Locorum Rhethoricorum Distinctio

Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius begins the Distinction of Rhetorical Topics. The person is that which is called into judgment; the matter is the deed or statement of the person on account of which the person is called into judgment: and the person and the matter cannot supply arguments; for the question is about them themselves. However, those things which are attributed to persons and matters make the matter credible. The person also makes the matter credible, but not insofar as it is a person, but insofar as it takes on a certain quality from the attributes of the person. Circumstances are those which, when they come together, constitute the substance of the question. For if who did it, and what was done, and the reason why it was done, or the place and time when it was done, and also the manner and the means are lacking, the cause and the matter will not stand. Cicero divides these circumstances into two groups, so that he places that circumstance which is "who" among the attributes of the person, and the six which remain among the attributes of the matter. The first of the circumstances, which is "who," which he attributes to the person, he cuts into eleven parts: name, like Verres; nature, like a barbarian; manner of life, like a friend of nobles; fortune, like a rich man; pursuit, like a geometrician; chance, like an exile; affection, like a lover; disposition, like a wise man; plan, like "finally, dear father, to place upon our neck"; deeds, like those speeches which are outside that deed or statement which is now called into judgment.

The remaining circumstances, which are what, why, when, where, how, and by what means, he places among the attributes of the action. He says that "what" and "why" are contained with the action itself, constituting them in the case. He then divides "what" into four parts: the summary of the deed, such as the killing of a parent; before the deed, such as he, provoked, seized a sword; during the deed, such as he struck violently; after the deed, such as he buried it in a secret place. Although all these are deeds, yet because they pertain to the action under inquiry, they are not those deeds which pertain to the attributes of the person or have been enumerated. For those, placed outside the action under consideration and informing the person, lend credibility to the action with which the issue is concerned; these deeds, however, which are contained with the action itself, pertain to the action under inquiry. Cicero places the last four circumstances in the management of the action, which is the second part of the attributes of actions. And he divides the circumstance "when" into time, such as he did it at night; and into occasion, such as while everyone was sleeping. "Where," from the circumstances, he calls place, such as he did it in the bedroom. "How," from the circumstances, he calls manner, such as he did it secretly. "By what means," from the circumstances, he calls facility, such as with a large army.

But lest what is said to be "while it is happening" be thought the same as what is in the "management of the affair," this is the distinction: that "while it is happening" is that which was committed at the time the crime was perpetrated, such as a blow. In the "management of the affair," however, are those things which contain what was done, both before the deed, while it is happening, and after the deed. For in all, time, opportunity, place, manner, and means are investigated. Again, "while it is happening" is the deed by which the affair was administered. But those things which are in the "management of the affair" are not deeds, but adhere to the deed and are in a way subject to the affair itself which was done. Moreover, those things which are in the "management of the affair" can exist without those which are containing with the affair itself. But those cannot exist without these: adjuncts to the affair, they themselves also lend credence to the question. They are, in a way, effects and look back to the affair which is being conducted: in this manner. For the seven circumstances are enumerated in the attributes of the person or the affair. When these begin to be compared with others and, as it were, come into revelation, they become either genus, or part, or contrary, or outcome, or greater, or lesser, or similar, or equal, or disparate. These, therefore, happen to the circumstances which are enumerated in the attributes of affairs; so that when they are compared with others, arguments are taken from them, both active and dictive, which is called "in judicium.

They differ from the higher ones in that the higher ones either contained deeds done, or so adhered to the deeds that they could not be separated: such as place, time, and the rest which do not let go of the matter at hand. But these, which are adjuncts to the matter, do not inhere in the matter, but occur to the circumstances; and they furnish arguments only when those things which are adjunct to the matter have come into comparison. Arguments are taken not from contrariety, but from the contrary; and not from similarity, but from the similar; so that it appears that arguments are taken from revelation in the adjuncts to the matter; and that those things are adjunct to the matter which are related to the matter itself which is under discussion. Consequence, however, neither inheres in the things themselves, nor is found by comparison; but it follows or accompanies the deed done, either as antecedent or concomitant. And since the distinction of these topics is easy, I have set the treatise thus far. The end.