Contra Acephalos Disputatio

But what it is that I wish to say, I shall try to state more clearly: it is not the divine nature that is said to be united to the flesh, but the divine nature through the person of God the Word. For if the whole Trinity had willed to become incarnate, then perhaps the nature itself would justly have been incarnate through itself; for all things that belong to that nature according to itself and on account of itself are common to the Trinity, and are not proper to one person alone. But the incarnation is not common to the Trinity, but is proper to the subsistence of the Word alone. Therefore both God the Word and his nature have become incarnate: but he indeed through himself, and according to what he himself is; that nature, however, not so, but through the person. Therefore God the Word, according to himself indeed, is uniquely joined to the flesh—for one person and one subsistence has been made with the flesh—but according to nature he is conjoined rather than united, for two natures have remained; and by comparison, the Word rather than his nature is united to the flesh, and for this reason it is that which is the union rather than the other. That, therefore, is rather a conjunction, although it is also a union; but this is rather a union than a conjunction. And so, whatever is altogether called a conjunction, there almost always the number of the conjoined things is preserved, as also their quantity.

He clings to it. This statement seems to me full of unavenged incongruity; for it makes no difference to say how the two natures came together and how the divinity was joined to the humanity. For if it is one, it differs in no way from itself; thus, therefore, the Word was coupled to the flesh just as the flesh was to the Word. Then what again is the difference between the Word and His nature, such that He Himself is said to be united through Himself, but that nature is said to have been united not through itself, but rather to have been joined?

Rusticus: I ask that you hear me more attentively than that; for the argument is too subtle to be grasped otherwise. For God is said by us to dwell in the flesh, indivisibly and ceaselessly, but the flesh is not said to dwell in God; and the flesh is called the temple of God, but God is by no means the temple of the flesh; and God made this kind of union, and not the flesh; but the flesh suffered, and did not act. Now passion is predicated not only of bodily and distressing and evil things, but also of spiritual and pleasant and good things, so that even beatitude itself is called a passion of the creature. And the union is indeed one and the same, but the definition or account of the union is not one. If, therefore, the difference between the Divinity united to the flesh and the flesh united to the Divinity must be set forth by way of an image, we say as follows.

It happens that the accounts of one and the same way are contrary; for the same thing is ascent and descent: from this beginning there is ascent to that, and from that there is descent to this, yet the subject is the same; for the place of the journey is the same, even if someone traverse it many times and a thousand times. So then, to speak by way of example and for the sake of clarity, the union itself differs from the Deity to the humanity, but the account of the union differs from that which is in a different way; although here and there it is inconsistent, because the two natures did not both bring about the union of the two natures, but the divinity alone. For what could our nature that is in Christ contribute and cooperate toward the union, since it received its beginning from the union itself? Perhaps indeed also for this reason the substances are joined not according to substances but according to substance, because the union itself was a miracle not of two but of one only. For not as in the prophets or in certain others, when divine grace stretched out its hand while we nevertheless strove and in some way cooperated, are we united to God in such a way here, but ineffably and divinely.

Objection. Again I am compelled, though in doubt, to raise the question: what is the difference, or what is the middle term, between the Word and His nature or substance—so that He Himself is united to the flesh through Himself, but His nature is not through itself, but according to person.

Rusticus. The reason you give why the Father and the Holy Spirit were not made human, when the one nature of God the Word was incarnated—a nature common to the Trinity—that same reason we give why God the Word was made human through Himself, but His nature according to person. Nay rather, what we say seems much easier than what you say. For if the humanity and the divinity were so united that there was one nature, and the Father was certainly not made human, nor the Holy Spirit, who are of the same nature and not of another, how is it impossible that the Word was so made human that His nature was not made human through itself?

It follows. But all things that a person has, it has immediately and by nature; yet things that belong to a nature are not necessarily also of a person.

Rusticus. This argument, even before demonstration, seems to all to be utterly incongruous; nevertheless, on account of the foolish, I answer of necessity. As you say, there is, as it were, no difference and no middle term between the person of the Word and His nature: this very nothing prevents us from saying the converse. Therefore there is no difference and no middle term from the nature of the Word to His person. But since Father, and also the Holy Spirit, stand indifferently according to the same nature, then, with the Word and His nature made man, according to you both the Father and the Holy Spirit have been made man. It is necessary, therefore, in regard to your blasphemies, that the whole holy Trinity be both begotten and have suffered. Moreover, according to you, either the flesh has been of three persons because of the Trinity, or the Trinity is one person because of the flesh, or the flesh must have a nature indeed but not have a person.

Therefore, according to you, it is not from two natures that there is one Christ, one Son, one Lord—for these terms are significative of one and only one composite person among you—but, as you say, only one nature has been made. Therefore, from your argument, the necessity follows: either there is one Christ, one Son, one Lord, and not one nature of his from two; or there is one nature, and there is not one Christ, one Son, one Lord. Why, then, do you attribute your own crime to others, as though those who speak of two natures deny one Lord, one Christ, one Son—which we confess unceasingly both in words and in deeds, while you alone unceasingly deny it, saying there is one nature? But this too must be noted, that you who previously had denied that there is a difference between the Word and his nature now have said that all things that a person has, it has immediately and by nature; yet things that belong to a nature are not necessarily also of a person.

I confess that there is something different. But this indeed prevents certain things from being common to the nature and also to the persons; yet it does not prevent the things that belong to the persons from also belonging to the nature. And therefore the incarnate person has become one nature; but no nature having been made [incarnate], the Trinity has not been incarnated. For the things that belong to the person are immediately also of the nature; but the things that belong to the nature are not immediately also of the persons.

Rusticus: If, therefore, the things that belong to the person are, as you say, immediately also of the nature: since the two persons, that is, of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, are other than the humanity of the Son; therefore according to you there is also another nature of the Father and of the Spirit besides the nature of the humanity that is in Christ. Therefore the nature of the Father and the nature of the flesh are two. Since, therefore, the nature of the Father and of the Holy Spirit is one and only and simple; but it is also the Son's own, according to that which he is God: therefore the Son's natures are two.

It adheres. But in the Son alone, it has been made one with the humanity; in the remaining persons, however, it is one thing and another, and there are two natures.

Rusticus. Therefore, in respect of something of its own, it has been made one; but in respect of something else, not at all. This "something," indeed, if it is a property of the person of the Son, you manifestly confess with us that not one nature but one Son has been made, and you confess one person of him. But if this is not the same as the person, then, according to you, the divine substance will not be simple but composite: something of it has been made one nature with the flesh, but something else not one nature with the flesh. Therefore, not enduring to distinguish deity and humanity from one another, you will distinguish simple Deity itself, and this according to itself. But since it is impious to impart all things of the Son of God to his divine nature, if you doubt it, it will be shown: for neither is it permitted to call the passions of his flesh [properties] of the divine nature of the Son, nor those things which are proper to the Word or, as I think, to the other subsistences. The reason for this is that the things which express the persons are distinct from one another, whereas the simple, insofar as it is simple, has nothing differing. For the Father begot, but was not also begotten; the Son was begotten, but did not beget; the Holy Spirit proceeds, and not conversely.

But the divine nature, that is, the nature of the holy Trinity, which is common to the three subsistences, neither begot nor was begotten nor proceeds; for if one of these were true, then the others would be too; that is, if it begot, then it was also begotten and it proceeded. And so it is likewise impious to impart all things of the divine nature of the Son of God to his nature. For since it is proper to the Son of God neither to beget nor to proceed, these things are no longer referred to the nature of him who begets and proceeds. Rather, if it is something for the Father to beget, which is not to be begotten nor to proceed, and for the Son this... (A line was missing in the copy.)

It adheres. If the divine nature did not beget, how do the most holy Fathers at Nicaea say that the Son was begotten from the substance of the Father, declaring him begotten from the Father, only-begotten, that is, from the substance of the Father?

Rusticus. The symbol does not have this; hence those holy Fathers at Constantinople did not say this either. But even if someone grants that this was stated thus, it was said for this reason: that he is begotten from the Father, only-begotten, existing of the same substance as the Father, not as though he were begotten from the substance itself; for the Son, God the Word, is of the subsistence of the Father, not of the substance: for the Father of the Word is not the nature common to the three subsistences, but the subsistence of the Father alone.

Heretic. Therefore, according to you, the holy, great, and universal synod that was held at Ephesus corrupted what is true; for it set down a creed, saying at that place as follows: And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, only-begotten of the Father, that is, of the substance of the Father, God from God, light from light; and the rest.

Rusticus. When the discussion concerns the Fathers, one ought not to proceed so boldly in word; otherwise I too might perhaps have said, according to you, that the holy and universal synod of Constantinople corrupted the creed of the Fathers. But we ought, sparing the holy Fathers, to leave this matter aside and say only this: that even if the formulation differs in words, it does not differ in meaning. Therefore, when we say "begotten of the substance of the Father," it is understood as we said above, that he is of the same substance; or it must be distinguished thus: that he is "of the substance of the Father," "God from God," and "light from light." And this too I say: that in the one and same Ephesine synod, where Charisius confessed his own faith, which also pleased that synod, it did not set down this passage of the creed in that way, but rather thus: And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, God from God, etc. But I think this is the cause of the discrepancy: that it was held in memory by many, and while some forgot certain things, they changed the wording, one thing for another.

Heretic. I should like to hear something more definite on this point; for these matters are doubtful.

Rusticus. It is enough for you, for the building up of my exposition and for the overthrow of the sense—or rather the suspicion or madness—of your reasoning: for if all things that belong to each person, and especially to the Son, must be assigned to the common substance of the Trinity, then the passion of the Son will also be a passion of the divine nature. But if you say that only those things which belong to the divinity are so assigned, then it is no longer one, as there is one person of God and man. For if, while all things are assigned to the person of God the Word, as you boast, to the divine nature, the divine nature itself does not become one person with the Word, how is His humanity—whose own things are not assigned to the divine nature—one with that same nature? But if we concede this too, that all things which belong to the person must be assigned to the common substance of the persons, not on the ground that these things are of that primary and self-existent substance: otherwise, according to itself, it both begot and did not beget; and was begotten and was not begotten; and proceeds and does not proceed; and was made man and was not made man. For the Father begot and was not begotten; the Son was begotten and did not beget; the Holy Spirit is none of these, but only proceeds, and not the reverse. For there is no reason why, if the things that belong to each person, and are also of their nature, are not also absent from the nature itself—the things that are absent from each person.

And by this, both affirmations and negations will be said to be true of the same thing, concerning one and the same simple substance, which is exceedingly incongruous; so that from these it is shown rather that the things which are proper to each person are his own, according to himself and through himself, because they are not opposed when said of the same one; but the things that are of the common nature are not so. Since, therefore, the becoming man is also a property of the person—I mean of the Son—it is not therefore through itself, and the first nature became man; and all the demonstrations that were stated above stand for us. I say also this, that when I have said "God" simply, I mean the whole Trinity; but when "God" has an addition, "the Father," I mean no longer the Trinity, but one person. So therefore, when I say "substance," I signify that which is common to the Trinity; but when with an addition, "the substance of the Father," I mean the person of that substance alone.

...would be blown about. But what of the fact that the holy synod says that God was formed together with the flesh, and that the Jews are Deicides, as though not a man but God had been killed? How is God said to have been formed together and to have been killed, unless because there is one nature? If there were two natures while the number remained intact, both the differences and the properties would in every way remain intact. But while these remain, one ought to say that a man was killed and God was not co-extinguished, and that God was formed, but that he formed and raised up the temple, that is, the man.

Rusticus: You do not rather notice what has been said; for that which we say with "with" always signifies either two or more in number. If, therefore, God was formed together with the flesh, then there are two things, God and humanity. And the most holy Cyril is my witness to this, in the second letter to Nestorius, saying thus: "We shall confess one Christ and Lord: not as adoring a man together with the Word, lest a fantasy of division be introduced on account of this that is said, 'with,' but as adoring one and the same: since his body is not alien to the Word, with whom he himself also sits at the Father's right hand.

In the third [chapter], however: "If anyone dares to say that the man assumed ought to be worshipped together with God the Word, and glorified together, and called God together, as one with another (for this word 'with,' whenever it is added, always compels us to understand the very same thing), and does not rather honor Emmanuel with one worship; and assigns to him one glorification according to the fact that the Word was made flesh—let him be anathema."

The Heretic. I am compelled to cry out these very things: how was God formed together with the flesh? How was he killed? In what way, then, does Cyril of holy memory not say things contrary to himself, who fervently abjures this very thing in his own person, and again approves this same thing synodically? These are the things that move me before all else and violently disturb me.

Rusticus. I think we should equally confess that the Son of God, God the Word, being consubstantial and undifferentiated in nature from his own Father, is likewise impassible just as he is, yet the things that happened to his own flesh are not for that reason entirely alien to him—I mean, in regard to the union. Therefore, since the flesh was indeed formed, not persisting as the eternal Deity of the Word, but the Word of God was inseparably united to the flesh, making the things that are proper to the flesh his own, he is said by dispensation to be formed together with the flesh, signifying impassibly the formation of his own flesh.

For just as, by his sacrosanct flesh born of the Virgin, he is said to be begotten, who grants genesis to all things so that they may exist, so by his flesh having been formed, he is said to have been formed together with it: so that in that respect in which he is, the account of the natures may be kept intact; but in that respect in which he was formed (which, while it belongs properly to humanity in the first place, is nevertheless said also of God the Word), the unity of an altogether inseparable union may be preserved. If, therefore, he had wished to show us only the union, he would without fault have said, "The Only-begotten was formed according to the flesh" or "in the flesh," that is, according to our nature. If, however, only the distinction, he would have said without flaw, "Because Wisdom built herself a house" (Prov. 9:1), that is, the Word [became] flesh. But now, showing both well and briefly, he has introduced not "to be formed" as principal and without any intermediary, but "to be formed together with," in a fitting manner.

He sticks. Look, as to this indeed I do not know in what way you would answer; but what are you going to say about the Deicides, that is, the Jews?

Rusticus: I will say to you again a second time: for if God once refers to himself, for our salvation's sake, the things that belong to the flesh, it follows consistently that, just as he who as God formed his own flesh is said to have been formed together with the flesh, so those who killed his flesh are, I think, consistently called Deicides; not because they killed God pure and without flesh, but because that man whom they killed is God: for he was not a pure man, but the same one perfect both in Deity and also in humanity. But if this does not seem probable to you, accept at least another explanation. Before this judge, the crime is assessed not from the penalty of the one who suffers, but from the intention of the one who acts. Since, therefore, God is indeed impassible by nature, but as for what pertains to the Jews who say, "This is the heir; let us kill him, and we shall have the inheritance" (Matt. 21:38; Mark 12:7; Luke 20:14): in regard to the Gospel they had so willed to destroy the Son of God that he should not rise again thereafter, nor should his life exist at all, although no one could extinguish him. But those who by their own intention set out to do this very thing which is impossible—they are justly called Deicides, not from the outcome of the event (for how could this be done, when what is attempted is impossible?), but from the very crime of their impulse or insistence.

Perhaps, however, it is not incongruous to say this too: that he kills God for himself who does not reckon him even to be God, or who so orders his own life as though God did not exist. For he brings forth no benefit from his goodness for the life to come, since, as far as he is concerned, he does not exist—in accordance with what is said: The fool has said in his heart: There is no God (Ps. 13:1). For thus the Apostle spoke of those of God who after baptism have judaized as before, in that they not simply but for themselves again crucify the Son of God (Heb. 6:6). But we say this too: that Sabellius and Paul of Samosata destroy, that is, abjure, the subsistences of the holy Trinity; and Arius the consubstantiality, and Nestorius the union, and you the distinction—lest perhaps in some such way this also be said, not because they have destroyed or killed, but because they have rejected God.

Haeretic. If this is understood thus, why has this reading been adopted against Nestorius, when certainly the things said by you a little earlier do not refute Nestorius?

Rusticus. I have indeed already said above, at the beginning of the adjacent discourse, that those things which he altogether does not accept—because through the union things of the flesh are said of God the Word—but according to those things which were said further down, the discourse seems in some way not useless for the overthrow of the dogmas of Nestorius. For it shows the condemnation of those who do not believe that he who was crucified is to be adored; for he is not a mere man, but God and man at once; nor is one adored alongside the other as one thing alongside another, but as one, because as one he is to be adored. Perhaps, however, just as those who say that God is passible are called Theopaschites (not because the impassible substance of the divinity suffered, but on account of the blasphemy of those who so judge), so let us not be named Apollinarist God-killers, who think that God himself was turned into flesh and so died. And if this is so, what was said is of this sort: If anyone does not adore him who was crucified, let him be anathema, and let him be written among those blasphemers who say that Jesus was not God in his own nature.

Rusticus. But if it is also according to that [reading], because where he said "to be joined and to be formed together," he did not say either God or the Word or Christ or the Lord—I think it is for this reason, to give understanding to the reader, that according to the person he was formed as one, [but] according to nature he was formed together as having another nature with which he was formed together.

Heretic. I, led to another understanding by this frequent use of the word, understand "to be formed together" thus: that what was not previously [existing] is said to be formed only according to matter, as Adam was formed from mud; but what is already previously [existing] and is perfectly [existing], when it is not indeed made but is united, is said to be formed together—as in a house, [with] the things that were previously [made] and the things that are made at that very hour; or as in a codex, when quires that had previously been sewn together are taken up, if someone says they are sewn together—the pure reasoning of the doctrine being preserved, which is not accustomed to be fitting throughout all cases, as was once established between us.

Rusticus. This too is useful to me: for just as that which exists is there not some one thing but many, so also here.

Haereticus. From what is it established that these things are so? Can you satisfy me on these points from the very words, or from what source do you bring these things forward for me?

Rusticus. Although it should have been the case that what has been said would fully satisfy you, nevertheless attend also to those things which have been added at the end to the things already stated. For he says: "That which began, or progresses, or is perfected, is not God"—or if it is said thus on account of the increase that happens gradually. What then? Tell me: is not the difference of natures manifest? For that which began, and progressed, and came to perfection, is flesh; but that which always is, and is most perfect according to nature and substance, is God. Since, therefore, those who think like Arius say concerning the crucified Lord that his flesh was not perfect according to nature and substance, but received honor from the Father as a gift or reward—inasmuch as it is changeable and mutable—the most holy Gregory objected against this, [saying] that if anyone [is] perfect from works.

To these points, indeed, the associates of Paul of Samosata used to say that after his birth from the Virgin, and likewise after his baptism, and further still after his resurrection from the dead, he advanced to adoption: the former, indeed, suspecting the Godhead of the Son to be broken and mutable; the latter, however, [holding him to be] a mere man honored by God and deified on account of the merit of his works, so that for this reason he is even called God, not as one who existed before Mary and was made man. These two Gregory crushed under one [argument], adding these words: For that which began, or advances, or is perfected, is not God; or if it is so called on account of the increase that comes about gradually—that is, that which has a beginning when it exists, and that which is not from nature but becomes perfect on account of works—that is not God in the fullest sense; or if it receives this in a single moment as soon as it is created by God the maker, or if it advances gradually like some of men.

Haereticus. Therefore, as you say, these things were spoken not against Nestorius, but against Apollinaris, and Arius, and Paul of Samosata.

Rusticus: But because the dogma of Nestorius has a certain kinship with the dogma of Paul, for that reason the same arguments serve against both. For there lies in the codex of the synod, among other blasphemies of Nestorius, also this reading: "But just as we used to call the God of all creation the God of Moses—for he says, I have made you a god to Pharaoh (Exod. 7:1)—and Israel the son of God, for he says, Israel is my firstborn son (Exod. 4:22); and just as we used to call Saul Christ, for he says, I will not put forth my hand against him, because he is the Lord's anointed (1 Kgs. 24:7); and Cyrus likewise: Thus says the Lord to my anointed Cyrus (Isa. 45:1); and the Babylonian a saint, for he says, I will give command, they have been sanctified, and I will bring them (Isa. 13:3)—but the community of names is similar, while the dignity is not the same." And here he plainly declares impious things: that just as Moses is called god, and Israel son, and Saul and Cyrus anointed, and the Babylonian a saint, so also the Lord himself is called God not according to nature but by name alone; not holy and only-begotten according to substance, but like the Babylonians and Israel; and he does not want his difference from the others to be according to substance but with respect to dignity, so that he does not know God by nature.

Objection. If one nature was not made, how is God said to be formed together with it, as though there were no difference? But if, as you say, because the things that happened concerning the flesh are said to be of God, are these things said according to truth or falsely?

Rusticus: We have already heard, with the difference of the natures preserved, Cyril of holy memory saying to Nestorius: "Since indeed the diverse natures came together for a true union, but one Christ and Son from both, not as though the difference of the natures were destroyed because of the union; rather, while we complete one Lord and Christ and Son, in deity and humanity." Behold, openly, the difference of the natures is so far from being destroyed because of the union that he does not even say it in the singular, "while we complete one Christ in deity and humanity," but says it in the plural, "while we complete." If therefore the difference and number of deity and humanity were not preserved, it would not have been necessary to say, "while we complete these and those"; but these things whose difference is preserved are not without union. When, therefore, we look to the difference of these, we will not then give to the flesh the things that are proper to the divinity; for we do not say that it is coeternal with God, nor that it descended from heaven; nor, conversely, do we refer to God the things that are proper to the flesh.

But when we look to their union, we say that the Son of man descended from heaven, and that the eternal and only-begotten God was seen on earth and conversed with men, according to the Scriptures. No one has ascended into heaven except the Son of man who descended from heaven. For God the Word who descended from heaven is the Son of man because of the union with what is ours. Otherwise, how is He said to be and is He one Son, except in this way? Again, He who ascended from earth to heaven and changed place according to the body only; the only-begotten of the Father is that same Word who was incarnate, eternal; for He who was assumed is not a mere man. Therefore neither does the union destroy the difference, nor does the difference dissipate the union. If, then, God had been formed according to His own substance, He could certainly not have been formed together with the flesh, but only formed. But since this is said of God not because of His eternal nature, but because of the union, we also say this truly, for the union is true.

Heretic. It does not mean this, but that he was co-formed, as the soul is with the body, so that no difference was left which would produce a number or division of duality.

Rusticus. Although I forewarned that the discourse concerning God was not spoken simply, but indefinitely—for he spoke more clearly concerning the Crucified—and he added below, "was co-formed"; but lest you say, "What, and with what was he co-formed?" I added this term, because "the Word with the flesh." If, however, according to you, divinity and humanity were formed into one nature, then he did not speak well in saying "to be co-formed"; for that which is "with" either signifies two formations, or two have been co-formed.

Heretic. But I will say to you again: therefore, undertaking this very thing—say "with"—and again accusing this very thing, Cyril is contrary to himself.

Rusticus. That teacher is not contrary to himself; but that which is "with," and that which is "together," when it is said of natures only, piously signifies the difference of two natures; and on account of this very thing, when it is said of persons or subsistences in Christ, it is impious: for it immediately signifies two persons, and Sons, and Lords, and Christs. But that he forbade that which is "with" to be said in this way has been manifestly demonstrated in the passages above.

But since he again says that the Word sits beside the Father with the flesh, hear this in the second letter to Nestorius of the same most holy Cyril, in which he says both this and that under one [point]: If we confess Christ one and Lord, not as though co-adoring the man with the Word (lest the fantasy of an uncircumcision be introduced on account of what is said as "with"), but as adoring one and the same, because his body is not alien from the Word, with whom he also himself sits beside the Father, not as though again two Sons sitting beside him, but as one in the union with his own flesh. Behold, he says, even speaking of the body, "with whom he sits beside the Father." Attend to what is [said]: "with whom," and again, "with his own flesh." But what he said first, "with," and what [he said] afterward, both "with" and "co-," is the same. But as often as, indeed, as I said, the discourse is about the natures, the divinity is said [to be] with the humanity, and conversely; but when [the discourse is] about the Son, it is not permitted to say that the son of man is co-adored with the Son of God, for in the holy Trinity only the persons are co-adored; but the divinity, just as it wrought miracles through the flesh, so is adored through the flesh; and we all adore the cross, and through it him whose cross it is; yet we are not said to co-adore the cross with Christ, nor by this is the nature of the cross and of Christ one. Similarly, we are not said to adore the altar, to co-adore the altar, the Trinity, but rather through the altar.

Nor, again, is it as the Father through the Son, so the Word through the flesh; for there are not two persons of Christ; but with the flesh, that is, through the flesh, as has been said, with which He sits beside the Father and is co-adored.

Objection. Because indeed one Christ is adored, and He sits beside the Father with His own flesh, the most holy Cyril has said; but from what is this established? Because in the Greek the same thing is meant by what we say, "with" or "con."

Rusticus. Because the most holy Cyril approved this very word, that is, "with," and it is manifest from elsewhere: that is, because not only in the universal synod, but also everywhere outside it, against various opponents, the letter of the most holy Athanasius to Epictetus is approved in all respects, in which there lie among other things also these words: "He said: I gave my back to the scourges, and I did not turn my face away from the shame of spittings (Isa. 50:6): for the things which He endured, that which is human of the Word, these the very Word, that which was with Him, was referring to Himself, so that we might be able to participate in the piety of the Word." Behold, you have heard that the passions which belong to the humanity He was referring to Himself; but where "to be with" and "to refer" are found, there the quantity according to nature is irrefutably [present].

Objection. And where did the most holy Cyril approve this letter of Pope Athanasius?

Rusticus. Not only did he set forth testimonies from it at the synod, but also in the letter to Saint John, in which he says this as well: "But because we follow the decrees of the holy Fathers everywhere, and especially those of our blessed Father Athanasius, worthy of all praise, avoiding altogether any wandering beyond that point, let your Holiness believe this from them, and let no one of others doubt it." And again: "But because we have learned that certain men, corrupting the letter to the blessed Epictetus of our Father Athanasius, worthy of all praise, which holds orthodox teaching, have published it, so that from this very many were harmed; for this reason, devising something useful and necessary for the brethren, from the ancient copies which are among us and are without error, we have sent copies to your Holiness; and so we also, having copies of this edition, have set them before you from them." Therefore, since he said that the letter to Epictetus holds orthodox teaching, and since, devising something useful and necessary for the brethren, he sent copies of it, praising its author as is fitting.

Objection. And if one nature of divinity and humanity was not made, how could one person be made, when certainly, as often as one person subsists from two natures, one nature is likewise made for it?

Rusticus. It is the part of the utterly senseless and foolish to ask of the Almighty how he could do it! To which it is enough to answer how he willed it; because it is impossible for God not to be present to what he wills.

Objection. And is it certain that God willed to be one person with the flesh, and willed not to become one nature, when certainly the Apostle says: Who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor (Rom 11:34)? Moreover, it follows that one nature is made whenever one person is made. And indeed, if we look to God's omnipotence, God could, willing it, become one nature together with the flesh; and since by the miracle of God Almighty one person was made, why was not one nature also made by another miracle? Or why not both by the same miracle, indeed truly the same? Is it easy for God to do that which seems impossible to human reasoning, that is, one person from divinity and humanity; and is it difficult for God to do that which is also consequent to human reasoning, that one nature belong to him whose one person it is?

Rusticus. Great is God's clemency, who, so that we might not err, deigned not only to become incarnate, but also to show us the principal cause of his incarnation; whence it was shown above that he took up all our [properties] except sin. He assumed, therefore, along with the substance of our perfect nature, also its quantity; on account of which the Apostle calls him one man (1 Cor 15; 1 Tim 2:5), and this often. This integral unity, then, of our perfect nature, concurring with the unity of the perfect divinity, reasonably completes the duality of the natures. Moreover, God does not perform great things idly, as though for this alone, that he might perform them; but weighing his intention in accordance with our salvation: for neither for the sake of astonishment, nor of vainglory, but our advantage is the intention of his kindness. And so it was fitting that he receive, just as all other things of our nature without sin, so also quantity—or rather unity—as we have demonstrated above. For if the nature that was assumed is not one, then it is not one, and through this nothing. But if it is one, just as it is impious to say that anything of our substance is lacking, so also of quantity: that quantity therefore has this property as well, that concurring with the quantity of the divine substance, it completes the duality.

Furthermore, our confession is found to be far superior also with respect to miracle: for the Word of God deigned once to be one person with the flesh; concerning which thing, it would not be said wonderfully (because even customarily, as you wish) that he was made one nature: for nothing is more wonderful, and more exceeding the mind and more divine, than what is unusual and incomparable. But what is more such than that one person subsist, whose nature was not one? It is clear, therefore, that in comparison of reason, and of miracle, and of cause, we are found superior to you.

Heretic. If it is possible to bring forward quantity (without the names of those things whose quantity it is) in speech: for example, if each one of men who is named one man—whether, then, with the name that is man removed, it is permitted us to say one. For if we rightly say this also concerning the holy Trinity, there will be two certain things, the Father and the Holy Spirit, for they are two persons; but there will also be the Son, two certain things; for according to you there are two natures. Therefore the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are four certain things. For thus you too objected to us a little while ago from your own position, that the unity of the divine nature with the unity of the human nature completes a duality of natures. And we therefore conclude according to your reasoning, that two and two are four: wherefore, instead of a Trinity, you worship a quaternity: therefore you are not orthodox.

Nor will you be able to affirm that the name of their number is not brought forward without the name of the thing, since, confessing that Christ is one of the Trinity, you cannot deny that he is one out of three. But if you are asked, one out of which three, you will not find one common name that you can predicate plurally of the three: for it is neither out of three Fathers, nor out of three Sons, nor out of three Spirits or holy paracletes.

Rusticus: You have set down ambiguous names by your usual fraud, and instead of things you have spoken a bare number. But when you say, the Father and the Holy Spirit are two somethings, say what these two are, and while we are silent, you will convict yourself. So again, when you say of the Son, two somethings, determine what those are; and from the falsity of your compunction, you yourself, while I am silent, will convict yourself. For the two things first spoken by you were set down for two persons; but the two that follow, for natures. But the Trinity is a Trinity of persons, not of natures. And again, the duality is said to be not of persons, but of natures, around the Lord Jesus Christ.

If, therefore, saying that the Father and the Holy Spirit are two persons, we were similarly to say that there are two natures—which is blasphemous—namely, that they are persons of the Son; or, conversely, saying that there are two natures of the Son, we were similarly to say that there are two natures of the Father and of the Holy Spirit—which God forbid—then we would have given occasion to your slanders not without plausibility: so that, with nature as a guide, there would be again two guides or two persons, and another guide, in which the Trinity would be counted together alike. But now, just as two persons and one person counted together make three, so one common nature of the holy Trinity and another one nature of the Son alone, that is, of the assumed [nature], must necessarily be two, and cannot be one. Although, therefore, we believe that there are two natures in the Son, nevertheless a quaternity does not follow our confession; for we do not worship a bare quantity apart from subsisting things, even if it were permissible to bring forward the bare quantity alone. Moreover, if because we say that there are two natures, it follows that on this very account we worship a quaternity in place of the Trinity, then you likewise, from a quaternity, worship the Trinity, because you say that Christ is from two natures.

Heretic. But we say that the Trinity is not from three persons, but that there are three persons; and we say that there is both a unity of three persons and a unity in three persons.

Rusticus. But why is not one Christ believed to be two natures, if three persons according to truth are one God, as also the Lord himself says in the Gospel: I and the Father are one (John x, 39)? One, he said, and, we are, so that one may be reckoned of nature, we are however in persons. For if the Trinity of persons does not divide a simple nature, how does the duality of natures disagree with a person which, as you confess, is by no means simple but composite? Moreover, two and three and four are certain things; not with each one subsisting by itself, but gathered and compared or collated, so to speak, or rather considered together, they are spoken of: but nature is not connumerated with persons in the Trinity; otherwise even before the incarnation, which God forbid, there would have been a quaternity: for there are three persons, and one nature; and the number does not advance to four at all.

Heretic. But there, for the reason that the unity is not outside and the Trinity outside; but the Trinity of the unity, and the unity of the Trinity.

Rusticus. If for this reason alone the divine nature is not counted together with the three persons, because it is the Trinity of the unity and the unity of the Trinity; therefore in every way the other unity is besides the common unity, it will be counted together with the Trinity: but the flesh of one of the three, that is, of the Lord Christ, is not of the whole Trinity: for according to you the whole Trinity was not incarnate: therefore there will be a quaternity, the Trinity and the flesh. Therefore either show that our nature is not a unity, that is, that the flesh is not one, or accept that it is not for this reason that the divine nature is least counted together with the persons, because it is the unity of the Trinity and the Trinity of the unity, and it remains for you to say with us that the nature is not counted together with the persons.

Heretic. And why is the nature least counted together with the persons? Tell me the reason, then?

Rusticus. No necessity presses upon me to show why it is not counted together with the persons, since I have demonstrated my perfect victory, because what I have proved is true; but if you wish to investigate the matter with us, let it be inquired into without prejudice. But I think that those things which are not contained at all under one definition are not counted together either: for example, if someone says, "You and I are one," in that I am a man and you are a man, and we are two men; and we are one with the angels, in that we too are rational. And again we are two natures because of the difference; and again we are the same as the heaven: for it too is a creature; and it is other besides it, because of substantial difference. I think, therefore, that those things which are counted together ought to have both a certain common definition and another which is not common but proper to each: so then the two natures of the Lord Christ have in common that they are natures; but it is proper that the one is divinity and the other humanity.

Heretic. If there is a definition of it, the Godhead is not incomprehensible. And this indeed moves me, how the divine substance common to the three persons can have one definition, and the individual nature of one and only one person, or certainly the substance of the flesh of Christ; for these things seem to be impossible.

Rusticus. It was not superfluously, as is evident, that we once used to shrink from seeking the cause, which draws us out into long and difficult words. Wherefore I ought not to add anything further of this kind, lest we be dragged superfluously into much speaking.

Heretic. Patiently, I ask, and without prejudice; for I wish to be satisfied concerning these matters; for perhaps by all means the opportunity will obtain satisfaction.

Rusticus. What seems to me—perhaps not unreasonably—I will say; yet with those things which I have already said kept safe and without prejudice; for I would not have added anything of this kind, unless this condition had been proposed. The Godhead, therefore, is defined not according as it is Godhead, but according as it is nature. What is it that I wish to say—not in that it is Godhead, but in that it is nature? It is one thing to ask in itself what the Deity is, and another how the Godhead itself stands in relation to the three persons. For example, I say, it is one thing to ask what man is, and another how—that is, whether we all participate equally in the common substance, or not; and again, according to proportion, whether we share a common humanity in such a way as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit share one Deity and a common one.

What we are therefore seeking then concerns proportion; but there is one definition of the two natures, insofar as they are natures, because that which is participated in equally and similarly and collectively by the persons, so that each thing may be, is substance; but those which participate in this very thing are persons, which differ from one another by their properties. But the common substance of the Godhead itself, which we contemplate in the individual Word, is nature; similarly also the nature of the flesh is not individual, although we contemplate it in an individual. For nature is never individual; for the definition is not individual, concerning which we say "rational animal," which is subject to becoming. But among physicians, men are said to differ in nature according to temperament, as, for example, the warmer and the colder; but we do not speak of nature in this way; wherefore, according to this, the common definition of the two natures of the Lord Christ differs in no way. Therefore, because each is similarly called a nature, and again each is not the same, but the definition of each differs, therefore there are two natures of the Lord Christ, and none of these is counted together with the Trinity, so as to make a quaternity, which God forbid.

Heretic: I hold that that nature which is called common, or certainly the species of humanity, is nothing but a name only; but that it is of each one of us is in individual subsistent beings; whereas that [common nature] exists in reasonings and intellects and the most subtle speculations alone, or rather in the phantasies of the mind; otherwise, in actual fact it does not subsist. But in God all things ought to subsist first, that is, both nature and persons. Wherefore neither according to the common definition are there two natures.

Rusticus: Against this I have no word to say; for it is enough for me that the substance of the assumed humanity is in no way numbered together with the subsistent beings of the Trinity, so that a quaternity be made from them. But why this is so, I do not know the reason, and I confess that I am ignorant.

Heretic: But why is the flesh numbered with the nature of the Trinity, so that, as you say, there be made two, when it is not numbered with the persons of the Trinity? Therefore neither is it numbered with this one; and now there are not two natures of Christ, but one.

Rusticus: I think that you do not wish the flesh to exist either; for it must be either one or not one. But while it is not one, it is nothing; and while it is nothing, it does not exist. For as it is in no way counted together with the three persons, we are struck back from that, lest a quaternity be made. Again, lest it be reckoned together with the one nature of the Trinity, the denial of the flesh seems to be complete; for if it is one, it is counted together with another one. But I affirm this, because here the reason must be demanded of me: for both all the holy Fathers and you yourselves have counted the flesh together with the nature of the divinity; for you say that Christ is from two natures. But if humanity is not counted together with the divinity, we ought not to say that it is not only in them but from them. Therefore he is not from two. But Ambrose also speaks badly, according to you, saying: "The one Son of God speaks in both, because in him is both nature"; and Gregory, saying: "Two natures, God and man, because both soul and body"; and Cyril, saying: "For the union of two natures has been made; and the natures which have come together for a true union are indeed different; but one Christ and Son from both, not as though the difference of the natures were destroyed because of the union, but rather as we maintain.

And the universal synod of Ephesus confirmed this, and the Roman popes Caelestinus and Xystus approved it; and likewise also certain of their statements which were spoken concerning the Lord; and that they are reckoned together as upon one person, and divided as upon two natures.

Heretic: We know this: the natures are reckoned together so that from them it may be, not so that in them it may be; for even things that are called equivocal, because they share in name only and not also in definition, are reckoned together with one another, as a painted dog and a true one: for one may call this one and that one by one name, but they are in every way two.

Rusticus: Glory to the Lord Christ, because you have confessed for the present that, in whatever way, nevertheless the natures are reckoned together, which was the subject of the discourse; but this being granted, it is no longer necessary to repeat the demonstrations of the rest. For it has already been shown at the same time that the union is of two natures, and that the natures are diverse, and that the difference of the natures has not been destroyed, and that they have effected one, and one in both, since in the same one both natures are; and that the one who is of two natures is God and man. But I also say this necessarily: that if the human nature is not reckoned together with the divine, then the one nature of the Lord Christ has not been made out of two natures through union; but that one, existing eternally, is itself alone even now just as it was.

But if the composition, or the unfolding, or the concurrence has been made, from the equal of that nature which, as you say, has been made from composition, the humanity is completive: therefore equally, just as the divine nature, it is a partaker of quantity. If, then, the divine nature is one, the nature of the flesh is also one; but if these are intermediate, that also is intermediate; and if these are nothing, that is nothing. Therefore even that which, according to you, has been made from nothing cannot be anything.

He sticks. You have the means to show whether the common nature of the Trinity differs from the nature of the flesh which has been united to the Word, and whether the Word himself also and the form of a servant have some distinction, or not.

Rusticus. This too will be shown by the preceding discourse, since our nature indeed which has been united to God the Word is neither another person nor belongs to another person, yet the flesh is other than the Word; but the nature is other, not another person. For in Christ, not only is "one and another" said in common by the Fathers concerning the persons of the divinity besides the rest and his own flesh, but also properly concerning God the Word and the assumed flesh, that he is one and another.

Attend, I ask, subtly to the truth, lest the narrowness of the way that leads to life terrify you with the labor of difficulty. For we have not said that there is another person of the flesh besides that one; for both these things belong to one and only one person. But because, besides God the Word, who is one person of those ineffable persons, the other is the human nature; so that God the Word is indeed a perfect person from eternity, but the flesh, although a perfect nature, is by no means a person. Again I say: I have not spoken of another person, and again another person, but another substance and nature. For evidently God the Word is defined as one thing, and his humanity as another; not one and again another, but he is one thing, and other than the flesh; and that is another thing and not another. For we have shown also from the synodical reading that Gregory says, two natures, God and man, because also soul and body. You see, therefore, that he speaks of this very person of the Lord Christ. For when he had said, two natures, God and man, he added, because soul and body; but these belong to one person. And again, but of the Son, not two. You see that he spoke not of the whole Trinity, but of the Word alone, God. And again after a little, one thing and another, from which the Savior. Do you attend that he spoke of the Savior alone? And again, for both are one; and of the one, God indeed made man, but not the whole Trinity has been made man.

Then he added these words as well: “But I say ‘another and another,’ the reverse of how it is in the Trinity; for there, indeed, ‘another and another,’ so that the substances are not confused, but not ‘another thing and another thing.’ Do you see that the discourse is not common to the whole Trinity, but proper to the Son alone? For when speaking of the Trinity, indeed, he said ‘another and another’; but of the Son alone, ‘another thing and another thing,’ the reverse of how it is in the Trinity, he says. Therefore the other, God the Word, is apart from his own flesh. But let the aforementioned testimony be set forth, and what has been said will be manifest.

He is stuck. If nature is not counted together with persons, but nevertheless pure number is counted together with pure number, why are two and two four? For how otherwise is Christ called one of the Trinity, not simple nor existing without flesh, but composed into one person, when certainly there are two simple and without flesh and incomposite?

Rusticus: The name of a number is then brought forward without the name of a thing when a common likeness of a thing accompanies some number; as, for instance, that each of the three is a person, even if not the same person. For how would it be pious not to distinguish the subsistences in the Trinity? But we have said this because, just as the Father is a person, so also is the Son and the Holy Spirit; for here the three persons are three certain things. Therefore, when we say "these three," if someone should ask "which?" we can answer "persons." But when we say "these three," if asked "who are the three?" we are at a loss to answer "persons," on account of the unseemly composition of words, lest we seem to say "these persons" or "these three persons." Since, therefore, the things are indeed present, but a name of such a kind as would be common to these three has not for the present been posited, it is permissible indeed to say "these three"; but if asked "who are the three?" we do not immediately find a fitting way to say it. When, however, saying simply first "these three," we are asked "which three?" we presently add fittingly "persons." But in that quaternion of yours, no thing is found common and equally fit for the number four; and not only in words, but even in things, an impossibility follows; wherefore it is not possible for it to be a number, because no common thing underlies it. This too shows it, that persons among the Latins are called "hae personae" and not "haec personae"—that is, by this, that among the grammarians it is called the feminine gender, not by that which is neuter.

But the Paraclete is likewise called by the masculine name, both in Latin and in Greek. Yet concerning the Son and concerning the Holy Spirit we find it said, so that we can speak of two; and when asked, which two do we speak of? we can answer, Paracletes. But concerning the Father I do not yet dare to say this, because this expression is neither written, nor is it named by any of the four synods specifically, that the Father also is called Paraclete. If however this is granted, when asked who are the three? we shall certainly be able to answer, because there are three Paracletes, just as there are three persons and three substances.

Heretic. If on account of consolation he is called Paraclete, and the Father is a Paraclete—for he consoles the souls of the just and soothes their sorrows, as it is written: I remembered God, and I was consoled (Ps. 76:4)—but also that very saying of the Lord: And I will ask my Father, and he will give you another Paraclete, the Spirit of truth (John 14:16, 17): he shows that there are not only two, but three Paracletes; for "another" is said not of two but of three; but "the other" is of two. Wherefore in the Trinity three Paracletes are spoken of.

Rusticus: This exactness of words is scarcely observed in the divine Scriptures, nor by the holy Fathers, because it is not worthy, since they are the inventions of men. For I have shown that even in the synod it lies, "another and another," from which the Savior, speaking of two, said "another" and "another." Moreover also the testimony of Athanasius of sacred memory, which was approved there, spoke thus: "Or how do Christians wish to be named, who say that the Word came into a holy man as into one of the prophets, and that he did not himself become man, receiving a body from Mary, but that another Word of God existed before Mary and before the ages as the Son of the Father? Or how can they be Christians who say that one is the Son and another the Word of God?" Behold, he placed it indiscriminately above, refuting those who say "another"; but below, those who say "another" and "another." But especially the testimony of Gregory repeatedly repeats this word, saying: "Not another and another: far be it: for both are one by commixture." Behold, he also said "both," that is, not three, lest perhaps you should suspect that he was speaking as it were of three: of God, of the soul, of the body; especially since it follows: "The reverse of how it is in the Trinity: for there it is another and another, so that we do not confuse the subsistences; but not another and another, etc.

See, he says, both concerning the Trinity, one thing, and concerning Christ, not one and another; and he did not say, not one and a second; whereas certainly the reading of Felix of holy memory stands, saying thus: "And the man was not assumed by God so as to be another besides him; for the Son of God did not take up a man so as to be another besides him." And indeed it has been shown that in the holy and universal synod of Ephesus "another" and "a second" are used without distinction, or rather "one" and "a second."

Heretic. See, meanwhile you too have confessed that if we have demonstrated that there are three natures of the Trinity, it clearly follows that those who say there are two natures in Christ introduce a quaternity of natures; if therefore we have demonstrated three natures in the holy Trinity, since in every way there are two natures of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, with the two natures of the Son, as you believe, added in by way of addition, in accordance with the irrefutable reckoning of number, we have demonstrated that your confession results in the worship of a quaternity.

Rusticus: Nor is this necessary, which for the present has been said without prejudice—unless perhaps if there are three natures of the Trinity, so that there is not one common nature. For if there is indeed one common nature, but three proper natures, then nature is now named equivocally: for one thing is understood to be that which is individually the same for each person, and another which is individually no one's, but is common to the three; for that one is contemplated in the three, but these three in the one. If therefore, saying that there are two natures of Christ, we number the common nature of the Trinity among our own—that is, with that human substance which is in Christ—we in no way introduce a quaternity; for we do not, heaping up those three, make four, but joining one alone to one alone, we make only two. Moreover, even if the nature proper to the Word is such that it is the same for the same person, and joining this to the human nature we say there are two, nevertheless a quaternity will not follow, because nature is spoken of in one way when it is also a person (since it is the same as that person through all things), and in another way when it is flesh, which is only a nature and not equally a person, and this same nature.

But we shall not add, if it is so, a nature which is also a person to a nature which is not also a person; nor for this reason do we say two, but we shall fit together one nature which is also a person, and the other which is not also a person but only a nature: that is, we declare the divine nature, which is itself also a person; but the human nature, which is only a nature and not also a person, and thus we produce a duality of natures.

Heretic: Therefore, as you say, much more, according to you, there will be four natures of the Trinity, or rather, as he says, of a quaternity, if [the number is taken] from that which they are natures of; for you said four; for it produces a difference of natures much more; for not only is the nature of the Word and of the man one and another, but also the definition of the nature is different, nor is it the same according to species: as if someone should say, either there will be one genus, one thing. Wherefore that which differs in every way is much more distant for producing a fourth, if nevertheless, according to you, quantity according to number also follows difference. Therefore by how much more the natures differ, by so much the more do they produce number, and by so much the more evidently is a quaternity introduced. There is therefore every necessity: either that the nature of humanity make no duality at all, when it is joined to the nature of God the Word; or that it complete a quaternity, counted together with the natures of the Trinity.

Rusticus: But attend to this, that however many natures there are, the Trinity remains; for it is named from three persons, and not from natures.

Heretic: It is called so not from natures alone, nor from persons alone, but rather from number.

Rusticus: But number is nothing when no thing underlies it.

Heretic: But a thing does underlie it too, for there are four natures, and your quaternity ought to be named from the number of natures. Although no common thing underlies the four natures, the name of nature itself will suffice for me; for equivocals are counted together, even though it is one thing for equivocals or things of one name to be counted together, and another for the things themselves—as the sea dog and the land dog are counted not as two dogs, but as two equivocals.

Rusticus: Conceding, we say all things. Let it be, then, as you say, that the Trinity is to be so called equally from the number of natures and of persons. Just as, therefore, the Trinity is in no way spoken of unless three persons of the same nature subsist, so a quaternity is never spoken of unless four have existed, not only natures but also persons. But we assert, even if there are four natures, as you say, yet not four persons, but only three; therefore we do not introduce the worship of a quaternity.

Heretic: Indeed, you even contradict yourselves, and you worship both a Trinity and a quaternity alike: a Trinity of persons, but a quaternity of natures. For just as, if there were only three persons, as there are only three natures, it would nonetheless be a Trinity; and if there were four, whether persons or natures, it would be a quaternity: so, if there is a Trinity of persons but a quaternity of natures, it is at once a Trinity and a quaternity.

Rusticus: But even if we were to confess—which God forbid—that there are three natures from eternity, we do not worship and venerate them according as they are natures, but according as they are persons.

Heretic: If there are three natures of the Trinity, and another of the flesh, they become four; but if you do not worship the quaternity, yet according to your confession there is a quaternity, it will be able to profit you nothing. Nay, choose what you will: either it is a quaternity, and you do wrong in divine matters not to worship and adore what both is and which you confess to be; or it is not, and you act impiously, confessing and asserting to be what is not. Then you assert that there are two natures in such a way that, since you count the common nature of the Trinity together with the proper nature of the flesh, either you will worship this duality as that one, or likewise that one.

Rusticus: Since indeed what was assumed became, by the dispensation, the property of the one who assumed it, it is manifest, yet not common to the three. And even if it is something fourth, it is nevertheless neither coeternal, nor without beginning, nor uncreated, nor is it through itself and from its own substance; but through union it is that which is glorified to be. But those three are coeternal, consubstantial, and without beginning, and are uncreated for this reason, even if someone says that the fourth, insofar as it exists, is something human, it will nevertheless not be a fourth in like manner, neither for adoring, nor for worshiping, nor for glorifying. For one thing is that which, as something other (since indeed it is created), makes an addition according to quantity to those things which are uncreated, because it is not this same thing, but something other; and another thing is that which, as consubstantial and coeternal, is adored together and glorified and equally worshiped. Moreover, adoration and worship are not offered as it were under number: for there are not three worships or three adorations of the Trinity; wherefore neither four, nor two, even if, as I said, something other is the property of one or even of the three. For neither the tabernacle in the desert, nor the ark, nor the temple, nor the altars were adored together with God and worshiped together by the ancients; and the nature of God and of these things is not one.

Nor did he diminish the number of the adorable and worshipful Trinity, in that the Trinity is indeed co-worshipped, but these creatures are not co-worshipped with the Trinity, but through them the Trinity is worshipped. For what then? Tell me: is it not written, "And worship the footstool of his feet" (Psalm 98:5)? But this is earth; for the body which is of earth is worshipped, not so that it is worshipped as God through itself or for its own sake, but so that through the body and through the flesh, that is, the humanity, God the Word who was made incarnate is co-worshipped. For certainly he also worked through the fringe of his garments in her who was flowing with blood; and yet no one says that the garments and the Word are one nature; and by that touch he saved many; and sending his voice from his own temple, he raised Lazarus, four days dead. Therefore, through that by which he works, while through it and in it he is worshipped and honored, he is well-pleasing to those who worship him. And moreover the nails with which he was fastened, and the wood of the venerable cross, the whole Church throughout the world worships without any contradiction; and not only are God and the cross two natures, but even that holy iron, besides that venerable wood, is one nature, and again the flesh of the Lord itself is another.

And if, as you say, there are three natures of the Trinity, and these have their own number, and we all worship all these things; and no Cliri of the Huns ever said that we worship a quaternity or a quinary or a senary: for those things which are set apart and become God's own, through which he is both worshipped and adored, are already, as it were, instruments and aids to our weakness for drawing near to God: and as for their being at all, they do not lose the property of quantity; but as for worshipping and adoring and venerating him, things created are no longer counted together with the Creator: for it is one thing for that to be worshipped through this, and another thing for that to be something to be worshipped according to nature, both eternally and most properly.

He hesitates. Is it not then, in all ways, whatever must be confessed, that same thing also to be adored, or worshipped, or venerated in the holy Trinity?

Rusticus. I have already said that it is not in all respects and in all ways alike. But I will add this also, that we neither confess nor worship a duality of natures in the Trinity: for the one nature of the flesh is not of the whole Trinity, but of one person, that of God the Word. But in the Trinity those things are counted together which are either similarly or equally of the three persons. But if we [confess] a duality, then you also worship a composite Trinity; or a composite and at the same time simple one: for you say that the natures or persons of the Father and the Holy Spirit are simple, but that of Christ is composite. Furthermore, one God in the Trinity and one Christ is worshipped.

Three persons are one God; the two natures are of the one Christ; but four natures, since they are neither God nor Christ, how can they be worshiped, when in three or in two nothing else is worshiped but either one or one? But so that we may not prolong our words further, we show that there is one only, and not three, nature of the holy Trinity, but only three persons or subsistences. For if there are both three natures and one, and nature and person are the same thing, then there will be, God forbid, one person of the Trinity! But if nature is both one and three, while person is not one but only three, then neither according to nature or substance nor according to person or subsistence will God be one. According to what, then, is the Trinity one God?

It would be permitted. We so speak of three substances and natures of the Trinity that nevertheless their consubstantiality is preserved; and therefore both one and three are the substances and natures, and one God is glorified not according to three, but according to one substance and nature.

Rusticus: Therefore, according to you, there is both one God and three Gods. For if on account of one substance and nature there is one, then on account of three substances or natures there are, according to you, three Gods. But indeed there will be far more three than one God, and properly speaking—which God forbid—there will be three Gods; improperly, however, the Trinity is one God, bordering on the error of the pagans. For all the Fathers and teachers wrote that God is one for this reason, that His substance or nature is one and only. If, then, the substance of the Trinity is one, and its nature only one, but there are three not only persons but also natures and substances, then all the more, since all three exist and none is undivided, there will be three Gods as well.

Haeretic: The Trinity has three natures to such a degree that we show that each person has its own nature from eternity, which is in no way common to another. But this will be clearly proved if it is demonstrated concerning even one person among them. For if the three are equal and in all respects alike, whatever one person has, the other will have as well. If, therefore, we show that each one of them has its own nature in such a way that it is common to no other, you are likewise convicted concerning the rest without any contradiction. But that the nature of God the Word is proper, the Fathers affirm, saying: We confess that one nature of God the Word has been incarnate.

If, therefore, we believe that this one nature is rather that common one, then that incarnate nature which is common to the whole Trinity will necessarily introduce an incarnate Trinity; but since that is impious, as being contrary to the holy Scriptures and the teaching of the Fathers, it is manifest that the one nature that was made man belongs to the Son alone. But you will not be able to deny the aforesaid statement of the Fathers. For Flavianus, who was once bishop of Constantinople, and whom you receive, wrote thus in that little book of his own faith which he sent to the emperor Theodosius, and which was also received at the synod of Chalcedon.

Rusticus: It is by no means necessary that those who confess one incarnate nature of God the Word, if this is said of the common nature of the holy Trinity, should introduce an incarnation of the holy Trinity; especially since by the explanation of their statement they add the most distinctive name of God the Word. For just as, when the Fathers say that God the Word was incarnate and made man, although the common name of God is predicated indifferently of the three persons, yet it does not follow from this that the Trinity was incarnate, even though the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God; and for this reason he who was incarnate is called both God and one God and alone God and God the Word. Just as, therefore, to be God, or to be one God, although it is common to each person, yet when we confess God incarnate, or the Virgin Mother of God.

It follows that—God forbid—we would be saying that the Trinity is unincarnate, but rather one of those persons, that is, one from that Trinity which is God. So when we say that the one nature of God the Word is incarnate, it does not follow that we are saying the Trinity itself is incarnate with its own nature, but rather one of those persons who must be confessed to be in that nature. And just as, when we say that God is incarnate, we do not, to avoid appearing to say that the Trinity is incarnate, call the three "Gods" for the sake of any precaution: so neither, lest we should perhaps appear to be saying that the Trinity is incarnate when we say that the one nature of God the Word is incarnate, do we say for any precaution that there are three natures in the Trinity. For if God is said to be incarnate, and again not incarnate—when the one is said of the Son, but the other of the Father and the Holy Spirit—and the one God is not separated or divided or distinguished into two Gods, what incongruity will follow if we say of the same God, that is, of one and the same nature, that it is both incarnate in the Son and not incarnate in the Father and the Holy Spirit? For you too, in saying that any nature or substance is common, cannot refute this consequence: for you will neither be able to deny that that substance is incarnate in the Son, nor to affirm that it is unincarnate in the Father and the Holy Spirit. There will therefore be one and the same simple nature, both incarnate, as of the Son, and not incarnate, as of the Father and the Holy Spirit.

Therefore it is not necessary on this account that the nature be proper to the Son, because the one nature of God the Word is said to be incarnate; since, even if there were some nature not common to him, this same thing would still be most correctly said of that common nature. Therefore it has not been demonstrated on this account that the nature is proper to the Son alone; nor, consequently, to any other person of the Trinity either. Moreover, we demonstrate that you rather introduce a quaternity, since you cannot deny the second synod said to be of Ephesus, because you are unwilling to condemn Dioscorus.

For he, together with that whole abominable synod, approved the voice of the heretic Eutyches, deposing it there among the records: "Because I confess that there were two natures before the union, but after the union I confess one nature." If therefore before the incarnation there were two natures, that is, one of the Father, the other of the Holy Spirit (for otherwise there could not be three natures of the three), and there were then two natures of Christ before the union, therefore you introduce four natures according to your reasonings—even if not up to now, yet as having existed before the union; and you introduce the holy Trinity as having afterward been made from a pre-existing quaternity. Moreover, these natures pre-existing, as you say, before the union—if indeed you say they remain up to now—then you more truly and impiously worship a quaternity, as you say to us; because what follows from these things which are said by you, you yourselves, if you cannot deny it, [maintain].

If, however, they have not been determined up to this point, at some time your quaternity will cease to be. And we indeed have demonstrated that neither are there three natures of the Trinity, nor, if there were, would the belief in a quaternity follow for us. But you who posit this as a consequence will be conquered by your own madness; and if this displeases you, then before all things anathematize Dioscorus.

He clings [to this]. Meanwhile let us not speak of the causes of individual persons, but let us learn concerning the faith universally. But we will reserve this business for that time when we shall dispute concerning Diodorus, and Theodore, and Ibas, and Theodoret, mixing the causes of persons into the question of faith. Therefore, even if we say that there are three natures in the sacrosanct Trinity for the distinction of persons, nevertheless we confess one common substance, according to which we say the Trinity is consubstantial, and we are content not even to hear of a quaternity.

Rusticus: But that common substance is also called, without distinction, the nature of the Fathers, which is common to the three persons, and there is no other there besides this one, as though it were proper to each person. Or if, compared only with the natures of created things, this very thing is said to be proper to each person—as when we say, just as the holy Fathers also do, that God the Word, the Son of God, did not endure a nature that was not his own. Moreover, if nature and subsistence are the same, you introduce four natures and substances. But if they are different, as is evident in reality and in name, then by however much they differ, by so much the more, when counted together with the number of persons, it overflows into four—unless perhaps you would surrender to our arguments, since then there could be a quaternity if this nature of the flesh were not only a substance but also a person. But what is distinct by the inspection of the mind, in that it is not also a person, is not counted together with that Trinity to which a similar reckoning assigns it; because there there are three persons, but this is not a person, but only a nature or substance.

Heerr. But this nature of the Trinity is in those three natures; and therefore, even if one is besides those, it cannot be counted together with all of them through each individually; because existing in them and having them in itself, it is nothing besides them: for the Trinity is a unity, and the unity a Trinity.

Rusticus: How then, before the union, do you say there are two natures of the Son of God, if this common one is counted as proper to him? For what other nature did the Lord altogether have before the incarnation, except his own essence which is before the ages?

Heerr. It is of the divinity of Christ and the flesh that we say this: I say two before the union, not as though joining a nature common to men to God; for if this were so, how would there not also now be two, since certainly nonetheless each man is only a man, except for that one alone who was incarnated? Nor as though the flesh was first one thing and afterwards was united to the Word: for he who says this is a heretic. But because, foreknowing two natures by understanding, and then applying the union, we say that one is immediately made, therefore what we say before the union or after the union signifies not a distinction of time, but an order of contemplation, in that we cannot grasp the understanding of these things equally, but we fore-contemplate the simple elements in relation to the composition.

For it is impossible that the order of things in nature be one thing and the order of contemplation which is concerned with the intellect be another, just as in speech, although the nature of letters is prior, they were nevertheless invented much later.

Rusticus: This contemplation according to which you say that two natures are understood—if indeed it is now up to the present true, as resting upon things that exist—then there are truly two natures, which we behold with a true intellect. But if it is always false, then you ought not to confess two natures even before the union. If, however, it was once true before the union, but is now and henceforth false, then the Lord's flesh existed before the union—which be far from us. And if it is believed that this flesh was animated by a rational soul, then according to you a mere man existed beforehand, and afterward was united to the Word. Therefore you blasphemously claim that one Christ comes to be out of two persons, and out of two Christs, out of two sons, out of two lords. But these things must be rejected in every way; for from persons that pre-exist by themselves, a union according to subsistence cannot come about. But if even after the incarnation two natures at some time subsisted, what other union do you speak of, by which, once it has been made, they are no longer two? But also all the things you say against us, who even now say that there are two natures, turn back against yourselves; for you say that those same natures existed up to that point, which we say remain forever.

He is stuck. I maintain that some of our people put it better: that that individual humanity of Christ did not pre-exist the union, but the common human nature from which that individual is.

Rusticus: But this discourse leads you to other inconsistencies. For neither after the union has our common nature become one thing through union with God, but that individual nature which was assumed; for the Fathers say this of the latter, not of the former; nor is it possible for the common nature to make a person ever by itself. Moreover, it does not subsist in itself, but only in the understanding of rational beings, which comes about from its individuals, from which it also receives its being, just as also those things which are said to be the genera or species of all things among the wise of this world; for if it were also something else, and yet were not rational, it would not be the common nature of creatures, or what is called genus and species. Nevertheless, he who says that before the union there were two, but after the union no longer two, but rather one indiscriminately altogether from the very things which were two, wants one something to be completed; otherwise what is said no longer has a place. But now you do not say that the common nature of all men has become one with the nature of the Word, lest perhaps all men in the common nature seem to be the same as Christ, or the whole Trinity be incarnate, which is absurd.

But one individual thing, that is, one and only flesh, and one and only soul, has been united to God the Word in one person, and in one only subsistence.

He is stuck. But first the two natures must be understood, and after this the union must be removed; and therefore it must not be said that Christ is in two natures, but from two natures.

Rusticus: Therefore, according to you, the union is the destruction of the two united natures.

He is stuck. It is not the destruction of the natures, but of the duality; so that the two are now not two, but one single thing according to the union.

Rusticus: If, as you say, the duality has been destroyed, then it existed before its destruction and before the union: on which, if I wish to make the same arguments about the duality as about the two natures themselves, the incongruities mentioned above will follow again: for nothing is destroyed except what previously existed. Therefore, if it has been destroyed, then the duality existed, and all those incongruities which we mentioned before come back into play.

He is stuck. The union shut out duality beforehand, so that this very duality could not exist; and on this point I say that it destroyed it by power, not in act; for the duality was not yet perfect.

Rusticus: Therefore it destroyed not what existed, but what was still to come. Tell me, then, what imperfect thing of each nature made it so that there should be no duality. For I do not suspect you to mean a diminution of the divine nature, nor the inestimable and ineffable progress of the human nature. In what way, then, was the duality diminished, when something was added to the thing? How was the quantity of the substances shut out, when no defect of the substances occurred? But if, as you say, equivocal things are counted together, how will the two natures of the Son by power—that is, counted together with the two in act of the Father and of the Holy Spirit—not be four? But if there were never not two natures, the divinity and the humanity of Christ, how is he said to be from two natures, who is shown by confession to be from these?

Iceret. For tell me, does the Lord not have all things of two perfect persons? Therefore, just as the union shut out duality of persons so that it would not exist, so also it shut out duality of substances.

Rusticus: But our nature in Christ is not also a person; for it does not have its being in itself and separately according to itself, but subsists in the Word; and therefore it is not said to be from two persons as it is from two natures, because the Word took the person of the man to itself; but because it united human nature to itself, both the holy Fathers at Ephesus and the rest teach, and we have shown sufficiently above concerning all these things.

Haeretic: We do not deny that there are two natures, but neither do we deny one on account of the union; for this pertains to nature, but that according to the union. Therefore they are two in speculation, not according to the thing itself.

Rusticus: If this speculation is true, there are two natures also with respect to the thing itself; but if you say it is not true, behold, you have denied that there are two natures.

It sticks. What then is the difference between those who hold impious views and those who hold pious ones, regarding the point that two natures are spoken of? For if (suppose, for instance, that mere man and God the Father) there are two natures, what difference does it make whether one speaks of two natures in this way or that, provided that just as we speak of God as pure and of man as bare, so you speak of Christ, because you say there are two natures?

Rusticus: There are many things that at first sight we seem to confess in common with the impious; but by the addition of terms they become determinate, and in themselves, even if they are suspect, they are not yet impious, nor on the other hand are those things that cannot be wholly accused. So Apollinarius says one Christ, one Son, one person and substance of him; Nestorius also says two natures. And these words do not yet reveal of what sort they themselves are; but in the addition of words we recognize what they are. For Apollinarius says one, as though he were both changeable in divinity and imperfect in humanity; but Nestorius, while he joins the two natures badly—according to equivocation, according to authority, according to apposition, according to habit—also divides and separates them badly into two subsistences and persons, and sons and lords.

Therefore, when we say two natures, if nothing precedes or follows that suffices to signify the union, your suspicion will have an occasion; but if this is so, both before we say two natures and afterward we say that the person of the two natures is one, the subsistence one, inseparably, indivisibly, unchangeably, what remains beyond this that those who wish to slander might suspect?

It sticks. I reproach this, that you say two natures not after two unions but after the union; when you ought first indeed to confess two natures, then the union, and thereafter one nature. This is signified by "from two," because the union comes after these; but by "in two," because the two are after the union.

Rusticus: If both two natures are to be confessed and the union is to be brought forward, I do not see why we should not rightly say both "from two" and "in two." For if what is [said] pleases you to such a degree, say not "one Christ in two natures" but "in two natures one Christ," so that, not first naming Christ and afterward applying two natures to him, as you say, but first saying two natures, you then name one Christ. And observe that other point similarly, that you do not say "one Christ from two natures," but rather say "from two natures one Christ.

But the Church of Christ has never directed its attention to such idle babblings. For although the divinity of the Son existed beforehand from eternity, nevertheless it is sometimes named after the flesh; to such a degree does the truth suffer no prejudice from the order of words, and especially here, where the two natures and the union are simultaneous. For in the holy synod of Ephesus, among other testimonies, and indeed before the others, lies the testimony of Saint Peter, which reads as follows: "Hence also the evangelist truthfully says: The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us (John 1:14). At that time, surely, from when the angel greeted the Virgin, saying: Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with thee (Luke 1:28). Behold, from the greeting of the angel, even now the union has been accomplished." Because the true flesh is sometimes named first, and afterward the Word, the reading of the most holy Gregory shows this from that point, saying thus: "Lest men be deceived, nor let them deceive themselves, believing the man of the Lord to be without a mind, but rather our Lord and God; for we do not separate the man from the divinity." Behold, it is plainly set forth that at the beginning of the Word he first names the man, and afterward Lord and God, and again the man and the divinity. And after a few words he has again: "Passible in the flesh, impassible in the divinity; circumscribed in the body, uncircumscribed in the spirit; the same earthly and heavenly, visible and intellectual, having a head and without a head, so that by the whole man and the same God the whole man may be reformed, who had fallen under sin.

Behold how many times, with the order changed, it first named him passible, then impassible; after this, circumscribed and then uncircumscribed; and after many such things it added: so that the whole man is the same and God. But the Synod of Chalcedon, after it had said "in two natures," added, saying, "to be acknowledged indivisibly, inseparably, inconvertibly." And it did not say "to be acknowledged" as two, but one to be acknowledged. And again: "As our Lord Jesus Christ taught us, and the symbol of the Fathers handed down to us." But if, as they say, one nature has been made, then you ought to say that he is not from two natures but from three: since you even say that the union of the Word with the humanity is such as the flesh has with the soul. For what, by your concession, is closer to the soul than the flesh, than this is to the deity, so that the Lord is from two and not three?

Here he sticks. Answer us simply. Do you say that two natures existed for this purpose, that they might make one Christ, or one Christ for this purpose, that the two natures might subsist? But the two natures also formerly subsisted in other subsistences? If therefore they were not for this purpose, that they themselves might subsist, but that Christ might be, the two natures were, but now the two natures no longer exist, but only that for which both the two natures subsisted and were united, but one. Therefore Christ is not to be confessed as two natures.

Rusticus: What great madness, to think that natures do not subsist for this reason, that they subsisted in order to converge in Christ; when nothing more needs to subsist than those things which subsisted for this reason, that Christ might exist; and rather it must be confessed that the united things subsist, which existed in order to be united. Nay rather, the divinity did not subsist even in order to be united, for it is eternal; but that humanity which was united as soon as it began to exist: therefore, according to you, the humanity of Christ is now not humanity, which subsisted in order to be united. Wherefore it is manifest that the two united natures subsist. Who therefore, unless seized in mind, would now say that things which subsisted for the sake of something either are themselves now not, or are not so many; but only that for the sake of which they subsisted, when the union has destroyed nothing of either, although it has immensely exalted one; and this, when each is most perfect according to the principle of its own nature...? This is indeed similar to someone saying that these letters were made for this reason, that this word might exist; wherefore these letters are now not, but only this word? But what will be more insane than this

It sticks. Whatever else you wish to say, to return to the matter at hand, we can by no means introduce a quaternion or worship a quaternity.

Rusticus: On the contrary, because you introduce that there was a quaternity by your own reasonings, I have shown it inevitably; and indeed it was fitting to give you no answer at all, vaunting your speeches over this matter as you do. But lest it please those who rave as you do to say, "We have not been satisfied on all points," I shall add this as well: that you say there are three natures of the holy Trinity. If they differ in nothing at all, how do you recognize that they are three, when you refuse to allow that divinity and humanity, which differ so greatly, are two? For we confess that there are three subsistences for this reason, that they are distinguished by properties not in that which is according to nature, but in how each one is. For the Father indeed begot, and is not begotten; and he is not from any other, as the others are from him. But the Son was begotten, and begot nothing coeternal; and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and nothing coeternal proceeds or was begotten from him. Some of the ancients also added this to the properties: that just as the Spirit did not eternally beget the Son with the Father, so neither does the Spirit proceed from the Son as from the Father. But I confess that the Spirit did not eternally beget the Son (for we do not speak of two Fathers); yet whether he proceeds from the Son in the same way as from the Father, I have not yet fully satisfied.

Since, however, it has no bearing on what is now being asked, it must indeed be noted, but passed over.

It sticks. And for my part, for the present I do not think it useful to speak about these very matters; but to your objection against us I shall answer you briefly—indeed, I shall make you answer yourself. Those things by which you say they differ so that there are and are believed to be three persons, we say those same things differ so that there are and are believed to be three natures.

Rusticus: But the natures of Christ, which you refuse to allow to be two, differ far more than the three persons, which you even wish to be three natures.

It sticks. Why, then, are there not also four persons, as though there were altogether two persons of the Son?

Rusticus: Because the humanity of the Lord Christ is not a person, although it differs in account; but as regards God the Word, it is only a nature; for that flesh is not, as one might say, its own, but belongs to God the Word, as I have often said.

It sticks. What, then, does the humanity lack that belongs to a person—something of a rational soul, or of the flesh, or of quantity?

Rusticus: This is not your question against us, but the question of others against us and against you at the same time. There is therefore no necessity for us to refute this when speaking against you, especially since it has been shown above that God the Word did not unite a person of ours to himself, but a nature. Nevertheless, in the discourse which I wrote concerning definitions against you and the Nestorians at the same time, it was demonstrated that nature indeed represents a common species, as it is said; but a person is the concurrence of those things which describe a rational subsistence. An individual subsistence, however, is, in its proportion, like a foundation on which the rest of the things around it rest, as the name itself shows, and like the most proper cause, in which all things that are called accidents—such as color, such as character, such as habit and dispositions, and things similar to these—and their properties themselves are joined together. For once the first subject of the individual things around it has been destroyed, nothing further is possible. But in order that each thing may exist from a most proper cause—that is, that in which the whole totality itself rests—it is named from that subject which is like a foundation for the things around it; the whole consistence is called subsistence. But because, according to the account given, the subsistences of irrational beings are also customarily named, and even of insensible and inanimate things, yet all these are not said by all to be properly persons, therefore I added that this subsistence is rational.

But since some again wish to call both the species and the genera of substantial things—which are spoken of as subsistences—therefore it has been added that this subsistence is rational and individual.

Iceretus: And what does this pertain to the question at hand? For I asked why a perfect man has an imperfect person, and this I desire above all to hear.

Rusticus: For this too has been said; but because you have paid very little attention, hear why the humanity of the Lord is indeed a perfect nature, yet does not also have a person through itself; and why there are not two persons of Christ, but one only: for the cause, as you too said at the beginning of your discourse—though intending it toward something else—is that the Word is God of the assumed flesh; in whom, as in a foundation, that assumed nature, which is the form of a servant, rests: assumed for this purpose, that the Son of God, who is eternal God, might for our salvation become man in the last days. For neither could man have had his origin from a virgin, unless it pleased God to redeem us through him ineffably according to the subsistence united to himself; united, moreover, from which each of his own began to subsist into one person and one subsistence, as we have said rather often.

Therefore, even if in the imagination of the mind or in the most tenuous speculation, the humanity of the Lord Christ, once understood, seems both to be a substance and to be a person (for it has nothing less than other rational and individual subsistences); yet when understood through itself, it seems to be this, but no longer as united to the Word. Therefore it is not the truth of the thing, but a defect of the mind that compels this to be thought, existing as a kind of forgetfulness of the union. But when the mind, having been reminded, considers that what is human does not remain as it were in itself, but through union has become proper to the subsistence of God the Word, it cannot take it as a person, since that is not properly called a subsistence whose reason for subsisting, around the intellect, is something else, that is, the Word, which is eternal. For if man were a subsistence, it would not be necessary that God the Word alone should receive him in himself and establish our foundation, so to speak, in himself, but rather that man, pre-existing, should make God the Word his own and establish and found for himself what is God's; or rather that both, pre-existing, should come together with each other, and one Christ, one Son, one Lord, and one person and subsistence would not come to be, with each remaining pure in itself and pre-existing. But now the opposite has happened; therefore what is ours does not have a person.

Heret. Therefore, if these things were not united, in every way there could be two persons: because both God the Word has nothing less than a person (for just as God the Father, so also God the Word is one person), and again the perfect man, consisting of flesh consubstantial with us and, according to us, a rational soul, has nothing less than a whole person, and subsists by the union of these.

Rust. Although every individual man is a person, yet this is not the cause of its being a person in the same way as it is the cause of its being a man. But indeed, that it be a man, the cause is that it be a rational soul from the earth; but that it be a person, the cause is that it be a rational individual subsistence. But, as we have said, that humanity does not have the reality of subsistence in itself in the Word; for it was not created for this, that it should be separately its own, as we are, but that it should be united to the Word, and be his own proper and inestimable garment and, so to speak, instrument, and that God should be man, for the sake of our salvation. That cause, therefore, is rather in the subject than the subject. Just as, for example, in a pure man the cause of the flesh's subsisting is the immortal soul; when it is separated, the flesh does not remain in its own essence, but hastens unceasingly toward non-being, since it must be altogether destroyed, in whatever way it is corrupted. And again now the souls of dead men are without a body.

as he said to the Sadducees: "Because the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, is not the God of the dead but of the living: for all live to him" (Matthew 22:32). And he did not say, "the God of the soul of that one and of that one," but "the God of that one." And he did not say, "he is not the God of dead souls," but "of the living": he said simply that he is God, and that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob exist perfectly. And he added: "For all live to him" (Luke 20:38), and he did not say, "for the souls of all live to him."

Heret. He said this, not because the soul of a perfected man is a person, as if by this Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were each one whole man; but because God calls those things that are not as though they were (Romans 4:17), as it is written.

Rust. Do not interrupt the discourse inopportunely: for where mention is made of the resurrection, there he necessarily represents the immortality of souls: not as of things that are not and are called by God as though they were, because God foreknows that the things which are not yet will be, but as of things that are; for none of the wise will dare to say that souls die together with bodies, so that for this reason neither Abraham nor the rest exist, except in the foreknowledge of God. What therefore I wished to say.

just as outside the body, although it is not animated perfectly according to nature, nevertheless the person of the rational soul is perfect; and again, after it has received the body in the resurrection, the person of the man is nonetheless perfect: so in a certain manner in Christ, before the incarnation indeed the person of God the Word was perfect, and after this the person of Christ is perfect, and there is one person, God and man at once, and the cause that that humanity exists is God the Word; and this, in comparison with the Word, is not as a subject but as an accident. For as an instrument through which our salvation had to be accomplished, and as resting upon him who uses it, as we have said. Just as, therefore, when we say concerning the Apostle: The head of the woman is the man, and the head of the man is Christ, and the head of Christ is God (1 Cor.

and we do not say that a man has two heads, nor that a woman has two or three heads—that is, the man and Christ, or the man and Christ and God—because a man, when compared to a woman, is indeed a head, but when compared to Christ he is no longer a head, but something else; and again Christ, when compared to a man, is indeed a head, but when compared to God, by no means (for the Word is not the head of the Father, nor is the nature that is in him [the head] for us); so in a certain way, insofar as it is possible to explain things that cannot be compared by means of likenesses, the subject of humanity, when compared to those things that happen to it in an entirely special way, shows the proportion of its subsistence; but when compared to God the Word, it is found to be, as it were, one of the things that are present in a subsistence, not according to personal subsistence. And just as there, while the man is the head of the woman and Christ is the head of the man, nevertheless in the sequence of order, the man alone is her head, while certainly by the excellence of glory Christ alone, as being God, is [head] in respect of that which is properly the highest; so also here it appears to be the case with regard to the things that have happened to our nature, and that humanity seems to be a subsistence; but according to the highest property of subsistence, the Word alone (from whom, moreover, there is one and only one subsistence, and truly the whole Christ), or certainly the things that are in Christ, is named. If anyone, however, reads these things, let him remember that we are comparing a proportion to a proportion, insofar as it is possible, not many persons to the one and only person of Christ; otherwise, why are such great things said?

Heret. In truth, because in incomparable matters it is difficult to apply even a slight likeness.

Rust. But I say even what is greater; for there perhaps someone, relying on impudence, might say, as I think: that a woman has two or three heads (and perhaps not impiously, though incongruously); but here it is impossible to find two persons. For if there, when one and the same thing, or one thing and another, is compared, they are thought to be two heads—for each one is the head of each one—so it will be here likewise. For accidents are not related to the flesh in the flesh as they are compared to the Word, but to the flesh indeed without mediation, to God however not so; for not as though he were not incarnate. But the head of the woman is God even without mediation; for Christ is the head of the Church (Eph. 5:23). Figuratively, however, the Church is the bride; and figuratively the head of the woman is the man. And to speak simply and briefly, because I also confess that the example is not entirely apt, but I took it up not for the sake of demonstration but for the sake of explanation; if anyone finds a more apt likeness, let him say it, with me easily agreeing and willingly and gladly. But lest perhaps this too be more excellent to say: that just as the whole orb (I mean the orb of the earth), although often even alone, is yet called the whole world; and again with the whole heaven and all the elements it is called one and the only world; so let it be said also concerning that one person alone.

But if you believe that some say there are two subsistences of Christ for this reason (I mean, not as natures, but as persons), because in subtle speculations and pure intellects the humanity of Christ, contemplated by itself, seems to them capable of being thought of both as a person and as a subsistence in relation to its accidents—how is it that you yourselves deny that there are two natures of the Lord Christ, who cannot at all deny that the human nature in Christ subsists not only in subtle intellects or imaginations of the mind but also in reality itself—which nature is attested not only by that synod which is ours but also by that Ephesine synod of yours through the readings of the holy Fathers, and especially the epistles of the most blessed Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, proclaim? For you will not be able to object against us concerning nature what we say concerning person, since the definition of nature is far removed from the definition of person. For the natures of Christ, as was said above, are both the divinity common to the holy Trinity and the humanity common to all of us, contemplated in the individual; but the person and subsistence of the Lord Christ are those whose union has been celebrated. In these substances, moreover, we say that the whole and only Son of God, our Lord Christ, is one, whom we confess to be in two natures. But it can be gathered no less clearly from the synodical teachings of the holy Fathers that there are not three natures of the holy Trinity, but one only.

For if there were three natures of the holy Trinity, it would be altogether the case, as you too have said, that the divine nature of the Son also is one and indivisible. But this would be the same in all respects, and would in no way be distinguished from the eternal person of the Word of God: for it would contain nothing more or less, or in any way one thing or another, or otherwise in any respect. Wherefore, whatever we rightly say of the Son, that is, of God the Word (and this is to say of His own person, that is, of Christ), whether as before the incarnation or after it, would also be spoken orthodoxly of His nature; and whatever must be avoided in speaking of the person of the Son, the Fathers would truly shrink from saying of the nature of the Son. Just as, therefore, none of the Fathers has anywhere said at any time that the Son suffered in His own person and not in His person, so none of them would endure to say that the Son suffered in His own nature and not in His nature. But now the contrary is done: for they preach that the Son of God suffered in His own person, but the same holy Fathers deny that He suffered in His own nature.

From these things, therefore, it necessarily follows—and it has been demonstrated—that the nature of the Son is not the same as His person, but belongs to it. For if the nature of the only-begotten Son of God were so proper to Him alone that it were not common to Him with the Father and the Holy Spirit, it would necessarily follow that His nature is the same as His person. But since that by no means follows, it is evident that the nature is not proper to the Son alone, as though it were not also common to the Father and the Holy Spirit. Therefore there are not three natures of the Trinity.

Heretic. And from what source will you supply me with demonstrations that the Son of God, the Word, suffered in His own person—or whatever else of the things that happened to the flesh He took upon Himself—but did not endure in His own nature?

Rusticus. Listen patiently, and it will be shown at once; only let me bring my discourse to its end. This demonstration, then, advances the dogma of truth not only for this reason, that it commends the one and only nature of the holy Trinity, but is also in itself a cause of victory, in that it concludes that the one nature of Christ ought not to be believed, as will be declared below. But now let testimonies be brought forward from the synodal codex of the holy Fathers, and let the direct intent of our discourse be recognized.

A reading from the letter of Cyril of holy memory to Nestorius, which the holy and universal synod of Ephesus also ratified by the interlocutions of all the bishops.

These words and doctrines we ought to follow, understanding what this—being incarnate—and what this—being made man—signifies: namely, that the Word who is from God. For we do not say that the nature of the Word was transformed and became flesh, nor that it was entirely changed into a man who is of soul and body; but rather this: that the Word, uniting to Himself in subsistence a flesh animated with a rational soul, ineffably and inexplicably became man, and was called Son of man, not according to mere will or benevolence, nor by the mere assumption of a person. And because the different natures were brought together into a true union, yet there is one Christ and Son from both (not as though the difference of natures were destroyed because of the union; but rather, while we confess one Lord and Christ and Son, in divinity and humanity, through the ineffable and unutterable concurrence into union), so He is said—since He certainly has subsistence before the ages and is born of the Father—to be born according to the flesh and of a woman, not as though His own nature received in the holy Virgin the beginning of existing; nor indeed as though He needed, for His own sake, a second birth after that which is from the Father.

For it is both vain and ignorant to say that he who subsists before every age and is co-eternal with the Father needs a second principle in order to exist. But because for us and for our salvation, uniting to himself in subsistence what is human, he came forth from a woman, for this very reason he is said to have been born carnally. For it was not that a common man was first born of the holy Virgin, and only after these things the Word descended into him; but from the very womb, being united, he is said to undergo a carnal birth, as one who supplies the origin of his own flesh. Thus we say that he both suffers and rises again, not as though God the Word in his own nature underwent either the piercings of nails or other wounds—for that is impossible, since what is divine is also incorporeal. But because the body that became his own proper body suffered, he is again said to have suffered these things himself for us; for he was impassible in the body that suffered. And we understand this in a fitting measure also in Moses: for the Word of God is immortal by nature, and incorruptible, and life and life-giving.

Because again his own body, by the grace of God, as Paul said, tasted death for all, he himself is said to suffer death for us, not coming into the experience of death as regards his nature (for it is madness to say or think this); but because, as I said just now, his flesh tasted death, so too, when the flesh has been raised, his resurrection is again spoken of, not as though he had fallen into any corruption, which be far from us. And after a few things: The word of the most whole faith asserts this everywhere: thus we find the holy Fathers understood; thus they presumed to call the holy Virgin the Mother of God: not because the nature of the Word or his divinity obtained the principle of subsisting from the holy Virgin, but as the holy body, animated with reason, was born from her, to which the Word, united also according to subsistence, is said to be born according to the flesh.

Heretic. If, in addition to such great things as you have said before, you bring forward testimonies that will benefit your dogma, we too are ready to pour out the testimonies of the glorious teachers, long since sifted out; since we ought rather to follow them than to press our own conclusions.

Rusticus: We have not yet brought forward in the present work any testimony from other books, by which it is most evidently demonstrated that Christ is in two natures, but only from the synodical [writings], which you cannot refute; [we have done so] only to demonstrate that there is one sole nature or substance of the holy Trinity, which, although it is called proper to the Son of God by the Fathers, is not [said] to the exclusion of the Father and the Holy Spirit, but [to the exclusion] of all things that are created and made, and nonetheless also of that substance of man which he both created and assumed. And to show that that proper nature is not said to be the Word both begotten in time, and having suffered, and having borne either blows, or the marks of nails, or other wounds, nor to have died, as pertains to his nature, nor to have risen again; yet the Word is said to have borne a carnal birth from that very womb, being united [to it], as making the birth of his own flesh his own; and likewise the other things that are human, since that body which was made his own endured these things. Again, he himself is said to suffer for us, for he was impassible in the suffering body.

Therefore, for now, beginning with the universal and commonly confessed synodical writings, we have resolved the objections you raised and confirmed what was needed; but other matters we have scarcely touched, lest in the meantime, by mixing in those things that belong to another work, we produce confusion; yet the discussion of those readings can be reserved for another conversation without prejudice.

Heretic: I would like to learn this as well: how do you think this demonstration gives victory to those who understand what is yours, in that it proves that the nature of the Lord Christ ought not to be believed to be one through union? For you promised above that you would say this.

Rusticus: You have recalled it well to memory; I will say this too. If the nature of the Lord has been made one through union, whatever is said of the Word, of the Son, of Christ, will also be said of that nature; and again, whatever is said of that nature, as you say, will assuredly also be predicated of those names; and this not in another manner. Therefore, just as it is abominable to say that God the Word suffered in his own nature, so, if perhaps you presume, avoid saying that he suffered in himself or in his person or in his subsistence. Or, as you say, "not coming into the experience of the mother as it pertains to his nature," transfer this by saying: as it pertains to his own person and to himself, the Son did not die.

But since it is fitting to speak from these points, since he [Nestorius] affirmed the nature and substance of the Word: so let it be said by you—not that the subsistence of the Word is the same, nor the person, nor the Son himself, nor this only-begotten one, nor the same Lord, nor Christ himself; but you cannot deny that those who say these things introduce two sons, since he knew that Nestorius, by saying such things, was accused as a preacher of two sons; for he says (on account of which he is also condemned) thus: "I do not call this one of two months and three months God"; and again: "The nourishment of milk ought not to be attributed to God." And in his letter to the most holy Cyril, he said that the holy Virgin is the mother of Christ, not of God: "But it is manifest that David the son was not God the Word." And again indeed: "The body, the temple of the divinity of the Son, and a temple united according to some supreme and divine conjunction, so that it also appropriated to itself the things that belonged to the divine nature, is good to confess and worthy of the evangelical traditions." And again in what follows immediately, the same Nestorius denies what he confessed here.

For he added these things also in continuation: "But to assign to the name of propriification both the properties of the flesh (I mean generation and mortification), or those of one who errs—brother, among the pagans or gentiles—and of the mind; or those of one sick through the things that belong to the mad Apollinarius and Arius or other heresies; indeed, something even more serious, and from those men: for it is necessary that those who are drawn by the name of propriification make God the Word a partaker of milk-nourishment through propriification, and a sharer in the growth that comes about gradually, and in the time of the passion one who was in need of angelic assistance because of the fear that came upon him."

He clings [to this]. And what especially do you censure in these things, you who up to now assert the properties of the natures and duality itself to be preserved? For if these things were said according to the truth, then God is not to be called a three-month-old, nor nourished on milk, nor born of the Virgin in recent time, nor is he the son of David himself, nor did he suffer, nor was he put to death in the flesh, nor did he grow gradually, nor did he otherwise receive in himself the properties of the flesh through dispensational propriification.

Rusticus the deacon: I say what we censure, not we first, but together with the holy Fathers. First, indeed, I say it by way of passing over, he spoke very badly, because he assigns to the nature of the divinity the things that belong to the temple: for it is not the nature of the Trinity, but one person of that nature existing, that makes its own the things that belong to the flesh. Secondly, however, because in whatever way he signifies that God the Word makes his own the things proper to the flesh; and when he ought to explain this, he rather denied this very thing in what he said afterward. For if, as he says, God makes his own the things that belong to the flesh through a dispensational propriification, one ought rather to assign to the name of propriification also the properties of the flesh: I mean generation, and passion, and mortification, and others. But he by no means approves this now, but even (being contrary to himself) accuses it as heretical and gentile, and as something still worse. For why, indeed, did God, who was made man, make his own the things that belong to his own temple, if they cannot also be said of him, to the wonder of his love toward us? For what is greater, that those things become the Word's own, or that they be said? But confessing that the properties of the natures are preserved, we likewise nonetheless affirm the duality of those natures: because just as their distinction is preserved, so also is their union. Hence the things that are not proper to the Word according to nature belong to him with respect to the union, even if the impious one has refused this many thousands of times.

For the properties are indeed preserved, but they converge into one person and one subsistence. Therefore Valerianus in the synod accuses him not only as an impious Nestorius, but also as one contrary to himself, saying: "The contrariety of the revered Nestorius is evident to all, as he dissents not only from the faith of the holy Fathers who convened at Nicaea and from the letter of the most God-beloved and most holy archbishop Cyril, but is not even consistent with himself." Similarly, the most holy pope Celestine wrote to the same Nestorius, saying: "We have therefore read the tenor of the letters, and those books which we received when the illustrious man, my son Antiochus, delivered them: in these you were tracked down, caught, and held fast by us, that you were slipping in a kind of loquacity, while you wrap true things in obscure words, again confounding both, either confessing what you denied, or striving to deny what you confessed."

What you have said about propriification and union is truly orthodox, and directly opposed and, as it were, face to face with the wordiness of Nestorius; but in the rest, I think that you have brought forward the same things as that man whom you greatly accuse.

Rusticus: Far be it, O you who have been taught to slander! For pressing on with the argument already stated, we shall further tear down what is yours, and by proving it we shall show our right faith. For if he who says that the very God the Word, who is consubstantial with the Father, who is the Only-begotten, and who cannot be compared to the things that were made through him—(was begotten according to the flesh, was made man from the Virgin), was not nourished with milk, did not grow, was not made a two-month-old and a three-month-old, did not suffer, did not die, did not rise again: if, then, I say, he who says these things produces two sons and two Christs, then he who says that the same Lord did not have a beginning from the Virgin according to his Godhead, nor was he suckled according to his own nature, nor grew, nor was made a two-month-old and a three-month-old, nor suffered, nor died, nor rose again, nor [did] the rest—adding these things, surely, according to his own nature—introduces two natures in every way. Just as, therefore, we rightly abominate the things we have said above, so we fittingly embrace the things now said; because just as those things overturn the definitions of the Fathers, so these receive them: whence you are condemned by your own judgment.

For in that you abominate and subject to persecution those who say, or who are thought to say, that one is God the Word and another the man assumed by him who was born of the Virgin, who was formed in the Virgin, who is one of us, who was united to God the Word in a certain supreme and ineffable conjunction from the very moment of conception—in that, therefore, you rise up altogether fervently against those who say such things, and as though they were barking dogs you ceaselessly anathematize them, so that if anyone wishing to favor such men should be seen, no punishment is thought unworthy of him among you, as though he were saying that Christ is a mere man, or were introducing, as it were, two sons; yet you yourselves, and those in communion with you, saying that one is the human nature of Christ and the other his divine nature, and hearing that this was confessed by the Fathers whom you claim to follow, nevertheless abominate confessing two natures of the Lord Christ after the union. You therefore seem to me to be condemned on the day of judgment by the very condemnation of Nestorius. For if you justly hate Nestorius altogether, as one who by such words introduced two sons, why do you, saying these very things about the natures, not confess that you preach two natures? And certainly you not only say these things about the natures, but also name them oftener in the plural, and even confess that those who so named them are equal, which Nestorius is not recorded to have done with the name of Christ or of the Son or of the Lord.

How is it, then, that you who say these things about the natures are so blinded that you do not say what you confess? And how is it that you curse Nestorius, as though he had introduced two Christs, because he preached such things about God the Word and the man? And, to speak briefly, this argument is found invincible against you, whichever part of it we wish to examine. By us, therefore, Nestorius is justly condemned; but by you unjustly, and with him your own opinion has been condemned. Wherefore we too, when we condemn Nestorius, pronounce anathema against you; and you yourselves, as often as you condemn him, the same falls back upon you; and when you hurl this against us, as against Nestorians, as though we were slanderers and altogether hateful; and when from us against your heresiarchs (I mean Apollinarius, Eutyches, and Dioscorus) such a reckoning proceeds, on the contrary you irrefutably and frequently succumb to the same sentence.

Heretic: I cannot communicate with that synod which says that the Lord's becoming man is outside the Trinity. For in what is called its definition, it is stated concerning the creed of the Fathers: for it teaches the perfect things concerning the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and it sets forth the Lord's becoming man to those who faithfully receive it. For surely one who teaches the perfect things concerning the Son sets forth concerning his becoming man, not outside and beyond the Trinity as though concerning some fourth thing, but in that very place; but they, after they had spoken of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, then introduced another Lord, as it were, and his becoming man.

Rusticus: It was shown long ago that it is not introducing a fourth in any way whatever, outside, and making a speech outside the consubstantiality of the holy Trinity and concerning the becoming man of the Word of God; but you have by no means noticed all these things that have been approved. For the synod of Ephesus said: "For the case is the reverse in the Savior from what it is in the Trinity: for there, one and another, so that we do not confuse the subsistences, but not one thing and another; let it be absent; for there is one, three, and the same in the divinity; but in the Lord, one thing and another by which Christ is, since indeed this is not the same for him." You are therefore greatly blinded as to the truth, and you do not wish to accept those things which the synod of Ephesus approved more clearly than the synod of Chalcedon. For it is one thing to speak of the common substance of the Trinity, and another of the proper attributes of one person, and this of the servant, which there is a form not consubstantial.

Heretic: Who can accept a synod that approves the tome of the Icon, saying concerning the Word and the flesh, among other things, also this: "Of these, one shines forth with miracles, the other succumbs to injuries." What then? Tell me, was God not injured by the flesh? Did the Word not work miracles through the flesh? But what does that separation mean, that it says this of one and that of the other?

Rusticus: We by no means deny that God the Word was injured by the flesh; but he does not succumb to injuries, that is, he is not inferior to injuries and passions, but was stronger. His flesh was not only injured, but also succumbed to insults and suffered. For being by nature passible, it also died, and death, which serves God, ruled over it. But God the Word, having become man, is said to suffer because of the union, appropriating to himself the things that belong to the passible nature, through the dispensation of vivification, as I have already said before, yet he did not suffer as the flesh did. For if the impassible one simply suffered, impassibility is superfluous; for to what other purpose does impassibility profit, except that what is impassible should in no way suffer? If therefore in God nothing is superfluous or useless, but all things are perfect and beautiful and fitting, it is clear that his impassibility also is not useless; therefore he did not suffer.