Dialectica Recensio brevior

Table, with God's help, of the philosophical chapters of the Damascene. Prologue–Letter 1. On being, substance, and accident (see infra 12) (see infra 13) (see

(see infra 14) 2. On genus and species, the most generic and the most specific, and the subordinate 3. On the individual 4. On difference 5. On accident 6. On property 7. On the categories 8. On synonymous and homonymous predication 9. On the category of "what it is" and the category of "what sort of thing it is" 10. On subsistence and that which has subsistence and that which lacks subsistence 11. On substance and nature and form, and on the individual and person and subsistence 12. On division 13. On the prior by nature 14. On definition 15. On homonyms 16. On synonyms 17. On polyonyms 18. On heteronyms and those of different names 19. On paronyms 20. On the ten most generic genera 21. On things of the same genus and same species, and of different genus and different species, and those differing in number 22. On "in something" 23. On substance 24. On nature 25. On form 26. On subsistence 27. On person 28. On that which has subsistence 29. On that which lacks subsistence 30. Division of being and of substance 31. On what property of substance exists 32. Again on things of the same genus and same species, and of different genus and different species, and of the same subsistence and differing in number 33. On quantity and quantitativeness 34. On relatives 35. On quality and qualitativeness 36. On acting and being acted upon 37. On being situated 38. On "where" 39. On "when" 40. On "having" 41. On opposites 42. On habit and privation 43. On prior and posterior 44. On "together" 45. On motion 46. On "having" 47. On affirmation, denial, and affirmation 48. On term and proposition and syllogism 49. Definitions of

There are six definitions of philosophy. On the union according to subsistence (Another chapter). Preface. Letter. To the most holy and God-honored Cosmas, the most holy bishop of Maiuma, John the monk. Knowing the narrowness of my own understanding and the poverty of my tongue, O blessed ones, I hesitated to undertake things beyond my power and to venture upon impossibilities, as though I were some presumptuous and reckless person, dreading the danger that hangs over those who dare such things. For if Moses, that divine lawgiver, who withdrew from every human sight and left behind the surging waves of life and wiped away every material impression and purified the eye of the soul and thereby became fit for the vision of God, who was deemed worthy to behold in the bush and the immaterial fire the loving-kindness of the word of God toward us and his transcendent incarnation—the fire burning and consuming the thorn yet not burning it up nor destroying it, nor even removing it from its own nature—who was the first to be initiated into the name of the One who is and truly is beyond being, and who was entrusted by God with the leadership of his own people and kin, called himself slow of speech and slow of tongue, as being unable to serve the divine will and to bring this into the open and to be mediator of God and

to be established among men, how could I, who am stained with the filth of every sin, carrying within myself the much-troubled surge of my thoughts, and having neither mind nor understanding purified so as to serve as a mirror of God and of the divine manifestations, nor possessing a word able to suffice for the things conceived—how could I utter the divine and ineffable things that surpass the comprehension of every rational nature? Reflecting on these things, I shrank from the discourse and feared the command—for the truth shall be told—lest I incur a double laughter, that of ignorance and at the same time that of folly, which is the most grievous thing. For the charge of ignorance is pardonable, if it does not proceed from laziness. But to possess, along with ignorance, the conceit of knowledge is grievous and blameworthy and worthy of no pardon, and of greater—not to say of the utmost—ignorance as a proof. But since the fruit of disobedience is death, while he who becomes a humble and obedient disciple of Christ is led up to height and receives from God the light-guiding grace, and opening his mouth is filled with the Spirit, and his heart is cleansed and his understanding enlightened, and he receives a word in the opening of his mouth, not being anxious about what he shall speak, but serving as an instrument while the Spirit speaks in him—therefore, obeying through you the Christ who is hierarch in you, I submit to the command and open my mouth with confidence in your prayers, that I may be filled with the Spirit, and I shall speak oracles that are not the fruit of my own understanding but the fruit of the Spirit who enlightens the blind, receiving whatever he gives and uttering these things.

And first I shall set forth the finest things of the wise among the Greeks, knowing that, if anything is good, it has been given to men from above by God, since "every good gift and every perfect bestowal is from above, coming down from the Father of lights." But if anything is opposed to the truth, it is a dark invention and a figment of a wretched mind, belonging to satanic deception, as Gregory, great in theology, says. Imitating therefore the manner of the bee, I shall gather what is akin to the truth and reap salvation even from enemies, but I shall reject everything that is base and clings to falsely named knowledge. Then, following these things, I shall set in order the babblings of the God-hating heresies, so that, recognizing the falsehood, we may cling the more to the truth. Then the truth, destroyer of deception and vanquisher of falsehood, adorned and decked out as with golden fringes by the words of the God-inspired prophets and God-taught fishermen and God-bearing shepherds and teachers, I shall set forth with God and by his grace—the truth whose glory, flashing forth from within, enlightens those who encounter it with the requisite purification and the setting aside of turbulent thoughts by its radiance. And I shall say nothing of my own, as I said, but gathering into one what has been labored over by the most approved of the teachers, as far as I am able, I shall make the account concise, yielding in all things to your command. But be indulgent with me, I beseech you, O God-honored ones, since I have obeyed your injunctions; and, receiving my obedience, give in return the provision of your prayers. Concerning that which is, substance, and accident.

Being is a common name for all things that are. This being, then, is divided into substance and accident. Substance is a thing self-subsistent, not needing another for its constitution—that is, what is in itself and does not have its existence in another; whereas accident is what cannot be in itself but has its existence in another. For substance is the underlying subject, as it were the matter of things, while accident is what is contemplated in the substance, such as body and color; for body is not in color, but color is in body. Body, then, is substance, and color is accident. Likewise also soul and prudence; for the soul is not in prudence, but prudence is in the soul. Therefore it is not said that body is of color, but that color is of body; nor that soul is of prudence, but that prudence is of soul. Soul, then, is substance, and prudence is accident. For when the soul is removed, prudence is also removed; for if there is no soul, in what will prudence be? But when prudence is removed, the soul is not altogether removed; for it is possible for a soul to exist apart from prudence. Likewise in the case of all things that are, what has its being in itself and not in another is substance, while what cannot exist by itself but has its existence in another is accident. 2 Concerning genus and species, the most general and the most specific, and the subordinate ones. Genus is spoken of in three ways. In one way, as from the one who begets, just as those from Israel are called Israelites.

In another sense, from one's homeland, just as those from Jerusalem are called Jerusalemites and those from Palestine Palestinians. In a third sense, genus means what is divided into species, which is what the philosophers discuss, and which they also define when they say: A genus is what is predicated of many things differing in species in answer to the question what it is. And species has two meanings. For species means shape and form, such as the species of a statue. Again, species means what is placed under a genus, that is, what is divided from the genus. About this the philosophers speak. Since, when discussing genus, we mentioned species, saying "a genus is what is divided into species," and again, when discussing species, we mentioned genus, saying "a species is what is divided from a genus," it must be known that just as, when speaking of a father, we necessarily mention the son—for this is a father, the one who has a son—and when discussing a son, we necessarily mention the father—for this is a son, the one who has a father—so too here it is impossible to treat of genus apart from species or of species apart from genus; for a genus is altogether divided into species, and what does not have species divided from it is not a genus. And species are divided from a genus, and what do not have a genus are not species. And just as the first man, that is, Adam, not having had a father, is not called a son, but is called a father, for he had sons;

Seth is called both a son of the one who begot him—for he had Adam as his father—and a father of the one born from him, for he begot Enosh. Abel is called a son—for he had Adam as his father—but is not called a father, for he had no son. So it is also with genus and species. The first genus, which is not divided from another genus and has no genus before it, is only a genus and is not a species, and is called the most general genus, which those who define also state: the most general genus is that which, being a genus, is not a species because it has no genus above it. But the things divided from it, if they have other species below them divided from them, are both species of those before them—that is, of those above, from which they are cut—and genera of those cut from them—that is, of those below—and are called both genera and species, subordinate. But the last and lowest species, which have no other species below them, are not called genera but only species, because they have no other species below them divided from them; for it is impossible to posit a genus unless it has species below it divided from it. So the species that is not a genus is called the most specific species, just as the genus that is not a species is called the most general genus. But one must know that it is necessary for the species to receive both the name of their genus and the definition, and also of the genus that runs from genus up to the most general. But the species cannot receive one another's definition.

First, then, and most general genus is substance; for even if substance and accident are divided from being, being is not their genus, since they receive the name of being but do not receive its definition. For being is defined thus: Being is a thing either self-subsistent and not needing another for its constitution, or that which cannot exist by itself but has its existence in another. Substance is a thing self-subsistent and not needing another for its constitution only, and accident is a thing that cannot exist by itself but has its existence in another only. Behold, neither substance nor accident received the whole definition of being, but substance received one half and accident the other half. But species wish to receive both the name and the whole definition of the genus perfectly. So that substance is not a species, since it has no genus above it, but is itself the first and most general genus. This substance, then, is divided into body and incorporeal; body, then, and incorporeal are species of substance. Again, body is divided into animate and inanimate; behold again, body, being a species of substance, is a genus of the animate and the inanimate. The animate is again divided into perceptive and non-perceptive. The perceptive is the animal, which has life and perception; the non-perceptive is the plant, for it does not have perception. But the plant is called animate because it has a nutritive, augmentative, and generative power.

Again, animal is divided into rational and irrational; the rational into mortal and immortal; the mortal into human, horse, ox, and the like, which are no longer divided into other species but into individuals, that is, hypostases. For the human is divided into Peter, Paul, John, and the remaining particular humans, who are not species but hypostases. For the species, as we said, do not receive one another's definition—for example, body does not receive the definition of the incorporeal, and human does not receive the definition of horse; but Peter and Paul and John receive one definition, that of the human, and likewise the remaining particular humans, so that they are not species of the human but individuals, that is, hypostases. Again, a species, when divided, imparts both the name and the definition to the things beneath it. But Peter, when divided into soul and body, imparts neither the name nor the definition to the soul or to the body; for neither is the soul alone Peter nor the body alone, but the two together. Furthermore, every division made from a genus into species reaches as far as two or three, and rarely four; for it is impossible for a genus to be divided into five species and more. But the human is divided into all the particular humans, who are infinite in number. Therefore some say that the division from species into individuals is not even called a division but an enumeration. Hence it is clear that Peter and Paul and John are not species but individuals, that is, hypostases. Nor is the human a genus of Peter and Paul and John and the remaining hypostases, but a species. Therefore the human is the most specific species.

For it is a species of what is above and a species of what is below. Likewise, horse and dog and the like are most specific species. But the things between the most general genus and the most specific species are subordinate genera and species—species of what is above, genera of what is below. And these are the essential and natural differences and qualities, which are called divisive and constitutive—divisive of what is above, constitutive of what is below. For body and incorporeal divide substance; likewise, animate and inanimate divide body; likewise, perceptive and imperceptive divide the animate. These, then, constitute animal. For I take an animate, perceptive substance and make animal; for animal is an animate, perceptive substance. Again I take an inanimate, imperceptive substance and make stone. Again I take an animate, imperceptive substance and make plant. Again, rational and irrational divide animal; mortal and immortal divide the rational. I take, then, animal as a genus, and rational, and mortal, and constitute man; for man is a mortal, rational animal. And I take animal and irrational and mortal and constitute horse, perhaps, or dog and the like. And they are called essential and natural differences because these make one species differ from another species, and one nature and substance from another nature and substance. On the individual.

The individual is spoken of in four ways. For an individual is that which is not cut and not divided, as the point and the now and the monad, which are also called without parts. An individual is also spoken of as the hard-to-cut, that is, the thing that is cut with difficulty, as the adamant stone and the like. An individual is also spoken of as the species, which is no longer cut into other species, that is, the most specific species, as man, horse, and the like. But an individual is spoken of properly as that which is cut, but does not preserve after the cut the first species, just as Peter is cut into soul and body, but neither is the soul by itself a perfect man or a perfect Peter, nor the body. The discussion among the philosophers concerns this individual, which in the case of substance indicates the hypostasis. On Difference. This is spoken of in three ways: commonly, specifically, and most specifically. For it is impossible for two things not to differ from each other in some respect. In some respects, then, a species differs from a species, and in others a hypostasis differs from a hypostasis of the same species and the same substance, and in others a hypostasis differs from itself. For the species of man differs from the species of horse by the rational and the irrational. And the rational and the irrational are called essential difference. Likewise also all the things by which a species differs from a species are called natural and essential and constitutive difference and quality and natural property, which is present in every species invariably, which is called by the philosophers most specifically difference, as being more proper and declarative of nature.

Again, a human being differs from a human being, or a horse from a horse, or a dog from a dog—that is, an individual of the same species from an individual, insofar as one is tall and another short, one old and another young, one snub-nosed and another hook-nosed, one prudent and another foolish. All these are called non-essential differences and qualities, which is to say the accident, about which we shall speak next. On the accident. An accident is that which comes to be and passes away without the destruction of the subject. And again, that which can both be and not be in the same thing; for it is possible for a human being both to be white and not to be white, and likewise to be tall and prudent and snub-nosed. This accident is divided into two: into what is commonly called difference and into difference in the strict sense. In the common sense, then, difference is the separable accident, for example, one person sits and another stands; when the one sitting rises and the one standing sits, it is possible for their difference to be separated and for one to take another's place. And a person is also said to differ from himself according to the separable accident; for he differs from himself in sitting and rising, in being young and growing old, in being sick and being healthy, and in such things. In the strict sense, difference is the inseparable accident, such as being snub-nosed; for it is impossible for his snub-nosedness to be separated from him, and likewise his grey-eyedness and such things. According to these inseparable accidents, then, an individual differs from an individual—that is, a hypostasis from a hypostasis

differs, but never differs from itself. These things do not contribute to the definition of the nature; for it is possible for a human being to be snub-nosed and not to be. And when the blue-grayness of the eyes passes away, the human being no less remains a human being. On the Proper. The proper is spoken of in four ways. First, that which belongs to the species alone, but not to all of it, as geometrizing belongs to the human being; for the human being alone is a geometer, but not every human being is a geometer. Second, that which belongs to all of the species, but not to it alone, as being two-footed; for every human being is two-footed, but not only the human being is two-footed, but also the dove and such things. Third, that which belongs to all and alone, but not always, as growing gray belongs to the human being; for this fits every human being and alone, but not always, but in old age. Fourth, that which results from the first three coming together—that is, to all and alone and always—which also converts, as the capacity for laughter belongs to the human being and the capacity for neighing to the horse and such things; for the human being alone has the capacity for laughter, and every human being, and always, even if he does not always use it. For if anything is a human being, it is altogether capable of laughter, and if anything is capable of laughter, it is altogether a human being. This is what converting means. The discussion among the philosophers concerns this meaning. And outlining it, we say: A proper is that which belongs to all and alone of the species and always. And they divide this in three ways: from organization—that is, formation—as broad-nailed and upright-walking belong to the human being; from activity, as moving upward belongs to fire;

from power, as we say that the power of heating belongs to fire, exceeding the heat of other bodies. And the proper attribute is called non-essential. Concerning predicates. Every predication is either broader or equal, but never narrower. And broader, when the more universal things are predicated of the more particular; for the more universal are the higher, and the more particular are the lower. Now the most universal of all is being, and therefore it is predicated of all things; for both substance is called being and accident is called being. But we cannot say that being is substance; for being is not only substance but also accident. Likewise, genera are predicated of species as more universal, but species are not predicated of their genera; for species are more particular than genera. Therefore substance is predicated of animal, and animal of human being; for animal is substance and the human being is an animal. But it does not convert: for every human being is an animal, but not every animal is a human being. For the horse and the dog are animals; likewise every animal is substance, but not every substance is an animal; for the stone and the wood are substance, which are not animals. Likewise, the species is predicated of the individuals contained under it, that is, of the hypostases, as more universal. But the individual, that is, the hypostasis, is not predicated of the species; for the hypostasis is more particular than the species. And therefore Peter is a human being and Paul is a human being, but not every human being is Peter or Paul; for there are also other hypostases under the species of human being.

And the differentiae are predicated of the species in which they inhere, and of the individuals themselves. For the differentiae are broader than the species; for "rational" is broader than the species "man." For every man is rational, but not every rational being is a man; for an angel also, being rational, is not a man. And this is predication in the broader sense; but predication in the equal sense is when it converts. For the proper attributes are predicated of the species of which they are proper attributes, but the species are also predicated of their proper attributes; for every man is capable of laughter, and every capable-of-laughter being is a man. For even if an ape is said to laugh, it does not laugh in its heart but with its gestures; for it is an imitative animal. So that the predication of genera of species, and of differentiae of species, and of species of individuals, is spoken of in the broader sense, but that of proper attributes in the equal sense. And these, being equal, are said to convert and to be counter-predicated. Concerning synonymous and homonymous predication. Synonymous predication is when the subject receives both the name and the definition of that name itself, for example, "animal" is predicated of "man." And man receives both the name and the definition of animal; for an animal is a living, perceptive substance. And man also admits this definition; for man is a substance and living and perceptive. Homonymous predication is when it receives the name but not the definition at all, for example, the image of a man receives the name of "man" but does not receive the definition of man; for the definition of man is a rational, mortal animal receptive of intellect and knowledge.

The image is neither a living being; for it is not ensouled, nor rational, nor receptive of intellect and knowledge. One must know that whatever is predicated of something as of a subject, that is, synonymously, will also be predicated of that which is subject to it; for example, "living being" is predicated of "man" as of a subject, that is, synonymously, and "man" of "Peter"; for Peter is subject to man. Therefore "living being" is also predicated of Peter; for Peter is a living being. "Subject" is said in two ways: in one way with respect to existence, in another with respect to predication. With respect to existence, as substance is subject to accidents; for they have their being in it and do not subsist outside it. With respect to predication, the particular is the subject; for the particular is subject to the more universal with respect to predication, since the more universal is predicated of the more particular, as "living being" is predicated of "man." The universal is said to be predicated of a subject, while the more particular is a subject with respect to predication. Accident is said to be in a subject, namely substance, and substance is a subject with respect to existence.

Concerning the category in the "what it is" and the category in the "what sort of thing it is." One thing is the category in the "what it is," and another is the category in the "what sort of thing it is." The one in the "what it is" is when, being asked "what is man?" we say "animal"; and the one in the "what sort of thing it is" is when, being asked "what sort of animal?" we say "rational, mortal." So that genus and species are predicated in the "what it is," while difference, both essential and non-essential—that is, accident and property—are predicated in the "what sort of thing it is." But the hypostasis indicates neither what it is nor what sort of thing it is, but who it is; for being asked "who is this?" we say "Peter." Then being asked "what is Peter?" we say "man." Again being asked "what sort of man?" we say "tall, perhaps, or short." One must know that things differing by nature are called "another and another." For we say: man is one thing and horse another—another according to nature; for the species of man is one thing and that of horse another. But things differing in number, that is, the hypostases, are called "one and another." For we say that Peter is one and Paul another. But we cannot say that Peter is one thing and Paul another, since we would be lying; for they are one in nature, not

But they are one in number. It must be known that substance is called one thing, and likewise the substantial differences, while accident is called another kind of thing, because the substantial differences are contemplated in relation to the species, that is, in relation to the nature, and constitute it, while accident is contemplated in relation to the individual; for accidents are constitutive of the hypostasis. Therefore one thing is man and another thing is horse, and Peter is one kind of thing and another, and Paul is one kind of thing and another. Every difference, both substantial and non-substantial, makes a different thing; for "different" signifies both "other" and "of another kind." And nature signifies the "what," while hypostasis signifies "a certain one" and "this particular thing." And every difference [signifies] "of what sort it is." 10 Concerning hypostasis and enhypostaton and anhypostaton. The name of hypostasis signifies two things; for when spoken simply it signifies the simple substance, but hypostasis in itself signifies the individual and the delimiting person. And enhypostaton also signifies two things; for it signifies both the simply existing thing, in which sense we call enhypostaton not only the simple substance but also the accident. It also signifies the hypostasis in itself, that is, the individual. And anhypostaton is also spoken of in two ways; for that which in no way and nowhere exists is called anhypostaton. Again, accident is also called anhypostaton, because accident does not have its own existence, but subsists in the substance.

11 Concerning substance and nature and form, and the individual and the person and subsistence. The philosophers outside the Church, according to the account previously given, stated a difference between substance and nature, calling substance simply being, but nature substance specified by the substantial differences and having, along with simply being, also being of such a sort—whether rational or irrational, whether mortal or immortal—that is, as we say, the unchangeable and immutable principle and cause and power implanted by the Creator in each species for movement: in angels, for understanding and for communicating their thoughts to one another without spoken word; in humans, for understanding and reasoning and for conveying to one another through spoken word the thoughts in the heart; in irrational animals, the vital and sensitive and respiratory movement; in plants, the nutritive and growth-producing and generative power; in stones, the power of being heated and cooled and the change from place to place by external motion, that is, the lifeless power. This they called nature, that is, the most specific species, such as angel, human, horse, and the like, as being more universal and inclusive of the subsistences and existing in each of the subsistences contained by them alike and without omission. So that the more particular they called subsistence, but the more universal and containing the subsistences they called nature, and simple existence they called substance.

But the holy fathers, setting aside the many idle subtleties, called the common and that which is said of many, that is, the most specific species, substance and nature and form, for example angel, man, horse, dog and the like; for substance is named from being, and nature from having grown, and being and having grown are the same; and form and species signify the same as nature. And they called the particular individual and person and subsistence, for example Peter, Paul. And subsistence wishes to have substance together with accidents and to subsist by itself and to be contemplated by sense, that is, in activity. But it is impossible for two subsistences not to differ from each other by their accidents and to differ from each other in number. And one must know that the characteristic properties, the accidents, are what characterize the subsistence. Concerning division. Division is the first cut of a thing, for example animal is divided into rational and irrational; subdivision is the cut and division of one part of the two sections, for example when animal has been divided into rational and irrational, we divide the one part, that is the rational, into mortal and immortal; and further division is when, having made a division of a thing, I again make another division of the same thing, for example man is divided into male and female—behold a division—and again man is divided into soul and body—behold a further division. But division and further division do not always occur, but when not all things are contained under the first division; for behold, both in the male and in the female soul and body are contemplated.

One must know that two species divided from the same genus are called coordinate opposites, for example animal is divided into rational and irrational, which are called coordinate opposites. There are eight modes of division: either as genus into species, for example animal is divided into rational and irrational; or as species into individuals, for example man is divided into Peter and Paul and the remaining individual men; or as whole into parts, and this in two ways, either into homogeneous or into heterogeneous parts. Now they are homogeneous when the parts admit the name and definition of the whole and of one another, as when we cut flesh into many fleshes, and each part of the flesh is called flesh and admits the definition of flesh. But they are heterogeneous when the parts admit neither the name nor the definition of the whole nor of one another, as when we divide Socrates into head, feet, and hands; for neither the head nor the feet nor the hands admit the name or definition of Socrates or of one another. Or as an equivocal word into different meanings, and this in two ways, either as whole or as part. As whole, as the word dog; for it is applied to the terrestrial dog and the celestial and the marine, which are each a whole and not a part of an animal. As part, when the name of tongue is applied to the tip of a shoe and the tip of a flute and the gustatory organ of animals, which are parts and not wholes. Or as substance into accidents, as when I say: Of men, some are white and some black. Or as accidents into substances, as when I say: Of white things, some are animate and some inanimate.

– or as an accident into accidents, as when I say: Of cold things, some are dry and some are wet; – or as things from one and toward one: from one, as from medicine come a medical book and a medical instrument; toward one, as a healthy drug and healthy food, for they look toward one thing, health. In this way, then, being is divided into substance and accident. One must know that in no single mode of division is the naturally prior and posterior, nor the more and less, observed in the parts, except in things from one and toward one. 13 On the naturally prior. The naturally prior, then, is that which contributes along with and is not contributed along with, and which removes along with and is not removed along with, for example, animal is naturally prior to man. For if animal is removed and does not exist, man necessarily will not exist either; for man is an animal. But if man is removed and does not exist, it is possible for an animal to exist; for there will be a horse, a dog, and such things, which are animals. Again, if man is brought in, animal is certainly brought in as well; for man is an animal. But if animal is brought in, it is not altogether the case that man is brought in along with it, but rather a horse or a dog or some such thing; for these too are animals. Therefore neither is Peter naturally prior to Paul, nor is the rational animal prior to the irrational animal. For if Peter is removed and does not exist, Paul will exist; and if Paul is brought in, Peter is not brought in along with him, but if Peter is brought in along with him, Paul is not brought in along with him; and neither is Peter more, that is, more of a man, than Paul, nor Paul than Peter.

A remedy is found to be more healthful than a remedy, and a book more medical than another book. 14 On Definition. A definition is a concise account declarative of the nature of the underlying thing, that is, the account that signifies in brief the nature of the underlying thing, for example: a human being is a rational, mortal animal, receptive of intellect and knowledge. For many have composed accounts about the nature of a human being at length, that is, extended and long, but they are not concise; therefore they are not definitions either. And there are also concise accounts, such as maxims, but since they do not make clear the nature of a thing, they are not definitions. And a name too often makes clear the nature of the underlying thing, but it is not a definition; for a name is a single word, whereas a definition is an account. And an account is composed of at least two words. So a definition must be composed of different words and be concise and make clear the nature of the thing defined by it. A definition is constituted from genus and constitutive differences, that is, essential ones, as in the term animal; for an animal is a living, perceptive substance. See, the substance is the genus, while living and perceptive are the constitutive differences. It is also taken from matter and form, for example: a statue is made of bronze, signifying the form of a man; the bronze, then, is the matter, and the form of the man is the form. And matter corresponds to genus, while form corresponds to difference. It is also taken from the subject and the end, for example: medicine is an art occupied with human bodies, productive of health.

Behold, the underlying subjects of medicine are human bodies, and its end is health. The description (hypographē) is composed of non-essential elements, that is, of properties and accidents, for example: man is capable of laughter, walks upright, has broad nails; for all these are non-essential. Therefore it is called a description, as it were shadowing and not declaring the essential existence of the underlying subject but its attendant features. The descriptive definition is mixed, from essential and non-essential elements, for example: man is a rational animal, walks upright, has broad nails. And definition (horismos) is named by a metaphor from the boundaries of the earth; for just as a boundary separates what is proper to each thing, so also a definition separates the nature of each thing from the nature of another. And the health of a definition is neither to be deficient nor to be excessive in its words, and its vice is to be deficient and to be excessive. And a perfect definition is one that converts with the thing defined, and an imperfect one is that which does not convert. Therefore neither the one deficient in words converts, nor the one that is excessive. For when it is excessive in words, it is deficient in things; and when it is deficient in words, it is excessive in things. For example, the perfect definition of man: "a rational mortal animal." Behold, it converts; for every rational mortal animal is a man, and every man is a rational mortal animal. If, then, it is deficient by one word, it is excessive in things, for example "a rational animal." Behold, it was deficient in the word, for it is not

I said "mortal," and it was excessive in respect of things, for not man alone is a rational animal but also an angel, and it does not convert. But if I say "rational, mortal, grammatical animal," again it does not convert; for it was excessive in the word by saying "grammatical," but it was deficient in respect of things. For it did not define every man, but only the grammarians. For every rational, mortal, grammatical animal is a man, but not every man is a rational, mortal, grammatical animal; for not every man is grammatical. On Homonyms. Homonyms are things that share a name but differ in definition or description. For example, the name "dog" is a homonym, and it signifies the terrestrial dog and the marine dog; but the terrestrial has one definition and the marine another, since their nature is also different and different. They describe homonyms thus: Homonyms are things of which the name alone is common, but the account of the substance according to the name is different. Here he called the definition and the description "account"; and he said "according to the name" indicating that the definition of the name itself, according to which they become homonyms, is different. For example, the terrestrial and the marine dog are homonyms according to the name "dog"; for if someone wishes to give the definition of the terrestrial dog and of the marine dog, according to which each of them is called a dog, he gives one definition to the terrestrial and another to the marine. But it is possible for them to share again both the definition and the name; for both are called animals and receive the definition of animal, but they are not homonyms according to the name "animal" but rather synonyms.

In the case of homonyms, three things must be investigated: whether they belong to homonyms, and in how many meanings the term is used, and about which meaning the question has been posed. On synonyms. Synonyms are those things which share both the name and the definition or the description of the same name, for example "animal" signifies both man and horse, and according to this name, that is, of "animal," they are synonyms; for each of them receives both the name and the definition of "animal." They describe synonyms thus: Synonyms are those of which the name is common and the account of the substance according to the name is the same. On polyonyms. Polyonyms are those which share the definition but differ in name, that is, when the same thing is called by many names, for example phasganon, aor, spathe, machaira, xiphos; for all these names admit one definition, that is, a double-edged iron, that is, iron sharpened on both sides. They describe polyonyms thus: Very many names spoken of one thing. On heteronyms and heteronyms.

Those things that differ in both respects—that is, in name and in definition—either have one underlying subject and are called heteronyms, as ascent and descent (for they have one underlying subject, the ladder), or they do not have one underlying subject and are called different things, as substance and accident; for these have both a different name and a different description, and they do not have one underlying subject. Of both of these, both the heteronyms and the different things, this is the description: those whose name and definition are different. 19. On paronyms. There are certain things intermediate between homonyms and synonyms, sharing and differing in both name and definition, which are called paronyms, as grammarian from grammar; for they share the name but differ in the ending of the name, that is, the final syllable; and again they share and differ in the definition, because grammar is knowledge, while the grammarian is a substance in which the knowledge is. Paronyms are those that derive their appellation from something while differing in case, that is, in the inflection of the name. It must be known that grammar and music are not paronyms, but the musician is named paronymously from music, and the grammarian from grammar, and the just man from justice. It must be known that paronyms contain the things from which they are named paronymously, as the grammarian contains grammar and the just man justice, but things named from one thing do not at all; for the medical tool does not contain medicine.

Concerning the ten most general genera. Of things that are spoken of, some are spoken of simply and without combination, as substance, accident, and the like; others with combination, as "a horse runs," "Socrates philosophizes." Of those spoken of simply and without combination: 1) one signifies substance, as man, horse; 2) another quantity, as two, three, two cubits, three cubits; 3) another relation, as father, son; 4) another quality, as white, black; 5) another where, as in a temple, in the marketplace; 6) another when, as last year, today; 7) another being situated, as to stand, to sit; 8) another having, as to be clothed, to be shod; 9) another doing, as to burn, to cut; 10) another suffering, as to be burned, to be cut. These ten are called categories, as being from being said of certain things; for to speak is to say. One must know that each of these ten is a most general genus. Of these ten categories, which are also the most general genera, one is substance, and the nine are accidents. And these are: substance, quantity, relation, quality, where, when, being situated, having, doing, suffering. Concerning things of the same genus and the same species, and things of a different genus and a different species, and things differing in number. Things of the same genus are those that are ranked under the same category. Things of a different genus are those that are under one and another category; these are different in genus. Things of the same species are those that are ranked under the same species and share in the definition of substance, as Peter and Paul. Things of a different species are those that differ from one another in species, that is, those that differ in the definition of substance, as man, horse.

Things differ in number, as many as by the combination of accidents have marked off the particularity of their own hypostasis and have possessed existence in their own right—that is, the individuals, such as Peter, Paul, and each of men. Of things wholly of different genera, the differences too are different in species, for example animal and knowledge; for animal falls under substance, but knowledge under quality. Now of animal the constitutive differences are being ensouled and being perceptive, while the divisive differences are being rational, being irrational, being winged, being aquatic; and of knowledge the constitutive differences are inhering in ensouled and rational beings, and further also being hard to change, while the divisive differences are grammar and philosophy. For of whatever category the genus is, of that category are also the species and the differences of the species; and of genera and species subordinated to one another nothing prevents the same differences belonging, even if not all of them. By differences here I mean those that constitute them. One must know that the nine categories outside substance each have, even if they are accidents, constitutive and divisive differences, and each of them is a most general genus and has both species and subalternate genera and most specific species. For certainly, where there is a genus, there are also divisive differences; for these are what divide genera into species; and where there are species, there are also constitutive differences; for these are what constitute species. The one is taken in three ways: either by genus, as we say that man and horse are one and the same in genus; for they are under one genus, under animal; or by species, as we say that Socrates and Plato, being under one species, under man, are one and the same in species;

Or in number, as we say that Socrates is one, separated by himself from the rest of men. 22 On "in something." "In something" is said in eleven ways: 1) as genus in species, as animal in the definition of man, being the genus of man; 2) as species in genus, as man in the division of animal; 3) in place, as a priest in the temple; 4) in time, as Noah in the time of the flood; 5) in a vessel, as wine in a mixing bowl; 6) as whole in parts, as Socrates in his own limbs, head and hands and feet—but this is not "in something" but "in somethings"; 7) as part in whole, as head, hand in Socrates; 8) as form in matter, as the form of the statue in the bronze; 9) as in the productive cause, as all things in God; 10) as in the final cause, as a bed in the rest of men; for a bed comes to be for the rest of men; 11) as in a substrate, as white in a body. It must be known that parts are said of a whole, but a whole in no way of parts, but a whole in parts. On substance.

Substance is a self-subsistent thing not needing another for its constitution; and again, substance is everything that is self-subsistent and does not have its being in another—that is, not being through another nor having its existence in another nor needing another for its constitution, but being in itself, in which the accident also has its existence. For color has come to be through body, in order that it may color it, and not body through color. And color exists in body, and not body in color; whence also color is said to be of body, and not body of color. Often, therefore, when color is changed and altered, the substance—that is, the body—is not changed, but remains the same. And substance is said from "to be." On nature. Nature is the principle of the motion and rest of each of the things that are, for example, earth is moved with respect to sprouting, but is at rest with respect to change from place to place; for it is not moved from place to place. The principle and cause, therefore, of its motion and rest, according to which it is naturally disposed so to be moved and to rest essentially—that is, naturally, and not accidentally—is called nature from "to be naturally disposed" and "to exist" in such a way. And this is nothing other than substance; for from substance it has such power—that is, motion and rest. And substance is the cause of its motion and rest. And nature is said from "to be naturally disposed." On form.

Form is, as it were, a substance shaped and specified by essential differences, which signifies the most specific species; for example, the substance shaped and specified by an animate, sentient body and completing the animal, and again taking on the rational and the mortal, completes the species of man. Which most specific species is called form, as it were a shaped substance. Therefore the holy fathers apply the name of substance and nature and form to the most specific species, and they say that substance and nature and form are the same as the most specific species; and they call the individuals under the same most specific species consubstantial and connatural and congeneric and of like form. But they call the most specific species of different substance and different nature and different species and different genus and different form. For it is not possible for one species to be of different substance and different nature and different form from another species or one nature from another nature or one substance from another substance. One must know that it is impossible for one composite nature to come to be from two substances, that is, natures; for it is impossible for the differences that are divided against one another to exist together in the same thing as constituents. But it is possible for one composite hypostasis to come to be from different natures, as man is composed of soul and body; for even if one nature of men is spoken of, the individual man is not said to be of one nature. For one composite nature of men is spoken of, because all the composite hypostases of men belong under one species.

The individual man is not said to be of one nature, because each human being's hypostasis consists of two natures, I mean soul and body, and keeps these unconfused in itself; and the witness is the separation that comes about through death. On hypostasis. The name of hypostasis signifies two things: sometimes simple existence, according to which meaning ousia and hypostasis are the same, whence some of the holy fathers called them natures, that is, hypostases; sometimes the existence that is self-subsistent and individually constituted, according to which meaning it signifies the individual differing in number, that is, Peter, Paul, some particular horse. For one must know that neither formless ousia subsists by itself, nor essential difference, nor species, nor accident, but only the hypostases, that is, the individuals, and in them both the ousiai and the essential differences, the species and the accidents are contemplated. And the simple ousia is contemplated alike in all hypostases, both in inanimate and animate, rational and irrational, mortal and immortal. But the essential differences are other in inanimate things and different in animate, other in rational and different in irrational, likewise other in mortal and different in immortal, and simply to speak, in the hypostases of each most specific species the same differences unite them to one another by the principle of ousia, but separate them from hypostases of other species. Likewise the accidents also are contemplated in them, that is, in the hypostases, separating each hypostasis from hypostases of the same species.

Therefore the individual also properly received the name of hypostasis; for in it the essence subsists in actuality, having taken on the accidents. Concerning person. A person is that which, through its own activities and properties, provides us with a manifest and delimited appearance distinct from those of the same nature, as Gabriel, conversing with the holy Theotokos, being one of the angels, was present there alone and conversed, separated from the angels of the same essence by his presence in the place and by his conversation; and Paul, speaking publicly on the steps, being one of men, was distinguished from the rest of men by his properties and activities. But one must know that the holy fathers called hypostasis and person and individual the same thing, that which subsists by itself in its own peculiar constitution from essence and accidents and differs in number and indicates a particular thing, such as Peter, Paul, this horse. And hypostasis is so called from hyphestanai (to subsist). Concerning the enhypostatic. And the enhypostatic sometimes signifies simple existence, according to which meaning we call not only simple essence enhypostatic but also the accident, which properly is not

It is enhypostatic but heterohypostatic, and sometimes it also signifies the hypostasis that exists in itself, that is, the individual, which properly is not enhypostatic but is and is called a hypostasis. Properly, enhypostatic is either that which does not subsist in itself but is contemplated in hypostases, as the species, that is, the nature of humans, is not contemplated in its own hypostasis but in Peter and Paul and the remaining hypostases of humans; or that which, together with another different in essence, is composed into the generation of some whole and constitutes one composite hypostasis, as a human is composed of soul and body; neither the soul alone is called a hypostasis nor the body, but they are enhypostatic, and that which is constituted from both is the hypostasis of both. For properly a hypostasis is and is called that which subsists in itself in its own distinctive manner. Again, enhypostatic is called the nature that has been assumed by another hypostasis and has its existence in it. Hence also the flesh of the Lord, not having subsisted in itself nor by any momentary inclination, is not a hypostasis but rather enhypostatic; for it subsisted in the hypostasis of God the Word, having been assumed by it, and it had and has that hypostasis. Concerning the anhypostatic. And anhypostatic is also said in two ways: for sometimes it signifies that which in no way and nowhere exists, that is, the nonexistent; and sometimes that which does not have its being in itself but has its existence in another, that is, the accident. Division of being and of essence. Being is divided into essence and accident, not as a genus into species but as an equivocal term or as things from one and toward one. Essence is the most general genus.

This is divided into body and incorporeal, the body into animate and inanimate, the animate into perceptive and imperceptive (animal, zoophyte, and plant), the animal into rational and irrational, the rational into mortal and immortal, the mortal into man, ox, and the like, man into Peter, Paul, and the remaining individual men, which are atoms and hypostases and persons. Concerning what is proper to substance. What then substance and nature and form are, has been said, and what hypostasis and atom and person are, both enhypostatic and anhypostatic, and what the difference between substance and accidents is, and that substance is more authoritative than accidents, since accidents have their existence in it. It has also been said about its division and in what substance differs from essential differences, that through them substance, being specified, produces such a species and becomes such. It has also been said what nature and form and hypostasis and person and atom are, and how those outside the faith have opined about these things, and how the holy fathers, the disciples and teachers of truth and of true philosophy, have rightly divided them. But come now, let us state the properties of substance. It is a property of substance not to be in a subject; for it is rather that which underlies the accident for its existence, and does not itself have its existence in another. This property also belongs to essential differences; for what is in a subject neither preserves it when present nor destroys it when absent; therefore it is not taken into the definition either, for it is altogether an accident. But essential differences are not accidents, and they preserve when present and destroy when absent.

Therefore they are also included in the definition. It is also a property to be predicated synonymously, that is, to share both the name and the definition; and to have no contrary, for nothing is contrary to a stone, that is, to the very substance of a stone; and not to admit the more and the less; and this is also a property of essential differences, for neither is man more a substance or an animal than a horse, nor is a horse more than a man; and to be receptive of contraries in turn and not in itself but according to its own change. And I mean contraries of accidental, non-essential attributes; for the rational does not admit the irrational, but the body is heated and, when changed, is cooled, and the soul sometimes receives virtue and sometimes vice. Further, concerning things of the same genus and same species, and of different genus and different species, and of the same hypostasis and differing in number. Things of the same genus are those that are placed under the same category, such as all that are under substance, and likewise in the case of the other nine categories; for one must know that all the categories are ten, that is, the most general genera, under which every expression uttered simply is referred.

These are they: 1) substance, for example a stone; 2) quantity, for example two, three; 3) relation, for example father, son; 4) quality, for example white, black; 5) where, for example in Damascus—and this is indicative of place; 6) when, yesterday, tomorrow—and this is indicative of time; 7) to have, for example to wear a garment; 8) to be situated, for example to stand, to sit; 9) to do, for example to burn; 10) to suffer, for example to be burned. Things are of different genera, as many as fall under one and another category; and things of the same genus are, for example, man and horse, for both are under substance; but of different genera, as man and knowledge, for man is under substance, but knowledge under quality. Things are of the same species, as many as are ranked under the same species and share in the definition of substance, for example Peter, Paul; for both are under one species, that of man. But things are of different species, as many as differ in species, that is, in the definition of substance, for example man and horse. The holy fathers say that same-genus and same-species are the same as things consubstantial, that is, the hypostases under the same species. Things are co-hypostatic when two natures are united in one hypostasis and have one composite hypostasis and one person, as soul and body. But things are of different hypostases and differ in number, as many as by the combination of accidents have marked off the peculiarity of their own hypostasis, that is, as many as differ from one another by their accidents and have their existence individually and in themselves, for example the individuals Peter and Paul; for this one is one and that one is another. On quantity and quantity.

Quantity is a heap of units; for they say that the unit is not a quantity but the beginning of quantity. When unit and unit come together, two are produced, so that quantity is not a division but a heap and conjunction of units; for to divide two into one and one separately, this is division, but to say that one and one are two, this is rather a conjunction. It must be known that quantity is the measure itself and the number that measures and numbers, while quantities are the things subject to number and measure, that is, the things measured and numbered. Of quantities, some are discrete and some continuous. Continuous is when the thing measured is one, just as one piece of wood is found to be two cubits or three cubits, or a stone or something of the sort, and being one it is measured and is called continuous. Discrete are those separated from one another, as in the case of ten stones or ten palm trees; for these are separated from one another. These, then, are said to be numbered, unless through smallness and multitude they are measured by a modius or something of the sort, like wheat or something similar.

They define as continuous those things whose parts join together at some common boundary; for since the wood of two cubits—that is, having two cubits—is one, the end of the one cubit and the beginning of the other cubit are one, for they are glued together and joined and are not separated from one another. Discrete things, however, are those whose parts do not join together at any common boundary, as in the case of ten stones. For if you count five and five, they do not have a common boundary joining them; for if you place something between the five and the five, they become eleven and not ten. And the very name of continuous and discrete makes this clear. Under discrete quantity, then, are classed number and speech. We call number here the things counted; for all things counted are discrete, as has been shown. And speech is discrete; for speech, when counted by its words, does not have a common boundary joining its parts. For if the speech has ten words and you divide them into five and five, they do not have a common boundary joining them; for if something is inserted in the middle, they become eleven and not ten. Similarly, a word counted by syllables does not have a common boundary joining the syllables, for example Socrates: between the syllable So and the syllable cra there is no common boundary joining them. There are five continuous quantities: body, surface, line, place, time. One must know that the point is not a quantity; for it is neither measured nor counted, since it has no dimension at all. The line has one dimension, for it is a breadthless length, such as—

This, then, is reduced to continuous quantity. For being one, it is measured, and its parts have a common boundary joining them together—the point between them. A surface is the outer part of a body, from the fact of its appearing. It has two dimensions, length and width. And this too, being one, is measured, and its parts have a common boundary joining them together—the line between them. But one must know that a smooth and even surface is called a plane, while an uneven and crooked one is called simply a surface. A body has three dimensions: length, width, depth, that is, thickness; and being one, it is measured, and its parts have a common boundary joining them together—the surface. And place is the surface of the air; for your place is the surface, that is, the limit of the air surrounding you, and as a surface it is reduced to continuous quantity. And time is measured into the past and into the future, and its parts have a common boundary joining them together—the now; and the now is without quantity. Behold, then, there are three things without quantity: the unit, the point, and the now. And properly these seven are called quantities: number, speech, time, place, line, surface, body. But by accident we also call quantities the things observed in them—action, motion, color, and the like; for example, if the action and the motion occur in much time, we say much action and much motion, but if in little, little. Likewise also, if whiteness be in a large body, we say much white, but if in a small one, little. Further, of quantity, one kind is determinate, and the other indeterminate.

That which can be measured or numbered is limited, while the unlimited is that which exceeds every measure and every number by some excess; and it is called great and much indefinitely, as we say: Great is the compassion of God, great is the mystery of the economy of the Word of God. But one must know that Aristotle places the great and the small, the much and the little, and the greater and the lesser, and the fewer and the more, and the double and the half, and such things, under the category of relation. We say, then, that it is possible for the same thing to be referred to different categories according to different points of view. For insofar as the aforementioned things signify number and measure, they are referred to quantity; but insofar as they have a relation to one another and are spoken of in relation to one another, they are referred to relatives. For the great is called great in relation to the small, and the double in relation to the half, and likewise the rest. But body, insofar as it is natural, is referred to substance; but insofar as it is mathematical, that is, measured, it is referred to quantity. Further, of quantity, one kind is magnitude and another is multitude. Magnitude, then, is measured, while multitude is numbered. And the how-large follows magnitude, while the quantity

in multitude. There are three properties of quantity, which are called accompaniments: first, not to have anything contrary to itself; for body itself, as such, does not have anything contrary, but insofar as it happens to be white, it has something contrary, namely black. But one must know that to the number two there is no other number contrary; for if there were, there would be many. For all other numbers would be contrary, and nature is found to be unjust, setting many things against one; for it is not possible for many things to be contrary to one. Second, not to admit the more and the less. For two palm trees are not more two than two men. But that which does not have a contrary does not admit the more and the less. Third, which belongs to quantity alone and to all quantity, is the equal and the unequal. For a line is equal and unequal to a line. Concerning relatives. Relatives are those things, whatever they are, which are said to be of other things or in some way otherwise in relation to another. And they are said to be of other things, as a father of a son; for a father is wholly said to be the father of a son. And in relation to another, as great in relation to small and much in relation to little; for it is not said to be much of a little, but in relation to a little. But one must know that when something is considered by itself, it is not a relative, but whenever it has a relation to another, then it is said to be relative. So that this is the being of relatives and this is their subsistence, in being said in relation to another, that is, in having a relation to another; for the relation to one another makes relatives. Of relatives, some are named by the same name, as friend of a friend is friend, enemy of an enemy is enemy, and some by another name, as father of a son is father, teacher of a disciple is teacher.

Again, of relatives, some are according to superiority, as the greater is greater than the lesser; some according to the judging and the judged, as knowledge is knowledge of the knowable; for knowledge judges the knowable, that is, cognition judges the cognizable, and perception is perception of the perceptible, and position is position of the positioned, and standing is standing of the standing thing, and reclining is reclining of the reclining thing, and the like; some according to potentiality and impotence—potentiality, as the hot and the heated; impotence, as according to privation of potentiality, as we say the sight has an impotence to see the starless sphere; some according to cause and effect, as a father is father of a son. It is proper to relatives to be said in relation to things that convert: for a friend is a friend of a friend, and a friend is a friend of a friend; a teacher is teacher of a student, and a student is student of a teacher; and to be simultaneous by nature. And to be simultaneous by nature is to contribute together and be contributed together, and to remove together and be removed together; for if a father exists, a son will certainly also exist, and if a son exists, a father will certainly also exist, and if a father does not exist, neither will a son exist—for of whom will he be a son if the father does not exist?—and if a son does not exist, neither will a father exist; for he who does not have a son will not be a father. So the son is removed together with the father and the father with the son, but his subsistence is not removed together, but the relation. For even if the son remains, he does not remain a son; for not having a father, how will he be a son? But if we also call someone a son of the deceased, either we do not speak properly but by misuse, or as though the father had not perished and gone into non-being because of the immortality of the soul.

One must know that each category is a most generic genus and has both genera and species subordinated, and differences that divide the genera and constitute the species, and most specific species and individuals; but the constituting differences are not called essential, except of substance alone, nor are individuals called hypostases, except of substance alone. One must know that substance itself also, as a genus and having a relation to another, is reduced under the relatives; for the genus is a genus of species and the species are species of a genus and are among the relatives. Further, relatives and things said in relation to correlatives have their relation either in self-subsisting things, that is, substances, or not in self-subsisting things, that is, accidents. And if in self-subsisting things, either their relation is natural, as of father and son, or not natural. But if not natural, either by chance, as slave and master, or by art, as student and teacher, or by choice, as friend and friend, enemy and enemy. But if not in self-subsisting things but in accidents, either natural, as the double and the half, or not natural. One must reduce relatives first under another category as considered in itself, and then as having a relation to another under the relatives; for something must first be without relation, and then a relation be considered in it.

Concerning the qualified and quality. Quality is that according to which certain things are called qualified. And again, quality is that according to which the things that partake of it are spoken of by a derived name: from prudence the one who has prudence is called prudent, and the one who partakes of heat is called hot. But one must know that the qualified is more universal than quality; for the qualified signifies both the quality and the thing partaking of it, that is, both heat and the hot thing, the thing having heat; for those who have quality are qualified, for instance those having heat are called hot. The hot are qualified, but heat is a quality. And often quality itself is also called qualified, similarly also in the case of the quantified and quantity. Of qualities, some inhere in ensouled {and rational} bodies, as sciences and virtues, diseases and health, and they are called states and dispositions; others in both ensouled and inanimate things, as heat, cold, form, shape, power and impotence. Of these, some are in potentiality and some in actuality; and if in potentiality, they produce power and impotence; but if in actuality, either they have penetrated through the depth, as heat through all of fire and whiteness through all of milk and snow, and produce an affection and a passive quality, or they are on the surface and produce shape and form. There are, then, four species of quality: state and disposition, power and impotence, affection and passive quality, shape and form. But state differs from disposition in that state is hard to change and more lasting, for instance prudence; for no one quickly changes from prudence to folly.

Likewise also knowledge, when someone knows accurately, the knowledge in him is hard to change; it is a state, and courage and temperance and justice likewise. Dispositions are the easily moved and quickly changing things, such as heat, cold, disease, health, and the like; for a man is disposed according to these, but changes quickly, becoming cold from hot and healthy from disease. And these very things, such as disease and health and the like, if they are permanent and hard to change, are states. But disposition is more general; for both are called dispositions, since a man is in some way disposed according to these, but the hard-to-change disposition is called a state, while the easily changeable one is called a disposition only. The second species of quality is capacity and incapacity, which are not in actuality but have a fitness and natural capacity or unfitness, as we say that a child is potentially musical—for even if he does not have music in actuality, he has a fitness for receiving music—while the irrational creature is unmusical, as neither having music in actuality nor being able to receive it; and the hard also has a capacity for not being quickly divided. The third species is passive quality and affection, such as heat, whiteness, cold, blackness, and the like. Affection is easily cast off, like disposition, as when someone grows pale or blushes through shame or fear, but passive quality is hard to move and hard to change.

Of the passive qualities, some have not come from a passion, that is, not from elsewhere, but exist by nature, as heat in fire and sweetness in honey; for neither is heat acquired by fire, nor sweetness by honey, nor did they, not being such before, later receive heat and sweetness; yet they produce the same passion according to our perception; for fire, being hot, heats us, and honey, being sweet, sweetens us. But some have come from a certain passion, that is, a mixture, and sometimes produce a passion according to our perception, but not the same passion and the same quality that they have, such as colors; for white, coming to be from a certain passion and mixture, produces a passion concerning sight, that is, discrimination and expansion and illumination, but does not make us white. The passive quality, then, that is not acquired either exists in every member of the species, as heat in the whole of fire, or not in every one, as blackness in the Ethiopians; for not all humans are black. These things are contemplated not only concerning the body but also concerning the soul. The fourth species of quality is shape and form. Shape, then, applies to living things and to non-living things, but form only to living things. But if form or "well-formed" is said of non-living things, it is said not properly but by misuse. Shape, then, is more universal; for form is also called shape. But the shape of non-living things is not called form. Straightness, that is, uprightness, and crookedness, that is, distortion, belong to quality.

It must be known that qualities are for the most part spoken of paronymously from qualities, as "warm" from warmth; but some also homonymously, as "musical" is both the science of music and a musical woman, the one having the science of music; and some, though rarely, heteronymously, as "spoudaios" (earnest/good) from virtue; for the virtuous man is called spoudaios. It must be known that passion is twofold: for it is spoken of either in having already been affected, and is referred to quality, as a garment already whitened is called white, or in being affected now, and is referred to the category of being affected, as that which has not yet been whitened but is now being whitened. It must be known that qualities are not bodies but incorporeal. For if they were bodies, they would be under substance; and all accidents are incorporeal and do not exist in themselves, unless they are contemplated in substance. It must be known that essential qualities are referred to substance; for they are parts of it, as dividing it and being taken into the definition of its species, and under whichever category the whole is, under that same category its parts also will be referred. Heavy and light are contemplated either in magnitudes, as in the case of things weighed, and are referred to quantity, or in substance, as in the elements, that is, fire and earth, and they are referred to substance as essential differences; similarly also the dense and the rare, that is, the sparse; for either they are essentially in the elements and are referred to substance, or they are adventitiously in garments and are referred to the category of position, for they are by position. There are three things proper to quality, that is, concomitants: first, to admit of contrariety.

For warm is contrary to cold, and white to black; second, the more and the less, for where there is contrariety, there the more and the less are also found. The more is intensification, and the less is remission. It is possible, then, to say that this species is whiter than that one and colder to a lesser degree. Third, a concomitant, which is also most proper to quality, the like and the unlike. But it must be known that shape has no contrary. It must be known that not all privations are spoken of negatively, but there are also privations spoken of affirmatively, such as blindness and deafness. And again, not every species is named affirmatively but also negatively, just as intemperance, being a species, was named not affirmatively but negatively; for affirmation is called affirmation, as "he is beautiful," and denial is negation, as "he is not beautiful"; but when we say "you are lawless," the alpha signifies negation, as does "not." But if this white thing is said to be equal to that white thing, it is said to be equal not insofar as it is a quality but insofar as it is a quantity, and that this surface is equal to that surface, just as in quantity the like and the unlike are observed not insofar as it is quantity but insofar as it partakes of quality.

Concerning acting and being acted upon. It must be known that action and passion, that is, the active power and the passive power, fall under quality, while to act and to be acted upon is a certain substance operating or being acted upon in such and such a way. To act, then, is to have the cause of the activity in oneself; to be acted upon is to have the cause of being acted upon both in oneself and in another, as the craftsman and the thing crafted: for the craftsman has the cause of the crafting in himself, while the thing crafted has the beginning of the crafting in the craftsman, and in itself the aptitude for being acted upon. By craftsman here we mean the artisan, such as a carpenter, and by thing crafted we mean the matter underlying the artisan, such as wood; for this underlies the carpenter. Of acting and being acted upon, some things are said to act simply, as in the case of the productive arts, such as carpentry, bronze-working, and the like, in which even after the agent has ceased the product remains; for when the builder has ceased building, the thing built remains; — but that is called doing in the case of those things where the thing done does not remain once the doer has ceased; for when the flute-player has ceased, the flute-playing does not remain but perishes; — and that is called contemplating, as astronomy, geometry, thinking, and the like, and further also the forms contemplated in inanimate things, such as fire, stone, wood, and the like.

The first of these belong to rational beings, while the last belongs to soulless and irrational things; for it acts not insofar as it is animate but insofar as a body approaches a body. It has two peculiarities: first, receptivity to contrariety, for heating is contrary to cooling; second, the more and the less, for it is possible to heat more and to cool less, and likewise to be heated and to be cooled. In all the categories, then, acting and being acted upon are observed: in substance, begetting and being begotten; in quantity, numbering and being numbered; in relation, doubling and being doubled; in quality, whitening and being whitened; in position, sitting and being seated; in having, wearing and being worn; in where, encompassing and being encompassed; and in when, being encompassed and encompassing in the present, past, and future time. Concerning position. To be situated is for that which has a certain position relative to another, such as a body lying in some way relative to such a position, whether to reclining or sitting or standing. The species of position are three: standing, sitting, reclining; for being upright produces standing, while lying in part and standing in part produces sitting, and lying completely produces reclining. Position does not reveal the thing situated nor the place, but the very position of the thing situated relative to the place. Of things situated, some are situated by nature, as the elements in their proper places—earth, water, air, fire, and the like—while others are situated by position and art, as a statue, a column, and the like.

Next is the subdivision which says that of things that are posited, some are stationary, like earth, and some are moving, like the heavenly bodies. Further, of things that are posited, some are posited in potentiality, that is, things that are able to change their place, and some in actuality, as where they are posited. 38. On "where." "Where" signifies place; for when asked "where is so-and-so?" we say "in the house, in the city," and these signify place. The species of the category "where" are according to the differences of places: above, below, right, left, in front, behind. On "when." "When" indicates time; for when asked "when did this happen?" we say "last year, the year before," which signify time. The species of the category "when" are as many as the differences of time. And these are three: present, past, future. On "having." "Having" is substance concerning substance. It indicates containing or being contained, and not being a part of the thing. A tunic, weapons, and the like contain, while a ring and any other such small thing is contained. And both the containing and the contained must be substances; for if one were a substance and the other an accident, as the knowledgeable man and knowledge, it is no longer brought under "having." The differences of "having" arise according to the difference of beings; for it is either animate or inanimate, and we are said to have animate things as a child, a horse, and the like, and inanimate things as a ring, a sandal, and the like. "Having" is also said homonymously in many other senses, about which we shall speak later.

41 On Opposites. Every opposite is opposed either as a thing or as a word. And if as a word to a word, it produces affirmation and negation. Affirmation, then, is to say what belongs to something, for example, "he is beautiful," and negation is to say what does not belong to something, for example, "he is not beautiful"; and both are called a declarative statement. But if they are opposed as things, they are either spoken of in relation to things that convert, and produce relatives, which also introduce one another and remove one another together, or they are not in relation to things that convert and have no relation. And these either do not change into one another, yet both are according to nature and produce contraries, like heat and cold, or the one changes into the other, but the other does not change. And the one of them is according to nature and the other contrary to nature, and they produce the opposites according to privation and possession, like sight and blindness; for sight is a possession, as being from having, and blindness is a privation of the possession, that is, of sight. And of contraries, some are immediate, and some are mediate. Immediate, then, are those of which it is necessary that the one—that is, one of them—belong to the subject underlying them, or to those of which they are predicated, for example, disease and health in the body of an animal as the underlying subject, and it is entirely necessary that in the body there be either disease or health; and we call disease every deviation of nature. —Mediate, however, are those of which it is not necessary that the one belong to the subject or to those of which they are predicated, like white and black; for they are contraries, and it is not in every way necessary that one of them belong to the body; for it is not necessary that every body be either white or black, for there are bodies that are grey and tawny.

– unless one of the opposites belongs by nature determinately to something, as heat belongs to fire and cold to snow. Of the intermediates, then, some have names, as the middle between white and black is called gray, while others have no names; for the middle between the just and the unjust has no name, but the intermediate is known by the negation of each, for example, neither just nor unjust. Four properties follow upon contraries: first, that to the good, evil is necessarily contrary, but to evil sometimes good, sometimes another evil; for to temperance, intemperance is contrary, but to intemperance sometimes temperance, sometimes stupidity. Stupidity is the state in which the passions are neither moved nor stirred. Intemperance, then, is a deficiency of temperance, while stupidity is an excess, and excess is contrary to deficiency. – Second, that it is impossible for contraries to be present at the same time in individuals in the same respect; for it is not possible for Socrates to be healthy and sick at the same time, or for the same part to be heated and cooled at the same time. – Third, that contraries are in the same subject, either in genus or in species or in number: in genus, as white and black in a simple body; in species, as health and disease in the body of an animal; and in number, clearly; for the same body can be receptive of contraries through its own change. – Fourth, that contraries are either under the same genus, as white and black under color, or under contrary genera, as justice and injustice under good and evil, which are contraries, or are themselves contrary genera, as good and evil, being contrary genera.

Concerning habit and privation. Habit is spoken of as the activity of that which is held and of that which holds, as of the weapon and the armed man, that is, of the one putting on and the one putting on clothes; – secondly, the introduced activities that are permanent, whether natural or psychic; and natural, as heat in things being heated, and psychic, as knowledge; – thirdly, that which one does not yet have, but has a suitability to receive, which is the first meaning of "in potentiality"; – fourthly, natural quality, that is, natural habit, as the heat of fire and the sight of one sleeping, which is the second meaning of "in potentiality" (for it is able to burn, but does not burn in actuality, which is the first meaning of "in actuality"); – fifthly, as the final activity, as sight that already sees and heat that already heats. And privation of habit is loss. So opposed to the first meaning of habit is the privation of the weapon, that is, of the garment; – to the second, the loss of introduced habits, when the thing that has been heated becomes cold; – to the third, that which the genus has not by nature to have at all, as we say the infant has a suitability for music, but the fig tree in no way does. The fig tree, then, is deprived, since the genus of plants does not have the suitability to receive music. And that which the genus has a suitability for, but some one of the species does not have; for the animal has a suitability to see, but the mole, being a species of animal, does not have the suitability to see; – and to the fourth, the loss of the potentiality according to habit;

– In the fifth place, the loss of final activity, which he mentioned above as the opposition according to privation and habit of opposites, that is, of potency whether productive or passive; and this is characterized by these three things: what is naturally able to have something and does not have it at all, but is completely deprived of it, and when it is naturally able to have it, and where it is naturally able to have it. For example, we do not call a stone blind, for it is not naturally able to have the habit of sight; nor do we call a newborn dog blind, nor a newborn infant toothless, since they are not naturally able to have them at that time; nor do we call the foot blind, for the animal is not naturally able to have the habit of sight in the foot. When, therefore, according to these three things, something is naturally able to have and does not have, it is called privation. 43 Concerning prior and posterior. The prior is divided into four meanings. And the most proper is that which is prior in time. It is said properly in the case of living things as older, and in the case of non-living things as more ancient; but they are used improperly and interchangeably. – Second is that which is prior by nature, which is co-introduced but does not co-introduce, and co-destroys and is not co-destroyed, as animal is prior to man; for if animal does not exist, neither will man exist, for man is an animal. But if man does not exist, there will be an animal, for both the horse and the dog are animals; and if man exists, there will certainly be an animal, for man is an animal. But if an animal exists, there is not certainly a man, but perhaps a horse, a dog; for these too are animals. – Third is that according to order, as we say first is one, second is two, then the syllables, then the numbers.

– Fourth, according to worth, as we say: first a bishop, then a presbyter. But some reject this mode: for it is possible that the one first in order is later in worth. – Fifth, as we say, the cause and the caused, as Socrates is prior to his own image; for he himself is the cause of his own image. And the father is prior and greater than the son; for the father is the cause of the son, for the son is begotten from the father. Therefore also the blessed Gregory took in this sense what was said by our Lord in the holy Gospels: "My Father is greater than I." But others add the mode according to conception, as the wall is prior to the foundations. But this is reduced under the fourth mode, that according to worth; for what is prior by conception is later in reality. In as many ways as there is "prior," in so many ways also is there "later." But "prior" and "later" and "more" and "less" are not among homonyms but among things spoken of in relation to one thing. 44 On the Simultaneous.

Things are said to be "at the same time" in the primary sense when their generation occurs in the same time, for instance when two people are born at the same moment. This mode is opposed to the first mode of the meanings of "prior." The second meaning of "at the same time" is things that coexist with one another and are not the cause or the caused of one another, as the double and the half; for they coexist at the same time and mutually abolish and mutually contribute. This mode is opposed to the second and the fifth mode of "prior"; for in the second they neither introduce nor abolish one another, and in the fifth one is the cause and the other the caused. The third meaning of "at the same time" is things that are species divided against one another; species divided against one another are those derived from the same division, for instance the rational and the irrational from the animal. This mode is opposed to the first and the second and, one might say, to the other three. 45 On Motion. Motion is the actuality of what is in potentiality, insofar as it is such, for instance the bronze is in potentiality a statue; for the bronze is able to receive the form of the statue. The actuality, then, of the bronze that is in potentiality a statue is its being dissolved, its being molded, its being polished, which are motions. In whatever categories, therefore, the potential is observed, in these motion will also be observed; and in whatever categories the potential is not observed, neither will motion be observed. It is observed, then, in substance, in quantity, in quality, and in the category of where.

In substance there is generation and corruption; in quantity, increase and decrease; in quality, alteration; in place, the thing carried in a circle, which is called revolution, and the thing moved in a straight line, which is called straight-line motion. The differences of straight-line motion are six: up, down, inward, outward, right, left. Therefore together with revolution there are seven local motions. For everything that changes either changes in respect of itself, or in respect of something in it, or in respect of something around it. And if it changes in respect of itself, it produces generation and corruption; if in respect of something in it, that is, in respect of quantity, it produces increase and decrease; or in respect of quality, it produces alteration; if in respect of what is around it, it produces change in place. For place is neither the thing moved itself nor something in it, but it accompanies the things moved and is around the things moved. Generation and corruption differ: generation is the advance from non-being to being—for what was not before, this comes to be; corruption is the reverse, change from being to non-being. Increase and decrease: increase is motion toward the greater, decrease toward the lesser. In alteration, again, the opposed affections: heat to cold, black to white. Therefore corruption is opposed to generation, decrease to increase, and to alteration the opposite and rest. Opposed to heating are cooling and rest; for when the thing being heated reaches its limit and comes to the extreme of heat, it rests and ceases from being heated.

Thus also in local change both the contrary motion and rest are opposed; contrary, as upward motion is to downward motion and rest; for if someone throws a clod upward, it will not be moved downward before some rest occurs. But to celestial motion there is no contrary motion. Alteration seems to accompany the other motions; for both what comes to be and what perishes, what increases and what decreases, and what is moved in place is altogether altered. But in natural motions, even if we find alteration accompanying the other motions, nevertheless it is possible to be altered but not to be moved according to another motion, as in the case of a stone; for this is heated and cooled and neither increases nor comes to be; and similarly in the other cases. So that even if alteration accompanies the other motions, nevertheless it is possible to be contemplated by itself; whence their difference is acknowledged. Aristotle calls change motion. For in the fifth book of the Physics he demonstrated that generation and corruption are changes but are not motions, because motion occurs while the thing is preserved. And if we said that to alteration and to local change there are two contraries, motion and rest, it must be known that it is not impossible for two things to be contrary to one in different respects; for rest as cessation and privation, but the other properly as cold is to heating.

On "having." "Having" is spoken of in eight ways. For it is either as a state or a disposition or another quality; for we are said to have knowledge and virtue. Or as a quantity; for the piece of wood is said to have a magnitude of three cubits. Or as substance concerning substance, which is the most general genus. And this is either concerning the whole body, as a tunic, or concerning some part, as a ring on a finger, or as a part in a whole; for we are said to have a hand. Or as in a vessel, as we say the jar has wine. Or as a possession; for we are said to have a house or a field, and we are also said to have a wife, and a wife to have a husband. But this mode seems to be foreign to "having," since it converts; for it signifies no more that the man has a wife than that the wife has a man, for neither does the one prevail over the other, but perhaps they are related without difference. But even if the possessor has a possession and the possession a possessor, and it converts, still it is not as a man a wife and a wife a man; for the possessor is sovereign and most authoritative over the possession, and for this reason the possessor is rather said to have, and the possession to be had. It is clear that "having" is among homonyms. Some state the same differences of "having" as also of "doing.

And of "undergoing." For just as things that act and undergo are either animate or inanimate, so here too that which has and that which is had are either animate or inanimate. How then will the same differences belong to different genera? But it is possible to say that that which has is either in relation to the whole body or in relation to a part, and again this is either a means of defense or an ornament. On assertion, denial, and affirmation. One must know that affirmation and denial are called assertion. Affirmation, then, is that which signifies what belongs to something, that is, what someone is; for example, "Socrates is wise," "Socrates walks." Denial is that which makes clear what does not belong to something, that is, what someone is not, for example, "so-and-so is not wise," "so-and-so does not walk." Since, then, a denial is opposed to every affirmation and an affirmation to every denial, the denial opposed to the affirmation and the affirmation opposed to the denial are called contradiction; and it is necessary that the one be false and the one be true. On term, proposition, and syllogism. One must know that the logical treatise has as its aim demonstration. Demonstration is a syllogism; and the syllogism is composed of two true propositions and the conclusion; for example, wishing to demonstrate that the soul is immortal, I say that everything ever-moving is immortal; this is a proposition. Then I state a second proposition: The soul is ever-moving; then the conclusion: The soul, therefore, is immortal. Each proposition is composed of terms, for each word of the proposition is called a term; for a term is that into which the proposition is resolved. For example, the proposition says:

Every thing that is ever-moving is immortal; "every thing" is called a term as a part of a proposition, and "ever-moving" is likewise called a term, and "immortal" is called a term, and "is" is called a term. One must know that the propositions must be true and the conclusion must follow from the propositions. For if one of the propositions is found to be false, or the conclusion, it is a fallacy and not a syllogism. Simple utterance, name, verb, assertion, term: these five do not differ from one another in their subject, but their difference is only in their relation; for example, "man," as simply signifying something, is called a simple utterance; as a subject, it is called a name; as occupying the position of a predicate, it is called a verb; as a part of affirmation or negation, it is called an assertion; as a part of a proposition and syllogism, it is called a term. One must know that in the proposition—that is, in affirmation and negation—the subject is called a name, and the predicate is called a verb. For example, this is an affirmation: "Man walks"; "man" is the subject and is called a name, "walks" occupies the position of a predicate and is called a verb. "Socrates is beautiful": "Socrates" is the subject and is called a name, "is beautiful" occupies the position of a predicate and is called a verb as a part of affirmation, even if among grammarians "beautiful" is called a name. And simply, whatever "is" follows is a verb both in negation and in affirmation, whether it is a name or a verb, it is called a verb by the philosophers as a predicate.

It must be known that these five things differ in no way from one another: assertion, proposition, problem, objection, and conclusion. For when I assert simply that the soul is immortal, it is called an assertion. But when it is taken as a part of a syllogism, then the statement "The soul is immortal" is a proposition. And when someone objects to the proposition, saying, "From where is it clear that the soul is immortal?" then such a thing is called an objection. And when again we put something forward for inquiry—"Is the soul immortal?"—it is called a problem. And when something is gathered from a proposition, it is called a conclusion, for example: "The soul is ever-moving; the ever-moving is immortal; from these propositions it is gathered: therefore the soul is immortal"—this is a conclusion. A proposition is a statement that declares something of something, which is an affirmation, as "Socrates laughs," or something from something, which is a denial, as "Socrates does not laugh." A term is that into which the proposition is resolved. A syllogism is a discourse in which, certain things having been posited or agreed, something else necessarily follows from what has been posited because of what has been posited; for through the posited propositions the conclusion comes about, needing no other external support. A problem is a theorem tending toward choice and avoidance, that is, toward denial and assent with respect to knowledge and contemplation. A question is an inquiry requiring an extended, that is, a broad, answer; for the interrogative statement differs from the inquiry in that a quick answer, that is, one given in few words, follows the interrogative, whereas a lengthy answer and one given through many words follows the inquiry. The dialogic character is so called from question and answer.

An objection is one that overturns the argument from its premises. A counter-assertion is one that accepts the argument as true but shows that it does no harm to the matter at hand. A lemma is that which has been taken as agreed upon for the establishment of something. A heresy is an opinion of more people agreeing with one another but disagreeing with others. A common notion is that which is agreed upon by all, for example that the sun exists. A thesis is a paradoxical supposition of one of those well known in philosophy, that is, a foreign notion, as the argument of Parmenides, that he said the existent is one, and as that of Heraclitus, that all things are moved. A common is that which is observed in many or predicated of many. And "common" is said in four ways: either that which is divisible into parts, as land distributed by lot; or that which is taken in common use indivisibly, but not at the same time, as one slave or one horse of two masters, fulfilling the command now of this one, now of that one; or that which is appropriated in preconception but referred back to the common, as a place in a theater or in a bath; or that which is put forward indivisibly into a common and the same notion, as the voice of a herald. In this way one must take "of which the name is common" in the case of homonyms and synonyms. That which is in itself is what belongs primarily and according to substance to something, and not according to accident, as the rational to man. A universal is that which signifies many things, as man, animal, substance. That which is according to accident is what can belong to something and not belong, as for man to be sick and to be healthy. "To make" is said in the case of the productive arts, in which the thing produced remains, as in carpentry and the like.

For the bed remains after its making. "To act" is said of those things in which the end, that is the result, does not remain, as in flute-playing and dancing. "To contemplate" is said of thinking, astronomy, geometry, and the like. True reason declares conception to be twofold. For the one is a certain conceiving and cogitation that unfolds and clarifies the whole and undifferentiated contemplation and knowledge of things, as when what seems simple to sense appears, through the busy inquiry of the mind, to be many-parted and varied; for example, man, appearing simple, is understood by conception to be double, composed of soul and body. The other is a shaping of the mind by the combination of sense and imagination, composing and opining from things that exist things that in no way exist. Such is the myth-making of centaurs, sirens, and goat-stags. For taking the parts of wholes and composing from the parts something else, with great license and ease it has shaped in the mind and in words the things in no way contemplated in subsistence and essence, and then, being molded in matter, it has made them into images. And this is called

Mere conceptualization. Union comes about in various ways: for it comes about either by mixture, as with different flours kneaded together and mixed, or by gluing, as with bronze and lead, or by joining, as with stones and wood, or by confusion, as with things that melt and things metallic—things that melt, such as wax and pitch and the like, and things metallic, such as gold and silver and the like—or by blending, as with liquids, perhaps wine and water, wine and honey. Union by composition is the mutual interpenetration of the parts into one another without their destruction, as is the case with the soul and the body, which union some have called blending or natural coalescence. It should be known that some of the fathers did not accept the term "blending" in reference to the mystery in Christ, but all accepted union by composition. This is the union by composition that is according to hypostasis. Union according to hypostasis, then, is a thing subsisting from different natures. And again, that which is according to hypostasis is that which is from two things but in one person. And further, union according to hypostasis is a nature that runs together into another hypostasis. Blending is the juxtaposition of bodies, the exchange of qualities. And again, blending is the concurrence of substances different from one another and the interchange of the qualities pertaining to them. Blending is the coupling of bodies mutually exchanging the qualities within them. There is also union by juxtaposition; it resembles union by joining. Again, union is called personal when someone, assuming the person of another, speaks in his stead on his behalf, and relative union, as of friend to friend.

But Nestorius also devises other unions: I mean according to worth and equality of honor and identity of will and good pleasure and sameness of name. But one must know that in the case of union according to subsistence, the things conceived are also united to those able to receive them, as things corrupted together and united remain unconfused and incorrupt and unchangeable, like things placed side by side; for such is the nature of things conceived. The definitions of philosophy are six. 1. Philosophy is knowledge of beings, insofar as they are beings, that is, of their nature. 2. Philosophy is knowledge of divine and human matters. 3. Philosophy is meditation on death, both the voluntary and the natural. 4. Philosophy is assimilation to God, as far as is possible for a human being; and we are assimilated to God in respect of what is just and holy and good. Now what is just is that which distributes equality, that is, neither to do injustice nor to suffer injustice nor to show partiality in judgment, but to render to each according to his works; and what is holy is that which is beyond justice, that is, the good of enduring being wronged and forgiving those who do wrong and rather benefiting them. 5. Philosophy is the art of arts and the science of sciences; for philosophy is the principle of every art, for through it every art has been discovered. 6. Philosophy is the love of wisdom; and true wisdom is God. The love, then, that is toward God, this is true philosophy. And philosophy is divided into the theoretical and the practical; the theoretical into the theological, the mathematical, and the physical; the mathematical into arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy; and the practical into the ethical, the economic, and the political.

Theoretical, then, is the understanding of incorporeal and immaterial things—that is, concerning God, who is primarily and properly incorporeal and immaterial; then also concerning angels and demons and souls, which are themselves called immaterial insofar as they are compared to the body, even if in comparison to the properly immaterial, that is, the divine, they are material. This, then, is the theological. But to contemplate is also [to contemplate] the nature of material things—that is, of animals and plants and stones and the like—which is the physiological. But to contemplate also the things between these, which are sometimes contemplated in matter and sometimes outside matter, and which are between the immaterial and the material—this is the mathematical. For number is immaterial in itself, but it is also contemplated in matter, in wheat perhaps or wine; for we say ten modii of wheat and ten xestai of wine; and similarly in the other species of the mathematical. Practical ethics adorns and teaches how one ought to conduct oneself in public life; and if it educates one man, it is called ethical; if a whole household, it is called economic; if an entire city, it is called political. One must know that there are four dialectical methods, that is, logical: first, the divisive, which divides the genus into species through the intermediate differences; second, the definitive, which from the genus and the differences, which the divisive method has divided, defines the subject; third, the analytic, which analyzes the more composite into the simpler, that is, the body into the humors, the humors into the fruits, the fruits into the four elements, the elements into matter and form; fourth, the demonstrative, which demonstrates the proposed matter through some intermediate; for example, it is proposed to me to demonstrate that the soul is immortal.

I take a certain middle term, "ever-moving," and reason thus: The soul is ever-moving; the ever-moving is immortal; therefore the soul is immortal. But it must be known that syllogisms belong to demonstrative science. And one must know that analysis is threefold: for there is natural analysis, as the one just mentioned; there is also logical analysis, when we resolve the proposed syllogism into its proper figure; and there is also mathematical analysis, when we take the thing sought as agreed and arrive at something agreed, from which the proposed conclusion is captured. For example, let the thing sought be: Whether the soul is immortal. I take this thing sought as agreed and say: Since the soul is immortal, there are recompenses of evil and good deeds; and if there are recompenses, there is that which judges and is judged; and if there is that which judges and is judged, there is a provident one and providence. We have therefore arrived at providence, which is agreed by all. Henceforth, then, by synthesis I say: Since there is providence and a judge, there are recompenses; since there are recompenses, there is that which is judged; and if there is that which is judged, therefore the soul is immortal.

Concerning the union according to subsistence. It must be known that the union according to subsistence produces one composite subsistence of the things united, preserving in itself the natures that came together for union, and their difference, and their natural properties, unconfused and unaltered. But this subsistence has no subsistence-difference in relation to itself; for the characteristic differences of each of the things that came together for union belong to it, by which each is separated from things of the same kind, as is the case with soul and body. For one composite subsistence of Peter, say, or of Paul, is produced from both, and it preserves in itself the two perfect natures, that of the soul and that of the body, and their difference unmixed and their natural properties unconfused. And it has in itself the characteristic properties of each—those of the soul which separate it from the other souls, and those of the body which separate it from the other bodies—properties which in no way separate the soul from the body but unite and join them, while at the same time they separate the one subsistence composed of them from the other subsistences of the same kind. But once the natures have received the union with one another according to subsistence, they remain altogether indivisible. For even if the soul is separated from the body in death, yet the subsistence of both is one and the same; for a subsistence is the composition at the beginning of each one's existence, in accordance with that very thing. So both the body and the soul remain, always having one beginning of their existence

of existence and subsistence, even if they are separated from one another. It must be known that natures can be united to one another according to subsistence, as in the case of the human being, and that a nature can be assumed by a subsistence and can subsist in it; both of these are observed in Christ—for in him both the natures, the divine and the human, were united, and his animate flesh subsisted in the pre-existing subsistence of God the Word and had that subsistence itself—but for one composite nature to be produced from two natures, or one subsistence from two subsistences, is completely impossible; for it is impossible for contrary essential differences to coexist together in one nature; for it is the work of these differences to separate from one another the natures in which they exist. And again, it is impossible for things that have once subsisted in themselves to have another principle of subsistence; for subsistence is existence in itself. It must be known that in the Holy Trinity subsistence is the unoriginate mode of the eternal existence of each. It must be understood that whenever a nature becomes composite, the parts must be contemporaneous, and one thing is produced from others, not preserving but changing and altering the things from which it was composed, as when the body is produced from the four elements, one thing has come to be from others and is neither perfect fire nor any of the others, nor is it called so, and as the mule is from a horse and a donkey; for it is neither a horse nor a donkey, nor is it called so, but one thing from others, preserving neither of the two from which it was composed unconfused and unaltered.