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In Prophyrium Dialogi A Victorino Translati

Boethius. Severinus · ogl-pl

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machine-draft · no human review 147 passages · 36,195 words translation only — commentary and dossier not yet generated

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0 commentary units 1 derived notes 0 open questions 147 narrative
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  • coverageNo English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed.
  • limitThe English is a machine draft produced passage by passage from the transcribed Latin; no human has verified it. The commentary is model-written and cites only keys the pipeline could resolve.
  • registerRegister: other in Latin; the English keeps the liturgical formulae and the vocatives rather than normalising them.
  • structurePassages: 147 narrative.
  • caution1 passage(s) are fragmentary in the source; the English bridges each break and says so in the note.
  • sourceSource edition: ogl-pl.
  • sourceLicence: Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License

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tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:101 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod autem dicit: Haecdifferentiaanimataatquesensibilis socia a substantiae perficiet animal, constitutivas specierum differentias monstrat.Sic igitur variis modis acceptæ varias virtutes formasque sortitae sunt.Sed et divisibiles et constitutivæ utræque specifice nominantur, et in divisionibus generum definitionibusque solæ sunt utiles.Cæteræ vero inseparabiles per accidens, inutiles,et multo magis illæsuntinutiles,quæ separabili differentia discretioneque formatæ sunt.Has autem specificas differentias,qui de differentiarum divisione tractavere, tales esse declarant quibus species a genere abundant. Quid autem sit breviter explanandumest. Controversiaestutrum genusdifferentias specierum suarum in se habeat,an minime, ut puta: Animal sub se habet species rationale et irrationale, id est hominem,et verbi gratiaequum. Rationabilitatem igitur et irrationabilitalem,id est, hominis vel equi differentias,quibus a se species sub animali positæ differunt, utrum habet utrasque animal,an non habeat in controversia est. Nam si ani.

English

But what he says—"These differentiae, animate and sensible, being allied to substance, will complete animal"—shows the differentiae that are constitutive of species. Thus, then, accepted in various ways, they have obtained various powers and forms. But both the divisive and the constitutive are called specifically [i.e., by the name of species], and in the divisions of genera and in definitions they alone are useful. The others, however, are inseparable by accident and useless, and much more useless are those formed by separable differentia and separation. But those who have treated the division of differentiae declare that these specific differentiae are such as make species abound from a genus. What this is must be briefly explained. There is a controversy whether a genus has in itself the differentiae of its species or not—for example, whether Animal has under itself the species rational and irrational, that is, man and, say, horse. Therefore whether Animal has both rationality and irrationality, that is, the differentiae of man or horse, by which the species placed under animal differ from one another, or does not have them, is a matter of controversy. For if ani-

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:102 · narrative
Source · Latin

mal quod genus est,neque rationale est neque irrationale, species quæ subipsosuntpositapifetasdifferentiasnon habebunt.Nam sigenusistas differentias non habebit,unde erunt speciebus differentiae,qutbus a seipsis differunt?Sed si quisdicat esse in genere istas differentias(non enim habere differentias species, nisi prius genus habuisset), aliud majus continet incommodum. Nam quoniam seque sunt species quæ sub aliquo genere supponuntur,etæqua. liter homo atque equus sub ammali genere ponunturneque homo prius est neque equus, sed uterque fequaliter animalis species nominantur.Igitursi rationaleatque irrationale æquali ter sub eodem genere sunt,erunt etiam uno tempore.Quod si uno tempore et genua istas differentias habet, ut genus suapte natura.idegt animal rationale sit et irrationale,non est dubium quod eadem res uno tempore duas contrarietatesin sesesubslantialiterretineat, quod fieri nequit. Quid igitur? Dicendum est quoniam genus actu quidem ipso quod Græci vocant istas differentias non babet.At vero potestate ab his ipsis differentiis, quas in suas species fundit non vacat. Quid autem sit actus et potestas castigatius explicandum est. Tantum interest actus a potestate, quantum homo ridens ab eo ridere possit, non tamen rideat. Ille enim agit ipsam rem, ille tantum potest, non etiam agit. Sic igitur et animal. Namque homo actu ipso rationalis est.

English

For if the genus is neither rational nor irrational, the species placed under them will not have the differentiae mentioned above. For if the genus does not have these differentiae, whence will the species have the differentiae by which they differ from one another? But if someone says that these differentiae are in the genus (for species would not have differentiae unless the genus had first possessed them), a greater difficulty follows. For since the species that are placed under some genus are equal, and man and horse are placed equally under the genus animal, neither is man prior nor is horse, but each is equally called a species of animal. Therefore, if rational and irrational are equally under the same genus, they will also exist at one time. But if the genus has these differentiae at one time, so that by its own nature the genus is rational animal and irrational, there is no doubt that the same thing at one time retains in itself two contrarieties substantially, which cannot happen. What then? It must be said that the genus does not have these differentiae in actuality itself, which the Greeks call [actuality]. But it is not free from them in potentiality, from those very differentiae which it pours out into its species. But what actuality and potentiality are must be explained more carefully. Actuality differs from potentiality as much as a man who is laughing differs from one who can laugh but is not laughing. For the former does the thing itself, the latter only can do it, and does not also do it. So therefore also with animal. For man is rational in actuality itself.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:103 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sem perenim homo rationalis,et nihil aliud est: et equus semper irrationalis,etejusirrationabilitasin actu posita est. At vero ipsum animal rationale vel irrationale non ipsum agit,neque est in eorum actu positum, sedin potestate.Potest enim ex se rationale atque irrationale profundere.Quare quoniam species actu differentias continet, genus vero potestate, species a genere merito differentiis abundare dicuntur.Quoniam quod genus potest, id est differentias facere, species non solum possunt,sed etiam agunt.In ipsis enim speciebus positae informatasque sunt. Est autem alia differentiæ definitio talis quae dicat differentiam esse quæ ad plurimas species in eo quod quale sit,prædicatur.Difrerentia ad res plurimas dici potest,ut rationale dicitur adhominem:homo enim est rationalis,dicitur ad Deum.Deus enim rationalis dicitur,sed non in eo quod quid sit,sed in co quod quale sit. Nam si qualis homo sit interrogetur,rationalis continuo respondetur.Qualis Deus sit si interroges, rationale non absurde dixeris.

English

For man is always rational, and is nothing else; and a horse is always irrational, and its irrationality is placed in act. But animal itself, rational or irrational, does not itself act, nor is it placed in their act, but in potency. For it can pour forth from itself both rational and irrational. Wherefore, since the species contains the differentiae in act, but the genus in potency, the species is rightly said to abound in differentiae more than the genus. For what the genus can do—that is, make differentiae—the species not only can do, but also does. For they are placed and formed in the species themselves. But there is another definition of differentia, such as says that differentia is what is predicated of very many species in respect of what sort it is. Differentia can be said of very many things, as rational is said of man: for man is rational, and it is said of God. For God is called rational, but not in respect of what it is, but in respect of what sort it is. For if it is asked what sort of man he is, rational is immediately answered. If you ask what sort God is, you will not absurdly say rational.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:104 · narrative
Source · Latin

Eodem modo etiam irrationabilitas dicitur et ad equum et adbovem et ad piscem et ad avem,quae omnia si qualia sint interrogaveris,irrationabilia prædicantur.Bona igitur et recta hæc est definitio,id est differentia est quæ ad plurimas res specie distantes in eo quod quale prsedicatur.Et de mortali vero, et de aliis differentiis,eadem est ratio.Sequitur locus perdifficilis sed transferentis obscuritate Victorini magis quam Porphyriiproponentis,qui hujusmodiest:Dicit enim omnemremquaecunqueestcorporeaexmateriaet forma constare.Namque si statuam dicas,constat statua ex xere(verbi gratia)et figura illa quamei suus fictor imposuit,et est materia ex qua facta est ses: figura vero,id est,forma qua aes ipsum formatum est. Nam si hominem formabis exsere et figura hominis,erit hominis figura,forma,æs vero materia. Eodem modo etiam genus.Namquegenus in modum materiae-accipitur, differentia vcro in modum formæ. Etenim quemadmodumqu8ecunqueillares ex materia et forma constat, sic etiam omnis species ex genere et differentia. Namque genus ita est hominis, ut est statuæ æs. Differentia vero sic est hominis, ut est forma illaex qua æs effictum est.Nam sicut ex aliqua figura quae ex æris materia efficta es!.cujuscunque illius species statuæ sit, sic etiam in genus,id est in animal cum venerit difrerentia,id est rationale,hominis species fingitur.

English

In the same way, irrationality is also predicated both of a horse and of an ox and of a fish and of a bird; and if you ask what sort all these are, they are called irrational. This definition, then, is good and correct—that is, a differentia is what is predicated of very many things differing in species, in respect of what sort something is. And the same account holds for mortal and for the other differentiae. There follows a very difficult passage, made obscure more by the translator Victorinus than by Porphyry who sets it forth, which is of this sort: for he says that every corporeal thing whatsoever consists of matter and form. For if you speak of a statue, the statue consists of bronze, for example, and of that figure which its fashioner imposed upon it; and the bronze is the matter from which it is made, while the figure—that is, the form—is that by which the bronze itself is shaped. For if you fashion a man out of bronze and the figure of a man, the figure of the man will be the form, but the bronze the matter. In the same way also the genus: for the genus is taken in the manner of matter, but the differentia in the manner of form. For just as every one of those things consists of matter and form, so also every species consists of genus and differentia. For the genus is to a man as the bronze is to a statue. But the differentia is to a man as that form is by which the bronze is shaped. For just as from some figure which is shaped out of the matter of bronze, whatever species of statue it may be, so also when the differentia—that is, rational—comes into the genus, that is, into animal, the species of man is fashioned.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:105 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ista igitursibi proportionali' ter sunt.Propor: io autemestcujuscunqueilliusreisimilis ad aliquam rem cognatam comparatio.ut puta si duo compares ad quatuor,dupla proportio est. Si vero viginti ad quadraginta,eadem dupla.Sub eadem ergo proportione sunt quatuor adduo,subqualiquadraginta ad viginli,quod utraque duplex est numerorum comparatio. Sic igitur qualis proportio est, id est comparatio materise est figurae,lalis est proportio generis et differentia;: et ista quatuor sibi proportionaliter sunt.Eodem enim modo ex materia et figuraspeciesuniuscujusqueillius fictionis formataest,quemadmodum ex genereetdifferentiisspecies cujuscunque illius animanlis inanimantisve formatur,quod Victorinus scilicetintellexisse minus videtur.Nani quod Porphyrius dixit,id est proportionaJe,ille sic accepit quasi diceret, id est irrationaliter.Atque ideo in loco ubi habet hoc modo scriptum: Omnes namque res ex forma et materia consistunt,ipsa autem forma irrationalis est,tollendum est irrationale,Etsubterius paulu lum ubi habetur:Jam omnes genus simile materiæ est,et consistit irrationale, tollendum est irrationale,et ponendum est proportionale, ut sit,et consistit proportionaliter. Nam quæ proportio est figuræ ad materiam inefficienda cujuslibet corporis fictione, eadem est proportio differentiae ad genus in efficienda cujuslibet specie animati atque inanimati.

English

Therefore these things are proportional to one another. Now a proportion is a comparison of any one thing, similar to some related thing. For example, if you compare two to four, the proportion is double. But if twenty to forty, it is the same double. Therefore four to two are under the same proportion as forty to twenty, because each is a double comparison of numbers. So, therefore, as the proportion—that is, the comparison—of matter is to figure, such is the proportion of genus to difference; and these four are proportional to one another. For in the same way the species of any one of those fabrications is formed from matter and figure, just as the species of any one of those animals, animate or inanimate, is formed from genus and difference—which Victorinus, to be sure, seems to have understood less well. For what Porphyry said, that is, proportionally, he took as if he were saying, that is, irrationally. And therefore in the place where it is written in this way: For all things consist of form and matter, but the form itself is irrational, irrational must be removed. And a little below, where it is had: Now every genus is like matter, and it consists irrationally, irrational must be removed, and proportionally must be put, so that it reads, and it consists proportionally. For what proportion figure has to matter in effecting the fabrication of any body, the same proportion difference has to genus in effecting the species of any animate and inanimate thing.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:106 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sequitur item alia definitio quae est hujusmodi::Dicuntenim essedifferentiam quod possit separare quidquid sub eodem genere est,et recte dicunt.Nam dum sub eodem genere sit homo atque equus,quia utrumque est animal, cum venerit rationale vel irrationale, equum atque hominem quod sub eodem genere sunt. dividunt atque discernant. Sunt igitur illae differentiæ quae possunt res sub eodem genere separare. Est autem alia definitio: Differentias sunt quibus quodque ab alio distat. Nam homo atque equus rationali atque irrationali differentia discrepant, cum unum sint quantum ad genus,et hoc est quod dicit:

Differentia est qua diflerunt singula, quia per seipsum genus est,et illa quæ rationalia sunt,nos scilicet,et illa quæ irrafionalia sunt. Namque et homo et equuset avis hæc omnia genus unumsuntjidestanimal. Namque animal horum omnium genus est:

English

Another definition follows, which is of this kind: for they say that a difference is what can separate whatever is under the same genus, and they say rightly. For while man and horse are under the same genus, since each is an animal, when rational or irrational comes to them, they divide and separate the horse and the man, which are under the same genus. Those, then, are differences which can separate things under the same genus. But there is another definition: differences are those by which each thing is distinguished from another. For man and horse differ by the difference of rational and irrational, although they are one as regards genus, and this is what he says:

A difference is that by which individual things differ, because the genus itself is by itself, both those things which are rational—namely we ourselves—and those things which are irrational. For both man and horse and bird—all these are one genus, that is, animal. For animal is the genus of all these.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:107 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed si de hoc loco in quo positum est, quia per seipsum genus est,mutes et facias quae per se ipsa animalia sunt,planior sensus erit.Generis enim hic nomine pro animalis abusus est,et erit hujusmodi ordo: Differentia est qua differunt singula,qua' per se ipsa animalia sunt,et illa quae rationalia sunt animalia nos scilicet,et illa quae irrationalia sunt.Quod si sic esset, nullus esset error omnino. Nunc vero genus quod ait,pro animalis nomine intelligendum est. Item dii atque homines cum utrique rationales sint,mortalitatistamennomineadjectodifferunt discrepantque. Sic igitur differentia est qua singula differunt, sed hoc non simpliciter,sed illas tantum differentias hujusmodi esse putandum ewt,qua' ad substantiam prosint,et qua; ad id quod est et quascunque speciei possunt esse aliquæ partes quas hujusmodiest: Siequusatquehomo,quorumutrorumque unum genus est animal,a se differunt rationali atque irrationali qualitate, attamen istarationabilitas et irrationabilitas in substantia ipsarum specierum est hoc modo. Nam neque equus post esse sine irrationabilitate,neque homo sine rationabilitate.Atque ideo istæ differentiæ prosunt ad aliquid esse speciei illi cui fuerintaccomodatae,et substantias ipsius partes sunt. Nam cum homo ex his differentiis constet, id esl ex rationali et mortali, rationale et mortale solum positum pars est substantiæ hominis.

English

But if you change this passage, in which the genus is posited as being genus through itself, and make it refer to those things that are animals through themselves, the sense will be clearer. For here he has misused the name of genus in place of animal, and the order will be as follows: a difference is that by which individual things differ, by which they are animals through themselves, both those that are rational animals—namely, we ourselves—and those that are irrational. For if it were so, there would be no error at all. But as it stands, what he calls genus must be understood as the name of animal. Likewise, gods and humans, since both are rational, nevertheless differ and are distinguished by the addition of the name of mortality. So therefore a difference is that by which individual things differ, but not simply so; rather, only those differences of this kind are to be considered such as contribute to substance, and to that which a thing is, and whatever parts of a species can be of this kind. Thus horse and human, of which the one genus is animal, differ from each other by the quality of rationality and irrationality; yet rationality and irrationality are in the substance of those very species in this way. For neither is a horse after its being without irrationality, nor a human without rationality. And therefore these differences contribute to the being of that species to which they have been accommodated, and they are parts of its substance. For since a human consists of these differences, that is, of rational and mortal, rational and mortal taken together are a part of the substance of a human.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:108 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam si utraque simul unum hominem faciunt, non est dubius quin ad substantiam hominis efficiendam unaquæque earum res pars esse videatur.Quareillæ differentiæ quaecunque non prosunt ad esse, neque partes substantiae cujuslibet speciei sunt, specificæ differentiae dici non habent, quamvis sola hoc una species habeat. Nam si homo navigat, potest dici animal navigabile.Sed navigare in substantiam hominis non vertitur.Neque enim homo inde subsistit, quia navigat, quamvis hoc nullum aliud animal habere possit, id est, nullum possit animal navigare. Eodem modo et esse rhetorem vel grammaticum. Has igitur differentias quas ad esse non prosunt. Sed tantum artem aliquem scientiamque commemorant, non ponimus specificas esse, quamvis una qualibet animalis id species habeat. Ergo considerandum est, ut quoties dicimus definitionem differentiæ illam differentiam esse qua differant singula,illam significari differentiam illtelligamus,quæ ad aliquidesse prodestet quæ est alicujus pars substantiae speciei.Illa vero quae ad esse non prosunt in hoc genere differentiarum,quamvis sirigulæ cujusque sint non ponamus. Sed quoniam de differentia dictum est, de proprio explicemus.Tune Fabius,Ut arbitror, consequens est.

English

For if both together make one man, there is no doubt that each of them seems to be a part for producing the substance of man. Therefore, whatever differences do not contribute to being are not parts of the substance of any species, and are not to be called specific differences, although one single species alone may have this. For if a man sails, he can be called a sailing animal. But sailing is not turned into the substance of man. For man does not subsist from this, because he sails, although no other animal can have this, that is, no other animal can sail. In the same way also, to be a rhetorician or a grammarian. Therefore these differences, which do not contribute to being but only mention some art and knowledge, we do not posit to be specific, although any one species of animal may have them. Therefore it must be considered that, as often as we say in the definition of a difference that it is the difference by which individual things differ, we should understand that difference to be signified which contributes to being something and which is a part of the substance of a species. But those which do not contribute to being, in this kind of differences, although they belong to each individual, we do not posit. But since difference has been discussed, let us explain concerning property. Then Fabius said: As I think, it follows.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:109 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE PROPRIO.

Proprium quatuor dicitur modis, Dicilur namque proprium quod uni speciei accidit, etiamsi non omnibus.

Et ego: Quatuor ergo modis propria dividuntur; est enim proprium quod uni accidit, etsi non omnibus, ut est rhetor vel geometer vel grammaticus. Haec vero omnia uni soli speciei, id est homini accidunt, non tamen omnibus. Neque enim omnes homines vel grammatici, vel rhetores, vel geometri sunt, itaque ideo vocabitur hoc proprium quod uni sit,etiamsi no'1 omnibus.Est item alia.proprietasquEe est omnibus, etiamsi non soli.Nam bipes omni homini acidit. Omnis enim homo bipesest; sed non soli hominum speciei accidit,sed etiam avibus. Et item tertium proprium quod omni etsoli et aliquo tempore accidit,ut est in pubertate pubescere, et in senectute canescere.Namque et omnibus hominibus evenit, et nulli alii speciei nisi soli hominum,et aliquo tempore: constitutum enim tempus est vel adolescentibus pubescendi,vel senescentibus canescendi.Neque enim a sexto anno vel septimo aliquis pubescit,aut a vicesimo canescit, nisi forte aliquid accidat novi.Quartum proprium est, quod uni speciei accidit,et omnibus sub eadem specie individuis,et omni tempore. Nam risibilem esse hominem,et unispeciei solum,id est homini contingit, et omnibus sub eadem specie inviduis: onjnes enim singuli homines rident,et omnitempore.Nunquam enim tempus fuit, ut quicunque ridere non possit.

English

ON THE PROPERTY.

"Property" is spoken of in four ways. For that is called a property which belongs to one species, even if not to all.

And I said: Therefore properties are divided in four ways; for there is a property which belongs to one thing, though not to all, as being a rhetorician or a geometer or a grammarian. But all these belong to one species only, that is, to man, yet not to all. For not all men are either grammarians or rhetoricians or geometers, and so this will be called a property which belongs to one thing, even if not to all. There is also another property which belongs to all, even if not to one alone. For "two-footed" belongs to every man. For every man is two-footed; but it does not belong to the species of man alone, but also to birds. And likewise the third property is that which belongs to all and to one alone and at some time, as to reach puberty in youth and to grow gray in old age. For it happens to all men, and to no other species except man alone, and at some time: for a fixed time is appointed either for the young to reach puberty or for the aged to grow gray. For no one reaches puberty from the sixth or seventh year, or grows gray from the twentieth, unless perhaps something new happens. The fourth property is that which belongs to one species, and to all individuals under the same species, and at all times. For to be capable of laughter belongs to man, and to one species alone, that is, to man, and to all individuals under the same species: for all individual men laugh, and at all times. For there was never a time when anyone could not laugh.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:110 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed risibile dico potestate, non actu. Namque etsi non rideat homo, tamen quia ridere potest,risibilis appelJ alur.Et sunt integre ei vere propria ista quae et uni,et omnibus, et omni tempore insunt.Namque hæc speciebus suis converti possunt.Si enim dicas: Quid est bomo? Risibile. Si quid est risibile interroges, homo prædicabis. Illa vero alia bipes,vel grammaticus propria quidem sunt,sed converti non possunt.Nam grammaticus semper nomo,homo vero non semper grammaticus.Et econtrario homo semper bipes est, non econtra bipes semper homo est.Et hinnibile similiter magis proprium equi est.Nam eodem modo hæc proprietas ad suam speciem converti potest: nam si dicas quid estequus,hinnibile respondebis. Si,quid est hinnibile,equus prædicabitur. Sed quoniam de propriis dictum est,de accidentibus sequens tractatus habeatur.Tum Fabius: Definit Porphyrius accidens sic.

English

But I call "capable of laughing" in potentiality, not in act. For even if a man does not laugh, nevertheless, because he can laugh, he is called capable of laughing. And those properties are wholly and truly proper which belong to one species, to all of it, and at all times. For these can be converted with their species. For if you say, "What is man?" — "Capable of laughing." If you ask what is capable of laughing, you will predicate man. But those other properties, two-footed or grammatical, are indeed proper, but they cannot be converted. For the grammatical is always a man, but a man is not always grammatical. And conversely, a man is always two-footed, but the two-footed is not always a man. And similarly, capable of neighing is more properly a property of the horse. For in the same way this property can be converted with its species: for if you say what is a horse, you will answer "capable of neighing." If you ask what is capable of neighing, horse will be predicated. But since properties have been discussed, let the following treatment be of accidents. Then Fabius said: Porphyry defines accident thus.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:111 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE ACCIDENTI.

Accidens est quod infertur et aufertur sine ejus in quo est interitu.

Hoc autem dicere videtur,illud esse accidens sine quod potest constare illud cui accidit:ut puta si forte casu aliquo cuiquam facies irrubuerit, abscedente ruboreillassa facies permanebit,sicut eveniente non laesa est. Dividitur ergo accidens in separabile et in inseparabile. Namque separabiles accidens est,ut puta si quid sedeat vel ambulet: inseparabile est, ut si dicas corvum nigrum, cygnum album, atque haec accidentia separari non possunt.Nasciturautem hujusmodidubietas,utrumsuperior definitioverasit,et omnium accidentium nomen includat.Nam quoniam sunt quEedam(ut ipse ait)accidentia inseparabilia, in his talis definitio videtur convenire non posse.Nam si separari non possunt,non est in illis vera definitio quae dicit: Accidens esse quod inferri et auferri potest sine ejus in quo est interitu.Nam cum inseparabilia sint, auferri non possunt. Sed haec tam vehemens quaestio solvitur sic, quod haec ipsa definitio de accidentibus facta est potestate,non actu, et intelligentia,non veritate,Nam quia Æthiops et corvus colorem amittant,sed sine isto colore ad intelligentiam nostram possunt subsistere. Nam verum est quoniam Æthiopem autcorvum color niger nunquam diserit.

English

ON ACCIDENT.

An accident is what is brought in and taken away without the destruction of that in which it is.

He seems to say this: that is an accident without which the thing to which it happens can stand; for example, if by some chance a person's face has blushed, when the blush departs the face will remain unharmed, just as it was not harmed when the blush came. Accident, then, is divided into separable and inseparable. For a separable accident is, for instance, if someone sits or walks; an inseparable accident is, as if you say a crow is black, a swan white, and these accidents cannot be separated. But a doubt of this kind arises, whether the above definition is true and includes the name of all accidents. For since there are certain inseparable accidents (as he himself says), such a definition seems unable to apply to them. For if they cannot be separated, the definition is not true in their case which says: an accident is what can be brought in and taken away without the destruction of that in which it is. For since they are inseparable, they cannot be taken away. But this very forceful question is solved thus: that this definition itself was made about accidents in potentiality, not in act, and in understanding, not in truth. For although an Ethiopian and a crow may lose their color, yet without this color they can subsist for our understanding. For it is true that black color will never depart from an Ethiopian or a crow.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:112 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed si quis intelligat colorem istum Æthiopem vel corvum posseamittere,plumarum tantum color in corvo mutabitur, et erit avis alba specie et forma corvi, si quis hoc intelligat. An vero hominis, id est ÆÆthiopis,amisso'nigro colore,erit ejus species candida, sicut etiom aliorum hominum. Ergo hoc non ideo quia fiat dicitur, sed ideo quia si posset fieri,hujus accidentis susceptrix substantia non periret. Quod ipse hoc modo demonstrat.

Potest autem subintelliyi et corvus albus,el Ælhiops, ut corvus,amisso colore,in propriæ substantie natura permaneat3cotorem suum perditurus sine interitu suo in quo color fuit.

Nihil enim ad speciem impedit, si Æthiops vel corvus,amisso colore,in propriae substantias natura permaneat.Est autem alia definitio,quae est hujusmodi:

Accidens est quod contingit alicui, et inesse et non inesse.

Nam quod in substantiam non vertitur,id accidens esse dicimus,id est non in substantia insitum, sed extrinsecus veniens. Erga ea quas contingunt et esse et non esse, ideo accidentia vocata sunt,quoniam in substantias ratione non accipiuntur.Si enim in substantiæ ratione ponerentur,nunquam non essent,et sinonessent,nunquam essepossent.Nam quoniam, verbi gratia, rationalis in substantia hominis est, nunquam homo esse poterit irrationabilis, quoniam irrationabilitas in substantia hominis non est.Ex hoc ergo venit etiam alia definitio:

English

But if anyone understands that an Ethiopian or a crow can lose this color, only the color of the feathers in the crow will be changed, and it will be a white bird in species and form of a crow, if anyone understands this. Or indeed, if a man, that is, an Ethiopian, having lost his black color, will his species be white, as also that of other men? Therefore this is not said for the reason that it happens, but for the reason that if it could happen, the substance that is the recipient of this accident would not perish. Which he demonstrates in this way.

But an white crow can also be understood, and an Ethiopian, so that a crow, having lost its color, remains in the nature of its own substance, about to lose its color without its destruction, in which the color was.

For nothing hinders the species if an Ethiopian or a crow, having lost its color, remains in the nature of its own substance. But there is another definition, which is of this kind:

An accident is what happens to something, both to be present and not to be present.

For what is not turned into substance, we say is an accident, that is, not implanted in substance, but coming from outside. Therefore those things which happen both to be and not to be are called accidents for this reason, because they are not received into substances by reason. For if they were placed in the reason of substance, they would never not be, and if they were not, they could never be. For since, for example, rational is in the substance of man, a man can never be irrational, since irrationality is not in the substance of man. From this, therefore, another definition also comes:

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:113 · narrative
Source · Latin

Accidens esse illud, quod neque genus sit,neque species, neque differentia, neque proprium.

Nam quoniam genus,species, differentia, et proprium,in substantia sunt,et cujuscunque illius rei substantiam monstrant,idcirco quidquid horum aliquid non fuerit,id accidens merito prædicabitur.Explicitis igitur atque expeditis his quae proposuit,id est genere,specie,propriis, differentis,accidentibusque tractare,nunc exsequiturilla quae inter hsecomnia communia sunt,et quae differentia.

. DE COMMUNIBUS GENERIS, DIFFERENTJÆ, SPECIEI, PROPRH, ACCIDENTISQUE.

Et primo omnium simul inter se communiones explicat,post etiam singulorum,et dicit omnium esse commune de pluribus prædicari.Namque genus prædicatur de speciebus et de individuis,eodem modo prædicatur et differentia de speciebus et de individuis.Etiam proprium de specieet de individuis prædicatur. At vero species de solis tantum individuis appellatur. Genus enim, ut animal, praedicatur de equis,hominibus,bobus et canibusjidest speciebus. Prædicatur item et de his quae sub ipsis speciebus inclivid ua continentur.Nam sicut species ipsa canis vel equi vel hominis animalia sunt, sic vel unusquisqueequus vel homo animalia prædicantur.

English

That it is an accident which is neither genus, nor species, nor differentia, nor proprium. For since genus, species, differentia, and proprium are in substance and show the substance of whatever thing they belong to, therefore whatever is not any of these will rightly be called an accident. Having therefore explained and set out the things he proposed—that is, to treat of genus, species, propria, differentiae, and accidents—he now goes on to those things which are common among all these, and what the differences are.

ON THE COMMON FEATURES OF GENUS, DIFFERENTIA, SPECIES, PROPRIUM, AND ACCIDENT.

And first he explains all their common features with one another at once, and afterward those of each individually, and he says that it is common to all to be predicated of many things. For genus is predicated of species and of individuals, and in the same way differentia is predicated of species and of individuals. Proprium too is predicated of species and of individuals. But species is predicated of individuals only. For genus, as animal, is predicated of horses, humans, oxen, and dogs—that is, of species. It is also predicated of the individuals contained under those species themselves. For just as the species itself, dog or horse or human, are animals, so too each individual horse or human is predicated as an animal.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:114 · narrative
Source · Latin

Differentiæ vero prædicantur de speciebus et de individuis hoc modo.Namque homo et equus species sunt.Sed rationalis dicitur, et ad speciem hominis differentia pr'ædicatur,eodem modo et ad Ciceronem.Nam cum sub hominis specie individuum sit,et ipse rationalis appellatur. Proprium autem de specie prædicatur, cum dicitur species quod est homo risibilis, et cum diciturCicerorisibilis,quodestindividuum,rronstratur proprium de individuis praedicari. Species vero de suis tantum solis individuis prasdicatur.Interrogatur enim quid est Cicero. Et homo respondetur. Accedens vero praedicatur de individuis,etpostea de speciebus. Nam si quid dicat, homo sedet, quod est accidens separabile,quicunque singulum hominem, id est individuum sedere viderit, tunc idem et de specie prædicat,ut dicat.quoniam Cicero aedpt.Cicero autem homo est,homo sedet.Eodem modo inseparabile accidens de speciebus et de individuis prædicatur.Expeditis ergo omniumcommunionibus generis et difFerentiae primum communiones differentiasque declarat.

English

Differentiae, however, are predicated of species and of individuals in this way. For man and horse are species. But "rational" is said, and the differentia is predicated of the species man, and in the same way also of Cicero. For since the individual is under the species man, he himself is also called rational. Proprium, however, is predicated of a species when the species is said to be "risible man," and when "Cicero is risible," which is an individual, it is shown that proprium is predicated of individuals. Species, however, is predicated only of its own individuals alone. For it is asked what Cicero is, and "man" is answered. Accident, however, is predicated of individuals and afterwards of species. For if someone says "man sits," which is a separable accident, whoever has seen a single man, that is, an individual, sitting, then he also predicates the same of the species, so as to say that since Cicero sits—and Cicero is a man—man sits. In the same way an inseparable accident is predicated of species and of individuals. Having therefore set out the commonalities of all, he first declares the commonalities and differences of genus and differentia.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:115 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE COMMUNIBUS GENERIS ET DIFFERENTIÆ.

Et primum:dicit generi cum differentia esse commune, quod ab utrisque species continentur. Nam genus quod est animal, continet speciem hominis atque equi.Porro autem rationale,quod est differentia,continetet hominem etDeum. Et irrationale,quod est differentia,continet equum et bovem atque avem. Sed ita continet, ut genus semper plures species contineat,quam continet differentia.Namque genus et ipsas differentias continet.Genus enim,id est animal rationale atque irrationale,continetillas species quae sunt sub rationali,et illas quæ sunt sub irrationali continet genus,id est animal.At vero differentia id est rationale,irrationale non continet,sed tantum hominem atque Deum. Plus igitur genus continet quam differentia. Est autem alia communio; siquid enim ad quodlibet genus ita praedicatur,ut ejus genus sit,et de illis speciebus quæ sunt sub illo genere ad quod prædicatur,illud genus appellatur,et de illis individuis quæ sub illis speciebus sunt.Namque animal genus est hominis et de animali praedicatur,ut genus substantia. Genus enim substantia animalis est.Ergoilla substantia quae ad hommisgenus,id est animal,ita praedicatur,ut genus praedicatur etiam et ad ipsum hominem: dicitur enim homo substantia. Prædicatur item iliud generis genus, etiam de illis quae sunt specie individuis.

English

ON WHAT IS COMMON TO GENUS AND DIFFERENTIA.

And first, he says that genus has this in common with differentia, that species are contained by both. For the genus, which is animal, contains the species man and horse. But further, "rational," which is a differentia, contains both man and God. And "irrational," which is a differentia, contains horse and ox and bird. But it contains in such a way that the genus always contains more species than the differentia contains. For the genus also contains the differentiae themselves. For the genus, that is animal, contains those species which are under "rational," and the genus, that is animal, contains those which are under "irrational." But the differentia, that is "rational," does not contain "irrational," but only man and God. The genus, therefore, contains more than the differentia. There is, however, another commonality: for if anything is predicated of any genus in such a way that it is its genus, it is called the genus both of those species which are under that genus of which it is predicated, and of those individuals which are under those species. For animal is the genus of man and is predicated of animal as genus of substance. For substance is the genus of animal. Therefore that substance which is predicated of the genus of man, that is animal, as a genus, is also predicated of man himself: for man is said to be substance. Likewise that genus of the genus is predicated also of those individuals which are under the species.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:116 · narrative
Source · Latin

Dicitur enim Cicero, quodestsubhominisspecieindividuum,substantia: differantia eodem modo.Nam si qua differentia dicta fuerit de alia differentia,ut differentia intelligatur, prædicabitur,et ad speciem quae sub illa differentia est ad quam prædicatur,et de illis individuis quæ sub eadem specie sunt. Nam ratione uti, diiTerentia ad rationalem differentiam veluti cognata differentia præd:catur.Ralionabile autem praedicatur an hominem ergo ratione uti prædicabitur ad hominem. Idem etiam ratione uti, prædicatur ad Ciceronem, quod estindividuum,sub illa specie ad quam speciem illa differentia,id est rationalis, prædicatur, de qua praedicabitur ut cognata illa din'erentia,id est ratione uti.Igitur est istageneris differentiæque communitas,quod ea quæ de genere speciei praedicantur ut genus,et de sub eodem genere specie praedicantur, et de individuis: et illa quae de differentia praedicantur ut differentia, et de sub eadem differentia specie prcedicantur,et de individuis.Est autem alia communio,quod quemadmodum interempto genere species interimuntur,sic interempta differentiaspecies sub eadem differentia interimunt.ur.Nam si intenerit animal,homo atque equus continio periturus est. Sin vero differentia interierit, id est rationale, dii atque homines interibunt, et nihil corum erit quod uti ratione.

English

For Cicero is said to be an individual under the species man, a substance; and differentia in the same way. For if any differentia is said of another differentia, so that it is understood as a differentia, it will be predicated both of the species which is under that differentia of which it is predicated, and of those individuals which are under the same species. For to use reason, a differentia, is predicated of the rational differentia as a kindred differentia. But the rational is predicated of man; therefore to use reason will be predicated of man. The same to use reason is also predicated of Cicero, who is an individual under that species of which that differentia, that is the rational, is predicated, and of which that kindred differentia, that is to use reason, will be predicated. Therefore this is the community of genus and differentia, that the things which are predicated of the genus as of a species, and of the species under the same genus, are also predicated of individuals; and the things which are predicated of a differentia as a differentia are predicated both of the species under the same differentia and of individuals. But there is another community, that just as, when the genus is destroyed, the species are destroyed, so when the differentia is destroyed, the species under the same differentia are destroyed. For if animal perishes, man and horse, contained under it, will perish. But if the differentia perishes, that is the rational, gods and men will perish, and there will be nothing of those things which use reason.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:117 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE PROPRIIS GENERIS ET DIFFERENTIÆ.

Post demonstrationem igitur communionem proprietas corum differentiasqne designat,et dicit primam differentiam eam,qua genus non solum a differentiis, sed etiam speciebus, propriis et accidentibus differat.Namque dicit genus multodepluribus praedicari,quam prædicatur differentia, vel species, vel accidens,vel proprium. Namque genus dicitur, id est animal de quadrupede, de bipede, de reptili, id est de serpente, de natali, id est de pisce. Quadrupes autem quod est a bipede differentia,de solis illis dicitur quae quatuor pedes babent,id est, equus vel bos. De cæteris autem aliis, id est, bipede vel reptili vel nalatili,unde genus aequaliter praedicatur, appellari non potest.Plus autem genus a speciebuH praedicatur,quod cum homo species sit,et de solis individuis prædicetur, idem tamen homo de aequo vel bove vel cane non prædicatur.At vero animal quod est genus, de pluribus speciebus praedicatur. id est de homine, et de equo,et cane et bove,et de omnibus quæ subipsis positasuntindividuis.Genus autem a proprio prsedicationibusabundat,quod proprium unius speciei semper est,et de sub eadem individuis. Genus vero de multis speciebus et propriis prædicatur, et de sub eisdem individuis.

English

ON THE PROPERTIES OF GENUS AND DIFFERENTIA.

After the demonstration of community, therefore, he sets out the properties and differences of these, and says that the first difference is that by which genus differs not only from differentiae, but also from species, properties, and accidents. For he says that genus is predicated of many more things than differentia, or species, or accident, or property is predicated of. For genus is said, that is, animal, of the quadruped, of the biped, of the reptile, that is, of the serpent, of the swimmer, that is, of the fish. But the quadruped, which is a differentia from the biped, is said only of those things that have four feet, that is, the horse or the ox. But of the other remaining things, that is, the biped or the reptile or the swimmer, from which the genus is predicated equally, it cannot be called. Moreover, genus is predicated of more things than species, because although man is a species and is predicated only of individuals, nevertheless the same man is not predicated of a horse or an ox or a dog. But animal, which is a genus, is predicated of many species, that is, of man, and of horse, and dog, and ox, and of all the individuals placed under them. But genus abounds over property in predications, because a property is always of one species and of the individuals under it. But genus is predicated of many species and properties, and of the individuals under them.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:118 · narrative
Source · Latin

Ab accidentibus vero genus magis de plurimis prædicatur, quod cum unius cygni inseparabile fortasse accidens sit album,animal non solum de cygno praeditatur, sed etiam de albis omnibus et non albis animalibus. At vero accidens de solis tantum illis quibusinseparabiliter continetur,vel quibusseparabiliter.Nam principaliterdeindividuisdicitur.Quare constat multo de pluribus praedicari genus quam accidentia prsedicantur,quod accidentia principaliter de individuis,genera vero de individuis et despeciebus et de differentiis prædicantur.

Sed nunc illas differenlias accipiamus quibus genus dividitur, non quibus species informantur.

English

But genus is predicated of more things than accidents are, because, while whiteness is perhaps an inseparable accident of a single swan, animal is predicated not only of the swan but also of all white and non-white animals. But an accident is predicated only of those things in which it is contained, whether inseparably or separably. For it is predicated primarily of individuals. Hence it is clear that genus is predicated of far more things than accidents are predicated of, because accidents are predicated primarily of individuals, whereas genera are predicated of individuals and of species and of differentiae.

But let us now take up those differences by which genus is divided, not those by which species are informed.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:119 · narrative
Source · Latin

Hoc autem est: Quoniam duas diximus differentiarum esse formas, ut aliae sint divisibiles, aliae constitutivce, constitutivas illas duximus, quæ sub eodem filo positæ et subalternis generibus descendentesspeciem quamdarninformantatqueperficiunt ut est rationale vel mortale, quse hominis speciem cunstituunt: alias vero divisibiles,quæ genus dividunt,non speciem informant,id est rationale etirrationale,mortale et immortale.Nunc de differentiis iliis iste tractatus habetur duae genus dividunt,non quae speciem constituunt.Namillasquai genusdividuntin differentiarum integro loco accipiunlur:illæ vero quae speciem constituunt,in specierum generumque substantiam accipiuntur.Namque rationalemortalisgenusest.Porro mortale hominis genus est,et istas constituunt speciern.At vero rationale irrationalis species non est, neque geaus. Nec mortale immortalis neque genus neque species est.Atque ideo quoniam propriam vim differentiarum ista retinent,quæ neque genera nequespeciessibiinvicem esse possunt, ipsas nunc differentias accipiamus in quibus nulla quantum ad genus est speciemque communitas.Est etiam generis differentia.Namque genus a propriis difterentiisprius est.Namque si abstuleris genus,omnes simul differentias abstulisti.Nam si abstuleris animal, rationale atque irrationale non remanent.Porro autem si rationale abstuleris,remanet animal.

English

This, however, is the point: since we have said that there are two forms of differences, such that some are divisive and others constitutive, we have called those constitutive which, placed under the same line and descending through subaltern genera, shape and perfect a species in a certain way—as, for example, rational or mortal, which constitute the species of man; but the others are divisive, which divide a genus and do not shape a species, that is, rational and irrational, mortal and immortal. Now the present discussion is concerned with those differences which divide a genus, not those which constitute a species. For those which divide a genus are accepted in the full place of differences; but those which constitute a species are accepted into the substance of species and genera. For rational mortal is a genus. Moreover, mortal is a genus of man, and these constitute a species. But rational irrational is not a species, nor a genus. Nor is mortal immortal either a genus or a species. And therefore, since those differences retain their proper force which cannot be genera or species in relation to one another, let us now understand as differences those in which there is no community with respect to genus and species. There is also a difference of genus. For genus is prior to its proper differences. For if you remove the genus, you have removed all the differences at once. For if you remove animal, rational and irrational do not remain. But if you remove rational, animal remains.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:120 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed si utrasque interemeris differentias,id est rationale et irrationale,potest tamen quoddam intelligi,quod sit substantia animata sensibilis, id est animal.Ita genus sublatum omnes secum aufert differentias. Sublatae differentise genus secum non interimunt, quoa intelligentia genus remanet, icl est quoniam potest animal intelligi praeter differentias, ut ejus lanium definitionem animo capias,et esse dicas substantiam animatam atque sensibilem. Quæ autem talia sunt, ut ipsa interempta interimant,non simul aliis interemptis ipsa interimantur,priora sunt illis quce possunt interimere. Est etiam alia differentia, quod genus semper in eo quod quid sit prædicatur, ut dictum est,ditferenlia vero in eo quod quale sit. Sed hoc frequentius inculcatum est,atque ideo id a nobis praetermittendum est. Est etiam alia differentia, quod ad omnem speciem unum semper gen-is aptalur.Homo enim unum tantum genus habet, ut animal appellatur: in unam autem speciem plurimæ differentiæ poterunt commodari. Namque homo et rationale est, quæ differentia est, et mortale, quse eadem differentia est, et sensibile, quibus scilicet omnibus aliis differt.Differt enim his omnibus quod sensibilis est ab insensibilibus, quod rationalis ab irrationabilibus,quod mortalis ab immortalibus.Est etiam alia differentia quae superius dicta est. Nam genus speciei ita est ut materies, differentia vero ut ligura.

English

But if you have destroyed both differences, that is, rational and irrational, nevertheless a certain thing can be understood which is substance animate sensible, that is, animal. Thus a genus, when removed, takes away all differences with it. Differences, when removed, do not destroy the genus with them, because the understanding of the genus remains, that is, because animal can be understood apart from differences, so that you may grasp its full definition in your mind and say that it is substance animate and sensible. But those things which are such that, when they themselves are destroyed, they destroy others, are not themselves destroyed when the others are destroyed; they are prior to those which they can destroy. There is also another difference: that a genus is always predicated in respect of what a thing is, as has been said, but a difference in respect of what sort it is. But this has been impressed rather too often, and therefore it must be passed over by us. There is also another difference: that one single genus is always fitted to every species. For man has only one genus, so that he is called animal; but to one species many differences can be accommodated. For man is both rational, which is a difference, and mortal, which is the same difference, and sensible, by all of which, of course, he differs from other things. For he differs by all these: by being sensible from insensible things, by being rational from irrational things, by being mortal from immortal things. There is also another difference which was stated above. For a genus is related to a species as matter, but a difference as shape.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:121 · narrative
Source · Latin

Nam sicut in æris materiem veniens figura statuam efficit, ita animali, id est generi, veniens differentia, id est rationale vel irrationale, facit hominisveipecudis speciem.Quseautemcommunitates vel proprietates generis et differentiaefuerunt,hactenus dixit,et fortasse erunt etiam aliæ,quæ propter brevitatem supersedendæ atque dimittendae sunt.

DE COMMUNIBUS GENERIS ET SPECIEI.

Nunc autom de generis vel speciei communitatibus proprietatibusque tractatur, et dicit genus et speciem commune habere de pluribus prædicari, sicut dictum est.Nam genus etde speciebus pluribus prædicatur et de earum individuis.Et item species de sub se plurimis individuis appellatur,et hic quoque illæ species accipiunlur,qure magis species Hunt. Nam si subalternae accipiuntur, non magis species quam genera videbuntur. Nam quae subalternae species sunt, etiam genera sunt, et erit absurdum et huic propositioni inconveniens de generum inter se differentiis communionibusque tractare.Accipiantur igitur illa; tantum species,quai species et magis species appellantur. Est etiam alia eorum communio, quod sicut genus a specie primum est,sic species ab individuis primæ sunt. Nam si genus auferas,species abstulisti.

English

For just as a shape coming into the material of bronze makes a statue, so a difference, that is, rational or irrational, coming into an animal, that is, into a genus, makes the species of a man or of a beast. And what commonalities or properties of genus and difference there were, he has said up to this point, and perhaps there will also be others which, on account of brevity, must be passed over and dismissed.

ON THE COMMON FEATURES OF GENUS AND SPECIES.

Now next he treats of the commonalities and properties of genus and species, and he says that genus and species have in common to be predicated of many things, as has been said. For genus is predicated of many species and of their individuals. And likewise species is predicated of the many individuals beneath it, and here too those species are understood which are more properly species. For if subordinate species are understood, they will appear to be not more species than genera. For the things which are subordinate species are also genera, and it would be absurd and inconsistent with this proposition to treat of the differences and commonalities of genera among themselves. Let those, then, be understood as species only which are species and are called more properly species. There is also another commonality of these, that just as genus is first from species, so species are first from individuals. For if you take away the genus, you have taken away the species.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:122 · narrative
Source · Latin

Si species abstuleris, genera non peribunt.Porro si species abstuleris, individua morientur.Si individua interierint,speciesmanent.Est etiambisaliacommunioquodquemadmodum genus quid sit totum declarat,sic etiam species.Nam totum quod est rationale,atque irrationale a genere declaratum est.Dicitur enim quidquid fuerit rationale vel irrationale,id esse animal • sic igitur totum quid sit a genere declaratum. Porro autem quid sit totahominum diversitas,id est individuorum,a sola specie declaratur,cum dicitur homo.Nam et Scytha et Indus et lotum quidquid individuum est, uno solohominis, id est speciei, nomine continetur.

DE PROPRIIS GENERIS ET SPECIEI.

Dissertis igitur generis specieique communionibus,ad proprietates eorum vel differentias transitum fecit, dicens:

Differre inter se genus et species,guod genera species continent, nunquam rursus genera ab propriis speciebus continenlur.

English

If you take away the species, the genera will not perish. Moreover, if you take away the species, individuals will die. If individuals perish, the species remain. There is also this commonality between them, that just as the genus declares what a whole is, so also does the species. For the whole that is rational and irrational has been declared by the genus. For whatever is rational or irrational is said to be an animal; thus, what the whole is has been declared by the genus. Moreover, what the whole diversity of men is, that is, of individuals, is declared by the species alone, when it is said "man." For both the Scythian and the Indian and whatever individual there is are contained under the single name of man, that is, of the species.

ON THE PROPERTIES OF GENUS AND SPECIES.

Having therefore set out the commonalities of genus and species, he made the transition to their properties or differences, saying:

Genus and species differ from each other in that genera contain species, but genera are never in turn contained by their own species.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:123 · narrative
Source · Latin

Oportet autem (ut dictum est) in hoc tractatu non subalternas, sed magis species considerari. Genus enim plurimarum specierum est continens,etunum omnium,ct totum omnibus et singulos.Quod si ita est,et genus a suis speciebus singulis majus est, atque ideo eas dicitur continere,non est dubium quin ea ipsa genera quas continent species, ab his ipsis contineri non possint.Insuper omoia genera prsejacent. t!oc videtur dicere, quod omnia genera prius sint ab his speciebus quæ sub ipsis positæ continentur. Nam sicuti materies prima est ab illa re quæ veniens in materiam formam constituerit atque figuraverit,sic etiam prius est genus ab ilia specie quam veniens differentia formavit atque constituit. Nisi enim in generibus differentia venerit species nunquam constituentur. Quare praajacent, id est præsunt, et antiquiora sunt genera speciebus suis.Atque ideo si genera interimantur,species quoque peribunt.Nam si animalsustuleris,hominempecudemquesustulisti.Si vero species interimantur,non continuo genus interibit.Nam si homo perierit,auimal continuo non interemptum est: alia enim remanebit species de qua ipsum animal, id est genus praedicetur.

English

But it must be considered in this treatise, as has been said, not the subaltern [genera] but rather the species. For a genus is the container of very many species, and one of all, and whole in all and in each. But if this is so, and the genus is greater than its individual species, and is therefore said to contain them, there is no doubt that those very genera which the species contain cannot be contained by those same species. Moreover, all genera pre-exist. He seems to say this, that all genera are prior to those species which are placed under them and contained by them. For just as prime matter is [prior] to that thing which, coming into matter, has constituted and shaped form, so also the genus is prior to that species which the coming difference has formed and constituted. For unless the difference has come into the genera, the species will never be constituted. Wherefore they pre-exist, that is, they are before, and the genera are older than their species. And therefore if the genera are destroyed, the species will also perish. For if you take away animal, you have taken away man and beast. But if the species are destroyed, the genus will not immediately perish. For if man has perished, animal has not immediately been destroyed: for another species will remain of which that animal, that is the genus, is predicated.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:124 · narrative
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Atque ideo genera ab speciebus suis priora sunl,et quod omnia genera univoce de speciebus pr£dicentur, species ipsæ de generibus nunquam.Hoc(arbitror) hesterna lucubratione jam dictum est.Nam genera semper de speciebus univoce prædicantur.Homo enim,et homo estetanimal.Porro autem animal genus est hominis, et prædicaturanimal de homine. Quoniam ergo animal praedicatur, et dicitur homo animal, animal et homo uno animalis nomine nuncupantur. Sed his ipsis definitio una conveniet.Est enim animal substantiaanimata sensibilis,quod non absurdu estin homine dici. Nam homo ipse si animal dicatur,non erit absurdum dici de homine substantia animata sensibilis. Igitur genus de speciebus suis univoce prxedicatur, quod et eodem nomine,et eadem definitione conveniat.At vero species non modo univoce non prædicantur de generibus suis,sed nec omnino praedicantur.Nulla enim res minor de majore poterit proedicari.Atque ideo,quoniam speciesminores sunt suis generibus,de generibus suis neque univoce,neque aliquo modo poterunt appellari.

English

And therefore genera are prior to their species, and because all genera are predicated univocally of their species, the species themselves are never [predicated] of their genera. This, I believe, has already been said in yesterday's lucubration. For genera are always predicated univocally of species. For man is man and is an animal. Moreover, animal is the genus of man, and animal is predicated of man. Since, therefore, animal is predicated, and man is called an animal, animal and man are named by one name of animal. But one definition will also apply to these same things. For animal is animate sensible substance, which is not absurd to say in the case of man. For man himself, if he is called an animal, it will not be absurd to say of man that he is animate sensible substance. Therefore a genus is predicated univocally of its species, because it applies both by the same name and by the same definition. But species are not only not predicated univocally of their genera, but are not predicated [of them] at all. For no lesser thing can be predicated of a greater. And therefore, since species are lesser than their genera, they can be called [predicated] of their genera neither univocally nor in any way.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:125 · narrative
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Amplius omnia genera abundant complexione subse positarum specierum, ipsæ species abundant generum suorum propriis differentiis.

Quod dicit perinde est ac si diceret: Omne quod genus est, plures subsespecies continet; omnevero quod species sub se plures habet,di!ferentiashabet. Genus enim, id est animal, in hoc homine, id ast specie,superabundatet superest,quod homo solum homo est. Animal vero non solum homn, sed etiam bos vel avis,vel alia hujusmodi. Species vero in eo superant genera sua,quod easdifferentias quas species in actu habent,easgenera non habent.Nam,sicut superius dictum est, genera differentias illas quas habent sub se species positæ, potestate continent, non etiam re.Atque ideo species quae est homo, vel alia species,sicut est equus,a genere suo animali in hoc abundant et supersunt,quod animal ipsum per se neque rationale neque irrationale est. At vero homo vel equus hoc rationale,illud est rationis etpers.Illud etiam quod species nunquam magis genus fiet,rursus et genus nunquam magis species fit, et ut sciremus hic non de subalternis speciebus,sedrJe illis magis speciebus specialissimisque tractari.Quid ait? Quod ea quae sunt genera magis species fieri nunquam possunt, neque magis species aliquando fieri magis g-enus.Na.m species nunquam genus est.

English

Furthermore, all genera abound in the composition of the species placed beneath them, while the species themselves abound in their own proper differentiae over their genera.

What he says is the same as if he were to say: Everything that is a genus contains several subordinate species; but everything that is a species has several things beneath it and has differentiae. For a genus, that is, animal, surpasses and exceeds [its species] in this respect, in this man, that is, in this species, that man is only man. But animal is not only man, but also ox or bird, or other such things. But species surpass their genera in this, that the differentiae which the species have in actuality, the genera do not have. For, as was said above, genera contain in potentiality those differentiae which the species placed beneath them have, but not also in reality. And therefore the species which is man, or another species, such as horse, abounds and surpasses its genus animal in this, that animal itself is neither rational nor irrational per se. But man is rational, while horse is irrational. Also, that a species never becomes more a genus, and again a genus never becomes more a species, and that we should know that here the discussion is not about subaltern species, but rather about those that are more species and most specific. What does he say? That those things which are genera can never become more species, nor can those which are more species ever become more a genus. For a species is never a genus.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:126 · narrative
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Quidquid enim fuerit species, genus non erit, neque quidquid fuerit genus,species erit.Quare constatin his eum tractatibus despeciebus solis, non etiam de subalternis dissel'ere.SubalterDa enim possunt esse etiam genera,magis speciesvero(utipseait)nunquam genera esse possunt, sed post'luam de generum specierumque commutatibus differentiisque tractatus habitus cst,ad genera propriaque transgressus est.

DE COMMUNIBUS GENERIS ET PROPRII.

Generis et proprii commune hoc est,adhærere speciebus et eas amplectari.

Dicit genera et propria in hoc sibi esse consimilia, quod omne genus a suis speciebus nunquam reced il. Eodem modo et propria.Nam si dixeris homo, cn ipsohomine conlinuo animalnominasti,quod ipsius homini, id est speciei genus est. At vero etiamsi hominem dixeris,ejusetiam propriu continuo cum homine nominasti, omnis enim homo risibilisest. Itasemper renus et propria suis speciebus inserta et quodammodo conglutina sunt.

English

For whatever is a species will not be a genus, nor will whatever is a genus be a species. Hence it is clear that in these discussions he is treating only of species, and not also of subaltern genera. For subaltern genera can also be genera, but rather species can never be genera (as he himself says), but after he has given his treatment of the commonalities and differences of genera and species, he has passed on to genera and proper attributes.

ON WHAT IS COMMON TO GENUS AND PROPRIUM

This is what genus and proprium have in common: to adhere to species and to encompass them.

He says that genera and propria are alike in this, that every genus never departs from its species. In the same way also propria. For if you say "man," in man himself you have at once named animal, which is the genus of man himself, that is, of the species. But indeed even if you say "man," you have at once named his proprium together with man, for every man is risible. Thus genera and propria are always inserted into their species and, in a certain way, glued to them.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:127 · narrative
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S imiliter et genus praedicatur de speciebus,et proprium de iis quæ sui participantia sunt,et æqualiter,inquit,omnes species eidem generi supponuntur, et ad eas genus illud appellatur,sicut propria ad ea praedicantur,quae sui participari possunt.Namque aequaliter genus dehomine dicitur, et de equo, et de bove, et de caeteris B animantibus,quemadmodum et risibile,id est,proprium de Hortensio dicitur et Cicerone,etde singulis individuis quae sub eadem specie continentur,ad quam speciem proprium,id est,risibile poteritpraBdicari.Adhuc commune est ipsis univoce praedicari. Namque sicut genusdesuis speciebus (ut dictum est) univoce praedicatur, ita et proprium de ea specie cujus est proprium univoce prsedicatur. Nam qui homo est, et risibile est. Porro autem si quis dicat hominem esse animal rationale et mortale,et dixerit risibile esse animal rationale et mortal,non errabit, iE jualiter igitur et genus de speciebus suis,et propria de ea specie, cujus sunt,propria univoce praedicant.

English

Similarly, both genus is predicated of species, and property of those things which participate in it, and equally, he says, all species are placed under the same genus, and that genus is applied to them, just as properties are predicated of those things which can participate in them. For equally the genus is said of man, and of horse, and of ox, and of the other animals, just as the risible—that is, the property—is said of Hortensius and Cicero, and of the individual things contained under the same species, to which species the property, that is, the risible, can be predicated. Further, it is common to them to be predicated univocally. For just as the genus is predicated univocally of its species (as has been said), so too the property is predicated univocally of that species of which it is the property. For whoever is a man is also risible. Moreover, if anyone should say that man is a rational and mortal animal, and should say that the risible is a rational and mortal animal, he will not be mistaken. Equally, therefore, both the genus is predicated univocally of its species, and properties of that species of which they are properties.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:128 · narrative
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DE PROPRIIS GENERIS ET PROPRII.

Dillert autem utrumque,quoagenus primum est. secundum proprium.Genus enim si ab specie primum est,proprium autem uni tantum species adbæret,et eidem aequale est,non est dubium quin genus quod specie majus est, proprio etiam speciei majus sit. Nam ut sit risibile,animal prius est.Namque uta!!.qua species informetur,propriis et differentiis primo erit genus,ubi illa conveniant,sicut frequentius inculcatum est.Accedit eliam quod genus de pluribus speciebus praedicatur.Namque genus,id est animal, de pluribus, at vero proprium,id est,risibile de sola tantum hominis specie prcedicatur.Unde fit ut semper propria de speciebus suis conversim praedicari possint, species autem de genere nunquam. Neque enim quod animal est, homo est, neque omne quod animal est,risibile est. Potest enim esse et equus et hinnibile id quod animal nominatur. Porro autem omne quod est bomo,id risibile est, et omne quod est risibile,id homo est. Possunt enim propria et species sibi ipsa converti,et conversim ad se invicem prædicari.Præterea omni speciei quidquid fuerit proprium,et omni et soli est. Namque risibile et omnibus hominibus est, et soli hominis speciei evenit.

English

ON THE PROPERTIES OF GENUS AND PROPERTY.

But he distinguishes both, in that genus is first, and property second. For if genus is first in relation to species, but property attaches to one species only and is equal to it, there is no doubt that genus, which is greater than species, is also greater than the property of the species. For in order that something be capable of laughter, it must first be an animal. For in order that a species be informed, genus will be first with respect to properties and differences, where those things come together, as has been repeatedly impressed. It is also added that genus is predicated of several species. For genus, that is animal, is predicated of several, but property, that is capable of laughter, is predicated of the species of man alone. Hence it comes about that properties can always be predicated convertibly of their own species, but species never of genus. For it is not the case that what is an animal is a man, nor is everything that is an animal capable of laughter. For that which is called an animal can also be a horse and capable of neighing. But on the other hand, everything that is a man is capable of laughter, and everything that is capable of laughter is a man. For properties and species can be converted with themselves and predicated convertibly of each other. Moreover, whatever is a property of any species is both of all and of that alone. For being capable of laughter belongs to all men, and it happens to the species of man alone.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:129 · narrative
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At vera animal, quod genus est, etsi uni speciei inest, non tamen soli.Namque animal omni homini inest, non soli tamen homini,quia inest etiam percudi et caeteris animantibus.Oportet autem hic illa propria intelligere, quae magis propria sunt,id est quae integre propria nominantur,quæ sunt hujus modi ut et uni speciei et omnibus insint.Differunt ergo in hoc quoque generaet propria,quod propriaet uni speciei adsunt,et omnibus individuis quae ineaspecie sunt: genera vero omnibus quidem individuis quæ in eadem specie sunt et sub eodem genere, non tamen uni soli speciei,cum genus semper de pluribus prædicatur. Unde fit, ut sublata propria non auferant genus,sublatis vero generibus,ipsa quoque propria auferantur. Nam si sustuleris proprium, id est risibile,remanet hinnibile, remanet natabile. Si vero genus sustuleris, simul quoque species sustulisti. Si species sustuleris,propriaetiam quæ insunt speciebus simul interibunt. Itaque.sublatis generibus propria sustuleris, sublatis vero propriis, simul genera non auferentur.

English

But the true animal, which is a genus, although it is present in one species, is not present in that species alone. For animal is present in every human, yet not in the human alone, because it is also present in the horse and the other living beings. Here, however, one must understand those properties which are more properly properties, that is, those which are called properties in the full sense, which are of such a kind as to be present both in one species and in all its members. Therefore genera and properties differ also in this, that properties are present both in one species and in all the individuals which are in that species; but genera are present in all the individuals which are in the same species and under the same genus, yet not in one species alone, since a genus is always predicated of several things. Hence it comes about that, when a property is removed, the genus is not taken away; but when genera are removed, the properties themselves are also taken away. For if you remove the property, that is, the capacity for laughter, the capacity for neighing remains, the capacity for swimming remains. But if you remove the genus, you have at the same time removed the species. If you remove the species, the properties which are in the species will perish at the same time. And so, when genera are removed, you have removed the properties; but when properties are removed, the genera are not at the same time taken away.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:130 · narrative
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DE COMMUNIBUS GENERIS ET ACCIDENTIS.

Peractisigiturgenerum propriorumque differentiis ad generum accidentiumque communitates vel proprietatestransitum fecit,et unam eorum praedicat communitatem,quæ est quod de pluribus prædicatur. Namque sicutgenusde pluribusspeciebus prædicatur,ita etiam separabile accidens vel inseparabilede pluribus speciebus appellatur. Dicitur enim et de corvo et de iEthiope nigrum,et de equo et homine moveri,quod illud est inseparabile accidens,illud vero separabile; et quoniam longius a se distant, idcirco unam eorum solam communionem dixit,et alias si quae forte essent quaerere supersedit.

QUID INTER GENUS ET ACCIDENS.

Differt autem genusab accidenti,quod genus ante species est,accidentia vero speciebus posteriora sunt. Semper genera super species,ei his praejacere et esse majora superius demonstratum est. Namque prius est animal ab homine, atque ideo consumptum animal species quoque consumit,consumptae vero specie non interimunt genera.At vero accidens postea necesse est ut sit,quam sint ipsae species.

English

ON THE COMMON FEATURES OF GENUS AND ACCIDENT.

Having thus completed the differences between genera and proper characteristics, he made the transition to the common features or properties of genera and accidents, and he states one common feature of them, namely that they are predicated of many things. For just as a genus is predicated of many species, so also a separable or inseparable accident is asserted of many species. For black is said both of the raven and of the Ethiopian, and to be moved is said both of the horse and of the human—the one being an inseparable accident, the other a separable one; and because they are far distant from each other, for that reason he stated only one common feature of them, and omitted to inquire into any others that might perhaps exist.

WHAT DIFFERS BETWEEN GENUS AND ACCIDENT.

But a genus differs from an accident in that a genus is prior to species, whereas accidents are posterior to species. It has been demonstrated above that genera are always above species, and lie before them and are greater than them. For animal is prior to human, and therefore when animal is destroyed it destroys the species as well, but when the species is destroyed it does not destroy the genera. But an accident must necessarily be after the species themselves exist.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:131 · narrative
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Erit enim prius aliquid cui possit accidere.Omneenim accidens propter illud cui accidit esse non potest.Atque ideo prius erit aliqua res cui accidat, quam sit ipsum accidens.Necesse est igitur ut omne accidens post species inveniatur,et magis post individua, quibus principaliter possitaccidere.Hucaccedit quod generis participantia aequaliter participant, sicut omne genus speciebus suis aequalitergenus est,utsaepius dictum est, et species omnes aequaliter suo generi participant. Namque equus et homo aequaliter animalia sunt,neque equus homine plus, neque homo plus equo.At vero accidentia non aequaliter participant. Nam cum separabile accidens sit moveri,possunt alias inter se species eodem accidenti participantes tardius vel citius moveri, et de inseparabili accidenti eodem modo.Est enim ut aliquis nigrioribas oculis sit,et alius quamvis nigris,tamen ita purpureis, atque ideo ei intentionemetremissionemrecipit accidens.Nam et candidus quod dicitur,et magis etminus dicitur,et alia hujusmodi.Quare distant h?ec duo, quod genere, quæ participant, aequaliter participant, accidenti fortasse non aequaliter. Huc accedit quod genera non modo ante individua,sed ante species sunt, accidentia vero non modo post species, aed etiam post individua sunt. Ipsis enim principaliteraccidunt,ut dictum est.

English

For there will be something prior to which an accident can belong. For every accident cannot exist on account of that to which it belongs. And therefore there will be some thing prior to which the accident belongs, before the accident itself exists. It is necessary, therefore, that every accident be found after the species, and more after the individuals, to which it can principally belong. To this is added that those which participate in a genus participate equally, just as every genus is equally a genus to its species, as has often been said, and all species participate equally in their genus. For horse and man are equally animals, and neither is horse more an animal than man, nor man more than horse. But accidents do not participate equally. For since to be moved is a separable accident, other species participating in the same accident can be moved more slowly or more quickly in relation to one another, and in the same way concerning an inseparable accident. For it is possible that one person has blacker eyes, and another, though his eyes are black, nevertheless has them so darkly, and therefore the accident receives increase and remission. For what is called white is also said to be more and less, and other such things. Wherefore these two differ, because those which participate in a genus participate equally, but perhaps they do not participate equally in an accident. To this is added that genera are not only before individuals, but before species, whereas accidents are not only after species, but even after individuals. For they belong principally to the individuals themselves, as has been said.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:132 · narrative
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Estetiam differentia,quas jam superius dicta est: nam genus in eo quod quid sit prædicatu,accidens vero in eo quod quale sit, aut quomodo se habeat: nam si quid sit Socrates interroges, homo atque animal respondetur: si vero qualis sit, fortasse calvus, aut simus, quae accidentia sunt inseparabilia.Sin vero quomodo sehabeat,autjacetrespondetur, autsedet,aut quid aliud facere contigerit.Ergo quoniam generis a specie et dilTerentia et proprio et accidenti divisa substantia est,nunc posteriora persequitur. Sunt autem differentia viginti: nam cum quinque res sint, et unaquaeque ipsarum ab aliis quatuor distet et item quatuor differentias habeat,quinquies quaternis vi. ginti differentis efficiuntur'; nam si genus differtab specie, proprio, differentiaetaccidenti quatuor differentiæ fiunt. Sin vero species differt o genere, proprio,differentia,accidenti,item alix quatuor quae junctae cum superioribus octo fiunt.Et si differentia distat ab specie, proprio, genere et accidenti, aliae quatuor supercrescunt.Quae junctae cum octo prioribus duodecim faciunt. At vero si proprium differt agenere,specie,differentiaetaccidenti, aliis quatuor differentiis super duodecim positis,omnes sedecim differentias fiunt.Quod si accidentis quoque differentias ad quatuorreliquadixeris quatuorsupersedecim crescentibus, viginti omnes differentiæ perficiuntur.

English

There is also the difference which was already stated above: for genus is predicated in respect of what something is, but accident in respect of what sort it is, or how it is disposed. For if you ask what Socrates is, man and animal is answered; but if what sort he is, perhaps bald or snub-nosed, which are inseparable accidents. But if how he is disposed, it is answered either that he lies down, or sits, or whatever else he happens to be doing. Therefore, since the substance of genus is divided from species, difference, property, and accident, it now treats of the latter. Now there are twenty differences; for since there are five things, and each of them differs from the other four and likewise has four differences, five times four makes twenty differences. For if genus differs from species, property, difference, and accident, there are four differences. But if species differs from genus, property, difference, and accident, likewise another four, which joined with the former make eight. And if difference is distinct from species, property, genus, and accident, another four accrue. Which joined with the eight former make twelve. But if property differs from genus, species, difference, and accident, with another four differences placed upon the twelve, all make sixteen differences. But if you also add the differences of accident to the remaining four, with four added to the sixteen, all twenty differences are completed.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:133 · narrative
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Quæ ita viginti sunt ut ad sufficientem doctrinae cumulum decem tantum differentiaenumerentur.Nam quod dictum est genus differre a differentia,specie, proprio et accidenti, quatuor fuere differentiae. Si autam differentiam dicamus differre a specie, proprio et accidenti, supervacuum est differentiae cum genere differentiam commemorare, cum jam prius commemoraverimus, quando generis ad differentiam, differentias diximus iisdem enim (ut opinor) differt differentia a genere,quibus differebat genus a differentia. Itaque relinquenda est haec differentia, quadistatdifferentiaagenere,quoniam superiusjam dicta est, cum diceretur quo genus distaret a differentia.Remanent igitur tres differentia,quibus ipsa differentia ab specie, proprio, et accidenti distat, et est superioris generis ad alia, differentiæ fuerint, nunc vero differentiae ad alia,tres distantiae videantur,7, hae distantiæ fiunt. At vero species quo a genere distet jam tunc dictum est,cum dicebatur quo genus distet a specie.Quid autem differentia discreparet; tunc demonstratum est, cum diceremus in quo differentia a specie discerneretur. Remanent igitur dux speciei, id est,cum proprio et accidenti differentijE,quse junctee cum superioribus 7,9,differentias efficiunt.

English

These are twenty in such a way that only ten differences are enumerated for a sufficient accumulation of doctrine. For what was said—that genus differs from difference, species, property, and accident—made four differences. But if we say that difference differs from species, property, and accident, it is superfluous to mention the difference of difference with genus, since we have already mentioned it earlier, when we stated the differences of genus in relation to difference; for difference differs from genus (as I think) by the same things by which genus differed from difference. Therefore this difference must be set aside, which consists in difference differing from genus, since it was already stated above, when it was said in what way genus is distinct from difference. There remain, then, three differences by which difference itself is distinct from species, property, and accident; and the differences of a superior genus in relation to the others were [counted] then, but now the differences of difference in relation to the others appear as three distances, and these distances make seven. But in what way species is distinct from genus was already said then, when it was stated in what way genus is distinct from species. But in what way difference diverges was demonstrated then, when we said in what respect difference is discerned from species. There remain, then, two differences of species, that is, with property and accident, which, joined with the earlier seven, make nine differences.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:134 · narrative
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Restat igitur una proprii et accidentis differentia,quse dicatur: nam quid a genere distet dictum est,cum quid genus distaret a proprio diceretur.Porro quid a specie distaret dudum dicebatur,cum quid species a proprio differet enumerabatur.Porro autem quid a differentia, etiam id dictum est,cum a proprio differentia separaretur.Sed nunc quemadmodum differentia a specie, proprio accidentique discernitur, viedamus.

DE COMMUNIBUS DIFFERENТIÆ £T SPECIEI.

Est communio differentiae et speciei quod aequaliter species sub se individuis se permittit,et asqualiter individua specie ipsa participant: namque omnes homines eequaliter homines sunt,et hominis participatione æque participant: eodem modo etiam differentia: namque omnes homines aequaliter rationales sunt,et ratiunabilitate,quæ estdilferentia,omnes qui ratione participant aeque participant.Est etiam alia communitas,quod quemadmodum species nunquam deserit ea quorum species est, et quibus superest, sic et differentia nunquam ea deserit quae distare ab aliis facit: namque Socrates,cum sub specie hominis est, nunquam ab hominis specie deseritur. Semper enim Socrates homo est.At vero differentiaSocratem,cum Socrates rationalis est, nunquam deserit. Semper enim Socrates rationale animal est.

English

There remains, then, one difference between property and accident, which may be stated; for what distinguishes it from genus has been said, when it was stated how genus differs from property. Moreover, what distinguishes it from species was said a little while ago, when it was enumerated how species differs from property. Furthermore, what distinguishes it from difference has also been said, when difference was separated from property. But now let us see how difference is distinguished from species, property, and accident.

ON THE COMMON FEATURES OF DIFFERENCE AND SPECIES.

It is a common feature of difference and species that species equally admits the individuals under it, and individuals equally participate in the species itself; for all men are equally men, and they equally participate in man. In the same way also difference: for all men are equally rational, and all who participate in reason equally participate in rationality, which is a difference. There is also another common feature: that just as species never abandons those things of which it is the species, and over which it extends, so too difference never abandons those things which it makes to differ from others; for Socrates, since he is under the species man, is never abandoned by the species man. For Socrates is always a man. But indeed difference never abandons Socrates, since Socrates is rational. For Socrates is always a rational animal.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:135 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE PROPRIIS DIFFERENTLE ET SPECIEI.

Differunt autem inter se species et differentia, quod differentia semper in eo quod quale sit pnedicatur.Nam dicitur Socrates quale animal sit,ut rationale respondeatur; species vero in eo quod quid sit praedicatur. Nam dicitur quid sit Socrates, ut homo respondeatur.Namque hominis qualitas rationale est,sed non simpliciter. Illa enim qualitas pro differentia accipitur,qu3e veniens in genere speciem constituit,et de qualitate substantiali facta est substantialis et specifica differentia. Ista igitur talis qualitas differentia nominatur,et ea in eo quod quale sit ad hominem prædicatur,hoc etiam in eorum est differentiis.Namque differentia frequenter in pluribus speciebus consideratur. Differentia enim quadrupes in bovis, et in equi, et in canis specie est: et differentia rationalis hominis et angeli, species veronunquamaliis,nisisolissubsepositisindividuis praeest.Nunquam enim alia res homo est, nisi quod est individuum,ut est Socrates, et Plato, et Cicero. Unde fit ut sublata difIerentia,species quoque toll atur.Nam si sustuleris rationale, hominem sustuleris. Sin vero sustuleris speciem, differentia manet. Nam si sustuleris hominem rationalis angeli differentia manebit.Est vero etiam hæc differentia, quod differentia cum alia differentia jungipotest,utaliqua ex his species informetur.

English

ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROPERTY AND SPECIES

Species and differentia differ from each other in that differentia is always predicated in respect of what sort a thing is. For when it is asked what sort of animal Socrates is, the answer is "rational"; but species is predicated in respect of what a thing is. For when it is asked what Socrates is, the answer is "man." For the quality of man is rational, but not simply so. For that quality is taken as a differentia which, coming into a genus, constitutes a species, and from a substantial quality has become a substantial and specific differentia. Therefore such a quality as this is called a differentia, and it is predicated of man in respect of what sort he is; this is also the case with the differentiae of other things. For a differentia is frequently considered in several species. For the differentia "four-footed" is in the species of the ox, the horse, and the dog; and the differentia "rational" is in the species of man and of the angel, but a species never presides over other things unless individuals are set beneath it. For a thing is never a man otherwise than as it is an individual, as are Socrates, Plato, and Cicero. Hence it comes about that, when the differentia is removed, the species too is removed. For if you remove "rational," you have removed man. But if you remove the species, the differentia remains. For if you remove man, the differentia "rational" of the angel will remain. There is also this difference, that a differentia can be joined with another differentia, so that some species is formed from them.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:136 · narrative
Source · Latin

Namque rationalis differentia et mortalis differentia junctae unius hominis speciem reddiderunt.Junctae vero species nunquam aliquam ex se speciem constituent.Si enim jungas hominem bovi, nulla ex his species informabitur. Sed fortasse dicat aliquis: Asini atque equi conjun. ctione mulus nascitur; sed non ita est.Namque individui conjunctione natum estaliquid individuum. Si autem sic simpliciter speciem ipsam asini atque equi conjungas, nulla ex his unquam species constituitur. Neque enim si se possunt individua commiscere,idcirco etiam species individuorum in alterutram substantiam transeunt:atqueideo constat junctas species unam speciem non posse com ponere, quod differentiae junctae unius speciei constitutivæ sint.His itaque transactis ab differentiae et propria communia veniamus.

DE COMMUNIBUS DIFFERENTIÆ ET PROPRII.

Differentia et proprium commune habent quod quibus differentia est et a quibus ipsa differentia participatur,aaqualiter participatur; nam rationalis differentia cum inest hominibus,et omnes homines rationabili differentia participant, non est dubium quin omnes homines æqualiter sint rationales,atque eequaliter rationabilitate participent. At vero proprium,quod risibile est,aequaliter omnibus hominibus est: omnes enim homines æqualiter risibiles sunt.

English

For the differentia "rational" and the differentia "mortal," joined together, have produced the species of one man. But species, when joined, never constitute any species from themselves. For if you join a man to an ox, no species will be formed from these. But perhaps someone may say: from the conjunction of a donkey and a horse a mule is born; but it is not so. For from the conjunction of individuals something individual is born. But if you join the very species of the donkey and the horse in this simple way, no species is ever constituted from them. For it is not because individuals can mingle with one another that the species of individuals also pass over into one another's substance; and for this reason it is established that joined species cannot compose one species, because differentiae, when joined, are constitutive of one species. These matters therefore having been passed over, let us come to the things common to differentia and property.

ON THE THINGS COMMON TO DIFFERENTIA AND PROPERTY

Differentia and property have this in common, that by those to whom there is a differentia, and by those by whom the differentia itself is participated, it is participated equally; for since the differentia "rational" is present in men, and all men participate in the rational differentia, there is no doubt that all men are equally rational, and equally participate in rationality. But indeed the property which is the capacity to laugh belongs equally to all men: for all men are equally capable of laughter.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:137 · narrative
Source · Latin

Est etiam beec eorum communitas, quod sicut potestate risibile dicitur, etiamsi non rideat, ita etiam potestate bipes dicitur, etiamsi quis uno pede minuatur: non enim quod est dicitur, sed quod esse possit: nam quoniam ille ridere potest, risibilis nominatur; quod ille duos pedes habere possit,bipes.Atque ideo nunquam ab illis in quibus sederint, proprium differentiaque discedent. Semper enim homo risibilis est, etiamsi non rideat. Semper bipes, etiamsi uno pede minuatur. In his enim differentiis et propriis (ut dictum est) quod potestate esse possit, non quod vere sit consideretur.

DE PROPRIIS EORUMDEM.

Differunt autem inter se,quod differentia de pIuribus speciebus prædicatur,proprium vero de una. Namque differentia qua est mortalis prædicatur de homine, de bove, de equo, et cæteris animantibus; et rationale prædicatur, et de Deo, et de homine. At vero risibile de sola tantum specie hominis praedicatur. Unde evenit ut omnis differentia, quoniam plurimarIJm continens est specierum, a suis speciebus major sit, atque ideo ipsa de speciebus praedicari potest. Porro autem de ipsa species praedicari non potest: neque enim conversim dici potest. Nam quoniam homo dicitur rationalis, non contradicitur quod rationale est id quod homo est.

English

There is also this commonality between them: just as someone is called "capable of laughing" in potentiality even if he does not laugh, so too he is called "two-footed" in potentiality even if someone is diminished by one foot. For it is not what he is that is predicated, but what he can be. For since he can laugh, he is called "capable of laughing"; because he can have two feet, "two-footed." And therefore they never depart from the things in which they inhere, as do proper attributes and differentiae. For a man is always capable of laughing, even if he does not laugh; always two-footed, even if diminished by one foot. For in these—differentiae and proper attributes, as has been said—what is considered is what can exist in potentiality, not what truly is.

ON THE PROPER ATTRIBUTES OF THE SAME.

But they differ from one another in that a differentia is predicated of several species, whereas a proper attribute is predicated of one. For the differentia "mortal" is predicated of man, of ox, of horse, and of the other living things; and "rational" is predicated both of God and of man. But "capable of laughing" is predicated of the single species of man alone. Hence it comes about that every differentia, since it contains very many species, is greater than its own species, and therefore can itself be predicated of the species. But the species cannot be predicated of it; for it cannot be said conversely. For since man is called rational, it is not contradicted that what is rational is what man is.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:138 · narrative
Source · Latin

Potest enim esse etiam non homo, sed Deus.At vero proprium, quoniam aequaliter et ad unam speciem semper aptatur, aequa vice atque appellatione convertilur: dicitur enim, quid est homo? risibile. Quibus pertractatis ad differentiam et accidens transgressa disputatio est.

DE COMMUNIBUS DIFFERENTIÆ ET ACCIDENTIS.

DitTerentia et accidens commune habent de pluribus prædicari. Namque differentia dicitur et de bomine et de Deo; cum utrique rationales sunt. Et accidens dicitur et de homine et de equo, ut homo Æthiops niger, et equus niger. Est etiam alia comrnunioquodinseparabile accidens cuicunque speciei fuerit, inseparabiliter et omnibus inest ut differentia. Namque inseparabiliter accidens quod est nigrum, corvo inseparabiliter accidit, et omnibus corvis. Eodemmorlo etiam differentia. Nam quoniam accidit homini ut bipes sit semper et omnibus hominibus est esse bipedibus.

English

For it can also be something that is not a human, but a God. But a property, because it is fitted equally and always to one species, is converted by an equal turn and appellation: for it is said, what is a human? capable of laughing. Having examined these matters, the discussion has crossed over to difference and accident.

ON WHAT DIFFERENCE AND ACCIDENT HAVE IN COMMON.

Difference and accident have this in common, that they are predicated of many things. For difference is said both of a human and of God, since both are rational. And accident is said both of a human and of a horse, as an Ethiopian human is black, and a horse is black. There is also another commonality: an inseparable accident, whatever species it belongs to, is present inseparably in all of them, just like a difference. For the inseparable accident that is black belongs inseparably to the raven, and to all ravens. In the same way also a difference. For since it happens to a human to be two-footed always, it is also the case that all humans are two-footed.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:139 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE PROPRIIS EORUMDEM.

Differunt autem inter se, quod omnis differentia species conti net, non contra ipsa a speciebus continctur.Nam si differentia plures sub se species habet,ut dictum est,major erit sub se positis speciebus. Si major erit, nunquam eam quaelibet species continet. Major enim a minori nunquam poteritcontineri. Nam quod est rationale, continet hominem etDoum. Homo vero rationale non continet. Accidentia vero aliquoties continent, aliquoties continentur. Namque continent, quoniam frequenter unum accidens duas subsespeciesbabet,utnigrum habet Æthiopem et corvum Continentur vero quoniam sæpe una substantia habet duo vel tria vel quamlibet plurima accidentia. Si quis enim sit glaucus, vel crispus, vel candidus, vel procerus, haec omnia accidentiaunuscui accesserunt complectitur et continet. Atque ideo species illa quæ illud individuum continet quod individuum plura in se accidentia suscepit, accidentis illius complexiva est.

English

ON THE PROPERTIES OF THE SAME THINGS.

They differ from one another in that every differentia contains species, but is not in turn itself contained by species. For if a differentia has several species under it, as has been said, it will be greater than the species placed under it. If it is greater, no species will ever contain it. For what is greater can never be contained by what is lesser. For "rational" contains human and God. But "human" does not contain "rational." Accidents, however, sometimes contain and sometimes are contained. For they contain, since frequently one accident has two species under it, as "black" has the Ethiopian and the raven. But they are contained, since often one substance has two or three or however many accidents. For if someone is grey-eyed, or curly-haired, or white, or tall, the one to whom all these accidents have come encompasses and contains them. And therefore that species which contains the individual that has received several accidents in itself is inclusive of that accident.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:140 · narrative
Source · Latin

Dehinc differentia nunquam intenditur neque relaxalur.

Quod dicit hoc est rationale in unaquaque specie, neque plus neque minus est. Nullus enim homo alio homine ab substantiam plus rationalis est neque minus. At vero accidens et intenditur et remittitur. Dicitur enim quicunqueprocerior,diciturquicunque velocior,dicitur quicunque crispiorquae omnia accidentia esse non dubium est.

Prseterea immistæ semper sunt contrariæ differentiæ.

Immistae ait, id est,immiscibiiesquae misceri non possunt.Nequeenimrationalecumirrationalimisceri potest,neque in una specie conveuire.At vero contraria accidentia manifestum estin una specie posse congL'uere.Namque nigrum et album potest in una non modo specie, sed individuo congruere. Potest enim quicunque homo, cum ipse sit candidus,nigros tamen capillos habere.Ergo quemadmodum species differat a genere vel differentia dictum est, cum de generis ad speciem, et differentee ad speciem distantia diceremus.

English

Next, a differentia is never intensified or relaxed.

What he says is this: the rational [quality] in each species is neither more nor less. For no man is more or less rational in substance than another man. But an accident is both intensified and relaxed. For one man is called swifter, another faster, another curlier, all of which are undoubtedly accidents.

Moreover, contrary differentiae are always unmixed.

"Unmixed," he says, that is, immiscible, which cannot be mixed. For the rational cannot be mixed with the irrational, nor come together in one species. But it is manifest that contrary accidents can come together in one species. For black and white can come together not only in one species but in one individual. For any man, though he himself be fair, can nevertheless have black hair. Therefore how a species differs from a genus or a differentia has been stated, when we were speaking of the distance of genus from species, and of differentia from species.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:141 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE COMMUNIBUS SPECIEI ET PROPRII.

Nunc dicemus id quod reliqura est de speciei propriique communibus.Et est una eorum communio, quod de se ipsa invicem praedicantur.Nam quoniam æqua sibi sunt,neque species homillis alii proprio convenit,nisi risibili,neque risibilealii conveuitspeciei, nisi homini, atque ideo dicilur, quid est homo? risibile.Quid est risibile? horno.Commune est etiam illud quod omne proprium æqualiter ad sub se posita prædicatur.Namque omnes homines aequaliter risibites sunt,et species cequaliter ad sub se posita prædicatur.Namque omnes homines individui æqua. liter uno nomine homines nuncupantur.

DE PROPRIIS EORUMDEM.

Differunt a se,quoniam speciespotestetiamgenus alteri esse,proprium esse non potest.Sed hic illam speciem intelligamus quæ subalterna est,non illam quæ magis species est,et genus esse nunquam potest.Atque ideo nos illam modo solam, quae subalterna species est intelligamus, quae scilicet poterit esse et genus.Namque mortale cum rationalis generis sit species,hon:inis genus est.At vero risibile de nulla unquam alia specie poterit praedicari, neque alii esae proprium,sicut est horninis.llla enim semper (ut dictum est) propria sunt,quæ nulli alii nisi ad unam speciem semper aptantur.Deinde species pl'æcedit,et sic proprium sequitur.

English

ON THE COMMON FEATURES OF SPECIES AND PROPERTY.

Now we shall speak of what remains concerning the common features of species and property. And there is one common feature of them: that they are predicated of each other in turn. For since they are equal to each other, neither does species belong to any other property than the risible, nor does the risible belong to any other species than man; and therefore it is said: what is man? Risible. What is the risible? Man. It is also common that every property is predicated equally of the things placed under it. For all men are equally risible, and species is predicated equally of the things placed under it. For all individual men are equally called by the one name "men."

ON THE DIFFERENCES OF THE SAME.

They differ from each other in that species can also be a genus to another, but a property cannot be. But here let us understand that species which is subordinate, not that which is most properly a species and can never be a genus. And therefore let us now understand only that which is a subordinate species, which, namely, can also be a genus. For the mortal, since it is a species of the rational genus, is a genus of man. But the risible can never be predicated of any other species, nor be a property of another, as it is of man. For those things are always properties (as has been said) which are always fitted to no other than to one species. Then species comes first, and so property follows.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:142 · narrative
Source · Latin

Quod dicit tale est: Omnis species ut habeat proprium,primo eam esse et constare necesse est.Oportet enim prius esse hominem utsit risibilis5non prius esserisibile ut sit homo.Nam quoniam proprium dicitur, per se proprium non constat,nisi alicujus species sit. Atque ideo prius esse necesse est illud cujus est proprium quam sit.proprium.Hucaccedit quod species semper in opere intelligitur cujuscunque subjecti. Species enim semper in actu est, non solum propria potestate.Homo enim revera et opere et actu homo est, id est nunquam poterit esse non homo.At vero risibile quod est proprium, potestate tantum dicitur, etiamsi actu non sit. Potest enim quilibet ille non ridere,tamen quia ridere potest, risibile nominatur. Distant igitur in hoc quod semper species in actu est et in opere,proprium vero aliquoties potestate; deinde quorum definitiones diversos sunt, necessario etiam ipsa quoque diversa sunt. Omnis definitio substantiam definit. Ergo si quæ ejusdem substantiæ fuerint, eadem etiam definitione monstrantur. Si quae ejusdem definitionis fuerint,eadem substantia praedicantur.

English

What he says is of this sort: every species, in order to have a property, must first exist and be established. For it is necessary that a man first exist in order to be risible, not that he first be risible in order to be a man. For since it is called a property, a property does not stand by itself unless it be the property of some species. And therefore that of which it is the property must necessarily exist before the property itself. To this is added that a species is always understood in the actuality of whatever subject it belongs to. For a species is always in actuality, not only in its own potentiality. For a man is truly both in reality and in actuality a man, that is, he can never be a non-man. But risible, which is a property, is said only in potentiality, even if it is not in actuality. For anyone can fail to laugh, yet because he can laugh he is called risible. They differ, then, in this: that a species is always in actuality and in reality, but a property sometimes only in potentiality. Then, since their definitions are different, they themselves are necessarily also different. Every definition defines a substance. Therefore, if things are of the same substance, they are shown by the same definition. If things are of the same definition, they are predicated of the same substance.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:143 · narrative
Source · Latin

At vero si quae definitionibus differant, differunt etiam substantiis.Quæ substantiis differunt longe a seipsis alia sunt.Nuncigitur quoniam definitiones proprii et speciei differunt, species ipsa quoque et proprium a se differunt.Est autem speciei definitio sub genere esse, et ad plurima numero differentia in eo quod quid sit praedicari. At vero proprii uni tantum inesse speciei, et sub ipsa de omnibus individuis prædicari.Sed quoniam definitionibus differunt,ipsa quoque species aproprio distabit.

DE COMMUNIBUS SPECIEI ET ACCIDENTIS.

Post haec ad communitates speciei et accidentis disputationem transtulit, et dicit eorum raras alias esse cornmunitates,nisihas solas quod de pluribus praedicantur. Longe enim a se distare videntur, in substantia sui et in potesta).epatiend' atque faciendi id quod alicui accidit, et id cui accidit. Namqueillud cui accidit, quasi quoddam fundamentum est accidentis. Illud vero quod accidit, praeter id cui accidit, esse in sui substantia non potest.

English

But if things that differ in their definitions also differ in their substances, and things that differ in substance are far other than themselves, then now, since the definitions of property and species differ, the species itself and the property also differ from each other. Now the definition of species is to be under a genus and to be predicated, in respect of what something is, of many things differing in number. But the definition of property is to be present in only one species and to be predicated of all its individuals under it. But since they differ in definitions, the species itself will also be distinct from the property.

ON WHAT SPECIES AND ACCIDENT HAVE IN COMMON.

After this he turned his discussion to the common features of species and accident, and says that their other common features are rare, except only these: that they are predicated of many things. For they seem to be far apart from each other in their substance and in the power of acting and of suffering—both that which happens to something and that to which it happens. For that to which something happens is, as it were, a kind of foundation of the accident. But that which happens cannot, apart from that to which it happens, exist in its own substance.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:144 · narrative
Source · Latin

DE PROPRIIS EORUM.

Propria vero singulorum sunt haec, quod species in eo quod quid sit priedicatur, accidensveroineoquod quale sit et quodammodo se babens: Nam si quis dicat, quid Socratesest, homo dicitur. Si quis dicat qualis sil, calvus vel simus appellatur. Si quis vero quomodo se habens, sedens aut jacens appellabitur, Item in hoc differunt quod unaquæque substantia unam speciem habet. Namque hominissubstantia unam solamhominisspeciemhabet.Substantiavero aeque unam solius equi speciem habet. At vero una substantia plura frequenter accidentia continebit. Nam et in eodem equo quasdam pars frequenter nigra quaedam, alba est. Et est in eo proceritas, est altitudo, est cequilinum caput, et alia hujusmodi. Habet etiam non solum inseparabile accidens eadem substantia, sed etiam superabile. Nam fortasse quidam velox est, et idem etiam corpore validus est, idem etiam sagitta tor, et cætera. Huc accedit quod species praenoscuntur, id est prseinlelliguntur, hoc est ante esse cognoscuntur quam accidentia. Et prius erit aliqua res ubi accidat, quam illa quæ accidit, et quoniam species est subjectum accidentis ubi accidens accidat, Ideoque ante species intelligitur esse quam accidens.

English

ON THE PROPERTIES OF THESE.

The properties of each are these: that species is predicated in the category of what a thing is, whereas accident is predicated in the category of what sort a thing is and how it is disposed. For if someone asks what Socrates is, he is called a man. If someone asks what sort he is, he is called bald or snub-nosed. If someone asks how he is disposed, he will be called sitting or lying down. They differ also in this, that each substance has one species. For the substance of a man has one species only, that of man. But the substance of a horse likewise has one species only, that of horse. Yet one substance will often contain several accidents. For in the same horse some parts are often black, some white. And in it there is tallness, there is height, there is a horse-like head, and other such things. The same substance has not only inseparable accident but also separable accident. For perhaps someone is swift, and the same man is also strong of body, the same man is also an archer, and so on. To this it is added that species are foreknown, that is, understood beforehand, that is, they are known to exist before accidents. And any thing in which an accident befalls will exist before that which befalls it, and since the species is the subject of the accident, in which the accident befalls, therefore the species is understood to exist before the accident.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:145 · narrative
Source · Latin

Accidentia vero postea nata sunt, id est aforis venientia et extranea, a qualibet ilia substantia, etiamsiinseperabiliasunt Hæc quoque est eorum separatio, quod semper omnia quai participant specie, asqualiter participant. iEqualiter enim et Socrates et Cicero et Plato sunt homines. At vero illa quæ participant accidenti, etiamsi inseparabile accidens sit, tamen æqualiter participant. Nam quamvis inseparabile sit accidens Æthiopibus nigris esse, tamen est aliquis inter ipsos nigrior, nec omnes illa nigredine a?qualiter participant.

DE COMMUNIBUS PROPRII ET ACCIDENTIS.

Relinquitur igitur de communibus proprii accidentisque tractare. Nam proprium QU: i distaret vel a specie, vel a genere, vel a differentia superius demonstratum est. Proprium autem et inseparabile accidens communehabent, quod sine his nunquam consistunt ea quæ eorum participant, et in quibus ipsa considerantur. Nam neque homo amittit risibile esse, nec tEthiops aut corvus, nigrum. Atque ideo sine his ipsis, id est propriis et accidentibus, quæ eorum participant, constare non possunt, ne forte contra superiorem definitionem accidentis venire videatur ista communio. Est enim ita definitum. Accidensest quod infertur et aufertursine ejus in quo est interitu. Quod nunc dici videtursinehis constare nou posse, cum superius sine eorum interitu posse diceretur auferri.

English

Accidents, however, are born afterward, that is, coming from outside and foreign to any substance whatsoever, even if they are inseparable. This too is their distinction: that all things which participate in a species participate equally. For equally Socrates and Cicero and Plato are men. But those which participate in an accident, even if it is an inseparable accident, do not participate equally. For although it is an inseparable accident for Ethiopians to be black, nevertheless one among them is blacker, nor do all participate equally in that blackness.

ON WHAT IS COMMON TO PROPERTY AND ACCIDENT.

It remains, therefore, to treat of what is common to property and accident. For that property differs either from species, or from genus, or from difference has been demonstrated above. Property and inseparable accident have this in common: that those things which participate in them never consist without them, and those in which they are considered. For neither does a man lose being capable of laughter, nor an Ethiopian or a crow its blackness. And therefore without these very things, that is, properties and accidents, those things which participate in them cannot consist—lest perhaps this commonality seem to conflict with the earlier definition of accident. For it has been defined thus: an accident is what is brought in and removed without the destruction of that in which it is. What is now said to be unable to consist without these seems to contradict what was said earlier, that it can be removed without their destruction.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:146 · narrative
Source · Latin

Sed hoc modo dicitur, non quod si auferatur hoc accidens inseparabile, intereat ill ud cui accidit, sed quoniam separari non potest, idcirco sine his constare non possit. Est etiam inseparabilis accidentis et proprii alia communio, quod sicut et omni et semper inest proprium cui inest, id est homini (semper enim et omnis homo risibilis est), sic etiam quodlibet accidens inseparabile, et omni et semper est accidens inseparabile. Namque etomnis corvus, et semper niger est. Sola autem cum separabilibus accidentibus illa communio est, quod quemadmodum demultis individuis proprium prædicatur, ita etiam accidens de multis individuispotest prædicari. Plures enim currunt, plures etiam ambulant, quæ scilicet accidentia separabilia sunt, quemadmodum plures possunt esse risibiles.

DE PROPRIIS EORUM.

Differunt autem ista, quod proprium semper uni speciei inest, accidens vero pluribus. Nam accidens pluribus speciebus et animatis et inanimatis evenit, ut estebeno nigrum, corvo nigrum, homini iELhiopi nigrum. Risibile vero nulli, nisi soli homini. Atque ideo conversim proprium praedicatur, quia unius, speciei continens est, etilli speciei soli aequalis. est Al vero accidens conversim prædicari non potest, quiapluressubsespecieshabet. Non enimpotestdicere id esse nigrum quod ebenum, cum dicas hoc esseebenum quod nigrum. Potest enim esse nigrum et non esse ebenum.

English

But it is said in this way, not that if this inseparable accident is removed, that to which it belongs would perish, but because it cannot be separated, for that reason it cannot exist without it. There is also another commonality between an inseparable accident and a property: just as a property belongs to every instance and always to that in which it is, that is, to man (for every man and always is capable of laughter), so too any inseparable accident whatsoever belongs to every instance and always as an inseparable accident. For every crow, and always, is black. But their only commonality with separable accidents is that, just as a property is predicated of many individuals, so too an accident can be predicated of many individuals. For many run, many also walk—namely, those which are separable accidents—just as many can be capable of laughter.

ON PROPERTIES.

But these differ in that a property always belongs to one species alone, whereas an accident belongs to several. For an accident befalls many species, both animate and inanimate, as black is in ebony, black in a crow, black in an Ethiopian. But being capable of laughter belongs to none except man alone. And therefore a property is predicated convertibly, because it contains one species and is equal to that species alone. But an accident cannot be predicated convertibly, because it has several underlying species. For one cannot say that what is black is ebony, when one says that what is ebony is black. For it can be black and not be ebony.

tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:147 · narrative
Source · Latin

Deinde omne proprium æqualiUr se his rebus quæ sub se fuerint dat et ab his æqualiter participatur. Socrates enim et Cicero et Vergiliussequaliteretrisibili participant, et æqualiter risibiles sunt. At vero accidens non semper cequaliter est accidens. Potest enim quicunque esse procerior, et alius esse velocior. Quod scilicet illud separabile est accidens, illud inseparabile. Et fortasse aliae eorum quædam proprietates et commu. niones esse videantur. Sed nunc, quantum introductioni sat est, ista sutficiant. Sed jam tibi, Fabi omnia quaecunque ad introductionem Porphyrii pertinent, plenius uberiusque tractata sunt. Post vero si quidem unquam me egueris, studiis præsertim tuis quae nulla unquam honestate caruerunt, libens animo hortatorque ad easdem cupiditates parebo. Hic Fabius: Tu, inquit, paterno haec mihi animo polliceris: verum ego nunquam deficiam ab his studiis, te praesertim docente, a quo totam fortasselogicse Aristotelis, si vita suppetit, capiam disciplinam. Et ego faciam, inquam, libentissime. Sed quoniam jam matutinus (ut ait Petronius) sol tectis arrisit, surgamus, et si quid est illud, diligentiore posteaconside. ratione tractabitur.

English

Then every proper attribute gives itself equally to the things that fall under it and is equally participated in by them. For Socrates and Cicero and Vergil equally partake of the risible, and they are equally risible. But an accident is not always equally an accident. For anyone can be taller, and another can be swifter. Namely, that is a separable accident, that an inseparable one. And perhaps certain other properties and commonalities of these things may seem to exist. But now, as much as is enough for an introduction, let these things suffice. But now, Fabius, all the things whatsoever that pertain to the introduction of Porphyry have been treated by me more fully and more abundantly. Afterwards, if ever you should need me, especially in your studies, which have never lacked any honorableness, I shall willingly and with an encouraging mind submit to those same desires. Here Fabius said: You promise these things to me with a fatherly mind; but I shall never fall short in these studies, especially with you as teacher, from whom, if life suffices, I shall perhaps grasp the whole discipline of Aristotle's logic. And I shall do so, I said, most willingly. But since now the morning sun (as Petronius says) has smiled on the roofs, let us rise, and if there is anything, it will be treated afterwards with more careful reasoning.

Citation. Tergwame, “In Prophyrium Dialogi A Victorino Translati”, tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1:1, machine-draft, 2026. https://naxiai.com/christian/works/tmp1021.tmp1021.opp-lat1#s1
Colophon. Source: ogl-pl · licence: Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License · model: deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash:floor · provider: Baidu · cost: $0.0129 · generated 2026-11-15.