AN. MANYL. SEV. BOETII IN PORPHYRIUM DIALOGI A VICTORINO TRANSLATI.
DIALOGUS PRIMUS.
Hiemantis anni tempore in Aureliae montibus concesseramus, atque ibi tunc cum violentior auster ejecisset noctis placidamatqueexturbassetquietem, recensere libitum est ea quae doctissimi viri ad illuminandas quodammodo acies intellectus densitate caligantissimas,quibusdamquasiintroductoriiscoo:mentariis ediderunt. Ejus vero rei Fabius initium fecit,qui cum me lectulo recumbentem,et quaedam super eisdem rebus cogitantem meditantemque vidisset,hortatus, ut quod saepe eram pollicitus, aliquam illi ejus rei traderem disciplinam.Complacitum est igitur,quoniam tunc et familiarium salutationes,et domestica negotia cessabant.Interrogatus a me ergo super quibus vellet rebus me enodare atque expedire, tunc Fabius; Quoniam,inquit,tempus ad studia vacat,ethoc otium in honestum negotium converti licet, rogo ut mihi explices id quod Victorinus orator sui temporis|ferme doctissimus a Porphyrio per, id est per introductionem in AristotelisCategoriasdiciturtranstulisse.Etprimum disciplinisdidascalicisquibusdam meimbue,quibus expositores vel etiam commentatores,ut discipulorum animos;docilitatequadam assuescant,utuntur.
THE DIALOGUES OF ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS ON PORPHYRY, TRANSLATED BY VICTORINUS.
DIALOGUE ONE.
In the season of the wintry year we had withdrawn to the mountains of Aurelia, and there, when a rather violent south wind had driven in and disturbed the calm and quiet of the night, it pleased us to review those things which the most learned men have published, as it were, to illuminate the eyes of the intellect, which are most darkened by the density of fog, in certain works that serve as introductions. Fabius made a beginning of this matter; for when he had seen me lying on my couch and thinking and meditating on certain things concerning these same matters, he urged me, as I had often promised, to impart to him some instruction in this matter. It was agreed, then, since at that time both the greetings of household members and domestic business had ceased. Therefore, when I had asked him about which matters he wished me to unravel and explain, Fabius then said: Since time is free for studies, and this leisure may be turned to honorable business, I ask that you explain to me that which Victorinus, the orator, almost the most learned of his time, is said to have translated from Porphyry through, that is, through an introduction into Aristotle's Categories. And first imbue me with certain didactic disciplines, which expositors or even commentators use so that the minds of students may be accustomed by a certain teachableness.
Tunc ego: Sex omnino, inquam, magistri in omni expositione prælibant.Prædocent enim quae sit cujuscunque operis intentio, quod apud illos vocatur.Secundumquse utilitas,quod a Graecis appellatur. Tertium qui ordo,quod Grsecivocant £iv..Quartum si ejus cujus esse opus dicitur, germanus propriusque liber est,quod interpretari solet.Quintum quae sitejus operis inscriptio, quod Græci nominant.In hoc etiam quod intentionem cujusque libri insolerter interpretarentur, de inscriptione quoque operis apud quosdam minus callentes haesitatum est.Sextum est iddicere, adquampartemphilosophiaecujuscunquelibriducatur intentio, quod Græca oratione dicitur sis. Hæc ergo omnia in quolibet philosophiae libro quæri convenit, atque expediri. TuncFabius,quse essetintroductionis intentio interrogavit. Et ego inquam: Aristoteles, qui factus est introductionis pons,non aliter intelligi potest, nisi ipsas res de quibus disputaturus est ad intelligentiam praeparemus. Videns enim Porphyrius quod in rebus omnibu, essent quaedam prima natura,ex quibus omnia, velut ex aliquo fonte manarent, et illa quae prima essent, et subsistentia esse, et generis vocabulo nuncupari.Porroautem nunquam esse genus posse, nisi ei quaedam alia subderetur, et quæ essent subdita species appellari: porro autem nunquam genus uni speciei genus esse posse,sed pluribus.
Then I said: There are six points in all, I said, which teachers touch upon beforehand in every exposition. For first they teach what the intention of any work is, which among them is called the scope. Second, its usefulness, which by the Greeks is called the beneficial. Third, what its order is, which the Greeks call the arrangement. Fourth, whether the work said to be his is genuinely and properly his own book, which he is accustomed to interpret. Fifth, what the inscription of that work is, which the Greeks name the title. In this matter too, since they skillfully interpret the intention of each book, there has been hesitation concerning the inscription of a work among certain of the less skilled. Sixth is to state to which part of philosophy the intention of any book is directed, which in Greek speech is called the classification. All these things, then, ought to be sought out and explained in any book of philosophy. Then Fabius asked what the intention of the introduction was. And I said: Aristotle, who has become the bridge of the introduction, cannot be understood otherwise unless we prepare the things themselves about which he is going to dispute for understanding. For Porphyry, seeing that in all things there were certain first natures, from which all things flow as from some fountain, and that those things which are first both are subsistent and are named by the word genus. Furthermore, a genus can never exist unless some other things are placed under it, and those things which are placed under it are called species; and furthermore, a genus can never be the genus of one species, but of many.
Plures autem species non posse esse multiplices,nisi eas aliqua discretio separet. Si enim nibil sibi dissimilesforent,una species non multiplicesviderentudlla igitur divisio et dissimilitudo specierum differentiae nomine vocitantur.Om:;ia vero qua aliqua re differunt,fieri aliter non possunt nisi quibusdampropriis solitariisquenaturis insignita sint. Atque haec hactenus. Videns ergo quod omnis omnium disparilitas in gemina rerum principia secaretur.in substantiam atque accidens, ita ut neque accidens sine substantia, neque sine accidenti substantia esse possit. Accidens quippe sine aliquo substantiae fundamento esse non potest: substantia vero ipsasine superjecto accidente videri nullo modo potest. Ut enim color sit quod est accidens, in corpore erit quod cst substantia.Porro autem cum corpus, id est substantiam videris, insignitam eam accidenti, id est aliquo colore, respicies. Itaque fit ut neque substantia praeter accidens sit,neque accidens a substantia relinquatur.Ubi enim substantia fuit3moxaccidensconsecutum est.Speculatus igitur Porphyrius in his duabus rebus, id est accidenti et su bstan tia,genera,species, propria, differentiasque versari,et quod ipsa per se sint genera,subjectis et subjacentibus speciebus,q uæ differentiis et propriis insignitae sunt, statuit principaliter de ganere,specie, differentia, propriisque tractare.
But there cannot be many species unless some discernment separates them. For if they were not dissimilar to one another, they would not appear as many species; therefore division itself and the dissimilarity of species are called by the name of difference. But all things that differ in some respect cannot come to be otherwise than by being marked with certain proper and solitary natures. And so much for these matters. Seeing, then, that all the disparity of all things is cut into two principles of things, into substance and accident, such that neither can accident be without substance, nor substance without accident. For accident cannot be without some foundation of substance; but substance itself can in no way be seen without an accident placed upon it. For in order that color, which is an accident, may exist, it will be in a body, which is substance. Furthermore, when you see a body, that is, a substance, you will observe it marked by an accident, that is, by some color. And so it comes about that neither is substance without accident, nor is accident abandoned by substance. For where substance has been, accident has immediately followed. Porphyrius, therefore, having observed that in these two things, that is, in accident and substance, genera, species, properties, and differences are involved, and that genera themselves exist in their own right, while the species that are marked by differences and properties are subject and underlying, decided principally to treat of genus, species, difference, and properties.
Et quoniam tractatus hic in definitionibus, ut post docebimus, proderit,si quis autem in definitione generali ponat accidens, eum non recte definire manifestum est, quod suo loco tractabitur,statuit pauca de accidentibus praelibare.Ita enim nos prudentissimus doctor instituit,uttuncindefinitionibus quibuslibet plenam scientiam queamus accipere, cum quod prosit dictum sit,et quod non sit utile,segregetur.Haec igitur hujus operis intentio est,de genere,specie, differentiis,propriis,accidentibusque tractare. Hic Fabius: Expedisti,inquit, de intentione,nunc utilitatem explica. Varia, inquam, et multiplex in hoc opere commoditas utilitasque versatur. Primum enim in Aristotelis categorias perquam uberrime prodest. Quid autem prosit dicemus, cum de ejus libri inscriptione tractabimus, sed in quibus aliis prosit,paucis philosophiae ipsius divisione facta perstringam.Et prius quid sit ipsa philosophia considerandum est.Est enim philosophia amor et studium et amicitia quodammodo sapienLiæ.Sapientiæ vero non hujus quæ in artibus quibusdam et in aliquafabrili scientia notitiaque versatur,sed illius sapientiæ,quæ nullius indigens, vivax mens,el sola rerum primaeva ratio est.
And since this treatise will be useful in definitions, as we shall teach later—but if anyone places an accident in a general definition, it is clear that he defines incorrectly, which will be treated in its proper place—he decided to touch briefly on accidents. For thus the most prudent teacher instructed us, so that we may then receive full knowledge of any definitions whatsoever, when what is useful has been stated and what is not useful has been set apart. This, therefore, is the intent of this work: to treat of genus, species, differences, properties, and accidents. Here Fabius said: You have finished with the intent; now explain its utility. Various, I say, and manifold advantage and utility are involved in this work. For first, it is exceedingly useful for Aristotle's Categories. But what its use is we shall say when we treat of the title of that book; yet in what other matters it is useful, I shall briefly set forth after making a division of philosophy itself. And first it must be considered what philosophy itself is. For philosophy is love and study and, in a certain way, friendship of wisdom. But of wisdom—not this wisdom which is occupied in certain arts and in some craft-like knowledge and acquaintance, but that wisdom which, needing nothing, is the living mind and the sole primordial reason of things.
Est autem hic amor sapicnti.ie inlelligentis animi abUla pura sapieotia illuminatio, et quodammodo ad seipsum retractio atque advocatio,utvideatur studium æque sæpientiæ,studium divinitatis et puræ mentis illius amicitia. Haec igitur sapientia cuncto animarum generi meritum suasdivinitatis imponit,et ad propriam naturæ vim puntatemque reducit. Hinc nascitur speculationum cogitationumque veritas, et sancta puraqueactuum casumonia.Quae res in ipsius pbilosophias divisionem sectionemque convertitur.E,t enim philosophia genus, species vero ejus duæ,una quæ dicitur,altera quae, id est speculativa et activa. Erunt autem tot speculativæ philosophice species, quotsuntresin qu ibusjustæ speculatio considerationis habetur.Quotqueactuumdiversitates,totspecies varietatesque virtutem.Est igitur, id est contemplativae vel speculativae triplex diversitas,atque ipsa pars philosophiae in tres species dividitur. Est enim pars una de intellectibilibus, alia de intelligibilibus,alia de naturalibus.Tunc interpellavit Fabius,miratusque est quid hoc novi sermonis essel,quod unam speculativae partem intelJectibilem nominassem.Nota,inquam,quoniam Latino sermone nunquam dictum reperi,inteJlectil.Jilia,egomet mea verbi compositione vocavi.Est enim intellectibile quod unum atque idem per se in propria semper divinitate consistens,nul!is unquam sensibus,sed sola tantum mente intellectuque capitur.
Now this love of wisdom is the pure illumination of the understanding mind by wisdom itself, and in a way a drawing back and calling of it to itself, so that the zeal for wisdom appears equally to be a zeal for divinity and a friendship with that pure mind. This wisdom, then, imposes on every kind of soul the merit of its own divinity, and leads it back to the proper power and purity of its nature. From this is born the truth of speculations and thoughts, and the holy and pure chastity of actions. This matter is turned into the division and sectioning of philosophy itself. For philosophy is a genus, and its species are two: one which is called speculative, the other active. Now there will be as many species of speculative philosophy as there are things in which a just contemplation of consideration is had, and as many varieties of virtues as there are diversities of actions. There is, then, a threefold diversity of the contemplative or speculative part, and that part of philosophy itself is divided into three species. For one part is concerning the intellectible, another concerning the intelligible, another concerning natural things. Then Fabius interrupted, and wondered what this new manner of speech was, that I had named one part of the speculative [part] intellectible. Note, I said, that I have never found "intellectible" said in the Latin language; I myself have coined it by my own composition of the word. For the intellectible is that which, being one and the same, always subsisting in its own divinity through itself, is never grasped by any senses, but only by mind and intellect alone.
Quae res ad speculationem Dei atque ad animi incorporalitatem considerationemque veræ philosophiae indagatione componitur.Quam partem Graeci yfav nominant. Secunda vero pars est intelligibilis, qua; primam intellectibilem cogitatione atque intelligentia suscipiens,ea comprehendit quae sunt omnium coelestium supernae divinitati operum causæ, et quidquid sub lunari globo beatiore animo atque puriore substantia valet; postremo humanarum animarum conditionem atque statum,quee omnia cum prioribus illis intellectibilessubstantiae fuissent,sed corporum tactu,ab intellectibilibus ad intelligibilia degenerarunt,ut non magis ipsa intelligantur quam intelligant, et intelligentiae puritate tunc beatiora sunt,quoties sese intellectibilibus applicarint. Ter- ] tia 0£ species est,quse circa corpora atque eorum scientiam cognitionemque versatur, id est physiologia,quae naturas corporum passionesque declarat.Secunda vero,intelligibilium s,ubstantia, merito in medio collocata est, quod habeat et corporum animationem,et quodammodo vivificationem,etintellectibilium considerationem cognitionemque, ut dictum est. Practicæ vero philosophiæ, quam activam superius dici demonstratum est,hujus quoque triplex est divisio. Est enim prima quae sui curam gerens cunctis sese erigit, exornat, augetque virtutibus,nihil invita admitens,quo non gaudeat, nihil facienspoenitendum.
This matter is ordered by investigation toward the contemplation of God and toward the incorporeality of the mind and the consideration of true philosophy. This part the Greeks call yfav. The second part, however, is intelligible, which, receiving the first intelligible by thought and understanding, comprehends those things which are the causes of all heavenly works for the supernal divinity, and whatever under the lunar sphere prevails with a more blessed mind and purer substance; finally, the condition and state of human souls, all of which, although they had been among those prior intelligible substances, nevertheless by contact with bodies degenerated from intelligibles to things intelligible, so that they are not so much understood as they understand, and they are then happier by the purity of understanding whenever they have applied themselves to intelligibles. The third species is that which is concerned with bodies and the science and knowledge of them, that is, physiology, which declares the natures and affections of bodies. The second, however, the substance of intelligibles, is rightly placed in the middle, because it has both the animation and, in a way, the vivification of bodies, and the consideration and knowledge of intelligibles, as has been said. Of practical philosophy, moreover, which has been shown above to be called active, there is also a threefold division. For the first is that which, taking care of itself, raises itself up, adorns and increases itself with virtues, admitting nothing unwillingly in which it does not rejoice, doing nothing to be repented of.
Secunda vero est quae reipublicæ curam suscipiens, cunctorum saluti suae providentise solertia,et justitiae libra,et fortitudinis stabilitate,et temperantiae patientia medetur. Tertia vero quæ rei familiaris officium modiocri componens dispositione distribuit. Sunt harum etiam alix subdivisiones,quas nunc persequi supersedendum est. Ad hæc igitur ut sciri possint et. superiora intelligi queant,necessarius maxime uberrimusque fructus est artis ejus,quam Graeci, nos rationalem possumus dicere, quod recta orationis ratione quid verum, quidque decens sit,nullo erroris flexu diverticulove fallatur. Quam artem quidam partem phiJosophiæ,quidam non partem,sed ferramentum et quodammodo supellectilem judicarunt.Qua autem id utrique impulsi ratione crediderint,alio erit opere commemorandum. Hæc autem generis, speciei,differentia, proprii atque accidentis disputatio in omni nobis philosophiae cognitione quasi quamdam viam parat.Nam cum quid genus sit docemur, quid species,intelligimusgenus esse philosophiam, species vero indubitanter et, id est speculativam et activam. De logica vero utrum si species,eadem hac possumus ratione perpendere. Prodest nobis differentiæ cognitio ad ipsarum philosophiæ specierum differentias cognoscendas.Prodest proprii scientia ad cognoscendum quid unicuique philosophiae speciei solitaria natura videatur ac substantia innatum.
The second part, however, is the one that takes up the care of the commonwealth and heals the safety of all by the shrewdness of its providence, the balance of justice, the stability of fortitude, and the patience of temperance. The third part, however, arranging the duty of the household, distributes it by a moderate disposition. There are also other subdivisions of these, which must now be passed over without pursuing them. For these things, then, so that they may be known and the higher matters be able to be understood, the most necessary and most abundant fruit is that of the art which the Greeks call rational, and we may call rational, because by the right reasoning of speech it is turned aside by no bend or byway of error from what is true and what is fitting. Some have judged this art to be a part of philosophy, some not a part, but a tool and in a certain way an instrument. But by what reasoning both were driven to believe this will have to be recorded in another work. This disputation, however, concerning genus, species, difference, property, and accident prepares for us, as it were, a certain way in every cognition of philosophy. For when we are taught what genus is and what species, we understand that philosophy is the genus, but the species are undoubtedly two, that is, speculative and active. But whether logic is a species, we can weigh by the same reasoning. The knowledge of difference is of benefit to us for knowing the differences of the species of philosophy themselves. The knowledge of property is of benefit for knowing what solitary nature and innate substance seems to belong to each species of philosophy.
Prodest accidentis cognitio: per hoc enim quid principaliter in rebus sit cernere,et quid secundo contingentique loco conveniat,discernere valemus. Ita nobis harum quinque rerum scientia,ramosa quadam et multifida vi, in omnibus sese philosophiae partes infundit. Ad grammaticam vero, non minor hujus rei usus est, quando orationem genus dicimus: octo vero partes orationis, per species, differentias propriaque metimur. Est vero hujus rei perquam rhetorice amicaconjunctaquecognitio.Ita enim rhetoricam in tribus causarum possumus separare generibus,et eas in subjectis constitutionibusdissecare.Definitionem quoque quæ ad logicam pertinent magna atque utilis uberrimaque cognitio est,quas definitiones nisi per genera, species,differentias,proprietatesque tractaveris, nullus unquam definitionibus terminus imponetur.Nam si quid definis, ex quo sit genere primum tibi dicendum est,atque in hoc genus speciesqueconsummata sunt.Nam cujuscunque rei genus dixeris,ad quam rem illud dixeris,speciem facis. Ut si quid sit homo definias,dicas homine.m esseanimal.Igitur quoniam ad hominem aptasti animal,genus esse animal,et hominem speciem a te declaratum est, sed non sufficit sola generis in definitione monstratio.Si enim solum animal hominem.esse dixeris,num potius hominem quam bovem asinumque aut equum definitione depinxeris?
The knowledge of accident is useful, for through it we are able to discern what is principally in things, and to distinguish what belongs in the second and contingent place. Thus the science of these five things, with a certain branching and manifold power, pours itself into all the parts of philosophy. But for grammar the use of this thing is no less, since we call speech a genus: indeed we measure the eight parts of speech through species, differences, and properties. The knowledge of this thing is also very friendly and closely joined to rhetoric. For thus we can separate rhetoric into the three kinds of causes, and dissect them into their underlying constitutions. Definition too, which pertains to logic, is a great and useful and most abundant knowledge; unless you treat these definitions through genera, species, differences, and properties, no limit will ever be set to definitions. For if you define anything, you must first say from what genus it is, and in this genus and species are completed. For whatever thing's genus you have stated, the thing to which you have stated it, you make a species. As if you define what man is, you say that man is an animal. Therefore, since you have fitted animal to man, it has been declared by you that animal is the genus and man the species. But the indication of the genus alone is not sufficient in a definition. For if you say only that man is an animal, will you have depicted man rather than an ox, a donkey, or a horse by your definition?
Prodest igitur etiam differentiasadhihere, per quas id quod definies a speciebus aliis sejungatur, ut dicas hominem esse animal rationale. Et quoniam sub eadem differentia plures frequenter species inveniuntur, ut sub rationali Deus atque homo est, utilissimus proprietatis usus est, ut id dicas, quod sola quam detinis species, suum propriumque retineat. Fit ergo hujusmodi hominis definitio. Homo est animal, id est genus, homo vero species; rationale, quod differentia est; risus capax, quod propriumesl;accidentiumveroin definitionibus nullus usus esi. Prodest ergo in definitionibus harum quinque rerum cognitio, ut nec ea quai sunt utilia prætermittas, nec ea quæ nihil præstantcommoditatis,adjungas.Indivisioneverotantum prodest, ut nisi per horumscientiam, nulla res recte distribui, secarique possit. Nam quae generum vel specierum recta distributio divisione erit, ubi ipsarum quae dividuntur rerum nulla scientiae cognitione dirigimur? Probationum vero ventas in bis maxime constituta est: quod per ea quae dividis, id quod dividis, vel quid aliud probas. Nam MarcusTullius in Rhetoricorum primo,quoniamdivisionem generum,causarum rite atque ordinate faciebat, ejus rei probationem ita esse debere per species generaquedisposuit,cum ait easdem resaliissuperponi,aliisaupponi posse,eisdem et subjectasetsuperpositas esse non posse.Hæc fere de utilitate ad tempus dicenda credidimus.
It is useful, then, also to attach differences, through which that which you define is separated from other species, so that you may say that man is a rational animal. And since under the same difference several species are frequently found, as under "rational" are God and man, the use of property is most useful, so that you may state that which the species alone retains as its own proper characteristic. Thus the definition of man is made in this way: man is an animal—that is, the genus; man is the species; rational is the difference; capable of laughter is the property; but of accidents there is no use in definitions. It is useful, then, in definitions to have knowledge of these five things, so that you neither omit those things which are useful nor add those things which confer no advantage. Of division, however, it is so useful that, without the knowledge of these things, no thing can be rightly distributed or divided. For how will there be a right distribution of genera or species by division, when we are directed by no knowledge or understanding of the things themselves which are divided? But the truth of proofs is especially established in these: that through those things which you divide, you prove that which you divide, or something else. For Marcus Tullius in the first book of the Rhetoric, since he was making a division of the genera of causes rightly and in order, arranged that the proof of this matter should be thus through species and genera, when he says that the same things can be placed over others and placed under others, but the same things cannot be both subjects and placed over others. These things, concerning utility, we have believed should be said for the present.
Tunc Fabius: Valde miror, inquit, cur inchoanti mibi tam subtilius inventas exercitatasque res edideris. Sed dic, quaeso,quodnam hoc totum fuit consilium?Et ego, Dicam tibi quod assuescendus animusauditoris et mediocri subtilitate imbuendus est,ut cum sese hic primum exercuerit palaestra ingenii,quasi quodammodo prius luctatus,ea quae sequentursine ulla labore conficiat Sed quid restet dicas licebit. Et Fabius: Ordinem,inquit,restare arbitror,si bene commemini.Atqui, inquam, hic ordo valde cum inscriptione conjunctus est.Si enim alterum noris, ambo noverin.Ordo tamen est quod omnes post Porphyrium ingredientes ad logicam,hujus primum libelli tractatores fuerunt,quod primus hic ad simplicitatem tenuitatis usque progressus, quo procedentibus viandum sit, praeparat. Aristoteles enim, quoniam dialecticae atqueapodicticae disciplinae volebat posteris ordinem scientiamque contradere, vidit apodicticam dialecticamque vim uno syllogismi ordine contineri.Scribit itaque primos resolutorios quos Græci vocant, qui legendi essent antequam al i quid dialecticæ vel apodicticse artis attinge.
Then Fabius said: I wonder greatly why, for me as a beginner, you have brought out matters so rather subtle and well-practiced. But tell me, I ask, what was this whole plan? And I said: I will tell you, because the mind of the hearer must be accustomed and imbued with moderate subtlety, so that when it has first exercised itself here in the wrestling-school of wit, as if it had wrestled beforehand in a certain way, it may accomplish without any labor the things that follow. But you may say what remains. And Fabius said: I think that order remains, if I remember well. And indeed, I said, this order is greatly connected with the title. For if you know one, you will know both. Yet the order is that all who enter logic after Porphyry were the first tractators of this little book, because this first one, having advanced even to the simplicity of thinness, prepares the way by which those who proceed must go. For Aristotle, since he wished to hand down to posterity the order and knowledge of the dialectical and apodictic discipline, saw that the apodictic and dialectical power is contained in one order of syllogism. And so he writes the first Resolutories, which the Greeks call [analytics], which were to be read before one touched anything of the dialectical or apodictic art.
rent.Imprimis enim resolutoriis de syllogismorum ordine complexioneque et figuristractatur.Et quoniam syllogismus genus est apodictici et dialectici sylJogismi,dialecticam in Topicis suis exercuit,apodicticam in secundis resolutoriis ordinavit: horum disciplina,quamille in monstrandis syllogismis anie collegerat, prius etiam in studiis lectitatur. Itaque primi prius resolutorii quam secundi qui de apodictico syllogismo,vel Topica quae de dialectico syllogismo sunt,accipiuntur.Traxit igiturAristoteles dialecticam atque apodicticam scientiam,adunavitque insyllogismorum resolutoria disputatione.Sed quoniam syllogismum ex propositionibus constare necesse est,librum,qui inscribitur de Propositionibus,adnotavit. Omnes vero propositiones ex sermonibus aliquid significantibus componuntur.ltuque liber quem de decem prsedicamentis scripsit, quæ apud Graecos dicuntur, de primis rerum nominibus significantibusque est. Vi. ditenim Aristoteles infinitam miscellamque essererum omnium,verborumque disparilitatem,et ut eorum ordinem reperiret,in decem primis sermonibus, prima rerumgenerasignificantibus,omne quidquid illud vel rerum, vel sermonum poterat esse, collegit. Sed Aristoteles hactenus. Speculatus autem Porphyrius si calegoriæ genera sunt rerum.
For in the first place, the Resolutoria treat of the order, combination, and figures of syllogisms. And since syllogism is the genus of the apodictic and the dialectical syllogism, he practiced dialectic in his Topics, and he ordered the apodictic in the second Resolutoria: the discipline of these, which he had gathered earlier in demonstrating syllogisms, is read even earlier in his studies. And so the first Resolutoria are taken up before the second, which concern the apodictic syllogism, or the Topics, which concern the dialectical syllogism. Aristotle therefore drew together dialectical and apodictic knowledge, and united them in the resolutory disputation of syllogisms. But since a syllogism must consist of propositions, he noted down the book which is entitled On Propositions. But all propositions are composed of words that signify something. And so the book which he wrote On the Ten Predicaments, which among the Greeks are called categories, concerns the first names of things and things signifying. For Aristotle saw the infinite and confused mixture of all things and the dissimilarity of words, and so that he might discover their order, in the ten first words signifying the first genera of things, he collected everything whatsoever that could be either of things or of words. But Aristotle [has been treated] thus far. Porphyry, however, considered whether the categories are genera of things.
rerum vero sermonumque diversitas,speciebus,differentiis, propriisqueinsigniretur.videns etiam quod accidentium in categoriis magna vis esset (omnes enim res Arisloteles in duas primum partes dividit, in accidens atque substantiam),et accidens in novem membra dispersit,dicens,aut substantiam esse qnamcumque illam rem, aut si accidens esset, quoniam aut qualitas, aut quantitas, aut ad aliquid, aut ubi, aut quando,autjacere,aut habere, aut facere esset, aut pati.Praelibat igitur nos Porphyrius ad horum verissimam cognitionem hoc de gcneribtis,speciebus, differentiis, propriis, accidentibusque tractatu. Sic igitur cum ante apodicticam dialecticamque rem syllogistica prcelegantur.ante syllogisticam in propositionibus primus labor sit,ante, propositiones in categoriis pauca desudent,ante categorias in is agogis plurimum laborent,quæde generibus,speciebus, dilTerentiis, propriis, accidentibusque censentur, ordo est de his ipsis rebus pauca praelibare. Recte igitur ut filo quodam hie Porphyrii liber primus tegentibus studiorum praegustator, et quodammodo initiator occurrit. Quod si in hac re, quod dictum est, sat est,rem etiam de inscriptione confecimus. Quo enim alio melius quam introductionis nomine nuncupetur hic liber? Est namque ad categorias Aristotelis introitus,et quaedam quasi janua venientes admittit.
But the diversity of things and of words is marked out by species, differentiae, and proper attributes. Seeing also that the force of accidents in the Categories is great (for Aristotle first divides all things into two parts, into accident and substance), and he dispersed accident into nine members, saying that any given thing is either substance, or, if it is an accident, it is either quality, or quantity, or relation, or where, or when, or lying, or having, or doing, or being affected. Porphyry therefore preludes us to the truest knowledge of these things by this treatise concerning genera, species, differentiae, proper attributes, and accidents. So then, since before the apodictic and dialectical matter the syllogistic matter is read beforehand, and before the syllogistic matter the first labor is on propositions, and before propositions a few things are worked out in the Categories, and before the Categories there is very great labor in the Isagogae, which are reckoned to concern genera, species, differentiae, proper attributes, and accidents, the order is to prelude a few things concerning these very matters. Rightly, therefore, as if by a thread, this first book of Porphyry comes forward as a foretaster of the studies that cover these things, and in a manner an initiator. But if in this matter, as has been said, it is enough, we have also settled the matter concerning the inscription. For by what other name could this book be better called than by the name of introduction? For it is an entrance to Aristotle's Categories, and as a kind of door it admits those who come.
Tum Fabius: Perge, quaeso te; et si ejus hoc propriam germanumque opus est collige. Hoc,inquam,indubitatum est,omnibus enimPorphyrii libris stylus hic convenit. Et mos hic Porphyrio est,ut in his rebus quae sunt obscurissimæ,introducendaquaedam et prægustanda praecurrat, ut alio quodam libro de Categoricis syllogismis fecit5et de multis item aliis quae in philosophiagraviaillustriaque versantur.Et hoc apud superiores indubitatum est, quibus nolle credere inscitia est. Tum Fabius; Restat, inquit, ut ad quam partem philosophiae ducatur,edisseras.Ei ego: Dicam tibi: Quoniam categoriæ ad propositiones aptantur,syllogismi de propositionibus componuntur,apodictici vero vel dialectici syllogismi in logica; artis disciplina vertuntur.Constat quoque categorias quæ ad propositiones syllogismosque pertinent, logicas scienliaB esse connexas. Quare inlroductio quoque in categorias ad logicam scientiam convenienteraptabitur.Quoniam eaqusepraedicenda suntexplicui,nunc textus ipsius ratio atque ordo videatur. Tum Fabius: Priusquam explanatio sensus procedat id scire desidero, cur, cum posset dicere: Cum necessarium sit, praeposteralo ordine, cum sit necessarium dixit. Et ego; Quoniam, inquam, nullum accidens est, quod non substantia, fundamento nitatur.
Then Fabius said: Please continue; and if this is his own and genuine work, gather it together. This, I say, is beyond doubt, for this style suits all of Porphyry's books. And this is Porphyry's custom, that in those matters which are most obscure, he first brings forward certain things to be introduced and tasted beforehand, as he did in another book on categorical syllogisms and likewise on many other matters which are weighty and illustrious in philosophy. And this is beyond doubt among earlier authorities, for whom to refuse to believe is ignorance. Then Fabius said: It remains for you to explain to which part of philosophy it is directed. And I said: I will tell you: since the categories are fitted to propositions, and syllogisms are composed from propositions, while demonstrative or dialectical syllogisms are turned to the discipline of logic, it is also established that the categories which pertain to propositions and syllogisms are connected with the logical science. Wherefore the introduction to the categories also will fittingly be adapted to the science of logic. Since I have explained these things which needed to be said beforehand, let us now consider the reason and order of the text itself. Then Fabius said: Before the explanation of the meaning proceeds, I desire to know this: why, when he could have said "Since it is necessary," by a reversed order he said "since it is necessary." And I said: Because, I say, there is no accident which is not supported by substance as its foundation.
Porro autem quidquid ad cujuslibet superjectifirmitatemest,id antequam ipsum esset, fuisse necesse est: ut enim in domibus, nisi prius fundamenta subjicias, nulla unquam fabrica, sic nisi prius substantiae fundamenta sint, nulla unquam accidentiasuperponentur.Oportet enim prius esse aliquid, ut formam qualitatis arripiat, nam necessarium qualitas est: non absurde igitur prius esse posuit, pust etiam necessarium, id est post substantiam, qualitatis nomenaptavit. Hic Fabius; Subtilissime, inquit, et lucide, sed nunc ordo ipse operis textusque videatur.
Cum sit necessariumyMenanLiy sive ad Aristotelis categorias. sive ad definitionis disciplinam, nosse quid Slt genuSyquidve species, quid differentia, quidproprium, guid accidens, et omnino ad ea quæ sunt divisionis, vel quæ approbationis, quorum utilitas esi et magna cognilio, breviter tibi explicare tentabo. Quæ apud antiquos quidem alle et magnifice quæstionum genera proposita sunt. [ego simplici sermone cum quadam cunjectura in res consideratione alia ista explicabo mediocriter.
Furthermore, whatever contributes to the firmness of any underlying subject must necessarily have existed before that subject itself; for just as in houses, unless foundations are laid first, no structure is ever built, so unless the foundations of substances exist first, no accidents are ever superimposed. For something must exist first in order to take on the form of a quality, for quality is necessary; therefore he not unreasonably placed being first, and afterwards also the necessary, that is, after substance he applied the name of quality. Here Fabius said: Most subtly and clearly, but now let the order and texture of the work itself be seen.
Since it is necessary, whether with regard to Aristotle's Categories or to the discipline of definition, to know what genus is, what species, what differentia, what property, what accident, and generally all things pertaining to division or to proof, whose utility and great knowledge is [important], I shall attempt to explain briefly to you. Among the ancients indeed, other and magnificent kinds of questions were proposed. I shall explain these other matters in plain speech with some conjectural consideration of the subject, in a moderate way.
Tuncego: Praediximusquidem paucasuperius,sed vel bis quaedam addere, vel haec eadem rursus commemorare absurdum esse non arbitror. Totus autem seusus talis est: Scribens ad Menantium de utilitate libri, summatim pauca praedicit, quod elucubratior animus auditoris exercitatiorque ad haec capienda perveniat. Prodesse autem ad Aristotelis categorias dicit, quod cum omnium sermonum significantium varietatem diversa rerum summa divideret, etin substantiam atqueaccidens omnes res secaretatque;dispergeret, accidens in vocem secuit partes, quod superius demonstravi,et hæcgenera generalissimanominavit, id est,quod superista alia genera inveniri non possint. Igitur si sunt genera sine speciebus esse non possunt. Si sub his species supponuntur,differentiis non vacabunt.Quodsidifferentias retinent, propriis indigebunt. Accidentis vero novem praedicamenta sunt.Quocirca non absurdum fuit hincintroductionem in praedicamenta componi, ut de generibus, speciebus, differentiis propriisque tractaret,quæ in ipsis praedicamentis inseparabiliter videntur inserta.Amplius.Quod Aristotelica subtilitas priusquam ad prædicamentorum ordinem venire.
Tuncego: I have indeed said a few things about this a little earlier, but I do not think it absurd either to add certain points to them or to recall these same matters again. The whole sense, however, is as follows: writing to Menantius about the usefulness of the book, he briefly foretells a few things, namely that the mind of the hearer, more polished and better exercised, may arrive at the grasp of these matters. He says that it is useful for Aristotle's Categories, because when the diversity of all significant speech divided the varied sum of things, and cut and scattered all things into substance and accident, he divided accident into its parts with respect to speech, as I demonstrated above, and he named these the most general genera, that is, so that no other genera can be found above them. Therefore, if they are genera, they cannot exist without species. If species are placed under them, they will not be free of differentiae. But if they retain differentiae, they will need proper attributes. Of accident, however, there are nine categories. Wherefore it was not absurd for an introduction to the Categories to be composed from this material, so that it might treat of genera, species, differentiae, and proper attributes, which are seen to be inseparably inserted in the Categories themselves. Moreover, because Aristotelian subtlety, before it comes to the order of the Categories.
tur,de æquivocis univocisque tractavit, definit vero sequivocasic: Æquivoca sunt quorum nomen solum communeest,secundum veronomen substantiae alia ratio est, ut si qua sunt,quas nomine tantum communicent,substantia vero dissimilent: univoca vero quae sub eodem nomine et sub eodem substantia continentur.Omne igitur genus ad species quas sunt sub ipso positae univoce prædicari potest. Porro autem quidquid ad quaslibet res univoce praedicatur,in his sola diffinitio una est, genus vero speciesque convertitur.Animalenimet homo univocum est.Animal enim animalis nomine dicitur.Porro autem homini nomen etiam convenit animalis,ut dicatur animal, uno ergo nomine animalis homo et animal appellantur.A.iimalis vero diffinitio est, substantia animata sensibilis,quam si ad hominem vertas nihil absurdum feceris: potest enim homo esse substantia animata sensibilis,sed animal genus, homo vero species; univoce igitur genus et species prædicantur.
It is written that he treated of equivocals and univocals, and he defines equivocals thus: Equivocals are those whose name alone is common, but the account of substance according to the name is different—as, for instance, those things which share a name only but differ in substance. Univocals, however, are those which are contained under the same name and the same substance. Every genus, therefore, can be predicated univocally of the species placed under it. Furthermore, whatever is predicated univocally of any things whatsoever, in these there is one definition alone; but genus and species are convertible. For man is a univocal animal. For he is called by the name of animal. Furthermore, the name of animal also applies to man, so that he is called an animal; therefore by one name of animal both man and animal are named. But the definition of animal is "animated sensible substance," which if you apply to man you will have done nothing absurd; for man can be an animated sensible substance, but animal is the genus and man the species; therefore genus and species are predicated univocally.
Æquivoca vero qui fuerint, quoniam definitionibus differunt, et eorum quorum definitiones aliae sunt, alia est etiam substantia:quorum alia substantia est alia sunt etiam omnino genera, in his eisdem æquivocis constat,quod neque genus,neque species possit aptari: etenim si quis hominem marmoreum et hominem vivum hominis nomine appellel,idem no- • men utrique fecerit substantiæ, differentia vero diffinitioque estdissimilis.Porro autem hominis et staluae non unum genus est, sed statuae inanimatum, hominis animatum.Quare constat quoniam nunqua rr. sub eisdem generibus continent.urqusecunque aequivoce prædicantur.Quam vim,nisi prius de generibus, speciebus,propriis et differentiis notitiam scientiamque perceperis, nullo nunquam tempore discernis. Idem Aristoteles ait quid sint primæ substantiæ,quid secundae,et primas substantias dicit esse individuorum corporum et singulorum, ut est Cicero, aut Plato,aut Socrates. Secundas vero substantias species appellavit, ut est homo; vel genera in quibus ipsae species continentur,ut est animal.Hæc igitur nisi prælibata generis specieique cognitione sciri non possunt.Idem ait substantiam ab alia substantia, in eo quod substantia sit, nulla differentia disgregari. Idem substantiae proprietates requirit, ut quasi impresso aliquo signo, sic proprietate nota, facilius quid substantia sit invenire atque expedire possimus.
But which things are equivocal, since they differ in definitions, and of those whose definitions are different the substance is also different; and of those whose substance is different, the genera are also altogether different—it is established in these same equivocals that neither genus nor species can be fitted to them. For if anyone calls a marble man and a living man by the name of man, he will have made the same name for both substances, but the difference and definition are dissimilar. Moreover, the genus of a man and of a statue is not one, but that of a statue is inanimate, that of a man animate. Wherefore it is established that things which are predicated equivocally are never contained under the same genera. This force you will never at any time discern unless you have first grasped the knowledge and understanding of genera, species, properties, and differences. The same Aristotle says what primary substances are and what secondary substances are, and he says that primary substances are those of individual and singular bodies, as is Cicero, or Plato, or Socrates. But secondary substances he called species, as is man; or the genera in which the species themselves are contained, as is animal. These things, therefore, cannot be known unless the knowledge of genus and species has first been tasted beforehand. The same says that substance is separated from another substance by no difference in that it is substance. The same requires the properties of substance, so that, as if by some impressed mark, being known by its property, we may be able more easily to discover and set forth what substance is.
Atque hoc idem in accidentibus fecit. Nam et quantitatis et qualitatis et ad aliquid relationis propria collegit,et idem magna apud Aristotelem cura diligentiaqueconspicitur.Videsneutsesequinqueharum rerum vis in categoriasinterserat,etpraedicamentorum virtutibus inseparabiliter colligetur? Non mendax igitur Porpbyrius dehaccognitione,harum quinque rerum nobis in categorias, utilitate promisit. Definitionis vero disciplinam superius diximus praeter genera,species,differentias et propria non posse tra-; ctari.Sed quoniam sunt quaedam genera quae genu:i habere non possunt, ut est substantia, et alia quæ Aristoteles in prædicamentis constituit, dicat quis haec ad horum cognitionem nihil omnino prodesse quod non sit in his a genere trahenda definitio, in i quibus genus inveniri non possit,quod si qua res genus non haberet,species non esset.Hoc ita posito ad generalissimorum generum definitionemnihil genera et species utilitatis habere. Ridicula mehercle at queabsurdapropositione.Praeter scientiam enim generum specierumque magis genera illa generalissi. ma cognoscere qui potis est, cum,haecsola generum!
And he did the same in the case of accidents. For he collected the properties of quantity, quality, and relation to something, and the same is seen with great care and diligence in Aristotle. Do you see how the force of these five things intertwines itself in the categories, and is bound inseparably by the powers of the predicaments? Porphyry, therefore, is not false in this understanding, when he promised us the usefulness of these five things for the categories. But we have said above that the discipline of definition cannot be treated apart from genera, species, differences, and properties. But since there are certain genera that cannot have a genus, as is the case with substance and the others that Aristotle established in the Categories, someone may say that these contribute nothing at all to the knowledge of those things, because a definition is not to be drawn from a genus in those things in which a genus cannot be found; but if any thing had no genus, it would not be a species. With this posited, genera and species have no usefulness for the definition of the most general genera. A ridiculous and absurd proposition, by Hercules! For apart from the knowledge of genera and species, how can one know those most general genera, since these alone of genera—
specierumque cognitio si amissa sit,nihil de generibus speciebusque noscatur?In illis igitur quibus genus aliud superius inveniri non potest, nullius unquam terminus definitionis aptabitur,et in ipsius definitione genera speciesque cessabunt, et solæ ditferenliæ propriaque illius terminum definitionis informant. Cum enim id quod dicis, ab aliis rebus omnibus adjunctis differentiis segregaveris.etpropriisimpressis formam ejusfiguramquemonstraveris,genus quod invenire non poteris perquirere non labores.Sed in his species et genera non requiruntur, in quibus,quod ipsa generalissima sint genera,genus inveniri non queat.Porro autem in his quorum genus est aliquid,nisi a generedennitio ducatur,finis ejus definitionis vitiosa conclusione colligitur.Accidens vero ad definitiones nihil prodesse non dubium est.
And if the knowledge of species is lost, will nothing be known about genera and species? Therefore in those things in which no other superior genus can be found, no limit of any definition will ever be fitted, and in the definition of such a thing genera and species will cease, and only the differences and its own properties inform the limit of its definition. For when you have separated what you call it from all other things by the differences adjoined to it, and have shown its form and figure by its own impressed marks, you need not labor to seek the genus which you cannot find. But genera and species are not required in those things in which, because they are themselves the most general genera, no genus can be found. Furthermore, in those things which have some genus, unless the definition is drawn from the genus, the limit of its definition is gathered by a faulty conclusion. But it is not doubtful that accident contributes nothing to definitions.
Definitioenim substantiam mtormare desiderat,accidens vero substantiam non designat.Accidens igitur indefinitione nihil prodest.Est itaque necessaria generis specieique cognitio, ut si generalissima non sint quoe quisque definiturus est,a genere definitionem trabat.Si vero generalissima sint, ejus genus quærere,q uod inveniri non potest,non laboret.Æque enim vitiosum est vel in generalissimis genera quasrere,vel in subalternis generibus a generibus definitionem ducere supersedere.Differentiae vero et propria, vel si magis genera sunt, vel si subalterna, maximam retinent utilitatem: et quoniam ad definitionesquas pertinent quædam dicta sunt,paucaetiam de his ipsis ratiouabilius subtiliusque colligemus.Sit genus animal, sit species homo,sit differentia rationale vel mortale,sit proprium risibile; accidens vero quoniam ad definitiones incommodum est prætermittamus.Quisquis ergo speciem definit,ita de genere ab aliis eam generibus separat,ut si quis dicat quid est homo? animal.Dicens enin: animal, separavit hominem ab omnibus generibus quaecunque animalia non sunt.Si quis vero differentiam dicat et eam ad speciem accommodet,res sub eisdem generibus per differentias segregravit.Nam cum dicishomi.
For a definition desires to inform substance, but an accident does not designate substance. An accident, therefore, is of no use in a definition. And so the knowledge of genus and species is necessary, so that if the things which anyone is about to define are not most general, he may draw the definition from a genus. But if they are most general, he should not labor to seek their genus, which cannot be found. For it is equally faulty either to seek genera in the most general things, or to refrain from drawing a definition from genera in subaltern genera. But differences and properties, whether they are more properly genera or subaltern, retain the greatest usefulness; and since certain things have been said which pertain to definitions, we shall also gather a few points about these very things more reasonably and more subtly. Let animal be a genus, let man be a species, let rational or mortal be a difference, let risible be a property; but let us pass over accident, since it is unsuitable for definitions. Whoever therefore defines a species, separates it from other genera by means of the genus, as if someone should say what is man? animal. For in saying animal, he has separated man from all the genera which are not animals. But if someone should state a difference and apply it to the species, he has separated the thing under the same genera by means of differences. For when you say of man
nem esse animal rationale,cum etiam bos et equus species animalis sint,additum tamen rationale homini,ab aliis sub eodem genere speciebus,hominis speciem segregravitatque distinxit: propria vero cum dp.deris,res quae sunt sub eisdem,differentiis segregabis.Nam cum dixeris hinnibile vel risibile, illud est equ i proprium,illud hominis.Et cum equus cum bove atque cane sub eadem differentia sit, quod irrationabiliasuntomnia,adjectumhinnibileacaeteris equum sub eadem differentia speciebus dividit.Homo vero et Deus sub eadem differentiasunt,idestrationali,quod utrique rationales sunt,quamvis homo et Deus adjuncta mortali differentia separentur: propriotamen,id est risibili,quod solus habet homo, naturalius substantialiusque disjungitur quod in aliis rebus in quibusnullaspeciestalidifferentiaseparatur melius cognosci potest.Nam cum sub eadem differentia sint irrationalia, equus, bos, canis, nec est ulla alia quae eos separet differentia substantialis. Possunt enim accidentis esse rlifferentiæ,ea quae eos separent,qualessuntformarum,additumtamenequo proprium hinnibile,equum ab aliis sub eadem differentia speciebus proprietatis ipsius separatione disjunxit.
For [a human] is not a rational animal, since the ox and the horse are also species of animal; yet "rational" added to "human" has separated the species of human from the other species under the same genus and has distinguished it. But with a proper [property], you will separate the things that are under the same differences. For when you have said "neighing" or "laughing," the one is the proper property of the horse, the other of the human. And since the horse is under the same difference as the ox and the dog—namely, that they are all irrational—"neighing" added divides the horse from the other species under the same difference. But the human and God are under the same difference, that is, "rational," because both are rational, although the human and God are separated by the added difference of "mortal"; yet by the proper property, that is, "laughing," which the human alone has, [the human] is separated more naturally and more substantially, because in other things in which no such difference separates the species, it can be better known. For since the irrational [animals]—the horse, the ox, the dog—are under the same difference, there is no other substantial difference that separates them. For the differences that separate them can be accidental, such as those of forms; yet "neighing" added as a proper property has separated the horse from the other species under the same difference by the separation of that property itself.
Repetendum est igitur a primordio, quod genera in definitionibus ab aliis generibus separant, differentiae ab ipsis speciebus,quae sub eisdem generibus positae sunt,propria a speciebus,quae sub eisdem differentiæ supponuntur.Sed quoniam plene de diffinitione tractatum est,probationis vel divisionis vim subtilitatemque tractemus. Sed omnis divisio duplex est, aut cum totum corpus in diversadisjungis,aut cum genera per species distribuis. Si quis igiturharum quinquererum minussolers divisiones rerum facere voluerit, non est dubium quin eas per inscientiam saepe a speciebus in genera solvat,quod est tactu tceuissimum, quod Hermagorae in prima Rhetoricorum disputatione usu venit.In tales enim erroris nebulas incidit, ut duo genera sub aequalis generis parte poneret.Quodsi divisionis vim veritatem que vidisset,et disciplinam generum,specierumque, propriorum ct differentiam recepisset, nunquam tam insulsse divisionis errore vivacissime a Marco Tullio culparetur.In probationibus vero tantus est hujus operis fructus,ut praeter haec nullius unquam rei possit provenire probatio.Quid enim monstrare digne queas,cum cujus differentias nescias, idipsum quale sit scire non possis?Quid autem digne exsequeris, cujus si genus nescias,ex quo idipsum fonte manet ignores?
Therefore we must begin again from the beginning: that in definitions genera separate [one thing] from other genera, differentiae from the very species that are placed under the same genera, and properties from the species that are subordinated under the same differentiae. But since the treatment of definition has been completed, let us discuss the force and subtlety of proof or division. Now every division is twofold: either when you separate a whole body into its diverse parts, or when you distribute genera through species. If anyone, then, less skilled in these five things, wishes to make divisions of things, there is no doubt that through ignorance he often resolves them from species into genera, which is the most shameful to touch upon, as happened to Hermagoras in the first book of his Rhetoric. For he fell into such clouds of error that he placed two genera under a part of an equal genus. But if he had seen the force and truth of division, and had received the discipline of genera, species, properties, and differentiae, he would never have been censured by Marcus Tullius with such lively wit for the error of so foolish a division. In proofs, moreover, the fruit of this work is so great that beyond these, no proof of any matter can ever arise. For what could you worthily demonstrate, when, if you do not know its differentiae, you cannot know what sort of thing it itself is? Or what will you worthily carry out, if you do not know its genus, from what source it itself flows?
Vel quid in probationibus ratione possis ostendere, cujus si speciem nescias, idipsum de quo aliquid probare vis, quid sit non possis agnoscere? Quid si propria praetermittas? nullas unlluam res valebis propriae termino probatio. nis includere.At vero si non vim accidentium naturam que perspicias,cum de cujusque substantia tractes,inane accidentis nomen æque in definitionibus probationibusque miscebis.Itahisrebuscognitis,integra stabilisque divisio et definitio permanebit; incognitis, debilis lababit et trunca probatio. Haec se igitur Porphyrius(non Victorinus) brevitermediocri. terque promittit exponere.Non en.m introductionis vice fungeretur,si ea nobis a primordio fundaret,ad quas nobis hæc tam clara introductio praeparatur. Servat igitur introductionis modum doctissima parcitas disputandi,ut ingredientium viam ad obscurissimas rerum caligines aliquo quasi doctrinae suæ lumine temperet. Dicit enim apud antiquos alta et magnifica quaestione disserta,quae ipse nunc parce breviterque composuit.Quid autem de his a priscis philosophiaetractatoribusdissertumsit,breviteripse tangit et praeterit. Tum Fabius: Quid illud, inquit est?
Or what could you show by reasoning in proofs, when, if you do not know its species, you cannot recognize what that very thing is about which you wish to prove something? What if you pass over properties? You will be able to enclose no proof by the term of a property. But if you do not perceive the force and nature of accidents, when you treat of the substance of anything, you will equally mix in the empty name of accident in definitions and proofs. Thus, when these things are known, division and definition will remain whole and stable; when they are unknown, proof will totter weak and maimed. Porphyry (not Victorinus) therefore promises briefly and moderately to set these things forth. For he would not serve in the place of an introduction if he established from the very beginning those things for which this introduction, so clear, is prepared for us. The most learned frugality of disputing therefore preserves the manner of an introduction, so that it may temper the path of those entering toward the darkest obscurities of things, as if by some light of its own teaching. For he says that these things were set forth among the ancients in a deep and magnificent inquiry, which he himself has now composed sparingly and briefly. But what has been set forth concerning these things by the early philosophical writers, he himself briefly touches upon and passes over. Then Fabius said: What is that?
Et ego: Hoc,inquam, quod ait se omnino praetermittere genera ipsa et species, utrum vere subsistant, an intellectu solo et mente teneantur; an corporalia ista sint an incorporalia; et utrum separata,an ipsis sensibilibus juncta.De hissese,quoniam alta esset disputatio, tacere promisit: nos autem adbibitomoderationisfreno,mediocriterunumquodque tangamus.Eorum ergo quæ se transire et praetermittere pollicetur, prima est quaestio, utrum gel nera ipsaet species verasinl.an in solis intellectibus, nuda inaniaque fingantur; quæ quæstio hujusmodi est: Quoniam hominum multiformis est animus, per sensuum qualitatem res sensibus objectas intelligit, et ex his quadam speculatione concepta;viam sibi ad incorporalia intelligenda præmunit: utcumsingulos homines videam,eos quoque me vidi?se cognoscam, et quia homines sunt,me intellexisse profitear. Hinc igitur ducta intelligentia, velut jam sensibilium cognitione roborata, sublimiori seseintellectuconsiderationis extollit, et jam speciem ipsam hominis, quæ sub animali est posita, et singulos homines continet,suspicatur,et illud incorporeum intelligit, cujus anteparticulascorporales in singulis hominibus sentiendis et intelligendis assumpserat.Nam hominem quidem illum specialem,qui nos omnes intra sui nominis ambitum coercet,non est dicere corporalem,quippe quem solamenteintelligentiaqueconcepimus.
And I said: This point, which he says he altogether passes over—namely, whether the genera themselves and species truly subsist, or are held only by the understanding and mind; whether they are corporeal or incorporeal; and whether they are separate or joined to the sensible things themselves—he promised to be silent about, since it is a deep dispute. But let us, with the rein of moderation applied, touch on each point moderately. Of those matters, then, which he promises to pass over and omit, the first question is whether the genera themselves and species are true, or are fashioned bare and empty in the intellects alone. This question is of this sort: since the mind of men is multiform, it understands things set before the senses through the quality of the senses, and from these, conceived by a certain speculation, it paves for itself the way to understanding incorporeal things—so that when I see individual men, I also come to know that I have seen them, and because they are men, I declare that I have understood it. From here, then, the understanding, once led forth and, as it were, strengthened by the cognition of sensible things, raises itself by a higher intellect of consideration, and now suspects the very species of man, which is placed under animal and contains individual men, and understands that incorporeal thing whose corporeal parts it had earlier taken up in sensing and understanding individual men. For that special man, who confines us all within the circuit of his name, it is not possible to call corporeal, since we have conceived him only by understanding and mind.
Sic igitur mens rerum nixa primordiis altiori atqueincorporabiliintelligentiasubiimalur.Hinc ergo animus non solum per sensibilia res incorporales intelligendi est artifex,sed etiam fingendi sibi atque etiam mentiendi.Inde enimexformaequiethominis falsam centaurorum speciem sibi ipsa intelligentia comparavit.Has igitur mentis considerationes,quæ a rerum sensu ad intelligentiam profectæ,vel intelliguntur,vel certe figuntur, Græci dicunt, generibus.speciebus et cæteris quaerunt,utrum haec vere subsistentia,et quodammodo essentiaconstantaque intelligantur, ut a corporibus singulis vere atque integre ductam hominis speciem intelligamus, an certe quadam animi imaginatione fingant!lr, ut ille Horatii versus est: Rumano capiticervicem pictor equinam jungeresi velit, quod neque est, neque esse poterit,sed sola falsa mentis consideratione fingitur. Nimis acuta et subtilis inquisitio,atque adrem maxime profutura.Scienda enim sunt,utrum vere sint: nee esset de his disputatio consideratioque si non sint. Sed si rerum veritatem atque integrilatem perpendas, non est dubium quin veræ sint.Nam cum res omnes quae verae sunt, sine his quinque esse non possint has ipsas quinque res vere intellectasessenon dubites.Sunt autem in rebus omnibus conglutinatae et quodammodo conjunctae atque compactse.Cur enim Aristoteles de primisdecem sermonibus genera rernm significantibus disputaret?
Thus the mind, resting on the deeper and incorporeal beginnings of things, raises its understanding on high. Hence the soul is not only the maker of understanding incorporeal things through sensible things, but also of fashioning and even of feigning for itself. For from the form and likeness of man the understanding itself has compared to itself the false species of centaurs. These considerations of the mind, therefore, which proceed from the sense of things to understanding, and are either understood or at least fashioned, the Greeks call genera, species, and the rest; and they ask whether these are truly subsistent and are understood as a kind of essence and constant being—so that we understand the species of man as truly and integrally drawn from individual bodies—or whether they are fashioned by some imagination of the mind, as in that verse of Horace: if a painter wished to join a horse's neck to a human head, which neither is nor can be, but is fashioned only by a false consideration of the mind. This is a very acute and subtle inquiry, and one that will be most useful for the matter. For it must be known whether they truly exist; nor would there be disputation and consideration about them if they did not exist. But if you weigh the truth and integrity of things, there is no doubt that they are true. For since all things which are true cannot exist without these five, you should not doubt that these five things themselves are truly understood. But they are in all things glued together and in a certain way joined and compacted. For why would Aristotle dispute about the first ten words signifying the genera of things?
vel eorum differentias, propriaque colligeret, et princi paliter de accidentibus dissereret,nisihæc in rebus intimata et quodammodu adunata vidisset? Quod si ita est,non est dubium quin verae sint,eL certa animiconsideratione teneantur,quod ipsius quoque Porphyriiprobaturassensu. Nam quasi jam probato,et scito quod ita vere subsistant,aliam quæstionem inferre non dubitat,cum dicit: An corporalia ista sint,an incorporalia. Quae nimis esset frivola atque absurda quaestio, utrum essent corporalia, nisi prius esse constaret. Hcec quoque non mediocriter utilis inquisito ita resolvi.. tur: Incorporalia esse nullus dubitat,cumque ipsa nullis sensibus capiantur,animi tamen qualia sint consideratione clarescuni.Nam quia incorporeorum prima natura est.potest res incorporea parens esse quodammodo corporeæ. Corporea vero incorporeis praeesse non poterunt,quod quoniam substantia genus est, corporale vero et incorporale species sunt substantiæ, corporale non esse genus h.rc res declarat, quod substantiae, id est generi, incorporale supponitur.Quod si corporaleesset genus,nunquam sub eo species incorporeaponeretur.Animadvertere igitur vehementissime, quam nunquam quidquam ate animadversum fuit.
or their differences, and gather their proper characteristics, and speak principally about accidents, unless it had seen these things implanted in things and in some way united? But if this is so, there is no doubt that they are true and are held by the mind's sure consideration, which is also proved by the assent of Porphyry himself. For as though it were already proved and known that they truly subsist, he does not hesitate to bring in another question, when he says: Whether these things are corporeal or incorporeal. That question would be far too frivolous and absurd—whether they were corporeal—unless it were first established that they exist. This inquiry too is resolved, and not insignificantly: no one doubts that they are incorporeal, and since they are grasped by no senses, yet by the mind's consideration it becomes clear of what sort they are. For since the first nature is of incorporeals, an incorporeal thing can in some way be the parent of a corporeal thing. But corporeal things cannot be set over incorporeal things; and since substance is a genus, while corporeal and incorporeal are species of substance, this fact declares that corporeal is not a genus—namely, that incorporeal is placed under substance, that is, under the genus. But if corporeal were a genus, an incorporeal species would never be placed under it. Therefore observe most intently, as nothing has ever been observed by you.
Genus ipsum quoniam species habet,species vero differentiis disjungantur,et proprietatibus informentur,quoniam quaedam species reperiuntur quas in contraria sub generis divisione contrarias obtinent vices: ut sub animali rationale atque irrationale contraria sunt, sub rationali, mortale atque immortale, et haec quoque contraria.Quaeritur,si animal solitario intellectu neque rationale neque irrationale sit, unde hae differentiae in speciebus natæ sint, quae in genere ante non fuerant? Quod si genus,idestanimal,utrasque res in se habet,ut et rationale et irrationale sit, in uno eodemque duo contraria eveniunt,quod est impossibile. Attingam igitur breviter quaestionem, et dicam quod non genus utrumque sit, id est rationale vel irrationale, vel quidquid aliud inter se species per contrarietates dividunt,sed vi suaetpotestate genus hoc continet, ipsum vero nihil horum est. Ita ergo genus tale est, ut ipsum neque incorporale, neque corporale sit,utrumque tamen ex se possit efficere,quod secundo libro melius liquebit. Species vero alias corporalis,alias incorporalis est. Nam si hominem sub substantia ponas,corporalem speciem posuisti, sin Deum incorporalem. Eodem modo etiam differentiæ.
Since the genus itself has species, and species are distinguished by differences and informed by properties, and since certain species are found which, under the division of a genus, occupy contrary positions: as under animal, rational and irrational are contraries; under rational, mortal and immortal, and these too are contraries. It is asked, if animal by itself in solitary understanding is neither rational nor irrational, whence were these differences born in the species, which were not in the genus before? But if the genus, that is animal, has both things in itself, so that it is both rational and irrational, two contraries come to be in one and the same thing, which is impossible. Let me therefore briefly touch upon the question, and say that the genus is not both, that is rational or irrational, or whatever else species divide among themselves by contrarieties, but the genus contains this by its force and power, while it is itself none of these. So therefore the genus is such that it is itself neither incorporeal nor corporeal, yet it can bring forth both from itself, which will be clearer in the second book. But species is now corporeal, now incorporeal. For if you place man under substance, you have posited a corporeal species; if God, an incorporeal one. In the same way also with differences.
Nam si corporales vel incorporales species dividunt, erunt alias incorporales,alio tempore corporales: ut si dicas quadrupes ad bipedem,corporalis differentia est; sed rationalis ad irrationalem,incorporalis est differenlia,et propria nihilominus eodem modo.Nam aequale speciei cum proprium fuerit, si incorporalis erit species, incorporale erit proprium, sin corporalis, corporale vindical,itur.Et accidens eodem modo. Nam si incorporalibusquidem accidit incorporaleesse,manifestum est ut in animo accidens est scientia, incorporalis scilicet.Corporalibus vero quas accidunt, corporalia esse manifestum est: ut si quis dicat accidens me habere capillum crispum.Sic igitur genus neutrum per seipsum est,sed utrasque res ex seipso efficere potest, species, differentias, propria et accidentia, ut accepta in contrarias species fuerint, proinde vel corporalia vel incorporalia vocabuntur. Sed sunt quibus hoc ipsum integrum videri possit, et haec solum incorporalia esse diffiniunt, qui sic dicant,non considerari genus in eo quod suapte natura constat, sed in eo quod genus sit.Itaque si substantia genus est,non consideratur in eo quod substantia est, sed in eo quod sub se species habet.
For if species divide into corporeal or incorporeal, at another time there will be some incorporeal and some corporeal: as if you say "two-footed" in relation to "four-footed," the difference is corporeal; but "rational" in relation to "irrational" is an incorporeal difference, and properties likewise in the same way. For since a property is equal to its species, if the species is incorporeal, the property will be incorporeal; but if corporeal, it will be claimed as corporeal. And accident is in the same way. For if it happens that incorporeal things have an incorporeal accident, it is evident, as knowledge is an accident in the mind—namely, incorporeal. But for corporeal things, whatever accidents befall them, it is evident that they are corporeal: as if someone says it is an accident that I have curly hair. Thus, therefore, genus is in itself neither, but from itself it can produce both kinds of things—species, differences, properties, and accidents—so that, having been taken into contrary species, they will accordingly be called either corporeal or incorporeal. But there are those to whom this very point can seem sound, and they define only these things as incorporeal, saying thus: that genus is not considered in that which consists by its own nature, but in that which it is as a genus. And so, if substance is a genus, it is not considered in that which it is as substance, but in that which it has species under itself.
Item si species corporeum et incorporeum est, non in eo qnod Deus vel homo dicitur,considerantur, sed in ec quod est sub genere.Eodem modo etiam differentine non considerantur in eo quod bipes vel quadrupes si, sed in eo quod est differentia. Nam quadrupes hoc ipsum nulla differentia est, nisi sit bipes a quo differat.Itaque non quadrupes vel bipes respicitur, sed id quod medium estin bipede etquadrupede,id est differentia. Et de proprio idem.Nam quod cujuscunque est proprium,in eo proprium consideratur,quod ejus cujus dicitur esse proprium speciei solius est. Nam risibile non in eo est proprium hominis quod risus est, sed in eo quod solus homo potest ridere: quae manifesteincorporalia esseindubitatum est.Deinde accidentia proinde sunt,qualia fuerunt ea quibus accidunt,u superius dictum est: sed hi probare videntur hoc ipsius Porphyrii senlentia,qui,valuli jam probato quod incorporeasint, ita ait: Et utrum separata, an ipsis sensibilibus juncta; quod si esse haec aliquando corporaliaexstitisset, absurdum esset quaerere utrum corporalia sejuncta essent a sensibilibus an juncta,cum sensibilia ipsa sint corporea.
Likewise, if species is corporeal and incorporeal, these are not considered in respect of what is called God or man, but in respect of what is under the genus. In the same way, differences too are not considered in respect of what is two-footed or four-footed, but in respect of what a difference is. For "four-footed" itself is no difference unless there is a "two-footed" from which it differs. And so it is not "four-footed" or "two-footed" that is regarded, but that which is intermediate between two-footed and four-footed, that is, the difference. The same holds for property. For that which is the property of anything is considered as a property in this respect, that it belongs to the species alone of that of which it is said to be the property. For "capable of laughter" is not a property of man in respect of the fact that it is laughter, but in respect of the fact that man alone can laugh; and it is beyond doubt that these are manifestly incorporeal. Then accidents are of the same sort as those things to which they happen, as was said above; but these men seem to prove this by the opinion of Porphyrius himself, who, when it had already been sufficiently proved that they are incorporeal, speaks thus: "And whether they are separate, or joined to sensible things themselves"; whereas if it had ever turned out that these are corporeal, it would be absurd to ask whether corporeal things are separated from sensible things or joined to them, since sensible things themselves are corporeal.
Talis autem est quæstio,ut quoniam quaedam incorporales sunt res,quæ omnino corpora non patiuntur, ut anima vel Deus: quædam veroquae sinecorporibusesse non possunt, ut prima post terminos incorporalia: quaedam autem quae in corporibus sunt, et praetercorpora sese esse patiuntur,ut anima; quaeritur ergo hæ quinque res ex quo incorporaliter sint genere, utrum eorum quas omnino separantur a corpore,an eorum quae a corporibus separari non possunt,an quae jungantur aliquoties et aliquoties segregentur. Videtur autem quod et segragari et jungi possint.Nam quando corporalium divisio per genera in species fit,et eorum propria et differentiae nominantur, haec scilicet sensibilia,id est corporalia esse non dubium esse.Gum vero de incorporalibus rebus tractatus habetur, et per ea ipsa dividuntur quae corpore carent, circa corporalia versantur. Quod si hoc est, non est dubium quod quinque haec ex eodem sint genere,quod et præter corpora separatum esse possit, et corporibus jungi patiatur, sed ita, ut si corporibus juncta fuerint, inseparabilia a corporibus sint. Si vero incorporalibus,nunquam ab incorporalibus separentur, et utrasque in se contineant potestates. Nam si corporalibusjunguntur,talia sunt,qualis illa prima post terminos incorporalitas,quse nunquam disceditacorpore:si vero incorporalibus,laliasunt, qualis est animus,qui nunquam corpori copulatur.
But the question is of this kind: since certain things are incorporeal, which altogether do not admit of bodies, such as the soul or God; but certain things which cannot be without bodies, such as the first incorporeality after the boundaries; but certain things which are in bodies and yet allow themselves to be apart from bodies, such as the soul—it is asked, then, from what genus these five things are incorporeally: whether from those which are altogether separated from body, or from those which cannot be separated from bodies, or from those which are sometimes joined and sometimes separated. But it seems that they can both be separated and be joined. For when the division of corporeal things into species is made through genera, and their proper qualities and differences are named—namely, these sensible things, that is, corporeal things—there is no doubt that they are corporeal. But when a discussion is had concerning incorporeal things, and they are divided by those very things which lack body, they are concerned with corporeal things. But if this is so, there is no doubt that these five are from the same genus, which can both be separated apart from bodies and allow itself to be joined to bodies—but in such a way that, if they have been joined to bodies, they are inseparable from bodies; but if to incorporeal things, they are never separated from incorporeal things, and contain both powers in themselves. For if they are joined to corporeal things, they are such as that first incorporeality after the boundaries, which never departs from the body; but if to incorporeal things, they are such as the mind, which is never coupled to a body.
Haec se igitur lacere Porphyrius pollicitus, breviter mediocriterque super his rebus tractare promittit, habita in res alias consideratione aut conjectura, quod simile est ac si diceret: Quoniam haec ad praediramenta et ad definitiones,et ad Jivisiones,et ad probationes pertinentjideohsectractalurusassumo, et eatenus de his disseram, quatenus supradictis rebus proficiunt, non quatenus de his ipsis generibus speciebusque, et cæteris quaevis tractari possint.Sunt enim illa (ut ipse ail) gravioris tractatus, quam doctrinam a Peripateticis acceptam,id est ab Aristotelicis,se sequi confessus est. Nam Stoiciqui de his quoque rebus tractare voluerunt, non ommino a Porphyrio suscipiuntur,atque ideo ait se a Peripateticis rationem disputationis accipere.Tunc me Fabius ita percunctatus: Quid est,inquit,quod dudum dixeras, cum a te de incorporalibus tractaretur,esse quasdam incorporalitates quæ circa corpus semper constiterent,ut sunt primæ incorporalitates post terminos? quae est haec incorporalitas, aut quos terminosdicis?
Porphyrius therefore, having promised to set these matters aside, promises to treat briefly and moderately concerning these things, having regard or conjecture directed to other matters—which is the same as if he were to say: Since these things pertain to the predicaments and to definitions and to divisions and to proofs, for that reason, about to treat of them, I assume [the task], and I shall discuss them only insofar as they contribute to the aforementioned matters, not insofar as it is possible to treat of these very genera and species and the rest of whatever sort. For those matters are (as he himself says) of more serious treatment, [and] he confessed that he follows the doctrine received from the Peripatetics, that is, from the Aristotelians. For the Stoics, who wished to treat of these matters as well, are not entirely accepted by Porphyrius, and therefore he says that he receives the method of disputation from the Peripatetics. Then Fabius questioned me thus: What is it, he said, that you said a little while ago, when the matter of incorporeals was being treated by you, that there are certain incorporealities which always stand around a body, as are the first incorporealities after the limits? What is this incorporeality, or what limits do you mean?
non enim intelligo.Etego, Longus, inquam, tractatus est, et nihil nobis ad hanc rem quam quærimus profuturus.Seddicam breviter terminos medixisseextremitates earum quæ in geometria sunt figurarum: de incorporalitate vero quæ circa terminos constat,si Marcrobii Theodosii doclissimi viri primum librum quem de Somno Scipionis composuit in manibus sumpseris, plenius uberiusque cognosces. Sed nunc ad sequentia transeamus. Tunc Fabius, Ut placet, inquit, simulque sic incipit:
DE GENERE.
Videtur enim neque genus, neque species, simpliciter appellari, id est uno modo. Genus namque dicitux quorumdam ad se invicem, et ad aliquem quodam modo se habentium collectio, per quam Dardanidum dicitur genus. Dicitur rursus genus uniuscujusque generationis principium, aut a generante, aut ab eo loco in quo quis genitus est.
Cætera,inquit, rere nota sunt. Tunc ego: Si vim prius aequivocationis aspicias, divisionem generis diligenter agnosces.Placetenimgeneris nomen cum sibi subjectis aequivoce nominari. Æquivoca vero sunt,quae cum nomine una sint,longe diversa substantiae ratione et diffinitionis discreta sunt, ut si quis hanc, verbi gratia, statuam Veneris appellet, Congruunt igitur Venus ipsa et statuaVenerisunius nuncupatione vocabuli,quod utrique Veneris nomen est. Si quis vero quid sit utrumque definiat, longe aliam verae Veneris, aliam lapidis, rationem definitionemque constituet.
For I do not understand. And I, said Longus, say that it is a long treatise, and will profit us nothing for this matter which we seek. But I shall say briefly that I have defined the terms and their extremities of the figures which are in geometry; but concerning incorporeality, which consists around the terms, if you take in hand the first book of Macrobius Theodosius, that most learned man, which he composed On the Dream of Scipio, you will know it more fully and abundantly. But now let us pass to what follows. Then Fabius said, As it pleases, and at the same time thus begins:
ON GENUS.
For it seems that neither genus nor species is called simply, that is, in one way. For genus is said to be the collection of certain things related to one another and in some way related to something, through which the genus of the Dardanians is spoken of. Again, genus is said to be the beginning of each one's generation, either from the begetter or from the place in which someone was born.
The rest, he said, are known. Then I: If you first look at the force of equivocation, you will diligently recognize the division of genus. For it pleases that the name of genus is named equivocally with its subjects. But equivocals are those which, while they are together in name, are far different in the account of substance and are distinguished by definition, as if someone, for example, should call this statue of Venus. Therefore Venus herself and the statue of Venus agree in the naming of one word, because the name of Venus is for both. But if someone defines what each is, he will establish far another account and definition of the true Venus, and another of the stone.
Speculantibus igitur ilia esse aequivoca, quas uno vocabulo appellentur, definitionibus vero diversis constituantur, clarescet (ut opinor) participio generis quam Porphyrius fecit praevisa. Omne enim quidquid a genere in species ducitur,univocum, non aquivocum est. Univocum est, quod et eodem nomine vocari,et eadem defmitione constitui potest, ut et animal genus, homo vero species,sed idem homo animal est. Genus igitur et species, id est animal atque homo possunt unius animalis nomine nuncupari, ut utrumque animal vocetur, sed eadem definitionibus non discrepant. Nam si definitionem reddas animalis, dicas id esse animal, quod est substantia animata sensibilis: quam definitionem si ad hominem vertas,non ei'itabsurdum dicere hominem substantiam esse animatam atque sensibilem sicut animal, sed hoc superius dictum est. Si enim univoca sunt quae uno nomine atque eadem definilione constituuntur,aequivoca vero quae uno nomine sunt, et non sunt sub una definitione substantiæ,quidquid univocum est, ut animal genus ad suas species est, in his genera speciesque versantur: quidquid æquivocum est,ut aries,namque plura significans aequivocum est, sed non censetur participatione generis et speciei, non est in eis talis participatio,utspeciebus et generibus censeantur.Quæ enim erit in his generis specieique cognito, in quibussubstantieedefinitioatqueintegerrimaratiodisgregatur?
Therefore, for those who consider that those things are equivocal which are called by one word but established by different definitions, it will become clear (as I think) how Porphyrius made the participation of genus, once this has been foreseen. For everything whatsoever that is led from a genus into species is univocal, not equivocal. That is univocal which can both be called by the same name and be established by the same definition, as the genus animal and the species man, but the same man is an animal. Therefore genus and species, that is animal and man, can be named by the name of one animal, so that each is called an animal, but they do not differ in the same definitions. For if you give the definition of animal, you would say that it is an animal which is a substance animated and sensible; if you turn this definition to man, it will not be absurd to say that man is a substance animated and sensible just as an animal, but this has been said above. For if those things are univocal which are established by one name and the same definition, but equivocal things are those which are under one name and are not under one definition of substance, whatever is univocal, as the genus animal is to its species, genus and species are involved in these; whatever is equivocal, as aries, for it is equivocal by signifying several things, but is not reckoned by participation of genus and species, there is not in them such a participation that they are reckoned among species and genera. For what will be the understanding of genus and species in those things in which the definition of substance and the most complete account are separated?
Ita ergoPorphyriusnomengenerisin tresdividitformas, sed ut aequivoca, non ut univoca,id estuthae formæ uno quidem generis nomine contineantur, sui autem proprietate disgregata dissentiant: et hoc modoillud in tres dividit partes, ut dicat vocari semel genuseorum inter se plurimorumque collectio,qui ab uno quocunque nomen generis trahunt, ut Romani a Romulo trahentes genus, ex. eodem genere esse dicuntur.Secundo vero loco dici genus affirmat, uniuscusque generationis principium,aut a generante,aut a luco in quo quis genitus est, ut tEneam ab Anchise et genere dicimus esseTrojanum.Tertium vero genus dicitur illud cui species supponitur. Victorinus vero duo superiora genera in unum redigit.Nam et multitudinis congrueqtiam inter se per eamdem generis nuncupationem, et quorumcumque a genere lineam et locum in quo quis natus est uno generis vocabulo et designatione esse declarat. Addit autem ipse quod soli Latinas linguae congruere possit: dicit enim secundo modo genus dici,ut est genus causae honestum: quae generacausarum Graeci in rhetorica arte genera esse non putant, sed vocant, id est figuras.Genera autem sola principaliaaccipiunt, demonstrativum,deliberativum etjudiciale.
Porphyrius therefore divides the name of genus into three forms, but as equivocals, not as univocals, that is, so that these forms are contained under one name of genus, yet, separated by their own property, they disagree: and in this way he divides that into three parts, saying that genus is called, first, the collection of many things among themselves which draw the name of genus from one source whatsoever, as the Romans, drawing their genus from Romulus, are said to be of the same genus. In the second place, he affirms that genus is called the principle of each one's generation, either from the begetter or from the grove in which someone was born, as we say that Aeneas is from Anchises and is of the Trojan genus. Third, that is called genus to which a species is subordinated. Victorinus, however, reduces the two former genera into one. For he declares both that a multitude agrees among themselves through the same naming of genus, and that the line of anyone whatsoever from a genus and the place in which someone was born are expressed by one word and designation of genus. He himself adds, moreover, what can fit the Latin language alone: for he says that genus is called in the second way, as the genus of a cause is the honorable, which genera of causes the Greeks do not consider to be genera in the art of rhetoric, but call them figures. But they receive only the principal genera: the demonstrative, the deliberative, and the judicial.
Quae ipsa rhetorices vocant,id est species rhetoricae, genera vero causarum non dicimus.Tertium vero genus est id quod Porphyrius ponit, id est sub quo differentiis|distributæ species supponuntur.Sed quoniam de tertio genere tractaturus est,Victorini culpam,vel,si ita contingit,emendationem aequi bonique faciamus. Nunc ergo ad priorem apud Victorinum generis significationem revertamur,et ejus ut sunt verbaenodandaatqueexplanandasumanus.Genusnamque, inquit, diciturquorumdam ad seinvicem etadaliquemquodammodoseihabentiumcollectio. Hicergoutrumque monstravit, et cognationem inter se multitudinis etlineaeductum.Namcum dicit genus quorumdamcollectionem ad se invicem quodammodo habentium,id est aliqua inter se cognatione junctorum,cognatione monstrat; et quod addidil,et ad aliquem,generis lineam significat,quam singuli contingentes, ei ad usum sese ipsius generationis applicatione jungentes,plures ex eadem Iinea juncti atque cognati sunt, utsithic ordo: Genus dicitur quorumdam collectioad seinvicem quodammodo et ad aliquem habentium, id est ad alicujus lineam pergenuscontingentium,utpercollectionem cognationem demonstret, et per habitudinem quodammodu ad aliquem colligatam, lineam generis ductumque designet. Sequitur ergo, et id planius lucidiusque signiticat,cum dicit: Dicitur rursusgenus cujuscunque generationis principium, aut agenerante,aut ab eo loco in quo quis genitus est.
Those things which the rhetoricians themselves call species of rhetoric, we do not call genera of causes. But the third kind of genus is what Porphyrius sets down, that is, that under which the species distributed by differences are placed. But since he is about to treat of the third genus, let us make fair and good allowance for the fault of Victorinus, or, if it so happens, for his correction. Now therefore let us return to the earlier signification of genus in Victorinus, and let us undertake to unravel and explain his words as they stand. For genus, he says, is said to be the collection of certain things that have themselves to one another and to some one thing in a certain manner. Here therefore he has shown both the kinship of the multitude among themselves and the drawing of a line. For when he says that genus is the collection of certain things that have themselves to one another in a certain manner, that is, of things joined to one another by some kinship, he shows kinship; and what he added, and to some one thing, signifies the line of the genus, which line, when individuals touch it and join themselves to its use by the application of their own generation, are joined and made kin in greater number from that same line, so that the order here is: genus is said to be the collection of certain things that have themselves in a certain manner to one another and to some one thing, that is, of things that touch the line of someone through the genus, so that through collection he demonstrates kinship, and through the relation, as it were, gathered to some one thing, he designates the drawing and the line of the genus. It follows therefore, and he signifies it more plainly and clearly, when he says: Again, genus is said to be the principle of any generation, either from the begetter, or from that place in which someone was begotten.
Id ipsum latius expedit quod superius strictoet sentuoso brevitatis vinculo colligaverat.Dicit enim rursus genus dici,aut a generatione, id est a quo quis genitus est, aut ab eo loco in quo quis natus est. Sed rursus particula,si ad hoc connectatur,quod ait aut ab eo in quo quis genitus est, intellectus non titubat, ut sit ordo.Dicitur genus uniuscujusque nativitatis principium, aut a generante, aut rursus ab eo loco in quo quis genitus est; vel certe erit simplicior expositio,si priorem generi significationem, id est quorumdam ad aliquem quodammodo se habentium collationem,ad solius cognationem mullitudiuis accipiamus: lineae vero ductum et loci generationem in inferiori significatione distribui, ita tamen ut una quodammodo generis significatione,et multitudinis cognationem,et a generante lineam. et loci nativitatem significet.Haec enim omnia de sola cujuslibet nominatione tractantur.Quarenon absurdum est omnia quae ad ortum genitalem cujuslibet pertineant una significatione generis contineri.Proprie tamen etsimplicissimæ exposilionis est quatuor significationes generis constituisse Victorinum, ut ad tres Porphyrii unam ipse addiderit,et honestum genus causae, ut sint generis hae quatuor significationes, multitudinis cognatio, lineae ductus, genus causce,genus specierum.
He expands more fully that very point which he had bound together above with the narrow and dense bond of brevity. For he says again that genus is spoken of either from generation, that is, from the one by whom someone was begotten, or from the place in which someone was born. But again, if the clause is connected to this—namely, what he says, "or from the one in whom someone was begotten"—the understanding does not waver, so that the order may be: the genus of each one's birth is called its principle, either from the begetter or again from the place in which someone was born. Or certainly the exposition will be simpler if we take the former signification of genus—that is, the comparison of certain things that in some way stand in relation to something—as applying to the kinship of a multitude alone; but that the drawing of a line and the generation of a place are distributed under the lower signification, yet in such a way that by one, as it were, signification of genus it signifies both the kinship of a multitude and the line from the begetter and the nativity of a place. For all these things are treated under the heading of someone's naming alone. Wherefore it is not absurd that all things which pertain to anyone's genital origin be contained under one signification of genus. Properly, however, and of the simplest exposition, it is Victorinus's to have established four significations of genus, so that to Porphyry's three he himself added one, the honorable genus of a cause, so that these are the four significations of genus: the kinship of a multitude, the drawing of a line, the genus of a cause, the genus of species.
Sequitur secunda generis divisio apud Victorinum, ut est genus causas quae Graeci (ut dictum est) non genera, sed vocant. Tertias vero significationis generis hic modus est,genus dici cui supponitur species, id est genus illud a quo species derivantur,l'quod ait ad superiorum fortasse similitudinem aequitatemque dispositum.Sic enim genus speciebus suis principium est, ut Romulus his qui abeo cognati suntjunctique Romani. Item eodem modo nomen Romuli Romanos omnes continet,quemadmodum nominegenerisspecies continetur. Nam sicut a Dardano Dardanidae prioris nomen Dardani in sese ipsos posteriores accipiunt: ita et animal, cum, verbi gratia, specieshabeat hominem atque equum,equus scilicet atque homo animalis in se vocabulum capere,ut dicantur ipsaanimalia,non recusant.Eodem igitur modo species sub generibus continentur,quemadmodum cognati homines sub illoaquoillamcognationemsorte traxerunt.Nam et genus speciebus principium est, et plurimarum in se specierum collectivum est.Rursus primumcognationis nomen et ipsius generationis est principium, et in illius solius vocabulo diversitashominum vocabuli etgenerisparticipatione colligitur, atque hoc est quod ait his verbis: Aliter dicitur genus cui supponuntur species,juxta similitudinem forte superiorum appellatum: etenim principium quoddam est genus his quae sub ipso sunt,et videtur multitudinem continere omnium quae sub se sunt.
There follows the second division of genus according to Victorinus, namely that genus is [spoken of] in the sense of causes, which the Greeks (as has been said) do not call genera but [call by another name]. The third mode of the signification of genus is this: genus is that to which a species is subordinated, that is, that genus from which species are derived, which he says was perhaps arranged in accordance with the likeness and proportion of the things above. For genus is a principle to its species in such a way as Romulus is to those who are related to and joined with him as Romans. Likewise, in the same way the name of Romulus contains all Romans, just as a species is contained by the name of a genus. For just as from Dardanus the Dardanids, the later descendants, receive the name of the earlier Dardanus upon themselves, so too animal, when, for example, it has man and horse as species, horse and man of course do not refuse to take upon themselves the designation of animal, so as to be called animals themselves. In the same way, therefore, species are contained under genera, just as related men are contained under him from whom they drew that kinship by lot. For both is genus a principle to species, and it is a collector of very many species within itself. Again, the name of the first kinship and of generation itself is a principle, and in the designation of that one alone the diversity of men is gathered by participation in the designation and the genus. And this is what he says in these words: In another way genus is spoken of as that to which species are subordinated, perhaps so called according to the likeness of the things above; for genus is a kind of principle to those things which are under it, and it seems to contain the multitude of all things which are under it.
Sed cautissime est additum, videtur. Si enim nihil haec omnia distarent, una significatio generis esset, et ea quae in species funditur, et ea quae in cognitione dividitur. Sed v est inter haec genera talis diversitas, et quod genera earum specierum, quae sub se habent alias species, aequaevis speciebus aequaliter sunt genera. Hominem enim et equum, qui sub animali sunt, neutrum neutro possumus dicere prius, quantum pertinet ad tempus, inchoationemque nascendi. Nam;si qua res una sit prior, altera posterior, et eassub uniuscujusque generis nomine quis velit aptare, non poterit. Genus enim speciebus suis aequaliter genus est. Quod si genus speciebus suis aequaliter genus est, species ipsae ejus ordinis inter se aequai tempore ortuque censentur. At vero in generibus quae cognationes efficiunt non ita est. Quisquis enim fuit Capis pater, qui Capuam condidit, si solum filium Capim progenuit, et ab eo uno Capuanorum cognatio junctioque manavit, distat a genere cujus speciessupponuntur,quod genus uni specieigenus esse nunquam potest nisi pluribus, quod quoniam est idoneum genus illud, id est principium cognationum etiam ab uno filio colligereetcongregare eognationem, quod genus per species ductum facere non potest, nisi plures species supponantur. Constat in hoc distare genus quod cognationem colligit, et a quo species dividuntur.
But it has been added very cautiously, "it seems." For if all these things differed in nothing, there would be one meaning of genus, both that which is poured out into species and that which is divided in cognition. But there is such a diversity between these genera, and [it is] that the genera of those species which have other species under themselves are equally genera with co-eval species. For we cannot say that man and horse, which are under animal, are either one prior to the other, as far as pertains to time and the beginning of birth. For if some one thing is prior and another posterior, and one wishes to fit them under the name of each one's genus, he will not be able. For a genus is equally a genus to its species. But if a genus is equally a genus to its species, the species themselves are reckoned equal among themselves in order and in time of origin. But truly in the genera which make cognations it is not so. For whoever was the father of Capis, who founded Capua, if he begot only a son Capis, and from that one the cognation and union of the Capuans flowed, he differs from the genus under which species are placed, because a genus can never be a genus to one species unless to many, which because that genus is fit—that is, the principle of cognations—to gather and congregate a cognation even from one son, which a genus led through species cannot do unless many species are placed under it. It is established that in this the genus which gathers a cognation differs from that from which species are divided.
Potest autem distare in hoc etiam quod genus, id est principium cognationis potest habere sub se duos, ex se non aequali temporis conditione progenitos, sed aliud posterioris ortus, alium vero senioris, quod in generibus, speciebusque non convenit. Nam (ut superius dictum est) species nisi sibi aequales fuerint non merito, sed natura, sub genere poni non possunt. His igitur expeditis sequitur:
Toties igitur de genere dicto, de postrema significatione inter philosophos disputatio est, quod definientes ita declarant; Genus esse quod ad plurimas differentias specie distantes in eo quod quid sit, prædicetur.
Quod dicit toties, tertio demonstrare vult, atque hoc propter lucidam operis seriem admissum est, ut quoniam genus plurimorum nomen est, omnisejus primum significatio diceretur, ut de qua disputandum esset, aliis rejectis, eligeretur. Quod ait hoc modo, Cum toties, id est tertio genus dicatur apud philosophos, undeipse tractaturusest de postrema generis significatione quam dixit, id est de illo genere quod sub se species habet disputatio consideratioque vertitur. Atverodesuperioribusgeneribus, id est de cognatione etJocoin quo quis genitus est, aut historicorum,aut poetarum exspectatio est, secundi vero generis rhetorum, tertii philosophorum consideratio est.
But it can also differ in this respect: that a genus, that is, the principle of kinship, can have under itself two [persons] descended from it not with an equal condition of time, but one of a later birth and the other of an earlier, which does not apply in genera and species. For (as was said above) species, unless they are equal to one another not by merit but by nature, cannot be placed under a genus. Having set these matters out, then, what follows is:
Since, then, genus has been spoken of so many times, the dispute among the philosophers concerns its last signification, which when defining they declare thus: that a genus is what is predicated of many things differing in species, in respect of what it is.
What he means by "so many times" is that he wishes to demonstrate it in the third place, and this has been admitted for the clarity of the sequence of the work, so that since genus is the name of very many things, first its every signification might be stated, so that the one about which the discussion was to be held, with the others rejected, might be chosen. He says this in this way: since genus is said so many times, that is, in the third place, among the philosophers, whence he himself, about to treat of the last signification of genus, which he has mentioned, that is, concerning that genus which has species under itself, the discussion and consideration is turned. But concerning the former genera, that is, kinship and the place in which someone was born, the expectation belongs to the historians or the poets; but the second kind, of the rhetoricians, and the third, of the philosophers, is the consideration.
Etiam hic in disputationibus ordo est, quod cum inciderint res quae multis possintnominibus nuncupari, et de uno quocunque eorum vocabulo tractari disserique necesse sit, ducuntur prius in ordinem omnia, ut id quod eligitur et rejici tur distinguatur. Sed illa quae rejicienda atque explodenda sunt prius dicuntur. Illud uero quod disserendum tractandumque capitur posterius nominatur. ut hic illa posterior generis significatio posita est, quam disserendam accepturus, prius definiendam et termino quodam circumscribendam demonstrandamque suscepit. Omnis enim res nisi quod prius sit, constiterit, ejus tractatus vacuus modo speculationis habitur. Definit igitur genus sic; Genus esse, quod ad plures differentias specie distantes in eo quod quid sit praedicatur, velut animal, quaediffinitiotalia est: Omnia quae distant, habet inter se quamdam differentiam qua distare et differre videntur. Porro autem si quod sit genus,et sub eo species supponatur, duas vel plures necesse est species poni sub genere, quoniam unius speciei genus esse non potest. Sed si plurimae species erunt, aliqua necesse est differentia dividantur, aliter enim plures esse non possunt. Nam si nihil distant, non erunt plures species et nomen generis perit. Constat igitur eas sub genere poni species, quae differentiis distributae plures numero ipsarum differentiarum divisionibus componantur.
Here too there is an order in discussions: when matters arise that can be called by many names, and it is necessary to treat and dispute one of those terms, all of them are first brought into order, so that what is chosen and what is rejected may be distinguished. But those things which are to be rejected and cast aside are stated first. That, however, which is taken up for discussion and treatment is named later—as here the latter signification of genus has been placed, which, being about to be taken up for discussion, he undertook first to define and to circumscribe with a boundary and to demonstrate. For every matter, unless it has first been established what it is, its treatment will be empty and merely a matter of speculation. He defines genus therefore thus: that a genus is what is predicated of several things differing in species, in respect of what something is, as animal; and its definition is of this sort: all things that differ have among themselves a certain difference by which they appear to stand apart and differ. Furthermore, if something is a genus and a species is placed under it, it is necessary that two or more species be placed under the genus, since one species cannot be a genus. But if there are very many species, they must be divided by some difference, for otherwise they cannot be many. For if they differ in nothing, they will not be many species, and the name of genus perishes. It is established, therefore, that those species are placed under a genus which, distributed by differences, are composed as many in number by the divisions of those very differences.
Ergo, quoniam superiusdictum est in omnibus definitionibus a genere definitionis trahendum esse principium, si quam cujuslibet speciam definire volueris, genus primo necessario nominabis, et ad iilam speciem quam definis, generis nomen prius aptabis. Et hoc illam principaliter dicis esse quod est illud genus sub quo ipsa species quam definis est posita. Post autem differentiis proprusque eam ab aliis circumscriptione quadam definitionis excludis. Nam si dicis animal esse hominem, animal genus est, species vero homo. Nomen igitur animalis, id estgeneris, de homine, idest species praedicasti, cum dixeris hominem esse animal. Quod si nomen generis in defioitionibus ad unam speciem dicere posses, de ea nomen generis praedicares: species autem ut non aequali modo generibus suis species sint, nihil vetat, imo etiam necesse est semper quæcunque sunt genera de sibi|subjectis speciebus in definitionibus, vel in quibuslibet interrogationibus prædicari. Sed quoniam praedicatur genus de speciebus, quomodo prædicatur agnoscendum est. Nam si dixeris quid est homo? et aliquis responderit, animal, bene et integre respondisse videtur, et certe. Nam cum tu quid sit homo interrogaveris, ille respondit animal, genus scilicet de specie in eo quod quid sit species prædicatur.
Therefore, since it was said above that in all definitions the starting point must be drawn from the genus of the definition, if you wish to define any species whatsoever, you must first necessarily name its genus, and to that species which you are defining you must first apply the name of the genus. And you say primarily that it is that which the genus is, under which the very species you are defining is placed. Afterwards, by differences and by a certain circumscription of the definition, you separate it from other things as proper to it. For if you say that man is an animal, animal is the genus, and man is the species. Therefore you have predicated the name of animal, that is, of the genus, of man, that is, of the species, when you have said that man is an animal. But if in definitions you could apply the name of the genus to a single species, you would predicate the name of the genus of it; but nothing prevents—indeed it is even necessary—that whatever things are genera are always predicated in definitions, or in any questions whatsoever, of the species subject to them, though species are not related to their genera in an equal way. But since the genus is predicated of species, it must be understood how it is predicated. For if you say, what is man? and someone answers, animal, he seems to have answered well and completely, and certainly so. For when you asked what man is, he answered animal, that is, the genus is predicated of the species in respect of what the species is.
Nam tu quid esset species interrogasti: ille vero in eo quod quid sit species de qua interrogasti, animalis nomen, id est genus accomodavit. Plenaigitur et propria definitio facta est generis, hoc esse genus, quod ad plurimas differentias specie distantes in eo quod quid sit appellalur, ut animal: animal enim ad hominem, equum, bovem, corvum, anguem, et alia plura quæ differentiis speciebusquedifferunt, in eo quod quid sit appellatur. Sed utrum si dixit genus esse, quod ad plurimas species differentia distantes in eo quod quid sit prædicetur, an sic dixit genus esse. quod ad plurimas genus differentias specie distante* in eo quod quid praedicetur, nihil interest. Nam sive differentias specie distent, sive species differentiis distent, utrumque idem est. Nam sive rationale et irrationale, quæ sunt differentiae, specie hominis, verbi gratia, atque equi distent, sive species homo atque equus differentia rationali atque irrationali dividantur et distent, nihil interest. Quare plena perfectaquefactaestreneris diviso. Sed definitiones duplicibus modis fiunt: una enim definitio est, quae (sicut dictum est) a genere trahitur. Sed quoniam suntquaedam genera magis, quae superse genus aliud habere non possunt, ut sunt praedicamenta decem quæ Aristoteles constituit;eorum igitur de denitio quæ haben potest, quorum genus inveniri non potest quod omnium quaecunque sunt ipsa sunt genera.
For you asked what a species is; but he, in respect of that in which the species you asked about consists, supplied the name of animal, that is, the genus. Therefore a full and proper definition has been made from the genus: that this is a genus, which is predicated in respect of what something is of the most numerous things that differ by differences in species, as animal; for animal is predicated in respect of what something is of man, horse, ox, crow, snake, and many other things which differ by differences and species. But whether he said that a genus is that which is predicated in respect of what something is of the most numerous species that differ by difference, or he said thus that a genus is that which is predicated in respect of what something is of the most numerous differences that differ in species, makes no difference. For whether differences differ in species, or species differ by differences, each is the same. For whether rational and irrational, which are differences, differ in species of man, for example, and of horse, or the species man and horse are divided and differ by the difference rational and irrational, it makes no difference. Wherefore the division of the genus has been made full and perfect. But definitions are made in two ways: for one definition is that which (as has been said) is drawn from the genus. But since there are certain greater genera which cannot have another genus above them, as are the ten categories which Aristotle established; therefore the definition of those which can have a genus cannot be found, of which all things whatsoever that are, are themselves genera.
Horum ergo quod Graeci Xoyouc dicunt, Latini subscriptivas rationes dicere possunt, reddemus. Subscriptivæ autem rationes sunt demonstrativae et quodammodo insignitivae proprietatis illius rei, quae cum ipsa generalissima sit; et genus ejus nullum reperiri possit, eam tamen definire necesse est: et Aristoteles, quoniam substantiam genus generalissimum definire volebat, et ejus nullum genus poterat invenire, proprietatem quamdam et demonstrationem subscriptionemque ipsius rei dicit esse subjectum. Substantia enim omnibus subjecta est. Accidens enim quod in novem dividit partes, praeter substantiamesse non potest, atque ideo omnia quæcunque detinienda sunt, si genus non habeant, eorum subscriptivam quamdam et demonstrativam rationem reddi necesse est. Sic igitur nunc genus, quoniam rem ipsam £intendam putabat, non duxit a genere definitionem, sed dedit quamdam generis demonstrationem proprietatemque. Dico autem quod Porphyrius vel subalternorum generum, vel illorum quæ generalissima sunt,hanc dederit:tdefinitionem, et quodammodo subscriptionem demonstrationemque. Nam si quod genus habet aliud genus, et item hoc ipsum aliud, et item aliud, si nullum erit supra genus, quod genus non habet, in infinitum procedit ratio. Sin vero habuerit, necesse est quoque istam definitionem aperte ordinateque congruere.
Therefore, what the Greeks call logoi, the Latins can call subscriptive accounts, we shall render. But subscriptive accounts are demonstrative and in a certain way indicative of that property of the thing which, since it is itself the most general, and no genus of it can be found, must nevertheless be defined; and Aristotle, because he wished to define the most general genus, substance, and could find no genus of it, says that a certain property and demonstration and subscription of the thing itself is the subject. For substance is subject to all things. For accident, which is divided into nine parts, cannot exist apart from substance, and therefore all things whatsoever that must be defined, if they have no genus, a certain subscriptive and demonstrative account of them must be given. So therefore now genus, since he thought the thing itself was to be understood, he did not derive the definition from a genus, but gave a certain demonstration and property of genus. But I say that Porphyry gave this definition, and in a certain way subscription and demonstration, either of subaltern genera or of those which are most general. For if a genus has another genus, and again this one another, and again another, if there will be no genus above, which has no genus, the account proceeds to infinity. But if it has one, it is necessary that this definition also correspond clearly and in order.
Dico autem genus non animal animali, neque quod homo species sit homini, atque equusequo: sed iIlud quo ipsum animalhominiatqueequogenus est, animalenimipsumpersesenulli genus est, neque homo ipsum per sese ulli species est, neque equus ipsum per sese ulli species est, sed sunt genere et species ad alterius participationem. Nam, quoniam sub animali est equus atque homo, non ad seipsum animal genus est, sed ad equum atque hominem. Et itemspeciesqueevocantur, homo scilicet atque equus, non ad equum atque hominem, sed ad animal species sunt. Dico igitur genus et species non ipsas substantias in quibus genus et species sunt, sed ipsam participationem priorum ad subteriores, et subteriorum ad priores. Hæc igitur participatio, quoniam et in magis generibus, et in magis speciebus et in subalternis generibus, et in subalternis speciebus una atque eadem est, et hujus participationis inveniri genus non poterat, hæc definitio generis quæ facta, est non a genere tracta est, sed subscriptiva ratio et demonstrativa et designativa quodammodo generis est reddita. Hic Fabius: Subtiliter, mehercle, et quod nunquam fere ante hac audivimus, sed perge, quaeso te. Jam enim certant sidera quodammodo, et nox luce superatur. Tunc ego: Sequitur rerum omnium prima brevisque divisio. Ita enim ait:
I mean, however, not the genus "animal" in relation to the animal, nor that "man" is a species in relation to man, and "horse" likewise: but that by which animal itself is genus to man and to horse. For animal itself, taken by itself, is genus to nothing, nor is man himself, taken by itself, a species to anything, nor is horse himself, taken by itself, a species to anything; but they are genus and species through participation in another. For since horse and man are under animal, animal is not genus to itself, but to horse and to man. And likewise the things which are called species—namely man and horse—are not species in relation to horse and man, but in relation to animal. I say, therefore, that genus and species are not the substances themselves in which genus and species are, but the participation itself of the prior in the lower, and of the lower in the prior. This participation, then, since it is one and the same both in the more general genera and in the more specific species and in subaltern genera and in subaltern species, and since a genus of this participation could not be found, this definition of genus which has been made was not drawn from a genus, but has been rendered as a subscriptive account, demonstrative and in a certain way designative of genus. Here Fabius said: Subtly, by Hercules, and what we have scarcely ever heard before this; but proceed, I beg you. For already the stars, in a certain way, contend, and the night is overcome by the light. Then I said: There follows the first and brief division of all things. For thus it says:
Eorum quæ dicuntur, alia ad unitatem dicuntur, sicut sunt omnia individua, ut est Socrates, et hoc ei illud. Alia quae ad multitudinem, ut sunt genera, species, et differentiæ, et propria, et accidentia. Hxc enim communiter non unius propriseappellationis sunt Est enirn genus ut animal, species ut homo, differentia ut rationale.pJ'oprium ut risibile, accidens ut album, sedere. Ab his igitur quæ ad unitatem dicuntur differt genus, quod genus est quod de pluribus prædicatur.
Brevis (ut supra dictum est) et distincta divisio. Omnis enim res, aut unius rei nomen est, aut plurimarum,etboc est quod ait: Eorum quæ dicunturalia ad unitatem dicuntur, sicut sunt omnia individua. Quid autem sit breviter explicandum est. Omne genus quoniam sub se species habet, species vero differentiis disjunguntur, et proprietatibus explicantur. Accidunt autem in speciebus accidentia secundo loco, principaliter vero in individuis quae sunt sub speciebus.
Of the things that are said, some are said in relation to a unity, as are all individuals, for example Socrates, and this one and that one. Others are said in relation to a multitude, as are genera, species, differences, properties, and accidents. For these are not, in common, the appellations of one thing in particular. For a genus is, for example, animal; a species, for example, man; a difference, for example, rational; a property, for example, risible; an accident, for example, white, to sit. From those things, therefore, which are said in relation to a unity, the genus differs, because a genus is that which is predicated of many.
The division is brief (as was said above) and distinct. For every thing is either the name of one thing or of many, and this is what he says: Of the things that are said, some are said in relation to a unity, as are all individuals. But what this is must be briefly explained. Every genus, since it has species under itself, and the species are distinguished by differences and unfolded by properties. Accidents, however, fall upon the species in the second place, but principally upon the individuals which are under the species.
Quid autem sit posterius dicendum est Genera igitur et de speciebus dicuntur, et de differentiis quae ipsas species distribuunt, etde propriis quæspecies componunt, etde his accidentibus quae cum principaliter in individuis fuerint, in speciebus esse dicuntur: hoc autem monstremus exemplis, et sit nobis genus animal, sit species homo, sitdifferentia rationale, sit proprium risibile, sit accidens stans vel ambulans, vel aliquid in mensura corporis ut tripedalis. Animal ergo quod genus est, dicitur de specie, id est de homine. Dicis enim hominem esse animal. Porro autem de speciei differentia nihilominus dicis genus. Dicis enim rationale esse animal.Nihilautem prohibet eodemmodoetde proprio genus dicere. Nam si dicas. Quid est risibile? non absurdum est animal nominare. Accidentia vero hoc modo principaliter in individuis, secundo vero loco sunt in speciebus. Nam siquis dicatsinguloshomines, utputa Ciceronem, sedere vel stare, vel quod aliud libet in specie hominis eadem quoque convenirenecesse est. Nam si Cicero sedet,sedet etiam homo. Si Cicero ambulat, ambulat etiam homo. Ergo siqua accidentiavenerintabindividuis, et ea tracta in speciebusconsederint,ad ipsa quoque accidentia dici poterit genus. Quid est enim ambulans, siquis interroget: merito animal dicitur. Nihil enim ambulare nisi animal potest.
But it must be said next what is posterior. Genera, then, are said both of species and of the differences that divide the species themselves, and of the properties that constitute the species, and of those accidents which, when they have been primarily in individuals, are said to be in the species. Let us show this by examples: let animal be the genus, let man be the species, let rational be the difference, let risible be the property, let standing or walking be the accident, or something in the measure of the body such as three-footed. Animal, therefore, which is the genus, is said of the species, that is, of man. For you say that man is an animal. Moreover, you no less say the genus of the difference of the species. For you say that the rational is an animal. Nothing prohibits the genus from being said in the same way also of the property. For if you say, What is risible? it is not absurd to name an animal. Accidents, however, are primarily in individuals in this way, but in the second place they are in species. For if someone says that individual men, for example Cicero, sit or stand, or whatever else you please, it is necessary that the same also belong to the species of man. For if Cicero sits, man also sits. If Cicero walks, man also walks. Therefore, if any accidents have come from individuals and, drawn forth, have settled in the species, the genus can also be said of those very accidents. For if someone asks what walking is, animal is rightly said. For nothing can walk except an animal.
Porro autem sub speciebus individua sunt, ut Cicero et Virgilius sub bomine, ad quae individua genus speciei praedicari potest. Nam si interrogaveris, quid est Cicero? merito animal dicas. Genus igitur et ad speciem et ad differentias, et ad accidentia, et ad propria, et ad individua nominatur. Porro autem species, non jam de genere, neque de differentiis, sed de solis propriis et subjectis individuis appellatur. In illis, id est individuis, quiasuperest: in propriis,quia qualis est. Quid autem sit hoc modo videmus: Omnia genera speciebus suis supersuntet abundant. Abundare autem genera dicimus speciebus, plus habere genera virtutis qnam species. Homo enim quod est species solum homo est. Animal vero quod est genus, non solum homo est, sed et equus vel bos, vel quodlibet aliud animali suppositum. Ita major vis generis recle de minori sibi et subjecta species praedicatur. Alia vero sunt, quaesibi suntparia, ut sunt propria et species. Species est homo, proprium risibile. Quidquid ergo fuerit risibile,hoc est homo. Quidquid homo, hoc risibile est. Itaque neque risibile bominis.nequehomo risibilis potentiam supervadit, sed æqualia sibi ad se invicem prædicari possunt, ut si dicas, quid est homo? Risibile. Quid est risibile? Horr.o. Itaiyiturqujecunque superiora fuerint ad illa quae subteriora sunt, prædicantur. Et quaecunque æqualia fuernt, pariter sibi ad invicem praedicantur.
Furthermore, individuals are under species, as Cicero and Virgil are under man, and of these individuals the genus of the species can be predicated. For if you ask what Cicero is, you may rightly say an animal. The genus, therefore, is named both of the species and of the differences, and of the accidents, and of the properties, and of the individuals. But the species is not now [predicated] of the genus, nor of the differences, but is called [predicated] only of the properties and of the underlying individuals. In those, that is, in the individuals, [it is predicated] because it is present in them; in the properties, because [it tells] of what sort it is. But what this is in this way we see: all genera surpass and abound over their species. But we say that genera abound over species, that genera have more power than species. For man, which is a species, is man alone. But animal, which is a genus, is not only man, but also horse or ox, or whatever else is placed under animal. Thus the greater power of the genus is rightly predicated of the lesser species subject to it. But there are other things which are equal to each other, as are properties and species. The species is man, the property is risible. Whatever, therefore, is risible, is man. Whatever is man, is risible. And so neither does risible surpass the power of man, nor man that of risible, but equal things can be predicated of each other, as if you say, what is man? Risible. What is risible? Man. Thus, whatever things are superior are predicated of those which are inferior. And whatever things are equal are predicated equally of each other.
Illa vero quae subteriora sunt et minora, de superioribus et abundantibus,ut sunt genera et species,prædicari non possunt. Nunquam enim recte speciem de genere prædicabis. Ita ergo species de proprio prædicatur ut pari. Sed quoniam sub speciebus sigillatim individua sunt: individua autem vocamus quæ in nullas species,nequeinaliquasjam aliaS partes dividi possunt, ut est Cato, vel Plato, vel Cicero, et quidquid hominum singulorum est: hos enim in nullis partibus dividis, ut animal in species, hominem scilicet, atque equum, hominem qunque ipsum specialem,etsingulos circumplectentem, in Catonem, Platonem. Virgilium, et omnes sigillatim homines distributos,hominem vero ipsum singularem, id est Ciceronem, in nullos alios distribere possumus, atque ideo, id est invididuum vocitatum est. Species ergo quae ad propria asqualiter prædicatur ad individua, quoniam major est species hominis, quam quodlibet aliud individuum, ita praedicatur ut superius ad id quod est suballerius. Cicero enim solus Cicero est, homo autem non solus est Cicero, quod si ad individua prædicatur, et ad individuorum accidentia prædicatur. Ita igitur species ad genus quod superius est non praedicatur, neque ad differentiam, quia differentia (Ut nunc monstraturi sumus) super speciem est, ad proprium vero cui par species est, vel ad individuum cui superest, prædicatur.
But those things which are lower and lesser cannot be predicated of things superior and more abundant, as genera and species cannot. For you will never rightly predicate a species of a genus. A species, then, is predicated of its proper [subject] as of an equal. But since individuals are under species one by one—and we call individuals those things which cannot be divided into any species, nor into any other parts, as is Cato, or Plato, or Cicero, and whatever belongs to single men; for these you do not divide into any parts, as you divide animal into species, namely man and horse, and man himself, the specific man encompassing the individuals, into Cato, Plato, Virgil, and all men distributed one by one—but the singular man himself, that is Cicero, we cannot distribute into any others, and therefore it has been called an individual. The species, then, which is predicated equally of its proper [subjects] and of individuals, since the species man is greater than any other individual, is predicated as a superior of that which is subordinate to it. For Cicero alone is Cicero, but man is not Cicero alone; and if it is predicated of individuals, it is also predicated of the accidents of individuals. Thus, therefore, a species is not predicated of the genus which is superior to it, nor of the differentia, because the differentia (as we are now about to show) is superior to the species; but it is predicated of the proper [property], to which the species is equal, or of the individual, to which it is superior.
Differentia vero et ad species, et ad propria,(et ad accidentia, et ad individua prædicatur. Namque rationale quod est differentia ad hominem prædicatur, quod est species. Iia ratio. nale quod est differentia, praedicatur ad risibile, id est proprium. Dicitur enim id esse risibile, quod rationale. Nam si homo ratibnale, et homo risibile, constatid quod est risibile etiam rationale posse nominari quod si ad species differentia dicitur, species autem ad individua praedicatur, necesse eqt ut differentia quoque ad individua praedicetur. Dicis enim, qualis est Cicero? rationalis. Quod si differentia ad individua prædicatur,accidentia vero individuis accidunt, necesse est differentias ad acoidentiapreedicari. Proprium vero quoniam semper unius speciei proprium est, et ad unam speciem praedicatur solam, cui est proprium. Risibile namque, quod proprium est, ad solam hominis speciem praedicatur. Quod si ad hominis speciem prædicatur, species vero ad individua dicitur, non est dubium quin proprium quoque de individuis prsedicetur-Nam si homo risibile animal est, Cicero quoque et Virgilius risibilia animalia recte dicuntur. Quod si proprium ad individuo recte dicitur, recte etiam et de accidentibus prædicatur, quæ ipsis accidunt individuis.Accidentia vero et ipsa,et de speciebus,et de aliis omnibus praedicantur, et de ipsis maxime individuis.
But a differentia is predicated both of species and of properties, and of accidents, and of individuals. For "rational," which is a differentia, is predicated of man, which is a species. Likewise "rational," which is a differentia, is predicated of "capable of laughter," that is, a property. For that is said to be capable of laughter which is rational. For if man is rational, and man is capable of laughter, it is established that what is capable of laughter can also be called rational. But if a differentia is predicated of a species, and a species is predicated of individuals, it is necessary that a differentia also be predicated of individuals. For you say: of what sort is Cicero? Rational. But if a differentia is predicated of individuals, and accidents befall individuals, it is necessary that differentiae be predicated of accidents. But a property, since it is always the property of one species, is predicated of one species alone, of which it is the property. For "capable of laughter," which is a property, is predicated of the species of man alone. But if it is predicated of the species of man, and a species is said of individuals, there is no doubt that a property is also predicated of individuals. For if man is a capable-of-laughter animal, Cicero too and Virgil are rightly called capable-of-laughter animals. But if a property is rightly said of individuals, it is rightly also predicated of the accidents which befall those same individuals. But accidents themselves are predicated both of species and of all other things, and most especially of individuals themselves.
Namque et albus equus et albus homo dicitur, et iterum niger equus,et niger Æthiops dicitur.Quod si ita est, animal quoque nigrum dicitur. Dicitur etiam rationale nigrum etirrationalenigrum, quippe si equus et homo iEthiops nigri sunt. Dicitur etiam risibile nigrum cum hominum quis niger fuerit. Dicitur etiam individuum nigrum, cum sic quis unus homo ex Æthiopia nominatur. Quod cum ita sit, constat et genus ad plurima prædicari,id est species, differentias, accidentia, propria, atque individua, nihilominus et differentiam ad plurima praedicari, id est adispecies, propria ad individua et accidentia, et proprium ad plurima, id est speciem, individua et accidentia Et speciem ad plurima, id est individua et accidentia. Accidens vero et ad genus et.od speciem et ad proprium, et ad differentiam, et ad individua. Quod si ita est, has quinque res constat ad plurima praedicari. At veromdividuum,quoniam sub se nihil habet, ad singularitatem quamdamct unitatem prfedicatur. Cicero enim unus est, et ad unum nomen aptatur.
For "white horse" and "white man" are both said, and again "black horse" and "black Ethiopian" are said. And if this is so, "black" is also said of animal. "Rational black" is also said, and "irrational black," since both horse and Ethiopian man are black. "Risible black" is also said, whenever one of men is black. "Individual black" is also said, when some one man from Ethiopia is so designated. Since this is so, it is evident that genus is predicated of many things—namely species, differentiae, accidents, properties, and individuals—and none the less that differentia is predicated of many things, namely of species, of properties, of individuals, and of accidents; and that property is predicated of many things, namely of species, of individuals, and of accidents; and species of many things, namely of individuals and accidents. But accident is predicated both of genus and of species and of property and of differentia and of individuals. Since this is so, it is evident that these five things are predicated of many things. But the individual, since it has nothing beneath it, is predicated of a certain singularity and unity. For Cicero is one, and is fitted to one name.
Ila individua quae ad unitatem dicuntur,cunctis superioribus supposita sunt, ut genus, species, differentia, ad propria, vel accidentia, quamvis ad se invicem dici possunt, ad individua tamen sequaliter praedicantur, ut superius demonstratum est.Individua vero, quoniam sub se nihil habent ubi secari distribuique possint, ad nihil aliud praedicantur, nisi ad seipsa quae singula atque una sunt. Atque hoc est quod ait Eorum quæ dicuntur alia ad unitatem dicuntur,sicutomnia individua,ut est Socrates, et hoc et illud. Alia quae ad multitudinem, ut sunt genera, et species, et differentiæ, et propria, et accidentia. Haec enim communiter non unius propriae appellationissunt.Simile est acsi diceret: Hæc enim communiterad plurima praedicantur, non ad unitatem sicut individua. Et quid sint genera vel species vel differentiae vel propria vel accidentia exemplum supponitdicens:Estenimgenus,utanimal; species, ut homo, quam dudum hominis speciem cum aliis animantibus sub animali posuimus. Differentia, ut rationale qua species, scilicet hominis ab irrationali distat animali. Proprium, ut risibile, quod nullum aliud animal, neque rationale, neque irrationale habet. Nullum enim animal ridet, nisi solus homo. Quarecum quaedam coelestium potestatum animalia rationabiliasint,eorum tam en proprium risibile non est, quoniam non rident. Recte igitur risibile solius hominis proprium praedicatur.
Those individuals which are said in relation to unity are placed under all the higher [predicables], such as genus, species, difference, property, and accident; for although they can be said of one another, they are nevertheless predicated equally of individuals, as was shown above. But individuals, since they have nothing beneath them where they can be cut and divided, are predicated of nothing else except themselves, which are single and one. And this is what he says: of things that are said, some are said in relation to unity, as all individuals, for example Socrates, and this and that. Others [are said] in relation to multitude, as are genera, species, differences, properties, and accidents. For these are not [terms] of one proper appellation in common. It is as if he were saying: for these are predicated in common of many things, not in relation to unity as individuals are. And what genus or species or difference or property or accident is, he supplies an example, saying: for there is a genus, as animal; a species, as man, which we placed a little while ago under animal as the species of man along with other living things. A difference, as rational, by which, namely, the species of man is distinguished from the irrational animal. A property, as risible, which no other animal, neither rational nor irrational, has. For no animal laughs except man alone. Wherefore, although certain of the heavenly powers are rational animals, nevertheless risible is not their property, since they do not laugh. Rightly, therefore, risible is predicated as the property of man alone.
Accidens, album, nigrum etsedere,quoniam in subslantia hominum non sunt,merito accidentia nominantur.Nam si substantiae cujuscunque speciei interesset id quod accidens dicimus,interemptoaccidenti periret etiamejus speciei substantia cui accidit. Nam quoniam rationale in hominis substantia est,si rationabilitasinterimatur, hominis quoque substantia necessario peritura est. Idcirco, quoniam in ipsius speciei substantia naturaque versatur. At vero album etnigrum, vel qua?cunque suntaccidentiasiinterimas,speciesipsa in qua illa accidebant, manet.Nam neque omnis hemo candidus, neque omnis niger est, et cui alterutra defuerint, ejus species non peribit.Alque idcirco hæc accidentia, veluti non innata in substantia, sed a foris venientia recte nominata sunt.
Accident, white, black, and to sit, since they are not in the substance of men, are rightly called accidents. For if what we call an accident were present in the substance of any species, when the accident is destroyed the substance of the species to which it belongs would perish as well. For since rational is in the substance of man, if rationality is destroyed, the substance of man will necessarily perish too. Therefore [this is] because it dwells in the substance and nature of the species itself. But truly, if you destroy white and black, or whatever accidents they are, the species itself in which they occurred remains. For not every man is white, nor is every man black, and for the one in whom either of the two is lacking, his species will not perish. And for this reason these accidents, as though not innate in the substance but coming from outside, are rightly named.
Nunc ergo, quoniam quid sit genus ostenditur, et ea quae ad unitatem dicuntur, ab iis quæ de plurimis prædicantur distinxit, atque distribuit,ipsius generis differentias, vel ab his quas ad unitatem dicuntur, vel ab eis quæ ad pluralitatem congruunt, id est differentia, specie,proprio, accidentique declarat, et dicit genus ab illis quae ad sola individua praedicantur, id est quae ad unitatem, hoc differre, quod genus ad plurima prædicetur, individua vero ad singula.Sed,quoniam haec differentia generis adindividuacommunis eratdifferentiis,speciebusque,propriis etaccidentibus,abillisipsis aliis differentiis genus dividit atque disjungit. Quod ita demonstrat: Ab his igitur quæ ad unitatem dicuntur differt genus, quod genus est boc quod de pluribus praedicatur.
Ab his ergo reliquis genus differt. Primo a specie, qnoniam species, etsi de pluribus, non tamen specie differentibus, sed numero prædicatur.
Now therefore, since it is shown what genus is, and he has distinguished and separated the things that are said with respect to unity from those that are predicated of many, he sets forth the differences of genus itself, either from those things that are said with respect to unity or from those that correspond to plurality—that is, difference, species, property, and accident—and says that genus differs from those things that are predicated of individuals alone, that is, those that are said with respect to unity, in this: that genus is predicated of many, whereas individuals are predicated of single things. But since this difference of genus from individuals was common to differences, species, properties, and accidents, he divides and separates genus from those very things by other differences. He demonstrates it thus: Genus therefore differs from those things that are said with respect to unity, in that genus is that which is predicated of many.
Therefore genus differs from the remaining things. First, from species, since species, although it is predicated of many, is not predicated of those that differ in species but in number.
Ac primum generis specieique distantiam monstrat,quae prior est agenere.Nam quamvis differentia suprabpeciem sil,non supersubalternamtamen,sed super speciem specialissimam differentia ponitur. Nam quamvis rationalis differentia super bominem; ponatur, qum species specialissima est, tamen ante speciem specialissimam ipsa differentia species est ejus generis, cui species specialissima supponitur. Nam sub animali ante hominem rationale ponitur. Igitur cum genuset species utraque ad plurima praedicentur,genus vero ad plurimas species in eo quod quid sit praedicatur, species non jam ad plurimas species, sed ad plurima individuapraedicatur. Sunt autem quædam genera generalissima(ut dictumest) supra quae aliud genus inveniri non possit.Sunl autem species sub quibusaliaespeciesinveniri non possint,et integra species illa nominatur,quae nunquam genus est, id est sub qua species nullae sunt.Nam si sub ea species essent,ipsa etiam genus esse posset. Species ergo quae vere species est, alias sub se species non habebit, ut est homo. Namque homo, quoniam species est, singuli homines qui sub ipso sunt, non ejus species, sed individuanominantur.Nam si homo genus esset hominum singulorum,genus autem, sicut dictum est, ad plurimas res specie differente in eo quod quid sit appellatur: homo, id est species,siutgenuspraedicareturad singuloshomines, singuli homines specie ipsa differrent.
And first he shows the difference between genus and species, which is prior to genus. For although a differentia is above a species, it is not however above a subaltern genus, but a differentia is placed above the most specific species. For although the differentia "rational" is placed above man, which is a most specific species, yet before the most specific species that differentia is itself a species of the genus to which the most specific species is subordinated. For under animal, "rational" is placed before man. Therefore, since both genus and species are predicated of many things, but genus is predicated of many species in respect of what something is, species is no longer predicated of many species, but of many individuals. Now there are certain most general genera (as has been said) above which no other genus can be found. There are also species under which no other species can be found, and that is called an integral species which is never a genus, that is, under which there are no species. For if there were species under it, it itself could also be a genus. Therefore the species which is truly a species will not have other species under it, as is man. For man, since he is a species, the individual men who are under him are not his species, but are called individuals. For if man were the genus of individual men, but genus, as has been said, is predicated of many things differing in species in respect of what something is: man, that is the species, if it were predicated as a genus of individual men, the individual men would differ in species itself.
Sed singuli homines specie non differunt,quod autem specie non differt, si quid ad hoc praedicatum fuerit, non praedicatur ut genus ad species, id est homo non praedicatur ad singulos hominesut genus ad res plurimas species differentes,sed ad res plurimas numero differentes: singuli enim homines numero a se tantum non specie distant. Atque ideo, quoniam genus sic ad subjecta praedicatur, ut ad plurimas res specie differentes praedicetur; species autem ad subjecta ita praedicatur, ut ad plurimas res numero differentes prædicatur. Congruunt igitur sibi genus et species, quod genus etspeciesad plurima praedicantur, et utraquein eo quod quid sit.Nam si interroges quid est homo, animal dicitur, id est genus. Et si interroges quid est Cicero, homo dicitur, id est species. Distant autem, quod quamvis utraque ari plurima praedicentur,et id eo quod quid sit genus tamen praedicatur ad res specie differentes,species vero dicitur ad res tantum numero differentes,quod Porphyrius s:c demonstrat:
But individual men do not differ in species; yet what does not differ in species, if it is predicated with respect to this, is not predicated as a genus is predicated of species—that is, man is not predicated of individual men as a genus is predicated of many things differing in species, but of many things differing in number; for individual men differ from one another only in number, not in species. And therefore, since a genus is predicated of its subjects in such a way that it is predicated of many things differing in species, while a species is predicated of its subjects in such a way that it is predicated of many things differing in number, genus and species therefore agree in that both are predicated of many things and both in respect of what something is. For if you ask what man is, animal is said, that is, the genus; and if you ask what Cicero is, man is said, that is, the species. But they differ in that, although both are predicated of many things and both in respect of what something is, a genus is nevertheless predicated of things differing in species, while a species is said of things differing only in number, which Porphyry demonstrates as follows:
Ab his vero reliquis quæ de pluribus appellantur. genus differt, primo a. specie.Quoniam species,et si de pluribus prædicentur,nolt tamen species differentibus. sed numero: homo enim species cum sit, de Socrate, Platone et Cicerone prsedicatur, qui non specie, sed numero differunt. Animal vero quod genus est, et bovis et equi prsedicatio est, quæ differunt specie a se invicem, non numero solo.
Quod simile est ac si diceret, genus a specie unam differentiam plus habere.Congruuntnamque genera speciebus, quod utraque in eo quod quid sit prædicantur, ut dictum est. Congruunt item genus et species quod utraque ad res plurimas prædicantur. Congruit item genus et species, quod utraque ad res numero differentes praedicantur. Nam et singuli homines ita a se divisi sunt,quantum ad numerum,ut homo ab equo vel bove, vel a cervo, vel a quibuslibet aliis animantibus.At vero distat a specie genus, quod genus de pluribus rebus specie differentibus praedicatur, quod species non habent. Nihil autem differre arbitror,u trum ita dicatur aliam rem ad aliam praedicari, an aliam rem de alia praedicari. Uterque enim idem intellectus est. Nam si animal praedicatur ad hominem,idem etiam animal de homine praedicatur. Namcum interrogaveris quid est homo, respondes dehominisinterrogatione hominem esse animaf.Sed nunc oportet nos ea quae sequuntur aspicere. Quid ergo sequitur.
From the remaining things that are said of many, genus differs, first from species. For species, even if they are predicated of many, are not predicated of things differing in species, but in number: for man, though he is a species, is predicated of Socrates, Plato, and Cicero, who differ not in species but in number. But animal, which is a genus, is predicated of both ox and horse, which differ from one another in species, not in number alone.
This is similar to saying that genus has one more difference than species. For genera agree with species in that both are predicated in respect of what something is, as has been said. Likewise genus and species agree in that both are predicated of very many things. Likewise genus and species agree in that both are predicated of things differing in number. For individual men are so divided from one another with respect to number, as man is from horse or ox, or from deer, or from any other living things whatsoever. But genus differs from species in that genus is predicated of many things differing in species, which species does not have. But I think it makes no difference whether it is said that one thing is predicated with respect to another, or that one thing is predicated of another. For both have the same meaning. For if animal is predicated with respect to man, the same animal is also predicated of man. For when you ask what man is, in answer to the question about man you say that man is an animal. But now we must look at what follows. What then follows?
A proprio autem genus diffel't,quod proprium juxta quamque speciem proprium appellat' cui proprium est et juxta ea quæ sub specie sunt, scilicet individua. Namque risibile hominis solum est,et singulorum utique hominum.Genus autem non ad unam speciem, sed ad plures res specie differenles semper aptatur.
Ergo hoc videtur hie dicere, quod omne proprium si fuerit speciei unius tunc vere est proprium. Nam si unius speciei non fuerit, sed duarum vel plurium, tunc duobus vel pluribus non proprium, sed erit in subtant.iae ratione commune. Constat ergo proprium ei cujus est proprium, solispecieisingulariteradhcerere. Unde quoniam hominis species sola est quæ rideat,risibilehominiproprieetsinguiariteraptutur. Ad unamsemperigiturspeciemproprietas adhibetur. Distat igitur proprium a genere,quod genus semper ad plurimasspeciesappellatur,propriumverodeuna tantum specie cujus est proprium.Nam si risibiledicas,ad unam tantum speciem hominis appellatur. Congruitautem genus cum proprio in hoc quod genus et proprium de pluribus appellantur.Namquegenus ad pluresspeciesappellatur.
But genus differs from property in that a property is called the property of each species, to which it is proper also in respect of the things that are under the species, namely individuals. For the capacity to laugh is of man alone, and certainly of each individual man. But genus is always fitted not to one species, but to many things differing in species.
Therefore he seems to say here that every property, if it belongs to one species, is then truly a property. For if it belongs not to one species but to two or more, then it is not a property of two or more, but will be common in the account of substance. It is established, therefore, that a property adheres to that of which it is the property, to its species alone and singularly. Hence, since the species of man alone is the one that laughs, the capacity to laugh is properly and singularly fitted to man. A property, therefore, is always applied to one species. Property differs from genus, then, in that genus is always attributed to very many species, but property to only one species, of which it is the property. For if you say the capacity to laugh, it is attributed to only one species, that of man. But genus agrees with property in this, that both genus and property are predicated of many. For genus is attributed to many species.
Appellatur etiam genus de his quæsubspeciebus sunt individuis.Nam si homo et equus animal est,erit etiam Cicero animal, et quilibetequus singulariteranimal nominatur.SLniliteret proprium ad plurima dicitur.Dicitur enim ad unamquamque speciem, et ad eaindividuaqusesunt sub specie prcedicatur.Nam si homo risibilis est,risibilis est etiam Cicero et Virgilius,et quicunque singulariter nominanlur risibiles sunt.Congruunt eti am quoniam utraque in eo quod quid sit praedicantur. Nam genus de specie in eoquod quid sit prædicatur. Nam si dictis, Quid est homo? animal appellabis. Item proprium in eo quod quid sit praedicatur. Nam si dicis, Quid est homo? merito risibile praedicabis. Congruunt autem quod genus et proprium ad plurimas res numero differentes praedicantur. Nam ila a se differunt singula animalia, id est homo, equus et corvus, et caetera, ut singuli homines, quantum ad numerum. Distatautem agenere, quod genus ad plurimas species prsedictatur, proprium vero ad unam solam cujus est proprium nominatur.Sed non est inter genus et proprium eadem differentia quæ est inter speciem et genus. Nam species de nulla omnino pecie prædicatur,proprium vero licet non ad plures, ad unam tamen solam speciem cujus est proprium, semper aptatur. Post haec igitur de difIerentiæ accidentisque a genere distantia disserit dicens:
Genus is also called of the individuals that are under the species. For if man and horse are animals, then Cicero also will be an animal, and any horse is named an animal individually. Similarly, property is also said in relation to many things. For it is said in relation to each species, and it is predicated of the individuals that are under the species. For if man is capable of laughter, Cicero also is capable of laughter, and Virgil, and whoever are named individually are capable of laughter. They also agree because both are predicated in respect of what something is. For genus is predicated of species in respect of what something is. For if you say, What is man? you will call him an animal. Likewise, property is predicated in respect of what something is. For if you say, What is man? you will rightly predicate capable of laughter. They agree, moreover, because genus and property are predicated of very many things differing in number. For the individual animals differ from one another, that is man, horse, and crow, and the rest, as individual men do, in respect of number. But they differ in that genus is predicated of very many species, whereas property is named of one species alone of which it is the property. But the same difference is not between genus and property as is between species and genus. For species is predicated of no species at all, whereas property, although not of many, is yet always fitted to one species alone of which it is the property. After these things, therefore, he discusses the difference of difference and accident from genus, saying:
A differentia uero et ab accidentibus differt genus, quoniam et si etiam ista depturibus specie differentibus prædicantur (differentiæ scilicet,et accidentia quæ communiter accidunt),non tamen ineo quod quid sit appellantur, cum interrogantibus nobis fit secundum ea responsio: magis enim quale quid sil ostenditur.
Oifferentiam vero et accidens idcirco posteriusreservavit, quod eorum unam differentiam erat distantiamque dicturus. Differentia enim et accidens qualitatem cujuscunque speciei demonstrant: illa substantiie qualitatem, id est differentia: illud, id est accidens, accidentalem qualitatem non substanliæ. Ergo quoniam genus supra speciem est, et species supposita generi,genus speciem,species individuum quid sit ostendit.Porro autem sola possunt species differentia segregari:qualitatibus enim substantialibus, id est substantias declarantibus, sejunguntur atque dispertiuntur.Nam cum animal genus sit, homo vero vel equus species, quales utraeque species sint monstrat differentiæ segregatio,ut dicamus speciem esse hominis rationalem, speciem vero equi irrationalem.Si quis enim interroget quid est homo, animal dicitur.Sin autem quis dicat.Qualis est bomo?
But genus differs from difference and from accidents, since although these also are predicated of several things differing in species (namely differences and accidents that occur in common), still they are not called in respect of what a thing is, since when we are asked, the answer is made according to them; for rather it is shown what sort of thing it is.
But he reserved difference and accident for later for this reason, that he was about to state one difference and distinction of them. For difference and accident show the quality of any species: the former, the quality of substance, that is, difference; the latter, that is, accident, an accidental quality, not of substance. Therefore, since genus is above species, and species is placed under genus, genus shows what a species is, and species shows what an individual is. Furthermore, only species can be separated by differences; for they are separated and divided by substantial qualities, that is, those that declare substances. For since animal is a genus, but man or horse a species, the separation of differences shows what sort both species are, so that we say the species of man is rational, but the species of horse irrational. For if anyone asks what man is, he is said to be an animal. But if anyone says, what sort is man?
rationalis respondetur.Ita semper differentia non in eo quod quid sit,sed in eo quod quale sit appellatur: de accidenti vero non dubium est,cum ipsa qualitas in accidentis partibus componalur.Namque in praedicamentis inter alias novem partes acddentis,etianl qualitas nominantur. Nam etiam si quis interroget qualis corvi species sit,nigra continuo respondetur, Congruunt ergo genera differentiis et accidentibus quod de speciebus pluribus prædicantur.Nam sicut genus species sub se plures habet,ita differentia.Nam rationalem dicimus Deum et hominem. Rursus etiam accidens de pluribus speciebus praedicatur.Nam nigrum dicimus et hominem,et equum,et corvum, et ebenum,et plurimas alias species. Rursus congruit genus differentias,quod, sicut genus, sic differentia sequaliterad individuum praedicatur. Nam si Cicero animal est,quod est genus,et rationale animal esi, quod est differentia. Congruunt etiam, quod de numero differentibus praedicantur, quod superius de aliis monstratum est. Distat autem quod (sicut dictum est)genus in eo quod quid sit appellatur: differentia vero vel accidentia in eo quod quale sit prædicantur. Nam si dicas,Quid est homo? appellabis genus, et dices animal esse hominem. Si vero qualis sit ad differentiam interrogaveris, rationale respondeam, vel accidens nigrum vel album, vel qualis quisque sit de quo interrogatur.
It is answered, "rational." Thus a difference is always called not in respect of what a thing is, but in respect of what sort it is. Concerning accident, however, there is no doubt, since quality itself is comprised among the parts of accident. For in the Categories, among the other nine parts of accident, quality also is named. For even if someone asks what sort the species of crow is, "black" is immediately answered. Therefore genera agree with differences and accidents in that they are predicated of several species. For just as a genus has several species under it, so does a difference. For we call God and man rational. Again, an accident is also predicated of several species. For we call man, and horse, and crow, and ebony, and very many other species black. Again, a genus agrees with differences in that, just as a genus, so a difference is predicated equally of the individual. For if Cicero is an animal, which is a genus, he is also a rational animal, which is a difference. They agree also in that they are predicated of things differing in number, which was shown above concerning others. But it differs in that (as has been said) a genus is called in respect of what a thing is, whereas differences or accidents are predicated in respect of what sort it is. For if you say, "What is man?" you will name the genus, and you will say that man is an animal. But if you ask what sort he is with respect to difference, I would answer "rational," or as an accident "black" or "white," or what sort each one is of whom the question is asked.
His igitur distributis distantias ipsas a primordio rursus orditur dicens:
Unde hoc quod de pluribus prædicatur genus distat ab iis quæ de singulis prædicantnr, hoc est ab individuis. Illo quod de specie differentibus prsedicatur distat a speciebus et a propriis. lUo etiam in quo quid sit appellatur, secernitur a differentiis et a communiter accidentibus, quod hæc duo quale quid sil declarant.
Hoc dicit distare genus ab individuis,quod genus de pluribus(ut dictum est)prædicatur.Colligit autem et in unum redigit proprii specieique differentias. Nam,quoniam species de pluribus non specie, sed numero differentibus prædicatur,proprium vero de una tantum specie et de iis quae sub eadem specie sunt individuis praedicatur. Quamvis enim de una specie praedicetur, tamen aequa est illi cum specie a genere differentia de pluribus specie differentibus non praedicari. Nam neque species praedicare omnino de speciebus aliquid poterit. neque proprium,quoniam proprium non depluribusspeciebus,sed de una tantum cujus est specie prædicantur.Quod si itaest,una differentia a genere,species et propria sejunguntur. Accidens vero et differentia eadem quoque una a genere differentiaseparuntur,quod genus in eo quod quid sit dicitur, differentia vero vel accidentia,in eo quod qualeappellantur.
Having made these distinctions, he begins again from the very beginning to treat of the differences themselves, saying:
Hence the genus, which is predicated of many, differs from those things which are predicated of individuals, that is, from individuals, in this: that it is predicated of things differing in species. It differs from species and from properties in that it is predicated of things differing in species. It is also separated from differences and from common accidents in that it is said in respect of what a thing is, whereas these two declare what sort of thing it is.
He says that the genus differs from individuals in that the genus is predicated of many, as has been said. He also gathers and reduces to one the differences of property and species. For since species is predicated of many that differ not in species but in number, while property is predicated of one species only and of the individuals that are under the same species—for although it is predicated of one species, yet it has the same difference from the genus as the species has, namely that it is not predicated of many things differing in species. For neither can a species predicate anything at all of species, nor can a property, since property is predicated not of many species but of one only, of which it is the property. If this is so, species and properties are separated from the genus by one difference. Accident, however, and difference are also separated from the genus by this same one difference, because the genus is said in respect of what a thing is, whereas differences or accidents are called in respect of what sort of thing it is.
HasPorphyriusad construendam generis rationem differentiasquam parcissime potest colligit, et ipsas differentias multis modis posterius probaturus,nuncvero,quantum satest,dicitseabundantem generis constituisse rationem, hoc dicens:
Hoc si ita est, nullo minus aut plus effecta est generis diffinitio.
Perfectam plenamque se generis diffi nitionem fecissedicit,quoniamnequeplus nequeminus facta sitdif. finitio sed aequaliter ad genuspariliterquecomposila, Quod quale sit hoc modo monstrandum est: Novimus quod quaedam res quæ ad alia praedicantur his de quibus praedicantur, abundant, ut genera etspecies.Namque animal quod genusest,de homine quod est species,boc abundat, quod nomen generis etiam in equum atque bovem atque in alia valet aptari. Ergo si quis ad quamlibet rem abundantem fecerit majoremque definitionem quam ipsaresfuerit,quam definit, non erit integra propriaque definitio, quoniam non solam illam rem amplectitur quam definit, si major fuerit diffinitio,sed etiam alias quascunque res quibus ipsius definitionis terminus abundabit. Majorum igitur prsedicamentorum major erit definitio, minorum vero minor erit etiam definitio.
Porphyrius, to construct the account of genus, has gathered the differences as sparingly as possible, and these same differences he intends later to prove in many ways; but now, as far as is sufficient, he says that he has established an abundant account of genus, saying this:
If this is so, the definition of genus has been made neither less nor more.
He says that he has made a perfect and full definition of genus, since the definition has been made neither more nor less, but equally and uniformly composed in relation to genus. What sort of thing this is must be shown in this way: We know that certain things which are predicated of others are more extensive than those of which they are predicated, as genera and species. For animal, which is a genus, is more extensive than man, which is a species, because the name of genus can also be applied to horse and ox and to others. Therefore, if anyone makes a definition of any thing that is more extensive and greater than the thing itself which he defines, the definition will not be complete and proper, since the definition does not embrace only that thing which it defines, if the definition is greater, but also any other things to which the boundary of that definition will extend. Therefore the definition of greater predicables will be greater, and the definition of lesser ones will also be lesser.
Animal ergo quod majus est, ila definiunt: Animal est substantia animata sensibilis: hominem vero quod ac animali minus est,ita definiunt: Homo est ani mal rationale, mortale, risus et disciplinae perceptibile.Quod si majus est animal ab bomine,major erit etiam animalis definitio ab bominis definitione.Plus enim erit diceresubstantiaanimatasensibilis,quam animal rationale, mortale. Nam substantia animata sensibilis, sicut ipsum animal,non solum hominem complectitur,sed etiam equum et bovem atque alias hujusmodi species.Si quis ergo ad hominem majorem definitionem aptaverit,quce est animalis,ut ita definiathominem: Homo est substantia animatasensibilis, non est plena definitionis ratio, cum equus atque bos substantia animata atque sensibilis esse possint, quae species hominis non sunt.Si quis vero majori rei minorem definitionem aptaverit,curtatnet diminutam quodammodo facit rationem.Nam si quis animal definire volens dicat: Animal est res rationalis, risus et disciplinse perceptibilis, non erit integra definitio, quoniam sunt quaedam animalia quae istiusdefinitionis rationem subterfugere atque eva' dere possunt.Est enim animal bos,quod neque rationale sit, neque risus perceptibile.
Therefore, they define the greater thing, animal, thus: Animal is a substance, animate and perceptible; but man, which is less than animal, they define thus: Man is a rational, mortal animal, capable of laughter and of learning. But if animal is greater than man, the definition of animal will also be greater than the definition of man. For it is more to say "substance, animate, perceptible" than "rational, mortal animal." For "substance, animate, perceptible," like animal itself, embraces not only man but also the horse and the ox and other species of this kind. If anyone, then, applies the greater definition, which is that of animal, to man, so as to define man thus: Man is a substance, animate and perceptible, the account of the definition is not complete, since the horse and the ox can be a substance, animate and perceptible, which are not species of man. But if anyone applies a lesser definition to a greater thing, he makes the account in a certain way curtailed and diminished. For if anyone wishing to define animal says: Animal is a rational thing, capable of laughter and of learning, the definition will not be complete, since there are certain animals that can escape and evade the account of this definition. For the ox is an animal, which is neither rational nor capable of laughter.
Sola igitur relinquantur bene definiri,quaecunque aequalibus definitionibus constituuntur, ubi autem aequalis definitio sit, hoc modo possumus reperire: PrMedicament.a quaecunque fuerint,si majus praedicamentum de minore aliquo praedicatur, converti non potest, ut minor de majore praedicetur. Semper enim majora de minoribus.nunquam minora de majoribuspraedicantur.Nam si quis dicat hominem esse animal,non poterit convertere animal esse hominem Nam homo nihil aliud, quantum ad genus, nisi animal est: animal quantum ad species potestesseetiam non homo. Paria vero prædicamenta semper sibi ipsa invicem convertuntur.Nam quoniam risibile solius esthominis, risibile ad hominem praedicatum etiam converti potest, ut homo ad risibile praedicetur. Dicitur enim quidquid est homo, risibile: quidquid est risibile, homo. Ergo quascunque definitiones convertere potes,illae verae atque pares sunt: quascunque convertere non potes, aut majores,aut minores sunt, pares inveniri non possunt.Nam si dicas hominem esse substantiam animatam atquesensibilem,verum est. Item si convertas et dicas substantiam animatam atque sensibilem esse hominem,non omnino verum dixeris. Potest enim substantia animata esse atque sensibilis et homo nonesse.Item si dixeris rem rationalem,*mortalem, risus et disciplinae capacem animal esse, verum dixeris.
Therefore let those alone be left to be well defined, whatever things are established by equal definitions. But where a definition is equal, we can discover it in this way: whatever things there are, if a greater predicate is predicated of some lesser thing, it cannot be converted, so that the lesser is predicated of the greater. For greater things are always predicated of lesser things, never lesser things of greater things. For if someone says that man is an animal, he cannot convert it to say that animal is man. For man, as far as genus is concerned, is nothing other than an animal; but animal, as far as species is concerned, can also be not man. But equal predicates are always converted into one another. For since the capacity for laughter belongs to man alone, "capable of laughter" predicated of man can also be converted, so that man is predicated of "capable of laughter." For whatever is man is said to be capable of laughter, and whatever is capable of laughter is man. Therefore, whatever definitions you can convert, those are true and equal; whatever you cannot convert are either greater or lesser, and cannot be found to be equal. For if you say that man is a substance, animate and perceptible, it is true. Likewise, if you convert it and say that a substance, animate and perceptible, is man, you will not have said something altogether true. For a substance can be animate and perceptible and not be man. Likewise, if you say that a rational, mortal thing, capable of laughter and of learning, is an animal, you will have said something true.
Si autem dicas atque convertas animal esse rem rationalem, mortalem, risus etdisciplince perceptibilem,nonomninoverum dixeris. Potest enim esse animal,et non esse rationale et risus capax. Ergo quoties major est definitio,quam id quod definitur.si prius dicitur id quod definitur,et major definitio adhibetur, vera esse poterit definitio.Si enim prius dixeris hominem remminorem, et ad ipsum postea adhibueris definitionem majorem,ut prius dicas homo est,et postea subjungas subtantia animata sensibilis, utrum est.Homo enim necessario est subwntia animata sensibilis.Si vero prius dixeris definitionem, et postea dixeris id quod definies, vera esse non potest omnino.Nam si definitionem majorem priusdixeris,dicens,substantia animata sensibilis,et postea rem minorem intuleris, ut dicas homo est,ut sit substantia animata sensibilis homo est, non omnino verum est. Potest enimesseetsubstantiaanimata sensibilis,non tamen homo.At vero si minor fuerit definitio quam illa ipsa res quae definitur, si prius dicta sit definitio vera est,posterior,falsa.Nam si dixeris definitionem quae est minor,res rationalis,mortalis,risus et disciplinae capax, et post intuleris animal est.ut sit, res rationalis,mortalis,risus et disciplinæ capax animal est, vera est. Omnis enim res, quae rationalis et mortalis est, risus et disciplinas capax, necessario animal est.
But if you state and convert it, saying that an animal is a rational, mortal thing, capable of laughter and of learning, you will not have spoken the truth. For it can be an animal and not be rational or capable of laughter. Therefore, whenever the definition is greater than that which is defined, if that which is defined is stated first and the greater definition is applied, the definition can be true. For if you first say that man is the lesser thing, and afterward apply to it the greater definition, so that you first say "man is," and afterward add "an animated sensible substance," it is true. For man is necessarily an animated sensible substance. But if you first state the definition and afterward state that which is defined, it cannot be true at all. For if you first state the greater definition, saying "an animated sensible substance," and afterward bring in the lesser thing, so that you say "man is," making it "an animated sensible substance is man," it is not altogether true. For it can be an animated sensible substance and yet not a man. But if the definition is lesser than the thing itself which is defined, if the definition is stated first it is true, and the later statement is false. For if you state the lesser definition, "a rational, mortal thing, capable of laughter and of learning," and afterward bring in "it is an animal," so that it is "a rational, mortal thing, capable of laughter and of learning is an animal," it is true. For every thing which is rational and mortal and capable of laughter and of learning is necessarily an animal.
At vero si converteris,et rem majorem prius dixeris: postvero minorem definitionem adhibueris, vera omnino esse non potest. Nam si dicas prius, animal est,postea autem junxeris,rex rationalis, mortalis, risus et disciplinae perceptibilis, non omnino verum est. Potestenimesse animal,et rationale vel mortale non esse.Itaque si major est definitio quam res fuerit: si prius rem dixeris, postea definitionem intuleris, vera est.Si vero prius definitionem dixeris, postremintuleris, falsa est. In minoribus vero definitionibus et majoribus rebus contra est. Nam si definitionem prius dixeris, postea rem subjeceris,vera est.Sivero rem prius dixeris,postea definitionem subjeceris, vera omnino esse non potest. At vero in æqualibus definitionibus converti aequaliter potest. Nam quoniam solius hominis hæc est definitio,animal rationale,mortale,æqualis est haec ad hominem definitio, quoniam nun est aliud, cui possit aptari. Itaque si prius definitionem dixeris, postea rem subjeceris, vera erit, ut est: homo est animal rationale,mortale.risus et disciplinæ perceptibile. Sin vero converteris,et prius definitionem, postea rem dixeris, ut si dicas, animal quod fuerit rationale, mortale, risus et disciplinae perceptibile homo est,hæc quoque vera est: ita semper ut definitiones verae sint,neque plus, neque minus in dfiniLionibus oportet aptari,sed aequaliter definitiones convenienterque disponi.
But if you convert it and state the greater thing first, and afterward apply the lesser definition, it cannot be wholly true. For if you say first, "it is an animal," and afterward join, "a rational, mortal king, capable of laughter and of learning," it is not wholly true. For it can be an animal and not be rational or mortal. Therefore, if the definition is greater than the thing, if you state the thing first and afterward bring in the definition, it is true. But if you state the definition first and bring in the thing afterward, it is false. In the case of lesser definitions and greater things, however, the opposite holds. For if you state the definition first and afterward add the thing, it is true. But if you state the thing first and afterward add the definition, it cannot be wholly true. But in the case of equal definitions, conversion can be made equally. For since this is the definition of man alone—a rational, mortal animal—this definition is equal to man, because there is nothing else to which it can be applied. And so if you state the definition first and afterward add the thing, it will be true, as: man is a rational, mortal animal, capable of laughter and of learning. But if you convert it and state the definition first and the thing afterward, as if you say, "the animal which is rational, mortal, capable of laughter and of learning is man," this also is true. Thus, so that definitions may always be true, nothing more or less ought to be applied in definitions, but definitions should be arranged equally and fittingly.
Quod Porphyrius scilicet nou ignorans ait,se neque plus, neque minus tiffecisse generis definitionem.Et Fabius: Sequitur inquit despeciedisputare.Dic,inquam,quid sequitur? Et sequitur; Hic (ut opinor) ordo est:
DE SPECIE.
Species quoque multis dicitur modis.Nam et uniuscujusque hominis forma species appellatur. Rursus dicitur et pulchritudo vultus9undepulcherrimos quosque speciosos dicimus. Dicitur species et ea quæ supposita est generiyiinde hominem animalis speciem appella mus, cum animat ipsum genus sit: et album coloris spectem.
Tunc ego:: Speciei quoque nomen sicut generis æquivocum puta. Nam et hoc quoque multifariam appellari designat.
Porphyry, certainly not unaware of this, says that he has made the definition of genus neither more nor less. And Fabius says: "Next," he says, "to dispute concerning species." Tell me, I say, what follows? And it follows: "Here (as I think) is the order":
ON SPECIES.
Species also is spoken of in many ways. For both the form of each individual man is called species. Again, beauty of countenance is also called species, whence we call the most beautiful people "specious." Species is also said of that which is placed under a genus, whence we call man a species of animal, since animal is itself the genus; and white a species of color.
Then I said: Think the name of species also, like that of genus, to be equivocal. For he shows that this too is called by many different names.
Dicitur enim, inquit, species et figura corporis,et fortasse alia plura.De quibus quoniam nullus lractatus habebatur,jure prætermissa sunt.Hic tamen a Victorino videtur erratum, quod cum idem sit cujuscunquehominisspecieset vultus, quasi in alia appellatione speciei vultus iterum pulchritudinem dixit: quasi vero non perinde pulchritudo vultus sitae totaspecies fuerit,nam si quispiam pulcher fuerit toto corpore, etiam vultu.Sed, praetermissis his,ad illam speciem quae sub genere ponitur atque genus efficit veniamus.Namque,utdictum est,substantiae ipsæ nullo speciei nomine generisve censentur,nisi quidam ad se invicem collatione sint comparationequeconopositae.Namquequod homo animal est, non idcirco ei genuE est,quoniam animal est, sed idcirco quod sub sehominis atque equi,et caeterorumanimantiumspecieshabetatqueidcircoait:Unde hominem animalis speciem appellamus,cum animal ipsum genus sit: neque enim homo species diceretur, niaisuperipsumanimalisappeltatiopraedicaretur.Sed utmonstraretnoninsolissubstantiisgenera speciesque versari,sedetiamin omnium praedicamentorum nuncurationibus esseconnexa,non soliussubstantiae deditexemplumsed etiamejusquodreliquumrenianserat accidentis.Quodenim ait: Et album coloris specieminaccidentisdivisioneponiturqualitatis.Sedquo niamintersequapdam connexio estettaliscomparatiu atque relatio ut præter ad se invicem habitudinem
For it is said, he says, that species is also the figure and shape of the body, and perhaps other things besides. Since no discussion of these was had, they have rightly been omitted. Here, however, Victorinus seems to have erred, because since the species and the face are the same for any human being, as if in another application of "species" he again called the face beauty—as if indeed beauty of face were not the same as the whole species; for if someone is beautiful in the whole body, he is also beautiful in the face. But, setting these aside, let us come to that species which is placed under a genus and makes the genus. For, as has been said, substances themselves are not classed under the name of species or genus unless certain ones are set together by comparison and relation to one another. For that man is an animal is not for this reason a genus to him, because he is an animal, but for this reason, that it has under itself the species of man and horse and the other animals, and therefore he says: Whence we call man a species of animal, although animal itself is the genus; for man would not be called a species unless the name of animal were predicated over man himself. But to show that genera and species are not situated in substances alone, but are also connected in the applications of all the predicaments, he gave an example not of substance alone, but also of that accident which remained. For what he says: And white is placed as a species of color in the division of accident, that is, of quality. But since there is a certain connection between them and such a comparison and relation that, besides the relation they have to one another
generaetspeciesessenonpossint: nihil enim in eorum diffinitionibusconcludi potestnisi alterutrum nominatasint.Namsi substantia generis speciei supposita,speciei vero substantia genere superposito,etad ipsam praedicatio perficitur, non est dubium quin cum genus diffinire necesse sit jure speciem,et cum speciem,jurenobisgenuspraedicare necesse sit.Hæc igitur etiam in generis subscriptione servabatur distinctio,cum generis definitio babitaest.Hocenim dictum est tunc esse geaus quod ad distantes species dice. retur.Nuncverodicendumest id essespeciemquaesub genere ponitur.Sed multiplexejusdiffinitiohaberi potest.Potest enim rursus dici id esse speciem, ad quam genus in eo quod quid sit, praedicatur. Quee res utraeque id significant, speciem poni sub genere. Nam prima qui dem definitio, id aperte designat. Secunda non talis est: quoniam semper minora majoribus supponuntur. Genus ab eo aliquid in eo quod quid sit prædicatur: quod majus esse non dubium est. Quod si ita est, nullus est obscuritatis error, quin species quæ minor est rnajori sibi generi supponatur.Nihil igitur hæc secunda definitionis significatio a priore differt: non enim species sub genere poneretur, nisi genus ad speciem in eo quod quid praedicaretur. Tertia vero definitio speciei integraratione collecta est, et ipsius speciei vim naturamque demonstrat.
For genus and species cannot be [understood] without one another: for nothing can be concluded in their definitions unless each has been named. For if the substance of the genus is placed under the species, and the substance of the species is placed over the genus, and the predication is completed in relation to the species itself, there is no doubt that when it is necessary to define the genus, the species is rightly [involved], and when [it is necessary to define] the species, the genus must rightly be predicated of us. This distinction, therefore, was also preserved in the subordination of the genus, when the definition of the genus was given. For it was said then that the genus is that which is said in relation to distant species. Now, however, it must be said that the species is that which is placed under the genus. But its definition can be had in multiple ways. For it can again be said that the species is that to which the genus is predicated in respect of what it is. Both of these things signify the same: that the species is placed under the genus. For the first definition indeed openly designates this. The second is not of such a kind: since lesser things are always placed under greater things. The genus is predicated of it [the species] in respect of what it is: which is undoubtedly greater. But if this is so, there is no error of obscurity but that the species, which is lesser, is placed under the greater genus. Therefore this second meaning of the definition differs in no way from the former: for the species would not be placed under the genus unless the genus were predicated of the species in respect of what it is. But the third definition of the species is gathered by a complete account, and it demonstrates the force and nature of the species itself.
Dicit enim speciem esse quae ad plurima numero differentia in eo quod quid sit praedicatur. Quæ diffinitio etiam ex superiore genere debuit esse pJanissima.Sed ego non quantum castigata permittit brevitas explicabo, sed prius de ipsis generibus speciebusque paucadicendasunt: Gumsintqutedam genera quae species habeant,atque ipsa aliis generibus species esse possint,non est dubium ea gemina comparationis habitudine fungi,ut ad alia species, ad alia genera nominentur-Sed si in uno filo atque ordine speculemur,etquodcunquegenusalicujusrei repertum est,ejusrursus genus aliud requiramus,et rursus aliud atque aliud: iterum sinihilsitquointellectus ratioque consistat,inexplicabilis ratio interminabilisquetractabitur: sed,quoniam multa sunt in his scientiae fundamenta,quae nulla ratione animi in infinitumprocedentiaconcludunturdicendumnecessario est posse nos ascendentes usque ad tale aliquid pervenire,cujus cum ipsum caeteris genus sit,aliud genusinvenirenonpossumus,quod genus primum,et magis genus,et generalissimum nuncupetur.Sed si hoc in genere contingit,ut ascendentes alicubi consistamus,non est dubium quin descendentes iterum species ad aliquem quodammodo calcem offenso termino consistamus.
For he says that a species is that which is predicated in answer to "what is it?" of many things differing in number. This definition should also have been made most clear from the higher genus. But I shall not explain it as far as the permitted brevity allows, but first a few things must be said about genera and species themselves. Since there are certain genera that have species, and these same things can themselves be species of other genera, there is no doubt that they serve a twofold relation of comparison, so that they are called species in relation to some things and genera in relation to others. But if we examine a single thread and order, and whatever genus of any thing has been found, we again seek another genus of it, and again another and another, until the understanding and reason come to rest in something, an inexplicable and interminable account will be treated. But since there are many foundations of knowledge in these matters, which are in no way concluded by the mind proceeding to infinity, it must necessarily be said that we, ascending, can arrive at some such thing whose own genus it is to the rest, and of which we cannot find another genus; this genus is called first, and more a genus, and most general. But if this happens in the case of genus, so that in ascending we come to rest somewhere, there is no doubt that in descending we likewise come to rest, as it were, at some final limit, with the boundary struck, in the case of species.
Igitur cum descenderimus per speciem et usque ad illam speciem venerimus,quae sub se species nullas habet,illam speciem ultimam speciem et magis speciem et specialissimam nuncupemus.Sed,quoniamspeciesaliquorumestcontinens (si aliquorum specie differentiam continens esset), non magis species,sed genus merito vocaretur. Sed, quoniam continet et non specie differentes res contine similes necesse est sibi contineat pluralitates; sed si continetpluralitatem,et majus semper est id quod continet, quam id quod continetur, de pluralitate illa species praedicabitur.Appellabitur igiturspecies de pluribus rebus numero differentibus in eo quod quid scit.Speciesenimcumappellaturdesubterioribus, superiorem speciem substantiaque declarat. Nam cum dicimus: Quid est Cicero? homo continuo respondetur.Cum ergo tribus modis speciei facta sit definitio, superiores duae non tantum sunt speciei, sed etiam subalternae speciei.Est enim species quae et ipsa genus est: sit enim ipsa generalissimum genus substantia,et sub ea corpus, sub corpore, animatum corpus; sub animato corpore,animal; sub animali, homo; sub homine, individua.
Therefore, when we descend through a species and come all the way to that species which has no species beneath it, let us call that species the last species and more a species and most specific. But since a species is the container of certain things (if it were containing a difference of species of certain things), it would not be more a species, but would rightly be called a genus. But since it contains and does not contain things differing in species, it must contain pluralities similar to itself; but if it contains a plurality, and that which contains is always greater than that which is contained, the species will be predicated of that plurality. Therefore it will be called a species of many things differing in number in respect of what it knows. For when a species is called from things below it, it declares the higher species and substance. For when we say, "What is Cicero?" "Man" is immediately answered. Therefore, since the definition of species has been made in three ways, the two higher ones are not only of species, but also of subalternate species. For there is a species which is itself also a genus: for let the most general genus itself be substance, and under it body, under body animate body; under animate body, animal; under animal, man; under man, the individual.
Sed hanc divisionem pleniusposteriusexsequemur,nuncautemhocnobis tantum sufficit.Substantia igitur magis genus est, homomagisspecies,itautneque substantia species aliquando esse possit, nee homo genus: corpus vero animatumvel animal ad superiora species ad subteriora generanominantur.Siquisergocorpusanimatumvel animal vel hominem vclit exprimere et dicat:Species estquaeponitursubgenere, et ad quam genus in eo quod quid sit prædicatur hseo definitioetmagis speciem idesthominem,et subalternamspeciem continet, id estcorpus animatum vel animal. Namcorpus animatum et animalethomosub generesuntpositaet ad eas omnes in eo quod quod sit appellatur,utdictum est. Si quis vero illam speciem definitionemonstrare velit quae vere species est,id est speliacissimam speciem quae tantam speciesetnunquam genus sit, hoc modo definiet.
But we shall pursue this division more fully later; for now this much is enough for us. Substance, then, is more a genus, and man more a species, so that neither can substance ever be a species, nor man a genus; but body, whether animate, or animal, is called a species in relation to what is above it and a genus in relation to what is below it. If anyone, therefore, wishes to express body, whether animate, or animal, or man, and says: A species is that which is placed under a genus, and to which the genus is predicated in respect of what it is—this definition contains both the more specific species, that is, man, and the subaltern species, that is, animate body or animal. For animate body and animal are placed under man as under a genus, and the genus is predicated of all of them in respect of what it is, as has been said. But if anyone wishes to demonstrate by definition that species which is truly a species, that is, the most specific species, which is only a species and never a genus, he will define it in this way.
Speciem esse,qu;e ad plurimas resnumero differentes in eo quod quid sit prædicetur.Sed hæc definitio subalternis speciebus nunquam conveniet.Illaeenim quæ subalternæ sunt species, possunt etiam pro generibus accipi, si ad subjectaprsedicentur.Quod si possunt pro generibus accipi,cum progeneribus acceptae fuennt,non tantum ab plurimas res numero,sed etiam specie dilferenles prædicabuntur, quippe cum sunt genera.Sed quia hoc in magis speciebus nonevenitutaliquandodespeciedifferentibus praedicentur, haee definitio posterior solius magis speciei definitio est,et eam caeterae subalternae species excludunt atque rejiciunt,quod Porphyrius ita demonstrat.Sed hæc definitio ejus speciei est, quæ magis species dicitur. Aliæ vero definitiones erunt etiam illarum quae non sunt magis species,horum ergo ipsam subscriptionem demonstrationemque clarius seipsum dicere prornittit cum dicit:
That a species is what is predicated, in respect of what something is, of many things differing in number. But this definition will never fit subaltern species. For those which are subaltern species can also be taken as genera, if they are predicated of subjects. But if they can be taken as genera, when they have been taken as genera, they will be predicated not only of many things differing in number, but also of things differing in species, inasmuch as they are genera. But because this does not happen in the case of the more specific species, so that they are sometimes predicated of things differing in species, this latter definition is the definition of the more specific species alone, and the other subaltern species exclude and reject it, as Porphyry demonstrates thus. But this definition is of that species which is called the more specific species. The other definitions, however, will also be of those which are not the more specific species. Therefore he promises that he himself will speak more clearly of their subordination and demonstration when he says:
Manifestius autem hoc fiet quod dicimus hoc modo: In omnibus praedicamentis sant quseaam macjisgenerum et magis specierurn,sunt alia:rnixta: magis genera sunt supra quæ nullum aliud genus poterit inveniri. Magis species rursus,sub qua nulla species reperitur, horum intervalla quæ possident, et genera et species sunt, singula superioribus et inferioribus collata, ut alteri genus ulteri species appellentur.
Hujusmodi sunt,inquit, quasdam quorum genera inveniri non possunt, haecque ipsa merito magis genera nominantur,quoniam majus ipsis aliquid invenirinon potest. Nam si ista sunt genera (genus autem omnibus sub se positis majus est)quorum genus nullum est,nihileorum majus se poteritreperiri.At,quo. rum nihil majus poterit inveniri, merito ipsa magis genera vocitantur.
But what we are saying will become clearer in this way: in all the predicaments there are certain things that are more genera and more species, and there are others that are mixed. More genera are those above which no other genus can be found. More species, again, are those under which no species is found. The intermediate things that they occupy are both genera and species, each being called a genus in relation to those below it and a species in relation to those above it.
Things of this kind, he says, are certain things whose genera cannot be found, and these very things are rightly called more genera, since nothing greater than them can be found. For if these are genera (and a genus is greater than all things placed under it), and there is no genus of them, then nothing greater than them can be found. But those than which nothing greater can be found are rightly called more genera.
Sunt autem quaedam alia quæ magis species appellantur,sub quibus aliae species locatae non sunt.Nam plus videtur esse species ea et integrior, ac vere species est, quae genus nunquam est,quam ea quae aliquando genus esse potest.Quod si verior species est, quae sola species, nunquam genus est,merito magis species appellata est.Igitur inter magis speciem et magis genus intervallum quod est,subalterna genera,et subalternæ species impleverunt.Nam subalterna vocamus quaecunque ad superi ora species, ad inferiora progeneribusaccipiuntur,idcirco quia,si omnes res ad inferiora com ponas, generasunt,siad superiora,species:etsiad superiora etinferiora eadem ducas;genera et species invenientnr.Atque ideo subalterna genera et species nominata sunt, quod filo quodam atque ordine ad inferiora composita genera,et ad superiora species agnoscantur.Sed hæc ita genera speciesque esse possunt, non ut cui genus est, eidem iterum velutspecies supponatur.Nam si (ut prius ostensum est) specie sua majus est genus, non est dubium quin major res sub minori poni non possit: atque ideo ait,ut alteri genus,alteri species appellantur,quod nequaquam ad eamdem rem et genus esse et species conveniret. Dat igiturhujus rei exemplum,utquoddicit,facilius possit agnosci. Facit igitur hanc divisionem.
But there are certain other things that are called more species, under which no other species are placed. For that species seems to be more and more complete, and is truly a species, which is never a genus, than that which can sometimes be a genus. But if that is the truer species which is only a species and never a genus, it has deservedly been called more a species. Therefore, between more species and more genus, the interval that exists is filled by subaltern genera and subaltern species. For we call those things subaltern whatever are taken as species in relation to things above and as progenitors in relation to things below, for this reason: if you set all things in relation to things below, they are genera; if in relation to things above, species; and if you lead the same things both to things above and to things below, they will be found to be genera and species. And for that reason they have been named subaltern genera and species, because by a certain thread and order they are recognized as genera when composed in relation to things below, and as species in relation to things above. But these can be genera and species in such a way that what is a genus to one thing is not again set under the same thing as a species. For if (as was shown earlier) a genus is greater than its species, there is no doubt that a greater thing cannot be placed under a lesser one; and therefore he says that one thing is called a genus and another a species, because it would by no means be fitting for the same thing to be both a genus and a species. He therefore gives an example of this matter, so that, as he says, it can be more easily recognized. He therefore makes this division.
Ponit substantiam magis genus, supponitur substantiae corpus et in incorporeum.Corpori,animatum corpus et inanimatum.Animato corpori animal sensibile,et animal insensibile, ut sunt ostrea vel conchilia3 vel echini,vel arbores,et alia hujuscemodi,quæ vivendi animam habent,non etiam sentiendi.Sub animali, animal rationaleetirrationale.Sub rationali,mortale et immortale. Sub mortali, hominem. Sub homine singulos homines,hoc est corpora individua,Ciceronem etVirgiliumscilicet,eteos qui jam in partes sunt singuli.Substantia ergo quae prior est,magis generis loco accipitur.Genus enim solum non etiam species est,quod nunquam ei genussuperiusinvenitur,homo vero solum species est: nullas enimjalias sub se species coercet, Singuli enim homines non specie, ut dictum est, sed numero differunt. Corpus vero quod pridem sub genere posuimus id est substantia, ad substantiam quaedam species,ad animatum corpus genus accipitur.Animatum autem corpus ad corpus species et,ad animal genus; animal autem ad animatum corpus species videtur,ad rationale animal, genus.
He posits substance as the more general genus; under substance is placed body, and also the incorporeal. Under body, the animate body and the inanimate body. Under the animate body, the sensible animal and the insensible animal, such as oysters or shellfish or sea urchins, or trees and other things of this kind, which have a soul for living but not also for sensing. Under the animal, the rational animal and the irrational. Under the rational, the mortal and the immortal. Under the mortal, man. Under man, individual men, that is, individual bodies, namely Cicero and Virgil, and those who are now in part individual. Substance, therefore, which is prior, is taken in the place of a more general genus. For a genus alone is not also a species, because no genus superior to it is ever found; but man is a species alone: for he contains no other species under himself. For individual men differ not by species, as has been said, but by number. But body, which we earlier placed under the genus, that is, substance, is taken as a species in relation to substance, and as a genus in relation to the animate body. The animate body, however, is a species in relation to body and a genus in relation to the animal; the animal, moreover, seems to be a species in relation to the animate body and a genus in relation to the rational animal.
Rationale, item animal, mortalis genus est, species animalis.Morlalc autem genus hominis est, species rationalia animalis: homo autem quod super individua est, nihil de generis natura sortitus est, sed tantum solaspeciesappellatur.Sed bancdivisionem sicubi in aliis rebus transferri et aptari placet, ita considerandum est,ut quidquid fuerit cujus renus inveniri non potest,magisid genus appelletur. Et quidquid cujus nulla species fuerit, id est ut super individuacollocetur,illa magis species.Oportet enim si quod genus sit, super differentes specie res poni, Quod autem magis species, non super differentes species res poni, nunquam aliter digne species poterit appellari. Ergo, quoniam quemadmodum quod superius genus super se nullum genus habet, magis genus dicitur,: ita species, quoniam sub se species non habet,sed tantum individua, merito magis species appellatur. Illa autem quæ in medio posita sunt non ejusdem sunt hatitudinis. Nam quoniamspecies esse possunt, nou sunt magis genera: et quoniam genera esse possunt,idcirco nunquam magis species prædicantur.Nam illis quæ supersunt species sunt: illis vero qux e subs'jnt loco generis præponuntur. Cum igitur duæ formæ sint omnium rerum, ut aut genera £ponantur,aut species supponantur,summitates, id est generalissimum genus, et specialissimaspecies,singulas tantum continent habitudines.
The rational is also a genus of animal, and the mortal is a genus of animal; the mortal is a genus of man, and the rational is a species of animal. But man, which is placed above individuals, has received nothing of the nature of a genus, but is called only a species. But wherever it pleases to transfer and apply this division to other things, it must be considered thus: that whatever is such that its genus cannot be found, is called more properly a genus. And whatever is such that no species of it exists, that is, so that it is placed above individuals, that is more properly a species. For it is necessary that if anything is a genus, it be placed above things differing in species. But what is more properly a species, since it is not placed above things differing in species, can never otherwise be worthily called a species. Therefore, since just as a superior genus that has no genus above itself is called more properly a genus, so a species, since it has no species beneath itself but only individuals, is by merit called more properly a species. But those things that are placed in the middle are not of the same condition. For since they can be species, they are not more properly genera; and since they can be genera, for that reason they are never predicated as more properly species. For they are species in relation to those above them, but they are placed in the position of a genus in relation to those beneath them. Since, therefore, there are two forms of all things, so that either genera are placed above or species are placed beneath, the summits, that is, the most general genus and the most special species, contain only single conditions.
Illud, ut tantum genus,nunquam species videatur; illud, ut sola species,nunquam etiam genus appelletur. Subalterno vero quae media sunt duas formas habent, id est utrasque.Namque(ut frequentius insinuatum est) et generis quodammodo parentelam, et speciei derivationem sortita sunt. Nec hoc fortasse nos turbet quod species specialissima habet aliquid sub se. Namque homo, cum sit magis species,habet sub se singulos homines. Hæc enim quamvis individuissupersit,nunquam formam specialitatis immutat.Gum enim sub se individua habeat quod eacontineat, quae sub una specie sint, et nullasubstantia, proprietate discrepent, species eorum vocatur quae, continet. Ita homo et animalis species dicitur, quia continetur: et hominu singulorum species est,quia eos continet qui nulla unquam specie discrepabunt. Definitio igiturmagis generum magisque specierum talis est i Magis genus esse dicitur,quod genus semper sit.nunquam species, et quo superius nullum genussit. Rursus magis species est, quae species semper sit,nunquam genus.Et iterum quæ nunquam dividiturin species,etquse adplurimanumero differentia in eo quod quid sit praedicatur. IlIa vero alia (ut sæpe dictum est) et genera et species;esse possunt, superioribus scilicet inferioribusque collata.
That one is called genus only, so that it never appears as a species; that one is called species only, so that it is never even called a genus. But the intermediate ones under a subaltern genus have two forms, that is, both. For (as has been suggested rather often) they have obtained, in a certain way, both the parentage of a genus and the derivation of a species. Nor should this perhaps disturb us, that the most specific species has something beneath it. For man, since he is more a species, has individual men beneath him. For although this stands above individuals, it never changes the form of speciality. For since it has individuals beneath it—because it contains those which are under one species, and no substance differs in property—the species of those which it contains is called. Thus man is called both a species of animal, because it is contained, and a species of individual men, because it contains those who will never differ in any species. The definition, therefore, of genera and of species is such: that is called more a genus, which is always a genus, never a species, and above which there is no genus. Again, that is more a species, which is always a species, never a genus, and again which is never divided into species, and which is predicated of many differing in number in respect of what it is. But those other things (as has often been said) can be both genera and species, namely when compared to superiors and inferiors.
Hoc autem attentissime respiciendum est, quod in diversis longe nationibus in eo genere, ubi ex sanguine aliqua cognatio deducitur diversarum cognationum gens ad unum caput generis duci potest. Namque cumRomani aRomulo sunt,Romulusautem a Marte,Mars a Jove, poterit genus Romanorum ad Jovem duci. Item quoniam Athenienses a Minerva, Minerva a Jove,potest Atbenensium genus ad eumdem Jovem velut ad originem duci. Item quoniam Persse a Sole, Sol autem a Jove,possunt Persee quoque ad eumdem Jovem,velut ad originem propriam deduci.lta diversissimas gentes ad unius cognationem erigi possunt,quod idemin speciebus gcneribus que non fit. Nunquam enim diversa genera sub uno genere potuerunt accommodari.Aristoteles enim primorum generum prcedicamenta decem constituit, quae velut aliquis fons, ita subterioribus omnibus ortum quodammodo nationemque profuderunt. Haec igitur genera, quoniam generalissima sunt,et superius eis nullum aliud inveniri genus potest, ad unum genus reduci non potuerunt. Quod si decem genera prima ad unum genus reduci non potuerunt, nec illaqusesubsunteisdemgencribusjid est species subalternaque genera, ad unum genus aliquando potuerunt applicari.
But this must be observed most attentively: that among far-separated nations, in the kind of genus where some kinship is traced through blood, the lineage of diverse kinships can be led back to one head of the genus. For since the Romans are from Romulus, Romulus from Mars, and Mars from Jupiter, the genus of the Romans can be led back to Jupiter. Likewise, since the Athenians are from Minerva, and Minerva from Jupiter, the genus of the Athenians can be led back to the same Jupiter as to its origin. Likewise, since the Persians are from the Sun, and the Sun from Jupiter, the Persians too can be led back to the same Jupiter as to their own origin. Thus the most diverse nations can be raised up to the kinship of one, which does not happen in species and genera. For diverse genera can never be accommodated under one genus. For Aristotle established the predicaments of the ten first genera, which, like some fountainhead, poured forth, as it were, origin and lineage for all those below them. These genera, therefore, since they are the most general and no other genus can be found above them, could not be reduced to one genus. But if the ten first genera could not be reduced to one genus, neither can those which are under the same genera—that is, species and subaltern genera—ever be brought under one genus.
Nam si prima eorum genera ad unum superius duci non possunt, non est dubium quin ea ipsa quæ sub ipsis sunt,ab uno genere coerceri continerique non patiantur.Nam si substantia, qualitas, et quantitas, et caetera sub alio communi genere poni non possunt,quod ipsa magis sunt genera,nec quidquid substantia fuerit, id est sub eodem genere, ut animal vel homo, vel item sub qualitate vel quantitate, ad aliqnod genus cummune se potueruntapplicare). Nunquam enim invenirigenus poterit,quod haec decem genera solitario et proprio intellectu intra se possit veluti species continere.At dicat quis: Haec omnia decem genera si vere sunt subsistentia, quodammodo substantia vel entia dici posse. Flexus enim hic sermo est ab eo quod est esse,et id participii abusione tractum est propter augustationem Latinas linguae compressionemque. Hæc igitur (utdictum est; entia possunt appellari,E;t ens hoc ipsum, id est esse, genus eorum fortasse dici videbitur,sed falso. Namque omnia quae inter se aequivoce nominantur, nunquam ejusdem continentiam generis sortiuntur.
For if their first genera cannot be led back to one higher genus, there is no doubt that those things which are under them do not allow themselves to be confined and held together by one genus. For if substance, quality, and quantity, and the rest cannot be placed under another common genus, because they themselves are rather genera, nor can whatever is a substance—that is, under the same genus, such as animal or man—or likewise whatever is under quality or quantity, be able to apply themselves to some common genus. For a genus can never be found which could contain these ten genera within itself as species by a solitary and proper understanding. But let someone say: if all these ten genera are truly subsistent things, they can in some way be called substance or beings. For this word is inflected from that which is "to be," and it is drawn by an abuse of the participle, on account of the augmentation and compression of the Latin language. These things, therefore (as has been said), can be called beings, and being itself—that is, "to be"—will perhaps seem to be called their genus, but falsely. For all things which are named equivocally among themselves never obtain the containment of the same genus.
Quippe quorum substantia discrepat, non est dubium quin generis quoque ipsius definitio discrepabit: htec autem ut entia nominentur, non univoce, sed aequivoce praedicantur.Nam quoniam substantia ens est, et item qualitas ens, siquisrationem definitionemque substantix e et qualitatis dixerit,eademnam utriusque non poterit convenire,non est dubium quin substantia et qualitas non univoce, sed æquivoce prædicentur. Quod si aequivoce praedicantur, sub ejusdem generis fonte poni non poterunt.Non est igiturin generibus speciebusque aliquod genus solum quod possit diversa rerum genera coercere.Tunc Fabius: Abundanter haec, inquit, omnia, et de his ipsis rebus frequentius inculcatum est. Sed perge ad sequentia. Faciam, inquam. Hæc enim,ut arbitror,sequuntur.
Ergo decem genbra constituit Aristoteles in prsedicarnentis quæ magis genera sunt. At vero illa quæ magis species sunt, semper in plurimo quidem numero sunt, non tamen in infinito. At vero individua quæ sub magis speciebus sunt, infinita sunt semper.
Indeed, for things whose substance differs, there is no doubt that the definition of their genus as well will differ; but that they are called beings is predicated not univocally but equivocally. For since substance is a being, and likewise quality is a being, if anyone were to state the account and definition of substance and of quality, the same account could not apply to both; there is no doubt that substance and quality are predicated not univocally but equivocally. But if they are predicated equivocally, they cannot be placed under the source of the same genus. Therefore there is no single genus among genera and species that can contain the diverse genera of things. Then Fabius said: All these points have been stated abundantly, and on these very matters it has been impressed rather frequently. But proceed to what follows. I will do so, I said. For these things, as I think, follow.
Therefore Aristotle established ten genera in the Categories, which are more properly genera. But those which are more properly species are always in the greatest number, yet not in an infinite number. But the individuals which are under the more properly species are always infinite.
Hoc enim dicere vult quod multo plures species sunt quam genera: habet enim genus sub se plurimas species: et quoniam decem genera rerumomnium prima suut, species specialissima? non solum decem sunt, sed plures, non tamen infinitae. Individua vero quæ sub magis speciebus sunt infinita sunt, et eorum intelligentia nulla unquam capi scientia potest.Quae eniminfinita sunt nulloscienti(B termino concludentur. Igitur omnis a nobis divisio, omnisque scienLia a magis generibus per subalterna genera usque ad magis species deducatur. Ibi enim consistentes integram superiorum scientiam accipere possumus ac retinere.Si quis autem individua velit scientia disciplinaque comprebendere,frustra laborat: sed ita jubemur a magis generibus usque ad magis species per media intervalla discurrere, ut specificis differentiis dividentes subalterna genera, a magis generibus usque ad magis species descendamus. Specificte differentiae sunt quae speciem quamcunque declarant. Declarant autem species differentiis hoc modo. Si quis enim dicat substantiam,ut ponat sub substantia, corpus sub corpore, animatum corpus sub animato corpore, animal sub animali,rationale animal sub animali rationali, mortale,etomnes has species quae sunt substantiae cum differentiis posuerit, bominis scilicet species informabitur.Nam corpus animatum ab inanimato corpore differentia est.
For he wants to say this: that there are many more species than genera. For a genus has under itself very many species; and since the ten genera of all things are the first, are the most specific species only ten? They are not only ten, but more, yet not infinite. But individuals, which are under more species, are infinite, and no understanding of them can ever be grasped by knowledge. For those things which are infinite will be concluded by no boundary of knowledge. Therefore let every division of ours, and every science, be led down from the more general genera through subalternate genera all the way to the more specific species. For stopping there, we can receive and retain the complete knowledge of the superior things. But if anyone wishes to comprehend individuals by knowledge and instruction, he labors in vain; but we are commanded to run to and fro from the more general genera all the way to the more specific species through the intermediate intervals, so that, dividing the subalternate genera by specific differences, we may descend from the more general genera all the way to the more specific species. Specific differences are those which make clear any species whatsoever. But they make species clear by differences in this way. For if anyone should say substance, so as to place under substance body, under body the animate body, under the animate body animal, under animal the rational animal, the mortal [rational animal], and should have placed all these species which are of substance together with their differences, the species of man, that is, will be formed. For the animate body is a difference from the inanimate body.
Porro autem animal ab insensiLilibus,et rationale ab irrationali,et mortale ab immortalibus differentiae sunt, hoc igitur omnia cum junxeris, unam speciemdeclarabis,idest hominem. Nam cum dicis corpus animatum, animal rationale et mortale,quse scilicet differentia; insubalterno ordine sibi suppositae sunt, bominem demonstrasti. Sunt autem quasdam aliæ dilierentice, quæ tales sunt, ac si dicas animal rhetoricorum, quod solus homo rhetor esse possit. Sed haec differentia non specifica differentia est,et substantiam hominis naturamque non perficit,sed tantum artem quamdam scientiamque commendat.Illce igitur in divisionibus differentiæ speciesque prosunt, ex quibus illa quæ dicitur magis species informatur, et haec vocatur specilica differentia. quae magis speCiem possit efficere. Ergo cum per hæc descensum fuerit ad magis species,relinquenda suntsub magis speciebus individua,neceorumestaliquascientiarequirenda.Nam illa non solum infinita sunt, sed etiam quaecunque in sese continuerint infinita fiunt. Rhetorica enim species est. Sed cum venerit in singulos homines, tunc per singulos et infinitos divisa, singula etiam fiet et infinita. Si enim omnes quicunque sunt vel fuere numerentur rhetores, nullus unquam hujusce numerationis finis erit, cum praesertim etiam per infinita tempora in futurum singuli homines rhetores esse possint. Hic Fabius: Hoc igitur, inquit erat quod ait.
Furthermore, "animal" is a differentia from inanimate things, "rational" from irrational, and "mortal" from immortal; when you have joined all these together, therefore, you will declare one species, that is, man. For when you say "animated body," "rational and mortal animal"—which differentiae are, of course, subordinated to one another in an unsubalternate order—you have pointed to man. But there are certain other differentiae which are of this sort, as if you were to say "animal of rhetoricians," since man alone can be a rhetorician. But this differentia is not a specific differentia, and it does not perfect the substance and nature of man, but only commends a certain art and knowledge. Those differentiae, therefore, are useful in divisions and species, from which that which is called the more specific species is formed, and this is called the specific differentia, which can make a species more specifically. Therefore, when by these means a descent has been made to the more specific species, individuals must be left under the more specific species, nor is any knowledge of them to be sought. For they are not only infinite, but also whatever things they have contained within themselves become infinite. For rhetoric is a species. But when it has come to individual men, then, divided through individuals and infinite ones, it will also become individual and infinite. For if all the rhetoricians who are or have been were numbered, there would never be any end of this numbering, especially since even through infinite times in the future individual men can be rhetoricians. Here Fabius says: This, therefore, he said, was what he meant.
Porro autem vel artium vel disciplinarum cum individuaper singulos homines esse cæperint,rationem ad percipiendum cupere vel habere omnino non possunt,
Et ego: Hoc,inquam,est quod cum artes vel disciplina;, quae in sua specie una ante collecta fuerint, inindividuavenerint,idest,per singulos homines in infinitam multitudinem innumerabilemque sese dis. perLiunt: hoc autem idcirco evenit,quod hæceadem ratio est quam Porphyrius ipse dicere non neglexit. Genus enim cum unum sit, plurimarum specierum progenitivum est. Namque sub uno genere plures species inveniuntur, idcirco quoniam species genus illud undeprofiuunt,in pI urima segregant atque dispertiunt. Genusautem plurimas colligitres, sicutipsuma plurimis iterum specicbus:dividitur. Namque homo,corvus et equus,qute sunt species, quantum ad animal,2equaliter animalia sunt. Ita enim nomen animalis omnes suas species intra se continet. Quod si et in homine animalis nomen est, et in corvo, et in equo,non est dubium,quoniam illud genus,quod sub seipsum ea continet, species divisae inter se dividant multi plicentque.Colligit igitur genus species in se, species vero suaptenaturagenusipsumdispertiunt.Est igitur genus collectivum specierum suarum et quodam modo adunativum.Species vero divisaegeneris quodammodoet multiplicativae. Igiturquicunque ad magis genera ascendit, omnem specierum multitudinem per genera colligit adunatque.
But further, when either the arts or the disciplines begin to exist as individuals through single men, they cannot at all desire or possess the capacity to grasp them.
And I said: This is what happens when the arts or disciplines, which in their own species were one and previously gathered together, come into individuals—that is, when they disperse themselves through single men into an infinite and innumerable multitude. This happens for the reason that this same account is what Porphyry himself did not neglect to state. For since the genus is one, it is the begetter of very many species. For under one genus many species are found, because the species divide and separate that genus from which they flow into very many. But the genus gathers very many things, just as it is itself divided again by very many species. For man, crow, and horse, which are species, are equally animals as regards animal. For thus the name of animal contains all its species within itself. But if the name of animal is in man, and in crow, and in horse, there is no doubt that the species, divided among themselves, divide and multiply that genus which contains them under itself. The genus, therefore, gathers the species into itself, but the species by their own nature divide the genus itself. The genus is therefore a gathering-together of its species and in a certain way a unifying. But the species are, in a certain way, divisions and multiplications of the genus. Therefore, whoever ascends to the more general genera, gathers and unifies the whole multitude of species through the genera.
Cum vero a magis generibus usque ad magis species decurritur,omnis unilas generum superiorum in multifidasramosiisquespeciessegregabitur. Quod autem ait multitudo capienda, perinde est ac si diceret, multitudo facienda est: nam cum dividis genus in species,easdem species multas esse accipis, quas tu idem fecisti. Species quoque ab hac generis ad una. tione ac quodammodo collectione non discrepant. Narnque et ipsæ infinitatem individuorum ad unarr. revocant formam.Singulorulm enimhominum species quæ est homo, collectiva est,hoc modo. Ad hominis enim speciem cuncti singuli homines, unus homo sunt,id est prima species quæ nos continet coercetquc.Porro autem ipsa species in nos multas scissa dividitur.Omne enim quod singulum est atqueindi'viduum,iilud unde nascitur dividit.Omnequodnon est singulum atque individuum, sed dividi potest, non perseipsummagisdividitsubteriora, quam colligit.His igitur expeditis, constat et genus plurimarum specierum esse genus, et speciem plurima sub se individua coercere. Nam si illa duae sunt subteriora dispertiunt.et in multitudinem dissipant dividuntque,non est dubium quin superiora semperin. ferioribus pauciora sint.
But when one descends from the more general genera all the way to the more specific species, every unity of the superior genera is separated into species scattered in manifold division. Now what he says, "multitude is to be grasped," is the same as if he had said, "a multitude is to be made"; for when you divide a genus into species, you understand those same species to be many, which you yourself have made. Species also do not differ from this unification and, as it were, collection of the genus. For they too recall the infinity of individuals to one form. For the species which is man is collective of individual men, in this way: for to the species of man all individual men are one man, that is, the primary species which contains and confines us. Further, that same species is itself split and divided into many among us. For everything that is single and individual divides that from which it is born. And everything that is not single and individual, but can be divided, does not divide itself more than it collects things below it. These matters having been set out, it is evident both that a genus is the genus of very many species, and that a species confines very many individuals beneath itself. For if those two are [i.e., genus and species], they distribute the lower things and scatter and divide them into a multitude; there is no doubt that the superior things are always fewer in the inferior.
Preedicamenta vero quae aliud de alio prædicantur, vel ad se invicem quæ torquentur, hoc modo sunt: omnis enim res aiu aut major erit, aut minor, aut aqua; omne quod est rnajus,dc minore poterit prædicari: nam cum animal sit majus ab homine, poterit animal de homine praedicari, minus vero de majore non dicitur. Nam quoniam animal est et homo et equus, ad animal hominemsiprcedicarevolueris,tantum hæc convenit praedicatio, quantum convenit animal partem esse super hominem. Age enim, converte, et dic hoc esse animal quod hominem:: quantum igitur pars est animalis, quae hominis speciem contineat,tautum animal homo est.In illis autem aliis partibus animalis quae aliud continent quam est specieshominis,hominis appellatio non convenit. Nam si dicas animal, hoc est, quod homo in illa parte in qua equus est non erit homo, atque ideo universaliter non convertuntur.Namsi dicis, omnis homo animal, verum est. Si dixeris, omne animal homo est,falsum est. Quod si majora de minoribus idcirco praedicantur, quia omne majus minus in se continet: et minora de majoribusidcirco non prædicantur,quia majora minoris definitionem supervadunt, et quodammodo exsuperant, non est dubium quin illa quæ sunt aequalia, sibi possint ipsa converti.
But the categories which are predicated of one another, or which are turned toward each other, are as follows: for every thing will be either greater, or lesser, or equal. Everything that is greater can be predicated of the lesser; for since animal is greater than man, animal can be predicated of man, but the lesser is not said of the greater. For since animal is both man and horse, if you wish to predicate man of animal, this predication is valid only insofar as it is valid that animal is a part superior to man. Come now, convert it and say that this is animal which is man: therefore, insofar as the part of animal which contains the species of man extends, to that extent animal is man. But in those other parts of animal which contain something other than the species of man, the name of man does not apply. For if you say animal, that is, what man is, in that part in which horse is, there will not be man, and therefore they are not universally converted. For if you say, every man is animal, it is true. If you say, every animal is man, it is false. But if greater things are predicated of lesser things for the reason that every greater contains the lesser within itself, and lesser things are not predicated of greater things for the reason that greater things surpass the definition of the lesser and in a certain way exceed it, there is no doubt that those things which are equal can be converted with respect to themselves.
Æqualia autem illa sunt quæ neque minora neque majora sunt, id est, ut si in quamli bet speciem apponantur, et omni illi speciei adsunt, et nulli alii: nam omnis bomo risibilis est, et nulla alia species risibili potest proprionuncupari, atque ideo quoniam aequalia sunt convertuntur.Dicis enim: Quid est homo? Risibile. Quid est risibile? Homo: et item,Quid est hinnil,iJe? Equus. Quid est equus,? Hinnibde.Quod si semper majora de minoribus prcedicantur, superiora necesse est genera esse, et omnia subalterna minora. Quod si subalterna om. nia minora sunt, non est dubium quin si quis per subdivisionem descendat ad ultimam speciem,quodcunque genus de vicinis sibi praedicabitur, etiam de subalternis prædicetur: namque substantia ballet sihi vicinum ad subteriora genus, ad se vero speciem, quod est corpus; de hoc igitur substantia prædicatur. Si quis enim interroget quid est corpus, dicltursubstantia. Sub corpore vero e-t ani malum corpus, et sub eo animal. Ergo quoniam substantia idcirco praedicatur de corpore, quia illi est superior, necesse est,quibus corpus superius fuerit, eisdem etiam sit substantia superior. Nam si corpus praedicatur de animato corpore, et de animali, praedicabitur etiam substantia de animato corpore, et de animali.
Those things are equal which are neither lesser nor greater, that is, if they are applied to any species whatsoever, they are present in every instance of that species and in no other. For every human is capable of laughter, and no other species can be called capable of laughter in the same sense; and therefore, since they are equal, they are converted. For you say: What is a human? Capable of laughter. What is capable of laughter? Human. And likewise: What is a horse? Neighing. What is neighing? Horse. But if greater things are always predicated of lesser things, then the higher must be genera, and all subordinate genera lesser. But if all subordinate genera are lesser, there is no doubt that if one descends by subdivision to the ultimate species, whatever genus is predicated of the genus neighboring it will also be predicated of the subordinate genera. For substance is the genus neighboring body, which is subordinate to it, and body is the species with respect to substance; therefore substance is predicated of body. For if one asks what body is, it is said to be substance. Under body, however, is the animate body, and under that, animal. Therefore, since substance is predicated of body for the reason that it is higher than body, it is necessary that substance be higher than those things of which body is higher. For if body is predicated of the animate body and of animal, substance will also be predicated of the animate body and of animal.
Sic ibitur qua;cunque superioraf uerint de subterioribus non solu sibi vicinis,sed etiam longe subterioribus prædicantur.Nam si majora sunt iis quae sibi vicinae sunt speciebus,multo majora eruntetiam illis quibus illee vicinæ species fuerint ampliores: ergodequibuscunquespeciespraedicatur, do ipsis praedicabitur et illiusspeciei genus.Nam si species aliqua, aliqua re major est, multo genus speciei ipsius illa re qua species major est,majus erit.Atque ita ad id prædicabitur quemadmodum ipsa species antea prsedicataest. Quod si ita est, non est dubium quin genus quoqne generis illius,quod ad illud ad quod species praedicabatur,poterat praedicari, etiam id quoque de eo de quo species etgenus speciei prædicabatur,prædicari posse. Nam si quis dicat Ciceronem esse hominem, cum animal hominis genus sit, non erit absurdum Ciceronem animal prædicari, et cum animalis ipsius substantia genus sit,non erit inconveniens Ciceronem substantiam praedicari, quoniam quae supersunt de subterioribuspraedicantur,etquce subteriora sunt si qua alia sibi subteriorahabeant,illud primum genus habebunt etiam ista subteriora,et de his non inconvenienter praedicabitur.
Thus one proceeds by whatever path: superior things are predicated not only of the things beneath them that are near to them, but also of things far beneath them. For if they are greater than the species near to them, they will be much greater also than those things of which those neighboring species are greater; therefore, of whatever things a species is predicated, of those same things the genus of that species will also be predicated. For if some species is greater than some thing, the genus of that species will be much greater than that same thing than which the species is greater. And thus it will be predicated of that thing in the same way as the species itself was previously predicated. But if this is so, there is no doubt that the genus also of that genus—which could be predicated of that thing of which the species was predicated—can likewise be predicated of that thing of which the species and the genus of the species were predicated. For if someone says that Cicero is a human being, since animal is the genus of human being, it will not be absurd that animal be predicated of Cicero; and since substance is the genus of animal itself, it will not be incongruous that substance be predicated of Cicero, because the superior things are predicated of the inferior things, and if the inferior things have any other inferior things beneath them, those inferior things will also have that first genus, and it will not incongruously be predicated of them.
Igitur species de individuo prædicatur ut magis, magis genus vero de omnibus subalternis, et de magis specie praedicatur: æquo enim modo dicitur et corpus substantia,etanimatum corpus substantia, et sensibile corpus substantia,et rationale animal substantia, et mortale substantia, et homo substantia, et de ipsis etiam magis genus individuis praedicatur, ut dictum est: potest enim Cicero dici substantia, species vero sola de nullis aliis, nisi de individuis prædicatur, ut praedictum est: individua autem ipsa de nullo alio praedicantur nisi de ipsis,id est singulis.Natura autem individuorum hæc est,quod proprietates individuorum in solis singulis individuis constant,et in nullis aliis transferuntur,atque ideo de nullis aliis prædicantur. Ciceronis enim proprietas cujuslibet modi fuerit, neque in Catonem, neque in Brutum, neque in CatuJlum aliquando conveniet. At vero proprietates hominis quae sunt idem rationale, mortale, risibile, pluribus, et omnibus individuis possunt et singulis convenire. Omnis enirn homoetsigillatimindividuus,et rationaIisest,et mortali s,et sensibilis,et risibiiis.Atque ideo illa quorum proprietates possunt aliis convenire, possunt de aliis prædicari.
Therefore species is predicated of the individual as something greater, but genus is predicated of all subordinate species and of the species that is greater: for in like manner body is called substance, and animate body is called substance, and perceptible body is called substance, and rational animal is called substance, and mortal is called substance, and man is called substance, and genus is even predicated of the individuals that are greater than it, as has been said: for Cicero can be called substance, but species alone is predicated of nothing other than individuals, as has been said: but the individuals themselves are predicated of nothing other than themselves, that is, of singulars. Now the nature of individuals is this: that the properties of individuals consist in singular individuals alone and are transferred to no others, and therefore are predicated of no others. For the property of Cicero, of whatever kind it may be, will never fit Cato, nor Brutus, nor Catullus. But the properties of man, which are the same as rational, mortal, capable of laughter, can fit many and all individuals and each one. For every man, even taken individually, is both rational and mortal and perceptible and capable of laughter. And therefore those things whose properties can fit others can be predicated of others.
Haec autem quorum proprietas in aliis non convenit,nisi in se ipsis tantum singulariter,de aliquibus aliis praeter sesingulariter praedicari non possunt.Repetendum est igitur,quod omne individuum specie continetur, species vero ipsa coercetur a genere,et unum quasi omnium totum corpus, magis genus est, et nunquam est pars, individuum vero pars semper est, nunquam est totum.Species autem et pars et totum merito nuncupatur, nam ad genus pars est, ad individua totum: dividit enim genus(ut dictum est)et individua colligit.Sed species pars est alterius, id est, generis, totum vero non est partis,sed partium. Namque genus et unum est,et plures species unius rei,id est, unius generis species pars est. Et quoniam individua plura sunt, et infinita sub una specie quas illa individua colligit,species illa non est unius totum, id est,non est partis totum,sed plurimorum, id est partium; plures enim partes sub ea individuorum sunt,quarum totum species,id est homo,appellatur. Sed de genere et specie sufficienter diclum est. Et quoniam matutinas salutationes vocant, in futuras noctis vigilias quod est reliquum transferamus.
But those things whose property does not agree with other things, except in themselves alone singularly, cannot be predicated singularly of any other things besides themselves. It must therefore be repeated that every individual is contained by a species, but the species itself is constrained by a genus, and the one, as it were the whole body of all things, is more a genus, and is never a part; but the individual is always a part, never a whole. The species, however, is deservedly called both a part and a whole: for in relation to the genus it is a part, in relation to individuals it is a whole; for it divides the genus (as has been said) and collects individuals. But the species is a part of another, that is, of the genus, yet it is not the whole of a part, but of parts. For the genus is both one and many species of one thing, that is, the species is a part of one genus. And since the individuals are many and infinite under one species, which that species collects, that species is not the whole of one, that is, it is not the whole of a part, but of many, that is, of parts; for there are many parts of individuals under it, of which the species, that is, man, is called the whole. But enough has been said concerning genus and species. And since they call the morning greetings, let us transfer what remains to the coming night watches.
DIALOGUS SECUNDUS.
DE DIFFERENTIA.
Multa tam nobis a parente natura quam caeteris animantibus gravia illustriaque concessa sunt, quae nos ita quasi quaedam benigna artifex humanitatis excoluit. ut primum nobis reputandi considerandique animos rationemque concederet,post vero ratio nem repertam proloquendi conferret, perinde ac si voluisset, jussissetque nos non corporis sensibus a belluis,sed mentis divinitate distare: quæ cum se ibi adjunxerit, et a suae vivacitate naturae non discesserit,tunc sic ut ipsa est aeterni generis,ita quoque famam in posteros,vitamquegloriae infinitissimis temporibus coaequat.Sin vero pravis se libidinibus corporis obnoxiam meus perdendam corrumpendamque permiserit,naturam corporis sequitur.Nam nihil ejus vivacitatis post corpora remanet,cui omnis labor et studium de rebus corporis atque in corpus impensum est. Quare advertendum est,ut nos meliores accuratioresque reddamus,non ea re qua pecudibus nihil distare possumus,sed quo coelestium virtutum similitudine æternitatis gloriam factis egregiis dictisque mereamur.
DIALOGUE TWO.
ON DIFFERENCE.
Many grave and illustrious gifts have been granted to us by our parent nature, as also to the other living creatures, and she, as a kind of kindly artificer of humanity, has cultivated us so that first she granted us minds and reason for reckoning and considering, and afterwards, once reason was discovered, she conferred speech, just as if she had willed and commanded that we should differ from brute beasts not by the senses of the body but by the divinity of the mind. And when this divinity has joined itself there and has not departed from the liveliness of its own nature, then, just as it is itself of an eternal kind, so too it makes fame among posterity and a life of glory equal to the most boundless ages. But if it has allowed itself, enslaved to the depraved lusts of the body, to be ruined and corrupted, it follows the nature of the body. For nothing of its liveliness remains after the body, when all its labor and zeal has been spent on the things of the body and upon the body. Wherefore it must be observed that we make ourselves better and more refined, not by that means by which we can differ in no way from cattle, but by that by which, through the likeness of heavenly virtues, we may merit the glory of eternity by outstanding deeds and words.
Sed de his alias, nunc ad propositum revertar.Cum igitur alterius noctis consuetalucubratio vigiliæque venissent,credo hesternæ rationis subtilitate captus,vel qua ipse est cupiditate discendi audiendique studio, vigilantius quam unquam surrexeratFabius ad me perrexit,qui postquam consalutatus,sequentis a me operis promissam continuationem reposceret: Faciam, inquam,non invitU5,quippecum nec mihi sit in vita quidquam melius agere,et tu hanc mihi jocund italem studio tuo augeas, quod mihi perquam gratissimum est, placuit igitur ut quoniam hesterna dissertatio speciem explicuerat, alterius expositionis principium de sequenti differentia sumeretur.Bic Fabius: Uberrime.inquit,a te hesternis vigiliis de generibus et speciebus expositum est. Sed (ut dici audio) subtilior de differentiis tenuiorque tractatus est. Non, inquam, immerito, nam varie accepta? differentiae varias habebunt etiam potestates. Erunt namque alias genera,alias species, alias vero differentias, sed hoc postea demonstrabitur.Nunc vero ita(utarbitror)textus est:
But of these things another time; now I shall return to the matter at hand. So when the customary night-time labour and vigils of the next night had come, Fabius—captured, I believe, by the subtlety of yesterday's reasoning, or else by his own eagerness and zeal for learning and listening—rose more alertly than ever and came to me; and after he had greeted me, he demanded from me the promised continuation of the work that followed. I shall do it, I said, not unwillingly, since indeed there is nothing better for me to do in life, and you increase this pleasantness for me by your zeal, which is exceedingly welcome to me. It was decided, then, that since yesterday's discourse had set out the species, the beginning of the second exposition should be taken from the difference that follows. Then Fabius said: Most abundantly, by your vigils of yesterday, have you expounded on genera and species. But (as I hear it said) the treatment of differences is more subtle and finer. Not without reason, I said, for differences, understood in various ways, will also have various powers. For some will be genera, others species, and others indeed differences, but this will be shown later. Now, however, the text is (as I think) as follows:
Omnis differentia et communiter et proprie et magis proprie dicitur.
Differentiam quoque multis appellari modis designat.Dicit autem tribus his modis fieri differentiam, cum aut communes sunt, aut propriae, aut magis propriae. Communes sunt quibus omnes aut ab aliis differimus,aut a nobis ipsis: nam sedere vel ambulare vel stare differentia est: nam si tu ambules,ego vero sedeam,in situ ipso atque ambulatione differimus.Et item ego cum nunc sedeo,postea vero si ambulem, communi a meipso differentia discrepabo. Propriae vero sunt quæ uniuscujusque individui formam aliqua naturali proprietate depingunt,ut si quis sit caesiis oculis, vel crispo capillo. Etenim propria uniuscujusque singuli hominis sunt quocum ista nascuntur. Magis propriæ sunt quæ in substantia ipsa permanent, et totam speciem differentia descriptioneque permutant, ut est rationalis vel mortalis homi- I nis differentia. Horum autem commune::; et propriæ differentiae sub eadem specie singulos a se faciunt discrepare, illa propriis differentiis, illa communibus. Magis propriae vero totam naturam cujuslibet specieisubstantiamque permutant,etab aliis speciebus segregant atque disjungunt.
Every difference is called common, proper, and more proper. He also shows that difference is spoken of in many ways. He says that difference comes about in these three ways: when they are either common, or proper, or more proper. Common differences are those by which we all differ either from others or from ourselves; for to sit or to walk or to stand is a difference; for if you walk and I sit, we differ in posture itself and in walking. And likewise, when I now sit but afterwards walk, I shall differ from myself by a common difference. Proper differences are those that depict the form of each individual by some natural property, as if someone has blue eyes or curly hair. For these are proper to each single man, since he is born with them. More proper differences are those that remain in the substance itself and change the whole species by difference and description, as the difference of man is rational or mortal. Of these, the common and proper differences make individuals within the same species differ from one another—the latter by proper differences, the former by common ones. But the more proper differences change the whole nature and substance of any species and separate and disjoin it from other species.
Harum ergo communes et propriæ differentiæ,quoniam speciem non permutant,sed forma.mquodammodoethabitudinem solum fnciunt discreparejalteratum facere dicuntur, id est non integrum alterum facere,idest non integre permutare, sed quodammodo discrepantiam distantiamque faciunt,atqueideo non vocantur alterum facientes;id est permutantes,sed magis alteralum, id est non integre alterum faciente3. Ila vero tertia, id est magis propria, quoniam substantialis est, et ipsius speciei inserta naturæ alterum facit. Nam quoniam homo atque equus quantum ad hoc quodanimaliaerant una illis eratsubstantia,veniens rationale disgregavit omnino!speciem,et funditus alterum fecit.
Therefore the common and proper differences of these, since they do not change the species but only in some way make the form and disposition differ, are said to make one thing other, that is, they do not make it wholly other, that is, they do not wholly change it, but in some way produce a discrepancy and distance, and for that reason they are not called making another, that is, changing, but rather making it in a way other, that is, not wholly making it other. But the third kind, that is, the more proper difference, since it is substantial and implanted in the very nature of the species, makes another. For since man and horse, insofar as they were animals, had one substance, the coming of rational [difference] wholly disjoined the species and made it fundamentally other.
Ergo communes et propriae differentiæ alteratum facientes vocantur,magis propriae autem alterum facientes.Constat igitur differentiarum alias facere alterum, aliis alteratum: illae quae faciunt alterum,quaa substantiales sunt7etomnes naturam speciemque permutant, et specificae prædicantur; valent enim quamlibet speciem constituere, et ab aliis omnibus segregare,et ejus formam naturamque componere.Nam si dicas mortale et rationale differentias et ea animali supponas, non dubium quin cum hominis speciem facias,speciei hujus sint perfectrices, atque ideo specificae nominantur,quod et permutantnaturam,et ipsam substantiam cujuslibet aliusspecieiconstituant.Illse vero aliae nihil aliudefficiunt, nisi alteratum,quippe cum aut proprietate quadam forma; alius distet ab alio,aut aliqua habitudine et dispositione aliquid faciendi. Illa igitur magis propria differentia,quam speciucam nominamus,sola poterit in generis divisione congruere. Etenim cæteræ nihil ad substantiam,sed ad quamdam quodammodo ejusdem similitudinis discrepantiam distantiamque ponuntur.Nihil enim in illis praeter alteritatem solam reperire queas, quippe quae non constituunt species,sed constitutas jam et effectas magis propriis suis qualitatibus ipsae discriminant. Quod autem dicit:
Therefore the common and proper differences that make something other are so called, but the more proper ones make it another. It is established, then, that some differences make another, others make something other: those which make another, since they are substantial and change the whole nature and species, are also predicated as specific; for they have the power to constitute any species whatever, and to separate it from all others, and to compose its form and nature. For if you were to call mortal and rational differences and place them under animal, there is no doubt that, since you make the species of man, they are the perfecters of this species, and therefore they are named specific, because they both change the nature and constitute the very substance of any species. But those other differences effect nothing else than something other, inasmuch as either by some property of form one thing differs from another, or by some condition and disposition of doing something. That difference, then, which is more proper, which we call specific, alone can be fitting in the division of a genus. For the rest are posited with regard to nothing substantial, but with regard to a certain discrepancy and distance of the same similarity, in some way. For in them you could find nothing besides otherness alone, since they do not constitute species, but rather they themselves distinguish species already constituted and effected by their own more proper qualities. But what he says:
Repetenti nunc a superioribus dicendum est, differentiarum alias esse separabiles alias inseparabiles, hoc est quod hic nunc divisio alia rursus assumitur.Namcum prius differentiam in tribus partibus separaret,et postea tres illas in duarum tantum numerum quantitatemque colligeret,utalias alterum tacentes esse diceret,alias alterantes,ipsarum rursus trium tertia sumitur facienda divisio.Dicitenim alias esse separabiles,alias inseparabiles,et sicut in priore divisione alteratum facientes duae fuerunt communes et propriae, sola vero magis propria remanserat quæ alterum faciebat,eodem nunc etiam modoin separabilibus et in inseparabilibus:communis tantum separabilis differentiaest, utraque aliae, ut caecitas oculorum,vel flava caesaries,vel corporis proceritas, quae sunt propriae differentiae; vel certe rationabilitas, vel mortalitas,quæ sunt magis propriæ difl'erentiæ,non possunt unquam ab hominis specie segregari. Sedere vero vel currere, quae communes sunt,separanturasingulis,etitemrursus adduntur. Earum vero quae sunt inseparabiles,aliae per se veniunt, aliae vero per accidens. Et illae quae per se veniunt,a magis propriis manant.Illae quæ per accidens, a solis propriis effunduntur.
Now, returning to the points made above, it must be said that of differences some are separable and some inseparable; that is, here again another division is now taken up. For when previously he had divided difference into three parts, and afterwards had gathered those three into the number and quantity of only two, so as to say that some differences, being unspoken, make something other, while others make it another, a third division of those same three is again taken up to be made. For he says that some are separable and some inseparable; and just as in the earlier division the differences that make something other were two, the common and the proper, while only the more proper remained, which made another, so now also in the case of separable and inseparable differences: the common difference alone is separable, while the other two are inseparable. For the common differences, such as blindness of the eyes, or yellow hair, or tallness of body, are separable; but the proper differences, such as rationality or mortality, which are the more proper differences, can never be separated from the species of man. But to sit or to run, which are common differences, are separated from individuals and again added to them. Of those differences, however, which are inseparable, some come of themselves, while others come by accident. And those which come of themselves flow from the more proper differences; those which come by accident are poured forth from the proper differences alone.
Et inseparabile accidens est,quidquid per inseparabilem propriam differentiam unicuique speciei contigerit.Sed quanquampropriaetmagis propriainseparabiles differentiæ sint,nunquam tamen illam superiorem formam naturamque commutaut.Nam magis propria semper alterum,propriasoIum sem per efficit alteratum.Huc accedit quod inseparabiles propriae possunt alicui plus minusve contingere.Inseparabiles magis propriae, nec cumulis intentionis augent,nec imminutione decrescunt. Potest enim alius procerior,alius fuscior,deductioribus alius capillis, alius flavioribus nasci, quae sunt inseparabiles propriae differentis. At vero magis propria,id est rationale neque plus, neque minus admittit.Omnes enim homines in eo quod homines sunt,æqualiter sunt rationales atque mortales.Nam sigenus plusminusveessepossit genus, possunt etiam differentiae vel intentione crescere,vel remissione decrescere.Nam quoniam animal non est plus homini quamequo,nequeequo plus quam caeteris,et aequaliter subjectis omnibus genus est. Sic specierum differentiae quas specificas appeltamusmagismiuusvenoncapiunt.Nam sianimalrationaleJmortale,bominis est definitio, et hominum nihilominus singulorum,non est dubium quin hcec definitio ad omnes homines singulos æqualiter sempe aptetur,et nulli neque plus neque minus conveniat.
And an inseparable accident is whatever has befallen each species through an inseparable proper difference. But although proper and more proper differences are inseparable, they never change that higher form and nature. For a more proper difference always makes one thing other, while a proper difference always makes it only other. To this is added that inseparable proper differences can befall something more or less. Inseparable more proper differences neither increase with an addition of intensity nor decrease with a lessening. For one person can be born taller, another darker, another with sparser hair, another with fairer hair—things which are inseparable proper differences. But a more proper difference, that is, rational, admits neither more nor less. For all men, insofar as they are men, are equally rational and mortal. For if a genus could be more or less, then differences too could increase by intensity or decrease by remission. For since animal is not more for man than for horse, nor more for horse than for the rest, the genus is equally present to all its subjects. So the differences of species, which we call specific, do not admit more or less. For if animal, rational, mortal is the definition of man, and none the less of each individual man, there is no doubt that this definition always applies equally to all individual men, and belongs to none more or less.
Quod si itaest,partesquoquetotiusdefinitionis,quae sunt differentiae, tales erunt ut nulli neque plus neque minus, sed aequaliter semper et convenienter aptentur. Partes autem hujus definitionis suntrationale et mortale. Rationale igitur etmortale quaesuntmagispropricedifTerentiaeplusminusvenon capiunt.Ab hac igitur,id est,separabilium inseparabiliumque differentiarum divisioue tribus modis differentias speculamur.Nam aut separabiles sunt,aut inseparabiles.Inseparabilium vero aut per se veniunt aut per accidens.Quce per se veniunt aliæ sunt qua: genus dividunt, aliae speciem informant atque constituunt.Sed de superioribus prius dictum est.
But if this is so, the parts of the whole definition, which are the differences, will be such that they fit no thing either more or less, but always equally and fittingly. Now the parts of this definition are rational and mortal. Therefore, rational and mortal, insofar as they are more properly differences, admit neither more nor less. From this, then—that is, from the division of separable and inseparable differences—we observe differences in three ways. For they are either separable or inseparable. But of inseparable differences, some come per se, others per accidens. Of those that come per se, some divide the genus, others inform and constitute the species. But concerning the former, enough has been said earlier.
Nunc autem de iis genus dividunt et speciem constituuntdisseramus.Omnis quæcunque fit generum divisio in species,si earum specierum alia subdivisio fiat,et a magis generibus per subaltern a genera usque ad magis species decurratur,gemina in his erit duplexque divisio.Namque si contrarias differentias respicias,generum esldivisio.Si subalternorum generum sit,specierum constitutio.Si enim genus dividamus, id est substantiam, ut jam in speciei disputatione divisa est, et sic ut substantia sit summa post substantiam, animatum corpus et inanimatum;sub animato corpore sensibile etinsensibile; sub sensibili, id est animali, rationale et irrationale; sub rationali,mortale et immortale.Ilae igitur differentiae eaedem species sunt,si contra seipsas in divisione respiciantur,etdividunt genus hoc modo.Nam quoniam sub substantia animatumcorpus et inanimatum posuimus,si animatum corpus contra inanimatumrespicias,substantiam divisisti. Si vero subalterna genera in ipsis differentiis aspicias,speciem constitues.Nam si animatum corpus et quod sub ipso est sensibile corpus aspexeris,animal respexisti. Item si rationalem differentiam contra irrationalem differentiam acceperis,genus quod est utrorumque, id est animal divisisti.Si vero sub eodem ordine rationalem differentiamet et mortalem accipias,hominis sine dubio speciem demonstrasti.
But now let us discuss how genera are divided and species constituted. Every division of genera into species, if a further subdivision of those species is made, and one descends from the more general genera through subaltern genera all the way to the more specific species, will involve a twofold and double division. For if you look at the contrary differences, it is a division of genera; if at the subaltern genera, it is a constitution of species. For if we divide a genus—that is, substance, as it has already been divided in the discussion of species—so that under substance there is, as the highest, animate body and inanimate body; under animate body, perceptible and imperceptible; under perceptible, that is, animal, rational and irrational; under rational, mortal and immortal. Those differences, then, are the same things as species, if in the division they are viewed in contrast with one another, and they divide the genus in this way. For since we have placed animate body and inanimate body under substance, if you view animate body in contrast with inanimate, you have divided substance. But if you look at the subaltern genera in the differences themselves, you will constitute a species. For if you look at animate body and the perceptible body that is under it, you have looked at animal. Likewise, if you take the rational difference in contrast with the irrational difference, you have divided the genus that is common to both, that is, animal. But if under the same order you take the rational difference and the mortal difference, you have without doubt demonstrated the species of man.
Ita has differentiæ alio modo acceptæ fiunt generis divisibiles,id est genera dividentes.Alio vero modo fiunt constitutivae specierum,id est quae species declarent atque constituant.
Nam si contrarias diflerentias respexeris, divides genus. Si vero subalternas,speciem constitues.
Differentiarum igitur vis,et separabilium etinseparauilium, exteras tres res,id est genus,speciem, accidensque sic retinet,ut permutata comparatione per hcec eadem ipsa etiam permutentur.Nam rationate et mortale differentias si contra irrationale et immortale respexeris,divisibiles suntgeneris differentiæ.Sin vero idem ipsum rationale et mortale ad superiora comparaveris,speries erunt ejusquod eas continet animalis.
Si vero rationalealque mortale ad subjectum homi. nem consideres,genera ejus constitut ivasque differentia contemplabere.
At verodeillisaliisinseparabilibus,id est propriis cadunt differentiae inseparabitis accidentis.Inseparabile namque est accidens, cfecitas oculorum, et nas: curvila8,et alia hujusmodi.Et idem de separabilibus accidentibus,id est decommunibus.Separabile namque accidens est,vigilare,dormire,currere, et sedere. Quod autem dicit: Sic igitur composita ait super omnia substantia,ut sint ejus differentiæ divisibiles animatum et inanimatum,contrarias differentias in species monstrat.
Thus these differentiae, taken in one way, become divisive of a genus, that is, dividing genera. In another way they become constitutive of species, that is, those which declare and constitute species.
For if you have regard to contrary differentiae, you divide the genus. But if to subaltern ones, you constitute the species.
The force of differentiae, then, both of separable and of inseparable ones, retains the other three things—genus, species, and accident—in such a way that, when the comparison is changed, through these same things those very things are also changed. For if you regard rational and mortal as differentiae in contrast to irrational and immortal, they are divisive differentiae of a genus. But if you compare the same rational and mortal to the higher things, they will be species of that which contains them, namely animal.
But if you consider rational and mortal in relation to the subject, man, you will contemplate them as genera of it and as constitutive differentiae.
But in the case of those other inseparable ones, that is, proper ones, the differentiae fall under inseparable accident. For an inseparable accident is, for example, blindness of the eyes, and the curvature of the nose, and other things of this kind. And the same holds concerning separable accidents, that is, common ones. For a separable accident is to be awake, to sleep, to run, and to sit. But what he says—"Thus therefore the substance that is above all things is composed, so that its differentiae are divisible: animate and inanimate"—shows contrary differentiae in species.