Quaestiones gentilium ad Christianos

Concerning the incorporeal, and concerning God, and concerning the resurrection of the dead. 1. Whence is it evident whether there is something incorporeal, and if there is something incorporeal? 2. Whence is it evident that it can exist by itself apart from a body, and if it is itself by itself incorporeal? 3. Whence is it evident whether the incorporeal is better than the body, and if the incorporeal is not better than the body? 4. What is the incorporeal? Is it soul, or something better than soul, such as God? 5. And wherein does soul differ from God? And whence is it evident whether God exists at all? 6. And if God exists, it must be investigated whether he makes, or ever made, or will make anything whatsoever. 7. And whether he made, or makes, or will make? 8. And what does he make, and how does he make it, whether with deliberation or also without deliberation? 9. And if with deliberation, using an instrument or without an instrument? 10. And if without deliberation, does he make irrationally, without thought and consideration, or with some judgment? 11. And if with judgment, of what deficiency does he require judgment? But if without judgment, by what reasoning must it be investigated? 12. And if we grant that something comes to be from him, is that which comes to be imperishable or perishable? And if imperishable, we are at a loss whether that which is generated at all can be imperishable, and by what reasoning? And if it perishes, how do the works of the immortal differ from human works? For many of these often endure a much longer time, while their maker himself has perished, they themselves being imperishable, as can be seen in buildings and such things.

14. And if what is produced by God is destroyed, by whose vice is it destroyed—that of the maker, that of the thing produced, or of some external thing opposed to the maker? Whichever of these we assume, it is clear that the vice belongs to the maker. For if the thing produced ought to be destroyed because of some innate vice of its own, the maker is responsible, because he made it such that some evil remains in it. Or if there is something external opposed to the maker, then again it is due to the vice of the maker, because he is unable to prevail over the opposing things. Or if the vice comes from the maker, it is obvious that he himself is evil. These matters, for now, are a few from many; for if we wish, we must also investigate what a body is and of what a body consists, and the difficulties arising from these. But setting these aside for now, as if none of the difficulties were present, we seek one of the more noble things deemed worthy of wonder from the discourses concerning the resurrection; for this is one of the not insignificant difficulties raised among the hard-hearted.

15. For if, he says, the dead must rise whole, how, if a man should happen to die in the sea, and then, having been eaten by fish, be in turn consumed by other men through the medium of the fish, how would he recover the flesh that has been consumed into other men? For either this man must rise apart from the flesh which the other men ate through the medium of the fish, as has often been said, or those men, being required to yield up the parts of his flesh, must set them aside and become deficient, in order to fill up the deficiency of what was unjustly consumed by them. And these are the sorts of things that the stony-hearted say, laughing. But I urge you to learn a constructive argument for the resurrection, free from difficulty, one that demonstrates from necessity that resurrection must exist, through certain demonstrative and true arguments. For when the proofs are strengthened by truths, I will make no account of any argument of difficulties; for it is absurd and contentious to wish to quarrel with a strengthened demonstration.

Christian Responses to the Previously Stated Questions from the Piety of Natural Reasonings. These arguments are not logical difficulties, but artless questions. For the argument that constructs logical difficulties gathers the absurdity from things said in some consequential manner: for example, only man is capable of laughter, every laughing animal is a living being, therefore only man is a living being; these are consistent propositions, but the conclusion is absurd. In the present arguments, however, no absurdity has been gathered by consequence; therefore they have not been reasonably called difficulties. Question. Whence is it evident that there is something incorporeal? Response. It is impossible for the same thing both to be ignorant of and to know the same things (for in every case either the affirmation or the negation must be true), how does one who is ignorant whether there is something incorporeal know will and judgment, thought and examination, mind and reason, which are activities of the incorporeal? For to know the activities of the incorporeal while in ignorance of the existence of the incorporeal is characteristic of those who do not know what they say. Another. To construct a difficulty and to resolve a difficulty is not a matter of sense perception, nor does it belong to a body. That which is not of a body must necessarily be of the incorporeal. Another. Whence do we seek the demonstration of the existence of the incorporeal? For if seeking about something, whether it exists or not, is an activity of reason, and reason is an activity of the rational, while the body in itself is irrational, it is evident that there is something incorporeal, to which seeking and judging properly belong. Another. For one who does not admit that there is something incorporeal, it is inappropriate to seek and judge by reason whether there is something incorporeal.

It is irrational, then, to make use of the activities of the incorporeal while being ignorant of the existence of the incorporeal. Another. There are in us two powers capable of apprehending things, namely sense-perception and intellection; the activities of these differ from each other as much as what is apprehended by the one cannot be apprehended by the other. But since all powers are powers of substances, for this reason it is necessary that there be two substances, of which the property of one is to perceive, and of the other to think. But if this is so, then there is some incorporeal substance whose property it is to think, just as perceiving belongs to the body. Another. If something is animate, it is necessary that the soul exist; for by participation in the soul the animate thing exists as animate. If knowledge does not exist by itself, but in the soul, it is necessary, then, that the soul exist by itself, in which knowledge exists. Another. If the body needs the soul for living and perceiving, but the soul does not need the body, either for living or for thinking, then the soul is other than the body.

Another. If the soul commands the body, and the body serves the commands of the soul, then the soul is something other than the body. Another. If the soul holds the place of a craftsman, and the body of a tool, and tools are not the same as the craftsman, then the body is not the same as the soul. Another. If reason is first and that which is according to reason is later (for reason is in the soul, while that which is according to reason is in matter), then matter is something other than the soul. And that which is other than matter is also other than body. Another. If that which is not body is not substance either, how is substance divided into body and incorporeal, since that which is divided must necessarily exist in the things into which it is divided? Question. If there is something incorporeal, how is it evident that it can exist by itself? Answer. That which by its presence makes the body partaker of life and perception and thought, and by its absence again makes it dead and insensible and thoughtless, this must necessarily exist by itself, as being incorruptible by its own nature. Another. To construct logical difficulties scientifically, and to solve them likewise scientifically, is not the work of sense-perception; for it is agreed that sense-perception cannot attain knowledge of substance and truth. If this is so, and it belongs to science to attain knowledge of substance and truth, but not to sense-perception, and that which does not belong to sense-perception does not belong to body either, then there must necessarily be something incorporeal by itself, in which science resides.

Another. If substance must exist in itself, and substance is divided according to the primary division into body and incorporeal, how is the incorporeal not substance existing in itself? Another. That which is able to separate itself from being affected together with the body and not be destroyed is also able to be separated from the body and not be destroyed; therefore it is more excellent and more honorable than the body, as being the cause of the body's being beautiful by its own presence. We say that such a thing is the rational soul, being a noetic spirit, both vital and cognitive and self-moved, of which we say that both angels and demons are consubstantial. And, to speak generally, every enousion thing that can be controlled by something is a body relative to that which controls it. And we say that the divine is incorporeal, not because it is incorporeal (for God is beyond both body and incorporeal in his own substance, as the creator of each of these; for God did not make what he himself is), but, just as we are accustomed to honor the divine always with the more honorable material things among us, so also with names, not as if God needs these, but as we indicate our conception of him by means of them. In this way, then, we name him incorporeal, although we know that he exists beyond the incorporeal, as the creator of this. Let this also be established in the argument as indicative that there is something incorporeal. For if there were nothing incorporeal among beings, neither would body exist. But since there is something incorporeal, just as there is something body, for this reason it is necessary to distinguish opposites from each other by opposite names.

For we call God uncreated, distinguishing him by the name of the uncreated from created things. And if there were no created things, God would not be distinguished from them by the name of the uncreated. According to this distinction made by the name of the uncreated, then, God is shown to be beyond both bodies and incorporeals. For if the name "created" collectively includes all bodies and incorporeals, it is clear that he who is distinguished by this name from created things is necessarily distinguished from both bodies and incorporeals. And what belongs to other incorporeals, namely not being controlled by bodies, belongs also to God, not as to an incorporeal, but as to that which is beyond the incorporeal. And since not having a creator and master is more honorable than having a creator and master, for this reason we call God uncreated. For that which exists uncreated can have neither a creator nor a master. Likewise, since not being controlled by anything is more honorable than being controlled, for this reason we call him incorporeal.

Question. How is it clear whether God exists at all? Answer. From the constitution and continuance of beings. For beings would not exist, unless God pre-existed them, having established all the parts of creation as needful for the benefit of the whole creation, he who is known to us through prophecy and teaching of prophets and of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ and of his apostles, attested by divine powers in their words. Question. Does God make, or did he make, or will he make? And if he makes, is it with deliberation or without deliberation? Answer. God made, and makes, and will make through his own will. For he made creation, which did not exist before, having willed it himself, which he preserves in being by his own providence, which is to make, and which he will also renew and bring to a better state through renewal, which is to will make, in order to cleanse it from all disorder that has befallen it from the negligence of rational beings, not from having later found the better by judgment and consideration, but from above and before the making of the world it was resolved by him to do this. For it is not possible for God to acquire later, either in knowledge or in power, what he did not have before. A proof that God makes the world by will is this: that, though God is able to make more suns, he did not make more, but made only one; for he who is unable to make more suns cannot make even one, and he who is able to make one sun is necessarily able to make more.

Why then did God not make more suns, which he was able to make, unless he did not wish to make more suns? And if he did not make the suns which he did not make by will, it is clear therefore that he also made the sun which he did make by will, and just as the sun, so also all the other parts of creation, both the imperishable and the perishable, have both their existence and their being of such a kind from the will of God. Question. Is the incorporeal better than the body? Answer. If the body is ensouled and becomes capable of thought, not by the presence of another body but by that of the incorporeal, how is the incorporeal not better than the body, existing as it does? Another. If every corporeal substance is from matter and form, and the form does not come from matter but arrives to matter from elsewhere, how is the incorporeal not better than matter, from which the form arrives into matter? Another. If it is not possible to know the equal when the unequal is unknown, how is it possible to know the body when the incorporeal is unknown?

Another. If all corporeal things exist in a body in a representational manner, but the soul exists rationally, how is the soul not incorporeal? Another. If it is possible for the soul to act according to intellect, and the soul acts according to intellect when it separates itself from all sense perception, how is the soul not independent? Question. What distinguishes God from soul? Answer. It is the difference between being the creator and master and having a creator and master, and the difference between being beyond being and being. Question. If God acts with deliberation, does he use an instrument or act without an instrument? Answer. God is in need of nothing external to his own nature; and just as he deliberates without an instrument, so also he acts without an instrument. For if, at the moment he wills something to come into being, it subsists as willed, how is the use of instruments for what comes into being not superfluous? Question. If God acts without deliberation, does he act irrationally, without thought and consideration, or with some judgment? And if with judgment, for what lack does he need judgment? But if without judgment, by what reason?

Answer. If the works of God are known to God, and known things are known by reason, how does God not know by reason what He does? But to do something with thought, examination, and judgment is characteristic of our craftsmen, who by these means arrive at a better end of the things produced; but God, since He neither acquires knowledge nor loses knowledge, has need of none of these. Question. If something that is altogether generated can be incorruptible, by what reasoning? Answer. Things whose incorruptibility depends on the will of another cannot be incorruptible in an ungenerated manner; therefore we say that only God has immortality, because it belongs to Him from His own nature and not from the will of another. Another. If God is above the incorruptible as their maker, but is not above the ungenerated (for He is not the creator of ungenerated things), then the ungenerated does not follow from the incorruptible. Another. If God is incorruptible by His own nature, and the soul is incorruptible by the will of the creator, how, in such a difference of incorruptibility, does the ungenerated follow from the incorruptible according to you?

Another. If something contributes to the constitution of perishable things, how are the imperishable things not servants of perishable things, with the cause of their imperishability leading them to such service? But if this is so, it is clear that one can have imperishability on account of some necessary purpose, but not ungeneratedness; for the ungenerated must exist without any necessary cause. Another. If the element is a primary body, and the body composed of elements is a secondary body, and the body composed of elements cannot be ungenerated (for nothing ungenerated can be posterior to something generated), how, if the bodies composed of elements are imperishable, will they not be generated and imperishable? Another. If all the elements are generated, how is it not absurd to say that things composed of elements are ungenerated? For if matter by itself is neither an element nor a substance, but when it receives quality and quantity becomes an element and a substance, how can things composed of such elements be ungenerated, even if they happen to be imperishable? Another. If body is one thing, imperishable body another, and perishable body another, and body is divided into imperishable and perishable body according to the difference of imperishability and perishability, how is it not necessary that the generated or the ungenerated be a property of the body that is divided? But if neither of these is a property of the divided body, how will the divided body be neither generated nor ungenerated? And if this is impossible, that the divided body be neither, then it is necessary to posit that this divided body is the imperishable body and the perishable body, into which the divided body is divided.

Question. Is what comes into being by God destroyed, and by whose vice is it destroyed—that of the maker, or that of what has come into being, or of some external thing that becomes opposed to the maker? Answer. Things that are destroyed are destroyed neither from the vice of the one who has made them nor from that of an opposing thing, but by the ordinance of the demiurge, who works destruction in particulars and imperishability in universals. For if things that are destroyed were destroyed from the vice of any of the things mentioned, the whole kind would be destroyed, both the particular and the universal. For if we grant that destruction comes from some vice, the kind of things that are destroyed would not be preserved imperishable among things that come into being, since vice would dominate the universal just as it does the particular. But if it is impossible for the universal to be destroyed by some vice, then neither is the particular destroyed by any vice, but by the ordinance of God. For if there is no vice among existing things that can prevent generation, then neither is there any vice among existing things that destroys the kind.

Answers concerning the resurrection to the previously stated questions about it. 1. That a human should be or become eaten by a fish and the fish eaten by a human neither dissolves the human into a fish nor the fish into a human, but the dissolution of each occurs into the elements from which they were originally composed. And even if the manner of the dissolution of the parts occurs through mutual consumption, the end of every dissolution taking place in whatever manner is that the dissolved things proceed into the elements. Therefore, one ought not, on account of the mutual consumption of human and fish, construct a sophistical difficulty that would abolish the resurrection, but rather look to the power of God, who not only promises to effect the resurrection of the dead, but has also provided us with sure faith in this through the already begun resurrection of our Savior Christ. But if the elements underlie the creation of things that come into being and the re-creation of things that have perished, how, if the re-creation of perished things is considered unbelievable and impossible, will not the creation of things that come into being in the beginning also be unbelievable and impossible? Which is absurd.

a human, nor does it prevent the resurrection of the human. 2. The Greeks believe neither the creation of the world nor its restoration. But if the first were true, it would become evident in this way. For they say that time is eternal. But if time is eternal, then necessarily the parts of time are also eternal, that is, the hours and the days, the months and the year. But if these are not eternal, because among them some are earlier and some later, then neither can the world, which exists in time, be ungenerated. 3. It is necessary to disbelieve the resurrection of the dead for two reasons: either because God is unable to raise the dead, or because it is not beneficial for those who are raised to be imperishable. Of these, the one is impious, the other ridiculous. But if this is so, how is the argument of those who disbelieve the resurrection of the dead not composed of impiety and ridicule? 4. Whatever God does by his own action, he does by command; and the existence of the things made by him is simultaneous with the command of God. You have thought, it is said, and it is present. But if this is fittingly said concerning God, how does the one who disbelieves the resurrection not also disbelieve that God has such power? For those who are raised from the dead need nothing else except the command of God. 5. If it is true that "God has found a way for the unexpected," as indeed it is true, how does the one who disbelieves the resurrection of the dead not make the statement false?

. When the re-creation occurs, all discord among humans concerning the creator of the world regarding his works is necessarily removed. How will the re-creation of the world not be more beautiful than the creation of the world? For because of the re-creation, the creation is also beautiful. But if that is disbelieved as impossible, how will the creation of the world not be utterly base? 7. One thing is absolutely impossible, and another is impossible for a particular thing. Absolutely impossible is, for example, that the diagonal be commensurable with the side; impossible for a particular thing is, for example, that nature produce an animal without seed. To which of these impossibilities do those who disbelieve in the resurrection assign it? But if to the first, the argument is false; for the diagonal does not become incommensurable with the side by re-creation, and those who rise rise by re-creation. But if to the second, yet for God all things that are impossible for a particular thing are possible. 8. If in the present life the pious differs from the impious only in hope, does not he who abolishes hope of future things also abolish the difference between the pious and the impious? 9. If without the particular it is impossible for the universal to exist, how, if the particular is created, will the universal not also be created? But if this is so, how is it not false that man and the remaining parts of creation are co-eternal with God? For example, if Plato is created, how is man not created?

10. How did the Greeks, positing that the world is eternal, dogmatize the consequences necessarily following from that hypothesis? But if, according to them, the world were eternal, they would reasonably say that there would be no re-creation of the world; for re-creation belongs to a created world, not to an uncreated one. That the world is not eternal is evident from the fact that man is not co-eternal with God. For if the universal were co-eternal with God, the particular would necessarily be so as well; but if the particular is not, neither is the universal. 11. To transfer all men once and for all, through re-creation, into a state where they are imperishable is far more divine in magnitude than to introduce them into this mortal condition in which we now are. He reserved for us the fitting and more divine for later, since in it lies the end of our existence. If we were deprived of this according to those who disbelieve the resurrection, how much better would it be for us not to exist than to exist? For everything deprived of its proper end is useless. 12. If it is impossible for someone to prefer death for the sake of a thing that does not exist, how then, according to you, since the doctrine of the resurrection is not true, did the martyrs prefer their own death for the sake of this? By what other religion was the doctrine confirmed through manifold tortures and deaths than by their own religion, I mean that of the Christians concerning the resurrection of the dead?

13. If the Greeks do not believe certain things, then those things neither are nor will be; therefore, the existence of beings lies in the knowledge of the Greeks. How, then, are they shown to be in conflict with themselves and with each other in most of their most fundamental doctrines? For such conflict does not permit the existence of beings to lie in the knowledge of the Greeks. 14. If they disbelieve the tradition of those who witnessed the founder of the resurrection rising from the dead into immortal life, they are too weak to refute the doctrine of the resurrection with an indissoluble proof. For a man being eaten by fish presents a difficulty, but not a proof. For it is impossible for the same event to fall under divinity as having occurred; and when the essence of the event has been demonstrated by power, no syllogism can effect its overthrow. 15. The sun, when it is above the earth, is not under the earth, and when it is under the earth, it is not above the earth. How, then, is this sun eternal according to you, if it does not eternally possess its being above the earth or under the earth? And if the Greeks assume what is not eternal as eternal, how will they be credible lawgivers concerning the non-resurrection of the dead? 16. That which is sometimes above and sometimes below belongs to things that at some time are not, neither above nor below. How, then, is the sun eternal, which before being above or below was not? For those who do not understand that the sun is by its own nature generated, how is it not absurd to trust them concerning the non-resurrection of the dead, when the founder of the resurrection, the firstborn of them, has already come forth from the resurrection?

17. When the power of the maker prevails, then matter is also suitable for the production of what comes into being. But if a corpse is suitable for God for resurrection, then necessarily every corpse is; and if not every corpse, then none. One must not measure the works of God by our own thoughts; for the works of God are beyond mind, sense, and reason, among which it is also that a corpse devoured by fish must necessarily come into being again, even if it happened to be destroyed by something. 18. How is it true that the Lord rules over the living and the dead, if according to you he has no power to transform one into the other? 19. If God is the maker of the worse things but not of the better, is this not a sign of God’s weakness? It is impious to say so. But if God’s power is equal for the production of each, why do you disbelieve in the resurrection of the dead, who rise to incorruptibility? 20. If for God it is not impossible to act, and for us it is beneficial to be led from the much-lamented and corruptible life to a blessed and incorruptible state through resurrection, rather than to lead philosophizing Greeks from the toil of philosophy to the toil of ants through metempsychosis, what is more ridiculous than to disbelieve in that which is attested, but to believe and dogmatize without foundation in this, so that the once Athenian philosopher Plato later becomes an ant?

21. If, according to the Greeks, God makes men by being and not by willing, how is it that Plato is at one time a rational animal and a man, and at another time an irrational animal and an ant through metempsychosis? If it follows from God that Plato becomes a man, then of necessity, when Plato is transferred from being a man to becoming an ant, God also is transferred from being what he is. But if Plato is transferred, while God is not transferred from being what he is, how does God make men by being and not by willing? 22. If the work of God is not destroyed, but man is destroyed, then man is not the work of God according to those who say this. 23. If our kind is introduced into being through generation and is led out of being through destruction, how is it possible that God is the cause of being and of not-being, not by willing but by his being? 24. If things composed of elements are again elements, what absurdity or impossibility appears in things composed of elements being again? 25. If God is not under definition, but is master of every definition, how is it that God is master of men’s coming to be and being destroyed, but is not master of our coming to be and not being destroyed?

22. If God refashions us into incorruption out of repentance, as you claim, why does he not rather, out of repentance, allow us to exist always? 27. If the gifts of God are irrevocable, and he has granted us our existence, why does God not fulfill his original purpose concerning us by refashioning us into incorruption? 28. According to those who believe in the resurrection of the dead by the just judgment of God, we both die and are revived, the former by human disobedience, the latter by human obedience. Therefore, among those to whom the cause of death is unknown, the creator of human nature is also unknown. Since they are ignorant of the cause of death and the creator of human nature, how can they deny the resurrection of the dead except from ignorance? 29. It is one thing to be entirely non-existent, and another to be non-existent in a particular way; for example, it is one thing for a human never to have come into being, and another for a human to have perished after coming into being. And since for God no work is more laborious than another, how is it not irrational to trust God for the creation of things that were entirely non-existent, but to distrust him for the transformation of things that have perished? 30. If, just as before the human came into being the human existed potentially in the elements from which he was made, so also after he has perished he exists potentially in the elements, why do the Greeks disbelieve God, who has promised to raise the dead, as if it were an impossible thing, when the human exists potentially in the elements, just as he was once created, so also now is he being refashioned?

31. If God was not able from the beginning to make men incorruptible, it is clear that he is not able now either. But if he had the power from the beginning to make us incorruptible and did not lose it, how is it not irrational to disbelieve God, as if in an impossible thing, when he has promised to make the rest of men incorruptible in the likeness of the one raised from the dead by him into incorruptible life? 32. Potentially the animal is in the seed by nature, potentially the bed is in the wood by art, potentially those who are raised are in the elements by God. But if this is so, how is it not absurd to trust nature in natural things, and art in artificial things, but to distrust God in divine things? 33. Nothing is disobedient to divine authority. If the sea and the land long ago gave back what they did not receive at the divine command, how will they not now rather give back what they did receive, when God commands? 34. If, just as nature cannot make the animal from corrupted seed, and art cannot make the bed from corrupted wood, so also God cannot make an incorruptible man from a corrupted man, then the power of God will be limited, like that of nature and art. But if it is absurd to say this, then it is also absurd to disbelieve that God can make an incorruptible man from a corrupted man.

35. If, just as the resurrection seems impossible to unbelieving men, so it is impossible for God to effect the resurrection, then God differs in no respect from man. But if He differs infinitely, as indeed He does, how is it not absurd to disbelieve that God can produce those things for which He possesses the power? 36. If God has the power to create beyond nature, how is it not absurd to disbelieve that He can transform beyond nature? 37. If what occurs contrary to nature must be considered incredible and impossible to produce, how will the creation of the first man not also be incredible and impossible, since he was not produced according to nature? For it is impossible for a man to be born from a man according to nature, unless the first man was produced beyond nature. 38. If I do not become again what I once was, how do I receive the rewards of virtue or the punishments of vice, which I did not obtain in the present life? For if the resurrection of the dead does not occur, how will those who endure the struggles of martyrdom and those who yield be equal to each other? But if this is unjust, how is it not unjust for the resurrection of the dead not to occur, in which alone it is possible for the distinction between those who have committed unjust acts and those who have endured them to be made, according to the difference of honor and punishment?

39. If what man was and is, how did he, having died, advance beyond the knowledge of God? His being what he was did not depart. For the works of God are known to Him and possible; and if they are not possible to Him, they are not even known to Him. 40. If it is good for us to be mortal in the present, but better for us to be immortal in the future, how is it not absurd to say that God is capable of producing the good, but incapable of producing the better? 41. If it is impossible for God to make the mortal body immortal, how will death not be stronger than God, since He is unable to release those subject to Him? 42. If God has the power to give life to the dead, how are those who are raised not suitable for resurrection? And with God being capable of raising the dead, and those who are raised being suitable for being raised, what place does the disbelief of those who disbelieve the resurrection have? 43. If God rules over our being and our not being, how will our becoming immortal not come from the same rule of His? But if our becoming immortal stands outside the rule of God, how will God not be without rule over our not being?

44. If the nature that the immortal and the mortal possess comes from the will of God, how is it not possible for the dead to be made immortal when God wills it? 45. Things whose opponents are weak have a firm constitution. But if the Greeks, having used every manner of opposition to refute the doctrine of the resurrection, have not been able to abolish it—the doctrine being kept unshaken amid manifold oppositions by the power of the God who effects the resurrection—on what ground is the resurrection of the dead disbelieved, when the doctrine concerning it is shaken neither by hands nor by tongue? 46. If the greatest evidence of God’s invincible and unlimited power is to know the forms and deeds, both good and evil, of all men, living and dead, how is the resurrection of the dead not a demonstration of God’s unlimited power and knowledge, through which he restores men to existence again? But if this is so, how will he who deprives the dead of resurrection not be depriving God of such a demonstration?

47. The Greeks, having hoped to refute the doctrine of the resurrection through their own opposition, failed in their hope; how will they not again fail in their hope, hoping again that the resurrection of the dead will not take place? 48. The Greeks ought, having fought against the doctrine of the resurrection, either not to be defeated in the battle, or, being defeated, not to disbelieve the resurrection; otherwise, their first fruitless labor will be a proof of their irrational disbelief.