Stromata

He, having magnanimously received the magnitude of knowledge, advances to the holy exchange of transposition. For he has heard the psalm saying: "Surround Zion and encompass her, tell stories in her towers." For it hints, I think, that those who have received the word in a lofty manner will be lofty as towers and will stand firmly in both faith and knowledge. And let these things be said as briefly as possible, in a scattered way, to the Greeks concerning the gnostic. But it must be known that if the faithful person accomplishes one or even two of these things, he does not do so in all at once, nor with the highest knowledge, as the gnostic does. And indeed, concerning the impassibility according to the gnostic, as it were, by which the perfection of the faithful person through love advances into a perfect man, reaching the measure of maturity, becoming like God, truly becoming equal to angels, many other testimonies from Scripture present themselves to be adduced, but I think it better to postpone such ambition due to the length of the discourse, entrusting to those willing to labor and to work out the doctrines by selection from the Scriptures. Yet I will mention one thing very briefly, so as not to leave the topic unremarked. For the divine apostle says in the first epistle to the Corinthians: "Does any of you dare to have a matter with another judged before the unjust and not before the saints? Or do you not know that the saints will judge the world?" And so on.

The passage being of the greatest extent, employing the opportune expressions of the apostolic writings, we will, as if paraphrasing the statement in the briefest possible manner by way of a running exposition, set forth the meaning of the apostle's text, according to which he delineates the perfection of the gnostic. For he does not only establish the gnostic as one who would rather be wronged than do wrong, but also teaches him to be unforgiving of injuries, not even permitting him to pray against the one who has wronged him; for he knows that the Lord explicitly commanded to pray even for one's enemies. Now, to say that the injured party should be judged by the unjust is nothing other than to appear to wish to retaliate and to desire to commit a second wrong, which is likewise to do wrong oneself. And to say that some wish to be judged by the saints indicates those who, through prayer, ask that the injustice be repaid to those who have wronged them, and that while the latter are better than the former, they are not yet free from passions, unless, having become completely unforgiving of injuries according to the Lord's teaching, they pray also for their enemies. It is good, therefore, that they, through repentance, partake of good sense and of the faith. For even if the truth seems to have those who are jealous as enemies, yet it itself is not hostile to anyone.

For just as God shines his sun upon both the just and the unjust, and sent even the Lord himself to both the just and the unjust, so he who strives to be assimilated to God, through great forbearance, forgiving seventy times seven (as if signified by the whole of life and the entire cosmic cycle numbered by sevens), is gracious to everyone, even if someone spends his entire time in the flesh doing injustice to the gnostic. For the excellent man deems it right not only to entrust judgment to others concerning those who have wronged him, but also wishes to ask of those judges that the just man grant remission of sins to those who have offended against him, and reasonably so; since the external and bodily aspect alone, even if it proceeds to the point of death, is what those who attempt to do wrong take advantage of, none of which is proper to the gnostic. How could anyone judge the apostate angels, having himself become an apostate from that forbearance according to the gospel? Why are you not rather wronged? he says; why are you not rather deprived? But you wrong and deprive, praying, of course, against those who err through ignorance, and you deprive, as far as it depends on you, of the philanthropy and goodness of God those against whom you pray, and this toward brothers, not those according to faith

not only, but also calling the proselytes. For if even the one who is now hostile will later believe, we do not yet know. From which it is clearly concluded that even if not all are, at least we must consider them as brothers. And indeed, all men, being the work of one God and clothed in one image upon one substance, even if some are more clouded than others, only the knowledgeable one recognizes, and through the creatures, the energy, through which again he worships the will of God. Or do you not know that the unjust will not inherit the kingdom of God? Therefore, the one who retaliates is unjust, whether in deed or in word or even in the intention of the will, which the gospel defines after the instruction of the law. And you were some of these, evidently such as those whom you yourselves do not forgive. But you have washed yourselves, not simply as the rest, but with knowledge you have washed away the passions of the soul, to be assimilated as much as possible to the goodness of God's providence through forbearance and through forgetfulness of wrongs, shining the benevolence of the word and of works upon both the just and the unjust, like the sun. Whether the gnostic will achieve this through magnanimity or through imitation of the better; the third cause is "forgive and you will be forgiven," as if the commandment compels toward salvation through an excess of goodness. But you have been sanctified; for the one who attains this state happens to be holy, falling into none of the passions in any way. But as if already incorporeal and above this earth, having become holy. Therefore, it is said, you were justified by the name of the Lord.

You were made, so to speak, by him to be just as he is, and you were mingled with the Holy Spirit as much as possible according to your capacity. For is it not the case that all things are permitted to me, but I will not be empowered, he says, to do or think or say anything contrary to the Gospel? And the foods for the belly and the belly for the foods, which God will abolish—that is, those who reason and live as if they were made for eating, and not rather eating in order to live, according to the consequent, while according to the antecedent they attend to knowledge. And does he not say that these are, as it were, flesh of the holy body? The body is allegorized as the church of the Lord, the spiritual and holy chorus, of whom those who have only invoked the name but do not live according to reason are flesh. But this spiritual body, that is, the holy church, is not to be appropriated in any way or manner whatsoever to fornication or to apostasy from the Gospel toward the pagan life. For he who lives in a pagan manner in the church, whether in deed, or in word, or even in thought itself, commits fornication against the church and his own body. He who clings to this harlot, to the activity contrary to the covenant, becomes another body, not holy, into one flesh and a pagan life and another hope; but he who clings to the Lord is one spirit, a spiritual body, the distinct kind of the assembly. This one is entirely son, holy man, impassible, gnostic, perfect, formed by the teaching of the Lord, so that, having become attentive to the Lord in deed, word, and spirit itself, he may receive that abode which is owed to one who has thus been perfected into manhood.

The example suffices for those who have ears. For one must not divulge the mystery, but indicate only as much as is needed for recollection to those who have shared in knowledge, who will also understand how it was said by the Lord: Become as your Father perfect, perfectly forgiving sins and bearing no malice, and living in the state of impassibility. For just as we call a physician perfect and a philosopher perfect, so also, I think, a perfect gnostic; but none of these, although it is very great, is taken as likeness to God. For we do not, like the Stoics, impiously say that the virtue of man and of God is the same. Must we then become perfect as the Father wills? For it is impossible and impracticable for anyone to become perfect as God is; but the Father wills that we, living in accordance with the obedience of the gospel, become perfect blamelessly. If, then, we supply the missing part of the saying, understanding the deficiency, and take up what is left for those able to comprehend, to complete the passage, we will know the will of God and live piously and magnanimously in accordance with the worth of the commandment.

Since it is consistent to offer a defense against the charges brought against us by Greeks and Jews, and since the heresies concerning the true teaching likewise join in some of the difficulties along with those previously mentioned, it would be well, after first clearing away the obstacles, to proceed readily to the solutions of the difficulties in the next Stromateus. First, then, they bring this very charge against us, saying that one ought not to believe because of the disagreement of the heresies: for with whom is the truth, when different people hold different doctrines? To them we say that among you Jews and among the most esteemed of the Greek philosophers there have been very many heresies, and you surely do not say that one ought to hesitate either to philosophize or to Judaize because of the disagreement among your own heresies. Next, it was prophetically said by the Lord that the heresies would be sown together with the truth, just as tares are sown with the wheat, and it is impossible for what was foretold to come to pass not to happen; and the reason for this is that every good thing is followed by blame. So then, if someone should violate agreements and break the covenant with us, shall we on account of the one who has lied abandon the truth as well? But just as the reasonable person must not lie and must not invalidate any of his promises, even if others violate agreements, so too it is fitting for us in no way to transgress the ecclesiastical rule; and especially do we preserve the covenant concerning the greatest matters, while they transgress it. Therefore, one must trust those who firmly hold to the truth.

Now, as if using this apology at length, it is possible to say to them that even physicians, holding contrary opinions according to their own sects, treat patients equally in practice. So would anyone who is sick in body and in need of treatment refuse a physician because of the sects in medicine? Therefore, neither would one who is sick in soul and full of idols, for the sake of becoming healthy and turning to God, ever use the sects as a pretext. Indeed, it is said that the sects exist for the sake of the "tested." By "tested" he means either those who come to faith, approaching the Lord's teaching more selectively, just as tested money-changers distinguish the genuine coin of the Lord from counterfeit, or those who have already become tested in the faith itself, both in life and in knowledge. For this reason, then, we need greater care and forethought in examining how one ought to live precisely and what true piety really is. For it is clear that since truth is difficult and hard to attain, inquiries have arisen; from these come the self-loving and glory-loving sects, of those who have neither learned nor truly received, but have acquired a conceit of knowledge. Therefore, we must investigate with greater care the truth that truly exists, which alone concerns the God who truly is. Toil is followed by sweet discovery and memory. So we must gird ourselves for the toil of discovery because of the sects, but not abandon it entirely.

For just as when fruit is set out, one genuine and ripe, the other made of wax and as similar as possible, one must not abstain from both on account of the similarity, but must distinguish the true from the apparent by means of both apprehensive theory and the most authoritative reasoning. And just as when there is one royal road, and many others leading some to a precipice, others to a rushing river or a sea of shallow depth, one would not hesitate to travel because of the disagreement, but would use the safe, royal, and frequented road, so, when different people say different things about truth, one must not desist, but must hunt more carefully for the most precise knowledge of it; for even among cultivated vegetables, weeds also spring up. Do farmers therefore abstain from horticultural care? Having many natural starting points for examining what is said and discovering the sequence of truth, we ought to do so. Hence we are rightly judged, when we do not assent to what we ought to obey, when we do not distinguish the contradictory, the unbecoming, the unnatural, and the false from the true, the consistent, the fitting, and the natural, which starting points we must use for the recognition of truth as it really is. This pretext, then, is vain for the Greeks; for those who wish it will be possible to find the truth, while for those who put forward irrational excuses, the judgment is indefensible. For do they deny or admit that demonstration exists? I think all would agree, except those who deny the senses.

Since demonstration exists, it is necessary to descend into the investigations and to learn demonstratively from the Scriptures themselves, how the heresies went astray, and how in the truth alone and the ancient Church are found the most accurate knowledge and the truly best choice. Of those who deviate from the truth, some deceive only themselves, while others attempt to deceive even their neighbors. Now those called doxosophists, who think they have found the truth but possess no true demonstration, deceive themselves, believing they have found rest; their number is not small, as they avoid investigations because of refutations and flee from teachings because of condemnation. But those who deceive those who approach them are exceedingly crafty, and although they themselves realize that they know nothing, they nevertheless obscure the truth with plausible arguments. The nature of plausible arguments, I think, is one thing, and that of true arguments another. And we know that the name of the heresies must be spoken in contradistinction to the truth; from which some, having torn away fragments for the ruin of men, the sophists, having buried them in the human arts they have devised, boast that they preside over a school rather than a Church. But those who are ready to labor for the noblest things will not cease seeking the truth until they obtain demonstration from the Scriptures themselves. Now there are some criteria common to men, such as the senses, but others belong to those who have willed and practiced the true things, those through mind and reason, the technical means of true and false discourses.

The greatest thing is also to set aside conceit, taking one's stand in the midst of exact knowledge and rash opinion, and to know that he who hopes for eternal rest recognizes that its entrance is laborious and straitened. But he who has once been evangelized and says he has seen the saving word, at whatever hour he may come to know, let him not turn back like Lot's wife, nor revert to his former life which clings to the sensible, nor yet run back to the heresies; for they contend in some way, not knowing the God who is. For he who loves father or mother more than me, the true father and teacher of truth, who regenerates and recreates and nurtures the chosen soul, is not worthy of me, says the one who is worthy to be a son of God and a disciple of God, both friend and kinsman. For no one who looks backward and lays his hand to the plow is fit for the kingdom of God. But, as it seems, to the many even now Mary appears to be a woman in childbed because of the birth of the child, though she is not a woman in childbed (for after giving birth, some say, she was found to be a virgin when examined by a midwife). Such are the Lord's Scriptures for us, giving birth to the truth and remaining virgins after the

of concealing the mysteries of truth. “She has borne and has not borne,” says scripture, as if from herself, having conceived not from union. Therefore the scriptures have given birth for the Gnostics, but the heresies, not having learned, are dismissed as not having given birth. Since all men have the same judgment, some, following the word that chooses, make their faiths, while others, having given themselves over to pleasures, force scripture toward their desires. But it is necessary, I think, for the lover of truth to have spiritual vigor; for those who undertake the greatest things must necessarily err most greatly, unless they hold the rule of truth taken from truth itself. Such persons, having fallen away from the right path, naturally err also in most of the particulars, because they do not possess a criterion of truth and falsehood precisely trained to choose what is proper. For if they possessed it, they would obey the divine scriptures. Just as if someone were to become a beast from a man, similarly to those enchanted by Circe, so has the one who has kicked against the ecclesiastical tradition and leaped away into the opinions of human heresies lost being a man of God and faithful to the Lord. But the one who has run back from this deception, having listened to the scriptures and entrusted his own life to the truth, is perfected, as it were, from a man into a god. For we have the beginning of teaching, the Lord, leading through the prophets, through the gospel, and through the blessed apostles, in manifold and various ways from beginning to end of knowledge.

If one were to suppose that the beginning requires something else, it would no longer truly be preserved as a beginning. Therefore, the one who is faithful from himself to the Lord's scripture and voice is reasonably trustworthy, as if acting through the Lord for the benefit of mankind. Naturally, we use it as a criterion for the discovery of things. But everything that is judged is still untrustworthy before it is judged, so that which requires judgment is not a beginning. Reasonably, then, having embraced the indemonstrable beginning by faith, and having taken the demonstrations about the beginning from the beginning itself out of abundance, we are educated by the Lord's voice toward the knowledge of the truth. For we would not simply heed men who make assertions, to whom it is equally possible to make counter-assertions. But if it is not enough merely to state one's opinion, but one must confirm what is said, we do not await testimony from men, but we confirm what is sought by the Lord's voice, which is more trustworthy than all demonstrations—indeed, which is the only demonstration that exists. According to this knowledge, those who have only tasted the scriptures are faithful, while those who have advanced further are accurate standards of the truth, the Gnostics, since even in the affairs of life craftsmen have something more than laymen and, beyond common notions, they shape what is better. Thus we also, demonstrating completely from the scriptures themselves about the scriptures, are persuaded demonstratively from faith.

And even if those who pursue heresies dare to use the prophetic scriptures, first they do not use all of them, and then they do not use them completely, nor as the body and texture of prophecy dictates, but they select ambiguously spoken passages and transfer them to their own opinions, culling a few scattered phrases, not considering the meaning from them, but employing the bare wording itself. For in almost all the passages they cite, you would find that they attend only to the words, altering the meanings, neither knowing how they are spoken nor using the selections they bring as they are naturally constituted. Truth is not found in transposing meanings (for in that way they would overturn all true teaching), but in examining what is perfectly fitting and proper to the Lord and the all-powerful God, and in confirming each of the demonstrated points according to the scriptures from the same scriptures themselves. Therefore, neither to turn back to

They wish for the truth, but are ashamed to lay aside the advantage of self-love, and they have no way to arrange their own opinions, forcing the scriptures. Having already brought forth false doctrines among men, they openly conflict with nearly all the scriptures and are always refuted by us who oppose them; for the rest, even now they persist in not accepting some of the prophetic writings, while they slander us as being of a different nature and incapable of understanding what belongs to them; sometimes, when refuted, they even deny their own doctrines, being ashamed to openly admit what they privately teach in this way. For thus it is possible to see in all the heresies, by examining the perversity of their doctrines. For when they are overthrown by us, who show them clearly to be opposed to the scriptures, one of two things is seen to happen at the hands of the leaders of the doctrine: either they disregard the consistency of their own doctrines or of prophecy itself. Rather, they despise their own hope, and each time they choose what seems to them more evident than what has been said by the Lord through the prophets and by the gospel, and moreover what is attested and confirmed by the apostles. Therefore, seeing the danger to themselves not concerning a single doctrine but concerning the preservation of the heresies, and not seeking the truth (for having encountered what is common and readily available among us, they despised it as cheap), and having striven to surpass the common faith, they have departed from the truth.

For they have not learned the mysteries of ecclesiastical knowledge, nor have they grasped the grandeur of the truth, having been too indolent to descend to the depth of matters, and having read the scriptures superficially, they have misinterpreted them. Therefore, puffed up with conceit of wisdom, they continue to wrangle, having become manifest that they care more for seeming than for philosophizing. At once, laying down unnecessary principles of things and being moved by human opinions, then necessarily procuring for themselves a conclusion that follows from them, they quarrel because of the refutations with those who handle true philosophy, and they endure everything rather, and they move, as they say, every stone, even if they are about to be impious because of their disbelief in the scriptures, rather than change, on account of the ambition of their heresy and their much-talked-about preeminence in their churches, for which they also welcome that sympotic preeminence through the falsely named love. But our knowledge of the truth procures faith for those not yet faithful from those already faithful, which faith becomes, so to speak, the substance of proof. But, as it seems, every heresy has no ear that hears what is beneficial, but only ears opened to pleasure, since someone among them would be healed if he only wished to be persuaded by the truth. The treatment of conceit is threefold, as indeed of every passion: learning the cause and how this might be removed, and thirdly the training of the soul and habituation to be able to follow what has been rightly judged.

For just as an eye that is disturbed, so also the soul, clouded by doctrines contrary to nature, is not able to discern the light of truth accurately, but even overlooks what lies at its feet. And they say that in turbid water eels are caught, being blinded. And just as wicked children shut out the pedagogue, so these shut out the prophecies from their own church, suspecting them of reproof and admonition. Indeed, they stitch together many falsehoods and fabrications, so that they may seem reasonably not to accept the scriptures. Therefore they are not pious, being displeased with the divine commandments, that is, with the Holy Spirit. And just as almonds are called empty not in which there is nothing, but in which what is within is useless, so we say that the heretics are empty of the counsels of God and the traditions of Christ, truly bitter according to the wild almond tree, originating doctrines, except those which, through the clarity of the truths, they were unable to set aside and conceal. Just as in war one must not abandon the rank which the general has assigned to the soldier, so also one must not abandon the rank which the Word, whom we have received as ruler of knowledge and life, has given. But the many have not even examined this, whether one must follow someone, and whom, and how. For as the Word is, so also must the life of the faithful be, so as to be able to follow God, who from the beginning brings all things to a straight conclusion. But when someone transgresses the Word and through this God, if he has weakened because some sudden impression has befallen him, one must make ready the rational impressions.

If, having been defeated by the custom that has taken hold, he has become (as Scripture says) vulgar, the custom must be completely abandoned and the soul must be trained to contradict it. And if some seem to drag in conflicting doctrines, these must be removed, and one must go to the peacemakers of the doctrines, who charm the timid among the inexperienced with the divine Scriptures, clarifying the truth through the sequence of the covenants. But, as it seems, we incline more toward the reputable, even if they happen to be contrary, than toward the truth; for it is austere and solemn. And indeed, there being three dispositions of the soul—ignorance, opinion, and knowledge—the nations are in ignorance, the true church is in knowledge, and those in the heresies are in opinion. Nothing, at any rate, is clearer to see than that those who know are confident about what they know, and those who opine are confident about what they opine, at least as far as confidence without demonstration goes. They despise and laugh at one another, and it happens that the same mind is considered most honorable by some, but convicted of madness by others. And yet we have learned that pleasure is one thing, which must be assigned to the nations; strife another, which must be attributed to the heresies; joy another, which must be appropriated to the church; and delight another, which must be given to the gnostic who is according to truth.

Just as, if one attends to Ischomachus, he will make him a farmer, and to Lampis a shipowner, and to Charidemus a general, and to Simon a horseman, and to Perdix a huckster, and to Crobyle a cook, and to Archelaus a dancer, and to Homer a poet, and to Pyrrho a disputant, and to Demosthenes an orator, and to Chrysippus a dialectician, and to Aristotle a natural philosopher, and to Plato a philosopher, so the one who obeys the Lord and follows the prophecy given through him will be perfectly formed according to the image of the teacher, a god walking about in flesh. Therefore those who do not follow God wherever he leads fall away from this height; and he leads according to the God-inspired scriptures. Now, although there are countless things in number that men do, there are nearly two sources of every sin, ignorance and weakness (both within our power, since some are unwilling to learn and others are unwilling to control desire); of these, through one they do not judge rightly, through the other they are not strong enough to follow what has been rightly judged. For neither could one who has been deceived in his judgment do well, even if he were very capable of doing what he knows; nor, if he is strong in judging what is necessary, could he present himself as blameless in his works if he is weak in action. Consequently, two kinds of education are handed down, each appropriate to one of the sins: for the former, knowledge and the clear demonstration of testimony from the scriptures; for the latter, rational training, educated by faith and fear; and both contribute to the growth of perfect love. For I think the end of the gnostic here is twofold: in some cases, scientific contemplation; in others, action.

May it be, then, that even these heretics, having learned from these notes, be brought to their senses and turn to the all-ruling God. But if, like the deaf to serpents, they do not hear the song that is spoken in a new way yet is most ancient, let them at least be disciplined by God, enduring the paternal admonitions before the judgment, until, put to shame, they repent, and do not, through harsh disobedience, bring themselves to the final judgment. For there are also certain partial disciplines, which they call punishments, into which many of our people from the Lord's flock, having fallen into transgression, slip and fall. But just as children are disciplined by a teacher or a father, so we are disciplined by providence. God does not take vengeance (for vengeance is the repayment of evil), but he does chastise for the benefit, both common and individual, of those chastised. These things I have set forth, wishing to turn those who love learning away from easy falling into heresies. And, striving to put a stop to the prevailing ignorance, or stupidity, or ill-condition, or whatever one must call it, and to persuade and lead to the truth those who are not altogether incurable, I have made use of these words. For there are those who cannot even bear to hear at the outset the arguments that urge them toward the truth; and they actually attempt to talk nonsense, pouring out blasphemous words against the truth, granting to themselves that they have known the greatest of realities, without learning, without inquiring, without laboring, without finding the sequence.

Whom would one pity or hate for such perversion? But if someone is curable, able to bear, like fire or iron, the frankness of truth that cuts and burns their false opinions, let him submit the ears of his soul. This will happen if, eager not to be idle, they do not thrust away the truth, or, grasping for glory, they do not force innovation. For those are idle who, instead of procuring proofs proper to the divine scriptures from the scriptures themselves, choose whatever is convenient and agreeable to their pleasures; and those desire glory who, by other manipulations, cunningly pretend that the teachings handed down by the blessed apostles and teachers, which are congenial to the divinely inspired words, are their own, opposing human teachings to divine tradition in order to establish their heresy. For what word truly remained among such men, I mean according to ecclesiastical knowledge, for Marcion, for instance, or Prodicus and those like them who did not walk the straight path? They would not have surpassed in wisdom the men before them, so as to discover something in addition to what was truly said by them, but it would have been enough for them if they had been able to learn what was previously handed down. Therefore, for us, the gnostic alone, growing old in the scriptures themselves, preserving the apostolic and ecclesiastical orthotomy of doctrines, lives most rightly according to the gospel, finding the proofs he may seek, referred by the Lord from both law and prophets. For the life of the gnostic, I think, is nothing other than works and words following the tradition of the Lord. But knowledge is not for all.

I do not want you to be ignorant, brothers, says the apostle, that all were under the cloud and partook of spiritual food and drink, clearly establishing that not all who hear the word have received the magnitude of knowledge in deed and word. Therefore he added: but he was not well pleased with all of them. Who is this? The one who said: why do you call me Lord and not do the will of my Father? That is, the teaching of the Saviour, which is our spiritual food and drink that knows no thirst, the water of gnostic life. Yes, they say, knowledge is said to puff up. To them we say: perhaps the apparent knowledge is said to puff up, if one supposes that the expression is to be interpreted as being inflated; but if, which is more likely, the apostle’s utterance indicates thinking greatly and truly, then the difficulty is resolved. Following the scriptures, then, let us confirm what has been said. Wisdom, says Solomon, puffed up her own children. For surely the Lord did not instill pride in his

to youths in accordance with teaching, but to be confident in the truth, and to be magnanimous in knowledge transmitted through the scriptures, and to be contemptuous of things that drag into sin, which the expression "inspired" signifies, the magnificence of wisdom having implanted in the children of learning through what it teaches. Immediately the apostle says: And I will know not the word of the puffed up, but the power, if you understand the scriptures magnanimously (which is truly; and nothing is greater than truth). For here is the power of the puffed-up children of wisdom. For instance, I will know, he says, if you rightly think highly of knowledge. For God is known according to David in Judea, that is, to Israelites according to knowledge. For Judea is interpreted as confession. Reasonably, then, it is said by the apostle: You shall not commit adultery, you shall not steal, you shall not covet, and if there is any other commandment, it is summed up in this word: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. For it is never necessary, as those who pursue heresies do, to adulterate the truth nor to steal the rule of the church, gratifying one's own desires and love of fame by deceiving one's neighbors, whom it is fitting to teach to cling to the truth itself more than anything. For it is said outright: Proclaim among the nations his practices, so that those who have heard beforehand may not be judged but may turn back. And those who deal deceitfully with their tongues have their penalties recorded.

Those who lay hold of the words of the impious, and, besides leading others astray, do not even use the divine words rightly, but misuse them in a mistaken manner, neither enter themselves into the kingdom of heaven, nor allow those whom they have deceived to attain the truth. But, not possessing the key of entrance themselves, they have a certain false key, as the common saying goes, a counterfeit key, through which they do not open the gate, as we enter through the tradition of the Lord, but, cutting open a side door and secretly digging through the wall of the church, and overstepping the truth, they become mystagogues of the soul of the impious. For that they have made their human assemblies later than the catholic church, there is no need of many words. For the teaching of the Lord, beginning from the time of his advent, from Augustus and Tiberius Caesar, and reaching its completion in the middle of the times of Augustus, and that of his apostles, reaching at least to the ministry of Paul under Nero, is completed; while lower down, about the times of the emperor Hadrian, those who devised the heresies arose, and they extended at least to the age of Antoninus the Elder, as, for example, Basilides, even if he claims Glaucia as his teacher, the interpreter of Peter, as they themselves boast. Likewise, they also bring forward that Valentinus heard Theodas, and this man was a disciple of Paul. For Marcion, being of the same age as them, as an old man associated with younger men. After him, Simon, for a short time, listened to Peter preaching.

Such being the case, it is evident from the most ancient and truest church that these later heresies, and those even more recent in time, have been innovated and debased. From what has been said, I think it is clear that there is one true church, the truly ancient one, into which those who are righteous according to intention are enrolled. For since God is one and the Lord is one, for this reason the highest honor is praised in its uniqueness, being an imitation of the one principle. Indeed, by the nature of the one, the one church is conjoined, which heresies attempt to cut into many. Therefore, in terms of substance, conception, origin, and preeminence, we say that the ancient and catholic church alone exists, gathering into the unity of one faith—according to the appropriate covenants, or rather according to the one covenant at different times, by the will of the one God through the one Lord—those already assigned, whom God foreknew would be righteous before the foundation of the world. Moreover, the preeminence of the church, like the beginning of its constitution, is according to the monad, surpassing all other things and having nothing similar or equal to itself. But these matters are for later. Of the heresies, some are named after a person, such as that of Valentinus, Marcion, and Basilides, even if they boast of introducing the opinion of Matthias; for the teaching of all the apostles was one, and likewise the tradition.

Some are named from place, as the Peratics; some from a nation, as the Phrygian heresy; some from an activity, as that of the Encratites; some from distinctive doctrines, as that of the Docetae and that of the Haematites; some from hypotheses and from what they have honored, as the Cainists and those called Ophians; some from what they have unlawfully practiced and dared, as the Entychites, who are called from the Simonians. Having therefore pointed out a small opening to those who love to contemplate the truth, from the law concerning sacrifices, and concerning the Jews of the common sort, and concerning the heresies mystically distinguished as impure, from the divine church concerning clean and unclean animals, let us conclude the discourse. For the scripture declares as clean and acceptable to God those sacrificial animals which are cloven-hoofed and chew the cud, as if those who make their journey through faith of the righteous to the Father and to the Son (for this is the steadfastness of the cloven-hoofed) and who meditate on the oracles of God by night and by day and ruminate them in the receptacle of the soul for learning, which law allegorizes as the rumination of a clean animal, being also a gnostic exercise. But those which have neither of these, nor either one, it sets apart as unclean. For instance, those which chew the cud but are not cloven-hoofed signify the many Jews, who have the oracles of God on their lips, but do not have the faith and the foundation that transmits through the Son to the Father, resting on the truth. Hence the race of such animals is slippery, as not being cloven-footed nor resting on the double faith.

No one, he says, knows the Father except the Son and the one to whom the Son reveals him. And conversely, those are likewise impure which are cloven-hoofed but do not chew the cud. For these indicate the heretics who, while in name relying on the Father and the Son, are unable to refine and smooth out the precise clarity of the divine oracles, and who also pursue the works of justice in a more general, not a more exact, manner—if indeed they pursue them at all. To such persons the Lord says: Why do you call me Lord, Lord, and not do what I say? Wholly impure are those who are neither cloven-hoofed nor chew the cud. But you, O Megarians, says Theognis, are neither third nor fourth nor twelfth, neither in word nor in number; but rather like the dust which the wind casts from the face of the earth, and like a drop from a jar. These matters having been previously accomplished by us, and the ethical topic having been sketched out in summary, we have sown, as we promised, sporadically and in scattered fashion the live sparks of the doctrines of true knowledge, so that the discovery of the holy traditions may not be easy for the chance uninitiated person. Let us now proceed to our promise. The Stromateis seem somehow not like those carefully cultivated gardens planted in rows for the pleasure of the eye, but rather like a shady and thickly wooded mountain planted with cypresses and plane trees, with laurel and ivy, and also with apple trees, olive trees, and fig trees, the planting of fruit-bearing trees being deliberately intermingled.

... both of unfruitful trees, because of those who dare to take away and steal the fruits, the scripture wishing to be hidden. From these, the farmer, by grafting and transplanting, will adorn a beautiful orchard and a pleasant grove. The Stromata, then, are concerned neither with order nor with phrasing, since they deliberately intend the diction not to be Greek and have made the sowing of doctrines hidden and not according to truth, preparing the readers, if any happen to be industrious and inventive, to be such. For the baits are many and varied because of the differences among fish. And after this seventh Stromateus of ours, we will begin the discourse from another starting point. CLEMENT'S STROMATA, BOOK EIGHT ** But not even the most ancient of the philosophers were given to disputing and raising difficulties. How much more so we who hold to the truly true philosophy, to whom scripture directly entrusts searching for the sake of discovery: the younger philosophers among the Greeks, driven by empty and imperfect ambition, are led into useless nonsense in a manner both refutative and eristic; conversely, barbarian philosophy, casting out all strife, said: seek and you will find, knock and it will be opened, ask and it will be given to you. Now, the word of question and answer knocks, in accordance with inquiry, at the door of truth as it appears; when the obstacle is opened up through investigation, scientific contemplation arises.

Thus, I think, for those who knock in this way, what is sought is opened, and for those who ask in this way, the inquiries according to the scriptures proceed from God, and the gift of God-given knowledge is given comprehensively through truly logical inquiry that shines forth. For it is not possible to find without seeking, nor to seek without investigating, nor to investigate without unfolding and opening up through questioning, leading what is sought to clarity, nor, after passing through every examination, not to receive the reward, the knowledge of what is sought. But it is possible for the one who has sought to find, and to seek, if he first supposed that he did not know. Led by desire from this toward the discovery of the good, he seeks with good will, without contentiousness. Questioning and answering without love of victory or love of glory, and also examining the things said themselves. For it is fitting for those who hold fast not only to the divine scriptures but also to common concepts to conduct their inquiries toward some beneficial end, with the discovery concluding. For another place and crowd receive the turbulent people and the market-place sophistries, but the lover and knower of truth ought to be peaceful even in inquiries, approaching knowledge comprehensively through scientific demonstration, without self-love and with love of truth.

What other method, then, could be better or clearer for the beginning of such teaching than to go through the proposed name in speech so clearly that all who are of one voice can follow? Is the name of demonstration, then, something like "blituri," a mere sound signifying nothing? And how is it that neither the philosopher nor the rhetorician, nor even the judge, utters "demonstration" as a meaningless name, nor does any of the litigants fail to know what it signifies, that it does not exist? Indeed, philosophers provide demonstration as something substantial, each in his own way. Therefore, concerning everything that is sought, if one were to judge correctly, he would not refer the argument to any other agreed-upon beginning than what is agreed to be signified by the appellation to all who are of the same nation and of the same voice. Then, starting from this, it is necessary to seek whether this signification, about which the argument is, exists or not. Next, if it is shown to exist, one must seek precisely its nature, what sort it is, and whether it ever exceeds the given order. But if it is not sufficient simply to state one's opinion about what is sought (for it is possible for the opponent equally to declare what he wishes in reply), but one must confirm what is said: if his judgment is referred to something equally disputed, and that again similarly to another disputed point, it will proceed to infinity and be unproven; but if the proof of what is not agreed upon is referred to what is agreed upon by all, that must be made the beginning of teaching.

Every proposed name, then, must be transformed into a speech that is both agreed upon and clear to those who share in the inquiry, which will be the beginning of teaching and will explain the discovery of the things sought. Suppose, then, the name "sun" is proposed. The Stoics say that this is a kindling of intelligence from the waters of the sea. Is not this speech more unclear than the name itself, requiring another demonstration to see if it is true? It is better, then, to say in common and clear speech that the sun is named the brightest of the things that go in the sky; for this speech is, I think, more trustworthy, clearer, and equally agreed upon by all. In the same way, all people would agree that demonstration is a speech that produces belief in disputed matters from things that are agreed upon. Not only demonstration, belief, and knowledge, but also foreknowledge is spoken of in two ways: one scientific and firm, the other merely hopeful. Most properly, then, demonstration is called that which implants scientific belief in the souls of learners, while the other is doxastic, just as a man is either truly a man who possesses common sense, or wild and beastly. Thus the comic poet said: "How charming a man is, as long as he is a man." And the same reasoning applies to ox, horse, and dog, according to the virtue or vice of the animal. For looking to the perfection of the genus, we come to the most proper meanings. For instance, we understand a physician as one lacking nothing of medical power, and a gnostic as one lacking nothing of scientific knowledge.

And indication differs from syllogism in that what is indicated is a single thing revealing a single thing, and is itself that single thing, as we say that being pregnant is an indication of no longer being a virgin; whereas what is grasped by syllogism is a single thing that follows from several, as, for example, if it so happened that Python was betraying the Byzantines, not one but several indicators are taken. And to conclude from agreed-upon premises is to syllogize, but to conclude something from true premises is to demonstrate, so that the benefit of demonstration is composite, both from taking the premises as true in relation to what is sought and from the conclusion following from them. But if either the first does not hold or the second does not follow from it, then one has not demonstrated, but has syllogized. For to bring a conclusion appropriate to the premises is merely to syllogize, but for each of the premises also to be true is not merely to syllogize but also to have demonstrated. To conclude, as is clear from the name itself, is to lead to an end. And the end in each argument is presumably what is sought, which is also called the conclusion. No simple and primary statement is called a syllogism, even if it is true, but it is at least a composite of three such statements: two as premises and one as conclusion. Either everything requires demonstration, or some things are credible from themselves. But if the former, then by demanding a demonstration for each demonstration we will proceed to infinity, and thus demonstration will be overturned.

If the second, then these very things that are credible from themselves will become the principles of demonstrations. For instance, philosophers declare the principles of all things to be indemonstrable. So that if demonstration exists, it is absolutely necessary that there first be something credible from itself, which is indeed called first and indemonstrable. Therefore, all demonstration is reduced to indemonstrable faith. And there would be other principles of demonstrations after the source from faith, namely, things that appear clearly to sense and to intellect. For things that occur to sense are simple and indissoluble, while things to intellect are simple, rational, and primary, and things generated from them are composite, yet no less clear, credible, and more rational than the primary ones. Of the consequent and the contradictory, then, there is a faculty of reason which we all possess by nature as its own. If, therefore, any such reason is found as is able to procure faith from things already credible for things not yet credible, we will declare this very thing to be the substance of demonstration. And it has been said that both the genus of faith and that of demonstration are twofold, one producing only persuasion in the souls of hearers, the other producing knowledge. If, then, one were to begin from things clear to sense and intellect, and then bring forward the appropriate conclusion, he truly demonstrates; but if from plausible things only, yet not from primary ones, that is, from things clear neither to sense nor to intellect, if he brings forward an appropriate conclusion, he will syllogize, but he will not make a scientific demonstration; if he brings forward an inappropriate one, he will not even syllogize at all. Demonstration differs from analysis.

Each of the things demonstrated is demonstrated through certain demonstrated things, those having been previously demonstrated by others, until we run back either to things credible from themselves or to things evident to sense and thought, which is called analysis. Demonstration occurs when someone proceeds from the first principles to the thing sought through all the intermediate steps. Therefore, the demonstrative man must take great care for the truth of the premises, but be unconcerned about names, whether one wishes to call them axioms or propositions or premises. Likewise, he must take great care as to what conclusion follows from what premises, but be least concerned whether one wishes to call the argument a concluding argument, a conclusive argument, or a syllogistic one. For I say that the demonstrative man must observe these two things in all cases: to take the premises as true, and to draw the conclusion that follows from them, which some also call the inference, that which is inferred from the premises. Concerning every subject of inquiry, for each problem, the premises must be different but appropriate to what is proposed, and it is necessary to convert the thing proposed itself into a proposition, and the proposition must be agreed upon by all. If premises not appropriate to the problem are taken, it is not possible to discover anything well concerning it, the whole problem being unknown, which is also called the inquiry into the nature.

In all matters under investigation, then, there is something pre-known (which, being entirely credible from itself, is believed without demonstration), which must be made the starting point of the inquiry and the criterion of what appears to have been discovered. For every inquiry is discovered from pre-existing knowledge; and it is possible that the knowledge which pre-exists the whole object of inquiry is sometimes of the substance alone, while its activities are unknown, as in the case of stones, plants, animals, whose operations we do not know, or of affections or powers, or, to speak simply, of one of the attributes belonging to beings; at other times, something of these powers or affections, or some of them, may be known, as the desires and affections of the soul, while the substance is unknown and sought; and in many cases, with our own thought positing all these things for itself, the inquiry is as to to which of the substances it might belong in this way; for, having taken the conceptions of both substance and activity in the mind, we thus proceed to the inquiry. There are also things whose activities we know while at the same time we are ignorant of their substances, and we do not know their affections. The method of discovery, then, is this: one must begin from the very recognition of the problems. Often, indeed, the form of expression deceives and confuses and disturbs the mind, so that it is not easy to discover from which difference it arises, for example, whether that which is conceived is not an animal; for, having some notion both of an animal and of that which is conceived, we inquire whether being an animal belongs to that which is conceived, and this is whether the ability to move and also to perceive belongs to the conceived substance.

Thus the inquiry concerning growths and affections is based on a pre-known substance. Immediately, then, one must ask the proposer what he calls an animal; for this is especially necessary when we see the term used in different ways. And one must investigate whether the meaning derived from the name is disputed or agreed upon by all. For if he says he calls an animal whatever grows and is nourished, we will again ask whether he also considers plants animals, and then, if he affirms this, we must already demonstrate something that is conceived, grows, and is nourished. For Plato calls even plants animals, partaking only of the third form of the soul, the appetitive; Aristotle, however, thinks plants partake of the vegetative and nutritive soul, but does not deem them worthy of being called animals, for he considers only that which partakes of the other soul, the sensitive, worthy of being called an animal. The Stoics, indeed, do not even call the vegetative power soul. If the proposer denies that plants are animals, we will show that he contradicts himself. For having defined an animal as that which is nourished and grows, but also declaring that a plant is not an animal, he seems to say nothing other than that what is nourished and grows both is and is not an animal. Therefore, let him state what he wishes to learn: whether the embryo grows and is nourished, or whether it partakes of some sensation or even of motion according to impulse. For according to Plato, the plant is ensouled and an animal; according to Aristotle, it is not yet an animal—for it lacks the sensitive—but it is already ensouled; for him, at least, an animal is a sensitive ensouled substance.

According to the Stoics, a plant is neither animate nor an animal; for an animal is an animate substance. If, then, an animal is animate, and the soul is a sentient nature, it is clear that the animate is already sentient. If, therefore, the inquirer, when asked in turn whether the fetus is an animal, should say that he calls an animal that which is nourished and grows, he has his answer; but if he should claim that this is what he is asking—whether the embryo is already sentient or is capable of moving itself by some impulse—then the investigation of the matter becomes clear, the deception concerning the name no longer persisting. But if he does not answer the counter-question and is unwilling to say what he understands or with reference to what thing he applies the name "animal" in making his proposition, and instead bids us to decide for ourselves, he would be recognized as contentious. And if, of two modes—one by question and answer, the other by continuous exposition—one is rejected, let him listen to all that we expound on the problem; then, when we have finished, it will be possible for him to discuss each point in detail. But if he attempts to interrupt the examination by asking questions, it is clear that he does not even wish to listen. But if he should choose to answer, first of all he must be asked to what thing he applies the name "animal"; and when he has answered this, he must be asked again what he means by "the embryo" or "the fetus"—whether he intends by "the fetus" to signify things not yet formed, both animals and the seed itself that has been deposited, or only those that are articulated and already formed, called embryos.

And having answered this as well, it is now necessary to proceed to the conclusion of the matter at hand and to teach further. But if he wishes to say that we ourselves have not answered, let him hear: since you are unwilling to state according to which signification you mean what you proposed (for in that case I would not be making an argument about significations, but would already be considering the things themselves), know that you have done something like what would happen if you had proposed whether a dog is an animal. For I would reasonably say: which dog? For I go through the land dog, the sea dog, the celestial dog-star, and also Diogenes and the other dogs in turn. For I could not divine whether you are asking about all or some one. Therefore, what you will do later, learn now about which you are inquiring, and state clearly. But if you are quibbling about names, this very word "kuoumenon" is clearly to everyone neither an animal nor a plant. But it is a name and a sound and a body and a being and a something and everything rather than an animal. And if you proposed this, you have the answer. Nor indeed is the signification from the word "kuoumenon" an animal, but that is incorporeal and is a sayable and a thing and a thought and everything rather than an animal. And the nature of an animal would be something else; for the nature of the thing itself under investigation, I mean of the embryo, was clearly shown, whatever it is. The problem concerning the significations of the word "zōon" is a different one. I say, therefore, if by "zōon" you mean that which is capable of perception and of motion according to impulse, an animal is not simply that which moves according to impulse and perceives.

For it is possible for it to be asleep or, when the objects of perception are not present, not to perceive; but that which is capable of either impulse or perception is by nature the mark of a living being. For something of this sort is signified by these things: first, whether the embryo is already able to perceive or to be moved by impulse, which is the matter set before us to examine; second, whether the embryo will ever be able to perceive or to be moved by impulse, according to which signification no one inquires, since it is evident. The question was whether the embryo is already a living being or still a plant, and then the name of living being was taken up into the argument for the sake of clarity. Having found that it differs from what is not a living being by perception and motion according to impulse, we again distinguished this, saying that of the things adjacent to it, one is that which is potentially such, which is not yet perceiving and moving but will be so at some time, and another is that which exists in actuality already as such; and of this, one is already actualizing, and the other is capable of actualizing but is at rest or asleep. This is the matter under inquiry. For the embryo is not to be called a living being from being nourished, which is a departure from the substance of what is sought, while attending to other accidental properties. Common to all things said to be discovered is demonstration, which is a discourse confirming one thing from others. And the things from which what is sought must be confirmed must be agreed upon and known to the learner. And the beginning of all these is that which is evident to perception and intellection.

The first demonstration, then, is composed from all these things, while the one that, from what has already been shown through this, again concludes something else, is no less trustworthy than the former, but cannot be called first, because it is not concluded from first propositions. Now the first form of the difference among the things sought, which are three, was shown—I mean that (when the essence is known) some of its works or affections are unknown; the second difference of problems was that in which we all know the works and affections, but are ignorant of the essence, for example, in which part of the body the ruling principle of the soul resides. The same method of demonstration applies also to the third problem. Some, then, say that it is not possible for there to be more than one principle in a single living being. Now it is not possible for there to be more than one principle of the same kind in a single living being, but for principles differing in kind, there is nothing absurd. Against the Pyrrhonists. If suspension of judgment says that nothing is certain, it is clear that, beginning from itself, it will first invalidate itself. Either, then, it grants that something is true and that one ought not to suspend judgment about everything, or it insists that nothing is true, and it is clear that it itself will not be true in the first place. For either it is true or it is not true. But if it is true, it grants that something is true; if it is not true, it leaves as true the very things it wished to abolish. For in that in which the abolishing suspension is shown to be false, in that the things abolished are shown to be true, like the dream that says all dreams are false. For being self-refuting, it becomes confirmatory of the others.

And in general, if it is true, it will make its beginning from itself, being the suspension of no other thing, but first of itself. Then, if someone apprehends that he is a human being or that he suspends judgment, he is clearly not suspending judgment. How could he even have arrived at the beginning of the dispute about all things while suspending judgment? How could he even answer what was asked? For concerning this very thing, he is clearly not suspending judgment; indeed, he even declares that he suspends judgment, on account of which, if we must obey them and suspend judgment about all things, we will first suspend judgment about suspension itself, whether it is to be trusted or not. Further, if this very thing is the truth—that the truth is not known—then no truth is given by him from the start. But if he will say that this too—ignorance of the truth—is disputable, in this very point he grants that the truth is knowable, in that he appears not to confirm the suspension concerning it. A heresy is an inclination toward doctrines, or, as some say, an inclination toward many doctrines that contain a sequence with each other and with phenomena, contributing to living well. And a doctrine is a rational apprehension, and apprehension is a state and assent of the mind. Not only the skeptics, but also every dogmatist is accustomed to suspend judgment in some matters, whether due to weakness of judgment, or obscurity of matters, or the equal strength of arguments. The approaches and beginnings of investigations are about these things and in these things. One must therefore set forth, before the definitions and demonstrations and divisions, in how many ways the subject of inquiry is spoken of, and one must handle homonyms and arrange synonyms clearly according to their meanings.

Next, one must investigate whether the subject under consideration is among things observed in relation to others or is taken in itself; and, in addition, whether it exists, what it is, and what has befallen it; or, likewise, whether it exists, what it is, and why it exists. For the contemplation of these matters, the knowledge of particulars and that of universals together supply both the prior principles and the divisions of these into their differences. Induction, then, brings forth the universal and the definition, while divisions produce the species, the essence, and the individual; the inquiry into the various senses provides the grasp of the proper; and the aporiai yield the differences in these, the demonstrations, and otherwise augment the contemplation along with its consequences. From all these, both science and truth are established. Again, what is summarized from division becomes a definition; for the determination is taken both before and after the division—before, when it is conceded or proposed, and after, when it is demonstrated. And according to sensation, the universal is summarized from the particular; for the beginning of induction is sensation, and its end is the universal. Induction, then, does not show what something is, but that it is or is not; division, however, sets forth what it is; and determination, like division, teaches the substance and the what-it-is, but not whether it exists; while demonstration clarifies all three—whether it exists, what it is, and why it exists. There are also some definitions that encompass the cause. Since to know is to see the cause, and there are four causes—matter, the mover, the form, and the end—the determination will be fourfold.

First, then, one must take the genus, that which is nearest among the higher terms, and after this the proximate differentia. The continuity of the differentiae, when divided and separated, completes the essence. It is not necessary to state all the differentiae of each thing, but only those that are species-forming. Geometrical analysis and synthesis resemble dialectical division and definition; and from division we ascend to the simpler and more principal terms. For we divide the genus of the thing under investigation into the species that are contained in it, for example, in the case of man, the genus "animal" being divided into the species that appear in it, the mortal and the immortal, and thus, always cutting the things that seem to be composite genera into the simpler species, we arrive at that which is not further sought and admits of no further division. For having divided "animal" into the mortal and the immortal, then we divide the mortal into the terrestrial and the aquatic, and again the terrestrial into the winged and the footed, and thus, dividing the species that is proximate to the thing sought, which also encompasses the thing sought, we will arrive, by cutting, at the simplest species, which includes nothing else but only the thing sought. For again we divide the footed into the rational and the irrational. Then, selecting the proximate species taken from the division and combining them into one account, we give the definition of man, which is: a mortal, terrestrial, footed, rational animal.

Hence, division holds the place of matter for the definition, seeking the simplicity of the name, while the definition, as craftsman and maker, combines and constructs and presents the knowledge of the being. Definitions are not of the things themselves nor of the ideas, but rather we say that the interpretive accounts of those thoughts of which we have universal conceptions are definitions; for divisions occur of these thoughts. Of divisions, one divides the divided into species as genus, another into parts as whole, and another into accidents. Now, the division of the whole into parts is for the most part conceived according to magnitude, while the division into accidents can never be completely taken up, since substance must belong to each of the beings in every way. Hence both these divisions are invalid; only the cutting of the genus into species is approved, by which both the identity according to genus and the difference according to specific differentiae are characterized. The species is always observed in some part, but not conversely: if something is a part of something, it will not also become a species. For the hand is a part of man, but it is not a species. And the genus inheres in the species—for animal inheres both in man and in ox—but the whole does not inhere in the parts, for man does not inhere in the feet. Therefore the species is more authoritative than the part, and whatever is predicated of the genus will all be predicated also of the species. It is best, then, to divide the genus into two species, or if not, into three.

The forms, then, are characterized more generally when divided by the same and the other, and then when divided by what is signified generically. For each of the forms is either substance (as when we say: of beings, some are bodies, some are incorporeal) or quantity or quality or relation or place or time or position or state or action or affection. Whoever is knowledgeable about anything whatsoever will also give its definition, since one who cannot encompass and define anything in speech could never be knowledgeable about it. From ignorance of the definition arise many disputes and deceptions. For if one who knows the thing has in his mind the knowledge of it, and can also clarify in speech what he thinks, and the interpretation of thought is a definition, then it is necessary that one who knows the thing can also give its definition. Difference is also taken up in definitions, holding the place of a sign for the definition. For instance, when 'laughing' is added to the definition of man, it makes the whole: rational, mortal, land-dwelling, walking, laughing animal. For the things added by difference to the definition are signs of the things in question, but do not indicate the nature of the things themselves. Indeed, they say that difference is the rendering of a property. And insofar as that which has the difference differs from all others, it belongs only to it and is predicated reciprocally of

of the thing in definitions, it is necessary to take the first genus as foundational and substantial. In longer definitions, the multitude of species discovered through the ten categories is taken; in the shortest, the leading of the proximate species, taken to signify the substance and nature of the thing. The shortest definition consists of three parts: the genus and two of the most necessary species. This is done for brevity. We say, then, that man is a rational, risible animal. The distinctive accident of the definiendum must be taken along, either its own virtue or its own work, and such other things. The definition, being explanatory of the substance of the thing, is unable to encompass the nature of the thing precisely, but through the most principal species it makes a manifestation of the substance, and the definition has its substance almost in quality. The causes productive of suspension of judgment are two highest: one is the manifold and unstable character of human opinion, which is naturally generative of disagreement, either of one with another or of oneself with oneself; the second is the disagreement among beings, which has reasonably become productive of suspension of judgment. For being unable to trust all impressions because of the conflict, nor to distrust all because the statement that all are untrustworthy, being itself one of all, is included with all, nor to trust some and distrust others because of the equality, we have been led to suspension of judgment.

Of these most fundamental things themselves, the instability of thought is generative of disagreement, and disagreement is the immediate cause of suspension of judgment. Hence life is full of courts, councils, assemblies, and generally of choice and avoidance concerning what are called goods and evils, which are proofs of a mind in perplexity and wavering toward the equal force of opposite things. And the bookcases, treatises, and works are full of those who disagree in their doctrines and have convinced themselves that they know the truth in existing things. There are three things concerning speech: first, names, which are symbols of thoughts primarily, and by consequence also of the underlying objects; second, thoughts, which are likenesses and impressions of the underlying objects (hence the thoughts are the same for all, because the same impression from the underlying objects arises in all, but the names are not the same because of the different dialects); third, the underlying objects, from which the thoughts are impressed upon us. Now names are reduced in grammar to the twenty-four universal elements; for the elements must be definite, since there is no science of individual things, which are infinite, and it is proper to science to rest on universal and definite theorems. Hence individual things are reduced to universals. The study of philosophers concerns thoughts and underlying objects. Since the individual things of these are infinite, certain elements of these too have been found, under which everything sought is subsumed.

And if it should appear to have fallen under one or more of the elements, we will declare it to be; but if it should escape all, to be in no way. Of things said, some are said with combination, as "man runs," and some without combination, as "man" and as "runs" and all that do not complete a statement nor have truth or falsehood. Of things said without combination, some signify substance, some quality, some quantity, some relation, some place, some time, some posture, some state, some action, some affection, which indeed we call elements of beings that are in matter and after the principles. For these are perceptible by reason, while the immaterial are graspable only by intellect according to the first application. Of the things subordinated under the ten categories, some are said in themselves, as the nine categories, and some in relation. And again, of those under these ten categories, some are synonymous, as ox and man, insofar as they are animal; for synonyms are those of which both the name is common, animal, and the account is the same, that is, the definition, that is, ensouled substance; heteronyms are those which are about the same subject in different names, for example, ascent and descent; for the road is the same, either upward or downward; the other kind of heteronyms, for example, horse and black, having both name and account different from each other and not sharing the subject, are to be called different, not heteronyms. Polyonyms are those having the same account but a different name, as sword, blade, scimitar. Paronyms are those named from something else, as courageous from courage.

Homonyms are things that use the same name but do not have the same definition, for example, "man" both the living being and the painted one. Of homonyms, some are homonymous by chance, as Ajax the Locrian and Ajax the Salaminian; others are homonymous by design, and of these, some are by similarity, as "man" both the living being and the painted one; some are by analogy, as the feet of Ida and our feet because they are lower down; some are by activity, as the foot of a ship, by which the ship sails, and our foot, by which we move. Things are called homonyms from the same and in relation to the same, as from the doctor the book and the scalpel are called medical both from the doctor who uses them and in relation to the same medical principle. Of causes, some are antecedent, some are sustaining, some are cooperative, and some are that without which not. Antecedent causes are those that primarily provide the occasion for something to come to be, just as beauty does for the licentious in the case of desire; for when seen by them, it produces the erotic disposition only, not necessarily under compulsion. Sustaining causes are those which are synonymously also called self-sufficient, since they are by themselves adequately productive of the result. Next, all the causes are to be shown in the case of the learner. The father is an antecedent cause of learning, the teacher is a sustaining cause, the nature of the learner is a cooperative cause, and time holds the place of that without which not. A cause is properly said to be that which actively provides something, since we also say that iron is capable of cutting not only when it is cutting, but also when it is not cutting.

Thus, then, "productive" signifies both that which is already acting and that which, though not yet acting, is potentially capable of acting. Some say that causes are of bodies, others of incorporeals; some say that body is properly a cause, while the incorporeal is so called by misuse and in a causal sense; others reverse this, calling incorporeals properly causes, and bodies by misuse, as for example cutting, being an action, is incorporeal and is a cause of cutting, since it is an action and incorporeal, and of being cut similarly, both with the knife and the thing cut, which are bodies. "It is a cause of something" is said in three ways: that which is a cause, as the sculptor; that of which it is a cause, as of the statue's coming to be; and that for which it is a cause, as for the matter—for the bronze, it is a cause of the statue's coming to be. Coming to be and being cut, then, which are that of which it is a cause, being actions, are incorporeal. In which account, causes are causes of predicates, or, as some say, of sayables (for Cleanthes and Archedemus call predicates sayables); or, which is more likely, some will be called causes of predicates, as of "is cut," whose case is "being cut," and others of propositions, as of "a ship comes to be," whose case is "a ship's coming to be"; but Aristotle says of appellatives, such as house, ship, burning, cutting. The case is agreed to be incorporeal; hence that sophism is resolved thus: "What you say passes through your mouth," which is true; "you say 'house,' therefore a house passes through your mouth," which is false.

For we do not call the house a body, but the collapse incorporeal, of which the house happens to be the subject. And we say that the builder builds with reference to what is to come into being. Thus we say that a cloak is being woven; for the term "productive" indicates an activity. And that which produces is not one thing and the cause another, but they are the same with respect to the cloak and the house; for insofar as it is the cause of coming into being, to that extent it is also productive of coming into being. Therefore the same thing is both cause and productive and that for the sake of which. And if something is cause and productive, it is certainly also that for the sake of which; but if something is that for the sake of which, it is not necessarily also cause. For many things converge upon a single result, for the sake of which the end comes about, but not all of them are causes. For Medea would not have killed her children if she had not been angry, nor would she have been angry if she had not been jealous, nor this if she had not loved, nor this if Jason had not sailed to Colchis, nor this if the Argo had not been built, nor this if the timber had not been cut from Pelion. For in all these things that which is "for the sake of which" occurs, not all are causes of the child-killing, but only Medea herself. Therefore that which does not prevent is inactive, and for this reason that which does not prevent is not a cause, but that which prevents is. For the cause is conceived in acting and doing something. Moreover, that which does not prevent is separate from what comes to be (for this reason, indeed, it is accomplished because that which could prevent is not present), whereas the cause is related to what comes to be; therefore that which does not prevent would not be a cause.

The cause is spoken of in four ways: that which makes, as the sculptor; the matter, as the bronze; the form, as the shape; and the end, as the honor of the gymnasiarch. The bronze holds the place of that without which not, with respect to the statue’s coming to be, and is similarly a cause. For everything without which the result cannot come to be is necessarily a cause, but not a cause simply. For that without which not is not constitutive, but co-operative. Everything that acts provides the result together with the suitability of that which undergoes; for the cause disposes, but each thing undergoes that for which it is naturally fitted, the suitability being productive and holding the place of that without which not. The cause is therefore inoperative without the suitability, but it is not a cause, but a co-worker, since every cause is conceived in acting. The earth could not make itself, so it would not be a cause of itself. It is ridiculous to say that fire is not the cause of burning, but the wood; nor the knife of cutting, but the flesh; nor the athlete’s being wrestled down the strength of the opponent, but his own weakness. The constitutive cause does not require time; for the cautery, at the same time as it is applied to the flesh, produces the pain. Of the preliminary causes, some require time until the result comes to be, others do not, as the fall of the fracture. Perhaps, then, these are not called timeless by privation of time, but by reduction, as also the sudden, which does not itself occur without time.

Every cause, as cause, is to be grasped in a double sense, since it is conceived of something and in relation to something: of something, that is, of the effect, as the knife is of cutting; in relation to something, as to that which is suitably disposed, as fire is to wood—for it will not burn adamant. The cause is among the relatives; for it is conceived in relation to another, so that we apprehend two things in order to conceive the cause as cause. The same account applies to the craftsman, the maker, and the father. Nothing is the cause of itself, nor is anyone his own father, since then the first would become second. Moreover, the cause acts and disposes, while that which comes from the cause is affected and disposed. The same thing, taken in relation to itself, cannot both act and be affected at the same time, nor can it be both son and father. And further, the cause is prior in time to that which comes from it, as the knife is prior to the cut. The same thing cannot, in the same respect, be both prior in time to the matter, insofar as it is cause, and also posterior and later in time, insofar as it is the product of the cause. Being differs from becoming; thus the cause is of that which becomes, and the father is of the son. For the same thing cannot, in the same respect, both be and become at the same time. Therefore nothing is the cause of itself. Causes are not of each other, but are causes for each other. For the splenic condition, when already present, is not the cause of fever, but

of the fever coming to be; and the fever, being preexistent, is not the cause of the spleen, but of the increase of the condition. Thus also the virtues are causes for each other of not being separated, because of their mutual entailment; and the stones of an arch are causes for each other of remaining, as a predicate, but they are not causes of each other; and the teacher and the learner are causes for each other of progressing, as a predicate. Things are said to be causes for each other sometimes of the same thing, as the merchant and the retailer are causes for each other of making a profit, and sometimes of different things, as the knife and the flesh: the knife is for the flesh of being cut, and the flesh is for the knife of cutting. "An eye for an eye and a life for a life." For the one who struck someone fatally is a cause for him of death or of death coming to be, but having been struck fatally in return by him, he had him as a counter-cause, not insofar as he became a cause for him, but in a different respect. For he became a cause of death for him, but death did not in turn impose a fatal blow on this one, but the wounded person himself did, so that he himself became a cause of one thing and had another as a cause; and the one who committed injustice becomes a cause for the one wronged in one respect, but the law that orders retaliation is a cause not of injustice, but of vengeance for one and of discipline for the other. So the causes are not of each other as causes, but they are causes for each other. Further, it is inquired whether many things coming together become many causes of one thing. For the men who come together are causes of the ship being launched; but each one individually is not a cause, but together with the others, unless perhaps the joint-cause is also a cause.

Others say that if there are many causes, each individually is the cause of one thing. For instance, the virtues, being many, are causes of the single thing of being happy, and similarly of being heated and of being pained there are many causes. Is it not then that the many virtues are one in power, and likewise the things that heat and the things that pain? And the multitude of the virtues, being one in genus, becomes the cause of the single thing of being happy. In reality, preliminary causes become many for one thing both in genus and in species: in genus, for being ill in some way, e.g., cold, burning, fatigue, indigestion, drunkenness; in species, for fever. The sustaining causes are only in genus, no longer also in species. For being fragrant, being one in genus, has many causes in species, e.g., frankincense, rose, crocus, storax, myrrh, ointment; for the rose would not be fragrant in the same way as myrrh. The same thing becomes the cause of opposites, sometimes due to the magnitude and power of the cause, sometimes due to the suitability of the patient. Due to a certain power: the same string, by tension or relaxation, produces a high or low note. Due to the suitability of the patients: honey sweetens the healthy but becomes bitter to those with fever, and one and the same wine leads some to anger, others to cheerfulness, and the same sun melts wax but dries clay. Of the causes, some are evident, some are grasped by reasoning, some are unclear, some by analogy.

Of unclear things, some are unclear for a time, being hidden at one time but visible at another, while others are unclear by nature, things that can never become evident at any time. And of those by nature, some are apprehensible, which some called not unclear, being grasped by analogical reasoning through signs, like the symmetry of pores perceptible to reason, while others are inapprehensible, things that can in no way fall under apprehension, which are indeed called unclear in the absolute sense. And some causes are precursory, some sustaining, some co-causes, and some cooperative. And some are of what is according to nature, some of what is contrary to nature, some of disease, and, descending further, some of affections, some of their magnitude, and some of times and occasions. Now, of precursory causes, when they are removed, the result remains; a sustaining cause is one by whose presence the result remains and by whose removal it is removed. The sustaining cause is also called synonymously self-sufficient, since it is by itself adequately productive of the result. If the self-sufficient cause is indicative of self-sufficient activity, the cooperative cause signifies service and ministration together with another. If, then, nothing is contributed, it will not be called cooperative; but if it is contributed, it is certainly a cause of that for which it is contributed, that is, of what comes to be through it. A cooperative cause is therefore one by whose presence the result came to be, with the evident being present to the evident, and the unclear to the unclear. And the co-cause is from the class of causes, just as a fellow soldier is a soldier and a fellow ephebe is an ephebe.

The cooperative cause, then, assists the sustaining cause toward the intensification of what is produced by it, while the co-cause is not of the same conception; for something can be a co-cause even if it is not a sustaining cause. For the co-cause is conceived together with another, which is itself unable to produce the result on its own, being a cause together with a cause. The cooperative differs from the co-cause in that the co-cause provides the result together with another that does not produce it on its own, while the cooperative does not produce on its own, but by coming to another that does produce on its own, it cooperates with it toward the result becoming more intense. The fact that the cooperative has come from a preliminary cause especially demonstrates that the power of the cause extends to the cooperative.