Speculatio De Rhethoricae Cognatione

The Speculation of Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius on the Kinship of Rhetoric. i. How great a kinship the art of rhetoric has with itself cannot easily be considered; and it is scarcely possible even to be perceived by hearing, let alone to be easily discovered. The error of which, divided as it is, the individual disputation of the precepts creates: for they give precepts concerning each one, laboring over nothing common. That part of the doctrine which is empty, let us approach as we are able. We shall therefore speak concerning the genus of the art, and concerning the species, parts, instrument, and parts of the instrument, also the work, and the office of the author, and the end. Wherefore, what is to be contemplated in common, let us take up the beginning of our discussion from this point. Therefore the genus of rhetoric is faculty; the species, however, are three: judicial, demonstrative, deliberative. And that the genus is what we have said is clear. The species, moreover, are those which we have enumerated above for this reason, because in these the whole of rhetoric consists. For the entire force of rhetoric is in the judicial genus of causes; entire in the demonstrative or deliberative. But these are genera of causes; for all causes, whether special or individual, fall under one of these three genera: as under the judicial indeed fall special causes, such as of treason or of extortion, and individual causes, such as of the treason of Cornelius, or the extortion of Verres. Under the deliberative, moreover, fall whatever causes have consultation, as if you take specially concerning war or peace; if, however, individually, as concerning the war with Pyrrhus or peace.

In the same way, also in demonstrative [speeches], whatever comes into praise and blame—for instance, if specifically, as the praise of a brave man; individually, indeed, the praise of Scipio—falls under the demonstrative [kind]. The material of this faculty, however, is every matter proposed for speech, but generally the civil question. Into this, the species coming from rhetoric, like certain forms, take hold of the material and hold it shaped in a threefold way, as will become clear later: so that the civil question, which was still formless according to species, becomes, once it has received its end, subject to each of the species of rhetoric. For example, the civil question, still formless, when it has taken from the judicial [kind] the end of the just, itself becomes the civil question constituted in the judicial genus. But when it has taken from the deliberative [kind] the useful or the honorable, then the civil question itself becomes constituted in the deliberative genus of causes. If, however, it has taken the good from the demonstrative [kind], then the civil question becomes demonstrative. The species come into the material from rhetoric: for no faculty can otherwise operate in its own material than if it has its own parts present; for when all its parts are absent, rhetoric itself is also absent.

But since it has been spoken concerning the species of rhetoric, just as they are the genera of causes, so they are that all matters which are established in civil business are informed. From a just end, the judicial is the genus. But of all those which, established in a civil question, have taken up an honorable or useful end, the deliberative is the genus; and of all those which, placed in a civil question, have taken up an end of the honorable, the just, or the good, the demonstrative is the genus. But concerning these, thus far. Now it must be provided concerning the parts of rhetoric. For the parts of rhetoric are five: invention, arrangement, style, memory, delivery. Moreover, they are called parts for this reason, because if any of these is lacking to the orator, the faculty is imperfect. And therefore, those things which form the entire oratorical faculty, it is not absurd to call them parts of that faculty. But since these parts are of the rhetorical faculty and compose the entire rhetorical faculty, it is necessary that where rhetoric exists, they also follow. But rhetoric exists whole in its own species; therefore all the parts of rhetoric will be present in the species of rhetoric. For this reason, they will also be applied to those civil matters which are informed by the aforementioned species of rhetoric. Equally, therefore, in judicial business and in deliberative and in demonstrative, invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery are appropriate.

But since every orator uses an instrument to accomplish what he can, there will therefore be some instrument. This is speech, which is partly engaged in the civil kind, partly not at all. We speak, however, about that speech which has some question, or which is adapted to the end of expediting a question. That speech, therefore, which is engaged in the civil kind runs on continuously; that which is not in civil causes is unfolded by question and answer. But the former is called rhetoric; the latter, dialectic: which differs from the former, first in that that one considers civil matters, this one considers others; then in that that one is carried out in continuous speech, this one in interrupted speech; and in that rhetorical speech has a judge in addition to the adversary, while dialectic relies on the same person as both judge and adversary. This rhetorical speech, therefore, has six parts: prooemium, which is the exordium; narration; partition; confirmation; refutation; peroration; which parts, since rhetoric is present in all its species, will be present in the same; or rather, they will not merely be present, but will administer the same things which they accomplish. And so in the judicial kind of causes the order of prooemium and narration and the rest is necessary, which are also necessary in the demonstrative and deliberative kinds. The work of the rhetorical faculty, however, is to teach and to move: which is nonetheless administered by these same six instruments, that is, the parts of speech.

The parts of rhetoric, since they are parts of a faculty, are themselves also faculties. Therefore they too will use the parts of speech as instruments, as it were, in their own part, and in order to work with them, they will inhere in them. For unless the aforementioned parts of rhetoric are present—so that it may invent, express, arrange, remember, deliver—the orator accomplishes nothing. And in the same way, those which are roughly the parts of the instrument are useless unless they possess all the parts of reason. The effector of this faculty, however, is the orator, whose duty is to speak in a manner suited to persuasion. The end is both in the orator himself and in another. In the orator himself, indeed, it is to have spoken well, that is, to have spoken in a manner suited to persuasion; in the other, however, it is to have persuaded. For even if some things hinder the orator from persuading, once the duty has been performed, the end is not attained. But the one who was contiguous and akin to the duty does, when the duty is performed, attain it; the one, however, which is external often is not attained. Yet rhetoric will not be deprived of honor, content with its own end. These things are so intermingled that rhetoric inheres in its species, and the species inhere in rhetoric. The parts of causes, however, are said to be the statuses, concerning which one must inquire in this way. For how will they be thought to be parts of a cause, if they are parts in such a way as species—how could it happen that there are several constitutions in one cause? For species are unmixed with each other. But many constitutions come into a cause; therefore they are not parts of causes, like a species of status.

That also is true, that no species helps another species opposed to it in respect of substance. But a constitution confirms a constitution for the sake of belief. Nor can it happen that they are as parts of the whole, as it were, of the causes. For nothing composed of one part can be a whole and complete thing. But in a cause, one constitution is sufficient to constitute the cause. What, then, is to be said? The path is clear to reason. For a constitution is not said to be a part of that cause which comes into controversy and which the status constitutes, especially since that which is added to the cause after the status has already been established by one constitution is not principal but accidental; and in one business as many controversies arise as there are constitutions. But as many controversies, so many causes: and although one business may contain them, the causes nevertheless remain unmixed and vary among themselves. For example, someone who saw a young man coming out of a brothel, and shortly after saw his own wife coming out of the same place, accuses the young man of adultery. Here there is one business which is at issue; but the causes are two: one conjectural, if he denies that he did it; the other definitive, if he says that intercourse in a brothel cannot be considered adultery. But for the one who denies, the conjectural status is not a part of the same controversy; nor for the one who defines, is the definition: for each contains the whole cause. But I call a cause not in a general sense, but a controversy established by some constitution.

The parts, however, are the constitutions of the general cause in this way. For if every cause were conjectural, and no other status were found, the conjectural status would not be a part of the cause, but the cause itself would without doubt be conjecture. But since all causes are held partly by conjecture, partly by definition, partly by quality, partly by transference, a constitution is a part of the cause—not of the one which it informs by holding it, but of the one which it divides into generalities: that is, of which, as it were, cutting off some member, each constitution makes its own. Therefore the constitutions are parts, as species, of the general cause, not of the one which each, by holding it, has informed. Hence rhetoric is a faculty. The species of rhetoric, however, are three: judicial, demonstrative, deliberative. Its material is the civil question, which is called the cause. The parts of this material are the constitutions. The parts of rhetoric are invention, arrangement, style, memory, delivery. Its instrument is speech. The parts of the instrument are exordium, narration, partition, confirmation, refutation, peroration. Its works are to teach and to move. The agent is the orator. The function of this is to speak well. The end is both to have spoken well and to persuade.

All of rhetoric exists in its species; the species, however, inform the whole matter in such a way that they in turn claim the whole for themselves. This can be understood from the fact that each individual species holds all the parts of the matter. For in the judicial kind you will find four constitutions, and in the deliberative and demonstrative kinds you can find the same four. Hence it is shown that if all the parts of the general cause, which is the civil question, are held by the individual species, and all the parts constitute the cause, then the cause itself—that is, the civil question—is in turn claimed in its entirety by the species, in the same way that a voice reaches the ears of many people at one time, whole with its parts, that is, its elements. For at the same time, the whole cause passes over to the different species with its parts. But when the species have entered into the matter, that is, into the civil question, and have taken possession of it with their parts, they also bring with them the faculty of rhetoric itself; hence also the parts of rhetoric. Therefore, in each individual constitution there will be the parts of rhetoric. But once the matter has been introduced, rhetoric brings with it its own instrument. Therefore it brings with it speech, and this has its own parts; and in the constitutions there will be an exordium, a narration, and the rest. But when the instrument has come into the civil question, it also brings its own work along with it. And so it will teach and persuade in every constitution. But these things cannot come about by themselves unless there is someone who sets them in motion, like a craftsman and architect.

Here, however, is the orator, who, when he has approached a case, will perform his duty. He will therefore speak well in every kind of case and in every constitution. The orator will also achieve the end, both that he has spoken well in every constitution and that he has persuaded. Concerning the individual points, then, we have now treated in common; concerning each one separately, however, later, if it should be convenient, we will discuss. Here ends the common speculation on the kinship of rhetoric.