Institutio elementaris

Elementary Introduction of Dogmas An elementary introduction of dogmas from the voice of John, humble monk, to John, the most holy bishop of Laodicea. Prologue. In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, of the one trihypostatic and worshipful divinity, of the consubstantial and life-originating Trinity, of the one God, from whom every good gift and every perfect endowment descends from above to us, I, the sinful and wretched one, open my stammering and slow-tongued lips, trusting in Him, that for the humility of those who have requested the discourse and for the benefit of the hearers, the Lord of grace and the steward of all good things, who is God over all, blessed unto the ages, will give a spirit of wisdom and speech at the opening of my mouth. Amen. 1. On essence and nature and form. Essence and nature and form are, according to the holy fathers, the same. And again, hypostasis and person and individual are the same. And difference and quality and property are the same. Concerning these, then, and such things, it is our purpose to speak, about which your holiness has condescendingly inquired. Beginning, therefore, we speak thus concerning essence and nature and form. There is a super-essential essence and nature and form, the incomprehensible divinity; and its hypostases and persons are Father, Son, and the all-holy Spirit; for each of them is a perfect hypostasis and a perfect person. Furthermore, every creature of God is an essence. But there are many creatures, and they have great difference from one another.

For an angel is one creation and a human another, and an ox is different and a dog different, heaven is one thing and earth another, and fire is one thing and air another and water another; and to speak simply, there are many species among the creatures. Each species, then, is one nature, for example all humans are one nature, and all angels are one nature, and all oxen are one nature; similarly for the remaining creatures. And the nature of angels is one, and that of humans another, and that of oxen another; likewise for the rest. 2 On hypostasis and person and individual. Since there are many humans, each individual human is a hypostasis, for example Adam is a hypostasis, and Eve is another hypostasis, and Seth is another hypostasis. Similarly for the rest. Each human is a hypostasis different from the other humans, and each ox is a hypostasis, and each angel is a hypostasis. So that nature and form and essence are the common and that which encompasses the consubstantial hypostases, while hypostasis and individual and person are the particular, that is, each of those contained under the same species. 3 On difference and quality and property. We have said that there are many species and different essences, and likewise within each essence and species there are different hypostases. Therefore each essence differs from the other essence, and each hypostasis from the other hypostasis. That thing, then, by which essence differs from essence and species from species or hypostasis from hypostasis, is called difference and

quality and property, for example, a human differs from an angel in that an angel is immortal, but a human is mortal; the immortal and the mortal are a difference and a quality and a property. Again, Adam differs from Seth, in that Adam is the father of Seth, but Seth is the son of Adam. Fatherhood and sonship, then, are differences; for in these Adam and Seth differ from each other. And all such things are called differences and qualities and properties, for example, the rational and the irrational, the mortal and the immortal, the bipedal, the quadrupedal, the sentient and the insentient, the snub-nosed and the hook-nosed, the white and the black, the long and the short, and all such things. 4 On essential and non-essential difference, that is, natural difference and accident. Every thing by which one species differs from another species and one substance from another substance is called an essential and natural and constitutive difference and quality and natural property and property of nature. For example, an angel and a human differ from each other according to the immortal and the mortal; the immortal is an essential and natural and constitutive difference of the angel and a natural property. Likewise also the mortal of the human. Again, a human and an ox differ from each other, in that a human is rational, but an ox is irrational.

Behold, the rational is an essential and constitutive difference of a human, but the irrational is that of an ox. Similarly also in the case of the remaining species and substances and natures and forms. Everything in which a hypostasis differs from a conspecific and consubstantial hypostasis is called an accidental difference and quality and hypostatic property and characteristic property, that is, an accident; for example, a human differs from another human in that one is tall and the other short, one is white and the other black, one is healthy and the other ill, one is a father and the other a son. These and all such things are accidental differences and qualities and hypostatic and characteristic properties and accidents. And to speak simply, all things that are observed similarly in all hypostases under the same species and without which it is impossible for the substance and the species to subsist are called an essential difference; but those that are present in some of the conspecific hypostases and are not present in others are accidents and accidental. 5. On the separable and inseparable accident. Of accidents, some are separable, others inseparable. Inseparable are those in which a hypostasis differs from another hypostasis, but does not differ from itself; for example, a certain human differs from another human in that he himself is snub-nosed and the other is hook-nosed, in that one is blue-eyed and the other black-eyed. But he himself does not differ from himself; for the snub-nosed is always snub-nosed and the hook-nosed is always hook-nosed, and it is not possible for the same person to be at one time snub-nosed and at another time hook-nosed. These are called inseparable accidents because, when they come to be in someone, they are no longer separated from him. Nevertheless, they are accidents.

For it is possible both not to be snub-nosed and to be a human, and not to be hook-nosed and to be a human; for not every human is snub-nosed nor is every human hook-nosed, but every human is rational, and he who is not rational is not a human. Separable are those which the same human, that is, the same hypostasis, sometimes has and sometimes does not have, such as being ill and being healthy, sitting and standing, rejoicing and grieving, and the like. 6 On Homoousia and Heteroousia. Homoousia and homophyē and symmorphia and homoeidē and homogeneia are those which are under the same form and under the same substance, such as Peter, Paul, and the rest.

individual humans and all oxen and all dogs, and similarly the rest. Things that are under another and another species and another and another substance—such as human and horse and ox and dog and the like—are heteroousian, heterophyē, heteromorphic, heteroeidetic, and heterogeneic. 7 On genus and species. Genus is divided into species, for example, animal into rational or irrational; behold, animal is the genus of rational and irrational, while rational and irrational are species of animal. Again, rational is divided into mortal—human—and immortal—angel. Rational is the genus of mortal and immortal, while mortal and immortal are species of rational. So that what is said may become clearer, let us make the account from above. Genus is the most generic: the first genus, which, being a genus, is not a species because it has no other genus above it; the most specific species is the last and subordinate species, which, being a species, is not a genus because it has no other species cut from it. Between the most generic genus and the most specific species there are both genera and species—genera in relation to those below, species in relation to those above—which are called subaltern. For example, the most generic genus is substance; for it has no other genus above it, therefore it is not a species. This is divided into body and incorporeal; body is cut into animate and inanimate; animate is cut into sentient and insentient; sentient into rational and irrational; rational into mortal and immortal. Thus the incorporeal is rational and immortal.

By “incorporeal” here I mean a substance such as soul, angel, demon; each of these is a most specific species. A body that is animate and sentient is an animal; a rational mortal animal is a human, who is a most specific species; an irrational barking animal is a dog, which is a most specific species. Then a body that is animate but insentient is a plant. A body that is wholly inanimate is earth, air, water, fire, each of which exists as a most specific species. For greater clarity we speak thus. Substance, which contains in a superessential manner the uncreated divinity and cognitively and comprehensively the whole creation, is the most generic genus. This is either incorporeal and intellectual and immortal, as God, angel, soul, demon; or an inanimate body, as fire, air, water, earth; or a vegetative body, as vine, palm, olive and the like; or an animate sentient body, that is, an animal, as horse, dog, elephant and the like; or a composite of body and incorporeal soul, as a human. Of these, substance as primary and more universal and comprehensive of all is the most generic genus. The species of this most generic genus are the incorporeal, the inanimate body, the vegetative body, the animate and sentient body, that is, the animal. These are called subaltern species and genera; for they are species of substance as cut from it. Each of them is divided into other species and is comprehensive and more universal than them.

For the incorporeal substance contains God, angel, soul, demon; the inanimate body contains earth, water, air, fire; the vegetative body contains vine, olive, palm and the like; the animate and sentient body, that is the animal, contains horse, ox, dog and the like, and also the human being composed of incorporeal soul and body. Thus father, son, and the holy spirit are a hypostasis and an individual and a person; their encompassing species is the superessential and incomprehensible divinity. Further, Michael, Gabriel, and the other individual angels are hypostases; their encompassing species is the angelic nature. Further, Peter, Paul, John, and the other individual humans are hypostases; their encompassing species is humanity. Again, hypostases

There are such and such an individual and such and such a horse; and their encompassing species is horse simply. Again, there are hypostases such and such a plant of the olive; and their encompassing species is olive simply. It must be understood, therefore, that only the encompassing forms of individuals are called most specific species, such as angel, man, horse, dog, olive, palm, and the like; while the encompassing forms of the most specific species are called only genera and subaltern species, such as incorporeal, body, inanimate, insentient, vegetative, animate, sentient, animal, rational, irrational, mortal, immortal, biped, quadruped, creeping, winged, and all such things—those which contain the most specific species and are their genera and constitutive differences, but are themselves contained by the most generic genus, which is substance. And otherwise we must treat of the same things. All things that came to be by one command of God are of one genus, for example: God commanded fish to come to be, and many differences of fish came to be; all fish are of one genus, and each difference of fish is a species. Again, God commanded the waters to bring forth birds, and many differences of birds came to be; all birds are of one genus, and each difference of birds is a species of that genus of birds. Similarly also with creeping things, cattle, wild beasts, herbs, vegetables, and trees.

It is also said that there is one genus of all animals, and one genus of all plants, and one genus of things completely inanimate and lacking entirely any augmentative or nutritive power, and again one genus of incorporeal things and one genus of bodies. And all creation is also said to be one genus, and the differences among creatures are many species under the genus of creation, and all substance is one genus. 8 On Energy. Energy is a kinetic activity of that which acts. Natural energy is a kinetic activity of nature, such as the rational motion of the mind, the vital, the sensitive, the nutritive, the augmentative, the generative, and motion according to impulse, that is, the motions of the body, and the imaginative, the recollective, the spirited, the desiderative, and the volitional, that is, the appetitive, and such things. This is fivefold: either intellectual, as in the case of angels and all incorporeal substances, which understand by simple application; or rational, as in the case of humans, who are composed of an incorporeal soul and a body, understanding not by simple but by varied and discursive application; or vital, as in the case of irrational animals, which have sensation but do not reason or understand; or vegetative, as in the case of insensate things that have nutritive, augmentative, and generative power; or wholly inanimate, as in the case of earth and stones, which have neither vital nor nutritive nor augmentative power, but are not devoid of certain natural energies. 9 On Passion. Passion is a natural passive motion of that which undergoes.

This is an activity of nature, but a passion of that about which the activity occurs, such as generation, joy, grief, anguish, distress, fear, hesitation, fatigue, sleep, pleasure, pain, anger, desire, cutting, flux, and corruption, and the like. These and similar passions are natural and blameless, not being within our power. Only sin is contrary to nature, a voluntary and self-willed passion of the soul, most evil and corruptive. 10 On the will. Will is a natural rational appetite. And again, will is a natural rational and self-determined appetitive motion of the mind. For irrational beings do not move self-determinedly toward appetite; for appetite moves in them naturally, and since they lack reason to preside over them, they are led by nature, being overcome by its appetite. Hence they immediately rush to action, unless hindered by something else. Therefore they are not self-determined, but subject to another. But the rational nature has the power to yield to natural appetite or not to yield but to overcome it, and the nature manifests a desire for life, which is natural and yields to reason.

For many, having overcome this by the governing reason, have voluntarily gone to death and deferred the desire for food and sleep and the rest, leading nature by self-determined reason, not being led by it. Just as natural desire is inherent in every sentient nature, so self-determination is inherent in every rational nature; for everything rational is self-determined, and this is what is according to the image of God. Will, therefore, is a natural or rational and self-determined appetitive power and motion. The objects underlying will, which will desires, are called gnomic wills; for the self-determined mind rushes by its own judgment to the use of these. These are such things as to eat or not to eat, to drink or not to drink, to travel or not to travel, to marry or not to marry, and the like, which are in our power, which we can do and also their opposites.

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