TITUS Texts: Nemesios of Emessa, De natura hominum

Of our blessed father Nemesios, Archbishop of Emesa, on the nature of man, a summary discourse. Chapter I: On the nature of man. The preparation of the rational soul of man and the choice of the body, and this so well that it was impossible for his creation or confirmation to be better in any other way, was spoken of by many and good men. But concerning the rational discourse of the soul, some brought in from elsewhere, that reason, coming from outside, rationally created the soul, as something else creates another; or that rationality is inherent in the soul from itself and by nature, and this is its better part, as the eye is in the body? But some—among whom are [N.N.] and Plotinus—who are transmitters of the otherness of the soul and the otherness of reason, desire the confirmation of man from three: body, soul, and reason; to whom also Apollinaris, who became bishop of Laodicea, adhered, for he seized this as a foundation for his own will and added many things as his own transmission. But some did not separate reason from the soul, but desired that the rational be the principal part of its essence.

Aristotle, however, considers the potential intellect to be co-prepared with man, while the active intellect he deems to be supervenient upon us from without, not for the perfection of the being and existence of man, but, for the sake of the natural cognitions of the dispositions, as an aid to contemplation; for he confirms the possession of the active intellect only in a few men—and only in those who philosophize. Plato, however, does not think to say that man is composed of two co-rulers, soul and body, but he deems the soul to be such a user of the body, worthily dreaming concerning man; by this he turns us toward the sole divinity and care of the soul, so that, being persuaded that we are the soul, we may pursue only the goods of the soul—virtues and good service—and not embrace the desires of the body, as if they were not those of man—for truly man is the soul—but rather primarily those of an animal, and only secondarily those of man, since man is an animal.

Again, the soul is naturally separated from every body, for the body, like an instrument, is moved by it; death makes this evident, for when the soul departs, the body lies completely immobile and inactive, just as an instrument lies immobile when the craftsman departs. And it is evident that it partakes of the inanimate and has the power of life and reason in common with the irrational animals: for it partakes of the inanimate insofar as it is by the body and the mixture of the four elements, and of plants by this and by the power of growth and reproduction, and of the irrational animals among these as well, but by the faculty of nutrition, by the capacity for desire, by appetite, by anger, by sensation, and by the power of imagination, for all these are common to humans and irrational animals, even if not all are present in every one.

but by the word of the incorporeal and rational natures, as a rational, intelligent, and discerning being, and as one who adheres to each thing and, for the sake of the virtue of the yoke, partakes of good service, for which reason man exists between the boundaries: of rational and sentient beings, touching the body and corporeal power of irrational animals without soul, and by the word of incorporeal beings, as was said earlier. For it seems that the Creator, from the smallest, brings together the separated natures into one, so as to make everything constructed one and of the same kind. From this, the unity of all existing things by the Creator is especially evident; for he not only united beings with the divisible and indivisible, but also arranged each individually together in order by their own property; for among each of the animals he united the insentient with the sentient—bones, nails, hair, and other insentient things with sentient veins and others—for which reason he created the animal composed of insentient and sentient things, and not only as a composite, but also as a unified whole.

And in this way, upon the other corporeally constructed things, the unifier created, little by little, with their own property and the changeability of nature, so that they might not be greatly separated from the wholly soulless plants, which possess the power of growth, nor again these from the unreasoning and sentient animals, nor the unreasoning from the rational beings, as being altogether foreign and unblended with them, but rather that they might be of some kind of common nature and natural kinship; for stone is separated from stone by some force, and the magnet stone is considered to be capable of drawing out other stones from their nature and power, because it manifestly attracts iron to itself and holds it, as if making it its own nourishment, and it does not only show this effect on one iron, but through one it takes hold of another and gives all its power to the possessed things at once: iron is also held by iron, when it is itself held by the magnet.

Then again, the one who directs from the plants toward the animals did not proceed abruptly to the moving and sentient nature, but came to it little by little, in a well-ordered manner. For he created the pines and the acalyphe, which are like sentient trees, for he made them rooted in the sea, like plants, and, like wood, he covered them with bark, and made them as plants, but gave them the sense of touch, which is the common sensation of all animals, so that they might share in plants by rooting and standing, and in animals by touch. And also the sponge, which is attached to rocks, by its continuity and suddenness, when it perceives the approach of something—as Aristotle notes. For this reason and for such things, all the most ancient sages have the custom of calling all these "animal-plants." And again, among the pines and such, he placed the moving animals' similar generation, but the inability to move far, yet a self-contained and local motion; for such are most of the testaceans and the intestinal worms.

Then again, having added to each individually some with greater sensation, and some with greater mobility, he finally proceeded to the most perfect of the irrational animals; and I speak of those possessing all the senses and capable of moving far. But when he came from the irrational to the rational animal, which is man, he did not prepare this one hastily either, but first, among the other animals as well, he placed certain natural dispositions, skills, and inclinations toward salvation, so that they might appear near to the rational ones, and thus, truly rational animal, man, he brought forth. Likewise, concerning voice, the investigator found that from the simple and uniform neighing of horses and the bellowing of oxen, proceeding individually to the varied and distinct, they produced the cawing of crows and the clucking of speckled hens, and from that, as if from a scattered and incomplete state, they were perfected into the complete human voice. Again, the broken murmuring, touching upon hearing and inner speech, was gradually transformed into the power of drawing toward the intellectual. And thus he harmonized and bound together all things musically, and gathered into one the rational and the invisible, and again these material and visible ones, by the wisdom of human creation.

Then again, the creator of the world, having fittingly spoken of the creation of man at the very end, did not only prepare each of the things created after him in succession and thus set forth that which is mortal, but also because it was then the turn of the rational being and of all visible creation, and as a unifier of those natures, so that everything might be one and akin to itself and not alien to itself. Thus man was created as a living being uniting the natures. But the wisdom of the creator is to be spoken of collectively. For such is the case: man, placed between the boundaries of the irrational and rational nature, if he inclines somewhat toward bodies and embraces bodily things more and delights in the life of the irrational, then he is counted among them and is called "earthly" after the manner of Paul, and it is heard: "You were earth and to earth you go"* and he is numbered among the irrational, senseless ones and becomes like them; but if he directs himself toward the rational, despising all bodily sensations, and follows the divine and God-loving life as proper to man, then he is like that heavenly one, as it is said: "Such are the heavenly and such the earthly, such are the earthly"**.

But the nature of rational beings has as its principle the avoidance and turning away from evil, and the pursuit and choice of good. However, some goods are of a mixed kind, belonging to both soul and body, since the soul’s direction also involves the elevation of this, as the soul is the provider for the body, such as the virtues; while the virtues of the soul alone, not involving the body, are like piety or the contemplation of beings. Now, as many as pertain to human life, how they accord with human life, are chosen, and not merely as that of an animal—they become companions of the virtues and of piety. But which are of virtue and which of piety, let it be judged among the following, when we have set forth the discourse concerning the soul and the body, for nowhere has it been indicated what our soul is in essence, and it is not fitting to speak first of its powers and activities.

The Jews, however, say that from the beginning man was created neither as mortal by choice nor as immortal, but between the boundaries of the natures of the rational beings, so that if he followed the passions of the bodily beings, the bodily cycles would also overtake him; but if he honored the goods of the soul, he would become worthy of immortality. For if from the beginning he had been created mortal by God, he would not have punished the sinner with death, for no one punishes a mortal with mortality; and if, on the other hand, he had been born immortal, he would not have been prepared for the taking of food, for none of the immortals is a taker of bodily food, nor would he have so easily repented, and one created immortal would not have been so quickly made mortal, since not even among the sinful angels is such action seen, but from the beginning, according to their nature, they remain immortal, awaiting the judgment for their sin and not death. It is better, however, to put it thus: or perhaps it may be conceived of the present matter in this way, that he was prepared as mortal, but was capable, through progress, of becoming perfected as immortal, which is immortality by power.

But since it was not better for him to know the nature of his own completion beforehand, he forbade him to taste the fruit of the tree of knowledge, for there were and still are great powers among the plants, and at that time, as at the beginning of the creation of the world, when things were in a perfect state, they had powerful effects. The tasting of some fruit was the creator of the knowledge of his own nature. And God did not wish him, before completion, to know his own nature, lest, having known his own active power among many corporeal concerns, he, being mindful of them, should abandon the governance of the soul. And for this reason he restrained him from partaking of the fruit of knowledge. But when he disobeyed and came to know himself, he fell from completion and, having become a maker of corporeal concerns, immediately sought a covering, for Moses says that he was ashamed; but before the first transgression he was created and was in ignorance of himself. He fell from completion and likewise fell also from immortality, which he later receives through the grace of his Creator.

But after the transgression, it was permitted to him also to partake of flesh, for at first he commanded him to be satisfied only with plants; this was in paradise. But for the sake of the completion of the imperfect, it was permitted to him to touch and eat flesh by way of indulgence. However, since man is composed of bodies, and every body is constituted from the four elements, it is necessary that these afflictions enter into him, namely those of the elements: cutting, alteration, and flux, which are only of the body. Alteration is by quality, while flux is by depletion; for the living being is constantly depleted through the sensible and insensible moistures, concerning which we shall speak later. Now, it is necessary for the depleted parts to receive a corresponding replacement, or else the dissolution of the living being occurs through deficiency, by the substitution of other incoming elements; and since only the dry, the moist, and the spirit are depleted, it is necessary that there be a proportionate mixture of dry and moist nourishment for the living being, and likewise for the spirit.

Because, since from the four humors are the foods and drinks, from which we are strengthened, each one grows by its own corresponding and similar, but is cured by the opposite, for some humors we take in directly, and some only through a medium, as when water is taken in itself, but only through the mediation of wine and oil and all other things called moist; for wine is nothing other than water transformed by the vine. And similarly we also take in fire, sometimes directly from it when we are warmed, and sometimes through other media which we eat or drink, for in all things—whether much or little—a portion of fire is sown. In this same way we also take in air directly, but also through the breath and the respiration held around us, for in eating and drinking we draw air into ourselves, but through the mediation of all other things which we receive. But earth we never take in directly and immediately, but through certain media, for earth becomes bread, and we eat bread.

Because deer and wild goats often eat snakes, and also partridges eat near the dung; but man, by means of a mixture of seeds and of garden vegetables and of meats. But, since not only by reason of intelligence, but also by reason of sensibility to touch does man surpass all animals—for we have neither thick hide like oxen and other thick-skinned animals, nor large and dense hair like goats and sheep and bears, nor scales like snakes and fish, nor shells like tortoises and oysters, nor hard shells like crabs, nor feathers like birds—we have become makers of garments, as necessary, to fulfill among ourselves the substitute for those things which nature has granted to others. And because of this cause we are makers of food and clothing, and not comparable to the manner of beasts. But because of the difficulty of mixing the elements and of dissolving the solidity of bodies, we have become makers of physicians and medicines.

But concerning the changes of the qualities that are produced, it became necessary, by means of the opposite quality, to bring about the raising of the bodies to a standing position in due proportion; for otherwise, as some think, the complete cooling of the heated body would be imminent by physicians, but rather the application in a well-blended manner, because from complete cooling by the opposite, the onset of disease is brought about. But the needs of man, such as those of food and drink, are for change and excretion; and concerning clothing, for which he has no strong natural covering from the outside; and houses, for the difficult blending of the air surrounding us and against wild beasts; and medicines, for the change of qualities and for the senses, which are implanted in the body: for if we did not have senses, we would not feel pain, nor would we become capable of healing, being not subject to decay, and we would perish in grievous ignorance, unable to be healed of injury.

But of the arts and the exact sciences, and of those things that are useful from these for mutual exchange, we are co-creators with one another for the sake of common fellowship, so that through this many might become one; for we partake of one another's life through the exchange of useful things. And some have given the name "city" to companionship and cohabitation, because we derive benefit from one another by proximity and not by distance; for man was by nature created as a social and civic living being; for no one is sufficient unto himself for all matters. It is pitiable, for cities were established for the sake of exchange and learning. In this twofold dignity man was deemed worthy by a miracle: for he alone is granted forgiveness if he repents, and of these bodies, only the mortal ones are made immortal, the soul being the user of the body, and the body of the soul. For only man, possessing the miracle of reason, was deemed worthy of forgiveness through repentance: but neither demons nor angels, even if they were to repent, are deemed worthy of forgiveness. And especially through this, God is seen and proclaimed as just and merciful.

For the angels have nothing that is hateful or that draws them toward sins, but they are by nature free from bodily passions, needs, and appetites—rightly so, and no pardon is granted to those who repent. But man is not only rational but also animal, for the needs and passions of the animal often surround the thoughts; yet when he is stirred, he flees from these and turns to the virtues, and, seeking mercy from what is right, he inclines toward pardon. And if it is proper to his being to be changeable, and if it is peculiar to man alone to have existence both in a communal and in an eternal sense, so also among all gifts peculiar to man, more than any rational construction, is the ability through repentance to remove the cause of former errors. For this was granted to man alone, wholly and perpetually throughout the times of this worldly life, but after death it is no more.

Thus, even among the angels, after a fall, there is no longer any acceptance of pardon through repentance, for for them the fall is death; but before the fall, they are like men in their manner of life, and they too are worthy of pardon. For this reason, if they do not do this, they would have an unforgivable and eternal excess of torments justly due to them. Let it be known from what has been said above concerning them, how many do not accept repentance, the chosen gift and property of man, which cuts them off from the mercies of God. — But his own peculiar property is this as well: alone, more than other living beings, the resurrection of these bodies after death and being deemed worthy of immortality. For it pertains to this concerning the immortality of the soul, and at times concerning the passions of the soul due to the weakness and manifold afflictions of the body. But his own property is the learning of arts and sciences, whence also the arts and actions. For this reason, when defining man, they inscribe him by definition thus: "A rational, mortal animal, capable of intellect and science.

Living being" [is added] because man is also a spiritual and sentient being, for this is the definition of a living being; and "rational," so that he may be separated from the irrational ones; and "mortal," so that he may be separated from the immortal rational beings; but "capable of receiving intellect and knowledge," because through learning arts and sciences are acquired by us, for we have the power to receive both intellect and arts, but we become possessors of actions through teachings. They say, therefore, that this definition is completed by the final addition, for man is defined even without the final definition; but, since the Chaldeans and certain other tribes say that some of the long-lived demons are immortal, — so that man may be separated from these as well, they added the capacity to receive intellect and knowledge; for none of them learns, but knows by nature what they know. The Hebrew tradition, however, says that this entire man was created, but more so than all those inferior to him, such as quadrupeds and beasts; and these are for labor, while the beast is for these. For some creatures are made for their own sake, while others are for the sake of others: all rational beings are for their own sake, but irrational and inanimate beings are for the sake of others.

But since these were made for the sake of other things—let us consider for what purpose they were made. Or is it also for the sake of angels? Yet no right-minded person would say that these were created for angels: for all things made for the sake of others were created for their preservation, maintenance, and delight, or for the renewal of the race, or for food, or for covering, or for healing, or for use and delight. But an angel is not engaged in any of these, for it has neither renewal of race, nor is it concerned with bodily food, nor with covering, nor with anything else for others. But since an angel is not engaged in any of these—it is evident that there is no other nature higher than the angels; for even the higher order is subordinate to the order below, and this is precisely its non-engagement. For a rational nature would seek and be engaged in these things. And if another such nature appears, is it apart from us humans? But since this is so, the creation of dumb and soulless things for the sake of man is established. But since it is for this reason, as is now evident, he was appointed as their ruler; and the work of a ruler is to use the resources of the realm in due measure, to be unyielding toward passions, and not to be weighed down by the realm like a burden.

Now the beasts, which the irrational ones do not use well, because they are not for the work of the ruler, and not only [for the ruler's, but also not] for the just one's, according to the scripture: "The just man takes pity on the soul of his irrational beast." But if someone should say: "It was not for the sake of another, but for its own sake that it was created." Let us first separate the animate from the inanimate and see whether the inanimate are capable of being created for their own sake, or are sufficient. But if these are for their own sake—how then do animals grow anywhere? For we observe nature providing food for animals from the fruits and plants of the earth, except for a few carnivores; and even these carnivores obtain their food from animals that graze the earth, such as wolves and lions from lambs and goats and deer and stags, and eagles from partridges and pheasants and quails and the like, which feed on the fruits of the earth. And also the nature of fish, one devouring another, does not extend carnivory to all, but is limited by the grazers among the frogs and leeches and others that arise among the waters.

but, although all kinds of fish were flesh-eaters and not one of them abstained from eating flesh, they were not even slightly satisfied, but would have perished, some from mutual devouring, others from lack of food. But so that this should not happen, some kinds of fish were created that are separated from flesh, and, one might say, became grazers of the sea's grasses, so that from them other flesh-eating ones might be sustained; for they serve as food for these, the foul and the harmful, but these are for others, and these again for others, without end, for the sake of food, unceasingly, as from a source, borne by the sea, so that the embodiment of others might be sustained. For this reason, the word revealed the creation of plants not for their own sake, but for the sake of food and the maintenance of humans and other animals; it indicated that the causes of their growth and creation were made for these. Whence the stars and the sky and the mountains and the hills and all such things were made for these, so that between food and the sphere's stability, nature might establish perpetual givers and unceasing receivers of fruits, until these should suffice for the fruits, and the fruits for the animals and humans.

But it is now necessary to investigate: was the nature of the irrational animals made for their own sake, or for the sake of man? Not to mention those that are devoid of perception and those that live only by natural relationships and are bent toward the earth and those that show a servile form by their appearance, to say that they came into being for their own sake. There is much appropriate speech concerning these, and one who is skilled in the abundance of another description would be needed, but the length of speech does not allow the present exposition; rather, its swift and unhindered completion is fitting. Now then, as if in an image, let us adorn man, as if by a mirror, and let us be those who begin from the discovery of beings to investigate; — let us see, then, the irrationality within our own soul and its parts — and I speak of desire and anger — which are given as servants to the rational part, which is like a ruler, and the other as a ruling part, and one as a commander, and another as a command and servant for the functions, whatever the rational part may ordain, whenever man lives according to nature. But since within us the rational part rules over the irrational part within us, how is it not fitting that the external irrational beings also be controlled by it and given over to its functions?

For by nature it has been established as a servant of the rational being, as is now evident among us. Know that the preparation of other animals also for the service of man was made fittingly, and all quadrupeds for labor and taming, and many of the birds and aquatic creatures and even those on dry land for some use, while the creeping ones for delight and pleasure. But although not all such creatures serve these needs, but only those that are of some use to men—know that first for this service of man, all others, as many as were possible, were prepared, so that the completed whole of all creatures should lack nothing. But neither is this entirely removed from the benefit of men: for reason also makes fruitful speech concerning the benefit of their own kind, since it uses them for the healing of afflictions that befall them and for the treatment of other infirmities; such are those called therapeutically prepared, which reason has devised so that these too may be possessed by themselves and used as by a warrior's capture. Men also have many preceptors set before them, which are given by the Creator as unchangeable and instead for overturning and correcting their thoughts, capable of doing so.

For other animals, they are suitable for different purposes. But generally, all are capable of serving the needs of man, even if not for other uses. As it was said concerning this present life of ours, in the beginning none of the animals dared to harm man, but all were his slaves, subjugated and obedient, as long as he held in check the irrational passions within him. But when he no longer held the passions in check, he was overcome by them and was seized by external forces, justly, like a beast: for sin was followed by passion from these. This is true and evident from those who have lived a chosen life, for they have shown themselves superior to the desires of beasts, like Daniel among the lions, and Paul after the bite of the viper.

Who, then, by virtue of the dignity of this living creature, marveling at its excellence, having united within itself the mortal and the immortal, and having brought together the rational with the irrational, and bearing within itself the nature of the entire creation, as if it were an image—since it is said to be "a small world"—is it not worthy of the divine providence, for whose sake all things present and future exist, for whose sake God became man, for the sake of perfection toward incorruptibility and the abolition of mortality? For it dwells in the heavens, this creature made in the image and likeness of God, it abides with Christ, it is the child of God, and it is the steward of every beginning and authority. Who, then, could be capable of expressing the excellences of this living creature!

For it gazes into the abyss, ascends to the heavens by sight, calculates the motion, magnitude, and number of the stars, traverses the earth and the sea, holds beasts and brutes in contempt; it directs every art, skill, and form, and ponders things beyond the outer limits which it desires; it foretells future events from bodies not near; it rules over all, governs all, receives all; it speaks of angels and of God, commands creation, threatens demons; it expels the nature of existing things, strives to know God, and becomes a house and temple of God;—and it acquires all these virtues and builds itself up as a good dwelling. But, lest we be carried away into immeasurable lengths by enumerating such great excellences concerning man, and not only to set forth his nature as a preface, as was previously established,—but here let us cut short the discourse, lest we speak more of the excellences of his nature than we define what his nature is.

and we know [what] we have become recipients of such nobility, for we are plants of heaven—let us not shame nature, nor prove unworthy of such great gifts, but let us not deprive ourselves of those selfsame powers and blessings, and for the sake of a brief moment and a fleeting taste let us not become givers of all eternity to shame; but through good works, by abstaining from filth, by righteous experience and by prayers let us preserve nobility. Concerning these matters, this too is sufficient. But since the word will generally expound the composition of man from soul and body, let us proceed and first begin concerning the soul, while we shall pass over very briefly and cursorily and with difficulty the many subjects of inquiry that are hard to comprehend.