Confutatio dogmatum quorundam Aristotelicorum

Of the good things done by men through human diligence for the service of God, nothing is so acceptable to God as striving, according to one's ability, to make men better. Seeing, therefore, this zeal in you, most honored elder Paul, exceedingly fervent, I readily obeyed you concerning what you enjoined upon me: to make a brief selection of the Greek doctrines about God and creation—not that you might learn something true from them (for how could one who has from above the teaching about these things through the prophets learn from the very God who made creation?), but that you might know that they did not do this according to demonstrative knowledge, by which the Greeks profess to make their arguments about God and creation, but that they defined what seemed so by conjecture. Of the men who have made arguments about God and creation, some received the teaching about God and creation from the very God who made creation through the prophets, who served God for this purpose, whom he first showed worthy to be believed by the divine works done through them, and then in this way provided the teaching about things unclear to those being taught; but others, disbelieving the words spoken through the prophets, entrusted the discovery of the knowledge of God to their own reasonings.

And according to those who have come to know the difference between God's teaching and creation, there is one God, who in each respect of the manner of unbegottenness is unbegotten, having had neither a god nor gods before himself nor after himself, having no coeternal being either subject to him or opposed to him, possessing a substance that is incorruptible and an activity that is unimpeded, being the craftsman of the whole world, which has its beginning of being and of being what it is and of how it persists from his will. For either the parts of the world persist in incorruptibility, as the heaven and the heavenly things and the invisible powers, or in coming to be and perishing, as the living creatures and plants upon the earth. And just as what has come to be would not have come to be unless he had commanded, Let it be made, so neither would it have persisted unless he had established the command—for the incorruptible, that they stand forever and ever; for those in generation and corruption, that you grow and multiply and fill the earth. And as a demonstration of his divine power and that he is not enslaved to the law of nature but by the authority of his will accomplishes what seems good to him, he made in the beginning the things of a nature subject to generation and corruption from the earth and the waters, commanding: Let the earth bring forth a living soul according to its kind, and plants having their seed in themselves, and trees producing fruits; and again: Let the waters bring forth a living soul according to its kind; but the things that have come to be from the generative principles he ordained to come to be from the sowing of seed.

And concerning these things, all the prophets sent by God to all men continued to think the same things, and no disagreement arose among them. But according to those who disbelieved the words of the prophets and who determined what seemed right concerning God and creation by their own conjecture, there is great disagreement both with one another and with themselves concerning the things that exist and their principle in respect of substance, number, motion, and limit, just as is shown from the first book of Aristotle's Physics, together with the fact that he does not speak the truth about any of the matters he has undertaken to determine. 1. From the first book of Aristotle's Physics. For there is always something that underlies, from which the thing that comes to be comes to be, such as plants and animals from seed. And things that come to be come to be in the simple sense: some by change of shape, such as a statue; some by addition, such as things that grow; some by removal, such as Hermes from the stone; some by composition, such as a house; some by alteration, such as things that change in respect of their matter. And it is evident that all things that come to be in this way come to be from underlying subjects. And this is twofold: for it is either the underlying subject or the opposite. I mean that the unmusical is opposite, and the man is underlying. Since the first is the seed that sows and the later is the thing that comes to be from the seed, and both are things that come to be, in the coming-to-be of the thing that is produced from the seed the seed underlies, but in the coming-to-be of the one who sows it is not possible for the seed to underlie; therefore animals and plants do not always come to be from seed.

Furthermore, if each is a generated living thing—both the seed and the thing that comes to be from the seed—and each is not from the same underlying subject, but the one is from the seed and the other is not from the seed, how is it not false that living things always come to be from seed? And concerning plants the same account holds. Furthermore, if the beginning of what comes to be from seed is the seed, but this is unknown and undefined in Aristotle's treatise of the Physics, for what reason was this treatise written, when the beginning of the first living thing and plant is unknown? For the ignorance of the things that come from the beginning follows upon the ignorance of the beginning. If the living thing that comes to be from seed comes to be by nature, it is clear that the same living thing, when it comes to be but not from seed, does not come to be by nature. Let the Aristotelians therefore state according to what the living thing that does not come to be by nature comes to be. Furthermore, if, a distinction in the generation of the living thing having been given—both of the thing from seed and by nature, and of the thing neither from seed nor coming to be by nature—it is necessary that generation be finite, how then do the Greeks say that living things and plants are co-eternal with God, things that have come to be by nature, things that cannot be contemporary with the first living thing and plant? Furthermore, if everything that comes to be is always composite, how have you distinguished the manner of things that come to be by composition, by the proper difference of that manner, from the other manners of generation? For if every generated thing is com-

...posited, it must come to be by composition; but if the mode of generation by composition suits every generation, then the other modes of generation are superfluous, being distinguished by their own specific difference. Furthermore, if the underlying subjects of the generations just mentioned are substances, and in them the twofold character of the underlying subject is observed—that is, the underlying subject and the opposed subject—but matter is not a substance, how does the mode of generation of things that come to be from substances suit the mode of generation of things that do not come to be from substances? Therefore it is necessary either that matter be a substance, or that the things that come to be from matter come to be in some other mode besides the modes of generation just mentioned. But since in the treatise of the Physics (Lecture) matter has been defined as not being a substance, and the mode of generation of things that come to be from it has not been handed down, how is this treatise not superfluous, in which the clear is aporous? Furthermore, if, as by nature and by art it is necessary that things not be made from whatever happens to be at hand, but definite things from definite things, so also it is necessary for God to make definite things from definite things, who is it that has set this limit for God? That God has set this limit for nature and art is evident. But if God is not under the limit, but makes whatever happens to be at hand from whatever happens to be at hand, not being hindered by the necessity of the limit from doing what he wishes, how is he not freed also from the limit of making from underlying things by necessity?

2. From the same Aristotle, from the same account. The underlying subject is one in number but two in form. For man and gold and, in general, matter are countable; for it is more a particular thing, and the thing that comes to be comes to be from it not incidentally; but privation and contrariety are incidental; and the form is one, such as order, or music, or any other of the things predicated in this way. By these considerations it is possible in one sense to say that the principles are two, and in another sense three; and in one sense they are the contraries, as if someone were to say the musical and the unmusical, or the hot and the cold, or the harmonized and the un-harmonized, and in another sense they are not; for it is impossible for contraries to be affected by one another. But this too is resolved by the fact that the underlying subject is something else; for this is not a contrary. So that neither are the principles more numerous than the contraries, in a way, but two, so to speak, in number, nor again are they wholly two, because their being is something different, but three. If the underlying subject is one in number but two in form, from which one must underlie the one, how is the underlying subject not its own underlying subject? And if this is impossible, how is it not false that the underlying subject is two in form? Further, if something must always underlie the things that come to be, and this is matter, how is matter not always generated? For it always underlies one of the contraries. For it underlies either privation or the form that is contrary to privation; and it becomes embodied in the form, but formless in privation. How then is matter not a generated substance, always having its being in a generated way? Further, if privation is nothing

If it is something other than the destruction of every being, and matter possesses this, how is its very being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form is absent from the matter, its being substance and a this-something and a being is also absent from it, then matter is nowhere when its form is absent. Further, if matter is countable, but the opposites that are its accidents are not countable, how are there three principles—matter and its accidents? None of the things we observe in the constitution of natural things as they come to be is from matter—neither quality nor quantity—so how do the things that come to be come to be from it in their own right? It is impossible for something to be and not be a this-something; how, then, through privation, when matter is not a this-something, does it have being? Privation and form are accidents of matter, but matter is not substance; how do opposites belong to it as accidents? For accidents belong to substance. Just as order is in things ordered, so too form is in matter; how is it that unordered things before order have the being of a this-something, while matter before form, not having the being of a this-something, preserves in itself the analogy of order in relation to form? In the composition of things that come to be, only two principles are observed—matter and form—but apart from composition there are three principles—matter, privation, and form. It is clear, then, that when the thing coming to be did not exist, three principles were posited; but when the thing coming to be exists, not three but two. How, then, is the thing coming to be not a principle of the destruction of one principle, which, if it had not been destroyed, the thing coming to be would not have come to be?

Just as a man is affected by the musical and the unmusical, and the body by cold and heat, and the voice by harmony and disharmony, so matter is affected by form and privation—let matter be substance, as man and body are, or accident, as voice is, so that the consequence of the analogy may be preserved. But if matter is neither substance nor accident, then neither is it affected by contraries. 3. From the same argument by the same author. How many, then, are the principles of natural things concerned with generation, and how they stand, has been stated; and it is clear that something must underlie the contraries and that the contraries must be two. But in another way it is not necessary; for it is sufficient that one of the contraries produce change by its presence and absence. The underlying nature is knowable by analogy. For as bronze is to a statue, or wood to a bed, or matter to any other of the things that have form, and the formless is related before it receives form, so is this related to substance and to this particular thing and to being. This, then, is one principle, not being one in this way nor one as a particular thing is, but one in account; and further, the contrary of this is privation. But whether the form or the underlying subject is substance is not yet clear.

If form by its presence gives form to matter and by its absence makes it formless, and there are two principles, form and the formless, and privation itself produces these very things by its presence and its absence, then the principles will be coming to be from one another and being destroyed by one another, and will not be eternal; for the eternal has no need of any presence or absence in order to be. If the change of the principles comes about by the presence and absence of contraries, it is clear that the change comes about from their being principles. How then can they remain principles, having cast off being principles? If a principle that has a principle is not a principle, how can matter, which has form as the principle of its being and privation as the principle of its not being, be a principle? To call the subject underlying privation "nature"—that which is neither substance nor a this-something nor being—how is this not superfluous? If principles are neither from others nor from one another, but privation is from the absence of form and form is from the absence of privation, how are form and privation not principles from one another? For by their absence of one another they are productive of one another. Whatever relation bronze has to the statue that is to come to be from it, matter has to substance and the this-something and being. How is it that bronze, unless it be substance and a this-something and being, cannot have a relation to the statue, while matter, being neither substance nor a this-something nor being, can have an analogy to bronze?

If all things observed in the compositions of natural bodies are knowable by sense-perception, how is matter, from which sensible things come, knowable by analogy and not by sense-perception, or how in general is it possible for sensible things to come from something non-sensible? And what is this, and how is it that there is one principle—how does matter have it that it is one principle, but not have it that it is this particular thing? And if to be this particular thing and not to be this particular thing is substance, how is it that matter is not being this particular thing, yet is not substance? And how can anyone exclude matter from being one, who has divided it into two kinds, both into the underlying subject of what comes to be and into the opposite? It is not yet clear from what has been said whether the form or the underlying subject is substance—how has he stated declaratively about matter that it is neither substance nor this particular thing nor being? For he has said that matter is the underlying subject. At one time [he says] that it is neither substance nor this particular thing nor being, at another that it is unclear whether it is substance—how is he not among those who do not know what they say? 4. From the same argument.

Those who first pursued philosophy sought truth and the nature of existing things, but they were diverted, as it were, and pushed onto another path by inexperience. They claim that nothing that exists either comes to be or perishes, on the grounds that whatever comes to be must necessarily come to be either from what exists or from what does not exist, and that both of these are impossible. For what exists does not come to be (since it already is), and nothing could come to be from what does not exist (since something must underlie it). And so, amplifying the consequence that follows, they say that not even many things exist, but only the existent itself. These points are sufficient to bear witness to the truth of what we have said about the philosophers among the Greeks—that they did not construct their arguments about existing things according to demonstrative knowledge, but determined what seemed plausible by conjecture. From the same discourse. We, however, say that to come to be from what exists or from what does not exist, or for what does not exist or what exists to do something or undergo something or become anything at all, in one sense differs in no way from a doctor doing something or undergoing something, or something being or coming to be from a doctor. So, since this is said in two or more ways, it is clear that "from what exists" and "what exists" doing or undergoing something are also said in multiple ways. A doctor builds, then—not insofar as he is a doctor, but insofar as he is a builder; and he becomes pale—not insofar as he is a doctor, but insofar as he is dark; but he heals and becomes a non-doctor insofar as he is a doctor. Since we most of all say that a doctor strictly does something or undergoes something or comes to be from a doctor if he does or undergoes these things insofar as he is a doctor, it is clear that "to come to be from what does not exist" means this: insofar as it is not existent.

What those men failed to distinguish and so abandoned, and through this ignorance they went so far astray as to think that nothing either comes to be or is among other things, but abolished all generation. We ourselves also say that nothing comes to be simply from what is not, yet nevertheless something comes to be from what is not, as it were incidentally; for it comes to be from privation, which is in itself what is not, not being present within. But this is marveled at and seems impossible in this way, that something comes to be from what is not. Likewise neither does being come to be from being, except incidentally; and in this way this too comes to be in the same manner, as if a living thing were to come to be from a living thing, and some living thing from a certain living thing, as if a dog were to come to be from a horse. For the dog would come to be not only from a certain living thing, but also from a living thing, yet not insofar as it is a living thing; for this already exists. But if something were about to become a living thing not incidentally, it will not be from a living thing, and if something is a being, it is not from being nor from what is not. For we have said what "from what is not" signifies, namely insofar as it is not. Moreover, we do not abolish that all either is or is not. That it is possible for something to come to be neither from being simply nor from what is not simply is common to those who abolish generation out of ignorance and inexperience, and to this one who corrected those who erred—how has generation not been abolished according to the one who corrected it, as it has been abolished according to those who erred?

If it is impossible for anything to come to be incidentally from what is and from what is not, unless the generation of what comes to be in its own right is first conceived, for example it is impossible for the doctor to become white unless the black becomes white, and it is impossible for the doctor to build unless the builder builds, if the doctor is both black and a builder, how does anything come to be incidentally from what is and from what is not, when nothing comes to be in its own right beforehand? If first the animal, and later the animal from an animal and a particular animal from a particular animal, and for the generation of the animal from an animal the seed is the substrate, in potentiality an animal but in actuality not an animal, but for the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from what is not not contrary to nature? If before the thing that comes to be comes to be, the matter was, but the thing that comes to be from it was not, what was the matter? For example, if there was matter of the horse before the horse came to be, if all the things contemplated in the substance of the horse are generated, how was the matter ungenerated, from which the horse came to be? In its own right neither privation is a being nor is matter, but the incidental belongs to what is in its own right; how is it possible for anything to come to be incidentally from privation, when it is neither in its own right nor incidentally? Since these things are disjoined, it is impossible for anything to come to be from none of them; and when these things are conjoined, it is not possible for anything to come to be from them; for example, from what is simply it is not possible for anything to come to be, and likewise also from what simply is not, to use Aristotle's expressions. How have both become possible, both to come to be from what is and to come to be from what is not?

If the underlying subject, from which the thing that comes to be comes to be, must underlie contraries, then does nothing come to be from privation incidentally, if it does not underlie the contraries? He who does not abolish the whole, either that it is or that it is not, but concedes that the whole is and is not, how can he speak the truth in saying that matter is neither substance nor this something nor being? The thing that comes to be does come to be, but not from what simply is not nor from what simply is, but from both; therefore it comes to be both from matter as from what is and from what is not, and as from this something that is and this something that is not. But if these things are so, then what was said about matter is false—that it is neither substance nor this something nor being. Just as matter is formless, so also form is immaterial. But if matter and its formlessness are two principles, then form and its immateriality will also be two principles. How then, when there are four principles, have only three been posited as principles? From the same argument.

For we say that matter and privation are different, and that of these the one—matter—is not-being incidentally, while privation is not-being in itself, and the one is close to and in some way substance, while the other is in no way so. But they say that not-being is the great and the small alike, either the one being both together or each separately. So this way of the triad is entirely different from that one. That matter is not-being incidentally is evident, since matter is incidentally neither matter nor principle; for it is of a being that it is to be matter and to be principle. And if it is for matter to be not-being incidentally because of privation, it is clear that it is being incidentally because of form. Therefore it will be for matter never being in itself, but always being incidentally, at one time being not-being, at another being being. How then is it not absurd to say that what is never being in itself is close to substance and in some way substance? And it is one thing to be matter and another to be matter of something, and matter is deprived of being matter of something, but is not deprived of being itself matter; therefore matter will be both being and not-being—being because it is itself matter, not-being because it is not matter of something. But if matter is matter of nothing, then matter is of nothing as regards formlessness. And if matter is of formlessness, then matter was never matter as matter, but is always matter of something, at one time of formlessness, at another of form. And what formlessness is is clear from the fact that it was posited as a principle of things that come to be. But if these things are so, then matter is never not-being, but is always being, at one time formless, at another formed; and therefore it is also always generated.

If matter can lose the formlessness that is coeternal with it, then it can also lose the ungeneracy that is coeternal with it. But if not the second, then neither the first. How, then, does what comes to be come to be from matter, if matter does not lose the formlessness that is coeternal with it? And if, just as the mode of the triad according to Aristotle is different from the mode of the triad according to Plato, so too the triad is different, how is the hexad not a principle of things that come to be, but the triad? And if the triad is not different, how is its mode different? 6. From the same argument. For the one that remains is a co-cause, together with form, of things that come to be, like a mother; but the other portion of the contrariety might often appear, to one who fixes his thought on its capacity for evil, not to exist at all. For since there is something divine and good and desirable, we say that the opposite of it exists, and that it is naturally disposed to desire and yearn for it according to its own nature. But it happens to them to desire the opposite of their own destruction. And yet neither can form desire itself, because it is not in need, nor can the opposite, for opposites are destructive of one another. But this is matter, as if female were to male and base to noble; except that it is not base in itself, but incidentally, nor female, but incidentally. It is destroyed and comes to be, in one sense yes, in another sense no. For as the "that in which," it is destroyed in itself; for what is destroyed in it is privation; but as potentiality, not in itself, but it must be imperishable and ungenerated. For if it were coming to be, something must first underlie it, that from which, being present in it, it comes to be.

This is nature itself, so that it will exist before it comes to be. For I call matter the first underlying subject of each thing, from which something comes to be as something present in it, not incidentally. And when it is destroyed, it will arrive at this as its last state, so that it will be destroyed before it is destroyed. And just as matter and form are principles of things that come to be, so too is privation—how is matter a joint cause with shape of things that come to be, but privation not a joint cause? And for this reason form is a principle, since being comes to the thing that comes to be from it; it is clear that privation is also a principle for this reason, since not-being comes to the thing that comes to be through it. How, then, is privation said to be a principle of things that come to be? And when form is present, then privation does not remain; it is clear that when form is not present, privation remains. How, then, is it not absurd to say that what remains does not exist? For remaining belongs to what exists. And privation is another part of the opposition, and the form is the evil-producing element of it—how is form not both good and evil: good for matter, as through it matter has its being a substance, but evil for privation, as through it privation is destroyed? And there is something divine and good and desirable, and it has an opposite which is neither good nor desirable; therefore the divine will be both good and not good, desirable and not desirable, and therefore both divine and not divine. And if this is absurd, then the divine, which is good and desirable, does not have anything opposite; for the simply good is good for all things, not only for some.

If the contrary of the good does not desire the good (for it desires the destruction of its own nature, if it does desire the good), and form does not desire itself (for form is without need), but the divine is desired and longed for, to what is it desired and longed for if not to matter? Matter, then, is ensouled; for desiring and longing belong to what is ensouled. And if matter is ensouled, how is it not false that matter is not being in virtue of an accident? For the soul is a being, and what has a soul is a being. And if, as the female desires the male and the ugly the beautiful, matter desires the good, and matter is not female and ugly in itself but in virtue of an accident, it is clear that it does not desire the good in itself either, but in virtue of an accident. The divine, then, will also be good and desired and longed for not in itself but in virtue of an accident—which it is absurd to say. And if matter is generable through form, corruptible through privation, but ungenerable and incorruptible through itself, then matter will always be either corruptible or generable, but never incorruptible and ungenerable; for it is always subject either to the privation that is corrupted in it, or to the form that comes to be in it. Ungenerable, in the case of things generable, signifies the privation of a generation that can come to be; but in the case of eternal things it signifies the negation of all generation, both that which has previously occurred and that which is going to be. For example, bronze that is going to be a statue, before it becomes a statue, is called ungenerable by privation, because it can become a statue; but in the case of God, ungenerable signifies the negation of all generation according to substance, both past and future.

Since, then, there are two modes of unbegottenness, in which sense is matter unbegotten? If in the sense of privation, then matter is unbegotten like bronze; but if matter is unbegotten by way of negation, then matter does not come to be at all; nor can matter stand in the same relation to substance as bronze does to a statue, as Aristotle said. If matter is unbegotten in the same way as God, and God can make something out of the unbegotten, it is clear that God can also make something out of what simply is not. For the same unsuitability that non-being has for something coming to be from it by nature and by art, the eternally unbegotten also has for something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How, then, could God make something out of the eternally unbegotten, but could not out of what simply is not? But clearly the disbelief in God's ability to make something out of non-being drove the first philosophers to deny all coming-to-be of beings from matter, and Aristotle, who corrected this, to the abolition of the coming-to-be of matter. There is something that comes to be, and there is something that this comes to be, as he said in the earlier passages; therefore neither of these is matter, if it is unbegotten and incorruptible. If matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, it is by necessity unbegotten according to each of the two modes of unbegottenness; therefore neither does anything come to be from it, nor is anything corrupted in it. How, then, is privation corrupted in the incorruptible? If matter is one, but the things that come to be from it are many and various, how is it necessary that matter remain unbegotten, when what is always divisible in it cannot remain indivisible?

If matter is one in number but two in species, and is unbegotten and incorruptible, then either the whole of it is unbegotten and incorruptible, or half of it is. But if the whole is unbegotten and incorruptible, it is clear that half of it is such also; but if half of it is unbegotten and incorruptible and half of it is not such, then the contradiction concerning the same thing will be true; which is impossible. If that which receives the form either becomes that thing or becomes from that thing, how is matter unbegotten when it receives the form? If it belongs to beings to be unbegotten and incorruptible, how is matter both not a being and unbegotten and incorruptible? If that which exists ungenerately is unbegotten in the unbegotten, how does privation, being unbegotten, come to be in matter and be corrupted? If, as has been said, it is sufficient for one of the contraries by its own presence and absence to produce the change, what is it that changes in matter, if matter is unbegotten and incorruptible? If the unbegotten and incorruptible is contemplated with respect to the substance of that which is unbegotten and incorruptible, where is the unbegotten and incorruptible of matter, when matter is not a substance? If bronze were not generated according to its prior generation, neither would a statue come to be. How, then, does matter come to be, or something from matter, if matter was not previously generated? If bronze were not corrupted, neither would the bronze object be corrupted. How, then, is the material thing corrupted, if matter is incorruptible? If body is not produced from incorporeal things, how has body come to be from matter and form, when they are in themselves incorporeal?

If by natural necessity indivisibility and immutability follow upon the unbegotten and incorruptible, how is the unbegotten and incorruptible matter present in things divided by genera and species, and how do things that change undergo alteration with respect to matter, as he defined in his exposition of the modes of generation in the passages above? 18. From the second book of Aristotle's Physics. In one way, then, nature is spoken of thus: the primary matter underlying each thing that has within itself a principle of motion and change; and in another way, the form and the shape according to the account. For just as art is spoken of as that which is according to art and the artistic, so too nature is spoken of as that which is according to nature and the natural. What then should we call that which is according to matter and the material, if not matter? Tell me, what else? But if we call this matter, then matter will be matter at that time when that which is according to matter and the material exists; for nature too is nature at that time when that which is according to nature and the natural exists; and likewise art as well. For things spoken of in the same way have the same relation to one another. But if matter exists at that time when that which is according to matter and the material exists, then matter is not unbegotten.

9. From the same author, from the same discourse. So in another way the nature of things that have within themselves a principle of motion would be the form and the species, which is not separable except in account. But what is composed of these is not nature, but is by nature, for example a human being. 10. If a human being is according to nature and is a natural living thing, how is the human being not a nature? For having drawn a distinction, he said: Nature is spoken of as that which is according to nature and that which is natural. 10. From the same discourse. In things that come about by craft, then, we produce the matter for the sake of the work, but in natural things the matter exists already present. Since there is another kind of work that is neither according to nature nor according to craft, where must the matter of this work be placed? For a living thing comes to be from a living thing; and if the living thing is not first, neither does a living thing come from a living thing. And the living thing that comes from a living thing comes to be according to nature, but the living thing simply does not come to be according to nature. But if in things that come about by craft the matter is external, and in things that come about by nature the matter is present in natural things, it is clear that in works that are neither according to craft nor according to nature the matter exists in another way; and if the one whose business is the treatise on natural things does not make the distinction regarding this matter, he makes both these and the distinctions already made untenable. For if we then think we know each thing when we recognize the first causes and the first principles, how would one recognize the living thing that comes from a living thing, if one is ignorant of the living thing that does not come from a living thing? For that is the principle and cause of this. 11. From the same discourse.

Since the automatic and chance are causes of those things of which mind or nature would be the cause, whenever something becomes a cause of these very things by accident, and nothing accidental is prior to what is per se, it is clear that neither is the accidental cause prior to the per se. Therefore the automatic and chance are posterior to mind and nature; so that even if the automatic were most of all the cause of the heaven, it is necessary that mind and nature be causes beforehand, both of many other things and of this whole. In these words he has not preserved the order not only of the first and second causes, but he has also subjected the heaven—which he himself, in the second book of the Physics, in the passages above, excluded from automatic generation—here to generation, not only to the automatic but also to that through mind and nature; which is manifestly absurd, that the same thing which has received its generation in respect of substance through mind and nature, through the first causes, should again receive the same generation through the second causes. Moreover, how is it not among the most absurd things that the same man should sometimes exclude it from automatic generation, and sometimes subject it to this, and sometimes call it ungenerated, and sometimes generated by nature? I shall set out the very words in which he does these things, so that from the parallel the falsehood contained in him may be known. 12. From the same discourse.

There are those who attribute even this heaven and all cosmic things to the automatic; for they say that the vortex and the motion that separated and established the whole into this order came to be of themselves. And this very thing is certainly worthy of wonder, when they say it: for that animals and plants neither exist nor come to be by chance, but that the cause is either nature or mind or some other such thing (for it is not whatever happens that comes from the seed of each, but from one sort an olive tree, from another a human being), yet the more divine of visible things come to be from the automatic, and there is no cause of the sort that belongs to animals or plants. And yet if this is so, this very thing would be a cause for inquiry, and it is well to say something about this very matter. For in addition to the statement being in other ways irrational, it is still more absurd to say these things when they see that in heaven nothing comes to be from the automatic, but in things that are not from chance many things happen from chance—although the opposite would be reasonable.

That the heaven came to be from the automatic, and again not from the automatic, the words which we have set out from the second book of the Physics in the two chapters, the eleventh and the twelfth, make clear. But that he says it is ungenerated and again generated by nature, I will also make the exposition of these words, in which he has done this. 13. From the second book of Aristotle's On the Heaven. That, then, the whole heaven has not come to be nor can it be destroyed, as some say, but is one and eternal, having no beginning and no end of the whole age, but having and containing within itself infinite time—from what has been said it will be possible to receive the proof. Having said these things about the ungeneratedness of the heaven, Aristotle—see what he again says about its generation in the first book of On the Heaven. 14. From the first book of On the Heaven. And nature seems rightly to have chosen out from the contraries that which is going to be ungenerated and incorruptible; for in the contraries are generation and corruption.

For none of the impossible things either is or could be; but it is among impossible things that what is going to be should be ungenerated, without beginning and without end, having and containing within itself infinite time. Therefore the one who says these things will be ignorant of the difference between a possible and an impossible thing. 15. From the first book of Aristotle's On the Heaven, at the end of the book. For nothing that comes to be by chance can be either imperishable or ungenerated. How then could anyone believe one who says both things about the heaven? For in the eleventh chapter he says that chance is the cause of the heaven, but in the thirteenth chapter he says that the heaven is without beginning and ungenerated. 16. From the second book of the Physics. There are two principles that move by nature, of which the one is not natural; for it does not have the principle of motion in itself. Such is whatever moves without being moved, so that the wholly immovable and the first of all things. How then would the principle move by nature, being neither natural nor moving according to nature? For it belongs to the only natural principle, the one moving according to nature, to move by nature. If the principle that is not natural does not have in itself the principle of motion, it is clear that the natural principle has in itself the principle of motion; but the principle that has a principle is not a principle. If among eternal ungenerated things nothing can be prior or posterior to anything, how is the immovable principle, the one that moves without being moved, the first of all things, or a principle at all?

17. From the third discourse of the same treatise. They take the belief that it is infinite from time; for this is infinite; and further, generation and destruction would thus alone not fail, if that from which the generated thing is removed were infinite. And time always has its being in coming to be, but the thing coming to be was not before it came to be; how then is time infinite, whose existence is always preceded by non-existence? For what is not yet is about to be present, and what is future is about to pass, and what is past was about to come to be. And by generation and destruction not failing, generation and destruction must be infinite; therefore generation and destruction will also be without beginning, just like the ungenerated and the incorruptible; but if this is impossible, then generation and destruction are not infinite. 18. From the same discourse. But neither is number separate and infinite in this way; for number is numerable, or that which has number. If then the numerable can be numbered, the infinite would also be possible to traverse.

For the number of the countable and of that which has number is not infinite, but the time that has come to be is countable; therefore the time that has come to be would be finite. 19. From the same discourse. That, if it is not infinite in any way, many absurdities follow, is clear; for there will be a beginning and an end of time, and magnitudes will not be divisible into magnitude, and number will not be infinite. Of the infinite, one part is in actuality and the other in potentiality, but it is impossible that the now, being in actuality, should not be prior in potentiality to the infinite; it is impossible, therefore, that the infinite should always be partly in actuality and partly in potentiality, but rather that it is first in potentiality and later in actuality. Just as time is endless in respect of the future, so also is it without beginning in respect of the past; therefore time will be, as it were, ungenerated in respect of the future and so also in respect of the past. But if this is impossible—that time be ungenerated in respect of the future, according to which it has not yet come to be, but generated in respect of the past—then time is not without beginning. For of that which is without beginning there is no generation, but of time there is. Nothing can be infinite in actuality; therefore the bisections of magnitude already taken are not infinite, nor is the number already taken; for both are in actuality. But if they are not infinite, then they are finite; and if they are finite, then they have a beginning—the one of being bisected, the other of being counted. 20. From the same discourse.

The infinite exists in one sense by addition and in another by subtraction. That magnitude is not infinite in actuality has been stated, but it is infinite by division. It remains, therefore, that the infinite exists in potentiality. But one must not take what is in potentiality in the way that, if this thing can be a statue, then this thing will also be a statue, and so too something will be infinite which will be in actuality; but since "to be in potentiality" is said in many ways, as a day is and a contest is, by one thing always coming to be after another, so too is the infinite. For in these cases too there is both potentiality and actuality. For in general the infinite exists in this way, by one thing always being taken after another, and what is taken is always finite, but always different and different. If nothing is infinite in actuality, it is clear that everything that is in actuality is always finite; and being finite, it necessarily has a beginning, and having a beginning, it is necessarily generated, and being generated, there was therefore a time when it was not. This applies to every infinite, whether spoken of by addition and subtraction, or by potentiality and division.

From the same argument. Nor is whatever is outside this infinite; rather, that which receives the outside becomes greater than it was before receiving the outside. But that which becomes greater than itself by the addition of the outside is always finite. The infinite is always in addition and subtraction; therefore the infinite is always in becoming. How, then, is that which always has its being in becoming without beginning? For a generated thing is not without beginning. From the same argument. The divisions of magnitude are infinite. So it exists in potentiality but not in actuality; rather, the amount taken always exceeds any determinate quantity. But this number is not determinate, nor does the infinite remain but comes to be, just as time and the number of time do. The infinite does not remain but comes to be, just as time and the number of time do; therefore nothing infinite is ungenerated. But if every infinite is generated, then all the other things in which the infinite is said to exist are also generated. What happens to the infinite happens by necessity also to those things in which the infinite exists; and it happens to the infinite to have come to be and to have begun to be. Therefore time is generated and has begun; and likewise motion, of which time is the number.

23. From the fourth discourse of the same treatise. For that which is not is nowhere. How then is matter nothing, being neither being nor existent nor this something? 24. From the same discourse. Hesiod too would seem to speak correctly, having made Chaos first. At any rate he says, "First of all came Chaos, and then broad-breasted Earth," as though place must first exist for the things that are, because of the belief, as most people hold, that all things are somewhere and in a place. And if this is so, the power of place would be something wondrous and prior to all things; for that without which nothing else exists must necessarily be first among other things. If, then, place is first and the things in place are subsequent by natural necessity, just as Hesiod said and Aristotle bore witness to the correctness of the argument, how is it not among impossibilities to call the heaven, which is in place, ungenerated? For this is equal to saying that the generated is before the ungenerated. 25. From the same discourse. First, then, one must understand that place would not be sought if there were no motion in respect of place; for it is because of this that we think the heaven especially is in a place, since it is always in motion.

If it is impossible for the ungenerated to need the movable for its being and for its being moved, then it is impossible for the heaven to be ungenerated; for it needs place for its being and for its being moved. 25. From the same discourse. For place has magnitude, but no body. If place has finite intervals and magnitude, then place is generated; but if infinite, then either potentially or in actuality. But if potentially, then place is generated, just as time and the number of time; but if in actuality, then the statement is false which says that nothing can be infinite in actuality. If place is what it is and has what it has by the providence of someone, then place is generated and second to providence; but if place is what it is and has what it has ungeneratedly and without beginning, then place is ungenerated and first of all things in place, among which are the heaven and the things appearing in the heaven; for that without which nothing else exists must necessarily be first among the others. 27. From the same discourse.

For just as, if a thing is altered, there is this—which is now white and formerly was black (wherefore we say that matter is something)—so too place seems to be by some such imagination, except that in the one case it is because what was air is now water, while in the case of place it is because where the air was, there is now water. And whatever ratio place has to the things in it, matter has the same ratio to the things in it through a similar imagination; but place and matter are incomprehensible. Therefore matter is nothing of the things that are altered and come to be in it, and is not substance. How then was matter posited to be the substance of things that come to be without qualification? 26. From the same argument. Every body that is movable in respect of locomotion or in respect of growth is somehow in itself somewhere; but the heaven, as has been said, is not anywhere at all nor in any place, if indeed no body encompasses it. If that which is movable in respect of locomotion is in itself somewhere, and the heaven is movable in respect of locomotion, then the heaven must also be in itself somewhere. If not the second, then neither the first; for they are inseparable from one another, and with the removal of one the removal of the second follows. If the heaven is not in a place in itself, how, being carried in circular motion, do some of its parts become up and others down, and some of the lower become upper? But if it is up and down in its own parts, how is it not false to say that the heaven is not in a place? 29. From the same argument.

A point has no place. Therefore the point is not somewhere, just as non-being also is not; but if this is false, then the point is a being and is somewhere. And if it is somewhere, it is also necessarily in a place. L. From the same argument. And place both is and is somewhere, yet not as in a place, but as a limit is in that which is limited. For it is not being that is in a place, but the movable body. If everything that is in a place is somewhere, and not everything that is somewhere is in a place, then "somewhere" is broader than "in a place." How, then, are "somewhere" and "in a place" said to belong to one category, when they differ from each other so much that place itself is said to be somewhere, but not in a place? And if it is the limit of that which is limited, and is the place of one limited thing but the limit of another, how is it not necessarily always the case that place is both a place and a limit? And if place is prior to the things that are in a place, how is the necessity dissolved that place is always the place of one thing and the limit of another? And if that which in no way is is not in a place (for it would then be somewhere, as he said), how is it not the same

Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some of the beings not be the same as non-being, since not being in a place is common to both? And if only movable body is in a place, how is the heaven, being a movable body, not in a place? 31. From the same argument. That it either does not exist at all, or exists only barely and faintly, one might suspect from the following. For one part of it has come to be and is not, and another part is going to be and is not yet. And from these both the infinite time and the time always being taken are composed. But that which is composed of non-beings would seem unable to partake of substance. For of every divisible thing, if indeed it exists, it is necessary that, when it exists, either some or all of its parts exist; but of time some parts have come to be, some are going to be, and none exists, though it is divisible. But the now is not a part; for a part must measure and the whole must be composed of the parts; but time does not seem to be composed of the nows. If everything that comes to be was not before it came to be, then time is not eternal and without beginning; therefore neither is motion eternal and without beginning, of which time is the number. For if the future part of time is not yet, and the past part of time was also future before it came to be, then there was a time when the past part of time was not. And if the infinite must be without beginning, then time is not infinite, since it has a beginning of existence from the change of the future. And if the past part of time is time in actuality, and the future in potentiality, and in beings there is actuality and potentiality, then time, which is composed of the past and the future, is not composed of non-beings.

And if time does not partake of substance, yet nevertheless it partakes of being present alongside substances, so that from this too it is evident that time is among the things that exist. And if the past part of time is contemplated in the past parts of the divisible, how is it no part of time, when time is divisible? And if the now is not the smallest part of time, what is the sudden, and the indivisible, and the point of time, as it is called? How is it possible for change to come from the future into the now, and from the now into the past, if the now is not a part of time? For every part of time is first, future, later, now, then, past. 32. From the same fourth discourse of the same treatise. That, then, time is neither motion nor without motion, is evident. But that time is generated and not eternal, having begun and not without beginning, bounded and not infinite, this too is evident. And if time is such, of necessity motion also is such, of which time is the number. 33. From the same discourse.

For as great as the motion is, so great also does time always seem to have been. To whatever things belong the generated and the having-been-generated, from these of necessity the eternal and the unoriginated and the infinite are absent. 34. From the same argument. We say that time has come to be then, whenever we perceive in motion the prior and the posterior. And we define it by conceiving them as other and other and the interval between them as different. For when we conceive the extremes as different from the middle, and the soul says two "nows," the one prior and the other posterior, then we say that this also is time; for what is defined by the now seems to be time; for time is the number of motion according to the prior and the posterior. Time, therefore, is not motion, but insofar as motion has number. A sign of this: we judge the more and the less by number, but motion as more and less by time. He who defines the generation of time by the prior and posterior in motion neither calls time nor motion eternal and unoriginated and infinite; for if it has come to be, it is neither eternal nor unoriginated, and if it is bounded by its own extremes, it is not infinite. 35. From the same argument.

But the now measures time, insofar as it is before and after, and motion follows magnitude, and time follows motion. If the now is not a part of time, as he said in the thirty-first chapter, how does it measure time? Either, then, the now does not measure time, or it is necessary that it be a part of time. And if motion follows magnitude, and time follows motion, then magnitude is generated, just as motion and time are, being things that follow it. 30. From the same argument. The smallest number of a line in plurality is two or one, but in magnitude there is no smallest; for the smallest in number is one or two, but in magnitude there is none. If the smallest part in a line is the point, and in time the now, what else is the point in a line and the now in time? But if it is not a smallest part but a limit, how then is it impossible for the limit to exist apart from the limited, yet possible for the point to exist apart from the line? And if in those things in which there is no smallest there is also no greatest, by what account is the remaining difference of parts, when the difference of the greatest and the smallest is abolished?

37. From the same discourse. So it is clear that things which always exist or things which always do not exist are not in time; for they are not encompassed by time, nor is their being measured by time. How then have you said that motion is eternal, and time the number of it? For things whose time is inseparable cannot possibly not be in time. 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor rests is not in time; for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measure of motion and rest. That which is in time moves and rests; and heaven moves, according to him who says so, and the earth rests; therefore heaven and earth and their motion and rest are in time. And if time is generated, then of necessity heaven and earth are also generated. 39. From the fifth discourse of the same treatise. So from what has been said it is necessary that there be three kinds of change: that from a subject into a subject, that from a subject into a non-subject, and that from a non-subject into a subject. For the change from a non-subject into a non-subject is not a change, because it is not according to opposition; for it is neither contrariety nor contradiction. The change, then, from a non-subject into a subject is generation according to contradiction, and the change from a subject into a non-subject is destruction.

Nowhere, then, is matter, which you said in the earlier passages underlies things that come to be and perish, for the one as that from which, for the other as that into which. 40. From the same discourse. For what is not white or not good can nevertheless be moved incidentally (for a man could be the thing that is not white), but what is simply not this particular thing in no way can; for it is impossible for what is not to be moved. If it is impossible for substance to come to be from what is not moved, and what is simply not this particular thing is in no way moved (for it is impossible for what is not to be moved), how has substance come to be from matter, when it is not simply this particular thing? 41. From the eighth discourse of the same treatise. If it is impossible for time to exist and to be conceived without the now, and the now is a kind of middle, having both a beginning and an end—but a beginning of the future time and an end of the past—time must always exist; for the last point of the last time taken is the now; for nothing can be grasped in time besides the now. So since it is a beginning and an end, time must exist in both directions. But if time, then necessarily motion too, if indeed time is an affection of motion.

In these passages Aristotle establishes that the heaven is eternal. For if it is a kind of middle and beginning and end, and always has time on both sides, then, this being granted, it necessarily follows that time is eternal; and if time is eternal, motion is also necessarily eternal, of which time is the number; and if motion is eternal, the moved body is also necessarily eternal. But he set this down absurdly, that it is coeternal; and it will be refuted as follows. For as the time that is going to come will come to be, so the past time has also come to be. But the time that is going to come to be, just as it has a coming generation, so also has a beginning; and just as nothing of the past is in the future, so nothing of the future is in the present. But if what is now is and is present, while the future is not yet either being or present, then the present now is not a beginning of future time, but the future-to-be now—that is a beginning of the future—which is not a kind of middle having time on both sides, but on one side, nor a beginning and end, the same now, but of one and another time, as a beginning of the future, but an end of the past; but one now is a beginning and another an end, of the same time. Otherwise, if it is impossible for the now to be now unless it was previously future and not being, then it is impossible for the now to be coeternal. For if everything that was previously not being and later is, is generated, and the now is such, then the now is generated; and if the now, then necessarily also all time, of which the now is beginning and end; and if time, then necessarily also motion, of which time is the number.

And if motion is, then necessarily the moved body is also generated. 42. From the same argument. In general, to think that this principle is sufficient—that it always is so or comes to be so—is not correct to suppose, to which Democritus reduces the causes concerning nature, that thus it also came to be previously; but of the eternal he does not deem it right to seek a principle, saying correctly in the case of some things, but not correctly in the case of all. For the triangle always has its angles equal to two right angles, yet nevertheless there is some other eternal cause of this eternity; however, it is not a cause of the principles, since they are eternal. So then, that as it comes to be now, so also it came to be previously—it is not correct to suppose that there is a principle of things that always come to be according to nature; therefore it is necessarily correct to suppose that there is a principle of things that come to be according to nature—not having come to be as it now comes to be, but otherwise; wherefore it is right also to seek the principle of what always comes to be. In one way an animal comes to be from an animal, and in another way an animal came to be from what is not an animal; and the animal from what is not an animal neither came to be according to nature nor always comes to be, while the animal from an animal both always and according to nature comes to be, from the point where it received a beginning of coming to be from an animal that is not from an animal. And this applies to all things that always come to be according to nature, not only to some; for it is impossible that things from generated principles have the same generation as the principles themselves have. The eternity in generated things cannot be without beginning. For the triangle always has its three angles equal to two right angles, having a generated principle—the straight line, whose definition is a line perfectly laid out.

For this is the cause of the triangle's having its three angles equal to two right angles; and if this is not, it is not possible for a triangle to be, but if a triangle is not, it is possible for a straight line to be. The principles of things that always come to be by nature cannot be eternal. For the nature they have, this they impart to the things that come to be from them; but this nature is generated, so the nature of the principles is also generated, even if the manner of generation has been changed and is different from that of the things that come from the principles. 43. From the same argument. There must be some one eternal first mover. For it has been demonstrated that motion must always be. But what is always must be continuous; for the always is continuous; for what is successive is not continuous. But what is continuous is one; and one is that which is moved by one mover and of one moved thing; for if one thing and another thing move it, the motion is not continuous but successive. The first mover of motion in respect of place, and motion in respect of place is that of the heaven, and the heaven is a natural body, and the natural body has in itself by nature the principle of its natural motion—the heaven, then, is moved superfluously by the first mover of motion in respect of place; and even if the first mover did not move it, it would be moved by itself, because it is the fifth element, having neither weight that moves it downward nor lightness that moves it upward, but another nameless power that moves it around the center.

If the first mover of the heaven in respect of local motion moves it neither according to nature (for to move it thus is superfluous) nor contrary to nature (for motion contrary to nature is second to motion according to nature), then it does not move the heaven at all. If every motion, as it now comes to be, so also formerly came to be, and now comes to be through a change of what is going to be, and what is going to be was not yet before it came to be, and what first was not and later is, all this is generated, and what is generated cannot be without beginning and eternal, then motion is not eternal and without beginning. 44. From the same argument. It is evident that local motion is first. For the first, as in other things, so also in motion, would be spoken of in many ways. That is called prior without which the others will not be, while that is without the others; and that which is prior in time, and that which is prior in substance. That local motion must be first. For there is no necessity either that what is moved locally grow or alter, nor indeed that it come to be or perish; but none of these is possible if the continuous motion is not, which the first mover moves. Further, it is first in time; for it is possible for this alone to be moved among eternal things. But in the case of one of the things that have generation, local motion must be the last of motions; for after first coming to be there is growth and alteration, and local motion is the motion of things already perfected. But it is necessary that another thing be moved locally prior, which will also be the cause of generation to things that come to be, not itself coming to be, such as the begetter of the begotten, since generation would seem to be the first of motions for this reason, that the thing must first come to be.

But the case of any one of the things that come to be is like this: something else must first be moved, of the things that come to be, being itself and not coming to be, and another before that. If that which grows is generable, and local motion increases it in respect of the quantity of motion, then local motion is not eternal; for the body that is carried has different places, in which, being extended, it makes the increase of motion in respect of local motion by the displacement of its own parts. If local motion has its increase in itself in respect of the quantity of motion, how is local motion said to be first of motion in respect of growth? It is impossible for that which has not begun and is not limited to receive increase by addition; therefore local motion is not without beginning, always becoming greater in respect of the quantity of motion. Local motion has its being in coming to be and ceasing to be; therefore local motion is not eternal, since non-being always precedes its being; for all motion comes to be by change from what is not yet but is going to be. All local motion is limited by the past, and everything limited is necessarily also begun, and everything begun is generable; therefore local motion is generable. And if the local motion of the body that is carried is not prior, then the body that is carried is also generable. Among eternal things, one alone moves and another alone is moved eternally with local motion; how is it not among impossibilities that what is without beginning should be moved with a motion that has begun? That without which the others are nothing is first in substance and in time among the others; how then is it ungenerated?

For it was laid down that the first mover of all things is first and unbegotten, and further that the heaven and the things in the heaven, both those that appear and those that move, are all unbegotten; which is absurd—to say that something unbegotten is before some eternal thing among eternal things. If the first mover moves the continuous motion, and moves neither the motion according to nature nor the motion contrary to nature—the former as superfluous, as was said, and the latter as being second to the motion according to nature—then it moves no continuous motion at all. If eternal things are moved, neither is the motion prior to the things moved, nor are the things moved prior to the motion; but all motion is by way of change from what is not yet but is going to be; therefore all things moved will have their being from a change of what is not yet but is going to be. In the case of one of the things that come to be, locomotion is the last of the motions, but it is necessary that another thing moved by locomotion be prior, which is also the cause of generation, being unbegotten. How then can the same thing be the cause of generation according to nature and of generation beyond nature? For the one who first begot was not begotten. And yet the thing first moved was moved in this way at the generation of the first thing that comes to be, as it was moved later at the generation of the things that come from that one. Either, then, the thing moved in this unbegotten way is not the cause of all generation, or the first mover does not move the continuous motion, since a difference of generation is observed among the things that come to be,

according to which some things have come to be beyond nature, and others according to nature. If the unbegotten is both prior and posterior, then there will be a time when the unbegotten is not unbegotten; which is absurd—that the unbegotten should at some time not exist. me. From the same argument. But in the continuous there are infinitely many halves, yet not in actuality but in potentiality. i. In actuality nothing is infinite; it is clear, therefore, that neither motion nor time is infinite. And since motion and time are limited in respect of the past, they have necessarily begun; and since they have begun, they are necessarily also generated. But if motion and time are generated, then necessarily also the moved body, which always has its being in being moved. And if in the time taken, its halves can be taken from the future and added to the past, not even so can time ever be infinite in actuality in respect of the past. m. Of Aristotle, from the first book of On the Heaven. It is necessary that there be some simple body which is naturally disposed to be carried in circular motion according to its own nature. What need, then, is there for the first mover to move such a body, which is moved in circular motion according to its own nature? mz. From the same argument.

It is evident that there is by nature some other substance of body besides those constituted here, more divine and prior to all these. If this body moves eternally and without beginning around the earth that is here, how can it be prior to the earth, without which it would not move in its circular motion? And if the eternal and the unbegotten and the useful for the constitution of things that come to be here, as they belong to such a body, so they belong to the earth, why is that body more honorable and prior to the earth? From the same argument. The body carried in a circle cannot possibly have weight or lightness. If that which has neither weight nor lightness cannot be tangible (for the tangible is among things that have weight and lightness), how does that which cannot exist without them have them, while they do not have them? And how by its own motion does it produce some heating power of air, just as the bodies here that have heaviness and lightness, performing heating activities by their own motions? From the same argument.

But the oppositions of motion correspond to oppositions of places. For if they were equal, there would be no motion of them; but if the one motion prevailed, the other would not exist. So that if both existed, the one body would exist in vain, not being moved with its own motion; for in vain do we call this a shoe, for which there is no putting on. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were in the motion of bodies contrary motions, either equal, hindering each other's motions by mutual circumambience, or unequal, and because of the prevalence of the one the other became motionless, overcome by the force of the prevailing one, not accomplishing its own natural motion—in vain would those things have come to be which are thus impeded with respect to their proper and natural motions, and these would not be works of God nor, clearly, of nature. God was not the maker of these things that come to be in vain, nor was nature; of things, then, that do not come to be in vain, but accomplish their natural motions without hindrance, God is the maker and nature. How, then, is it not among the most absurd things to say that these are unbegotten, eternal, and without beginning, of which God and nature are the maker? And if we call those shoes works of a craftsman which have a putting on, why do we not also call the bodies that accomplish their own natural motions thoughts of God and of nature? From the same discourse.

That the rational principle without matter is other than the form in matter is well said, and let this be true. But nevertheless there is no necessity on this account for there to be more worlds, nor is it possible for more to come to be, since this one is from all matter, as it is. If the difference of the rational principle from the rational principle is that it is immaterial and material, it is clear that the material principle is later than the immaterial principle. How then is the world ungenerated, having received its constitution from the later principle? If matter is formless and without substance and deprived of being a particular thing before it receives the form and becomes substance and a particular thing, how is the world ungenerated, having come to be from such matter? If the one who has the principle of the one world also had the principles of more worlds, and did not make the creation of the world according to his own will by choice, but by the abundance of matter was able to make one world and by its scarcity was not able to make more worlds, how does he not seem to have had the principles of more worlds in vain, whose creation he was not able to accomplish because of the scarcity of matter? From an ungenerated thing it is impossible for an ungenerated thing to come to be; how, if matter is ungenerated and the world is also ungenerated, does the latter come to be from the former? If God did not make matter in the same way as he made the things from matter, then God does not make as many things as he wills, but as many as he is able. But if he has power equal to his will in all things, then God is the maker of matter, just as also of the things from matter.

If matter, lying subject to God for the making of things from itself, being without form and without substance, and both without quality and without quantity, was changed by the power of God into all these things and became substance endowed with quality and quantity, how was it not increased by the same power of God, which wrought in it so many changes to such an extent that even more worlds might come to be from it—but, consumed for the generation of one world, it stopped God against his will from making more worlds? 51. From the same argument. But the heaven is among things individual and things from matter; but if it has not been constituted from a part of it but from all of it, the being for it as heaven and for this particular heaven is different, yet it would neither be another nor could more come to be, because this one has encompassed all matter. If the heaven is among things individual and things composed of matter and rational principle, so that its being as heaven is different from being by the immaterial rational principle, how is it not generated, having a beginning of its own substance—the composition of matter and rational principle from which it is? If matter in itself has neither weight nor lightness (for these are affections of the bodies that come to be from it), if the heaven, which has neither weight nor lightness, has come to be from all such matter, from where have all other things come to be, since all matter was consumed for the making of the heaven? If, before matter was given form by the form of the heaven, it did not have weight and lightness in such a way as it now does not have them after it has been given form, how was it not moved before being given form, as it now is moved after being given form?

If being moved is of substance, and not having weight and lightness is of matter and not of substance, and the heaven is moved with circular motion because it has neither weight nor lightness, it is clear that it is because of matter that the heaven is in this state of being moved, and not because of form. How then was matter unmoved before form with respect to circular motion, having neither weight nor lightness? 52. From the second book On the Heaven. Each thing exists for the sake of its work, of which it is the work. But the activity of God is immortality; this is eternal life. So it is necessary that motion be eternal for God. And since the heaven is of such a nature (for it is a certain divine body), for this reason it has a circular body, which is moved by nature always. Of the ungenerated and eternal there is no cause of being; but those things of which there is a work, these exist for the sake of the work. Therefore those things whose works are causes of being are not eternal. It belongs to soulless things to perform their natural activities only by their presence, but to rational things by will. How then is the heaven a god, when it does not perform immortality by will, but by motion and by the change of place of its own parts? The ungenerated needs nothing or none of the things outside its cooperation, neither for being nor for acting. How then is the heaven ungenerated, needing the earth, around which it is moved, both for its own being and for its acting, and needing the sun and the moon and the rest of the stars? Of the ungenerated there is no rational principle in the maker. How, if the heaven is ungenerated, does it have an immaterial rational principle in the maker?

and a reason embodied in matter, through which the heaven is different by being this particular heaven? If the heaven cannot by its will do what it does by its motion, how is this god eternal, performing an eternal life without will? If in eternal things the heaven does not perform the eternal life (for they have this from their own nature), but generated and corruptible things do not live eternally, where is the eternal life that the heaven performs? If the motion of the heaven is useful not only for the generation of things that come to be, but also for the corruption of things that are corrupted, how is the heaven a god and its activity an eternal life, through which corruptible things are corrupted? If it is impossible for what is from matter to be co-generated with matter, how is the heaven ungenerated, being from matter? If what is from both is later than both, how is the heaven, which is from matter and form, co-eternal with both? If form is not from matter but from the maker, how is the heaven, having its matter from one source and its form from another, ungenerated? If the heaven is a material body and has a spherical shape and is ungenerated, how does it not have both from matter—both to be what it is and to have what it has? If matter is what primarily underlies and is present in things that come to be from it in themselves, how is the heaven, being ungenerated, having matter as underlying and present, as generated things do? 53. From the same argument.

Since the heaven is a divine body, for this reason it has the circular body, which by nature is always moved in a circle. Why, then, is not the whole body of the heaven of this sort? Because it is necessary that something of the body carried in a circle remain at the center, and of this no part can remain, neither wholly nor at the center. For then its natural motion would be toward the center; but by nature it is moved in a circle; for otherwise its motion would not be eternal; for nothing contrary to nature is eternal. And that which is contrary to nature is posterior to that which is according to nature, and the contrary to nature is a kind of departure in generation from that which is according to nature. It is necessary, then, that there be earth; for this rests at the center. But if there is earth, it is necessary that there also be fire; for of contraries, if one is by nature, it is necessary that the other also be by nature, if indeed it is a contrary, and that there be some nature of it; for the same matter of contraries and of privation is prior, I mean for example the hot of the cold. But if indeed there is fire and earth, it is necessary that the bodies between them also exist; for each has a contrariety toward each of the elements. And these being present, it is necessary that there be generation, because none of them can be eternal; for contraries act and are acted upon by one another, and are destructive of one another. Moreover, it is not reasonable that there be something movable that is eternal, whose motion cannot be eternal by nature; and of these there is motion. That, then, generation must exist, is clear from these considerations. And if there is generation, it is necessary that there also be another destruction, either one or more; for in the same way it is necessary that the elements of bodies be disposed toward one another according to the whole

For now it is sufficiently clear for what reason the circular bodies are more numerous: because it is necessary that there be generation, and generation there is, if indeed fire exists, and this too and the other elements, if indeed earth exists; and earth exists because it is necessary that something remain forever, if indeed something is always in motion. Because it has neither weight nor lightness, the body that is always moved around the center of the heaven is a body; therefore it is necessary that the whole body of the heaven be moved around the center. But if the heaven has a body of this sort but does not have a motion of this sort, it is clear that it is moved contrary to nature. The body of the heaven is moved around the center, but not as a whole according to the motion of the element from which the body is said to be made, but spherically, by the interchange of its parts—how is it that the spherical motion does not prevail over the motion of the element? And yet motion does not belong to bodies composed of elements according to their form, but according to the elements of which they are composed. How, then, has the necessity of motion been changed from the body of the heaven? For a body that has neither weight nor lightness, it is necessary to have a motionless rest rather than an unstable motion; for if it is neither borne downward by weight nor borne upward by lightness, it is necessary that it remain motionless. If a stone were shaped into the form of a sphere and placed in the air, it would be carried down to its own place; it would not be carried down rolling spherically because of its shape, but would be carried in a straight line according to its own weight.

How then is the fifth element, of which the heaven consists, whose nature is to move about the center because it has neither heaviness nor lightness, not carried as a whole with its own parts about the center according to its own nature, but moves in a spherical manner by the interchange of parts with a motion that is not of the nature of the element but of the spherical shape? If neither contrary to nature nor superfluous nor in vain is anything among the eternal things, how is the heaven not moving contrary to nature, and in vain has the nature of the element, according to which it does not move, and superfluously by the first mover that is not moved is moved with a motion which it could have moved even without that? If the resting thing did not always rest at the center, the moving thing would not always move about the center. How then is it not false that the heaven always moves by its own nature? If the earth did not have the nature and position which it has, and likewise the heaven, if it did not have the nature and position which it has, neither would the moving thing move nor would the resting thing rest. How then are these eternal and ungenerated, whose being something and being somehow belong to each through the other—which is the property of generated things? In eternal things there is neither anything according to providence nor anything automatic (for things according to providence are secondary to providence, and the automatic is either contrary to nature or incidental among things that come to be according to choice; but the contrary to nature is secondary to the according to nature; for the contrary to nature comes to be by the deviation of the according to nature;

And what follows in things that come about by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it belong to eternal things that this is this because that is that—for example, since the heaven exists, the earth must also exist, and if the earth exists, the heaven also exists? But this is the work of providence, which made this universe out of parts differing in substance and in use. Either, then, the heaven and the earth and all things in them are not eternal—the things that contribute to one another's being, acting, and being acted upon—or, if they are eternal, it is not necessary that this be this because this is this. Aristotle, having supposed one eternal necessity, hung many other eternal necessities upon the one supposed. Necessity, he says, requires that motion be eternal. But if motion is eternal, necessity requires that time also be eternal; for time is the number of motion. But if motion is eternal, necessity requires that it be continuous. But if motion is continuous, necessity requires that there be a simple body besides the bodies here, having neither heaviness nor lightness; for heavy and light bodies, since they move in a straight line, cannot move continuously. But if it moves continuously, necessity requires that it have a spherical shape; for by this shape alone can continuous motion come about. But if it moves spherically, necessity requires that the earth be always at rest in the middle, so that the motion of the sphere may take place around it. But if the earth exists, necessity requires also the bodies between earth and fire. But if these exist, necessity requires that generation exist, since these cannot be eternal. But if generation exists, necessity requires that there be other bodies moving in a circle as well.

But if "if this is, that must be" has no place in things ungenerated and eternal, then the things said are not eternal and ungenerated. But if these things are eternal and ungenerated, then this is not because of that, nor that because of this. Since, if the earth exists, the fire must also exist and the bodies between them, how is it that, if the earth is ungenerated and eternal, the fire is not eternal, though it is light and upward-tending by nature? For if, as he says, of things that are opposites, if one is by nature, the other must also be by nature, how is it not absurd that the earth is eternal and ungenerated, but the fire is not eternal, or that the fire is eternal but the earth is not eternal, when they exist for each other's sake? And if for the sake of generation other circular bodies must exist, how is generation not the cause of eternal things? For the circular bodies are eternal, and generation is according to their motion. But if this is absurd, then the circular bodies are not ungenerated; for those whose existence is through other things coming to be are generated and not eternal. And if it is possible for what would exist in generated things to exist in eternal things—that this must be because that is—then nothing differs between ungenerated and generated things; for, he says, in eternal things the possible differs in no way from being.

54. From the same discourse. Since it is possible for the circle to be moved in two ways, and these are not contrary. But if nothing happens by chance or spontaneously among eternal things, and the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what cause is it moved in one direction rather than the other? For this too must either be a principle or have a principle. For if nature always does the best of what is possible, and just as among motions in a straight line the motion toward the upper place is more honorable (for the upper place is more divine than the lower), in the same way the forward motion stands in relation to the backward, if indeed right and left exist. The accustomed difficulty bears witness that the prior and the posterior exist; for this cause resolves the difficulty. For if it is as it can best be, this would be the cause also of what has been said; for it is best to be moved with a simple and ceaseless motion, and this toward the more honorable. If nature made the heaven to be moved forward and not backward, nature which always does the best of what is possible, how is the heaven eternal and its motion, having been generated by nature and having to be moved with the best motion? If the forward motion has the same difference in relation to the backward motion, in respect of the more honorable and more divine and better, that the upper place has to the lower, how are these motions not contrary, differing so much from one another? If the motion of simple bodies is simple, not according to what is possible but according to what is necessary, how can the heaven be moved in two ways, having a simple body and being moved according to what is possible?

If the heaven is everywhere equal to itself and has its parts equal to the parts, and if, when moved, it preserves the spherical and circular motion, then it can be moved from south to north and from north to south, just as it can be moved from east to west and from west to east. How then is it not in vain that nature has implanted in the body of the heaven the powers of so many motions, if it has the powers in four ways but is moved in only one way? 55. From the same discourse. Concerning the so-called stars, it would follow to speak of what they are composed and what their motions are. It is most reasonable and follows from what has been said that each of the stars performs its motion from this body in which it happens to be, since we said that there is something which is naturally moved in a circle; for just as those who assert they are fiery say this for the reason that they claim the upper body is fire, as it is reasonable that each thing is composed of those things in which each thing is, in the same way we also say. And the heat and the light come from them when the air is rubbed by their motion. For motion naturally sets fire to stones and wood and iron; more reasonably, then, that which is nearer to fire, and nearer is the air, as also in the case of missiles being carried; for these are set on fire to such an extent that the leaden bullets melt, and since they themselves are set on fire, it is necessary that the air around them

to be affected itself. These things, then, are themselves heated by being carried in the air, which by the impact becomes fire through the motion; but each of the things above is carried in its sphere, so that they themselves are not set on fire, but the air beneath the sphere of the circular body must be heated when that body is moved, and especially in the region where the sun happens to be bound. Therefore, when it approaches and rises and is above us, heat comes about. That, then, they are neither fiery nor carried in fire, let this be said by us concerning them. If the stars are from the same matter from which the heaven is, how is it not false that "the heaven has come to be from all the matter," and that "it has encompassed all the matter"? If a thing that is moved and becomes capable of heating another by its motion cannot become capable of heating another unless it is first heated by its own motion, how do the sphere and the stars in it heat the air by their own motion, while not being heated themselves? If a thing that performs heating activities by its own motion must necessarily have either weight or lightness, how does the heaven and the stars in it, having neither weight nor lightness, perform heating activities? If things that have the same movable substance must necessarily be moved with the same motion in themselves and not incidentally, how is the sun not moved incidentally, if it is bound in the sphere? And concerning the other stars the same argument holds, if they are not moved by themselves in their natural motions, but through the spheres to which they are bound.

If the sun is of the same matter as the heaven, which has neither weight nor lightness, and has a spherical shape, just as the heaven also has, why are they not moved in the same way, both of them, either by the interchange of parts as the sun is moved? If nothing is contrary to nature among eternal things, how is it not contrary to nature that the motion which something has according to nature, this motion it does not move by itself but by another? For both the sun and the stars are moved not by themselves but by the spheres in which they are bound. If, just as generated things are according to reason—that which has come to be—so also ungenerated things are according to reason—that which is—then ungenerated things are posterior to reason. But if this is impossible, then ungenerated things are not according to reason. And if they are not according to reason, how is each of them usefully that which it is, and has what it has, and does what it does? For things that exist usefully are the works of reason and providence. If it follows for generated things that they are from reason and matter, then ungenerated things are not from reason and matter. How then are the heaven and all things in it ungenerated, and yet are from reason and matter? If, as Aristotle said, nothing among eternal things is in vain or contrary to nature, how does it follow from what he said about the motion of the sun that both things happen to the sun—both the in vain and the contrary to nature? For if the sun were not bound to the sphere that moves it, the same according to

If it was moved by nature with the motion which it now moves, why was it bound to the sphere to no purpose? But if it was not moved by nature with this motion, but with another beside this one, whether in respect of quantity or of quality, how is it not now moved contrary to nature? V. From the same argument. That the circles are moved, but the stars are at rest and are carried bound to the circles. If the stars rest in the circles by nature, they are bound to the circles to no purpose; but if they rest contrary to nature, it is clear that they rest by force. But in eternal things nothing is either to no purpose or contrary to nature. Therefore Aristotle has not found the account concerning the motion of the stars; for he says the stars are eternal, and in what he said about their motion both appear—the purposeless and the contrary to nature. If the stars are eternal, and the heaven also is eternal in which the stars are bound, and each of them has been called a god, how are they not gods dragged by gods? For things bound to a moving thing are moved as being dragged. If the composition of substance (for it is from matter and form) is one thing, and the composition from parts having substance is another, how are these said to be eternal, which have both compositions? For the heaven, having the sun and the stars as bound parts, is composite from them; for the heaven, having these in itself, is [composite].

57. From the same discourse. In addition to these things, it is irrational that nature gave them no instrument for motion; for nature does nothing at random, nor did it care for animals but overlook things so precious, but it seems as though deliberately to have taken away all the means by which they might proceed of themselves. If of things eternal and ungenerated there is no maker, nor are they what they are, or have what they have by nature, through the care of anyone, how, if the heaven is ungenerated and the things appearing in the heaven are generated together with it, does it have nature as maker and provider of the things accomplished for their constitution? It was fitting for one making an argument about the motion of eternal things to say that nature does nothing at random; how is it not clear that both the heaven and the things appearing in the heaven are works of nature, of the nature that took away from them the instruments of motion? 58. From the same discourse. Since, then, the heaven must be moved with its own motion, but the other stars do not proceed of themselves, it would reasonably be that each is spherical; for thus especially the one will be moved and the other will remain at rest.

If that which is at rest is said to be that which is able to be moved with that motion from which it is at rest, how are the stars at rest, not having their own motion, according to which they ought to have been moved? And if they have the power to be moved, but are prevented because they are bound to the sphere, how is it not contrary to nature for them to be moved always? If to things always moved the spherical shape was given as fitting, how is it that of things having the spherical shape, one is always moved as the heaven is, while another is always at rest as the stars are? 59. From the same discourse. So then, since this does not appear to happen always, neither would any of them be carried with an animate or a violent motion, as if nature foresaw what was going to be, because if the motion were not in this way, nothing of the things in this place here would be in a like condition. How then are the things that have received their being as such and their being moved in such a way according to the providence of nature eternal and ungenerated? For the things that are according to providence are secondary to providence, and eternal things are secondary to nothing. If what is going to be was not before it existed, how is it possible concerning the heaven and the stars and their motion that both be true—that it is going to be and that they are eternal and ungenerated? For what is going to be is not yet, while what is eternal and ungenerated is always present. If for the sake of the things in this place here being in a like condition, nature foresaw that the motion of the heaven in the said manner should exist, how are these things eternal and ungenerated—things which exist for the sake of generated things, and are moved as they are moved? 60. From the same discourse.

For since it has been shown that they are not naturally moved by themselves, and nature does nothing without reason nor in vain, it is clear that it has also given to the immovable bodies such a shape as is least capable of motion. And the sphere is least capable of motion because it has no organ for motion. So that it is clear that they would be spherical in bulk. If nature has given to the ever-movable bodies the spherical shape as suited to easy motion, how is it that the stars have not received such a shape in vain, being bound to the circles and unable to accomplish their own natural motion? If the stars are not naturally moved by themselves, then they do not have eternal motion according to nature. How then are they from the same element as the heaven, which has neither weight nor lightness? If the heaven, because it is from such an element and because it has the spherical shape, is naturally moved always about the center by itself, but the stars, being from the same element and having the same shape, are not naturally moved by themselves, then nature has, as it seems, given to them in vain both substance and a shape suited to eternal motion, if they have an immovable rest. That the stars have a substance and an ever-movable shape and an immovable rest—how is this not a proof of the irrational and vain making of that which, contrary to nature, has made the stars to be at rest? The substances of the ungenerated and eternal things are higher than all making, both that according to reason and that contrary to reason. How, if the heaven and the stars are ungenerated, are they, by the providence of nature which does nothing without reason nor in vain, what they are

And they have what they have? If the stars ought not to be moved, why are they moved at all by others? But if they ought to be moved, why are they not moved by themselves but by others, when nature is able to make them be moved by themselves with the motion which they are now moved by others, since it has made them immovable in themselves in their most easily moved substance? In eternal things nothing is contrary to nature; but it is contrary to nature that a substance and shape should always have what is movable, yet an immovable rest. Are not those things in which something is contrary to nature non-eternal, or is the statement false that in eternal things nothing is contrary to nature? None of the ungenerated things has or does not have either what it has or what it does not have by the providence of anyone. How, then, if the heaven and the stars are ungenerated, do they not have an instrument of motion by the providence of nature, but have a spherical shape instead of an instrument, being more suited to continuous motion than instruments of travel? 61. From the same discourse. The first, being one, moves many of the divine bodies, but the many, being many, each moves only one; for of the planets, each one is carried by more motions than one. In this way, then, nature balances and produces a certain order, assigning many bodies to the one, and many motions to the one body. For in many spheres the one sphere, bound within, is carried, and each sphere happens to be a body. And if there is no maker of ungenerated and eternal substances, how are these things eternal and ungenerated, whose nature is the maker of order, assigning many bodies to the one and many motions to the one body, equating the multitudes of the motions of the one body to the multitude of the bodies?

If these things are ungenerated and unmade, how can a natural order that has been made exist among the ungenerated? A sphere bound to a sphere, having the same substance as the sphere to which it is bound—how does it not appear to have both absurdities, which do not exist among eternal things: that its movable substance is in vain in respect of that by which it is not moved, and that it is moved contrary to nature incidentally? 62. From the third book On the Heaven. Of things said to exist by nature, some are substances, and some are the works and affections of these; I mean by substances the simple bodies, such as fire and earth and their kindred, and all things composed of these, both the whole heaven and its parts, and again animals and plants and their parts. He who said that the heaven is made of some simple element other than the elements here, and that it is not possible for another heaven to come to be because this one has encompassed all matter—how does he now say that the heaven is made of the same elements as those from which animals and plants are made? But if he says that another heaven came to be from other elements, how is he not lying when he says, "It is not possible for another heaven to exist besides one"? But if he calls the same heaven at one time [made] from another, more divine element...

...than the things here, but sometimes from the same elements, how is he not in one way or the other lying? 63. From the same argument. Concerning the first of the elements, then, it has been said both what its nature is and that it is incorruptible and ungenerated. If an element is that from which the thing that comes to be comes to be, existing within it, how can the same thing be both an element and ungenerated? If the element is first and the thing from the element is later, how is the element ungenerated, from which the heaven comes, and the heaven generated together with it? If the element is ungenerated for this reason, that it is not from an element, how is the heaven ungenerated, which is from an element? 64. From the same argument. That they are eternal, then, is impossible; for we see both fire and water and each of the simple bodies being dissolved. So it is necessary that the elements of bodies be generated and corruptible. If earth is also an element of bodies, how have you said that earth is coeternal and cogenerated with the heaven, but the other elements are generated and corruptible? 65. From the same argument.

The generation of the elements is from one another. How do the elements come to be from one another if they do not first come to be according to the generation from one another? For this generation must precede that generation; for when they exist, they change into one another and come to be from one another. PROSTRYLLANSA. a. The nature that produces natural things, unless it first comes to be by that which produces contrary to nature, neither exists nor produces. b. That not simply every thing generable and corruptible has the fourfold time in its generation—beginning, increase, peak, and decline—but only what comes to be by nature or by art. c. If God is called by our names, whatever he is called, it is not necessary that whatever follows upon our name should follow upon God because of the name. For God is called both truth and good; and to truth falsehood is opposed, and to good evil, but to God nothing is opposed. Plato, not understanding this, taught something contrary to God—an evil both necessary and eternal. d. That which is cannot be without being this particular thing, for example, body cannot be without being this particular body. But if matter does not have being-this-particular, then it does not have being either; for being is inseparable from being-this-particular.

Nature and art make what they make out of substances, for example, nature makes man out of seed and seed out of man; and seed and man are substances. In the same way the arts also make a statue out of bronze and a house out of bricks; and bronze and bricks are substances. Therefore, if matter is not a substance, who is it that made the things that came to be from it out of it, since nature and art are unable to make anything out of what is not a substance? And, as Aristotle says, if there is a body neither heavy nor light, neither one of the four elements nor from the four elements, it is clear that, if this is true, there will be a body neither hot nor cold, neither by nature nor by affection; for what is hot or cold by nature or by affection is either one of the four elements or from the four elements. And if there is no body hot or cold either by nature or by affection, then there is no body either heavy or light, either being one of the four elements or being from the four elements. How then does he say that the aether is hot because of the motion of the heavenly body and of the bodies moved within it? For bodies that heat by their motions are heated before the things heated by them; but if it is heated, it is clear that it is heated by affection; and if by affection, it is clear that it is by alteration; and if by alteration, it is clear that it is by change; and if by change, it is clear that it changes from the contrary into the contrary. And hot is contrary to cold; therefore it changes from cold into hot.

But since there is no body that changes by way of passion from cold to hot, being neither one of the four elements nor composed of the four elements, for this reason the heavenly body is not an element other than the four elements; for it is heated by way of passion, changing from cold to hot. 7. If bodies heated by motion are heated more by greater motion, how is it that, according to Aristotle, if the sun is a body hot not by nature but by motion, it is neither heated more nor heats more by greater motion, but always has equal heat despite unequal motion? 8. If, according to Aristotle, the definition of substance is that which is receptive of contraries in turn, how does the same Aristotle again say that matter is not substance, though it is receptive of contraries in turn, namely of privation and habit? 9. If one who is deprived of being this particular thing is also deprived of being, how does Aristotle say that it is impossible for anything to come to be from that which is in every way non-existent, when matter, according to him, is deprived of both—both of being and of being this particular thing? 10. If nothing comes to be from that which is in every way non-existent, it is clear that something comes to be from that which exists. But if matter is this, how is Aristotle speaking truthfully when he says that matter is not being? 11. If matter is not altered, it is not possible for anything to come to be from it. But if everything that is altered is altered from this to that, and matter is not this, then it is not altered; therefore nothing comes to be from it either.

12. If change does not come about from any chance thing to any chance thing, but to the contrary within the same genus—for example, in quality change does not come about from white to large but to black—then in what respect does matter change in the generation of the substances that come to be from it, since it has nothing that is able to change? 13. Just as in things pertaining to animals [there is] the animal, and in things pertaining to color [there is] color, so too in things pertaining to matter [there is] matter. How is it that when things pertaining to animals are destroyed, the animal is destroyed along with them, and when things pertaining to color are destroyed, color is destroyed, and yet when things pertaining to matter are destroyed, matter is not destroyed? But if matter is destroyed along with things pertaining to matter, how does matter pre-exist things pertaining to matter? 14. To be separate from and to partake of beings belongs to beings; it is clear that what is in no way being neither is separate from anything nor partakes of anything. How, then, does matter partake of privation, and yet is not among beings? 15. It is impossible for the same thing in the same respect to be moved by both motions at once, the one according to nature and the one contrary to nature. How, then, is the sun moved according to nature from east to west, but contrary to nature from west to east by reason of the sphere? For it is not possible for the same thing in the same respect to be moved by motions contrary to nature. 16. If the sun did not exist, the eye would be superfluous; and if the eye did not exist, the sun would be superfluous. But since each is necessary on account of the other, each is therefore generated; for the ungenerated is ungenerated on account of nothing, but on account of itself alone—or rather, not even on account of itself; for the uncaused is uncaused.

If it is impossible for what has come to be in time to have come to be by cause but not in time, how do the Greeks say that the world has come to be by cause and not in time? 18. If it is impossible for the world to exist without a year, how is the world eternal and ungenerated, when the year is not eternal but has its existence from a cycle of more days? 19. If the year is generated, how are the things in the year eternal and ungenerated?