DE SPIRITU ET ANIMA LIBER UNUS.
PRÆFAТIO. Quoniam dictum est milii ut me ipsnm cognoscam, sustinere non possum ut me tiabeam incognitum. Magna namque est negligentia nescire quid illud sit, quo cælestia tam profunde cogitamus, quo naturalia tam subtili indagatione investigamus, et de ipso quoque Creatore nostro tam sublimia scire desideramus. Non est res peregrina, nec longe quærenda: animus est quo ista sapimus. Sed semper nobiscum adest, tractat, loquitur, et intus versatur *. Datum est illi tam ingentium rerum secreta scire, ct se ipsum cognoscere non potest: paucis siquidem licet ipso animo animum cernere, id est, ut ipse animus se videat. Fieri autcm non potest quadam divina providentia, ut inveniendi facultas desit religiosis animis se ipsos et Deum suum pie, caste ac diligenter qu:erentibus; idcirco reddam me mibi, imo Deo meo, cui maxime me debeo, et videbo quid sit animus, et quae patria ejus.
ON THE SPIRIT AND THE SOUL, ONE BOOK.
PREFACE. Since it has been said to me that I should know myself, I cannot bear that I should hold myself unknown. For it is great negligence not to know what that thing is by which we think heavenly things so profoundly, by which we investigate natural things with such subtle inquiry, and by which we desire to know such sublime things even concerning our own Creator. It is not a foreign matter, nor is it to be sought far off: it is the mind by which we understand these things. But it is always present with us, it treats, it speaks, and it dwells within. It has been granted to it to know the secrets of such great things, and it cannot know itself; indeed, it is permitted to few to discern the mind by the mind itself, that is, for the mind itself to see itself. But it cannot happen, by a certain divine providence, that the faculty of finding should be lacking to religious minds that seek themselves and their God piously, chastely, and diligently; therefore I will give myself back to myself, or rather to my God, to whom I owe myself most of all, and I will see what the soul is, and what its homeland is.
CAPUT PRIMUM. Animus quid sit. Ratio. Ralioci natio. Animus est substantia quaedam rationis particeps, regendo corpori accomunodata. Animus sapientia illustratus, et suum principium respicit, et se Ipsum cognoscit, et quam sit indecorum ut extra se quaerat quod in se ipso possit invenire, intelligit. Corporcis vero passionibus consopitus, et per sensibiles formas extra semetipsum abductus, oblitus est quid fuit. Et quia nihil aliud se fuisse meminit, nihil præter quod videtur esse credit. Solo sensu circa corpora, et imaginatione circa corporum similitudines et locorum versatur, et in eis sive vigilando, sive dormiendo distrahitur 2. Cum vero ab hac distractione per puram intelligentiam ascendens in unum se colligit, rationalis dicitur. Ratio siquidem est animi aspectus, quo per se ipsum verum intuetur. Ratiocinatio vero est rationis inquisitio. Quare illa opus est ad videndum, ista ad inquirendum.
CHAPTER ONE. What the mind is. Reason. Reasoning. The mind is a certain substance partaking of reason, fitted for governing the body. The mind, enlightened by wisdom, both looks back to its own beginning and knows itself, and understands how unfitting it is that it should seek outside itself what it is able to find within itself. But lulled to sleep by bodily passions and led away outside itself through sensible forms, it has forgotten what it was. And because it remembers nothing else that it was, it believes nothing except what it seems to be. It is occupied by sense alone concerning bodies, and by imagination concerning the likenesses of bodies and of places, and in these it is distracted, whether waking or sleeping. But when, ascending from this distraction through pure intelligence, it gathers itself into one, it is called rational. Reason indeed is the mind's gaze, by which through itself it beholds the true. Reasoning, however, is the inquiry of reason. Wherefore the former is needed for seeing, the latter for inquiring.
CAPUT II. Animus se ipsum intelligit. Animus invisibilis est. Neque enim aliter invisibilia cernere valeret. Visibilia per corpus videt, invisibilia per se, et in eo se videt, quod invisibilem se esse videt. Videtur tamen in corpore per corpus, sicut sensus in liltera manet, et per litteram videtur. Animus corporis dominator, rector, habitator videt se per se: per se ipsum semetipsum vidct. Non quaerit auxilium curporalium oculorum, imo vero ab omnibus corporis sensibus tanquam impedientibus et perstrepentibus abstrahit se ad se, ut videat se in se, ut noverit se apud se. Et cum vult Deum cognoscere, elcvat se super se mentis acie. Non enim aliquid tale est Deus, qualis est animus: non tamen videri nisi animo potest, nec ita videri ut animus potest. lncommutabilis siquidem est veritas sine defectu substantie. Non talis est anirnus: sed deficit et proficit, novit et ignorat, meminit et obliviscitur; modo vult, modo non vult. Diffusis cogitationibus atque consiliis, huc atque illuc vagatur: considerat, spectat omnia. Videt absentia; transmarina visu ambit, et percurrit aspectu, abdita scrutatur: et uno momento scusus suos per totius orbis fines et mundi secret:. circumfert. Descendit ad inferna, ascendit inde, versatur in coelo, adhæret Christo, conjungitur Deo. Ipse siquidem est ejus patria et habitatio, ad cujus similitudinem factus est.
CHAPTER TWO. The mind understands itself. The mind is invisible. For otherwise it could not perceive invisible things. It sees visible things through the body, invisible things through itself, and it sees itself in that it sees that it is invisible. Yet it is seen in the body through the body, as a sense remains in a letter and is seen through the letter. The mind, the ruler, director, and inhabitant of the body, sees itself through itself: through itself it sees its very self. It does not seek the aid of bodily eyes; indeed, it withdraws itself from all the senses of the body as from things that hinder and clamor, drawing itself to itself, so that it may see itself in itself and know itself in its own presence. And when it wishes to know God, it raises itself above itself by the keenness of the mind. For God is not such a thing as the mind is; yet he cannot be seen except by the mind, nor can he be seen in the way the mind can. For the truth is unchangeable, without any defect of substance. The mind is not such as this: rather it fails and advances, knows and is ignorant, remembers and forgets; now it wills, now it does not will. With thoughts and deliberations spread abroad, it wanders hither and thither: it considers and observes all things. It sees things absent; it ranges over what lies across the sea by sight, and runs through it with a glance; it searches out hidden things; and in a single moment it carries its senses around through the ends of the whole world and the secrets of the universe. It descends to the underworld, ascends from there, dwells in heaven, clings to Christ, is joined to God. For he himself is its homeland and dwelling place, after whose likeness it was made.
Quisquis ergo se talem reddi desiderat, qualis a Deo factus est, id est similem Deo, redeat ad se, et stet in se, et sic intra semetipsum quaerat, et videat unde constet homo, et ex qua sui parte factus sit ad imaginem Dei.
CAPUT III. Homo quibus constet. Ex duabus substantiis constat homo, anima et carne; anima cum ratione, carne cum sensibus suis: quos tamen sensus non movet caro absque animae societate; anima vero rationale suum tenet sine carne.
CAPUT IV. Vires animœ. Affectus quatuor. Virtutes quatuor. Animi vires quinque. Est siquidem rationalis, concupiscibilis et irascibilis. Per rationalitatem habilis est illuminari ad aliquid cognoscendum infra se et supra se, in se et juxta se. Cognoscit siquidem Deum supra se, etse in se, et angelum juxta se, et quidquid cæli ambitn continetur infra se. Per concupiscibilitatem et irascibilitatem habilis est anici ad aliquid appetendum vel fugiendum, amandum vel odiendum: et ideo de rationalitate omnis sensus oritur animæ, de aliis omnis affectus. Affectus vero quadripartitus esse dignoscitur: dum de eo quod amamus, jam gaudemus, vel gaudendum speramus; et de eo quod odimus, jam dolemus, sive dolendum mctuimus; ct ob hoc do concupiscibilitate gaudium et spes, de irascibilitalc dolor et metus oriuntur. Qni quidem quatuor affectus animæ omnium sunt vitiorum et virtutum quasi quædam principia, et communis materia.
Whoever therefore desires to be restored to such a state as that in which he was made by God—that is, to be like God—let him return to himself, and stand in himself, and thus seek within himself, and see of what man consists, and from which part of himself he was made in the image of God.
CHAPTER THREE. Of what man consists. Man consists of two substances, soul and flesh; the soul with reason, the flesh with its senses: yet the flesh does not move these senses without the fellowship of the soul; but the soul holds its rational nature without the flesh.
CHAPTER FOUR. The powers of the soul. Four affections. Four virtues. Five powers of the mind. It is indeed rational, concupiscible, and irascible. Through rationality it is capable of being illuminated to know something below itself and above itself, in itself and beside itself. For it knows God above itself, and itself in itself, and an angel beside itself, and whatever is contained within the circuit of heaven below itself. Through concupiscibility and irascibility it is capable of being moved to seek or to flee, to love or to hate something: and therefore from rationality arises every sense of the soul, from the others every affection. But affection is recognized to be fourfold: when we already rejoice in what we love, or hope to rejoice in it; and concerning what we hate, we already grieve, or fear that we shall grieve; and for this reason from concupiscibility arise joy and hope, from irascibility pain and fear. These four affections of the soul are, as it were, certain beginnings and common matter of all vices and virtues.
Affectus siquidem operi nomen imponit. Et quoniam virtus est habitus nimis bene compositæ, componendi et instituendi atque ordinandi sunt animi affectus ad id quod debent, et quomodo debent, ut in virtutes proficere possint; alioquin in vilia facile deficient. Cum igitur prudenter, modeste, fortiter et juste amor et odium instituuntur, in virtutes exsurgunt, prudentiam scilicet, temperantiam, fortitudinem atquejustitiam, quæ quasi origines et cardines sunt omnium virtutum. Et hæc omnia cum affectuose et virtuose in anima constituuntur 1, per odium mundi et sui, proficit in amorem Dei et proximi: per contemptum temporalium et inferrorum, crescit in desiderium æternorum et superiorum. Sensus vero unus est in anima, ct quod ipsa: et cum corpus non sit, corporeus dicitur, quia corpus non transcendit, vel quia corporeis exercetur instrumentis; unde et ob numerum instrumentorum quin. quepartitus dicitur, cum intus non sit nisi unus. Vcrumtamen propter varia exercitia variatur et vario nuncupatur. Dicitur namque sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, intelligentia. Et hæc omnia in anima nibil aliud sunt, quam ipsa, aliæ et aliae inter se proprietates propter varia exercitia, sed una essentia rationis et una anima: proprietates quidem diversæ, sed essentia una: secundum exercitia, multa sunt; secundum essentiam vero, unum sunt in anima et idem quod ipsa.
Affection indeed gives its name to the work. And since virtue is a habit composed in an excellent manner, the affections of the soul must be composed, ordered, and arranged toward what they ought, and in the manner they ought, so that they can advance into virtues; otherwise they will easily fall away into base things. When therefore love and hatred are prudently, temperately, bravely, and justly ordered, they rise up into virtues—namely prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice—which are, as it were, the origins and hinges of all the virtues. And when all these things are established in the soul with affection and virtue, through hatred of the world and of self, it advances into the love of God and neighbor; through contempt of temporal and lower things, it grows into desire for eternal and higher things. But sense is one in the soul, and is what the soul itself is; and although it is not body, it is called corporeal because it does not transcend the body, or because it is exercised through bodily instruments; whence also, on account of the number of instruments, it is called fivefold, although within it is but one. Nevertheless, on account of various exercises it is varied and is called by various names. For it is called sense, imagination, reason, intellect, and intelligence. And all these in the soul are nothing other than the soul itself—different and distinct properties among themselves on account of various exercises, but one essence of reason and one soul: the properties indeed are diverse, but the essence is one; according to exercises, they are many; according to essence, however, they are one in the soul and the same as the soul itself.
Et sicut mundus iste visibilis quinquepartiLa quadam distinctione est ordinatus; terra scilicet, aqua, acre, et æthere, sive firmamento, ip oque supremo cælo, quod empyreum vorant: sic animæ in mundo sui corporis peregrinanti quinque progressus sunt ad saplentiam; sensus scilicct, imaginatio, ratio, inielleclus, et intelligentia. Quinque enim progressionibus rationalitas exercetur ad sapientiam, et quatuor affectibus ad charitatem: quatenus novem istis progressionibus in semetipa proficiens anima, sensu et affectu, quaternis quibusdam pedibus, quae spiritu vivit, spiritu ambulet usque ad Cherubim et Seraphim, id est, usque ad plenitudinem scientiæ, et regnum I charitatis, habeatque anima per exercitium virtutes, quarum facultates habet per naturam.
CAPUT V. Collatio virtutum anima cum choris angelorum. Et hos progressus nominibus et ordinibus Angelorum comparare prudenti Icetorl relinquo. Facile siquidem erit ci, si sciat aptare sensum qui primus animae nuntius est, Angelis qui nuntii vo cantur; imaginationem Archangelis, quæ plura quant sensus percipit; timorem Virtutibus, dolorem Potestatibus. Qui enim metu suppliciorum perterritus, ut dolore peccatorum compunetus, contemnit mundum et se ipsum, cum Virtutibus facit miracula, cum Potestatibus fugat dæmonia. Majus namque est contcmnere se ipsum, quam mundum, quem multi propter vanitatem contempserunt.
And just as this visible world is ordered by a certain fivefold distinction—namely earth, water, air, and ether or the firmament, and the highest heaven itself, which they call the empyrean—so for the soul sojourning in the world of its body there are five advances toward wisdom: namely sense, imagination, reason, intellect, and intelligence. For by five progressions rationality is exercised toward wisdom, and by four affections toward charity; so that the soul, advancing in itself through these nine progressions—by sense and by affection, as it were by four feet—may walk in the spirit, since it lives by the spirit, all the way to the Cherubim and Seraphim, that is, to the fullness of knowledge and the kingdom of charity, and may possess through exercise the virtues whose capacities it has by nature.
CHAPTER V. The comparison of the soul's virtues with the choirs of angels. And these progressions I leave to a prudent reader to compare with the names and orders of the angels. For it will be easy for him, if he knows how to fit sense, which is the soul's first messenger, to the angels who are called messengers; imagination to the archangels, which perceives more things than sense does; fear to the Virtues, and sorrow to the Powers. For one who, terrified by fear of punishments, and pricked by sorrow for sins, despises the world and himself, works miracles with the Virtues and puts demons to flight with the Powers. For it is a greater thing to despise oneself than the world, which many have despised for the sake of vanity.
Rationem assignamus Principatibus: nam sicut illi præsunt et principantursubjectis spiritibus, sic ratiosensibus atque affectibus. Amorem proximi sive gaudium Dominationibus: recto namque aliis dominantur qui omnes amant, et de prorectu omnium gaudent. Intellectum Thronis: Throni sedes dicuntur, quia in eis Deus sedet. Intelligere etiam debes, quoniam in cordibus nostris Deus lmbitat per fidem (Ephes. III, 17), per sanctificationem, per pacem, per dilectionem: quoniam Deus est pacis cl dilectionis (II Cor. XIII, 11). Intelligentiam aptamus Cherubim. Illi namque spiritus tanto perfectiore fcientia pleni sunt, quanto divinitatem Dei in intiinis contemplantur. Intelligentia namque animæ vis cst, quæ immediate Deo supponitur: cernit siquidem ipsum ct quae in ipso sunt. Spem sive desiderium sive amorem Dei, Seraphim: Deus namque est spes omnium finium terræ (Psal. LXIV, 3), cujus vultum tota terra desiderat: et in quem Seraphim prospicere desiderant, tuta spes nostra et desiderium nostrum est. Odium mundi Virtutibus: odium sui Potestatibus: i ationem Principalibus: amorem proximi Dominationibus: intellecturn Thronis: intelligentiam Cherubim: amorem Dci Scraphim. Timor namquc de suplaicis et dolor de peccatis faciunt contemptum mundi ct sui, ut cum Virtutibus faciant miracula, et cum Potestatibus expellant dæmonia.
We assign reason to the Principalities: for just as they preside and rule over the spirits subject to them, so reason presides over the senses and affections. Love of neighbor, or joy, to the Dominations: for they rule others rightly who love all and rejoice in the advancement of all. Understanding to the Thrones: Thrones are called seats, because God sits in them. You must also understand that God dwells in our hearts through faith (Eph. 3:17), through sanctification, through peace, through love: for God is a God of peace and love (2 Cor. 13:11). Intelligence we assign to the Cherubim. For those spirits are filled with knowledge the more perfect in proportion as they contemplate the divinity of God in the depths. For intelligence is a power of the soul that is immediately subject to God: it indeed beholds him and the things that are in him. Hope, or desire, or the love of God, to the Seraphim: for God is the hope of all the ends of the earth (Ps. 64:3), whose face the whole earth desires; and he whom the Seraphim desire to look upon is our sure hope and our desire. Hatred of the world to the Virtues; hatred of self to the Powers; reason to the Principalities; love of neighbor to the Dominations; understanding to the Thrones; intelligence to the Cherubim; love of God to the Seraphim. For fear of punishments and sorrow for sins produce contempt of the world and of self, so that with the Virtues they may work miracles, and with the Powers cast out demons.
Spes de promissis, et gaudium de præmiis faciunt amorcm proximi ct Dei.
CAPUT VI. Vestigia Trinitatis in anima a quo. Anima ad similitudinem totius sapientiae facta, omnium in se gerit similitudinem: unde et a philosopho definita est omnium similitudo. Habet siquidem in se vires, quibus omnia apprehendit; sive investigat, ct, omnibus similis existit, cum una sit. Similis est terræ per sensum, aquæ per imaginationem, acri per rationem, firmamento per intellectum, cælorum caelo per intelligentiam. Similis est lapidibus per essentiam, arboribus per vitam, animalibus per sensum et imaginationem, hominibus perralioncm, Angelis per intellectum, Deo per intelligentiam. Et sicut Deus est nb omnibus capabilis et participabilis; sic anima omnium est capax. Capabilis et participabilis omnibus cst Deus; quia naturali suo munere scilicet Spiritu sancto, et usu ex munere gratiae, participatur ab omnibus pcr essentiam qua sunt, et secundum illam ad idoneam speciem qua ab aliis differunt, et secundum utrumque ad congruum usum quo proficiunt. Tria hæc omni homini existenti insunt, quasi quædam vestigia summæ essentiæ, imaginis, et muneris, id est, Trinitatis Patris et Filii ct Spiritus sancti. Æternitas quippe est in Patre, species in imagine, usus in munere*. Æternitas a cst in Patre; quia Pater non habet patrem de quo sil: Filius de Patre est ut sit, aiquc ut illi coæternus sit.
Hope from promises, and joy from rewards, make love of neighbor and of God.
CHAPTER VI. From what source are the vestiges of the Trinity in the soul. The soul, made in the likeness of all wisdom, bears within itself the likeness of all things: whence also it was defined by the philosopher as the likeness of all things. For it has within itself powers by which it apprehends all things; or investigates them, and it is like all things, though it is one. It is like the earth through sense, like water through imagination, like air through reason, like the firmament through intellect, like the heaven of heavens through understanding. It is like stones through essence, like trees through life, like animals through sense and imagination, like men through reason, like angels through intellect, like God through understanding. And just as God is capable of being received and participated in by all things, so the soul is capable of all things. God is capable of being received and participated in by all things; because by his natural gift, namely the Holy Spirit, and by the use that comes from the gift of grace, he is participated in by all things according to the essence by which they are, and according to that fitting form by which they differ from one another, and according to both together for the fitting use by which they profit. These three things are present in every man that exists, as certain vestiges of the supreme essence, image, and gift, that is, of the Trinity of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. For eternity is in the Father, form in the image, use in the gift. Eternity is in the Father; because the Father has no father from whom he is: the Son is from the Father that he may be, and that he may be coeternal with him.
Imago enim si perfecte implet illud cujus est imago, coaequalis est illi. Species est in imagine, id est, pulchritudo, congruentia, acqualit s, pruna et summa similitudo, prima et summa vita, primus et summus intellectus. Usus est in muncre. Munus Patns et Filii Spiritus sanctus est. Usus ergo in muncre est, id est, delectatio, gaudium, laetitia, felicitas, suavitas. Ille namque ineffabilis complexus Patris et imaginis, non est sinc perfectione, sine charitate, sine gaudio: sic in illa Trinitate sum:na est origo omnium rerum, perfectissima pulchritudo, ct beatissima dilectio 4, nobis autem omnis usus deitatis est ex munere. Quodam modo namque quasi proprior videtur nobis esse Spiritus sanctus, utpote Patris ct Filii munus. Ex ipso nimirum est omnis usus gratias cum Patre et Filio. Ipse enim rcgit et erudit, consolatur et perducit Ecclesiam ad Christum, quam ipse simul sine macula et ruga (Ephes. v, 27) tradet reguum Deo et Patri (I Cor. xv, 24). Sic a Patre per Filium et Spiritum sanctum vel potius in Spiritu diviua ad nos descenderunt. l'ater siquidem tradidit Filium suqm, quo redimeret servos; misit Spiritum sanctum, quo servos adoptaret in filios: Filium dedit in pretium redemptionis, Spiritum sanctum in privilegium adoptionis, se denique totum servat in haereditatem adoptatis.
For if an image perfectly fulfills that of which it is the image, it is coequal with it. In the image there is species, that is, beauty, harmony, equality, pure and supreme likeness, first and supreme life, first and supreme intellect. Use is in the gift. The gift of the Father and the Son is the Holy Spirit. Use, therefore, is in the gift, that is, delight, joy, gladness, felicity, sweetness. For that ineffable embrace of the Father and the image is not without perfection, without charity, without joy; so in that Trinity is the supreme origin of all things, the most perfect beauty, and the most blessed love; but for us every use of the Godhead is from the gift. For in a certain way the Holy Spirit seems to be, as it were, nearer to us, inasmuch as He is the gift of the Father and the Son. From Him, surely, is every use of grace, together with the Father and the Son. For He Himself rules and instructs, consoles and leads the Church to Christ, which He Himself, without spot or wrinkle (Eph. 5:27), will hand over as a kingdom to God and the Father (1 Cor. 15:24). Thus from the Father through the Son and the Holy Spirit, or rather in the Spirit, divine things have descended to us. For the Father handed over His Son, by whom He might redeem servants; He sent the Holy Spirit, by whom He might adopt servants as sons: He gave the Son as the price of redemption, the Holy Spirit as the privilege of adoption, and finally He keeps Himself entire as the inheritance of the adopted.
Nemo ergo de Dei pietate diffidat, quoniam major est ejus misericordia, quam nostra miseria; et quisquis ad eum toto corde clamaverit, exaudiet illum, quoniam misericors est. Tardius siquidem ei videtur peccatori veniam dare, quam ipsi peccatori accipere. Sic enim.festinat absolvere reum a tormento conscientiae suæ, quasi plus eum cruciet compassio miseri, quam ipsum miserum compassio sui. -
CAPUT VII. Anima capax omnium. Capax cst omnium anima, quia per rationalitatem ad cogn!tionem, et per concupiscibilitatem ad dilectionem universitatis capax invenitur. Sunt euim duo in anima, et sunt id quod anima, scilicet naturalis sensus cognoscens omnia et dijudicans inter omnia; ct naturalis affectus, quo suo ordine et gradu anima diligat omnia. Verumtamen facultates et quasi instrumenta cognoscendi et diligendi habet ex natura; cognitionem tamen verilalis et ordinem dilectionis nequaquam habct nisi ex gratia. Facta siquidem a Deo mens rationalis, sicut ejus imaginem suscepit, ita cognitionem et amorem. Vasa namque quas crcatrix Sapientia format ut sint, adjutrix gratia replet ne vacua sint, si strenuum operarium invenerit.
Let no one therefore distrust God's loving-kindness, since his mercy is greater than our misery; and whoever cries out to him with his whole heart, he will hear, because he is merciful. Indeed, to the sinner it seems slower to grant pardon than to the sinner himself to receive it. For he hastens so to absolve the guilty from the torment of his conscience, as though compassion for the wretched man torments him more than compassion for himself torments the wretched man.
CHAPTER VII. The soul is capable of all things. The soul is capable of all things, because through rationality it is found capable of knowledge, and through concupiscibility of the love of the universe. For there are two things in the soul, and they are that which the soul is, namely the natural sense, knowing all things and judging between all things; and the natural affection, by which the soul, in its own order and degree, loves all things. Yet it has the faculties and, as it were, the instruments of knowing and loving from nature; but it by no means has the knowledge of truth and the order of love except from grace. For the rational mind, having been made by God, received knowledge and love just as it received his image. For the vessels which creative Wisdom forms so that they may exist, helping grace fills so that they may not be empty, if it finds a diligent worker.
CAPUT VIII. Anima rursum quid. Anima est substantia rationalis, intellectualis, a Deo facta spi. ritualis, non ex Dei natura, sed potius creatura ex nihilo facta, in bonum malumque convertibilis. Et idco aliquatenus est mortalis in quantum in deterius mutari, et a voluntate Dei cujus participatione bona fit, alienari potest; et aliquatenus immortalis, quoniam sensum, quo ei post hanc vitam vel bene vel male sit, amittere non potest: non quod pro actis ante carnem gestis meruerit ut in carne includeretur, ut quidam voluerunt; sed nec ideo potest esse in homine sine sorde peccati, nisi a Christo fuerit libcraia. Dei enim nutu ad corpus anima venit, ut si secundum ejus præceptum agere vellet, mercedem accipcrel vitæ æternæ atque societatis Angelorum: si autem contemneret, pœnas justissimas et amarissimas lueret, sive doloris continui, sive ignis æterni.
CHAPTER VIII. What the soul is, again. The soul is a rational, intellectual substance, made by God, spiritual, not from God's nature, but rather a creature made out of nothing, convertible to good and to evil. And therefore it is in some measure mortal, inasmuch as it can be changed for the worse and can be alienated from the will of God, by participation in which it becomes good; and in some measure immortal, since it cannot lose the sense by which, after this life, it is either well or ill with it: not that it merited, by deeds done before the flesh, to be enclosed in the flesh, as some have held; but neither for that reason can it be in man without the stain of sin, unless it has been set free by Christ. For by God's will the soul comes to the body, so that if it would act according to his precept, it may receive the reward of eternal life and of the fellowship of the angels; but if it should despise it, it would pay the most just and most bitter penalties, whether of continual pain or of eternal fire.
CAPUT IX. Sensus hominis duplex. Anima vero ex eo dicta est quod animet corpus ad viveudum, hoc est, vivificet. Spiritus est ipsa anima pro spirituali natura, vel pro eo quod spiret in corpore appellatus est spiritus. Anima et spiritus idem sunt in homine, quamvis aliud notet spiritus, et aliud anima. Spiritus namquc ad substantiam dicitur, et anima ad vivificationem. Eadem est essentia, sed proprietas diversa. Nam unus et idem spiritus ad se ipsum dicitur spiritus, et ad corpus anima. Spiritus est in quantum est ratione praedita substantia rationalis: anima in quantum est vita corporis, de qua dictum est, Qui perdiderit animam suam propter me, salvam faciet eam (Luc. ix, 24); id est, Quisquis propter Deum vitam hanc quoe nunc corporis vivilicatione ex anima temporaliter mortalis constat, libenter despexerit, in futuro eamdem corporis, non solum animae, vitam aeternam et inmortalitatem recipiet. Ilumana quidem anima, quia in corpore habet esse et extra corpus, anima pariter ct spiritus vocari potest: non duae animae, sensualis et rationalis, altera qua bomo vivat, et altera qua ut quidam putant, sapiat; sed una atque eadem anima in semetipsa vivit per intellectum, et corpori vitam praebet per sensum.
CHAPTER IX. The twofold sense of man. But the soul is so called from the fact that it animates the body to live, that is, gives it life. Spirit is the soul itself, called spirit on account of its spiritual nature, or because it breathes in the body. Soul and spirit are the same in man, although spirit denotes one thing and soul another. For spirit is said with reference to substance, and soul with reference to vivification. It is the same essence, but the property is different. For one and the same spirit is called spirit in relation to itself, and soul in relation to the body. It is spirit insofar as it is a rational substance endowed with reason; it is soul insofar as it is the life of the body, of which it was said, Whoever loses his soul for my sake will save it (Luke 9:24); that is, whoever for God's sake has willingly despised this life, which now consists of the temporal mortal life of the body through the soul's vivification, will in the future receive the same eternal life and immortality of the body, not only of the soul. Indeed, the human soul, because it has its being in the body and also outside the body, can be called both soul and spirit: not two souls, a sensory and a rational one, the one by which man lives and the other by which, as some think, he understands; but one and the same soul lives in itself through the intellect, and provides life to the body through the senses.
Humanum namque corpus nee vivere nec nasci potest sine anima rationali; vegetatur tamen et movetur et crescit ct humanam formam in utcro recipit, priusquam animam rationalem recipiat. Sicut etiam virgulti et herbas sine anima' moveri ct incrementum habere - videmus. Duplex est quidem vita animæ; alia qua vivit in carne, et alia qua vivit in Deo. Duo siquidem in homine sensus sunt, unus interior, et unus exterior, et uterque bonum suum habet in quo reficitur. Sensus interior reficitur in contemplatione divinitatis, sensus exterior in contemplatione humanitatis. Propterea enim Deus homo factus est, ut totum hominem in se beatificaret, et tota conversio hominis esset ad ipsum, et tota dilectio hominis esset in ipso, cum a sensu carnis videretur per carnem, et a sensu mentis videretur per divinitatis contemplationem. Hoc autem erat tomum bonum hominis, ut sive ingrederetur sive egrederetur, pascua in factore suo inveniret (Joan. x, 9); pascua foris in carne Salvatoris, et pascua intus in divinitate Creatoris. Hoc bonum magnum secutum est malum; quoniam perdito bono quod intus crat, egressa est anima ad bona aliena, quæ foris erant; et pactum fecit cum delectationibus sæculi, rcquiescens super illas, non attendens absentiam boni sui interioris, eo quod consolationes suas cerneret in bonis alienis.
For the human body can neither live nor be born without a rational soul; yet it is nourished and moved and grows and receives the human form in the womb before it receives a rational soul. Just as we see that shoots and plants are moved and have growth without a soul. The life of the soul is indeed twofold: one by which it lives in the flesh, and another by which it lives in God. There are, then, two senses in man, one interior and one exterior, and each has its own good in which it is refreshed. The interior sense is refreshed in the contemplation of divinity, the exterior sense in the contemplation of humanity. For this reason God became man, so that he might beatify the whole man in himself, and the whole conversion of man might be to him, and the whole love of man might be in him, since he is seen by the sense of the flesh through the flesh, and is seen by the sense of the mind through the contemplation of divinity. This, moreover, was the whole good of man, that whether he went in or went out, he might find pasture in his Maker (John 10:9): pasture outside in the flesh of the Savior, and pasture within in the divinity of the Creator. After this great good followed evil; for when the good that was within was lost, the soul went out to alien goods that were outside; and it made a pact with the delights of the world, resting upon them, not attending to the absence of its own interior good, because it saw its consolations in alien goods.
Nam cum exterior sensus carnalis bono suo utitur, interior sensus mentis quasi obdormit. Non enim cognoscit bona interioris sensus, qui jucunditate bonorum exteriorum capitur. Nam qui in carne vivit, in carne sentit, et dolores carnis fugit in quantum potest, vulnera autcm animæ prorsus ignorat, nec medicinam quærit in eis. Cum autem mortuus fuerit sensus animæ, quo vivit in carne, tunc vivificari incipiet sensus ille, quo sentit semetipsum, et tunc sciet dolores suos, et sentire incipiet vulnera sua lanto gravius quanto propius. Magis enim obest malum quod est magis vicinum; et magis prodest bonum quod magis cst intimum.
CAPUT X. Spiritus. Spiritus dicitur multis modis. Dicitur namque Spiritus Deus, et aer iste, et flatus aeris qui a corde receptus st inde per totum corpus emissus mortalium vitam hatu necessario continet. Iste tamen spiritus jure anima dici non potest, quia aeris varietate dissolvitur. Dicitur spiritus anima, sive hominis, sive pecoris. Dicitur spiritus mens rationalis, ubi est quædam scintilla tanquam oculus animæ, ad quem pertinet imago a et cognitio Dei. Oculus animæ est mens ab omni corporis labe pura, mentis aspectus est ratio, intellectus visio. Tria hæc omni animae necessaria sunt: ut sanos oculos habeat, ut aspiciat, ut videat. Sanos oculos habet, cum a mortalium cupiditatibus est purgata atque remota.
For when the exterior carnal sense enjoys its own good, the interior sense of the mind, as it were, falls asleep. For he who is captivated by the pleasantness of exterior goods does not know the goods of the interior sense. For he who lives in the flesh senses in the flesh, and flees the pains of the flesh as far as he can, but utterly ignores the wounds of the soul, nor does he seek medicine for them. But when that sense of the soul by which it lives in the flesh has died, then that sense by which it perceives itself will begin to be made alive, and then it will know its own pains, and will begin to feel its wounds, by so much more grievously as they are nearer. For the evil that is nearer harms more, and the good that is more inward profits more.
CHAPTER X. Spirit. Spirit is spoken of in many ways. For God is called Spirit, and this air, and the breath of air which, received from the heart and sent forth from there through the whole body, necessarily sustains the life of mortals by its breath. Yet this spirit cannot rightly be called the soul, because it is dissolved by the changeableness of the air. The soul is called spirit, whether of man or of beast. The rational mind is called spirit, where there is a certain spark as it were the eye of the soul, to which belongs the image and knowledge of God. The eye of the soul is the mind pure from every stain of the body; the aspect of the mind is reason; the vision of the mind is understanding. These three things are necessary for every soul: that it have sound eyes, that it look, that it see. It has sound eyes when it has been cleansed and removed from the desires of mortals.
Aspicit, cum in Dei lumine contemplationis oculos figit. Videt, cum in illa contemplatione conspicit quanta sint gaudia, quanta lætitia, quanta securitas, quanta sereuitas, ut quanta jucunditas. Sanitas facit illam securam, aspectus rectam, visio beatam. Cum enim fuerit ab omni faece libera. maculisque diluta, tunc se denique in se ipsa libentissime tenet, et nihil sibi metuit, ant ulla sua culpa quidquam angi. tur: et tunc ingenti quadam et incredibili fiducia pergit in Deum, id est, in ipsam contemplationem veritatis; aspectum siquidem rectum sequitur ipsa visio Dei, qui est finis aspectus. Sic anima prius sanatur, sanata introducitur, introducta reficitur 5. Spiritus etiam est quædam vis animae, mente inferior, ubi corporalium rerum similitudines exprimuntur. Nec ipse spiritus corpus est, sed corpori similis. Qua: - enim spiritu videntur, nou sunt corporalia, sed corporalibus similia. Facies siquidem hominis et nobis forinsecus nota est, et in memoria nostra habet imaginem suam, incorporalem quidem, sed corpori similem. Mundi quoque istius mirabilis pulchritudo, ct nobis foris præsto est, et in memoria nostra habet. imaginem suam, incorporaletn quidem, sed corpori similem, ad quam recurrimus cum clausis oculis cam cogitamus.
It gazes when it fixes the eyes of contemplation in the light of God. It sees when in that contemplation it beholds how great are the joys, how great the gladness, how great the security, how great the serenity, and how great the delight. Health makes it secure, sight makes it upright, vision makes it blessed. For when it has been freed from all dregs and washed clean of stains, then at last it holds itself within itself most willingly, and fears nothing for itself, nor is it troubled by any fault of its own. And then with a certain immense and incredible confidence it advances into God, that is, into the contemplation of truth itself; for the right vision of God, who is the end of sight, follows upon upright sight. Thus the soul is first healed, when healed it is brought in, when brought in it is restored. The spirit also is a certain power of the soul, lower than the mind, where the likenesses of corporeal things are expressed. Nor is the spirit itself a body, but like a body. For the things that are seen in the spirit are not corporeal, but like corporeal things. For the face of a man is known to us outwardly, and has its image in our memory—incorporeal indeed, but like a body. The wondrous beauty of this world also is present to us outwardly, and has its image in our memory—incorporeal indeed, but like a body—to which we recur when with closed eyes we think of it.
Quod enim est ad corporis sensum aliquod corpus in loco, hoe est ad aniini aciem similitudo corporis in memoria: et quod est intentio voluntatis ad corpus visum visionemque copulndam, hoc est eadem intentio voluntatis ad copulandam imaginem corporis, quæ est in memoria et visiono cogitantis. Ille spiritus dicitur factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, in quo est cognitio veritatis et amor virtutis. Imago siquidem est in cognitione, et similitudo in dilectione. Imago, quia rationalis; et similitudo, quia spiritualis. Hæret siquidem veritati nulla interposita substantia. Rationale nostrum I, quo ratiocinamur, intelligimus, et sapimus, spiritum dicimus. Hunc autem spiritum Apostolus mentem vocat, cum dicit, Renovamini spiritu mentis vestrœ (Ephes. IV, 23); id est, mente, nihil enim aliud est spiritus mentis, quam mens: sicut corpus carnis, nihil aliud est quam caro.
For what a body in a place is to the sense of the body, that the likeness of a body in memory is to the keenness of the mind; and what the intention of the will is to a body seen and to joining vision to it, that the same intention of the will is to joining the image of a body, which is in the memory, to the vision of the one thinking. That spirit is said to have been made to the image and likeness of God, in which there is knowledge of the truth and love of virtue. The image, indeed, is in knowledge, and the likeness in love. Image, because rational; and likeness, because spiritual. It cleaves to the truth with no substance interposed. Our rational faculty, by which we reason, understand, and are wise, we call spirit. But the Apostle calls this spirit the mind, when he says, Be renewed in the spirit of your mind (Ephesians 4:23); that is, in the mind, for the spirit of the mind is nothing other than the mind, just as the body of the flesh is nothing other than the flesh.
CAPUT XI. Mens unde dicta. Differunt sensus et imaginatio. Dimensio animce. Sapientia. Prudentia. Mens autem dicitur a autem Græce, laLine dicitur luna. Et sicut luna crescit et decrescit, et varia vicissiludinc mutatur, in id tamen quod fuit quadam perfecta novitate se restituit: sic mens nunc caput summis inserit, nunc decidit in infima, nunc sese referens sibi I, veris falsa rcdarguit; modo ad corporalia regenda deflectitur, indo æternis rationibus inspiciendis vel consulendis adhaerescit. Ratio siquidem est mentis aspectus quo honum et malum discernit, virtutes eligit, Deumque diligit. Mens universorum capax, et omnium rerum similitudine insignita, omnia esse dicitur naturali quadam pretentia et naturali dignitate. Idcirco invisibiles rerum causas per intelligentiam comprehendit, et visibiles actualium formas rer sensuum passiones colligit. Et sive per sensus:ul sensibilia exeat, sive per intelligentiam ad invisibilia ascendat, rerum similitudines nd se ipsam trahit, pra:sentia cognoscit, absentia intelligit, ignota inquirit, ct in inveniis versatur. Rationale et intellectuale lumen, quo ratiocinamur, intelligimus et sapimus, mentem dicimus, quæ ita facta est ad imaginem Dei, ut nulia interposita natura ab ipsa veritate formetur. Mens enim ex eo dicta est quod emineat in anima: praestantior siquidem vis animæ est, a qua procedit intelligentia.
CHAPTER XI. Whence the mind is so called. Sense and imagination differ. The dimension of the soul. Wisdom. Prudence. But the mind is called from the Greek word that in Latin is called the moon. And just as the moon grows and wanes, and is changed by various alternations, yet restores itself to what it was in a certain perfect newness: so the mind now raises its head to the highest things, now falls down to the lowest, now returning to itself, refutes false things by true; at one time it is bent to ruling bodily things, at another it clings to the eternal reasons to be inspected or consulted. Reason indeed is the mind's aspect by which it discerns good and evil, chooses virtues, and loves God. The mind, capable of all things and marked with the likeness of all things, is said to be all things by a certain natural pre-eminence and natural dignity. Therefore it comprehends the invisible causes of things through understanding, and gathers the visible forms of actual things or the passions of the senses. And whether it goes out through the senses to sensible things, or ascends through understanding to invisible things, it draws the likenesses of things to itself, knows present things, understands absent things, inquires into unknown things, and is engaged with things found. The rational and intellectual light, by which we reason, understand, and are wise, we call the mind, which is so made to the image of God that, with no nature interposed, it is formed by the truth itself. For the mind is so called because it stands out in the soul: it is indeed the more excellent power of the soul, from which understanding proceeds.
Pcr intelligentiam utique ipsam veritatem intelligit, per sapientiam diligit. Sapientia namque est amor boni sive sapor boni, a sapore siquidem dicitur. Mentis visio est intelligentia; gustus, sapientia est. Ilia contemplatur, ista delectatur. Cum ab inferioribus ad superiora volumus ascendere, prius occurrit nobis seusus, deinde imaginatio, postea ratio, intellectus ct intelligentia, et in summo est sapicntia. Summa namqno sapientia ipse Deus est. Sapientia hominis est pietas, id cst, cultus Dei. Sensus ea vis animae est, quæ rerum corporearum corporeas percipit3 formas præsenles. Imaginatio est ea vis animae, quae rerum corporearum corporeas percipit formas, sed absentes. Sensus namque formas in materia percipit, imaginatio extra materiam: et ea vis qu;e exterius formata, st nsus dicitur, cadem usque ad intimum traducta, imaginatio vocatur. hnagiuntio nanque de sensu oritur, ct secundum ejus diversitates ipsius quoque est variatio. Multa videt aninia carnalibus oculis, multa etium phantasticaimaginatione concipit: et ubique quasi diffunditur movetur, erigitur, et fluctuare videtur: DOn a se egrediens, sed in semetipsa tanquam in magno percurrens spatio pervagatur; et non exit ad illa, sed tractatibus suis sibi illa repræsentat. Habet siquidem in fe quasi quamdam latitudinem, longitudinem et altitudinem.
Through understanding, certainly, it understands truth itself; through wisdom, it loves it. For wisdom is the love of the good, or the savor of the good—indeed it is called from "savor." The vision of the mind is understanding; the taste, wisdom. The one contemplates, the other delights. When we wish to ascend from lower things to higher, first sense meets us, then imagination, afterward reason, intellect, and understanding, and at the summit is wisdom. For the highest wisdom is God Himself. The wisdom of man is piety, that is, the worship of God. Sense is that power of the soul which perceives the bodily forms of bodily things that are present. Imagination is that power of the soul which perceives the bodily forms of bodily things, but absent. For sense perceives forms in matter, imagination outside matter; and the same power which, formed outwardly, is called sense, when brought inward even to the inmost part, is called imagination. For imagination arises from sense, and according to its diversities there is also a variation of it. The soul sees many things with carnal eyes, and conceives many things also by phantastic imagination; and everywhere, as it were, it is diffused, is moved, is raised up, and seems to fluctuate. Not going out from itself, but running through within itself as though through a great space, it wanders about; and it does not go out to those things, but by its own workings represents them to itself. It has, indeed, within itself, as it were, a certain breadth, length, and height.
Nam per charitatem Deum et omnes sibi fulcies complectitur; per meditationem universa quæ a principio mundi usque ad finem Deus propter salutem nostram operatus est meditatur; per contemplationem quæ sursuln sunt cœlestia contemplatur. Ratio est ea vis animnr, quæ rerum corporearum naturas, formas, differentias, propria et accidentia percipit: omnia incorporea, sed non extra corpora, nisi ratione subsistentia. Abstrahit enim a corporibus, quæ fundantur in corporibus, non actione, sed consideratione. Natura namque ipsius corporis secundum quod omne corpus corpus est, nullum utique corpus est. Intellectus ea vis animæ est, quæ invisibilia percipit, sicut Angelos, dæmones, animas, et omnem spirituln creatum. Intelligentia ea vis animæ cst, quae immediate supponitur Deo: cernit siquidem ipsum summum verum et vere incommutabilem. Sic igilur aniina sensu percipit corpora, imaginatione corporum similitudines, ratione corporum naturas, intellectu spiritum creatum, intelligentia spiritum increatum. Et quidquid sensus percipit, imaginatio repraesentat, cogitatio format, ingenium investigat, ratio judicat, memoria servat, intellectus separat, intelligentia comprehendit, et ad meditationem sive contemplationem adducit. Ingenium est vis ea animæ, sive intenlio, qua anima se extendit et exercet ad incognitorum cognilioncm.
For through charity it embraces God and all things that are dependent on him; through meditation it meditates on all things that God, from the beginning of the world even to the end, has wrought for our salvation; through contemplation it contemplates the things that are above, the heavenly things. Reason is that power of the soul which perceives the natures, forms, differences, properties, and accidents of corporeal things: all incorporeal things, but not apart from bodies, subsisting only by reason. For it abstracts from bodies those things that are founded in bodies, not by action but by consideration. For the nature of the body itself, according as every body is a body, is certainly no body. Intellect is that power of the soul which perceives invisible things, such as angels, demons, souls, and every created spirit. Intelligence is that power of the soul which is immediately subject to God: it discerns indeed the supreme true and truly unchangeable itself. Thus, then, the soul perceives bodies by sense, the likenesses of bodies by imagination, the natures of bodies by reason, created spirit by intellect, uncreated spirit by intelligence. And whatever sense perceives, imagination represents, thought forms, ingenuity investigates, reason judges, memory preserves, intellect separates, intelligence comprehends, and leads to meditation or contemplation. Ingenuity is that power or intention of the soul by which the soul extends and exercises itself toward the knowledge of unknown things.
Ingenium siquidem exquiritincognita, ratio discernit inventa, memoria recondit judicata, et offert adhuc judicanda. Sic lit ascensus ab inferioribus ad superiora, et ima a summis dependent. Intellectus namque qunedam imago et similitudo intelligentiæ est, ratio intellectus, rationis phantasticum spiritus, cui etiam supremum corporis corpus, id est, ignis quadam similitudine jungitur, ct igni aer, et acri aqua, ct aquae 'terra. Sensus informat imaginationem, imaginatio rationem, facitque ratio scientiam sive prudentiam. Rursum rationi occurrenf divina prudentia, informateam, ct tacit intelligentiam sive sapientiam. Est itaque in ratione quiddam ad superna et coelestia intendens, et id dicitur sapientia; et est quiddam ad transitoria et caduca respiciens, et id vocatur prudenti:.. Hæc duo ex ratione sunt, et in ratione consistunt. Et dividit se ratio in dno, scilicet in seorsum ct deorsum: sursum, in sapientiam; deorsum, in prudentiam; quasi in virum et mulierem, ut vir sit superior et regat, mulier inferior et rcgalur. Unde dicium est: Melior eat iniquitas viri, quam benefaciens mulier (Eccli. XLII, 14). Melior siquidem cat qui per cœleste desiderium accensus, carnem necessai ia etiam ci subtrahendo affligit, quam qni per carnalem affectum resolutus, per omnia quae commoda sunt ei satisfacere contendit.
Indeed, the ingenium seeks out unknown things, reason discerns what has been found, memory stores away what has been judged, and offers what still remains to be judged. Thus there is an ascent from lower things to higher, and the lowest things depend on the highest. For the intellect is a certain image and likeness of intelligence, reason of the intellect, the phantastic spirit of reason, to which also the highest body of the body, that is, fire, is joined by a certain likeness, and air to fire, and water to air, and earth to water. Sense informs the imagination, the imagination informs reason, and reason produces knowledge or prudence. Again, divine prudence meeting reason informs it, and makes it intelligence or wisdom. And so there is in reason something reaching toward things above and heavenly, and this is called wisdom; and there is something looking toward things transitory and falling, and this is called prudence. These two are from reason and consist in reason. And reason divides itself in two, namely, into upward and downward: upward into wisdom, downward into prudence; as it were into man and woman, so that the man be the superior and rule, the woman the inferior and be ruled. Whence it is said: Better is the iniquity of a man than a woman doing good (Ecclus. 42:14). For better is he who, inflamed by heavenly desire, afflicts the flesh even by withholding from it what is necessary, than he who, dissolved by carnal affection, strives to satisfy it in all things that are agreeable.
CAPUT XII. Sensus et ejus opus. Sensus juvatur exterius; quia oculus carnis, quamvis ex natura facultatem videndi habeat, nunquam tamen per se consequitur visionem, nee auris auditum nisi es beneficio exterioris lucis ct soni. Imaginatio juvatur exterius a; quia ex sensibilibus concipitur. Ratio juva. tur iulcrius; quia etsi spiritus rationalis ex dono Creatoris habilis est ad cognoscendum vcrum et diligendum bonum, tamen nisi interioris lucis radio Grerit perfusus et calore succensus, nunquam consequitur sapientiæ cognitionem vel charitatis affectum. Intellectus et intelligentia juvantur superius; quia Deus jguis et lux est (I Joan. I, 5). Lux ergo splendorem emittens ex se, quem retinetin se, illuminat intelligentiam ad cognitianem verilatis. Ignis vero calorem de se emittens, sed non amittens, inflammat affectum ad amorem virtulis. Et sicut solern non vidct oculus nisi in lumine solis; sic verum ac divinum lumen non poterit intelligentia videre nisi in ipsius lumine. Domine, inquit propheta, in lumine tuo videbimus lumen (Psal. XXXV, 10). Cum enim mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem, et corruptibile boc induerit incorruptibilitatem (I Cor. xv, 54), tunc mente pariter et corpore spirituales effecti, secundum modulum nostrum per mentis illuminationem omnia sciemus, ct per corporis incorruptibilis levitatem ubiqueesse poterimus.
CHAPTER XII. Sense and Its Work. Sense is aided from without, because the eye of the flesh, although it has from nature the faculty of seeing, nevertheless never attains vision by itself, nor does the ear attain hearing except by the benefit of exterior light and sound. Imagination is aided from without, because it is conceived from sensible things. Reason is aided from within, because although the rational spirit is by the gift of the Creator capable of knowing the true and loving the good, nevertheless unless it has been pervaded by the ray of interior light and kindled by its heat, it never attains the knowledge of wisdom or the affection of charity. Intellect and understanding are aided from above, because God is fire and light (1 John 1:5). The light, therefore, emitting splendor from itself, which it retains in itself, illuminates the understanding for the knowledge of truth. But the fire, emitting heat from itself but not losing it, inflames the affection for the love of virtue. And just as the eye does not see the sun except in the light of the sun, so the understanding will not be able to see the true and divine light except in its own light. Lord, says the prophet, in your light we shall see light (Psalm 35:10). For when this mortal shall have put on immortality, and this corruptible shall have put on incorruption (1 Corinthians 15:54), then, having been made spiritual in mind and body alike, according to our measure we shall know all things through the illumination of the mind, and through the lightness of the incorruptible body we shall be able to be everywhere.
Volabimus mente per contemplationem, volabimuset corpore per incorruptionem. Discernemus mente, discernemus et corpore, cum sensus nostri rorporci vertentur in rationem, ratio in intellectum, intellectus in intelligentiam, intelligentia in Deum mutabitur '. Sensu visibilia percipiuntur, in imaginatione continentur visibilium imagines et similitudines, ad rationem pertinent visibilium rationes ct definitiones et invisibilium investigationes, ad intellectum et intelligentiam spectant spiritualium et divinorum comprehensionca et contemplationes. Sensus vero et imaginatio ad rationem non ascendunt, sed infra remanentes cam aliquatenus deducerc possunt, et quasi a longe quædam ostendere, ad quae non possunt pervcnire. Simili quadam proportione intellectum et intelligentiam ratio juvare potest, sed ad statum eorum non valet ascendere, quoniarn metas suas et proprios fines habet, quos transcendere non potest. Sensum et imaginationem cum caeteris animalibus communem habemus: vident siquidem visibilia, et visorum re. cordantur. In quibusdam etiam sensibus nos superant: quoniam justum fuit ut brulis animalibus, quibus nil dandum erat ill intellectu, aliquid amplius daretur in sensu. Et e contrario tanto major necessitas indicitur homini exercendæ rationis, quanto majorem defectum patitur sensualitatis.
We shall fly by the mind through contemplation, and we shall fly also in the body through incorruption. We shall discern by the mind, and we shall discern also in the body, when our bodily senses are turned into reason, reason into understanding, understanding into intelligence, and intelligence is changed into God. By sense visible things are perceived; in the imagination the images and likenesses of visible things are contained; to reason belong the principles and definitions of visible things and the investigations of invisible things; to understanding and intelligence belong the comprehensions and contemplations of spiritual and divine things. But sense and imagination do not ascend to reason, but remaining below they can to some extent lead one toward it and, as it were from afar, point out certain things which they cannot reach. By a similar proportion reason can aid understanding and intelligence, but it cannot ascend to their state, since it has its own boundaries and proper limits, which it cannot transcend. We have sense and imagination in common with the other animals: for they see visible things and remember what they have seen. In certain senses they even surpass us, since it was just that brute animals, to which nothing was to be given in understanding, should be given something more in sense. And on the contrary, the greater the defect of sensuality a man suffers, the greater the necessity imposed on him of exercising reason.
Ratio autem inde incipit, uude aliquid occurrii, quod nobis cum animalibus non sit commune. Quædam ergo sunt infra rationem, qua'dam juxta rationem, quædam supra rationem. Infra rationum sunt quae sensu percipimus, sicut dura et mollia, calida et frigida, candida et nigra, dulcia et amara. Juxta rationem sunt et pervia rationi, quæratione percipimus, sicut commoda et incommoda, vera et falsa, justa et injusta. Ratio siquidem est quidam animi motus, visum I mentis acuens, veraque a falsis distinguens. Supra rationem sunt quæ nec sensus docet, nec ratio persuadet, sed aut divina revelatione comprehenduntur, aut divinarum Scripturarum auctoritate creduntur, sicut Deum in unasubstantia trinum, cl in tribus personis substantialiter unum. Deus siquidem est rcrum universitas, ita quod nulla singnlarum: et ideo motibus rationis non subjacet, qnia ratio non est nisi de re aliqna.
But reason begins from that point where something occurs to us that is not shared with animals. Some things, then, are below reason, some alongside reason, some above reason. Below reason are the things we perceive by sense, such as hard and soft, hot and cold, white and black, sweet and bitter. Alongside reason, and accessible to reason, are the things we perceive by reason, such as advantages and disadvantages, true and false, just and unjust. Reason is indeed a certain movement of the mind, sharpening the keen edge of mental sight and distinguishing true things from false. Above reason are the things that neither sense teaches nor reason persuades, but that are either grasped by divine revelation or believed on the authority of the divine Scriptures, such as that God is three in one substance and substantially one in three persons. God is indeed the universality of things, in such a way that he is none of the individual things; and therefore he does not fall under the movements of reason, since reason is only about some particular thing.
CAPUT XIII. Animæ definitio. Actiones. Simplicitas. Potentiæ. Vires. Anima est spiritus intellectualis, rationalis, semper vivens, semper in motu, bonæ malæque voluntatis capax: secundum benignitatem Creatoris atque secundum sui operis officium variis nuncupatur nominibus. Dicitur namque anima, duni vegetat; spiritus, dum contemplatur: senus, dum sentit; animus, dum sapit; dum intelligit, mens; dum discernit, ratio; dum recordatur, memoria; dum consentit, voluntas. Ista tamen non differunt in substantia,quemadmodum in nominibus; quoniam omnia ista una anima est: proprietates quidem diversæ, sed essentia una. In spiritu tamen et anima potest esse differentia; quia omnis anima est spiritus, sed non omnis spiritus eslanima. Anime duplices sunt actiones. Alio namque consilio erigitur ad Deum, atquo alio inclinatur ad carnem. Inclinatur autem sic. Cum sit subtilis cL invisibilis, videri non potest, sed per potentias suas se expendit et ostendit. Per concupiscibilitatem namque appetit, per irascibilitatem eontemnit, per rationalitatem inter utrumque discernit. Tota animæ essentia in his potentiis suis consistit, nec prr partes dividitur, cum simplex sit et individua: et si aliquando partes habere dicitur ratione potius similitudinis, quam veritate compositionis intelligendum est. Simplex substantia cstanima, nee aliud, nec minus est ratio in substantia quam auilna; nec aliud, nec.
CHAPTER XIII. Definition of the soul. Its actions. Its simplicity. Its powers. Its forces. The soul is an intellectual spirit, rational, always living, always in motion, capable of good and evil will: according to the goodness of the Creator and according to the office of its own work it is called by various names. For it is called soul, while it gives life; spirit, while it contemplates; sense, while it perceives; mind, while it has understanding; intellect, while it understands; reason, while it discerns; memory, while it remembers; will, while it consents. Yet these do not differ in substance as they do in name, since all these are one soul: the properties are indeed diverse, but the essence is one. There can, however, be a difference between spirit and soul, because every soul is a spirit, but not every spirit is a soul. The soul's actions are twofold. For by one counsel it is raised up to God, and by another it is inclined toward the flesh. It is inclined thus: since it is subtle and invisible, it cannot be seen, but through its powers it expends and shows itself. For through concupiscibility it desires, through irascibility it despises, through rationality it discerns between the two. The whole essence of the soul consists in these its powers, nor is it divided into parts, since it is simple and indivisible; and if at some time it is said to have parts, this is to be understood by reason of likeness rather than by the truth of composition. The soul is a simple substance, nor is reason in substance other than the soul, nor less; nor other, nor.
minus est irascibilitas vel concupiscibilitas quam anima: sed una eademque substantia secundum diversas potentias diversa sortitur vocabula. Has potentias habet antequam corpori misceatur. Naturales siquidem sint ei, nec aliud sunt quam ipsn. Tota namque animæ substantia in his tribus plena et perfecta consistit, id est, in rationalitate, concupiscibilitate et irascibilitate, quasi quadam sua trinitate; et tota haec trinitas est quaedam animæ unitas, et ipsa anima. Deus est omnia sua, et anima quædam sua. Habet siquidem naturalia, et ipsa omnia cst. Potentiae namque ejus et vires idem. sunt quod ipsa. Habet accidentalia, et ipsa non est. Suæ vires est, suæ virtutes non est. Non enim est sua prudentia, sua temperantia, sua fortitudo, sua justitia. Potentiæ animae sunt, ra. tionalitas, concupiscibilitas, et irascibilitas. Vires sunt, sensus, imaginatio, ratio, memoria, intellectus, intelligentia. Potentiæ tamen possunt dici vires, et vires potentiæ.
The irascibility or concupiscibility is less than the soul; but one and the same substance receives different names according to its different powers. It has these powers before it is united to the body. For they are natural to it, and are nothing other than itself. For the whole substance of the soul consists full and perfect in these three, that is, in rationality, concupiscibility, and irascibility, as in a kind of trinity of its own; and this whole trinity is a certain unity of the soul, and the soul itself. God is all that is his, and the soul is certain things that are its own. For it has natural properties, and all these it is. For its powers and forces are the same as itself. It has accidental properties, and these it is not. It is its own forces, but not its own virtues. For it is not its own prudence, its own temperance, its own fortitude, its own justice. The powers of the soul are rationality, concupiscibility, and irascibility. The forces are sense, imagination, reason, memory, intellect, intelligence. Yet the powers can be called forces, and the forces powers.
CAPUT XIV. Animæ et corporis amicitia. Coniunctiones tres miræ. Quod corporis bonum, quod animæ. Quibusdam affectibus et quadam aMicitia anima corpori conjungitur, secundum quam amicitiam nemo carnem suam odio habet. Sociata namque illi, licet ejus socielate prægravetur, ineflabili tamen conditione diligit illud; amat carcerem suum, et ideo libera esse non potest. Doloribus ejus vehementer afficitur. Formidat interitum, quae mori non potest. Timet defectum quæ per naturam non potest deficere. Oculorum depascitur speculatione, sonoris deleetatur auditibus, suavissimis jucundatur odoribus, larga epulatione reficitur. Et licet his rebus nullatenus ipsa utatur, gravi tamen mærore allligilur, H subtrahantur. Hinc etiam nonnuuquam subrepunt vilia contraria rationi, dum anima dilecto corpori indulgentius remittendo, locum noscitur præbere peccalo. Per sensus quoque progreditur anima ad corpus movendum et vivificandum. Novem namquc sunt foramina in humano corpore, quibus secundum naturalem contemperantiam influit et effluit omne quo idem corpus vegetatur et regitur. Sunt etiam utriusque quxdam similia, corporis scilicet supremum, et spiritus infirmum, in quibus sine naturarum confusione, personali tamen unione facile connecti possunt. Similia enim similibus gaudent.
CHAPTER XIV. The friendship of soul and body. Three wondrous conjunctions. What is the good of the body, what of the soul. By certain affections and a certain friendship the soul is joined to the body, according to which friendship no one hates his own flesh. For having been united to it, although she is burdened by its companionship, yet by an ineffable condition she loves it; she loves her prison, and therefore cannot be free. She is vehemently affected by its pains. She dreads destruction, though she cannot die. She fears failure, though by nature she cannot fail. She is fed by the contemplation of the eyes, delighted by melodious hearings, cheered by the sweetest odors, refreshed by lavish feasting. And although she herself in no way uses these things, yet she is afflicted with heavy grief when they are withdrawn. Hence also sometimes base things contrary to reason creep in, while the soul, indulging the beloved body too generously, is known to give occasion to sin. Through the senses also the soul proceeds to move and vivify the body. For there are nine openings in the human body, through which, according to a natural tempering, flows in and out everything by which the same body is nourished and governed. There are also certain similarities of both, namely of the body's highest part and of the spirit's lowest, in which, without confusion of natures, yet by personal union, they can easily be connected. For like things rejoice in like things.
Itaque anima quae vero spiritus est, et caro quæ vere corpus cst, in suis extremitatibus facile ct convenienter uniuntur, id est, in phantastico animae, quod corpus non est, sed simile corpori; et sensualitate carnis quæ fere spiritus est 1, quia sine anima fieri non potest. Sicut enimsupremum animae, id est, intelligentia sive mens imaginem et similitudinem gerit sui superioris, id est Dei, unde ei ejus susceptiva esse potuit, et ad unionem personalem etiam, quando ipse voluit, absque ulla demutatione naturae fuit assumpta: sic supremum earnis, idest, sensoalitas animae,ge. rens similitudinem ad personalem umonem ejus essentiam suscipere potest. Nec istud mirnm est, cum etiam in sensu et memoria pccudis sit quædam imitatio rationalitatis, et in appetitu voluntatis, et in iis quae refugit, reprobationis. Spiritus namque corporeus, qui utique vcre est corpus et sensu naturali inter multa discernit, et vi concupiscibilitatis eligit, et natura irascibilitatis reprobat. Habet siquidem corporea vita quosdam gradus incrementorum, quibiu ad imaginem summæ vitæ proficit. Primus enim gra. dus corporeæ vitae est sensificatio. Secundus, per sensum ingredicns imaginatio. Tertius, per imaginationem conceptorum memoria. Quartus, secundum senpuum passiones quædam sine discretione intelligentiae providentia, in qua quidcm quasi rationis imago est, et nulla ratioest.
CHAPTER XIV. Therefore the soul, which is truly spirit, and the flesh, which is truly body, are easily and fittingly united at their outermost limits—that is, in the phantastic part of the soul, which is not body but like body, and in the sensuality of the flesh, which is almost spirit, since it cannot exist without the soul. For just as the highest part of the soul, that is, the intelligence or mind, bears the image and likeness of its superior, that is, God, whence it was able to be receptive of him, and was assumed into personal union with him, when he willed it, without any change of nature: so the highest part of the flesh, that is, the sensuality of the soul, bearing a likeness unto personal union, can receive his essence. Nor is this wonderful, since even in the sense and memory of a beast there is a certain imitation of rationality, and in the appetite of the will, and in the things it shuns, of reprobation. For the corporeal spirit, which is truly body, both discerns among many things by natural sense, and chooses by the power of concupiscibility, and rejects by the nature of irascibility. Indeed, corporeal life has certain degrees of increase, by which it advances toward the image of the highest life. For the first degree of corporeal life is sensation. The second, imagination entering through sense. The third, memory of things conceived through imagination. The fourth, certain passions according to the senses without the discretion of intelligence, a providence in which there is, as it were, an image of reason, and no reason.
In his omnibus corpo rea vita spiritualem vitaro imiialur. Primo, in eo quod sentit; secundo, in eo quod sensum concipit; tertio, in eo quod concepta retinet; quarto, in eo quod sive in imaginatis, sive in sensibus secundumquamdam rationis simiHtudincm, sive ad appetendum, sive ad fugiendum se inflectit. Convenientissima autem media sunt carnis et animæ, sensualitas carnis, quæ maxime ignis est; et phantasticum spiritus, qui igneus vigor dicitur. Unde et quidam loquens de animabus ait: Igneus est ollis vigor et coelestis origo. (Virgilius, Æneid. tib. 6, vers. 730.)
Mira societas carnis et animæ, spiritus vitæet limi terræ. Sic enim scriptum est, Fecit Deus hominem de limo terrce; et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitæ (Gen. II, 7): dans ei sensum et intellectum, ut per sensum lutum sibi sociatum vivificaret, etper intellectum regeret; et ut per intellectum intus ingrederetur et contemplaretur Dei sapientiam et per sensum foris egrederetur, et contemplaretur opera sapientiæ, intellectu intus illustravit, sensu foris decoravit, ut in utroque refectionem inveniret, intusad felicitatem, foris ad jucunditatem. Sed quia bona exteriora diu stare non possunt, jussus est homo ab exterioribus ad interiora redire, et ab interioribus ad superiora ascendere. Tanix siquidem dignitatis est humana conditio, ut nullum bonum præter summum ci sufficere possit.
In all these things bodily life imitates the spiritual life. First, in that it senses; second, in that it receives the sense; third, in that it retains what it has received; fourth, in that it turns itself, whether toward things imagined or toward the senses, according to a certain likeness of reason, either to seeking or to fleeing. Now the most fitting intermediaries between flesh and soul are the sensuality of the flesh, which is chiefly fire, and the phantastic [part] of the spirit, which is called fiery vigor. Whence also one speaking of souls says: Fiery is their vigor and heavenly their origin. (Virgil, Aeneid 6, line 730.)
A wondrous fellowship of flesh and soul, of the spirit of life and the mud of the earth. For thus it is written, God made man of the mud of the earth; and he breathed into his face the breath of life (Gen. 2:7): giving him sense and intellect, so that through sense he might give life to the mud joined to him, and through intellect might rule it; and so that through intellect he might enter within and contemplate the wisdom of God, and through sense go forth outside and contemplate the works of wisdom. Within, he illumined him with intellect; outside, he adorned him with sense, so that in both he might find refreshment—within unto felicity, outside unto delight. But because external goods cannot long endure, man was commanded to return from external things to internal, and to ascend from internal things to higher things. So great indeed is the dignity of the human condition that no good apart from the highest can suffice for it.
Plenum fuit miraculo, quod tam diversa et tam divisa ab invicem, ad invicem potuerunt conjungi. Nec minus mirabile fuitquod limo nostro Deus se ipsum conjunxit, ut sibi invicem unirentur Deus et limus, tanta subli. mitas, tanta vilitas. Nihil enim est Deo sublimius, ct nihil limo vilius. Mirabilis fuit conjunctio prima, mirabilis ctsecunda, ncc minus mirabilis crit tertia, cum homo et angelus et Deus, unus erit spiritus. Eodem namqne bono bonus est homo, quo bonus cst angelus, eodemque bono uterque est bcatus, si tamen ambo idipsum eadem voluntate eodemque spiritu cupiunt. Si enim tam disparcm carnis ct animae naturam ad unam confoederationem atque amiciliam Deus conjungere potuit, nequaquam erit ci impossibile rationalem spiritum, qui usque ad consortium terreni corporis humiliatus est, cum eodem corpore glorificato, utsit ei glorier quod fuit ei ircinæ, ad consortium beatorum spirituum, qui in sua puritatc perstiterunt, exaltare et usque ad su:c glorim participationemsublimare. Ad boc siquidcm i!lum sola charitate, nulla necessitate crcavit Altissimus, ut suæ beatitudinis participemfaceret. Si ergo tantum gaudium et tanta lætitia cst in vita ista temporali, quae constat ex præsentia spiritus in corpore corruptibili; quanta lætitia et quantum gaudium crit in vita aLterna, quæ constabit cx præsentia Deitatis in spiritu rationali?
It was full of wonder that things so diverse and so divided from one another could be joined to one another. Nor was it any less wonderful that God joined Himself to our clay, so that God and clay might be united to each other—such great sublimity, such great vileness. For nothing is more sublime than God, and nothing is more vile than clay. Wonderful was the first conjunction, wonderful also the second, and no less wonderful will be the third, when man and angel and God will be one spirit. For by the same good a man is good by which an angel is good, and by the same good both are blessed, if indeed both desire the same thing with the same will and the same spirit. For if God could join together natures of flesh and soul so disparate into one confederation and friendship, it will by no means be impossible for Him to exalt the rational spirit, which was humbled even to the fellowship of an earthly body, together with that same body glorified—so that what was once a burden to it may be a glory to it—into the fellowship of the blessed spirits who persevered in their purity, and to raise it up even to participation in their glory. For to this end the Most High created it by love alone, with no necessity, that He might make it a partaker of His own blessedness. If, therefore, there is such great joy and such great gladness in this temporal life, which consists in the presence of the spirit in a corruptible body, how great a gladness and how great a joy will there be in eternal life, which will consist in the presence of the Godhead in the rational spirit?
Subjiciatur ergo corpus animo, animusDeo; ct unus spiritus crit cum eo: ita tamen si in humilllatc permanserit, et graHam sui Creatoris, per quam exaltandus et glorificandus est agnoverit.
Ex carne et anima constat homo, et utrumque bonum suum habet, in quo gaudet ut exsultat. Bonum animae est Deus, rum affluentia dulcedinis sua. Bonum carnis est mundus, cum abundantia jucunditatis suæ. Sed mundus iste est exterior. Deus autem interior. Nihil cnim eo interius, ct nihil eo praesentius. Interior est omni re, quia in ipso sunt omnia: exteriur est omnire, quia ipse est super omnia. Ab hoc ergo mundo ad Deum revertentes, et quasi ab imo sursum ascendentes per nosmetipsos transire debemus. Ascendere enim ad Deum, est intrare ad se ipsum; et non solum ad se intrare, sed ineflabili quodam modo in intimis, se ipsum transire. Qui enim interius intrans ct intrinsecus penetrans se ipsum transcendit, ille veraciter ad Deum ascendit. Ab hujus ergo mundi distractionibus cor nostrum colligamus, et ad interiora gaudia revocemus. Et si cor nostrum semper tcnere non possumus, saltem ab illicitis et vanis cogitationibus restringamus, ut aliquando in divinæ contemplationis lumine figere valeamus. Hæc est enim requies cordis nostri, cum in Dei amorc per desiderium figitur. Hæc cst vita cordis nostri, cum Deum suum contemplatur, et ipsa sua contemplatione suaviter reficitur.
Let the body therefore be subject to the soul, and the soul to God; and it shall be one spirit with Him: yet only if it remains in humility and acknowledges the grace of its Creator, through which it is to be exalted and glorified.
Man consists of flesh and soul, and each has its own good, in which it rejoices and exults. The good of the soul is God, with the abundance of His sweetness. The good of the flesh is the world, with the abundance of its pleasantness. But this world is outward, whereas God is inward. For nothing is more inward than He, and nothing more present than He. He is more inward than all things, because all things are in Him; He is more outward than all things, because He is above all things. Returning therefore from this world to God, and ascending as it were from the lowest to the heights, we must pass through ourselves. For to ascend to God is to enter into oneself; and not only to enter into oneself, but in some ineffable manner, in one's inmost being, to pass beyond oneself. For he who, entering within and penetrating inwardly, transcends himself, truly ascends to God. Let us therefore gather our heart from the distractions of this world, and recall it to inward joys. And if we cannot hold our heart always, let us at least restrain it from unlawful and vain thoughts, so that at some time we may be able to fix it in the light of divine contemplation. For this is the rest of our heart, when through desire it is fixed in the love of God. This is the life of our heart, when it contemplates its God, and is sweetly refreshed by that very contemplation.
Et dulce est illi semper ad considerandum, quod ad amandum et laudandum semper cst suave. Nihil enim ad beatam vitam pra;stantius videtur, quam velut clausis carnalibus sensibus extra carnem mundumque effectum qucmpiam intra semetipsum converti, alienulnque effectum a mortalium cupiditatibus sibi soli et Deo loqui.
CAPUT XV. Corpus qui ab anima regatur. Corporis compositio. Ex ejus temperie vei confusione quid sequatur. Cum anima sit incorporea, per subtiliorem naturam corporis sui, id est, per ignem et aerem quæ in isto quoque mundo præcellentia sunt corpora, ct idco magis spiritui similiora, corpus administrat. Ista siquidem priora excipiunt nutus aninævivificantis, eoquod incorporeæ naturx sunt propinquiora quam humor et terra, ut ad corum proximum ministerium tola moles administretur. Nullus sinc bis duobus vel in corpore sensus est, vel ab anima spontaneus corporis motus. Ignis enim ct aer, quælevia sunt, movent aquam et terram quae gravia sunt. Quapropter corpora etiam post animæ abscesgum moveri videmus; quia ignis et aer, quae duo per animæ præsentiam tenentur in corpore terreno ct humido, ut omnium quatuor fiat temperatio, post ejusdcm animae abscessum ad superna evadunt ac sese expediunt. Corporis autem compositio sic fit.
And it is always sweet for it to consider what is always pleasant to love and to praise. For nothing seems more excellent for the blessed life than, with the bodily senses as it were closed, to be drawn apart from the flesh and the world and to turn oneself within oneself, and, made alien to the desires of mortals, to speak to oneself alone and to God.
CHAPTER XV. That the body is ruled by the soul. The composition of the body. What follows from its temperament or its confusion. Since the soul is incorporeal, it administers the body through the subtler nature of its body, that is, through fire and air, which in this world also are the more excellent bodies, and therefore more like to the spirit. For these, being nearer to the incorporeal nature than moisture and earth, first receive the nods of the life-giving soul, so that through their nearest service the whole mass may be administered. Without these two there is no sense in the body, nor any spontaneous movement of the body from the soul. For fire and air, which are light, move water and earth, which are heavy. Wherefore we see bodies moved even after the departure of the soul, because fire and air, which two are held within the earthly and moist body by the presence of the soul, so that a tempering of all four may be made, after the departure of that same soul escape to things above and free themselves. Now the composition of the body is made as follows.
Corpus constat ex officialibus membris, oflicialia ex consimilibus, consimilia ex humoribus, humores ex cibis, cibi ex elementis; ct nihil horum est anima, sed in istis tanquam in organis agit, et per haec consulit corpori, et huic vitae in qua factus est homo in aniinam viventem. Quæ cum temperata et ordinata fuerint, congruunt vivificationi, et nunquam recedit aninia. Si vero distemperata et confusa fuerint, invita recedit anima, secum trahens omnia; sensum sciliret, imaginationem, rationem, intellectum, intelligentiam, concupiscibilitatem, et irascibilitatem: et px his secundum merita afficitur ad delectationem, sive ad dolorem. Corpus autem quod prius integrum tanquam organum contemperatum ct dispositum erat, ut melos musicum in se contineret et tactum resonarct, tunc confractum et inutile ercgione jacet. Anima vcro recurrentibus ad regiones suas elementnrum partibus, non habens ubi vires suas exerccat, requiescit ab his tantum motibus, quibus corpus per tempus et locum movebat, ipsa per tempus illocaliter mota: quoniam etsi organum periit, sed non melos, nec quod organum movebat. Anima inter Deum et corpus posita per tempus movetur, vel reminiscendo quod oblita fuerat, vel discendo quod ignorabat, vel volendo quod nolebat: per locum vero non movetur, quia per loci spatia non distenditur.
The body consists of its official members, the official members of like parts, the like parts of humors, the humors of foods, the foods of the elements; and none of these is the soul, but it acts in them as in organs, and through these it provides for the body, and for this life in which man was made into a living soul. When these things have been tempered and ordered, they are suited to vivification, and the soul never withdraws. But if they have been distempered and confused, the soul withdraws unwillingly, drawing all things with it—namely sensation, imagination, reason, intellect, intelligence, concupiscibility, and irascibility—and from these it is affected according to its merits toward delight or toward pain. But the body, which previously was whole as an organ tempered and disposed to contain a musical melody within itself and to resound to the touch, then lies broken and useless in its region. But the soul, when the parts of the elements have returned to their regions, having nowhere to exercise its powers, rests from those motions only by which it moved the body through time and place, itself moved through time without place; since even if the organ has perished, yet not the melody, nor that which moved the organ. The soul, placed between God and the body, is moved through time—either by remembering what it had forgotten, or by learning what it did not know, or by willing what it did not will; but it is not moved through place, because it is not extended through the spaces of a place.
Deus autem corpore I non eget ut sit; nec luco, ut alicubi; nec tempore, ut aliquando; nee causa, ut ahcunde; nee forma, ut aliquid sit; nec aliquo genere subjecti in quo subsistat, vel cui assistat.
CAPUT XVI. Animæ charitate ornatce præstantin. Habet anima quamdam propriam naturam, omnibus his mundanæ molis elementis excellentiorem, quæ veraciter non possit in aliqua phantasia corporalium imaginum, quas per sensus carnis percipimus cogitari; sed mente intelligi, vitaque sentiri. Intelligi potest, sentiri non potest. Non enim est corpus, nec Deus, nee vita sine sensu, qualis est in arboribus; nee vita sine rationali icente, qualis est in animalibus; sed vita et vita perpetua, Nunc quidem minor quam Angelorum est, et futura qualis Angelorum, si ex præcepto sui Creatoris vixerit. Praeceptum autem ejus est, ut in dilectione cjus mamamus: Manete, inquit, in dilectione mea (Joan. xv, 9). Pcr dilectionem namque sibi rationalem creaturam copulavit, ut eum semper haberet, et in ipso maneret, de eo et in eo delectans, gaudens et exsultans. Pcr dilectionem Creatori suo et sibi invicem rationalis crcatura copulata est; Solum mamque dilectionis vinculum est, quod ligat utrosque in idipsum. Per amorem Dei omnes ei adhæremus; per amorem proximi omnes ad invicem unum sumus; ut bonuin commune omnium liat singulorum, et quod quisque in se non habet in altero possideat.
God, however, does not need a body in order to exist, nor a place in order to be somewhere, nor time in order to be at some time, nor a cause in order to be from somewhere, nor a form in order to be something, nor any kind of subject in which to subsist or to which to be present.
CHAPTER XVI. The pre-eminence of a soul adorned with charity. The soul has a certain nature of its own, more excellent than all these elements of the worldly mass, which truly cannot be thought in any phantasm of bodily images that we perceive through the senses of the flesh, but can be understood by the mind and felt by life. It can be understood, it cannot be felt. For it is not a body, nor is it God, nor is it life without sensation, such as is in trees; nor life without rational light, such as is in animals; but it is life, and life perpetual. Now indeed it is less than that of the angels, and it will be such as that of the angels, if it has lived according to the precept of its Creator. His precept, moreover, is that we remain in his love: Abide, he says, in my love (John 15:9). For by love he has joined the rational creature to himself, so that it might always have him and remain in him, delighting in him and in him rejoicing and exulting. By love the rational creature is joined to its Creator and to itself in turn; for the bond of love alone is what binds both into one and the same. Through the love of God we all cling to him; through the love of neighbor we are all one to one another, so that the common good of all may become that of each, and what each one does not have in himself he may possess in another.
Charitas est via Dei ad homines, et via hominum ad Deum. Per charitatem enim venit Deus ad homines, venit in homines, factus est homo. Pcr charitatem homines dili. gunt Deum, cligunt Deum, ad Deum currunt, ad Deum perveniunt. Sic ctiam familiaris est Deo charitas, ut ipse mansionem habere nolit, ubi charitas non fuerit. Si ergo charitatem habemus, Deum habemus; quia Deus charitas est.
CAPUT XVII. - Ad amorem Dei excitatio. Miser ego, quantum deberem diligere Deum meum, qui me fecit cum non eram, redemit cum perieram! Non eram, et de nihilo me fecit; non lapidem, non arborem, non avem vel aliquod de animalibus aliis, scd hominem me voluit esse: dedit mihi vivere, sentire, discernere. Perieram, et ad mortalem descendit, mortalitatem suscepit, passionem sustinuit, mortem vicit; et sic me restauravit. Pericram, et abicram; quoniam in peccatis mois eram vcuumdatus: venit ille post me ut redimeret me; et tantum dilexit me, ut sanguinis sui prelium appenderet pro me, talique pacto et rcduxit me de exsilio, et redemit de servitio. Nomine etiam suo vocavit me, ut memoriale suum semper esset apud me. Unxit me oleo lætitiæ quo ipse erat unctus, ut ab uncto esscin unctus, et a Christo dicerer christianus. Sic gratia ejus et misericordia semper prævenerunt me.
Charity is God's way to men, and man's way to God. For through charity God came to men, came into men, was made man. Through charity men love God, choose God, run to God, reach God. So familiar to God is charity that he himself would not have a dwelling where charity has not been. If, therefore, we have charity, we have God, because God is charity.
CHAPTER XVII. — An awakening to the love of God. Wretched I, how much ought I to love my God, who made me when I was not, who redeemed me when I had perished! I was not, and he made me out of nothing; not a stone, not a tree, not a bird or any of the other animals, but he willed that I be a man: he gave me to live, to feel, to discern. I had perished, and he descended to a mortal, took up mortality, endured suffering, conquered death; and so he restored me. I had perished, and had been cast away, since I was overwhelmed in my sins: he came after me to redeem me; and he loved me so much that he weighed out the price of his own blood for me, and by such a covenant he both led me back from exile and redeemed me from slavery. He also called me by his own name, so that his memorial might always be with me. He anointed me with the oil of gladness with which he himself was anointed, so that from the Anointed I might be anointed, and from Christ be called a Christian. Thus his grace and mercy have always gone before me.
De multis namque periculis sæpe liberavit me liherator meus: quando errabam, reduxit me; quando ignorabam, docuit me; quando peccabam, corripuit me; quando tristabar, consolatus cst me; quando desperabam, confortavit me; quando cecidi, crexit me; quando steti, tenuit me; quando ivi, duxit; quando veni, suscepit. Hæc et multa alia fecit mihi Deus meus, de quibus dulce erit mihi semper loqui. semper cogitare, semper gratias agere, ilL pro omnibus beneficiis suis possiln semper cum laudare et amare. Cum enim cunctis sit praesidens, singulos implens, ubique præsens, cunctorum curam agens, ct tam singulis quam omnibu:, providens, ila cum totum ad custodiam mei occupatum video, ac si ego super custodiam mei starcm; quasi omnium oblitus sit, et mihi soli intendere velit. Semper enim se præsentem exhibet, semper se paratum offeri, si me paratum invenerit. Quocumque me vertero, non me descrit, nisi ogo pnor cum descram. Ubicumque fucro, non recolit, quoniam ubique cst, ut qnocumque iero, inveniam eum cum quo possim esse. Quidquid fecc'ro, pariter assistit, utpote perpetuus inspector omnium cogitationum, et intentionum et actionum mearum. Cmn h:rc diligenter considero, timore pariter ct ingenti rubore confundor; quod illum ubiquc mihi præsentem ct omnia occulta mea videntem inlucor. Multa cnim sunt in me, de quibus coram oculis cjus erubesco, et pro quibus ei valde displicere timeo.
For my deliverer has often freed me from many dangers: when I was wandering, he led me back; when I was ignorant, he taught me; when I was sinning, he corrected me; when I was sad, he consoled me; when I was despairing, he strengthened me; when I fell, he raised me up; when I stood, he held me; when I went, he guided me; when I came, he received me. These things and many others my God has done for me, of which it will be sweet for me always to speak, always to think, always to give thanks, so that I may always praise and love him for all his benefits. For since he presides over all things, filling each one, present everywhere, taking care of all things, and providing for individuals as well as for all, when I see him so occupied with the whole of my protection, it is as if I myself were standing over my own protection; as if he had forgotten all things and wished to attend to me alone. For he always shows himself present, always offers himself ready, if he finds me ready. Wherever I turn, he does not abandon me, unless I, being worse, abandon him. Wherever I shall be, he does not withdraw, since he is everywhere, so that wherever I go, I may find him with whom I can be. Whatever I shall do, he stands by equally, as the perpetual inspector of all my thoughts, intentions, and actions. When I consider these things diligently, I am confounded with fear and great shame at the same time, because I provoke him who is everywhere present to me and sees all my hidden things. For there are many things in me at which I blush before his eyes, and for which I greatly fear to displease him.
Nec pro bis omnibus quid illi rependam habeo, nisi tantum ut cum diligam. Non enim melius nec decentius quam per dilectionem rependi potest, quod per dilectionem datum cst. Hæc praeter rem dixisse videor, sed forte non præter utilitatem mihi, et iis qui mecum sentiunt quod ego sentio.
CAPUT XVIII. Anima vita corporis. Quomodo anima immortalis et mortalis, incorporea et corporea. Qni anima in corpore. Anima præsentia sua corpus vivificat, fit sic colligata cst ei, ut lice cum velit, se inde segregare possit, nec retinere, cum sui Creatoris jussionem audierit. In viia siquidem animæ consistit vita corporis, ct de morte corporis descendit mors animæ. Sicut eniui anima vita sua facit carnem viventem, ct dc fonle naturæ sua: irrigat animando; sic caro per corruptelam materiæ suæ animam, si cupiditatibus illicitis illigaverit, occidit. Et cum altera natura vincatur, altera natura vincat I, transit unaquæque in victricis naturam; id est, ut ant carnem spiritualem anima virtutibus suis præstet, aut aniinam carnalem carovictrix ejus efficiat. Anima tamen nihil de morte habere potest, nisi per vitia ci propinatum fuerit: nec caro aliquid de vita retinere potest, nisi ab anima fuerit irrigata: nec in alterius naturam altera transire potest, nisi aut illa vitiis infecta, aut hæc virtutibus deserta fuerit '.
Nor do I have anything to repay him for all these things except only that I love him. For what was given through love cannot be repaid better or more fittingly than through love. I seem to have said these things beside the point, but perhaps not without benefit to me and to those who agree with me in what I feel.
CHAPTER XVIII. The soul is the life of the body. How the soul is both immortal and mortal, incorporeal and corporeal. How the soul is in the body. The soul by its presence gives life to the body, and is so bound to it that it can separate itself from it whenever it wishes, nor can the body retain it when it has heard the command of its Creator. For the life of the body consists in the way of the soul, and from the death of the body descends the death of the soul. For just as the soul by its own life makes the flesh living, and waters it by giving life from the fountain of its own nature, so the flesh, through the corruption of its own matter, kills the soul if it has bound it fast with unlawful desires. And when one nature is conquered and the other nature conquers, each passes over into the nature of the victor; that is, either the soul by its virtues makes the flesh spiritual, or the flesh, as victor over it, makes the soul carnal. Yet the soul can have nothing of death unless it has been brought near to it through vices; nor can the flesh retain anything of life unless it has been watered by the soul; nor can the one pass over into the nature of the other unless either the former has been infected with vices or the latter has been forsaken by virtues.
Ratione insignita est anima, qua artibus docetur egregiis et disciplinis instruitur eximiis, ut divina sapiat, ct humana tractet; atque sic cætera animalia decenter excellat, utpote substantia rationalis. Hoc enim propiic est anima, substantia scilicet rationalis, id est, spiritus rationalis. Immortalis cst anima, ne a Crcaloris sui similitudine discrepare videatur. Non enim poterat esse imago et similitudo Dei, si mortis termino claudcretur. Secundum quemdam itaque modum vitæ, quem nullo modo potest ainillere, immortalis est. Secundum vero quamdam mutabilitatem, qua potest melior vcl deterior fieri, mortalis cst. Et sicut mortalis est cum beate vivere perdit, licet misere vivere amittere uon possit, sic respectu incorporei Dei corporea est. Nibil enim invisibile et incorporeum natura credendurn est praeter solum Deum, id cst, Patrem et Filium ei Spiritum sanctum. Qui ex eo incorporeus et invisibilis dicitur, quia infinitus ct incircumscriptus, simplex ct sibi omnibus modis sufficiens, se ipsum sustinet et idipsum. £t cum ubique sit in semetipso invisibilis ct incorporeus esse dignoscitur. Omnis vero rationalis creatura corporea est, Angeli et omnes virtutes corporeae sunt, licet non carne subsistant.
The soul is distinguished by reason, by which it is taught excellent arts and instructed in surpassing disciplines, so that it may savor divine things and handle human things; and thus it rightly excels the other animals, as being a rational substance. For this is properly what the soul is, namely a rational substance, that is, a rational spirit. The soul is immortal, lest it seem to differ from the likeness of its Creator. For it could not be the image and likeness of God if it were closed off by the boundary of death. According to a certain manner of life, then, which it can in no way lose, it is immortal. But according to a certain mutability, by which it can become better or worse, it is mortal. And just as it is mortal when it loses to live blessedly, although it cannot lose to live miserably, so in respect of the incorporeal God it is corporeal. For nothing invisible and incorporeal is by nature to be believed except God alone, that is, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. He is called incorporeal and invisible because, being infinite and uncircumscribed, simple and in every way sufficient to himself, he sustains himself and is the very same. And since he is everywhere in himself, he is recognized to be invisible and incorporeal. But every rational creature is corporeal; the angels and all the powers are corporeal, although they do not subsist in flesh.
Ex eo enim intellectuales naturas corporeas esse dicimus, quia loco circumscribuntur, sicut et anima humana quæ carne clauditur, quæ idcirco et esse in loco et localis dici potest: in loco, quia hic aut alicubi præsens est; localis, quia quod alicubi præsens est totum, alibi non est. Non habet tamen corporalem dimensionem, nec corporalem circumscriptionem; quoniam corporalis quantitatis expers est. Sed quia per præsentiam ct operationem in loco concluditur, localis et ipsa dicitur; verumtamen non sicut corpus, cui secundum locum principium, medium et finis assignatur. Respectu vero natune incorporeæ, quæ summe incommutabilis ubique est, corporea est anima; quia tale aliquid non est ipsa: nec tamen per loci spatiuin ita sistitur vel movetur, ut majori sui parte majorem locum occupet, et bre. viore breviorem, minorque sit in parte quam in toto. Per omnes siquidem particulas corporis tota simul adest, nee minor in minoribus, nec in major'ilo, major. Sed alicubi intensius, alicubi remissius, el in omnibus tola ct in singulis tota est. Sicut cniin Deus ubique est totus in toto mundo, et in omni creatura sua: sic anima ubique tola in toto corpore suo, lanquam in quodam mun do suo, intensius tamen in corde et in cerebro, quemadmodum Deus præcipue dicitur esse in caelo.
For from this we say that intellectual natures are corporeal, because they are circumscribed by place, just as the human soul also is, which is enclosed by the flesh, and which for this reason can be said both to be in a place and to be local: in a place, because it is present here or somewhere; local, because what is present as a whole somewhere is not elsewhere. Yet it does not have corporeal dimension, nor corporeal circumscription, since it is devoid of corporeal quantity. But because by its presence and operation it is confined within a place, it too is called local; yet not as a body is, to which beginning, middle, and end are assigned according to place. But in respect to an incorporeal nature, which is supremely immutable and everywhere, the soul is corporeal, because it is not such a thing as that; nor yet is it so fixed or moved through the space of a place that it occupies a larger place by a larger part of itself and a smaller by a smaller part, or is smaller in a part than in the whole. For through all the particles of the body it is present whole at once, neither smaller in the smaller parts nor larger in the larger. But somewhere more intensely, somewhere more faintly, and it is whole in all and whole in each. For just as God is everywhere whole in the whole world and in every creature of his, so the soul is everywhere whole in its whole body, as if in a kind of world of its own, yet more intensely in the heart and in the brain, just as God is said to be especially in heaven.
CAPUT XIX. Tota agit quod agit. Invisibilis et. incorporea est anima: si enin visibilis esset, corporea esset. Et si corporea esset, partibilis esset, et partes haberet, neque tota simul in uno loco esse posset. Nullum enim corpus aut simultangi totum potest, aut simul tangere totum potest. Anima vero in quibuscumque suis motibus vel actibus tota simul adest. Tota videl, ct tota visorum meminit: lota audit, ct toLa sonorum reminiscitur: tota odorat, et lota odores recolit: tota per linguam et palatum sapores sentit ct discernit: tota tangit dura vcl mollia: tola simul approbaI et reprobat. Calida vero vcl frigida summo tanlum digito lota discernit. Tota cal visus, tota est auditus, tota meminit: ct cum tota meminit, tota cat memoria; cum tota vult, tota est voluntas; cum lota cogilar, tota est cogitatio; cum tota diligit, tota est dilectio. Potest namque ex parto cogitare, et ex parte diligere.
CHAPTER XIX. It acts wholly in whatever it acts. The soul is invisible and incorporeal: for if it were visible, it would be corporeal. And if it were corporeal, it would be divisible, and would have parts, and could not be wholly at once in one place. For no body can either touch wholly at once, or be touched wholly at once. But the soul is wholly present at once in whatever motions or acts of its own. The whole soul sees, and the whole remembers things seen; the whole hears, and the whole recalls sounds; the whole smells, and the whole recollects odors; the whole through tongue and palate senses and discerns tastes; the whole touches hard or soft things; the whole at once approves and disapproves. But hot or cold it discerns wholly with the very tip of a finger. The whole is sight, the whole is hearing, the whole remembers: and when the whole remembers, the whole is memory; when the whole wills, the whole is will; when the whole thinks, the whole is thought; when the whole loves, the whole is love. For it can think in part, and love in part.
CAPUT XX. Animæ vires ad virtutes et contra vitia. Virtutes sacramentales. Quibus Deo inhærcat, quibus corpori. Vis animae naturalis. Habet anima affectiones, quibus exercetur ad virtutes. Dolor namque de peccatis, timor de suppliciis, desiderium de promissis, gaudium do præmiis quædam exercitia suut virtutum. Ilabet etiam virtutes, quibus instruitur ct armatur contra vitia. A prudentia namque scit quid debeat facere: temperantiam habet contra prospera, fortudinem contra adversa, justitiam qua scit quid cuique debeat reddere. Prudentia est scire quid possit; fortitudo, lacerequod possit; temperantia, non pra'sumere quod non possit; justitia, non velle plus quam possit. Prudentia est in eligendis; temperantia, in utendis; fortitudo, in tolerandis; justitia, in distribuendis. Prudentiæ cst nihil pœnitendum appelere, et nihil præter justum velle facere. Temperantiæ est nihil nisi tUI'pia timere, et quidquid agimus vel cogitamus ad rationis normam dirigcre. Fortitudinis est terrenas cupiditates non salum reprimere, sed penitus oblivisci. Justitiæ est omnem animi cogitationem ad solum Deum dirigere, cumque tanquam nihil aliud sit sola mentis acie intueri. Habet autem anima sacramentales virtutes quibus initiatur, id cst, fidem, spem, sacramentum Baptismi, inunctionem, Confirmationem, et cætera quibus Deo consecratur.
CHAPTER XX. The powers of the soul unto virtues and against vices. The sacramental virtues. By which things it cleaves to God, by which to the body. The natural power of the soul. The soul has affections by which it is exercised unto virtues. For sorrow over sins, fear of punishments, desire for promises, joy over rewards are certain exercises of the virtues. It has also virtues by which it is instructed and armed against vices. For by prudence it knows what it ought to do; it has temperance against prosperity, fortitude against adversity, justice by which it knows what it ought to render to each. Prudence is to know what one can do; fortitude, to do what one can; temperance, not to presume what one cannot; justice, not to will more than one can. Prudence is in choosing; temperance, in using; fortitude, in enduring; justice, in distributing. It belongs to prudence to call nothing to be repented of, and to will to do nothing besides what is just. It belongs to temperance to fear nothing but what is base, and to direct whatever we do or think to the rule of reason. It belongs to fortitude not only to repress earthly desires, but utterly to forget them. It belongs to justice to direct every thought of the mind to God alone, and to behold Him as though He were nothing else, with the sole keenness of the mind. The soul also has sacramental virtues by which it is initiated, that is, faith, hope, the sacrament of Baptism, anointing, Confirmation, and the rest by which it is consecrated to God.
Habet ctiam virtutes, quibus proficit, ct quibus Den conjungitur, ut est humilitas, puritas, charitas. Humilitas eam Deo subjicit, puritas jungit, charitas unit.
Habet quoque anima vires quibus corpori commiscetur: quarum prima cst naturalis; secunda, vitalis; tertia, animalis. Et sicut Dcus trinus et unus, vcrus ct perfectus omnia tenet, omnia implet, omnia sustinct, omnia superexcedit, omnia circumplectitur: sic annua his tribus viribus per tomum corpus diffunditur, non locali distensione, sed vitali intensione. Naturalis namque virtus operatur ill hepate sanguinem et alios quosque humores, quos per venas ad omnia corporis menbra transmittit, ut inde augeantur et nutriantur. Vis ista quadrifaria est. Dividitur namque in appetitivam, retentivam. expulsivam ct distributivam.Appetitiva quæsunt necessaria corpori appetit. Retentiva su njtU retinet, donec ex illis digestio utilis fiat. Expulsiva nociva et superflua expellit. Distributiva bonos bonorum ciborum humores omnibus membris distribuit, prout cuique expedit. Istas vires habent omnia animalia; et ideo corporis esse videntur, non animæ.
It also has virtues by which it advances and by which it is joined to God, such as humility, purity, and charity. Humility subjects it to God, purity joins it, charity makes it one.
The soul also has powers by which it is mingled with the body: the first of these is natural, the second vital, the third animal. And just as God, three and one, true and perfect, holds all things, fills all things, sustains all things, transcends all things, and encompasses all things, so the soul, by these three powers, is diffused through the whole body, not by local extension but by vital intensity. For the natural power works blood and the other humors in the liver, which it transmits through the veins to all the members of the body, so that from them they may grow and be nourished. This power is fourfold. For it is divided into the appetitive, the retentive, the expulsive, and the distributive. The appetitive power desires the things that are necessary for the body. The retentive power retains what it has received until a useful digestion is made from them. The expulsive power expels harmful and superfluous things. The distributive power distributes the good humors of good foods to all the members, as is expedient for each. All animals have these powers; and therefore they seem to belong to the body, not to the soul.
CAPUT XXI. Vis vitalis. Vis vitalis est in corde, quae ad temperandum fervorem cordis aerem bauriendo atque reddendo, vitam et salutem toti corpori tribuit. Aere namque puro sanguinem purificatum per totum corpus impellit per venas pulsatiles, quæ arteriae vocantur. Ex quaruni motu temperantiam vel distemperantiam cordis physici cognoscunt.
CAPUT XXII. Via animalis. Vis animalis triplex. Vis animalis est in cerebro, et inde vigere facit quinque sensus corporis. Jubet etiam voces edere, membra moverc.Tres namque sunt ventriculi cerebri. Unus anterior, a quo omnis sensus; alter posterior, a quo otnnis motus; tertius inter utrumque medius, id est, rationalis. Corporis sensus sic fiunt. Quod est in corpore subtilissimum et ob hoc animæ similius et vicinius qnam c:etcra, id est, lux, primum per oculos ipsos diffunditur, cmicatque in radiis oculorum ad visibilia intuenda; deinde mixtura quadam primo curn acre puro, secundo cum acre caliginoso atque nebuloso, tertio cum corpulentiore humore, quarto cum terrena crassitudine, quinque sensus cum ipso sensu oculorum perficit, ubi ipsa sola excellit. Isti sensus quia in sola facie prælocati sunt, ideo scriptum arbitror quod Deus in faciem insufflavit homini spiraculum vitæ, et factus est in animam viventem (Gen. II, 7).
CHAPTER XXI. The vital power. The vital power is in the heart, which, in order to temper the heat of the heart by drawing in and giving back air, grants life and health to the whole body. For by pure air it drives purified blood through the whole body through the pulsating veins, which are called arteries. From their motion physicians recognize the temperance or distemperance of the heart.
CHAPTER XXII. The animal way. The animal power is threefold. The animal power is in the brain, and from there it makes the five senses of the body flourish. It also commands the utterance of voices and the movement of members. For there are three ventricles of the brain. One is anterior, from which all sensation comes; another posterior, from which all motion comes; the third is the middle between the two, that is, the rational. The senses of the body are made thus. That which is most subtle in the body and for this reason more like and nearer to the soul than the rest, that is, light, is first diffused through the eyes themselves, and gleams in the rays of the eyes for beholding visible things; then by a certain mixture, first with pure air, second with dark and cloudy air, third with more corpulent moisture, fourth with earthly thickness, it perfects the five senses together with the sense of the eyes themselves, where it alone excels. Because these senses are placed beforehand in the face alone, I think it is written that God breathed into man's face the breath of life, and he was made into a living soul (Gen. 2:7).
Anterior quippe pars posteriori merito præponitur: quia ista ducit, ilia sequilur; ab ista tensus, ab illa motos; sicut consilium praeccdit actionem. Istæ vires tam animas quam corporis dici possunt; quia ab anima in corpore Hunt, nec sine utroque fieri possunt. In prima parte cerebri vis animalis vocatur phantastica, id est imaginaria; qnia in ca corporalium rerum similitudines et imagines continentur, unde ct phantasticum dicitnr. In media parte cerehri vocatur rationalis; quia ibi examinat et judicaL ea quæ per imaginationem repraesentantur. In ultima parte vocatur memorialis; quia ibi commendat memoriae quæ a ratione sunt judicata.
» CAPUT XXIII. Percipiendi in anima quot vires. Somnia lasciva. Aliud utique est in nobis, quo corhora sentimus, quod quinque corporis sensibus facimus. Aliud quo nun corpora, sed corporibus similia cernimus, ubi et nos ipsos non aliter quam similes corporibus intuemur. Aliud quo nee corpora nec corporum similitudines conspicimus, sed illas rcs quæ non habenl imagines sui similes. sicut est Deus, ct ipsa mens rationalis, vel intelligentia, vul ratio: sicut cliam virtutes, prudentia, justitia, castitas, charitas, pietas, et quaccumque alix sunt, quas intelligendo vel cogitando enumeramus, discernimus et definimus. Porro anima nun est corpus I, quia non omnis similitudo corporis corpus est.
The front part is rightly preferred to the back part, because the one leads and the other follows; by the one we are stretched out, by the other we are moved; just as counsel precedes action. These powers can be said to belong to both the soul and the body, because they come to be from the soul in the body, and cannot come to be without both. In the first part of the brain the animal power is called phantastic, that is, imaginative, because in it are contained the likenesses and images of corporeal things, whence it is also called phantastic. In the middle part of the brain it is called rational, because there it examines and judges the things that are represented through the imagination. In the last part it is called memorial, because there it commends to memory the things that have been judged by reason.
CHAPTER XXIII. How many powers of perceiving are in the soul. Wanton dreams. There is indeed one thing in us by which we perceive bodies, which we do by the five senses of the body. Another by which we discern not bodies, but things like bodies, where we behold even ourselves not otherwise than as like bodies. Another by which we behold neither bodies nor the likenesses of bodies, but those things that do not have images like themselves, such as God, and the rational mind itself, or intelligence, or reason; such also as the virtues, prudence, justice, chastity, charity, piety, and whatever others there are that we enumerate, discern, and define by understanding or thinking. Furthermore, the soul is not a body, because not every likeness of a body is a body.
Dormienti cnim tibi in somnis velut corpus apparebit, neque id corpus tuum, sed anima tua; nee verum corpus, sed similitudo corporis tui. Jacebit enim corpus tuum, antbulabit ilia. Taccbit lingua corporis lui, loquetur illa. Clausi erunt oculi tui, videbit illa. Et ita in ca toU et integra cernetur similitudo carnis lux. In hac similitudine quasi per loca cognita vel incognita discurrit, et sentit læta vel tristia. Anima etiaM mortui, sicut dormientis, in ipsa similitudine corporis sui sentit, sen bona seu mala: non sunt tamen corporalia, sed corporalibus similia, quibus animæ corporibus exutæ afficiuntur, seu bene seu male, cum et ipsæ suis corporibus similes sibimet appareant; sunt tamen et vera lætitia et vera molestia, facta de substantia spirituali in substantia spirituali. Certuln nempe est quamdam spiritualem naturam esse in nobis, ubi corporalium rerum similitudines aut formantur, aut formatae ingeruntur, sive cum præsentia aliquo sensu corporis tangimus, et continuo corum similitudo in spiritu formatur, et in memoria reconditur; sive cum absentia jam nota vel quæ non novimus cogitamus, ut inde formetur quidam spiritualis intellectus. Innuinerabilia etiam pro arbitrio et opinatione fingimus, quæ vel non sunt, vel esse nesciuntur.
For when you are sleeping, there will appear to you in dreams, as it were, a body—and not your body, but your soul; nor a true body, but the likeness of your body. For your body will lie still, while that will walk. The tongue of your body will be silent, while that will speak. Your eyes will be closed, while that will see. And so in it the likeness of the flesh will be discerned whole and entire. In this likeness it runs about, as it were, through places known and unknown, and feels things joyful or sad. The soul even of a dead person, like that of one sleeping, feels in that same likeness of its body, whether good or evil; yet these are not bodily things, but things like bodily ones, by which souls stripped of their bodies are affected, whether well or ill, since they too appear to themselves like their own bodies; yet there is also true joy and true distress, produced from a spiritual substance in a spiritual substance. For it is certain that there is a certain spiritual nature in us, where the likenesses of bodily things are either formed or, once formed, are brought in—whether when by some sense of the body we touch things present, and at once their likeness is formed in the spirit and stored away in the memory; or when we think of things absent, either already known or unknown to us, so that from there a certain spiritual understanding is formed. Countless things, too, we fashion at will and by opinion, which either do not exist or are not known to exist.
Innumerabiles quoque et variae formæ rerum in animo nostro versantur, vel cum aliquid facimus, vel facturi sumus: aliquo etiam spiritu rapicnte tollitur anima in hujusmodi videnda seu bona seu mala. Nimia quoque intentione cogitationis vel aliqua vi morbi, ut phreneticis per febrem accidere solet,seu commixtione alterius cujusdam spi. ritus seu boni seu mali, ita corporalium rerum imagines in spiritu exprimuntur, tanquam corpora ipsius corporis sensibus præsententur, ut absentia videantur adesse tanquam præsentia, et quæ non sunt tanquam prae oculis adsint. A dormientibus eti.m multa videntur, vel nihil vel aliquid significantia. Unde sæpe imagines rerum corporalium tanta illis expressione præsentantur in somnis, quanta ipsa corpora præsentantur vigilantibus, ut inter visionem dormientium et veram commixtionem vigilantium non discernatur; sed continun eis caro moveatur, ct contra propositum suum vul contra licitos mores concumbere vidcantur, et quod naturaliter collectum est, per gcnitalcs vias emittatur. Hunc motum casti vigilantes cohibent et refrenant: dormientes autem ideo non possunt, quia in potestate non habent imaginis corporalis expressionem I, qua caro naturaliter movetur; et sequitur quod eum motum sequi solet, ct quod sine peccato a vigilantibus fieri nou potest.
Countless and varied forms of things also revolve in our soul, either when we do something or when we are about to do so; sometimes, too, when some spirit snatches it away, the soul is carried off to see things of this kind, whether good or evil. Moreover, by an excessive intensity of thought, or by some force of disease—as is wont to happen to the frenzied through fever—or by the mingling of some other spirit, whether good or evil, the images of bodily things are so impressed upon the spirit as if the bodies themselves were presented to the senses of the body, so that absent things seem to be present as though they were present, and things that are not seem to be before the eyes. Many things are also seen by those who sleep, signifying either nothing or something. Hence the images of bodily things are often presented to them in dreams with as much vividness as the bodies themselves are presented to those who are awake, so that no distinction is discerned between the vision of those who sleep and the true mingling of those who are awake; but the flesh is moved continuously in them, and against their own purpose or against lawful conduct they seem to lie together, and what has been naturally collected is emitted through the genital passages. The chaste restrain and curb this motion when awake; but those who sleep cannot do so, because they do not have in their power the impression of the bodily image by which the flesh is naturally moved; and there follows what is wont to follow that motion, and what cannot be done without sin by those who are awake.
Sic in spirilu ct corporalium rerum imagines apparent, et multa pro arbitrio finguntur, vel praeter arbitriuln demonstrantur. Ipsa namque anima quæ motu proprio semper in motu est, quia pcr corpus non sinitur, vel non plene sinitur corporalia sentire, vcl ad corporalia vim suæ intentionis dirigere, corpore sopito, spiritu corporalium similitudines aut ipsa agit, sicut et imagines corporum cogitando ex se ipsa versare assolet; aut objectas intuetur, cum in eas videndas aliquo spiritu assumitur.
CAPUT XXIV. — Anima quid sit, et quid non sit. Visionum tria genera. Falsitati quæ obnoxiæ. De ecstasi. Visionum alia genera. Anima cst substantia spiritualis, simplex et indissolubilis, invisibilis et ineorporca, passibilis atque mutabilis, carens pondere, figura et colore. Non est credenda pars, sed creatura Dei, nec etiam de substantia Dei, vel de qualibet clementorum matcria, sed ex nihilo creata. Si enim ex semctipso eam Deus fecisset, nequaquain vitiosa aut mutabilis aut miscra esset. Si autcm ex elementis facta fuisset, esset corporea. Cum itaque sit incorporea, ignotam habens originem; initium habet, finem non habet.
Thus in the spirit the images of bodily things appear, and many things are fashioned at will, or are shown forth beyond the will. For the soul itself, which by its own motion is always in motion, because through the body it is not permitted, or not fully permitted, to perceive bodily things, or to direct the force of its intention toward bodily things—when the body is asleep, the soul either itself produces the likenesses of bodily things in the spirit, just as it is also accustomed to turn over the images of bodies from itself by thinking; or it gazes upon things set before it, when by some spirit it is taken up to see them.
CHAPTER XXIV. — What the soul is, and what it is not. The three kinds of visions. Those liable to falsity. On ecstasy. Other kinds of visions. The soul is a spiritual substance, simple and indissoluble, invisible and incorporeal, capable of suffering and changeable, lacking weight, figure, and color. It is not to be believed to be a part, but a creature of God, nor even of the substance of God, or of any material of the elements, but created from nothing. For if God had made it from himself, it would by no means be defective or changeable or miserable. But if it had been made from the elements, it would be corporeal. Since, therefore, it is incorporeal, having an unknown origin, it has a beginning, but has no end.
Et cum sit spiritualis naturas nihil babet mixtum concretumque terrenum, nihil humidum, aereum vcl igneum; nullum habet colorem, nullo loco continetur, nullis membris circumscribitur, nullo spatio finitur: sed ito est cogitanda et intelligenda, sicut sapientia, justitia, et æteræ virtutes ab Omnipotente creatæ. Natura animx invisibilis est, ideo invisibiliter in corpore manet, et de corpore invisibiliter egreditur. Per corpis corpora videt, sicut cœlum et terram, ct quæ in eis conspicua sunt oculis nostris. Spiritu autem corporum similitudines intuetur. Quidquid enim corpus non est, et tamen aliquid est, recte jam spiritus dicitur. Idcirco quadam vi occulta et spirituali rapitur anima, ut vice corporum expressas corporalium rerum similitudines in spiritu videat. Sed intellectu ea quæ nec corpora nec corporum formas habent conspicit, sicut est justitia et sapientia, vel ipsa mens et omnis animae affectio bona. statria genera visionum manifesta sunt. Primum corporale, quo per corporis sensus corpora sentiuntur. Secundum spirituale, quo corporum similitudines spiritu, non mente cernuntur. Tertium intellectuale, quo illae res quæ nec corpora nec corporum formas habent conspiciuntur.
And since it is of a spiritual nature, it has nothing mixed or compounded of earth, nothing moist, airy, or fiery; it has no color, is contained in no place, is bounded by no members, is limited by no space: but it is to be thought and understood just as wisdom, justice, and the other virtues created by the Almighty. The nature of the soul is invisible, and therefore it remains invisibly in the body, and invisibly departs from the body. Through the body it sees bodies, such as heaven and earth and the things in them that are visible to our eyes. But in the spirit it beholds the likenesses of bodies. For whatever is not a body, and yet is something, is rightly called spirit. Therefore by a certain hidden and spiritual power the soul is rapt, so that in the spirit it may see likenesses of bodily things expressed in place of bodies. But by the intellect it beholds those things which have neither bodies nor the forms of bodies, such as justice and wisdom, or the mind itself and every good affection of the soul. These three kinds of vision are manifest. The first is corporeal, by which bodies are perceived through the senses of the body. The second is spiritual, by which the likenesses of bodies are discerned in the spirit, not in the mind. The third is intellectual, by which those things are beheld which have neither bodies nor the forms of bodies.
In intellectuali visione nunquam fallitur anima: aut eniin intelligit, et verum est; aut si verum non est, non intelligit. In visione autem corporali saepe fallitur anima, cum in ipsis corporibus fieri putat, quod fit in corporis sensibus. Sicut navigantibus videntur in terra moveri, quae stant; et intuentibus coelum, sidera stare, quæ moventur: et divaricatis oculorum radiis res una duas formas habere videtur, et unus bomo duo capita, et in aqua remus infractus, et multa hujusmodi. In visione etiam spirituali anima fallitur et illuditur, quoniam ea quae videt, aliquando vera, aliquando falsa, aliquando perturbata, aliquando tranquilla sunt. Ipsa autem vera aliquando futuris omnino similia; vel aperte dicta, aliquando obscuris significationibus vel quasi figuratis locutionibus pr nuntiala. In ecstasi vero quando ab omnibus corporis sensibus alienatur et avertitur anima, amplius quam in somno solet, sed minus quam in morte, non Callitur. Sed ipsa mente divinitus adjuta, vel aliquo ipsa visa exponente, sicut in Apocalypsi Joanni exponebatur magna revelatio est. Cum euim bono spiritu assumitur anima, falli non potest; quia sancti Angeli miris modis, visa sua facili quadam ac præpotenti unitione vel commixtione nostra esse faciunt, et visionem. suam quodam ineffabili modo in spiritu nostro informant.
In intellectual vision the soul is never deceived: for either it understands, and it is true; or if it is not true, it does not understand. But in bodily vision the soul is often deceived, when it thinks that what happens in the senses of the body happens in the bodies themselves. As those who sail seem to see the land moving, though it stands still; and those who look at the sky think the stars stand still, though they move; and when the rays of the eyes are spread apart, one thing seems to have two forms, and one man seems to have two heads, and an oar in the water seems broken, and many things of this kind. In spiritual vision too the soul is deceived and mocked, since the things it sees are sometimes true, sometimes false, sometimes confused, sometimes calm. And these true things are sometimes altogether like future things, or plainly stated, sometimes announced by obscure significations or, as it were, figurative expressions. But in ecstasy, when the soul is alienated and turned away from all the senses of the body, more than in sleep but less than in death, it is not deceived. But when it is aided by divine power, or when something itself explains what is seen, as in the Apocalypse a great revelation was explained to John. For when the soul is taken up by a good spirit, it cannot be deceived, because the holy angels, in wondrous ways, by a certain easy and most powerful union or commingling, make their visions to be ours, and in an ineffable manner inform our spirit with their vision.
Ipsi siquidem his corporalibus judicandis atque ministrandis præsunt, et eorum significativas similitudines in spiritu ita discernunt, et tanta potentia quodam modo tractant, ut etiam eas possint hominum spiritibus revelando miscere. Inde est quod angelus Domini apparuit in somnis Joseph: dicens, Noli timere accipere Mariam conjugem tuam; el iterum: Tolle puernm et matrem ejus, et fuge in Ægyptum (Matth. I 20, et II, 13). Deus etiam per prophetam dicit: Effundam de spiritu meo super omnem carnem; et juvenes vestri visa videbunt, et senes vestri somnia somniabunt (Joel. II, 28).
Sunt et alia visa usitata et humana, quæ vel es ipso spiritu nostro multipliciter exisumt; vel ex corpore spiritui quodam modo suggeruntur, sicut fuerimus affecti a carne vel animo. Non enim solum vigilantes homines curas suas cogitando versant in similitudinibus corporum, verum etiam dormientes hoc sæpe somniant quo indigent. Nam et negotia sua gerunt ex animi cupiditate, et epulis et poculis inhiant instanter, si forte esurientes silientesque dormierint. Vigilaniibus eliam occulto quodam instinctu ingestas esse cogitationes, quas divinarent, novimus: sicut Caiphas pontifex prophetavit (Joan. xi, 51), cum ejus intentio prophetandi voluntatem non haberet.
These indeed preside over judging and ministering these bodily things, and they discern their significative likenesses in the spirit, and in a certain way handle them with such power that they can even mingle them with human spirits by revealing them. Hence it is that the angel of the Lord appeared in dreams to Joseph, saying, Do not fear to take Mary your wife; and again: Take the child and his mother, and flee into Egypt. God also says through the prophet: I will pour out of my spirit upon all flesh; and your young men shall see visions, and your old men shall dream dreams.
There are also other visions, common and human, which either arise in manifold ways from our own spirit, or are in a certain manner suggested to the spirit from the body, according as we have been affected by the flesh or the mind. For not only do waking men turn over their cares by thinking in likenesses of bodies, but even sleeping men often dream of that which they need. For they both conduct their affairs out of the desire of the mind, and eagerly crave dishes and drinks, if perhaps they have gone to sleep hungry and thirsty. We know also that thoughts were secretly, by a certain instinct, injected into waking men, which they would divine: as Caiphas the high priest prophesied, when his intention did not have the will to prophesy.
Multa videt anima, et eadem natura est omnium visionum, sive in vigilantibus, sive iu dormientibus, sive in ægrotantibus: quoniam non ex alio genere sunt quae videntur, quam ex natura spiritus, de quo vel in quo fiunt similitudines corporum. Visa siquidem phrenelicorum similia sunt visis somniantium: obsturatas namque vias sentiendi habent, ut videant quod somniantes vident. Visa etiam somniantium similia sunt cogitationibus vigilantium. Dormientibus quippe in cerebro consopitur via sentiendi, qu.c intentionem ad oculos ducit. Ideoque ipsa intentio in aliud aversa, cernit visa somniorum tanquam species corporales adsint, ut sibi dormientes vigilare videantur, et non similia corporibus, sed ipsa corpora intueri se putent. Ego autem mulo amplius admiror et vehementius stupeo, quanta celeritate ac facilitate in se anima fabricet imagines corporum, quae per corporis oculus viderit, quam phreneticorum vcl somniantium, vei ctiam in ecstasi visioncs. Quæcumque tamen illa natura visorum est, procul dubio corpus non est. Non enim corpora visa ilias imagines in spiritu faciunt, nec cam vim habent ut aliquid spirituale forment, sed ipse spiritus in se ipso celeritate mirabili, utpote spiritus intellectualis ct rntionnlis.
The soul sees many things, and the nature of all visions is the same, whether in those who are awake, or in those who are sleeping, or in those who are sick: since the things that are seen are not of another kind than from the nature of the spirit, from which or in which the likenesses of bodies are made. For the visions of the frenzied are similar to the visions of those dreaming: for they have obstructed the pathways of sensing, so that they see what those dreaming see. The visions of those dreaming are also similar to the thoughts of those awake. For in those sleeping, the pathway of sensing is lulled to rest in the brain, which leads intention to the eyes. And therefore that intention itself, turned toward something else, discerns the visions of dreams as if bodily species were present, so that those sleeping seem to themselves to be awake, and think they are beholding not things similar to bodies, but the bodies themselves. But I am amazed much more and am struck with greater astonishment at how great is the swiftness and ease with which the soul fabricates within itself the images of bodies which it has seen through the eyes of the body, than at the visions of the frenzied, or of those sleeping, or even in ecstasy. Whatever, however, that nature of visions is, it is beyond doubt not a body. For bodies seen do not make those images in the spirit, nor do they have the power to form anything spiritual, but the spirit itself, in itself, with wondrous swiftness, as being an intellectual and rational spirit.
CAPUT XXV. Somniorum quinque genera. Somnia unde diversa. Omnium quas sibi videre videntur dormientes, quinque sunt genera; videlicet, oraculum, visio, somniuin, insommium, et phantasma. Oraculum est, cum in somnis parens vet aliqua sancta gravisque persona, seu sacerdos, vel etiam Deus eventurum aliquid aperte vel non eventurum, faciendum vel devitandum denuntiat. Visio est, cum id quis videt quod eodem modo quo apparuerat eveniet. Somilium est figuris tectum, et sine interpretatione intelligi non potest. Insomnium est, quando id quod fatigaverat vigilantem, ingerit se dormienti; sicutest cibi cura vel potus, vel aliqua studia, vel artes, vel iufirmitates. Secundum namque studia quæ quisque exercuit, somniat; et solitarum artium simulacra in praesentia mentis impressa apparent in somnis. Juxta etiam infirmitatum diversitates diversa accidunt somuia. Etiam secundum murum et humorum varietates variantur somnia. Alia namque vident sanguinei, alia cbolerici, alia phlegmatici, alia melancholici. Illi videut rubea ct varia; isti, nigra et alba. Phantasma cst, quando qui vix dormire coepit, et adhuc se vigi. lare æstimat, aspicere videtur irruentes in se, vel passim vagantes formas discrepantes et varias, lætas vel turbulentas. In hoc genere est ephialtes, quem publica persuasio quiescentes opinatur invadere, et pondere suo pressos ac sentientes gravare.
CHAPTER XXV. The five kinds of dreams. Whence dreams are diverse. Of all the things that those who sleep seem to themselves to see, there are five kinds: namely, oracle, vision, dream, nightmare, and phantasm. An oracle is when in sleep a parent, or some holy and grave person, or a priest, or even God, announces that something will or will not happen, or is to be done or avoided. A vision is when someone sees that which will come to pass in the same manner in which it appeared. A dream is covered with figures and cannot be understood without interpretation. A nightmare is when that which had troubled a person while awake thrusts itself upon him sleeping; as is the concern of food or drink, or some studies, or arts, or infirmities. For according to the studies that each person has pursued, he dreams; and the images of accustomed arts, impressed upon the presence of the mind, appear in dreams. Also, according to the diversities of infirmities, diverse dreams occur. Dreams also vary according to the varieties of humors. For the sanguine see some things, the choleric others, the phlegmatic others, the melancholic others. The former see red and varied things; the latter, black and white. A phantasm is when one who has scarcely begun to sleep, and still thinks himself awake, seems to see forms rushing upon him, or wandering here and there, discordant and various, joyful or troubled. In this kind is the ephialtes, which public opinion supposes to invade those at rest, and to press and weigh upon them with its weight while they feel it.
Quod non est aliud nisi quædam fumositas a stomacho vel a corde ad cerebrum ascendens, et ibi vim animalem comprimens.
CAPUT XXVI. Spectrorum ratio. Dicit etiam humana opinio, quod quadam arte mulierum et potestate daemonum homines converti possint in lupos et jumenta, et quæque necessaria portare 1, ct post peracta opera iterum ad se redire, nec fieri in eis mentem bestialem, sed rationalem humanamque servari. Hoc sic intelligendum est, quoniam dæmones naturas non creant, sed aliquid tale facere possunt, ut vidcantur esse quod non sunt. Nulla enim arte vel potestate animus, sed nec corpus quidem aliqua ratione in membra et lineamenta bestialia veraciter converti potest. Sed phantasticum hominis (quod etiam cogitando sive somniando per rerum innumerabilium gencra variatur, et cum corpus non sit, corporum similes formas mira celeritate capil), sopitis aut oppressis corporeis hominis sensibus, ad aliorum sensuum figuras corporeas perduci potest: ita tamen quod corpora ipsa hominum alicubi jaceant, viventia quidem, sed..ulto gravius atque oppressius quam somno suis sensibus obseratis; phantasticum autenti illud veluti formatum 2in alicujus animalis imaginem, alienis sensibus appareat, talisque homo sibi videatur, qualis sibi vidcri posset in somnis, cl portare onera. Quae onera si vera sunt corpora, portantur a dæmonibus, ut illudatur hominibus, partim ver?
Which is nothing other than a certain smoky exhalation rising from the stomach or the heart to the brain, and there compressing the animal power.
CHAPTER XXVI. The rationale of apparitions. Human opinion also says that by a certain art of women and power of demons men can be changed into wolves and beasts of burden, and carry whatever necessities, and after the works are completed return again to themselves, and that the mind in them is not made bestial, but is preserved rational and human. This must be understood thus: that demons do not create natures, but can make something of such a kind that they seem to be what they are not. For by no art or power can the soul, nor indeed can the body by any reasoning, be truly converted into the members and lineaments of beasts. But the phantastic [power] of a man (which is also varied by thinking or dreaming through countless kinds of things, and, since it is not a body, takes on forms similar to bodies with wondrous speed), once the bodily senses of the man are lulled or oppressed, can be brought to the bodily figures of other senses: yet in such a way that the bodies of the men themselves lie somewhere, living indeed, but much more heavily and oppressively than in sleep, with their senses shut fast; but that phantastic [image], as if formed into the image of some animal, appears to the senses of others, and such a man seems to himself to be as he could seem to himself in dreams, and to carry burdens. Which burdens, if they are true bodies, are carried by demons, so that men may be mocked, partly true...
hominum corpora, partim falsa jumentorum cernentibus.
CAPUT XXVII. Spiritus angelici quid possint in humanum. Humanum spirilum aliquando bonus aliquando malus assuinit spiritus; nec facile discerni potest a quo spiritu assumatur, nisi quia bonus instruit, cl malus fallit. Fallit autem s;rpe in manifestis bun'is ut cum sibi in cis creditum fueri!, ad sua seducat. Sic plerumque humanum spiritum rapit, ut quadam occulta mixtura quasi idem spirilus esse videatur, et spiritus patientis et spiritus vexantis, ut in dæmoniacis videmus. Animam tamen hominis, id est mentem, nulla creatura juxta substantiam implere poteM, nisi sola Trinilas. Implere autem dicitur satanas mentem alicujus et principale cordis, non ingredicns quidem in eum et in sensum ejus; sed fraude et iniquitate, atque omni malitia illum allicicns, alque seducens affectu maliliic, trabit' per cogitationes et incentiva vitiorum, quibus ipse plenus est, utpote fallax, nequam et fraudulentus deceptor animarum. Non enim participatione naturæ seu substantiæ, ut quidam putant, quemquam implet diabolus, aut ejus habitator eflicitur; sed per fraudulentiam, dcceplionem atque malitiam, in eo habitare dicitur quem implet. Solius enim Trinitatis est intrare et implere naturam sive substantiam quam creavit.
the bodies of men, partly false [apparitions] of beasts to those who see them.
CHAPTER XXVII. What the angelic spirits can do in [relation to] the human [spirit]. Sometimes a good and sometimes an evil spirit takes possession of the human spirit; nor can it easily be discerned by which spirit it is taken possession of, except that the good one instructs and the evil one deceives. But it often deceives in manifest goods, so that when it has been believed in them, it may lead [the person] away to its own [ends]. Thus for the most part it seizes the human spirit, so that by a certain hidden mingling it seems, as it were, to be the same spirit—both the spirit of the sufferer and the spirit of the tormentor, as we see in demoniacs. Yet no creature can fill the soul of a man, that is, the mind, according to substance, except the Trinity alone. But Satan is said to fill the mind of someone and the principal part of the heart, not indeed entering into him and into his understanding, but by fraud and iniquity and all malice drawing him on and seducing him by the affection of malice, he drags [him] through thoughts and incentives of vices, with which he himself is full, as being a deceitful, wicked, and fraudulent deceiver of souls. For the devil does not fill anyone by participation of nature or substance, as some think, nor is he made its inhabitant; but through deceitfulness, deception, and malice, he is said to dwell in him whom he fills. For it belongs to the Trinity alone to enter into and fill the nature or substance which it created.
CAPUT XXVIII. Dæmonum in illudendo experientia el artes. Dæmones et acrimonia sensus, et celeritate motus aerii corporis, terrenorum corpo. rum sensum facile præcedunt, et quædam cogitala prænuntiant, quae homines mirantur propter tardilatem terreni corporis. Accessit autem dæmonibus per tam longum tempus, quo eorum vita protenditur, rerum longe major experientia, quam bominibus potest evenirc propter brevitatemviLe. Idcirco quadam futura prædicunt ct quædam mira faciunt, quibus Itouiincs alliciunt et seducunt. Unde quædam niulierculæ post satanam conversae, daemonum illusionibus et phantasmatibus seducta?, credunt se et profitentur nocturnis horis cum Diana Paganorum dea, vel cum Herodiade et Minerva, et innumera mulierum multitudine equitare, carumque jussionibus obtemperare. Ipse namque satanas, qui transfigurat se in angelum lucis ( II Cor. XI, i4), cum mentem cujusque mulierculæ cœperit, et hanc sibi per infidelitatem subjugaverit, illico transformat se in diversarum personarum species ac similitudines: ct mentem quam captivam tenet in somnis deludens, modo læta modo tristia, modo cognitas, modo incognitas personas ostendens, per devia quæque deducit.
CHAPTER XXVIII. The experience and arts of demons in deceiving. Demons, by the sharpness of their senses and the swiftness of the motion of their airy body, easily outrun the senses of earthly bodies, and foretell certain thoughts, which men marvel at because of the slowness of the earthly body. Moreover, through so long a time, during which their life is prolonged, there has accrued to demons a far greater experience of things than can befall men because of the brevity of life. For this reason they predict certain future things and perform certain wonders, by which they entice and seduce men. Hence certain little women, converted after Satan, seduced by the illusions and phantasms of demons, believe and profess that in the night hours they ride with Diana, the goddess of the pagans, or with Herodias and Minerva, and with a countless multitude of women, and that they obey their commands. For Satan himself, who transforms himself into an angel of light (II Cor. 11:14), when he has seized the mind of any little woman and subjected it to himself through her faithlessness, immediately transforms himself into the forms and likenesses of various persons; and deluding in dreams the mind that he holds captive, now showing joyful things, now sad, now known persons, now unknown, he leads it through every devious path.
Et cum solus loc patitur spirilus inlidclis, non in animo, sed in corpore evenire opiuatur; idcirco nimis stultus et hebes est, qui hæc omnia quæ in spir itu fiunt, etiam in corpore accidere arbitratur: cum Ezechiel et alii Prophetæ, Joannes etiam evangelista et alii Apostoli in spiritu, uon in corpore visioucs viderint.
CAPUT XXIX. Mortuorum apparitiones. Eoa netcire quid hic agatur. Unde discant. Cum homines mortui, sive vivi, hominibus dormientibus vel vigilantibus apparent, non in ipsis rebus ut sunt videntur, sed in quibusdamsimilitudinibus rerum. Istum autem angelicis operationibus fieri credimus, per dispensationem providentiæ Dei, bene utentis bonis vel malis secundum inscrutabilem altitudinem judiciorum suorum: sive hinc instruantur mentes mortalium, sive fallantur; sive consolentur, sive terreantur; sicut unicuique vei præbenda ast misericordia, vel irroganda justitia, ab eo cui misericordiam et judicium non inaniter cantat Ecclesia (Psal. c, i). Ibi siquidem sunt spiritus defunctorum, ubi non vident, neque audiunt quat aguntur, aut eveniunt in ista vita bominibus. Ita tamen est eis cura de vivis quanquam quid agant omnino nesciant; quemadimodum cura est nobis de mortuis, quamvis quid agant utique nesciamus. Nesciunt quidem mortui quid hic agatur; sed dum hic agitur.
And when he suffers this only in the spirit, they think it happens not in the soul but in the body; therefore he is exceedingly foolish and dull who supposes that all these things which are done in the spirit also happen in the body, since Ezekiel and the other Prophets, and John the Evangelist and the other Apostles, saw visions in the spirit, not in the body.
CHAPTER XXIX. The appearances of the dead. That the dead do not know what is done here. Whence they may learn. When dead men, or living men, appear to men sleeping or waking, they are not seen in the things themselves as they are, but in certain likenesses of things. We believe this to be done by angelic operations, through the dispensation of God's providence, which uses good and evil things well according to the unsearchable height of His judgments: whether by this the minds of mortals are instructed or deceived; whether they are consoled or terrified; as mercy is to be shown or justice inflicted upon each one, by Him to whom the Church does not sing in vain of mercy and judgment (Psalm 100:1). For the spirits of the dead are there, where they neither see nor hear the things that are done or that happen to men in this life. Yet they have such care for the living, although they are entirely ignorant of what they do; just as we have care for the dead, although we certainly do not know what they do. The dead indeed do not know what is done here; but while it is done here.
Postea audire possunt ab ein qui hinc moriendo ad eos pergunt: non quidem omnino, sed quantum sinitur eis indicare et cos oportet audirc. Scire etiam possunt ab Angelis qui hic nobis præsto sunt, et animas nostras ad illos deferunt. Spiritu etiam Dei revelante cognoscere possunt quæ hic aguntur, et quae necessarium est eos noscere. Quidarn etiam ex mortuis ad vivos rapi possunt; non per propriam naturam, sed per divinam potentiam. Utrum tamcn ista fiant per corum praesentiam, aut per angelos suscipientes eorum personam, affirmare non audeo. Deus enim omnipotens, qui est ubique præsens, per angelica ministeria usquequaque diffusa potest præbere ista hominibus solatia, quibus in hujus vitæ miseria judicat esse præbenda.
CAPUT XXX. Anima non crescit. Exuta carne ubi sit aut quid agate Potentiæ animae alque virtutes longa exercitatione et successu temporum crescunt. Ipsa vcro anima nec crescit nec decrescit, sed aut imparilitate membrorum, aut humorum crassitudine et eorum corruptione præpedita, vires suas exercere non potest. Anima carne exuta vivit, videt, audit, et omnes sensus atque ingenia vivacitcr tenet, utpote pura, subtilis, cita, et perpetua. Et sicut Deus ubique in semetipso est, sic anima ubique quodam modo in semetipsa est: ac per hoc ibi est anima post corpus, ubi erat agens in corpore.
Afterward they can hear from those who, dying hence, pass over to them: not indeed wholly, but insofar as it is permitted them to indicate and as it behooves them to hear. They can also know from the angels who are present here with us and carry our souls to them. With the Spirit of God also revealing, they can know the things that are done here and that it is necessary for them to know. Some even can be snatched from the dead to the living; not by their own nature, but by divine power. Whether, however, these things are done through their presence, or through angels taking on their person, I do not dare to affirm. For God almighty, who is present everywhere, through the angelic ministries diffused on every side, can furnish these consolations to men, to whom in the misery of this life he judges that they are to be furnished.
CHAPTER XXX. The soul does not grow. Where it is or what it does when stripped of the flesh. The powers of the soul and its virtues grow through long exercise and the succession of time. But the soul itself neither grows nor decreases, but, hindered either by the unlikeness of the members or by the thickness of the humors and their corruption, it cannot exercise its powers. The soul, stripped of the flesh, lives, sees, hears, and holds all the senses and faculties vigorously, as being pure, subtle, swift, and perpetual. And just as God is everywhere in himself, so the soul is in some way everywhere in itself: and through this, the soul is there after the body where it was acting in the body.
lbi Deus est modo, ubi crat priusquam mundus fieret, ubi etiam fcret si mundus dcsineret esse. Sicut sæpe dictum est, incorporca cst anima: potest tamen habere similitudinem corporis, non corporalem, sed corpori similem, et corporalium omnino membrorum, cum de corpore egreditur. Sic enim aut ad spiritualia pro meritis fertur, aut ad loca poenalia similia corporibus: qualia sæpe demonstrata sunt iis qui rapti sunt a corporis sensibus, et mortuis similes jacuerunt; cum et ipsi in se ipsis.gcrerent quamdam similitudinem corporis sui, per quam possem ad illa ferri, et talia similibus sensibus experiri. Animae siquidem quæ in corporibus viventes per dilectionem rcrum visibilium corporalibus imaginibus afliciuntur, a corporibus exeuntes in eisdem imaginibus tormenta patiuntur. Propterca enim corporalibus passionibus ibi teneri possunt, quia a corruptione corporalium affectionum hic mundatæ non fuerunt, quam per corpulentiam de corporis delectatione1'traxerunt. Quædam autem animæ iii eisdem locis, in quibus culpam commiserunt, puniuntur: quædam vero abditis receptaculis usque ad ultimam resurrectionem continentur, sicut unaquæque digna est requie vel miseria.
There God is now, where he was before the world was made, where he would also be if the world ceased to be. As has often been said, the soul is incorporeal; yet it can have a likeness of the body, not bodily but similar to the body, and of bodily members altogether, when it departs from the body. For thus it is borne either to spiritual things according to its merits, or to penal places resembling bodies—such as have often been shown to those who were rapt from the senses of the body and lay like the dead; since they too bore within themselves a certain likeness of their own body, through which they could be borne to those places and experience such things by similar senses. For souls which, living in bodies, are affected through love of visible things by bodily images, when they depart from the bodies suffer torments in those same images. For this reason they can be held there by bodily passions, because here they were not cleansed from the corruption of bodily affections, which they drew from bodily pleasure through corpulence. But certain souls are punished in the same places in which they committed their fault; certain others, however, are held in hidden receptacles until the final resurrection, as each one is worthy of rest or misery.
CAPUT XXXI. Homo mortalis. Sensus impediunt ne se noscat. Multa de anima dixi, sed nondum dixi quando facta est, vel quando de corpore egrcdictur. Quod primum posui, postea dicam; quod ul-' timum, dicere non possum; quoniam nescio linem meum. Hoc plane scio, quod mortales sumus; ct vclimus nolimus, omnes moriemur. Nihil enim morte certius, et nibil hora mortis incertius. Nam nescimus quando, aut quomodo, aut ubi moriemur; quoniam mors ubique nos exspectat. Idcirco semper debemus esse parati, ut cum corpus revertetur ad terram cle qua sumptuum est, spiritus redeat ad eUm qui dedit ilium. illud siquidem nos maxime movere debet, quod a veteribus sapientibus ita homo definitus est: Homo est animal rationale, mortale. Hoc genere posito, quod animal dictum est, additas duas differentias videmus, quibus admonendus erat homo, et quo sibi esset redeundum, et unde fugiendum. Sicut enim progressus animae usque ad mortalia lapsus est; sic regressus cjus in rationem esse debet, qua impugnanlibus vitiis resistere valeat, ut secundum naturam suam vivat, et ordinari appetat sub illo a quo regi debet, et supra ea quae regere debet. Uno verbo, quod rationale dicitur, separatur a bestiis; alio, quod mortale, a divinis. illud nisi relinuerit, bestia erit; hinc nisi se averterit, ad divina non perveniet.
CHAPTER XXXI. Mortal Man. The senses hinder him from knowing himself. I have said many things about the soul, but I have not yet said when it was made, or when it departs from the body. What I placed first, I will say afterward; what I placed last, I cannot say, since I do not know my own end. This I know plainly, that we are mortal; and whether we will or not, we shall all die. For nothing is more certain than death, and nothing more uncertain than the hour of death. For we do not know when, or how, or where we shall die, since death awaits us everywhere. Therefore we ought always to be ready, so that when the body returns to the earth from which it was taken, the spirit may return to him who gave it. Indeed, that ought to move us most of all, which was thus defined by the ancient wise men: Man is a rational, mortal animal. With this genus posited—that he is called an animal—we see two differentiae added, by which man was to be admonished both whither he must return and from what he must flee. For just as the soul's progress has fallen even to mortal things, so its return ought to be into reason, by which it may be able to resist attacking vices, so that it may live according to its nature, and desire to be ordered under him by whom it ought to be ruled, and above those things which it ought to rule. In one word, in that he is called rational, he is separated from beasts; in the other, in that he is mortal, from divine things. Unless he relinquishes the former, he will be a beast; unless he turns himself away from the latter, he will not reach divine things.
Idcirco ut homo sibi incognitus cognoscat se, magna opus babet consuetudine recedendi a sensibus, ut animum ad se colligat, et in se ipso retineat. Ilis siquidem sensibus impeditur anima, ne cernere semetipsam valeat et Creatorem suum, quem sola et simplex sine istis oculis intueri debet.
CAPUT XXXII. Menti nihil se ipsa magis notum. Animæ conjunctio cum corpore. Quomodo anima ad corpus descendat. Quomodo ab eo ascendat. Meditatio. Contemplatio. Anima namque rationalis inter eas res quæ sunt a Deo conditae, superat omnia; et Deo proxima est, quando est pura, eique in quantum charitate cohæserit, in tantum ab eo lumine illo inlelligibili perfusa quodam modo et illustrata, non per corporeos oculos, sed per sui ipsius principale, id est, per intelligentiam Deum cernit, in quo est perfectissima pulchritudo et beatissima visio, qua visione fit beata. Removeat ergo a consideratione sua omnes notitias quae per corporis sensus extrinsecus capiuntur. Quæque namque corporalia, eorumque similitudines, sensus quoque et imaginationes in memoria infixæ, cum recordando reminiscuntur, ad exteriorem hominem pertinent, quanquam istis quasi nuntiis aniina exteriora percipiat. Mens ergo cui nihil se ipsa præsentius est, quadam interiori, non simulata, sed vera præsentia, videt se in se. Nihil enim tam novit mens, quam id quod sibi præsto est: nec menti quidquarn magis præsto est, quam ipsa sibi.
Therefore, in order that man, unknown to himself, may know himself, he has great need of the habit of withdrawing from the senses, so that he may gather his mind to itself and hold it within itself. For by these senses the soul is hindered from being able to behold itself and its Creator, whom it ought to gaze upon with the mind alone and simple, without these eyes.
CHAPTER XXXII. Nothing is more known to the mind than itself. The soul's conjunction with the body. How the soul descends to the body. How it ascends from it. Meditation. Contemplation. For the rational soul, among those things which were created by God, surpasses all; and it is nearest to God when it is pure, and insofar as it has clung to him in charity, to that extent, suffused and in a certain manner illumined by that intelligible light, it beholds God not through bodily eyes but through its own principal part, that is, through the intelligence—in which is the most perfect beauty and the most blessed vision, by which vision it is made blessed. Let it therefore remove from its consideration all the knowledges that are taken up from outside through the senses of the body. For all bodily things, and their likenesses, and also the sensations and imaginations fixed in the memory, when they are recalled by remembering, belong to the outer man, although the soul perceives outer things through these as though through messengers. The mind, therefore, to which nothing is more present than itself, sees itself in itself by a certain inner presence, not feigned but true. For the mind knows nothing so well as that which is at hand to it; nor is anything more at hand to the mind than itself.
Nam cognoscit se vivere, se meminisse, se intelligere, se velle, cogitare, scire, judicare. Haec omnia novit in se, nec imaginatur, quasi extra se illa aliquo sensu corporis tetigerit, sicut corporaiia quæque tanguntur. £x quorum cogitationibus si nihil sibi affingat, ut tale aliquid se esse putet; quidquid ei de se remanet, hoc solum ipsa est. Nihil enim tam in mente est, quam ipsa mens; nee quidquam sic mentem cognoscit, quemadmodum mens. Cum enim quærit mens quid sit mens, profecto novit quod se ipsam quærat; et quod ipsa sit mens, quoe se ipsam quærit. Nique enim aliunde se quærit quam se ipsa. Cum ergo quaerentem se novit, se utique novit. Et omne quod novit, tota novit; atque ita totam se novit. £t si parte inventa non se totam quærat, tamen quia se lota quærit, tota sibi præsto est. Nihil enim sibi se ipsa præsentius esse potest. Quod antem de se quærit; quid antea fuerit, vel quid futura sit, vel qualis modo sit quærit, id est, quam similis est vel quam dissimilis Deo, quam humilis et devota, quam pura, quam sancta. Sed quia in istis est corporalibus, quae cum amore cogitat, et cnm quibus amore assucfacta est, non valet sine imaginibus eorum videre semetipsam, vel esse in semetipsa. Nam tanto glutino amoris ei cohæserunt hæc quae foris sunt corporalia, ut etiam cum absint ista, præsto sint imagines eorum cogitanti.
For it knows that it lives, that it remembers, that it understands, that it wills, thinks, knows, judges. It knows all these things in itself, and does not imagine that it has touched them, as it were, outside itself by some bodily sense, as all bodily things are touched. If from the thoughts of these things it fabricates nothing for itself, so as to suppose that it is some such thing; whatever remains to it concerning itself, this alone is what it is. For nothing is so present in the mind as the mind itself; nor does anything know the mind as the mind does. For when the mind seeks what the mind is, it surely knows that it seeks itself; and that it is the mind which seeks itself. Nor does it seek itself from anywhere else than from itself. When, therefore, it knows itself as seeking, it certainly knows itself. And whatever it knows, it knows with its whole self; and thus it knows its whole self. And if, having found a part, it did not seek its whole self, yet because it seeks its whole self, its whole self is present to it. For nothing can be more present to itself than it is to itself. But what it seeks concerning itself—what it formerly was, or what it will be, or what sort it now is—that is, how like or how unlike it is to God, how humble and devoted, how pure, how holy. But because it is among these bodily things, which it thinks of with love, and with which it has grown accustomed by love, it cannot, without their images, see itself or be in itself. For these bodily things which are outside have clung to it with such glue of love that even when they are absent, their images are present to it as it thinks.
Quapropter secernere eas a se non potest, ut se solam inspiciat et videat. Redeat ergo ad se, et stet in se, nec sicut absentem se quærat, sed velut præsentem se curet cernere et discernere, et intentionem voluntatis, qua per alia vagabatur, statuat in se ipsa, et se cogitet, ut se ipsam cognoscat et diligat. Ita videbit quod nunquam se non amaverit, nunquam nescierit: sed alia secum amando cum eis se confudit; ila ut sinc magno labore ab eis separari non possit, quibus cum amore inhaesit. Proplerca phantasiis corporalium imaginum deformatur, eisdemque alte impreosis eliam soluta a corpore uon exuitur. Si eun a corporalium affectionum corruptione hic non mundaiur, corpore exuta corporalibus tenetur passionibus. Studeat ergo in hac vita se mundarc ab hujusmodi fæculentia, quatenus cum hinc exierit, nihil corporeum secum trahat, et a corporali passione immunis existat.
Therefore it cannot separate them from itself so as to inspect and see itself alone. Let it therefore return to itself and stand in itself, and not seek itself as though absent, but take care to perceive and discern itself as though present, and fix the intention of the will, by which it was wandering through other things, upon itself, and think upon itself, so that it may know and love itself. Thus it will see that it has never not loved itself, never not known itself; but by loving other things along with itself, it confounded itself with them, so that it cannot be separated from them without great effort, since it has clung to them with love. Therefore it is deformed by the phantasms of bodily images, and, with these deeply impressed upon it, even when released from the body it is not stripped of them. If it is not cleansed here from the corruption of bodily affections, when released from the body it is held by bodily passions. Let it therefore strive in this life to cleanse itself from filth of this kind, so that when it departs from here it may drag nothing bodily away with it, and may exist immune from bodily passion.
Vivificatione et sensificatione descendit anima nd corpus. Præsentia namque sua illud vivificat, colligit in unum, atque in uno tenet; defluere atque contabescere non sinit, congruentiam ejus modumque conservat, non tantum in pulchritudine, sed etiam in crescendo atque gignendo. Intendit se etiam anima in tactum, et eo calida et frigida, aspera et lenia, dura ct mollia, gravia et levia sentit atque discernit. Deinde innumerabiles differentias saporum, odorum, sonorum, atque formarum, gustando. olfaciendo, audiendo, videndoque dijudicat; atque in his omnibus ea quae secundum naturam sui corporis sunt appetit, fugitque contraria. Removet se ab his sensibus certo intervallo temporum, et eorum motus quasi per quasdam ferias reparans, rerum imagines quas per eos hausit, secum catervatim et multipliciter versat. Cum ergo vult intelligere, vel divina, vel Deum, vel se ipsam, suasque considerare virtutes, abstrahit se ab omnibus corporis sensibus, quibus nun adjuvatnr nisi ad corporeas formas coloresque sentiendos; et spiritu ac ratione se conspicit, meditatione atque contemplatione ad Deum ascendit! Deus vero revelatione atque divina inspiratione ad eam descendit. Meditatio siquidem est occultæ veritatis studiosa investigatio. Contemplatio perspicuae veritatis jucunda admiratio.
By vivification and sensation the soul descends to the body. For by its presence it vivifies it, gathers it into one, and holds it in one; it does not allow it to flow away and waste away; it preserves its congruence and measure, not only in beauty but also in growing and begetting. The soul also extends itself into touch, and by it senses and discerns hot and cold, rough and smooth, hard and soft, heavy and light. Then it judges innumerable differences of tastes, odors, sounds, and forms by tasting, smelling, hearing, and seeing; and in all these things it desires what is according to the nature of its body, and flees the contrary. It withdraws itself from these senses at a fixed interval of times, and repairing their motions as though by certain holidays, it turns over with itself in crowds and in manifold ways the images of things that it drew in through them. When, therefore, it wishes to understand either divine things, or God, or itself, and to consider its own powers, it abstracts itself from all the senses of the body, by which it is not aided except for sensing bodily forms and colors; and by spirit and reason it beholds itself, and by meditation and contemplation it ascends to God. But God descends to it by revelation and divine inspiration. Meditation, indeed, is the studious investigation of hidden truth. Contemplation is the joyful admiration of clear truth.
Ullam namque divina illuminat revelatio, ut veritatem cognoscat: istam vero divina inspiratio inflammat, ut cam diligat. Corpus autem sensu et imaginatione ad spiritum' ascendit.
CAPUT XXXIII. Corporis materia. Quomodo sensus formentur et imaginatio. Imaginatio a quid sit. Spiritus corporeus. Humanum siquidem corpus ex quatuor elementis compositum est; sed in carne et ossibus terra maxime apparet propter terrenam soliditatem. Aqua in humoribus, ser continetur in pulmonc; idcirco semper est in motu, quia ventilabrum cordis est, ne nimio calore cur consumatur et dissolvatur. Sedes ignis est in corde; et ideo inferius est latum, et superius acutum; quoniam formam ignis retinet. Quaedam vis ignea acrc temperata a corde 2d cerebrum ascendit, tanquam in coelum corporis nostri: ibique purificata et colata per oculos, aures, nares, cæteraque instrumenta sensuum, foras progreditur, et ex contactu exteriorum formata quinque sensus corporis facit; visum videlicet, auditum, gustum, odoratum et tactum. Qui tangendi sensus ab anteriori parte cerebri ad posteriorem transiens, et inde per cervicem et medullam spinae descendens per tatum corpus diffunditur.
For the divine revelation illuminates one, so that it may know the truth; but the divine inspiration inflames the other, so that it may love it. The body, however, ascends to the spirit by sense and imagination.
CHAPTER XXXIII. The matter of the body. How the senses and the imagination are formed. What the imagination is. The corporeal spirit. The human body, indeed, is composed of four elements; but in the flesh and bones earth is most apparent, on account of its earthly solidity. Water is contained in the humors, air in the lungs; and for this reason it is always in motion, because it is the fan of the heart, lest the heart be consumed and dissolved by excessive heat. The seat of fire is in the heart; and therefore it is broad below and pointed above, since it retains the form of fire. A certain fiery power, tempered by the air, ascends from the heart to the brain, as if into the heaven of our body; and there, purified and filtered through the eyes, ears, nostrils, and the other instruments of the senses, it proceeds outward, and, formed by contact with external things, it produces the five senses of the body: namely, sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch. The sense of touch, passing from the front part of the brain to the back, and thence descending through the neck and the marrow of the spine, is diffused through the whole body.
Porro ipsa tis ignea, quæ exterius formata sensus dicitur, eadem formata' per ipsa sensuum instrumenta, pcr quæ egreditur ct in quibus formatur, natura operante introrsum ad cellam phantasticam usque retrahitur et reducitur atque imaginatio efficitur. Postea eadem imaginatio ab anteriori parte capitis ad medium transiens, ipsam animæ rationalis substantiam contingit, et excitat discretionem: in tantum jam purificata et subtilis effecta, ut ipsi spiritui immediate conjungatur, veraciter tamen naturam corporis retinens et propriciatcm. Quae quidem imaginatio in brutis animalibus phantasticam cellam non transcendit: in rationalibus autem purior fit, et usque ad rationalem et incorpoream anima) substantiam contingendam defertur et progreditur. Est itaque imaginatio siinilitudo corporis, per sensus quidena corporeos, ex corporum contaclu concepta extrinsecus, atque per eosdem sensus introrsus ad partem purtorem corporei spiritus reducta, eique impressa, in summo scilicet corporalis spiritus, et in imo rationalis, corporalem Uiformans, et rationalem contingens. Spiritum cor* poreum voco aerem, vel potius ignem, qui pra: sui subtilitate videri non potest, et corpora interius vegetando vivificat. Quædam autem vegetat tantum et non sensificat, sicut arbores, herbas et universa in terra germinantia. Quædam vegetat et sensificat, sicut omnia bruta animalia.
Furthermore, that very fiery [spirit], which is called sense when formed outwardly, is the same [spirit] formed through the instruments of the senses themselves, through which it goes out and in which it is formed; with nature working within, it is drawn back and led all the way to the phantastic chamber and becomes imagination. Afterward the same imagination, passing from the front part of the head to the middle, touches the very substance of the rational soul and awakens discernment, having by now been so purified and made subtle that it is joined immediately to the spirit itself, yet truly retaining the nature and property of the body. This imagination indeed does not transcend the phantastic chamber in brute animals; in rational beings, however, it becomes purer and is carried and advances all the way to touching the rational and incorporeal substance of the soul. Imagination is therefore a likeness of the body, conceived outwardly through the bodily senses from contact with bodies, and through those same senses led inward to the purer part of the bodily spirit and impressed upon it—namely, at the summit of the bodily spirit and at the base of the rational [spirit]—forming the bodily [part] and touching the rational. I call the bodily spirit air, or rather fire, which by its subtlety cannot be seen and which vivifies bodies inwardly by nourishing them. Some things it only nourishes and does not give sense to, such as trees, plants, and all things sprouting in the earth. Some things it nourishes and gives sense to, such as all brute animals.
In quibus quaedam lantum sensum habent, et imaginationem non habent; quædam sensum et imaginationem habe..... Cum itaque magis I sit sensificari, quam vegetari tantum; constat profecto hanc vim subtiliorem esse, ct ubi magis subtilis est, magis spiritus est. Magis siquidem incorporex naturae appropinquat, cum imaginationem format, quam cum sensum praestat. Nihil enin in corpore altius, vel spirituali naturae vicinius esse potest, quam id ubi post sensum vel supra sensum vis imaginandi concipitur, quod quidem in tantum sublime est, ut quidquid supra illud est, aliud nou sit quam ratio '.
CAPUT XXXIV. Sensus. Memoria. Mens. Spiritus. Animus idem cum anima. Ratio. Qui anima se ad Deum erigat. Mira divisio animæ. Mens imago Dei. Anima nominatur lotus homo interior, qua vivificatur, regitur ct continetur lutea illa massa, humectata succis, ne arefacta dissolvatur. Dum ergo vivificat corpus, anima est; dum vult, animus est; dum scil, mens cst; dum recolit, memoria est; dum judicat, ratio est; dum spirat vel contemplatur, spiritus est; dum sentit, sensus est. Nam inde sensus anima dicitur, pro iis quae sentit: unde et sententia nomen accepit. Habet etiam corpus quinque sensus, qui ex eo dicti sunt, quia per eos aniina tomum corpus sub. tilissimeagitat vigore sentiendi.
In these things, certain [natures] have only sense and do not have imagination; certain have sense and imagination. Since, therefore, it is more [a property] of this [spirit] to be made sensory than merely to be animated; it is established certainly that this power is more subtle, and where it is more subtle, it is more spirit. For it approaches closer to incorporeal nature when it forms imagination than when it provides sense. For nothing in the body can be higher, or closer to spiritual nature, than that in which, after sense or above sense, the power of imagining is conceived, which indeed is so sublime that whatever is above it is nothing other than reason.
CHAPTER XXXIV. Sense. Memory. Mind. Spirit. Animus, the same as the soul. Reason. How the soul raises itself to God. The wondrous division of the soul. The mind is the image of God. The soul is called the whole inner man, by which that clayey mass is vivified, ruled, and contained, moistened with juices lest, dried out, it dissolve. Therefore, while it vivifies the body, it is the soul; while it wills, it is the animus; while it knows, it is the mind; while it recollects, it is memory; while it judges, it is reason; while it breathes or contemplates, it is spirit; while it senses, it is sense. For thence the soul is called sense, with respect to the things it senses: whence also the name "sententia" [judgment/opinion] is derived. It also has the body's five senses, which are so called because through them the soul moves the whole body most subtly with the vigor of sensing.
Ita autem hæc omnia adjuncta sunt animae, ut una res sit: pro efficientiis tamen causarum, diversa nomina anima sortita est. In essentia namque est simplex, in officiis multiplex. Memoria etiam mens est; unde et immcmores amentes dicimus. Omnium rerum thesaurus et custos est memoria, nec enarrari potest, tam grandis est ejus perplexitas; et animus ipsa est. Nee aliud significo quam animam, cum mentem dico: sed propter aliud animam, et propter aliud mentem. Nam totum quod vivit, hominis anima cst. Cum autem anima in se agit se, et ex se et per se a, sola mens dici solet. Sensus vero ad sua ministeria intplenda consuetius anima dicitur. Spiritum Idem esse quod animam, evangelista pronuntiat diocns: Potestatem habeo ponendi animam meum, et rursum potestatem habeo sumendi eam (Joan. x, 18). De hac quoque ipsa Domini anima passionis tempore, memoratus evangelista ita protulit dicens: Et inclinato capite emisit spiritum (Id. xix, 50). Quid est enim cmiuere spiritum, nisi quod animam ponere? Sed anima dicta est pro eo quod vivit: spiritus autem vel pro spirituali natura, vel pro eo quod spirat in corpore. hem animum idem dicimus esse quod animam: sed anima vitæest, animus consilii. Unae aiunt philosophi, et sine animo vitam manere, et sine mente animam durare, sicut in amentibus. Ad mentem enim pertinere videtur ut sciat; ad animum, ut velit.
All these things, however, are so joined to the soul that it is one thing; yet, according to the workings of causes, the soul has received different names. For in its essence it is simple, in its functions manifold. Memory is also mind; whence we call the forgetful mindless. Memory is the treasury and guardian of all things, nor can it be described, so great is its intricacy; and it is itself the spirit. Nor do I signify anything other than the soul when I say mind; but it is soul for one reason and mind for another. For all that lives is the soul of man. But when the soul acts upon itself, and from itself and through itself, it is customarily called mind alone. Sense, however, for fulfilling its own ministries, is more commonly called soul. The evangelist declares that spirit is the same as soul, saying: I have power to lay down my soul, and again I have power to take it up (John 10:18). Concerning this very soul of the Lord also, at the time of his passion, the aforementioned evangelist brought forth these words, saying: And bowing his head, he sent forth the spirit (John 19:30). For what is it to send forth the spirit, except to lay down the soul? But it is called soul because it lives; spirit, however, either because of its spiritual nature, or because it breathes in the body. We also say that the spirit is the same as the soul; but the soul is of life, the spirit of counsel. Some philosophers say that life remains without the spirit, and the soul endures without the mind, as in the mindless. For it seems to pertain to the mind to know, and to the spirit to will.
Pueri etiam in genitricis utero sine scienda et voluntate vivunt. Mens autem vocata est, quod emineat in anima, vel quod memincrit. Quapropter non anima, sed quod excellit in anima, mens vocatur, tanquam caput vel oculus. Uude et ipse homo secoudum mentem imago Dei dicitur. Mens namque ex eo dicta est, quod emineat in anima, præstantior siquidem vis animae est, a qua procedit intelligentiaRatio siquidem est animi motus, visum mentis acucns, veraque a falsis distinguens.
Redeat ergo ad se mens rationalis, et colligat se in se: ut sine imaginibus corporeis se ipsam, et omnipolenlis Dei invisibilem naturam considerare valeat, terrenarum phantasmata imaginum, et quidquid terrenum cogitationi ejus occurrerit, respuat: et talemse intus quærat et videat, qualis est sine istis; considerel se talem, qualis sub Deo supra corpus creata est. Deinde supra semetipsam surgat et se ipsam deserat, atque quodam modo in oblivionem sui i veniat, et se contemplationi sui Creatoris humiliter et devote subjiciat.
Even children in the mother's womb live without knowledge and will. But it is called "mind" because it stands out in the soul, or because it remembers. Wherefore it is not the soul, but that which excels in the soul, that is called mind, as it were the head or the eye. Hence even man himself is said to be the image of God according to the mind. For mind is so called because it stands out in the soul; for it is the more excellent power of the soul, from which intelligence proceeds. Reason indeed is the movement of the mind, sharpening the mind's sight, and distinguishing true things from false.
Let the rational mind therefore return to itself, and gather itself into itself, so that without bodily images it may be able to consider itself and the invisible nature of almighty God; let it reject the phantasms of earthly images and whatever earthly thing occurs to its thought; and let it seek and see itself within, such as it is without these things; let it consider itself such as it was created under God above the body. Then let it rise above itself and forsake itself, and in a certain manner come into forgetfulness of itself, and humbly and devoutly subject itself to the contemplation of its Creator.
Cum enim corperit mens per puram intelligentiam semetipsam excedere I, et illam incorporeæ lucie claritatem tota intrare', et ex iis quae intrinsecus videt quemdam intimæ suavitatis saporem trahere, et ex eo intelligentiam suam condire, et in sapientiam vertere; in tanto hoc mentis excessu, pax illa qna; exsuperat omnem sensum, invenitur atque obtinctur, ut liat silenlium in coelo quasi hora dimidia; ita ut contemplantis animus nulla altercantium cogitationum tumultuatione turbetur, nihil omnino inveniens quod vel per desiderium peiat, vel per fastidium arg'tat, vel per odium accuset: sed intra contemplaHonis tranquillitatem totus colligitur, et intromittitur in quemdam affectum multum inusitatum introrsus ac nescio quam dulcedinem, quæ si semper sic sentiro. tur, profecto magna felicitas esset. Nibil sensualitas, nibil agit imaginatio; sed omnis inferior vis animæ proprio interim viduatur officio. Purior autem animæ pars in illud intimae quietis secretum, et summæ tran. quillitatis arcanum felici jucunditate introducitur. Vivus quidem est sermo Dei et efficax, et penetrabilior omni gladio ancipiti, et pertingens usque ad divisionem animæ et spiritus (Hebr. IV, 12).
For when the mind begins through pure intelligence to go beyond itself and to enter wholly into that brightness of incorporeal light, and to draw from those things which it sees within a certain savor of intimate sweetness, and from it to season its understanding and turn it into wisdom—in this so great an ecstasy of the mind, that peace which surpasses all sense is found and obtained, so that there is silence in heaven, as it were, for half an hour; so that the spirit of the contemplative is disturbed by no tumultuous clamor of quarreling thoughts, finding nothing at all that it may seek through desire, or reproach through distaste, or accuse through hatred; but within the tranquility of contemplation it is wholly gathered up and admitted into a certain very unusual affection within, and into a certain sweetness I know not what, which if it were always felt thus, would surely be great felicity. Sensuality does nothing, imagination does nothing; but every lower power of the soul is for the time deprived of its own office. The purer part of the soul, however, is introduced with happy delight into that secret of intimate quiet and mystery of the highest tranquility. For the word of God is living and efficacious, and more piercing than any two-edged sword, and reaching even to the division of soul and spirit.
Et ideo nihil in creaturis hac divisione mirabilius cernitur, ubi id quod essentialiter unum cst atque individuum, in se ipsum scinditur; et quod simplex in se et sine partibus constat, quasi quadam partitione dividitur. Neque enim in hoinine uno alia essentia cst ejus spiritus, atque alia est ejus anima: sed prorsus una eademque naturæsimplicis substantia. Non enim in hoc gemino vocabulo gemina substantia intelligitur: sed cum ad distinctionem ponitur gemina vis ejusdem essentiæ, una superior per spiritum, alia inferior per animam designatur. In hac utique divisione anima et qnod animate est, in imo remanet; spirims autem et quod spirituale cst, ad summa evolat. Ab infimis dividitur, ut ad summa sublimetur; ab anima scinditur, ut Domino uniatur: Quoniam qui adhæret Deo, unus spiritus est (I Cor. VI, 17). Felix divisio ct mirabilis separalio, ubi quod corpulentum et fæculentum est, deorsum remanet; quod spirituale et subtile est, usque ad speculationem divinae gloriæ sublimatur, et in eamdem imaginem transformatur. Pars inferior componitur ad summam pacem et tranquillitatem: pars autem superior sublimatur ad gloriam et jucunditatem. Licet enim mens humana non sit cjus naturæ, cujus est. Deus; imago tamcn illius naturæ, qua natura nulla melior est, ibi quaerenda et invemenda cst in nobis, quo etiam natura nostra nihil habet melius.
And therefore nothing among created things is seen as more wonderful than this division, where that which is essentially one and indivisible is split within itself; and that which stands simple in itself and without parts is divided as if by a kind of partition. For in one man the essence of his spirit is not one thing and the essence of his soul another, but altogether one and the same substance of a simple nature. For in this twofold word no twofold substance is understood, but when it is set down for the sake of distinction, the twofold power of the same essence is meant: the one, higher, is designated by "spirit," the other, lower, by "soul." In this division, then, the soul and what is animate remains at the bottom; but the spirit and what is spiritual flies up to the heights. It is divided from the lowest things so that it may be raised to the highest; it is severed from the soul so that it may be united to the Lord alone: "For he who cleaves to God is one spirit" (1 Cor. 6:17). A happy division and a wonderful separation, where what is corpulent and dregs-like remains below; what is spiritual and subtle is raised up even to the contemplation of divine glory, and is transformed into that same image. The lower part is composed unto the highest peace and tranquility; but the higher part is raised up unto glory and joy. For although the human mind is not of the same nature as God, yet the image of that nature, than which no nature is better, is to be sought and found in us in that respect in which our nature also has nothing better.
Sed prius mens ipsa in se ipsa consideranda est, et in ea reperienda est imago Dei. Mens igitur quando cogitatione se respicit, intelligit se et cognoscit; quando contemplatione ad Deum ascendit ut eum intelligat diligat, imago Dei dicenda est: cogitando a'terna, vir est; sicut dicit Apostolus, Vir non debet velare cuput suum, cum sit imago Dei et glo. ria (Id. xi, 7), id cst quanto magis se extendit in id quod aeternum est, tanto magis inde fonnatur ad lmaginem Dei; et ideo non est cohibenda, ut inde se contineat ac temperet. Quando vero ea agit vel cogitatquae sunt temporalia, mulier appellatur; et tunc non est dicenda imago Dei, et propterea debet velare caput suum, ne nimia sit ejus progressio ad inferiora; ne cnm licita agit, illicita concupiscat.
CAPUT XXXV. Dignitas humanas conditionis. Bomo quatenus ad imaginem Dei Rursus quomodo imago Dei in anima. Quatenus anima gerat similitudinem Dei. Tanta dignitas humanae conditionis esse cognoscitur, ut non solum jubentis sermone, sicut alia sex dierum opera, sed consilio sancuc Trinitatis, et opera divinæ majestatis creatus sit homo; ut ex primæ conditionis honore intelligeret, quantum deberet suo Conditori, dum tantum in conditione mox dignitatis privilegium præstitil ei Couditor; et tanto amplius Conditorem diligeret, quanto mirabilius se ab eo conditum intelligeret.
But first the mind itself must be considered in itself, and in it the image of God must be found. When the mind, then, regards itself by thought, it understands and knows itself; when by contemplation it ascends to God so as to understand and love him, it is to be called the image of God: by thinking on eternal things, it is man; as the Apostle says, A man ought not to cover his head, since he is the image and glory of God (1 Cor. 11:7), that is, the more it extends itself toward that which is eternal, the more it is formed therefrom unto the image of God; and therefore it is not to be restrained, so as to hold itself back and temper itself on that account. But when it does or thinks those things which are temporal, it is called woman; and then it is not to be called the image of God, and for that reason it ought to cover its head, lest its advance toward lower things be excessive; lest, while it does what is lawful, it lust after what is unlawful.
CHAPTER XXXV. The dignity of the human condition. How man is in the image of God. Again, how the image of God is in the soul. How far the soul bears the likeness of God. So great is the dignity of the human condition known to be, that man was created not only by the word of one commanding, as were the other works of the six days, but by the counsel of the holy Trinity and by the work of the divine majesty; so that from the honor of his first creation he might understand how much he owes to his Creator, since the Creator bestowed on him so great a privilege of dignity at once in his creation; and the more wonderfully he understood himself to have been created by him, the more abundantly he might love his Creator.
Nec ob hoc soluin quidem, quod consilio sanctae Trinitatis sic excellenter a Conditore conditus est, sed etiam quod ad imaginem et similitudinem suam Creator omnium eum creavit, quod nulli alteri ex creaturis donavit. Quoe imago diligentius in interioris hominis dignitate et nobilitate est consideranda. Primo quidem, quod sicuti Deus unus semper uhique totus est, omnia vivificans, movens et gubernans, sicut Apostolus ait, quod in eo vivimus, movemur, et sumus (Act. XVII, 28): sic anima in suo corpore ubique tota viget, vivificans illud, movens et gubernans. Nec enim in majoribus corporis sui membris major est et in minoribus minor: sed in minimis tota est, et in maximis tota. [ Sic infusa est corpori, ut non per membrorum parles partibus sit divisa. Nam in quolibet Joco pars corporis percutitur, tota dolet. Miro autem modo una eademque viviiicatione membris præsidens, cum ipsa pernaturam non sit diversa, per corpus tamen agit diversa. Ipsa quippe est, quæ per oculos videt, audit per aures, per nares odoratur, per os gustat, per membra omnia tangit, et tangendo lene ab aspero disceruit; et cum non sit diversa, per sensus tamen operatur diversa. Ex qua re intelligitur, quod ita est anima secundum suum modum in suo corpure, sicut Deus est in suo mundo.
Nor is it for this reason alone that he was so excellently created by the Creator according to the counsel of the Holy Trinity, but also because the Creator of all things created him in his own image and likeness, which he granted to no other of the creatures. This image is to be considered more diligently in the dignity and nobility of the inner man. First indeed, just as God, one and always everywhere whole, vivifies, moves, and governs all things, as the Apostle says, that in him we live, are moved, and exist (Acts 17:28): so the soul in its body is everywhere whole and vigorous, vivifying it, moving and governing it. For it is not greater in the larger members of its body and lesser in the smaller, but it is whole in the smallest and whole in the largest. [Thus it is infused into the body, that it is not divided among the parts by the parts of the members. For in whatever place a part of the body is struck, the whole suffers pain. But in a wondrous manner, one and the same vivification presiding over the members, since it is not in its nature diverse, yet through the body it acts diversely. For it is the same which sees through the eyes, hears through the ears, smells through the nostrils, tastes through the mouth, touches through all the members, and by touching distinguishes the smooth from the rough; and though it is not diverse, yet through the senses it works diverse things. From this it is understood that the soul is in its body according to its own measure, just as God is in his world.
Interius siquidem et exterius, superius et interius est: regendo superior, portando inferior, reptendo interior, circumdando exterior. Sic est intus, ut extra sit; sic circumdat, ut penetret; sic pnesidet, ut portet; sic portat ut præsideat. Et sicut Deus nec crescentibus creaturis crescit, nec decrescentibus decrescit: sic anima nec minutia membris minuitur, neo adauctis augetur. ] Hæc est imago sive similitudo omnipotentis Dei, quam anima habet in se.
Quamdam etiam sanctae Trinilatis habet imaginem: primo in eo, quod sicut Deus est, vivit et sapit; ita anima secundum suum modum est, vivit et sapit. Est quoque et alia trinitas in ea; quia ad imaginem perfect quidem et summae Trinitatis, quæ est in Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto, condita est. Et licet unius sit naturae anima, tres tamen in se vires habet, id est intellectum, voluntatem et memoriam: quod idem, licet aliis verbis, in Evangelio designatur, cum dicitur, Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo, et ex tota anima tua, et ex tota mente tua (Matlh. XXII, 37); id est, ex toto intellectu tuo, et ex tota voluntate tua, et ex tota memoria tua. Nam sicut ex Patre generatur Filius, et ex Patre Filioque procedit Spiritus sanctus; ita ex intellectu generatur voluntas, et ex his ambobus procedit memoria, sicut facile a sapiente quolibet potest intelligi.
For it is both within and without, above and below: ruling as superior, bearing as inferior, creeping as inner, encompassing as outer. It is so within as to be without; it so encompasses as to penetrate; it so presides as to bear; it so bears as to preside. And just as God neither grows when creatures increase nor diminishes when they decrease, so the soul is neither diminished by the loss of members nor increased by their addition. This is the image or likeness of almighty God that the soul has in itself.
It also has a certain image of the Holy Trinity: first, in that just as God is, lives, and knows, so the soul according to its own measure is, lives, and knows. There is also another trinity in it, because it was created to the image of the perfect and supreme Trinity, which is in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. And although the soul is of one nature, it nevertheless has three powers in itself, that is, intellect, will, and memory; which same thing is designated, though in other words, in the Gospel, when it is said, You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and with your whole soul, and with your whole mind (Matt. 22:37); that is, with your whole intellect, and with your whole will, and with your whole memory. For just as the Son is begotten of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, so will is begotten of intellect, and memory proceeds from both, as can easily be understood by any wise person.
Nec enim anima perfecta potest esse sine his tribus, nec horum trium aliquod sine aliis duobus integrum constat, quantum ad suam pertinet habitudinem I. Et sicut Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus sanctus; non tamen tres dii, sed unus Deus et tres personae: ita anima intellectus, anima voluntas, anima memoria; non tamen tres animae in uno corpore, sed anima una et tres vires. Atque in his tribus divinam imaginem gerit mirabiliter in sua natura noster interior 'bomo, et ex his quasi excellentioribus animæ viribus jubemur diligere Conditorem, ut in quantum intelligitur, diligatur;et in quantum diligitur, semper in memoria habeatur. Nec solum sufficit de eo intellectus, nisi fiat in amore ejus voluntas. Imo nec hæc duo sufficiunt, nisi memoria addatur, qua semper in mente intelligentis et diligentis maneat Deus: ut sicut nullum potest esse momentum, quo homo non utatur vel fruatur Dei bonitate et misericordia; ita nullum sit momentum, quo præsentem non habeat eum in memoria. Et ideo mihi juste videtur dictum, nostrum interiorem hominem esse imaginem Dei.
For a perfect soul cannot exist without these three, nor does any one of these three stand complete without the other two, as far as its own disposition is concerned. And just as God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit are not three gods but one God and three persons, so the soul is intellect, the soul is will, the soul is memory; yet not three souls in one body, but one soul and three powers. And in these three our inner man bears the divine image wondrously in its own nature, and from these, as it were the more excellent powers of the soul, we are commanded to love the Creator, so that insofar as he is understood, he may be loved; and insofar as he is loved, he may always be held in memory. Nor is the understanding of him alone sufficient, unless the will is brought into love of him. Indeed, not even these two suffice, unless memory is added, by which God may always remain in the mind of the one who understands and loves him: so that just as there can be no moment in which man does not use or enjoy the goodness and mercy of God, so there may be no moment in which he does not have him present in memory. And therefore it seems to me rightly said that our inner man is the image of God.
Nunc vero de similitudine aliqua dicamus. Nam sicut Dens creator. qui hominem ad imaginem suam creavit (Gen. i, 27), est charitas, banus et justus, patiens et mitis, mundus et niisericors, et cætera sanctarum virtutum insignia quæ de eo leguntur: ita homo creatus est, ut charitatem haberet, ut bonus esset et justus, patiens atque mitis, mundus et misericors. Quas virtutes quanto plus quisque in se ipso habet, tanto propior est Deo, et majorem sui Creatoris gerit similitudinem. Si vero, quod absit, aliquis per devia vitiorum et diverticula malorum ab hac nobilissima sui Conditoris similitudine degener aberrat, tunc fiet de eo quod scriptum est, Homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit (Psal. XLVIII, 13), etc. Quis major honor esse potuit homini, quam ut ad similitudinem sui Conditoris conderetur, et eisdem virtutum vestimentis ornaretur, quibus et Conditor, de quo legitur, Dominus regnavit, decorem indutus eat (Psal. xcn, i j; id est, omnium virtutum splendore et totius bonitatis decore ornatus Vel quod majus bomini potest esse dedecus aut infelicior miseria, quam ut hac similitudinis gloria sui Conditoris amissa, ad informem et irrationalem brutorum jumentorumque similitudinem dilabatur?
Now let us speak of a certain likeness. For just as God the Creator, who created man in his own image (Gen. 1:27), is love, good and just, patient and gentle, pure and merciful, and the other marks of the holy virtues that are read of him: so man was created to have love, to be good and just, patient and gentle, pure and merciful. And the more anyone possesses these virtues in himself, the nearer he is to God and the greater likeness of his Creator he bears. But if, which God forbid, anyone through the byways of vices and the diversions of evils should degenerate and wander away from this most noble likeness of his Maker, then there shall be fulfilled in him what is written: Man, when he was in honor, did not understand (Ps. 48:13), etc. What greater honor could there have been for man than that he should be created to the likeness of his Maker and adorned with the same garments of virtues with which the Maker himself is adorned, of whom it is read: The Lord has reigned, he is clothed with beauty (Ps. 92:1); that is, adorned with the splendor of all virtues and the beauty of all goodness. Or what greater disgrace or more wretched misery can there be for man than that, having lost this glory of likeness to his Maker, he should slip down to the formless and irrational likeness of brute beasts and cattle?
Quapropter quisque diligentius attendat primæ conditionis suæ excellenliam, et vcnerandam sanctae Trinitatis in se ipso imaginem agnoscat, honoremque divinæ similitudinis, ad quam creatus est, nobilitate morum, exercitatione virtutum, dignitate meritorum habere contendat: ut quando apparebit qualis sit, tunc similis ei appareat, qui mirabiliter eum ad similitudinem suam in primo nomine condidit, mirabiliusque in secundo; id est, in se ipso reformavit.
CAPUT XXXVI. Comparatio animæ cum Deo. Magna convenientia est inter Deum et animam. Deus namque vita est, spiritus est, sapientia et amor. Vita eliam anima est, spiritus est, in quo spiritu sapientia est et amor. Vita Deus est, vita et anima est, similis, sed dispar: similis, quod vita, quod se ipsa vivens, quod non tantum vivens, sed eliam vivificaus, sicut et ille hæc omnia est; dispar, quoniam ille creator est, et ista creatura. Nisi enim ab illocreata esset, non esset; et nisi ab illo vivificata, non viveret. Vivit anima naturali vita, etiam si spirituali non vivat, sed talis vita mors est potiusquam vita: quoniam mors peccatorum pessima(Psal.XXXIII,22).Anima quidem quæ secundum carnem vivit, vivens mortua est; et ideo bonum erat illi non vivere, quam sic vivere. Vita anima est, vivens quidem, sed non aliunde quain se ipsa; et ob hoc non lam vivens, quam vita est.
Therefore let each person attend more diligently to the excellence of his first condition, and recognize within himself the venerable image of the holy Trinity, and strive to possess the honor of the divine likeness, to which he was created, by nobility of conduct, exercise of virtues, and dignity of merits; so that when he appears as he is, he may then appear like him who wonderfully created him in his own likeness in the first name, and more wonderfully reformed him in the second; that is, in himself.
CHAPTER XXXVI. The comparison of the soul with God. There is a great correspondence between God and the soul. For God is life, is spirit, is wisdom and love. The soul also is life, is spirit, in which spirit is wisdom and love. God is life, the soul also is life, similar but unequal: similar, in that it is life, in that it lives by itself, in that it is not only living but also life-giving, just as he is all these things; unequal, because he is the creator and it is the creature. For unless it had been created by him, it would not exist; and unless it had been given life by him, it would not live. The soul lives with a natural life, even if it does not live with a spiritual life, but such a life is death rather than life: for the death of sinners is the worst (Ps. 33:22). Indeed the soul that lives according to the flesh, though living, is dead; and therefore it would have been better for it not to live than to live thus. The soul is life, living indeed, but not from anywhere other than itself; and for this reason it is not so much living as it is life.
Inde est qu infusa corpori vivificat illud, ut sit corpus deviae præsentia, non vita, sed vivens, Creata est anima a Deo, vita a vita, simplex a simplici, immortalis ab immortali; ut non sit longe a Creature suo, cui appropiare videtur simplicitate essentiæ et perpetuitate vitæ. Licet enim spirilualiler non vivat, immortaliter tamen necesse est ut vivat. Creata cst anima magna a magno, recta a recto: eo magua, quo capax æternorum; eo recta, quo appetens supernorum; eo beata \ quo Deo unita. Anima namque quam Dei pietas respicit, humilitas subjicit, pœnitentia reducit, justitia deducit, obedienlia conducit, perseverantia perducit, devotio introducit, puritas jungit, charitas unit.
Habet anima in se amorem, quo semper potest stare cum Deo, aut redire, si mota cum suis affectibus, imo defectibus, ab eo fuerit. Solus est amor ex omnibus animæ affectibus atque sensibus, in quo potest anima, etsi non ex æquo, suo respondere anctori, vel de simili mutuam rependere vicem: et si minus amat, quoniam minor est; tamen si ex tota se diligat, nihil deest ubi totum est. Renuntians ergo cunctis affectionibus aliis, tota soli incumbat amori, effundens se totam in amarem illius, cui respondere habet in redhibendo amorc. Amat siquidem Deus ut anietur, et cum amat, nil aliud vult quam amari, sciens ipso amore beatos qui se amaverint.
Hence it is that, infused into the body, it gives it life, so that the body may be the presence of the soul, not life, but living. The soul was created by God: life from Life, simple from the Simple, immortal from the Immortal, so that it may not be far from its Creator, to whom it is seen to draw near by the simplicity of its essence and the perpetuity of its life. For although it does not live spiritually, it must nonetheless live immortal-ly. The soul was created great by the Great, upright by the Upright: great in that it is capable of eternal things; upright in that it desires heavenly things; blessed in that it is united to God. For the soul whom God's mercy regards, humility subjects, penitence leads back, justice leads down, obedience conducts, perseverance brings through, devotion introduces, purity joins, charity unites.
The soul has within itself a love by which it can always stand with God, or return, if it has been moved away from him by its affections—indeed, by its defects. Love alone, of all the soul's affections and senses, is that in which the soul can, even if not equally, respond to its Author, or repay a mutual exchange in kind; and if it loves less, because it is lesser, yet if it loves from its whole self, nothing is lacking where the whole is. Renouncing, therefore, all other affections, let it devote itself wholly to love alone, pouring itself entirely into the love of him to whom it must respond by returning love. For God loves in order to be loved, and when he loves, he wills nothing other than to be loved, knowing that by that very love those who have loved him are blessed.
Per amorem venit ad homines, venit in homines, factus est homo, et deliciae illius esse cum filiis bominum Prov. VIII, 51). Noslra) vero deliciae erunt cum ad eum vcnicmus, et videbimus cum sicuti est, atque similes ei erimus ( I Joan. tu, 2). Tunc erit manifesta visio, plena cognitio, vera dilectio, firma conjunctio, socretas individua, similitudo perfecta, ct vita beata, in alternum et ultra in perpetuas aeternitates. Sicut enim corpus in resurrectione sua vitam et sensum recipiet; sic anima in resurrectione sua vitam et sensum recipiet, id est, cognitionem et amorem Dei. Quod autem cognitio sit vita:lerna, ipsa Veritas affirmat dicens: Hæc est vita æterna, ut cognoscant te verum Deum, et quem misisti Jesum Christum (Joan. XVII, 5). Amor etiam sensus est. Nam sicut exterior homo circa ista temporalia quinquepartito sensu afficitur, id est, visu, auditu, gustu, odoratu ct tactu: sic interior homo in beata vita circa quinque ineirabilia Dei ineffabili amore alficiclur. Cum enim Deum suum amabit, quamdam lucem, quantdam vocem, qucmdam odorem, quemdam cibum, et quemdam amplexum interiorern amabit. Ibi enim fulget quod non capit locus. Ibi sonat quod non rapit tempus. Ibi olet quod non spargit MaIus. Ibi salit quod.non minuit edacitas. Ibi hæret quod non divellit satietas.
Through love he came to men, he came into men, he became man, and his delights were to be with the sons of men (Prov. 8:31). But our delights will be when we come to him, and we shall see him as he is, and we shall be like him (1 John 3:2). Then there will be manifest vision, full knowledge, true love, firm union, undivided fellowship, perfect likeness, and blessed life, for ever and ever into eternal ages. For just as the body in its resurrection will receive life and sensation, so the soul in its resurrection will receive life and sensation, that is, the knowledge and love of God. But that knowledge is eternal life, the Truth itself affirms, saying: This is eternal life, that they may know you, the true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent (John 17:3). Love also is a sensation. For just as the outer man is affected toward these temporal things by a fivefold sense, that is, by sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch, so the inner man in the blessed life is affected toward the five ineffable things of God by an ineffable love. For when he loves his God, he will love a certain light, a certain voice, a certain fragrance, a certain food, and a certain inner embrace. For there shines what no place contains. There sounds what no time snatches away. There is a fragrance that no evil scatters. There is a savor that no greed diminishes. There clings what no satiety tears apart.
Ibi siquidem videtur Deus sine intermissione, cognoscitur sine errore, amatur sine ofJensione, laudatur sine fatigatione.
CAPUT XXXVII. Anima civitas Dei. Illius cives. Consiliarii. Milites. Plebeii. Tres vires animæ secundum Platonem etmedicos. Ratio. Intelligentia. Memoria. Ape pelitus. Nobilis creatura est anima. Civitas namque Dei est, de qua tam gloriosa dicta sunt (Psal. LXXXVI, 3), quod ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei facta est. Hæc civitas Jerusalem merito appellanda est; quia ad frucndum visione illius summæ pacis, quæ fecit utraque unum ( Ephes. II, 14), creata est. Mens ejus paradisus est, in qua cum coelestia meditatur, quasi III paradiso voluptatis delectatur. Domus ctiam summi Patrisfamilias est anima, propter unitatem morum; sponsa Christi, per dilectionem; templum Spiritus sancti, per sanctificationem; civitas Hegis:eterni, propter pacem et concordiam civium. Et quia nulla eat civitas absque populo, disposuit in ea Conditor noster populum triplicis gradus, id cst, sapientes ad consulendum, milites ad propugnandum, artifices ad ministrandum. Cives hujus civitatis, sunt naturales et ingeniti animæ vigores, tanquam indigenæ: quorum distincti sunt gradus; quia alii superiores, alii inferiores, alii medii. Superiores quidem sunt, intellectuales sensus; medii, rationales; infimi, animales. Quorum differentia hæc est. Animalis sive sensualis appetit visibilia.
There indeed God is seen without ceasing, known without error, loved without offense, praised without weariness.
CHAPTER XXXVII. The soul is a city of God. Its citizens. Counselors. Soldiers. Commoners. The three powers of the soul according to Plato and the physicians. Reason. Understanding. Memory. Appetite. The soul is a noble creature. For it is a city of God, of which such glorious things are spoken (Ps. 86:3), because it was made in the image and likeness of God. This city is rightly to be called Jerusalem, because it was created to enjoy the vision of that highest peace which has made both one (Eph. 2:14). Its mind is a paradise, in which, when it meditates on heavenly things, it is delighted as if in the third paradise of pleasure. The soul is also the house of the supreme Father of the household, on account of unity of conduct; the bride of Christ, through love; the temple of the Holy Spirit, through sanctification; the city of the eternal King, on account of the peace and concord of its citizens. And because no city exists without a people, our Creator has arranged in it a people of three ranks, that is, the wise to counsel, soldiers to fight, and artisans to serve. The citizens of this city are the natural and inborn powers of the soul, as it were natives; their ranks are distinct, because some are higher, some lower, some middle. The higher are the intellectual senses; the middle, the rational; the lowest, the animal. Their difference is this: the animal or sensual power desires visible things.
Rationalis discernit, et discretionis oculo aspernatur ea. Intellectualis pertrahit ad divina. Intellectualcs igitur sensus sunt tanquam animæ consiliarii, dicentes ei: Deum time, et mandata ejus observa. Propter hoc enim est omnis homo ( Eccle. XII, i3). Rationales sunt tanquam milites, qui hostes, puta concupiscentias, impugnant per arma justitiae. Animales sen sensuales sunt tanquam rustici et artifices, qui corporalibus rudimentis ins!stunt, et corpori necessaria ministrant. Hanc triplicem vim animae, id est, sensualem, rationalem, et intellectualem, philosophi partes vocaverunt, non integrales, sed virtuales: quia potentiae cjus sunt. Sensualitas ea vis animae est, qua corpus vegetat, et per corporis sensus ista exteriora sentit et discernit. Omnes enim sensus, tam exteriores quam inicriorcs, ad animam referuntur, utpote ab illa procedentes: ut enim sentiant, omnes ab anima habent. Ratio vis est animæ supra corporalia, et infra spiritualia collocata: secernit enim vera a falsis, quod est Logicae; virtutes a viliis, quod est Ethicæ; et per experimenla rcrum investigat naturas, quod est Physicie. In his vero tribus tota Philosophia consistit. Totam igitur Philosophiam ratio comprehendit. Intellectus sive intelligentia, ca vis animae esi, qua de divinis, quantum homini possibile est, cognoscitur.
The rational [power] discerns, and with the eye of discernment it spurns those things. The intellectual [power] draws [the soul] toward divine things. The intellectual senses, therefore, are like the soul's counselors, saying to it: Fear God, and keep his commandments. For this is every man. The rational [senses] are like soldiers, who fight against enemies, namely, concupiscences, through the weapons of justice. The animal or sensual [senses] are like rustics and craftsmen, who apply themselves to bodily rudiments and minister the things necessary to the body. This threefold power of the soul—that is, the sensual, the rational, and the intellectual—the philosophers called parts, not integral but virtual, because they are powers of it. Sensuality is that power of the soul by which it vegetates the body, and through the body's senses it senses and discerns these exterior things. For all the senses, both exterior and interior, are referred to the soul, as proceeding from it; for in order to sense, all have [this] from the soul. Reason is the power of the soul placed above corporeal things and below spiritual things; for it separates true from false, which belongs to Logic; virtues from vices, which belongs to Ethics; and through the experiences of things it investigates natures, which belongs to Physics. In these three, moreover, all Philosophy consists. Reason therefore comprehends all Philosophy. Intellect or intelligence is that power of the soul by which divine things are known, insofar as is possible for man.
Ad coelestia enim arcana penetranda ratio per se non sunicit, nisi a Deo adjuta fuerit. Tunc finis ejus, si bene viget, cum ad notitiam secretorum, quæ diu investigando quaesivit, pervenerit, intellectus seu intelligentia nuncupatur. Boethius tamen dicit intelligentiam solius Dei csse et admodum paucorum hominum; sed horum al. terum pro alturo sare ponitur. Memoria etiam consors et cooperatrix est rationis; quoniam sine ea ratio nee ad incognita proceucre, nee cognitorum scientiam retinere potest. Mcmoria est vis animæ accepta retinens, præterita repetens, elapsa recolligens. Humanus appetitus inter summa ct ima positus, cum plerumque in utraque divisus sibimetipsi sit contrarius, in quamcumque partem totus transierit, nomen ejus merito sortitur. Si carnis voluptatibus pascitur, carnalis sive animalis nominatur. Si spiritualibus desideriis delectatur, spiritualis nuncupatur. Appetitus siquidem est naturalis vis in animante movendis avide sensibus attributa.
For to penetrate heavenly secrets, reason is not sufficient by itself unless it has been aided by God. Then its end, if it thrives well, when it has arrived at the knowledge of the secrets that it has sought out by long investigation, is called intellect or understanding. Boethius, however, says that understanding belongs to God alone and to very few men; but one of these is placed for the other. Memory is also the partner and co-worker of reason, since without it reason can neither advance to unknown things nor retain the knowledge of things known. Memory is the power of the soul that retains things received, repeats things past, and recalls things that have slipped away. The human appetite, placed between the highest and the lowest, since for the most part it is divided between both and is contrary to itself, into whichever part it has passed over wholly, it deservedly receives its name. If it is fed on the pleasures of the flesh, it is called carnal or animal. If it delights in spiritual desires, it is called spiritual. Appetite, indeed, is a natural power assigned in the living being to moving the senses eagerly.
CAPUT XXXVIII. Virium animæ definitiones. Quoniam de viribus animae sæpe mentionem feci, definire cas debeo; quatenus quæ de anima dicta vel dicenda sunt, evidentius intelligi possint. Sensualitas, sensus, imaginatio tam corporis quam animae dici possunt. Sensualitas corporis est quaedam vis ignea. Sensualitas sive animalitas animae, est infe nor vis ejus, quæ secum trahens sensualitatem carnis, velut famulam et obedientem, sensus et imaginationes facil, easque in arca memoriæ reponit. In sensu instrumentum est sensualitatis ' et origo imaginationis. Ipsa namque vis ignea, quæ extrinsecus formata sensus dicitur, eadem forma usque ad intimum traducta, imaginatio vocatur. Sensus itaque parit imaginationem, imaginatio cogitationem, cogitatio meditationem. Meditatio acuit ingenium, ingenium rationem: ratio conducit ad intellectum, intellectus ad intelligentiam, intelligentia per contemplationem ipsam veritatem admiratur, et per charitatem in ea delectatur. Sensus est passio animae in corpore ex qualitalibus extra accidentibus. Imaginatio est vis animæ, quæ figuram corporearum rerum absente corpore sine exteriori sensu dignOscit. Cogitatio est circ:, quælibet animi occupatio. Consideratio cst in tenta cogitatio. Meditatio est frequens cogitatio rnodum. et causam, et rationem uniuscujusque rei investigans. Ingenium est vis quædam naturaliter animis insita, per se valt-ns.
CHAPTER XXXVIII. Definitions of the powers of the soul. Since I have often made mention of the powers of the soul, I ought to define them, so that what has been said or is to be said about the soul may be understood more clearly. Sensuality, sense, and imagination can be said of both the body and the soul. The sensuality of the body is a certain fiery force. The sensuality or animality of the soul is its lower power, which, drawing along with itself the sensuality of the flesh as a handmaid and obedient servant, produces senses and imaginations, and stores them in the chest of memory. In sense there is the instrument of sensuality and the origin of imagination. For that same fiery force, which when formed externally is called sense, when the same form is conveyed all the way to the inmost part, is called imagination. Sense, therefore, gives birth to imagination, imagination to thought, thought to meditation. Meditation sharpens the intellect, the intellect reason; reason leads to understanding, understanding to intelligence; intelligence through contemplation admires the truth itself, and through charity takes delight in it. Sense is a passion of the soul in the body arising from qualities occurring externally. Imagination is a power of the soul that recognizes the figure of corporeal things when the body is absent, without the exterior sense. Thought is any occupation of the mind whatsoever. Consideration is intent thought. Meditation is frequent thought investigating the mode, the cause, and the reason of each thing. Intellect is a certain power naturally implanted in souls, prevailing by itself.
Ratio est quædam vis anilia, quæ omnia discernit et judicat; sed maxime cum inhi-It spiritualibus, et imaginem Dei in se conservai. intellectus est rerum vere existentium perceptio. Intelligentia est de solis rerum principiis, id est, de Deo, ideis, hyle, et de incorporeis substantiis pura et certa cognitio. Contemplatio cst perspicuæ veritatis jucunda admiratio. Charitas est concordia mentium, et societis electorum, viia beatarum animarum et Angelorum, quia nec animæ nec Angeli nisi her charitatem vivunt.
CAPUT XXXIX. Ad quid anima ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei. Anima rationalis et intellectualis facta est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, ut factoren suum pro imagine cognoscat, et pro similitudine diligat. Ex imagine nainque Dei habet rationem, et ex similitudine charitatem. Charitas vero in se ipsa repræsentat Trinitatem. Hanc ratio sentit, et pacata requirit: hanc charitas invenit, et videndo beata quiescit. Hanc in præsenti fides sequitur, spes in caelum usque comitatur, charitas perenniter amplexatur. Mens itaque spiritualis, scu intelligentia rationalis, primo Creatorem suum aspiciat; deinde creaturam ipsius videat; et mcdianle arbitrii libertate ad eum, qui condidit omnia, se et cclera referat. Sic in homine Trinitas appareat, quam charitas manifestat, ut charitatem semper homo exhibeat, semperque conspiciat is, quem Trinitatis imago perornat.
Reason is a certain power of the mind which discerns and judges all things, but most of all when it cleaves to spiritual things and preserves in itself the image of God. Understanding is the perception of things that truly exist. Intelligence is the pure and certain knowledge of the principles of things alone, that is, of God, the ideas, hyle, and incorporeal substances. Contemplation is the joyful admiration of clear truth. Charity is the concord of minds and the fellowship of the elect, the way of blessed souls and angels, because neither souls nor angels live except by charity.
CHAPTER XXXIX. To what end the soul is made in the image and likeness of God. The rational and intellectual soul was made in the image and likeness of God, so that it may know its Maker as its image and love Him as its likeness. For from the image of God it has reason, and from the likeness it has charity. Charity indeed represents the Trinity in itself. Reason perceives it, and when at peace seeks it; charity finds it, and in seeing it rests blessed. In the present, faith follows it, hope accompanies it even to heaven, charity embraces it forever. Therefore let the spiritual mind, or rational intelligence, first look upon its Creator; then let it see His creation; and by the mediating freedom of the will let it refer itself and all other things to Him who created all things. Thus may the Trinity appear in man, which charity makes manifest, so that man may always show forth charity, and He whom the image of the Trinity adorns may always behold it.
Sic homo cjus servabit similitudinem, cujus in se naturaliter portat imaginem. Appareat ergo imago Dei in intelligentia rationali, in mente spirituali, in honore liberi arbitrii. Appareat similitudo Dei in moribus pro natura, in opcrihus pro justitia, in virtutibus pro gratia: ut moribus naiura perornetur, ut justitia operibus comprobetur, ut gratia virtutibus compleatur, et sic semper Domino præsentetur. Anima lotum corpus ho.ninis lota pariter animat. Est quidem inspirata a Deo homini vita, non de præjacenti materia, sed de nihilo facta all eo. De cæteris animantibus Scriptura dicit: Producant aquæ, etc. Producat terra animam viventem (Gen. i, et 24). Animam vero non aqua, non terra produxit, sed Deus inspiravit; non tamcn vivam vcl viventem, sed spiraculum vitæ (Id. II, 7), rationale ex Dei imagine, factum ex Dei similitudine.
Thus man will preserve the likeness of him whose image he naturally bears within himself. Let the image of God therefore appear in rational understanding, in the spiritual mind, in the honor of free will. Let the likeness of God appear in morals according to nature, in works according to justice, in virtues according to grace: that nature may be adorned by morals, that justice may be approved by works, that grace may be completed by virtues, and thus may he ever be presented to the Lord. The soul animates the whole body of man, and being whole, animates it equally. Indeed, the life breathed into man by God is not made from pre-existing matter, but made from nothing by him. Concerning the other living creatures Scripture says: Let the waters produce, etc. Let the earth produce the living soul (Gen. 1, and 24). But the soul neither water nor earth produced, but God breathed it in; not, however, a living or life-giving [soul], but a breath of life (Ibid. 2:7), rational from the image of God, made from the likeness of God.
CAPUT XL. Miseria animæ a Deo recedentis. Recedit a similitudine, non ab imagine Dei. Animæ non generantur. Anima non est pars Dei. Probat hoc mutabilitas quam incurrit. Deus enim immutabilis est: hæc sæpe 'mutata, pro culpa quandoque damnata, pro pœna quoque lit misera. Nihil ei tamen nocere posset nisi a Deo rcce sisset. Recessit aulcm quando peccavit. Proinde torquetur misera, a Dco refuga. Ab uno disjuncta spargitur ad inulta, ct pro sua intempcraniia fit morbida, fit molesta, Ea propter sensus corporci turbata memoria turbati hebeles fiunt, marcidi et stupidi. Inde caro patitur, languorcs oriuntur, et mors violenta pervagatur. Homo quidem a Deo aversus, peccando perversus, quia a Deo dissentit, dissidet et sibi, ponatque iti se ipso pœnam dc se ipso. Anima non formatur ex materia informi, scil in sua creatione formam accepit, qua facta cst ad imaginem ct similitudinem Dei. A quo si avertitur, remanet informis; qnia rea, quia dissimilis: nec idco tamen efficitur irrationalis; quia gestat imaginem Dei, unde et potest ireformari. Sed ncc etiamsi tola peccaio concludatur, et licet pro insipientia jumento comparetur, ideo lit anima pecoris vel alterius corpotis. Ipsum cnim corpus et nunc et in fine semper est habitura, cum quo facta cst una persona. Sed nee Ideo fit corpus, etiamsi pen'ilus hebetetur Non enim distrahitur partibus, nee loco concluditur.
CHAPTER XL. The misery of the soul that departs from God. It departs from the likeness, not from the image, of God. Souls are not generated. The soul is not a part of God. Its mutability, which it incurs, proves this. For God is immutable; the soul is often changed, sometimes condemned for guilt, and for punishment has become miserable. Yet nothing could harm it unless it had receded from God. But it receded when it sinned. Hence the miserable soul is tormented, a fugitive from God. Separated from the One, it is scattered to many things, and through its own intemperance it becomes diseased, it becomes burdensome. On this account the senses of the body are disturbed, the memory is disturbed, and they become dull, withered, and stupefied. Thence the flesh suffers, sicknesses arise, and violent death spreads abroad. Man indeed, turned away from God, perverted by sinning, because he disagrees with God, is also at variance with himself, and places in himself the punishment from himself. The soul is not formed from formless matter; namely, in its creation it received a form, by which it was made to the image and likeness of God. From which if it turns away, it remains formless; because it is guilty, because it is unlike. Nor for that reason, however, is it made irrational, because it bears the image of God, whence also it can be reformed. But not even if the whole of sin be enclosed, and although for its foolishness it be compared to a beast of burden, is the soul for that reason made the soul of a beast or of another body. For it will always have that very body, both now and at the end, with which it was made one person. But neither for that reason does it become a body, even if it be thoroughly dulled. For it is not torn apart into parts, nor confined by place.
Non est major in majoribus, nee est minor in minoribus sui corporis partibus vitæ idoneis. Spiritus namque est anima rationalis, quantislibet obruta malis; ct ubicumque cst, tota est.
Non traducitur a palre in filiuin, ne una sit anima amborum. Sicut, inquit Dominus, anima patris, sic amma filii mea eat (Ezech. XVIII, 4), Nec pars animæ patris in filium, dum generat, se transfundit. Partiri namque seu dividi, augeri vel minui, pro substantia sua spiritus nescit. Non enim potest esse major, sed melior. Si enim particulariter transfunderetur, corporcus esse probaretur. Quod si, ut delirant aliqui, semen animæ cum semine carnis haberet generando transfundi, multa quidem inhonesta ct impossibilia possent exinde reclamari, quæ de spiritu rationali nec dici debent ncc opinari. Indecens cnim est ob-.scaena scœna retexere, et male fusa carnis semina denudare.
It is not greater in greater parts, nor is it less in the lesser parts of its body that are fit for life. For the soul is a rational spirit, however great the evils it is buried under; and wherever it is, it is whole.
It is not transmitted from father to son, so that one soul might be that of both. As the Lord says, "As the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine" (Ezek. 18:4). Nor does a part of the father's soul pour itself into the son when he begets. For a spirit, by its own substance, does not know how to be divided or split apart, increased or diminished. For it cannot be greater, but it can be better. For if it were poured out part by part, it would be proved to be corporeal. But if, as some rave, the seed of the soul were transmitted in generation along with the seed of the flesh, many indeed dishonorable and impossible things could be objected from this, which ought neither to be said nor even thought concerning a rational spirit. For it is indecent to uncover obscene matters and to lay bare the badly poured seeds of the flesh.
CAPUT XLI. Sed in dies creantur. Materiæ a prima creatione nulla fit nova creatio. Peccatum originale per catnem contrahitur. Baptismi necessitas. Dieimus autem rationales animas pro essentia fieri quolidic de nihilo novas, sed pro consimili natura ex institutione divina, non utique novas. Quales enim iu exordio Deus die sexto masculo et feminæ dedit (Gen. I, 27), tales quotidie inspirat singulis, nova de nihilo creatione, non nova institutione. Pater, inquit, meus usque modo operatur, et ego operor (Joan. v, 17). Operatur usque modo Pater et Filius; operatione siquidem nova, sed institutione non nova; pro illa agens, cum ista quiescens. Res vero corporeae post primam sui creationem novæ nulłæ creantur, sed simul in exordio conditum temporali formatione propagantur. Animæ autem Bon simul essentialiter factæ sunt, sed pro natura consimili,.qna ad imagincm et similitudinem Dei fiunt, et simul factæ reputantur, et non simul editæ judicanlur: non simul edite pro essentia, sed simul factæ pro compari forma ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei praerogata. Caro de carne generando traducitur, sed spiritus de spiritu minime propagatur.
CHAPTER XLI. But they are created daily. No new creation of matter takes place after the first creation. Original sin is contracted through the flesh. The necessity of baptism. We say, however, that rational souls are made new from nothing each day as regards their essence, but as regards their like nature they are not new by divine institution. For such as God gave to the male and the female on the sixth day in the beginning (Gen. 1:27), such he breathes daily into each one, by a new creation from nothing, not by a new institution. "My Father," he says, "works even until now, and I work" (John 5:17). The Father and the Son work even until now; by a new operation indeed, but not by a new institution; acting in accordance with that former work, while resting in this one. But no corporeal things are created new after their first creation, but having been established together in the beginning they are propagated by temporal formation. But souls were made essentially at the same time, but on account of their like nature, whereby they are made to the image and likeness of God, they are both reckoned to have been made at the same time and judged not to have been brought forth at the same time: not brought forth at the same time as regards essence, but made at the same time as regards the equal form bestowed to the image and likeness of God. The flesh is transmitted from flesh by generation, but the spirit is in no way propagated from spirit.
Certum tenemus quia caro contracta de carne per legein concupiscentiæ, quam cito vivilicaiur, originalis culpa: vinculo premitur, ejusque affectionibus anima, qu:e carnem vivificat, aggravatur. Sub hoc peccati vinculo demerguntur parvuli, qui sine remedio baptismi moriuntur. Habent enim originale peccatum. non per animam I sed per carnem utique contractum, animæque refusum. Carni namque ita unitur anima, ut cum carne sit una persona. Fit enim auctore Deo anima et caro unum iudividuum, unus horno: unde salva naturæ utriusque proprietate adjicitur carni quod animæ cst, et animæ quod carnis est; pro ullitate personæ, non pro diversitate naturæ. Quod igitur ibidem singulis est proprium, commune lit amborum; proprium pro natura, commune pro persona. Exinde lit anima originali culpæ obnoxia, quam caro contrahit, ct animæ refundit, cum qua unita est in persona, licet divisa sit in natura. Ea propter necesse cst parvulum, dum vivit, Christi Sacramento renovari, IIC obsit ejus animx socictas carnis peccati, qua gravatur etiam corpore exuta, nisi dum in corpore vivit, salutari fuerit remedio expiata. Currant igitur adulti, currant pro se ipsis; impendant etiam parvulis Sacramenta fidei, suscipiant Christi fidem cum Sacramentis, ut parvulos in Christo renalos fides Ecclesiæ tucatur, et adultos cum Sacramentis opera fidei comitentur.
We hold it as certain that the flesh, contracted from flesh through the law of concupiscence, as soon as it is vivified, is pressed by the bond of original guilt, and the soul, which vivifies the flesh, is weighed down by its affections. Under this bond of sin are submerged the little ones who die without the remedy of baptism. For they have original sin, contracted not through the soul but through the flesh, and poured back into the soul. For the soul is so united to the flesh that with the flesh it is one person. For by God the author, soul and flesh are made one individual, one man; whence, with the property of each nature preserved, there is added to the flesh what is the soul's, and to the soul what is the flesh's; for the sake of the unity of the person, not for the diversity of nature. What therefore in the same being is proper to each individually becomes common to both; proper by nature, common by person. Hence it comes about that the soul is liable to original guilt, which the flesh contracts and pours back into the soul, since it is united with it in person, although it is divided in nature. For this reason it is necessary that a little one, while it lives, be renewed by the Sacrament of Christ, lest the society of the flesh of sin harm its soul, by which it is weighed down even when stripped of the body, unless while it lives in the body it has been expiated by the saving remedy. Let adults therefore run, let them run for themselves; let them also bestow the Sacraments of faith upon little ones, let them receive the faith of Christ with the Sacraments, so that the faith of the Church may protect the little ones reborn in Christ, and the works of faith may accompany adults together with the Sacraments.
His etiam per gratiam renovatis, tandem complebitur in resurrectione generali, ut caro ipsa resurgat in gloria, animæ suæ restituta, viva et æterna, felix ct bcata.
CAPUT XLII. NoM baptizatis cur anima data. Natura quid ait. Spiraculum vitæ. Si quaratur cur Deus donet animas illis quos absque remedio salutari mori cont ingil; respondemus, quod divina institutio, qua res et rerum naturæ conduntur, nec peccato tollitur, nec violentia pnepedilur. Inde est quod lex carnalis copulæ, nec etiam in malis jure suo privatur. Generant adulteri, fornicatores, profani: naturalis tamen institutio nec in talibus deperit. Natura namque, prout Deus instituit, quod suum est operatur. Natura siquidem est quaedam vis et potentia divinitus rebus creandis insita, quae unicuique rei suum esse tribuit, qua bona quisquis male utitur, malus esse judicatur. Juste enim puniuntur, qui licitis abutuntur. Juste vero puniuntur, qui rapere inconcessa conantur. Sic saLanas coelum, sic protoplastus perdidit paradisum. Abutuntur licitis, qui bona Dei maculant usibus inconcessis. Maculant bona Dei, sicut ii qui cum ardore Iibidinis exercent opera copulae carnalis. Ex his filii generantur, quorum corpora serviente Creatori creatura formantur, et Deo inspirante spiraculum vitæ. animantur.
For those also who have been renewed through grace, it will at last be completed in the general resurrection, so that the flesh itself may rise again in glory, restored to its own soul, living and eternal, happy and blessed.
CHAPTER XLII. Why a soul is given to those who are baptized. What nature says. The breath of life. If it is asked why God gives souls to those whom he allows to die without the remedy of salvation, we answer that the divine institution by which things and the natures of things are established is neither abolished by sin nor hindered by violence. Hence it is that the law of carnal union is not deprived of its right even among the wicked. Adulterers, fornicators, and the profane beget children; yet the natural institution does not perish even in such persons. For nature, as God instituted it, works what is its own. Nature, indeed, is a certain force and power divinely implanted in things for creating, which gives to each thing its own being; and whoever uses good things badly is judged to be bad. For they are justly punished who abuse things lawful. But they are justly punished who attempt to seize things not permitted. Thus Satan lost heaven, thus the first-formed man lost paradise. They abuse things lawful who defile the good things of God by uses not permitted. They defile the good things of God, like those who with the ardor of lust perform the works of carnal union. From these, children are begotten, whose bodies are formed by the creature serving the Creator, and by God breathing in the breath of life, are given souls.
Spiraculum vitai humanam animam intellige, quam non producit terra vel aqua, sed Deus inspirat: quo sensus corporei animantur; unde homo factus in animam viventem memoratur. In his et in aliis Omnipotens agit, prout instituit, quem nullius adjuvant bona, nec impediunt mala. Bonos quidem provehit sua gratia: malos terret1 sua justitia. Nos equidem servi, dum Domini bonis abutimur, rei et nriseri pariter invenimur. Ipse vero Dominus, qui servorum suorum malis bene utitur, sanctus et omnipotens adoratur. Ipse corpori terreno de peccati traduce I propagato, pro institutione sua inspirat antinam, bene utens inolila prevaricatione nostra; quae si esset naturalis, Creatori poterat imputari. Sed Creator præparat omni tempore Sacramenta, et obedientiie pia proponit edicta, ut contra peccatum Sacramenta sint in remedium, et temporalium observatio mandatorum alternorum afferat praemia donorum. Unde si aliqui sub peccato geniti obeunt parvuli absque remedio salutari, pertimesce justitiam Dei, qui nihil debet alicui, sed damnat in singulis maluin quod non fecit in eis. Si autem parvulos renovat Sacramentis, admirare misericordiam Dei. Ipsi enim sicut nesciunt culpam, cum qua ex carne nascuntur; sic nesciunt gratiam, qua per Christum renovantur. Non excusat parvulos a culpa, quia eam non norunt; nec excludit gratiam ab eis, quia eam nesciunt. Quieris in eis culpam?
Understand the breath of life as the human soul, which earth or water does not produce, but God breathes in; by it the bodily senses are animated; hence man is recorded as having been made into a living soul. In these and in other things the Almighty acts as he has established, whom no one's good works help nor evil works hinder. The good he advances by his grace; the wicked he terrifies by his justice. We indeed, as servants, while we abuse the good things of the Lord, are found guilty and wretched alike. But the Lord himself, who uses well the evils of his servants, is adored as holy and almighty. He himself breathes the soul into the earthly body propagated from the stain of sin, according to his own institution, using well our inborn transgression; which, if it were natural, could be imputed to the Creator. But the Creator prepares sacraments at every time, and sets forth the pious decrees of obedience, so that the sacraments may be a remedy against sin, and the observance of temporal commandments may bring the rewards of other gifts. Hence if some little ones born under sin die without the saving remedy, fear the justice of God, who owes nothing to anyone, but condemns in each one the evil that he did not make in them. But if he renews little ones through the sacraments, marvel at the mercy of God. For just as they do not know the guilt with which they are born from the flesh, so they do not know the grace by which they are renewed through Christ. He does not excuse little ones from guilt because they do not know it; nor does he exclude grace from them because they do not know it. Do you seek guilt in them?
Invenis ex carne traductam. Quæris in eis gratiam? Invenis a Dcocollatam. ilia debite damnatur,hæc indebite praerogatur. Illa judicium praedicat, hæc misericordiam repræsentat. In utroque Deus:ignoscitur, cui misericordia et judicium perpetua laude cantatur (Psal. c, 1). Sed ab his intuendis mens nostra, mens inlirma, quia peccatis obruta, citius ad se ipsam redeat, sibique remedium quaerat, ut quae in Adam ceciderit, in Christo resurgat.
CAPUT XLIII. De animæ natura. Mors hominis. Plura veteres de natura animæ dixisse inveniuntur, sed uihil ita ut non aliquid restare videatur. Ego autem ex eorum dictis, quanto diligentius potui, breve istud et certum colligere, atque in unum studui redigere, quod memoriæ commendetur. Hebes namque est memoria hominis, et brevitate gaudet; et si in multa dividitur, fit minor in singulis. Ex corpore et anima constat horno: et quidquid oculis corporeis videtur, propter corpus factum est, corpus propter animam, aniina autem propter Deum. Vita corporis anima est, vita animae Deus est. Immortalis est anima, quia carne caret; nec habel quo cadat, ut resurrectione egeat post ruinam, nisi peccato ceciderit. Et ideo in morte vita nostra nou pert, sed corpus destituit, dum discedens anima vim suam non perdit, sed quod vivificaverat hoc dimittit, ct quantum in se est, mortem allerius facit, qnam ipsa non rccipit. Facit, inquam.
You find it transmitted from the flesh. Do you seek grace in them? You find it bestowed by God. The former is justly condemned, the latter is undeservedly granted. The former proclaims judgment, the latter represents mercy. In both is God: pardon is given, to whom mercy and judgment are sung with perpetual praise (Ps. 100:1). But from the contemplation of these things, let our mind—a mind weak because overwhelmed by sins—return more quickly to itself and seek a remedy for itself, so that what fell in Adam may rise again in Christ.
CHAPTER XLIII. On the nature of the soul. The death of man. The ancients are found to have said many things about the nature of the soul, but nothing in such a way that something does not seem to remain. But I, from their sayings, as diligently as I could, have taken care to gather this brief and certain summary, and to reduce it into one, that it may be committed to memory. For the memory of man is dull and rejoices in brevity; and if it is divided into many things, it becomes less in each. Man consists of body and soul: and whatever is seen with bodily eyes was made for the sake of the body, the body for the sake of the soul, but the soul for the sake of God. The life of the body is the soul, the life of the soul is God. The soul is immortal because it is without flesh; nor does it have anything by which it may fall, so as to need resurrection after a fall, unless it has fallen by sin. And therefore in death our life does not perish, but forsakes the body, while the soul departing does not lose its power, but dismisses what it had given life to, and as far as in it lies, causes the death of another, which it itself does not receive. It causes, I say.
non vivificando quod deserit, non amittendo qnod vivit. Itaque mors hominis nihil est aHud quam carnis occasus, a qua cum vis potentiæ vivificantis abscesserit, in terram de qua sumpta est redit, antissis sensibus quos non per se ipsam habuit. Anima non aliter, quam sol lucem diei, vitam tribuit carni, cum venerit; mortem efficit, cum recedit. Mors tamen non consumit conjuncta, sed dividit, dnm origini suæ utrumque reddit. Et ne quis putet animam corporis morte consului, audiat quid Dominus in Evangelio dicat: Nolite, iuquit, eos timere qui occidunt corpus, animam autem non possunt occidere(Matth., 28). Fatigatur corpus cogitationibus mentis: afficitur in corpore mens doloribus corporis.
CAPUT XLIV. Anima invisibilis est. Ratio speculum est inquo Deum videat. Corpus ex quatuor etcmentis constat. Anima nee elementum est, nec ox elementis, sed de nihilo est facta, et soli Creatori suo cognita, Ex his ergo omnibus quae in se, hoe est, in corpore suo visibilia videt, nihil se esse vel posse esse videt. Secernat ergo et dividat se per se ab eo toto, quod visibile videt in se; et invisibilem omnino se esse videt in eo quod videt se, et tamen videri se non posse videt. Deinde elevet se supra se, et in eo quod primum et principale speculum est speculandi Dei, illiusque imagini ac similitudini proximum et cognatum magis factum, invisibilem Deum inspiciat.
by not giving life to what it abandons, by not losing what it lives. And so the death of a man is nothing other than the falling away of the flesh, from which, when the power of the life-giving force has departed, it returns to the earth from which it was taken, having lost the senses which it did not have of itself. The soul, no differently than the sun gives light to the day, gives life to the flesh when it comes; it brings about death when it withdraws. Yet death does not consume things joined together, but divides them, while it returns each to its own origin. And lest anyone think that the soul is destroyed by the death of the body, let him hear what the Lord says in the Gospel: Do not, he says, fear those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul (Matthew 28). The body is wearied by the thoughts of the mind; the mind is affected in the body by the body's pains.
CHAPTER XLIV. The soul is invisible. Reason is the mirror in which it sees God. The body consists of four elements. The soul is neither an element nor from the elements, but was made from nothing, and is known to its Creator alone. From all these things, therefore, which it sees visible in itself, that is, in its body, it sees that it is nothing, or can be nothing. Let it therefore separate and divide itself by itself from that whole which it sees visible in itself; and it sees that it is altogether invisible in that it sees itself, and yet it sees that it cannot be seen. Then let it raise itself above itself, and in that which is the first and principal mirror of the beholding of God, and has been made closer and more akin to His image and likeness, let it look upon the invisible God.
Hoc autem est ipsa ratio, et mens ratione utens, quae ad primam simitudinem Dei facta est, ut per se invenire possit eum a quo facta est, et in ejus amore atque contemplatione dulciter requiescere. Ea namque perfectius suum factorem manifestant, quæ illius similitudini vicinius appropinquant. Hæc autem est ipsa rationalis creatura, qua et excellenter et proprie ad illius similitudinem facta est: et tunc citius Creatorem suum, quem non videt, agnoscit et diligit, cum se ad illius imaginem factatn intelligit 1.
Mens rationalis est, quæ se cogitando intelligit, ct imaginem suam ex se natam habet, quae imago ejus verbum est. Verbum enim rei est ipsa cognitio ad si. militndinem ejus ex memoria formata. Hoc modo Iiquido apparet summam Sapientiam, cuin se dicendo intelligit, gignere consubstantialem sibi similitudinem suam, id est, Verbum suum. Mens tamcn rationalis, quoniam non se semper cogitat, sicut sui semper meminit, liquet quia cum se cogitat, verbum ejus nascitur de memoria. Unde apparet quia si semper se cogitaret, semper verbum ejus de mcmoria nasceretur. De summa vero Sapientia, quae semper se dicit sic, sicut sui semper memor est, liquet quia de æterna memoria coæternum ejus Verbum nascitur.
Now this is the very reason, and the mind using reason, which was made after the first likeness of God, so that through itself it might be able to find him by whom it was made, and sweetly rest in his love and contemplation. For those things manifest their maker more perfectly which approach more closely to his likeness. And this is the rational creature itself, which was made after his likeness both excellently and properly; and then it more quickly acknowledges and loves its Creator, whom it does not see, when it understands that it was made after his image.
The rational mind is that which understands itself by thinking, and has its image born from itself, which image is its word. For the word of a thing is the very knowledge of it formed from memory after its likeness. In this way it plainly appears that the highest Wisdom, when it understands itself by speaking itself, begets its own consubstantial likeness, that is, its Word. However, the rational mind, since it does not always think of itself as it always remembers itself, it is clear that when it thinks of itself, its word is born from memory. Hence it appears that if it always thought of itself, its word would always be born from memory. But of the highest Wisdom, which always speaks itself just as it is always mindful of itself, it is clear that from eternal memory its coeternal Word is born.
Sicut enim summa Sapientia æterna est, ita æterne sui memor est, et aeterne se intelligit, et æterne se dicit, cnm sit illi dicere quod intelligere: ct cum æterne se dicat, aeterne Verbum ejus apud ipsam. Mens ergo rationalis quæ inter omnes creaturas ad investigationem summæ sapientiae sola assurgere valet, et nihilominus ad ejusdem inventionem sola prolicere, semper studeat illius reminisci, illam iutelligere et amare: ad hoc facta est ut semper vivat, si semper amet summam vitam, summam sapientiam, summam essentiam, cui debet hoc ipsum quod est. Ainarc autem nequit, nisi ejus reminisci, et eum studuerit intelligere. Faciat ergo hoc ad quod ta est, ut bene vivat.
CAPUT XLV. Rationalium status tripicti Vis animœ triplex. Amor quid sit. Deus omnipotens cujus beatitudo nee augeri potest, qUIa perfecta est; nec minui, qnia æterna est. sola charitate, nulla sni necessitate rationales spirilus crcavit, ut eossuæ beatitudius participes faceret. Alios vero in sua puritate in cœlo confirmavit: alios autem propter superbiam in infernum præcipitavit: atque alios ad probandaln humilitatem et obedientiam in terrena habitatione terrenis corporibus sociavit, ut ad vitæ sensum luteam materiam vegetarent. Habent namque in natura sua quamdam mutabilitatem, secundum quam corporibus vivificandis appropinquant, in qua quidem nonnihil suæ puritatis deponunt.
For just as the highest Wisdom is eternal, so eternally it remembers itself, and eternally understands itself, and eternally speaks itself, since for it to speak is the same as to understand; and since it eternally speaks itself, its Word is eternally with it. The rational mind, therefore, which alone among all creatures is able to rise to the investigation of the highest Wisdom, and nonetheless alone to advance to its discovery, should always strive to remember it, to understand it, and to love it: for this it was made, that it might always live, if it always loves the highest life, the highest wisdom, the highest essence, to which it owes this very thing that it is. But it cannot love unless it remembers it and has striven to understand it. Let it therefore do that for which it was made, that it may live well.
CHAPTER XLV. The threefold state of rational beings. The threefold power of the soul. What love is. God almighty, whose blessedness can neither be increased, because it is perfect, nor diminished, because it is eternal, created rational spirits by charity alone, with no necessity of his own, so that he might make them partakers of his blessedness. But some he confirmed in their purity in heaven; others, however, on account of pride he cast down into hell; and others, to test their humility and obedience, he joined to earthly bodies in an earthly dwelling, so that they might give life to clayey matter for the sensation of life. For they have in their nature a certain mutability, according to which they draw near to giving life to bodies, in which indeed they lay aside something of their purity.
Cuin enim delectatione corporis afficiuntur, qnasi quamdam corpulentiam inde trahunt; quæ puriorem naturam eorum corrumpit. Et hoc vitium quanto altius eis in corporibus manentibus inhæserit, tanto difficilius eos a corporibus discedentes deserit: quoniam non tollitur passio, etiam cum tollitur causa passionis, nisi ab ejusmodi fæcutenlia se in hac vita mundare studuerint. Nos ergo qui in medio bonoruin et nidorum positi sumus, considerare sæpe debemus ei gaudium illorum, et istorum supplicium, atque nostram miseriam. Rationalis siquidem est anima nostra, ut sciat discernere inter bonum et malum. Est etiam concupiscibilis atque irascibilis, ut possit amare bonum et odire malum. De concupiscibilitate nascitur amor, et de amore desiderium et gaudium. Amor est delectatio cordis alicujus ad aliquid propter aliquid, per desiderium currens, atque per gaudium requiescens; per desiderium in appetendo, et per gaudium in perfruendo. Nec aliunde bonum est, si bonum est, cor humanum, nisi quod bene amat quod bonum est. Nec aliunde malum est, si malum est, nisi quod male amal qnod bonum ese. Omne enim quod est, bonum est: sed in eo quod male amatur tantum v tium est. De irascibilitate nascitur odium. Ira enim generat odium: et de odio dolor et timor. Cum enim contra peccata nostra irascimur, et ea odire incipimus, dolemus quia peccavimus, et poenas pro peccatis timemus.
For when they are affected by the delight of the body, they draw from it a kind of corpulence, as it were, which corrupts their purer nature. And this vice, the more deeply it has clung to them while they remain in bodies, the more difficultly does it leave them when they depart from bodies; because the passion is not removed even when the cause of the passion is removed, unless they have taken care to cleanse themselves from this kind of filth in this life. We, therefore, who are placed in the midst of goods and evils, ought often to consider the joy of those and the punishment of these, and our own misery. For our soul is rational, so that it may know how to discern between good and evil. It is also concupiscible and irascible, so that it may be able to love the good and hate the evil. From the concupiscible power is born love, and from love desire and joy. Love is the delight of a heart toward something for the sake of something, running through desire and resting through joy; through desire in appetition, and through joy in enjoyment. Nor is the human heart good from any other source, if it is good, except that it loves well what is good. Nor is it evil from any other source, if it is evil, except that it loves badly what is good. For everything that exists is good; but in that which is loved badly there is only vice. From the irascible power is born hatred. For anger generates hatred; and from hatred, pain and fear. For when we are angry against our sins, and begin to hate them, we grieve because we have sinned, and we fear punishments for our sins.
CAPUT XLVI. Rationalis creaturœ sors diversa. Animæ qualuor affectus ad quid dati. Ad quid ratio. Sic creator omnium Deus inter caetera et super cætera quae creavit, rationalem dignatus est amplius illustrare naturam, quam et sua similitudine fecit insignem, et snae beatitudinis voluit esse participem. Cujus tamen rationalis creaturæ licet similis vidcatur origo, facta cst diversa conditio; dum pars cjus est in æterna fericitate firmata; pars rudentibus inferni detracta, et in tartarum tradita in judicium crucianda servatur ( II Petr. II, ); pars etiam tertia terrenis unita corporibus locum mediumsOr'tila cognoscitur. Et prius quidem eadem media summis vicinior in deliciis erat posita paradisi; nunc jain propinquior infimis, pro reatu inobedientiæ humiliata est in loco afflictionis. Summus igitur omnium Itorum locus plenam hahet lætitiam, infimus solam tristitiam. Ibi enim plena felicitas: illic sola et summa miseria cst. In medio sane summa speranda, sed nihilominus infima sunt timenda: et idco nobis jam amplior timoris causa quam spci, quo viciniores eisdem infimis, dejecti in ipsa dcgimus umbra mortis.
CHAPTER XLVI. The diverse lot of the rational creature. For what purpose the four affections of the soul were given. For what purpose reason. Thus the Creator of all things, God, among the other things and above the other things which He created, deigned to enlighten more abundantly the rational nature, which He both made distinguished by His own likeness and willed to be a partaker of His blessedness. Yet although the origin of this rational creature seems alike, its condition has been made diverse; since one part of it is confirmed in eternal felicity; another part, dragged down by the ropes of hell and handed over to Tartarus, is kept to be tormented in judgment (2 Peter 2); and a third part also, united to earthly bodies, is recognized to hold the middle place. And indeed at first this same middle part, being nearer to the highest things, was placed in the delights of paradise; now, however, nearer to the lowest things, it has been humbled for the guilt of disobedience into a place of affliction. Therefore the highest place of all these has full joy, the lowest has only sorrow. For there is full felicity; here is sole and supreme misery. In the middle, indeed, the highest things are to be hoped for, but nonetheless the lowest things are to be feared; and therefore there is now for us a greater cause of fear than of hope, inasmuch as we are nearer to those same lowest things, cast down and dwelling in the very shadow of death.
Quia tamen ct illius beatitudinis, et illius nihilominus damnationis æternæ humanam Deus animam pro suorum qualitate meritorum participem fieri posse cognovit, naturales affectus ci qualuor indidit; ut haberet unde bona illa posset optare, et in eis quandoque lætari; et rursum unde mala illa metuere, vel in cis etiam dolore perpetuo contristari. Interim sane eo gravior est moderna conditio, quod non modo exhibet tristitiam et modernam molestiam; sed et timor habet pœnam, et spes ipsa qu:c differtur affligit animam. Piissimus enim pater et terribilis judex, qui vera illa et perpetua gaudia filiis, dolores æque perpetuos rcis in fine paravit, nonnulla tamen ctiam in praesenti experimenta capere voluit gaudii vel doloris, unde illa non modo certius credi, sed affectuosius quoque optari valeam et timeri. Cæterum nec præsenlia gauaia in illorum cotnparatione sunt gaudia, nec tristitia præsens in illius comparatione est tristitia. Nec desipiet si quis interim omnem operam dare maluerit, quemadmodum illa potius valeat concupiscere gaudia, illos formidare dolores, quam hujus vitae vitare molestias, captare letitiam. Verumtamen invenire est etiam in præsenti unde utiliter gaudeat quis, vel salubriter contristetur. Si lætetur do beneficiis suis gratias Dco agens, et devotione ejus exsultet, et propria seu etiam proximorum delicta deploret.
Nevertheless, because God knew that the human soul could become a partaker of that blessedness, and likewise of that eternal damnation, according to the quality of its merits, he implanted in it four natural affections, so that it might have that by which it could desire those good things and at some time rejoice in them, and again that by which it might fear those evils, or even grieve over them with perpetual sorrow. Meanwhile, indeed, the present condition is all the more grievous because it not only brings forth sorrow and present distress, but fear also has its punishment, and hope itself, when it is deferred, afflicts the soul. For the most loving Father and terrible Judge, who has prepared for his sons those true and perpetual joys, and equally perpetual pains for the wicked, at the end, willed nevertheless that some experiences of joy or sorrow be grasped even in the present, so that those things may not only be believed more certainly, but also be desired and feared more affectionately. Moreover, neither are present joys joys in comparison with those, nor is present sorrow sorrow in comparison with that. Nor will he be foolish who in the meantime has preferred to give all his effort to how he may rather desire those joys and dread those pains than avoid the troubles of this life and grasp at its gladness. Yet even in the present one may find that by which one may rejoice profitably or be saddened wholesomely: if he rejoices by giving thanks to God for his benefits and exults in devotion to him, and also laments his own sins or those of his neighbors.
Unde etiain divina dispositione media inter eosdem affectus con. stituta est ratio in corde hominis, per quam nimirum discernere et dijudicare possit unde gaudeat seu doleat, imo etiam quid cupiat vel quid timeat. Sane qui tripliccm esse vim animæ docuerunt, rationalem illam, irascibilem et concupiscibilem asserentes, affectus quidem diversos, sed quadain sibi cognatione junctos, sub irascibili metum ct tristitiam, sub concupiscibili desiderium et lætitiam comprehendisse videntur.
CAPUT XLVII. Homo inler mundum et Deum. Interim ergo inter affectus varios humana fluctuans anima, nccesse est ut certam demum vel in imis vcl in summis accipiens stationem, in solo deinceps vcl gaudio vel dolore persistat. Deus est in summo, mundus in imo. Deus in eodem statu æternitatis suae scmper consistit. Mundus cursu mutabilitatis suæ sempcr instabilis fluit. Humanus animus quasi in medio collocatus quadam conditionis sure excellentia, et huic mutabilitati quæ deorsum est supereminet, et ad illam quæ est apud Deum, veram immutabilitatem necdum pertingit. Si vero in iis quæ deorsum transeunt, se per cupiditatem immerserit, statim per infinitas distractiones rapietur,et a semetipso quodam modo divisus dissipabitur.
Hence also by divine disposition reason has been placed in the heart of man as a mean between these same affections, by which, to be sure, it can discern and judge whence it should rejoice or grieve, and indeed even what it should desire or fear. Those who taught that the power of the soul is threefold, asserting it to be rational, irascible, and concupiscible, appear to have comprehended the various affections, joined to one another by a certain kinship, under the irascible: fear and sorrow; under the concupiscible: desire and joy.
CHAPTER XLVII. Man between the world and God. In the meantime, therefore, as the human soul fluctuates among various affections, it is necessary that at last, taking a fixed station either in the lowest or in the highest things, it thereafter persist in either joy or sorrow alone. God is in the highest, the world in the lowest. God always stands firm in the same state of his eternity. The world always flows unstable in the course of its mutability. The human mind, placed as it were in the middle, by a certain excellence of its condition both rises above this mutability which is below and does not yet reach that true immutability which is with God. But if it immerses itself through desire in those things which pass away below, it is immediately swept away through infinite distractions, and, divided as it were from itself, is dissipated.
Si vero ab bac infinita distractione quae deorsum est, se erexerit, et hæc infilna deserens atquo paulatim in unum se colligens, secum esse didicerit, tanto amplius in unum colligetur, quanto magis cogitalione et desiderio sursum elevabitur: donee tandem omnino immutabilis sit, et ad illam veram et unicam, quæ est apnd Deum, immutabilitatem perveniat, ubi perpetuo sinc omni mutabilitatis viciscitudine requiescat.
CAPUT XLVIII. Animarum origo. Arbitrium. Electio. Credimus animas non esse ab initio cum Angelis, nee sim!!! creatas, sicut Origenes fingit. Nec per coitum cum corporibus seminantur, sicut Luciferiani et Cyrillus, et aliqui Latinorum præsumptores affirmant. Sed dicimus earum creationem solumomnium Creatorem nosse: corpus tautum per conjugii copulam seminari; Dei vero judicio coagulari in vulva, et compingi atque formari; ac formato jam corpore, animam creari et infundi: ut vivat in utero homo ex anima constans et corpore, et egrediatur vivus ex ut. ro plenus humana substantia. Nec duas animas esse credimus in uno homine, sicut multi scribunt, unam animalem, qua animetur corpus, et quæ immixta sit sanguini; et alteram spiritualem, qn:c rationem ministret. Sed dicianus unam eamdemque esse animam in homine, quæ et corpus sua societate vivificet, et semetipsam sua ratione disponat, habens in se libertatem arbitrii, ut in suæ substantiæ cligat cogitatione quod vult.
But if it has raised itself up from that infinite distraction which is below, and, forsaking these lowest things and gradually gathering itself into unity, has learned to be with itself, it will be gathered into unity all the more fully the more it is lifted upward in thought and desire, until at last it is altogether immutable and arrives at that true and unique immutability which is with God, where it may rest forever without any vicissitude of mutability.
CHAPTER XLVIII. The origin of souls. Free will. Choice. We believe that souls were not created from the beginning together with the angels, nor were they created simultaneously, as Origen imagines. Nor are they sown together with bodies through sexual intercourse, as the Luciferians and Cyril and certain presumptuous men among the Latins affirm. But we say that their creation is known only to the Creator of all things; that the body alone is sown through the union of marriage, but by the judgment of God is coagulated in the womb and compacted and formed; and that once the body is formed, the soul is created and infused, so that a human being, consisting of soul and body, may live in the womb and come forth alive from it, full of human substance. Nor do we believe that there are two souls in one man, as many write—one animal soul, by which the body is animated and which is mingled with the blood, and another spiritual soul, which ministers reason. But let us say that it is one and the same soul in a human being which both gives life to the body by its association and orders itself by its reason, having within itself the freedom of will, so that by the thought of its own substance it chooses what it wills.
Libertati siquidem arbitrii sui commissus cst hoIno. Postquam vero seductione serpentis per Evani cecidit ( Gen. III, ), naturae bonum perdidit, pariter et vigorem arbitrii; non lamcn electionem I ne non esset suum, quod emendaret peccatum. Manet itaque ad qua'rendam salutem arbitrii libertas, id cst, rationis voluntas; sed admonente prius Deo et inspirante ad salutem. Ut ergo acquiescamus salutari ill. spirationi, nostræ potestatis cst; ut adipiscamur quod adipisci desideramus, divini est muneris I. Ut nou labamur adepto salutis numere, nostræ sollicitudinis est et cœlestis pariter adjutorii; ut labamur, potestatis nostræ cst et ignaviæ. Solum bominem eredimus habere animam substantivam,quæ exuta corpore vivit, et sensus suos atque ingenia vivaciter tenet. Neque cum corpore moritur, ut Aratus I asserit; npque postmodum interitura, sicut Zenon dicit: quia subslantialiter vivit. Animalium vero animae non sunt substantivæ, sed cum carne ipsa carnis vivacitate nascuntur, et cum carnis morte finiuntur: et ideo nec ratione reguntur sicut Plato et Alexander putant; sed ad omnia naturæ incitamenta ducuntur. Anima humana non cum carne moritur, quia nec cum carne, ut diximus superius, seminatur: sod formato in utero matris corpore, Dei judicio creari et infundi eam diximus, ut vivat homo intus in utero,et sic procedat nativitate in mundum.
Man was indeed entrusted to the freedom of his own will. But after he fell through the seduction of the serpent by means of Eve (Gen. 3), he lost the good of nature, and likewise the vigor of his will; yet not the power of choice, lest what he might amend by his sin should not be his own. Thus the freedom of the will, that is, the will of reason, remains for seeking salvation, but with God first admonishing and inspiring unto salvation. Therefore, that we consent to that saving inspiration is within our own power; but that we obtain what we desire to obtain is a gift of God. That we do not slip after having obtained the gift of salvation is a matter of our own solicitude and of heavenly help alike; that we slip is within our own power and sloth. We believe that man alone has a substantial soul, which lives when stripped of the body and actively retains its senses and faculties. Nor does it die with the body, as Aratus asserts; nor will it afterward perish, as Zeno says, because it lives substantially. But the souls of animals are not substantial, but are born with the flesh itself by the vitality of the flesh, and end with the death of the flesh; and therefore they are not governed by reason, as Plato and Alexander think, but are led by all the impulses of nature. The human soul does not die with the flesh, because, as we said above, it is not sown with the flesh; but when the body has been formed in the mother's womb, we have said that it is created and infused by the judgment of God, so that man may live within the womb, and thus come forth into the world by birth.
Anima a Creatore principium habens, ex quo est, perfecta est in genere suo: unde ex quo est, sciret omnia quae ab homine sciri possunt, nisi gravitas carnis esset. Quod per primum hominem, qui ante corruptionem humanitatis, ex quo fuit, perfecte habuit scientiam humanam, probari potest. Sed modo corrupta bumannate, ex quo conjungitur corruptioni, corrumpitur. Nec proprietates suas potest exercere, donce usu et experientia et alicujus doctrina incitata incipit discernere; veluti si quis cum subtili licet acie oculorum in tenebrosa detrudatur, videre tamen non potest ibi, nisi prins assuescat tenebris, vei lumcn accendatur. Unde Virgilius: Quantum non noxia corpora tardant. (Æneid. lib. 6, vers. 731.) Et licet aliæ sint actiones corporis, et aliæ animae actiones; tamen corporis vitia vel virtutes possunt esse animæ. Cum enim ad hoc sit anima data, ut illicitos carnis motus corrigat, ignoranlia illius contingunt vel negligentia. Sicut si vel discipulus I vel servus negligentia doctoris vel domini peccat, magister vel dominus extra culpam nou est; sic anima illis contingentibus extra culpam non est, cum ista debeat imperare, et illa ohcdire.
The soul, having its beginning from the Creator, from whom it exists, is perfect in its own kind: whence, from the very fact that it exists, it would know all things that can be known by man, were it not for the weight of the flesh. This can be proved through the first man, who before the corruption of humanity perfectly possessed human knowledge from the moment he existed. But now, with humanity corrupted, from the moment it is joined to corruption, it is corrupted. Nor can it exercise its own properties until, stirred by practice and experience and by someone's teaching, it begins to discern; just as if someone, even with keen eyesight, were thrust into darkness, he cannot see there unless he first grows accustomed to the darkness or a light is kindled. Whence Virgil: "As much as the harmful bodies do not hinder" (Aeneid 6.731). And although the actions of the body are one thing and the actions of the soul another, nevertheless the vices or virtues of the body can belong to the soul. For since the soul was given for this purpose, that it might correct the illicit motions of the flesh, those things happen through its ignorance or negligence. Just as if a disciple or a servant sins through the negligence of the teacher or master, the teacher or master is not free from blame; so the soul is not free from blame when those things happen, since it ought to command and the other to obey.