De Creatis (Fragmenta Ap. Photium, Bibl. Cod. 235)

From the <Xenon or> On Created Things.

That you should not cast the holy thing to the dogs, nor your pearls before the swine—Xenon understanding by "pearls" the more mystical teachings of the God-given religion, and by "swine" those who still wallow in impiety and every kind of pleasure like swine in filth; for to these, he said, Christ spoke not to cast the divine teachings, because they cannot bear them, being already held fast by impiety and wild pleasures—the great Methodius says: If by "pearls" we must understand the venerable and divine teachings, and by "swine" those who live in impiety and pleasures, for whom even the apostolic proclamations that rouse to piety and faith in Christ must be hidden, see how you say that none of the Christians turns from their former impiety to the proclamations of the apostles; for they would certainly not have cast the mysteries concerning Christ before those who, through unbelief, resemble swine.

Either these things were set before all the Greeks and the other unbelievers by the disciples of Christ and proclaimed, and turned them from impiety to faith in Christ, just as we also confess who believe, and then the saying "Do not cast your pearls before the swine" can no longer be understood as it was spoken; or this was said as it was.

of the intelligible, it is necessary for us to say that to none of the unbelievers, whom we have compared, has faith in Christ and freedom from impiety come from the apostolic teachings, which like pearls illuminate the souls. But this is blasphemous.

Therefore, we must not interpret the pearls here as the more mystical teachings, and the swine as the impious, nor take the saying "do not cast your pearls before swine" to mean "do not expose the mystical and perfective teachings of faith in Christ to the impious and unbelieving." Rather, we must understand the pearls as the virtues, by which the soul is adorned as with precious pearls, and "do not cast them before swine" means do not expose these virtues themselves—such as purity, temperance, justice, and truth—to the lascivious pleasures, for these pleasures are like swine, lest they devour the virtues and prepare the soul to live a swinish and passion-ridden life.

That Origen, whom he calls a Centaur, used to say that the universe is coeternal with the only wise and self-sufficient God. For he argued: If there is no craftsman without artifacts, nor maker without things made, nor almighty without things over which he rules (for the craftsman is necessarily so called because of the artifacts, the maker because of the things made, and the almighty because of the things over which he rules), then it is necessary that these things have existed from the beginning by God, and that there be no time when they did not exist. For if there was a time when the things made did not exist, then since when the things made do not exist, neither does a maker exist, see what impiety follows.

But it will also follow that the unchangeable and immutable God undergoes alteration and change. For if he made the universe later, it is clear that he changed from not making to making. This is absurd, along with what has been said before. Therefore it is not possible to say that the universe is not without beginning and coeternal with God.

To this, the saint speaks through another person, asking: Do you consider God to be the beginning and essence of wisdom and glory and, in short, of every virtue, substantially and not by acquisition? The other replies: Yes.

What then besides these? Is he not entirely perfect through himself and in need of nothing? True. For is it not impossible for that which is in need of nothing to be something in need of nothing through another? Impossible. For must not everything that is through another, being full and incomplete, be so called? Necessarily. For must it not be held that that which is through itself, being its own fullness and remaining in itself, is alone to be considered perfect? You speak most truly.

Would you say that which is neither itself through itself nor itself a fulfillment of itself is without need? Not at all. Therefore God will not be considered perfect through something; for that which is perfect through something must necessarily be imperfect in itself. Necessarily.

Therefore will God himself be considered perfect through himself, and not through another? Most correctly. Is God one thing and the world another, and the world one thing and God another? Entirely. Then must it not be said that God is perfect, creator, and all-ruler through the world? No. So that through himself, and not through the world—and that a changeable one—he may be found perfect in himself. Properly.

What then? Must the rich man be called rich because of his wealth? Correctly. And must the wise man, who partakes of essential wisdom but is not himself wisdom, be called wise? Yes. What then? Must God, being other than the world, be called rich and benefactor and creator on account of the world? Away with that, not at all. Then is he himself his own wealth, and rich and powerful through himself? So it seems.

Therefore, before the cosmos, being entirely without need, he was both father and almighty and creator, just as he is through himself, but not because of something else. Necessarily.

For if on account of the cosmos and not on account of himself, being other than the cosmos, he were known as almighty and creator by concession (for I am compelled to say this), he himself by himself will be imperfect and in need of those things which he is as almighty and creator. Exceedingly. Therefore, one must not accept this pernicious error of those who say that he is almighty and creator on account of the things that are ruled and created, which are mutable, and not that God is on account of himself.

Consider also this: if the cosmos was made later, as you said, while previously existing, then the impassible and unchangeable God must necessarily change; for the one who first does nothing, and later does something, must necessarily change and be altered from not-doing to doing. For I was saying this. Has God ever ceased making the cosmos, or not? He has ceased. For otherwise he would not yet have been perfected. True.

If, then, doing from not doing implies an alteration in God, does not not doing from doing also imply one? Necessarily. Would you say that He is altered when He does not do today compared to when He did? Not at all. Nor, therefore, when He made the cosmos, must He necessarily be altered compared to when He was not making; and so it is not necessary to say that the universe must coexist with Him because of being compelled to say He is altered, nor that it is coeternal for this reason.

And consider this as well. Would you say that something is generated if it does not have a beginning of generation? Not at all; for if it does not fall under a beginning of generation, it is necessarily ungenerated. But if it has come to be, do you grant that it has come to be by some cause? For it is altogether impossible for it to have generation without a cause.

Impossible.

We will say, then, that the world and all things in it came into being later, not existing before, through the agency of some other or of God? Clearly, of God. For it is impossible for that which is bounded by a beginning of generation to be co-eternal with the infinite. Impossible.

Again, then, O Centaur, let us discuss from the beginning. Do you say that beings have come into being by divine knowledge, or not? "O throw," they will say, "by no means." But from the elements, or matter, or foundations, or however you wish to name these (for it makes no difference)—with these having pre-existed ungenerated and moving disorderly, did God, separating everything, like a good painter from many colors, fashion a single form?

Not this either. For they will altogether avoid confessing against themselves, lest, by conceding that matter had a beginning of its separation and transformation, they be compelled by the argument to say that God began to administer and order matter which was previously formless in every respect.

Let us suppose, then, since we have arrived at this point in the argument, that there is a statue, standing on a base, beautiful. Let those who behold its well-proportioned beauty dispute with one another, trying to say on the one hand that it is created, and on the other that it is uncreated.

I would ask them: For what reason do you say that it is ungenerated? Is it because of the craftsman, so that he might in no way be thought to have been idle from the work of creation, or because of itself? For if it is because of the craftsman, how, being ungenerated, is it crafted by the craftsman? For if it stands in need of the art at all, being wrought in bronze so as to receive whatever character the craftsman might wish, in what way will it be ungenerated, while suffering and being acted upon? But if, on the other hand, it is said to be perfect and ungenerated because of itself, not needing the art,

statue, according to the pernicious doctrine, it is necessary to acknowledge spontaneous generation.

But if they will perhaps not even accept this argument, but will answer more harshly, saying that the statue is not ungenerated, but is generated yet has no beginning of generation, so that the craftsman might be said to rule over the artifact without beginning, then we shall say to them: O you there, if neither time nor eternity is found above, when the statue was not perfect, what did the craftsman provide to it, or what did he effect in it, tell us?

For if the same craftsman, being without need and having no beginning of generation, is found never to have crafted but always to be crafting, according to your argument, then the reasoning seems to have run around again to the same point, namely, to confess spontaneity. For if the craftsman is said to have moved even the slightest statue, he will fall under a beginning, according to which he began to move and order it when it was previously unorderly and unmoved. Therefore, the same world is not and will not be continuously the same forever; for the craftsman must be likened to God, and the statue to the world.

How then, O foolish ones, do you suppose that creation, being co-eternal with the craftsman, does not need the craftsman? For that which is co-eternal, having no beginning of generation, must necessarily be ungenerated and of equal power. And that which is ungenerated, being self-sufficient and unchangeable, will also be without need and indestructible; and if this is so, then the world is no longer changeable according to your argument.

He says that the church is so called from having turned away from pleasures.

The holy one says that we said there are two creative powers in what was previously agreed: one, which from non-being, by bare will, without delay, at the moment of willing, itself works what it wills to do; this is the Father. The other, which adorns and variegates, in imitation of the first, things that have already come into being; this is the Son, the all-powerful and mighty hand of the Father, with which, after making matter from non-being, he adorns it.

That the book of Job is by Moses, the holy one says.

That concerning the phrase "In the beginning he made the heaven and the earth.

He says, "One would not err in calling wisdom itself the beginning. For it is said by one of the divine chorus, speaking about herself in this manner: 'The Lord created me as the beginning of his ways; he established me for his works before eternity.'

for it was consistent and more fitting that all things which came into being should be younger than her, since they came into being through her. For consider whether the statement, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God," according to the Evangelist, and "the Word was God; this one was in the beginning with God," does not agree with these things.

For the beginning, from which the most correct Word sprang forth, must be said to be the Father and Maker of all things, in whom he was; and the phrase "he was in the beginning with God" seems to signify the authoritative power of the Word, which he had with the Father even before the world came into generation, having spoken of the beginning. Therefore, after his own beginningless beginning, the Father, he himself becomes the beginning of all other things, through which everything is created.

That Origen, after having spun many myths about the eternity of the universe, adds also this: "Neither, then, did man, who previously was not, first come into the world when he was fashioned from Adam, as some say, nor did the world begin to be created six days before the generation of Adam.

If someone should be kindly disposed to differ concerning these things, let him first state whether the time from the genesis of the world according to the book of Moses, as those who understand it thus take it, will not be easily counted, the prophetic voice crying out here also: "From eternity and unto eternity you are; for a thousand years in your eyes are as yesterday, which has passed, and a watch in the night." For if a thousand years are bounded as one day in the eyes of God, from the genesis of the world until the consummation . . . until us, as those around six days are concluded (the six-thousandth

Six days are completed (so they say that the six-thousandth year from Adam extends to the present; for in the seventh week, in the seven-thousandth year, they say judgment will arrive). Therefore all the days, thirteen in number, from us back to the beginning, in which God made the heaven and the earth, are measured.

above, according to their own folly, had in no way been stripped of being father and almighty. But if there are thirteen days in the eyes of God from the beginning of the world, how does the wisdom in Sirach say, “Who will number the sand of the seas, the drops of rain, and the days of eternity?” These things Origen says, being eager, and see what nonsense he plays.

That one should not cast the holy thing to the dogs, nor your pearls before swine—Xenon, understanding pearls as the more mystical teachings of the God-given religion, and swine as those who still wallow in impiety and every kind of pleasure like swine in filth, for he said that Christ had spoken these words to them, not to cast the divine teachings before them, because they are unable to bear them, being held fast by impiety and wild pleasures—the great Methodius says: If pearls are to be understood as the dignified and divine teachings, and swine as those who live in impiety and pleasures, for whom even the apostolic proclamations that stir up piety and faith in Christ must be hidden, see how you say that none of the Christians turn from their former impiety to the apostolic proclamations; for they would certainly not have cast the mysteries concerning Christ before those who, through unbelief, resemble swine.

Either these things were set before all Greeks and other unbelievers by the disciples of Christ and proclaimed, and they turned them from impiety to faith in Christ, just as we also confess who believe, and then the saying "Do not cast your pearls before swine" can no longer be understood as it was spoken; or this is as it was said.

It is necessary for us to say that to none of the unbelievers, whom we have compared, has faith in Christ and freedom from impiety come from the apostolic teachings, which like pearls illumine the souls. But this is blasphemous.

Therefore, we must not take the pearls here to mean the more mystical teachings, nor the swine to mean the impious, nor interpret the saying "do not cast your pearls before swine" as "do not expose the mystical and perfective teachings of faith in Christ to the impious and unbelieving." Rather, we must understand the pearls as the virtues, by which the soul is adorned as with precious pearls, and not to cast them before swine—that is, not to expose these virtues themselves, such as chastity, temperance, justice, and truth, to the wanton pleasures, for these pleasures resemble swine, lest they devour the virtues and cause the soul to live a swinish and passion-ridden life.

That the saying "do not cast the holy to the dogs, nor your pearls before swine"—with Xenon interpreting pearls as the more mystical teachings of the God-given religion, and swine as those still wallowing in impiety and every kind of pleasure like swine in filth, for he said that Christ spoke these words to them, not to expose the divine teachings, because they cannot bear them, being held back by impiety and wild pleasures—the great Methodius says: If pearls must be understood as the venerable and divine teachings, and swine as those living in impiety and pleasures, for whom even the apostolic proclamations that awaken piety and faith in Christ must be hidden, see how you say that none of the Christians turn from their former impiety to the proclamations of the apostles; for they would certainly not have exposed the mysteries concerning Christ to those who resemble swine through unbelief. Therefore, either these were exposed to all Greeks and other unbelievers by the disciples of Christ and proclaimed, and they turned them from impiety to faith in Christ, just as we also confess in believing, and then the saying "do not cast your pearls before swine" can no longer be understood as it was said; or this, as it was spoken.

ignorance, and the holy as the sacred doctrines of the faith, and dogs as those who are contentious and bark against the truth.

It being understood, we are compelled to say that faith in Christ and freedom from impiety have come to none of the unbelievers, whom we compare, from the apostolic teachings, which like pearls illuminate the souls. But this is blasphemous. Therefore, one must not here interpret pearls as the more mystical teachings, and swine as the impious, nor take “do not cast your pearls before swine” as “do not expose the mystical and perfective teachings of faith in Christ to the impious and unbelieving.” Rather, one must receive pearls as the virtues, by which the soul is adorned like precious pearls, and not cast them before swine, that is, not expose these virtues themselves—such as chastity, temperance, justice, and truth—to the lascivious pleasures; for they resemble swine, lest these virtues, devoured by them, prepare the soul to live a swinish and passion-ridden life. That Origen, whom he calls a Centaur, said that the universe is co-eternal with the only wise and self-sufficient God. For he argued: If there is no craftsman without works, nor maker without products, nor almighty without those over whom he is almighty (for the craftsman is necessarily so called because of his works, the maker because of his products, and the almighty because of those he rules), then these must have been produced by God from the beginning, and there must be no time when they did not exist. For if there was a time when the products did not exist, since when the products do not exist, neither does the maker, see what impiety follows.

But also the unchangeable and immutable God will be subject to alteration and change. For if He made the universe later, it is evident that He changed from not making to making. This is absurd, along with what has been said before. Therefore it is not possible to say that the universe is not without beginning and co-eternal with God. That Origen, whom he calls a Centaur, said that the universe is co-eternal with the only wise and self-sufficient God. For he argued, If there is no craftsman without works of craftsmanship, or maker without things made, nor ruler without things ruled (for the craftsman is necessarily so called because of the works of craftsmanship, and the maker because of the things made, and the ruler because of the things ruled), then these must have been produced by God from the beginning, and there is no time when they did not exist. For if there was a time when the things made did not exist, since when the things made do not exist, neither does the maker, see what impiety follows. But also the unchangeable and immutable God will be subject to alteration and change. For if He made the universe later, it is evident that He changed from not making to making. This is absurd, along with what has been said before. Therefore it is not possible to say that the universe is not without beginning and co-eternal with God. To which the holy one speaks through another person, asking, Do you consider God to be the beginning of wisdom and glory and, in sum, of every virtue, substantially and not by acquisition? And he says, Yes.

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What then besides these? Is he not entirely perfect through himself and in need of nothing? True. For is it impossible for that which is in need of nothing to be something in need of nothing through another? Impossible. For must everything that is through another, even if it is full, be called imperfect? Necessarily. For must that which is through itself, being its own fulfillment and remaining in itself, be considered perfect only in this way? You speak most truly.

Would you say that which is neither itself through itself nor itself a fulfillment of itself is without need? Not at all. Therefore God will not be considered perfect through something; for that which is perfect through something must necessarily be imperfect in itself. Necessarily.

Therefore will God himself be considered perfect through himself, and not through another? Most correctly. Is God one thing and the world another, and the world one thing and God another? Entirely. Then must we not say that God is perfect, creator, and almighty through the world? No. So that he might be found perfect in himself through himself, and not through the world, which is changeable. Appropriately.

What then? Must we not call the rich man rich on account of wealth? Correctly. And must we not call the wise man wise by participation in substantial wisdom, not being wisdom itself? Yes. What then? Must we not call God, who is other than the world, rich and benefactor and creator on account of the world? Away with that, not at all. Then is he not himself his own wealth, and rich and powerful through himself? So it seems.

He was therefore, even before the cosmos, being entirely without need, both Father and Pantocrator and Demiurge, so that He Himself through Himself, and not another, was these things? Necessarily.

For if it were on account of the cosmos and not on account of Himself, being other than the cosmos, God would be known as Pantocrator by indulgence—for I am compelled to say this—He will be in Himself incomplete and in need of those things which He is as Pantocrator and Demiurge. Exceedingly. Therefore, one must not accept this pernicious error of those who say that He is Pantocrator and Demiurge on account of the things that are ruled and created, which are mutable, and not that God is these on account of Himself. To which the saint speaks through another person, asking, "Do you consider God to be the source and substance, not by acquisition, of wisdom and glory and, in sum, of every virtue?" And he says, "Yes.

What then besides these? Is He not perfect entirely through Himself and in need of nothing? True. For is it impossible for that which is in need of nothing to be in need of nothing on account of another? Impossible. For must everything that is full on account of another be called incomplete? Necessarily. For that which is itself its own fullness through itself and remains in itself, must this alone be considered perfect? You speak most truly. But would you say that that which is neither itself through itself nor itself its own fullness is in need of nothing? Not at all. Therefore God will not be considered perfect on account of something; for that which is perfect on account of something must necessarily be incomplete in itself. Necessarily. Therefore God Himself will be considered perfect through Himself, but not on account of another? Most correctly. Is God other than the cosmos, and the cosmos other than God? Entirely. Therefore must God not be called perfect, and creator, and pantocrator on account of the cosmos? No. So that through Himself, but not on account of the cosmos, and this being changeable, He Himself might be found perfect in Himself. Fittingly. What then? Must the rich man be called rich on account of his wealth? Correctly. And must the wise man, by participation in essential wisdom, not being wisdom itself, be called wise? Yes. What then? And must God, being other than the cosmos, be called rich and benefactor and creator on account of the cosmos? Away with it, not at all. Therefore is He Himself His own wealth and rich through Himself and powerful? It seems so. He was therefore before the cosmos entirely in need of nothing and father and pantocrator and creator, so that He Himself through Himself but not on account of another is these things? Necessarily.

For if He were known as Pantokrator and Demiurge on account of the world and not on account of Himself, being other than the world (for I am compelled to say this by indulgence), He Himself would be imperfect in Himself and in need of those things of which He is Pantokrator and Demiurge. Extraordinary. Therefore this pernicious error of those who say that He is Pantokrator and Demiurge on account of the things that are ruled and created, which are mutable, and not that God exists on account of Himself, is not to be accepted. But consider also this: if the world was made later, as you said, while He existed earlier, it is necessary that the impassible and unchangeable God change; for the one who previously did nothing and later does something must necessarily change and be altered from not doing to doing. For they said this. Has God ever ceased from making the world, or not? He has ceased. For otherwise He would not have been perfected. True.

If, then, making from not making is judged to be an alteration of God, is not also not making from making? Necessarily. Would you say that He is altered when He does not make today compared to when He was making? Not at all. Therefore, neither when He was making the world must He necessarily be altered compared to when He was not making; and it is not necessary to say that the universe coexists with Him because of not being compelled to say He is altered, nor is it coeternal for this reason. But consider also in this way: if the world was made later, you said, being earlier, it is necessary that the impassible and unalterable God changes; for He who makes, first making nothing and then later, must necessarily change and be altered from not making to making. For they said: Does God ever cease from making the world, or not? He ceases. For otherwise He would not have been perfected. True. If, then, making from not making is judged to be an alteration of God, is not also not making from making? Necessarily. Would you say that He is altered when He does not make today compared to when He was making? Not at all. Therefore, neither when He was making the world must He necessarily be altered compared to when He was not making; and it is not necessary to say that the universe coexists with Him because of not being compelled to say He is altered, nor is it coeternal for this reason. And tell me also this: would you say that what is generated does not have a beginning of generation? Not at all; for if it does not fall under a beginning of generation, it is necessarily ungenerated. But if it has come to be, you grant that it has come to be by some cause; for it is entirely impossible for it to have generation without a cause.

all. For if He is not altered when He makes, neither is He altered when He ceases to make.

Impossible.

We say, then, that the cosmos and all things in it have come into being later, not existing before, by the work of some other or of God? Clearly, by God. For it is impossible that what is bounded by a beginning of generation be co-eternal with the infinite? Impossible. And tell me also this: would you say that what does not have a beginning of generation is generated? Certainly not; for if it does not fall under a beginning of generation, it is necessarily ungenerated. But if it has come into being, do you grant that it has come into being by some cause? For it is altogether impossible for it to have generation without a cause.

Impossible. Shall we say, then, that the cosmos and all things in it have come into being later, not existing before, by the work of some other or of God? Clearly, by God. For it is impossible that what is bounded by a beginning of generation be co-eternal with the infinite. Impossible. Again, then, O Centaur, let us argue from the beginning. Do you say that beings have come into being by divine knowledge, or not? O by all means, they will say, not at all. But from the elements, or matter, or foundations, or however you wish to name these (for it makes no difference)—these having pre-existed ungenerated and moving in disorder, did God, separating everything, like a good painter from many colors, fashion one form?

Not this either. For they will certainly avoid confessing against themselves, lest by granting that matter had a beginning in separation and transformation, they be compelled by the argument to say that God began to administer and order the previously formless matter in every respect. So then, O Centaur, let us discuss from the beginning. Do you say that beings have come to be by divine knowledge, or not? “By no means,” they will say. But from the elements, or matter, or foundations, or however you wish to name these (for it makes no difference)—with these existing ungenerated beforehand and moving in a disorderly manner, did God separate everything, like a good painter creating a single form from many colors? Not this either. For they will certainly avoid confessing against themselves, lest by granting that matter had a beginning in separation and transformation, they be compelled by the argument to say that God began to administer and order the previously formless matter in every respect. Come now, since we have reached this point in the argument (to say with God), let there be a statue, standing on a base, beautiful. Let those who behold its well-proportioned beauty dispute with one another, trying to say on the one hand that it is created, and on the other that it is uncreated.

For I would ask them: For what reason do you say it is ungenerated? Is it because of the craftsman, so that he might in no way be thought to have been idle from the work of creation, or because of itself? For if it is because of the craftsman, how, being ungenerated, is it fashioned by the craftsman? For if it is altogether in need of the art, being worked like bronze in order to receive whatever character the craftsman might wish, in what way will it be ungenerated while suffering and being acted upon? But if, on the other hand, it is said to be perfect and ungenerated because of itself, not needing the art...

a statue, according to the destructive opinion, it is necessary to admit spontaneous generation.

But if they are unwilling to accept even this argument, and will answer more harshly, saying that the statue is not ungenerated, but is generated yet has no beginning of generation, so that the craftsman is said to rule over the artifact without beginning—then we shall say to them: If no time nor age is found above, when the statue was not yet perfect, what did the craftsman provide to it, or what did he effect in it? Tell us.

For if the same thing is self-sufficient and has no beginning of generation, then according to your argument the craftsman will be found never to have crafted while crafting, and again the argument seems to have run around in a circle, to be confessing spontaneity. For if the craftsman is said to move even the slightest statue, it will fall under a beginning, according to which he began to move and order it when it was previously unorderly and unmoved. Therefore the same world is not continuously the same always; for the craftsman must be compared to God, and the statue to the world.

Then how, O foolish ones, do you suppose that creation, being co-unending with the craftsman, does not need the craftsman? For that which is co-unending, having no beginning of generation, must necessarily be co-unbegotten and of equal power. And that which is unbegotten, being self-sufficient and unchangeable, will also be without need and indestructible; and if this is so, then according to you the cosmos is no longer changeable. For consider, since we have come to this point in the argument (to speak together with God), let there be a statue, standing on a base, beautiful. Let those who behold its well-proportioned beauty dispute with one another, some trying to say it is created, others that it is unbegotten. For I would ask them: For what reason do you say it is unbegotten? Is it because of the craftsman, so that he might never be thought to have been idle from his work, or because of the statue itself? If because of the craftsman, how is it that, being unbegotten, it is crafted by the craftsman? For if it is altogether in need of the art, being worked in bronze to receive whatever character the craftsman wishes, in what way will it be unbegotten while suffering and being acted upon? But if, on the other hand, it is said to be perfect and unbegotten because of itself, not needing the art...

...statue, according to the pernicious doctrine, one must necessarily admit automatism. But if, perhaps not willing to accept even this argument, they will answer more harshly, saying that the statue is not unbegotten, but is begotten, yet has no beginning of generation, so that the craftsman is said to rule the artifact without beginning, Then, O you there, we shall say to them, if neither time nor age is found above, when the statue was not perfect, what did the craftsman provide to it, or what did he effect in it, tell us? For if it is the same, being without need and having no beginning of generation, then according to you the craftsman will be found never to have crafted, yet always crafting, and again the argument seems to have run around to the same point, to admit automatism. For if the craftsman is said to have moved the statue even for the briefest moment, it will fall under a beginning, according to which he began to move and order it, when previously it was disordered and unmoved. Therefore the cosmos is and will be perpetually the same always; for the craftsman must be likened to God, and the statue to the cosmos. Then how, O foolish ones, do you suppose that creation, being co-unending with the craftsman, does not need the craftsman? For that which is co-unending, having no beginning of generation, must necessarily be co-unbegotten and of equal power. And that which is unbegotten, being self-sufficient and unchangeable, will also be without need and indestructible; and if this is so, then according to you the cosmos is no longer changeable. That he says the church is so called from having turned away from pleasures. That he says the church is so called from having turned away from pleasures.

That the holy one says: We said that there are two creative powers in the things previously agreed upon: one which, from non-existent things, by bare will without delay, at the moment of willing, itself works what it wishes to do; and this is the Father. The other adorns and variegates, in imitation of the first, the things that have already come into being; and this is the Son, the all-powerful and mighty hand of the Father, with which, after having made matter from non-existent things, he adorns it. That the holy one says the book of Job is by Moses. That concerning the phrase "In the beginning he made the heaven and the earth.

One would not err in calling wisdom itself the beginning. For it is said by one of the divine choir, speaking about herself in this manner: "The Lord created me as the beginning of his ways; he established me for his works before the age.

For it was consistent and more fitting that all things which came into being should be younger than her, since they came into being through her. For consider whether also the saying, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God," according to the Evangelist, and "the Word was God; this one was in the beginning with God," does not agree with these things.

For the beginning from which the most correct Word sprang forth must be called the Father and Maker of all things, in whom he was; and the phrase "he was in the beginning with God" seems to signify the authoritative power of the Word, which he had with the Father even before the world came into generation, having spoken of "the beginning." Therefore, after his own beginningless beginning, the Father, he himself becomes the beginning for the others, through whom all things are created.

He says, "If one were to call Wisdom itself 'the Beginning,' he would not err. For it is said by one of the divine choir, speaking about herself in this manner: 'The Lord created me as the beginning of his ways, for his works; before the age he established me.'" For it was fitting and more proper that all things which came into being should be younger than her, since they came to be through her. For consider whether the phrase "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God," according to the Evangelist, and "the Word was God; this one was in the beginning with God," does not agree with these things. For the beginning from which the most correct Word sprang forth must be called the Father and Maker of all things, in whom he was; and the phrase "this one was in the beginning with God" seems to signify the authoritative power of the Word, which he had with the Father even before the world came into being, having spoken of the beginning. Therefore, after its own beginningless beginning, the Father, it itself becomes the beginning of the others, through which all things are created. That Origen, after having spun many myths about the eternity of the universe, adds also this: "Therefore neither did man, not previously existing, first come into the world at that time, as some say, from Adam, having been fashioned for the first time, nor did the world begin to be created six days before the generation of Adam.

But if someone should be kindly disposed to disagree with these things, let him first state whether time will not be easily counted from the generation of the world according to the book of Moses for those who interpret it in this way, since the prophetic voice cries out here as well: "From eternity and to eternity you are; for a thousand years in your eyes are as yesterday, which has passed, and a watch in the night." For if a thousand years are bounded as one day in the eyes of God, from the generation of the world until the consummation . . . until us, as those around six days are concluded (the six-thousandth

Six days are concluded (so they say that the six-thousandth year from Adam extends to the present; for in the seventh week, the seven-thousandth year, they say judgment will arrive). Therefore all the days, thirteen in number, are measured from us back to the beginning, in which God made the heaven and the earth.

higher up, according to their own folly, nothing at all had been stripped of being father and almighty. But if there are thirteen days in the eyes of God from the beginning of the world, how does the wisdom in Sirach say, “Who will number the sand of the seas, the drops of rain, and the days of eternity?” This is what Origen says, exerting himself, and see what nonsense he plays. That Origen, after much mythologizing about the eternity of the universe, adds also this: “Therefore neither from Adam, as some say, did man, not previously existing, first come into the world when fashioned, nor did the world begin to be created six days before the generation of Adam. But if someone should be kindly disposed to disagree with these things, let him first state whether time from the generation of the world according to the book of Moses will not be easily counted by those who interpret it thus, since the prophetic voice cries out here too, ‘From eternity and to eternity you are; for a thousand years in your eyes are as yesterday’s day which has passed, and a watch in the night.’ For with a thousand years being limited to one day in the eyes of God, from the generation of the world until the consummation . . . until us, as the six days are concluded (so they say that the six-thousandth year from Adam extends to the present; for in the seventh week, the seven-thousandth year, they say judgment will arrive). Therefore all the days, thirteen in number from us back to the beginning, in which God made the heaven and the earth, are measured. Of which God . . .

that the Lord rested on the seventh day from all the works which he had made, and that the number seven is held in honour among the Hebrews, and that the days of creation are not thirteen but seven, as the Scripture says, "In six days the Lord made the heaven and the earth," and on the seventh he rested.

higher, according to their own folly, had in no way been stripped of being father and almighty. But if there are thirteen days in the eyes of God from the beginning of the world, how does the wisdom in Sirach say, “Who will number the sand of the seas, the drops of rain, and the days of eternity?” These things Origen says, being eager, and see what nonsense he plays.