Οὗπερ μόνος καί παρά πάντας Σεβῆρος ὁ παράφρων σοφιστής, ὡς τά μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς περινοῶν ἑαυτῷ καί πλαττόμενος, καί ποιοτήτων ἀνουσίων ἐπί Χριστοῦ λέγων διαφοράν, ἵν᾿ ἀνύπαρκτον αὐτόν ἀποφήνῃ, τῇ τῶν ἐξ ὧν καί ἐν αἷς συνέστηκε φύσεων ἀποσκευῇ, καί αὐτῶν γε πάλιν συναποσκευῇ τῶν ποιοτήτων. Οὐ γάρ δύναιντ᾿ ἄν ἀναιρουμένων τῶν φύσεων,·ὡς μηδέ κἄν ταύταις λοιπόν ἤ ὅλως ἐκ τούτων, λέγω δέ τῶν ποιοτήτων, ὑφιστᾷν δύνασθαι τόν Χριστόν, εἰ καί σύνθετον αὐτόν τερατολογεῖ ὁ δείλαιος, κἀντεῦθεν τελείαν αὐτοῦ ποιούμενος τήν ἐξάρνησιν. Οὐ γάρ Θεός ἤ Θεοῦ φύσις, ἡ σύνθετος· ἐπεί καί πᾶσα σύνθετος φύσις φύσει Θεός. Εἰ δέ πᾶσα σύνθετος φύσις φύσει Θεός, οὐ Θεός κατ᾿ αὐτόν ὁ Πατήρ ὁ ἀσύνθετος· ( εἰ γάρ τό σύνθετον φύσει Θεός, οὐ φύσει Θεός τό ἀσύνθετον. Εἰ δέ καί τό ἀσύνθετον φύσει Θεός, πολύθεός τις ἄν ἀπέφηνεν ὁ ἄθεος καί ἀντίθεος, ἀγνοήσας τόν ὄντως ὄντα Θεόν καί σάρκα γενόμενον, ἀλλά φυλάξαντα κἀν τῇ συνθέσει τῆς ὑποστάσεως τό πρός τόν Πατέρα κατά φύσιν ἁπλοῦν καί ἀσύνθετον, ὡς Θεόν φύσει καί ἐκ Θεοῦ, κἄν
This alone, and beyond all others, the mad sophist Severus, devising and fashioning for himself things that in no way exist, and speaking of a difference of non-essential qualities in Christ, in order to declare him nonexistent, by the stripping away of the natures from which and in which he consists, and again by the joint stripping away of the qualities themselves. For if the natures are abolished, they could no longer—so that not even in these, nor at all from these, I mean the qualities—be able to subsist Christ, even if the wretched man fantastically claims him to be composite, and from this makes his complete denial of him. For God is not composite, nor is the nature of God composite; since every composite nature is God by nature. But if every composite nature is God by nature, then according to him the Father, who is incomposite, is not God; (for if the composite is God by nature, the incomposite is not God by nature. But if the incomposite is also God by nature, then the godless and anti-god man would have shown himself to be a polytheist, having ignored the truly existing God who became flesh, but who kept even in the composition of the hypostasis the simplicity and incompositeness toward the Father according to nature, as God by nature and from God, even if
ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπων διά ἀνθρώπου ὑπέρ ἀνθρώπους γεγέννηται προσλήψει σαρκός ψυχήν ἐχούσης τήν νοεράν· κἄν οὐδέ ἄνθρωπον ὁμολογεῖ τόν ἐνανθρωπήσαντα Θεόν ὁ ἀπάνθρωπος, ὡς φύσιν ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ τήν ἀνθρώπου, καθά καί τήν θείαν ἀρνούμενος. Οὐ γάρ διφυᾶ τοῦτον ἤγουν διπλοῦν τήν φύσιν, ὡς οἱ Πατέρες, ἀλλά σύνθετόν τινα καί νόθον ὑποτίθεται φύσιν, τήν Ἀπολιναρίου βδελυρίαν ζηλώσας. Ταύτῃ γε τό μέγα τῆς περί ἡμᾶς οἰκονομίας ἀποσκευάζων μυστήριον ὁ ἀλητήριος, τῇ κλήσει τῶν ὀνομάτων εὐμηχάνως ὡς δεινός ἀποκέχρηται ῥήτωρ, δυσφώρατον ποιούμενος τή τῶν πραγμάτων ὑποκλοπήν, καί οἷον ὑποκνίζων τήν αἴσθησιν, εἰς τήν τῆς ἀσεβείας παραδοχήν. Θεόν τε γάρ αὐτόν ἀποκαλεῖ δῆθεν καί ἄνθρωπον· ἀποσκευάζει δέ θατέρας προσηγορίας τήν κυριότητα τήν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς οὐχ ὁμολογῶν τάς φύσεις, ὧν προδήλως αἱ κλήσεις τυγχάνουσι. Καί διαφοράν λέγει, μηδεμίαν γνωρίζων διαφοράν, τῶν διαφερούντων οὐχ ὑποκειμένων φύσει κατ᾿ αὐτόν τῶν πραγμάτων, ἵνα καί σύγχυσιν ἐπεισκρίνῃ διά τῆς μιᾶς συνθέτου φύσεως, καί ἀνυπαρξίαν νομοθετήσῃ τῇ ἀπαρνήσει τῶν φύσεων· καί δόξῃ τοῖς μέν ὀνόμασι τήν ἀναίρεσιν ἐπικαλύπτειν, τῇ δέ διαφορᾷ διαῤῥίπτειν τήν σύγχυσιν· τοσαύτη τοῦ κακόφρονος ἡ κακόφρων ὄντως μηχανή καί ἐπίνοια, τῷ τῆς ἀγνοίας ζόφῳ καλυπτομένη, καί σκοτίζουσα τούς ἁλόντας.
A man from men through a man beyond men has been born by the assumption of flesh having a rational soul; even if the man-hating one does not confess the God who became man to be a man, since he denies the nature of man in him, just as he also denies the divine nature. For he does not suppose him to be of two natures, that is, double in nature, as the Fathers do, but some composite and bastard nature, emulating the abomination of Apollinaris. Thereby the vagabond, setting aside the great mystery of the economy concerning us, cleverly misuses the naming of names as a clever rhetorician, making the theft of things hard to detect, and as it were scratching the senses, toward the acceptance of impiety. For he calls him God, ostensibly, and man; but he sets aside the lordship and truth of the other designation, as not confessing the natures whose names they manifestly are. And he speaks of a difference, recognizing no difference, since in his view the things that differ are not underlying by nature, so that he may both introduce confusion through the one composite nature and legislate non-existence by the denial of the natures; and he may seem to cover the destruction with names, but by the difference to scatter the confusion; so great is the evil-minded device and invention of the evil-minded one, truly evil-minded, covered by the darkness of ignorance, and darkening those who are caught.
Πρός οὕς δέον, ὡς ὑπέρ ἐκείνου διατεινομένους τρέψαι τόν λόγον, καί τοῦτο προσειπεῖν, ὡς εἴπερ καθ᾿ ὑμᾶς Κυρίλλῳ τῷ ἀοιδίμῳ Σεβῆρος κατακολουθῶν ὁμολογεῖ τήν διαφοράν, ἐκτρεπόμενος τήν συναίρεσιν, πῶς οὐ συνομολογεῖ καί τάς φύσεις ( αὐτῷ, κἀν ταύταις, ὡς ἐκεῖνος, τήν οὐσιώδη γνωρίζει διαφοράν, μόνην ἀποσκευαζόμενος τήν τούτων διαίρεσιν, ἀλλά ποιότησι μόνον ψιλαῖς παρά τόν ἐκείνου νόμον καί ὅρον τίθεται τήν διαφοράν; Ὅτι γάρ ὁμολογεῖ τάς φύσεις ὁ μακάριος Κύριλλος, ὧν καί τήν διαφοράν δογματίζει, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ μη δέ Νεστορίῳ τῷ διῃρημένῳ κατ'αὐτήν γε τήν τῶν φύσεων ὁμολογίαν ἀπαξιοῦν κοινωνεῖν, εἰ καί μή κατά τήν ἐννοίας τό σύνολον. "Τί γάρ, φησίν ὁ διδάσκαλος, κοινόν ἐμοί καί Νεστορίῳ; τό δύο λέγειν τάς δύο φύσεις μέχρι τοῦ γινώσιειν τήν διαφοράν τῆς σαρκός καί τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου· ἑτέρα γάρ αὕτη κατά τήν φυσικήν ποιότητα, καί τῆς οὐσίας οὐχ ὁμογενές παρ᾿ ἐκεῖνον». Ἐάν οὖν καί τάς φύσεις ὁμολογῇ, καί ἐπ᾿ αὐταῖς τήν διαφοράν γνωρίζη, καί τήν τῆς ὁμολογίας αἰτίαν εὐσεβῶς ἀποδίδωσι, φάσκων, "Διά τό ἑτέραν εἶναι τήν σάρκα παρά τόν Λόγον κατά τήν φυσικήν ποιότητα»· ταυτόν δέ λέγειν, οὐσίαν καί ἐνέργειαν, πρός τήν Θεοῦ Λόγου διαφοράν·
To those to whom it is necessary, since they strain the argument on his behalf, to turn the discourse and to add this also: that if, according to you, Severus, following the renowned Cyril, confesses the difference while avoiding the combination, how does he not also agree with him on the natures, and in these, as he does, recognize the essential difference, setting aside only their division, but instead posits the difference in bare qualities alone, contrary to that man's law and definition? For that the blessed Cyril confesses the natures, whose difference he also teaches, is clear from the fact that he does not even deign to hold communion with Nestorius, who divided them, on the very confession of the natures, even if not in the conception of the whole. "For what," says the teacher, "is common to me and Nestorius? The saying that the two natures are two, up to knowing the difference of the flesh and of God the Word; for this is other according to natural quality, and not of the same kind in essence as that one." If, then, he confesses the natures, and recognizes the difference in them, and piously gives the reason for the confession, saying, "Because the flesh is other than the Word according to natural quality"—and to say the same is essence and energy—in relation to the difference of God the Word:
πῶς ὁ παράφρων Σεβῆρος οὐδ᾿ αὐτῷ τῷ πεπλασμένως αὐτῷ τετιμημένῳ Κυρίλλῳ κοινωνεῖν ἀξιοῖ, καί τάς φύσεις συμφθέγγεσθαι μέχρι τοῦ γινώσκειν τήν διαφοράν κατά τήν ἐκείνου διδασκαλίαν, οὐ κατά τήν φυσικήν ποιότητα μόνον, ἀλλά καί τό τῆς οὐσίας οὐχ ὁμογενές, ἵν' ὁμοῦ τε τῶν φύσεων καί τῶν φυσικῶν ποιοτήτων, ἤγουν οὐσιῶν τε καί ἐνεργειῶν γνωρίσῃ τήν διαφοράν, ἀλλά καί τό τῆς οὐσίας οὐχ ὁμογενές ἐξαρνούμενος τῆς σαρκός πρός τόν Λόγον, ὅπερ ἐστί τό κατά φύσιν διάφορον, τήν ἐν ποιότησιν ἀνυπάρκτοις ( πᾶσα γάρ πάντως ποιότης ἀνύπαρκτος δίχα τῆς ὑποκειμένοις οὐσίας ) ἀντεισαγάγοι διαφοράν; Ὁ δέ κακούργως διαπραττόμενος, καί τῆς τοῦ σοφοῦ Κυρίλλου, ταυτόν δέ λέγειν πάντων τῶν θεοκρίτων Πατέρων, ἀληθοῦς κατεξανιστάμενος διδασκαλίας, ἀλλότριον ἑαυτόν ἀποφαίνει, καί τοῦ ψεύδους κοινωνόν καί συνήγορον. Ἆρα δέ ποιοτήτων λέγων ἐπί Χριστοῦ διαφοράν, μετά τήν ἕνωσιν, ἤ πρό τῆς ἑνώσεως λέγει τήν διαφοράν; Εἰ μέν γάρ πρό ( τῆς ἑνώσεως, διαίρεσιν φρονεῖ πάντως, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ διαφοράν, καί ἐκ διῃρημένων, οἷον τῶν καθ᾿ αὑτά προϋφεστότων, δογματίζει τήν ἕνωσιν, ἤ ταύτην ἔλυσε διά τῆς τῶν ποιοτήτων διαφορᾶς καί ὁμολογίας, ἤ οὐδέ ταύτας ὅλως ἡνῶσθαι τήν ἀρχήν ἀποφαίνεται. Καί εἰ μέν οὐχ ἡνῶσθαι λέγει, δῆλον ὡς οὔτε τάς φύσεις ὧν αἱ ποιότητες, ἡνωμένας
How does the senseless Severus not even deem worthy of communion with Cyril himself, whom he fictitiously honors, and of agreeing with him on the natures up to the point of knowing the difference according to his teaching—not only according to natural quality, but also the non-homogeneity of essence—so that together he might recognize the difference of the natures and of the natural qualities, that is, of essences and energies, but also, by denying the non-homogeneity of essence of the flesh in relation to the Word, which is the difference according to nature, he would introduce the difference in non-subsistent qualities (for every quality is altogether non-subsistent apart from the underlying essences)? But the one who acts maliciously, and who rises up against the true teaching of the wise Cyril—and to say the same, of all the God-judged Fathers—shows himself alien, and a partaker and advocate of falsehood. But does he, when speaking of a difference of qualities in Christ, speak of the difference after the union, or before the union? For if before the union, he altogether thinks division, not difference, and he dogmatizes the union from divided things, such as those that pre-existed by themselves, or he has dissolved this union through the difference and confession of qualities, or he declares that these were not united at all in the beginning. And if he says they were not united, it is clear that neither the natures, of which the qualities are, are united
δοξάζει, κἄν ὑποκρίνεται λέγειν· οὐ γάρ ἐνδέχεται, τάς μέν ἡνῶσθαι, τάς δέ διῃρεῖσθαι ποτ᾿ ἄν· ἀλλά σύν ἀλλήλαις ταυτόν ἀλλήλαις παθεῖν, εἴτε ἕνωσιν, εἴτε διαίρεσιν. Εἰ οὖν τήν διαίρεσιν ἀποβαλλόμενος ἡνῶσθαι διαγορεύει μετά τῶν φύσεων, καί τάς τούτων ποιότητας, ἀνάγκη πάντως αὐτόν ἑαυτῷ γε στοιχοῦντα διά πάντων, ἤ μίαν σύνθετον λέγειν ποιότητα, καθάπερ καί μίαν σύνθετον φύσιν, διά τήν ἕνωσιν, καί ἠλέγχθη μή δέ τήν ἐν ποιότητι γνωρίζων διαφοράν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀμφοῖν, οὐσιῶν τέ φημι καί ποιοτήτων δογματίζων τήν σύγχυσιν, ἤ διαφόρους διδούς τάς ποιότητας, καί οὐ δεδειώς τήν διαίρεσιν, διαφόρους καί τάς φύσεις εἴποιεν ἄν, οὐ δεδιττόμενος, οὔτε μήν προφασιζόμενος τήν διαμπάξ τομήν εἰς τήν τῆς αὐτῶν ὁμολογίας ἀποστροφήν καί παραίτησιν. Εἰ γάρ κατ᾿ αὐτόν οὐ πεπόνθασι διατομήν αἱ ποιότητες, πρός αὐτοῦ δῆθεν ὁμολογούμεναι, διά τήν διαφοράν, πῶς αἱ φύσεις τμηθήσονται τῆς ὁμολογίας χάριν καί διαφορᾶς; Εἰ δέ ταύτας μέν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ, μόνας δέ δῆθεν ὁμολογεῖ τάς ποιότητας, δῆλός ἐστι τάς φύσεις ἐξαφανίζων, καί ποιοτήτων ἄθροισμα τόν Χριστόν δογματίζων, ὥσπερ καί τάς τῶν ὑλικῶν φύσεις οὔσας γνωρίζομεν· ὑποκειμένῳ μέντοι τῆς ὕλης συνισταμένας, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἐν μόναις ἐπιθεωρουμένας καί ψιλαῖς ταῖς ποιότησιν, ὡς ἐκεῖνός γε τόν Χριστόν διαγράφει, καί διά τοῦτο σύνθετον αὐτόν ὀνομάζει φύσιν, ἐκείνην δηλαδή, καί οὐκ ἄλλην νοῶν ἥν ἐκ ψιλῶν τῶν ποιοτήτων ἀνεπλάσατο καί συνέθηκεν. Ὧν γάρ εἶναι λέγει τήν διαφοράν, τούτων σαφῶς καί τήν ἕνωσιν.
he glorifies, even if he pretends to say it; for it is not possible that some things be united and others divided at any time, but they must together undergo the same thing with one another, whether union or division. If, then, rejecting division he declares that the natures are united, along with their qualities, he must by all means, being consistent with himself throughout, either speak of one composite quality, just as also of one composite nature, on account of the union—and he was refuted as not even recognizing the difference in quality, but dogmatizing the confusion of both, I mean of substances and of qualities—or, granting the qualities to be different and not fearing the division, he would say that the natures are also different, not being intimidated, nor yet making the thorough cutting a pretext for turning away from and declining the confession of them. For if, according to him, the qualities—confessed, as he claims, by him on account of the difference—have not undergone cutting, how will the natures be cut for the sake of confession and difference? But if he does not confess these, but confesses, as he claims, only the qualities, it is clear that he is making the natures vanish and dogmatizing that Christ is a collection of qualities, just as we recognize that the natures of material things exist, yet subsisting in the underlying matter, and not being observed in bare and naked qualities alone, as he at any rate depicts Christ, and for this reason calls him a composite nature—clearly understanding that one, and no other, which he molded and composed from bare qualities. For of whatever things he says there is a difference, of these he clearly also [says there is] a union.
Οὐ γάρ ἄλλων ἡ διαφορά καί ἄλλων ἡ ἕνωσις, ἀλλά τῶν αὐτῶν, καί οὐκ ἄλλων. ( Οὐκοῦν ἐκ ποιοτήτων καί ποιότητας εἶναι διαγορεύει τόν Χριστόν ὁ παράφρων, καί κατ᾿ αὐτάς γε πάλιν διῃρημένον αὐτόν ἀποδείκνυσιν, ὡς οὐ μίαν σύνθετον διά τήν ἕνωσιν, ἀλλά διαφόρους ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ δογματίζων ποιότητας, εἴπερ ὅρος οὖτος αὐτῷ τῆς ἑνώσεως ἄριστος. Εἰ δέ ἄλλος μέν ἐπί φύσεων, ἄλλος δέ πάλιν ἐπικρατεῖ νόμος ἐπί τῶν ποιοτήτων, τῆς αὐτοῦ δεῖξαι τοῦτον ἡμῖν ἔργον ἐμμελείας, ἤ ἐκπληξίας, εἰπεῖν οἰκειότερον, ὡς ἄν μάθοιμεν πῶς κατά τήν ἕνωσιν μίαν μέν φύσιν τάς δύο γνωρίζει φύσεις, οὐ μίαν δέ ποιότητα διαφόρους ποιότητας· ἤ τίνι λόγῳ ποιοτήτων μέν λέγει, φύσεων δέ διαφοράν οὐ λέγει. Καί πῶς οὐκ ἀσύγχυτοι μέν δίχα διαφορᾶς μεμενήκασιν αἱ ποιότητες, ἀσύγχυτοι δέ καί δίχα ταύτης αἱ φύσεις; Πῶς τε κατά τήν διαφοράν αἱ ποιότητες οὐ διαιροῦνται, διαιροῦνται δέ κατ'αὐτήν αἱ φύσεις; Ἤ πῶς οὐ διαιρούμεναι μή ὁμολογοῦνται μετά τῶν ποιοτήτων; Διατί δέ συντίθησι μέν τάς φύσεις, οὐ συντίθησι δέ τάς ποιότητας, καί πῶς τούτων οὐχ ἑνωθεισῶν εἰς μίαν ποιότητα σύνθετον, ἐκείνας εἰς μίαν σύνθετον ἑνῶσθαι τερατεύεται φύσιν; Ταῦτα διατρανώσαι διαποροῦσιν ἡμῖν, ὅστις ἐκείνου δυσσεβής ἐραστής καί συνήγορος, ἵνα τήν τούτων λύσιν ποιούμενος, συνδιαλύσῃ τήν μέμψιν, ἤ μή δυνάμενος ταύτην ἐνδίκως, ἐκείνῳ συναπενέγκηται μετά καί μείζονος τῆς κατακρίσεως, ὅτι τε σύμφωνον, τόν καί πρός ἑαυτόν ὄντα διά πάντων ἀλλόκοτον, εἰπεῖν τοῖς Πατράσιν τετόλμηκεν.
For the difference is not of some things and the union of others, but of the same things, and not of others. (Therefore the madman declares that Christ is from qualities and qualities, and again demonstrates him divided according to them, dogmatizing not one composite [nature] because of the union, but different qualities in him, if indeed this is his best definition of the union. But if one law prevails over natures and another again over qualities, it is the task of his own diligence—or, to speak more aptly, of his astonishment—to show us this, so that we might learn how, according to the union, he recognizes the two natures as one nature, but not the different qualities as one quality; or by what reasoning he speaks of a difference of qualities but does not speak of a difference of natures. And how have the qualities remained unconfused without difference, and the natures unconfused also without it? And how are the qualities not divided according to the difference, but the natures are divided according to it? Or how, not being divided, are they not acknowledged together with the qualities? And why does he combine the natures but not combine the qualities, and how, when these have not been united into one composite quality, does he marvelously claim that those have been united into one composite nature? Whoever is that impious lover and advocate of his must clarify these things for us who are perplexed, so that by making the solution of these things he may dissolve the censure together with them, or, unable to do so justly, may be carried off with him along with even greater condemnation, because he has dared to say that the wholly discordant one, who is at odds even with himself, is in agreement with the Fathers.
Ταῦτά μοι, θεοτίμητε δέσποτα, ἐν παραδρομῇ κατά τήν ὑμετέραν εἰρήσθω κέλευσιν, εἰς τήν ἐκείνου καί τῶν τῆς ἐκείνου συμμορίας ὑπασπιστῶν ἀνασκευήν καί κατάργησιν. Τῆς σῆς δ᾿ ἄν εἴη θεόφρονος διανοίας, τά μείζω, καί τελεώτερα τούς ἀτελεῖς κατ᾿ ἐμέ καί νηπίους ἐκπαιδεῦσαί τε καί διδάξαι, καί πρός γνῶσιν ἀγαγεῖν θειοτέραν, ἵν᾿ οἰκειώσῃς Θεῷ διά τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμης τῶν ὄντων, ὧν αὐτός ὁ ὑπέρ τά ὄντα φύσει Λόγος αἰτία καθέστηκε, Κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, ᾧ καί δι᾿ εὐχῶν ( μή διαλείποις μέ παρατιθέμενος τόν ἀνάξιον, ἁγιώτατε καί θεοτίμητε Πάτερ.
Καί πάλιν ὁ θεῖος Μάξιμος.
Πῶς οὖν τήν οὕτω ταῦτα σεβασμίως ἅμα καί διαπρυσίως ὁρῶσαν τε καί διαγορεύουσαν ἁγίαν ἐν Χαλκηδόνι σύνοδον, ὡς διαπεμπομένην τόν τῆς Νικαέων ὅρον παραστῆσαι, τίς ἄν ἰσχύσειε πώποτε, κἄν πάντων ᾖ ποριμώματος εἰς ἐξεύρεσιν τῶν διά ψεύδους, τά μή ὄντα κατά τῆς ἀληθοῦς καί ὄντως (πίστεως) πλαττομένων; Εἰ δέ καί ὡς τοῦτο μέν τηροῦσαν βεβαίως, ὡς δεύτερον δέ τυχόν ἐπεισάγουσαν ὅρον διαλοιδορεῖτε, καί μέμφεσθε, τίς οὖτος καθέστηκεν ὁ ὑπ᾿ αὐτῆς ἐπεισαγόμενος δεύτερος ὅρος; Ἡ ὁμολογία, φησί, τῶν δύο φύσεων καί ἐν δύο φύσεσι φωνῆς. Οὐ γάρ ἔχει ταύτην ὁ τῆς Νικαέων ὅρος· εἰσήχθη δέ προδήλως ὑπό τῶν ἐν Χαλκηδόνι Πατέρων, οὐ πρότερον γνωρισθεῖσα ἤ ὀνομασθεῖσα παρά τινος. Ὅτι μέν οὐδέ τοῦτο δύνασθε παραστῆσαι δῆλον· πολλοῖς γάρ τῶν πρό αὐτῆς ἁγίων Πατέρων, ὡς εὐσεβής ἡ φωνή καί ἐκρίθη καί ἀνηγορεύθη·
These things, O God-honored master, have been said by me in passing at your command, for the refutation and destruction of that man and of the band of his shield-bearers. But it would be for your God-minded understanding to educate and teach the greater and more perfect things to me, who am imperfect and infantile, and to lead me to a more divine knowledge, so that you may unite me to God through the true knowledge of beings, of which the very Word who is by nature above beings is the cause, our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom also through prayers do not cease to entrust me, the unworthy one, most holy and God-honored Father.
And again the divine Maximus.
How then could anyone ever be strong enough to set forth the holy Council at Chalcedon, which so reverently and at the same time so clearly saw and declared these things, as sending forth the definition of Nicaea to present it—even if he were the most resourceful of all at discovering the things fabricated through falsehood, things that are not, against the true and real faith? But if you also reproach and blame it as keeping this one firmly, but perhaps introducing a second definition, what is this second definition introduced by it? The confession, he says, of the voice of the two natures and in two natures. For the definition of Nicaea does not have this; but it was brought in plainly by the Fathers at Chalcedon, not previously known or named by anyone. That you cannot establish this either is clear; for by many of the holy Fathers before it, as pious, the phrase was both judged and proclaimed.
καί μαρτυροῦσι τῶν ταύτην κηρυξάντων οἱ λόγοι, πάσης ὄντες ἡλιακῆς ἀκτῖνος φωτοειδέστατοι καί λαμπρότεροι, κἄν ὑμεῖς ἀγνοεῖτε δι᾿ ἀπαιδευσίαν, ἤ ἀγνοεῖν προσποιεῖσθε διά λοιδορίαν, καί τῶν εὐσεβῶν Πατέρων τε καί δογμάτων ἀνόητον ἔγκλησιν. Εἰ δέ καί μηδέν ἦν, ὁπότε πλεῖστον, ὡς ἔφην, καθέστηκε, τί τό κωλύον ἁγίους τοσούτους (μᾶλλον δέ τόν ἅπαντα Χριστιανισμόν· τοῦτο γάρ κυρίως ἐστίν ἡ τῶν ( ὀρθοδόξων Πατέρων ἁγιωτάτῃ σύνοδος) ἐξουσιαστικῶς ταύτην προέσθαι, καί νομοθετεῖν κατά τῆς Εὐτυχοῦς συναιρέσεως;
Καί μετά τινά φησι· Τίνι λόγῳ, καί πῶς τήν ἐν Χαλκηδόνι ἁγίαν σύνοδον, καίτοι πατρικαῖς προδήλως ἀποχρησαμένην φωναῖς, αἰτιᾶσθε, καί ὡς ἄλλον πίστεως ὅρον εἰσάγουσαν, τῇδε κἀκεῖσε καί ἐγγράφως καί ἀγράφως διαλοιδορεῖτε καί διασκόπτετε; Μή καθ᾿ ὄψιν κρίνετε, διά τόν εἰπόντα Θεόν, ἀλλά τήν δικαίαν κρίσιν κρίνατε. Τίς ἡ ἐπί τῆς αὐτῆς καί μιᾶς ὑποθέσεως τῶν ἐν Χαλκηδόνι Πατέρων ἔγκλησις ὑμῶν, καί τίς ἡ τῶν προλαβόντων ἀνάῤῥησις; Εἰ γάρ ἔστι κατά τῆς ἐν τῇ Χαλκηδόνι ἄλλον αἰτιᾶσθαι πίστεως ὅρον διά τάς ἐγκειμένας τῷ ὅρῳ τῆς Νικαέων φωνάς, τοῦτό γε πάντως ἕψεται λέγειν διά τήν αὐτήν αἰτίαν καί κατά Κυρίλλου καί τῶν ἑκατόν πεντήκοντα. Εἰ δέ κατ' αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔστι, πῶς κατ᾿ ἐκείνης, συνιδεῖν οὐκ ἔχω. Παριστᾷν δέ προτρέπομαι τήν ὑμῶν ἐπί τοῖς ἀναποδείκτοις λύσσαν καί ἔνστασιν· εἴ γε κἄν ἄρα οὕτως ἱκανῶς αἰσχυνθέντες, συσταλῆτε τῆς ἀπονοίας τῆς τοσαύτης κατά τῆς ἀληθείας ψεύδους συστάσεως.
And the words of those who proclaimed this bear witness, being more radiant and brighter than any ray of the sun, even if you are ignorant of it through lack of education, or pretend to be ignorant through abusive slander, and make a foolish accusation against the pious Fathers and their doctrines. But even if there were nothing—when there is very much, as I said—what prevents so many saints (or rather the whole of Christianity; for this is properly the most holy council of the orthodox Fathers) from authoritatively setting this aside and legislating against the confusion of Eutyches?
And after some things he says: For what reason, and how, do you accuse the holy council at Chalcedon, although it plainly employed the voices of the Fathers, and slander and mock it here and there, both in writing and orally, as introducing another definition of faith? Do not judge by appearance, because of the God who said it, but judge righteous judgment. What is your accusation against the Fathers at Chalcedon concerning the same and one matter, and what is the annulment of those who came before? For if it is possible to accuse another definition of faith against the one at Chalcedon because of the words of Nicaea contained in the definition, this will certainly follow: to say, for the same reason, also against Cyril and the one hundred and fifty. But if it is not possible against them, how it is possible against that one, I cannot understand. And I urge you to restrain your fury and insistence in the face of unproven things—if indeed, being sufficiently ashamed in this way, you would shrink back from the madness of such great falsehood assembled against the truth.
Ἐπεί καί Γρηγόριος ὁ τῆς θεολογίας συνήγορος, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐκφεύξεται τῆς ὑμῶν κατά τῆς Χαλκηδονέων ἐνοχῆς· πλεῖστον δέ ὅσον ὑποπεσεῖται ταύτῃ παρά τόν ὑμέτερον νόμον, προδιαρθρῶν τό ἐλλιπῶς εἰρημένον τῆς ἐν Νικαίᾳ περί τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος· "διά τό μηδέ κινεῖσθαι, φησί, τό τηνικαῦτα τοῦτο τό ζήτημα»· μετά τοῦ Πατρός καί Υἱοῦ τό Πνεῦμα γινώσκων, καί Κληδονίῳ γράφων οὕτω νοεῖν καί διδάσκειν. Ἀλλ᾿ ἐοίκατέ μοι τῆς σαθρᾶς ὄψεως, οὐχ ἱκανούσης πρός ἡλιακῆς αἴγλης ἀνάνευσιν καί μετάληψιν, τήν αὐτήν ὡς ἀμυδράν αἰτιωμένης, οὐ τήν οἰκείαν ἀδράνειαν, ἐκμιμήσασθαι τό πάθος· αὐτοί τά καί νοσηλευόμενοι διά τήν σύγχυσιν, καί τούς ταύτην ὡς ( ἀσεβῆ καί ἀνάρμοστον πρός τήν ἐν Χριστῷ τῶν σωζομένων ἀλήθειαν φύσεων ἱκανῶς ἐξελέγχοντας, ὡς οὐ φωστῆρας κοινούς, οὐδέ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐκφάντορας ἐκδιαβάλλοντες. Εἰ γάρ ἔστι τἀληθῇ περί ἀληθείας εἰπεῖν, πάντες, οἵ τε κατά τήν Νικαέων θεόκριτοι Πατέρες, καί πᾶσα σύνοδος ὀρθοδόξων καί ἁγίων ἀνδρῶν, οὐκ ἄλλον πίστεως ὅρον διά τῆς ἐπεισαγωγῆς τῶν οἰκείων ῥημάτων παντελῶς ἐπεισήγαγον, ὡς ὑμεῖς ἀποφαίνεσθε, πλεῖστον παραληροῦντες. καί τό ὅλον μαινόμενοι· ἀλλ᾿ αὐτόν ὡς πρῶτον καί μόνον τῶν ἐκ τῶν ἁγίων τριακοσίων δέκα καί ὀκτώ Πατέρων νομοθετηθέντα βεβαίως ἐκύρωσαν, τρανοῦντες αὐτόν, καί οἷον ἐπεξηγούμενοι καί ἐπεξεργαζόμενοι, διά τούς ἐκεῖνον καί τά ἐκείνου δόγματα πρός τήν οἰκείαν κακῶς ἐκλαμβάνοντας καί παρεξηγουμένους δυσσέβειαν.
Since Gregory, the champion of theology, will by no means escape your charge against the Chalcedonians either; rather, he will fall under it as much as possible, contrary to your law, in that he sets in order beforehand what was said incompletely at Nicaea concerning the Holy Spirit: "Because," he says, "this question was not then even being raised," knowing the Spirit to be with the Father and the Son, and writing to Cledonius that this is how one should understand and teach. But you seem to me to have imitated the condition of weak eyesight, which, being unable to face and receive the sun's radiance, blames that same radiance as dim, rather than its own weakness—you who are yourselves sick with the confusion, and who slander those who sufficiently refute it as impious and incongruous with the truth in Christ of the natures of those who are saved, as though they were not common luminaries nor expositors of the truth. For if one may speak the truth about the truth, all the God-judged Fathers at Nicaea, and every synod of orthodox and holy men, did not introduce another definition of faith at all by the addition of their own words, as you declare, raving excessively and wholly mad; but they firmly ratified that same first and only definition legislated by the holy three hundred and eighteen Fathers, clarifying it and, as it were, explaining and elaborating it, on account of those who wrongly interpret and misinterpret it and its doctrines toward their own impiety.
Αὐτίκα γοῦν τόν τῆς θεολογίας ἐν αὐτῷ κείμενον λόγον ἐν αὐτῷ κείμενον λόγον παραβλάψαι βεβουλημένους Εὐνόμιόν τε καί Μακεδόνιον, οἱ ἑκατόν πεντήκοντα Πατέρες οὐ συνεχώρησαν διά τῶν οἰκείων φωνῶν καί δογμάτων. Οὕτω δέ καί τόν τῆς οἰκονομίας Νεστόριον διαιρεῖν μηχνώμενον, ὁ μακάριος οὐκ εἴασε Κύριλλος· ὥσπερ οὖν καί Εὐτυχέα συγχεῖν ἐθελήσαντα διεκώλυσαν οἱ ἐν Χαλκηδόνι τίμιοι Πατέρες. Πῶς οὖν ὑπέρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ σύν ἐκείναις, φημή δέ ταῖς συνόδοις, καί ταύτην οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, διά τό αὐτό καί ἴσον καλόν· ἤ ταύτην ὡς μισόκαλοι διαλοιδοροῦντες συνδιαλοιδορεῖτε κἀκείνας; ὅ δή μάλιστα ποιοῦντες τοῖς πράγμασιν, εὐλαβεῖσθε τοῖς ῥήμασιν, ἵν᾿ εὐσεβείας πλάσμασιν ἐκεῖνας δῆθεν κατά ταύτης σεμνύναντες, διά ταύτης κἀκείνας λυμήνησθε, τό ἴσον αὐταῖς διά τήν ἴσην πρᾶξιν ἐπιφέροντες ἔγκλημα. Τίς οὖν ὑμῶν τήν τοσαύτην ὑποίσοι κατά τῆς εὐσεβείας καί τῶν εὐσεβούντων αὐθάδειαν; κ. τ. ἑ. ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΑ ΠΕΡΙ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ, ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΕΩΣ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΟΥ ( Ὅτι οὐσία μέν τό εἶδος καί τήν φύσιν, ὅπερ ἐστί καθ᾿ ἑαυτήν, δηλοῖ, ὑπόστασις δέ, τόν τινα τῆς οὐσίας ἐμφαίνει. Ὅτι οὐσία καί ἐνούσιον, οὐ ταὐτόν· ὥσπερ οὐδέ ὑπόστασις καί ἐνυπόστατον, εἰ καί ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἄμφω θεωρεῖται, ἀλλ᾿ ἄλλο καί ἄλλο. Ἐνούσιον μέν γάρ ἐστι, τό ἐν τῇ φύσει θεωρούμενον, καί οὐ καθ᾿ ἑαυτό ὑπάρχον· ἐνυπόστατον δέ, αὐτό τό ἐν ὑποστάσει ὄν, καί οὐκ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καθ᾿ ἑαυτό τυγχάνον, δηλοῖ· τουτέστι, τό μή ἐξ ἀτελῶν μερῶν εἰς ἕν τι συνελθόν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκ τελείου καί ἀτελοῦς, ἐν τῇ κατά σύγχυσιν συνόδῳ θεωρούμενον.
For instance, Eunomius and Macedonius, who wished to corrupt the word of theology that lies within it—the word that lies within it—the one hundred and fifty Fathers did not permit, through their own words and doctrines. In the same way, the blessed Cyril did not allow Nestorius, who was scheming to divide the word of the economy; just as the honored Fathers at Chalcedon prevented Eutyches, who wished to confuse it. How then, for the sake of the good, along with those—I mean the synods—do you not accept this one too, because of the same and equal good? Or, hating the good, do you revile this one and thereby revile those as well? This is exactly what you do in fact, though you are cautious in words, so that by pretending piety you may exalt those, as it were, against this one, and through this one destroy those too, bringing against them an equal charge because of the equal deed. Who among you could endure such audacity against piety and against the pious? And so on. CHAPTERS ON SUBSTANCE AND NATURE, HYPOSTASIS AND PERSON ( That substance reveals the form and the nature, what it is in itself, while hypostasis indicates a particular instance of the substance. That substance and "enousion" are not the same; just as neither are hypostasis and "enypostaton," even if both are contemplated in each other, but they are different. For "enousion" is what is contemplated in the nature and does not exist in itself; but "enypostaton" indicates the very thing that exists in a hypostasis and does not subsist in itself by itself; that is, what has not come together into one from incomplete parts, but from a complete and an incomplete, contemplated in the union by confusion.
Ὅτι ἡ μέν ὑπόστασις πρόσωπον ἀφορίζει τοῖς χαρακτηριστικοῖς ἰδιώμασι. Τό δέ ἐνυπόστατον, τό μή ὄν καθ᾿ ἑαυτό συμβεβηκός δηλοῖ· ἀλλ᾿ ὅπερ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχει τό εἶναι, καί οὐκ ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεωρεῖται, οὐδέ ἔστι καθ᾿ ἑαυτό ὑφεστός, ἀλλά περί τήν ὑπόστασιν πάντοτε θεωρούμενον, ὥσπερ αἱ ποιότητες, αἵ τε οὐσιώδεις καί ἐπουσιώδεις καλούμεναι· αἵτινες οὐκ εἰσίν οὐσία, οὐδέ καθ᾿ ἑαυτά, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ τυγχάνουσι, καί δίχα ταύτης τό εἶναι οὐκ ἔχουσιν. Ὅτι ὥσπερ οὐδ᾿ ἑτέρα τῶν ποιοτήτων, ἤγουν οὐσιωδῶν καί ἐπουσιωδῶν, ἐστίν οὐσία, ἤ πρᾶγμα ὑφεστώς καθ᾿ ἑαυτό, ἀλλ' ἀεί περί τήν οὐσίαν τό χαρακτηριστικόν κέκτηνται, ὥσπερ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι, καί ἐπιστήμη ἐν ψυχῇ· οὐδέ γάρ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν χρῶμα δίχα σώματος φαίνεσθαι, ἤ ἐπιστήμην δίχα ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖσθαι· ( οὕτως οὐδέ ἐνυπόστατον ἤ ἐνούσιον ἔστιν νοῆσαι δίχα οὐσίας ἤ ὑποστάσεως. Οὐ γάρ καθ᾿ ἑαυτά τήν ὕπαρξιν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀεί περί τήν ὑπόστασιν θεωροῦνται.
Ὅτι τό λέγειν τινάς, μή εἶναί φύσιν ἀνυπόστατον, ὀρθῶς μέν λέγεται παρ᾿ αὐτοῖς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δέ νενόηται· καί τό μή ἀνυπόστατον εἰς ὑπόστασιν φέρειν, καί οὐχί μᾶλλον ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει θεωρεῖσθαι.
That the hypostasis distinguishes a person by characteristic properties. But "enhypostaton" indicates what is not an accident existing by itself, but what has its being in another and is not contemplated in itself, nor is it self-subsistent, but is always contemplated in relation to the hypostasis, just as the qualities, both those called essential and those called non-essential; these are not substance, nor do they exist by themselves, but they reside in the substance, and without it they do not have being. That just as none of the qualities, that is, essential and non-essential, is a substance or a self-subsistent thing, but they always possess their characteristic in relation to the substance, as color in a body and knowledge in a soul—for it is not possible to say that color appears without a body, or that knowledge operates without a soul—so neither can enhypostaton or enousion be conceived without substance or hypostasis. For they do not have existence by themselves, but are always contemplated in relation to the hypostasis.
That the saying of some, that there is no nature without hypostasis, is correctly said by them, but is not correctly understood; and that what is not without hypostasis is to be brought into hypostasis, and not rather contemplated in the hypostasis.
Ὅτι ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγει, Οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα ἀσχημάτιστον ἤ ἀχρωμάτιστον, ὀρθῶς μέν λέγει, οὐ μήν ὀρθῶς συνπεραίνει, τό σχῆμα, ἤ τό χρῶμα σῶμα λέγων εἶναι, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχί ἐν σώματι θεωρεῖσθαι· οὕτως εἴ τις ὀνομάσει λέγων· Οὐκ ἔστι φύσις ἀνυπόστατος· εἶτα τό μή ἀνυπόστατον εἰς ὑπόστασιν συνάγων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διακρίνει. Ὅτι φύσις μέν οὐκ ἄν εἴη ποτέ ἀνυπόστατος, οὐ μήν ἡ φύσις ὑπόστασις· οὐδέ τό μή ἀνυπόστατον εἰς ὑπόστασιν θεωρεῖται. Ἐπειδή οὐδέ ἀντιστρέφει. Ἡ μέν γάρ ὑπόστασις, πάντως καί φύσις· ὥσπερ καί τό σχῆμα, πάντως σῶμα. Οὐκ ἔστι γάρ ὑπόστασιν νοῆσαι ἄνευ φύσεως· οὐ δέ πάλιν σχῆμα ἤ χρῶμα ἄνευ σώματος ἡ δέ φύσις, οὐ πάντως καί ὑπόστασις.
Ὅτι ἡ μέν φύσις τόν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον κοινόν ἐπέχει, ἡ δέ ὑπόστασις καί τόν τοῦ καθ᾿ ἑαυτό εἶναι.
Ὅτι ἡ μέν φύσις εἴδους λόγον μόνον ἐπέχει, ἡ δέ ὑπόστασις καί τοῦ τινός ἐστι δηλωτική.
ΤΟΥ ΑΓΙΩΤΑΤΟΥ ΚΛΗΜΕΝΤΟΣ ΠΡΕΣΒΥΤΕΡΟΥ ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΕΙΑΣ, ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑΣ Οὐσία ἐστίν ἐπί Θεοῦ. Θεός οὐσία θεία ἐστίν, ἀΐδιόν τι καί ( ἄναρχον, ἀσώματόν τι καί ἀπερίγραφον, καί τῶν ὄντων αἴτιον. Οὐσία ἐστί, τό δι᾿ ὅλου ὑφεστός. Φύσις ἐστίν, ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀλήθεια, ἤ τούτων τό ἐνούσιον. Κατά δέ τούς ἄλλους ἡ τῶν εἰς τί εἶναι παραγενομένων γένεσις· καθ᾿ ἑτέρους δέ, ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ πρόνοια ἐμποιοῦσα τοῖς γινομένοις τό εἶναι, καί τό πῶς εἶναι. ΤΟΥ ΠΑΝΣΟΦΟΥ ΜΑΞΙΜΟΥ ΟΡΟΣ ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΕΩΣ Ὑπόστασις σύνθετός ἐστιν, οὐσία τις σύνθετος, τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστα περιληπτική τῶν ὄντων ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἀτόμῳ πάντων ἰδιωμάτων.
That just as if someone says, "There is no body without shape or without color," he speaks correctly, but does not correctly conclude by saying that shape or color is a body, rather than that they are contemplated in a body; so if someone names it by saying, "There is no nature without hypostasis," and then, gathering "not without hypostasis" into hypostasis, he does not distinguish correctly. For a nature could never be without hypostasis, yet nature is not hypostasis; nor is "not without hypostasis" contemplated as hypostasis. Since it does not convert. For hypostasis is certainly also nature, just as shape is certainly also body. For it is not possible to conceive hypostasis without nature, nor again shape or color without body; but nature is not certainly also hypostasis.
That nature holds the principle of being in common, but hypostasis also that of being for itself.
That nature holds only the principle of species, but hypostasis is indicative also of the particular.
Of the most holy Clement, presbyter of Alexandria, from On Providence: Essence in God. God is divine essence, something eternal and without beginning, something incorporeal and uncircumscribed, and the cause of beings. Essence is what subsists wholly. Nature is the truth of things, or the essentiality of these. But according to others, it is the generation of things that have come to be for some purpose; and according to others, the providence of God, which produces in things that come to be both that they are and how they are. Of the all-wise Maximus, Definition of Hypostasis: Hypostasis is composite, a certain composite essence, comprehensive of the particulars of beings, of all properties in its own individual.
Τό γάρ κοινῶς ἐν τοῖς ὑπό τό αὐτό εἶδος ἀτόμοις θεωρούμενον, τό τῆς οὐσίας ἤτοι φύσεως χαρακτηρίζει, προηγουμένως μέν ἐν τοῖς ὑπ᾿ αὐτό ἀτόμοις, γεινικῶς δέ πάντων τό κοινόν, τῶν ὑπό τό σύνθετον εἶδος ἀτόμων.
ΤΟΥ ΜΑΚΑΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΥ ΕΥΛΟΓΙΟΥ ΠΑΠΑ ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΕΙΑΣ... Τοῦ μακαριωτάτου Εὐλογίου πάπα Ἀλεξανδρείας, κεφάλαια ἑπτά περί τῶν δύο φύσεων τοῦ Κυρίου καί Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Εἰ μιᾶς φύσεως κατά τήν ἕνωσιν ὁ Κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός ἐστιν, εἰπέ, ποίας, τῆς λαβούσης, ἤ τῆς ληφθείσης; καί τί γέγονεν ἡ ἑτέρα; Εἰ δέ ὑπάρχουσιν ἀμφότεραι, πῶς μία, εἰ μή ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων μία ἀπετελέσθη σύνθετος; εἰ δέ τοῦτο, πῶς οὐχ ἑτεροούσιος ὁ Χριστός, τοῦ Πατρός ἀσυνθέτου ὑπάρχοντος; Εἰ οὐδέποτε δύω φύσεων ὁ Κύριος ἡμῶν, Ἰησοῦ Χριστός ὡμολόγηται ὤν, πῶς δυνατόν λέγειν μιᾶς μετά τήν ἕνωσιν τόν Χριστόν, ἤ καί ὅλως λέγειν ἕνωσιν; Εἰ δέ ὡμολόγηται ὁ Χριστός δύο φύσεων γεγονέναι, εἰπέ, πότε δύο φύσεων ἦν ὁ Χριστός, καί πότε γέγονεν ἐκ μιᾶς;
For what is contemplated in common in the individuals under the same species characterizes the essence, that is, the nature—primarily in the individuals under it, but generically the common element of all the individuals under the composite species.
Of the most blessed Eulogius, pope of Alexandria... Chapters of the most blessed Eulogius, pope of Alexandria, seven chapters concerning the two natures of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. If our Lord Jesus Christ is of one nature according to the union, tell me, of what kind—of the one that took, or of the one that was taken? And what became of the other? But if both exist, how is He one, unless one composite [nature] was formed from both? And if so, how is Christ not of a different essence, since the Father is incomposite? If our Lord Jesus Christ was never confessed to be of two natures, how is it possible to say that Christ is of one nature after the union, or even to speak of a union at all? But if it is confessed that Christ was of two natures, tell me, when was Christ of two natures, and when did He become of one?
Ὁμοούσιος ὁ Θεός Λόγος τῇ παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ ληφθείσῃ σαρκί, ἤ ( ἑτεροούσιος; Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μέν ὁμοούσιος, πῶς οὐ γέγονε τετράς ἤ Τριάς; Εἰ δέ ἑτεροούσιος ἡ σάρξ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου, πῶς οὐ δύο φύσεων ὁ Χριστός; Μίαν φύσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένην φασί τινες· οἶμαι δέ καί ὑμᾶς οὕτω λέγειν. Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μέν μιᾶς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ καί τῆς σαρκός τοῦτο νοητέον, πῶς οἷόν τε τό κτιστόν τῷ ἀκτίστῳ, καί τό ἀΐδιον τῷ ὑπό χρόνον εἶναι ταυτόν; Εἰ δέ ὡς μιᾶς φύσεως ἐχούσης ἑτέραν, ἤ ἐχομένης ὑφ᾿ ἑτέρας, τίς ὑποίσει μίαν καί μίαν, οὐ δύο, ἀλλά μίαν εἰπεῖν;
Εἰ μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου καί τοῦ Πατρός, πῶς οὐ μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου, καί τοῦ Πατρός καί τῆς σαρκός;
Εἰ κατ᾿ οὐδέν δύο ὁ Θεός Λόγος καί ἡ σάρξ, πῶς οὐ κατά πάντα ἕν ὁ Θεός Λόγος καί ἡ σάρξ; Καί εἰ κατά πάντα ἕν ὁ Θεός Λόγος καί ἡ σάρξ, πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ὁ Λόγος σάρξ, καί ἡ σάρξ Λόγος, καί συναΐδιος τῷ Πατρί καί ὁμοούσιος ὡς ὁ Θεός Λόγος; Εἰ δέ οὐ κατά πάντα ἕν ὁ Θεός Λόγος καί ἡ σάρξ, πῶς οὐ κατά τι δύο ὁ Θεός Λόγος καί ἡ σάρξ;
Is God the Word consubstantial with the flesh he took from himself, or is he of a different essence? But if he is consubstantial, how has there not become a quaternity or a Trinity? And if the flesh of God the Word is of a different essence, how is Christ not of two natures? Some say that there is one nature of God the Word made flesh; and I think that you too say this. But if this is to be understood as one essence of God and of the flesh, how can the created be the same as the uncreated, and the eternal as that which is under time? But if it is as of one nature that has another, or is had by another, who will endure to speak of one and one, not two, but one?
If there is one nature of God the Word and of the Father, how is there not one nature of God the Word, and of the Father and of the flesh?
If God the Word and the flesh are not two in any respect, how are God the Word and the flesh not one in all respects? And if God the Word and the flesh are one in all respects, how will the Word not be flesh, and the flesh Word, and coeternal with the Father and consubstantial as God the Word is? But if God the Word and the flesh are not one in all respects, how are God the Word and the flesh not two in some respect?
Εἰ ἀδύνατον πλέον ἡνῶσθαι τόν Θεόν Λόγον καί τήν σάρκα, οὗ ἥνωται ὁ Θεός Λόγος καί ὁ Πατήρ, πῶς ἡνωμένος ὁ Θεός Λόγος καί ἡ σάρξ κατ᾿ οὐδέν εἰσί δύο;
ΠΕΡΙ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΕΩΣ Οὐσία ἐστίν ἡ τό κοινόν τε καί ἀπερίγραπτον σημαίνουσα, ὅ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος. Ὁ γάρ τοῦτο εἰπών, τήν κοινήν φύσιν ἐσήμανεν, ( οὐ περιγράψας τῇ φωνῇ τόν τινα ἄνθρωπον, τόν ἰδίως ὑπό τοῦ ὀνόματος γνωριζόμενον. Φύσις ἐστί, τό ἐξ ἴσου πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπό τό αὐτό εἶδος ἀναγορευομένοις ἐνθεωρούμενον.
Ὑπόστασίς ἐστιν, ἡ τό κοινόν τε καί ἀπερίγραπτον ἐν τῷ τινι ἰδίως παριστῶσα καί περιγράφουσα, οἷον ὁ δεῖνα.
Ὑπόστασίς ἐστι, τό μετά τοῦ καθόλου, ἔχον τι καί ἰδικόν. Φύσις ἐστί κατά τούς ἔξω, ἀρχή κινήσεως καί ἡρεμίας. Φύσις ἐστίν, ἡ ποιά τῷ παντί ὕπαρξις.
Φύσις λέγεται, παρά τό πεφυκέναι.
Πρώτη οὐσία ἐστί, πᾶν τό καθ᾿ ἑαυτό ὑφεστώς, οἷον λίθος. Δευτέρα οὐσία αὐξητική, καθό αὔξει καί φθίνει τό φυτόν. Τρίτη δέ οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική, τό ζῶον, ὁ ἵππος. Τετάρτη δέ οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική λογική, ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Διό καί ἔσχατος γέγονεν, ὡς ἐκ πάντων τήν ψυχήν ἄυλον ἔχων, καί τόν νοῦν Θεοῦ εἰκόνα.
If it is impossible for God the Word and the flesh to be more united than God the Word is united to the Father, how are God the Word and the flesh, being united, in no way two?
CONCERNING ESSENCE AND NATURE AND HYPOSTASIS. Essence is that which signifies the common and uncircumscribed, which is man. For he who has said this signified the common nature, not having circumscribed by the word some particular man, the one known individually by the name. Nature is that which is contemplated equally in all those who are called under the same species.
Hypostasis is that which distinctly presents and circumscribes the common and uncircumscribed in the particular, such as a certain individual.
Hypostasis is that which, together with the universal, has something also individual. Nature, according to those outside, is a principle of motion and rest. Nature is the qualified existence of the whole.
Nature is so called from "to have grown."
First essence is every self-subsisting thing, such as a stone. Second essence is the nutritive, insofar as the plant grows and decays. Third essence is the animate sensitive, the animal, the horse. Fourth essence is the animate sensitive rational, man. Therefore he has also become last, as having the soul immaterial from all things, and the mind as an image of God.
ΟΤΙ ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ ΕΝ ΘΕΛΗΜΑ ΛΕΓΕΙΝ ΕΠΙ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΥ ΜΑΞΙΜΟΥ.
Τό Χριστός ὄνομα, οὐ φύσεώς ἐστι δηλωτικόν, ἀλλά συνθέτου ὑποστάσεως. Τουτέστιν, ὅλος ὁ Χριστός, καί Κύριός ἐστι καί Θεός, καί παντοδύναμος, ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ καί ἥν δι᾿ ἡμᾶς, καί διά τήν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν ἀδιαιρέτως καί ἀσυγχύτως ἐφόρεσε ( σάρκα παθητήν καί οὐ παντοδύναμον, κτιστήν, ὀρατήν, περιγραπτήν, τήν μή παντοδύναμον φυσικῶς, ἀλλ᾿ ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ παντοδύναμον θέλημα ἔχουσαν. Οὐ γάρ ὑποστάσει ἐστί ὁ Χριστός θνητός καί ἀθάνατος· οὐ δ᾿ αὖ πάλιν ἀδύναμος καί παντοδύναμος ὁρατός καί ἀόρατος, κτιστός καί ἄκτιστος· ἀλλά τό μέν φύσει, τό δέ ὑποστάσει. Καί ἁπλῶς εἶπείν, οὐκ ἐναντιότητι γνώμης, ἀλλ᾿ ἐν ἰδιότητι φύσεως. Εἷς γάρ ἐστίν, ὡς προεῖπον, ὁ Χριστός, ἔχων ἑκατέρα φυσικῶς. Τό γάρ, Οὐχ ὡς ἐγώ θέλω, ἀλλ' ὡς σύ, οὐδέν ἕτερον δείκνυσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἤ ὅτι σάρκα ἀληθῶς περιβέβληται, φοβουμένην θάνατον. Τό γάρ φοβεῖσθαι θάνατον, καί ἀναδύεσθαι καί ἀγωνιᾷν, ἐκείνης ἐστί. Νῦν μέν οὖν ἐρήμην αὐτήν ἀφίησι καί γυμνήν τῆς οἰκείας ἐνεργείας, ἵνα αὐτῆς δείξας τήν ἀσθένειαν, πιστώσηται αὐτῆς καί τήν φύσιν. Νῦν δέ αὐτήν οὐκ ἀποκρύπτει, ἵνα μάθης, ὅτι ψιλός ἄνθρωπος ἦν. Ὥσπερ γάρ εἰ διά πάντων τά ἀνθρώπινα ἐπεδείκνυτο, τοῦτο ἄν ἐνομίσθη· οὕτως εἰ διά παντός τά τῆς Θεότητος ἐπετέλει, ἠπιστήθη ἄν ὁ τῆς οἰκονομίας λόγος. Διά τοῦτο ποικίλλει καί ἀναμίγνυσι καί τά ῥήματα καί τά πράγματα, ἵνα μήτε τῇ τοῦ Παύλου τοῦ Σαμοσατέως, μήτε τῇ τοῦ Μαρκίωνος καί Μανιχαίου νόσῳ καί μανίᾳ παράσχῃ ὑπόθεσιν.
That it is impossible to speak of one will in Christ, by the blessed Maximus.
The name Christ is indicative not of a nature but of a composite hypostasis. That is, the whole Christ is both Lord and God and almighty, having in himself both the passible flesh, which he wore for us and for our salvation inseparably and without confusion, and not almighty, created, visible, circumscribed, having a will not naturally almighty but almighty in Christ. For Christ is not mortal and immortal by hypostasis; nor again is he powerless and almighty, visible and invisible, created and uncreated; but the one by nature, the other by hypostasis. And to speak simply, not by opposition of will, but in propriety of nature. For one is Christ, as I said before, having both naturally. For the words, "Not as I will, but as you," show nothing other than that he has truly put on flesh that fears death. For to fear death, and to shrink back and be in agony, belongs to that flesh. Now, then, he leaves it desolate and stripped of its own operation, in order that, having shown its weakness, he may also confirm its nature. But now he does not hide it, so that you may learn that he was a mere man. For just as, if he had displayed human things through all, this would have been supposed; so if he had accomplished the things of the Godhead through all, the account of the economy would have been disbelieved. For this reason he varies and mingles both the words and the deeds, so that he may give no occasion to the disease and madness of Paul of Samosata, nor to that of Marcion and Manichaeus.
Δια τοῦτο καί προλέγει τό ἐσόμενον ὡς Θεός, καί ἀναδύεται πάλιν ὡς ἄνθρωπος. Ὁ ἐπί τοῦ ἑνός καί μόνου Χριστοῦ δύο θελήματα εἰπεῖν ἤ ὁμολογεῖν παραιτούμενος, τοῦτο τό ἕν θέλημα, ὅπερ ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ λέγεις, ἄναρχον καί συνάναρχον καί συναΐδιον τῷ Πατρί καί τῷ ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι, ἤ ποσότητι θεϊκόν ὅλον, ἁπλοῦν τε καί ἀσύνθετον, ὡς τῆς θείας ὑπάρχον οὐσίας, ἤ διά τήν ἐνανθρώπησιν ἀλλοῖόν τί σοι δοκεῖ; ὁποῖον δέ σήμανον, καί τί τούτου τοῦ θελήματος τό ὄνομα, φῆσαι ἡμῖν. Τό γάρ πρό τῆς ἀνανθρωπήσεως, τουτέστι τοῦ θείου θελήματος ὄνομα, ἐγώ σημαίνω. Ὥσπερ γάρ ἡ θεία φύσις ἡ τρισυπόστατος, ἄναρχος, ἄκτιστος, ἀπερινόητος, ἁπλῆ, καί
ἀσύνθετος ὁλότητι ὑπάρχει· οὕτω καί τό αὐτῆς θέλημα. Ἰδού οὖν τό πρό τῆς ἐναθρωπήσεως εἶπον· καί πάντες μοι συμφθέγξονται, ( ὡς τήν ἀλήθειαν εἰρηκότι. Καί σύ αὐτός, εἰ θέλεις, καί οὐ θέλεις. Εἰπέ οὖν ἡμῖν τό μετά τήν ἐνανθρώπησιν, ποῖον ὄνομα ἔχει. Ζήτησον Παλαιάν καί Καινήν Διαθήκην ὅλην. Εἰπέ τούτου σύ τοῦ ἐφευρισκομένου ἐπί Χριστοῦ ἑνός θελήματος τό ὄνομα. Ζήτησον, καί μή ὀκνήσῃς. Ἀλλ᾿ ἄρα ἐπειδή τό θεῖον θέλημα, θεῖον λέγεται, καί τό ἀνθρώπινον θέλημα, ἀνθρώπινον λέγεται, θεανδρικόν θέλημα εἴποις τόν Χριστόν ἔχειν; οὐ νομίζω. Ἐπειδή ὁ Πατήρ καί τό ἅγιον Πνεῦμα θεανδρικόν οὐκ ἔχει θέλημα. Ἀλλ᾿ ἄρα σύνθετον τολμήσῃς εἰπεῖν; Ὁμοίως πάλιν καινόν τῇ Θεότητι τοῦτο. Ἀλλ᾿ ἄρα φυσικόν εἴπῃς; συγχύσεις καί σύ κατά Σευῆρον· δύο γάρ φύσεις ἤ φυσικά θελήματα, μία φύσις, ἤ ἕν φυσικόν θέλημα γενέσθαι ἄνευ συγχύσεως ἀδύνατον. Ἀλλ᾿ ὑποστατικόν;
For this reason he also foretells what is to come as God, and again withdraws as man. He who declines to say or confess two wills in the one and only Christ—is this one will that you speak of in him unoriginate and co-unoriginate and co-eternal with the Father and the Holy Spirit, or is it divine in its entirety by quantity, simple and incomposite, as belonging to the divine essence, or does it seem to you to be something different because of the incarnation? And signify of what sort it is, and tell us what is the name of this will. For the name that belongs to it before the becoming-man, that is, of the divine will, I myself signify. For just as the divine nature, which is in three hypostases, is unoriginate, uncreated, incomprehensible, simple, and incomposite in its entirety, so also is its will. Behold, then, I have stated what belongs to it before the incarnation; and all will agree with me, as one who has spoken the truth. And you yourself, if you wish—and you do not wish. Tell us, then, what name it has after the becoming-man. Search the whole Old and New Testament. Tell us the name of this one will that you invent in Christ. Search, and do not hesitate. But then, since the divine will is called divine, and the human will is called human, would you say that Christ has a "God-man" will? I do not think so. Since the Father and the Holy Spirit do not have a "God-man" will. But then would you dare to call it composite? Again, this is equally novel for the Godhead. But then would you call it natural? You too will fall into confusion, in accordance with Severus; for two natures or natural wills to become one nature or one natural will without confusion is impossible. But a hypostatic one?
καί πάλιν ἀλλοτριώσεις τόν Υἱόν τοῦ Πατρός, καί τρεῖς θελήσεις εἰσάγων φανήσῃ μή συμβαινούσας ἀλλήλαις, ὥσπερ καί τάς ὑποστάσεις. Ἐάν εἴπῃς τήν ὡς ἑνός μίαν θέλησιν καί ἐνέργειαν, ἀναγκασθήσῃ τήν ὡς ἑνός τοῦ Πατρός, καί τήν ὡς ἑνός τοῦ Πνεύματος εἰπεῖν, κἄν θέλῃς καί μή θέλῃς θέλησιν καί ἐνέργειαν, καί εὑρεθήσεται εἰς πολυθεΐαν ἐκπίπτων ὁ λόγος. Ἐάν καί σχετική εἴπῃς· Νεστορίου εἰσάγεις προσωπικήν διαίρεσιν. Εἰ δέ καί παρά φύσιν εἴπῃς, φθείρεις τήν ὕπαρξιν τοῦ θέλοντος· φθορά γάρ τῇ φύσει τό παρά φύσιν ἐστί, καθώς οἱ Πατέρες ὡρίσαντο. Ἀλλ᾿ ἄρα τήν μονάδα πάλιν ἀνασπαράξεις, καί εἰς ψήφους ἡμᾶς κινήσεις εἰς διμοιρότριτα τοῦ παρά σοῦ ἑνός θελήματος, ὅπως μαθεῖν εὕρωμεν κατά πόσον ἐστί θεῖον, καί κατά πόσον ἀνθρώπινον. Ὁμοίως καί κατά πόσον ἄκτιστον, καί κατά πόσον κτιστόν, καί ἁπλῶς ὡς ἔστι σοι φίλον εἰπεῖν. Εἰπέ ἡμῖν τό ὄνομα τοῦ θελήματος, τοῦ παρά σοῦ πρεσβευομένου ἐπί Χριστοῦ, σύνταξον αὐτό μετά τῶν ἀνωνύμων Ψαλμῶν, ὅπως κἄν ἐκεῖ χώραν καί τόπον εὕρῃ. Ἐπειδή, λογιώτατε, ἡμεῖς ἀνώνυμον τί ποτε ( ὁμολογῆσαι οὐ δυνάμεθα. Ὡς εἰκός δέ, μέχρι τοῦ νῦν τινί τῶν γηγενῶν οὐ πεφανέρωται. Ἐγχάραξον οὖν ὁριστικῶς ἐκ πατρικῶν διδάσκαλιῶν, καί τήν τοῦ ὀνόματος δήλωσιν διατύπωσον ἡμῖν. Ἅ γάρ ἀριθμοῦμεν ἡμεῖς, ταῦτα καί ὁμολογοῦμεν, κατά τόν μέγαν καί θεοφάντορα Βασίλειον. Ἐγώ λέγω, ὅτι ἡ ζωοποιός σάρξ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἐν αὐτῷ ἔσχε τῷ Θεῷ Λόγῳ πάντα τά ὑπερφυᾶ τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως, εἰς ἕν πρόσωπον καί μίαν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου, τάς δύο φύσεις συντελούσας.
And again you will alienate the Son from the Father, and by introducing three wills you will appear to bring in wills that do not agree with one another, just as you do with the hypostases. If you speak of the one will and energy as of one being, you will be compelled to speak of the will and energy as of one being of the Father, and as of one being of the Spirit, whether you wish it or not, and the argument will be found to fall into polytheism. If you call it relational, you introduce Nestorius's personal division. But if you call it contrary to nature, you destroy the existence of the one who wills; for what is contrary to nature is corruption to nature, as the Fathers defined it. But then you will tear apart the monad again, and you will move us to counters, to two-thirds of your one will, so that we may find a way to learn how much of it is divine and how much human. Likewise also how much uncreated and how much created, and simply as it pleases you to say. Tell us the name of the will that you advocate in Christ; set it alongside the untitled Psalms, so that it may find a place and a location there too. Since, most learned sir, we are unable to confess something that is unnamed. And as is likely, until now it has not been made manifest to any of those born of earth. Therefore inscribe it definitively from the teachings of the Fathers, and set out for us the declaration of the name. For what we count, these we also confess, according to the great and God-inspired Basil. I say that the life-giving flesh of the Son of God had in the very God the Word himself all the transcendent properties of its own nature, with the two natures concurring into one person and one hypostasis of God the Word.
Ἕνα γάρ Υἱόν, ὡς ἕνα τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος συμπροσκυνοῦμεν Πατρί καί ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι, ὡς πρό τῶν αἰώνων, νῦν καί εἰς τούς σύμπαντας εἰῶνας, καί μετά τούς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων. Ἀμήν. ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΑ Ι' ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΔΥΟ ΘΕΛΗΜΑΤΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΚΥΡΙΟΥ... Κεφάλαια ι´ περί τῶν δύο θελημάτων τοῦ Κυρίου καί Θεοῦ καί Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Ἐγράφη δέ πρός ὀρθοδόξους.
( α´. Εἰ ὡσπερ μιᾶς ὑποστάσεώς ἐστιν ὁ Λόγος μετά τῆς σαρκός, οὕτω καί ἕν θέλημα κατά τινας, εὐλογημένοι ἀνάγκη ὥσπερ τῇ ὑποστάσει, οὕτω καί τῷ θελήματι καί ἡμῶν καί τοῦ Πατρός διαφέρειν. Καί πῶς ἡ τῆς φύσεως πρός τόν Πατέρα ταυτότης, τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν θελημάτων δειχθήσεται. β´. Οἷς ὁ Λόγος τό ἕν ἔχει μετά τῆς σαρκός, τούτοις τοῦ Πατρός χωρίζεται, καί οἷς τό ἕν ἔχει μετά τοῦ Πατρός, τούτοις τῆς σαρκός διακρίνεται. Εἰ δέ ἕν θέλημα μετά τῆς σαρκός κατά τινας, εὐλογημένοι, ἄρα τῷ θελήματι τοῦ Πατρός ἐχωρίσθη. γ´. Εἰ οἷς ἥνωται ὁ Λόγος τῷ Πατρί καί τῷ Πνεύματι, τούτοις τῆς σαρκός διαφέρειν κρίνεται· ἥνωται δέ κατά τήν κοινήν τῶν Χριστιανῶν δόξαν τῷ θελήματι Πατρί καί Πνεύματι, ἄρα θελήματι τῆς σαρκός διαφέρει τοῦ Πατρός καί Πνεύματος·
For we worship one Son, as one of the holy Trinity, together with the Father and the holy Spirit, as before the ages, now and unto all the ages, and after the ages of ages. Amen. CHAPTERS 10 CONCERNING THE TWO WILLS OF THE LORD... Chapters 10 concerning the two wills of our Lord and God and Savior Jesus Christ. Written to the orthodox.
(1. If, as the Word is one hypostasis with the flesh, so also there is one will according to some, blessed ones, it must be that just as in hypostasis, so also in will he differs both from us and from the Father. And how will the sameness of nature with the Father be shown by the difference of wills? 2. Those things in which the Word has unity with the flesh, by these he is separated from the Father; and those things in which he has unity with the Father, by these he is distinguished from the flesh. But if there is one will with the flesh according to some, blessed ones, then he has been separated from the Father in will. 3. If, in those things in which the Word is united to the Father and the Spirit, he is judged to differ from the flesh—but he is united in will to the Father and the Spirit according to the common opinion of Christians—then in the will of the flesh he differs from the Father and the Spirit.
ὡς αὐτοί ἑαυτοῖς οἱ Πατέρες καί ἡμῖν διωρίσαντο, καί ἡμεῖς, εὐλογημένοι, φυλάσσειν σπουδάζομεν.
δ´. Τοῦτο τό ἕν θέλημα, ἤ φυσικόν ἤ ὑποστατικόν ἀνάγκη αὐτούς, εὐλογημένοι, λέγειν· εἴπερ ἡ τῶν ὄντων σύστασις ἐν οὐσίᾳ καί ὑποστάσει θεωρεῖται. Τί γάρ ἄν καί εἴη παρά ταῦτα ( ἕτερον λέγειν, [οἷς οὐ ἐξῆν]; Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μέν φυσικόν αὐτό εἴπωσι, καί μίαν φύσιν λέξουσιν τοῦ Λόγου καί τῆς σαρκός, καί μή θέλοντες. Εἰ δέ ὑποστατικόν, ἀναγκασθήσονται διά τάς ἁγίας τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, τρία λέγειν καί τά θελήματα, εἴπερ ἑαυτοῖς στοιχεῖν διέγνωσαν. ε´. Εἰ τό τῆς φύσεως τοῦ Λόγου θέλημα, δημιουργικόν πάντων τῶν γεγονότων· τοῦτο δέ κατ᾿ αὐτούς, εὐλογημένοι, καί τῆς σαρκός τυγχάνει θέλημα, δημιουργός ἔσται προδήλως τῶν γεγονότων καί ἡ τοῦ Λόγου σάρξ. Καί ἀνῄρηται οὕτω γε ἡ κοινή δόξα τῶν Χριστιανῶν, τό κτιστήν αὐτήν εἶναι. Πῶς γάρ κτίσμα τό ἐκ μή ὄντων κτίζον, καί τό ἐξαίρετον τῆς θείας φύσεως ἰδίωμα ἔχον. ´. Εἰ διά τό ἕν θέλημα Πατρός καί Υἱοῦ καί ἁγίου Πνεύματος, καί μία φύσις αὐτῶν ἐδείχθη ὑπό τῶν θεολήπτων Πατέρων· ἕν δέ θέλημα κατ᾿ αὐτούς, εὐλογημένοι, τοῦ Λόγου καί τῆς σαρκός, καί μία φύσις ἔσται γε οὕτω καί τοῦ Λόγου καί τῆς σαρκός. Εἰ δέ ἐπί τῆς σαρκός καί τοῦ Λόγου, τό ἕν θέλημα τήν κίαν φύσιν οὐ συνάγει, οὐδέ ἐπί Πατρός καί Υἱοῦ καί ἁγίου Πνεύματος, τό ἕν θέλημα τήν μίαν φύσιν συνάξει, καί κενή ἡ πίστις ἡμῶν, κενόν τό τῶν Πατέρων κήρυγμα. ζ´. Τοῦτο τό ἕν θέλημα, ἤ προαιρετικόν τυγχάνει, ἤ φυσικόν. Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μέν φυσικόν καί μία φύσις ἔσται, ὡς καί ἤδη ἐδείχθη, τῆς σαρκός καί τοῦ Λόγου·
As the Fathers themselves defined for themselves and for us, and we, blessed ones, strive to keep.
4. This one will, they must, blessed ones, call either natural or hypostatic, since the constitution of beings is contemplated in essence and hypostasis. For what else could there be besides these (to say something else, [which was not permitted to them]? But if they call it natural, they will say there is one nature of the Word and of the flesh, even unwillingly. But if hypostatic, they will be compelled, because of the holy three hypostases, to say that the wills are also three, if indeed they have determined to be consistent with themselves. 5. If the will of the nature of the Word is creative of all things that have come to be; and this, according to them, blessed ones, is also the will of the flesh, then the flesh of the Word will plainly be a creator of things that have come to be. And thus the common opinion of Christians, that it is created, is destroyed. For how can a creature be that which creates from non-being, and has the distinctive property of the divine nature? 6. If, because of the one will of the Father and the Son and the holy Spirit, their one nature was also shown by the God-inspired Fathers; and there is one will, according to them, blessed ones, of the Word and of the flesh, then there will thus also be one nature of the Word and of the flesh. But if in the case of the flesh and the Word the one will does not bring together the one nature, neither in the case of the Father and the Son and the holy Spirit will the one will bring together the one nature, and our faith is empty, and the proclamation of the Fathers is empty. 7. This one will is either a matter of choice or natural. But if it is natural, there will also be one nature, as has already been shown, of the flesh and of the Word.
εἰ δέ προαιρετικόν, ὥσπερ τῆ ὑποστάσει, οὕτω καί τῇ γνώμῃ χωρισθήσεται Πατρός καί Πνεύματος ὁ Χριστός.
η´. Εἰ κατά τόν μέγαν Κύριλλον, τά τῆς αὐτῆς ὄντα οὐσίας ( καί φύσεως, καί τοῦ αὐτοῦ τυγχάνουσι θελήματος, πῶς τά τῆς αὐτῆς μή ὄντα φύσεως, τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι θελήματος δύνανται;
θ´. Εἰ τό μή θέλειν ἀποθανεῖν, κατά τό χρυσοῦν στόμα Ἰωάννου, φυσικόν ἔχει ἡ σάρξ· μετά πάντων δέ τῶν φυσικῶς προσόντων αὐτῇ ἰδιωμάτων ὁ Λόγος ἥνωσεν αὐτήν ἑαυτῷ ἀτρέπτως καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν, πῶς τά φυσικῶς προσόντα αὐτῇ ἀρνούμενοι, οὐχί καί τήν φύσιν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἰδιώμασι συναρνοῦνται; ι´. Εἰ τῷ θελήματι καί πρόσωπον συνεισάγεσθαι λέγουσι, καί διά τοῦτο τόν οὐκ ὄντα φοβούμενοι φόβον, δύο θελήματα ἐπί Χριστοῦ λέγειν οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ἵνα μή καί δύο πρόσωπα ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτοῖς συνεισαχθῇ, βιασθήσονται, εἴπερ εὐσυνάρτητον τόν τοῦ οἰκείου δόγματος λόγον δεῖξαι βούλονται, ἤ διά τό ἕν θέλημα τῆς Θεότητος, καί ἕν λέγειν πρόσωπον· ἐπειδή τῷ θελήματι κατ᾿ αὐτούς ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί πρόσωπον ἕπεται· ἤ διά τά τρία πρόσωπα, καί τρία θελήματα, Σαβελλίου τέ τήν συναίρεσιν καί Ἀρείου τήν διαίρεσιν εἰσάγειν. Ἐπειδή δέ, εὐλογημένοι, ἡ ὁμωνυμία αἴτιον πολλάκις πλάνης γίνεται, τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ πρός ἑτέραν σημασίαν μεταβαίνοντος, παρ᾿ ἥν ὑπέφηνεν ὁ λόγος, παρακαλῶ τήν ὑμετέραν ἐν Χριστῷ σύνεσιν, διά τήν εὐκρινῆ καί ἀσύγχυτον τῶν σημαινομένων πραγμάτων δήλωσιν, σαφηνίσαι ὑμῖν πρό πάντων, εἰ ὅλως ἐστί θέλημα, καί ἐπί ποίων σημαινομένων ἤγουν πραγμάτων φέρεται τό τοιοῦτον ὄνομα·
But if it is a matter of choice, then Christ will be separated from the Father and the Spirit by his choice, just as he is by his hypostasis. 8. If, according to the great Cyril, things that belong to the same essence and nature also possess the same will, how can things that do not belong to the same nature be of the same will? 9. If, according to John the Golden Mouth, not willing to die is natural to the flesh, and the Word united it to himself in a hypostasis without change together with all the properties that naturally belong to it, how is it that those who deny the properties that naturally belong to it do not also deny the nature together with its natural properties? 10. If they say that a person is introduced together with the will, and for this reason, fearing a fear that does not exist, they cannot endure to speak of two wills in Christ, lest two persons be necessarily introduced for them as well, they will be compelled, if indeed they wish to show the argument of their own doctrine to be coherent, either because of the one will of the Godhead to speak also of one person—since, according to them, a person necessarily follows the will—or because of the three persons to speak also of three wills, and so to introduce both the confusion of Sabellius and the division of Arius. But since, blessed ones, homonymy often becomes a cause of error, when the hearer passes over to a different meaning than the one the argument indicated, I urge your understanding in Christ, for the sake of a clear and unconfused demonstration of the things signified, to clarify for yourselves before all else whether will exists at all, and in which meanings, that is, things, such a name is applied.
καί εἰ τά μέν τῶν ὑπ'αὐτό προσαγορευομένων πραγμάτων σύνθετά εἰσι, τά δέ ἁπλᾶ· καί ποῖα δέ τά σύνθετα. Καί εἰ ἄρα τά σύνθετα, ὁμόχρονα ἔχουσι τά μέρη, ἤ οὐχ ὁμόχρονα· καί ποῖα ποίων προγενέστερα· ποῖα δέ ποίων μεταγενέστερα. Καί τίς ὁ ἀποδεικτικός ἑκάστου μέρους καί ὁριστικός ( λόγος, ἵνα ἔχωμεν νοούμενον, τό ἕν θέλημα δέχεσθαι. Οὐ γάρ περί φωνῶν ὁ λόγος τοῖς Πατράσιν, ἀλλά περί πραγμάτων. Ὅθεν φωνάς μέν παραχωροῦντας τούς Πατέρας εὕρομεν· ἐννοίας δέ, οὐδαμῶς. Πρός ἐπί τούτοις δέ, τί προαίρεσις, καί τί γνώμη· τί δέ γνωμικόν
θέλημα, καί τί προαιρετικόν. Ταῦτα γάρ πάντα συνδραμεῖν θέλουσι πρός τήν τῶν θελημάτων παράστασιν. Καί ὁ μή ταῦτα γινώσκων μετά ἀκριβείας, καί περί θελημάτων διηγούμενος, τυφλός μυωπάζων, μή γινώσκων μήτε τί λαλεῖ, μήτε περί τίνος διαβεβαιοῦται.
ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ, Ἐκ τῶν ἐρωτηθέντων αὐτῷ παρά Θεοδώρου μοναχοῦ. Φύσις ἐστί, κατά μέν φιλοσόφους, ἀρχή κινήσεως καί ἡρεμίας· κατά δέ τούς Πατέρας, εἶδος κατά πολλῶν καί διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ, ἐν τῷ ὁποῖον τί ἐστι, κατηγορούμενον.
And if some of the things that are spoken of as being under him are composite, and others simple; and of what sort the composite things are. And whether the composite things have their parts contemporaneous or not contemporaneous; and which are earlier than which, and which are later than which. And what is the demonstrative and definitive account of each part, so that we may have it understood and accept the one will. For the argument of the Fathers is not about words, but about things. Hence we find the Fathers yielding on words, but by no means on concepts. In addition to these things, what is choice, and what is opinion; and what is opinionative will, and what is choice-based will. For all these things must concur for the presentation of the wills. And he who does not know these things with precision, and yet discourses about wills, is blind and nearsighted, not knowing either what he says or about what he makes confident assertion.
Of the same author, from the questions put to him by Theodore the monk. Nature is, according to the philosophers, a principle of motion and rest; but according to the Fathers, a species predicated of many things that differ in number, in respect of what sort of thing it is.
Οὐσία ἐστί, κατά μέν φιλοσόφους, αὐθυπόστατον πρᾶγμα μή δεόμενον ἑτέρου πρός σύστασιν· κατά δέ τούς Πατέρας, ἡ κατά πολλῶν καί διαφερόντων ταῖς ὑποστάσεσιν ὀντότης φυσική.
Ἄτομόν ἐστι, κατά μέν φιλοσόφους ἰδιωμάτων συναγωγή, ὧν τό ἄθροισμα ἐπ' ἄλλου θεωρεῖσθαι οὐ δύναται· κατά δέ τούς Πατέρας, οἷον Πέτρος ἤ Παῦλος, ἤ τις ἕτερος τῶν καθ᾿ αὑτά ἰδίοις προσωπικοῖς ἰδιώμασι τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἀφοριζόμενος.
Ὑπόστασις δέ ἐστιν, κατά μέν φιλοσόφους, οὐσία μετά ἰδιωμάτων· κατά δέ τούς Πατέρας, ὅ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον ἄνθρωπος, προσωπικῶς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἀφοριζόμενος.
Τοῦ ἁγίου Εἰρηναίου ἐπισκόπου Λουγδούνων, μαθητοῦ τοῦ ἁγίου Ἰωάννου τοῦ ἀποστόλου καί εὐαγγελιστοῦ, ἐκ τῶν πρός Δημάτριον διάκονον Βιαίνης περί πίστεως λόγων· οὗ ἡ ἀρχή, "Ζητῶν τόν Θεόν, ἄκουε τοῦ Δαυΐδ λέγοντος». ( Θέλησις καί ἐνέργεια Θεοῦ ἐστιν, ἡ παντός χρόνου καί τόπου καί αἰῶνος, καί πάσης φύσεως ποιοτική τε καί προνοητική αἰτία. Θέλησίς ἐστι τῆς νοερᾶς ψυχῆς, ὁ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν λόγος, ὡς αὐτεξούσιος αὐτῆς ὑπάρχουσα δύναμις. Θέλησις ἐστι νοῦς ὀρεκτικός καί διανοητική ὄρεξις πρός τό θεληθέν ἐπινεύουσα.. Κλήμεντος τοῦ Στρωματέως ἐκ τοῦ Περί Προνοίας λόγου. Θέλησις ἐστι φυσική δύναμις, τοῦ κατά φύσιν ὄντος ὀρεκτική. Θέλησίς ἐστι φυσική ὄρεξις, τῇ τοῦ λογικοῦ φύσει κατάλληλος. Θέλησίς ἐστι φυσική, αὐτοκράτορος νοῦ αὐτεξούσιος κίνησις· ἤ νοῦς περί τι αὐθαιρέτως κινούμενος. Αὐτεξουσιότης ἐστί νοῦς κατά φύσιν κινούμενονς ἤ νοερά τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησις αὐτοκρατής.
Substance is, according to the philosophers, a self-subsistent thing not needing another for its constitution; but according to the Fathers, the natural entity that is predicated of many and different things in their hypostases.
An individual is, according to the philosophers, a collection of properties whose aggregate cannot be observed in another; but according to the Fathers, for example Peter or Paul, or some other of those who are marked off from other men by their own personal properties.
A hypostasis is, according to the philosophers, a substance with properties; but according to the Fathers, the particular man, marked off personally from other men.
From the holy Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons, disciple of the holy John the apostle and evangelist, from his discourses On Faith addressed to Demetrius the deacon of Vienne, whose beginning is, "Seeking God, hear David saying." Will and energy of God is the productive and providential cause of every time and place and age, and of every nature. Will is, of the rational soul, the reason that is in our power, as being a self-determining power of it. Will is a desiring mind and a discursive desire assenting to what has been willed. Of Clement of the Stromateis, from the discourse On Providence. Will is a natural power, desiring what exists according to nature. Will is a natural desire, suited to the nature of the rational. Will is a natural, self-sovereign motion of the mind that is in its own power; or a mind moved of its own choice toward something. Self-determination is a mind moved according to nature, or a self-sovereign motion of the soul that is intelligent.
Τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀλεξάνδρου πάπα Ἀλεξανδρείας, ἐκ τῆς πρός Αἴγλωνα ἐπίσκοπον Κυνοπόλεως κατά Ἀρειανῶν Ἐπιστολῆς. Θέλησις ἐστι φυσική, παντός νοεροῦ αὐθαίρετος δύναμις, ὡς μηδέ κατά τήν οὐσίαν ἀκούσιον ἔχοντος.
Τοῦ ἁγίου Εὐσταθίου Πατριάρχου Ἀντιοχείας, ἐκ τοῦ Περί ψυχῆς λόγου. Θέλησίς ἐστι φυσική λόγου τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν κίνησις. Θέλησίς ἐστιν ὄρεξις λογική τε καί ζωτική.
( Τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀθανασίου πάπα Ἀλεξανδρείας, ἐκ τοῦ Περί πίστεως μείζονος λόγου.
Θέλησίς ἐστι ψυχῆς νοερᾶς αὐτεξούσιος κίνησις. Πρῶτον ἰδίωμα τῆς νοερᾶς ψυχῆς, καί τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς δηλωτικόν ἐστιν ἡ θέλησις. Νοῦς Κυρίου οὔπω Κύριος, ἀλλ᾿ ἤ θέλησις, ἤ βούλησις ἤ ἐνέργεια.
Τοῦ ἁγίου Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης, ἐκ τοῦ Κατά Ἀπολιναρίου λόγου. Θέλησίς ἐστι νοῦς τις, καί περί τι διάθεσις. Αὐτεξουσιότης ἐστίν, αὐτοκρατής τοῦ θελήματος κίνησις. Θέλησις ἐστί τῆς νοερᾶς ψυχῆς, τό κατ᾿ ἐξουσίαν αὐτήν αἱρεῖσθαι τῶν κατά γνώμην, διά τῆς προαιρετικῆς θελήσεως. Θέλησίς ἐστι πάσης λογικῆς φύσεως, ἡ κατά φύσιν αὐτῆς ζωή. Ἡ στέρησις τῆς οὕτω ζωῆς, οὐσίας ἐστίν ἀναίρεσις.
Of Saint Alexander, pope of Alexandria, from his Letter to Aeglon, bishop of Cynopolis, Against the Arians. Will is a natural power of every intelligent being, self-determining, so that not even according to substance does it possess anything involuntary.
Of Saint Eustathius, Patriarch of Antioch, from his Discourse On the Soul. Will is the natural movement of the reason within us. Will is a rational and living appetite.
Of Saint Athanasius, pope of Alexandria, from his Greater Discourse On the Faith. Will is the self-governing movement of the intelligent soul. The first property of the intelligent soul, and that which reveals its substance, is the will. The mind of the Lord is not yet Lord, but either will, or volition, or operation.
Of Saint Gregory, bishop of Nyssa, from his Discourse Against Apollinaris. Will is a certain mind, and a disposition concerning something. Self-determination is the sovereign movement of the will. Will is the power of the intelligent soul to choose, by its own authority, among things according to judgment, through the deliberative will. Will is, of every rational nature, its life according to nature. The privation of life so understood is the destruction of substance.
Τοῦ ἁγίου Διαδόχου ἐπισκόπου Φωτικῆς, ἐκ τοῦ ἕκτου κεφαλαίου τῶν Ἀσκητικῶν.
Αὐτεξουσιότης ἐστί, ψυχῆς λογικῆς θέλησις ἀκωλύτως γινομένη πρός ὅπερ βούληται.
Τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀναστασίου πατριάρχου Ἀντιοχείας. Θέλημα ἐστι, λόγος ἐν καρδίᾳ στρεφόμενος, δι᾿ ἐνεργείας καί μόνον φανερωθῆναι δυνάμενος. Θέλημά ἐστι βούλησις ψυχῆς [εἰ μή] οἴκοθεν ἀνακοπῆναι μή δυναμένη.
Τοῦ ἁγίου Νεμεσίου ἐπισκόπου Ἐμέσης.
Θέλησίς ἐστιν ὄρεξις βουλευτική τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν καί δι᾿ ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι δυναμένων, καί ἄδηλον ἐχόντων τό τέλος.
( Τοῦ αὐτοῦ· Κατά τί λογικός ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καί τί ἐνδιάθετος λόγος, καί τί προφορικός;
Ἐνδιάθετος λόγος ἐστί τό κίνημα τῆς ψυχῆς, τό ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λογιστικῷ γινόμενον, ἄνευ τινός ἐκφωνήσεως· ὅθεν πολλάκις σιωπῶντες, λόγον ὅλον παρ᾿ ἑαυτοῖς διεξερχόμεθα, καί ἐν τοῖς ὀνείροις διαλεγόμεθα. Κατά τοῦτο δέ μάλιστα λογικοί πάντες ἐσμέν· ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ὡς κατά τόν προφορικόν λόγον· Καί γάρ οἱ ἐκ γενετῆς κωφοί, καί οἱ διά πάθος, ἤ καί νόσημα τήν φωνήν ἀποβαλόντες, οὐδέ ἦττον λογικοί εἰσίν. Ὁ δέ προφορικός λόγος ἐν τῇ φωνῇ καί ἐν ταῖς διαλέκτοις τήν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει.
Of Saint Diadochus, bishop of Photice, from the sixth chapter of the Ascetic Works.
Self-determination is the will of a rational soul, proceeding unimpeded toward whatever it wishes.
Of Saint Anastasius, patriarch of Antioch. Will is a word turned over in the heart, able to be made manifest through action alone. Will is the volition of the soul, which cannot be checked from within.
Of Saint Nemesius, bishop of Emesa.
Will is a deliberative desire for things that are in our power and can come to be through us, and that have an unclear outcome.
(Of the same. In what respect is man rational, and what is the inner word, and what is the spoken word?
The inner word is the movement of the soul that takes place in the reasoning faculty itself, without any utterance; hence often, though silent, we run through an entire discourse within ourselves, and in dreams we converse. And it is chiefly in this respect that we are all rational—but not as by the spoken word; for those deaf from birth, and those who have lost their voice through suffering or disease, are nonetheless rational. The spoken word has its activity in the voice and in the dialects.
Τοῦ ἁγίου Μαξίμου, ἐκ τῶν περί θελημάτων αὐτοῦ συλλογισμῶν· τί φυσικόν θέλημα, καί τί γνωμικόν;
Θέλημά ἐστι φυσικόν, ἡ ἁπλῶς καί ὡσαύτως ἔχουσα τῶν κατά φύσιν συστατικῶν ὁρμή τε καί ἔφεσις. Θέλημα δέ γνωμικόν, ἡ τῶν καθ᾿ ἡδονήν συναγερτικῶν ποιά καί διάφορος κίνησίς τε καί ὄρεξις. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῆς πρός Μαρῖνον πρεσβύτερον ἐπιστολῆς, Τί θέλησις, καί τί προαίρεσις;
Θέλημά φασιν εἶναι φυσικόν, ἤγουν θέλησιν· Ζήτει ὄπισθεν ὁμοίως εἰς τήν αὐτήν ἐπιστολήν, περί βουλῆς καί γνώμης καί φρονήσεως καί δόξης καί ἐξουσίας. ΟΡΟΙ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΓΙΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΘΕΟΦΟΡΩΝ ΠΑΤΕΡΩΝ ΗΜΩΝ... Τῶν ἁγίων καί θεοφόρων Πατέρων ἡμῶν, περί τῶν δύο ἐνεργειῶν τοῦ Κυρίου καί Θεοῦ καί Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Τοῦ ἁγίου Ἰουστίνου φιλοσόφου, καί τέλος μάρτυρος, ἐκ τοῦ πρός Εὐφράσιον σοφιστήν, περί Προνοίας καί Πίστεως λόγου, οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· "Ἄχραντος ὁ Λόγος». ( Εἰ σύνδρομον ἔχει Θεός τῇ φύσει τήν θέλησιν, ὥσπερ και τήν ἐνέργειαν· ἀεί γάρ φύσει θελητικός καί ἐνεργητικός ὑπάρχει ὁ Θεός· οὐδέ τῶν θελητικῶν τῆς αὐτῆς αὐτῷ φυσικῆς ἔσται θελήσεως καί ἐνεργείας· ἐπεί καί φύσεως ἔσται πάντως τῆς αὐτῆς. Κατ᾿ ἐνέργειαν δέ καί φύσιν οὐκ οἶδεν ὁ Θεός περιγραφήν. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου.
Of Saint Maximus, from his collections on the wills: what is natural will, and what is gnomic will?
Natural will is the impulse and inclination of the natural constituents, simply and uniformly disposed. Gnomic will is the particular and varied movement and appetite of things that are gathered together according to pleasure. Of the same, from the letter to Marinus the presbyter: what is volition, and what is choice?
They say that natural will is volition; seek below likewise in the same letter, concerning counsel and opinion and prudence and belief and authority. DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF OUR HOLY AND GOD-BEARING FATHERS... Of our holy and God-bearing Fathers, concerning the two energies of our Lord and God and Savior Jesus Christ. Of Saint Justin the philosopher, and finally martyr, from the discourse to Euphrasius the sophist, on Providence and Faith, whose beginning is: "The Word is undefiled." (If God has will as a companion to nature, just as also energy—for God is always by nature willing and active—then the things that are willed will not belong to the same natural will and energy as he; since they will also be of the same nature entirely. But God knows no circumscription according to energy and nature. Of the same, from the same discourse.
Ἐνέργεια πάσης οὐσίας ἐστίν, ἡ προσφυής αὐτῇ ποιότης. Ἐνέργεια φυσική τε καί συστατική ἐστιν, ἡ ὁριστική διαφορά τῆς τοῦ δηλουμένου πράγματος φύσεως· ἧς χωρίς, κατ᾿ οὐδέν οὐδέν παντελῶς ἔχει, τήν τοῦ πῶς εἶναι διάγνωσιν. Ἐνέργεια φυσική ἐστιν, ἡ οὐσιώδης καί συστατική πάσης οὐσίας ποιότης· ἧς τό ἐστερημένον, καί πάσης οὐσίας ἐστέρηται. Ἐνέργεια φυσική ἐστι, δύναμις οὐσιώδης μή δέ μίαν ἑτέρου πρός ἕτερον ἐπιδέχεσθαι συγχωροῦσα κατά τήν οὐσίαν ἀλλοίωσιν. ( Ἐνέργεια φυσική ἐστιν ἡ ἀμιγῆ τήν οὐσιώδη πάντων πρός ἅπαντα διάκρισιν σώζουσα δύναμις.
Τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀλεξάνδρου, ἐκ τῆς πρός Αἴγλωνα ἐπίσκοπον Κυνοπόλεως κατά Ἀρειανῶν ἐπιστολῆς.
Ἐνέργεια φυσική ἐστιν, ἡ πάσης φύσεως ἔμφυτος κίνησις. Ἐνέργεια ἐστι φυσική, ὁ πάσης φύσεως οὐσιώδης καί γνωστικός λόγος. Ἐνέργειά ἐστι φυσική, ἡ δηλωτική ἡ πάσης οὐσίας δύναμις.
Γρηγορίου Νύσσης.
Ἐνέργεια λογικῆς ψυχῆς, ἐστί νοῦ κίνησις καί διάνοια. Ἐνέργειά ἐστι κίνησις οὐσιώδης χαρακτηριστική τῆς φύσεως, ἧς ἰδία καθέστηκε, δι᾿ ἧς γινώσκεται τῶν ἄλλων οὐσιωδῶς διαφέρουσα. Ἐνέργειά ἐστι κίνησις δραστική. Δραστικόν δέ λέγεται, τό ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον. Ἐνέργειαν γάρ ἡμεῖς εἶναι φαμεν, τήν φυσικήν ἑκάστης οὐσίας δύναμίν τε καί κίνησιν, ἧς χωρίς οὔτε ἔστιν, οὔτε γινώσκεται φύσις. Νοερῶν γάρ ἐστι, νόησις· αἰσθητικῶν, αἴσθησις, καθ᾿ ἥν, αὗταί τε
Energy is the natural quality belonging to every essence. Natural and constitutive energy is the definitive difference of the nature of the thing signified; without it, nothing has in any respect at all the discernment of how it is. Natural energy is the essential and constitutive quality of every essence; that which is deprived of it is deprived of every essence. Natural energy is an essential power that does not permit even a single alteration of one thing in relation to another according to essence. Natural energy is the power that preserves the essential distinction of all things in relation to all things unmingled.
Of Saint Alexander, from his letter to Aeglon, bishop of Cynopolis, against the Arians.
Natural energy is the innate motion of every nature. Natural energy is the essential and cognitive principle of every nature. Natural energy is the power that manifests every essence.
Of Gregory of Nyssa.
The energy of a rational soul is the motion and thought of the mind. Energy is the essential motion characteristic of the nature to which it properly belongs, through which it is known to differ essentially from other things. Energy is an active motion. And that which is moved of itself is called active. For we say that energy is the natural power and motion of each essence, without which a nature neither exists nor is known. For it belongs to intellectual beings to have intellection, and to perceptive beings perception, according to which these
καί τῶν ἐκτός ἐφάπτονται φυσικῶς, καί τοῖς ἐκτός ὑποπίπτουσι. Πτηνῶν, πτῆσις· νηκτῶν, νῆξις· ἑρπηστικῶν, ἕρψις· βαδιστικῶν, βάδισις· βλαστῶν, βλάστησις. Καί περιληπτικῶς εἰπεῖν, τό σημαντικόν ἑκάστης ἰδίωμα φύσεως, ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν φυσικήν. Ἧς μόνον ἐστέρηται, τό μή ὄν. Τό γάρ ὄν, οὐσίας τινός μετέχον, καί τῆς δηλούσης αὐτήν φυσικῶς μεθέξει πάντως δυνάμεως. Ὅρους γάρ τῶν οὐσιῶν, τάς φυσικάς αὐτῶν ἐνεργείας ὁ ἀληθής ἐπίσταται λόγος. Ἐνέργειά ἐστι ψυχῆς λογικῆς, οἰκεία τοῦ νοῦ διάνοιά τε καί κίνησις. Ἐνέργειά ἐστι ψυχῆς λογικῆς, ἡ κατά φύσιν αὐτῆς ζωή.
Τοῦ Χρυσοστόμου.
Οὐσιώδης ἐνέργειά ἐστι Θεοῦ, τό μηδαμοῦ εἶναι· οὐ τῷ μή ( εἶναι, ἀλλά τῷ ὑπερεῖναι τόπου καί χρόνου καί φύσεως· οἷς φυσικῶς ἀρχή συνεπινοεῖται καί πέρας καί γένεσις· ὅς ἐστι συνοχεύς καί ποιητής μόνῳ τῷ βούλεσθαι. Ἄνευ γάρ φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας, οὐδενός φύσις ἐπίδηλος. Οἷον γάρ ἑκάστῃ φύσει χαρακτῆρα γνωριστικόν ὁ Δημιουργός, τήν διακρίνουσαν αὐτήν τῶν ἄλλων, οὐσιωδῶς ἐναπέθετο κίνησιν.
And they naturally touch external things, and they fall under external things. Of birds, flight; of swimmers, swimming; of creeping things, creeping; of walkers, walking; of plants, sprouting. And to speak comprehensively, the distinctive mark signifying each nature, we call natural energy. Of this, only non-being is deprived. For being, partaking of some essence, will certainly also partake of the power that naturally reveals it. For the true account knows the natural energies of essences as their boundaries. Energy of a rational soul is the thought and movement proper to the mind. Energy of a rational soul is its life according to nature.
From Chrysostom.
The essential energy of God is to be nowhere; not by not being, but by being beyond place and time and nature—things to which beginning and end and generation are naturally co-conceived; he is the sustainer and maker of them by willing alone. For without natural energy, the nature of nothing is evident. For as a distinguishing mark of recognition for each nature, the Creator essentially implanted in it the movement that distinguishes it from others.
Τοῦ ἁγίου Κυρίλλου.
Ἐνέργεια θεοπρεπής καί δύναμίς ἐστι, τό εἶναι πανταχῆ, καί πληροῦν μέν ἀῤῥήτως τόν οὐρανόν· πληροῦν δέ αὖ πάλιν τήν γῆν, καί χωρεῖν μέν ἐν πᾶσι, χωρεῖσθαι δέ ἐπ᾿ οὐδενός. Οὐ γάρ περιληπτός, ἤ διαστήματι περιωρισμένος· ἀλλ᾿ οὐδέ περιγραφῆς τινος εἴσω. Παθεῖν γάρ τι τοιοῦτον ὁ ἄποσός τε καί ἐμεγέθης καί ἀσώματος οὐκ ἀνέχεται.
Τοῦ ἁγίου Βασιλείου.
Ἐπείπερ πάσης οὐσίας ὅρος, ἡ κατά φύσιν αὐτῆς ἐνέργεια καθέστηκε· πίστωσις ἀνάγουσα τόν νοῦν ἐπί τήν φύσιν, ἐξ ἧς ἔχει τήν πρόοδον, ὧν μία καί ἡ αὐτή ἐνέργεια, τούτων καί ἡ οὐσία μία.
Τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῶν κατ᾿ Εὐνομίου.
Πῶς ἑτερότης οὐσίας, ἐν ᾗ ταυτότης ἐνεργείας γνωρίζεται; Παρηλλαγμένων γάρ τῶν οὐσιῶν, παρηλλαγμένας εἶναι δεῖ καί τάς ἐνεργείας. Πῶς οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας τό Πνεῦμα τῷ Πατρί καί τῷ Υἱῷ, τό καί τῆς αὐτῆς ἐνεργείας. Πῶς ἑτερότης οὐσίας ἐν τῇ Τριάδι, ἐν ᾗ ταυτότης ἐνεργείας εὑρίσκεται; Εἰ γάρ κατά τήν ( οὐσίαν ἀπαραλλάκτως, ἕξει καί κατά τήν δύναμιν. Ὧν δέ ἡ δύναμις ἴση που πάντως καί ἡ ἐνέργεια· ὧν δέ ἡ φύσις μία, τούτων ἐνέργειαι αἱ αὐταί. Τοῦ ἁγίου Γρηγορίου Νύσσης.
Of Saint Cyril.
It is a God-befitting energy and power to be everywhere, and to fill heaven ineffably, and again to fill the earth, and to be contained in all things, yet to be contained by none. For it is not comprehensible, nor bounded by interval, nor within any circumscription. For the one who is without quantity and without magnitude and incorporeal does not admit of suffering any such thing.
Of Saint Basil.
Since the definition of every essence is its natural energy, a confirmation leading the mind up to the nature from which it has its procession; of those whose energy is one and the same, of these the essence is also one.
Of the same, from the works against Eunomius.
How can there be otherness of essence, where identity of energy is recognized? For if the essences are different, the energies must also be different. How is the Spirit not of the same essence as the Father and the Son, being also of the same energy? How can there be otherness of essence in the Trinity, in which identity of energy is found? For if they are indistinguishable in essence, they will also be so in power. And of those whose power is equal, in every way also the energy; and of those whose nature is one, of these the energies are the same. Of Saint Gregory of Nyssa.
Οὐκοῦν ἡ τῆς ἐνεργείας ταυτότης ἐπί Πατρός καί Υἱοῦ καί ἁγίου Πνεύματος δείκνυσι σαφῶς τό τῆς φύσεως ἀπαράλλακτον. Τοῦ δέ ἐνεργοῦντος τήν φύσιν, διά τῆς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν κατανοήσεως ἐπιγνῶναι δυνάμεθα. Τό δέ κοινόν τῆς φύσεως ἐνεργῶς ἀποδείκνυται, διά τῆς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ταυτότητος συνιστάμενον. Ἀλλά Θεός μέν ὁ Πατήρ, Θεός δέ ὁ Υἱός, Θεός δέ τό Πνεῦμα τό ἅγιον· εἷς δέ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κηρύγματι Θεός, διά τό μήτε φύσεως, μήτε ἐνεργείας θεωρεῖσθαί τινα διαφοράν ἐν
θεότητι. Εἰ οὖν καί ἐνέργεια καί δύναμις μία, πῶς ἐστιν ἑτερότητα φύσεως ὑπονοῆσαι, ἐν οἷς οὐδεμία κατά τήν δύναμίν τε καί τήν ἐνέργειαν διαφοράν ἐξευρίσκομεν.
Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη κατάλληλον εἶναι καί οἰκείαν ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει καί τήν προαίρεσιν· καί εἰ ἀνομοίως ἔχοιεν κατά τήν φύσιν, ἀνόμοια ἀεί εἶναι καί τά θελήματα. Τῆς δέ δυνάμεως ἐφ᾿ ἑκατέρων ἱκανῶς ἐχούσης, οὐδ᾿ ἕτερον ἀτονήσει πρός τήν ἐκπλήρωσιν τοῦ ἰδίου θελήματος. Οὐκοῦν ἐάν ἴδωμεν διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων τάς ἐνερεγείας τάς παρά τοῦ Πατρός τε καί τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος ἐνεργουμένας, διαφόρους εἶναι καί τάς ἐνεργούσας φύσεις ἐκ τῆς ἑτερότητος τῶν ἐνεργειῶν στοχαζόμεθα. Οὐ γάρ ἐνδέχεται τά διεστῶτα κατά τόν τῆς φύσεως λόγον, πρός τό τῶν ἐνεργειῶν εἶδος συνενεχθῆναι, οὔτε ψύχει τό πῦρ, οὔτε θερμαίνει ὁ κρύσταλλος. Ἀλλά τῇ τῶν φύσεων ἑτερότητι, συνδιαχωρίζονται ἀπ' ἀλλήλων καί αἱ παρά τούτων ἐνέργειαι.
Therefore the sameness of energy in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit clearly demonstrates the unvaryingness of nature. And by understanding the energies, we are able to recognize the nature of the one who acts. And the commonality of nature is actively demonstrated, being established through the sameness of the energies. But the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God; and in the same proclamation there is one God, because no difference is observed either of nature or of energy in the Godhead. If, then, both energy and power are one, how is it possible to suspect a difference of nature, in the case where we find no difference at all in power and energy?
It is entirely necessary to confess that the choice is also fitting and proper to the nature; and if they differ in nature, their wills will always be different as well. But since the power is sufficient in both, neither will be weak with respect to the fulfillment of its own will. Therefore, if we see the energies performed by the Father and by the Holy Spirit differing from one another, we infer from the difference of the energies that the natures which act are also different. For it is not possible for things that are distinct in the principle of their nature to be brought together into the same form of energies; neither does fire cool, nor does ice heat. But along with the difference of natures, the energies that come from them are also separated from one another.
Κυρίλλου.
Ἐνεργήσει γάρ ὁμοίως, τά τήν αὐτήν ἀλλήλοις λαχόντα φύσιν. ( Οἷς δέ ὁ τοῦ πῶς εἶναι λόγος ἐξηλλαγμένος, τούτοις ἄν εἴη, καί ὁ τῆς ἐφ᾿ ἅπασιν ἐνεργείας λόγος, οὐχ ὁ αὐτός. Τά τήν αὐτήν ἐνέργειαν ἔχοντα, καί ταῖς αὐταῖς δυνάμεσι φυσικαῖς ἀποκεχρημένα, τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι οὐσίας ἀνάγκη. Οὐδέν γάρ τῶν ὄντων πρός τό ἑτερογενές καί ἑτεροούσιον, τάς αὐτάς ἀπαραλλάκτως φορέσει δυνάμεις τε καί ἐνεργείας. Τά γάρ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐνεργείας ὄντα, καί τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ὁμολόγηται. Τά ἑτεροφυῆ καί ἑτερογενῆ τήν αὐτήν ἐνέργειαν ἔχειν, οὐκ ἄν τις δῴη σωφρονῶν. Οὐ γαρ ἄν ὕδατι πῦρ ἕν τι καί ταυτόν ἐνεργήσειεν· ἀλλ᾿ ὥσπερ ἀπεσχοινισμένον ἔχουσι τῆς οὐσίας καί τῆς ποιότητος τόν λόγον, οὕτω καί διάφορον συναποδώσουσι τήν ἐνέργειαν. Οἷς γάρ ἡ ἐνέργεια καί ἡ δύναμις ἀπαραλλάκτως μία, τούτοις ἀνάγκη καί τήν τοῦ εἴδους κοινότητα σώζεσθαι. Φιλεῖ γάρ τά τήν αὐτήν ἐνέργειαν ἔχοντα, τῆς αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν καί οὐσίας, καί τό ἑτεροφυές ἐν τούτοις ἀπίθανον. Οὐ γάρ δήπου μίαν εἶναι φυσικήν ἐνέργειαν δώσομεν Θεοῦ καί ποιήματος, ἵνα μήτε τό ποιηθέν εἰς τήν θείαν ἀναγάγωμεν οὐσίαν, μήτε μήν τῆς θείας φύσεως τό ἐξαίρετον, εἰς τόν τοῖς γεννητοῖς πρέποντα καταγάγωμεν τρόπον. Τά γάρ μίαν ἔχοντα τήν ἐνέργειαν, ἕνα καί τόν αὐτόν τοῦ πῶς εἶναι φορέσει λόγον. Τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀμβροσίου ἐπισκόπου Μεδιολάνων, ἐκ τοῦ πρός Γρατιανόν τόν βασιλέα δευτέρου λόγου.
Of Cyril.
For those that have obtained the same nature will also act in like manner. But those whose principle of being is different would also have a different principle of energy in all things, not the same. Those that have the same energy and employ the same natural powers must of necessity be of the same essence. For none of existing things will bear the same powers and energies without variation in relation to what is of a different kind and different essence. For things that are of the same energy are confessed also to be of the same essence. That things of different nature and different kind have the same energy, no one of sound mind would grant. For fire and water would not effect one and the same thing; but just as they have a distinct principle of essence and quality, so also will they yield a different energy. For those whose energy and power are one without variation, for these the community of form must also be preserved. For things that have the same energy are wont to be also of the same essence, and the difference of nature in these things is incredible. For surely we will not grant that there is one natural energy of God and of a creature, lest we either raise the created thing up to the divine essence, or bring down the pre-eminence of the divine nature to the manner befitting things generated. For things that have one energy will bear also one and the same principle of being. Of the holy Ambrose, bishop of Milan, from the second discourse to the emperor Gratian.
Πῶς γάρ ἡ αὐτή ἐνέργεια, ἐκ διαφόρου οὐσίας ἐστί; Μή γάρ οὕτως ἡ ἥττων ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ ἡ μείζων ἐνεργεῖ. Ἔνθα γάρ διάφορος οὐσία ἐστίν, ἀδύνατον μίαν ἐνέργειαν ὑπάρχειν.
Τοῦ ἁγίου Βασιλείου, ἐκ τῶν κατά Εὐνομίου συλλογισμῶν. Ἕτερόν ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεργήσας, καί ἕτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια, καί ἕτερον ( τό ἐνέργημα, καί ταῦτα πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διέστηκεν. Ὁ ἐνεργῶν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ πρός τό ἐνεργῆσαί τι κινούμενος. Ἐνέργεια δέ, οἱονεί κίνησις ἡ ἐνεργητική, καί αὐτή ἡ ὁρμή ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι τῆς προαιρέσεως, ἡ πρός τό ἐνεργῆσαί τι συντεινομένη καί νεύουσα, καί ἅμα τῷ ἑλέσθαι πεπαυμένη καί λήγουσα, καί θᾶττον κινηθεῖσα καί παραδραμοῦσα. Ἐνεργήματα δέ, τά ἐκ ταύτης ἀποτελούμενά τε καί ὑφιστάμενα.
For how can the same energy be from a different essence? For the lesser does not energize in the same way as the greater energizes. For where the essence is different, it is impossible for there to be one energy.
Of Saint Basil, from the syllogisms against Eunomius. One thing is the one who energized, and another is the energy, and another is the effect, and these differ from one another very greatly. For the one energizing is the one moved toward energizing something. But energy is, as it were, the energizing movement, and the impulse itself, so to speak, of the choice, which strains and inclines toward energizing something, and together with the choice has ceased and come to an end, and having been moved more swiftly and run past. But effects are the things accomplished and subsisting from it.