De natura composita

Of our venerable father John of Damascus on composite nature against the Acephalians. 1 A single composite nature arises from different natures when, with the natures being united, something other than the united natures is produced. And that which is produced is neither properly this nor called this, nor that, but something else. For example, from the four elements—I mean fire, air, water, and earth—a body is constituted, with the four being united and mingled, and the body produced is neither fire nor called fire, nor air, nor water, nor earth, but something else besides these. Similarly, from a horse and a donkey a mule comes to be, and it is neither a horse nor a donkey nor called such, but something else besides these. But our Lord Jesus Christ, being from divinity and humanity, is both in divinity and humanity, and is and is called perfect God and perfect man, and wholly God and wholly man, which cannot be found in the case of composite nature; for the whole body is not fire nor the whole air, nor similarly earth nor water, nor is the whole mule a horse nor the whole a donkey, nor a perfect horse nor a perfect donkey, but Christ, as I said, is perfect God and perfect man, and wholly God and wholly man. Therefore, it is not a single composite nature, but a single hypostasis known in two natures, and two natures in one composite hypostasis.

Let us then ask the heretics: When you say that Christ is from two natures, of which natures do you speak? They will say: From divinity and humanity. Then let us say: And how, when you say that Christ is in divinity and humanity, do you not say that he is in two natures? For they cannot say that Christ is not in divinity and humanity. Again let us ask them: Is the nature of Christ one composite nature or two? And they will say: One composite. Then we say: Are the simple and the composite consubstantial? And they cannot say that the simple and the composite are consubstantial. Then we say: If therefore Christ is of one composite nature from divinity and humanity, he is not consubstantial with the Father; for the Father is not of a composite nature from divinity and humanity, but of a simple one. But neither will he be consubstantial with the mother; for the mother is not composed from divinity and humanity. But we, saying that Christ is one hypostasis in two natures, in divinity and humanity, affirm that according to his divinity he is consubstantial with the Father, and according to his humanity consubstantial with the mother, and we neither divide him, saying one hypostasis, nor confound him, confessing two natures united. And again we say thus: If the nature of Christ’s divinity and his flesh is one, and the nature of the Father and of Christ is one, then the nature of the Father and of the flesh will be one. And again: How do you confess the difference of the natures? For difference introduces at least two things that differ, either natures or hypostases, or one hypostasis altered and changed according to separable accident.

That you do not mean a difference of hypostases in the case of Christ is clear. And that you do not mean a difference of separable accident is also clear; for you do not say that he is at one time immortal and at another time mortal, having changed from immortality to mortality, as we change from sickness to health. It remains, therefore, that you speak of a difference of natures, as you also confess; and, confessing a difference of natures, you must first confess the natures of which the difference exists; for if the substances do not exist, neither will the substantial differences exist. But if there is one nature, just as there is one hypostasis in Christ, why, when you speak of a difference of natures, do you not also speak of a difference of hypostases in him? And why, when you say that Christ is from two natures, do you not also say that he is from two hypostases? If Christ is of one composite nature, he is not consubstantial with the Father; for the Father is of a simple nature. And the simple and the composite are not consubstantial. If Christ is consubstantial with the Father according to the same substance and consubstantial with us, then the Father and we will be of one substance. If Christ is of the same nature as the Father and consubstantial with him, who is of a simple nature, and Christ also has a composite nature, he will have two natures, one simple and one composite. If nature and hypostasis are the same according to you, then either, since there are three hypostases of the holy divinity, there will also be three natures of it, or, since there is one nature, there will also be one hypostasis. If you say that the common nature is one thing and the nature considered in the individual, which you also call partial, is another, you will be compelled to confess that not only Christ, but also the Father and the Holy Spirit have two natures, one common and one composite.

If the divinity is uncreated and without beginning, but the humanity is created and has a beginning, how will that which is without beginning and that which has a beginning be of one nature? Since they bring forward to us the usage of Saint Athanasius and of the most holy Cyril which says "one nature of the Word of God incarnate," we say that the saying of Saint Gregory the Theologian which declares "one deified, the other was deified" is equivalent to this. For just as "being fired" does not indicate a change of that which is fired, but a union with fire, so also deification indicates a union with divinity, and incarnation a union with flesh. Therefore we know one nature of the Word of God, that is, of his divinity, incarnate, that is, united with flesh, and one nature of the flesh of the Word deified, that is, united with divinity. So there are two natures united with each other. For if he had said "one nature of the Word of God and incarnate," he would indisputably have indicated one nature, the composite. But having said "one nature of the Word" and added "incarnate," by saying "incarnate" he indicated the essence of the flesh, just as he himself, interpreting himself in the letter to Succensus, says: "For if, having said 'one nature of the Word of God,' we had been silent, not adding 'incarnate,' then their argument would be not implausible, as they pretend to ask: If the whole is one nature, where is the perfection in humanity? But since through 'incarnate' the indication of the flesh was introduced, let them cease setting up a reed for themselves." Behold, he clearly removed saying "one nature" for the whole, that is, the composite.

And by saying "incarnate" he introduced the indication of the flesh. We have, then, "the one nature of God the Word," and through "incarnate" we have the flesh; but the flesh is not without substance. Therefore, the nature of the Word and the substantial flesh will be two substances. Why, then, when we confess a nature of divinity and a nature of flesh in Christ and speak of one and the other, do you not say two natures, fearing a fear where there is no fear? And they say that number is the beginning of division, and fleeing division we do not say two natures of Christ. To them we say that every number is indicative of the quantity of the things numbered, not of their relation; for when we say three men, we do not signify three divided natures, and when we say three hypostases in the Godhead, we do not confess them as divided. So also, when we affirm two natures in Christ and indicate the number, we do not admit division; for just as in the Holy Trinity the three hypostases are united indivisibly and without confusion—indivisibly, on the one hand, because of the

the singularity of nature and the unconfused interpenetration in each other, and unconfusedly on account of the hypostatic difference, that is, the mode of existence—I mean the unbegotten and the begotten and the processional—and the number of hypostases does not introduce division. So also in the case of the incarnation of God the Word, the two natures are united both indivisibly and unconfusedly—indivisibly on account of the singularity of the hypostasis and the unconfused interpenetration of the natures in each other, and unconfusedly on account of the essential difference—I mean the created and the uncreated, the mortal and the immortal, the circumscribed and the uncircumscribed, and such things—and the number of natures does not introduce division. But since some appear to be at a loss, speaking to us in an uncertain manner, that if there is no substance without hypostasis and no nature without person, then by saying two substances and natures in Christ you will of necessity speak of two hypostases and persons, we say that there is no substance without hypostasis and no nature without person—for substance and nature are contemplated in hypostases and persons—but substance is not hypostasis nor is nature person. For if substance were hypostasis and nature person, then necessarily in the case of the holy divinity, either by saying one substance and nature we would confess one hypostasis and one person, or by confessing three hypostases and persons we would also confess three substances and natures; and similarly in the case of humanity, either we would confess one nature and one hypostasis, or we would speak of infinite substances just as of infinite hypostases; but also by saying Christ is from two natures, we would confess him to be from two hypostases.

We say, therefore, that substance is contemplated in hypostases, and for this reason it is enhypostatic, but it is not a hypostasis. It is not necessary, then, that the enhypostatic be called a hypostasis. For both "hypostasis" and "enhypostatic" are said in two senses. For "hypostasis" sometimes denotes simple existence, in which signification it does not mean simple substance, but also the accident; sometimes it denotes the individual, that is, the person, which is called hypostasis in the proper sense, which indicates Peter, Paul, this horse, and the like. And "enhypostatic" sometimes signifies substance as contemplated in a hypostasis and as self-subsistent; sometimes it signifies each of the things that come together into the composition of one hypostasis, as is the case with soul and body. Therefore, both the divinity and the humanity of Christ are enhypostatic; for each has in common his one composite hypostasis—the divinity from before the ages and eternally, and the ensouled and rational flesh assumed by it at the end of time, existing in it and having it as its hypostasis. Further, they say that the holy fathers used the example of man in the mystery concerning Christ; and since there is one nature of men, therefore there will be one nature of Christ. Let them listen, then: The name of nature is also applied to the species. All men, indeed, are said to be of one nature as being classed under one species, that of humanity. But man is not of one nature, being from soul and body; for the incorporeal and invisible soul is not consubstantial with the visible body.

When, then, a human is compared to a human, they are called homoousios as belonging under one species and as all composed of soul and body and as all bearing two natures; but when the human is physiologized, two natures are contemplated in him, I mean of soul and body, composed in one hypostasis. For in the comparison of soul to body, who is so foolish as to say that both have one nature? But in the case of Christ there is no species; for there are not many Christs composed of divinity and humanity, so that all, being ranked under the same species, might be said to be of one nature, but there is one Christ known from two and in two natures. For the theologian Gregory says: "For there are two natures, God and human, since there are also soul and body, but not two sons." 8 Further: How will one and the same nature have the contrary essential differences? For if substance is receptive of accidental differences without division and not according to the same thing, how is it of essential ones? For it is clear that it is impossible for the contrary essential differences to be found in the same substance; for the same substance will not be rational and irrational or created and uncreated. Further: The constitutive differences of substances constitute the substances; therefore they are called essential and constitutive and subsist in the substances. If, then, you confess the constitutive differences of substances in the case of Christ, it is necessary also to confess the substances—for of what will they be?—and they will be superfluous if they do not constitute substances. Further: You who say that the nature of the divinity and the humanity of Christ is one, tell us by which nature Christ suffered? By the composite, clearly, you will say.

For if you say it is one, you will necessarily also attach passion to it, and according to you both the divinity and the humanity of Christ will be passible. Again: If the one composite nature of Christ exists, it will be either only passible, or only impassible, or passible-impassible and at the same time both passible and impassible, or mutable, and sometimes passible, sometimes impassible, or part of it passible and part of it impassible. Choose whichever of these impieties you wish. For if it is only passible, Christ is not God. If it is only impassible, Christ is not human. If it is sometimes passible and sometimes impassible, it will not be passible by nature nor impassible by nature, but accidentally; for what is by nature so constituted does not change. And if part of it is passible and part of it impassible, and each is by nature what it is, the parts will not be of the same nature, and thus Christ will be of two natures—he who is not a nature but a hypostasis. For the same nature to be at once passible and impassible is impossible; for one and the same substance cannot be receptive of opposite essential differences at the same time. Further, tell us this: Does Christ have a divine nature? Yes, you will certainly say. Does he also have a human nature? This too you will agree to, unless you wish to blaspheme bareheaded. So, divine nature and human nature: one nature or two? But if you say one, the Father will be homoousios with us. If two and not one, why do you not, casting far away the pride together with its begetter, I mean the devil, confess with us one Christ, one Son, one Lord, one hypostasis from two natures and two natures and in two natures after the union?

For if you never confess Christ to be of two natures, why do you vainly speak of him as of one nature after the union? But if, while affirming him to be of two natures before the union, you confess him to be of one after the union, you are directly opposing the truth. For before the union, that is, before the divine incarnation, being of one simple nature, that is, the divine, and existing as one hypostasis, he was neither Christ nor was he so called, except insofar as the future was foretold by prophetic speech. Therefore, either you will completely abolish the two natures in Christ, or you will say that Christ was of two natures before the incarnation from the Virgin, while refusing to grant him the two natures that are properly his after the union. But we do not think thus, nor is this the portion of Jacob; rather, standing within the boundaries of piety, we say that from divinity and humanity there is one composite hypostasis. For this pre-eternal hypostasis of the Word of God, having taken up dwelling in the womb of the holy ever-virgin, established in itself animate, rational flesh, itself becoming the hypostasis for the animate and rational flesh, and there came to be from perfect divinity and perfect humanity one Christ, one and the same Son of God and of man, one and the same Lord, perfect God and perfect man, wholly God and wholly man, the natures being united to each other without confusion, without change, and without division. Without confusion: for each nature preserves its own difference—the uncreatedness of divinity, the createdness

...humanity; impassibility belongs to divinity, passibility to humanity, and so forth. And "without change" because each nature has remained unaltered, not transformed into the other, nor has a single composite nature come into being, but they exist and endure as two. And "without division" because they are united with each other in hypostasis, having one hypostasis—that which was from eternity incorporeal and simple, but in the last times was incarnated from the holy ever-virgin without mutation; for this exists as both: incorporeal in its eternal divinity, and corporeal in its temporal or assumed flesh. This is the preeternal Son and Word of God, who is himself incorporeal as God and corporeal as having become man in the last times. Therefore the natures are united in one hypostasis and interpenetrate.