Fragmenta philosophica

PHILOSOPHICAL [CHAPTERS] On Voice. Since our aim is to discuss, simply put, every philosophical voice, we must first know about what sort of voices philosophy is concerned with. Making the beginning of our account from voice itself, we say that voice is either meaningless or meaningful. And meaningless is that which signifies nothing, while meaningful is that which signifies something. Then again, meaningless voice is either inarticulate or articulate. Inarticulate is that which cannot be written, while articulate is that which can be written. So a meaningless and inarticulate voice is, for example, the noise or the clatter made by a stone, say, or a piece of wood; for it is neither written nor signifies anything. A meaningless but articulate voice is, for example, "tragelaphos," "skindapsos"; for these are written, but they signify nothing, since neither a tragelaphos nor a skindapsos ever existed or exists. So then, about meaningless voice, both inarticulate and articulate, philosophy has no account to give. Meaningful voice, in turn, is either inarticulate or articulate. Inarticulate meaningful voice is, for example, the barking of dogs; for this signifies the dog, since it is a dog's voice, and it also signifies the presence of someone. But it is inarticulate because it is not written. So philosophy has no account to give about this either. Meaningful and articulate voice is either particular or universal: particular, for example, Peter, Paul; universal, for example, man. So philosophy has no account to give about the particular either, but about the meaningful and articulate and universal—that is, the common and predicated of many. This in turn is either essential or non-essential. Essential is that which is declarative of the essence, that is, the nature, of things.

The accidental [voice] is the one that makes clear the attributes, for example, man is a mortal rational animal. All these are essential. For if you remove any of these from man, he will not be man. For if you say that he is not an animal, he is no longer man. And if you say "he is not rational," he is not man. Likewise also, if you say "he is not mortal," he is not man; for every man is both an animal and rational and mortal. Therefore these are called essential, because they themselves complete the nature of man and it is impossible for man to subsist without them. Likewise also in the case of each thing, the things that constitute its nature are called essential, while the attributes are called accidental, which can be present in man and not be present, for example, white; for even if someone is not white, he has not lost being man. Likewise also black and such things. The essential voice, then, either makes clear what something is or what sort of thing it is, for example, when asked "what is man?" we say "animal," then when asked "what sort of animal?" we say "rational mortal." The essential voice, then, that makes clear what sort of thing it is is called difference. And the one that makes clear what it is either signifies many species and makes the genus, such as substance (for substance signifies both man and horse and ox; for each of them is called and is a substance, but is another species) or makes clear many things differing from one another in number, but in no way in species, and makes the species.

For example, "man" signifies many, that is, all individual human beings, who differ from one another in number (for Peter is one and Paul another, and they are not one but two), but they do not differ in species; for all are both called and are human beings. Therefore the more particular, such as Peter, is an atom, a person, and a hypostasis, which signifies a particular someone. For when asked "who is this?" we say "Peter," which also subsists in itself. That which contains all the atoms is called species, and it is more universal than the atom, because it contains many atoms, for example "man." For it contains both Peter and Paul and all individual human beings, which is called nature and form and essence according to the fathers. That which contains many species is called genus, for example "animal"; for it contains man, ox, horse, and it is more universal than the species. The fathers called species and genus nature and form and essence. The essential voice either belongs to one species or to many. And if it belongs to one species, it is called a property, as the capacity for laughter; for the capacity for laughter belongs only to man, and the capacity for neighing to the horse. If it belongs to many species, it produces the accident, for example "white"; for this belongs to man and horse and dog and other species, which are many and differ in species. And these are the five voices, to which every philosophical voice is reduced. These, then, we must know: what each signifies, and in what they share with one another and in what they differ. And they are these: genus, species, difference, property, accident.

A genus is what is predicated in the what-it-is of many things that differ in species; a species is what is predicated in the what-it-is of many things that differ in number; a differentia is what is predicated of many things that differ in species in the what-sort-of-thing-it-is and is taken in the definition as essential. One must know that this is called essential and natural and constitutive and divisive and species-making and most properly a differentia and a quality. A property is what belongs to one species alone and to every member of that species and always. An accident is what is predicated of many things that differ in species in the what-sort-of-thing-it-is and is not taken [in the definition], but can both belong to something and not belong. This is also called a non-essential differentia and quality; about these we shall learn more precisely, with God's help, in what follows, where the treatment is. An individual is what subsists in itself from substance and accidents, separated in number from things of the same species, not signifying what something is but who someone is.

Concerning the ten most general genera, which they call categories, it must be known that of things spoken, some are spoken simply and without combination, such as substance, accident, and the like, while others are spoken with combination, as "a horse runs," as "Socrates philosophizes." Our purpose here is to discuss simple expressions, through simple concepts that signify simple things. Each of the things spoken simply is, in itself by itself, in no affirmation, and much less in a negation. But by the combination of these with one another, affirmation and negation arise; for affirmation is composed of at least two expressions, as "Plato walks." Negation comes about by the addition of the negative particle, that is, "Plato does not walk." Combination comes about either in power, as "I live"—for it has the power of two expressions; for the one who says "I live" signifies "I myself live," and the one who says "you live" signifies "you yourself live"—or in sound, as "a man walks." Of things spoken simply and without combination, one signifies substance, such as man, horse; another quantity, such as two, three, two cubits, three cubits; another relation, as father, son; another quality, as white, black; another where, as in a temple, in the marketplace; another when, as last year, yesterday, today; another being situated, as to stand, to sit; another having, as to be armed, to be shod; another doing, as to burn, to cut; another suffering, as to be burned, to be cut. These ten are called categories, as from agoreuo, that is, lego; for they are expressions predicated of simple things, and these they signify through simple concepts.

1 substance, 2 quantity, 3 relation, 4 quality, 5 place, 6 time, 7 position, 8 possession, 9 action, 10 passion. Substance is divided into body and incorporeal, body into animate and inanimate, and animate some divide into perceptive and non-perceptive, others into animal, zoophyte, and plant; for an animal is nothing other than an animate, perceptive substance. Again, animal is divided into rational and irrational, rational into mortal and immortal, mortal into human, horse, dog, and the like. Substance, then, is the most general genus because it has no other genus before it predicated of it synonymously; and we said "synonymously" on account of being. For being is before it and is more universal than it; for being signifies not only substance but also accident. And being is divided into substance and accident, since all things are under being; for non-being is not among all things at all. But even if being is before substance, nevertheless it is not its genus; for being is not predicated synonymously of substance. A synonymous predication is when the subject receives both the name and the definition of the predicate, that is, of the term above it. Substance receives the name of being, but it cannot receive its definition. Substance, then, is the most general genus, while human, horse, and the like are most specific species because they are not cut into other species; for even if human is cut into male and female, these are not species; for they are of the same substance. But it is impossible for a species to be of the same substance as a species.

The things between the most specific species—that is, man—and the most general genus—that is, substance—are called both genera and species, subordinate to one another: species of those before them, that is, of those above, but genera of those after them, that is, of those below. For example, body is a species of substance but a genus of the animate; the animate is a species of body but a genus of the animal; the animal is a species of the animate but a genus of the rational; the rational is a species of the animal but a genus of the mortal; the mortal is a species of the rational but a genus of man. And man is called a species of the mortal and of the individuals under it; again he is called a species and no longer a genus. And substance is called only a genus, and no longer also a species. For this reason, then, substance is called the most general genus, and man the most specific species. And every genus that has no other genus before it is called the most general, and every species that has no other species under it and is not a genus is the most specific. So every thing immediately before the individuals, that is, the nearest, is only a species and no longer also a genus. On quantity. Quantity is a heap of units and not a division but rather a conjunction. Of quantity, one kind is continuous, the other discrete. Discrete is that whose parts do not join toward some common boundary, as two palm trees; continuous is that whose parts join toward some common boundary, for example one piece of wood three cubits long. Under discrete quantity are ranged number and speech: number, for example, two, three, and the like; for the parts of two, which are one and one, do not have a common boundary joining them.

And speech measured by syllables is classed under discrete quantity; for syllables do not have a common boundary joining them. Under continuous quantity are classed line, surface, body, place, and time. Line, surface, body, place, and time are classed under continuous quantity; for the parts of each of them join at some common boundary—of a line at a point, of a surface at a line, of a body at a surface. For a point is without quantity. A line has one dimension; for it is length without breadth. A surface has two dimensions, length and breadth. A body has three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. Place is the limit of the containing body, insofar as the contained is contained by a limit, for example the air contains the body. So the end of the air that contains the body is called the place of the body, and not the whole air, so that place is the surface of the air containing the body, and thus it is classed under continuous quantity as a surface. The parts of place join at a line as at a surface. The parts of time join at the now; for the now, being without quantity, is the limit of the past and the beginning of the future. It should be known that a surface is the outer part of a body, from the fact of appearing. This is either equal and even and smooth and is called a plane, or curved and unequal and uneven and is called simply a surface. It should be known that body, surface, and line are under one thing and simultaneous, while time and place are about them. Place especially is of quantity.

Some are positional, and some are non-positional. Positional indicates that the parts lie somewhere and persist alongside one another; it also has a certain continuity and interconnection with respect to one another. Non-positional things are those that are not like this but are disposed in the opposite way. Under the positional are classed line, surface, body, and place; for the parts of each of these remain and lie somewhere and have continuity with respect to one another—the parts of the line in the surface, those of the surface in the body, those of the body in place, and those of place in body as in a surface. Non-positional are number, speech, and time: number and speech, because their parts have neither continuity nor lie anywhere, nor do their parts persist. The parts of time, even if they have continuity, nevertheless do not persist nor lie anywhere. Number is twofold: one is in the numbers, the other in the things numbered, as a pint measure—the one is the bronze measure that measures, the other is the thing measured, such as wine or something else of that sort. The number that numbers is not positional, but the number that is numbered is positional. Every quantity is both a measure and measurable. It should be known that quantity is the measure itself and the number that measures and numbers. Speech, time, place, body, surface, and line are not quantity but quantified things, as underlying quantity and being measured and numbered, just as also the number that is numbered, that is, the wine and such things. Some underlie continuous quantity as being numbered continuously, others discrete quantity as being measured and numbered discretely; therefore they are called quantified things and not quantity.

And strictly speaking, these seven are called quantities, but we call quantities by accident the things observed in them, such as action, motion, whiteness, and the like; for example, if the action and the motion occur in much time, we say much action and much motion, but if in little, little; likewise also, if whiteness be in a large body, we say much white, but if in a small one, little. And Aristotle also refers motion, taken by itself, under quantity. Under quantity is also referred inclination, because the "most" is observed in it. The property of quantity is the equal and the unequal; but lightness and heaviness are under quality. Concerning relatives. Relatives are said of such things as, being what they are, are said to be of other things, or in any other way in relation to another, that is, whatever are said to be of others or in relation to another, whether to the genitive or to another case; for this is what "in any other way" means, that is, in whatever case; for relatives are said not only with respect to the genitive, but sometimes also with respect to the same case, whether genitive or dative, both the attribution and the counter-attribution, for example, the double is double of the half, and the half is half of the double, with respect to the genitive; but with respect to the dative, the like is like to the like; or the attribution is with respect to the genitive and the counter-attribution with respect to the dative, the attribution for example knowledge is knowledge of the knowable, and the counter-attribution: the

...or in relation to a straight line, for example, a mountain is great in relation to something small, and much in relation to little; for no one says "great in relation to a small" or "much in relation to a little." Of things in relation to something, some are named by the same name, as a friend is a friend of a friend, and the like is like to the like, and such things; others are named differently. And of these, some are by excess and defect, under which are brought the species of the multiple, as the greater is greater than the lesser; others are by the judging and the judged, as knowledge is knowledge of the knowable, habit is habit of the thing had, perception is perception of the perceptible, and likewise disposition and position and reclining and sitting and standing; for the genus of these is position. And under whichever category the genus is, under that same category the species of the genus are also brought. But to sit and to lie and to stand, as paronyms and infinitives, are not brought under things in relation to something; for they are not position. Others are by capacity and incapacity—capacity, as the heating and the heated; incapacity, as by privation of capacity, when we say that sight has an incapacity to see the starless sphere. Others are by cause and caused, as a father is father of a son. Others are by reference to the genus, as we say that grammar is under things in relation to something, not insofar as it is grammar but insofar as it is knowledge; for knowledge is the genus of grammar, and knowledge is knowledge of the knowable. Likewise also reclining and sitting and standing, for the genus of these is position, and virtue because of habit; for virtue is a habit. Concerning quality and quality: Quality is that by which certain things are named qualified, or quality is that by which the things that partake of it are spoken of paronymously.

For from prudence the one who has prudence is called prudent, and the one who partakes of heat is called hot. It must be known that "of what sort" (poion) is more universal than "quality" (poiotēs); for "of what sort" signifies both the quality and the thing partaking of it, whereas "quality" does not signify the thing partaking of it. The same holds also for "quantity" (poson) and "quantum" (posotēs). Quality is among things spoken of in many ways, not as homonymous but as synonymous. For the name "dog," spoken homonymously, is not a common genus of the land animal, the sea animal, and the star; but quality, being a genus, is predicated synonymously of the species under it; for its species receive both its name and its definition. Of qualities, some belong to ensouled bodies, such as sciences and virtues, diseases and healths, and they are called states and dispositions; others belong to both ensouled and soulless things, such as heat, cold, form, shape, power and weakness. Of these, some are in potentiality and some in actuality; and if in potentiality, they produce power and weakness; but if in actuality, either they have penetrated through the depth, as heat through the whole of fire and whiteness through the whole of milk and snow, and they produce the third species, affection and affective quality, or they are on the surface and produce the fourth species, shape and form. On the difference of union. Union comes about in different ways:

For mixture occurs either by blending, as with different flours stirred up and mixed together; or by gluing, as with bronze and lead; or by jointing, as with stones or wood; or by confusion, as with things that melt and metals, as with wax and pitch, and as with gold and silver; or by commingling, as with liquids, wine perhaps and water, or wine and honey. For union by composition is the mutual interpenetration of the parts without destruction, as is the case with soul and body, which union some have called blending or connatural growth; for things that coexist have such a nature as even to be united with the things able to receive them, as things corrupted together and united remain unconfused and incorruptible and unchangeable, as things placed side by side. The soul, then, is not in the body, but the body is in the soul. It must be known that some of the fathers did not accept the name of blending in the case of the mystery according to Christ, but all accepted union by composition. There is also union by juxtaposition; and it resembles union by jointing. Again, union is called personal when someone, putting on the person of another, makes the statements on his behalf in place of him, and relative union, as of friend with friend. But Nestorius invents other unions too—I mean according to worth and identity of will and equality of honor and good pleasure and sameness of name. On division. Division is the first cut of the thing, for example, animal is divided into rational and irrational. Subdivision is the second cut of the same thing, for example, animal is divided into mortal and immortal.

Subdivision is the cutting of a branch, for example, when an animal has been divided into rational and irrational, the rational is divided into mortal and immortal. But division and subdivision do not occur in all cases, but only when not all things are contained under the first division; for example, when an animal is divided into rational and irrational, there are found among rational beings herbivores, that is, those that eat plants, and likewise among irrational beings carnivores. Necessarily, then, we make a subdivision, that is, a second cut of the same animal, saying: Animal is divided into herbivore and carnivore. The modes of division are eight: either as genus into species, as when you divide animal into rational and irrational; or as species into individuals, for example, man into Peter and Paul and the remaining individual men; or as whole into parts, and this in two ways, either into homogeneous parts or into heterogeneous parts. A homogeneous part is when the parts admit both the name of the whole and of one another and the definition, for example, flesh is divided into many fleshes, and each part of the flesh is called flesh and admits the definition of flesh. A heterogeneous part is the opposite, when the thing cut admits neither the name nor the definition, neither of the whole nor of one another, as if you were to divide Socrates into hands and feet and head; for the foot cut off from Socrates is neither called Socrates nor admits the definition of Socrates. Or as an equivocal term into different meanings; and this again in two ways: for it signifies either a whole or a part. And a whole, as the term dog;

For it is applied to a whole—of a land dog and a star dog and a sea dog, which are a kind of whole and not a part of an animal. But as a part, when the name of the tongue is applied both to the tip of a shoe and to the reed pipe and to the tasting organ of animals, which are parts and not wholes. —Or as substance into accidents, as when I say: Of humans, some are white and some are black. —Or as accident into substances, as when I say: Of white things, some are animate and some inanimate. —Or as accident into accidents, as when I say: Of cold things, some are white and some are black. —Or as things from one and toward one. From one, as from medicine a medical book, a medical drug; for from one thing, medicine, they were named medical. Toward one, as a healthful drug, a healthful food; for they look toward one thing, health. Of things from one, some are said to be from some cause, as the image of a human is said to be from the true cause, the human, while others are said to be named from something, as a medical book and the like. But one must know that in no single mode of division is the naturally prior and posterior observed in the segments, nor the more and less, except in things from one and toward one and from which the naming comes. But what is naturally prior, you will find by seeking in the teaching concerning the prior; for our soul has two

Powers. 8 On Philosophy. There are six definitions of philosophy. Philosophy is the knowledge of beings insofar as they are beings, that is, of their nature, and the knowledge of things divine and human, and the meditation of death—of death in the sense of the voluntary, as they say, but I say also of the natural—and the assimilation to God as far as is possible for a human being. And we are assimilated to God in respect of what is just and holy; now the just is that which distributes equality, that is, neither to do injustice nor to suffer it, while the holy is that which is beyond the just, that is, the good, namely to suffer injustice rather than to do it. And it is the art of arts and the science of sciences; for philosophy is the beginning of every art. And it is the love of wisdom; and true wisdom is God; therefore the love directed toward God, this is true philosophy. And philosophy is divided into the theoretical and the practical; the theoretical into the theological, the mathematical, and the physical; the mathematical into arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy; and the practical into the ethical, the economic, and the political. Now the theoretical is to comprehend both the incorporeal and the immaterial, that is, concerning God, who is primarily and properly immaterial; then also concerning angels and demons and souls, which are themselves also called immaterial in relation to the body, even if in relation to the properly immaterial, that is, the divine, they are material—which is the theological part. And to contemplate also the nature of material things, that is, of animals and plants and stones and the like—which is the physical part. And to contemplate also the things intermediate between these, which are sometimes contemplated in matter and sometimes apart from matter, and are intermediate between the immaterial and the material—which is the mathematical part.

For number in itself is immaterial, but it is also contemplated in matter, that is, in grain; for we say "ten bushels of grain," and likewise in other cases. Practical character adorns and teaches how one ought to conduct oneself as a citizen; and if it educates one man, it is called ethical, if a whole household, it is called economic, and if an entire city, it is called political. 9 Various Definitions. Dogma is the true piety's inquiry, an unerring and unerring discernment, or a release from error in words. A universal dogma is an opinion set before all without compulsion, and a contradiction of another and an overthrow of the worse. A definition is a concise account declarative of the whole underlying essence of the thing. A definition is an account beyond which the thing of which it is cannot proceed, because it is known in it and in it alone. A definition is a declaration of a thing through an account, without which neither what it is nor that it is can be known. A definition is a concise account declarative of the nature of the underlying thing. A definition is that up to which anything at all comes and there terminates. —A description is a concise account declarative of accidents, that is, one that declares the underlying subject from its accidents and properties. —A definition differs from a term, because a definition is more particular, while a term is more universal; for a term signifies both the definition and the boundary and that of which it is the limit. A term is also spoken of as that into which a proposition is resolved; but a definition indicates only the concise account declarative of the nature of the underlying thing.

A description differs from a definition in that a definition is taken from essential attributes, while a description is taken from non-essential attributes, that is, accidents; but a descriptive definition is taken from both essential and non-essential attributes. It is a virtue of a definition to convert, and a vice not to convert. The definable is the subject of the definition, that is, the thing being defined; the indefinable is only the uncreated (for every creature is defined by the Creator), while the hard-to-define is that which exists in transformation and not according to essence, that is, what appears, as in the case of angels and demons and the soul. The definition of definitions is that which defines all things but is itself defined by nothing. Union is the concurrence of different things. On the difference of reason. Reason is that which is always essentially present with the Father. Reason is internal, that which is spoken in the heart. Reason is the messenger of thought and without subsistence. The one, then, is essential and subsistent, the other internal, and the other uttered. The only-begotten is he of whom neither before nor after has another been begotten. Composition is the mutual interpenetration of parts through the whole. Composition is the making of one thing out of one thing and another, either divisibly or confusedly or in this way and that. Composition is that which is constituted from different things and does not know the peculiarity of each. Division is that which has come about separately and in part and in no way in relation to another. Division is that which has separated the uniform into the multiform. Division is the first cut of a thing, while subdivision is the cut of one of the divided parts, and further subdivision is the second cut of the same thing.

For example, animal is divided into rational and irrational—behold, a division—the rational into mortal and immortal—behold, a subdivision—again, animal is divided into carnivorous and herbivorous—behold, a further division. The divisible is that which is divided; the indivisible is that which is not divided. On the Five Voices. A genus is that which is predicated of many things differing in species, in answer to the question what it is. But genus also signifies a homeland, as when we say that Peter is a Galilean by genus. It also signifies the origin of the generation of certain things, as when we say that the Israelites from Israel are Israelites by genus. A genus is a thing considered in itself. Species is borne according to two meanings; for form is also called species, as in “first of all, a form worthy of tyranny.” That which is divided from the genus is also called species, as when we call man a species of animal. A species is that which is placed under a genus. And again, a species is that of which the genus is predicated in answer to the question what it is. And again, a species is that which is predicated of many things differing in number, in answer to the question what it is. But this definition is of the most specific species. The most general genus is the first genus, which, being a genus, is not a species, that is, the one that does not have another genus above it, from which it is cut off as substance. The most specific species is the last species, which, being a species, is not a genus because it does not have another species below it, but is immediately above the individuals, being divided into them; its definition is: that which is predicated of many things differing in number, in answer to the question what it is.

The genera and species between the most general genus and the most specific species are called subordinate. Difference is spoken of in three ways: commonly, specifically, and most specifically. A difference spoken of commonly is the separable accident, because it is commonly observed in every species, for example when a certain person differs from another in being healthy or sick, in moving or being at rest, in sitting or standing. A difference spoken of specifically is the inseparable accident, because it is not present in every species but in some, for example when a certain person differs from another in being snub-nosed or grey-eyed or bald. A difference called most specifically among the philosophers is that which is also an essential difference, by which the species exceeds the genus. And again, a difference is what is predicated of several things differing in species in respect of what sort of thing it is. A difference is likewise that which is naturally fitted to separate things under the same genus essentially. A difference is likewise that by which each thing differs essentially. A difference is that which makes another species and which is taken up in the definition. A difference is a account according to which the otherness of the things signified in relation to one another is naturally preserved. Identity is invariability, according to which the account of the thing signified possesses its uniqueness in every respect, no manner of difference being recognized. It must be known that identity is taken in three ways. For things are the same in genus, as when we say that a human being and a horse are the same, insofar as both are animals. Things are also the same in species, as when we say that Peter and John are the same in species, insofar as both are human beings.

Again, it is the same in number, as when we say that Peter is the same as himself. And difference is taken in three ways. For there is difference in genus and difference in species and again in number. A property is that which belongs to one nature and converts with the definable thing, like the capacity for laughter of man and the capacity for neighing of horse. About this the philosophers speak of that which belongs to every and only and always, as they call an essential property. A property is that which belongs to every and only the species and always. A peculiarity is that which is known peculiarly, in that in which it is, and only, and in another not. A peculiarity again is the shape and thing significative of every essence. A peculiarity is that which signifies the existence of that of which it is. An accident is that which comes to be and passes away without the destruction of the subject. An accident is that which can belong to the same thing and not belong. An accident is that which, existing in something not as a part, cannot be without that in which it is. An accident is both the separable, such as heat, cold, whiteness, and the inseparable, such as snubness in a nose and the greyness in an eye. A generic is that which contains the genus in itself. A specific is that which contains the species in itself. A specific is the essence, that is, the nature. A comprehensive is that which gathers and fills up the particulars in itself.

Concerning substance and form and nature. Substance is that which subsists through the whole and needs nothing else in order to be. Substance is the existence of each thing. Substance is the common nature of beings, according to which both the individuals and the species share with one another, being referred to one and the same definition of substance. And substance is a thing subsisting self-subsistently. Substance is everything that subsists according to its own existence and does not have its being in another. Substance is primarily and properly everything that is self-subsistent and does not have its being in another. Substance is properly said to be being itself, which needs nothing else for existence. Substance is a common and indefinite name, predicated equally of all the hypostases under it. Substance is that which inheres not in one only but in many and different things in number, and is contemplated in one thing more, in another less. Substance is that which is said of the underlying hypostases and is contemplated equally and alike in all of them. Substance is that which is receptive of the same and one in number of contraries in turn; this definition the outsiders, as they are called, have laid down for the most part for the particular substance among them. Substance is that which is predicated of many and different things in number in the what it is, and is present with all and imparts equally its own name and thing. Form is called and taken to be this visible shape of the body. But properly form was taken by the fathers to be substance, just as also by the apostle; for it is unlawful and impious to call form, that is, figure, a shape in the case of the invisible God.

Form is that which is contemplated by its own proper contemplation and has no need of another for its own manifestation. Form is that which exists by itself and does not need association with another in order to be. Nature is a principle of motion and rest. But we often call nature the being-so-disposed-by-nature, and not absolutely the substance itself. Again, it is customary to call nature, for the most part, substance, and especially among our own teachers. Nature truly is that in which the being of the substance is apprehended. Nature, according to the external philosophers, is a certain power implanted in matter, a principle of rest and motion. Nature is the truth of things. Nature and substance and form is the quality that belongs to beings. That which is without substance is the uncreated and wholly nonexistent. – A partial substance is articulate speech without meaning. That which is essential is what, when present, preserves, and when absent, destroys, as in the case of the rational. That which is accidental is what neither preserves when present nor destroys when absent, as in the case of the white. The philosophers call things that are additionally accidental the inseparable accidents. – An individual is that which is composed of peculiarities, the aggregate of which could never be seen in another. – A person is that which, through its own activities and peculiarities, is clearly manifest and provides us with a distinct appearance of those of the same kind. Concerning hypostasis, that which is enhypostatic and anhypostatic. A hypostasis is the concurrence of characteristic peculiarities, distinguishing the individual and particular—that is, the particular man—from the common. A hypostasis is the concurrence of the peculiarities pertaining to each thing.

Hypostasis is that which, through characteristic properties, presents and delineates the common and uncircumscribable [element] of nature in a particular thing. Hypostasis is substance distinguished by properties that are numerically different among things of the same kind. That which is enhypostatic is that which does not subsist at all by itself but is contemplated in others, as form in the individuals under it, or that which is composed together with another different in substance toward the generation of some whole. We call hypostasis that which subsists by itself and is not contemplated together with anything else, which some also call the individual; and this would be an aggregate of accidents, which, all contemplated together, belong to no other thing except the one to which they belong. That which is enhypostatic is that which truly exists and is contemplated in existence. That which is anhypostatic is not that which does not exist but that which has not come to be, like darkness. Anhypostatic is everything that has not come to be from God but stands in the absence of the better, as it were darkness or disease or sin or death. —That which is consubstantial is that which is in no way and in no respect deficient in comparison with the other. —That which is according to hypostasis is a thing subsisting from different natures. That which is according to hypostasis is that which is from two things but in one person. Union according to hypostasis is a nature that runs together into another hypostasis. Blending is the juxtaposition of bodies, the mutual interchange of qualities. Blending is the coupling of bodies, their qualities being mutually mixed into one another. Blending is the concurrence of substances different from one another and the mutual interchange of the qualities pertaining to them. Further, concerning the same things: That which is according to nature is what is commonly seen in the genus as constitutive of the substance.

Monoeides is the substance seen in its single form alone and not in transformation. Monoeides is that which can be seen in a single manner. Monoeides is the substance devoid of all turning and transformation. Kath' hauto is that which belongs primarily and substantially to something, and not accidentally, as the rational [faculty]; for this belongs essentially to the human being. Homogene are those under the same genus. Homoeide are those under the same species. Homohypostata are those having one and the same hypostasis. Heterogene are those differing in genus and not being homoousia. Hetereoide are those differing in species, that is, in substance. Homoousia are those partaking of the same substance. Heteroousia are those differing in substance. Heterohypostata are those divided in hypostasis. Homophyе are the homoousia, heterophyе are the heteroousia. Homogene and homophyе and homoeide and homoousia are the same; heterogene and heterophyе and heteroeide and heteroousia are not the same.

Concerning homonyms and heteronyms and the like. Homonyms are those things which have only a name in common, but the account of their substance according to the name is different—that is, things that have the same name, but the meaning signified by the name is different and different, as John the Baptist and John the Apostle both have one name, "John," but the meaning signified by the name is one thing and another: the one is the Baptist, the other the Apostle; and the one is the son of Zachariah, the other the son of Zebedee. Synonyms are those things whose name is common and whose account of substance according to the name is the same—that is, things that have the same name and the same meaning signified by the name, that is, the definition of the common name itself, as animal in the case of both man and horse; for both share in animal and in its definition, since each of them is called an animal and admits the same definition of animal, for it is a living perceptive substance. Polyonyms are many names spoken of one thing, as sword, blade, dagger, sabre; for all these names make clear the same thing and have one definition, for their definition is a two-edged iron. Heteronyms are those things that share neither in the name nor in the definition, whose name and account of substance are different. If, then, they have one subject, they are called heteronyms, for example ascent and descent; for they have one subject, the ladder. Others are those whose name and account of substance are different, and they do not have one subject, as substance and accident. Paronyms are those that have their appellation from something, as just from justice.

Concerning the common and the subject. A common thing is either that which is observed in many things or that which is predicated of many things. "Common" is spoken of in four ways: either that which is divisible into parts, as land that is allotted by lot; or that which is taken in common use indivisibly, but not at the same time, as one slave or one horse belonging to two masters; or that which is appropriated in anticipation, but is referred back to the common, as a place in a theater or the one in a bathhouse; or that which is put forward indivisibly into a common and the same conception, as the voice of the herald—in this way it has been taken here: reason is the voice that of itself makes known the whole of which it is. A subject is spoken of as substance itself. And "of a subject" is spoken of when universals are predicated of particulars, and "in a subject" as accidents are in substances, for example as white in a swan. The subject is twofold: the one with respect to existence, the other with respect to predication. And with respect to existence they say substance underlies accidents, and with respect to predication particulars underlie universals. "In a subject" is that which exists in something not as a part, and is unable to exist apart from that in which it is, as color in a body; for color is not a part of the substance of the body, but color cannot exist outside the body. A universal is that which signifies many things, as "man"; for it signifies all men, who are many. A particular is that which is divided from the universal and is subject to it, as Peter, Paul, and each one of men. A synonymous predication is when both

The subject receives the name and the definition of the predicate. That which belongs primarily and according to substance to something is [said to be] of itself. 16 Concerning the categories of habit and capacity. Quantity is the limit of number, that is, a composition of units. Number is defined as a heap of units or a mass of units, but not a division of units. Quality is that which shows in itself the difference from other things. Habit is the activity and completeness of each thing according to nature, for example, in the soul, temperance, courage, prudence, justice; in the body, the perfection of the limbs and their proportion, and health. The failure and error and, in general, the removal of these things is called privation. Habit is a certain abiding quality; and I call its offspring activity. Habit is a certain quality that is hard to move and hard to change, while disposition, which is distinguished from habit, is easy to change and easy to move. Habit, then, is spoken of in one way as the activity of the thing possessed and of the possessor, as of the weapon and the armed man, and of the garment and the man wearing it.

Second, there are the introduced activities that are momentary, whether they be natural or psychical: natural, as heat in bodies that are being heated; psychical, as knowledge. In the third mode, that which one does not yet have but has a suitability for receiving it, which was the first meaning of "in potentiality." In the fourth mode, natural quality, that is, natural habit, as the heat of fire, the sight of one sleeping, and the coldness of snow. And the fifth is the final activity, as sight and heat. Accordingly, in the fourth meaning Aristotle took the opposition of contraries as according to privation and habit, that is, of capacity, whether qualitative or passive. A disposition is the quality of each thing that is of such a kind incidentally. Capacity is spoken of in one sense according to suitability, in another according to habit: according to suitability, as when we say that a child is potentially a grammarian, insofar as he has a suitability for becoming a grammarian; according to habit, as when we say that a grammarian who is at rest is potentially a grammarian, insofar as, even if he is not using the art, he knows it. Again, capacity is spoken of according to habit, as when we say that a child is capable of seed, insofar as he is naturally capable of seed and is potentially so, even if not yet in activity because of time; likewise also the grain of wheat is potentially, according to habit, an ear of grain, for it has a natural capacity to become an ear of grain. Capacity is also spoken of as strength. Capacity is also spoken of as an army, that is, the expeditions. Relatives are those for which to be is the same as to be somehow related to something.

Those things are called relatives for which their being is the same as being said in relation to something else. And things are called relatives, whatever things, being just what they are, belong to other things; and they also reciprocate toward one another. Those are relatives for which their being is the same as having a certain relation. But some have interpreted the definition more clearly, that those things are relatives for which their being is the same as having a certain disposition toward another. —Where is a indication of place, for example in Rome, in Alexandria. —When is an indication of time, for example last year, today, tomorrow. —To lie is that which has a certain position toward another, for example the body lying in some way toward such-and-such a position or toward reclining or sitting. —To have is substance about substance, as a ring about the finger and a garment about the body. —To act is to have in oneself the cause of the activity. —To be acted upon is to have in oneself and in another the cause of being acted upon. To act is said of productive arts, I mean carpentry and the like; but to do, in the case of those where the end, that is the result, does not remain, as in flute-playing and dancing; and to contemplate, in the case of astronomy, geometry, thinking, and of the

Such things are called [relatives]. That is impassive which is apart from all matter and can in no way be understood by it as to what it is. That is impassive which is apart from passion and higher than all contact. That is impassive which is in need of nothing else and always remains in the same state in itself. A passion is a change of this particular thing from what it was, whether for good or in some other way. That is passible which is able to be changed into that which it was not before. Concerning the prior, together with motion. One thing is said to be prior to another in five ways. That which is prior in the strict sense is prior in time, as we say older or elder. That which is prior by nature is that which removes along with it and is not removed along with, and is contributed along with but does not contribute along with; for which reason simple things take precedence over composite things and universals over particulars. That which is prior in order is also prior. That which is prior in power, that is, in worth, is also prior. The cause and the caused are likewise prior; but cause must be understood as that which produces, and caused as that which is produced. Things are said to be simultaneous which coexist with one another and are not prior, the one to the other, either in time or in nature or in cause or in order or in power, that is, in worth. Things are also said to be simultaneous which are divided in opposition, that is, the two branches that come from the same division, for example, of the animal, the one rational and the other irrational. Motion is the actuality of that which is in potentiality, insofar as it is such; for example, bronze is potentially a statue, for bronze is able to receive the form of the statue. The actuality, then, of the bronze, which is potentially a statue, is being melted down, being molded, being polished, which are motions.

In whatever categories, then, the "in potential" is found, in those it is reasonable that motion be contemplated: in substance, in quantity, in quality, and in the category of where. In substance, generation and corruption; in quantity, increase and decrease; in quality, alteration; in where, that which is carried in a circle and that which is moved in a straight line—and the former is called revolution, the latter simply motion in a straight line. There are seven motions in the category of where, that is, the local and transitional motions: down, up, inward, outward, right, left, and the circular. Concerning affirmation and syllogism. The fathers and the true account declared that conception is twofold. For the one is, as it were, a certain conception and after-thought, unfolding and making clear the general and undifferentiated contemplation and knowledge of things, so that what is opined by sense is simple, while by the busy-working of the mind it appears as many-parted and varied. The other is a moulding of the mind, arising from the combination of sense and imagination, putting together things that in no way exist out of things that exist, and supposing them to be. Such is the myth-making of centaurs and sirens; for taking the parts of wholes and putting together something else from parts, with great license and ease it moulded in the mind and in words things contemplated in no way in subsistence and substance, and then, being shaped in matter, it made them into images. A beginning is the cause of all things that have come to be. That is without beginning from which all things have come to be, but itself is unbegotten. An end is to attain the goal.

An end, according to Aristotle, is that for the sake of which other things exist, while it itself is for the sake of nothing; or thus: An end is that for the sake of which one does other things, while it itself is for the sake of nothing. Simple utterance, name, verb, expression, term: these five differ from one another in nothing as regards their underlying subject, but the difference is only as regards relation—for example, "human being," insofar as it is simply significative of something, is called a simple utterance; insofar as it is a subject, it is called a name; insofar as it holds the position of a predicate, it is called a verb; insofar as it is a part of a proposition, it is called an expression; insofar as it is a part of a syllogism, it is called a term. A declarative statement is a meaningful account signifying what belongs or does not belong to something—for example, "Socrates is not walking" makes clear that walking does not belong to Socrates. This declarative statement is divided into affirmation and negation. A declarative statement is an account in which there is truth or falsehood—for example, "Socrates is a human being" (for behold, it is true), or "Socrates is not a human being" (for behold, it is false). An affirmation is a meaningful account signifying what belongs to something—for example, "Socrates is walking." Again, an affirmation is a declarative account of something concerning something. A negation is a meaningful account signifying what does not belong to something—for example, "Socrates is not walking." A contradiction is a conflict of two propositions that divide truth and falsehood in every material case and at every time—for example, "Every human being is just" and "Not every human being is just"; of these, one is altogether true and the other false. A proposition is a declarative account of something from something, which is a negation, or of something concerning something, which is an affirmation. A term is that into which a proposition is resolved—for example, a proposition is "Socrates is walking.

This proposition is analyzed into "Socrates" and into "walks." Each of these, then, as a part of a proposition, is a term. — A syllogism is a discourse in which, certain things having been posited, something other than the things laid down follows of necessity through the things laid down; I said "having been posited" in place of "having been agreed," and I say "through the things laid down," that is, that the conclusion comes about through the premisses laid before it, needing no other external support or term. — A lemma is that which has been taken as agreed for the establishment of something. But one must know that these five do not differ from one another in substance, namely assertion, proposition, problem, objection, and conclusion. For when I simply assert that the soul is immortal, it is called an assertion. But when it is taken as a part of a syllogism, then the statement "the soul is immortal" is a proposition. And whenever someone objects to the proposition, seeking, "From where is it clear that the soul is immortal?" then such a thing is called an objection. And whenever we again put it forward for inquiry, "Is the soul, then, immortal?" it is called a problem. And when it is inferred from a proposition, it is called a conclusion, for example: The soul is ever-moving; the ever-moving is immortal; therefore from these propositions: Is the soul, then, immortal? — that is, the conclusion.

A problem is a speculative question that leads to choice and avoidance with a view to contemplation and knowledge. — A inquiry is a question requiring a detailed answer. — It should be known that the interrogative form of speech differs from the inquiry form, in that a quick answer, that is, a brief one, follows the interrogative form, whereas a lengthy answer, that is, one given through many words, follows the inquiry form. — An objection is one that overturns the argument from the first starting point, that is, from the preliminaries. — A counter-position is one that accepts the argument as true but shows that it does no harm to the matter at hand, for example when we wish to demonstrate something. A heresy is an untrue opinion concerning the faith. A heresy is an opinion of more people agreeing with one another but disagreeing with others. — A common notion is one that is agreed upon by all, for example that God exists. — A thesis is a paradoxical supposition of one of the things known in philosophy, that is, a foreign notion, for example the argument of Parmenides, that he said the existent is one, and that of Heraclitus, that all things are in motion. Concerning the four dialectical methods, it should be known that there are four dialectical, that is, logical, methods: first, the divisive, which divides the genus into species through the intermediate differences; second, the definitive, which, having divided from the genus and the differences, defines the subject as the divisive method does; third, the analytic, which analyzes the more composite into the simpler, that is, the body into the humors, the humors into the fruits, the fruits into the four elements, the four elements into matter and form; fourth, the demonstrative, which demonstrates the matter at hand through some middle term.

For example, it is proposed to me to show that the soul is immortal; I take a middle term, the ever-moving, and reason thus: The soul is ever-moving; the ever-moving is immortal; therefore the soul is immortal. But it should be known that syllogisms belong to demonstrative science. And one must know that analytics is threefold: for there is natural analysis, as was said before; there is also logical analysis, when we resolve the syllogism that has been set out into its proper figure; there is also mathematical analysis, when we take the thing sought as agreed and arrive at something agreed, from which the proposed question is captured. For example, let the thing sought be whether the soul is immortal. I take this thing sought as agreed and say: Since the soul is immortal, there are requitals of evil and good deeds; and if there are requitals, there are courts of justice beneath the earth; and if there are courts of justice beneath the earth, there is that which is judged and that which judges; and if there is that which is judged and that which judges, there is a providential overseer and providence, which is agreed by all. From this, then, I say by synthesis: Since there is providence and a judge, there are courts of justice beneath the earth; and if these exist, there are requitals; and if there are requitals, there is that which is judged; and if there is that which is judged, therefore the soul is immortal.