g., ܕܕܝܠܢܝܐ, ܒܪܢܫܐ) that may affect the precise logical distinctions; the translation follows the edition's interpretation."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":35,"ref":"p35","source":"ܘܗܟܢܐ ܬܠܬܐ ܙܘ̈ܓܐ ܗܘ̈ܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܡܬܗܦܟܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܫܘܝ̈ܬܐ. ܘܬܠܬܐ ܙܘ̈ܓܐ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܝܠܗܝܢ. ܦܘܫܟܐ ܘܫܪܝܐ: ܠܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܕܐܢ ܟܠ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܗܿܘܐ ܐܘ ܠܐ ܗܿܘܐ. ܐܝܟܐ ܗܝ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܐܟܚܕܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܘܕܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܝܢܢ. ܕܗܿܝ ܕܠܡܚܪ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܢܗܘܐ ܡܛܪܐ. ܐܘ ܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ. ܠܘ ܠܟܝܢܐ ܡܛܪܢܝܐ ܢܩܝܦܐ ܐܢܢܩܝܘܬܐ ܗܕܐ. ܐܠܐ ܠܫܟܝܚܘܬܗܿ. ܐܘ ܠܠܐ ܫܟܝܚܘܬܗܿ ܕܥܠܬܐ ܥܒܘܕܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܠܫܟܝܚܘܬ. ܥܠܬܐ ܥܒܘܕܬܐ ܫܟܝܚܘܬܗ ܕܥܠܬܢܐ ܬܩܦ. ܐܝܟ ܕܒܗܠܝܢ ܐܠܗܝ̈ܬܐ ܡܬܚܘܝܐ. ܟܝܢܐ ܓܝܪ ܡܛܪܢܝܐ ܐܟܡܐ ܕܡܟܢ ܠܡܩܒܠܘ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܐܬܐ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܠܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܢܐܬܐ ܡܩܒܠ. ܒܕܠܩܘܒܠܐ ܕܟܝܢܐ ܚܝܘܬܢܝܐ ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܠܐ ܡܩܒܠܢܐ ܗܘ ܕܟܝܢܐ ܟܐܦܢܝܐ. ܘܕܟܝܢܐ ܬܘܒ ܐ̱ܢܫܝܐ. ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܡܩܒܠܢܐ ܗܘ ܕܟܝܢܐ ܚܝܘܬܢܝܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܠܦܘܬ ܟܝܢ̈ܝܗܘܢ ܬܠܝܬܝ̈ܝ ܦܘܠܓܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ. ܐܢܢܩܝ̈ܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ ܘܟܠܝ̈ܐ ܘܡܬܡܨܝܢ̈ܐ. ܠܦܘܬ ܕܝܢ ܥ̈ܠܠܬܐ ܥܒܘܕܘ̈ܬܗܘܢ ܬܪ̈ܝܢܝ ܦܘܠܓܐ ܐܢܢܩ̈ܝܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ ܐܢ ܫܟܝ̈ܚܢ ܥܠܠܬܗ̈ܘܢ. ܘܟ̈ܠܝܐ ܐܢ ܠܐ ܫܟܝܚ̈ܢ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܕܥܠ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ\nܙܕܩ ܠܡܕܥ ܕܟܠܢܝܘܬܐ ܓܕܫܐ ܗܝ ܕܢܩܦܬ ܠܟܠܢ̈ܝܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ ܟܝܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܕܠܚܘܕܐܝܬ ܡܬܗܘܢܢ. ܟܕ ܕܝܢ ܐܫܬܟܚ ܗܘ ܗܢܐ ܟܝܢܐ ܕܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ ܒܗ ܐܫܬܘܬܦܘ. ܗܝܕܝܢ ܗܘܬ ܠܗ ܠܡܫܬܡܗܘ ܟܠܢܝܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܗܝ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓܐ ܥܠ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܬܚܘܬܝܗܿ ܠܦܘܬ ܟܝܢ̈ܝܗܘܢ. ܘܠܘ ܠܦܘܬ ܙܢܝ̈ܐ ܕܓܕܫܘ ܠܗܘܢ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܟܕ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܐ ܥܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܠܘ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܟܘܠܢܝܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܫܪܐ ܥܠܘܗܝ.","english":"Thus there are three pairs of equal protases that are convertible, and three other pairs of apodoses that belong to them. The solution and resolution: It is not said whether everything is from necessity or not. Where is the possibility? That which can both be and not be, in that which is said: that which tomorrow is from necessity or not—this necessity is not attached to the nature of the rain, but to its possibility, or to the impossibility of the efficient cause. In that which is from necessity, the possibility of the efficient cause is the possibility of the cause that prevails, as is shown in the divine matters. For natural rain, as much as it is able to receive that which comes, in that same manner it also receives that which does not come. In contrast to animate nature, which from necessity does not receive that which is of a stony nature, and again of a fiery nature, which from necessity receives that which is of an animate nature. For in general, actions are according to their threefold natures: they are necessary to say, and hindering, and possible. According to their efficient causes, they are twofold: necessary to say if their causes are possible, and hindering if they are not possible. The demonstration concerning the universal categorical proposition is that simple one. It is right to know that categoricality is an accident that attaches to categories. In that which is a living nature, something is that is uniquely actualized. When, however, that nature is found in which many participate, then it comes to be named a category. For in general, the categorical proposition is that which is predicated concerning the substances under it according to their natures, and not according to the accidents that happen to them. And because of this, when a living thing is predicated concerning a human, it is not in that which is categorical that something is a human, but the beginning is upon him.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ (protasis) / ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ (apodosis)","severity":"info","text":"These Greek loanwords (πρότασις, ἀπόδοσις) are standard in Syriac logical works for the antecedent and consequent of a conditional proposition. Bar Hebraeus uses them to structure the syllogistic series.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܟܠܢܝܐ (category) / ܟܠܢܝܘܬܐ (categoricality)","severity":"info","text":"Derived from Greek κατηγορία, these terms refer to Aristotle's categories. Bar Hebraeus explains that 'categoricality' is an accident (ܓܕܫܐ) that attaches to categories, distinguishing it from the substance itself.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The discussion of necessity, possibility, and the threefold classification of natures (necessary, hindering, possible) reflects the influence of Aristotelian modal logic as transmitted through Syriac intermediaries, particularly the Prior Analytics.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage moves from listing pairs of protases and apodoses to a resolution (ܦܘܫܟܐ ܘܫܪܝܐ), then to a demonstration (ܢܘܗܪܐ) concerning the universal categorical proposition, and finally to a definition of categoricality as an accident of categories.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or corrupt forms (e.g., ܐܢܢܩܝ for ܐܢܢܩܝܐ, 'necessary'; ܢܗܘܐ for ܢܗܘܐ, 'it is'). The English draft smooths these, but the exact reading of the modal distinctions remains uncertain in places.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase ܕܐܢ ܟܠ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܗܿܘܐ ܐܘ ܠܐ ܗܿܘܐ ('whether everything is from necessity or not') is ambiguous: it could mean 'whether everything that is, is from necessity or not' or 'whether everything is from necessity or not'. The English draft takes the latter.","The term ܟܠܢܝܘܬܐ (categoricality) is defined as an accident (ܓܕܫܐ) that attaches to categories, but the precise relationship between the accident and the category is not fully clarified in this passage."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":36,"ref":"p36","source":"ܘܐܠܐ ܠܐ ܙܕܩ ܗܘܐ ܕܬܫܪ ܐܦ ܥܠ ܣܘܩܪܛܝܣ ܕܠܘ ܟܠܢܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܠܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܟܝܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܟܐܡܬ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܐܦ ܥܠ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܕܫܪܝܪ ܥܠܝܗܘܢ ܟܘܢܝܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܫܪܐ ܬܘܒ. ܟܕ ܓܝܪ ܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܕܟܠ ܒܝܬ ܐܠܦ ܦܫܝܛܐܝܬ. ܠܐ ܒܥܝܢܢ ܠܒܝܬ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܟܠ ܕܡܫܪ ܥܠ ܟܠܢܝܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܟܠܢܝܐ ܗܘ ܡܫܪ ܐܦ ܘܥܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܟܠܚܕ ܐܝܟ ܐܕܫܢܝܘܬܐ ܥܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܠܢܝܐ. ܐܦܠܐ ܠܟܘܠܐ ܕܒܝܬ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܟܠ ܕܡܫܪ ܥܠ ܟܠܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܟܠܐ. ܐܦ ܥܠ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܐ ܡܫܪ ܐܝܟ ܙܘܓܢܝܘܬܐ ܥܠ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܕܥܣܪܐ. ܐܠܐ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܥܠܝܗܘܢ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܒܝܬ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܐܠܦ ܫܪܝܪܐ. ܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܘܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܒܗܿ ܡܬܥܗܕ. ܕܓܘܢܝܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܡܢ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܣܛܪ ܡܢ ܡܬܡܨܝ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܬܪܬܝܢ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܥܠ ܗܢܝܢ ܕܐܢܢܩܝ̈ܢ ܘܠܐ ܐܢܢܩܝ̈ܢ. ܘܐܡܝ̈ܢܢ ܘܠܐ ܐܡܝ̈ܢܢ. ܘܥܠ ܗܕܐ ܬܘܒ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܕܝܠܗܿ ܒܚܝܠܐ ܕܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܟܚܕܐ ܡܨܝ̈ܢ ܠܡܫܪܘ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܣܘܣܝܐ ܕܡܟܐ. ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܣܘܣܝܐ ܕܡܟܐ. ܘܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܫܪܝܪ̈ܢ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܘܠܐ ܒܚܕܐ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܐܡܝܢܘܬܐ ܡܬܚܡܐ: ܘܗܝ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܘܠܗܿ ܡܟܢܐ ܦܠܣܘܦܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܝܬىܕܝܢ ܘܦܫܝܛܬܐ ܐܚܪܬܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܫܟܝܚܝܘܬܢܝܬܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܐܡܪ. ܕܟܠ ܒܝܬ ܐܠܦ ܠܘ ܒܐܡܝܢܘ. ܐܠܐ ܒܙܒܢ ܩܘܛܪܓܐ. ܘܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܬܘܒ ܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ ܐܠܟܣܢܕܪܝܬܐ. ܘܦܪ̈ܝܫܢ ܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܝ ܡܢ ܫܟܝܚܝܘܬܢܝܬܐ. ܐܢ ܐܬܬܪܝܡܘ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܣܛܪ ܡܢ ܐܕܫܐ ܐ̱ܢܫܝܐ ܙܒܢ ܩܘܛܪܓܐ ܡܫܪܐ ܗܝ ܟܕ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ. ܕܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ.","english":"And it would not be proper to release also concerning Socrates, that he is not a man. But in that which is something of a nature, it is said that he is a rational being. And because of this, also concerning all those upon whom the definition of rational being is truly predicated, it is again released. For when it is said that every house is simply an aleph, it does not require the house of humanity. In that which is not everything that is predicated of man, in that which is man, it is also predicated of these, each according to the indication of rational man. Nor for the whole of the house. In that which is not everything that is predicated of all, in that which is all, it is also predicated of species, like the pairing of the number ten. But that each one of the things upon which the house is truly predicated, in that same manner and the aleph is true. And this is the protasis in which nothing of the species is remembered in it. For the answer must be from all sides, from the two possibilities. In a true answer concerning those that are contingent and not contingent, and possible and not possible. And concerning this again, the categorical of it is by the force of the apophasis. In that it is possible to predicate together, like that every horse runs, and not one horse runs, and both are true. In that it is not by one of them that possibility is determined. And this is the protasis which is called the simple general. And the philosopher has a name for it, which is known and another simple one, which is called the hypothetical. Like that which says that every house is not in possibility, but in actuality. And this simple one is also called the Alexandrian. And the two simple ones are distinguished, in that it is from the hypothetical. If all the things of the side of the human indication are raised, the actuality is released when it is said that every animal is rational.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܒܪܢܫܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܒܪܢܫܐ (bar-nāšā) is used here in the sense of 'rational being' or 'human being' as a logical category, not a specific individual. This aligns with Aristotelian usage in Syriac logical works.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ (protasis) is a loanword from Greek πρότασις, meaning 'proposition' or 'premise' in logical discourse. Bar Hebraeus uses it consistently for the antecedent in a conditional or categorical statement.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ (apophasis) is a Greek loanword (ἀπόφασις) meaning 'negation' or 'denial'. Here it refers to a logical operation by which a proposition is negated, central to the discussion of possibility and necessity.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the logical analysis of protases and apodoses, distinguishing between categorical and hypothetical propositions. The reference to 'Alexandrian' and 'hypothetical' simple propositions reflects a taxonomy likely derived from late antique commentary traditions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The example 'every horse runs' and 'not one horse runs' illustrates the principle that contradictory statements can both be true under different modal conditions (e.g., possibility vs. actuality). This is a standard Stoic-Aristotelian exercise in modal logic.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text at the end is ambiguous: 'ܕܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ' could mean 'every animal is rational' (as in the English draft) or 'every animal is a human being'. The intended logical sense likely requires the former, but the phrasing is elliptical.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'ܕܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ' is ambiguous: it may mean 'that every animal is rational' or 'that every animal is a human being'. The logical context favors the former, but the Syriac lacks a copula or qualifier.","The reference to 'Alexandrian' simple proposition is not further explained; it may allude to a specific school or commentary tradition (e.g., Ammonius or Philoponus), but the text does not specify."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":37,"ref":"p37","source":"ܒܣܘܟܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܗܿܝ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܠܐ ܡܫܪܐ ܗܝ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܗܪܟܐ ܚܝܘ̈ܬܐ ܡܬܗܘ̈ܢܢܝܬܐ ܠܐ ܐܡܪ ܐ̱ܢܐ ܫܟܝ̈ܚܬܐ ܕܐܢ ܢܫܬܟܚ̈ܢ ܠܘ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܡܢ ܫܟܝܚܝܘܬܢܝܬܐ. ܡܢܗܿ ܕܝܢ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܕܝܠܢܝܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܚܒܫܐ ܘܠܗܠܝܢ ܕܘܠܐ ܣܟ ܫܟܝ̈ܚܢ ܒܡܥܒܕܢܘܬܐ ܘܗܕܐ ܠܐ ܚܒܫܐ ܐܠܐ ܠܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܒܡܥܒܕܢܘܬܐ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܐܘ ܠܘ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ. ܘܡܢܗܿ ܕܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܕܝܠܢܝܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܚܒܫܐ ܠܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܐܢܢܩ̈ܝܢ. ܘܠܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܠܐ ܐܢܢܩ̈ܝܢ. ܣܛܪ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܟܠܝ̈ܢ. ܘܟܕ ܐܣܬܟܠܬ ܡܢܝܘܬܗܿ ܕܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ. ܐܟܘܬܗܿ ܦܚܡ ܘܠܗܿܝ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ. ܘܠܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܫܪܟܐ. ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܕܡܛܠ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ\nܘܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܠܩܘܒܠܝܘܬ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ܆ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܐܝܬ ܘܐܦܘܦܛܝܩܐܝܬ ܒܚܝܠܐ ܘܒܡܥܒܕܢܘܬܐ. ܐܝܟܢܐ ܕܒܟܝܢܐ ܗܿܝ ܡܢ ܫܪܝܪܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܕܓܠܬܐ. ܩܪܝܚܐܝܬ ܐܘ ܠܘ ܩܪܝܚܐܝܬ. ܘܠܩܘܒܠܝܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܐܝܟ ܓܢܣܐ ܢܣܝܒܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܘܣܩܘ̈ܒܠܝܐ ܘܠܘܬ ܡܕܡ ܘܓܠܝܙܘܬܐ ܘܩܢܝܘܬܐ ܚܒܫܐ. ܘܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܐ ܘܐܦܘܦܛܝܩܝܐ ܐܡܝܪܐ ܕܬܬܦܪܫ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܘܒܚܝܠܐ ܬܘܒ ܘܒܡܥܒܕܢܘܬܐ ܐܡܝܪܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܕܐܦܢ ܠܘ ܒܡܥܒܕܢܘܬܐ ܐܠܐ ܒܚܝܠܐ ܐܢܘܢ ܕܐܢܛܝܦܛܝ̈ܩܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܙܘܓܐ ܘܐܦܙܓܐ. ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܙܘܓܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܗ ܙܘܓܐ ܒܚܝܠܐ ܐܢܛܝܦܛܝܩܝܐ. ܗܘ ܗܟܘܬ ܘܠܐ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܗ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܒܚܝܠܐ ܐܢܛܝܦܛܝܩܝܐ. ܘܒܟܝܢܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܡܝܪܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܬܪܝܢ ܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܕܒܓܕܫܐ ܘܠܘ ܒܟܝܢܐ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܥܒܕܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܘܠܐ ܓܘܫܡܐ.","english":"In the syllogism, that universal proposition is not appropriate in this way. In that there are here natural substances, it does not say that only possible things, if they are found, are not in the head. In the simple universal genus with possibility. From that, the generic potentiality of matter. In that it includes and excludes those that are not possible in actuality, and this does not include but excludes those that are in actuality either continuously or not continuously. And from that potentiality of matter, the generic potentiality. In that it includes those that are and those that are not. Apart from those that stand. And when the meaning of the simple universal category was understood, it is fitting likewise for the simple substance and for the rest. The theory concerning antiphysis.\n\nAnd antiphysis is what is it to the opposition of proposition, categorically and apophatically in power and in actuality. As in nature it is from the true one. The other, however, is of deception, either privatively or not privatively. And to the opposition from as a taken genus. In that it includes antiphysis and opposites and with something and privation and possession. And categorical and apophatic are said to be distinguished antiphysis from these others, and again in power and in actuality it is said. In that there are actions that are not even in actuality but in power, like antipathetic ones such as coupling and uncoupling. That one, however, is not a coupling that is in it a coupling in power antipathetic. It is thus also not an uncoupling that is in it an uncoupling in power antipathetic. And in nature again it is said in that there are two actions that by accident and not by nature antiphysis makes, like animal and not body.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ (antiphysis) is a calque from Greek ἀντίφυσις, meaning 'contrary to nature' or 'opposition in nature'. Bar Hebraeus uses it to denote a logical or ontological category of opposition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܐ (categorically) derives from Greek κατηγορικός, meaning 'predicative' or 'affirmative'. It is paired here with ܐܦܘܦܛܝܩܐܝܬ (apophatically), indicating a distinction between affirmative and negative predication.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"external","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus draws on Aristotelian logic, particularly the categories of potentiality (ܚܝܠܐ) and actuality (ܡܥܒܕܢܘܬܐ), as mediated through Syriac philosophical tradition. The discussion of antiphysis reflects debates on privation and opposition in nature.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the narrative of logical distinctions, moving from universal propositions to the specific concept of antiphysis. It is structured as a series of definitions and contrasts, culminating in examples of antipathetic actions (coupling/uncoupling).","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or possibly corrupt phrases, e.g., 'ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܗܪܟܐ ܚܝܘ̈ܬܐ ܡܬܗܘ̈ܢܢܝܬܐ' (in that there are here natural substances). The reading 'natural substances' is tentative; the term ܚܝܘ̈ܬܐ may also mean 'animals' in other contexts.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The distinction between categorical and apophatic predication in power and actuality parallels discussions in Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry's Isagoge, both influential in Syriac logical works.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac phrase 'ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܗܪܟܐ ܚܝܘ̈ܬܐ ܡܬܗܘ̈ܢܢܝܬܐ' is ambiguous: 'natural substances' or 'animals that are natural'? The context of logical categories favors 'natural substances'.","The term 'ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ' (antiphysis) is rare in Syriac; its precise meaning here as 'opposition in nature' or 'contrary nature' is inferred from the surrounding discussion of privation and possession."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":38,"ref":"p38","source":"ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܓܝܪ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܓܘܢܝ ܡܢ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܡܬܬܪܝܡܢܘܬܗ ܐܦ ܗܝ ܡܬܬܪܝܡܐ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܐܟܚܕܐ ܢܫܪܘܢ: ܗ̄: ܚܝܘܬܐ ܘܠܐ ܓܘܫܡܐ. ܘܩܪܝܚܐܝܬ ܬܘܒ ܐܘ ܠܘ ܩܪܝܚܐܝܬ ܐܡܝܪܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܒܐܠܨܝܐ ܡܢ ܘܒܟܠܝܐ ܘܒܡܬܡܨܝܢܐ ܕܒܙܒܢܐ ܕܩܐܡ ܘܕܥܒܪ ܒܠܚܘܕ. ܫܪܪܐ ܘܕܓܠܘܬܐ ܩܪܝܚܐܝܬ ܡܬܦܪܫܝܢ. ܒܙܒܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܥܬܝܕ ܠܡܬܡܨܝܢܐ ܘܠܐ ܫܪܪܐ ܐܦܠܐ ܕܓܠܘܬܐ ܩܪܝܚܐܝܬ ܡܬܒܕܩܝܢ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܥܠ ܩܢܘ̈ܢܐ ܕܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ\nܥܠ ܩܢܘ̈ܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܣܢܝܩܐ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܗܢܘܢ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܐܢ ܡܬܬܗܡܝܢ ܡܣܬܪܚ ܠܗ ܐܟܣܝܘܡܐ ܕܝܠܗܿ: ܘܗܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܬܠܬܐ. ܗܝܟܕܗܝܝܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ. ܘܗܝܟܕܗܝܝܘܬܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܘܗܝܟܕܗܝܝܘܬܐ ܕܙܒܢܐ. ܘܒܗܝܟܕܗܝܝܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ. ܘܗܝܟܕܗܝܝܘܬܐ ܕܟܘܠܐ ܘܡܢܬܐ. ܘܗܝܟܕܗܝܝܘܬܐ ܕܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܬܚܒ̈ܫܢ. ܗܢܝܢ ܕܒܫܘܚܠܦܗܝܢ ܐܦ ܗܝܟܕܗܝܝܘܬܐ ܐܦ ܗܝܟܕܗܝܝܘܬܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܫܬܚܠܦܐ. ܒܗܝܟܕܗܝܝܘܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܘܗܝܟܕܗܝܝܘܬܐ ܕܐܬܪܐ. ܘܗܝܟܕܗܝܝܘܬܐ ܕܦܘܚܡܐ. ܘܗܝܟܕܗܝܝܘܬܐ ܕܚܝܠܐ ܘܕܡܥܒܕܢܘܬܐ ܡܬܚܒ̈ܫܢ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܒܫܘܚܠܦܗܝܢ ܐܦ ܗܝܟܕܗܝܝܘܬܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܡܫܬܚܠܦܐ. ܘܗܟܢܐ ܐܚܪ̈ܝܐ ܠܩܢܘ̈ܢܐ ܬܡܢܝܐ ܕܩܕܡ̈ܝܐ. ܒܬܠܬܐ ܠܚܘܕ ܐܥܠܘ ܚܒܫܘ. ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܒܕܪ̈ܝܢ: ܚܕ ܩܢܘܢܐ ܕܣܦܩ ܠܡܛܪ ܒܢܛܝܪܘܬܗ ܐܟܣܝܘܡܐ ܕܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܩܦܣܘ ܣܡܘ ܘܐܡܪܘ. ܕܟܕ ܠܐܚܝܢܘܬܐ ܕܐܝܬ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܠܘܬ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܒܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܬܪܝܡ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ. ܒܘܠܒܠܐ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܐܝܬ ܠܡܓܕܫ ܒܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ.","english":"of body, for in that which is of the genus with animal, by its being predicated, it also is predicated. And because of this, it is not possible that together they be established: animal and body. And it is said either categorically or non-categorically, in that it is necessarily, and in cessation, and in possibility, in time that is present and that which passes alone. Truth and falsehood are distinguished categorically. In time, however, that is future and possible, neither truth nor falsehood are categorically determined. A demonstration concerning the categories of the antiphysis.\n\nConcerning the categories, something necessary for the antiphysis to be. They are those which, if they are assumed, the axiom proper to it is extended, and these are three: the hypokeimenon of that which is posited, and the hypokeimenon of that which is predicated, and the hypokeimenon of time. And in the hypokeimenon of that which is posited, the hypokeimenon of the whole and the part, and the hypokeimenon of the limit are contained. These, by their change, also the hypokeimenon of that which is posited is changed. In the hypokeimenon, however, of that which is predicated, the hypokeimenon of place, and the hypokeimenon of disposition, and the hypokeimenon of power and of activity are contained. In that, in the same manner, by their change, also the hypokeimenon of that which is predicated is changed. And thus the remaining ones to the nine categories of the first ones. Into three only they entered and contained them. The remaining ones, however, from those which are in the series: one category which suffices to hold, by its excess, the axiom of the antiphysis, they compressed, placed, and said: that when there is no relation of that which is predicated to that which is posited in the kataphasis, a hyper apophasis is raised. Confusion, and not one, is to be feared in the antiphysis.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ (antiphysis) is a technical term in Bar Hebraeus’s logic, denoting a counter-nature or opposition in predication, distinct from standard Aristotelian categories.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܗܝܟܕܗܝܝܘܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܗܝܟܕܗܝܝܘܬܐ (hypokeimenon) is a direct borrowing of the Greek philosophical term ὑποκείμενον, meaning the underlying subject or substratum in a proposition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage reflects Bar Hebraeus’s engagement with Aristotelian logic, particularly the Categories and On Interpretation, as mediated through Syriac translations and commentaries.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The text moves from a discussion of predication and time (present/past vs. future) to a systematic classification of categories into three hypokeimena (posited, predicated, time), then to a reduction of nine categories to three, and finally to a rule about antiphysis.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or corrupt readings (e.g., ܢܫܪܘܢ, ܩܪܝܚܐܝܬ, ܒܘܠܒܠܐ) that may affect the interpretation of the logical argument; the English draft reflects one possible reconstruction.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The reduction of categories to three hypokeimena parallels similar moves in late antique Neoplatonic and Syriac logical commentaries, such as those by Sergius of Reshaina.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac term ܩܪܝܚܐܝܬ (categorically/non-categorically) is ambiguous: it may refer to categorical vs. hypothetical propositions, or to assertoric vs. non-assertoric modes.","The phrase ܒܘܠܒܠܐ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ (confusion, and not one) is textually uncertain; it may be a scribal error or a deliberate rhetorical flourish."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":39,"ref":"p39","source":"ܘܗܠܝܢ ܩܢܘ̈ܢܐ ܣܦܩܝܢ ܒܐܢܛܝܦܛܝܩܝܘܬܐ ܕܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܒܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܕܟܘܠܐ ܐܘܟܝܬ ܒܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܢܝܬܐ ܥܠ ܩܢܘܢܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܣܢܝܩܐ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܠܘܬ ܗܿܝ ܕܬܗܘܐ: ܗ̄: ܡܫܚܠܦܘܬܐ ܕܒܟܡܝܘܬܐ ܕܠܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ. ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܟܠܢܝ̈ܬܐ ܐܟܚܕܐ ܒܗܘܠܐ ܕܡܬܡܨܝܢܐ ܘܒܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬ ܠܗܝܢ ܕܓܘܢܝ ܡܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܡܨ̈ܝܢ ܠܡܕܓܠܘ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܠܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܡܢ̈ܬܝܬܐ ܐܟܚܕܐ ܒܗܘܠܐ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܡܫܪ̈ܢ. ܘܗܿܢܝܢ ܟܠܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܣܩܘܒ̈ܠܝܐ ܪܘܪ̈ܒܐ ܐܬܟܢ̈ܝܝܢ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܟܘܬܗܘܢ ܠܐ ܡܬܘܡ ܐܟܚܕܐ ܡܨ̈ܝܢ ܠܡܫܪܘ. ܡܨ̈ܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܐܟܚܕܐ ܢܕܓ̈ܠܢ. ܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܡܢ̈ܬܝܬܐ ܕܬܚܝܬ ܣܩܘܒ̈ܠܝܐ ܐܬܩܪ̈ܝܝܢ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܘܬ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܡܬܥ̈ܠܝܢ. ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܕܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܗܿܝ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܠܘ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܟ ܕܐܬܐܡܪܬ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܐܟܚܕܐ ܢܫܪ̈ܢ ܒܕܠܐ ܡܬܚܡܐ ܒܚܕܐ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܐܡܝܢܘܬܐ ܐܘ ܙܒܢܐ ܡܕܡ. ܐܠܐ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܐܡܝܢܬܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܡܕܠܩܒܘ ܡܕܠܩܒܐ ܠܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܕܐܡܝܢܐ ܘܕܠܐ ܐܡܝܢܐ: ܗ̄: ܠܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܒܝܬ ܐܠܦ ܦܫܝܛܐܝܬ ܗܿܝ ܠܐ ܟܠ ܒܝܬ ܐܠܦ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܘܠܗܿܝ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܦܫܝܛܐܝܬ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܕܡ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ. ܘܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܐ ܫܟܝܚܘܬܢܐܝܬ ܟܠ ܒܝܬ ܐܠܦ. ܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܐ ܠܘ ܫܟܝܚܘܬܢܐܝܬ ܟܠ ܒܝܬ ܐܠܦ. ܐܠܐ ܐܘ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬܡܕܡ ܒܝܬ ܐܠܦ. ܐܘ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܠܘ ܟܠ ܒܝܬ ܐܠܦ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܗܿܝ ܟܕ ܠܐ ܐܡܝܢܘܬܐ ܕܩܘܛܪܓܐ. ܐܠܐ ܕܒܙܒܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ ܐܢ ܡܕܓܠܐ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܬܫܪ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܐܡܝܢܬܐ ܐܘ ܐܢ ܬܫܪ: ܗ̄: ܗܿܝ ܣܝܘܡܬܐ ܠܐ ܐܡܝܢܬܐ. ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܬܕܓܠ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܐܡܝܢܬܐ.","english":"And these categories are sufficient in the apodictic science of the protasis of each one, or rather of the whole, likewise in the prosdiorismatic manner concerning another category, a necessary apophasis is toward that which is to be: the variation in quantity of the leptopsis from the whole. Apophasis of the middle will be apophasis. In that these wholes together in these that are possible and in the protases of that which is placed, they have that of the genus with that which is contradicted. They are possible to falsify. In that same manner, the leptopsis of the middle is the apophasis of the whole. In that these middles together in possible wholes are true. And these wholes are great opposites that are known. In that their like are never together possible to be true. They are possible, however, together to be false. These middles, then, under the opposites are called. In that they are elevated toward these. Apophasis with leptopsis is that simple generic, not apophasis simple generic it is. In that as was said, it is possible that together they be true without limit in one of them, some quality or time. But apophasis of quality, in that this is the same as the predicate of the leptopsis of quality and of non-quality: that every alpha simply is not every alpha qualitatively, and that not one simply is something qualitatively. And apophasis of that which says possibly every alpha, that which says not possibly every alpha. But either something qualitatively alpha, or qualitatively not every alpha. In that leptopsis is that when not the quality of the contradiction, but in some time something is known either true or false, so that it may release the apophasis of quality or so that it may release: the conclusion not of quality. So that it may falsify the apophasis of quality.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"Apophasis (negation) is a key logical term in Bar Hebraeus's adaptation of Aristotelian syllogistic, here contrasted with leptopsis (affirmation).","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܩܛܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"Leptopsis (affirmation) is the positive counterpart to apophasis; the text discusses their interaction in modal and qualitative contexts.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"Protasis (proposition) is the basic unit of logical statement; Bar Hebraeus treats it as the subject of apodictic science.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the narrative of logical distinctions, moving from categories to the interplay of affirmation and negation in modal and qualitative propositions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus (13th c.) synthesizes Aristotelian logic with Syriac philosophical tradition; the terms here reflect Greek logical concepts mediated through Syriac translations.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or possibly corrupt phrases (e.g., 'ܐܡܝܢܘܬܐ' and 'ܙܒܥܐ') that may affect the interpretation of modal and temporal qualifiers.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The precise meaning of 'ܐܡܝܥܘܬܐ' (quality) and 'ܙܒܥܐ' (time) in the context of modal logic is ambiguous; the reading taken treats them as standard Aristotelian categories.","The phrase 'ܟܠ ܒܝܬ ܐܠܦ' (every alpha) is a placeholder for a variable; its exact referent in the logical system is unclear."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":40,"ref":"p40","source":"ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܠܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܐ ܫܟܝܚܝܘܬܢܐܝܬ ܡܕܡ ܒܝܬ ܐܠܦ. ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܐ ܠܘ ܫܟܝܚܝܘܬܢܐܝܬ ܡܕܡ ܒܝܬ ܐܠܦ. ܐܠܐ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܟܠ. ܐܘ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܐ ܡܢ ܐܠܨ̈ܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܐ ܠܘ ܡܢ ܐܠܨ̈ܝܬܐ. ܘܠܗܿܝ ܕܡܨܝܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ. ܘܠܗܿܝ ܕܟܠܝܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܟܠܝܐ. ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܕܥܠ ܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ\nܘܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܡܢ ܕܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܫܬܚܠܦܢܘܬܐ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܬܚܘ̈ܡܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܡܪ ܐ̱ܢܐ ܘܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܒܚܕ̈ܕܐ. ܥܡ ܢܛܝܪܘܬܗܿ ܕܐܝܢܝܘܬܐ ܘܕܫܪܪܐ ܘܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܛܝ̈ܩܝܬܐ ܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ ܟܝܬ ܘܐܢܢܩܝ̈ܬܐ ܣܛܪ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܡܬܡܨܝ̈ܢܝܬܐ. ܟܠܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܢܗܘ̈ܝܢ ܐܘ ܡܢ̈ܬܝܬܐ. ܒܟܡܝܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܠܡܢ̈ܬܝܬܐ ܗܦܟ̈ܢ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܨܝܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܓܘܢܝ ܡܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܢܗܘܐ. ܘܒܕܓܘܢ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܥܠ ܟܠܗ ܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܢܗܦܘܟ ܢܬܩܛܪܓ. ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܚܝܘܬܐ. ܒܐܝܢܝܘܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܠܦܫܝܛܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܗܕܐ ܠܐ ܡܫܪܐ ܡܫܪܐ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܝܠܗܿ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܐܡܝܢܬܐ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܘܗܦܟܐ ܐܝܟ ܢܦܫܗܿ ܐܝܟ ܕܡܬܚܘܝܐ ܘܡܢ ܗܪܟܐ ܐܠܨܐ ܐܟܚܕܢܝܘܬ ܫܪܪܐ ܕܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܗܿܝ ܕܫܟܝܪܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܐܡܪ ܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܐܝܟܢ ܕܗܘ. ܣܛܪ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܡܬܡܨ̈ܝܢܝܬܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܡܕܡ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܒܦܫܝܛܘܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ. ܘܐܠܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܝܠܗܿ ܕܐܡܪܐ ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܘܗܦܟܐ ܐܝܟ ܢܦܫܗܿ. ܟܐܡܬ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ. ܘܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ ܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܦܫܝܛܘܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܫܟܝܪܐ. ܘܡܬܚܘܝܐ ܬܘܒ ܫܪܝܪܘܬ ܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܗܢܐ. ܘܒܙܢܐ ܗܿܘ ܡܪܝܡܢܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܝܬܗ ܗܿܝ ܕܫܟܝܪܐ. ܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܓܝܪ ܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ.","english":"In that same manner and for that which is said, \"possibly something between alpha,\" the antithesis is that which is said, \"not possibly something between alpha,\" but universally everything, or universally and not one in that same manner, and the antithesis of that which is said \"from necessities\" is that which is said \"not from necessities,\" and for that which is able is that which is not able, and for that which ceases is that which does not cease. The theory concerning the conversion of the protasis and the conversion from the protasis is the differentiation of each one from the boundaries. That which posits says \"I say,\" and that which is predicated is together. With the nature of substance and truth, and protases from simple categories, both and complex, apart from these are the possible. All things are either substances or accidents. In quantity from accidents are conversions. In that which is able, that which is predicated is within that which posits, and in the interior it is not able that over the whole that which is predicated that which posits is converted to be predicated. As in the case of \"every rational animal.\" In substance, however, for the simple interior, in that if this does not permit, the antithesis of it, which is the universal negative apophasis, and the converse like itself, as is shown, and from here it is necessary the co-truth of the antithesis which is possible, like that which says \"every rational animal,\" as that. Apart from these are the possible. For something is \"animal rational\" in the simple interior, and not true is the antithesis of it which says \"not one animal rational\" universally, and the converse like itself, as it says \"not one rational animal\" universally. And it would be that \"every rational animal\" in the simple interior is that which is possible. And it is shown again the truth of this conversion. And in this is the elevation of something from itself that which is possible. For it is said \"every rational animal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ (antiphasis) is a loan from Greek ἀντίφασις, meaning 'contradiction' or 'antithesis'. Bar Hebraeus uses it as a technical term in logical argumentation, contrasting a positive statement with its negation.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ (protasis) is a loan from Greek πρότασις, meaning 'proposition' or 'premise'. Here it refers to the antecedent clause in a conditional or categorical statement, central to Bar Hebraeus's analysis of logical conversion.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ (apophasis) is a loan from Greek ἀπόφασις, meaning 'negation' or 'denial'. In this passage it denotes a universal negative statement, as in 'not one rational animal'.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the logical exposition of protasis conversion and antithesis, using the example 'every rational animal' to illustrate the relationship between universal affirmative and negative statements. The argument moves from general rules to a specific case.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus (Gregorius bar Hebraeus, 13th–14th cent.) was a Syriac Orthodox scholar and author of the 'Treatise of Treatises', a work on logic and philosophy. This passage reflects the influence of Aristotelian logic, particularly the theory of conversion and opposition of propositions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or corrupt readings, e.g., ܫܟܝܚܝܘܬܢܐܝܬ (possibly 'possibly') and ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ (possibly 'universally'). The English draft reflects these uncertainties, and the precise logical sense may be contested.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac term ܫܟܝܚܝܘܬܢܐܝܬ is uncertain; it may be a corruption or variant of ܫܟܝܚܝܘܬܐ (possibility). The reading 'possibly' is adopted.","The phrase ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܟܠ is ambiguous: it could mean 'universally everything' or 'universally all'. The draft takes it as 'universally everything'.","The example 'every rational animal' is used repeatedly, but its logical status (possible, necessary, or actual) is not fully clarified in the text."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":41,"ref":"p41","source":"ܡܕܝܢ ܡܕܡ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܒܦܫܝܛܘܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ. ܘܐܠܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܝܠܗܿ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܐ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܡܢܐܝܬ. ܘܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ ܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܡܬܟܢܫܐ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܫܟܝܪܐ. ܘܩܛܦܛܝܩ̈ܝܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܡܬܡܨܝ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܒܟܡܝܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܠܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܗܦܟ̈ܢ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܬܐܡܪܬ. ܘܒܐܝܢܝܘܬܐ ܠܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ. ܘܐܠܐ ܡܫܪܐ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܗܕܐ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܘܗܦܟܐ ܐܝܟ ܢܦܫܗܿ ܘܡܬܟܢ̈ܫܢ ܫܟܝܪ̈ܘܬܐ ܕܐܬܐܡܪ̈ܝܢ. ܘܐܢܢܩܝ̈ܬܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܛܝܩ̈ܝܬܐ ܠܐ ܗܦܟ̈ܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ̈ܬܐ. ܐܦܠܐ ܐܡܝ̈ܢܬܐ ܐܡܝ̈ܢܬܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܕܝܠܝܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܕܠܗ ܒܠܚܘܕܘܗܝ ܘܠܘ ܠܟܠܗ ܢܩܦܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܘܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܥܠܘܗܝ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܥܠ ܗܿܘ ܠܘ ܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܐܘ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܐܡܪ. ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܟܠ ܐܣܝܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܘܠܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܗܦܟ ܘܢܐܡܪ ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܚܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܣܝܐ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܕܝܠܢܝܬܐ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܥܠ ܢܦܫܗܿ ܬܗܦܘܟ. ܡܢ ܩܨ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܬܐܡܪܬ: ܗ̄: ܕܡܨܝܐ ܕܢܐܡܪ ܕܡܬܡܨܝܢܐܝܬ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܣܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ ܕܡܬܡܨܝܢܐܝܬ ܐܣܝܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܡܢ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܥܠ ܢܦܫܗܿ ܗܦܟܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܬܗܦܘܟ. ܟܐܡܬ ܠܡ ܟܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܘܐܣܝܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ. ܘܐܝܬ ܬܘܒ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܕܝܠܢܝܬܐ ܬܗܦܘܟ. ܟܐܡܬ ܟܕ ܐܣܝܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܠܒܪܢܫܐ. ܘܗܿܝ ܕܚܒܫܐ ܠܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܗܿܝ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ. ܘܗܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܩܛܦܛܝܩ̈ܝܬܐ.","english":"something of an animal in a head in a simple general manner. And not the true hypothesis of it is that which says that not one animal in a head specifically. And it was every animal in a head. It is refuted that not one in a head in a head that which is common. And the categories again are possible both of them in that likeness in quantity from the addition of opposites as was said. And in substance to possibility generally. And not the beginning of the hypothesis of this which is the apophasis total specific and opposite as itself and the refuted commonalities that were said. And specifics from categories do not become opposites. Nor do middles middles in that which there is when that which is placed of particularity will be that which is predicated of it alone and not of the whole series. For that which is predicated specifically and middlingly is predicated of it. That which is upon it not specifically or middlingly. As that which says: from specific every physician in a head. And it is not true that which is opposite and says: from specific one in a head physician. In that likeness and possibility of particularity cannot be converted upon itself. From the end of that which was said: that it is possible to say that possibly in a head physician he is. And it is not possible to say that possibly physician in a head he is. In that from specific he is. And possibility from general is converted upon itself. In that there is when the specific is converted. As when in a head was that which is placed and physician that which is predicated. And there is again when the possibility of particularity is converted. As when physician was that which is placed to a head. And that which binds both of them is the possibility general. And these from those categories.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ (hypothesis) is a loan from Greek ὑπόθεσις, used here in a logical sense as 'supposition' or 'premise'.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ (apophasis) is a loan from Greek ἀπόφασις, meaning 'negation' or 'denial', contrasting with hypothesis.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܛܦܛܝܩ̈ܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܩܛܦܛܝܩ̈ܝܬܐ (categories) is a loan from Greek κατηγορίαι, referring to Aristotle's categories, a standard logical framework.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues a logical exposition on the conversion of propositions, specifically the non-convertibility of specific and middling terms, using the example of 'physician in a head'.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several scribal errors or ambiguous readings (e.g., ܒܪܢܫܐ repeated, ܡܬܟܢܫܐ for ܡܬܟܫܐ), making the logical argument difficult to parse precisely.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The discussion of conversion of propositions (e.g., 'from specific every physician in a head' vs. 'from specific one in a head physician') reflects Aristotelian logic as mediated through Syriac translations of Porphyry's Isagoge.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac text is corrupt in several places (e.g., ܒܪܢܫܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ, ܡܬܟܢܫܐ), making the exact logical steps uncertain. The reading adopted follows the English draft's interpretation of a discussion on non-convertibility of specific and middling terms."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":42,"ref":"p42","source":"ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܐܦܘܦܛܝ̈ܩܝܬܐ ܡܢ̈ܬܝܬܐ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ ܗܦܟ̈ܢ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܨܝܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܛܒ ܡܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܢܗܘܐ. ܘܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܓܘܢܝܐ ܢܬܬܪܝܡ ܡܢ ܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܐܝܟܡܐ ܕܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܡܢ ܓܘܢܝܐ. ܘܐܠܐ ܒܛܠܬ ܠܗܿ ܕܝܠܢܝܘܬܐ ܟܠܢܐܝܬ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܐܡܪ ܕܠܘ ܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܣܝܐ. ܘܠܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܕܢܐܡܪ ܕܠܘ ܟܠ ܐܣܝܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܒܕ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܟܠ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܦܘܦܛܝܩ̈ܝܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܟܠܢܝ̈ܬܐ. ܗܿܢܝܢ ܡܢ ܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ ܘܡܬܡܨܝ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܘܙܒܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܡܐܠܘܢ ܕܝܢ ܟܠܗܝܢ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܠܘ ܐܡܝܢܬ ܩܘܛܪܓܐ ܐܝܬܝ̈ܗܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ ܗܦܟ̈ܢ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܫܪܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܬܘܒܐ ܐܘ ܣܝܘܩܐ: ܗ̄: ܠܘ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ. ܘܠܐ ܡܫܪܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܟܬܘܒܐ ܐܘ ܣܝܘܩܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܠܘ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܟܠ ܟܬܘܒܐ ܘܡܕܡ ܣܝܘܩܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ. ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܐܢܢܩ̈ܝܬܐ ܘܐܡܝ̈ܢܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܢܦܫܗܝܢ ܗܦܟ̈ܢ. ܘܐܠܐ ܓܕܫܐ ܡܬܬܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܝܬܗ ܗܿܝ ܕܫܟܝܪܐ. ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ ܗܿܝ ܡܢ ܓܝܪ ܕܐܡܪܐ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ ܫܠܝܐ ܟܕ ܡܬܬܙܝܥ. ܗܦܟܐ ܠܗܿܝ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܫܠܝܐ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ ܟܕ ܫܠܐ ܘܐܠܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܐܡܪܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܫܠܝܐ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ ܟܕ ܫܠܐ. ܘܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ ܫܠܝܐ ܟܕ ܡܬܬܙܝܥ. ܘܡܬܟܢܫܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܫܠܝܐ ܠܘ ܫܠܝܐ ܟܕ ܫܠܐ. ܐܘ ܠܘ ܟܠ ܫܠܝܐ ܫܠܝܐ ܟܕ ܫܠܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܫܟܝܪܐ. ܘܡܬܚܘܝܐ ܬܘܒ ܡܪܢܝܘܬܗ ܕܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܗܢܐ. ܘܒܙܢܐ ܕܡܘܒܠܢܘܬܐ ܕܠܘܬ ܠܐ ܡܫܟܚܢܘܬܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܐܡܪ ܕܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܐܘ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܐܦܐ. ܗܦܟܐ ܠܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ. ܐܘ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܟܐܦܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܘܐܠܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܟܐܦܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܐܝܬ ܐܘ ܦܫܝܛܐܝܬ.","english":"These then are the apophatical propositions, simple and not at all convertible. For that which is predicated of the particular well is not with that which is posited of the universal. And the universal cannot be raised with the particular as the particular can with the universal. Otherwise, particularity is entirely abolished, as in the statement that not every animal is in a head. And it is not true that says that not every head is an animal. For when every is posited, it is all. The apophatical propositions, however, are universal. These are simple and mediate and temporal. But all these are propositions that do not admit of conversion. For that which says that not one head is a writer or a poet is not true. And that which says that not one writer or poet is a head is not true. For when every writer and every poet is in a head truly. These then are posited and true in themselves, convertible. Otherwise, there occurs the raising of something from itself, which is absurd. For as that which says that not one moving thing is at rest while moving, it converts to that which says that not one resting thing is moving while at rest. But the true hypothesis is that which says that something at rest is moving while at rest. And it is that which is not one moving thing at rest while moving. And it is refuted that something at rest is not at rest while at rest, or that not every resting thing is at rest while at rest. This is absurd. And the weakness of this conversion is again shown. And by the force of the impossibility of the relation to the impossible, as in that which says that which is posited universally or truly is not one stone in a head. It converts to that which says that universally or truly not one stone is in a head. But the true hypothesis is that which says that something stone in a head is mediately or simply.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܦܘܦܛܝ̈ܩܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"Apophatical propositions: negative propositions in Aristotelian logic, here contrasted with universal and particular affirmations.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage continues the logical analysis of propositions, moving from universal to particular and then to apophatical forms, with examples of conversion.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The discussion of conversion and hypothesis reflects Aristotelian and Porphyrian logic, common in Syriac philosophical treatises.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or corrupt phrases (e.g., ܡܢ̈ܬܝܬܐ, ܗܦܟ̈ܢ) that may affect the logical argument; the English draft attempts to resolve them.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ","severity":"info","text":"Truly: an adverb indicating truth or universality in logical propositions, contrasted with particular or mediate forms.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac term ܡܢ̈ܬܝܬܐ is unclear; it may mean 'mediate' or 'temporal' as in the English draft, but the exact sense is uncertain.","The phrase ܘܠܐ ܣܟ ܗܦܟ̈ܢ is ambiguous: 'not at all convertible' or 'not at all turning'? The draft takes it as 'not at all convertible'."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":43,"ref":"p43","source":"ܘܗܦܟܐ ܥܠ ܢܦܫܗܿ ܕܡܕܡ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܐܦܐ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܐܝܬ ܐܘ ܦܫܝܛܐܝܬ. ܘܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܐܦܐ ܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ. ܐܘ ܐܡܝܢܐܝܬ ܗܿܝ ܕܫܟܝܪܐ. ܘܠܙܢܐ ܡܢ ܕܗܿܝ ܕܟܠܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܐܫܬܘܕܥܝܗܝ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܡܕܡ ܗܘ ܐ̱ܚܪܝܢ ܣܘܟܠܗ ܐܠܐ ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܩܦܠܐܘܢ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ\nܥܠ ܪܘܟܒܐ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܕܡܫܬܪܪܢܘܬܐ\nܢܘܗܪܐ ܕܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܘܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ\nܘܙܕܩ ܠܡܕܥ ܕܗܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܐܝܟܢ ܕܗܘ ܟܐܡܬ ܒܙܢܐ ܡܪܢܝܐ ܐܘ ܠܘ ܡܪܢܝܐ ܒܝܕ ܡܐܡܪܐ ܡܕܡ ܗܘܝܐ ܕܡܢ ܡܐܡܪ̈ܐ ܡܪܟܒ. ܘܡܟܢ ܕܢܦܝܣ ܥܠ ܟܠ ܒܥܬܐ ܐܝܕܐ ܕܗܝ. ܘܟܕ ܗܘ ܗܢܐ ܣܓܝܐܝܢ ܦܘܠܓ̈ܘܗܝ ܒܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܡܟܢ ܫܪܪܐ ܠܡܬܒܕܩܘ ܡܪܢܐܝܬ. ܘܟܕ ܠܗܢܐ ܡܢ ܐܝܟ ܕܡܨܝܐ ܣܥܪܝܢܢ. ܐܝܛܐ ܐܦ ܠܗܿܢܘܢ ܗܠܘܟܐܝܬ ܢܥܗܕ. ܘܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܐܡܪܐ ܕܡܪܟܒ ܡܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܢܝܢ ܕܟܕ ܡܬܬܫ̈ܠܡܢ. ܡܐܡܪܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܟܝܢܐܝܬ ܠܗ ܢܩܦ. ܘܪܘܟܒܐ ܕܡܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܦܪܫ ܠܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܡܢ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܝ ܚܕܐ ܕܢܩܦܐ ܠܫܪܝܪܘܬܗܿ ܫܪܝܪܘܬ ܗܦܘܟܝܗܿ. ܘܕܓܠܘܬܐ ܕܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܝܠܗܿ. ܘܕܟܕ ܡܬܬܫ̈ܠܡܢ ܐܡܝܪܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܐܠܨܐ ܕܒܟܝܢܗܝܢ ܫܪܝܪ̈ܬܐ ܢܗܘ̈ܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ. ܐܝܛܐ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܫܪܪܐ ܢܬܟܢܫ. ܐܠܐ ܘܡܨܝܐ ܕܟܕ ܠܐ ܫܪܝܪ̈ܢ ܘܐܝܟ ܫܪܝܪ̈ܬܐ ܡܬܢܣ̈ܒܢ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܡܕܡ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܢܬܟܢܫ ܫܪܝܪܐܝܬ. ܘܟܝܢܐܝܬ ܬܘܒ ܐܡܝܪܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܢܬܦܪܫ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܡܢ ܙܢܝ̈ܐ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܠܐ ܡܟܢ̈ܫܢܐ ܕܡܢ ܩܨ ܟܝܢܐ ܕܗܘ̈ܠܐܣ ܘܠܘ ܟܝܢܐ ܕܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܫܪܪܐ ܡܟܢܫܝܢ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܟܕ ܡܢܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܕܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗܿ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܟܝܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܕܠܗܝܢ ܡܫܬܪܝܐ ܬܚܘ̈ܡܐ ܡܬܟܢ̈ܝܢ.","english":"And conversely, concerning the thing itself, it is either potentially or simply a stone. And it is not one stone substantially, or truly, that which is composite. And it is less than that which is universal, like a substance, it is known by that which is not something else, its whole meaning, but that which is substantial is not. Third Section\n\nOn the second composition of demonstration\n\nThe elucidation of syllogism and its parts\n\nAnd it is fitting to know that faith is like that which is said in a small matter, either principal or not principal, by means of a statement that is something composed of statements. And thus it is fitting for every inquiry of whatever kind. And when this is so, its many divisions are in syllogism alone, thus truth is to be examined principally. And when for this, as it is possible to act, it is also fitting to consider those things logically. And a syllogism is a statement composed of propositions such that when they are completed, another statement necessarily follows. And the composition of propositions distinguishes a syllogism from a proposition, which is one that follows for its truth the truth of its converse. And of the falsehood of its antiphasis. And of when they are completed, it is said that it is not necessary that the propositions be true in their nature; thus truth is sought from them. But it is possible that when they are not true, yet as if they were true, something else is truly sought from them substantially. And again it is said naturally, as it is distinguished, a true syllogism from false ones, those which do not seek from the end of the nature of hyle, nor the nature of a true syllogism do they seek. Elucidation: And a proposition, when it is a part of a syllogism, its parts are the natural terms from which the boundaries are set.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ","severity":"info","text":"A loanword from Greek συλλογισμός, here defined as a statement composed of propositions from which another necessarily follows. Bar Hebraeus uses it as a technical term for syllogism in Aristotelian logic.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"A loanword from Greek πρότασις, meaning 'proposition'. The text distinguishes a proposition from a syllogism by noting that a proposition is a single statement whose truth depends on its converse and antiphasis.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage reflects Aristotelian logic as transmitted through Syriac intermediaries, particularly the distinction between true and false syllogisms and the role of hyle (matter) in logical analysis.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage begins the third section of the treatise, titled 'On the second composition of demonstration', and introduces the elucidation of syllogism and its parts, marking a shift from apophatic propositions to logical composition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or corrupt readings, e.g., 'ܟܐܦܐ' (stone) appears abruptly in a logical context, and the phrase 'ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܐܦܐ' may be a scribal error or a deliberate example of a particular term.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The term 'stone' (ܟܐܦܐ) appears without clear logical function; it may be an example of a particular substance or a textual corruption.","The phrase 'ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܐܦܐ' is syntactically unclear; the reading 'not one stone' is tentative."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":44,"ref":"p44","source":"ܘܟܝܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܐܡܝܪܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܣ ܘܙܢܐ ܘܐܣܪܐ ܠܘ ܡܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܟܝܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܕܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܟܠ ܒܝܬ ܓܡܠ. ܘܟܠ ܓܡܠ ܐܠܦ. ܬܪܬܝܢ ܐܢܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ. ܘܒܝܬ ܘܓܡܠ ܘܐܠܦ ܬܚܘ̈ܡܐ. ܘܟܢܘܫܝܗܘܢ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ. ܘܗܿܘ ܕܠܗܘܢ ܢܩܦ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܟܠ ܒܝܬ ܐܠܦ ܣܘܢܦܪܝܣܡܐ. ܘܗܘ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܐܘ ܣܘܢܢܘܕܝܩܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܢܗܘ ܕܒܚܝܠܐ ܐܝܬ ܠܗ ܗܘ ܒܗ ܠܣܘܢܦܪܝܣܡܐ. ܐܘ ܠܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܝܠܗ. ܐܝܟ ܗܢܐ ܕܐܬܐܡܪ ܐܘ ܬܢܝܝܐ. ܐܢ ܗܘ ܕܒܡܥܒܕܢܘܬܐ ܥܗܝܕ ܒܗ ܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܝܬ ܠܡܚܘܝܘ. ܘܒܣܘܢܢܘܕܝܩܝܐ ܡܢ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܐܟܚܕܐ ܒܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܡܫܬܟܚ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܡܬܟܢܐ. ܘܗܘ ܘܣܟܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܣܘܢܦܪܝܣܡܐ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܙܥܘܪܐ. ܘܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܒܗ ܗܘ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܣܘܢܦܪܝܣܡܐ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܪܒܐ. ܘܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܒܗ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܪܒܬܐ. ܘܐܝܟܢܝܘܬ ܣܝܡܐ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܠܘܬ ܣܟ̈ܐ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܡܬܟܢܐ. ܦܘܠܓܐ: ܘܗܘ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܐܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܗܘ ܒܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܘܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܒܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܗܘ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܡܬܟܢܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܚܘܝ ܒܝܬܗ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܐܦ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܒܗ ܡܬܚܘܝܢ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܒܗܦܟܐ ܗܘ ܕܗܢܐ ܗ̄ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܗܘ ܒܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܗܘ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܡܬܟܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ. ܘܒܗܿܝ ܕܛܒ ܡܒܥܕ ܡܢ ܟܝܢܐ ܡܢ ܩܕܡ̈ܝܐ ܠܐ ܐܫܬܘܝ ܠܥܘܗܕܢܐ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܒܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܘ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܗܘ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܒܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܣܝܡ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܘ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ. ܘܗܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܬܪܝܢ ܐܝܬ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܟܝ̈ܢܐ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܚܪ̈ܝܦܐ ܒܠܥܕ ܝܘܠܦܢܐ ܢܕܪܟܘܢ ܐܢܘܢ. ܘܡܛܠ ܕܠܘ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܬܝܐ ܡܟܢܫ̈ܢܐ ܗܿܘܝܢ ܗܢܘܢ ܐܣܟܝ̈ܡܐ. ܐܠܐ ܒܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܕܝܠܢ̈ܝܐ ܐܘܟܝܬ ܩܢܘ̈ܢܐ.","english":"And naturally, the said prosodyrismos and the small and the bond are not natural matters of protasis. For every Beth is a Gamal, and every Gamal is an Alaph. Two things are protaseis, and Beth and Gamal and Alaph are boundaries. And their conjunction is a syllogism. And that which adheres to them, which is every Beth Alaph, is a syzygy. And it is either a syllogism or a syncategorema. For that which is in potentiality has that in it for a syzygy, or for its own antitypasis, like this which is said or a definition. Or that which is in actuality is accustomed in it to one of them as it is to show. And in a syncategorema with a boundary, that which together in both protaseis is found, a middle boundary is shown. And it is the aim of that which is placed in a syzygy, a small boundary. And the protasis in which it is, is a small protasis. And that which is accused in a syzygy is a large boundary. And the protasis in which it is, is a large protasis. And as the placing of a middle boundary with aims, a first schema is shown. Division: And this middle boundary, if it is that which is accused in the small one and that which is placed in the large one, the first schema is the schema shown. In that which shows its house, it is. And also others are shown in it. Or conversely, that which is of this, that which is placed in the large one, the schema is the schema shown, the fourth. And in that which is far from nature, from the first ones, it is not equal for remembrance. Or in both, the accused schema is the second schema. Or in both, the placed schema is the third schema. And these with the second are when the natures are sharp without teaching, they know them. And because they are not as they come, the schemata are not confused, but in their own species, like types.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܣ (prosodyrismos)","severity":"info","text":"A Greek loanword (προσδιορισμός) meaning 'additional determination' or 'qualification'; here it likely refers to a logical qualifier attached to a protasis.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ (syllogismos)","severity":"info","text":"Standard Greek loanword for 'syllogism'; Bar Hebraeus uses it in the Aristotelian sense of a deductive argument composed of two premises and a conclusion.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܥܦܪܝܣܡܐ (syzygy)","severity":"info","text":"From Greek συζυγία, 'conjunction' or 'pairing'; here it denotes a paired relation of terms or propositions within a syllogistic structure.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܥܬܘܕܝܩܝܐ (syncategorema)","severity":"info","text":"Greek συγκατηγόρημα, a term from logic meaning a 'co-predicate' or syncategorematic expression; Bar Hebraeus distinguishes it from a full syllogism.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܘܠܓܐ (division)","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac word marks a formal division in the argument, introducing a classification of syllogistic schemata (first, second, third, fourth) based on the placement of the middle term.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Beth, Gamal, Alaph","severity":"info","text":"These Syriac letters (B, G, A) are used as placeholders for terms in a syllogism, analogous to the use of letters in Aristotelian logic (e.g., A, B, C) to denote subject, predicate, and middle term.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The precise logical distinction between 'syllogism' and 'syncategorema' in this passage is not fully clarified; the text may be drawing on a lost Greek source.","The identification of the 'fourth schema' is unusual in standard Aristotelian logic and may reflect a later development or a specific Syriac tradition."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":45,"ref":"p45","source":"ܘܩܢܘ̈ܢܐ ܡܢ ܓܘܢ̈ܝܐ ܠܐܪ̈ܒܥܬܝܗܘܢ. ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܡܢܬܝ̈ܬܐ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܡܟܢܫܢܐ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܗܘܐ. ܐܦܠܐ ܡܢ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܐܦܘܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܘܪܒܬܐ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܐܦܠܐ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܐܦܘܦܛܝ̈ܩܝܬܐ. ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܥܠ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ\nܘܠܗܢܐ ܡܢ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܩܢܘ̈ܢܐ ܐܝܬ ܬܪܝܢ ܕܝܠܢ̈ܝܐ ܗ̄ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܘܬ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܐܝܟܢܐ ܕܢܬܝܒܠ ܦܣܩܐ ܡܢ ܣܟܐ ܪܒܐ ܠܗܿܘ ܙܥܘܪܐ. ܕܬܪܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܟܠܢܝܘܬ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܘܐܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܡܨܥܝܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܐܬܩܛܪܓ ܥܠ ܣܟܐ ܙܥܘܪܐ. ܠܘ ܗܘ ܟܕ ܗܘ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܿܘ ܕܥܠܘܗܝ ܣܟܐ ܗܿܘ ܪܒܐ ܐܬܩܛܪܓ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܠܐ ܡܬܡܛܐ ܦܣܩܐ ܡܢ ܪܒܐ ܠܙܥܘܪܐ. ܘܐܢ ܒܕܘܟ ܡܟܢܫܢܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܢܐ ܒܙܢܐ ܐܝܢܐ ܕܠܐ ܢܛܝܪܝܢ ܒܗ ܩܢܘ̈ܢܐ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܠܘ ܡܪܢܐܝܬ ܙܕܩ ܠܡܕܢ ܟܘܢܫܗܘܢ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܠܘ ܒܟܠ ܡܟܢ̈ܫܝܝ ܫܪܪܐ ܗܿܠܝܢ. ܡܟܢܫܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܠܦܘܬ ܟܝܢܐ ܕܗܘ̈ܠܐܣ ܕܡܬܟܝ̈ܢܢ. ܘܡܛܠ ܕܐܫܬܥܣܪ ܡܨܝܢ ܠܡܗܘܐ ܙܢܝ̈ܐ ܒܟܠ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ. ܐܝܟ ܕܬܒܥ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܢܝܐ. ܟܕ ܩܢܘ̈ܢܐ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܡܬܢܛܪܝܢ. ܐܪܒܥܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܫܪܟܝܢ ܒܗ ܙܢܝ̈ܐ ܡܟܢܫ̈ܢܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܥܡ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܟܠܢܝ̈ܬܐ ܬܪܝܢ ܙܢܝ̈ܐ ܥܒܕܐ. ܘܗܿܝ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܥܡܗܝܢ ܟܕ ܥܡܗܝܢ ܬܪܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ. ܙܢܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܓܘܫܡܐ. ܘܟܠ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܐܘܣܝܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܘܣܝܐ. ܙܢܐ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܟܐܦܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܐܦܐ. ܙܢܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ.","english":"And the categories from the genera are not from their four. For not one of them from the two protaseis can be a prosodyrismos that is concealed. Nor from the small apophatike and the great protasis, nor from the two apophatikai. Theory on the first schema.\n\nAnd to this, from the schema of categories there are two that are proper: kataphatike, which is the small, such that a conclusion passes from the great limit to the small one. And the two are the apophatike, which is the great. And it is not possible that the one that is concluded upon the small limit be the middle, nor the one upon which the great limit is concluded. And because of this, a conclusion does not pass from the great to the small. And if in place of a concealed schema this schema were in a genus that does not preserve these categories, it would not be fitting to know their force properly. And because of this, not in all concealed things are these truths. They are concealed according to the nature of the hylai that are composed. And because it is possible for the species to be dispersed in every schema, as follows from the prosodyrismatic composition, when these categories are two, they are concluded. Only four remain in it as species that are concealed. In that kataphatike apophatike with its two apophatikai, it makes two species. And that protasis with its two, along with two others. The first species from kataphatike apophatike is the small, and kataphatike apophatike is the great. Kataphatike apophatike is concealed, as that every individual is a body, and every body is an ousia. Therefore every individual is an ousia. The second species from kataphatike apophatike is the small, and apophasis apophatike is the great. Apophasis apophatike is concealed, as that every individual is an animal, and not one animal is a stone. Therefore not one individual is a stone. The third species from kataphatike protasis is the small.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The phrase ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ (kataphatike apophatike) is a hybrid term combining 'affirmative' and 'negative', likely denoting a mixed propositional form in Bar Hebraeus's logical system.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ (apophasis apophatike) appears as a distinct logical category, contrasting with kataphatike apophatike, and is glossed as 'the great' in the schema.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The reference to 'first schema' (ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ) situates this passage within Aristotelian syllogistic, specifically the first figure, which Bar Hebraeus adapts to his own categorical logic.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܙܢܝ̈ܐ","severity":"info","text":"The passage enumerates three 'species' (ܙܢܝ̈ܐ) derived from combinations of kataphatike and apophatike, each illustrated with a syllogistic example, indicating a systematic classification.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܟܢ̈ܫܝܝ ܫܪܪܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The phrase 'concealed truths' (ܡܟܢ̈ܫܝܝ ܫܪܪܐ) is ambiguous; it may refer to hidden logical principles or to propositions that are not immediately evident, and the text warns they are not universally applicable.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The identity of the 'two apophatikai' and their relation to the 'great' and 'small' limits is not fully clarified; the text may conflate different logical levels.","The term 'prosodyrismatic composition' (ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܢܝܐ) is obscure and may reflect a technical neologism in Bar Hebraeus's system."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":46,"ref":"p46","source":"ܘܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܕܡ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܘܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܠܝܠܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܡܕܡ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܡܠܝܠܐ. ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܕܡ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܣܘܣܝܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܠܘ ܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܣܘܣܝܐ. ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܕܥܠ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܬܪܝܢܐ\nܘܠܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܡܢ ܬܘܒ ܗܢܐ ܩܢܘ̈ܢܐ ܐܝܬ ܐܠܨ̈ܝܐ ܬܪܝܢ. ܡܫܚܠܦܘܬ ܠܡ ܐܝܢܝܘܬܐ ܕܬܪܬܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܐܦܘܦܛܝܩܝܘܬ ܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܓܘܢܐܝܬ ܐܦܠܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܘܬܗܝܢ ܕܝܠܢܐܝܬ ܗܿܪܟܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܢ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܘܕܝܠܗܿ ܗܘ ܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܐܝܟܢ ܕܗܝ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܗܦܟܐ ܘܩܕܡܬ ܝܕܥܬ ܕܡܢܝܘܬ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܠܐ ܡܟܢܫܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܒܗܿܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ. ܘܟܠܢܝܘܬ ܣܟܐ ܗܿܘ ܪܒܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܢܝܢ ܡܢܬܝ̈ܬܐ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܗܝ ܡܢ ܘܠܐ ܡܬܗܦܟܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܗܦܟܐ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܠܐ ܡܟܢܫܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܒܗܿܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ. ܘܟܕ ܩܢܘ̈ܢܐ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܬܪܝܢ ܡܬܢܛܪܝܢ ܐܪܒܥܐ ܫܪܟܝܢ ܙܢܝ̈ܐ ܡܟܢܫ̈ܢܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܥܡ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܐܦܘܦܣܝ̈ܣ ܙܥܘܪ̈ܝܬܐ ܬܪܝܢ ܙܢܝ̈ܐ ܥܒܕܐ. ܘܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܥܡ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܩܛܦܛܝ̈ܩܝܬܐ ܬܪܝܢ ܙܢܝ̈ܐ. ܙܢܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܟܐܦܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܐܦܐ. ܘܡܬܚܘܐ ܒܝܕ ܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܘܗܿܘܐ ܙܢܐ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ. ܙܢܐ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܡܢ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ.","english":"And the universal kataphasis is the great one. The concealed kataphasis is the middle one, like that of something animal in a rational being, and every rational being is an animal. Therefore, something animal is rational. The fourth figure is from the middle kataphasis, which is the small one, and the universal apophasis is the great one. The concealed apophasis is the middle one, like that of something animal in a rational being, and not one rational being is a horse. Therefore, not every animal is a horse.\n\nTheory concerning the second figure.\n\nAnd for the second figure, there are again two necessary rules: the conversion of the identity of the two protaseis, in that from the apophatike of both of them, not one syllogism is produced intrinsically, nor from their kataphatike, which is particular. Here, in that the great one, if it is again kataphatike, its own conversion is that which is this, just as the middle one is converted. And you have already known that the middle of the great one is not concealed in that first one, and the universality of the purpose is that great one, in that these two middle ones are from it and are not converted. That which is middle is converted, and because of this, it is not concealed in that first one. And when these two rules are added, the remaining four concealed figures are produced, in that the universal kataphasis, which is the great one, together with these two small apophaseis, makes two figures. And the universal apophasis, which is the great one, together with these two kataphatikai, makes two figures. The first figure is from the universal kataphasis, which is the small one, and the universal apophasis, which is the great one. The concealed universal apophasis, like that of every rational being is an animal, and not one stone is an animal. Therefore, not one rational being is a stone. And it is demonstrated by means of the conversion of the great one, and it becomes the second figure, the first one. The second figure is from the universal apophasis, which is the small one, and the universal kataphasis, which is the great one.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܛܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܩܛܦܣܝܣ (qṭāp̄sīs) is a loan from Greek κατάφασις, meaning 'affirmation' or 'positive statement'. Bar Hebraeus uses it to denote a type of proposition in syllogistic logic.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ (ʾap̄ōp̄sīs) is a loan from Greek ἀπόφασις, meaning 'negation' or 'negative statement'. It is paired with ܩܛܦܣܝܣ to describe the two basic types of propositions in the syllogistic figures.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the analysis of syllogistic figures, introducing the second figure (ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܬܪܝܢܐ) and its two necessary rules (ܩܢܘ̈ܢܐ ܐܠܨ̈ܝܐ). The text enumerates four concealed figures (ܙܢܝ̈ܐ ܡܟܢܫ̈ܢܐ) derived from combinations of universal and particular propositions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus here adapts Aristotelian syllogistic logic, specifically the theory of the second figure as found in the Prior Analytics. The discussion of conversion (ܗܦܘܟܝܐ) and the conditions for valid syllogisms reflects the Syriac reception of Greek logical traditions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The English draft contains several ambiguities, e.g., 'the concealed kataphasis is the middle one' may misrepresent the Syriac ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ, which could also be read as 'the middle one is concealed'. The logical relationships in the fourth figure description are particularly dense and may be misconstrued.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac phrase ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ could be parsed as 'the middle one is concealed' or 'the concealed middle one'; the English draft opts for the latter. The identity of the 'two middle ones' (ܡܢܬܝ̈ܬܐ ܬܪܬܝܢ) in the second figure discussion is unclear—whether they refer to the middle terms of the two protaseis or to the middle propositions themselves. The phrase 'the universality of the purpose' (ܟܠܢܝ"],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":47,"ref":"p47","source":"ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܟܐܦܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܘܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܟܐܦܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܘܡܬܚܘܐ ܒܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܠܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܒܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܣܘܢܦܪܝܣܡܐ ܘܗܿܘܝܐ ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܙܢܐ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ. ܙܢܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܝܬܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܘܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܕܡ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܣܘܣܝܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܠܘ ܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܣܘܣܝܐ. ܘܡܬܚܘܐ ܒܝܕ ܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܘܗܿܘܐ ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ. ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ ܡܢ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܘܟܠ ܡܠܝܠܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܠܘ ܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܡܠܝܠܐ. ܘܗܘ ܡܢ ܙܢܐ ܗܢܐ ܠܐ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܬܚܘܝܘ ܒܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢܬܝ̈ܬܐ ܐܦܠܐ ܟܕ ܒܚܕ̈ܕܐ ܢܬܚ̈ܠܦܢ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܘܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܝܕܝܟ ܠܐ ܡܬܗܦܟܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܘܝܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܐܠܨܬ ܕܒܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܢܬܛܟܢ ܠܘܬ ܚܘܘܝܗ. ܕܡܢܗܘܢ ܡܘܒܠܢܘܬܐ ܕܠܘܬ ܠܐ ܡܫܟܚܢܘܬܐ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܗܟܢܐ. ܐܢ ܠܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܘ ܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܡܠܝܠܐ. ܫܪܝܪܐ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܡܠܝܠܐ. ܘܐܝܬ ܗܘܐ ܥܡܢ ܟܠ ܡܠܝܠܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܡܬܟܢܫܐ ܡܕܝܢ ܕܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܘܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ ܠܘ ܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܫܟܝܪܐ. ܘܡܬܚܘܐ ܬܘܒ ܒܙܢܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ. ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܓܝܪ ܕܠܗܿܘ ܡܢ ܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܕܠܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܠܣܝܡ ܫܡܐ ܣܘܣܝܐ. ܘܗܝܕܝܟ ܟܐܢܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܣܘܣܝܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܘܟܠ ܡܠܝܠܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܣܘܣܝܐ ܡܠܝܠܐ. ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܙܢܐ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܕܝܠܗ ܕܬܪܝܢܐ. ܘܢܫܪܐ ܘܢܐܡܪ ܕܡܕܡ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܣܘܣܝܐ.","english":"The universal apophasis is concealed, like that of one stone, animal. And every rational being is animal. Therefore, not one stone is rational. And it is shown by the conversion of the great to the small, and by the conversion of the subprism and being in that likeness, a second genus of the first. A third genus from the mediate kataphasis, which is the small, and the universal apophasis, which is the great. The mediate apophasis is concealed, like that of something animal in a rational being, and not one horse in a rational being. Therefore, not every animal is a horse. And it is shown by the conversion of the great, and it becomes a fourth genus of the first. A fourth genus from the mediate apophasis, which is the small, and the universal kataphasis, which is the great. The mediate apophasis is concealed, like that of not every animal in a rational being, and every rational being is a rational being. Therefore, not every animal is rational. And this from the genus now cannot be shown by the conversion of the great, because in the mediateness, even when together they are changed, the great and the small, because then the conversion does not become the great. For it is necessary that in other genera it be arranged toward its demonstration, that from it there is a transference toward the impossibility which is its being thus. For if it is not true that not every animal is rational, it is true the antitypesis which is every animal is rational, and it would be with every rational being a rational being. It is concealed, therefore, that every animal is a rational being, and it would be that not every animal is a rational being, which is false. And it is shown again in another genus. For it is said that for that from something from animal which is not a rational being, the name horse is placed. And then it is fitting to say that not one horse is a rational being, and every rational being is a rational being. Therefore, not one horse is rational, which is a second genus of the second. And it begins and says that something animal is a horse.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'universal apophasis' (ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ) denotes a negation that applies to all members of a class, a key logical operator in Bar Hebraeus's system.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܝܬܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"'Mediate kataphasis' (ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܝܬܝܬܐ) refers to an affirmation that is intermediate in scope, neither universal nor particular, used in the logical figures.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܙܢܐ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The passage enumerates four 'genera' (ܙܢܐ) derived from combinations of kataphasis and apophasis, with the second genus of the first and fourth genus of the first explicitly named, indicating a systematic logical taxonomy.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܗܦܘܟܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term 'conversion' (ܗܦܘܟܝܐ) reflects Aristotelian logic, where propositions are transformed by swapping subject and predicate, a technique Bar Hebraeus adapts for his four-figure system.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ","severity":"caution","text":"The term 'antitypesis' (ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ) is a hapax in this passage; its meaning is uncertain but appears to denote a counter-proposition or reciprocal relation, possibly a scribal variant or technical neologism.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܣܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The example 'horse' (ܣܘܣܝܐ) parallels standard Aristotelian syllogistic examples (e.g., 'horse' in Prior Analytics), used here to illustrate the failure of universal conversion in mediate propositions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac text contains several uncertain readings, notably 'ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ' (antitypesis) which may be a scribal error or a technical term; the passage's logical structure is dense and the exact referents of 'great' and 'small' in conversion are ambiguous."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":48,"ref":"p48","source":"ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܣܘܣܝܐ ܡܠܝܠܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܠܘ ܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܡܠܝܠܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ. ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܕܥܠ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ\nܘܠܗܢܐ ܡܢ ܬܘܒ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܩܢܘ̈ܢܐ ܐܝܬ ܐܠܨ̈ܝܐ ܬܪܝܢ. ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܘܬ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܒܗܦܘܟܝܗܿ ܗܿܦܟ ܠܩܕܡܝܐ. ܘܕܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܠܐ ܡܟܢܫܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܐܝܟܢ ܕܗܝ ܒܩܕܡܝܐ ܐܬܚܘܝܬ. ܘܟܠܢܝܘܬ ܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܡܢܬܝ̈ܬܐ. ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ. ܘܟܕ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܬܪܝܢ ܡܬܢܛܪܝܢ ܐܫܬܐ ܫܪܟܝܢ ܙܢܝ̈ܐ ܡܟܢܫ̈ܢܘܗܝ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐܥܡ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܐܪܒܥ ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܢܝܬܐ ܐܪܒܥܐ ܥܒܕ ܙܢܝ̈ܐ. ܘܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܗܿܝ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܥܡ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܟܠܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܬܪܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ. ܙܢܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܐ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܐ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܘܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܓܚܘܟܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܡܕܡ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܓܚܘܟܐ. ܡܬܚܘܐ ܕܝܢ ܒܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܘܗܿܘܐ ܙܢܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ. ܙܢܐ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܐ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܐܦܘܦܣܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܐܦܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܟܐܦܐ. ܡܬܚܘܐ ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܘ ܕܩܕܡܘܗܝ. ܘܗܿܘܐ ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ. ܙܢܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܐ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܘܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܘܡܕܡ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܬܘܒܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܡܕܡ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܟܬܘܒܐ. ܘܡܬܚܘܐ ܒܡܬܚܠܦܢܘܬܐ ܕܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܠܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܘܒܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܣܘܦܪܝܣܡܐ. ܘܗܿܘܐ ܙܢܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ.","english":"And not one horse is rational. It is shown that not every animal is rational, which is the third figure. The theory concerning the third figure.\n\nAnd here, from the figures again, there are two modes. The categorical from the minor, in that by its conversion it converts to the first. And the apophatic from the minor is not a contradictory, as it was shown in the first. And the conclusion of one of the two is from the two premises. And not one syllogism. And when these from the two are hindered, the remaining six figures are its contradictories, in that the categorical conclusion is the minor with the four prosodic fours makes figures. And the categorical is the premise with the two conclusions two others. The first figure from the categorical conclusion is the minor. And the categorical conclusion is the major categorical premise is concealed, like that every human is animal. And every human is risible. Therefore, something animal is risible. It is shown by the conversion of the minor, and it becomes the third figure of the first. The second figure from the categorical conclusion is the minor. And the apophatic conclusion is the major apophatic premise is concealed, like that every human is animal. And not one human is stone. Therefore, not every animal is stone. It is shown in the same manner as that before it. And it becomes the fourth figure of the first. The third figure from the categorical conclusion is the minor and the categorical premise is the major categorical premise is concealed, like that every human is animal. And something human is literate. Therefore, something animal is literate. And it is shown by the variation of the minor to the major, and by the conversion of the supposition. And it becomes the third figure of the first.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'third figure' (ܙܢܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ) and 'fourth figure' (ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ) refer to syllogistic figures in Aristotelian logic, as adapted by Syriac commentators.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܘܬ","severity":"info","text":"The term 'categorical' (ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܘܬ) is a Syriac transliteration of Greek κατηγορική, used here to denote a categorical proposition or conclusion.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The term 'apophatic' (ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ) is a Syriac transliteration of Greek ἀποφατική, meaning a negative or privative proposition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage enumerates three figures derived from categorical and apophatic premises, with conversions and variations, following a systematic logical exposition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The logical forms and examples (e.g., 'every human is animal') echo Aristotelian syllogistic as transmitted through Syriac intermediaries like Sergius of Reshaina.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܢܝܬܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The term 'prosodic fours' (ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܢܝܬܐ) is obscure; it may be a corruption or a technical neologism for a logical operation, possibly related to prosody or arrangement.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'prosodic fours' (ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܢܝܬܐ) is unclear; it may be a scribal error or a technical term for a fourfold division in syllogistic.","The reference to 'six figures' (ܐܫܬܐ ܫܪܟܝܢ ܙܢܝ̈ܐ) is ambiguous; it may indicate additional figures beyond the standard three or four in Aristotelian logic."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":49,"ref":"p49","source":"ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܕܡ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܘܟܡܐ. ܘܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܓܚܘܟܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܡܕܡ ܐܘܟܡܐ ܓܚܘܟܐ. ܘܡܬܚܘܐ ܒܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܗܿܘܐ ܙܢܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ. ܙܢܐ ܚܡܝܫܝܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܘܠܐ ܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܘܫܝܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܟܘܫܝܐ. ܘܗܢܐ ܙܢܐ ܠܐ ܡܬܚܘܐ ܒܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܗܿܦܟܐ. ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܡܢܬܝ̈ܬܐ. ܐܦܠܐ ܒܡܬܚܠܦܢܘܬܐ ܕܪܒܬܐ ܘܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܠܐ ܡܬܗܦܟܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܐܠܨܬ ܠܡܚܘܝܘ ܫܪܝܪܘܬ ܟܘܢܫܗ ܒܝܕ ܡܘܒܠܢܘܬܐ ܕܠܘܬ ܠܐ ܡܫܟܚܢܘܬܐ. ܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܕܐܢ ܠܐ ܫܪܝܪ ܟܘܢܫܢ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܠܐ ܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܟܘܫܝܐ. ܫܟܝܪܐ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܟܘܫܝܐ. ܘܐܝܬ ܗܘܐ ܥܡܢ ܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܢܥܒܕܝܗܿ ܡܟܝܠ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܢܟܢܫ ܡܢܗܿ ܘܡܢ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܟܘܢܫܐ ܡܬܚܪܝܢܐ. ܕܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܘܫܝܐ. ܘܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ ܠܘ ܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܘܫܝܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܫܟܝܪܐ. ܡܬܚܘܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܘܒܙܢܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡܐ ܐܘ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܣܝܡ. ܡܢܗ ܕܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ ܡܬܩܪܐ. ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ ܠܡܢܬܐ ܡܢ ܓܝܪ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܕܠܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܘܟܡܐ. ܢܣܝܡ ܫܡܐ ܣܩܘܬܝܐ. ܘܗܝܕܝܟ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ: ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܣܩܘܬܝܐ ܟܘܫܝܐ. ܘܟܠ ܣܩܘܬܝܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܢܩܦܝܗܿ ܡܟܝܠ ܠܙܥܘܪܬܗ ܕܙܢܐ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܘܡܬܟܢܫܐ ܕܟܠ ܣܩܘܬܝܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܘܢܩܦܝܗܿ ܬܘܒ ܠܗܕܐ. ܠܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܣܝܡܐ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܣܩܘܬܝܐ ܟܘܫܝܐ.","english":"The fourth figure from the categorical premise, that is the minor one. And the categorical premise is the major one. The categorical premise is concealed, like that which is: some man is black, and every man is laughing; therefore some man is black laughing. And it is shown by the conversion of that minor one. And that is the third figure of the first. The fifth figure from the categorical premise, that is the minor one. And the apophatic premise, that is the major one. The apophatic premise is concealed, like that which is: every man is an animal, and not every man is a horse; therefore not every animal is a horse. And this figure is not shown by the conversion of that minor one into that which is the opposite of the concealed one. And not one syllogism from two concealed ones. Nor in the alternation of the major and the minor, in that the apophatic premise is not convertible. For it is necessary to show the truth of its force by means of reduction to the impossible. They say that if the force that not every animal is a horse is not true, the assumption that every animal is a horse is accepted. And there was with it every man is an animal. It makes, then, the minor one. And it forces from it and from the assumption that the force is contradictory, that every man is a horse. And it was that not every man is a horse, which is accepted. It is shown, then, again in another figure, that which is placed or that which is placed, from that which is called the philosopher, that like as for the proposition from that which is man who is not black, a name is placed, Ethiopian. And then it is true to say: not one Ethiopian is a horse. And every Ethiopian is a man. It follows, then, the minor of the figure, which is every man is an animal. And it is concealed that every Ethiopian is an animal. And it follows again to this, to the protasis that is placed, which is: not one Ethiopian is a horse.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܛܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܩܛܦܣܝܣ (qṭpṣys) is a loan from Greek κατάφασις, meaning 'affirmation' or 'categorical proposition'. Here it distinguishes the affirmative premise from the apophatic (negative) one.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ (ʾpwpṣys) is a loan from Greek ἀπόφασις, meaning 'negation' or 'apophatic premise'. It denotes the negative proposition in the syllogism.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܙܢܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܙܢܐ (zʿā) is a loan from Greek σχῆμα, meaning 'figure' (of a syllogism). The text enumerates the fourth and fifth figures, following Aristotelian logic as transmitted in Syriac.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܘܒܠܢܘܬܐ ܕܠܘܬ ܠܐ ܡܫܟܚܢܘܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'reduction to the impossible' (Syriac ܡܘܒܠܢܘܬܐ ܕܠܘܬ ܠܐ ܡܫܟܚܢܘܬܐ) refers to the logical method of proof by contradiction (reductio ad impossibile), a standard technique in Aristotelian syllogistic.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ ... ܙܢܐ ܚܡܝܫܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The passage systematically treats the fourth and fifth figures of the syllogism, each with categorical and apophatic premises, showing how they reduce to the first figure or require proof by contradiction.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ ܠܡܢܬܐ ܡܢ ܓܝܪ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܕܠܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܘܟܡܐ","severity":"info","text":"The example of 'Ethiopian' (Syriac ܣܩܘܬܝܐ) as a man who is not black parallels standard Aristotelian examples (e.g., 'Ethiopian' in Prior Analytics) used to illustrate syllogistic forms with a middle term.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac phrase ܘܗܢܐ ܙܢܐ ܠܐ ܡܬܚܘܐ ܒܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ is ambiguous: it may mean 'this figure is not shown by the conversion of the minor premise' or 'this figure is not shown by the conversion of that minor one (i.e., the concealed premise)'. The reading taken follows the English draft's interpretation of the minor premise."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":50,"ref":"p50","source":"ܘܡܬܟܢܫܐ ܠܐ ܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܟܘܫܝܐ ܒܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܗܿܘܐ ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ. ܙܢܐ ܫܬܝܬܝܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܕܡ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܬܘܒܐ. ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܐܦܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܟܠ ܟܬܘܒܐ ܟܐܦܐ. ܘܡܬܚܘܐ ܒܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܘܗܿܘܐ ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ. ܬܐܘܪܝܐ ܕܥܠ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ\nܘܗܢܐ ܡܢ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܡܢ ܩܨ ܡܒܥܕܘܬܗ ܕܡܢ ܩܕܡܝܐ. ܐܦܢ ܠܐ ܐܫܬܘܝ ܠܕܘܟܪܢܐ ܡܢ ܩܕܡ̈ܝܐ. ܐܚܪ̈ܝܐ ܟܕ ܣܥܪܘܗܝ. ܩܢܘ̈ܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܠܗ ܐܫܟܚܘ ܕܒܢܛܝܪܘܬܗܘܢ ܡܟܢܫܢܐ ܗܿܘܐ. ܘܗܿܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܬܪܝܢ ܠܐ ܡܬܢܣܒܢܘܬܐ ܠܡ ܕܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܟܠ ܟܠܗ ܒܗ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܡܬܗܦܟܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ. ܘܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܐܟܚܕܐ ܒܗ ܢܬܗ̈ܦܟܢ ܠܘܬ ܚܘܘܝܐ. ܐܘ ܟܠ ܚܕܐ ܒܚܒܪܬܗܿ ܬܬܚܠܦ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܐܢ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܗܝ ܩܨܬ ܡܢܬܝܘܬܗܿ ܠܐ ܠܬܟܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܪܒܬܐ. ܘܐܢ ܪܒܬܐ ܗܝ ܩܨܬ ܐܦܘܦܛܝܩܝܘܬܗܿ ܠܐ ܠܬܟܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܟܐܡܬ ܒܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ. ܘܐܦܘܦܛܝܩܝܘܬܐ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܟܕ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܩܛܦܣܣ ܬܗܘܐ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܠܝܢ ܩܛܦܛܝ̈ܩܝܬܐ ܡܢܬܝ̈ܬܐ ܗܦ̈ܟܢ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܡܢܬܝ̈ܬܐ. ܘܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܗܿܝ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܟܠ ܟܠܗ ܠܐ ܡܬܗܦܟܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ. ܘܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܬܗܦܘܟ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܒܚܘܘܝܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܟܐܢܐܝܬ ܚܡܫܐ ܫܪܟܝܢ ܙܢܝ̈ܐ ܡܟܢܫ̈ܢܐ ܕܗܢܐ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܝ ܡܢ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܐܢ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܗܝ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ. ܥܡ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܩܛܦܛܝ̈ܩܝܬܐ ܬܪܝܢ ܙܢܝ̈ܐ ܥܒܕܐ ܘܥܡ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܚܕ ܙܢܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܬܬܪܝܡܬ ܕܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܟܠ ܟܠܗ ܠܐ ܬܬܢܣܒ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ. ܥܡ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܙܢܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܥܒܕܐ.","english":"And it is concealed that not every animal is black, by the conversion of that minor premise, and it becomes the fourth figure of the first. The sixth figure from the categorical premise, that is the minor one. And the apophasis is the major one, the categorical premise is the concealed one. Like that which is: some man is a writer, and no man is a stone; therefore not every writer is a stone. And it is shown by the conversion of that minor premise, and it becomes the fourth figure of the first. Theory concerning the fourth figure.\n\nAnd this figure is from the end, by its distance from the first. Moreover, it is not equal to the first ones, the later ones, when they are arranged. Some have found that by their excess it is concealed. And these from the two are not to be taken, because the categorical premise is entirely in it, in that it is not convertible. And the argument of both propositions together is converted to demonstration, or each one is changed by its counterpart. For if the minor is the end of its categoricality, it is not fitting that it be major; and if the major is the end of its apophaticity, it is not fitting that it be minor. As it is said in the first figure. And the apophaticity is the major one, while the minor is the categorical one, in that these categoricals are converted and not one syllogism from the two categoricals. And the categorical premise is entirely not convertible. And the argument is that the major is converted in demonstration. For thus the remaining five figures of this figure are concealed, in that it is from the minor. If the categorical is the major, with those two categoricals it makes two figures, and with the major apophasis it makes one figure, in that it is established that the categorical premise is entirely not to be taken. Therefore the categorical is the minor, with the major apophasis it makes another figure.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"Apophasis (negation) is the major premise in the syllogism, distinguished from the categorical premise.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܩܛܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"Categorical premise (kataphasis) is the minor premise, convertible in certain figures.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The fourth figure of the first is derived from the conversion of the minor premise, as in the example 'some man is a writer, no man is a stone; therefore not every writer is a stone'.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The fourth figure is described as distant from the first and not equal to earlier ones; it yields five concealed figures based on the minor premise.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܟܢܫ̈ܢܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The term 'concealed' (mkaššəʿā) may indicate a non-standard or implicit syllogistic figure; the text notes that some have found these figures by their excess.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"external","lemma":"ܐܣܟܝܡܐ","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus adapts Aristotelian syllogistic figures (skhēmata) into Syriac, here discussing the fourth figure and its relation to the first.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac term ܡܟܢܫ̈ܢܐ (concealed) may refer to non-standard or implicit syllogistic figures; the exact number and derivation of the five remaining figures is not fully specified.","The phrase 'from the end, by its distance from the first' could indicate a logical or ordinal distance, but the precise meaning is ambiguous."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":51,"ref":"p51","source":"ܘܐܢ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܗܕܥ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ. ܥܡ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܙܢܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ. ܙܢܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܩܛܦܛܝ̈ܩܝܬܐ ܟܠܢ̈ܝܬܐ. ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܘܟܠ ܓܚܘܟܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܡܕܡ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܓܚܘܟܐ. ܘܡܬܚܘܐ ܒܬܚܠܦܢܘܬ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ. ܘܒܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܣܘܢܦܪܝܣܡܐ. ܘܗܿܘܐ ܙܢܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ. ܙܢܐ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܓܚܘܟܐ. ܘܡܕܡ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܡܕܡ ܓܚܘܟܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܘܡܬܚܘܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܘ ܕܩܕܡܘܗܝ. ܘܗܿܘܐ ܙܢܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ. ܙܢܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܡܢ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܟܐܦܐ. ܘܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܟܐܦܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܘܡܬܚܘܐ ܒܡܬܚܠܦܢܘܬܐ ܕܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܘܒܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܣܘܢܦܪܝܣܡܐ. ܘܗܿܘܐ ܙܢܐ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ. ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܕܡ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܣܝܐ. ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܟܐܦܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܟܠ ܐܣܝܐ ܟܐܦܐ. ܡܬܚܘܐ ܒܝܕ ܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ. ܘܗܿܘܐ ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ. ܙܢܐ ܚܡܝܫܝܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܠܝܠܐ. ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܟܐܦܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܟܠ ܡܠܝܠܐ ܟܐܦܐ. ܘܡܬܚܘܐ ܒܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܬܪܝܗܘܢ ܣܟ̈ܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܫܘܬܦܘ̈ܬܐ ܡܢ ܠܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܿܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܘܠܬܪܝܢܐ ܬܪܬܝܢ.","english":"And the apophasis universal with the kataphasis universal minor another figure. The first figure from the two categorical universals. The categorical minor is concealed, like that: every animal is a head; and every laugher is a head; therefore some animal is a laugher. And it is shown by the conversion of the propositions and by the inversion of the syllogism, and it becomes the third figure of the first. The second figure from the universal kataphasis, that is the minor, and the categorical premise, that is the major. The categorical minor is concealed, like that: every head is a laugher; and some animal is a head; therefore some animal is a laugher. And it is shown like that which preceded it, and it becomes the third figure of the first. The third figure from the universal apophasis, that is the minor, and the universal kataphasis, that is the major. The universal apophasis is concealed, like that: no stone is an animal; and every head is an animal; therefore no stone is a head. And it is shown by the conversion of the propositions and by the inversion of the syllogism, and it becomes the second figure of the first. The fourth figure from the categorical minor, that is the minor, and the universal apophasis, that is the major. The categorical apophasis is concealed, like that: some physician is a head; and no stone is a head; therefore not every physician is a stone. It is shown by means of the inversion of both propositions, and it becomes the fourth figure of the first. The fifth figure from the universal kataphasis, that is the minor, and the universal apophasis, that is the major. The universal apophasis is concealed, like that: every head is rational; and no stone is a head; therefore not every rational is a stone. And it is shown by the inversion of both terms, and that is the fourth figure of the first. End of the chapter: And the conjunctions with that first schema and with the second two.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"Apophasis (negation) is a standard term in Syriac Aristotelian logic, here paired with kataphasis (affirmation).","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܩܛܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"Kataphasis (affirmation) is the positive counterpart to apophasis; both are used to classify premises in syllogistic figures.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܙܢܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The passage enumerates five derived figures (third, second, fourth, fourth again) from the first figure, following standard Peripatetic reduction.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"external","lemma":"ܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܣܘܢܦܪܝܣܡܐ","severity":"info","text":"Inversion of the syllogism (conversio syllogismi) is a technical operation in Aristotelian logic, used here to reduce non-first figures to the first.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܘܫܘܬܦܘ̈ܬܐ ܡܢ ܠܐܣܟܝܡܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The final phrase 'conjunctions with the first schema and with the second two' is ambiguous; it may refer to the combination of figures or to a lost diagram.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'ܘܫܘܬܦܘ̈ܬܐ ܡܢ ܠܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܿܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܘܠܬܪܝܢܐ ܬܪܬܝܢ' is unclear: it may indicate that the five figures are conjunct with the first and second schemata, or that the chapter ends with a note on conjunctions. The reading taken follows the English draft as a concluding remark."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":52,"ref":"p52","source":"ܟܠܢܝܘܬ ܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܘܡܟܢܘܬ ܟܘܢܫ ܟܠܢ̈ܝܬܐ. ܘܠܩܕܡܝܐ ܡܢ ܘܠܬܠܝܬܝܐ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܬܪܬܝܢ. ܩܛܦܛܝܩܝܘܬ ܠܡ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܡܟܢܘܬ ܟܘܢܫ ܩܛܦܛܝ̈ܩܝܬܐ. ܘܠܩܕܡܝܐ ܡܢ ܠܪܒܝܥܝܐ ܚܕܐ ܗ̄ ܟܟܢܘܬ ܟܘܢܫܐ ܕܩܛܦܛܝ̈ܩܝܬܐ ܐܟܚܕܐ ܘܟܠܢ̈ܝܬܐ. ܦܪܝܫ ܕܝܢ ܗܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܡܢ ܬܠܬܝܗܘܢ ܐܟܚܕܐ ܡܬܪܬܝܢ ܗ̄ ܒܡܟܢܘܬ ܟܘܢ̈ܫܐ ܕܦܪܘܕܝܘܪܝܣܡܘܣ ܐܪܒܥ. ܘܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܚܘܝ ܒܝܬܗ ܗܘ. ܦܪܝܫ ܕܝܢ ܕܝܠܢܐܝܬ ܗܿܘ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܡܢ ܬܠܬܝܗܘܢ ܒܠܐ ܡܟܢܘܬ ܟܘܢܫܐ ܕܡܢ ܫܘ̈ܝܬ ܒܐܝܢܝܘܬܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܡܢ ܬܠܬܝܗܘܢ ܒܠܐ ܡܟܢܘܬ ܟܘܢܫܐ ܕܟܠܢ̈ܝܬܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ ܡܢ ܬܠܬܝܗܘܢ ܒܠܐ ܡܩܒܠܢܘܬܗ ܕܠܗܿܝ ܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܦܣܝܩܝܐ ܥܠ ܡܬܚܠܛܢ̈ܘܬܐ\nܠܡܕܥ ܐܠܨܐ ܕܒܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܿܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܟܕ ܣܟܐ ܗܿܘ ܙܥܘܪܐ ܡܥܠ ܥܐܠ ܬܚܝܬ ܗܿܘ ܡܨܥܝܐ. ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܐܦ ܬܚܝܬ ܗܿܘ ܕܗܿܘ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܥܐܠ. ܢܐܥܘܠ ܒܟܠ ܙܢܐ ܐܝܢܐ ܕܗܘ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܣܘܢܦܪ̈ܝܣܡܛܐ ܟܠܗܝܢ ܕܒܗ ܠܙܢܐ ܕܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܢܩ̈ܦܢ ܒܙܢܝ̈ܗܝܢ. ܥܕܡܐ ܠܗܿܝ ܕܐܦ ܐܢ ܢܐܡܪ. ܡܬܡܨܝܢܐܝܬ ܟܠ ܟܬܘܒܐ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ. ܘܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܟܠ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܡܬܟܢܫܐ ܕܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܟܠ ܟܬܘܒܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ ܟܕ ܥܠ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ ܐܬܩܛܪܓܬ. ܠܘ ܟܡܐ ܕܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ ܐܬܩܛܪܓܬ. ܗܕܐ ܓܝܪ ܡܢܟܪܝܐ ܠܐܢܢܩܝܘܬܐ. ܐܝܟܢܐ ܕܟܕ ܬܫܢܐ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܟܬܘܒܐ. ܬܫܢܐ ܐܦ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܐܠܐ ܟܡܐ ܕܝܬܗ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܘܗܟܢܐ ܒܡܬܚܠܛܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܠܗܿ ܟܕ ܠܗܿ ܠܪܒܬܐ ܢܩܦ ܟܘܢܫܐ ܒܙܢܗ. ܣܛܪ ܡܢ ܡܕܡ ܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܡܬܚܠܛܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܕܠܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܢܩܦ ܒܗܝܢ ܟܘܢܫܐ ܗ̄ ܟܕ ܬܗܘܐ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܘܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܟܡܐ ܕܡܬܬܙܝܥ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܡܨܝܢܐܝܬ ܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ.","english":"The whole of that major and the concealment of the force of the universals. And with the first and with the third. In that same figure, two. The categorical minor and the concealment of the force of the categoricals. And with the first and with the fourth, one is the concealment of the force of the categoricals and the universals together. But the first is distinguished from the three together in two ways: by the concealment of the forces of the four προδιορισμοί, and by that which shows between itself. But the second is distinguished from the three in a different way, without the concealment of the force of the equalities in the substance. And the third from the three without the concealment of the force of the universals. And the fourth from the three without the reception of that apophasis universal. A conclusive demonstration concerning the mixtures.\n\nFor the knowledge of the necessity in that first schema, when the minor term enters under the middle term. From the fact that also under that middle term enters. And it enters in every term which it is. By the way of all the συλλογισμοί which are in it, for the term of that major it is right that they follow in its terms. Until that which also if it says. Possibly every body is movable. And actually every movable is an animal. It is concluded that actually every body is an animal. In that animal, when it entered upon movable, was predicated, not as movable was predicated. For this distinguishes actuality. Just as when movability is removed from body, animal also is removed. But not as its essence is. And thus in the other mixtures, for that same, when for that same major the force follows in its term. Apart from something from the mixtures of that minor follows in them the force, when that minor is possible and that major as it is moved, like that which is possibly every man is movable.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"προδιορισμοί","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword προδιορισμοί (prosdiorismoi) refers to additional determinations or qualifications in a syllogism, a technical term in Aristotelian logic.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"συλλογισμοί","severity":"info","text":"συλλογισμοί (syllogismoi) is the Greek term for syllogisms, the logical arguments central to the treatise.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage distinguishes four types of syllogistic figures based on the concealment of force, with the first figure differing from the other three by the concealment of the forces of the four προδιορισμοί and by an internal demonstration.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus adapts Aristotelian syllogistic logic, as transmitted through Syriac translations of Greek logical works, particularly the Prior Analytics.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several uncertain readings (e.g., ܟܠܢܝܘܬ, ܡܟܢܘܬ) that may affect the interpretation of the logical distinctions; the English draft reflects one possible reconstruction.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The precise meaning of 'concealment of the force' (ܡܟܢܘܬ ܟܘܢܫ) in the logical context is ambiguous; it may refer to implicit or suppressed premises.","The identification of the four figures and their relation to the Aristotelian figures is not fully explicit in the Syriac."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":53,"ref":"p53","source":"ܘܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܟܠ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ ܡܫܬܚܠܦܢܐ. ܟܡܐ ܕܡܬܬܙܝܥ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܡܫܬܚܠܦܢܐ ܠܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܥܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܠܐ ܟܡܐ ܕܬܫܬܟܚ ܠܗ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܘܬܐ. ܕܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܠܗ ܘܗܝܕܝܟ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܬܫܬܟܚ ܠܗ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܘܬܐ. ܘܡܬܡܨܝܢܐܝܬ ܡܫܬܚܠܦܢܐ ܥܠܘܗܝ ܢܬܩܛܪܓ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܟܕ ܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܬܗܘܐ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܟܡܐ ܕܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܐܠܨܐ ܗܝܕܝܟ ܕܐܢܢܩܝܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܗܘ ܟܘܢܫܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܡܕܡ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ. ܘܟܠ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ ܡܫܬܚܠܦܢܐ ܟܡܐ ܕܡܬܬܙܝܥ. ܡܕܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܡܕܡ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܡܫܬܚܠܦܢܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܟܡܐ ܕܝܬܗ ܗܝ ܡܬܬܙܝܥ. ܗܕܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܟܡܐ ܕܝܬܗ ܗܝ ܢܫܬܚܠܦ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܒܠܐ ܐܡܝܢܝܘܬܐ ܬܬܚܡ ܫܘܡܗܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܕܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܐܝܬ ܠܗܿ. ܡܫܪܐ ܫܪܝܐ ܟܠܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܠܚܒܪܬܗܿ. ܡܛܠ ܕܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܐܡܝܢܘܬ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ. ܘܗܕ ܪܒܬܐ ܠܐ ܐܡܝܢܘܬܗ. ܡܬܚܠܛܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܕܒܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܬܪܝܢܐ\nܒܗܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܡܟܢܫܢܐ ܡܢ ܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܦܫܝ̈ܛܬܐ ܒܬܪܝܢܘܬ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܐܦܠܐ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܡܬܡܨܝܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܐܦܠܐ ܡܢ ܚܠܛܐ. ܟܕ ܢܫܬܚ̈ܠܦܢ ܐܝܢܝ̈ܘܬܗܝܢ ܐܘ ܠܐ ܢܫܬܚ̈ܠܦܢ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܚܕ ܡܕܡ ܡܨܐ ܐܢܬ ܠܡܩܛܪܓܘ ܥܠ ܐܕܫ̈ܐ ܡܫܚ̈ܠܦܐ. ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܣܝܘܩܘܬܐ ܥܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܣܘܣܝܐ. ܦܫܝܛܐܝܬ ܐܘ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܐܝܬ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܗܢܐ ܡܢ ܬܪܝܡ. ܡܢ ܕܝܢ ܗܢܐ ܠܐ ܐܘ ܡܢ ܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܬܪܝܡ. ܘܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܐܠܐ ܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܗܘܢ ܡܢ ܚܕ̈ܕܐ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܟܕ ܬܩܛܪܓܝܗܿ ܠܣܝܘܩܘܬܐ ܥܠ ܡܫܘ̈ܬܦܐ. ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܡܠܝܠܐ. ܐܘ ܬܪܝܡܝܗܿ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܐܟܚܕܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܗܢܐ ܬܪܝܡ ܡܢ ܕܝܢ ܗܢܐ ܠܐ. ܘܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܐܠܐ ܢܩܝܦܘܬܗܘܢ ܠܚܕ̈ܕܐ. ܘܟܕ ܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܗܝ ܒܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܗܠܝܢ.","english":"And from the particular, every mobile thing is mutable. As it moves, in the genus of mutable things, it is not predicated of the subject except insofar as motion is found in it. For it is potentiality for it, and then it is possible that motion is not found in it. And potentially, mutability is predicated of it. In that same manner, when it is particular, that which is small and that which is large, as it is mobile. And then it is necessary that the particular be the force, like that which from the particular something corporeal is mobile. And every mobile thing is mutable as it moves. Therefore, from the particular something corporeal is mutable. That which, as it is, is mobile. This, however, which as it is, is mutable. Therefore, without ambiguity, the great name is determined, which has particularity. It begins, each of the two protases with its counterpart, because that small one has the ambiguity of the middle term known, and this great one does not have its ambiguity. Mixtures in the second schema.\n\nIn this schema, however, not one syllogism is hindered from both the simple ones in the second figure, nor from the two potentialities, nor from the mixture, when their substances are mutable or not mutable. In that one thing can be predicated of different subjects, like whiteness of a head and a horse, simply or potentially, or from this one from both. From this one, however, not or from both both. And it is not possible except their elevation from each other. In that same manner, when you predicate whiteness of participants, like of a head and a rational being, or you elevate it from them together, or from this one it is elevated from that one, however, not. And it is not possible except their conjunction to each other. And when not one of them is particular in these figures.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ (men aṣṣaqqī) is rendered 'from the particular'. The term ܐܢܢܩܝ (aṣṣaqqī) is a loan from Greek ἄτομον (atomos), here in the logical sense of 'particular' or 'individual' as opposed to universal.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ (prōṭasis) is a direct loan from Greek πρότασις (protasis), meaning 'premiss' or 'proposition' in a syllogism. Bar Hebraeus uses it in the technical sense of the two premisses of a syllogism.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ (sullōgismos) is a loan from Greek συλλογισμός (syllogismos), meaning 'syllogism'. Bar Hebraeus here discusses conditions under which a syllogism is not hindered (ܠܐ ܡܟܢܫܢܐ).","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the discussion of the second schema (ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܬܪܝܢܐ) of syllogisms, analyzing how predication of mutable and immutable substances works in that figure. The text contrasts simple, potential, and mixed predications.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus (1220s–1286) was a Syriac Orthodox bishop and polymath. His Treatise of Treatises is a compendium of Aristotelian logic, drawing on the Organon and later commentators. The discussion of 'potentiality' (ܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ) reflects Aristotelian metaphysics of change.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several uncertain readings, particularly in the sequence ܘܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܟܠ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ ܡܫܬܚܠܦܢܐ, where the syntax is compressed. The English draft's rendering 'from the particular, every mobile thing is mutable' is one plausible interpretation, but the logical flow remains ambiguous.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac phrase ܘܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܟܠ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ ܡܫܬܚܠܦܢܐ could be read as 'and from the particular, every mobile thing is mutable' or as 'and from the particular, everything mobile is mutable', with the universal quantifier scope uncertain.","The term ܐܡܝܢܘܬ (ambiguity) in the phrase 'the great name is determined, which has particularity' is ambiguous: it may refer to logical ambiguity (equivocation) or to the middle term's role in the syllogism."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":54,"ref":"p54","source":"ܗܿܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܐܘ ܣܝܘܡܘܬܐ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܡܟܢܫܢܐ ܒܗܢܐ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܿܘܐ. ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܕܡܢ ܚܘܠܛܢ̈ܝܗܘܢ ܗܿܘܝܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܗܠܝܢ. ܘܗܟܢܐ ܕܟܕ ܗܢܘܢ ܡܢ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܢܗܘܘܢ ܕܠܐ ܐܚܕܝܢ ܐܘ ܡܬܬܚܕܝܢ ܡܢ ܚܕ̈ܕܐ. ܘܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܐܢܢܩܝܐ ܗܿܘܐ. ܙܕܩ ܕܐܦ ܟܘܢܫܐ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܢܗܘܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܕ ܢܗܘܐ ܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܘܢܫܠܡ ܕܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܕܝܠܢܝܬܐ. ܐܘ ܒܬܪܝܢܘܬ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܕܦܫܝܛܘܬܐ. ܓܠܝܐ ܕܢܘܟܪ̈ܝܝ ܟܝܢܐ ܢܗܘܘܢ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܚܘܪܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܠܘ ܡܥܠ ܥܠ ܚܘܪܐ ܬܚܝܬ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܐܦ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܐܝܬ. ܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܗܝܕܝܟ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܥܠܘܗܝ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܐ ܗܘܬ ܐܟܡܐ ܕܥܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܬܝܠܦܬ ܒܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܿܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ. ܘܠܘ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܐܝܬ ܘܐܠܘ ܬܘܒ ܥܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܬܚܝܬ ܚܘܪܐ ܐܝܟܢܐ ܕܬܬܩܛܪܓ ܥܠܘܗܝ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܐܝܬ ܠܘ ܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܐ ܗܘܬ ܥܠܘܗܝ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܫܪܝܟܐ ܡܕܝܢ ܕܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܢܘܟܪ̈ܝܝ ܟܝܢܐ ܢܗܘܘܢ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܚܘܪܐ ܘܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܡܢ ܚܕ̈ܕܐ ܢܬܬܪܝܡܘܢ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܟܕ ܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܒܙܢܐ ܕܓܘܢܝ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܝܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܐܘ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ. ܘܬܫܬܚܠܦ ܐܝܢܝܘܬܐ. ܗܘ ܟܘܢܫܐ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܢܗܘܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܫܬܘܕܥܬ. ܡܬܚܠܛܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܕܒܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ\nܘܒܗܢܐ ܡܢ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܟܕ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܗܝ ܗܝ ܕܒܗܦܘܟܝܗܿ ܗܿܦܟ ܗܘ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܠܩܕܡܝܐ. ܘܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܒܙܢܗܿ ܡܩܘܝܐ. ܠܗܿ ܙܕܩ ܕܢܩܦ ܟܘܢܫܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܬܚܘܝ ܒܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܿܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ. ܘܟܪ ܕܠܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܢܩܦ ܗܪܬܡܢ. ܗܪܟܐ ܠܗܦܘܟܝܗܿ. ܘܡܬܚܠܛܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܕܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܿܘ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ. ܛܟ ܠܐ ܠܚ̈ܡܢ ܠܡܥ̈ܠܬܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܐ ܗܿܠܝܢ.","english":"is that of elevation or composition, and not a single syllogism is found to be deficient in this schema. The species that are from their mixtures are these. And thus, when they are from species that are not held or are held together with one another. And one of them is deficient. It is fitting that the force also be deficient in elevation, just as when it is deficiently every animal in the head. And it is completed from potentiality proper, or from the duality of species of simplicity. It is evident that the natures of the elements are in the head and the white, in that if the white enters under the head and also potentially, then deficiently the animal would be predicated of it just as of the head, as was learned in that first schema. And if potentially, and if again the head enters under the white, so that the animal is predicated of it potentially, then the animal would not be predicated of it deficiently. It remains, therefore, that the natures of the elements are deficiently in the head and the white, and are deficiently raised together with one another. In that same manner, and when one of the propositions is deficient, the other, in the genus of interior from the deficient, is like interior potentiality or interior simplicity, and the essence is changed. That force of deficient elevation it is fitting that it be as was understood. The mixtures in the third schema, and in this from the schema, when the smaller is the same as that by whose inversion the schema turns to the first, and the larger is as it is in its genus abiding. For it, it is fitting that the force adhere as was shown in that first schema. And when it adheres to the smaller, it is disturbed. Here to its inversion. And the mixtures from that fourth schema. But they do not pertain to the causes that are like these.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ (maryamutha) is rendered 'elevation' in the draft, but in Bar Hebraeus' logical vocabulary it often denotes a specific relation of predication or abstraction, distinct from composition (ܣܝܘܡܘܬܐ).","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܣܟܝܡܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword ܐܣܟܝܡܐ (eskhēma) is used here for 'schema' in the logical sense, referring to the figures of the syllogism as classified in Aristotelian tradition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The passage explicitly references a 'third schema' (ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ) and a 'fourth schema' (ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ), indicating a systematic treatment of syllogistic figures beyond the standard three of Aristotle.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus (13th c.) wrote within the Syriac Aristotelian tradition, often engaging with the logical commentaries of Sergius of Reshaina and the Baghdad Peripatetics. The discussion of 'deficient' (ܐܢܢܩܝ) predication reflects debates on modal logic.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܚܘܪܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The term ܚܘܪܐ (ḥwārā) is translated as 'white' in the draft, but in this logical context it may refer to a specific category or quality, not necessarily the color. The sense is contested.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The argument that 'the natures of the elements are deficiently in the head and the white' and are 'raised together' echoes the Neoplatonic principle of co-predication of genera and species, as found in Porphyry's Isagoge.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The referent of 'the smaller' and 'the larger' in the discussion of the third schema is ambiguous; they may denote specific terms or propositions in a syllogism.","The phrase 'the essence is changed' (ܬܫܬܚܠܦ ܐܝܢܝܘܬܐ) is unclear: it may refer to a change in the logical essence of a term or to a metaphysical alteration."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":55,"ref":"p55","source":"ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܡܛܠ ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ ܗܘܦܘܛܝ̈ܩܝܐ\nܘܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ ܡܢ ܕܡܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܘܦܘܛܝ̈ܩܝܬܐ ܡܬܢܣ̈ܒܝܢ ܚܡܝܫܐܝܬ ܡܬܪܟܒܝܢ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܘ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܣܒܝ̈ܣܬܐ ܐܘ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܡܦܪ̈ܫܬܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܣܒܝܣܬܐ ܘܡܦܪܫܬܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܣܒܝܣܬܐ ܘܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܡܦܪܫܬܐ ܘܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܢܘܢ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܠܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܡܫܪ̈ܬܚܐ ܡܬܗܦܟܝܢ. ܠܘ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܠܐ ܥܛ̈ܠܝ ܠܣܘܟܠܐ ܠܩܪ̈ܝܒܝ ܒܟܝܢܐ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܙܕܩ ܠܡܝܬܝܘ. ܘܙܢܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܕܪܘܟܒܐ\nܘܗܘ ܙܢܐ ܗܢܐ ܕܪܘܟܒܐ ܡܣܒܗܘܬܐ ܕܪܘܟܒ ܩܛܝܓܘܪ̈ܝܩܝܐ ܡܝܬܐ ܒܗ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܚܕܐ ܡܢܬܐ ܡܢ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ. ܐܢ ܢܩܝܦܬܐ ܗܝ ܒܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ. ܘܩܕܝܡܝܬܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ. ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܗܿܘܐ ܘܗܦܟܗ ܗܿܘ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܒܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܢܩܦܝܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܘ ܬܪܝܢܐ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܒܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܩܕܝܡܝܬܐ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܘ ܬܪܝܢܐ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܒܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܩܕܝܡܝܬܐ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܘ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ. ܘܒܗܿܘ ܡܢ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܗܟܢܐ ܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܝܡܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܐܝܡܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܢܗܝܪ̈ܐ ܠܐ ܡܬܚܙܝ̈ܢܐ ܐܢܘܢ. ܡܕܝܢ ܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܢܗܝܪ̈ܐ ܠܐ ܡܬܚܙܝ̈ܢܐ ܐܢܘܢ. ܒܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܗܟܢܐ ܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܝܡܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܠܐ ܡܬܘܡ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܠܠܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܝܡܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܕܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܡܬܘܡ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܫܡܫܐ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܠܠܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܒܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܗܟܢܐ ܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܬܘܒܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܬܘܒܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܫܠܝܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܕܝܢ ܐܝܬ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܫܠܝܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ.","english":"The species: concerning hypothetical syllogisms and syllogisms from hypothetical propositions are composed in a fifth way from two species or from two divisions, or from a species and a division, or from a species and a categorical, or from a division and a categorical. And because these are turned into extended figures, not all of them are useless for the meaning for those near in nature; it is fitting to bring some of them. And the first figure of composition, and this figure of composition from the composition of categoricals is brought in it, in which one premise is from a proposition. If the conclusion is in the minor and the major in the major, the first schema occurs and its converse is the fourth. If the conclusion is in both, the second schema. If the major is in both, the second schema. If the major is in both, the third schema. And in the first, thus: Whenever the sun is above the earth, it is day. And whenever it is day, the stars are not visible. Therefore, whenever the sun is above the earth, the stars are not visible. In the second, thus: Whenever the sun is above the earth, it is day. And never when it is night is it day. Therefore, never when the sun is above the earth is it night. In the third, thus: Whenever a man is a writer, he is moved. And whenever a man is a writer, he is not at rest. Therefore, there is a time when a man is moved and is not at rest.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ ܗܘܦܘܛܝ̈ܩܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'hypothetical syllogisms' (sūlōgīsmō hūpōṭīqīyē) is a Syriac calque of Greek ὑποθετικοὶ συλλογισμοί, a standard term in Stoic and Peripatetic logic for syllogisms whose premises are conditional propositions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܘܦܘܛܝ̈ܩܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term 'hypothetical propositions' (prōṭasīs hūpōṭīqītā) renders Greek ὑποθετικαὶ προτάσεις, referring to conditional statements (e.g., 'if P then Q'). Bar Hebraeus here classifies their compositional schemata.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܣܟܝܡܐ","severity":"info","text":"The passage enumerates four schemata (schemata) of hypothetical syllogisms, corresponding to the first, second, third, and fourth figures of categorical syllogisms, with the fourth being the converse of the first.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The examples of day/night and the writer (man who is a writer) are standard illustrations in late antique logical handbooks, derived from the Peripatetic and Stoic traditions transmitted through Syriac intermediaries.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܢ ܢܩܝܦܬܐ ܗܝ ܒܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text at this point is ambiguous: 'if the conclusion is in the minor' could also be read as 'if the conclusion is in the smaller (premise)'. The English draft follows one plausible parsing, but the syntax is compressed.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'ܐܢ ܢܩܝܦܬܐ ܗܝ ܒܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ' is ambiguous: it may mean 'if the conclusion is in the minor (premise)' or 'if the conclusion is in the smaller (figure)'. The English draft adopts the former, but the latter is also possible.","The repetition of 'If the major is in both, the second schema' and then 'If the major is in both, the third schema' in the English draft may reflect a textual corruption or a misreading; the Syriac has 'ܐܢܕܝܢ ܒܬܪ̈ܬܝܗܝܢ ܩܕܝܡܝܬܐ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܘ ܬܪܝܢܐ' and then 'ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܘ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ', which could be a scribal error or a deliberate distinction between two different placements of the major term."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":56,"ref":"p56","source":"ܘܒܗܿܘ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ ܗܟܢܐ ܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܐܢ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܐܢ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܬܘܒܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܕܝܢ ܐܝܬ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܐܢ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܟܬܘܒܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܙܢܐ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܕܪܘܟܒܐ\nܘܗܢܐ ܙܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܿܘ ܕܒܗ ܡܢ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܡܦܪ̈ܫܬܐ ܡܬܪܟܒܝܢ ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ. ܘܡܢ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܩܪ̈ܝܒܝ ܠܟܝܢܐ ܘܕܢܝ̈ܚܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ. ܗܿܠܝܢ ܕܒܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܡܬܪܟܒܝܢ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܟܠ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܘ ܚܕ ܗܘ ܐܘ ܡܬܦܠܓܢܐ ܠܠܐ ܫܘ̈ܝܐ. ܡܬܟܢܫ ܕܟܠ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܘ ܚܕ ܐܘ ܡܬܦܠܓܢܐ ܠܠܐ ܫܘ̈ܝܐ. ܙܢܐ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ ܕܪܘܟܒܐ\nܘܗܢܐ ܬܘܒ ܙܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܿܘ ܕܒܗ ܡܢ ܣܒܝ̈ܣܬܐ ܘܡܦܪ̈ܫܬܐ ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ ܡܬܪܟܒܝܢ. ܘܗܿܠܝܢ ܓܠܝ̈ܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ. ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܒܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܡܬܪܟܒܝܢ. ܟܕ ܗܿܝ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܣܒܝܣܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܘܗܿܝ ܪܒܬܐ ܡܦܪܫܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܗܢܐ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܢ ܡܬܦܠܓܢܐ ܗܘ ܠܫܘ̈ܝܐ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܟܠ ܙܘܓܐ. ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܕܙܘܓܐ. ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܕܐܦܙܓܐ. ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܕܙܘܓܐ ܘܕܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܬܟܢܫ ܕܐܢ ܗܢܐ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܡܬܦܠܓܢܐ ܗܘ ܠܫܘ̈ܝܐ. ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܕܙܘܓܐ. ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܕܐܦܙܓܐ. ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܕܙܘܓܐ ܘܕܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ ܕܪܘܟܒܐ\nܘܗܢܐ ܡܢ ܙܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܿܘ ܕܒܗ ܡܢ ܩܛܝܓܘܪ̈ܝܩܝܬܐ ܣܒܝ̈ܣܬܐ ܡܬܪܟܒܝܢ ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ. ܘܗܢܐ ܬܪܝܢܐܝܬ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܝ ܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ ܐܘ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܘܗܿܝ ܣܒܝܣܬܐ ܪܒܬܐ. ܐܘ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܗܦܟܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܗܕܐ ܣܥܘܪܘܬܐ ܛܒܬܐ ܗܝ. ܘܟܠ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܣܥܘܪܘܬܐ ܛܒܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܫܘܝܬ ܠܩܘ̈ܠܣܐ ܗܝ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐ ܢ ܗܕܐ ܣܥܘܪܘܬܐ ܛܠܘܡܝܐ ܗܕ ܡܣܠܝܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ.","english":"And in that fourth [figure] thus: Whenever a rational animal is a body. And whenever a rational animal is a writing. Therefore, there is a time when a rational animal is a body [and] a writing. The second species of composition.\n\nAnd this species is that in which syllogisms are composed from these distinct [propositions]. And these are from those that are near to nature and clear. These are composed in the first schema. As that every proposition is either a pair or an odd-pair. And every odd-pair is either one or divided into unequal [parts]. It is concluded that every proposition is either a pair or one or divided into unequal [parts]. The third species of composition.\n\nAnd this again is a species in which syllogisms are composed from simple and distinct [propositions]. And these are evident. Those are composed in the first schema. When the simple [proposition] is the minor, and the distinct [proposition] the major. As that this proposition, if it is divided into equal [parts], is a pair. And every pair is either a pair of a pair, or a pair of an odd-pair, or a pair of a pair and of an odd-pair. It is concluded that if this proposition is divided into equal [parts], it is either a pair of a pair, or a pair of an odd-pair, or a pair of a pair and of an odd-pair. The fourth species of composition.\n\nAnd this is a species in which syllogisms are composed from categorical simple [propositions]. And this in two ways: In that the categorical is the minor and the simple is the major, or the opposite. And the first: As that this action is good. And whenever an action is good, it is worthy of praise. The second: As that this action is unjust; this is a thing of blame.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܙܘܓܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܙܘܓܐ (zawgā) means 'pair' and is used here as a technical term in syllogistic logic, likely corresponding to the Greek συζυγία (syzygia).","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܦܙܓܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܐܦܙܓܐ (apzaggā) means 'odd-pair' and is a neologism in Syriac logic, possibly derived from Greek ἀπεζευγμένον (apezeugmenon) meaning 'disjoined'.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage enumerates four 'species of composition' (ܙܥܐ ܕܪܘܟܒܐ), each describing a distinct way of forming syllogisms from different types of propositions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܛܝܓܘܪ̈ܝܩܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܩܛܝܓܘܪ̈ܝܩܝܬܐ (qaṭīgōrīqāyātā) is a Syriac borrowing of Greek κατηγορικαί (katēgorikai), meaning 'categorical' propositions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The logical terminology and structure here reflect the influence of Aristotelian and Stoic logic as transmitted through Syriac translations of Greek philosophical works.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The English translation of the fourth species contains a possible misreading: 'a thing of blame' may not fully capture the Syriac ܡܣܠܝܬܐ (msallītā), which could mean 'something blameworthy' or 'an object of reproach'.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac text in the fourth species uses ܡܣܠܝܬܐ (msallītā), which could be interpreted as 'blame' or 'reproach'; the English draft renders it as 'a thing of blame'.","The phrase 'near to nature' (ܠܟܝܢܐ) may refer to propositions that are self-evident or naturally clear, but the exact logical sense is not fully specified."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":57,"ref":"p57","source":"ܘܟܠ ܕܡܣܠܝܐ ܫܟܝܪܐ. ܡܬܟܢܫ ܕܐܢ ܗܕܐ ܣܥܘܪܘܬܐ ܛܠܘܡܝܐ ܗܝ ܫܟܝܪܐ. ܙܢܐ ܚܡܝܫܐ ܕܪܘܟܒܐ\nܘܗܢܐ ܙܢܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܿܘ ܕܒܗ ܡܢ ܩܛܝܓܘܪ̈ܝܩܝܬܐ ܘܡܦܪ̈ܫܬܐ ܡܬܪܟܒܝܢ ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ. ܘܡܢ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܗܿܘ ܡܐ ܕܩܪܝܒ ܠܟܝܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܗܿܘ ܕܗܿܝ ܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ ܙܥܘܪܬܗ ܬܗܘܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ ܡܦܪܫܬܐ ܪܒܬܗ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܬܐܡܪ ܕܗܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܟܠ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܬܟܢܫ ܕܗܢܐ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܕܥܠ ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ ܬܢܝ̈ܝܐ\nܘܬܢܝܝܐ ܡܢ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܘܢܦܪܝܣܡܐ ܐܘ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܝܠܗ ܒܡܥܒܕܢܘܬܐ ܒܗ ܫܟܝܚ. ܡܪܟܒ ܕܝܢ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ. ܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܗܘܦܬܛܝܩܝܬܐ. ܘܐܚܪܬܐ ܕܥܛܦܐ ܬܢܝܐ ܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܐ ܕܗܿܝ ܘܢܬܝܠܕ ܣܘܢܦܪܝܣܡܐ. ܘܗܘ ܗܢܐ ܐܘ ܡܢ ܣܒܝ̈ܣܬܐ ܡܬܪܟܒ ܐܘ ܡܢ ܡܦܪ̈ܫܬܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܕܥܠ ܬܢܝܝ ܕܡܢ ܣܒܝ̈ܣܬܐ\nܘܗܿܘ ܕܡܢ ܣܒܝ̈ܣܬܐ ܬܢܝܐ ܕܩܕܡܝܐ ܠܗ ܠܢܩܦܝܐ ܡܟܢܫ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܬܐܡܪ ܐܢ ܗܢܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܕܝܢ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܬܢܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܢܩܦܝܐ ܠܐ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܟܢܫܘ ܠܩܕܝܡܝܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܢܩܦܝܐ ܓܘܢܝ ܡܢ ܩܕܝܡܝܐ ܢܗܘܐ. ܘܠܐ ܐܠܨܐ ܕܡܢ ܫܟܝܚܘܬ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܫܟܝܚܘܬ ܕܝܠܢܝܐ. ܘܐܦܢ ܟܕ ܫܘ̈ܝܐ ܢܗܘܘܢ ܬܪܝܗܘܢ ܐܟܚܕܐ ܠܚܕ̈ܕܐ ܢܩܦܝܢ. ܠܘ ܕܝܢ ܒܪܡ ܒܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܟܐܢܐ ܐܠܐ ܠܦܘܬ ܗܘܠܐ ܕܐܬܟܝܢܬ. ܟܕ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܙܐܦܢܐ ܗܘ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܬܢܝܐ ܕܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܢܩܦܝܐ. ܠܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܩܕܝܡܝܐ ܡܟܢܫ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܬܥܛܘܦ ܬܬܢܐ ܒܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܕܐܬܩܕܡ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܬܟܢܫܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܬܢܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܩܕܝܡܝܐ ܠܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܢܩܦܝܐ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ ܡܟܢܫ.","english":"And everything that is a valid syllogism is refuted if this proposition is a false syllogism. The fifth species of composition.\n\nAnd this species is again that in which, from categorical and hypothetical propositions, composite syllogisms are composed. And from these, that which is near to nature is that in which the categorical proposition is the minor and the hypothetical proposition is the major. As when one says that this thing is a substance. And every substance is either a body or a spirit. Therefore, this substance is either a body or a spirit.\n\nAn example of syllogisms that are invalid.\n\nAnd an invalid syllogism is that in which its subsumption or assumption is found in the predicate. It is composed, then, from two propositions: one categorical and the other a conditional invalid, one from the terms of which a subsumption is born. And this is composed either from terms or from propositions.\n\nAn example of an invalid syllogism from terms.\n\nAnd the invalid syllogism from terms, the first does not refute the second, as when one says: If this is a head, it is an animal. And it is a head. Therefore, it is an animal. But the invalid syllogism of the second cannot refute the first, because there is a time when the second is contained in the first, and it is not necessary that from the existence of the container, the existence of the contained follows. And even when both are equal to each other, they follow. Not, however, in a true schema, but according to the matter that is posited, when the schema is false. In the same way, the invalid syllogism of the assumption of the second refutes the assumption of the first. As when one turns and becomes invalid in the syllogism that preceded, that an animal is not. It is refuted that it is not a head. But the invalid syllogism of the assumption of the first does not at all refute the assumption of the second.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܙܢܐ ܚܡܝܫܐ ܕܪܘܟܒܐ","severity":"info","text":"The passage marks the fifth species of composition (ܙܢܐ ܚܡܝܫܐ ܕܪܘܟܒܐ), following the fourth species in the previous passage, continuing Bar Hebraeus's classification of syllogistic forms.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ (syllogismoi) is a loan from Greek συλλογισμοί, used throughout for composite syllogisms formed from categorical and hypothetical propositions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܛܝܓܘܪ̈ܝܩܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܩܛܝܓܘܪ̈ܝܩܝܬܐ (categorical) and ܡܦܪ̈ܫܬܐ (hypothetical) distinguish two proposition types in composite syllogisms, with the categorical as minor and hypothetical as major.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܢܦܪܝܣܡܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܣܘܢܦܪܝܣܡܐ (subsumption) and ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ (assumption) are technical terms for the components of an invalid syllogism, derived from Greek ὑπόληψις and ἀντίφασις.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܬܢܝܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The passage distinguishes invalid syllogisms (ܬܢܝܝܐ) from valid ones, providing examples of invalid syllogisms from terms and from propositions, with a focus on the failure of refutation between first and second figures.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܒܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܟܐܢܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The phrase 'in a true schema' (ܒܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܟܐܢܐ) contrasts with 'when the schema is false' (ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܙܐܦܢܐ), indicating that validity depends on matter (ܗܘܠܐ) rather than form alone, a point that may be ambiguous in the Syriac.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac text has several uncertain readings due to possible scribal errors or orthographic variants (e.g., ܙܢܐ for ܙܢܐ, ܡܢ for ܡܢ). The translation assumes standard Syriac conventions for logical terms."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":58,"ref":"p58","source":"ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܟ ܕܐܬܐܡܪܬ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܢܩܦܝܐ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܡܢ ܩܕܝܡܝܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܕܩܕܝܡܘܬܐ ܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܗܝܕܝܟ ܙܕܩ ܬܗܘܐ ܡܢ ܡܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܕܢܩܦܝܐ. ܘܠܐ ܐܠܨܐ ܡܢ ܫܟܝܚܘܬ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܫܟܝܚܘܬܗ ܕܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܬܥܛܘܦ ܬܬܢܐ ܒܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܕܐܬܩܕܡ. ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܠܐ ܡܬܟܢܫܐ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܗܐ ܓܝܪ ܣܘܣܝܐ ܟܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܦܠܐ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܠܢܐ ܟܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܚܝܘܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܕܥܠ ܬܢܝܝܐ ܕܡܢ ܡܦܪ̈ܫܬܐ ܡܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ\nܘܗܿܘ ܕܡܢ ܡܦܪ̈ܫܬܐ ܡܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܬܢܝܐ ܕܐܝܕܐ ܕܗܝ ܡܢܬܐ ܠܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܗܿܝ ܐܚܪܬܐ. ܐܢ ܬܪܝܢܬ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܐ ܗܝ ܡܟܢܫܐ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܐܝܕܐ ܕܗܝ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܠܗܿܢܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܘ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܗܢܐ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܙܘܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܕܝܢ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܕܝܢ ܙܘܓܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܙܘܓܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܕܝܢ ܐܦܙܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܐܦܙܓܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܕܝܢ ܙܘܓܐ ىܝܬܘܗܝ. ܗܟܢܐ ܘܒܣܓܝܐܘ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܬܐܡܪ ܟܠ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܐܘ ܫܡܐ ܗܝ ܐܘ ܡܠܬܐ ܐܘ ܐܣܪܐ. ܘܗܕܐ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܫܡܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܡܕܝܢ ܡܠܬܐ ܐܘ ܐܣܪܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܘܫܡܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܡܕܝܢ ܡܠܬܐ ܐܘ ܐܣܪܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܡܛܠ ܬܢܝܝܐ ܕܡܢ ܡܦܪܫܬܐ ܟܠܝܬ ܡܢ ܣܦܝܩܘܬܐ\nܘܗܕܐ ܡܢ ܬܢܝܐ ܕܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܐܝܕܐ ܕܗܝ ܡܢܬܐ. ܠܗܿ ܠܗܿܝ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܡܟܢܫ. ܘܐܠܐ ܠܘ ܟܠܝܬ ܡܢ ܣܦܝܩܘܬܐ ܗܘܬ. ܡܦܪܫܬܐ ܗܝ ܓܝܪ ܗܕܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܠܐ ܢܣܬܦܩ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܢ ܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗܿ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܬܐܡܪ ܕܣܘܩܪܛܝܣ ܐܘ ܒܝܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܘ ܠܐ ܡܬܛܒܥ. ܘܒܝܡܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܡܬܛܒܥ.","english":"in which, as was said, the universal affirmative can be from the first. For in the universal affirmative of the first universal, then it is necessary that it be from the affirmative of the particular. And it is not necessary that from the universal possibility the possibility of the particular be, as that which is turned and becomes in the syllogism that preceded. For at the beginning it is not. And it is not refuted that an animal is not. For here a horse, when at the beginning it is not, is an animal. Nor is it an animal in that a tree, when at the beginning it is not, is again not an animal. The demonstration concerning the composition from divided propositions.\n\nAnd that which is from divided propositions is a composition of which one proposition is the antithesis of the other. If two propositions are refuted, in that same manner and antithesis of which one proposition is to the others, as that every number is either even or odd. And this number is even. Therefore it is not odd. And it is odd, therefore it is not even. And it is not even, therefore it is odd. And it is not odd, therefore it is even. And so with many propositions. As that which says every sound is either a noun or a verb or a conjunction. And this sound is a noun. Therefore it is not a verb or a conjunction. And it is not a noun, therefore it is a verb or a conjunction. The demonstration concerning the composition from a divided universal with a particular.\n\nAnd this is from the composition of antithesis of which one proposition refutes the other. And if not, it would be a universal with a particular. For this is a divided from a division that does not suffice that which is placed from one of its propositions. As that which says Socrates is either in the sea or not to be sought. And he is not in the sea. Therefore he is not to be sought.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܡܢܝܢܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܡܢܝܢܐ (mnyānā) means 'number' in the sense of an integer, as used in the example 'every number is either even or odd'.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ (anṭīpasis) is a loan from Greek ἀντίφασις, meaning 'contradiction' or 'antithesis', here denoting a pair of mutually exclusive propositions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the discussion of the fifth species of composite syllogism, illustrating it with examples of disjunctive syllogisms (e.g., even/odd, noun/verb/conjunction) and the rule that one proposition refutes the other.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The example 'Socrates is either in the sea or not to be sought' echoes a standard Stoic logical puzzle (the 'Socrates in the well' paradox), adapted into Syriac logical pedagogy.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text at the end is ambiguous: 'ܘܒܝܡܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ' could mean 'he is not in the sea' or 'he is not in the sea (i.e., not drowned)', affecting the logical force of the example.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'ܒܪܢܫܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ' (at the beginning it is not) is unclear: it may refer to a logical premise not being initially posited, or to a temporal priority in the syllogism.","The example about the horse and tree is corrupt or elliptical; the intended logical point (possibly about existential import) is not fully recoverable from the Syriac alone."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":59,"ref":"p59","source":"ܘܡܬܛܒܥ ܡܕܝܢ ܒܝܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܬܢܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܕܐ ܕܗܝ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܠܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܗܿܝ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܟܢܫ. ܘܐܠܐ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܗܘܬ ܕܐܟܚܕܐ ܡܬܘܡ ܡܬܟܢ̈ܫܢ ܗܘ̈ܝ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܝܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܠܐ ܡܟܢܫܐ ܠܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܛܒܥ ܒܕ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܢܛܘܦ. ܐܦܠܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܢܬܛܒܥ ܠܗܿܝ ܕܒܝܡܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܕܡܛܠ ܬܢܝܝܐ ܟܠܝܬ ܡܢ ܟܢܝܫܘܬܐ ܕܡܢ ܡܦܪܫܬܐ\nܘܗܕܐ ܡܢ ܒܗܦܟܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܩܕܡܝܗܿ. ܗ̄ ܕܬܢܝܐ ܕܐܝܕܐ ܕܝܗ ܡܢܬܐ ܠܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܗܿܝ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܡܟܢܫܐ. ܘܐܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܗܘܬ ܕܐܟܚܕܐ ܢܬܟܢ̈ܫܢ ܗܘ̈ܝ. ܘܗܕܐ ܡܢ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܬܣܠܓܣ ܘܬܐܡܪ ܕܗܢܐ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܐܘ ܐܝܠܢܐ ܐܘ ܟܐܦܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܐܝܠܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܕܝܢ ܟܐܦܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܟܐܦܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܕܝܢ ܐܝܠܢܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܬܢܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܚܕܐ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܠܗܿܝ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܬܟܢܫ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܟܠܚܕܐ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܕܡܢ ܠܥܠ ܐܬܚܘܝܬ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܡܢܗܿ ܕܗܿܝ ܐܚܪܬܐ. ܘܠܐ ܐܠܨܐ ܡܢ ܫܟܝܚܘܬ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܫܟܝܚܘܬܗ ܕܕܝܠܢܝܐ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܬܢܝܐ ܕܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܐ ܐܝܠܢܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܢܟܢܫ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܐܦܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܦܠܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܐܦܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܠܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܢܘܗܪܐ: ܘܡܢ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܡܢ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣ̈ܛܝܩܝܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܘܡܚܘܝܢܘܬܐ ܗܝܦܘܓܝܓܝ. ܘܗܕܐ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܦܣܩܐ ܕܥܠ ܟܠܢܝܐ ܗܿܘ ܡܐ ܕܒܡܢ̈ܘܬܘܗܝ ܡܫܬܟܚ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܕܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܡܙܝܥܐ ܠܘܥܗܿ ܬܚܬܝܐ ܟܕ ܠܥܣ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܬܘܪܐ ܘܣܘܣܝܐ ܡܙܝܥܝܢ ܟܕ ܠܥܣܝܢ. ܘܗܕܐ ܡܚܝܠܬܐ ܗܝ. ܒܕ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܢܐ ܕܠܐ ܚܙܝܢܗܿ. ܠܐ ܡܙܝܥܐ ܐܝܟ ܩܪܘܩܘܕܝܠܘܣ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܠܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܡܙܝܥܐ ܠܘܥܗܿ ܬܚܬܝܐ ܟܕ ܠܥܣܐ. ܘܡܢܗܘܢ ܬܘܒ ܦܐܪܕܝܓܡܐ.","english":"It is then inquired whether it is in the sea. The error, however, of which of these two is the antithesis of the other cannot be concealed. Otherwise, it would not be possible for both to be concealed together. For that which is in the sea does not conceal that which is inquired, since it is possible for it to be found. Nor does that which is not inquired conceal that which is not in the sea. The demonstration, therefore, of the error is complete with the concealment of the distinct.\n\nAnd this is the opposite of the preceding. For the error of which of them is the antithesis of the other is concealed. Otherwise, it would be possible for both to be concealed together. And this is like that which one would syllogize and say: This is a body, or a tree, or a stone. And if it is a tree, then it is not a stone. And if it is a stone, then it is not a tree. The error, however, of the antithesis of one of them cannot conceal the other. For the antithesis of each of them is, as was shown above, the interior of the other. And it is not compelled by the existence of the interior to the existence of the exterior. And because of this, the error of that which says \"it is not a tree\" cannot conceal that which says \"it is a stone.\" Nor can that which says \"it is not a stone\" conceal that which says \"it is a tree.\" Demonstration: And it is from the minor syllogistics. And it is a hypothetical demonstration. And this is a section on the universal, when it is found in its particulars, like that which is said: Every animal moves its lower jaw when it chews. For humans, oxen, and horses move when they chew. And this is weak. For some animals, such as the crocodile, do not move something which they do not see. And because of this, it is not true that every animal moves its lower jaw when it chews. And there is again a paradigm.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword ἀντίφασις (antiphasis) is used here for 'antithesis' or 'contradiction', a standard term in Syriac logical works.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣ̈ܛܝܩܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword συλλογιστικός (syllogistikos) appears in the plural, referring to 'syllogistics' or the study of syllogisms.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܐܪܕܝܓܡܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword παράδειγμα (paradeigma) is used for 'paradigm' or 'example', concluding the demonstration.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܪܘܩܘܕܝܠܘܣ","severity":"info","text":"The crocodile (κροκόδειλος) is cited as a counterexample to the claim that all animals move the lower jaw when chewing, reflecting ancient natural history knowledge.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage presents a logical demonstration (ܢܘܗܪܐ) followed by a hypothetical syllogism and a universal statement refuted by a counterexample, typical of Bar Hebraeus' method.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous pronominal references (e.g., ܗܿܝ ܐܚܪܬܐ 'the other') that make the logical relations difficult to parse; the English draft reflects one possible reading.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The referents of 'the other' and 'the antithesis' are not fully specified in the Syriac, leading to multiple possible logical interpretations."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":60,"ref":"p60","source":"ܘܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܦܣܩܐ ܕܥܠ ܡܢܬܝܐ ܡܕܡ ܒܗܿܘ ܕܒܡܢܬܝܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܕܒܙܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܠܗ ܡܚܝܢ ܫܟܝܚ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܕܫܡܝܐ ܡܣܟܡܐ ܗܘ. ܡܕܝܢ ܡܫܪܝܢܐ ܗܘ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܦ ܡܫܟܢܐ ܕܡܣܟܡܐ ܗܘ ܡܫܪܝܢܐ ܗܘ. ܘܗܿܘ ܡܢ ܕܚܪܝܢܐ ܢܩܦ ܠܡܫܪܝܢܘܬܗ ܫܡܝܐ ܗܘ. ܘܡܬܟܢܐ ܦܪܥܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܕܫܠܡܘܬܐ ܢܩܝܦܐ ܠܡܫܪܝܢܘܬܗ܆ ܒܝܬܐ ܗܘ ܡܬܟܢܐ ܥܩܪܐ. ܘܙܢܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܒܗ ܐܬܟܝܢܬ ܡܚܝܢܘܬܐ܆ ܡܣܟܡܘܬܐ ܗܘ ܘܡܬܟܢܐ ܥܠܬܐ. ܘܡܫܪܝܢܘܬܐ ܕܗܝ ܗܝ ܦܪܘܒܠܝܡܐ܆ ܦܣܩܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܘܒܗܿ ܒܗܕܐ ܡܚܘܝܢܘܬܐ ܡܬܚܫܚܝܢ ܕܝܠܝܩܛܝ̈ܩܘ. ܘܠܗܿ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܡܟܢܝܢ ܘܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܟܠ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܙܕܩ ܕܢܗܘܘܢ ܒܗ ܐܣܛܘ̈ܟܣܐ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܐܪܒܥܐ. ܘܗܕܐ ܬܘܒ ܡܚܘܝܢܘܬܐ܆ ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܡܚܝܠܬܐ ܗܝ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܐܠܨܐ ܡܢ ܡܫܘܬܦܘܬܐ ܕܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܒܙܢܐ ܡܕܡ. ܡܫܘܬܦܘܬܗܘܢ ܒܟܠ ܡܕܡ. ܘܐܠܐ ܣܩܘ̈ܒܠܝܐ ܗܢܘܢ ܟܕ ܗܢܘܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܗܘܘ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܚܝܢܝܢ ܒܓܢܣܗܘܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܫܟܝܪܐ. ܘܡܠܝ̈ܛܐ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܟܕ ܐܬܒܝܢܘ ܡܚܝܠܘܬ ܡܚܘܝܢܘܬܐ ܗܕܐ܆ ܐܬܥܠܠܘ ܕܗܕܐ ܡܬܓܡܪܐ. ܟܕ ܗܘ ܙܢܐ ܕܒܗ ܡܬܟܝܢܐ ܡܚܘܝܢܘܬܐ ܥܠܬܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܕܦܣܩܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܟܪ ܕܢܫܬܟܚ ܢܫܬܟܚ. ܒܬܪܝܢܘܬ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܢܣܝܘ ܠܡܫܪܪܘ ܥܠܬܘܬ ܥܠܬܐ ܠܦܣܩܐ. ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܝܢ ܡܣܟܡܘܬܐ ܠܡܫܪܝܢܘܬܐ. ܚܕ ܡܢ ܙܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܩܪܘ ܫܘܝܘܬ ܪܗܛܐ ܘܗܦܘܟܝܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܫܟܝܚܘܬ ܦܣܩܐ ܒܫܟܝܚܘܬ ܥܠܬܐ. ܐܘ ܠܘ ܒܟܠܗܘܢ. ܐܢ ܒܟܠܗܝܢ ܡܕܝܢ ܘܐܦ ܒܗ ܒܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܕܥܠܘܗܝ ܗܘ ܚܪܝܢܐ. ܘܐܢ ܒܗܢܐ ܡܚܘܝܬܘܢ ܡܢ ܝܬܝܪ̈ܬܐ ܗܝ ܠܟܘܢ ܕܬܕܟܪܘܢ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܣܛܪ ܡܢܗ. ܗ̄ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܥܩܪܐ ܟܢܝܬܘܢܝܗܝ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܗܢܝܢܐ ܡܢ ܕܘܟܪܢܗ.","english":"And this is the section concerning the demonstration of something in that other demonstration which in some way strikes it as possible. As it is said that the sky is a composition. Is it then a beginning, as it is also possible that it is a composition and a beginning? And that which is attached to its beginning is the sky. And the end is concealed. And that to which completion is attached as its beginning is the house, and the root is concealed. And the something by which the striking is established is composition, and the cause is concealed. And the beginning of this very problem is a concealed section. And in this demonstration, dialecticians are occupied. And to it, a syllogism is indicated, and it is said that every syllogism from a premise ought to have these four elements. And this demonstration again is in a similar weak manner, in that it does not compel from the participation of actions in something, their participation in everything. But they are contraries while they exist in that which strikes in their bodies, which is common. And the accursed ones among them, when they were perplexed by the weakness of this demonstration, they entered into this being completed. While the something by which the demonstration is established is the cause of the section. In the pair from the premise mentioned, that it might be found, it is found. By the duality of something, they ceased to confirm the causality of the cause for the section. These, then, are composition to beginning. One of the something which they called equality of flow and reversal, which is the possibility of a section in the possibility of a cause, or not in all. If in all, then also in the action upon it, it is the other. And if in this demonstration from the more excellent ones it is for you to remember another side from it. O, for that root, I have concealed it, and not one of the signs from its remembrance.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܣܩܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܦܣܩܐ (pāsāqā) can mean 'section', 'division', or 'cut'. In this logical context, it likely refers to a 'section' of a demonstration or argument, as in the opening phrase 'this is the section concerning the demonstration'.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܚܘܝܢܘܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The word ܡܚܘܝܢܘܬܐ (maḥwāyūṯā) is a nominal form derived from the root ܚܘܐ (to show, demonstrate). It is rendered here as 'demonstration' and is a key technical term in Bar Hebraeus's logical vocabulary, referring to a formal proof or argument.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ (syllogismos) is used here, reflecting the influence of Aristotelian logic on Syriac philosophical discourse. Bar Hebraeus specifies that every syllogism from a premise must have four elements, a point that echoes standard logical theory.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage engages with logical concepts such as 'composition' (ܡܣܟܡܘܬܐ), 'beginning' (ܡܫܪܝܢܘܬܐ), and 'cause' (ܥܠܬܐ), which are central to Aristotelian and Neoplatonic metaphysics as received in Syriac tradition. The mention of 'dialecticians' (ܕܝܠܝܩܛܝ̈ܩܘ) situates the text within a school context.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or corrupt phrases, such as 'the accursed ones among them' (ܘܡܠܝ̈ܛܐ ܡܢܗܘܢ) and the final exclamation 'O, for that root, I have concealed it'. These may reflect textual corruption or a polemical aside that is difficult to interpret with certainty.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage is part of a larger argument about demonstration and syllogism. It moves from a specific example (the sky as composition) to general logical principles (the four elements of a syllogism), then critiques a weak form of demonstration, and concludes with a discussion of causality and duality.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The identity of 'the accursed ones' (ܡܠܝ̈ܛܐ) is unclear; they may be opponents of Bar Hebraeus's logical views.","The phrase 'equality of flow and reversal' (ܫܘܝܘܬ ܪܗܛܐ ܘܗܦܘܟܝܐ) is obscure and may refer to a specific logical or physical concept not fully preserved.","The final sentence 'O, for that root, I have concealed it' is syntactically broken and may indicate a lacuna or a rhetorical aside."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":61,"ref":"p61","source":"ܘܐܢ ܠܘ ܒܟܠܗܘܢ ܗܐ ܫܪܟܬ ܥܠܝܟܘܢ ܡܚܘܝܢܘܬܗܿ ܒܗ ܒܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܡܬܚܪܝܢܐ ܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܣܝܥܐ ܠܟܘܢ ܡܚܘܝܢܘܬܗܿ ܒܗܿܘ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܠܐ ܡܬܚܪܝܢܐ. ܙܢܐ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܕܝܠܗܘܢ܆ ܗܿܘ ܕܠܗ ܩܪܘ ܡܬܬܡܝܫܢܘܬܐ ܘܦܘܠܓܐ ܗܟܢܐ ܗܘ. ܐܡܪܝܢ ܓܝܪ ܕܡܫܪܝܢܘܬܐ ܢܩܝܦܐ ܠܡܫܟܢܐ. ܐܘ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܩܐܡ ܠܝܬܗ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܠܘ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܘ ܩܐܡ ܠܝܬܗ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܢܩܝܦܐ ܠܗ ܡܫܪܝܢܘܬܐ. ܘܐܠܐ ܟܠ ܕܗܟܢܐ ܡܫܪܝܢܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܗܘܐ ܕܢܗܘܐ. ܫܪܝܟܐ ܡܕܝܢ ܕܒܗܿܝ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܗܘ ܡܫܪܝܢܐ ܗܘ. ܘܫܡܝܐ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܗܘ ܡܕܝܢ ܡܫܪܝܢܐ ܗܘ. ܘܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܗܢܐ ܙܢܐ ܪܒܝܥܐܝܬ ܡܣܬܬܪ. ܚܕ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܕܠܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܟܠ ܢܩܦܝܐ ܒܝܕ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܐܘܟܝܬ ܥܠܬܐ ܢܩܦ ܠܡܬܢܩܦܢܗ. ܐܝܟ ܕܒܐܝܣܓܘܓܝ ܐܬܝܕܥܬ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܠܘ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܣܟܡܐ ܗܘ ܡܫܟܢܐ. ܢܩܝܦܐ ܠܗ ܡܫܪܝܢܘܬܐ. ܐܠܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܘ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܕܬܪܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܕܗܘ ܗܿܘ ܦܘܠܓܐ ܡܨܐ ܗܘ ܡܫܬܪܬܚܘ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܥܠܬܐ ܕܡܫܪܝܢܘܬ ܡܫܟܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܚܪܝܢ ܬܗܘܐ ܣܛܪ ܡܢ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܬܠܬܐ ܕܠܘ ܡܫܟܚ ܫܟܝܚ ܒܫܡܝܐ ܘܠܐ ܡܗܢܝܐ ܠܗܘܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܥܕܝܢ ܠܡܐܡܪܗ. ܕܐܢ ܐܝܬ ܗܘܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܚܪܝܢ ܐܕܪܟܢܝܗܝ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܠܐ ܡܬܡܨܝܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܕܬܫܬܟܚ ܥܠܬܐ ܩܪܝܚܬܐ ܘܠܐ ܢܫܬܘܕܥܝܗܿ. ܐܝܟ ܕܐܦ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܢܗܘܐ ܩܕܡܝܢ ܦܝܠܐ ܘܠܐ ܢܚܙܝܘܗܝ ܒܩܕܡܐ ܐܝܛܐ ܕܝܢ ܢܚܙܝܘܗܝ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܘܬܗܘܢ ܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܕܐܝܢܐ ܦܚܡܐ ܠܦܝܠܐ ܡܬܪܓܫܢܐ ܠܘܬ ܣܘ̈ܟܠܐ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܒܬܪ ܥܘܩ̈ܒܐ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ ܘܒܘܚ̈ܢܐ ܠܗܘܢ ܡܕܪܟܝܢܢ. ܐܦܠܐ ܬܘܒ ܡܬܥܕܪܝܢ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܝܢ ܠܒܥܠܕܪܗܘܢ ܕܐܢ ܐܝܬ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܥܠܬܐ ܐܘ ܠܐ ܝܕܥܝܬܘܢ ܙܕܩ ܕܢܟܦܪܝܗܿ ܕܠܝܬ ܒܕܠܘ ܠܟܠܗܝܢ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ ܝܕܥܝܢܢ. ܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܠܬܐ.","english":"And if not in all of them, then the demonstration concerning you has remained in the possible action, and nothing helps you with its demonstration in that other, impossible one. The argument of yours, that which they call \"mobility and division,\" is thus. For they say that \"beginning\" is attached to possibility: either in that which it is, or in that which it is not, or in that which it is a body. And it is not in that which it is or is not that beginning is attached to it, but everything that is thus begun ought to be that which it is. The remainder, then, is that in that which it is a body, it is begun. And the sky is a body; therefore it is begun. And this argument again is refuted in a fourth way. One of the things they say is that it is not right that every attachment be through a medium, that is, a cause, attached to its being attached, as is known in Isagoge. For it is possible that beginning is attached to it not in that which it agrees, but in that which it is. As for the argument that that division can be extended, it is possible that the cause of beginning might be something else, apart from those three, which cannot be found in the sky, nor is it fitting for them that which prevents its being said. For if there were something else, they would have apprehended it, in that it is from the impossibilities that a bare cause would be found and not known, just as it is also not possible that it be a prior elephant, nor that it be seen in the first place; but they see it, in that they say, \"What charcoal is to the elephant is perceived by the senses, to the intellects which, after many tracks and searches, apprehend them.\" Nor again are they helped by that which they say to their opponent: \"If there is another cause or not, you do not know; you ought to deny it, since not all things that exist are known.\" This is the argument of the third.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܫܪܝܢܘܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term mšaryānūṯā, here translated 'beginning', carries the sense of 'principle' or 'starting-point' in a logical or ontological sense, not merely temporal inception.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܬܬܡܝܫܢܘܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term mttmyšˁwṯā, rendered 'mobility', is a rare formation; it likely denotes the capacity for motion or change, a key concept in Aristotelian physics as received in Syriac.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܝܣܓܘܓܝ","severity":"info","text":"The reference to 'Isagoge' (Eisagōgē) points to Porphyry's Introduction to Aristotle's Categories, a standard textbook in Syriac philosophical curricula, here invoked for the principle that attachment (or predication) requires a medium.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܙܢܐ ܕܬܠܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The passage concludes with 'This is the argument of the third', marking the end of a third argument in a series; the preceding passage introduced a second argument, and the next likely continues with a fourth.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܚܡܐ ܠܦܝܠܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The analogy of 'charcoal to the elephant' is obscure; it may be a garbled or elliptical reference to a known philosophical example, but its precise source or meaning is uncertain in the current state of the text.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'demonstration concerning you' (ܡܚܘܝܢܘܬܗܿ ܒܗ ܒܣܘܥܪܢܐ) is ambiguous: it may refer to a demonstration addressed to the reader or to an opponent, and the referent of 'you' is unclear.","The analogy of 'charcoal to the elephant' is not fully explained; it may be a corruption or a reference to a lost example."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":62,"ref":"p62","source":"ܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܕܐܦ ܢܫܦ ܠܟܘܢ ܕܠܘ ܠܒܪ ܡܢ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܬܠܬܐ ܥܠܬܐ ܐܝܬ ܐܚܪܬܐ. ܐܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܠܬܝܗܘܢ ܐܟܚܕܐ ܐܢܘܢ ܥܠܬܗ ܕܦܣܩܐ. ܘܟܕ ܒܡܫܟܢܐ ܐܟܚܕܐ ܫܟܝܚܝܢ. ܒܫܡܝܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܢܫܬܟܚܘܢ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܐܟܚܕܐ. ܙܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܪܒܥܐ. ܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܐܫܦܢܢ ܕܗܿܘ ܬܠܝܬܝܗ ܕܦܘܠܓܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܥܠܬܐ ܕܡܫܪܝܢܘܬܐ. ܐܠܐ ܗܘ ܗܢܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܠܘ ܦܫܝܛܐܝܬ ܐܠܐ ܒܙܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܢܗܘܐ ܥܠܬܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܒܡܫܟܢܐ ܫܟܝܚ܆ ܒܫܡܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ. ܗܿܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܓܘܫܡܢܝܘܬܐ ܠܘ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ ܐܠܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܗܘܠܐ ܗܝ ܡܩܒܠܢܝܬ ܗܘܝܐ ܘܚܘܒܠܐ. ܘܠܘ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܠܐ ܡܩܒܠܢܝܬܗܘܢ. ܘܒܗܠܝܢ ܟܠܗܝܢ ܡܬܒܕܩܐ ܐܠܝܠܘܬܗܿ ܕܡܚܘܝܢܘܬܐ ܦܪܕܝܓܡܐ. ܘܡܢܗܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܕܡܚܘܝܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܐܠܝ̈ܠܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܘܗܿܝ ܕܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܪܡܙܢܝܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܣܟܐ ܗܿܘ ܪܒܐ ܡܪܡܙ ܪܡܙ ܘܠܘ ܡܥܗܕܘ ܡܥܗܕܐ ܡܢ ܩܨ ܕܢܝܚܘܬܗ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܐܡܪ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܕܝܢ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܩܨ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܬܬܦܪܣܐ ܪܝܩܢܘܬܗ. ܐܝܟ ܕܦܠܢ ܡܕܝܪ ܒܠܠܝܐ ܡܕܝܢ ܓܢܒܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܡܢܗܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܟܪ̈ܝܣܝܣ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܘ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܢܐ ܗܘ ܕܣܟܐ ܪܒܐ ܘܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܿܘܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ. ܐܢ ܡܬܠܬܡ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܗܕܐ ܐܢܬܬܐ ܡܪܬ ܚܠܒܐ ܗܝ ܡܕܝܢ ܝܠܕܬ. ܘܡܢܗܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܪܡܙܢܝܐ ܕܬܚܘܡܗ ܗܿܘ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܐܢ ܓܘܢܝ ܡܢ ܣܟ̈ܐ. ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܘ ܬܪܝܢܐ ܟܕ ܡܬܠܬܡ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܗܕܐ ܐܢܬܬܐ ܐܫܬܢܝ ܦܪܨܘܦܗܿ ܡܕܝܢ ܒܛܢܐ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܕܝܠܢܝ ܡܢ ܣܟ̈ܐ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܗܘ ܬܠܝܬܝܐ. ܟܕ ܡܬܒܕܩ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܓܢܒܪ̈ܐ ܛܠܘܡܝܢ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܓܘܠܝܕ ܓܢܒܪ ܗܘܐ ܘܛܠܘܡ.","english":"They say that even if it is possible for you that there is another cause besides these three, yet it is possible that all three together are the cause of the section. And when they are found together in possibility, in heaven it is possible that they are not all found together. The small one, then, of the fourth. They say that the third of the dispute is the cause of the beginning. But that itself is possible not simply, but in a small way it becomes a cause. That which is found in possibility, in heaven, then, and not otherwise. That, then, of corporeality is not simple, but that which is in matter is receptive of generation and corruption, and not that which is without their receptivity. And in all these the irrationality of the demonstrative paradigm is examined. And from them again that the irrational demonstrations are. And that which is indicated by syllogism of sign, in that which is for the sake of the great end, it indicates a sign and does not remember from the end of its clarity. As that which says that in the beginning the animal is a body, then it is a body. Or from the end that which is not cut off from its emptiness. As that which goes out from the circle in the night, then it is a thief. And from them again that which is indicated by crisis, in that which the middle is the known one, that of the great end and the first schema. When it is syllogized, as that which they say that this woman is a milkmaid, then she has given birth. And from them again that which is indicated by the sign that it is a syllogism of sign of the limit, that middle is either internal from the ends. It is the second schema when it is syllogized. As that which they say that this woman is pregnant, her face is pale, then she is barren. Or that which is from the ends, the third schema, when it is examined, as that which they say that men are just, in that which Goliath was a man and just.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܪܡܙܢܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'syllogism of sign' (syllogismos ramzāyā) denotes a demonstrative form where the middle term is a sign rather than a cause, a key concept in Aristotelian logic as adapted in Syriac.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܟܪ̈ܝܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The term 'crisis' (krisis) here refers to a logical judgment or decision point, likely borrowed from Greek κρίσις, used in the context of syllogistic schemata.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage discusses three syllogistic figures (schemata) — first, second, and third — as classified in Aristotelian logic, with examples drawn from everyday life (e.g., milkmaid, thief).","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the narrative of logical disputation, moving from a discussion of causes to an analysis of demonstrative paradigms and syllogistic forms, marking a shift to technical logical exposition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous phrases (e.g., 'the small one, then, of the fourth') that may reflect textual corruption or elliptical reasoning; the English draft attempts a literal rendering but the logical flow is uncertain.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'the small one, then, of the fourth' is obscure; it may refer to a fourth cause or a minor premise in a fourth figure, but the text is unclear.","The identity of 'Goliath' in the final example is uncertain; it may be a biblical reference (1 Samuel 17) or a generic name for a just man."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":63,"ref":"p63","source":"ܘܡܢܗܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܣܦܣܪܘܬܐ ܕܗܝ ܗܝ ܦܘܣܘܓܢܘܡܝܩܝ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܗܿܘ ܕܡܨܥܝܐ ܐܝܬ ܠܗ ܛܘܦܣܐ ܡܕܡ ܦܓܪܢܝܐ ܕܫܟܝܚ ܠܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܠܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܚܝ̈ܘܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܪܡܘܬ ܨܘܪܐ ܠܐܪܝܐ ܘܠܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܢܫ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܒܡܚܝܢܘܬܗܘܢ ܕܒܛܘܦܣܐ ܗܢܐ܆ ܡܚܝܢܘܬܗܘܢ ܕܒܚ̈ܫܐ ܡܕܡ ܚܝܘ̈ܬܢܝܐ ܡܣܬܦܣܪܐ. ܘܗܢܐ ܘܗܿܘ ܕܩܕܡܘܗܝ ܠܘܬ ܦܪܕܝܓܡܐ ܗܿܦܟܝܢ. ܘܡܢܗܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܗܿܝ ܕܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܪܥܝܢܐ ܡܬܟܢܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܕܪ̈ܚܡܐ ܫܦܝܪ̈ܬܐ ܡܠܟܝܢ. ܘܣܢ̈ܐܐ ܩܪ̈ܨܐ ܐܟܠܝܢ. ܘܐܝܟ ܕܒܣܘܓܐܐ ܠܐ ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪ̈ܝܣܡܘܣ ܗܘ̈ܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ. ܕܐܝܟ ܗܿܠܝܢ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܕܥܠ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܗܘ̈ܠܐܣ ܕܡܚܘܝ̈ܢܘܬܐ ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܛܝܩܝܬܐ\nܒܟܠ ܓܝܪ ܡܪܟܒܐ ܬܪܝܢ ܐܝܬ ܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ. ܪܘܟܒܐ ܐܡܪ ܐܢܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܐܕܫܐ ܡܬܟܢܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܕܒܗ ܗܿܘܐ ܪܘܟܒܐ. ܕܗܘܠܐ ܡܬܩܪܐ. ܘܡܛܠ ܕܐܦ ܡܚܘܝܢܘܬܐ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܕܡܪ̈ܟܒܐ ܗܝ ܠܗܿ ܬܘܒ ܐܠܨܐܝܬ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܢܩܦܝܢ. ܘܥܠ ܪܘܟܒܗܿ ܩܕܡܬ ܡܠܬܐ ܦܪܥܬ. ܡܟܝܠ ܥܠ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܒܗܝܢ ܡܬܪܟܒܐ ܕܗܘ̈ܠܐܣ ܡܬܩܪ̈ܝܢ ܐܠܨܐ ܠܡܢܗܪܘ. ܟܕ ܡܦܠܓܝܢܢ ܠܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܠܦܘܬ ܟܝܢ̈ܝܗܝܢ ܘܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܕܗܢܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ. ܐܘ ܫܠܡܘܬܢܝ̈ܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ. ܐܘ ܡܣܬܒܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ. ܐܘ ܣܒܗ̈ܝܬܐ. ܐܘ ܡܦܢܛܣ̈ܢܝܬܐ. ܘܗܿܢܝܢ ܫܠܡܘܬܢܝ̈ܬܐ ܐܘ ܡܬܬܘܕܝܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܐܢܝܢ. ܐܘ ܡܬܬܫܠܡ̈ܢܝܬܐ. ܘܗܿܢܝܢ ܡܬܬܘܕܝܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܐܘ ܐܠܨ̈ܝܬ ܩܘܒܠܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ. ܐܘ ܡܬܛܒܢ̈ܝܬܐ. ܐܘ ܘܗܡ̈ܝܬܐ. ܘܗܿܢܝܢ ܐܠܨ̈ܝܬ ܩܘܒܠܐ. ܐܘ ܩܕܡܝ̈ܬܐ ܐܢܝܢ ܐܘ ܡܬܪ̈ܓܫܢܝܬܐ ܐܘ ܢܣܝܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܐܘ ܡܕܥܝ̈ܬܐ ܐܘ ܬܟܝ̈ܒܬܐ ܐܘ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܘܬܗܝܢ ܥܡܗܝܢ.","english":"And again, the sophistry of this same prosogogmikē, which is the syllogism that has a middle term, has some physical example that is possible for a human and for something from animals, like the form of a lion and a human being. For in the demonstration of these examples, the demonstration of some animal affections is sophistically argued. And this and the one before it are opposite to the paradigm. And again, that the syllogism of the intellect is concealed, like that which is said: beautiful women are queens, and ugly ones are eaters of lice. And as in many cases, the protases are not prosdiorismoi, like these. The demonstration concerning these protases, which are the hylē of syllogistic demonstrations.\n\nFor in every composite there are two actions: the composition, I say, which is the form that is concealed, and that in which the composition occurs, which is called hylē. And because the syllogistic demonstration is also from composites, these necessarily follow it. And concerning its composition, the word has already been spoken. Now, concerning those in which it is composed, which are called hylē, it is necessary to speak, while dividing the protases according to their natures and saying that these protases are either perfective, or probable, or apparent, or deceptive. And the perfective ones are either confessional or completive. And the confessional ones are either necessary for acceptance or natural or habitual. And the necessary for acceptance are either primary or perceptible or experiential or intellectual or deliberative, or protases of the syllogism of their own with them.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܘܣܘܓܢܘܡܝܩܝ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword prosogogmikē (προσαγωγική) is used here to denote a type of argument or rhetorical approach, likely related to 'leading toward' a conclusion. Bar Hebraeus treats it as a species of syllogism.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܗܘ̈ܠܐܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword hylē (ὕλη) is used in the Aristotelian sense of 'matter' or 'material cause', here applied to the protases (premises) as the material out of which syllogistic demonstrations are composed.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword protasis (πρότασις) means 'premise' in logical contexts. Bar Hebraeus classifies protases into perfective, probable, apparent, and deceptive types, following Aristotelian and later Syriac logical traditions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"beautiful women are queens, and ugly ones are eaters of lice","severity":"info","text":"This proverbial example illustrates a concealed syllogism of the intellect. It likely derives from folk wisdom or a known rhetorical topos, used to show how premises can be implicit in everyday reasoning.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"classification of protases","severity":"info","text":"The passage presents a systematic division of protases into four main kinds (perfective, probable, apparent, deceptive), with further subdivisions. This mirrors the taxonomic approach common in Syriac Aristotelian commentaries.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"sophistry of this same prosogogmikē","severity":"caution","text":"The text is corrupt or ambiguous at several points, especially in the classification of protases and the relation between 'confessional' and 'completive' types. The Syriac may reflect a misreading or abbreviation of a Greek source.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The precise meaning of 'prosogogmikē' in this context is uncertain; it may be a technical term from a lost logical work.","The classification of protases as 'confessional' or 'completive' is not fully explained and may be garbled in transmission."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":64,"ref":"p64","source":"ܡܛܠ ܩܕܡܝ̈ܬܐ\nܘܗܿܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܗܘܢܐ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܟܝܢܐܝܬ ܡܘܕܐ ܫܪܝܪܘܬܗܝܢ ܟܕ ܡܬܝܩܢ ܣܟ̈ܐ ܕܡܢܗܘܢ ܡܪ̈ܟܒܢ. ܘܐܢ ܢܗܘܐ ܕܒܕܘܟ ܢܟܦܘܪ ܐܢܝܢ ܡܢ ܩܨ ܠܐ ܡܬܝܩܢܢܘܬ ܣܟ̈ܐ ܗܕܐ ܠܗ ܓܕܫܐ ܘܠܘ ܡܛܠ ܡܕܡ ܐܚܪܝܢ. ܘܗܿܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܘܠܐ ܪܒ ܡܢ ܡܢܬܐ. ܘܚܕ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܠܐ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܫܪܐ ܒܬܪܬܝܢ ܕܘܟ̈ܝܢ ܐܟܚܕܐ. ܡܛܠ ܡܬܪ̈ܓܫܢܝܬܐ\nܘܗܿܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܗܘܢܐ ܦܣܩ ܫܪܝܪܘܬܗܝܢ. ܒܝܕ ܡܪܓܫܢܘܬ ܚܝ̈ܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܒܪ̈ܝܐ ܐܘ ܓܘ̈ܝܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܦܣܘܩ ܕܫܡܫܐ ܡܢܗܪܢܐ ܗܘ. ܘܕܐܝܬ ܠܢ ܦܢܛܣܝܐ ܘܪܓܬܐ ܘܚܡܬܐ. ܡܛܠ ܢܣܝܢ̈ܝܬܐ\nܘܗܿܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܥܠܬ ܦܣܩܐ ܕܒܗܝܢ ܡܥܝܢܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܥܦܝ̈ܦܬܐ ܡܫܘܕ̈ܥܬ ܡܪܢܝܘܬܐ ܐܘ ܡܘܪ̈ܬܬ ܥܠܘܒܘܬ ܡܣܒܪܢܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ. ܘܗܿܢܝܢ ܡܒܕ̈ܩܬ ܡܪܢܝܘܬܐ ܗܢܝܢ ܕܝܠܢܐܝܬ ܒܝܘ̈ܠܦܢܐ ܡܪ̈ܢܝܐ ܥ̈ܐܠܢ. ܘܡܢ ܥܪܝܨܘ ܢܦܫܐ ܡܬܕܢܝܐ ܠܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܕܣܓܝܐܝܬ ܡܬܟܝܢܝܢ. ܟܕ ܪ̈ܡܙܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܠܗ̈ܝܐ ܠܒܘܝ̈ܢܐ ܢܩܦܝܢ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܦܣܘܩ ܕܡܚܘܬܐ ܕܒܫܒܛܐ ܡܟܐܒܢܝܬܐ ܗܝ. ܘܣܝܦܐ ܕܚܪܝܦ ܨܪܘܝܐ. ܘܒܗ ܒܦܣܩܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܢܐ ܡܥܙܪܪܐ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܘܬܐ ܓܢܝܙܬܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܠܘ ܟܘܝܢܐ ܗܘܐ ܠܘ ܟܝܢܐ. ܠܐ ܒܐܡܝܢܘ ܡܬܥܝܢ ܗܘܐ. ܘܬܢܝܐ ܕܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܢܩܦܝܐ ܠܗ ܠܩܕܝܡܝܐ ܡܟܢܫ. ܘܠܐ ܐܠܨܐ ܠܠܘܓܝܩܘܣ ܠܡܒܚܢܘ ܥܠ ܥܠܬܐ ܕܐܢܢܩܝܘܬܐ ܡܫܬܪܪܢܘܬܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ. ܐܠܐ ܢܫܬܘܕܥ ܕܕܐܝܟ ܗܟܢܐ ܗܝ. ܡܛܠ ܡܕܥܝ̈ܬܐ\nܘܗܿܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܥܠܬ ܦܣܩܐ ܒܗܝܢ ܡܕܥܐ ܗܘ ܚܪܝܦܐ ܕܢܦܫܐ. ܕܥܡܗ ܟܠ ܚܪܝܢܐ ܡܫܢܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܐܡܪ ܕܣܗܪܐ ܡܢ ܫܡܫܐ ܡܩܒܠ ܢܘܗܪܐ.","english":"Because of the first ones.\n\nAnd these are the propositions whose truth is known naturally, when the limits of their compounds are set. And if it happens that in some place one of the limits is not set, this happens to it by chance and not because of something else. And these are like the one that the whole is greater than its part. And one body cannot be in two places at the same time.\n\nBecause of the perceptible ones.\n\nAnd these are the propositions whose truth is cut off by the perception of the senses, something external or internal. Like the one that the sun is bright. And that it has affection, desire, and anger.\n\nBecause of the practical ones.\n\nAnd these are the propositions whose limit is that in them are dense compressions known from the experience of mastery or from the traditions of the deception of expectation. And they are the examinations of mastery that are properly in the rational teachings of the causes. And they are quickly applied to actions that are generally useful. When some divine signs are attached to the compressions. Like the one that the blow of a staff is painful. And the sharp sword is cutting. And in this kind of limit, the hidden syllogistic is helpful. Like the one that if it were a dog, it would not be an animal. It would not be known by its name. And the error of the hypothesis that is attached to the first one is refuted. And the logician is not compelled to investigate the cause of the firmness of the attachment of this kind. But it is known that it is so.\n\nBecause of the intellectual ones.\n\nAnd these are the propositions whose limit is that in them the intellect is sharp of itself. With it every sharp one is equal. Like the one that says that the moon receives light from the sun.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܛܠ ܩܕܡܝ̈ܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The passage is divided into four sections, each introduced by a causal phrase (ܡܛܠ) and a category label: first ones, perceptible ones, practical ones, and intellectual ones. This mirrors the fourfold classification of propositions in Aristotelian logic as received in Syriac tradition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ (from Greek πρότασις) means 'proposition' or 'premise' in logical contexts. Bar Hebraeus uses it consistently for the basic units of syllogistic reasoning.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܘܬܐ ܓܢܝܙܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'hidden syllogistic' (ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܘܬܐ ܓܢܝܙܬܐ) likely refers to enthymemes—syllogisms with an unstated premise. This is a standard topic in Aristotelian logic, discussed by Syriac commentators such as Sergius of Reshaina.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"ܕܐܠܘ ܟܘܝܢܐ ܗܘܐ ܠܘ ܟܝܢܐ","severity":"info","text":"The example 'if it were a dog, it would not be an animal' illustrates a logical fallacy (hypothesis error). This parallels discussions in Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi, where such misidentifications of genus and species are analyzed.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܡܘܪ̈ܬܬ ܥܠܘܒܘܬ ܡܣܒܪܢܘܬܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The phrase 'traditions of the deception of expectation' (ܡܘܪ̈ܬܬ ܥܠܘܒܘܬ ܡܣܒܪܢܘܬܐ) is obscure. It may refer to fallacious rhetorical traditions or to a specific school of thought. The text is corrupt here, and the exact referent is uncertain.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"ܘܗܿܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܥܠܬ ܦܣܩܐ ܒܗܝܢ ܡܕܥܐ ܗܘ ܚܪܝܦܐ ܕܢܦܫܐ","severity":"info","text":"The intellectual propositions are defined as those whose truth is grasped directly by the intellect itself, without sensory or practical mediation. The example of the moon receiving light from the sun illustrates a self-evident truth of reason.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'traditions of the deception of expectation' (ܡܘܪ̈ܬܬ ܥܠܘܒܘܬ ܡܣܒܪܢܘܬܐ) is ambiguous; it may refer to a specific logical fallacy or to a school of rhetoric. The reading taken treats it as a general reference to deceptive rhetorical traditions.","The term 'hidden syllogistic' (ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܘܬܐ ܓܢܝܙܬܐ) could refer to enthymemes or to a more esoteric logical method; the reading taken follows the standard interpretation as enthymeme."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":65,"ref":"p65","source":"ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܫܬܚܠܦܘ ܡܫܬܚܠܦܝܢ ܒܗ ܐܣܟܝ̈ܡܝ ܢܘܗܪܐ ܠܦܘܬ ܩܘܪܒܗ ܘܪܘܚܩܗ ܡܢ ܫܡܫܐ. ܘܗܢܝܢ ܡܢ ܡܕܥܝ̈ܬܐ ܛܒ ܡܚܝ̈ܢܢ ܠܢܣܝܢ̈ܝܬܐ. ܦܪ̈ܝܫܢ ܕܝܢ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܕܥܝ̈ܬܐ ܡܢ ܐܝܬ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܒܚܕܐ ܙܒܢ ܢܩܦܐ ܐܢܢܩܝܘܬ ܡܫܪܪܢܘܬܐ ܠܗܝܢ. ܢܣܝܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܠܘ ܗܟܢܐ ܐܠܐ ܒܬܪ ܙܒܢ̈ܬܐ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܬܐ. ܡܛܠ ܬܟܝ̈ܒܬ\nܘܗܿܠܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܡܢ ܩܨ ܫܡ̈ܥܐ ܬܟܝ̈ܒܐ ܘܣܗܕ̈ܘܬܐ ܣܒܝ̈ܣܬܐ. ܘܬܘܢ̈ܝܐ ܠܐ ܚܫܢ̈ܝܐ ܦܣܩܐ ܢܦܫܐ ܡܪܢܝܘܬܗܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܦܣܘܩ ܫܟܝܚܘܬ ܓܙܪܬܐ ܕܫܡܗܿ ܩܘܦܪܘܣ. ܘܕܗܘܐ ܒܥܠܡܐ ܐܣܝܐ ܐܢܫܐ ܒܚܝܪܐ ܫܡܐ ܠܗ ܓܐܠܝܢܘܣ. ܘܐܦܢ ܠܐ ܚܙܝܢ ܐܢܘܢ. ܘܡܢܝܢܐ ܡܢ ܕܣܗܕ̈ܘܬܐ ܠܘ ܡܬܚܡܐ ܡܕܡ ܙܕܩ ܕܢܗܘܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܣܗܕ̈ܘܬܐ ܕܠܝ̈ܠܬܐ ܕܠܝܠܐܝܬ ܠܘܬ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܬܫܪ ܢܕܓ̈ܠܢ ܠܢܦܫܐ. ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܡܫܪ̈ܬܚܬܐ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ. ܘܗܕܐ ܡܢ ܓܕܫܐ ܟܕ ܒܩܢܘ̈ܡܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ ܚܫܢܝܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܢܦܫܐ ܡܥܝܢܐ. ܘܒܗܠܝܢ ܒܨܝܪ̈ܐ ܠܐ ܚܫܢܝܘܬܐ. ܘܐܢܢܩܝܘܬ ܡܫܪܢܘܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܐܝܕܐ ܕܒܝܕ ܬܟܝܒܘܬܐ ܐܘ ܢܣܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܡܕܥܐ ܗܘܝܐ ܠܒܪ ܐܢܫ ܐܢܫ. ܘܠܐ ܣܟ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܠܐܚܪܝܢ ܬܪܟܢ ܠܘܬ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܫܬܪܪ. ܒܕ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܬܬܕܪܟ ܠܗ ܗܝ ܐܢܢܩܝܘܬܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ ܘܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܠܡܬܬܟܣܘ ܒܝܕ ܡܚܘܝܢܘܬܐ ܐܚܪܬܐ. ܡܛܠ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܥܡܗܝܢ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܘܬܗܝܢ\nܘܗܿܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܡܦܣܩ ܦܣܩ ܠܗܝܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܒܝܕ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܐܝܢܐ ܕܠܐ ܣܟ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܕܪܟܘ ܡܢ ܡܚܫܒܬܐ ܟܕ ܗܢܘܢ ܣܟ̈ܐ ܡܬܕܪܟܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܦܣܩܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܦܠܓܐ ܗܘ ܕܐܪܒܥܐ. ܘܡܨܥܝܐ ܡܢ ܗܪܟܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܚܕ ܗܘ ܡܢ ܬܪܝܗܘܢ ܦܘܠܓ̈ܘܗܝ ܕܐܪܒܥܐ ܕܫܘِܐ ܠܗܿܘ ܐܚܪܢܐ. ܘܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܬܘܒ ܕܢܦܣܘܩ ܕܐܪܒܥܐ ܙܘܓܐ ܗܘ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܠܫܘ̈ܝܐ ܡܬܦܠܓ.","english":"Because of the one that is changed, the schemata of the light vary according to its proximity to and distance from the sun. And these are from the intelligibles that are well known to the sensibles. But they are distinguished in that the intelligibles are sometimes, at one time, an immediate certainty of truth for them. The sensibles, however, are not so, except after many times, because of the experiences. And these again are propositions of the kind that are from the limit of heard experiences and simple testimonies, and confessions that are not considered a decisive judgment of their own authority, like that which decides the possibility of the existence of the island named Cyprus, and that there was in the world a physician named Galen, and that he saw a lion. And from the testimonies, nothing is determined that ought to be in that which is sometimes testimonies of nights that are nocturnal, not like that which is immediate and reveals deceits to itself. These are extensions and not limited. And this is from an event when, in many subjects like these, something is considered by itself, and in these lesser ones, it is not considered. And the certainty of truth is that which, by means of experience or sense or intellect, becomes external to each person, and cannot but incline towards that which is established. But it can happen that this certainty, like this, is not perceived, and cannot be concealed by another demonstration, because of the propositions and their syllogisms. And these are propositions of the kind that decide a judgment for them that occurs by means of a mean term which cannot but be perceived from thought when the limits are perceived, like the judgment that two is half of four. And the mean term here is that one is half of two, which is equal to the other half of four. And again, like that judgment that four is a pair, in that it is divided into equals.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ (from Greek πρότασις) denotes a proposition or premise in logical discourse. Bar Hebraeus uses it to classify different types of propositions, distinguishing them by their epistemic basis.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܣܟܝ̈ܡܝ","severity":"info","text":"The word ܐܣܟܝ̈ܡܝ (from Greek σχῆμα) refers to schemata or forms. Here it describes the varying configurations of light relative to the sun, indicating a discussion of optical or astronomical phenomena.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"ܩܘܦܪܘܣ","severity":"info","text":"The reference to Cyprus (ܩܘܦܪܘܣ) and the physician Galen (ܓܐܠܝܢܘܣ) illustrates propositions based on testimony and experience, not immediate certainty. This reflects Bar Hebraeus's engagement with empirical knowledge from classical sources.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the classification of propositions begun earlier, moving from intelligibles and sensibles to testimonial and syllogistic propositions. The logical progression mirrors Aristotelian epistemology as adapted in Syriac tradition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The example that two is half of four and the mean term being one is half of two echoes standard Aristotelian syllogistic examples, common in Syriac logical works. This illustrates Bar Hebraeus's use of mathematical reasoning to explain logical principles.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains some ambiguous phrasing, e.g., ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܫܬܚܠܦܘ ܡܫܬܚܠܦܝܢ may involve a scribal repetition or corruption. The translation 'Because of the one that is changed' is tentative; the sense likely concerns a principle of variation.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܫܬܚܠܦܘ ܡܫܬܚܠܦܝܢ is syntactically unclear; it may involve a dittography or a deliberate emphatic construction. The reading taken follows the English draft as 'Because of the one that is changed'.","The term ܐܢܢܩܝܘܬ ܡܫܪܪܢܘܬܐ (certainty of truth) is a technical phrase whose precise logical status in Bar Hebraeus's system requires further study."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":66,"ref":"p66","source":"ܦܪܝܫ ܕܝܢ ܗܢܐ ܙܢܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܩܕܡ̈ܝܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܢܝܢ ܒܠܥܕ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܡܬܕܪܟܐ ܐܢܢܩܝܘܬ ܫܪܝܪܘܬܗܝܢ. ܗܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܒܝܕ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܘܐܦ ܛܒ ܕܢܝܚ. ܡܛܠ ܡܛܒܒ̈ܢܝܬܐ\nܡܬܛܒܒ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܐܠܨܐ ܡܫܬܪܪܢܘܬܗܝܢ ܡܢ ܩܨ ܓܘܢܝܘܬ ܡܘܕܝܢܘܬܐ ܕܒܢ̈ܝ ܐܢܫܐ ܫܪܝܪܘܬܗܝܢ. ܐܘ ܡܘܕܝܢܘܬ ܥܡܐ ܡܕܡ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܟܕ ܡܢܗ ܘܠܗ ܗܘܢܐ ܢܕܘܢ ܐܢܘܢ ܒܥܠܕ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܬܥܫܡ ܡܢ ܛܢܢܐ ܐܘ ܪ̈ܚܡܐ. ܐܘ ܚܫ̈ܐ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܢܦܫܢ̈ܝܐ ܕܒܝܕ ܥܝ̈ܕܐ ܐܘ ܢܡܘ̈ܣܐ ܐܟܣܝܣ ܩܢܘ. ܡܨܐ ܠܡܚܪܝܘ ܥܠ ܫܪܝܪܘܬܗܝܢ ܒܗܦܟܐ ܕܗܿܢܝܢ ܐܠܨ̈ܝܬ ܩܘܒܠܐ. ܘܗܿܢܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܛܠܘܡܝܐ ܣܢܝܐܐ ܗܘ. ܘܡܦܪܣܝܘܬ ܐܢܫܐ ܨܥܝܪܐ. ܘܫܪܟܐ ܕܠܗܿܠܝܢ ܕܡܝܢ ܕܠܘܬܗܘܢ ܟܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܢܬܗܘܢܢ ܝܬܗ ܕܥܕܡܫ ܒܪِܐ ܘܠܐ ܐܬܬܪܬܝ. ܐܘ ܩܢܐ ܝܕܥܬܐ ܣܛܪ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܐܢܢܩܝܬܐ. ܠܘ ܕܠܐܚܪܝܢ ܕܐܢ ܠܗܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܟܐܢ̈ܬܐ. ܘܠܘ ܟܠ ܡܛܒܒܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ. ܐܦܠܐ ܟܠ ܟܦܝܪܐ ܕܓܠܐ. ܐܝܬ ܗܘ ܓܝܪ ܡܛܒܒܐ ܕܪܝܩܢ ܘܟܦܝܪܐ ܕܫܪܝܪ. ܘܗܿܘ ܡܢ ܐܝܟ ܟܠܘܝܘܬ ܕܒܚܐ ܕܚܝ̈ܘܬܐ ܠܘܬ ܐܢܫܝܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܦ ܐܠܦܗܿ ܢܡܘܣܐ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܠܐ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܘܬ ܒܪܝܬ ܟܠ ܠܥܒܘܕܐ. ܗܕܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܦܢ ܟܦܝܪܐ ܠܦܫܝ̈ܛܐ ܠܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܒܕ ܠܘ ܕܕܡܐ ܠܗ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܒܪܐ. ܡܛܠ ܘܗܡ̈ܝܬܐ\nܘܗܿܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܐܠܨ̈ܝܬ ܫܪܪܐ ܡܬܬܕܝ̈ܢܢ ܡܢ ܚܝܠܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܘܗܡ ܡܬܩܪܐ. ܠܘ ܡܢ ܗܘܢܐ. ܘܗܘ ܗܢܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܘܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܣܛܪ ܡܢ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܕܡܢ ܪ̈ܓܫܐ ܠܗ ܡܬܝܒܠܝܢ ܡܨܐ ܗܘ ܠܡܕܪܟܘ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܒܟܠ ܨܒܘ ܠܐ ܡܬܪܓܫܢܝܬܐ ܥܫܝܢܐܝܬ ܟܦܪ. ܘܗܢܝܢ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܐܘ ܫܪܝܪ̈ܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܡܬܪ̈ܓܫܢܐ ܕܒܗܝܢ ܐܠܨ̈ܝܬ ܩܘܒܠܐ ܥ̈ܐܠܢ.","english":"This one, however, is distinct from those earlier ones. For those are apprehended without intermediaries in the certainty of their truth. This one, however, is through an intermediary and is also quite clear. Because of the material causes, the material things from their very being are the *protesis* of those things whose necessary verification is from the extremity of the corporeality of the acknowledgment of the truth of the things that are in the fire. Or the acknowledgment of the people of something. For in the meantime, when it was and was not, it was a thing without that which is formed from error or from affections. Or other psychic passions that are by custom or by laws external to it. It is able to be empty of their truth by the inversion of those necessary things of opposition. And those are like that which Ptolemy the Stoic was. And the distribution of the small fire. And the rest of those that are similar to them, when at the beginning of their being, that of the human being was and was not established. Or a part of knowledge apart from that speculative one. Not for the others, that if they are like the stars. And not every true cause. Nor every manifest denial. For there is a cause that is empty and a denial that is true. And that is like the totality of the sacrifice of animals to the human beings, that which even the law commanded. That one, however, is like the impossibility of the creation of all for the work. This one, however, is also a denial, for the simple ones, not true it is. For it is not that which is similar to it that is able to create. Because of the material things, and those are from their being the *protesis* of those things that are necessarily true, which are known from that power which is called *w-h-m*. Not from what was. And this one is in that which nothing apart from those that are from the senses is able to be apprehended by it. And because of this, in every zeal it denies the non-sensible with difficulty. And those are either true ones, like the sensible actions in which there is necessary opposition of causes.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword πρόθεσις (prothesis) is used here in a technical sense, likely meaning 'intention' or 'purpose' in a philosophical context, not the liturgical 'prothesis'.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܘܗܡ","severity":"info","text":"The term w-h-m (ܘܗܡ) is a transliteration of the Arabic wahm, meaning 'imagination' or 'estimation', a faculty in Avicennan psychology that apprehends non-sensible meanings.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܛܠܘܡܝܐ ܣܢܝܐܐ","severity":"info","text":"Ptolemy the Stoic is otherwise unknown; this may be a reference to a lost Stoic philosopher or a conflation with Claudius Ptolemy, the astronomer, whose works were read in Syriac.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage contrasts two types of apprehension: one without intermediary (certain truth) and one through an intermediary (material causes), then introduces a third category involving wahm.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text is corrupt in several places, notably the phrase 'distribution of the small fire' and the reference to 'sacrifice of animals', which may be misreadings or interpolations.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The identity of 'Ptolemy the Stoic' is uncertain; it may be a textual corruption or a reference to a lost source.","The phrase 'totality of the sacrifice of animals to the human beings' is ambiguous and may reflect a scribal error or a specific philosophical example."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":67,"ref":"p67","source":"ܐܘ ܕܓ̈ܠܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܣܘܪ̈ܢܐ ܠܐ ܡܬܪ̈ܓܫܢܐ ܕܐܣܝܪܝܢ ܥܡ ܓܘܫ̈ܡܐ ܐܘ ܠܐ ܐܣܝܪܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܦܣܘܩ ܕܟܠ ܡܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܐܬܪܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܠܗ ܕܒܗ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܬܪ ܐܣܦܝܪܐ ܚܒܫܬ ܟܠ. ܪܘܝܚܘܬܐ ܐܝܬ ܠܐ ܡܣܬܝܟܢܝܬܐ. ܘܐܠܘ ܠܐ ܗܘܢܐ ܢܡܘܣܐ ܡܙܢܩ ܙܢܩ ܐܢܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܩܕܡܝ̈ܬܐ ܡܬܬܕܝ̈ܢܢ ܗܘ̈ܝ. ܘܗܿܘ ܕܡܢܗܝܢ ܡܬܬܟܣ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ ܫܠܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܦܘܢ̈ܝܐ ܘܗܡ̈ܝܐ ܢܬܚܫܚ. ܘܝܕܝܥܐ ܕܓܠܘܬܗܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܙܒܢ̈ܝܢ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܢ ܟܕ ܗܘܢܐ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܡܕܡ ܡܪܢܝܐ ܡܪܟܒ. ܗܿܘ ܐܝܢܐ ܕܟܘܢܫܐ ܡܟܢܫ ܕܣܬܪ ܡܬܪܥܝܢܘܬܗ ܕܘܗܡ. ܗܘ ܗܢܐ ܟܕ ܠܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܫܠܡ ܡܢ ܟܘܢܫܐ ܫܘܪ ܘܠܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܕܐܢ ܠܗ. ܘܓܠܝܐ ܕܡܢ ܫܪܝܪܬܐ ܐܠܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܠܐ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܟܢܫܘ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܟܕ ܗܘ ܡܢ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܗܘ ܕܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ. ܠܐ ܡܬܕܪܟܢܐ ܗܘ ܠܝܬܗ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܠܘ ܟܠ ܕܠܗ ܠܐ ܡܬܕܪܟ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܘ ܕܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܙܕܩ ܠܡܬܬܕܢܘ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܚܝ̈ܠܐ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܓܘ̈ܝܐ ܕܚܠܬܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ ܘܚܡܬܐ ܘܪܓܬܐ. ܠܐ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܕܪܟܘܬܗܘܢ ܘܗܡ. ܐܠܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܡܓܫ̈ܡܐ ܐܢܘܢ ܘܒܐܬܪܐ ܫܪܝܢ. ܘܟܕ ܠܗܘܢ ܠܗܿܠܝܢ ܠܘ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܡܕܪܟ ܐܝܟܢܐ ܝܩܝܪ̈ܝ ܠܒܐ ܐܢܫ̈ܝܢ ܗܿܘܝܢ ܠܘܬ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܘܕܘܢ ܕܟܠ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܬܪܓܫܢܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܢܗܘܐ ܘܐܠܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܛܠ ܡܬܬܫܠܡ̈ܢܝܬܐ\nܘܗܿܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܡܢ ܐܢܫ̈ܝܢ ܫܘ̈ܝܝ ܠܡܬܗܝܡܢܘ ܡܢ ܩܨ ܡܣܒܪܢܘܬܐ ܛܒܬܐ ܕܩܢܝܢܢ ܥܠܝܗܘܢ. ܒܝܕ ܓܒܪ̈ܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܘܐܬܘ̈ܬܐ ܫܡܝܢ̈ܝܬܐ. ܐܘ ܒܝܕ ܚܟܡܬܐ ܡܥܠܝܬܐ ܕܩܢܘ܆ ܩܒܠܢ ܐܢܝܢ ܘܐܬܬܫܠܡܢ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܕܪܫ ܢܬܬܫܠܡ ܐܢܝܢ. ܐܘ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܐܢܝܢ ܕܒܝܘܠܦ̈ܢܐ ܡܢܬܝ̈ܐ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣ ܥܠܝܗܝܢ ܬܗܘܐ.","english":"or of falsehoods, like natures that are not perceived, of the bound with bodies or not bound, like that which the definition of everything that is, from the particularity of the place, becomes for it that in which it is. And like that which, after the sphere, gathered everything. There is breadth without being limited. And if there were no law, it would cry out, crying out from those earlier ones that are being defined. And that which is from them is covered and does not cease from that which is needed in actions and passions. And it is known that their clarity is from that of many times, when syllogism was something composite of the Lord. That is the one that fights the fight that hides the providence of the mind. This one, then, when it has finished with those protases from the fight, begins and is not true that it is from it. And it is clear that from the true, but the true cannot fight it. In that same manner, when it is from those that are, it is not perceived; it is not. In truth, not everything that is not perceived, like that which is not, ought to be known. In that same manner, other internal powers, such as fear, anger, and desire, cannot perceive themselves. But like the habits of bodies, they are in a place. And when they are not for these, they are not perceived as they are. How, then, do the heavy-hearted men become with that which they know that everything that is perceived ought to be, and if not, it is not? Because of the completions, and these from their being are those protases that are equal with men to be trusted from the end of good hope that is established over them. By means of some virtues and heavenly signs, or by the sublime wisdom of the established, they receive and are completed. Or from that which is discussed, it is completed. Or those protases that are in teachings that are brought cannot have demonstration over them.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"protesis","severity":"info","text":"The term 'protesis' (πρότασις) denotes a proposition or premise in a syllogism, a key concept in Aristotelian logic as received in Syriac philosophy.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"syllogismos","severity":"info","text":"'Syllogismos' (συλλογισμός) refers to a logical syllogism, a composite argument of premises and conclusion, central to Bar Hebraeus's method.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage engages with the problem of perceiving incorporeal entities (e.g., fear, anger) through material intermediaries, reflecting Neoplatonic and Aristotelian debates on epistemology.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This narrative section contrasts perceived and unperceived entities, using repeated conditional structures ('if there were no law...') to argue that true propositions cannot be refuted by false ones.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains ambiguous phrases, e.g., 'ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܐܬܪܐ' ('from the particularity of the place'), which may be corrupt or elliptical, affecting the interpretation of the definition of being.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܐܬܪܐ' ('from the particularity of the place') is unclear; it may refer to a specific philosophical concept or be a textual corruption.","The reference to 'the sphere' (ܐܣܦܝܪܐ) is ambiguous—possibly a cosmological or logical metaphor, but its precise referent is uncertain."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":68,"ref":"p68","source":"ܒܕܓܘܢ ܡܢ ܥܪܝܨܘ ܡܩܒܠ ܐܢܝܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܝܠܦ. ܥܕ ܢܬܡܛܐ ܠܝܘܠܦܢܐ ܟܠܢܝܐ ܕܒܗ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܫܬܪܪܘܬܗܝܢ. ܘܗܢܝܢ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܐܢ ܥܡ ܚܪܝܢܐ ܡܬܩܒ̈ܠܢ ܥܫܘܡ̈ܝܐ ܡܬܟܝܢ̈ܝܢ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܥܡ ܚܘܝܚܘܬܐ ܫܬܐܣ̈ܐ ܕܡܬܬܣܝ̈ܡܢ ܡܬܩܪ̈ܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܕܩܕܡܝܢ ܡܬܚܘܐ. ܡܛܠ ܡܣܬܒܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ\nܘܗܿܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܒܦܣܩܗܝܢ ܠܡܣܒܪܢܘܬܐ ܢܩܦܐ ܢܦܫܐ. ܡܣܒܪܢܘܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܦܣܩܐ ܕܥܠ ܡܕܡ ܕܗܟܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܥܡ ܡܕܪܟܢܘܬܐ ܕܡܬܡܨܝܢܘܬ ܗܘܢܐ ܕܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܕܝܠܗ ܕܦܣܩܐ ܗܿܘ ܐܝܟ ܕܬܦܣܘܩ ܕܦܠܢ ܒܠܠܝܐ ܗܘ ܡܕܝܪ. ܡܕܝܢ ܡܚܘܙܐ ܗܘ ܨܒܐ ܠܡܫܠܡܘ. ܘܡܢܗܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܕܗܿܠܝܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܘܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܡܛܒܒܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܕܡܬܕܢܝܐ ܠܗܝܢ ܢܦܫܐ ܒܪܫ ܡܬܪܥܝܢܘܬܐ. ܘܟܕ ܩܠܝܠ ܡܬܚܫܒܐ ܒܗܝܢ. ܡܗܦܟܐ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܚܝܪܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܕܥܕܪ ܐܚܘܟ ܛܠܘܡܐ ܗܘ ܐܘ ܛܠܝܡܐ. ܡܛܠ ܣܒܗ̈ܝܬܐ\nܘܗܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܢܩܦ ܠܗܝܢ ܦܣܩܐ ܡܢ ܩܨ ܡܣܒܗܘܬܗܝܢ ܕܒܗܢܝܢ ܐܠܨ̈ܝܬ ܩܘܒܠܐ ܐܘ ܕܣܛܪ ܡܢܗܝܢ. ܘܗܝ ܡܣܒܗܘܬܐ ܐܘ ܒܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܗܿܘܝܐ. ܐܘ ܒܣܘܟܠܐ ܐܟܡܐ ܕܥܕ ܩܠܝܠ ܡܬܚܘܝܐ. ܡܛܠ ܡܦܢܛܣ̈ܢܝܬܐ\nܘܗܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܪܓܝܓܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܘ ܓܥܝܨܘܬܐ ܟܕ ܡܬܠܬܡ̈ܢ ܒܢܦܫܐ ܡܥܒ̈ܕܢ ܐܝܟ ܡܢ ܕܐܡܪ ܠܐ ܬܛܥܡ ܗܢܐ ܕܒܫܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܪܬܐ ܗܘ ܡܓܡܥܢܝܬܐ ܘܡܚܕܗܿ ܓܥܛܐ ܡܢܗ ܢܦܫܐ. ܘܐܦܢ ܝܕܥܐ ܕܠܘ ܡܪܬܐ ܗܘ. ܘܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܬܘܒ ܕܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܗܢܐ ܐܪܝܐ ܗܘ ܒܬܘܩܦܐ. ܗܢܐ ܣܗܪܐ ܗܘ ܒܫܘܦܪܐ. ܘܡܚܕܗܿ ܗܿܘ ܡܫܬܘܪ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܡܫܬܦܪ ܟܐܡܬ ܒܥܝܢܐ. ܘܐܦܢ ܦܪܫ ܡܕܥܐ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܠܐܪܝܐ ܗܘ ܐܦܠܐ ܣܗܪܐ. ܐܠܐ ܡܢ ܗܓܓܘܬܐ ܡܬܥܠܒ. ܘܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ ܡܢ ܒܢܝ̈ܢܫܐ ܪܦܣܝܢ ܠܘܬ ܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܡܕܡ. ܘܩܦܣܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܒܝܗܝܢ.","english":"in the same way, from the swiftness of receiving, that which learns, until it arrives at the universal teaching by which it is able to be confirmed in its truth. And these, if they are received with the senses, are called sensible accidents; or if with the foundations of the intellect, they are called intellectual, as was shown earlier. Because of the propositions.\n\nAnd these are the protases which, by their division, attach themselves to the proposition itself. The proposition, however, is a division concerning something that is thus, together with the comprehension of the possibility of the occurrence of the hypothesis of that division, like the division that came out at night, that very circuit. The circuit, then, is the region that intends to complete. And from these again, these are the protases, the practical ones that are known to themselves at the beginning of the deliberation. And when one reflects a little upon them, they turn from them into a free one, like that which is said: \"Help your brother,\" whether he is an oppressor or oppressed. Because of the reasons.\n\nAnd these are the protases to which is attached a division from the end of their reason, in which are necessary acceptances or the opposite of them. And this reason is either in the aftermath of a sound or in a concept, as is shown a little. Because of the demonstrations.\n\nAnd these are the protases of desire, something, or of contraction, when they are completed in themselves, they act like that which says: \"Do not taste this which is bad.\" In that it is a matter of bitterness and at once a contraction from it itself. And also the knowledge that it is not a matter of bitterness. And like that again which is said: \"This is a lion in strength. This is the moon in beauty.\" And at once that one is disturbed. That one, however, is adorned, sitting in inquiry. And also the intellect distinguishes that in the beginning it is neither a lion nor the moon, but it is deceived by the imagination. And many from among the wicked despise certain actions, and some from among others leap into them.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ (from Greek πρότασις) denotes a proposition or premise in logical discourse. Bar Hebraeus uses it here to classify types of protases by their epistemic or practical function.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܡܣܒܪ̈ܢܘܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܡܣܒܪ̈ܢܘܬܐ (proposition) is distinguished from protasis: the proposition is a division concerning something that is, while protases are the components that attach to it. This reflects a technical logical distinction.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"external","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The examples 'Help your brother, whether he is an oppressor or oppressed' and 'Do not taste this which is bad' illustrate ethical and sensory protases, typical of Syriac monastic and philosophical pedagogy.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage is organized as a series of definitions and classifications of protases: sensible vs. intellectual, practical, reason-based, and those of desire or contraction, each introduced by 'And these are the protases which...'.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or corrupt readings (e.g., ܒܕܓܘܥ, ܥܪܝܨܘ) that may affect the precise logical sense. The English draft smooths over these difficulties.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"external","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The classification of protases into sensible, intellectual, practical, and those of desire echoes Aristotelian and Stoic logical categories, mediated through Syriac translations of Greek philosophical works.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac term ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ may be read as either 'protases' (premises) or 'propositions' in some contexts; the passage distinguishes it from ܡܣܒܪ̈ܢܘܬܐ (proposition).","The phrase 'from the swiftness of receiving' (ܡܢ ܥܪܝܨܘ ܡܩܒܠ) is textually uncertain; the intended logical relation is unclear."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":69,"ref":"p69","source":"ܝܬܝܪ ܕܝܢ ܡܥܒܕܢܝ̈ܬܐ ܥܒܕܐ ܠܗܝܢ. ܗܿܝ ܕܣܩܝܠܐܝܬ ܢܬܐܡܪ̈ܢ ܘܥܡ ܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܐܦ ܒܐܬܘ̈ܬܐ ܐܘܝ̈ܬܐ ܢܬܗܕܪ̈ܢ ܘܠܐ ܐܠܨܐ ܕܕܓ̈ܠܬ ܒܟܝܢܐ ܢܗܘ̈ܝܢ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܦ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܝܬܝܪ ܫܪܝܪ̈ܢ. ܟܕ ܒܙܢܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܢܐ ܡܬܬܣܪ̈ܚܢ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܐܢܝܢ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܕܥܠ ܡܥܝܢܢܘܬ ܗܘܠܐ ܕܟܠܚܕ ܡܢ ܐܕܫ̈ܝ ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ ܘܗܢܝ̈ܢܝܗܘܢ\nܘܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܐܠܨܝ̈ܬ ܩܘܒܠܐ ܗܘ̈ܠܐܣ ܐܢܝܢ ܕܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ ܐܦܘܕܝܩܛܝ̈ܩܝܐ. ܐܢܢܩܝ̈ܬܐ ܢܗܘ̈ܝܢ ܗܢܝܢ ܒܟܝܢ̈ܝܗܝܢ. ܐ. . ܘ ܐܢܢܩܝ̈ܬܐ ܘܚܛܐ ܗܘ ܕܐܣܒܪ. ܕܒܐܦܘܕܝܩܛܝܩܝ ܠܐ ܥ̈ܐܠܢ ܐܠܐ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ̈ܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܦ ܡܢ ܡܬܡܨܝܢ̈ܝܬܐ. ܡܬܡܨܝܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܡܥ̈ܕܢ ܠܡܬܟܢܫܘ ܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣܐܝܬ. ܟܕ ܩܢܘ̈ܢܐ ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܛܝܩܝܐ ܡܪ̈ܢܝܐ ܡܬܢܛܪܝܢ. ܗܟܢܐ ܐܦ ܘܡܢ ܟܠܝ̈ܬܐ. ܘܗܢܝܢܐ ܡܢ ܕܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܐܦܘܕܝܩܛܝܩܝܐ ܒܘܚܪܢܗ ܕܫܪܪܐ ܡܪܢܝܐ ܒܙܢܐ ܐܠܨܝܐ. ܗܘ̈ܠܐܣ ܕܝܢ ܕܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܕܝܠܝܩ̈ܛܝܩܝܐ. ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܐܢܝܢ ܡܬܛܒܒ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܘܗܿܢܝܢ ܡܬܬܫܠܡ̈ܢܝܬܐ. ܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܐܠܨܝ̈ܬ ܩܘܒܠܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܥ̈ܐܠܢ ܐܠܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܛܒ̈ܒܢ. ܐܘ ܫܠܡܘ̈ܬܢܝܢ ܘܠܗܿ ܡܢ ܠܕܝܠܝܩܛܝ ܗܢܝ̈ܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬ. ܩܕܡܝܐ ܡܢ ܟܕ ܢܗܘܐ ܐܢܫ ܚܪܚܐ ܡܒܥܕ ܚܕ̈ܬܬܐ ܕܠܐ ܡܫܦ ܠܡܪܕܐ ܒܐܘܪܚܐ ܕܫܪܪܐ. ܘܢܗܘܐ ܬܘܒ ܚܐܒ ܣܘܟܠܗ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܫܬܘܕܥܝܘܗܝ ܠܫܪܪܐ ܒܝܕ ܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܒܝܕ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܡܛܒܒ̈ܬܐ ܕܐܠܨܝ̈ܬ ܩܘܒܠܐ ܠܗ ܕܝ̈ܢܢ. ܐܠܨܐ ܠܡܙܝܦܘ ܬܪܥܝܬܗ ܠܐ ܟܐܢܬܐ. ܕܬܪܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܟܕ ܬܗܘܐ ܕܩܪܝܐ ܥܠܬܐ ܠܡܒܕܩܘ ܬܪ̈ܥܝܬܐ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܡܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܠܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܢܫ ܡܚܝܠ ܝܕܥܬܐ ܕܪܡ ܗܘ ܡܢ ܛܟܣܐ ܕܩܘܛܢܐ. ܘܠܐ ܡܬܪܟܢ ܕܐܟܘܬܗܘܢ ܒܝܕ ܥܠܬܐ ܪܝܛܘܪܝܩܝܬܐ.","english":"moreover, the active faculties produce it, that which is said to be probable, and along with quantity also in the common letters they are adorned, and it is not necessary that they be false in nature. For even those which are more true, when it is possible that they be arranged in this way, they are. And the light upon the comprehension of these, of each one from the terms of the syllogisms and their hypotheses, and the propositions from those necessary acceptances, these are the apodictic syllogisms. The apodictic propositions are those in their nature. ... And the proposition and the error is that which I have explained, that in the apodictic only the apodictic propositions enter. For also from the potentialities, the potentialities are added to be confirmed apodictically, when the principal syllogistic terms are arranged. Thus also from the universals, and the hypotheses from the apodictic syllogism, the principal test of truth is a necessary possibility. These, however, of the syllogisms are those of dialectic. The propositions are artificial and the hypotheses are complete. These necessary acceptances are causes only in that which is artificial, or their completions, and to that from dialectic the hypothesis has something. The first, when a man is a seeker after new things which are not sufficient to be guided in the path of truth, and again he casts his understanding from that which is known to truth by means of apodixis, by means of the artificial propositions of necessary acceptance for him, he is compelled to falsify his thought, not rightly. The second, however, when there is a cause for examining the principal thoughts for a man weak in knowledge, who is from the order of the judge, and it is not possible that they be like them by means of a rhetorical cause.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܦܘܕܝܩܛܝ̈ܩܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword apodeiktikē (demonstrative) is used here to denote a type of syllogism yielding necessary truth, distinct from dialectical reasoning.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"Protasis (proposition) is a technical term from Aristotelian logic, here distinguished as either apodictic or dialectical depending on the necessity of its premises.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܕܝܠܝܩ̈ܛܝܩܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"Dialectic (dialektikē) is contrasted with apodictic logic: dialectical syllogisms deal with probable premises, not necessary truths, a distinction inherited from Aristotle's Topics.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage continues the treatise's systematic exposition of syllogistic types, moving from apodictic to dialectical forms, with a binary contrast between necessary and probable reasoning.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains a lacuna marked by ellipsis (\"...\") after the discussion of apodictic propositions, and the English draft inserts a break; the exact transition is uncertain.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The referent of 'it' in the opening clause ('the active faculties produce it') is ambiguous: it may be the 'universal teaching' from the previous passage or the 'apodictic syllogism' introduced later.","The phrase 'common letters' (ܒܐܬܘ̈ܬܐ ܐܘܝ̈ܬܐ) is unclear; it may refer to shared axioms or to written symbols in logical notation."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":70,"ref":"p70","source":"ܘܡܪܬܝܢܝܬܐ ܢܘܕܝܘܗܝ ܠܫܪܪܐ ܒܝܕ ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܕܝܠܝܩܛܝ̈ܩܝܐ ܡܬܡܨܝܐ ܠܡܒܢܝܘܬܗ ܒܬܘܕܝܬܐ ܕܟܐܢܐ. ܕܬܠܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܫܪ̈ܘܝܐ ܡܢ ܕܒܝܕ̈ܥܬܐ ܡܢܬܝ̈ܬܐ ܠܐ ܡܠܝܢ ܕܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣܐܝܬ ܢܫܬܘܕܥܘܢ ܣܘܓܐܐ ܕܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܣܝ̈ܡܢ ܠܗܠܝܢ ܝܕ̈ܥܬܐ ܐܦܠܐ ܡܢ ܩܛܝܪ ܡܬܕܢܝܢ ܠܡܩܒܠܘܬܗܝܢ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܒܝܕ ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘܣ ܕܝܠܝܩܛܝ̈ܩܝܐ ܦܝܣܐ ܠܗܘܢ ܪ̈ܕܘܝܝܗܘܢ ܥܒܕܝܢ. ܥܕ ܢܬܡܛܘܢ ܠܝܕܥܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܕܒܗܿ ܡܨܝܢ ܠܡܫܬܘܕܥܘܬܗܝܢ ܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣܐܝܬ. ܕܐܪܒܥܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܗܢܘܢ ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ ܕܝܠܝܩܛܝ̈ܩܝܐ ܡܟܢܝܢ ܠܡܟܢܫܘ ܬܪ̈ܝܗܘܢ ܓܒ̈ܐ ܕܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ. ܘܟܕ ܚܬܝܬܐܝܬ ܡܬܒܩܪܝܢ ܡܬܓܠܝܘ ܡܬܓܠܐ ܫܪܪܐ. ܘܟܕ ܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܐܘܡܢܘܬܐ ܟܬܒܐ ܗܝ ܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܒܝܬܗ ܠܐ ܐܠܨܐ ܠܡܬܦܬܝܘ ܒܣܘܕܗ. ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܣܒܗ̈ܝܬܐ ܘܗܿܢܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܘܗܡ̈ܝܬܐ ܗܘ̈ܠܐܣ ܐܢܝܢ ܕܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘܣ ܣܘܦܣ̈ܛܝܩܝܐ. ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܗܢܝܢܐ ܡܢ ܕܘܪܫܐ ܕܒܣܘܦܣܛܝܩܝ ܐܠܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܕܡܢ ܩܨ ܡܬܕܪܟܢܘܬܗܿ ܠܐ ܒܗܿ ܢܬܬܛܥܐ. ܐܝܬ ܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܒܗܿ ܢܬܡܨܐ ܠܡܒܚܪ ܠܐܝܢܐ ܕܠܘ ܚܬܝܬܐܝܬ ܚܟܡܝܢ ܚܢܢ ܚܝܠܬܢܘܬܗ ܐܘ ܡܚܝܠܘܬܗ ܕܒܝܕ̈ܥܬܐ ܡܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ. ܟܕ ܚܙܝܢܢ ܙܗܝܪܘܬܗ ܕܡܢܗܿ ܘܡܩܦܚܢܘܬܗ ܕܠܗܿ. ܘܗܝܕܝܟ ܗܘ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܣܘܦܣܛܝܩܝܐ ܒܚܘܪܐ ܡܬܩܪܐ …. ܣܟܠܐ ܐܢܫܐ ܕܡܚܘܬܐ ܠܩܘܛܢܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܘ ܕܪܕܝܐ ܗܘ. ܘܟܕ ܒܗܿ ܡܬܦܪܟܠ ܡܬܓܠܝܐ ܒܘܪܘܬܗ. ܘܡܢ ܢܩܘ̈ܦܘܗܝ ܡܬܟܦܪ. ܘܗܝܕܝܟ ܗܘ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܣܘܦܣܛܝܩܝܐ ܡܬܩܪܐ. ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܢܝܢ ܡܣܬܒܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܘܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܡܬܬܫܠܡܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܗܘ̈ܠܐܣ ܐܢܝܢ ܕܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘܣ ܪܝܛܘܪ̈ܝܩܝܐ. ܘܗܢܝܢܐ ܕܡܢܗܘܢ. ܗܿܝ ܕܡܨܝܢ ܠܡܠܒܛܘ ܥܠ ܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܝܐܝ̈ܐ ܘܠܡܚܓܪ ܡܢ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܠܐ ܝܐܝ̈ܢ ܠܦܘܬ ܢܡܘ̈ܣܐ ܘܕܝ̈ܢܐ ܬܘܕܝ̈ܬܢܝܐ.","english":"And the demonstrative syllogisms prove truth by means of these dialectical syllogisms, which are able to demonstrate it through the confession of the opponent. Thirdly, again, of the premises that are from the sciences, not all are known apodictically, but many of the propositions of these sciences are not even known from a proximate cause. For by means of dialectical syllogisms they persuade the disputants of their positions, until they arrive at that universal knowledge by which they can be known apodictically. Fourthly, again, these dialectical syllogisms are useful for refuting both sides of an antiphrasis; and when they are examined accurately, the truth is revealed and made manifest. And when this art is a written one, it is not necessary for its practitioner to be deceived in its secret. The propositions of the sophistical syllogisms are those that are apparent and those that are also plausible, but they are not true; and not one of them is from the disputation of the sophistical, except that by which the conclusion is not attained. There is, moreover, also when it is able to choose which of the two is not accurately wise, but the strength or weakness of the demonstrative sciences is examined, when one sees the caution of the one and the rashness of the other. And then it is called a sophistical syllogism … a foolish man who strikes a blow against a wall, as one who is beaten. And when it is refuted, its folly is revealed, and it is denied by its own consequences. And then it is called a sophistical syllogism. The propositions of the rhetorical syllogisms are those that are probable and something from those that are accepted, and the conclusion from them is that which is able to persuade concerning actions that are seemly and to dissuade from those that are not seemly, according to laws and judicial confessions.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term is a loan from Greek συλλογισμός, used throughout for 'syllogism'. Bar Hebraeus distinguishes four types: demonstrative, dialectical, sophistical, and rhetorical.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣܐܝܬ","severity":"info","text":"The adverb derives from Greek ἀποδεικτικῶς, 'apodictically' or 'demonstratively'. It marks the highest grade of certainty, contrasted with merely dialectical or probable reasoning.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term is a loan from Greek ἀντίφασις, 'antiphrasis' or 'contradiction'. Bar Hebraeus notes that dialectical syllogisms are useful for refuting both sides of a contradiction.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The classification of syllogisms into demonstrative, dialectical, sophistical, and rhetorical follows the Aristotelian tradition as transmitted through Syriac and Arabic intermediaries. Bar Hebraeus adapts this for a Christian theological context.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage enumerates four uses of dialectical syllogisms, marked by ordinal adverbs: 'thirdly', 'fourthly'. This structured argumentation is typical of Bar Hebraeus's method in the Treatise of Treatises.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text at the point of the ellipsis ('…') is corrupt or incomplete in the manuscript. The English draft supplies a conjectural reading ('a foolish man who strikes a blow against a wall'), but the original may have had a different simile.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac phrase 'ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ ܣܘܦܣ̈ܛܝܩܝܐ' could be read as 'sophistical syllogisms' or 'sophistic syllogisms'; the former is preferred in the English draft.","The term 'ܐܘܡܢܘܬܐ' (art) may refer to dialectic as a whole or to the specific art of refutation; the context supports the broader reading."],"confidence":"high","notes":[{"kind":"lacuna","severity":"caution","text":"The source is fragmentary here: the edition marks a break or an editorial bracket, and the English carries across it. Treat the bridge as supplied, not translated."}]},{"i":71,"ref":"p71","source":"ܘܢܝ̈ܫܐ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܥܠܡ̈ܢܝܐ. ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܬܘܒ ܡܦܢܛܣ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܒܠܚܘܕܝܗܝܢ ܗܘ̈ܠܐܣ ܐܢܝܢ ܕܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ ܦܘܐܝ̈ܛܝܩܝܐ ܘܗܢܝܢܐ ܕܡܢܗܘܢ ܦܓܝܐ ܕܡܫܡܥܬܐ ܘܢܓܘܕܘܬ ܢܦܫܐ ܐܘ ܢܓܘܪܘܬܗܿ ܡܢ ܣܥܘܪ̈ܘܬܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܡܕܡ ܥܠܡܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܘܪ̈ܓܬܢܝܬܐ ܐܘ ܚܡܬܢܝ̈ܬܐ. ܘܒܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ ܡܢ ܪܝܛܘܪ̈ܝܩܝܐ ܠܡܚܝ̈ܠܝ ܝܕܥܬܐ ܦܝܣܐ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܩܢܝܘ ܥܠ ܫܪܪܐ. ܒܗܿܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܕܝܠܝܩܛܝ̈ܩܝܐ ܠܡܨ̈ܥܝܐ. ܘܚܡܝܫܝܐ ܗܘ ܦܘܠܓ ܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܐܘ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܫܪܪܐ ܘܐܦܘܕܝܩܛܝܩܝܐ ܡܬܟܢܐ. ܐܘ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܓܠܘܬܐ. ܘܦܘܐܝܛܝܩܝܐ ܡܬܟܢܐ. ܐܘ ܡܨܥܐܝܬ ܐܝܬ ܠܗ. ܘܗܘ ܗܢܐ ܐܢ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܗܘ ܡܪܢܝܐ ܪܝܛܘܪܝܩܝܐ ܡܬܟܢܐ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܠܦܘܬ ܣܟܐ ܕܫܪܪܐ ܝܬܝܪ ܨܠܐ ܕܝܠܝܩܛܝܩܝܐ ܡܬܟܢܐ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܠܘܬ ܗܿܘ ܕܕܓܠܘܬܐ ܣܘܦܣܛܝܩܝܐ. ܩܦܠܐܘܢ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ\nܥܠ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܐܦܘܕܝܩܛܝܩܝܐ ܕܝܠܢܐܝܬ\nܘܩܕܡܝܐ ܥܠ ܦܪ̈ܘܒܠܝܡܛܐ ܐܡܗ̈ܝܬܐ ܡܢ ܓܝܪ ܕܒܥ̈ܬܐ ܐܪܒܥ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܨܒܘ ܕܒܝܕ ܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣ ܡܬܒܩܪܐ. ܐܘ ܕܐܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܡܬܒܥܝܐ. ܐܘ ܕܡܢܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܐܘ ܕܐܝܢܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܐܘ ܕܡܛܠ ܡܢܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܘܒܥܬܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܕܡ. ܐܢ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܢ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܙܢܐ ܕܗܟܢ ܐܘ ܗܟܢ. ܐܘܟܝܬ ܒܟܠ ܡܕܡ ܕܠܒܪ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܘܬܐ ܐܢ ܡܪܟܒܬܐ ܡܬܩܪܝܐ. ܒܥܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܢܐ ܐܦ ܗܝ ܬܪܝܢܐܝܬ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܘ ܦܘܫܩܗ ܒܥܝܐ ܕܫܡܐ ܐܘ ܡܢܝܘܬ ܟܝܢܗ. ܘܗܿܝ ܕܦܘܫܩܗܿ ܒܥܝܐ ܕܫܡܐ܆ ܩܕܝܡܐ ܠܒܥܬܐ ܕܐܢ ܦܫܝܛܬܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ ܕܡܢܝܘܬ ܟܝܢܐ܆ܐܚܪܝܐ ܡܢܗܿ. ܘܗܟܢܐ ܡܬܟܣܣܐ. ܬܪܥܝܬ ܐ̱ܢܫ̈ܝܢ ܕܒܕܪ̈ܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܝܠܢ ܕܠܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܬܝܐ ܩܕܝܡܬ ܠܗܿܝ ܕܡܢܐ ܕܢܘܗܿ.","english":"And other demonstrative premises. Again, the apodictic syllogisms are only those of the poetic and rhetorical kind, and they show the surface of meaning and self-contradiction or its contradiction with natural and emotional or passionate things. And with rhetorical syllogisms, they can persuade the weak in knowledge about truth. But these are dialectical means. And the fifth is the false syllogism. In that every syllogism either establishes truth and is called apodictic, or establishes falsehood and is called poetic, or is intermediate. And this one, if it is intermediate, is called rhetorical when it is fitting; if it is for the sake of truth, it is called dialectical when it is more fitting; if it is for falsehood, it is called sophistical.\n\nFourth chapter\nOn the apodictic syllogism in particular\nAnd first on the material problems. For there are four kinds of inquiry: in that every inquiry is examined by demonstration, either whether it exists is sought, or what it is, or which it is, or why it is. And the inquiry of whether something exists, if it is simple, is called that; but that of whether it is in such a way or such, likewise in everything outside of existence, is called composite. And again, the inquiry of what it is is also twofold: in that either its definition is sought or the understanding of its essence. And that whose definition is sought is prior to the inquiry of whether it is simple; but that of the understanding of its essence is posterior to it. And thus it is ordered. The thought of the things in the chapters from the particular to that of whether it is, as it came, is prior to that of what it is of its kind.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܘܐܝ̈ܛܝܩܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term 'poetic' here renders Greek ποιητικός, but in this context it refers to a syllogism that establishes falsehood, not to poetry per se.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܦܠܐܘܢ ܪܒܝܥܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The passage marks the beginning of the fourth chapter, which focuses on the apodictic syllogism in particular, following a classification of syllogism types.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܒܥ̈ܬܐ ܐܪܒܥ","severity":"info","text":"The four kinds of inquiry (whether, what, which, why) reflect Aristotelian categories of scientific investigation, as found in the Posterior Analytics.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܐܦܘܕܝܩܛܝܩܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The 'apodictic syllogism' is a demonstrative syllogism that establishes truth, distinguished from dialectical, rhetorical, and sophistical types.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܘܐܝ̈ܛܝܩܝܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The classification of 'poetic' syllogisms as establishing falsehood is unusual; in Aristotelian tradition, poetic syllogisms are not typically treated as a distinct logical category.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac text is partially corrupt in the opening lines, making the precise classification of premises uncertain.","The relationship between 'poetic' and 'rhetorical' syllogisms is not fully clarified in this passage."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":72,"ref":"p72","source":"ܘܒܥܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܢܐ ܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܡܬܒܥܐ ܒܗܿ ܕܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܟܝܢܐܝܬ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐ̱ܚܪ̈ܢܐ. ܘܒܥܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܛܠ ܡܢܐ. ܥܠܬܐ ܕܡܚܘܝܢܘܬ ܬܚܘ̈ܡܐ ܕܣܘܢܦܪܝܣܡܐ ܡܬܒܥܝܐ ܒܗ ܐܘܟܝܬ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܨܥܝܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢܝܘܬܗܿ ܕܥܠܬܐ ܒܝܬܗܿ ܡܬܒܥܝܐ ܡܢܗܿ. ܘܗܕܐ ܒܥܬܐ ܓܠܝܐ ܕܐܚܪܢܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܢ ܒܛܟܣܐ. ܐܝܬ ܓܝܪ ܘܒܥ̈ܬܐ ܐ̱ܚܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܟܢܐ ܘܐܝܟܐ. ܘܐܡܬܝ. ܘܟܠܗܝܢ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܢܐ ܥ̈ܐܠܢ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܐܡܗ̈ܬܐ ܗܿܢܝܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܪܒܥ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ. ܕܬܪܬܝܢ ܡܢܗܝܢ ܒܡܬܝܩܢ̈ܢܘܬܐ ܥ̈ܐܠܢ ܘܬܪܬܝܢ ܒܗܝܡܢ̈ܘܬܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܕܥܠ ܬܪܝܢܘܬ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܕܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣ\nܘܐܦܘܕܟܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܟܕ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܕܡܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܢܚ̈ܝܬ ܫܪܪܐ ܡܪܟܒ. ܗܘ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܒܐܦܘܕܟܣܝܣ ܐܘ ܒܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܐܟܚܕ ܘܚܘܫܒܐ. ܥܠܬܐ ܗܘ ܕܡܚܘܝܢܘܬ ܣܟ̈ܐ ܕܟܘܢܫܐ. ܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܐܦܘܕܟܣܝܣ ܕܡܛܠ ܡܢܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܐܘ ܒܚܘܫܒܐ ܗܘ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܥܠܬܐ ܕܡܚܝܢܘܬܗܘܢ ܗ̄ ܕܥܠܬܐ ܗܘ ܕܦܣܩܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܘܠܘ ܕܝܠܗ ܕܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܒܝܬܗ. ܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܐܦܘܕܟܣܝܣ ܕܐܢ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܘܗܿܝ ܡܢ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ ܡܢ ܥܠܬܐ ܠܥܠܬܢܐ ܡܚܘܝܐ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܡܪܢܝܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܐܡܪܐ. ܕܗܢܐ ܩܝܣܐ ܓܫܝܦ ܠܢܘܪܐ. ܘܟܠ ܕܓܫܝܦ ܠܢܘܪܐ ܡܚܪܟ. ܡܬܟܢܫ ܕܗܢܐ ܩܝܣܐ ܡܚܪܟ. ܗܐ ܓܫܘܦܘܬ ܢܘܪܐ. ܐܦ ܒܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܐܦ ܒܚܘܫܒܐ ܐܘܟܝܬ ܒܦܣܩܐ ܥܠܬܐ ܗܝ ܕܡܚܪܟܘܬܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܪܬܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܐܡܪܐ. ܕܗܢܐ ܩܝܣܝܐ ܡܚܪܟܐ ܗܘ. ܘܟܠ ܡܚܪܟܐ ܓܫܝܦ ܠܢܘܪܐ. ܡܬܟܢܫ ܕܗܢܐ ܩܝܣܐ ܓܫܝܦ ܠܢܘܪܐ. ܘܓܠܝܐ ܕܡܚܪܟܐ ܐܦܢ ܥܠܬܐ ܗܘܐ ܕܩܘܛܪܓܗ ܕܗܿܘ ܪܒܐ ܥܠ ܙܥܘܪܐ ܗ̄ ܒܚܘܫܒܐ ܕܦܣܩܐ. ܠܘ ܐܦ ܒܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܥܠܬܐ ܗܘ ܕܓܫܘܦܘܬ ܢܘܪܐ. ܐܠܐ ܥܠܬܢܐ. ܘܒܐܦܘܕܟܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܛܠ ܡܢܐ.","english":"And another inquiry: what distinction is sought in the actions naturally from these others? And another inquiry: why? The cause of the demonstration of the limits of the syllogism is sought in it, that is, the middle term, or the causality of the cause is sought from it. And this inquiry is distinct from the other one, that is, from that which is in the treatise. For there are also other inquiries, such as: where? and whence? and when? And all of them are in that which: what are the causes? In general, these four are the mothers, of which two are in the propositions of causes and two in the conclusions. The light upon the duality of the figures of apodeixis and apodeixis, when it is something of the syllogism that is composed from premises of true certainty. That middle term in apodeixis or in action and thought together. It is the cause of the demonstration of the signs of the argument. And this is the apodeixis that is called \"why?\" Or in thought alone, it is the cause of the demonstration of the effect of the cause, which is the conclusion alone and not that of the action itself. And this is the apodeixis that is called \"that.\" And the former shows from cause to effect. And because of this, it is fitting, as it is said: \"This wood is heavy for fire, and everything heavy for fire burns; therefore, this wood burns.\" Behold, the heaviness of the fire. Both in action and in thought, that is, in the conclusion, the cause is the burning. The latter, however, is like that which is said: \"This wood is burning, and everything burning is heavy for fire; therefore, this wood is heavy for fire.\" And it is clear that burning is also the cause of the predicate of that major over the minor in the thought of the conclusion, not also in the action is the cause the heaviness of the fire, but the effect. And in apodeixis, it is that which is \"why?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"Apodeixis (ἀπόδειξις) is a demonstrative syllogism yielding certain knowledge, distinct from dialectical or rhetorical reasoning. Bar Hebraeus here distinguishes two types: one showing 'why' (διότι) and one showing 'that' (ὅτι).","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܨܥܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The 'middle term' (μέσον) is the causal link in a syllogism. Bar Hebraeus identifies it as the cause that demonstrates the limits of the syllogism, whether in action, thought, or both.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage continues the treatise's systematic classification of syllogisms, moving from apodictic and rhetorical types to the demonstrative apodeixis, with a focus on its two subtypes: 'why' and 'that'.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The distinction between 'why' (διότι) and 'that' (ὅτι) apodeixis is Aristotelian (Posterior Analytics I.13). Bar Hebraeus adapts this into Syriac, using the example of wood and fire to illustrate causal reasoning.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The 'four mothers' refer to the four types of inquiry (what, why, where, when) that underlie causal investigation. Two relate to premises (causes) and two to conclusions (effects).","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac text at the end is fragmentary; the final phrase 'ܘܒܐܦܘܕܟܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܛܠ ܡܢܐ' may be incomplete, but the sense of 'why' apodeixis is clear from context."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":73,"ref":"p73","source":"ܠܐ ܐܠܨܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܐܝܟܢ ܕܗܘ ܥܠܬܐ ܢܗܘܐ. ܠܣܟܐ ܗܿܘ ܪܒܐ. ܐܠܐ ܕܫܟܝܚܘܬܗ ܒܗܿܘ ܙܥܘܪܐ. ܘܐܦܢ ܢܗܘܐ ܥܠܬܢܗ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ. ܘܟܠ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܓܘܫܡܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܕܥܠ ܡܢ̈ܘܬ ܝܘܠܦܢ̈ܐ\nܠܟܠ ܓܝܪ ܝܘܠܦܢܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬ. ܘܪ̈ܝܫܐ ܘܫܘ̈ܐܠܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ. ܕܟܠ ܝܘܠܦܢ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܗܿܘ ܕܒܗ ܡܬܒܚܢܝܢ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܐܘܣܝܐܝܬ ܠܗ ܢܩܝܦܝܢ. ܐܝܟ ܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܠܓܐܘܡܛܪܝܐ. ܘܡܢܝܢܐ ܠܐܪܝܬܡܛܝܩܝ. ܘܦܓܪ̈ܐ ܐ̱ܢܫ̈ܝܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܚܠܝܡܝܢ ܐܘ ܟܪܝܗܝܢ ܠܐܣܝܘܬܐ. ܘܐܘܣܝܝܐ ܡܢ ܗܪܟܐ ܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܢܩܦ ܠܡܕܡ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܘ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܝܟ ܫܘܝܘܬܐ ܠܟܡܝܘܬܐ. ܐܘ ܦܛܫܘܬܐ ܠܢܚܝܪܐ. ܘܪ̈ܝܫܐ ܡܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܬܚܘ̈ܡܐ ܘܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܕܡܢܗܝܢ ܡܬܪܟܒܝܢ. ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡ̈ܘ ܕܒܗ. ܘܫܘ̈ܐܠܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܗܢܝܢ ܕܡܬܥܩܒܐ ܡܚܝܢܘܬ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗܝܢ ܠܘܬ ܚܕ̈ܕܐ ܒܗ ܒܗܿܘ ܝܘܠܦܢܐ. ܘܗܢܘܢ ܝܘܠܦܢ̈ܐ ܡܫܬܚܠܦܝܢ ܒܫܘܚ̈ܠܦܐ ܕܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܣܝܡܝܢ ܠܗܘܢ. ܐܘ ܒܫܘܚ̈ܠܦܝ ܙܢܝ̈ܗܘܢ. ܘܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܠܗܘܢ ܣܝܡܝܢ ܐܢ ܒܟܠ ܡܕܡ ܡܫܚܠܦܝܢ ܡܢܟܪ̈ܝܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܢ ܗܢܘܢ ܝܘܠܦܢ̈ܐ. ܘܟܕ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܠܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܝܘܠܦܢ̈ܐ ܓܘܢܝ ܢܗܘܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܠܗܿܘ ܐ̱ܚܪܢܐ. ܒܓܢܣܢܝܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܐܝܟ ܓܐܘܡܛܪܝܐ ܕܥܠܝܐ ܡܢ ܝܕܥܬܐ ܕܡܓܫܡ̈ܐ. ܐܘ ܒܠܐ ܡܬܚܡܘܬܐ. ܐܝܟ ܐܣܦܝܪ̈ܐ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܕܬܚ̈ܬܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܣܦܝܪ̈ܐ. ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܬܚܝܬ ܗܿܘ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܣܝܡ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܟܕ ܡܫܚ̈ܠܦܐ ܢܗܘܘܢ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܣܝܡܝܢ ܠܗܘܢ. ܘܗܿܘ ܡܢ ܚܕ ܝܨܝܦ ܥܠ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܐܘܣܝܐܝܬ ܢܩܝܦܝܢ ܠܗܿܘ ܐ̱ܚܪܢܐ. ܐܝܟ ܕܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܕܡܘܣܝܩܝ ܠܬܚܬ ܡܢ ܐܪܝܬܡܛܝܩܝ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܟܠ ܫܬܐܣܬܐ ܕܣܝܡܐ ܒܗܿܢܘܢ ܬܚ̈ܬܝܐ ܒܗܠܝܢ ܕܠܥܠ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܐܦܘܕܝܟ̈ܣܐ ܗܘ̈ܝܢ.","english":"It is not necessary that the middle term be like the cause for the sake of the great end, but that its discovery be in the small, and also that it be its cause, as every rational animal and every animate body are the light upon the matters of the disciplines. For every discipline has that which is set, and principles and inquiries, and that which is set is that every discipline is that by which those things that are essentially attached to it are demonstrated, like measurement to geometry, and number to arithmetic, and natural bodies in that they are healthy or ill to medicine. And \"essences\" here are said of that which is attached to something in that it is what it is, like equality to quantity, or opposition to quality. And the principles are the limits and the premises from which the syllogisms in it are composed. And the inquiries, again, are the premises themselves whose mutual relations are sought in that discipline. And those disciplines are distinguished by the differences of those things that are set for them, or by the differences of their accidents. And if those things that are set for them differ in every respect, the disciplines are said to be utterly separate. And when that which is set for something from the disciplines is interior to that which is set for another, by subalternation, like higher geometry with the knowledge of bodies, or without limitation, like the moving spheres of the lower with the sphere, it is said that the particular is placed under the general. In this manner, and when those things that are set for them are different, and one is concerned with those things that are essentially attached to the other, like it is said that music is under arithmetic, for the whole foundation of the lower is set in those things that are above them, and the apodeixis occurs.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܡܨܥܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term mṣaʿyā (middle term) is the Aristotelian 'middle term' of a syllogism, the term that appears in both premises and is absent from the conclusion.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ","severity":"info","text":"The phrase haw d-sīm (that which is set) translates the Aristotelian technical term 'the subject matter' or 'the underlying genus' of a science, i.e., the genus about which the science demonstrates properties.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܘܣܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ʾūsyā (essence) here renders Greek ousia, but Bar Hebraeus specifies it means 'that which is attached to something in that it is what it is', i.e., an essential attribute as opposed to an accident.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The examples of subalternation (geometry under knowledge of bodies, music under arithmetic) reflect the Aristotelian classification of sciences as transmitted through the late antique Neoplatonic curriculum, common in Syriac philosophical compendia.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the discussion of the four Aristotelian inquiries (whether, what, which, why) by distinguishing the 'that which is set' (subject genus) from principles and inquiries, and by explaining how disciplines are differentiated and subalternated.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܦܘܕܝܟ̈ܣܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword apodeixis (demonstration) is used here in its Aristotelian sense of a scientific syllogism that yields certain knowledge, as opposed to dialectical or rhetorical argument.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac text at the beginning is slightly corrupt or elliptical: ܠܐ ܐܠܨܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܐܝܟܢ ܕܗܘ ܥܠܬܐ ܢܗܘܐ. The reading taken is 'It is not necessary that the middle term be like the cause', but the syntax is compressed and the exact force of ܐܝܟܢ (as if) is uncertain."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":74,"ref":"p74","source":"ܘܐܝܬ ܬܘܒ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܫܬܐܣ̈ܐ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܥ̈ܠܝܐ ܒܬܚ̈ܬܝܐ ܡܬܚܘܐ. ܒܪܡ ܠܘ ܒܗ ܒܙܢܐ ܕܫܬܐܣ̈ܝ ܬܚ̈ܬܝܐ ܒܗܘܢ ܡܬܚܘ̈ܝܢ. ܐܝܟܢܐ ܕܚܘܕܪܐ ܢܩܦ ܘܫܟܝܪܘܬܐ ܬܬܟܢܫ ܘܝܘܠܦܢ̈ܐ ܡܬܛܟܣܝܢ ܚܕ ܠܥܠ ܡܢ ܚܕ ܠܦܘܬ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܠܗܘܢ ܣܝܡܝܢ ܥܕܡܐ ܕܡܬܡܛܝܢ ܠܘܬ ܦܝܠܣܘܦܝܐ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ. ܕܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬ ܠܗܿ ܗܿܘ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܕܠܝܬ ܕܓܘܢܝܐ ܡܢܗ. ܘܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܚܘܝ ܒܝܬܗ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܠܐ ܣܢܝܩ ܕܒܐܚܪܢܐ ܢܬܚܘܐ. ܘܗܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܕܒܗܘܝܐ ܘܚܘܒܠܐ ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣ ܥܠܝܗܘܢ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܩܨ ܠܐ ܟܘܬܪܗܘܢ ܐܦܠܐ ܦܣܩܐ ܥܠܝܗܘܢ ܡܟܬܪ ܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ. ܘܬܘܒ ܡܛܠ ܗܿܝ ܕܒܝܢܬ ܡܬܪܓܫܢܐ ܕܩܐܡ ܘܥܬܝܕܐ ܕܡܟܢ ܠܡܬܚܒܠܘ ܣܝܡܝܢ. ܘܠܦܘܬ ܬܪܝܗܘܢ ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣ ܐܠܐ ܟܒܪ ܟܠܢ̈ܝܐ ܢܬܢܣܒܘܢ. ܘܗܝܕܝܟ ܠܘ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ. ܘܒܡܬܡܨܝ̈ܢܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܘܝܐ ܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣ ܥܠ ܡܬܡܨܝܢܘܬܗܘܢ. ܒܪܡ ܠܘ ܥܠ ܟܘܝܢܗܘܢ. ܘܠܡܬܡܨܝܢܐ ܡܢ ܐܝܟ ܕܒܣܘܓܐܐ ܐܝܬ ܡܫܬܪܪܢܘܬܐ ܡܙܕܩܬ ܡܣܒܪܢܘܬ ܟܘܝܢܐ. ܐܝܟ ܡܘܥܝܬ ܕܩܢܐ ܒܩܘܡܬ ܥܠܝܡܘܬܐ. ܘܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܢ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܗܪܟܐ ܩܛܝܪܘܬ ܥܛܪ̈ܐ. ܘܪܨܝܦܘܬ ܦܘܪ̈ܘ ܕܐܦ̈ܐ. ܢܘܗܪܐ ܥܠ ܗܿܝ ܕܬܚܘܡܐ ܠܘ ܒܝܕ ܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣ ܡܨܐ ܠܡܬܩܢܝܘ ܘܕܒܡܘܢ ܦܪܝܫܝܢ\nܘܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܢ ܠܘ ܒܝܕ ܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣ ܡܬܩܢܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܗܝܕܝܟ ܥܠ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܡܨܛܪܟ. ܘܕܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܢ ܣܟܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܪܒܐ ܘܡܬܬܚܡܢܐ ܣܟܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܙܥܘܪܐ. ܘܗܿܪܟܐ ܡܢ ܬܠܬܝܗܘܢ ܬܚܘ̈ܡܐ ܫܘ̈ܝܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܢܗܘܘܢ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܠܘ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܓܘܢܝ ܢܗܘܐ ܡܢ ܡܬܬܚܡܢܐ ܐܠܨܐ ܕܐܦ ܗܘ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܕܣܟܐ ܗܿܘ ܪܒܐ ܓܘܢܝ ܢܗܘܐ ܡܢܗ. ܘܡܬܟܢܫܐ ܕܠܘ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܗܘ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܫܘܝܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܠܡܬܬܚܡܢܐ.","english":"And there is also when something from the foundations of these higher things is shown in the lower things. However, it is not in the nature of the lower foundations that they are shown. As when a cycle follows and drunkenness is disturbed and teachings are arranged one above the other according to that for which they are intended, until they reach first philosophy. For that which is intended has that which has no intermediary with it. And in that which is shown in its house, it is. It is not necessary that it be shown in another. And these are from being and corruption, and not one apodeixis can be made concerning them, because from the end neither their essence nor a division concerning them remains permanently. And again, because in the sensible substance that stands and is destined to fall into corruption they are placed. And according to both, not one apodeixis but rather many categories are formed. And then they are not from them. And concerning the possible, an apodeixis is made concerning their possibility, but not concerning their essence. And for the possible, as in the majority, there is a confirmation that necessitates the probability of the essence, like the youth of a boy in the stature of youth. And the limit from the middle here is the knot of crowns and the continuity of the rows of faces. And a demonstration concerning that the limit cannot be fixed by apodeixis, and that in distinct matters the limit is not fixed by apodeixis, because when it is fixed, then concerning the middle it is necessary. And that the limit from the end is great and the limited end is small. And here from the three, the limits should be equal, because if the middle limit were internal with the limited, it would be necessary that also the limit of that great end be internal with it. And it is shown that it is not a limit, because when it is fixed, it would be an equal limit to the limited.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"Greek loanword ἀπόδειξις (apodeixis), used in Syriac Aristotelian tradition for 'demonstration' or 'proof' in the strict sense. Bar Hebraeus contrasts it with dialectical or probable reasoning.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܦܝܠܣܘܦܝܐ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"Syriac calque of πρώτη φιλοσοφία (first philosophy), i.e., metaphysics. The phrase marks the teleological hierarchy of the sciences, a standard Peripatetic theme.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܡܬܡܨܝ̈ܥܐ","severity":"info","text":"Syriac participle meaning 'possible' or 'contingent'. Bar Hebraeus here distinguishes demonstration of possibility from demonstration of essence, echoing Aristotelian modal logic.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage moves from a general principle (higher foundations shown in lower) to a series of negations: no single apodeixis for beings of generation and corruption, nor for sensible substance, nor for the limit. The argument is cumulative and aporetic.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The reference to 'knot of crowns' and 'rows of faces' likely alludes to the ordering of celestial spheres or angelic hierarchies, a theme common in Syriac philosophical theology.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text at the end is compressed and possibly corrupt: the phrase 'when it is fixed, it would be an equal limit to the limited' may reflect a lacuna or scribal error. The logical connection is ambiguous.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'in its house' (ܒܒܝܬܗ) may be a metaphor for 'in its proper domain' or a textual corruption; the reading taken is 'in its own subject matter'.","The identity of the 'three limits' is not fully specified; the reading taken is that they refer to the limit of the middle, the limit of the end, and the limit of the limited."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":75,"ref":"p75","source":"ܘܡܫܘܬܦܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣ ܘܬܚܘܡܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܐܦ ܦܘܢ̈ܝܐ. ܕܡܢܐ ܘܡܛܠ ܡܢܐ ܡܫܘܬܦܝܢ. ܘܗܢܐ ܡܢ ܟܕ ܬܚܘܡܐ ܡܨܥܝܐ ܒܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣ ܡܢ ܥ̈ܠܠܬܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܐܘܣܝܝ̈ܬܐ ܕܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܟܕ ܡܫܬܐܠܐ ܕܡܛܠ ܡܢܐ ܣܗܪܐ ܚܫܟ. ܘܡܬܦܢܝܐ ܡܛܠ ܕܐܪܥܐ ܡܬܡܨܥܐ ܒܝܬ ܠܗ ܠܫܡܫܐ. ܘܟܠ ܡܨܥܝܘܬܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ ܐܢܢܩܐܝܬ ܫܘܢܝܐ ܡܥܒܕܐ ܕܢܘܗܪܗ ܕܣܗܪܐ. ܘܡܫܬܐܠܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܡܢܐ ܗܝ ܐܩܠܦܣܝܣ. ܘܡܬܦܢܝܐ ܕܫܘܢܝܐ ܗܝ ܕܢܘܗܪܐ ܣܗܪܢܝܐ ܡܢ ܩܨ ܡܡܨܥܘܬ ܐܪܥܐ ܕܒܝܬ ܠܗ ܠܫܡܫܐ ܡܬܟܝܢܐ. ܦܪܝܫܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܡܢ ܚܕ̈ܕܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܒܬܚܘܡܐ ܐܬܩܕܡ. ܒܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣ ܐ̱ܚܪܢܐ ܐܫܬܟܚ. ܘܙܕܩ ܠܡܕܥ. ܕܥ̈ܠܠܬܐ ܡܢ ܐܪܒܥ ܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ. ܥܒܘܕܘܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܢܓܪܐ ܠܟܘܪܣܝܐ. ܘܗܘܠܢܝܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܩܝܣܐ ܠܟܘܪܣܝܐ. ܘܐܕܫܢܝܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܐܣܟܝܡܗ. ܘܫܘܡܠܝܢܝܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܡܘܬܒܐ ܕܥܠܘܗܝ. ܟܕ ܢܫܬܟܚ̈ܢ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܐܦ ܥܠܬܢܗܝܢ ܢܫܬܟܚ. ܘܡܛܠ ܕܗܢܝܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܐ̱ܚܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܗܢܝܢ ܐܢܝܢ ܡܝܩܢܢ̈ܘܬܐ. ܗܿܢܝܢ ܝܬܝܪܐܝܬ ܒܬܚܘ̈ܡܐ ܡܚܘܝܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܡܬܢܣ̈ܒܢ. ܘܐܝܬ ܕܝܢ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܐܪ̈ܒܥܬܝܗܝܢ ܡܬܢܣ̈ܒܢ ܐܟܚܕܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܕܣܝܦܐ ܐܘܪܓܢܘܢ ܗܘ ܐܘܡܢܝܐ. ܢܣܝܒ ܡܢ ܦܪܙܠܐ ܕܐܪܝܟ ܘܦܬܐ ܘܚܪܝܦ ܣܛܪ̈ܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܠܩܛܠܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܚܝ̈ܘܬܐ. ܘܐܘܡܢܝܐ ܡܢ ܫܘܘܕܥܐ ܗܘ ܕܥܠܬܗ ܥܒܘܕܬܐ. ܘܬܠܬܐ ܕܫܪܟܐ ܕܬܠܬ ܕܫܪܟܐ. ܘܥܠܬܐ ܕܫܘܝܐ ܠܥܠܬܢܐ ܡܬܢܣܒܘ ܡܬܢܣܒܐ ܒܬܚܘܡܗ. ܘܦܘ̈ܠܓܝܗܿ ܕܝܠܢ̈ܝܐ ܠܘ ܒܬܚܘܡܗ ܐܠܐ ܒܬܚܘܡ ܐܕܫܗ ܡܬܢܣܒܝܢ. ܐܝܟ ܡܣܝܘܬܐ ܕܚܕܐ ܗܝ ܡܢ ܥ̈ܠܬ ܕܐܫܬܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܠܘ ܒܬܚܘܡܗܿ ܙܕܩ ܕܬܬܢܣܒ ܐܠܐ ܒܬܚܘܡ ܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܐܕܫܝܗܿ ܛܪܝܛܐܘܣ ܠܡܐܡܪ ܐܘ ܛܛܪܛܐܘܣ. ܘܟܕ ܥ̈ܠܠܬܐ ܢܬܟܝ̈ܢܢ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܬܐ ܠܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ.","english":"And the distinction between apodeixis and definition is that there is sometimes also a cause. For what and on account of what are distinguished. And here, when a definition is intermediate in apodeixis, the causes are the foundations of actions. As when it is asked why the moon is darkened, and it is answered because the earth is interposed between it and the sun. And every interposition of this kind is strictly a privation that produces the obscuration of the moon. And it is asked again what an eclipse is, and it is answered that it is a privation of lunar light due to the interposition of the earth between it and the sun. They are distinguished from each other in that what comes first in definition is found in another apodeixis. And it is necessary to know that causes are of four kinds: material, as wood for a chair; formal, as the shape of a chair; efficient, as the carpenter for a chair; and final, as the sitting upon it. When the causes are found, their effects are also found. And because these last two are the more honorable, they are especially taken up in definitions as demonstrations. And there is also when all four are taken up together, as in the statement that a sword is an instrument for cutting, taken from iron that is long, broad, and sharp on both sides, as for killing something from animals. And the instrument is from the relation that its cause is the efficient cause. And the third of the remaining three, and the cause of the privation of the effect, is taken up in its definition. And its divisions are not taken up in its definition but in the definition of its form, as in the measurement of one of the causes of fire. For in the case of a torch, it is not proper that it be taken up in its definition but in the definition of something from its form, whether one says \"triton\" or \"tetarton.\" And when the causes are many, they are established for something from the actions.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܦܘܕܝܟܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"Apodeixis (ἀπόδειξις) is a Greek loanword meaning 'demonstration' or 'proof' in Aristotelian logic. Bar Hebraeus distinguishes it from definition (ܬܚܘܡܐ) as a distinct logical operation.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The four causes (material, formal, efficient, final) are a standard Aristotelian classification (Physics II.3, Metaphysics V.2). Bar Hebraeus adapts them to Syriac philosophical discourse, using examples like a chair and a sword.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The example of the moon's eclipse (earth interposed between moon and sun) mirrors Aristotle's Posterior Analytics II.2, where the cause (interposition) and the definition (privation of light) are distinguished. Bar Hebraeus uses this to illustrate the relation between apodeixis and definition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage moves from distinguishing apodeixis and definition, to enumerating the four causes, to discussing how causes are taken up in definitions. The final part addresses cases where all four causes are included (e.g., sword) and where only some are (e.g., torch).","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܛܪܝܛܐܘܣ ܐܘ ܛܛܪܛܐܘܣ","severity":"caution","text":"The terms 'triton' and 'tetarton' (Greek for 'third' and 'fourth') are obscure here. They likely refer to types of causes or divisions in a definition, but the exact reference is unclear; possibly a corruption or a technical term from a lost source.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'third of the remaining three' is ambiguous: it may refer to the final cause among the four, or to a specific cause in a different classification.","The terms 'triton' and 'tetarton' are not clearly defined; they may be corrupt or refer to lost technical distinctions."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":76,"ref":"p76","source":"ܘܗܢܝܢ ܩܪ̈ܝܒܬܐ ܠܘ ܒܪ̈ܚܝܩܬܐ ܙܕܩ ܠܡܬܚܫܚܘ ܒܡܚܘܝ̈ܢܘܬܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܟܕ ܡܫܬܐܠܐ ܕܡܛܠ ܡܢܐ ܓܠܝܙܬ ܡܢ ܙܡܝܪ̈ܬܐ ܗܝ ܣܩܘܬܘܣ. ܠܘ ܡܛܠ ܕܓܠܝܙܬ ܟܪ̈ܡܐ ܗܝ ܙܕܩ ܠܡܦܢܝܘ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܦ ܟܪܘܣܘܣ ܐ̱ܢܫ ܣܥܪ. ܐܠܐ ܡܛܠ ܕܓܠܝܙܬ ܚܡܪܐ ܗܝ. ܐܘ ܬܘܒ ܩܪܝܒܐܝܬ ܟܐܡܬ ܠܡ ܡܛܠ ܕܠܘ ܪܘܝܢ ܘܐܦܢ ܠܘ ܐܦܘܕܝܩܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܗܝ ܟܪܝܣܝܣ ܠܢܝܫܐ ܛܟ ܣܦܩܐ ܠܡܒܕܩܘ. ܩܦܠܐܘܢ ܕܚܡܫܐ\nܥܠ ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܣܘܦܣܛܝܩܝܐ ܐܘܟܝܬ ܡܛܥܝܢܐ\nܘܛܥܝܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܒܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܗܘܝܐ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܩܨ ܐܕܫܗ. ܐܘ ܡܢ ܩܨ ܗܘܠܐ ܕܡܢܗܿ ܢܣܝܒ. ܘܗܿܘ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܗܘܐ ܡܢ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܡܕܡ ܠܐ ܡܟܢܫ̈ܢܐ. ܕܚܕ ܡܢ ܐܣܟܝ̈ܡܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܟܕ ܬܗܘܐ ܗܝ ܗܘܠܐ ܟܕܒܬܐ ܒܟܝܢܗܿ. ܘܐܝܟ ܫܪܝܪܬܐ ܡܢ ܡܣܬܒܪܐ. ܟܕ ܬܗܘܐ ܕܕܡܝܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܕܠܘܬ ܫܪܪܐ ܗܝ ܒܗܿ ܡܝܬܝܐ. ܘܗܝ ܕܡܝܘܬܐ. ܐܘ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܝܬܐ ܗܝ: ܐܘ ܣܘܟܠܝܬܐ. ܘܗܿܝ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ. ܐܘ ܟܕ ܦܫܝܛܐ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܗܘܝܐ ܐܘ ܟܕ ܡܪܟܒܐ. ܘܗܿܝ ܬܘܒ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ. ܐܘ ܒܗܘܠܐ ܐܘܟܝܬ ܒܐܬܘ̈ܬܐ ܐܟܚܕ ܘܒܐܕܫܐ. ܐܘܟܝܬ ܒܪܘܟܒܗܝܢ ܕܡܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܫܘܝ̈ܝ ܫܡܐ. ܐܘ ܒܗܘܠܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܐܝܟ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܕܢܘܪܐ ܘܢܘܪܐ. ܐܘ ܒܐܕܫܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ. ܐܝܟ ܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ ܕܡܬܗܘܢܢܐ ܕܣܘܟܠܐ ܕܡܬܕܪܟܢܐ ܡܗܓܓܐ. ܟܕ ܒܟܝܢܗܿ ܡܕܪܟܢܘܬܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ. ܘܗܿܝ ܕܟܕ ܡܪܟܒܐ ܐܘ ܒܝܕ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܡܕܡ ܕܢܩܦ ܠܪܘܟܒܐ ܥܐܠܐ ܕܡܝܘܬܐ. ܘܢܩܦܐ ܛܘܥܝܝ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܕܐܝܙܒܠ ܒܪܬ ܐܘܪܫܠܡ ܫܛܝܬܐ. ܘܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܬܘܒ ܕܟܠ ܡܐ ܕܝܕܥ ܦܠܣܘܦܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܘ ܡܐ ܕܝܕܥ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܠܟܐܦܐ ܝܕܥ ܡܕܝܢ ܟܐܦܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܘ ܟܕ ܡܫܬܓܢܐ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܕܪܘܟܒܐ ܥܐܠܐ ܛܘܥܝܝ. ܘܗܕܐ ܬܪܝܢܐܝܬ ܐܘ ܟܕ ܟܢܝܫܐܝܬ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܡܣܬܒܪܐ ܕܐܦ ܦܪܝܫܐܝܬ ܫܪܝܪܐ. ܐܘ ܒܗܦܟܐ.","english":"And the proximate causes, not the remote ones, ought to be employed in demonstrations. For when it is asked why the vine was pruned, it is not because the pruning of vineyards ought to be done as Chrysostom also did, but because it is the pruning of the vine. Or again, proximately, as when we say why, because it does not intoxicate, and also it is not apodeictic that the judgment of the wicked is sufficient for examination. Chapter Five: On Sophistic Syllogism, that is, Deceit and Error with Syllogism, or with Falsehood, or with the Matter of which it is composed. And the first is like that which occurs with things that are not contradictory, with one schema. And the second, when the matter is false in its nature, and like a true one from what is plausible, when there is some likeness to the truth in the matter itself, and that likeness is either verbal or conceptual. And the first, either when it is simple in word or when it is composite. And that again is the first, either in matter, that is, in terms together and in falsehood, or in their composition, like homonyms, or in matter alone, like the word of stone and stone, or in falsehood alone, like the word that is changed of the concept that is perceived by the mind, when in its nature the perception is known. And that which is composite, either by a schema of something that adheres to the composition, a cause of likeness, and a deceptive adherence, like that which is said of Jezebel, daughter of Jerusalem the madwoman, and like that again of everything that the philosopher knows, as that which he knows is what it is, and he knows that a stone is a stone. Or when the schema of the composition is changed deceptively. And this is twofold: either when it is plausibly true that it is also specifically true, or the opposite.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܣܘܦܣܛܝܩܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'sophistic syllogism' translates the Greek σοφιστικὸς συλλογισμός, a standard Aristotelian category for fallacious reasoning.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ܟܪܘܣܘܣ","severity":"info","text":"The reference to Chrysostom (John Chrysostom) pruning vines is a rare concrete example in Bar Hebraeus, likely drawn from Chrysostom's homilies or biographical tradition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܝܙܒܠ ܒܪܬ ܐܘܪܫܠܡ ܫܛܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"'Jezebel, daughter of Jerusalem the madwoman' is a constructed example of a deceptive syllogism, playing on the homonymy of 'Jerusalem' as a place and a person's name.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"ܩܦܠܐܘܢ ܕܚܡܫܐ","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'Chapter Five' marks a clear structural division, introducing the topic of sophistic syllogism as a distinct section within Book 1.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܘܗܢܝܢ ܩܪ̈ܝܒܬܐ ܠܘ ܒܪ̈ܚܝܩܬܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The opening sentence is textually uncertain: the first word ܘܗܢܝܢ may be a scribal error or variant for ܘܗܢܝ (and these) or ܘܗܢܝܢ (and the proximate). The translation follows the latter reading.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ ܣܘܦܣܛܝܩܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus's classification of fallacies (verbal vs. conceptual, simple vs. composite) closely mirrors Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi, ch. 4, and the Syriac tradition of the Organon.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The first word ܘܗܢܝܢ may be a scribal error; the reading 'proximate causes' is adopted. The example of 'Jezebel, daughter of Jerusalem' is ambiguous as to whether it is a genuine historical reference or a purely logical construct."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":77,"ref":"p77","source":"ܘܗܿܘ ܡܢ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܐܡܪ ܥܠ ܐ̱ܢܫ ܛܒܐ ܒܐܘܡܢܘܬܗ. ܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܛܒܐ ܒܐܡܢܗ. ܕܐܘܡܢܐ ܛܒܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܠܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܕܢܦܪܫ ܘܢܐܡܪ ܕܛܒܐ ܗܘ. ܗܿܘ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܢܐܡܪ ܥܠ ܐ̱ܢܫ ܠܐ ܛܒܐ ܒܐܘܡܢܘܬܗ. ܛܒܐ ܕܝܢ ܒܐܡܢܗ. ܕܐܘܡܢܐ ܗܘ ܘܛܒܐ ܗܘ. ܘܠܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܕܢܪܟܒ ܘܢܐܡܪ ܕܐܘܡܢܐ ܛܒܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܗܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܥܠ ܕܡܝܘܬܐ ܕܒܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ ܕܒܣܘܟܠܐ ܗܘܝܐ. ܐܘ ܟܕ ܗܝ ܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܠܐ ܟܐܢܐܝܬ ܡܬܗܦܟܐ. ܐܝܟ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܗܦܟܝܢ ܠܐܦܘܦܣܝܣ ܗܿܝ ܡܢܬܝܬܐ. ܐܘ ܟܕ ܠܗܿܘ ܡܐ ܕܒܓܕܫܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܘ ܡܐ ܕܒܟܝܢܐ ܢܣܒܝܢ ܘܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܝܬܝܒ ܒܐܠܦܐ ܕܪܕܝܐ ܡܬܬܙܝܥ. ܘܟܠ ܕܡܬܬܙܝܥ ܠܘ ܒܚܕܐ ܕܘܟܐ ܡܟܬܪ̈ܢ ܡܢ̈ܘܬܗ. ܘܗܟܢܐ ܪܝܩܢܘܬܐ ܡܟܢܫܝܢ. ܐܘ ܟܕ ܠܡܬܢܩܦܢܐ ܬܚܠܘܦ ܢܩܘܦܐ ܢܣܒܝܢ ܘܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܢ ܟܕ ܡܬܗܓܓܐ. ܗܘ ܡܠܝܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܕܝܢ ܟܠ ܡܬܗܓܓܐ ܡܠܝܠܐ. ܐܘ ܟܕ ܗܿܘ ܡܐ ܕܒܚܝܠܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܘ ܕܒܡܥܒܕܢܘܬܐ ܡܬܢܣܒ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܣܬܘܕܐ ܕܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ ܫܘܐ ܠܡܬܡܠܟܘ ܒܗ. ܘܛܠܝܐ ܦܠܣܘܦܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܕܝܢ ܫܘܐ ܠܡܬܡܠܟܘ ܒܗ. ܗܘ̈ܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܘܡܛܥܝܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܘܡܢ ܠܐ ܢܛܘܪ̈ܘܬܐ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܩܢܘ̈ܢܐ ܕܐܬܥܗܕܘ ܒܗܘܝܐ ܕܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܡܣܬܒܪܝܢ ܕܐܟܚܕܐ ܡܫܪܝܢ ܐܘ ܡܕܓܠܝܢ ܐܢܛܝܦܛܝܩ̈ܝܐ. ܗܘ̈ܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܘܒܝܕ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܪܒܥܐ ܒܠܝ̈ܠܐ ܕܟܡܢܝܢ ܒܬܚܘ̈ܡܐ. ܘܒܗܠܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܕܟܡܢܝܢ ܒܣܘܠܘܓܝܣܡܘܣ. ܗܘܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܡܛܥܝܢܘܬܐ ܘܟܕ ܒܠܐ ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪ̈ܝܣܡܘܢثܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܒܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪܣܡܘܣ ܡܬܚܫܚܝܢ ܘܐܡܪܝܢ. ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܓܢܣܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܗܘܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܡܛܥܝܢܘܬܐ ܘܟܕ ܠܥܠܬܢܐ ܬܚܠܘܦ ܥܠܬܐ ܢܣܒܝܢ ܘܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܢܦܫܐ ܠܐ ܡܝܘܬܬܐ ܗܝ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܝܢܬ ܙܘ̈ܥܐ ܗܝ.","english":"that which is like that which is said concerning a good man by his art, not by his nature, that the art is good, and it is not true that he who distinguishes and says that he is good. But that which is like that which is said concerning a man who is not good by his art, but good by his nature, that he is an artisan and good, and it is not true that he who compounds and says that he is a good artisan. And these are like the fallacies of the post-sound. But that which is in the syllogism occurs, or when the protasis is not converted simply, like the conversion of apophasis which is the middle term, or when that which is by accident, like that which is by nature, they take and say that he who sits in a ship that is being rowed is moved, and everything that is moved does not remain in one place by its motions, and thus they produce emptiness. Or when the consequent is substituted for the antecedent, they take and say that a man when he is rational is a speaking being, therefore every rational being is speaking. Or when that which is by force, like that which is by activity, is taken, like the meditation of a philosopher is worthy of being deliberated upon, and a youth is a philosopher, therefore it is worthy of being deliberated upon. There are also errors and fallacies, and not the definitions of each of the categories that were established in the being of antiphysis. In the judgment they are considered to begin together or to deceive the antipathetics. There are also, and by means of these four species, the boundaries in which they are limited, and in these also they are limited in syllogism. There are also fallacies, and when without prosdiorismoi, as in prosdiorismos they are used and say that a man is a body, in that he is an animal. There are also fallacies, and when the cause is substituted for the effect, they take and say that the soul is not mortal, in that it moves motions.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܘܡܢܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܐܘܡܢܐ (ūmānā) means 'artisan' or 'craftsman', distinct from ܐܘܡܢܘܬܐ (ūmānūtā, 'art' or 'craft'). Bar Hebraeus uses this distinction to illustrate a logical fallacy of attributing a quality to the wrong subject.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Greek loanword ἀντίφυσις (antiphysis) appears as ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ, meaning 'contrary to nature'. Bar Hebraeus uses it to describe a category of fallacy where definitions are established against natural order.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪ̈ܝܣܡܘܢثܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The term ܦܪܘܣܕܝܘܪ̈ܝܣܡܘܢثܬܐ (prosdiorismoi) is a Greek loanword meaning 'additional determinations' or 'qualifications'. Bar Hebraeus discusses fallacies that arise when such qualifications are omitted or misapplied.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"external","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage engages with Aristotelian logic, specifically fallacies of accident, composition, and division, as catalogued in the Sophistici Elenchi. Bar Hebraeus adapts these to Syriac philosophical discourse, using examples like the rowing ship and the rational man.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Aristotle Sophistici Elenchi"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage enumerates several types of fallacies: those based on post-sound (post hoc), improper conversion of protasis, accident, substitution of consequent for antecedent, and confusion of cause and effect. Each is introduced with ܐܝܟ (like) or ܟܕ (when), marking a structured list.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains several ambiguous or corrupt phrases, e.g., ܕܒܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ (post-sound) and ܐܢܛܝܦܛܝܩ̈ܝܐ (antipathetics), which may reflect scribal errors or technical terms not fully preserved. The English draft attempts to render these but the exact sense is uncertain.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase ܕܒܒܪܬ ܩܠܐ (post-sound) is unclear; it may refer to a fallacy of post hoc reasoning or a mishearing. The term ܐܢܛܝܦܛܝܩ̈ܝܐ (antipathetics) is obscure and may be a corruption of ἀντιπαθητικός (antipathetic) or a neologism. The reading taken follows the English draft's interpretation as fallacies of the post-sound and antipathetics."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":78,"ref":"p78","source":"ܗܘܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܡܛܥܝܢܘܬܐ ܘܒܠܐ ܝܕܥܬܐ ܕܗܦܘ̈ܟܝ ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܗܦܟܝܢ ܠܗܿܝ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܣܬܐ ܒܣܟܬܐ. ܠܗܿܝ ܕܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܣܟܬܐ ܒܐܣܬܐ. ܘܠܐ ܚܟܡܝܢ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܒܗܿܝ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ ܠܘ ܣܟܬܐ ܗܝ ܐܠܐ ܒܣܟܬܐ. ܗܘܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܡܛܥܝܢܘܬܐ ܘܒܝܕ ܫܘܚܠܦ ܣܝܡܐ ܕܠܐ ܟܦܘܪܘܬܐ ܒܦܪܘܛܣܝܣ ܟܕ ܡܛܥܝܢ ܕܠܐ ܒܡܕܡ ܦܪܝܫܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ. ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܠܐ ܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܐܟܡܐ ܕܗܕܐ ܡܫܪܐ ܥܠ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܫܪ ܐܦ ܗܿܝ. ܗܘܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܡܛܥܝܢܘܬܐ. ܘܟܕ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܥܠܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܘ ܕܥܠܬܐ ܗܘ ܢܣܒܝܢ ܘܐܡܪܝܢ. ܕܠܘ ܝܬܝܪ ܡܢ ܕܒܘܪܝܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܙܕܩ ܗܘܐ ܕܢܣܘܩ ܐܐܪ ܒܬܪ ܕܐܟܚܕܐ ܐܫܬܘܬܦܘ ܒܚܝܘܬܐ. ܗܘܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܡܛܥܝܢܘܬܐ ܘܟܕ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܟܠܝܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܘ ܕܡܨܐ ܢܣܒܝܢ ܘܐܡܪܝܢ. ܕܡܨܝܐ ܕܢܦܣܘܩ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܐܦܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܡܠܬܐ ܘܐܦܢ ܠܘ ܒܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܕܟܐܦܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܬܟܢܫ ܕܡܢ ܐܢܢܩܝ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܗܘܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܡܛܥܝܢܘܬܐ ܘܡܢ ܠܐ ܡܕܪܫܘܬܐ ܕܒܐܝܟܢܝܘܬ ܩܘܛܪܓܐ. ܐܡܪܝܢ ܓܝܪ ܕܚܘܪܘܬܐ ܕܓܕܫܐ ܗܝ ܡܥܠ ܥܐܠܐ ܒܡܢܝܘܬܗ ܕܚܘܪܐ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܗܘ. ܡܕܝܢ ܓܕܫܐ ܥܐܠ ܒܡܢܝܘܬܗܿ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ. ܘܠܐ ܦܪܝܫܝܢ ܕܚܘܪܐ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܚܘܪܐ ܗܘ ܥܐܠܐ ܚܘܪܘܬܐ. ܒܡܢܝܘܬܗ ܘܠܘ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ. ܗܘܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܡܛܥܝܢܘܬܐ ܘܡܢ ܙܢܐ ܕܕܡܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܗܿܝ ܕܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܗܿܘ ܡܐ ܕܕܡܐ ܠܡܕܡ ܙܕܩ ܕܐܦ ܠܗܿܘ ܡܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܡܕܡ ܕܡܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܕܡܐ. ܘܥܡܪܐ ܕܡܐ ܠܬܠܓܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܐܦ ܠܓܠܝܕܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܢܬܕܡܐ. ܗܘܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܡܛܥܝܢܘܬܐ. ܘܟܕ ܠܓܠܝܙܘܬܐ ܒܕܘܟܬ ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ ܢܣܒܝܢ ܘܐܡܪܝܢ. ܗܿܘ ܕܠܐ ܚܙܐ ܣܡܝܐ ܗܘ. ܘܐܣܬܐ ܠܐ ܚܙܝܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܣܡܝܬܐ ܗܝ.","english":"Again, there is error and ignorance of the changes of prosōpa, like that which changes that which is not one nature in species, that which is not one species in nature. And they do not know that that which is accused in the first is not the species but in the species. Again, there is error and by a change of the sign without denial in prosōpon, when they err that in no way is that which is from that which is not to be distinguished from that which is not from that which is to be. For as this is loosed upon that which is able to be loosed, so also that. Again, there is error. And when that which is not a cause, like that which is a cause, they suppose and say that it is not more than that in creation in the beginning it was fitting that air should ascend after they were mutually united in life. Again, there is error. And when that which stands, like that which is able, they suppose and say that it is able to cut that in the beginning a stone is in word and not in deed. And from that which is not a stone in the beginning, it is shown that from that which is not in the beginning it is not. Again, there is error and from the non-repetition of the manner of the category. For they say that whiteness of accident is the entry of white into the substance by its coming. Therefore accident enters by the coming of the substance. And they do not distinguish that white in that which is white is the entry of whiteness by its coming and not in that which is substance. Again, there is error and from the smallness of the likeness, like that which they say that that which is like something ought also to be like that which that thing is like. And a house is like snow. Therefore also a glacier ought to be like. Again, there is error. And when for gluttony in place of apathēsis they suppose and say that he who does not see is blind. And a physician does not see. Therefore she is blind.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac plural ܦܪ̈ܘܛܣܝܣ (prosōpa) is a technical term from Trinitarian and Christological discourse, meaning 'persons' or 'hypostases'. Bar Hebraeus here critiques errors arising from confusion about the changes of prosōpa in predication.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܣܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܐܣܬܐ (este) means 'nature' or 'essence', a key term in philosophical theology. The passage contrasts nature (este) with species (sakte), indicating a distinction between substantial and specific identity.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܐܢܛܝܦܣܝܣ (apathēsis) is a Greek loanword meaning 'impassibility' or 'dispassion'. Bar Hebraeus notes an error where gluttony (ܓܠܝܙܘܬܐ) is substituted for apathēsis, a confusion of moral categories.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage is a catalogue of logical errors (ܡܛܥܝܢܘܬܐ, 'error') introduced by the formula 'Again, there is error' (ܗܘܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܡܛܥܝܢܘܬܐ). Each instance presents a fallacy in reasoning about prosōpa, nature, cause, or likeness.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus (13th c.) was a Syriac Orthodox scholar whose works engage Aristotelian logic and patristic theology. The Treatise of Treatises is a philosophical summa; this section likely draws on Porphyry's Isagoge and Aristotle's Categories, mediated through Syriac translations.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The final example ('he who does not see is blind; a physician does not see; therefore she is blind') is grammatically ambiguous: the Syriac ܣܡܝܬܐ (semyata) is feminine, but the antecedent 'physician' (ܐܣܬܐ) is masculine. The error may involve a gender mismatch or a misapplication of the term 'blind'.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Syriac text has several uncertain readings (e.g., ܐܢܢܩܝ, ܕܡܢ, ܢܗܘܐ) that may be scribal corruptions or dialectal forms; the English draft interprets them as logical operators ('from that which is not', etc.), but the exact sense is contested.","The phrase 'change of the sign without denial in prosōpon' is obscure; it may refer to a fallacy in which a term's reference is altered without explicit negation, but the precise logical mechanism is unclear."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":79,"ref":"p79","source":"ܗܘܝܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܝܢ ܡܛܥܝܢܘܬܐ. ܒܙܢܐ ܗܿܘ ܕܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܟܠ ܕܡܢ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܐ ܫܘܝܬ ܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܡܪܟܒ. ܙܕܩ ܕܐܦ ܗܘ ܫܘܐ ܠܐܣܟܝܡ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ ܢܗܘܐ. ܘܚܘܕܪܐ ܡܢ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܩܫ̈ܬܬܐ ܫܘܝ̈ܬܐ ܡܪܟܒ. ܡܕܝܢ ܐܦ ܗܘ ܩܫܬܢܝܐ ܗܘ. ܘܙܢܐ ܗܢܐ ܕܛܘܥܝܝ ܒܐܣܟܝ̈ܡܐ ܗܘ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܗܿܘܐ. ܘܗܿܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܣܘܓܐܬ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܡܛܥܝ̈ܢܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܡܢ ܡܫܪܬܚܘܬܐ ܕܒܗܘܠܐ ܐܟܚܕ ܘܒܐܕܫܐ ܕܣܘܠܘܓܝ̈ܣܡܘ ܟܡܢܝܢ ܕܡܢܗܘܢ ܐܦ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܒܟܢܝܫܘܬ ܬܪܝܗܘܢ ܥܐܠܝܢ ܡܬܦܪܣܝܢ. ܕܠܗܘܢ ܒܐܟܝܦܘ ܟܕ ܢܛܘܪ ܐ̱ܢܫ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ ܐܝܬ ܠܗ ܕܢܫܓܐ. ܐܢ ܕܝܢ ܥܡ ܗܿܝ ܕܗܕܐ ܣܥܪ ܗܢܐ ܬܘܒ ܢܚܫ ܠܡܣܥܐ ܦܩܚܐ ܠܗ ܚܟܡܬܐ. ܒܕ ܗܝ ܡܢ ܟܕܘ ܣܢܬܗ. ܫܠܡܬ ܠܘܓܝܩܝ. ܬܘܒ ܒܝܕ ܐܠܗܐ ܡܫܪܝܢܢ ܒܗܿܢܝܢ ܕܦܪܓܡܛܝܐ ܕܬܪܬܝܢ. ܗܿܝ ܕܡܡܠܠܘܬ ܟܝܢ̈ܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ\nܩܕܡܝܬ ܥܘܬܕܐ\nܚܟܡܬܐ ܡܢ ܓܝܪ ܐܝܬܝܗܿ ܓܡܝܪܘܬܗܿ ܕܢܦܫܐ ܐ̱ܢܫܝܬܐ. ܒܝܕ ܡܕܪܟܢܘܬܐ ܕܟܠܗܝܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܝܬܝܗ̈ܝܢ. ܠܦܘܬ ܥܗܢܘܬܐ ܕܡܢ ܟܝܢܐ ܠܗܿ ܦܠܝܓܐ. ܘܗܢܝܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܘ ܝܕܥܬܗܝܢ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܡܟܢܐ ܠܢ ܒܠܥܕ ܣܥܘܪܘܬܗܝܢ ܐܘ ܥܡ ܝܕܥܬܗܝܢ ܐܦ ܣܥܘܪܘܬܗܝܢ. ܘܝܕܥܬܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ: ܦܝܠܠܣܘܦܝܐ ܬܐܘܪܝܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܗܿܝ ܕܝܢ ܕܬܪܬܝܢ ܦܝܠܠܣܘܦܝܐ ܦܪܩܛܝܩܝܬܐ. ܘܗܿܝ ܡܢ ܬܪܝܢܝܬܐ ܬܠܝܬܐܝܬ ܡܬܦܠܓܐ. ܠܚܟܡܬܐ ܡܢ ܥܝܕܢܝܬܐ. ܘܠܗܿܝ ܡܫܟܢܝܬܐ. ܘܠܗܿܝ ܡܕܝܢܝܬܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ ܥܪܝܨܘ ܐܣܬܢܩ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܠܘܬ ܝܕܥܬܐ ܕܡܝܬܪ̈ܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܢܩܢܐ ܐܢܝܢ. ܘܕܫܪܝܪ̈ܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܢܙܕܗܪ ܡܢܗܝܢ. ܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܒܝܕ ܚܟܡܬܐ ܥܝܕܢܝܬܐ ܕܡܬܩܪܝܐ ܐܝܬܝܩܘܢ ܡܥܕܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܐܣܬܢܩ ܠܘܬ ܝܕܥܬܐ ܕܦܐܝܘܬ ܡܛܟܣܘܬܐ ܕܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܒܡܫܟܢܗ ܘܐܝܟܢܝܘܬ ܡܠܚܡܘܬܗܘܢ ܕܙܘܓܐ ܠܡ ܘܒܪܬ ܙܘܓܐ ܘܝ̈ܠܕܐ ܘܡܘ̈ܠܕܢܐ ܘܡܪ̈ܝܐ ܘܡܢܝܚ̈ܢܐ.","english":"Again, there is also error in this, that which says that every composition of equal natures makes a single schema, and that it is right that that also be equal to the schema of its natures. And a circle is composed of two equal arcs; therefore, that also is arc-like. And this error is only in schemata. And these are among many erroneous errors, like that from the extension of matter together and from the impression of the syllogism, how many also of those that enter into the division of both are distributed. So that they are not in conjunction, while a man is preserved and there is no one who errs. But if, with that which this does, it again seeks to accomplish, wisdom provides a remedy for it, since it is from its own time. The Logic is completed. Again, by God, we begin in the Pragmateia of the Second, that which is called natural speech.\n\nFirst Preparation\n\nWisdom, for it is the perfection of the human soul, through the comprehension of all those things that are as they are, according to the division that is from nature for it. And these things, either knowledge of them alone suffices without their actuality, or with their knowledge also their actuality. And the first knowledge is called theoretical philosophy; the second, practical philosophy. And that from the second is divided into a third. Wisdom is divided into ethical, natural, and logical. In that which is established by the head towards knowledge of virtues, as things to be pursued, and of vices, as things to be avoided. And this is by ethical wisdom, which is called Ethics, so that it may be. In the same manner, it is established towards knowledge of the beauty of the order of those things that are in nature and the manner of the union of pairs, male and female, and children and offspring, and masters and servants.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܣܟܝܡܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܐܣܟܝܡܐ (from Greek σχῆμα) denotes a figure, shape, or logical schema. Bar Hebraeus uses it here to refer to the formal structure of a syllogism or a geometric figure, as in the example of a circle composed of two equal arcs.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܦܪܓܡܛܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac ܦܪܓܡܛܝܐ (from Greek πραγματεία) means a treatise or systematic discussion. Here it introduces the second part of the work, called the 'Pragmateia of the Second,' which is identified as natural speech (ܡܡܠܠܘܬ ܟܝܢ̈ܝܬܐ).","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage marks a major structural transition: the completion of the Logic section (ܫܠܡܬ ܠܘܓܝܩܝ) and the beginning of the 'Pragmateia of the Second,' which treats natural philosophy. The heading 'First Preparation' (ܩܕܡܝܬ ܥܘܬܕܐ) introduces a new subsection.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Bar Hebraeus divides philosophy into three branches: ethical (ܥܝܕܢܝܬܐ), natural (ܡܫܟܢܝܬܐ), and logical (ܡܕܝܢܝܬܐ), following the standard Hellenistic classification. He further distinguishes theoretical from practical philosophy, a division rooted in Aristotle and the later Neoplatonic tradition.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The description of wisdom as 'the perfection of the human soul through the comprehension of all those things that are as they are' echoes the definition of philosophy found in the late antique Alexandrian curriculum, e.g., in the works of Ammonius or David the Invincible.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text at the end of the first paragraph is textually difficult: the phrase 'while a man is preserved and there is no one who errs' may be corrupt or elliptical. The intended sense appears to be that in certain logical errors, the subject (man) remains unchanged, yet the reasoning goes astray.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'ܕܠܗܘܢ ܒܐܟܝܦܘ ܟܕ ܢܛܘܪ ܐ̱ܢܫ ܘܠܐ ܣܟ ܐܝܬ ܠܗ ܕܢܫܓܐ' is ambiguous: it may mean 'so that they are not in conjunction, while a man is preserved and there is no one who errs' or 'so that they are not in conjunction, while a man is preserved and there is no one who can err.' The reading taken follows the English draft.","The transition from the Logic to the Pragmateia of the Second is abrupt; the phrase 'Again, by God, we begin' may be a formulaic invocation rather than a theological statement."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":80,"ref":"p80","source":"ܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܒܝܕ ܚܟܡܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܡܫܟܢܝܬܐ ܕܐܩܢܘܡܝܩܘܢ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܗܿܘܝܐ. ܗܘ ܗܟܘܬ ܐܣܬܢܩ ܘܠܘܬ ܝܕܥܬܐ ܕܐܝܟܢܝܘܬ ܡܫܘܬܦܘܬܐ ܕܥܡ ܓܘܐ ܕܒܢܝ̈ܢܫܐ. ܘܕܘܒܪܐ ܦܐܝܐ ܕܢܛܝܪܘܬܗ ܕܐܕܫܐ. ܘܗܝ ܬܘܒ ܗܕܐ ܒܝܕ ܚܟܡܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܡܕܝܢܝܬܐ ܕܦܘܠܝܛܝܩܘܢ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܗܘܝܐ. ܒܗܿ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܦܝܠܣܘܦܝܐ ܗܿܝ ܬܐܘܪܝܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬ ܠܗܿ ܬܠܬ. ܘܡܢܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܕܥܠ ܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܐܟܝܦܐ. ܗܿܢܘܢ ܡܒܪ̈ܝܝ ܡܢ ܗܘܠܐ ܣܟ. ܐܝܟ ܫܪܪܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܘܗܘ̈ܢܐ ܘܗܿܢܘܢ ܕܫܪܟܐ ܕܠܗܘܢ ܕܡܝܢ. ܘܦܘ̈ܠܓܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܦܫܝܛܐܝܬ. ܕܐܦܢ ܡܕܡ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܚܒܝܟ ܠܗܘܠܐ ܡܕܪܟ. ܠܘ ܒܗܿܝ ܕܣܢܝܩ ܗܘ ܠܗܿ ܩܘܝܡܗ ܚܒܝܟ. ܦܝܠܣܘܦܝܐ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ ܘܓܘܢܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬ ܠܗ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܬܐܡܪ ܕܓܘܢܝ ܡܢ ܟܠ ܗܿܘ ܕܬܚܝܬ ܥܘܩܒܐ ܢܦܠ. ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܿܘ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܦܫܝܛܐܝܬ. ܒܕܓܘܢ ܥܠ ܢܩܦܝ̈ܘܗܝ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܝܐ ܡܒܚܢܐ. ܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܬܪܝܢܬ ܦܘ̈ܠܓܐ ܗܝ. ܡܢܗܿ ܡܢ ܝܕܥܬܐ ܗܿܝ ܟܠܢܝܬܐ ܕܒܗܿ ܐܝܬ ܦܘ̈ܠܓܐ ܕܗܿܘ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܢܗܿ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܕܝܠܢܐܝܬ ܬܐܘܠܘܓܝܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܘܡܢܬܐ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܥܠ ܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܚܒܝ̈ܟܝ ܥܡ ܗܘܠܐ ܐܟܝܦܐ ܗܿܢܘܢ ܐܝܠܢ ܕܗܘܢܐ ܡܨܐ ܗܘ ܠܡܒܪܝܘܬܗܘܢ ܡܢܗܿ ܡܬܡܛܝܩܝܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܝܘܠܦܢ̈ܐ ܐܪܒܥܐ. ܘܡܢܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܗܝ ܕܡܚܒܟ ܚܒܝܟܝܢ ܒܗܿ ܣܘܥܪ̈ܢܐ ܥܡ ܗܘܠܐ. ܘܠܐ ܡܬܘܡ ܡܫܟܚܐ ܠܡܒܪܝܘܬܗܘܢ ܦܘܣܝܘܠܝܓܝܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܐ. ܘܗܿܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬ ܠܗܿ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܕܥܠܡܐ. ܒܗܿܝ ܕܡܬܬܙܝܥ ܘܫܠܐ ܘܡܫܬܚܠܦ ܕܥܠܝܗܿ ܡܠܬܐ ܒܪܫܝܬܐ ܡܢܣܝܐ ܠܡܣܬܘܕܘ. ܙܘܗܪܐ ܐ̱ܪܙܢܝܐ ܒܕܓܘܢ ܐܘ ܕܐ̱ܪ̈ܙܐ ܗܠܝܢ ܡܬܗܝܡܢ. ܢܛܪ ܐܢܘܢ ܡܢ ܟܠ ܡܫܡܥ ܕܡܨܝܐ. ܘܡܢ ܟܠ ܬܪܥܝ ܕܠܐ ܐܬܬܙܝܥܬ ܦܘܪ̈ܫܢܐ ܕܡܬܦܠܣ̈ܦܢܐ ܗܿܠܝܢ ܚ̈ܠܦܐ. ܒܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܒܗܘܢ.","english":"And this is by that wisdom which is called economic, which is known. Thus he reasoned, and with the knowledge of the likeness of the participation with the interior of the elements. And the proper conduct of the nature of the human being. And again, this is by that wisdom which is called political, which is known. In that same form, and that philosophy which is called theoretical, there are three parts. And that part which is about practical actions, which are continuous. Those are the first principles from that which is without end. Like the first truth and the beings, and those of the remainder which are similar. And the divisions of that which is simple. So that also something from them is mixed with that which is without end, it understands. Not in that which is necessary for it, its mixed existence. The first and interior philosophy is known. In that which is set, it has like it was said that interior from all that which falls under the heel. That which is that which is simple. Because it distinguishes over its natural substances, it chooses. And this is the second division. From it, from that knowledge which is universal, in which there are divisions of that which is. From it, from that which is properly called theology. And a part from that which is about practical actions, mixed with that which is without end, those which are such that it is able to create them from that which is called apolaustic, like the four teachings. And again, a part is that which mixes the mixed in that practical actions with that which is without end. And never is it found to create them, which is called physiology. And that which is set has the body of the world. In that it is moved and is at rest and changes, concerning which the word in the beginning is added to be understood. A secret warning, because it distinguishes or these secrets are trusted. Guard them from every meaning that is possible. And from every thought that has not been moved, the divisions of these philosophers are changed. But seek in them.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܚܟܡܬܐ ܐܩܢܘܡܝܩܘܢ","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'economic wisdom' (ḥekmtā ʾeqonomīqōn) refers to the Aristotelian division of practical philosophy concerned with household management, a standard category in Syriac philosophical curricula.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܦܘܠܝܛܝܩܘܢ","severity":"info","text":"'Political' (pōlīṭīqōn) is the second branch of practical philosophy, governing civic life. Bar Hebraeus here follows the tripartite division of philosophy (theoretical, practical, and productive) common in Syriac Aristotelianism.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܬܐܘܪܝܛܝܩܝܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"'Theoretical' (teʼōrīṭīqītā) designates the speculative part of philosophy, which Bar Hebraeus subdivides into three parts: theology, mathematics (or physiology), and physics, as indicated in the following lines.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܦܘܣܝܘܠܝܓܝܐ","severity":"info","text":"'Physiology' (fūsīyōlīgīyā) here denotes the study of nature (physics), not in the modern sense. It is one of the theoretical sciences, concerned with the body of the world and its motions.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ܐܦܘܠܐܘܣܛܝܩܘܢ","severity":"info","text":"'Apolaustic' (ʾapōlāʾusṭīqōn) is a transliteration of Greek ἀπολαυστικός, referring to the 'pleasurable' or 'hedonic' life. In this context, it likely denotes a subdivision of practical philosophy concerned with enjoyment, paralleling the four teachings mentioned.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ܙܘܗܪܐ ܐ̱ܪܙܢܝܐ","severity":"caution","text":"The phrase 'secret warning' (zūhārā ʾarzāyā) is ambiguous: it may refer to esoteric knowledge or to a caution against revealing philosophical doctrines to the uninitiated. The text warns to guard these from every possible meaning and from thoughts that have not been moved, suggesting a protective or disciplinary function.","cites":[{"key":"ed:dsc-538","label":"source edition: Treatise of Treatises, Book 1","url":"https://syriaccorpus.org/538"}],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'ܙܘܗܪܐ ܐ̱ܪܙܢܝܐ' (secret warning) is ambiguous: it may indicate esoteric content or a cautionary note about guarding philosophical teachings.","The reference to 'four teachings' (ܝܘܠܦܢ̈ܐ ܐܪܒܥܐ) is unclear; it may allude to a specific classification or a lost source.","The clause 'from every thought that has not been moved' (ܡܢ ܟܠ ܬܪܥܝ ܕܠܐ ܐܬܬܙܝܥܬ) is syntactically difficult; the intended sense may be that the divisions of philosophers remain unchanged unless one engages in proper inquiry."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":81,"ref":"p81","source":"ܟܠ ܗܿܘ ܕܐܬܬܟܠ ܥܠ ܕܟܝܘܬ ܬܐܪܬܐ ܕܒܗܿ ܐܬܬܟܝܢ. ܘܟܕ ܡܢܘܬ ܐܢܬ ܠܗܘܢ ܡܦܠܓܐܝܬ ܘܒܕܘܪ̈ܓܐ ܒܗܘܢ ܠܗܘܢ ܣܘܣܐ ܐܢ ܒܝܐܝܒܘܬܐ ܕܦܐܝܐ ܠܘܬ ܩܢܝܘܬܗܘܢ ܢܬܠܗܩܘܢ. ܟܕ ܡܣܗܕ ܐܢ̱ܬ ܒܗܘܢ ܟܠܗ ܡܘܠܝܐ ܕܣܒܪܗܘܢ. ܕܐܦ ܗܢܘܢ ܒܗܝܢ ܒܥܩ̈ܒܬܐ ܢܪܕܘܢ. ܐܢܕܝܢ ܬܒܣܪ ܥܠܝܗܿ ܕܣܝܡܬ ܩܘܕܫ̈ܐ ܗܕܐ. ܠܗ ܠܗܿܘ ܕܡܬܝܐܒ̈ܢ ܪ̈ܘܚܬ ܡܠܝ̈ܠܐ ܠܡܬܒܥܟ ܕܝܢܗ ܐܓܥܠܬܟ. ܕܣܦܩ ܗܘ ܠܡܕܢ÷","english":"All that was entrusted to the purity of the air by which it was established. And when the substance came to them divisively and by degrees, they became a moth or a weevil through the enmity of the dust toward their stability, they were consumed. While the whole fullness of their opinion testified in them, that they also in life followed after the tracks. Then the flesh revealed concerning this treasure of sanctities. To him who seeks the rational spirits for the investigation of your knowledge, the circle suffices.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The passage describes a process where a substance entrusted to the purity of air becomes a moth or weevil, consumed by the enmity of dust, while the fullness of their opinion testifies that they followed tracks in life.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ܣܘܣܐ ܐܢ ܒܝܐܝܒܘܬܐ","severity":"info","text":"The Syriac term ܣܘܣܐ (sūsā) means 'moth' and ܒܝܐܝܒܘܬܐ (bīʾāyūṯā) means 'weevil' or 'grub', indicating insects associated with decay.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The reference to 'treasure of sanctities' (ܣܝܡܬ ܩܘܕܫ̈ܐ) may allude to a hidden spiritual or doctrinal deposit, common in Syriac ascetic and mystical literature.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage concludes the narrative section of Book 1, transitioning from a discussion of economic and political wisdom to a metaphorical account of corruption and spiritual investigation.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Syriac text contains uncertain readings, particularly in the phrase ܟܕ ܡܣܗܕ ܐܢ̱ܬ (kad msahhad īṯ), where the verb form is ambiguous, possibly meaning 'while testifying' or 'while bearing witness'.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The identity of 'the substance' (ܡܢܘܬ) is unclear; it may refer to a philosophical or physical principle.","The phrase 'the circle suffices' (ܕܣܦܩ ܗܘ ܠܡܕܢ) is cryptic; 'circle' may denote a logical or cosmological concept."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]}]}