Contra Acephalos Disputatio

IN THE YEAR OF THE LORD 549. RUSTICUS, DEACON OF THE HOLY ROMAN CHURCH.

THE DISPUTATION OF RUSTICUS AGAINST THE ACEPHALI.

PREFACE.

I, indeed, knowing my sins and my needs and my measure, have often proposed to honor silence above dogmatizing, especially since the things that pertain to Christians have never been so disturbed as in our times: first, indeed, because no one emulates the studies of the ancients, but they discuss the outcome; and they do not confess themselves to be sons of those who long ago rested in the Lord, but set themselves up as judges, adding to these as many calumnies as cannot be counted. And this, as must be said, is so among all the Acephali; but among those who have newly arisen, chiefly among the laity alone: to whom also those who are called bishops and presbyters and deacons, and the rest of the clergy, and the monks—some through error, some through avarice, some through ambition, but rather all of them through every evil—have to such a degree cast away the liberty and confidence and sound zeal of Christians, that, as far as they are concerned, they have left no hope of correction any longer. But with these the whole virtue of Christians has departed, while no one truly cares for what is common and belongs to the Lord Christ, nor reckons it worthy of a word: but all pursue their own interests (Phil. 2:21), more keenly than they ever did at any time, and they place all their hope upon those through whom they hope to enjoy these things abundantly.

That these things are true, the facts themselves bear witness: for every trace of virtue has departed, and a whole flood of wickedness has submerged the Roman state. Therefore, setting these things before my mind, I judged that I must indeed abstain from abominations of this kind, and devote myself to tears alone, and unceasingly endure the divine sentence, which has long since often and mightily thundered from on high against many. But what am I to say—that I should forsake the world, though in will altogether eager, yet in strength most weak? The only thing left for me is to hope in your prayers. I shall return, therefore, to what I have proposed. As I anxiously pondered these things and things like them, zeal indeed did not rest, but reason on the contrary suggested: Why are you constrained, O man, and why do you suppose that all must be despaired of, looking only at human impieties and forgetting the divine will? Consider him who often raises up again things despaired of, who as the Lord has so many times given life to the dead; for he who died for the ungodly (Rom 5:6) does not now have to despise his whole creation. And the world indeed brings forth what is its own, and inclines toward its own end, turning away from its Maker; but the merciful Lord will not for that reason cease to show what is his own. Do you in the meantime not hide what has been entrusted to you, whether the ten talents (Mt 25:25) or one very small portion; lest he, coming afterward, require the interest on his own money.

Then let it be known from this that neither many, nor few, nor anyone at all will assent to these things that are said, either so as not to fall or so as to return to the faith of the Lord Christ. But when that which we suspect is worse than all things has come to pass, you will have suffered no loss; indeed, as though you had fulfilled all things, you will receive crowns: for the most upright and most valiant judge—or rather the most merciful—judges causes not by their outcome, but by the will and intention. Therefore, since from every side every excuse for keeping silent is entirely closed to you, and an unfading reward is set before you for not keeping silent, if you keep silent, you will condemn yourself utterly to punishment. For the accusations of those who do wicked things are not to be feared; they have been shown to be the procurers of boundless blessedness for the Lord. Nor are the exiles or imprisonments, and the various afflictions and diverse distresses, that are inflicted on you by those who forbid you, to be feared—for they are not equal to the terror of hell. Remember that you are a Christian and a deacon, and this of the Church of the whole highest universe. If the burden of the order is unbearable, why did you in any way undertake the dignity? Once made a deacon, you are bound to God by its vows; otherwise you ought first to have refused, and to have kept peace with your adversary concerning a rank of this kind, inquiring whether you with ten thousand could overcome the twenty thousand of the adversary. These things and similar ones compel me to write, as I am able.

For the rest, it will be your task in speaking—if the utterance of a man who scarcely presumes on the soundness of the faith alone is any good—not from ill will (far be it), but because I am certainly conscious of my own weakness. My intention, therefore, is to gather together those things which have been read or even said more often in conversations, both at Constantinople and at Alexandria in Egypt, or at Antinoopolis in the Thebaid and in the adjacent places, whether by me or by others, defending the definition of the faith of the holy synod of Chalcedon, and to fit them against the questions of the adversaries which I have likewise discovered, adding what is fitting only for the completion and firmness or adornment of the discourse. But so that there may be a distinction between the questions and the solutions, the proper person is marked beforehand for each of the things that are said: for those things which are ours, ORTHODOX; for those which are theirs, HERETIC, as the matters themselves stand and as will be shown in the book that follows; with this custom preserved also in this matter, that not all things which are said by such people are of that sort. For indeed, even starting many times from those things which we confess in common, they attempt to demonstrate the things that are their own. But lest we again confuse the discourses by the same distinction, yet so that it may run continuously through the memory of the readers, only two persons have been distinguished in opposition.

DISPUTATION.

The convenience of the place and time for those sitting together, and the common arrangement, and the leisure from other matters meanwhile with us—as I may say with God's favor—have all come together at once. Therefore, as you promised, ask whatever you wish, fittingly, about the matters in dispute between us; we shall keep to these with all patience and a good conscience. Remember, moreover, that it is equally fitting, without any wordiness, to set forth the matters themselves in words as far as possible: I saying that one and the same Son of God, son of man, our Lord Jesus Christ, is recognized in two natures; and you, however it may please you.

Heretic. If you say that Christ is two natures, and not one composed nature, and the most blessed Virgin gave birth to Christ, then she gave birth to two natures. She will therefore be called, from the natures she gave birth to, Mother of God and Mother of man—in the manner of the most impious Nestorius, who, thinking them of equal worth, preferred to call the Virgin by two names for one, that is, Mother of God and Mother of man, rather than by one name, that is, Mother of Christ, not Mother of God. Furthermore, by dividing the name, Nestorius spoke of her as Mother of God and Mother of man. But Cyril of holy memory called her Mother of God only. Those, therefore, who say that there are two natures of Christ are fittingly called Nestorians.

Rusticus. Consequently you confound yourselves throughout in every respect, unwilling to distinguish the natures of the Lord Christ. For it is more necessary for you to say that she is the Mother of God and the Mother of a man—to say nothing for the moment about the quality of the words. For if Christ is one composite nature, and this nature was born of the Virgin, and this same nature is God and man, then the Virgin bore God and man, and is she named both Mother of God and Mother of a man? If, therefore, on this account you call us Nestorians, you too will not lack this name. For we do not believe that this composite nature, as you say, means you call it God alone or certainly pure God; for those who so call Christ God as not also to confess him man, you do not judge to be of your faith. But neither do I think you suppose the nature of God to be composite.

Haereticus. We say she is the Mother of God only; for it was chiefly on this account that the most blessed Cyril pressed hard upon Nestorius.

Rusticus. What then? To remove the word "Mother of a man," is it shown that blessed Cyril used this word, or for something else? Tell us, then, whether it was to demonstrate one Son, the Lord Christ, one person, one substance.

Haereticus. To demonstrate one Christ, the Lord, the Son, one person, one subsistence, and a composite nature.

Rusticus. Therefore, according to you, is this nature God only, for whose sake she is called only Mother of God?

Haereticus. Not God only, but God incarnate.

Rusticus. Why, then, did she who bore these things not receive the name of mother from God and flesh?

Haereticus. Because God is the cause of the flesh, who, when he wished to dispense our salvation, took up as he willed that through which he might accomplish what he willed. Therefore both the nativity and the other miracles and the words and the passion and all things, to speak briefly, are to be attributed to God the Word through the flesh, who for these things was incarnate.

Rusticus. So then, are these things to be reckoned to God in such a way that they are denied to belong to the humanity, or in all other ways, or are these things also to be said of the man or of the flesh?

Heretic. All things are to be reckoned to God alone, not because they have accrued to one who is pure, but to the incarnate one himself.

Rusticus. But many of the holy Fathers have confessed that the things which belong to the humanity or to the flesh ought not to be separated from him, just as the most blessed Cyril did in his synodical letters, and the holy synod of Ephesus in the testimonies of the Fathers, which it inserted into its own acts to confirm its right faith, decreeing that certain things which belong to the flesh are to be assigned to the person of God the Word because of the union, yet in such a way that we confess them to be proper to the flesh.

Heretic. Give, if indeed you can, testimonies consonant with these things which you yourself have said, with the reservation, of course, for as long as the occasion demands, of those things which we shall bring forward for our own doctrine. But first, if you can, assign the reasons why all things dispensed through the flesh are not to be reckoned to God alone, as we showed above.

Rusticus. Because it is neither true nor fitting; indeed, beyond that, it is harmful. It is not true, because you presume to say that none of these things came to the incarnate God, nor according to the fact that he is God only; nor is it fitting that God be less than the Father as flesh, nor that he was not mortal, nor that he did not exist before Mary, nor that he took the beginning of existence from her, nor that God was divided by death into two parts, that is, with the body, or the soul separately. For if we attribute to the incarnate Word all things that are of the flesh, either as though they are present, or as though they are absent, as if they were not his, the Word of God is found to be neither equal nor consubstantial nor undifferentiated nor coeternal with the Father, nor immutable before the resurrection; but [he is found to be] from the substance, and from the substance of the Virgin, which is other than that which is the Father's. But he will also be found to be proclaimed both man and flesh, and through these that the flesh was incarnate and that man was made man. But if we say in turn that the things which are of the Word are of the flesh, it is concluded that man indeed is consubstantial and equal with God and the Father; but God is less than the Father. And from these things, for the rest: because the flesh is better than the Word, and the Word is less when compared to its own flesh; and moreover, because the Father is greater than the flesh, the Word is less; therefore the Father is much greater than the Word, and even more so than the angels themselves.

Rusticus. Since I am able to say many similar things, I leave to your understanding the task of gathering the boundless multitude and magnitude of incongruities—or rather, of impieties.

He is stuck. Therefore nothing that belongs to the flesh belongs to God, nor is anything that belongs to God [the property] of the flesh! And where have those things that belong to the divine Scriptures gone for us? Where are those things that belong to the holy synod of Ephesus—or rather, of Nicaea? Where are all the writings of the most renowned Cyril, equally?

Rusticus. Remember, excellent sir, that I did not say that we ought to say absolutely none of the things that belong to the Word are [said] of the flesh, nor conversely; but [I said] that not all [should be said]. So do not bring false accusations. But let us return to the matter at hand. If, then, as is clear from these [remarks], this indiscriminate manner of applying all names is useless and harmful, it nevertheless also requires its own page [of treatment]. For if we are saved not only by believing but also by confessing—just as our faith is marked in the heart or mind, not by words but by realities and definitions, so too it ought to proceed from the lips; for what is done otherwise is fraud and pretense, and this is inevitably harmful. If, therefore, in every way the eternal Word is as the Father, and the same Word of God is impassible and immutable as the Father, let these things be said not only with a similar word but with the same word and reality at once. For that is called immutable which cannot be otherwise.

But concerning that of which this is impossible, it neither turned nor suffered nor began; for the conviction is unavoidable: mutable things are changed, and passible things suffer. Therefore, in whatever way a thing suffers, in that respect it is passible; and what is turned is turnable; what dies is mortal; what grows is growable; and all these things do not keep impassibility or immutability from heaven.

He is stuck. Can you show me these things from the confessions of the holy Fathers, and especially from the holy synods—that is, the one that convened at Nicaea and the one at Ephesus—and from what the most renowned Cyril wrote?

Rusticus. Indeed, there are demonstrations of these things. But if you want this too, it will be done after a few points; meanwhile, a few things must still be said concerning the first question. If, therefore, Adam, conquered by the devil, introduced corruption into our race, it was necessary that the devil be conquered again through a man, so that we might be able to enjoy participation in incorruptibility. But since our nature, being weak and subject to slavery and corruption, was not able to accomplish this by itself, it was necessary that this be assumed by the Lord; and again, that this be done without our nature was neither fitting nor did God will it.

For he had not proposed to conquer the devil by violence—otherwise he would have done this by all means as one pure—but he willed to bestow victory through a man who had been conquered; which could not have come about more fittingly than through this most beautiful union, if indeed in so great a mystery we believe that to be fulfilled which either could only be done, or could not be more beautifully celebrated. Therefore what could not be accomplished without God, this same thing ought not to have been carried out without man; nor was God able—he who wills nothing to be except what ought to be; and therefore all things of this kind are God's alone, as if he himself were not also man, it is not permitted to say. All such things, therefore, must be confessed as belonging to one and the same person, of God and of man; or those things must be said to be God's in such a way that we do not remove them from being said of the man as well. Therefore it is not the blasphemy of Nestorius to call the mother of Christ the mother of God, in that it is the same to call her the mother of God and of man; but to deny that she is Theotokos is heretical, since both the divinely inspired Scripture says it, and this more than once: the mother of Jesus (John 2:1; 19:25; Acts 1:14); and, from her was born Jesus who is called Christ (Matthew 1:16). Moreover, if indeed he whom she bore is God, she is rightly called Theotokos; and because he who was born is Christ, she is rightly called Christotokos. But I think that whatever account is given of this name, it will be either the same as that one, or rather that one's.

Furthermore, if she who is the mother of God is not the mother of Christ, then Christ—which God forbid—will not be God, by the converse reasoning. For if one who confesses her as Christotokos and denies her as Theotokos does not call Christ God, then one who confesses her as mother of God and rejects her as mother of Christ likewise denies that Christ is God. Moreover, it is good to confess her as mother of Christ to such an extent that it is not pious to deny her as mother of God: so that even Nestorius himself, calling her mother of Christ but denying her as mother of God, was not condemned on account of what he had said, but because he had added it. Moreover, not all things that are said by heretics are wicked; but what the evil things of Nestorius are appears from the contradictions of the blessed Cyril which are contained in his letters to him, which the most holy Pope Celestine of great Rome received as his own.

Heretic: Although I have many things to say in response to the foregoing, I do not wish to prolong the discourse, for this would perhaps be both useless and laborious. But one thing I briefly demand: that it be demonstrated to me from canonical testimonies whether those things which happened to the flesh of the Word of God, as you say, ought to be said of his humanity, just as he who spoke before said.

Rusticus: You have asked well, for both order demands this and therefore it will be stated next from the letter of the most holy Cyril, archbishop of Alexandria, to John of holy memory, archbishop of great Antioch, through which the universal peace of God's holy Churches was touched: "We confess therefore our Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, perfect God and perfect man from a rational soul and body; before the ages indeed from the Father according to divinity, but in the last days for our salvation born of the Virgin Mary according to humanity; the same consubstantial with the Father according to divinity, and consubstantial with us according to humanity: for the union of two natures has been made, on account of which we confess one Christ, one Son, one Lord. Concerning this understanding of the unconfused nativity we confess the holy Virgin to be the mother of God, because God the Word was incarnate and became man, and from the very conception chose for himself from her as a temple what was received from her. But the evangelical and apostolic voices concerning the Lord, we know that the men inspired by God sometimes make them common, as in one person; but sometimes divide them, as in two natures; and sometimes deliver them in a manner befitting God, according to the divinity of Christ; but sometimes humble things, according to humanity. Approaching these holy voices of yours, you find that we ourselves also think thus (for there is one Lord, one faith, one baptism [Eph.

...we have glorified the God of all, the Savior, rejoicing with one another, because the Churches, both those among us and those among you, hold a faith consonant with the God-inspired Scriptures and the tradition of our holy Fathers. These things were indeed said by him also in his letter to Nestorius; from that letter we shall fit together for testimony below whatever pertains to this same matter, being suited to the understandings already stated; but now I will put an end to my discourse. Since, therefore, you slander us as though, by saying two natures of our Lord Jesus Christ and thereby necessarily introducing one who is the mother of God and of man, we were introducing a heretical doctrine, I have been compelled to demonstrate that not even this which is introduced by way of consequence is heretical—which by divine grace we have accomplished suitably.

Heretic: How many, then, are the substances of the one Christ?

Rusticus: Two.

Heretic: Why?

Rusticus: Because Christ is consubstantial in two whole, that is, perfect, natures.

Haeret. Therefore there are also two, or certainly many, who are Christs, or many persons, because Christ is consubstantial with many persons.

Rusticus. But the number of natures always receives a correspondence, or answers, or is equated, to things consubstantial; but the number of persons does not likewise correspond. For God the Father is consubstantial with two persons, yet the Father is not two persons; and similarly also the Son, and likewise the Holy Spirit. And each one of us is one person; yet he is consubstantial with innumerable persons.

Haeret. But neither, because Christ is consubstantial with two natures, are there therefore two natures; for each thing is not so great in number as the things that are consubstantial with it; otherwise, show something that has as many natures as the things that are consubstantial with it have — which is what is being asked.

Rusticus. I and you, or any man whatsoever, or any angel whatsoever, is both of one nature and consubstantial with one nature, and each individual animal likewise.

Haeret. But you must show that one [person] is consubstantial with many natures.

Rusticus. If any thing were consubstantial with two perfect natures, or with more existences, this thing would in every way equate its consubstantial [natures] to the number of its natures, because it is not one; many things equal the number of many. From this it is clearly shown that Christ also equates the consubstantial natures to the number of his natures; but if each of the remaining things is consubstantial with each nature, and each is of one nature, this does not in the least refute this reasoning for me: for nonetheless each equates its consubstantial [natures] to the number, or rather the quantity, of its nature; for it has not less of one on account of the natural quantity of consubstantials; and this not because it is less in quantity from one. Since, therefore, Christ is consubstantial with those who are in two natures, that is, both with the Father and with us, and every consubstantial thing co-equates the natural quantity of consubstantials, Christ therefore co-equates the natural quantity of consubstantials. But there are nonetheless two natures of things consubstantial with Christ, and therefore there are nonetheless two natures or substances of Christ. But this is to be proved from the very name of substance: for Christ is said to be consubstantial both with the Father and also with us; but co-personal neither with him nor with us.

Just as, therefore, if he were compersonal with both the Father and the Holy Spirit and also with us, he would certainly not be one person, but more; so, because he is consubstantial both with them and with us, his nature is not one but two; or rather, Christ is consubstantial with persons, not with natures. Nevertheless, he is confidently not compersonal with these, but consubstantial. But what is consubstantial, if not of the same nature in all respects? Therefore, whoever contends that things which are of different natures are consubstantial with persons, not with natures, contends not with the mind but with bare words. Therefore let us weave the argument thus: if Christ is consubstantial with the persons of two natures, or certainly if Christ is consubstantial with those persons who are in two natures; but everything consubstantial is in as many natures as is whatever is consubstantial with it: therefore Christ is in two natures; for as many are the things that are consubstantial with him.

He is stuck. It was said in a dispensation and condescension before peace by our most holy and blessed father Cyril, in the letter to John, that he is consubstantial with us according to humanity; otherwise, if this is not true, show other testimonies of him saying that Christ is most like us in the nature of humanity.

Rusticus: Therefore dispensation and hypocrisy differ in nothing from each other; and it will be the same according to the same, and at once both good and evil.

He is stuck. But if these things differ, show it.

Rusticus: If one who condescends is only exulting, what more will he be able to exult who remits nothing and conquers? I ask you, read the very beginnings of that letter, and cease resisting the truth; for soon they will destroy your whole suspicion. For condescension does not bring perfect joy, as being something that is not properly done on account of that which is principally sought, but on account of the weakness of the infirm.

He is stuck. We have the hypomnestic letters of that most holy Father, in which he indicates that he wrote to the Easterners in a condescending manner for the sake of peace.

Rusticus. First, there is a great doubt whether these letters are his; and if they are his, whence is it manifest that such passages were not fabricated, when certainly from the beginning, having been brought forward by Eutyches, they were not accused by many as fictitious? But if they are not even fictitious, whence is it certain that it was not rather this very thing that is brought forward by you that was said in a dispensational and condescending manner, especially since he himself knew that the Church of God does not attend to familiar writings, nor to hypomnestic ones, nor to those which are made for one individual and a household, but to those which are written to synods or by synods, dogmatically and publicly and definitively, concerning matters that come into question. This is clear, because when transmitting these letters, that is, his own and those of the Easterners, concerning peace, to the see of the Roman Church, he took care that they be confirmed by the most holy Xystus; but of the things that are said by you, he made nothing manifest to the first apostolic see.

He is stuck. Therefore did Xystus confirm the letters of union and their contents?

Rusticus. Not only did he confirm them in writing, and that with great joy, but he even added this in his reply to Cyril of holy memory: "Since he never savored things similar to Nestorius, but from the beginning our most holy brother John was orthodox, although he once suspended his own opinion, so that he did not condemn Nestorius with us." He adds moreover, saying: "Because we did well, who defined nothing against him prematurely; for the harvests of our joys are clear," and very many such things. But if you wish, we will set down the very words.

He is stuck. This too must indeed be done; yet if you have a demonstration that in other discourses as well something of this sort was said by him in synodical fashion, demonstrate it; otherwise it is manifest that it was said condescendingly, in order to gain the Easterners.

Rusticus. Saving what has been said above for me, let this also be done from the synod of the holy Fathers who assembled at Ephesus. The holy Augustines: "Our salvation was not made a phantasy, nor of the body alone; but the salvation of the whole man was truly made: therefore the human nature, that which is from Mary according to the divine Scriptures, was also truly that of the Savior.

From the same synod, the testimony of Saint Theophilus: He did not come to us as one receiving the body of some precious heavenly material, but in the vessel he showed the greatness of his art, restoring man formed from clay, himself proceeding as a man of new beauty from the virgin; changing indeed the manner of his birth, but in all things showing to us a likeness that is not to be shunned, apart from sin. From the same synod, the testimony of Saint Ambrose: Let vain questions about words therefore be silent, since the kingdom of God, as it is written, is not in the persuasion of human speech, but in the demonstration of power (2 Cor 4). Let us preserve the distinction between divinity and flesh: the one Son of God speaks in both, because both natures are in the same one; the same one speaks, but he does not always speak in one and the same manner. Attend to him: now indeed the glory of God, now truly the sufferings of a man; because as God he teaches divine things, because he is the Word; but as man he teaches human things, because he was speaking in my substance.

It follows. If God and flesh are not one and the same nature according to the union, then one nature of Christ will be God, and the other merely man. But that one nature according to which he is God is not consubstantial with us; therefore God is not consubstantial with us. If, then, Christ is indeed consubstantial with us, but God is not consubstantial with us, then Christ, which God forbid, is not God.

He always traps man in such a precipice by his own fallacy, so that he is caught in his own snares. For if the humanity of Christ is that according to which Christ is man, and this is not consubstantial with the Father, then man is not consubstantial with the Father. If, then, Christ is consubstantial with the Father, but man is not consubstantial with the Father, then Christ is not man. Furthermore, if this syllogism is true, we shall conclude similarly concerning God: for if the substance of Christ's divinity, according to which he is God, is not consubstantial with us, then God is not consubstantial with us. If, then, Christ is consubstantial with us, but God is not consubstantial, there will follow the incongruity already stated above, by which it is said that Christ is not God. Therefore, according to your idle babblings, either the nature of Christ's divinity will be consubstantial with us, or Christ, which God forbid, will not be God; or again, either the humanity of Christ will be consubstantial, or Christ, which God forbid, will not be man.

Therefore nothing has been concluded in that way.

He objects. If there are two natures of Christ, each will be what it is and nothing else; and therefore humanity will be humanity only, and not also God. But God will be God only and not man: therefore Christ is pure God and pure man.

He is refuted. It is not the same thing, you slanderer, for something to be only this and to be pure this. For your soul is only a soul and nothing else; yet it is incarnate and is not bare of the body, and your body is only a body; yet it is also animate. But if humanity is not humanity only, but also divinity; and divinity is not divinity only, but also humanity: therefore divinity and humanity are made human, and divinity and humanity have united divinity and humanity to themselves; and therefore humanity, according to these things, is made human, and divinity is united to God.

He objects. If one nature of Christ is God, and the other is man; but the one is not the same as the other: then neither are God and man the same: how, therefore, according to you, is Christ one?

Rusticus: Your cunning has been detected; for the same word signifies either a person or a nature. Therefore we say that Christ is the same God and man, but that the nature is not the same. Therefore Christ is one [person], not one [thing], as we say simply; but he is one in person, not simply one. Therefore he is one [person], not one [thing]; one thing and another thing, but not one person and another person—far be it.

Heretic: How this can be, I in no way see; for everything that is another [person] is also another [thing].

Rusticus: I am indeed another [person] than you, but not another [thing]; for there is one thing according to which you are a man and according to which I am a man. But my soul is another thing than your body, and your soul than my body; and my soul in my body, and yours in yours, is understood as something other, however these are compared to one another. For "another person" belongs more to the differences of persons, but "one thing and another thing" to natures. For if your soul is compared to your body, it is not another man, but another thing.

Heretic: Nay rather, he is most rightly called both another and a different thing. For who is the outer man in the Apostle, which is corrupted, and the inner man, which is renewed (2 Cor 4:16)? Therefore every other is also another, and again every another is also an other. For I am another than an angel, but also a different thing; and he is in turn both another and a different thing from me; and so each person will find it, if he enumerates each particular.

Rusticus: Whether what you have said is true, let us inquire, if it seems good, from those things which are related to one another. For since this one is related to one as this other is to this other thing, or to this different thing; and this one is related to this other as one is to another thing. If, therefore, "one" is not always the same as "one [person]," then "another thing" will not always be "another [person]"; and conversely, not every "one [person]" is also "one [thing]," nor is every "one [thing]" also "one [person]." The same follows concerning that which is "another [person]" and that which is "another thing." But the Lord distinguished all these things in the Gospel, saying: I and the Father are one (John 10:30); nowhere saying, "We are one person," but rather, on the contrary, he said, "I am." Again he says: If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true: there is another who bears witness of me, and I know that the witness which he bears of me is true (John 5:31-32). And who this was, he afterwards added, saying: The Father who sent me, he bears witness of me (John 5:37).

And concerning the Holy Spirit he says: If you love me, keep my commandments; and I will ask my Father, and he will give you another Paraclete, that he may abide with you forever: that Spirit of truth (John 14:15-17). He did not say, another consoling spirit, but another Paraclete.

Heretic: These things pertain to the fact alone that the Father and the Son are one, and that the Father is one and the Son another, not however to the fact that he is not one, nor to the fact that he is not one thing and another thing. Therefore, since four propositions were set forth, you have demonstrated only two, namely, that the Father and the Son are one, and that the Father is other than the Son, and the Holy Spirit. It remains, therefore, unproven that the Father is not one thing and the Son another thing, and that the Father is not himself the Son. These things, then, you ought rather to show by testimonies, especially since the Father and the Son are said to be one; for God is one.

Rusticus: And even if the things already set forth have demonstrated what you ask—both that what is one is not another, and that what is another is not one and the same—nevertheless this too will be demonstrated, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are indeed God himself, but with the addition of the name of God. If, however, the name that is God is taken away from those who say it, then it can no longer be said simply that he himself is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. For he says: I have not spoken from myself; but the Father who sent me, he himself gave me commandment what I should say and what I should speak (John 12:49).

Behold, the Father is not the same as the Son; for if he were the same, he would speak from himself. But above he said: He who believes in me does not believe in me, but in him who sent me (John 12:44). And again, a little further above: If I glorify myself, my glory is nothing; it is my Father who glorifies me, whom you say is your God, and you have not known him; but I know him; and if I say that I do not know him, I shall be like you, a liar; but I know him, and I keep his word (John 8:54-55). And still, when the Pharisees said to him that his testimony was not true, as though he were testifying concerning himself, he answered, saying: My judgment is just, because I am not alone; but I and the Father who sent me. In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true. I am the one who testifies concerning myself, and the one who sent me, the Father, testifies concerning me (Ibid., 16-18). From these things, therefore, which have been said, that question also is clear: that is, that the Father and the Son are not one thing and another thing; or if it be said that they are one thing and another thing in person; for there are two, yet not one thing and another thing simply and absolutely. For if he is another, he is not one and the same, as has been shown, and one thing is not one and the same thing, and conversely what is one is not another thing. Since, therefore, the Father and the Son are one, they are not another thing. Therefore the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are indeed one, because their nature is one; but they are not one [person], because they are three persons.

But again, testifying with clear voice, I say plainly: one, and plainly one; and plainly, not one but another; and plainly, not one thing but another is our discourse. For with composition, both another in person is said, and God the Father is not another from the Son. You see, therefore, that we have said that the Lord Christ, who deigned to unite to himself another nature besides the common one, is one, because he is one person; but not one thing, because he is not one nature. Understand, therefore, that we speak thus whenever we say, one and one thing, another and another. This very thing the Synod of Ephesus also, with the readings of the holy Fathers, set forth and confirmed for the condemnation of the blasphemies of Nestorius and the proof of its own faith. Indeed, by contraries it destroyed these things, but confirmed its own doctrines, among the readings of the blessed Gregory of Nazianzus, saying thus: Another and another, from which the Savior is; for indeed the invisible is not the same as the visible, nor that which is timeless the same as that which is under time; but not another and another—far be it; for both these are one by union, God indeed made man, and man deified, or however one may name it. I say, moreover, another and another, the reverse of how it is in the Trinity; for there, another and another, lest we confuse the subsistences; but not another and another. For the three are one and the same in this divinity.

But do not think that we are well supplied only with those points by which we may prevail to overturn your contradictions; rather, hear the things by which that truth of all, itself the firmest of all, is accustomed to strengthen our own. The things that are diverse in them are those which are usually more common to them along with many others, just as those which are the genera of these and the more specific are diverse; just as those which are called the species of these, and their substances and natures, are diverse according to number. But of a simple thing and a composite thing, of an eternal thing and a temporal thing, of a changeable thing and an unchangeable thing, of a mutable thing and an immutable thing, of a passible thing and an impassible thing, the genera and species are diverse; therefore their substances or natures are also diverse according to number.

He hesitates. This has no application in the Lord Christ, because of the union; for just as the genera and species of the rational soul and the body are indeed diverse, yet the man is one animated being, and his substance and nature are one, so also in the Lord Christ the genera indeed differ, but the natures in no way differ.

Rusticus: What you have said is not true. For soul and body differ not so much according to genus as rather according to species. For the substance of both soul and body is susceptible of contraries: indeed the soul is susceptible of virtue and of vice, and the body of health and of sickness. But neither does the body differ from the soul simply according to species—for the species of humanity is one—but perhaps by those things which are intermediate between these. For the one is mortal, the other immortal, and by other such differences. Wherefore the aforesaid proposition is true.

Haereticus: But behold, once this principle is granted, descending continuously you come at last to the boundaries of Nestorius. For those whose genera, species, substances, and natures are diverse—of these there is neither one individual, nor one subsistence, nor one person, but many. For if these two things of which you speak are individuals, whether substances or essences, or rational subsistences, then in every way they are also two persons.

Rusticus: You have not drawn a necessary conclusion; for since the genera and species and substances and natures of the world are diverse, the individual is not diverse. For the world is one individual, even if ages are called opposite; for ages are made from times, but the world is of substances. Nor are those who suspect there are many worlds contrary to this reasoning; for even if there were another, it would similarly have many natures and substances in itself; yet each of them would nonetheless be one. So therefore we, if we were to say that the other two individual substances subsist in anything other than in the one Christ, would then in every way and inevitably introduce two or more persons; but if we say this of the one and only, just as no one of those who believe rightly has affirmed that this constitution of all corporeal natures is two or more worlds, so neither do we assert two or more Christs. But rather not even so, but far better: for all those things are not united according to subsistence, as are the natures of this dominical Christ. But if the species of divinity and humanity are not diverse, then Christ is neither from diverse natures nor is he from two. But if he is from two, then give their substantial differences; for you do not wish to dictate these according to the individual. Moreover, if he is truly man, that is, soul!

rational, earthly, and differs in nothing from God: therefore—what is most impious—neither are we from him, or at any rate he is not consubstantial with us. Moreover, if it is true that things whose genera are diverse are not the same, and neither are the things distinguished under the genera, and likewise the things that underlie them, whether compared to genera alien to one another or to those things that are within them—of which one has this and the other does not—then they are shown to be much more diverse. If, therefore, deity has neither a genus nor that species which is subordinated to a genus, while humanity is found to have these, they are shown much more to be unable to be united in one nature. Let the foregoing, then, be set down without prejudice, in which we have spoken of diverse genera and species, of divinity and of flesh.

Haeretic: Divinity and humanity have one highest genus: for is substance the most general genus for divinity? and for humanity, which subsists through itself?

Rusticus: When "self-subsistent" is said of God, it signifies that he needs nothing else in order to exist; but when it is said of creatures, by no means, for they received their being from the Creator, and in him we live and move and are (Acts 17:28). But "substance," that is, when it is said of God, is named from the fact that he always is, since he is what always is; but in creatures, by no means. Therefore, even if "substance" is one name, it is not one thing. The substance of deity and of flesh is therefore not a common genus, but only a common name; and this is not a genus.

Heretic: But the soul too, not having the same genus as the body, completes one species with it.

Rusticus: Rather, it has one highest genus, for both are substance, both in name and in definition; if you still doubt that this is impossible in Christ with respect to deity and humanity, it will also be shown below. The rational soul, therefore, and the body of a man receive an identity of nature with respect to union, in that they hold both one genus and the same species; yet they are also diverse natures, because they are sometimes placed under a diverse species and definition. But the deity and humanity of Christ are not said to be under one species.

He is stuck. A demonstration of uncertain things is not made for him by means of things that are uncertain, inasmuch as they are uncertain. If, therefore, you show that the Godhead and the flesh do not fall under one definition, and that in one and the same man the species of body and of soul differ in definition and in nature, then perhaps the things you have added will follow. Therefore, keeping these matters in a lower place, let us come to other points, so that we do not extend the prolixity of our discourse too far.

Rusticus: You often declare that the Lord Christ is consubstantial both with the Father and with us, according to one and the same substance through union, with nothing lost or confused; but that very one substance, as you say, cannot fail to have certain things which, in comparison with one another, are rightly named one thing and another thing—as the flesh, as the soul, as the Word. For it happens that many differences are taken up, which I leave to you as known to your understanding. Therefore, if one thing and another thing is said of substance and substance, rightly one substance and another substance is predicated; but if any of these is not a substance, how is it that according to this certain things are consubstantial with it, when they are not consubstantial according to substance? And how will the true divinity, and the perfect and individual humanity, not be substance? If, therefore, the substance of the Godhead and of the flesh is one thing and another thing, how do you not allow them to be confessed as two? But if you do confess them as two, why do you withdraw from our judgment and communion?

He is stuck. In this way you will also be able to demonstrate two substances of any pure man, so that from these you are convicted of introducing three substances of Christ: for man, according to the substance of the mind, is consubstantial with the angels; but according to the body, with cattle and beasts alike. And again, according to the body indeed we are consubstantial with the bodies of the dead, but according to the soul, with their souls: so that we do not set forth the example of the angels only, concerning whom I confess that the question is even unresolved for me.

Rusticus: All this is false: for consubstantiality in part, and not in the totality of substance, is imperfect. For by the three hundred and eighteen holy Fathers, for this reason, the Son was declared consubstantial with God the Father, so that we might be compelled to acknowledge that nothing of the Father's substance is lacking in him. Similarly, moreover, by the holy Fathers who came afterward, he was proclaimed consubstantial with us, so that we may believe that he has all things of our substance. Therefore, by heretical fraud, he uses the name of consubstantiality who accepts it in part. Whatever therefore may be true concerning the angels, man is not consubstantial with them; similarly neither with beasts, nor with cattle, nor with corpses, nor with souls. Furthermore, man will not rightly be called consubstantial in rational beings even simply according to any part whatsoever: for although the matter from which the body comes is one, nevertheless the form of the body is far more excellent.

Hence it is not true that a part is consubstantial with a part, or that the whole is consubstantial; as if, because there is one matter, we should be called consubstantial with serpents, and bugs, and fleas, flies, and all things that are born at once from the exhalation of the human body. Moreover, if everything that is consubstantial with man according to the body is plainly consubstantial with him, then in this respect Christ will also be consubstantial according to the body with all the things just mentioned—which God forbid—with those things with which man is consubstantial in this respect; for Christ is consubstantial with us in this part. But if someone, despising such blasphemies, should grant that these things are true, yet that point cannot be torn away, namely that consubstantiality of this kind is neither whole nor perfect; therefore man is not consubstantial with two perfect natures, as Christ is. Furthermore, if nature is more properly said from being born, then nature is more properly understood as it is begotten than as it is corrupted; but a whole and perfect man is born, whereas corruption separates body and soul from each other and makes two separate things, neither of which is a perfect nature. For if corruption perfects nature, and the effect of a contrary is contrary to itself, then generation destroys natures, which is utterly incongruous. And indeed the nature of Christ's humanity, at the time of death, was separated into two, and one nature was made into two things, of which, however, neither was a perfect nature.

Again, however, the resurrection is from two, but the union of the most perfect natures in him is not so; for without corruption and without diminution each of the united natures subsists in the perfection of its species. Moreover, if, as you say, two substances of a certain pure man can be demonstrated, although none of them is a perfect nature, yet it is not for that reason that they are not two because they are not perfect, while the two natures of Christ are perfect—how are they not much more two? If, therefore, no inconvenience follows for those who say that there are two natures of a man, then what indecency will follow for those who confess two natures of Jesus the Lord Christ? But he who says three numbers imperfect things as perfect with the divinity; and the voice of all the Fathers will be superfluous, who say under one that Christ is consubstantial with us according to the second humanity, to the destruction of those who say that the dispensation is inanimate or without mind. But if among men consubstantial things are spoken of in this way, it profited nothing that the Fathers said the Son is consubstantial with the Father; for some impious person can suspect that as much as the rational surpasses the inanimate, so much is the Father compared to the Son. But, as I think, it is much more insane to say many such trifles than these. But for now I will let these suffice.

Haeretic. If Christ is one substance and one thing, therefore he is one substantive thing, and by union Christ is one substance.

Rusticus. "Thing" signifies both person and nature. And so Christ is one thing, and also two things; and indeed he himself is more truly one thing, inasmuch as he is one person, but he is recognized in two natures.

Haeretic. Since for the present you have not denied that Christ is one thing (for how do you not call Christ one, when you say that Christ is one thing?), and this thing is substantive: therefore, as we have said, Christ is one substance, therefore also one nature: for what does it matter to me whether there are also two things or not? For the present, since he is one, you cannot contradict it.

Rusticus. But it does not follow in every way that one thing is also one substance: for the rod of Aaron which bore fruit (Num. 17:8) was indeed one substantive thing with its fruits, but it was not one substance with its fruits. And the tablets written by the finger of God (Exod. 31:18) we call one thing, but not also one substance. But neither do I think it incongruous to answer that Christ is neither a substantive nor an insubstantive thing, but a supersubstantive thing, inasmuch as he is of two most perfect substances or natures. For that bread which we ask for in the Lord's Prayer is called supersubstantial (Matt. 6:11). And I think we ask for it in such a way that we seek Christ rather, until, as the Apostle says, Christ is formed in us (Gal. 4:19).

Furthermore, if a millet tree has pear branches grafted into it, it is one tree and one thing; but because it also has its own branches, it is neither one substance nor one nature. But just as millet and pear are two things, yet the tree is said to be one thing: what does this detract from the unity of the person, if we say that Christ is two things? Or what does it detract from the duality of natures, if we confess that he exists as one thing? Moreover, even if we answer that Christ is indeed a substantive thing, he will not for this reason be one substance; for we say that one person is substantive: just as, for example, if someone says that this world is not insubstantive, he would not for this reason be compelled to affirm that it is one substance. But if someone utterly insane and most contentious says that the world is one substance, it follows that he can in no way speak otherwise of any things whatsoever, except that it is one substance. For if all the diversities that are in the world do not cause them to be substances under number, each one compared to another will be one with it: therefore the substance of man and stone and elephant and ant, and of heaven and mountain, will be one.

He is stuck. In this world such a thing does not happen at the beginning, because there is not one son, one Christ, one Lord. And if the world is simply one, yet there are thousands of thousands to be found who are called sons and persons and substances; but in Christ an indivisible union has been made.

Rusticus: Did I not foretell that the example is not in all respects unsuitable? Otherwise it will not be an example, if it is the same in all respects. Since, therefore, you said that Christ is something substantive, I have shown that something else is also called substantive, yet it is not of one substance but of many. But if he wishes to speak of things made by craft, it is possible to find many thousands of such things, such as a ship, a house, a burning lamp, and things like these; for all such things are indeed a substance, but not of one substance.

He is stuck. Nature never contains less than a person, since it is accustomed to contain even more—I speak now of the natures of rational beings; and therefore we shrink from saying two natures, fearing that consequently we may also say two persons.

Rusticus: Most insane fear. For there are not two rational natures that contain not a thousand persons; but neither is there one that does not contain more than two persons. Therefore there will not be one nature of Christ, lest there be not only two but even more persons of him. Moreover, according to us Christ is not from two natures, lest he be either more persons or sons, or Christ, or Lord. But if those who say that Christ is from two natures, or from two, as you do, are followed by more persons, it does not follow that they say he is from two Christs or sons; nor will those heretics who also say that there are two persons of Christ be followed by these same incongruities. Therefore much less will it follow that the orthodox, who confess the Lord Christ in two natures, say that there are two Lords, or Christs, or sons. Moreover, if for this reason you fear to say two natures, lest perhaps, according to what is customary, you judge there to be two persons in the rest; for you say that two natures are never fewer than two persons; nor should you ever confess that the Lord Christ is perfect God and perfect man, because in all the rest of rational beings it is impossible for there to be one and only one person of perfect God and perfect man.

But if it is dangerous for us, who are of course Christians, to doubt concerning this most celebrated wonder, since when God willed it, being perfect, he could be that person with a perfect humanity, because every word is not impossible for him, according to the Gospel (Luke 1:37): why do we doubt that this very person exists in two perfect natures, not to be separated, but rather to be acknowledged? Just as therefore God, perfect, and man, perfect, are inestimably one single person, so the two perfect natures are wonderfully one Son. And this, so to speak, is the rule: in all other things indeed it is inviolable, but in Christ alone it is relaxed. Therefore, because Nestorius makes bad use of the duality of substances, it is not for that reason that one must be silent about there being two substances; otherwise, because he makes bad use of perfect God and perfect man, the orthodox ought not to say this. And to speak plainly, if we were to be silent about these things, or altogether remove everything that is badly usurped by heretics, there would be nothing for us to confess, and before all things the Scriptures would be removed.

Heretic. You force me to repeat the same thing: when did the divine nature fail to contain a person? Or when did substance fail to contain subsistence? Tell me.

Rusticus. To this indeed we have already responded sufficiently; yet I will also add this fittingly, that here too not only two natures contain the person of Christ, although in him alone they are united according to subsistence; for his divine nature equally contains both the Father and the Holy Spirit, and his human substance contains the rest of men. But just as one subsisting in the divine nature, as both the Father and the Holy Spirit, is not thereby pure God; and in our nature, but is not bare man: so one subsisting in two natures is not divided, for he does not have two persons. But I ask you, who have just now spoken of nature: is it universal, or rather individual?

Heretic. I take it indifferently; for what difference is there at all, or what does it matter?

Rusticus. For there are many instances: if indeed you mean the universal or common nature, it is true that it contains a person no less, but rather more and further; if however you mean the particular or individual nature, such as mine and yours, or that of another individual, shared with no other (for I am not the same as you), for this reason we do not find an example in Christ, as I said, because only rational natures exist—God, the heavenly hosts, and man; yet never have two of these natures been united to one another so as to make one single person, as in the Lord Christ in the union of divinity and humanity. For this is the most unexpected property of that union, an example of which cannot be found: for never have two rational natures been inseparably united into one person. Moreover, the nature of God is not particular, that is, belonging to no other than one person alone; but the one and only divinity is the nature of all three persons without diminution: for we truly confess one God.

Haeretic. It follows. If Christ is one and individual, but every individual has one species; and one species is one nature: therefore Christ has one nature.

Rusticus. There are many thousands of individuals whose species is not one nor their nature one, but many: as cities, as houses, as ships, as documents, and the letters that are written on them.

Haeretic. But these are from art, not from God nor from nature.

Rusticus. For the meantime, if it followed by every necessity that if there is one individual, there is also one nature, then in all these there would surely be one nature. But if you say that every individual that comes from God has one species and one nature, not even this is true: for the world was made by God, and it does not have one nature.

Haeretic. But I still wish to circumscribe my statement with an addition, and I say: Every substantial individual that comes from God and is inseparable is one species and one nature.

Rusticus. Again you seek what is admirable in what is not admirable, and comparison in what is incomparable, and an example in things that cannot receive an example. But if you think this to be the case for a rational man, I too bring before you many rules of this kind, which you will not be able to explain for ages of ages. For tell me, when did perfect divinity and perfect humanity become one nature, and did not remain two? When did creator and creature become one substance through union? When did the two most perfect natures produce something else perfect? And certainly not something more perfect at the same time and less? When was one species consubstantial with two perfect species inseparably?

Haeretic. Since no such thing has ever happened, we confess it as well; but from the time when all these inestimable and wondrous things were made, from the time when one person was made through union—you, however, accuse the great and inestimable works of God as incongruous. If, therefore, you do not think that from these there was made one Son, one Christ, one Lord, say so openly. But if you confess one person according to the truth, grant what necessarily follows from it.

Rusticus. Give the consequences of perfect deity and perfect humanity; give what is proper to the Wisdom consubstantial with God the Father, and to the flesh consubstantial with us, animated by a rational soul. Restore to each thing its proper number; do not take away quantity, if you do not pretend to confess perfection according to substance: for where there is perfection according to substance, there also is the quantity of substances; where there is unconfused union, there also is the number of the united. But every substance at once receives both to be and to be one; and it is one in such a way that, when compared to one, the union added makes two, not a number destroyed. Otherwise, show me an unconfused union of perfect things that destroys only their number, and destroys the being of none according to no part, so that you may seem to say something not unreasonably. To these things I will add this also. You said that every individual made by God, an inseparable substantive, is one species. If, therefore, the incarnation was made thus, as some other created thing, do you have something to say? But I want you not to speak mere words, but the things themselves. Say, then, either one substantial individual made by God and inseparable, and one species, so that from this you may find the truth.

Hæret. We observe that all such things are so; yet let them also state one of these. Behold, each one of us is both an individual and one something, and substantive and made by God, and inseparable; and yet there is one species, and one nature, and one substance.

Rusticus. You have set down all things deceitfully, as you are accustomed. Since, therefore, the example has made the things that were said clearer, we too shall say that these things are not taken in the same way in the Lord Christ; but you have taken as confessed the very things that are under investigation. For Christ is not individual in the same way as other things, or as we are. For each of us has an individual person, that is, one shared with no other, and his own individual substance. But in Christ, the person is indeed individual, for it is his alone; but the nature is not individual in the same way, for it is common to all three persons, and unless it were common it could not be found. Again, "one" is not said simply of Christ, because he is one something; but more cautiously, because he is one, as was shown above. Similarly, it has also been demonstrated concerning "substantive," because not only is that which subsists in one substance substantive, but also that which subsists in several; and that he is "of God" is not said as one with God the maker, but as a creature, one with the creature, as the soul with the body. And we confess the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, to be undivided, and his person is inseparable; but the one of his natures is not inseparable, but the two are united as inseparable.

Therefore it is clear that the things done in the Lord Christ are not the same as those done in others. It is therefore senseless that you have spoken such things deceitfully, when it would rather be fitting to say that in creatures it is so, but in the Creator who receives a creature it is not so. For never in any other was it done that two most perfect natures pre-existed from the beginning in their own individuals, and afterwards from these there should be one person.

He hesitates. For tell me, I ask, did not all the teachers of the catholic Church use this example, saying, "As one man is soul and body, so one is Christ, perfect God and perfect man"? So therefore Christ is also both an individual and one, and substantive, and the rest, as I have said.

Rusticus. And I have already said above: it is the most common rule of all rational things that examples be taken from a part, not from the whole. The Fathers therefore used this example, not to show the things you have said, which we have already shown to be false; but to show one Son, one Christ, one Lord, and his one substantial person. But that this example cannot agree in all respects, hear from us the irrefutable reasons which overturn your falsehood. For if you still hold to the fables of the Gentiles, and think that rational souls pre-existed their bodies, there will nonetheless be two most perfect and mature substances, God and mind.

Furthermore, [they say that] the Word of God and the soul united to it [constitute] the person that according to you pre-existed from the beginning. But out of two pre-existing persons it is impossible for one person to be made. For Saint Cyril says in the letter which both the apostolic see and the holy synod of Ephesus confirmed: "Or if they disparage a union of persons: for Scripture did not say that the Word united to itself the person of a man, but that [the Word] was made flesh." Behold, he accuses to such an extent those who say that a union of persons was made in Christ, that he even sets this against that which is read, that the Word was made flesh (John 1:14). But in regard to the matter, those who say that the man who was assumed pre-existed, and those who assert that the mind of Christ pre-existed, differ in no way; for these also wish those minds to have their own persons: for they assert that they pre-existed as equals, and that they are similar and indistinguishable in all things naturally and substantially, yet not indistinct as regards the number of individuals. For if what they say is not so, then one mind was previously [one] in all respects, and afterward by merits was divided into different [minds]. But how would one mind not be the mind of one [person] only, being altogether one and not differing from itself? Ah!

If it is only for this reason that those minds begin to differ, it could [be so], because it is not the same thing as those things that subsist by its distinction, and by this my mind ought to be distinguished into as many individuals as there are merits. But far be this madness from every rational soul, that the number of sins should be blasphemed as the cause of multiplying souls. If, therefore, you embrace the doctrines of such men, not even so can you recognize that the example of soul and body fits in all respects: for man is not [composed] of two most perfect persons, nor of pre-existing most perfect natures, even if according to the body [he is] from pre-existing matter. For the human body itself was made for no other purpose than to be, as it were, the organ of this soul. But the mind had its subsistence in relation to these things: for the union that was made in Christ was not from the beginning. For if from the beginning, each mind—which be far from us—was Christ; for in nothing would they differ from one made from the beginning, for Christ is not [Christ] on account of the body only—otherwise it would not be an inhumation but only an incarnation. Similarly, if one mind was united to the Word, the inhumation is not from the Virgin, because our nature was not united from that time as a whole, but already before that which is much more subsisted. Nay rather, by so much the more properly is he man, that is, the inner man; and the inhumation will be the union of that which is outside only.

But the holy Fathers did not hold this opinion: they most harmoniously taught that a perfect nature was indeed united to our Word, and not only the flesh from the time of the conception that took place in the Virgin. For the aforementioned epistle also contains these things: "Different natures indeed came together for a true union; but one Christ and Son from both, not as though the diversity of natures were consumed because of the union; rather, they accomplish for us one Lord and Christ and Son from divinity and humanity, through an ineffable and indescribable concurrence unto union." Behold, he said that different natures are united in the Lord, and this unto making Christ; lest you should think that it was at another time than that at which the conception of the body took place; and lest anyone should think that only the flesh was then united to the Word, he added that divinity and humanity concurred unto unity.

He clings to it. We do not worship the aforementioned dogma: for this is what is called Origen's concerning pre-existence, which both our holy Fathers and the archbishops of Alexandria condemned under anathema, especially Saint Theophilus, whom also the most holy Cyril followed in every orthodox confession. Superfluously, therefore, have you refuted dogmas that we do not worship. But since you have once so chosen to accuse our dogma and to stand on the opposing side, it is fitting that you speak to the point.

Rusticus: Because among you there are some who hold such opinions, and it follows from your dogma that you say these things, as will be shown later, I have therefore been compelled to say this. But since you do not claim such things, I will turn to the remaining points. For since the souls of men do not pre-exist their bodies, it is clear that they are created by God for one another: the soul, namely, so as to govern the body according to nature, and the body as that without which it is impossible for such operations of the soul to be fulfilled. For this reason an individual soul uses an individual body, and no other soul is by nature the governor of another's body, but each one governs its own, for this is also why it subsists. But God the Word did not subsist in order to be incarnate and become man, but is eternal; nor, therefore, did the humanity subsist in order to be united in this way, but it has another cause of its subsistence; and I speak not only of the individual humanity that was united to the Word, but of the common humanity. You see, therefore, how far unequal is the example of the union.

Heretic: Although the example of God the Word and the soul is dissimilar (in that God not only preexisted the soul, but preexisted man infinitely, and because He is Himself the creator both of all nature and of His own humanity), and He not only moves His own humanity, but all things that He wills, and in the manner that He wills; nevertheless, humanity is not [the same as] the flesh: for just as human flesh was made for this purpose, that, governed by a rational, that is, human, soul, it might be useful for carrying out the operations of the soul which cannot otherwise be accomplished, so the humanity of God the Word [was made] that, when moved by Him, it might accomplish His operations. Similarly, therefore, through the union of the Word and His humanity, there is one nature.

Rusticus: By no means is this so; rather the contrary is true. For if from the greater of these things that have been said the example is dissimilar and incongruous, but from the lesser it is similar and not discrepant, then much more is there not one nature of God the Word and His humanity, than [that there is]. Therefore, since it cannot both be and not be one nature, it remains that on account of the similarity of the example it is indeed rightly one person; but on account of that which is far more discrepant, it is not one nature.

If, therefore, one nature has been made, it follows that two remain; for you will not say, conversely, that the nature of God in relation to humanity is not one, but the nature of humanity in relation to God is one—not only because there is no difference in the matter itself, but also because I will immediately reply: therefore let there be two natures of the Word and of humanity, even if there are not two of humanity and of the Word, but one; and the inconsistency will arise not from my proposition but from yours.

Heretic: No one, I think, of those who have a soul would refuse to confess this: that if there is one nature of the flesh and the Word, there is one nature of the Word and the flesh, even if two; for it is the same thing, however often one twists words about with verbosity. But I ask this rather: if your reasoning is true, why is there not rather one nature and not one person of Christ, than indeed one person but not one nature? Or how is Christ one in the example of man, when he differs far more than he agrees? For it must be much more that Christ and the Son, the Lord, are not one, than that they are one.

Let it be so. If, therefore, according to him, the divine nature had been made human primarily in itself—that nature which is certainly common to the holy Trinity—then there would have been an incarnation of all three persons; for the things that belong to a common nature are common to the holy Trinity primarily and in themselves. But since it was incarnate not through itself but through one person—for God the Word, the Son of God, alone was incarnate, who is one person of that nature—therefore the rational flesh united to him, without any mediation, together with him is one person, and one Son, and one Christ, and one Lord. For to be one person and one Son is not the property of the Trinity, but of one sole person. But the nature of the Word is said to be incarnate through the Word, and according to what belongs to the Word—not rather the Word himself through the nature and according to what the nature itself is; lest the incarnation, and the nativity, and the passion be of the whole Trinity. The likeness, therefore, that has been adduced pertains to the one Son, the one Christ; but the difference pertains not to many Christs or Sons, but to the two natures. I have therefore gone through the whole matter, because it pertains to the difference in the examples of flesh and soul; not to what was asked—why in Christ there are diverse natures rather than persons.

He is stuck. It is not enough for me to believe, because this difference of example suffices to prove that there are not one but two natures of the Lord Christ. If, then, you have others, say what they are.

Rusticus. There are many others; the first of which is that the Word is distinguished from those who are consubstantial, not by nature nor by substance, but by person alone; whereas each one of us, besides the common substance, also has his own individual substance and nature—for this reason, indeed, we are also called many men. Again, the soul suffers together with the body, but God the Word does not at all; the soul in no way has the principle of its operation from its own body, but God the Word, even existing in the humanity, in heaven and indeed fulfilled his customary operations, though certain ones also inestimable even through the body. For what difference did it make to his operations which are from the beginning, whether he did not have or did have humanity, since through the humanity he did not rain, did not thunder, did not move the stars, and, if it is permitted to speak simply, he performed nothing more through it except only the things which were newly done for our salvation, for which he was also made man? These things, as if they were small, and he had not also joined to himself either greater or equal ones—so they seem to you less suitable.

Rusticus. We did not set down the foregoing remarks for that purpose, but for this: that the freedom of the deity is one thing, in the flesh and beyond it, and the necessity of the soul is another, which, bound in the body, accordingly has in the same way the power of moving a simple body. But let these things too be added by way of concession, since the account of the nature and persons of the Trinity, once completed, is sufficient.

Heretic. Is the subsistence of Christ one, or not one, but rather two?

Rusticus. You ask this too deceitfully. For "subsistence" is indeed one word, but it signifies different things, to which one answer does not apply. For sometimes it signifies a person, sometimes a substance. In the holy synod of Ephesus both are shown. For the holy Gregory of Nazianzus, among other things contained in the synodal records, is brought forward to bear witness to the most correct faith and to the destruction of Nestorius's doctrines, teaching these things: One thing and another are those from which the Savior is; for the invisible is not the same as the visible, nor the timeless as that which is under time. But he is not one person and another, God forbid; for both are one by mixture, God indeed having become man, and man having become God, or however one may name it. But in the Trinity it is the other way around: there it is one person and another, so that we do not confuse the subsistences, yet not one thing and another; for the three are one and the same in deity.

Behold, the most manifest authority of the universal synod has accepted and praised "subsistence" in place of "persons" in the Holy Trinity. But Saint Cyril, archbishop of Alexandria, in the third letter to Nestorius, asserting that the more united union according to subsistence was made in Christ, again commanded that the sayings concerning him are not to be divided into two subsistences, nor indeed into persons; saying first thus: "But the sayings of our Savior that are in the Gospel we divide neither into two subsistences nor indeed into persons." And afterwards: "If anyone assigns to two persons or subsistences either the sayings written in the Gospels and in the Apostolic writings, or those that are said concerning Christ by the saints, let him be anathema from himself." And the rest. But above: "If anyone divides the subsistences in the one Christ after the union, joining them by conjunction according to dignity alone, or authority or power, and does not rather join them according to natural union, let him be anathema." Saying, therefore, that it is abominable to divide the subsistences in the one Christ, and this after the union; and similarly accusing those who join them according to this or that, and not rather according to that; he shows that they ought to be joined according to this. Therefore the subsistences in Christ are not to be joined according to dignity alone or the like, but rather the subsistences in Christ are to be joined according to natural union.

He clings to it. I think that he spoke of the union in the Lord Christ as being more from two natures at once and from two subsistences, as from two persons; for he did not take up this name of "subsistence," so different, as being so closely connected with that [other term], and especially when he says "after the union"—as if before the union he were speaking of two natures and persons, but after the union of one.

Rusticus. In no way is it true; for we have already shown that he does not say the Lord is from two persons. For if he had wished to say this, just as, when he says the Lord was made from two natures, he does not refuse to confess that God the Word united our nature to himself, so he would not have had grounds to refuse to confess that he united the person of a man to himself. But as it is, he approves the one and accuses the other, saying in the second letter to Nestorius: "But in no way does it help the right account of the faith if it is held thus, or certainly if some speak disparagingly of a union of persons; for Scripture did not say that the Word united to himself the person of a man, but that he was made flesh." Behold, it is clear that either as he himself sets it forth, or as it is altogether consequent to say, [he ought to say] a union of persons, and to say that the Word united the person of a man to himself, and this, as though it were contrary to divine Scripture, he disparages and sets down on the opposite side, that "he was made flesh"—almost crying out that whoever says a union of persons in Christ casts out that saying of holy Scripture, that the Word was made flesh (John 1:11).

A little above, however, he shows this, saying: "For the union was made of two natures; on account of this, we confess one Christ, one Son, one Lord. Most clearly, therefore, the name of subsistence sometimes signifies person, but sometimes nature; for, as you say, it does not always signify both person and nature." And again, where he commands that the words spoken about Christ not be divided between two persons or subsistences, he has used the name of subsistence and of person simply and indiscriminately, to such an extent that he himself afterward divided the words, saying about the two natures: "But the evangelical and apostolic words about the Lord, we know that the men who spoke of God made some of them common, as about one person, but divided others, as about two natures." And after some things: "We have glorified the Savior of all, the Lord, because the things both among us and among you in the Church hold a faith consistent with the divinely inspired Scriptures and the tradition of our holy Fathers; but these things have been set out continuously throughout the whole." Behold, he has confessed that the divine Scriptures and the Fathers preach thus, that the words ought to be distributed to the two natures. Since, therefore, he does not say things contrary to himself, it is established that the words are to be distributed to the natures, but by no means to the persons, that is, to the subsistences. Therefore that name is common to diverse things, and sometimes it signifies person, but sometimes nature.

We say, therefore, one subsistence of the Lord Christ, for his person is subsistent; nor do we abhor to say two, when someone wishes piously to assume this in place of the name of the natures, with all caution; for two natures subsist.

This sticks. But behold, the synod of Chalcedon, which you venerate, says one subsistence of the Lord Christ. But the most blessed Cyril says one from two subsistences, and you were saying—or rather you wished to show above—that he does not say from two persons; therefore he says the Lord Christ from two natures. But since the aforesaid Father also shortly afterward says one subsistence of him, therefore he knows one nature of the Lord Christ. For just as you do not refuse that it was said with two natures and from two subsistences, so you cannot deny that he says in one nature, when he declares that the union was made in the subsistence. For we do not now bring forward things said by another Father, or in different little works under him, but both are shown in that same letter and not far from each other in the same place, and when we hear him saying that the natures came together according to natural union, and not personal, because not only one person, but also one from two natures.

Rusticus: What has been said is indeed sufficient to resolve those points that have been stated; for just as we have shown that in the same synod it was said that "subsistence" sometimes signifies person, but sometimes nature, so it has happened in one and the same epistle that different things are called by one name—especially since, even if it is in one epistle, it was nevertheless said in different chapters. Moreover, because he used the name "subsistence" in one way and another, you too will not be able to deny it. For if you once concede that he did not speak of two persons when he spoke of two subsistences, but you say that he spoke of one person and one subsistence made into one nature through union, it is evident that he used this name in different ways: here applying it to those subsistences which are not also persons but natures only, there to that subsistence which, according to you as well, is a person. Therefore what you, with me setting it aside, reproved as false, you yourself have confessed, even if under a different name. It is clear, then, that although closely related, you have used the name in one way and another. But that he did not call one subsistence a single nature, we shall show below.

Heretic: If he did not understand it in this way—that through union one nature was made from two—why does he say, as I have already said above, "according to natural union"?

Rusticus: To refute those who say that it was not the divine nature of the Word itself that was united to our nature, but only something accidental to the Word, such as dignity, authority, or power. For passing over the point that subsistences are not to be joined according to dignity, authority, or power, he then introduced only this: "but according to natural union," that is, of the natures themselves; just as if someone should say "the angelic chorus," that is, the chorus of angels. And also for this reason, because it was not a person that was united to a person, but God the Word deigned to unite our nature to himself, not our person; lest the union be held to be not true, and neither into one person nor into one [thing] made. But the most holy Cyril himself, in the exposition of these first chapters, says that he himself spoke of "natural union" in place of "true union"; and he brings forward a testimony of the Apostle for the confirmation of this matter, saying: "And you were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest" (Ephesians 2:3). And he adds: "For just as he said 'by nature children of wrath' instead of saying 'truly children of wrath,' so I have set down 'natural union' in place of 'true.'

If, therefore, we take "natural union" in this passage as meaning that the things united are gathered into one nature, then necessarily there must also be in that place a certain natural anger, whose offspring are evil according to nature, in the case of the most impious Manichaeus. Moreover, if Cyril had wished to demonstrate this—that one nature had been made—it would have followed that he should say so more clearly in his exposition, and add against those who brought this accusation, saying: "It is true: I said this, and I said it well, for one nature has been made through union." Why, then, did he exchange "natural union" for the name of "true union"? For no one, when explaining himself and wishing to clarify what he has said, substitutes a more uncertain term for the most proper one. For "true union" we both say, and you say; but "natural" you understand as if for yourselves alone. If, therefore, he had wished to say what you say, he could have said it much more easily, and would not have exchanged the proper term for one at once clearer.

He clings to it. Those to whom the discourse was addressed were weaker, that is, the Easterners; and for that reason he adapted his discourse in such a way—to such an extent—because, even if under another name, he nevertheless introduced the same thing, as if he were saying: because whoever says "true union" says "natural"; and whoever denies "natural" also refutes "true." But he yielded on the completeness of the discourse because of those who could not yet grasp it: for if the union is true and not natural, show this more clearly.

Rusticus: There is no need of an example, since the matter itself solves for us what is being sought. For you yourselves admit that you speak of a union other than, or different from, ours; but that we say the union was made into one person, into one Christ, into one Son, one Lord, one substance—that this union which we believe is true is manifest. But Saint Cyril, calling it by the name of "true union" and "natural," changing it, as you say, because of the weak, would by no means have fallen so far, by way of dispensation, into such impiety as to attempt to prove from apostolic testimony that anger subsists according to substance, whose sons would be those who in no way exist—which we have shown follows from your proposition. For if here the natural unity was called by him "into one nature," then there too the sons of anger would be called sons of anger according to nature, and of the same nature as the anger itself.

For the aforesaid Father says in his exposition of the third chapter thus: "But if we speak of natural union, we speak truly, since it is customary for the divinely inspired Scripture to use this term; for the most sacred Paul writes somewhere concerning certain persons: 'And we were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest.' And let no one say that divine wrath subsists according to nature, so that even those who sin are understood to be its offspring; otherwise in all ways we would be agreeing with those who are sick with the madness of the Manichaeans; but what I said—'nature'—shows that which is according to truth." Therefore this statement of his overturns all your calumnies against us—or rather against Saint Cyril.

Heretic: Whether you say that the two natures of Christ are common, or individual, as you say they are individual, it follows by absolute necessity that you also say there are two subsistences. For every substance and individual nature is a subsistence; but if, on the other hand, you say the natures are general, or universal, or certainly common, there are never fewer persons than these. There will therefore be two persons, or more, of the Lord Christ.

Rusticus: And here these things have indeed been set down in response to the question, though not necessarily; but for the conclusion the term "equi" has been set down, which has already often been caught out. For when we say that there are two natures of the Lord Christ, we call neither of them common, nor the two individual, but the divine nature common, and the human individual. Nor do we say absolutely that there are two subsistences of the Lord, but we say one subsistence, as truly one subsisting person. But to say two with an interpretation we do not abominate, whenever that word is put for nature.

Haereticus: Every individual nature is a person; if therefore the human nature of Christ is individual, then the Word will be non-subsistent, but the guide of nature; therefore there are two persons of Christ.

Rusticus: Many individual natures are not also persons, as with inanimate and irrational things. For even man, while he consists of soul and body, is not however said to be of two persons, though it is confessed that he consists of two individual natures. For if man is of two persons, then Christ will be of three, and the Trinity of five persons; yet we are accustomed to call trees, and shoots, and herbs, and stones, and other inanimate things individual natures, but not also persons.

Rusticus: It is stuck fast. There is much to be said about this, even if not aptly to the matter proposed. But passing over the rest, I define the proposition thus: every individual and rational nature is a person. For since there exist three confessed rational natures—that is, of God, of the heavenly hosts, and of man—in these each individual nature is a person. Since therefore you say that there are two rational natures in Christ, you inevitably introduce two persons as well. Superfluously, then, do you anathematize the name of Nestorius, whose dogma you defend; or, to speak more mildly, whose error follows your dogma by necessary reasoning.

Rusticus: If God is aptly called rational, I will not inquire into that; but I affirm this rather, that in God there is an individual (I mean singular) nature, that is, not common but of one and only person. For in God only the nature of the three persons is common; but he is not even so defined as a person, for there a person is not an individual nature, nor a common nature, but the individual of a common nature.

It sticks. Therefore, as you say, there are rather two persons in the Lord Christ: for according to you, the proper notion of a person belongs to each nature individually. For God the Word is an individual of the divine nature, and the humanity is an individual of the rational nature; these, then, are two natures: therefore also two persons. For you cannot say that things are not counted together as equivocal, but as univocal, since you, counting the common nature of the Trinity together with the individual humanity, thereby also confess two natures.

Rusticus: Although in other rational creatures an individual substance is a person, yet not in the name of Christ: for it is not because you confess that he is from two perfect natures that, according to you, he will therefore be from two persons; otherwise it would no longer be incongruous to say that the Word united to himself the person of a man, which was excluded at Ephesus by the common judgment. But because that was once demonstrated, I will add this also, that it is commonly confessed by us that the natures which came together into a true unity are indeed diverse, but not also that the persons which came together into a true unity are diverse. For if you also accept the letter of Saint Cyril to which the Ephesine synod subscribed, you can by no means refute this.

It sticks. And you will never be able to prove that that holy man ever wrote this anywhere.

Rusticus: The very words of that most holy man will suffice. A testimony from the second letter of St. Cyril to Nestorius: "The Word, uniting to himself in an ineffable and incomprehensible manner flesh animated by a rational soul, according to subsistence, became man and was called the Son of man, not according to mere will or benevolence, nor yet as in the assumption of a single person only; and because the natures that were brought to a true unity are indeed diverse, yet there is one Christ and Son from both—not as though the difference of the natures were destroyed because of the union, but rather as you perfect one Lord and Christ and Son from deity and humanity through an ineffable union and an inexpressible concurrence." Therefore, if a rational nature is an individual person in other cases, in Christ this rule is by no means true.

It sticks. It seems to me altogether unreasonable to say that while it is true in all things, in Christ this rule is by no means true. For if he partook of blood and flesh in the same way as we, and was made like us in all things without sin, why is it that in him alone what is true in all things is not true?

Rusticus: If this were something inestimable and unusual in Christ, then indeed it would not have been fitting for you even then to distrust these miracles. But if many things—indeed all things—in him are inestimable, then look back, even if late, on how much more unreasonable this is; for when you receive such great and wonderful and inestimable things by faith, you are doubtful about one of them. For tell me, who besides this one is such as he? Therefore this one was not made according to the law of custom, because no one was made from himself as this one was, but he was made in a new way, by a new union, by a new and singular and irregular law. For never, neither man nor angel nor any one of the rational beings above, was God, nor will be, united into one person with that God who is consubstantial with the Father, none from another nature; one Christ was made with the Word and God; nor is anyone one Lord, nor one only-begotten of God, as we believe was done in this one: for of two most perfect rational natures one person was never in truth made, as was done in the Lord Christ.

I shall say further still, that not even among the substances of created things themselves has anything of such a kind ever come to be, that they should be united in a unity of person. Therefore the Lord himself is not subjected to the rules of other rational beings, for he was not made under the law of the rest. Just as, then, we abominate the syllogisms of Nestorius—or rather his paralogisms, that is, false reasonings—so too those of others who in like manner seek things customary and beyond estimation among things beyond estimation, marvelous and surpassing the mind. For from such things it cannot be gathered that the same one is perfect God and perfect man. Thus, believing in God who governs all things and is almighty, we resist you as well, who, while you wish to subject to comparisons and examples and laws and rules the union that shines forth above all things, no longer believe it to be singular.

It sticks. I am a man; I desire to be persuaded reasonably—God created me rational.

Rusticus: Recall, I ask, that you are a partaker of the divine baptism of the Son; recall that the discussion concerns that mystery, to which nothing equal or similar has ever happened: because the Lord of all himself did this in himself, just as he himself had said through the prophets, saying: I will make a new thing on the earth, which all of you will marvel at (Jer. 30:22). But because you strongly compel me to enter in word upon things that surpass the soul, first asking pardon from God, I shall, as I am able, undertake to investigate this unsearchable matter. I say, then, that if faith is to be given to examples, Christ has all things without exception of our nature, but not all things of a human person: for we see that each one of such subsistences has all that is its own in itself, set apart from all others besides. For my soul does not by itself govern another's body, even if, by accident, as it were, we are said to govern sons or servants. But God never left that human nature destitute of his presence and governance, as if someone should say that it abuses free will without restraint, but he also created it for this, not that it should be its own, but that it should be his: and he founded it upon himself, as upon a certain base or foundation, so to speak truly, so that through it he might accomplish the most beautiful dispensation proposed by his immense generosity.

Therefore, if every individual nature is a person—but that "every" refers to one that is not created for this purpose, that it remain inseparably united to another. For even the human body is not a person other than its soul; otherwise, as I have already said, Christ will be of three persons, and the holy Trinity of five.

He is stuck. First you must recover your grasp of the things you have said, if you are striving to reach the rest. For I marvel how you say that the Lord's incarnation lacks an example, when many of the Fathers liken it by comparisons of examples, and indeed the holy and universal synod of Ephesus itself, for the explanation of the mystery, uses the example of a man, and teaches this from the readings of the ancients: that just as from soul and body there is one nature of man, so from divinity and humanity there is one nature of Christ the Lord, saying something to this effect: There are indeed two natures, God and man, because there is also soul and body; but of the Son there are not two, nor two Gods; for these are not two men, even though Paul called what is within man and what is outside (II Cor. 4:16); and if one must speak briefly, one thing indeed and another, those things from which Christ is.

If, therefore, the most holy Fathers take this example of the rational soul and the human body for the Lord's incarnation, saying that the natures in Christ are one in the same way as the soul and the body are one nature of man, how do you forbid us to understand this concerning the incarnation, saying that the union is outside the example, when such great Fathers as these bring forward its likeness?

Rusticus: Therefore you say that the union accomplished in Christ differs in no respect from that union which takes place unceasingly in the whole world, wherever a man is composed.

Heretic: How does it not differ, when it was made once and only once upon the divinity and the flesh?

Rusticus: This has made a difference not of the union itself, but only of the things that are united. For if, to speak by way of example, it should happen that either a man and an angel, or God and perhaps some power from among the rational beings of heaven, were united, they would not differ in the union from those things that were being united. Therefore it is one thing to bring forward the things of which something consists, and another the very manner of their union.

Haeretic. And something differs at the beginning, but the effect not at all, since they have come together into one person.

Rusticus. But we now argue from the union to the effect; and since we confess in common one and only person of Christ, we ask whether there is also one nature. But because every comparison or example must be posited as neither similar in all respects nor dissimilar in all respects, since we consider many modes in the example of man: for from two natures there is not only one man, one person, one subsistence, but also one species, one animal, and one substance or nature, from those very things which are taken by the holy Fathers, not as signifying one nature or substance about the Lord, because they accept this example. But if there is not only one person, and one subsistence, and one and the same, but also one species, substance, and nature, and simply in no way is the number of the united preserved, then it will no longer be an example. But this is neither true, nor was it said by the writer with this intention, but only to demonstrate that just as there the things united have brought about one and the same man, so also here one Christ, one Son, one Lord, one person and one subsistence: which is also to be considered from the words themselves. For it was not said, from two natures, God and man, as also soul and body; but the natures are now not two, but one through union. But after he said: two natures, God and man; he added.

But not two Sons. Why, then, do you pervert the things that are made clear by the words spoken for this purpose—that one Son might be shown, and not two Gods; and that no one should think there are two Christs, as though one were the inner and the other the outer, as if one and another; but that, even if there is something of Christ inward and something outward according to the example set before us, and just as the Apostle says of a man, nevertheless not as though inner and outer, there should exist two Christs.

Haeretic. I suspect another understanding of what has been said: for what he said—that there are two natures, God and man, because there is also soul and body; but not two Sons, nor two Gods, for here too there are not two men, even though Paul thus called what is within a man and what is without; it is as if someone should say: There are not two Christs, God and man, even though the Apostle thus named the inner and the outer as though two men, that is, soul and body. Therefore the man whom the Apostle divided as it were into two parts, Gregory of holy memory calls one mode in all respects, lest, comparing him to Christ, he should seem to assert two Christs. Since, therefore, concerning one and the same man it is permissible, in accordance with the Apostle, to say "the inner man" and "the outer man," but concerning Christ it is not permissible to say "the Christ who is within" and "the Christ who is without," according to the holy Fathers who convened at Ephesus, lest we make two Christs, it is clear that in Christ there is a greater unity than that which was made in man; much more, therefore, through union is the nature of Christ one.

Rusticus: I wish you would hear more plainly the things that were said by you just now, for they are exceedingly obscure.

Haereticus: The same things will be repeated briefly and plainly together. The Apostle said somewhere: "For though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed" (2 Cor. 4:16); and as though he were speaking of another, he separated the one who is within from the one who is without, so that they might be thought of as, as it were, two men—one inner and the other outer. Gregory therefore says, "So Christ is from two natures, as man is from body and soul"; yet it is not permitted us, even so, to speak of Christ as we do of man—such that, just as the one who is within and the one who is without are in a certain manner two men, so there should be two Sons. For we do not take up this example in the sense that one is the inner Son and the other the outer, but only in this respect: that from both there is one Son. Wherefore he took up the example in part, and not in whole. Moreover, the Apostle appears to indicate not only two, but even three, as it were, men; for in saying "our inner man" and "our outer man," in that he says "our," he shows another, as it were, man, whose these two are; for one is I, and another is he who is mine.

Rusticus: You speak most falsely and most craftily; for neither did the Apostle write so incongruously, nor was that universal synod so foolish as to expound this incongruity as though from the person of Saint Gregory, to demonstrate the character of the true faith; since the inner and the outer man is not that which is simply man, but that which is not a whole man; for neither is the soul nor the body a whole man. For everything that is governed is stated with a negative particle added, for example: A rational soul is not a man. Man is posited, and it is said that he is not this. Paul therefore circumscribes a part of man in his words, saying: the outer man, that is, not also the inner; and thereby not the whole man. Again, he who is within is man; therefore not also he who is without; therefore not man, but something of man, nor yet imperfect. But because the Father has understood it thus, it can be shown not only from the opposite diversity of incongruity, but also from the consequence of reasons. For he says: «If anyone introduces two Sons, one indeed from God the Father, the second truly from Mary, and not one and the same, let him fall from the adoption that was promised to those who rightly believe. The natures indeed are two, God and man, because both soul and body; but of the Son there are not two, nor two Gods; for neither are these two men, even though Paul named that which is within man and that which is without; and, if it must be said briefly, one thing and another thing from those of which the Savior [is composed].»

For the visible is not the same as the invisible, nor the timeless as that which is under time; nor is one thing true and another absent—for both of these are one by mixture, God indeed unhumanized, but man deified, or however anyone may name it. But I say "another and another," the reverse of how it stands concerning the Trinity; for there it is "another and another" so that we do not confuse the subsistences into one, not "one thing and another"—for the three are one and the same in deity. First of all, he did not say "Christ from two natures," but rather "two natures, God and man," that is, Christ. For if he were speaking of another, he would not have added, "but the Son is not two." For no one is at once God and man, one Son, except Christ. Nor did he say "there were" but "there are" two natures; for what was immediately added was not "there was" but "there is"—for he said that both the soul and the body [are], and he added, "but the Son is not two, nor are there two Gods"; and he did not add "they are." And therefore he did not add this for the reason that this very thing is, as it were, so that they are not two natures; for neither is it absent here for the reason—which be far from us—that they are as it were two Sons; but it is a property of these expressions to leave this particle of speech to the understanding of the hearer. If, therefore, there are two natures, God and man, which the Savior plainly confessed, how do you by certain diabolical tricks pervert his words to the contrary? Tell me.

He clings [to this]. Meanwhile, against the things that have been said, you ought to object in order, if indeed you have anything at all; and then to question me, if I have reasons for these things. What, then, does he wish to signify by this, even if Paul thus called that which is within man and that which is outside?

Rusticus: Receive it patiently; for this is what I am also about to do. After he said, therefore, "two natures, God and man, because both soul and body; but of the Son there are not two, nor two Gods," he added, "for here there are not two men." Therefore they are not to be called two men from one and the same [person]; for this too will harm the mystery of piety not moderately, if we say that Christ is God and two men; or that the Word was not made man, but men were made: and by this it is possible to conclude ten thousand things incongruous and at the same time blasphemous. Before all things, since you, not saying that there are two natures of the Lord Christ, say that there are two men in him, and denying that there are two natures of God and man: again you contend and assert, by the authority of the Apostle, that the same man is two men, and that Gregory said things contrary to the Apostle.

But what we said before is a statement of the Apostle and of the Fathers: that some things are said of one and only one, and not also of two or more; but some things similarly of one, yet not of one only: as when the Lord says of his body that it is a temple, when he foretold that it would be destroyed by the Jews indeed, but raised up by himself; and we too are said to be a temple, either of the Son or of the Holy Spirit. Do you see, then, that this same thing is said both of the same and of not the same, but of different and different things? If, therefore, it is one thing to speak of two or more, and another thing to speak of one indeed, but similarly, and thus as if of two—for there the similarity is of words, not the identity of things; for the account given of one and that given of many is not without dissimilarity—Gregory therefore says that even if the Apostle used common and similar speech about one man as about two, nevertheless they are not two men, the one who is within and the one who is without. But he set this down not without doubt, but as it were with suspended speech: for he did not say that the Apostle says this in every way, but he says: "if the Apostle so called what is within man and what is outside." But one must attend also to what he said: "he called." For he did not say, "he confirmed," nor "he defined," but "he called." Calling, however, is a similarity of words, not in every way and necessarily and inevitably an identity of things.

He therefore did not understand it of two men, even though, as of twins, he called them so.

Haeretic. Why do we wish to stretch out the discussion? For now the reading does not say "in two natures," but "from two"; for he added, "one thing and another, from which the Savior is."

Rusticus. For now allow us to finish in order what was once being asked, and we will inquire about this afterwards. So to what has been said he also adds this: "Even if one must speak briefly, one thing and another, those things from which the Savior is, since indeed the invisible is not the same as the visible, and the timeless is not the same as what is under time; but not another and another, far be it." And here he represents what had been said, that Christ is from two substances indeed, but not from two persons: for "one thing and another" is more proper to natures; but "another and another" to persons. But it must be noted that he did not say, "the Savior is from another and another," but "one thing and another, those things from which the Savior is," lest any of you suspect that he is from two indeed, but no longer of two natures: for he said in the plural, "those things from which the Savior is." If therefore the Savior is from two natures, and these are the very things from which he is [formed]; therefore there are two natures: for it cannot be said here that he spoke of certain other things from which he is, apart from the two natures. For it is not possible for Christ to be said to be from certain other things, unless from two natures existing: existing, I say, not pre-existing before the union; far be it, but remaining even now.

Therefore I will take up the argument again. This reading says that the Savior is from two, and to this extent it wants the natures to be clear. How then, unless by the cunning of Satan, do you try to turn into the opposite the things that are well said? For already, you say, there are two natures, those from which the Savior is, which the Fathers said are both two natures and one thing and another. But just as he said here, "one thing and another," those from which the Savior is, according as he said "from which the Savior is," so also above, "two natures, God and man," as if he said, "the two natures are God and man." Attend also to the tenor of this reading, because it runs similarly through the individual names.

Heretic. What is that to me! Let them be called two natures only for this purpose, that he is from them; not, however, for this purpose, that Christ is also in them, lest the one be cut into two.

Rusticus. However often you twist your words, it will not at all weary us to oppose the truth to your falsehoods; for it is truly shameful and indecent that, against one asserting perverse things, we should be found colder in defense of the truth. Hear therefore for now, and I will add still more from what follows, thus: "For these two are one by mixture, God indeed having become man, and man having been borne up, or however one may name it." See therefore the reading, calling them "two"; which you do not wish to be called two things. Who would be so senseless, indeed who would be mad, who impious and without God, as not to say that "two" are two things?

At the same time consider also that, as we said above, “one” is simply more a property of nature than of person, just as “one” is more a property of person than of nature; yet nevertheless, because such things are sometimes said even without strict precision, and interchangeably, with the pious understanding preserved—just as the Apostle spoke thus of one man as if he had spoken of two, the man who is within and the man who is without—so this man speaks of two natures as if of one, and does not say that Christ is one or that the person is one, but simply “one”; for he says, “both these are one by commixture.” But do not flatter yourself that he thought he was speaking altogether of one nature; otherwise I too shall say that here also “one” is not read without an addition, but it is said to be “one by commixture,” that is, by union, not one in nature.

Heretic: Say no more to me now; behold, I shall defeat you with a single word. Where will you flee from me hereafter? Where will you be able to turn? For not only did he say “one” of both, but he also added “by commixture”; where there is commixture, there is in every way also one nature from diverse things. Therefore one nature of the Lord Christ has been made from two.

Rusticus: I glorify God, because, as if having found an occasion, you have most readily vomited out all your poison. But I ask and entreat that, the more clearly your wound has been made manifest, the more quickly it may be cured. For the doctrine of the saints did not speak of a mixture of natures, did not speak of a fermentation, did not speak of a confusion; for all these things no longer preserve the things that have been united. Therefore, if—which God forbid—a confusion has taken place, then Christ is no longer God. But he himself explained what he meant by "commixture," when he adds, "God indeed unmanning himself, and man indeed being deified." He did not say, "God indeed confused, and man indeed fermented"; for there is, there truly is, a certain commixture that preserves unimpaired the difference of the things commixed. And this St. Cyril explained sufficiently long ago in the first tome against the blasphemies of Nestorius, saying thus: "Some of the holy Fathers also used the name of commixture. But since you say you revere it, lest perhaps some pouring-back be thought to have occurred—as in the case of those things that are commingled in a liquid state with one another—I will free you from fears of this kind. For they were wise, and never abused the true word, striving to signify the union that has been accomplished of the things that came together with one another.

But we say that they came together according to an indivisible union, and the Word of God having the properties of the flesh immutably; we shall find, however, that even the divinely inspired Scripture itself does not very much examine this word, but rather uses it loosely and simply. The most sacred Paul therefore wrote concerning certain people: But the word which they heard did not profit them, not being mixed with faith in those who heard (Heb. 4:2). Would they therefore, concerning whom the word was spoken, have been about to be mixed together to a certain equal measure, like wine and water, and to suffer a kind of pouring together of their subsistences into one another; or rather united as to the soul, according to what is written in the Acts of the holy apostles: that the multitude of those who had believed had one heart and one soul (Acts 4:32)? But I think this is more true than that. Let this therefore be beyond fears concerning these things: for the mind of the saints is exceedingly harmonious. Behold, what was once equally asked by Nestorius, St. Cyril absolved.

Haret. From his synodical letters, if indeed you truly can, demonstrate something of this kind; for the things said in strife, contention, and contradiction were not spoken with precision, for I think there are many such things, and spoken rather by way of dispensation. But the things that belong to a universal synod are the firmest of all, especially because one ought first to consider the common statements and then the private writings. For I too have no few things to bring forward from such writings.

Rusticus. If the authority of this Father concerning these matters does not suffice to satisfy you, suppose that I said these things. Can you fail to approve the sound exposition demonstrated by the words of the Apostle? Nevertheless, I will yield to you in these matters also; for I hope in the name of the Lord that, if you are fully satisfied in all the things you have sought, you will in every way be corrected also. From the synodical and unifying letter of Cyril of holy memory to John, archbishop of Antioch of holy remembrance, and to the synod under him: "But let your religiousness deign to condemn those who say that a confusion or fermentation of the Word of God with the flesh took place; for it is credible that certain persons even cast these things against me, as though I had either understood or said this. But I am so far removed from a sentiment of this kind that I think those who have suspected this in any way whatsoever are insane—namely, that a momentary overshadowing could affect that divine nature of the Word.

For that which is forever remains, and has not been changed; but it will never be changed, nor will it ever be susceptible of change: but that this Word of God is impassible, we all maintain.

He objects. And we do not speak of an impious mixture, which this doctor here accuses, but of a pious one, which this same most holy Cyril, together with the whole universal synod of Ephesus, accepted in the words of St. Gregory. But this pious mixture made one nature of Christ.

Rusticus. Although what has been said is sufficient, nevertheless because of your stubbornness, so that you may know that the intent of this reading is not such as you claim, let us examine the rest, which stands as follows: For both are one by mixture, God indeed made man, and man made God, or however one may name it. But I say one thing and another, in the opposite way from how it is in the Trinity: for there indeed one and another, so that we do not confound the subsistences; but not one thing and another, lest we separate the substance: for these three are one, and the same in Deity. Clearly in such words he crushes every true heresy, showing that one thing in Christ indeed applies, but in the whole Trinity by no means, but rather one and another.

You see, therefore, that both two natures and "one thing and another" are said of the one and same Lord Christ; but "one person and another" where there are three persons: not because Christ is a fourth person—for certainly without him there would no longer be three, but two persons or subsistences—but because just as in the common difference of the holy Trinity there is a number of subsistences and not of natures, so in Christ, who completes the Trinity, there is both a difference and a number of natures, not of persons. For if here the converse holds as in the Trinity, what else does this signify, by way of converse, except that just as there [in the Trinity] there is not one person, lest we confound the substances, so here there is not one nature, lest we confound the natures? From the judgment, therefore, of the holy and universal synod, those who say that the one nature of the Lord Christ was made from divinity and humanity introduce confusion in every way.

He objects. "Two natures," and "one thing and another," from which the Savior said: "not"; in which the Savior: "but you, as the synod of Chalcedon [says], not from two, but in two" — that these things are said.

Rusticus: He did not say "there were," but "there are" two natures: not only on account of those things which were said formerly, but also because of what has now been said. For he did not say that it was so in Christ, but that it is so up to now. For he says, "and in the opposite way from how it is in the Trinity," that is, up to the present; and he did not say, "there indeed it was so in the opposite way; but in the Trinity it is so," but he adds in common, "it is," after he had said "in the opposite way." Just as, therefore, there is up to now there a distinction of subsistences, so also here of natures. For those things which were and are no longer, in relation to those which are always so, in what way according to one thing and another, and one person and another, will be the other in the opposite way. But if this too is difficult for you, it has already been shown from the foregoing that while the natures are God and man, he set it down as if he were saying, "There are two natures, God and man."

Haereticus: And up to now we say there are two natures, but for this purpose that he may be from them, not that he may be in them; for to say this is to divide into two.

Rusticus: Therefore, what are these two? Surely it is manifest that they are his divinity and his humanity of the same one. If therefore Christ is in divinity and humanity, he is in two natures; for if he is not in two natures, that is, he is not from two natures—which be far from us—he who is from divinity and humanity; or, which be far from us, he is in divinity and humanity apart from two natures, or not from divinity and humanity.

Heretic: And how can you show me that Christ is in divinity and humanity?

Rusticus: For the present, because he said not only that there were once natures, but that there are also now, he demonstrates that very thing; and also because he says, "for both are one by commixture." But it is the same thing to say "these both" and "these two." Just as therefore when he says "this one," we understand that it was not only, but also is now; so also when he says "both these," we understand that they were not only, but also are: for if they are no longer both these, then they are no longer this one. Wherefore—which be far from us—Christ will no longer be called one, nor, according to you, will there be one person of him; and moreover that very article "these," spoken in the plural, signifies not a nature but natures; but that those two are one, and that all things were spoken under one—as the reading of the words shows.

Heretic: It is not many things for me, but that one, as I said, prove: that Christ is in them.

Rusticus: And this I will prove to you likewise from the synodical readings.

Let it be permitted. First, let us examine the remaining parts of the testimony of the holy Gregory, which, as I think, clearly declare the one substance of the Lord Christ.

Rusticus: Let even this discourse be preserved for you without prejudice; but now in the meantime, while we still hold in memory what has been said, receive the synodical reading, that Christ is in divinity and humanity.

The synodical testimony of the most holy Ambrose, bishop of Milan.

Therefore let vain questions about words be silent, because the kingdom of God, as it is written, is not in the persuasion of human speech, but in the demonstration of power (1 Cor. 2:4). Let us preserve the distinction between divinity and flesh. The one Son of God speaks in both, because in the same one there is both natures; and, if the same one speaks, he does not however always speak in one manner. Attend to him: now the glory of God, now truly the sufferings of man; since as God he teaches divine things, because he is the Word; but as man he speaks human things, because he was speaking in my substance. You have heard: let us keep the distinction between divinity and flesh. The one Son of God speaks in both, because in the same one there is both natures. Attend, I ask, to the fact that the Lord Christ is in both of those things which have been said, that is, in deity and humanity; of which he also said that the distinction ought to be preserved. And he adds, because in the same one there is both natures.

What, then, does that mean which he says, except as if he were saying, "For this reason he is in them, because they are in him"? For if there are two natures in Christ, Christ is also in two natures. For this reason the same one does not always speak in one manner, because he is not one nature, but sometimes indeed as God, sometimes truly as man, because he was speaking in my substance, that is, whoever was in my substance was speaking; but the very difference of time represents both the glory of God and the passion of man and the distinction of natures equally, when he says now indeed this, now truly that.

Heretic: You say these things; for the synod did not say that Christ is in both natures, but that he himself indeed speaks in both; but in him both natures are, and it did not say "two," but "both"; but "both" is not immediately "two."

Rusticus: How long, O man, will you disbelieve God, who spoke through the holy Fathers, and, not sparing your shamelessness, with the blindness of desperation even overturn the common conceptions of the mind? Who said, who ever heard among men, that "both" is not "two"? But I convict you from your own conscience. Say, therefore, anathema to him who does not believe that Christ is in both natures and that both natures are in Christ, so that we may believe you in this at least, that you speak from a good conscience. What is it, then, that you seek occasions and varieties of words?

Say "anathema," and then we will reasonably persuade you as one who does not know. But because you said that he speaks in both, and that he was speaking in my substance, he did not say that he is in this one or in that one, but that he speaks in both, the one who speaks in both; this is set down to such an extent that the Son of God follows. But when the order of the words is restored, the understanding is easy, as if he were saying, "the Son of God, who is in both natures," and he added, "speaks." Nevertheless, the same man again points out that incongruity which follows from your words: for if he is not in both, then he speaks where he is not. Indeed, if he is not in both natures, but both natures are in him, then that Son of God is not in the things that are in him. And concerning certain things such reasoning is true: for I am in this world and in this place, but neither the world nor the place is in me; but concerning things that pertain to substance, the conversion necessarily holds. For if the Son is in the divine substance, then the divine substance is also in the Son; and if the nature of humanity is in him, he is also in that nature; and if there are two natures in him, he is also in two natures.

He objects. I fear that I may be saying the same thing as a confession of faith, which anyone could say who divides and joins himself: for division is said to be made into two, or into three, or certainly more; and therefore I do not say "in two."

Rusticus. A similarity of words does not make the same thing exist in reality; otherwise, in such a way, even he who says that he is in the same both natures could possibly sustain a calumny: for on the contrary, things that are confounded are confounded into one something. But this is the great diversity, or rather adverseness, of words: to say that one and the same is in two natures, and to say that he is divided into two or into some two things. For he who is divided or parted, or separated, is not one in those things in which he is separated; for it is not possible to be one and to be divided; but after he was once one, now he is no longer one, after he has been separated. This, therefore, is what the impious division or separation signifies. But to be one and the same in certain things—this is rather to be one cautiously and tenaciously and inseparably: for he who is in two, and the same himself remains, he not only cannot be parted, but it is sufficient for him to keep united in himself those things in which he is according to subsistence, that is, substantively, that is, those things in which he participates without any diminution.

Therefore much more and more cautiously do we not say that the Son is one; for we know that he exists in two natures, and we have come to know him as one, steadfastly and immutably—not, so to speak, to be bound by the duality of the natures in which he is, so as to be divided into two, but prevailing, in his own unbreakable union, to preserve those very natures in which he is.

Halet. The argumentation, it seems to me, and the subtlety of intellect, so to speak, are these words. But I will turn to that most holy authority of the holy Fathers; from you, however, according to your promises, I will demand that the remaining portions of the reading of Saint Gregory, at long last, I now review, which are as follows: "If anyone says that the Word is united and formed together with the prophet, as it were, according to grace, not according to substance, and is inoperative, let him be empty of the better operation, but rather full of the adverse. If anyone does not adore this Crucified One, let him be anathema and be reckoned with the Deicides. If anyone says that he was made perfect from works, or after baptism or the resurrection from the dead was made worthy of assimilation, as the gentiles introduce those inscribed beneath, let him be anathema: for what has begun either progresses or is perfected, is not God; or if it is said thus by way of increment, in a catamodic sense." Behold, without doubt those are anathematized who say that God is not united to the flesh according to substance, and not formed together.

If, therefore, the union in Christ was made according to substance, it is evident that it made one substance; for he did not say that the testimony was joined according to substances, but according to substance. But substance is certainly one, and not two substances, as you say. I remember, moreover, that also, when a natural union was being spoken of, you said that for the time being he did not say a union according to nature, but "natural." Behold, therefore, here he spoke specifically not of a substantial conjunction, but of one according to substance, that is, a union; he added, moreover, that God is formed together with the flesh, and that the Jews are not murderers, but Deicides.

Rusticus: He does not now say how the two natures came together with each other, but how the one and only divine nature came together with the humanity, but not also conversely. But if you suspect this to be improbable, let us attend to the beginning of this passage; for he says: "If anyone speaks as in a prophet, as having worked according to grace." You see, therefore, the beginning of the proposition, how God was joined to the flesh, not how the Godhead and the humanity [came together] without unity, that is, from one part of the union, so to speak. He destroys, therefore, the notion that it be said simply that God was joined according to grace, and according to that measure of grace by which he worked in the prophets; but he proves that he was joined according to substance; and he did not say "united," but "joined"; but the conjunction is of those things which are not immediately united.