ARMAZI Texts: Ioane Petrici, Explanatio in Proclum Diadochum

John Petrici’s preface, together with the heart, gives knowledge for the vision among the great theologians and for the preparation of the mind beforehand for the book now set before us. Now the meaning of this book comprises the following: first, to set forth the One, whether the One exists, and by means of the constraints of the preface to reveal this much-preached One, so that it may not be made and may be confined, lest one should think and speak of the One as one. For many of the things that exist claim to be one, but they are not the One, whence one seeks by the laws of verbal forms and finds the pure and blameless nature of the One. Thus, by the introduction of forms, the word is more clearly manifested: for whatever one says and gives to the understanding, such as soul, intellect, or even the very truly existent, which I call the first being and the first composite, none of these is the One; for it and its nature and the parts of which it is composed are not the blameless One, as Parmenides said to Socrates. And of these constructed and composite things he spoke as a burden and a trial, and of the philosopher as a Laconian dog, for there are many who claim unity and the honor of unity, and they attribute to us the weaknesses and the dryness of the composite and the incorporeality of the heart.

But in nature and in the partitive relation they are conjoined, while the perfectly blameless and unparticipated One is conjoined neither with nature nor with essence and composition, but transcends all these. And it discovers the one as a form by the introduction of multiplicity and by the numbers of this one and according to the canons of the "Organon" it leads us forth, that "first the one is for all numbers". And just as it discovers and establishes this immovably and unshakably against every error of the disputant, then it takes up that which has been discovered and the unmanifested face and discovers another subsequent one. And it does this successively over all: for by the first discovered it lays the foundation for the discovery of the subsequent ones, and thus it completes, so that, like a body, it is composed by its own parts and brings about its own wholeness. And the superscription says: Proclus Diadochus, of the Platonic philosophy, Theological Elements. This Proclus, successor to the throne of the divine Plato, was by race a Lycian, a child of very great parents by nature, who had no child and by prayers incessantly besought the thrones of God's mercy. When it was revealed to them by divine revelation that "a child shall be given to you, a boy, who will surpass all his contemporaries in the vision of the higher part.

And just as the youthful age rises, by the purity of the inner powers it concealed all measures by their incomparability. I speak first of the purity and the blending of the inner youthful blossoms, by which this power subdues the perceptible and the fantasies of souls that have descended into generation. Secondly, of the dryness and the sharpness in the struggle of studies, whether one speaks of rational or natural contemplations, or of numbers and earthly measurements and of music itself, by which this image and the sketch of the structure of beings, and of their mutual conjunction and separation, are discovered, and how by these the good artistry of the whole divine creation is revealed to the beholder of the unoriginate. And again, above all these natural and partial contemplations it was placed, for it left behind in time and in generation the partial and the material, being only of being, for the greater part of them is bound up with non-being, whence it directed itself upward to the true and real being and essence. And it did not leave among these the limit of its own contemplations, for it followed its own first principles, I mean those of Plato and of that most incomparable intellect, the incomprehensible One.

As much as was possible, he labored to make known the desirable and beloved among those capable of knowledge, and he revealed the sealed and hidden words of Plato concerning the Forms, and among them he magnified the wisdom from eternity of beings and the co-present faith, and how among them Plato longs for that one of the unoriginate and of the whole intellectual and supra-intellectual summit. And again, concerning the Peripatetics, who are set apart and bound in the form of fire, he refuted the speech of Aristotle's followers, which is fabricated by the laws, with the truth. And he revealed and rendered powerless the truth, which is composed of the laws of the syllogisms discovered by Aristotle himself, by which the Peripatetics used to refute Plato. And thirdly, to all these he added purity and clarity of the discoveries, and to the height of vision, the source of the streams of translations, on account of which the Diadochy, which is the succession of Plato, was transformed by his successors. This we have given as a co-present form concerning Proclus to the discourse. And these chapters were spoken theologically.

The term "element" is applied to a bond, and for this reason he established the bond as the simplest of all, for those who are beginning to learn are first taught the simplest things, and then from them, as from letters, the syllable, and from syllables, the utterance, and from the utterance, finally, the word, as I have learned from the "Peri Hermeneias." For in all composite things, the simple ones are prior, as in the case of these four elements—I mean fire, air, water, and earth. For this reason, by this same form of speech, he called it a bond, as the simplest among all divine-theological visions. For what would every seeker of knowledge first come to know except the knowledge of the One? And thus, in a simple manner, he established and set forth the order and the series, which is the foundation of all, so that we may explain each of these—namely, intellect, the nature of the soul, and the body—in its proper place.

But let us add a little also concerning reading, how it is proper to read these books of instruction, just as they say of Socrates himself, that Socrates used to read how small children read, and again he would return to what had been read, for it is not the case that the heart is to be given to the reading matter, but rather it is for the sake of knowledge and understanding, and it is fitting for cutting and composition and inversion and the subsequent taking of letters and punctuation and all other guides, such as the acute accent, and the grave, which is heavy, and the circumflex, which is encircling, and everything else that is appropriate so that we may use the voice itself together with the letter of the word, so that we may form the understanding without error. And let us also learn this, that reading too quickly disrupts comprehension, for the vibration of the voice, if it is accompanied, carries away the listener, which is the soul. And this is for this reason. Again, conversely, it is fitting and even more necessary to know that the power and activity of the soul is one thing, and that of the intellect is another. And among all the Greeks, their own name is given to eloquence. It corresponds to the nature of its own being, but our translators, nor anyone else, have neglected it, and now it greatly hinders me in the translation, for all of ours speak and set down everything uniformly and equally.

But now hear: that which pertains to the soul is called dianoia, that which pertains to the intellect is called noēsis, and that which pertains to the intelligible and the supermundane is called noēton. Whence now I shall take each of these and explain them. First, then, that of the soul, which is dianoia. This dianoia is not simple and uncomposite, like intellect, but rather it is a kind of recollection or reminiscence, for the soul, in the midst of recollection, has the power of understanding, and it is composite and not simple, like that of the intellect, for it composes being and non-being, deliberating, as when I am about something, I say, "Shall I do it or not do it?" and then afterwards, upon some one thing, I reflect and I either affirm or deny being or non-being, for which reason it is given a fitting name, which is reminiscence or recollection. "These resemble," says Porphyry, "the recollection of the soul, as when a man proceeds by steps, for he does not simply leap to where he is heading, but by steps, step by step, he completes his own journey. So too the soul proceeds from this to that, little by little, until it has encompassed and clothed itself in the intelligible and made it its own, whatever it may be.

But as for the intellect, it attaches itself simply, just as when the sun rises, behold, its rays instantly and immovably cover everything, and they do not approach little by little, but immediately upon the emergence of the sun's disk, behold, the spreading of the rays occurs. Likewise, you may observe concerning the intellect: from the moment the intellect appears, intellection appears, for the intellect and intellection are present together, like the rays of the sun. And as for the noēton: for every noēton is, in some way, noēton for the higher powers. Do you understand what they call noēton? That which is intelligible or thinkable. Now hear: there is another thing, the act of intellection, as we have discovered, for it was spoken of concerning the soul, while intellection concerns the intellect, and that too has been discovered; and now we have before us to know what the noēton is: it is either the thinkable or the intelligible. But every intelligible is superior to the intellect, for the intelligible transcends the intellect, as we shall now make clear by means of examples. For the intellect transcends the soul, and its essence is different from that of the soul, and the soul is the intellective subject, while the intellect is the intelligible object. And again, the intellect is transcended by the essence of the truly existent, and the intellect is the intellective subject and the truly existent is the intelligible object.

And again, the divine and the unitary number is attached to the truly existent, for they are other and the being of the truly existent is other, and the truly existent is the perceiver, and the perceived is the super-essential number. And again, the perceivers are the divine ones and the super-essential ones alone, and the perceived from them is the first limit and the first infinity, and again the perceivers are the first limit and the first infinity, while the perceived is, from all of them, that super-ordinate, singular one and goodness, to which the desire of honor addressed it and also the appellation of father. Now all these, according to the orders, are both intellects and objects of intellection for each one. Whence it is appropriate to know by study that every perceived is superior to every perceiver, as the divine is greater. And upon these it is necessary to know by addition. Understand, know, that we perceive from the subsequent ones of every being and embodiment; and the subsequent ones to beings are their powers and activities, and whatever the activity is, such is the power, and whatever the power, such is the form and being as well. And again, it is appropriate to study, for the first ones by nature become posterior in the perception of the perceiver, and the subsequent ones by nature become prior, such as the being of each one and the activity.

Because natural being is prior, but whenever we conceive of something, we conceive from the later things, which are power and activity; for, as are the powers and activities, so likewise we form a conception of the beings; for every power and activity belongs to some being. And if its activity is simple and incomposite, then its being also is simple and incomposite. But if its activity is not simple, then its being also is not simple, as in the case of soul and intellect, for the intellection of soul is composite, which is its activity, and its being also is not simple. But the activity of intellect is simple and its being also is simple, as was shown among the higher things. Consider again that we speak in one way of the powers and activities concerning soul, in another way concerning intellect, and in another way concerning the One or the ones. Concerning soul, then, we speak of proceeding little by little and progressively and either acquiring activity or not, and being only in potency, as in the case of children or the unlearned, for they are only in potency, but without a share of actual intellect, as Aristotle showed. For he says that the unphilosophical are with soul only in potency and not in activity, but among those who philosophize, only in that state does he posit the soul in activity and intellect.

And again, power and activity of intellect are different, just as being also is; for activity is co-present and perpetual with being, and being with activity, like the rays of the sun with its disc, and likewise intellect with its intelligible object, for intellect is nothing other than its own perpetual intellection. And not as if a soul were gradually to advance little by little and attach itself to intelligibles and from this intelligible proceed to another, but intellect and its intelligible are simultaneous. But concerning this unity we cannot even speak of intellection, because every one who intellection is bound up with ignorance, desiring to intellection what has not been intellected, and to know what has not been known. But that which is super-unified is beyond knowledge and intellection. For what would it know, which is not ignorant of anything? Or what would it intellection, which has brought forth and completed the being of intellect? And again, intellect intellection each thing individually and many things plurally, but the One intellection all and each uniformly and indivisibly, as was shown earlier, which said that every one who intellection acts in accordance with its own beings. But the activity of the One is uniform and is above the principle of its own superiority. Now this very necessary thing was set forth very clearly.