Ad Graecos ex communibus notionibus

Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa: How, Saying Three Persons in the Godhead, We Do Not Say Three Gods, to the Greeks from the Common Notions. If the name "God" were indicative of a person, then in saying three persons we would of necessity say three gods. But if the name "God" is significant of substance, then, confessing one substance of the holy Trinity, we reasonably dogmatize one God, since of one substance the name "God" is one. Therefore, consistently with both the substance and the name, there is one God and not three. For we do not say "God and God and God," as we say "Father and Son and Holy Spirit," because we interweave the conjunction "and" with the names that are significant of persons, since the persons are not identical but rather different and distinct from each other according to the very signification of the names. But with the name "God," which is indicative of the substance, we do not join the conjunction "and" so as to say "God and God and God," since the substance is the same, of which the persons are, and which the name "God" signifies. Therefore it is the same God. And with the same, for the indication of the same, the conjunction "and" is never conjoined.

But if we say Father God and Son God and Holy Spirit God, or God the Father and God the Son and God the Holy Spirit, we also attach the conjunction “and” in thought to the names of the persons, such as Father, Son, Holy Spirit, so that there is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, that is, person and person and person, and therefore three persons. The name “God,” however, is predicated absolutely and identically of each of the persons without the conjunction “and,” so that we cannot say God and God and God, but we understand that the name is spoken second and third in utterance on account of the underlying persons, but is applied in the second and third instance without the conjunction “and” because God is not one thing and another. For it is not insofar as Father preserves otherness with respect to Son that the Father is God; for thus the Son would not be God. For if, because the Father is Father, therefore the Father is God, then because the Son is not Father, the Son is not God. But if the Son is God, it is not because he is Son. Similarly, the Father is not God because he is Father, but because of a certain essence, of which he is Father and Son, and on account of which the Father is God and the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God. Since the essence is not divided in each of the persons so that there are three essences corresponding to the persons, it is clear that the name which signifies the essence, that is, “God,” will not be divided so as to be three Gods. But just as the Father is essence, the Son is essence, the Holy Spirit is essence, and there are not three essences, so also the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, and there are not three Gods.

For God is one and the same, since the substance is also one and the same, even if each of the persons is said to be both substantial and God. For either we must say three substances of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, since each of the persons is a substance—which is most irrational, since we do not say that Peter and Paul and Barnabas are three substances; for the substance of such persons is one and the same—or, saying one substance, of which Father and Son and Holy Spirit are, even while knowing each of the persons to be substantial, we rightly and consistently say one God, even if we believe each of the persons to be God, because of the commonality of the substance. For just as, because the Father differs from the Son and the Holy Spirit, we say three persons of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, so, since the Father does not differ from the Son and the Holy Spirit in respect of substance, we say that the substance of Father and Son and Holy Spirit is one. For if, where there is difference, there is a triad because of the difference, where there is identity, there is a monad because of the identity; and there is identity of the persons in respect of substance; therefore there is a monad of them in respect of substance. But if in respect of substance there is a monad of the holy triad, it is clear that this is also the case with the name “God.” For this name is indicative of the substance, not presenting what it is (since the divine substance is manifestly inconceivable and incomprehensible), but, taken from some property belonging to it, it signifies it indirectly, just as the properties “neighing” and “laughing,” being properties of natures, when spoken, signify the natures of which they are properties.

It is, therefore, a property of the eternal substance, of which Father and Son and Holy Spirit are, to oversee and contemplate and know all things, not only those that come to be in deed, but also those that are conceived in thought, which belongs to that substance alone, since it is also the cause of all things, having made all things and ruling over all things as its own products, and administering all human affairs by some fitting and ineffable reason. From this the name "God," properly speaking, is taken to signify that substance which truly rules over all things as the creator of all things. Therefore, since the substance is one, of which Father and Son and Holy Spirit are, and the name that indicates it is one (I mean, of course, "God"), there will be one God properly and in accordance with the account of the substance, no argument compelling us to say three Gods, just as we do not say three substances. For if in the case of Peter and Paul and Barnabas we do not say three substances because they are of one substance, how much more rightly will we not do this in the case of Father and Son and Holy Spirit. For if the substance is not to be divided into three on account of the persons, it is clear that neither is God, since "God" does not indicate a person, but the substance. For if "God" indicated a person, one and only one of the persons would be called God, namely that which was signified by such a name, just as "Father" alone is called Father because this name is indicative of a person. But if someone should say that we call Peter and Paul and Barnabas three particular substances [it is clear that this means individual ones].

able only in thought. For this is more proper to say: let him know that when we speak of a partial substance, that is, an individual substance, we mean nothing other than an individual, which is a person. Hence, if we were to speak of three partial substances, that is, individual substances, we say nothing other than three persons; but the term "God" does not follow persons, as has been shown. Therefore, it does not follow the partial, that is, individual, substance either; for individual substance is the same as person when spoken of individuals. What, then, is to be said to that, that we call Peter, Paul, and Barnabas three men? For if these are persons, and persons are not signified by the significant name of the common substance, likewise neither is the so-called partial or individual substance, since this is the same as person—why do we call them three men, being of one substance, of which "man" is indicative, if we utter this neither because of the persons nor because of the partial, that is, individual, substance? We say that we say this catachrestically and not properly, due to a custom that has prevailed from necessary causes, which are not observed in the case of the Holy Trinity, so that we might do the same in its case. These causes are as follows: the definition of man is not always observed in the same individuals or persons; for when the former die, others come into being in their place, and again, while the same often remain, some others arise, so that the definition of nature or of man is observed sometimes in these, sometimes in those, and sometimes in more, sometimes in fewer.

For this reason, then, because of the addition and subtraction, the dying and birth of individuals, in which the definition of man is observed, we are compelled to speak of many men and few, the common usage having been displaced by the change and alteration of persons, even contrary to the very account of substance, so as in a way to count substances along with the persons. But in the case of the Holy Trinity, nothing of this sort ever occurs; for the same persons must always be spoken of, and not different ones, since they are always the same and in the same state, admitting neither any addition to a fourth nor any reduction to a dyad (for neither is another person born or proceeds from the Father or from one of the persons, so that the Trinity might ever become a tetrad; nor does any one of these three persons ever perish, even in the blink of an eye, so that the Trinity might become a dyad even in thought); and since no addition, reduction, change, or alteration occurs to the three persons of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, there is nothing to mislead our mind into speaking of three gods along with the three persons. Again, all the persons of man do not have their being from the same person in a proximate sense, but some from this one, some from that one, so that there are many and different causes in addition to the caused things. But in the case of the Holy Trinity, it is not so; for there is one and the same person, that of the Father, from whom the Son is born and the Holy Spirit proceeds.

Therefore, we confidently say that the one cause together with its effects is one God, since they coexist with it. For the persons of the Godhead are not separated from each other by time, nor by place, nor by will, nor by pursuit, nor by activity, nor by passion, nor by any such things as are observed in the case of men; except only that the Father is father and not son, and the Son is son and not father, and likewise the Holy Spirit is neither father nor son. Hence there is no necessity that compels us to call the three persons three Gods, as in our case we call many persons many men for the reasons stated. That it is for the reasons stated, and not by necessary reasoning, that we call the many persons of man many men, would be clear from this: the same thing cannot be both one and many in the same respect; but Peter, Paul, and Barnabas are admittedly one man in respect of "man"; therefore in the same respect, that is, in respect of "man," they cannot be many. They are called many men, clearly by catachresis and not properly; and what is said by catachresis is not worthy nor sufficient to destroy, among those who think rightly, what both is and is said properly. Therefore one must not speak of three Gods in the case of the three persons of the divine substance, since in respect of "God" there is one and the same God because of the identity of substance, of which "God" is indicative in the manner stated. And if someone should say that Scripture counts three men when it speaks, trying to refute us from our own resources, such a person has not shown himself to be a correct or pious hearer of Scripture.

For if he were such a one, he would not even be moved to argue with us about whether one should speak of three gods, observing especially the three persons of the divine essence, because Scripture, while giving Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and handing down God the Word, God not the Word (that is, God the Father), and God the Holy Spirit as God, altogether refuses to say three gods, considering polytheism impiety, and proclaims one God throughout, neither confusing the persons nor dividing the divinity, but rather preserving the identity of divinity in the distinctness of three hypostases or persons. If, then, such a man were right and made account of justice, understanding these things from Scripture, he would not hasten to confirm his own views, but would rather ask, seeking to learn the reason why Scripture speaks of three men, even though it knows the whole nature as one man, according to the phrase "Man, his days are like grass," having uttered the commonality of nature in the singular; for, declaring what belongs to the common nature, it said this of one man because it knows the whole man as one man and not many. For he would listen with a love of learning, asking why Scripture, like a good nurse knowing her own infants, sometimes lispingly uses certain names with them in the same way, without harming the

obviously perfect, and it wrongs those who are able to partake of solid food. For it does not define the lispings as doctrines, thereby harming the perfect, but condescending to infants out of compassion and imitating their ways, it thus leads them up to itself, bringing them to the perfection of age. Yet it also defines and dogmatizes the perfect things in a manner befitting itself and appropriate for the disciples to learn. Indeed, when it says that God has ears and eyes and a mouth and the other bodily parts, it does not hand down such a thing as a doctrine defining the divine as composite from different members, but in the aforementioned manner, taking such things by metaphor from our own, for the elevation, as I said, of those unable to proceed directly to the incorporeal, it sets forth the doctrines with certain solid and most distinct expressions, teaching wisely that God is spirit and everywhere, and that wherever one might go, his simple and uncircumscribed being is present. Thus also, when it says "three men" out of custom, so that the common and customary usage among the many may not be strange, and it says "one" for the sake of precision, so that the perfect observed in the nature of things may not be disturbed. And we consider the former a condescension made for the benefit and advantage of the more childish, while the latter we define as a doctrine set forth for the confirmation and transmission of perfection.

But some, being contentious and roused to leave nothing uncontradicted, with a view to training both speakers and hearers, as I would say, laboriously, overlooking what has been said by us and taking what is not granted as agreed, and using reasoning, construct what seems good to them and say that, just as we say that hypostasis does not differ from hypostasis insofar as it is hypostasis, and yet not all hypostases are one hypostasis on this account; and again, essence does not differ from essence insofar as it is essence, and yet not all essences are one essence on this account; so too we might say that God does not differ from God insofar as He is God, and yet the three hypostases of which "God" is predicated are not one God on this account; and again, saying that man does not differ from man insofar as he is man, we do not abolish that Peter, Paul, and Barnabas are three men. For essence differs from essence not insofar as it is essence, but insofar as it is a particular essence, and hypostasis differs from hypostasis insofar as it is a particular hypostasis; likewise, man differs from man insofar as he is a particular man, and again God differs from God insofar as He is a particular God; and "particular" or "particular" is customarily said of two or more. But these things, as we said, they say; we, however, will show that the whole is a sophism and nothing else than what has been said, prevailing in no other way than by using the very things that have been said and showing that one ought not to speak of a particular God and a particular God, or a particular man and a particular man; but rather, if at all, of a particular hypostasis of God and a particular hypostasis of man.

For we rightly say that there are many hypostases of the one man and three hypostases of the one God. Now, an expression of the form "such-and-such" aims to distinguish what shares with something else in that name to which "such-and-such" is added; for example, we call man a "such-and-such animal" when we wish to distinguish him from the horse, which shares with him the name "animal," but differs by the rational and the irrational. And one thing is distinguished from another either by essence or by hypostasis or by both essence and hypostasis: man is distinguished from the horse by essence, Paul from Peter by hypostasis, and this hypostasis of man from that hypostasis of the horse by both essence and hypostasis. But when the account of things that differ simply by essence and of things that differ by hypostasis and not by essence is made clear, the account of things distinguished by both essence and hypostasis will also be evident. Let our discussion, then, examine these matters. For that things differing by essence are said to be two or three essences, and things differing by hypostasis are likewise said to be two or three hypostases, both they and we agree. But we differ in that, in the case of

They say that one must speak of two men, Peter and Paul, but we do not do so properly and according to the scientific account; for we are not now concerned with common and catachrestic usage, since this is effective neither for the abolition nor for the establishment of anything. Let it first be clarified, therefore, on what account we say that man and horse, or horse and dog, differ in respect of being such-and-such a substance. Or is it obvious that it is because they differ from each other according to the features that customarily characterize substances, such as rational and irrational, neighing, barking, and anything of that sort? For in saying "substance of such-and-such a kind," we mean nothing other than an existence partaking of life, by contrast with that which is not of this kind; an existence naturally capable of reasoning, to distinguish it from that which differs by irrationality; an existence having neighing as a characteristic, and so forth. For it is in place of such differences and properties that "such-and-such" and "of such-and-such a kind" are added to substance, or to every genus, for the distinction of the species under it, e.g., "such-and-such a substance" instead of "perceptible" or "imperceptible," "such-and-such an animal" instead of "rational" or "irrational." And again we say: Paul differs from Peter in respect of being such-and-such a hypostasis for each of them, because they differ from each other according to some of the things that naturally constitute a hypostasis and not a substance, such as baldness, tallness, paternity, sonship, and anything of that sort. For it is obvious that species and individual, that is, substance and hypostasis, are not the same; for when one says "individual," that is, "hypostasis," he immediately directs the mind of the hearer to seek curly-haired, blue-eyed, son, father, and anything similar.

When he says "species," that is, "substance," for the purpose of knowledge, clearly, "rational animal, mortal, capable of intellect and knowledge," "irrational animal, mortal, neighing," and the like. But if substance and individual, which is hypostasis, are not the same, then the characteristics that define this one and that one are not the same either. And if these are not the same, it is not possible to link them with the same names; rather, some belong to terms placed under substance or substances, others to terms said of the individual. There are then three names about which the inquiry is: substance, individual, and man. And with substance we link "such-and-such" for distinction, as I said, of the species under it that differ from each other in substance; with hypostasis again we similarly join "such-and-such" for the division of persons who share this name, that is, hypostasis, and differ from each other not in what characterizes substance, but in what are called accidents. In what way, then, do they wish to link "such-and-such" with the name "man"? (For from commonly agreed things, disputed matters receive their resolution.) As with substance? Then will the things under it be distinguished from each other by a substantial difference? Which is not the case; for Paul differs in no way in substance from Peter, of whom "man" is predicated. But as with hypostasis? Then "man" would be indicative of a person and not of substance, which is absurd to say; for "man" signifies the commonality of substance and not a particular person, say, Paul or Barnabas. Therefore, "such-and-such" is in no way linked with "man," at least according to the scientific account.

But if common usage is at a loss for this and misuses the names of substance to indicate person, that is nothing against the precise standard of logical science. But why do I run down habitual misuse, which is at a loss in such matters, while overlooking that even the scientific of discourses, often not having suitable words to express what is conceived, themselves also use other, catachrestic names for the presentation of what is said? Nevertheless, let this be clear to us: that if we were able to say of Peter and Paul "man of man" insofar as man, they differ in nothing, but insofar as such-and-such a man, and "substance of substance" insofar as substance, they differ in nothing, but insofar as such-and-such a substance. But if it is not possible to say this, since the substance of Peter and Paul is one and the same, then neither is that possible, since the name "man" is indicative of substance. And if "such-and-such" and "such-and-such" cannot be conjoined with the name "man," then neither do we properly speak of two or three men. And if these things have been shown in the case of man, how much more fittingly will it apply to the eternal and divine substance that each of the hypostases be called not such-and-such a god and such-and-such a god, nor that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit be uttered as "god and god and god," nor that three gods be dogmatized, even in thought. Therefore, it has been established by our argument, which is both just and consistent and most scientific, that we say one God, the creator of all things, even if he is contemplated in three persons or hypostases: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.