khazarzar-athenagoras-de-resurrectione

To every doctrine and discourse that adheres to the truth in these matters, some falsehood attaches itself; it attaches itself not from any underlying principle proceeding according to nature or from the cause proper to each thing, but is zealously promoted by those who have honored the lawless sowing for the corruption of the truth. This can be observed first from those who long ago devoted themselves to concerns about these things and from the disagreement that arose between them and their own elders and contemporaries, and not least from the very confusion of those who are tossed about in the midst of things. For such persons have left nothing true unslandered—neither the essence of God, nor knowledge, nor activity, nor the things that follow in sequence from these and delineate for us the account of piety. But some utterly and completely despair of the truth concerning these matters, others distort it according to their own opinion, and others even affect perplexity about things that are evident.

Hence I think it necessary for those laboring over these matters to employ two kinds of discourses: those on behalf of the truth, and those concerning the truth. And the discourses on behalf of the truth are directed toward those who disbelieve or doubt, while those concerning the truth are directed toward those who are well-disposed and receive the truth with goodwill. For this reason, those who wish to examine these matters must consider the need that lies before them on each occasion, measure their discourses by this need, and adapt the order of these matters to what is fitting, rather than always preserving the same beginning in appearance and neglecting what is appropriate and the place that belongs to each. For as regards demonstration and natural sequence, the discourses concerning it always take precedence over those on behalf of it; but as regards what is more necessary, the discourses on behalf of it take precedence over those concerning it, in reverse order. For neither could a farmer properly cast seeds into the ground without first removing the wild growth and what harms the cultivated seeds that are sown, nor could a physician introduce any healthful remedy into a body needing treatment without first cleansing the existing disease or checking what is flowing in; nor, indeed, could one wishing to teach the truth, when speaking concerning the truth, persuade anyone if some false opinion lurks in the minds of the hearers and opposes the arguments. Therefore, looking to what is more necessary, we too sometimes place the discourses on behalf of the truth before those concerning the truth; and in the same way, it does not seem useless to do so now in the case of the discourses on the resurrection, when we aim at what is fitting.

For even among these we find some who disbelieve entirely, others who are in doubt, and some of those who have accepted the first principles who are equally perplexed with those who doubt. And the most irrational thing of all is that they suffer this without having any ground for disbelief from the facts themselves, nor can they give any reasonable cause why they disbelieve or are perplexed. Let us consider it thus. Every disbelief that does not arise rashly and from some uncritical opinion but from some strong cause preserves a plausible account of security in regard to the truth only when the matter itself about which they disbelieve appears to be unbelievable. For to disbelieve things that are not unbelievable is the work of men who do not use a sound judgment concerning the truth. Therefore, those who disbelieve or are perplexed about the resurrection ought not to deliver their opinion about it uncritically according to what seems to them and what is pleasing to the undisciplined, but either to attach the generation of human beings to no cause (which is indeed very easy to refute) or, attributing the cause of existing things to God, to look to the hypothesis of this doctrine and through it to show that the resurrection has no credibility from any source.

They will do this if they can show either that it is impossible for God or that it is not his will to reunite and bring together the dead bodies, even those completely dissolved, for the reconstitution of the same human beings. But if they cannot do this, let them cease from this godless disbelief and from blaspheming what is not lawful. For that they speak the truth neither when they say it is impossible nor when they say it is not his will will become clear from what follows. The impossible for someone is known truly as such either from not knowing what will come to be or from not having sufficient power to do well what is known. For he who is ignorant of what must come to be could neither undertake nor accomplish at all what he is ignorant of, while he who knows well what will be done and from where and how it could come to be, but has either no power at all to do what is known or insufficient power, would not undertake it in the first place, if he were prudent and considered his own power, and if he undertook it without due consideration, he would not complete what he intended. But it is not possible for God to be ignorant of the nature of the bodies that will be resurrected, both as a whole and in each part, nor of where each of the dissolved elements goes and which part of the element has received what was dissolved and has gone to its kindred, even if among men what is again harmoniously united with the whole seems entirely indiscernible.

For that which was not unknown before the individual constitution of each person, neither the nature of the elements from which human bodies are composed nor the parts of these from which he intended to take what he decided for the constitution of the human body, it is evident that after the dissolution of the whole, it will not be unknown where each of the things he took for the completion of each has gone. For as far as the order of things now prevailing among us and the judgment concerning other matters is concerned, it is greater to foreknow things that have not yet come to be; but with regard to the dignity of God and his wisdom, both are by nature and eternally equal: to foreknow things that have not yet come to be and to know things that have been dissolved. And indeed, that his power is sufficient for the resurrection of bodies is shown by the very generation of these bodies. For if he made human bodies and their beginnings from non-existence at the first constitution, he will also raise them, when dissolved in whatever manner, with equal ease; for this too is equally possible for him.

And it is no harm to the argument, whether some suppose the first principles to be from matter, or human bodies to be from the elements as first principles, or from seeds. For the same power that can form the formless substance, as they conceive it, and adorn the shapeless and unordered with many and various forms, and bring together the parts of the elements into one, and divide the seed, which is one and simple, into many, and articulate what is unarticulated, and give life to what is not living—that same power can also unite what is dissolved, raise up what is fallen, make alive again what is dead, and transform what is perishable into imperishability. And it would belong to the same power and wisdom to gather up the satiety from these, which is scattered into multitudes of all kinds of animals that customarily infest such bodies, and to separate it from there, and again unite it with its proper parts and members, whether it has passed into one animal from those, or into many, or from there into others, or has been dissolved together with those very animals and carried to the first principles according to the natural analysis into them—which indeed seems especially to trouble some, even those admired for wisdom, who have somehow considered strong the perplexities brought forward by the many.

These men say that many bodies of those who die in shipwrecks or rivers become food for fish, and many of those dying in wars or from some other harsh cause and circumstance of affairs, deprived of burial, lie as prey for whatever animals encounter them. Therefore, of bodies consumed in this way, and of the parts and members composing them, broken up into a great multitude of animals and united through nourishment to the bodies of those fed, they say first that the separation of these is impossible, and secondly, more perplexing than this. For of the animals that have fed on human bodies, as many as are suitable for human food, passing through the stomachs of these and being united to the bodies of those who have partaken of them, there is a necessity that all the parts of humans which have become food for the animals that partook of them pass over into other human bodies, the animals fed between them conveying the nourishment from which they were fed to those humans for whom they became food.

Then they declaim tragically about the acts of child-eating dared in famines and fits of madness, and about children devoured by their own parents through the machinations of enemies, and about that Median banquet, and the tragic feasts of Thyestes, and they string together such other novel calamities among Greeks and barbarians. From these they construct, as they suppose, the impossibility of the resurrection, on the ground that the same parts cannot be reassembled with different bodies in turn, but either the bodies of the former cannot be reconstituted, since the parts that complete them have passed into others, or, if these parts are restored to the former, the bodies of the latter will be deficient. To me, however, such men seem, first, to be ignorant of the power and wisdom of the one who fashioned and governs this universe, who adapted to each animal, according to its nature and kind, the nourishment that is fitting and appropriate, and who neither ordained that every nature should proceed to union or mixture with every body, nor is at a loss for the separation of what has been united, but who permits each created thing to act or be acted upon according to its own nature, while preventing something else, and who allows or transforms everything as he wishes and for whatever purpose he wishes; and, in addition to what has been said, they have not examined the power and nature of each thing that nourishes or is nourished. For they would have known that not everything that one takes in, under the compulsion of external necessity, becomes suitable nourishment for the animal.

But things that, as soon as they come into contact with the embracing parts of the stomach, are naturally corrupted, being vomited or excreted or dispersed in some other way, so that they do not undergo even briefly the first and natural digestion, let alone the assimilation into that which is being nourished—just as, indeed, not everything that has been digested and has undergone the first change necessarily reaches the parts being nourished, some things being separated off in the stomach itself by the nutritive power, others being separated out during the second change and the digestion that occurs in the liver and passing over into something else that has exceeded the capacity to nourish, and not even all of the change that occurs in the liver proceeds to become nourishment for humans, but is separated into what are naturally waste products, and the nourishment left behind in the very parts and members being nourished sometimes changes into something else according to the predominance of what is excessive or superfluous, which is accustomed in some way to corrupt or to turn toward itself what approaches.

Since there is great natural diversity in all animals, and even the natural food for each kind of animal changes along with the body being nourished, and since a threefold purification and separation occurs according to the food of each animal, everything foreign that cannot be blended into the animal's food must necessarily be corrupted and pass out in its natural way or change into something else, while the power of the nourishing body, being in accord with the powers of the animal being nourished, and having come through the natural channels and been precisely purified by the natural cleansers, becomes a very pure addition to the substance. This alone one would truthfully call food, in accordance with the facts, as it rejects everything foreign and harmful to the constitution of the animal being nourished, and that great bulk introduced for the filling of the stomach and the satisfaction of appetite. But no one would dispute that this food is united with the body being nourished, being interwoven and spread throughout all its parts and members. As for that which is otherwise and contrary to nature, if it meets a stronger power, it is quickly corrupted, but if it overcomes with ease, it corrupts the power it has mastered and turns into base humors and poisonous qualities, bearing nothing proper or friendly to the body being nourished. The greatest proof of this is that for many of the animals being nourished, pain or danger or death follows from these things, if by a more violent appetite something poisonous and contrary to nature mixed in the food is drawn in along with it.

this would certainly be destructive to the body being nourished, if indeed what is nourished is nourished by what is proper and according to nature, but is destroyed by what is opposite. Since, therefore, the natural food is divided in accordance with the difference of animals that differ by nature, and of this food itself, not everything that the animal might take in, nor any chance part of it, receives mixture with the body being nourished, but only that which, having been purified through every stage of digestion and having been genuinely transformed for union with the body of a particular quality, is well-fitted to the parts being nourished, it is evident that nothing contrary to nature could ever be united with those to which it is not a suitable and appropriate food, but either passes through the stomach itself before generating any other raw and corrupted humor, or, having coalesced further, produces a difficult-to-heal affection or disease, which corrupts along with it the natural food or even the flesh that requires the food. But even if it is ever expelled by some drugs or better foods or overcome by natural powers, it flows out with no little harm, bringing nothing peaceful to what is according to nature because of its incompatibility with nature. But even if one should grant that the food entering from these

Let it be said, however, that this is more customary; and even if it were contrary to nature for it to be separated and changed into one of the moistening, drying, heating, or cooling elements, even so nothing of consequence will result from what has been conceded to them, since the bodies that rise again are reconstituted from their own proper parts, and none of the things mentioned is a part, nor does it hold the relation or order of a part, nor does it always remain with the parts of the body that are nourished, nor rise again with those that rise, nor does it contribute anything further to life—neither blood, nor phlegm, nor bile, nor breath. For the bodies that were nourished will not need then what they once needed, since the need for that by which they were nourished is abolished together with the deficiency and corruption of those nourished. Next, even if one were to suppose that the change from such nourishment extends as far as flesh, even so there will be no necessity that the flesh recently changed from such nourishment, having approached the body of some other person, should again serve as a part for the completion of that other person, because neither does the flesh that receives it always preserve what it has received, nor is this united flesh stable and permanent in that to which it was added, but it undergoes much change in the opposite direction, being dispersed at one time by toils or anxieties, at another being consumed by griefs or labors or diseases, and by the bad temperaments arising from burning or chilling, while the [sinews] that receive nourishment do not change along with the flesh and fat, but remain what they are.

Such affections having occurred in the flesh, one would find it much more so in the flesh nourished by alien substances, which at one time increases in bulk and grows fat from what it has taken in, and then again expels it in whatever manner and diminishes, either by one of the previously mentioned means or by several; and only that part remains attached to the members which is naturally suited to bind, contain, or warm, being selected by nature and grown together with those parts with which it completed the natural life and the labors of that life. But (since it is not possible to show as true what is said by them, either when the matters recently examined are judged as they ought, or when the arguments exercised upon them are conceded) the bodies of men would never be mixed with those of the same nature, even if through ignorance they should ever steal perception by partaking of such a body through some other means, or even if from the outset, through need or madness, they should be defiled by a body of the same kind; unless, indeed, there are some man-shaped beasts or beings of mixed nature from men and beasts, such as the bolder poets are accustomed to fashion.

And why need one speak of those bodies which have been allotted to no living creature for food, but have been granted only burial in the earth in honor of nature, since the Creator has not even assigned any other living creature of the same species for food, even if in some other creatures of different kinds food is provided according to nature? If, then, they can show that human flesh has been assigned to humans for eating, nothing will prevent cannibalism from being according to nature, like anything else permitted by nature, and those who dare to say such things from feasting on the bodies of their dearest as more familiar, or even from entertaining the most well-disposed to themselves with these very bodies. But if this is not even holy to say, and partaking of human flesh by humans is something most hateful and utterly abominable and more accursed than any unlawful and unnatural eating or act, and what is unnatural could never pass into nourishment for the parts and members that need it, and what does not pass into nourishment could never be united with those things which it is not by nature fitted to nourish, then the bodies of humans could never be blended with similar bodies to which they are for food contrary to nature, even if they should often pass through the stomach of these by reason of some most bitter calamity.

creatures to feed upon them. But when they depart from the nutritive power and are dispersed back to those elements from which they originally received their composition, they are united with these for as long a time as each may happen to last, and then, being separated from there again by the wisdom and power of Him who has combined every nature of living creature with its proper faculties, each is fittingly united to each, even if it be burned by fire, even if it be rotted in water, even if it be consumed by wild beasts or by any chance animals, even if it be cut off from the whole body and dissolved before the other parts; and when united again to each other, they hold the same place for the harmony and composition of the same body and for the resurrection and life of that which has died or even been completely dissolved. Now to prolong these matters further is not opportune; for the judgment upon them is agreed by those who are not half-beasts. But since there are many things more useful for the present inquiry, I now pass over those who take refuge in the works of men and the human craftsmen of these works, who are unable to renew the works that have been broken or worn out by time or otherwise destroyed, and then try to show from the analogy of potters and carpenters that God neither would wish nor, if he wished, could raise a body that has died or even been dissolved, and who do not consider that through these arguments they insult God equally with the worst men, equating the powers of things that are completely different, or rather the substances of those who use these powers, and the artificial with the natural. Now to be zealous about these matters is not beyond reproach; for it is truly foolish to argue against superficial and vain things.

Far more glorious and most true of all is to say that what is impossible among men is possible for God. And if through these very arguments, as being glorious, and through all those examined a little earlier, the argument shows it to be possible, it is clearly not impossible. But indeed it is not even undesirable. For what is undesirable is either undesirable to him as unjust or as unworthy. And again, the unjust is considered either in relation to the one who will be resurrected or in relation to some other besides him. But that no one among those external and numbered among existing things is wronged is evident. For neither would the intelligible natures be wronged by the resurrection of men; for the resurrection of men is no hindrance to their existence, no harm, no insult. Nor indeed would the nature of irrational animals or of inanimate things be wronged; for they will not exist after the resurrection, and concerning that which is not, there is nothing unjust. But even if one were to suppose that these exist perpetually, they would not be wronged when human bodies are renewed; for if now, yielding to the nature of men and being in need of their use, they are brought under yoke and every kind of slavery and are not wronged, much more, when men become imperishable and without need and no longer require their use, and they are freed from all slavery, they will not be wronged.

For even if it had a voice, it would not have accused the creator of unjustly treating it as inferior to humans, because it had not obtained the same resurrection as them. For those whose nature is not equal, the just judge does not assign an equal end. And apart from this, where there is no judgment of justice, there is no complaint of injustice. Nor is it possible to say that some injustice is observed concerning the resurrected human. For this human consists of soul and body, and injustice is received neither into the soul nor into the body. For no one in his right mind will say that the soul is wronged; for in so saying he would also be casting out the present life along with it. For if now, dwelling in a perishable and passible body, it has suffered no injustice, much more when living together with an imperishable and impassible body will it not be wronged. But neither is the body wronged in any way; for if now the perishable, when joined with the imperishable, will be wronged. Nor could one say that it is an unworthy work for God to raise up and reassemble the dissolved body. For if the inferior is not unworthy—that is, to make a perishable and passible body—much more is the superior not unworthy, which is imperishable and impassible.

If through the primary natural principles and what follows from them each of the examined points has been demonstrated, it is evident that the resurrection of the dissolved bodies is both possible and willed and worthy of the creator’s work; for through these the opposite claim and the irrationality of the unbelievers have been shown false. For what need is there to speak of the reciprocal relation of each of these to each and of their interconnection with one another, if indeed one must even speak of interconnection as of things separated by some difference, and not also to say that the possible is willed and that what is willed by God is entirely possible and in accordance with the worth of what is willed? That the discourse concerning the truth is one thing, and the discourse in defense of the truth another, has been stated sufficiently in the preceding passages, wherein it was shown how each differs and when and for whom it is useful. But perhaps nothing prevents, for the sake of common security and for the connection of what has been said with what remains, making a fresh start from these very points and from what pertains to them. It is fitting for one to hold primacy by nature, and for the other to attend the first, to pave the way and to remove beforehand every obstacle and difficulty. For the discourse concerning the truth, being necessary for all people for security and salvation, takes first place both by nature, by order, and by need: by nature, as providing knowledge of realities; by order, as existing in and together with those things of which it becomes the revealer; by need, as procuring security and salvation for those who know.

But the one who is inferior by nature and capacity in regard to truth—for it is a lesser thing to refute falsehood than to establish truth—and second in order, for his strength lies against those who hold false opinions; false opinion arises from sowing and corruption. Yet, even so, these matters being thus, he is often placed first and sometimes becomes more useful, as he removes and clears away the disbelief that troubles some, and the doubt or false opinion that besets those who are newly approaching. And each of the two is referred to one end; for both the one who refutes falsehood and the one who establishes truth have their reference to piety. But they are not absolutely one; rather, the former is necessary, as I said, for all who believe and care for truth and their own salvation, while the latter sometimes becomes more useful for certain persons and in certain circumstances. Let these things be said by us summarily as a reminder of what has already been stated. We must proceed to the subject at hand and show that the account of the resurrection is true, both from the cause itself, on account of which and through which the first human came to be, and those after him, even if they did not come to be in the same manner, and from the common nature of all humans as humans, and further from the judgment of the maker concerning these matters, according to the time each lived and the laws under which they conducted their lives, which no one would dispute to be just.

The argument from cause is this: if we consider whether man came to be simply and in vain or for some purpose; and if for some purpose, whether it was for him to live and persist in the nature in which he was made, or for the need of something else; and if for need, either for the need of the maker himself or of some other of those belonging to him and deemed worthy of greater care. Now, examining this more generally, we find that every right-minded person moved by rational judgment to do something does nothing of what he does by design in vain, but either for his own use, or for the need of some other of which he has taken care, or for the sake of the thing itself, moved by some natural attraction and affection for its coming to be. For example—let it be said through some image, so that the matter at hand may become clear—a man builds a house for his own use, but he makes for oxen and camels or other animals of which he has need a shelter suitable for each of these, not for his own use, as it appears, but with respect to the end, for this reason, and with respect to the immediate purpose, for the care of these of which he has taken thought. And he also begets children neither for his own need nor for any other of those belonging to him, but for the sake that those begotten by him should exist and persist as far as possible, consoling his own end by the succession of children and grandchildren, and thinking by this to immortalize the mortal. But these things are from them.

God, however, would not have made man in vain, for he is wise, and no work of wisdom is vain; nor for his own need, for he is entirely without need, and to him who lacks nothing, nothing of what he has made could contribute to his own need. Nor did he make man for the sake of any of his other works, for nothing that uses reason and judgment, whether greater or lesser, has come to be or comes to be for the need of another, but for the sake of the life and persistence of those who have come to be themselves. For reason does not find any need as a cause of the generation of men, since the immortal beings are without need and in no way require any contribution from men for their existence, while the irrational beings are ruled according to nature and fulfill for men the needs for which each is naturally suited, but are not themselves naturally suited to use these men; for it was not and is not lawful to subordinate that which rules and governs to the use of lesser things, or to subject the rational to irrational beings, which are unfit for ruling.

Therefore, if man came into being neither without cause and in vain (for nothing that comes into being by God is vain, at least according to the intention of the maker) nor for the sake of the need of the maker himself or of any other of the things made by God, it is evident that, according to the first and more general account, God made man for his own sake and for the goodness and wisdom observed throughout the whole creation; but according to the account more directly concerned with the things that come into being, he made man for the sake of the life of those very things that come into being—a life not kindled for a brief time and then entirely extinguished. For to creeping things, I think, and to birds and to swimming creatures, or more generally to all irrational beings, God assigned such a life; but to those who bear the maker himself as an image within themselves, who also carry mind along with them and share in rational judgment, the maker allotted perpetual continuance, so that, knowing their own maker and his power and wisdom, and following law and justice, they might endure together with these without pain, strengthening the life they had previously received, even while being in perishable and earthly bodies. For as many things as have come into being for the sake of something else, when those things for the sake of which they came into being cease, the things that came into being will naturally cease to exist as well, and would not continue in vain, since there is no place for the vain among the things that come into being by God; but things that came into being for the sake of existing and living as they naturally do, since the cause itself is taken together with their nature and is observed in their mere existence, would never admit any cause that entirely annihilates their existence.

Since this is always observed in being, it is necessary that the living being that has come into being be preserved entirely, both acting and suffering what is natural to it, each of the parts from which it is composed contributing its own share, the soul being and remaining uniformly in the nature in which it came to be and performing what is natural to it (and it is natural for it to preside over the impulses of the body and to judge and measure whatever impinges upon it by the appropriate criteria and measures), and the body being moved according to nature toward what is natural to it and receiving the changes allotted to it, and along with the other changes according to age or form or size, the resurrection. For resurrection is a kind of change, and the last of all, and the change of those still surviving at that time toward the better. Confident in these things no less than in those already accomplished, and examining our own nature, we both accept the life of deficiency and corruption as befitting the present life, and firmly hope for the continuance in incorruption, which we do not fabricate in vain from human beings, deluding ourselves with false hopes, but have entrusted to the most unerring guarantee, the intention of our creator, according to which he made man from an immortal soul and a body, and also furnished him with intellect and an innate law for the preservation and protection of what is given by him, things appropriate to a rational life and a life of reason, knowing well that he would not have constructed such a living being and adorned it with all things for continuance, if he did not wish the created thing to endure.

If, then, the creator of this universe made man to partake of intelligent life and, having come into being, to be a spectator of his magnificence and of the wisdom displayed in all things, and to continue always in the contemplation of these according to that one's purpose and according to the nature he has received, the cause of his generation guarantees his perpetual continuance, and the continuance guarantees the resurrection, without which man would not continue. From what has been said it is evident that the resurrection is clearly shown by the cause of generation and the purpose of the maker. Such being the cause according to which man has been brought into this world, it would be fitting to examine the account that follows these things by nature or by sequence. In the inquiry, the nature of generated men follows the cause of generation, the just judgment of the maker concerning them follows the nature of those who have come into being, and the end of life follows all these. Having examined what has been set forth, we must next consider the nature of men. The demonstration of the doctrines of truth or of whatever is proposed for examination, bringing unerring trust to what is said, takes its beginning not from somewhere outside nor from what seems or has seemed to some, but from common and natural conception or from the consequence of secondary things to primary ones.

For either it is about the primary doctrines and requires only a reminder that stirs the natural concept, or it is about what naturally follows the primary things and the natural sequence, and requires the order of these things, showing what truly follows the first or the things that have been placed first, so as neither to neglect the truth or the security that comes from it, nor to confuse what has been ordered and defined by nature, nor to break the natural chain. Therefore, I think it is right for those who are earnest about the matters at hand and wish to judge wisely whether the resurrection of human bodies occurs or not, first to examine well the power of the things that contribute to the demonstration of this, and what place each has received, and which of these is first, which second or third, and which is last after these; and having arranged these, one must first set the cause of the generation of humans, that is, the intention of the creator according to which he made man, and to this fittingly attach the nature of the humans that have come into being, not as if it were secondary in order, but because it is not possible to make a judgment about both at the same time, even though they coexist with each other as much as possible and provide equal power for the matter at hand.

Through these, as primary and having their origin from creation, the resurrection is clearly demonstrated. Nevertheless, it is also possible to obtain faith concerning it through the arguments from providence—I mean through the honor or penalty owed to each human being according to just judgment, and through the end that pertains to human life. For many who take up the argument concerning resurrection have rested the entire cause on the third point alone, thinking that resurrection occurs for the sake of judgment. But this is manifestly shown to be false from the fact that all human beings who die rise again, yet not all who rise are judged. For if the justice pertaining to judgment were the sole cause of resurrection, then presumably those who have committed no sin or achieved no merit—that is, very young children—ought not to rise. But since all others, and indeed even those who die in early infancy, are affirmed by them to rise, resurrection does not occur primarily for the sake of judgment, but because of the intention of the creator and the nature of the created beings. And since even the cause observed in the generation of human beings alone suffices to show that resurrection follows naturally upon the dissolved bodies, it is perhaps just to shrink from none of the matters set forth, and in accordance with what has been said to indicate also the starting points from each of the consequences for those unable to see for themselves, and above all the nature of generated human beings, which leads to the same conception and provides equal faith concerning resurrection.

For if the entire nature of human beings is commonly constituted from an immortal soul and the body fitted together with it according to its generation, and God has not assigned such a generation or life and the whole course of life separately to the nature of the soul by itself or to the nature of the body apart, but to the human beings born from these, so that, from what they come to be and live, having lived through life they may arrive at some single and common end, then, since the living being from both is entirely one, which suffers all the affections of the soul and all those of the body, and performs and does all that requires sensitive or rational judgment, it is necessary that the entire sequence from these be referred to some one end, so that all things and through all things may converge to one harmony and the same sympathy: the generation of a human being, the nature of a human being, the life of a human being, the actions and affections and life of a human being, and the end proper to that nature. But if there is one harmony of the whole living being and one sympathy, both of the things that spring from the soul and of those accomplished through the body, then the end over all these must also be one. And the end will be one in truth, since it is of the same living being according to its own constitution, of which the end is the end. And the same living being will exist purely, when all the things from which the living being is composed as parts are the same. And these will be the same according to their particular union, when the dissolved parts are again united for the constitution of the living being. And the constitution of the same human beings necessarily demonstrates the resurrection of the dead and dissolved bodies.

For without this, neither would the same parts be naturally united with each other, nor would the nature of the same human beings be constituted. And if both mind and reason have been given to human beings for the discernment of intelligible things—not only of substances but also of the goodness, wisdom, and justice of the giver—then it is necessary that, as long as the things for the sake of which rational discernment has been given endure, the discernment itself given for these things also endures. But it is impossible for this discernment to endure unless the nature that receives it and the things in which it exists also endure. Now the one who receives both mind and reason is the human being, not the soul by itself. Therefore, the human being, who is composed of both, must endure forever; but it is impossible for this human being to endure without being resurrected. For if resurrection does not occur, the nature of human beings as human beings would not endure. And if the nature of human beings does not endure, then the soul has been fitted in vain to the body's deficiency and its affections, the body has been bound in vain to attain what it desires, yielding to the reins of the soul and being bridled, and mind is in vain, prudence is in vain, the observance of justice is in vain, the practice of every virtue is in vain, the establishment and ordination of laws is in vain, and, to speak comprehensively, everything that is good in and through human beings is in vain—indeed, even the generation and nature of human beings themselves. But if vanity is excluded from all the works of God and from the gifts given by him, then the persistence of the body according to its proper nature must necessarily co-endure forever with the immortality of the soul.

Let no one be surprised if we call life that is interrupted by death and corruption a continuance, considering that the meaning of the term is not one, nor is the measure of continuance one, because the nature of things that continue is not one either. For if each of the things that continue has its continuance according to its own nature, one would find neither among purely imperishable and immortal things a continuance that is equal, since the substances of the superior are not equal to those that differ by descent, nor is it fitting to seek that uniform and immutable continuance among human beings, since the immortal and continuing things that came into being from the beginning have their continuance without end solely by the will of the maker, while human beings have from birth an immutable continuance in respect to the soul, but in respect to the body they acquire imperishability through change—which is what the doctrine of resurrection intends. Looking to this, we await the dissolution of the body as following upon life with deficiency and corruption, and after this we hope for a continuance with imperishability, neither equating our end with that of irrational animals nor equating the continuance of human beings with that of immortals, lest we unwittingly equate the nature and life of human beings with those to which it is not fitting.

It is not, therefore, proper to be distressed on this account, if some irregularity is observed concerning the continuance of human beings, nor, because the separation of the soul from the body is a dissolution of parts and members which interrupts continuous life, ought we on this account to despair of the resurrection. For neither, because the natural relaxations of the senses and of the natural powers which occur during sleep seem to interrupt life according to perception, with men sleeping for equal intervals of time and in a manner coming to life again, do we refuse to call it the same life; for which reason, I think, some call sleep the brother of death, not as tracing a genealogy from the same ancestors or parents, but because similar conditions occur in the dead and in those who sleep, on account of the rest and of perceiving nothing of what is present or happening, or rather not even of existence and of one's own life. If, therefore, we do not refuse to call the same life the life of human beings, which is full of so much irregularity from birth until dissolution and is interrupted by all the things we have mentioned, neither ought we to despair of the life after dissolution, which brings with it the resurrection, even if it is interrupted for a time by the separation of the soul from the body. For this is the nature of human beings, which from the beginning and according to the intention of the creator has irregularity allotted to it, and has its life and continuance irregular, interrupted at one time by sleep, at another by death, and by the changes of each age, the later developments not being clearly manifest in the earlier ones.

or who, not taught by experience, would have believed that in a seed, uniform and unformed, there lie hidden so many and such great powers, or such a difference in the masses that are built up and solidified—I mean bones, sinews, cartilages, and also muscles, flesh, internal organs, and the remaining parts of the body? For neither in the still fluid seeds can one see any of these, nor in infants does anything appear of what comes to be in adults, nor in the age of adults what belongs to those past their prime, nor in these what belongs to the aged. But although some of the things mentioned show not at all, and others only dimly, the natural sequence and the changes that occur in the nature of human beings, yet all who are not blinded by wickedness or indifference in judging these matters know that first there must be a deposit of seeds, and when these have been articulated in each part and member and the conceived beings have come to light, there follows growth according to the first age, and perfection according to growth, and when perfected, a decline of natural powers until old age, and then, when the bodies have suffered, dissolution.

Just as in these cases, where neither does the seed have the human nature or form inscribed in it, nor does life have its dissolution into the first principles, the sequence of natural events provides belief for those who do not have the credible from the phenomena themselves, so much more does reason, tracing the truth from natural consequence, confirm the resurrection, being more secure and stronger than experience for the confirmation of truth. Of the arguments previously set before us for examination and confirming the resurrection, all are of the same kind, as having sprung from the same beginning; for their beginning is the generation of the first men from creation; but some are strengthened from that very beginning from which they sprang, while others, following the nature and life of men, receive their credibility from the providence of God concerning us; for the cause, on account of which and through which men have come to be, joined to the nature of men from creation, has its force, while the principle of justice, according to which God judges men who have lived well or badly, derives from the end of these; for they spring from that source, but depend rather on providence.

Since we have demonstrated the first points as far as possible, it would be well to show the matter at hand also through the subsequent points—I mean through the honor or penalty due to each human being according to just judgment, and through the end of human life—and before these very points, to set in order the argument that is naturally prior and first to examine, namely the argument concerning judgment, having only so much prefaced with care for the proper beginning and order of the matters at hand: that those who accept God as the maker of this universe must, by his wisdom and justice, assign the preservation and providence of all that has come to be to him, if they wish to abide by their own principles; and that, holding these views about these matters, they should consider nothing on earth or in heaven as ungoverned or unprovided for, but recognize that care from the maker extends over everything invisible and visible, small and great alike. For all things that have come to be need the care of the maker, each individually according to its nature and for its natural purpose; for it would, I think, be a vain ambition to now divide by kinds or to enumerate what is suitable for each nature. As for the human being, about whom it is now our task to speak, as a needy being he requires nourishment, as a mortal being he requires succession, and as a rational being he requires justice.

If each of the things mentioned is natural to a human being, and he needs nourishment for the sake of life, and he needs succession for the sake of the continuance of the race, and he needs justice for the sake of the lawfulness of nourishment and succession, then of necessity, since nourishment and succession are directed toward the composite whole, justice is also directed toward this—I mean the composite whole, the human being consisting of soul and body—and such a human being becomes liable for all that has been done, and receives the honor or penalty for these things. If, then, just judgment brings the penalty for deeds upon the composite whole, and neither must the soul alone receive the recompense for what was done with the body (for it is itself without attachment to the bodily pleasures or to the foods and cares

of the wrongdoings) nor the body alone (for this is in itself without judgment of law and justice), but the human being composed of these receives the judgment for each of the deeds done by him. Reason finds that this does not occur in this life (for what is deserved is not preserved in the present life, since many who practice impiety and every lawlessness and wickedness continue until death without experiencing evils, and on the contrary, those who have shown their life to be examined according to every virtue live in pains, in insults, in slanders, in tortures, and in all kinds of sufferings), nor after death (for the composite no longer exists, since the soul is separated from the body, and the body itself is scattered again into those things from which it was assembled, preserving nothing of its former nature or form, or indeed the memory of what was done). It is evident to all what remains: that according to the apostle, this perishable and dispersible thing must put on incorruption, so that when the dead are brought to life by resurrection and the separated or even completely dissolved are reunited, each may justly receive what he did through the body, whether good or evil. Now, against those who acknowledge providence and accept the same principles as we do, but then somehow fall away from their own hypotheses, one might use such arguments and many more than these, if one wished to expand upon what has been said concisely and cursorily.

As for those who differ concerning first principles, it might perhaps be well to set down another beginning before these, joining with them in their perplexity about what they think and examining such matters together: whether the life of human beings and the whole of existence has been entirely overlooked, and some deep darkness has been poured over the earth in ignorance and silence, hiding both human beings themselves and their deeds, or whether it is far more secure to think that the maker stands over his own creations, overseer of all things that in any way are or come to be, judge of works and counsels. For if no judgment anywhere occurs of what has been done by human beings, humans will have nothing more than the irrational animals; rather, those who subdue their passions and care for piety and justice or the rest of virtue will fare more wretchedly than even those animals, while the brutish or bestial life will be best, virtue foolish, the threat of justice broad laughter, the service of every pleasure the greatest of goods, and the common doctrine of all these and the one law will be what is pleasing to the licentious and lustful: "Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die." For the end of such a life is not even pleasure according to some, but complete insensibility.

If, however, there is some care on the part of the maker of human beings for his own creations, and the just judgment of those who have lived well or ill is preserved somewhere, it must be either during the present life while those who have lived according to virtue or vice are still living, or after death when they are in separation and dissolution. But according to neither of the stated possibilities is it possible to find the just judgment preserved; for neither do the virtuous receive the rewards of virtue during the present life, nor do the wicked receive those of vice. I pass over saying that, while the nature in which we now exist is preserved, the mortal nature could not even bear the proportionate penalty for more or heavier offenses. For the bandit or potentate or tyrant who has unjustly slain myriads upon myriads could not discharge the penalty for these by a single death, and the one who holds no true belief about God, living in every outrage and blasphemy, disregarding divine things, overthrowing laws, outraging both children and women, unjustly razing cities, burning houses with their inhabitants, ravaging the land, and along with these destroying peoples and populations or even an entire nation—how could he, in a perishable body, suffice for the penalty proportionate to these acts, when death anticipates what is deserved and the mortal nature is insufficient even for a single one of the deeds? Thus neither during the present life is the deserved judgment manifested, nor after death.

Either death is a complete extinguishment of life, with the soul being dissolved and corrupted together with the body, or the soul remains by itself, indissoluble, undispersed, and incorruptible, while the body is corrupted and dissolved, preserving no longer any memory of its deeds or perception of its experiences. For if the life of human beings is completely extinguished, there will appear no concern for human beings who are no longer alive, nor any judgment of those who have lived according to virtue or vice; but the swarm of lawless life and the absurdities that accompany it will again be introduced, along with the chief of this lawlessness, atheism. But if the body is corrupted and each of its dissolved parts goes to its kindred element, while the soul remains by itself as incorruptible, even so there will be no place for judgment concerning it, since justice is not present; for it is not lawful to suppose that any judgment from God and by God occurs to which justice is not attached. And justice is not attached to the judgment if the one who performed the justice or the injustice is not preserved; for the one who performed each of the deeds in life for which judgment occurs was a human being, not the soul by itself. And to speak comprehensively, this argument will preserve justice in no case. For if achievements are honored, the body will clearly be wronged, having shared with the soul in the labors for what was striven after, but not sharing in the honor for what was accomplished; and the soul often obtains pardon for certain offenses.

of cares due to the body's need and necessity, but the body itself falls away from sharing in the rewards for the achievements for which it bore the labors together with the soul during life. Moreover, when transgressions are judged, justice is not preserved for the soul if it alone pays the penalty for those offenses which it committed while the body was troubling it and drawing it toward its own appetites or movements—sometimes by seizure and theft, sometimes by a more violent compulsion, and at other times by concurrence in the way of favor and service to the body's constitution. Or how is it not unjust for the soul to be judged by itself for those things for which it has, by its own nature, no appetite, no movement, no impulse whatsoever—such as lust, violence, greed, injustice, and the wrongdoings that follow from these?

For if most such evils arise from people’s failure to control the disturbing passions, and these passions are disturbed by the body’s need and necessity and by the care and attention given to it (since all acquisition and, before that, use, as well as marriage and all actions in life, in which and concerning which both the faulty and the not-faulty are observed, are for the sake of these), where is the justice that, in matters where the body is primarily affected and draws the soul into sympathy and partnership in the actions toward which it is moved, the soul alone is judged, and that the appetites and pleasures, as well as fears and griefs, in which all that is immoderate is liable, have their motion from the body, yet the sins arising from these and the punishments for the sins are borne by the soul alone, which neither needs such a thing nor desires it nor fears it nor suffers anything of the kind by itself such as a human being is naturally subject to suffer? But even if we posit that the passions belong not to the body alone but to the human being, speaking correctly because the life of the human being is one from both, we will surely not claim that these belong to the soul when we examine its own nature purely. For if it is entirely without need of any nourishment, it would never desire those things which it does not at all need for its existence, nor would it ever set out after those things which it is not at all naturally suited to use; nor would it be grieved by a lack of money or possessions, since these do not pertain to it. And if it is also superior to corruption, it fears nothing at all as destructive of itself.

For it fears neither famine nor disease nor mutilation nor injury nor fire nor iron, since it can suffer nothing harmful or painful from these, as bodies and bodily powers do not touch it at all. But if it is absurd to attribute the passions to souls alone, then to assign the sins arising from these and the punishments for them to souls alone is exceedingly unjust and unworthy of the judgment of God. Moreover, in addition to what has been said, how is it not absurd that virtue and vice cannot even be conceived apart from the soul (for we know that virtues are human virtues, just as the vice opposed to them is not of a soul separated from the body and existing by itself), yet the honor or punishment for these is borne by the soul alone? Or how could one conceive of courage or endurance in a soul alone, when it has no fear of death, of wound, of mutilation, of loss, of outrage, or of the pains or suffering arising from these? How could one conceive of self-control and temperance, when no desire draws it toward food or intercourse or other pleasures and delights, nor does anything from within disturb it or anything from without provoke it? How could one conceive of prudence, when there are no matters of what ought and ought not to be done, nor of what is to be chosen and avoided, set before it—indeed, when it has no motion at all or natural impulse toward anything that ought to be done?

But where, in any sense, is justice toward one another or toward anything else of the same kind or of different kinds fitting for souls, when they have neither from what source, nor through what means, nor in what manner to apportion what is according to worth or proportionally equal, apart from the honor due to God, nor do they otherwise have impulse or movement toward the use of their own or toward abstention from what belongs to others, since the use of things according to nature and abstention are observed in things naturally capable of using, while the soul neither needs anything nor is naturally capable of using anything or anyone, and for this reason even the so-called proper function of parts cannot be found in a soul so constituted? And indeed that is the most irrational of all: to apply the laws ordained for humans, but to turn the penalty for what has been done lawfully or unlawfully only upon souls. For if the one who received the laws would justly also receive the penalty for lawlessness, and it was a human, not a soul by itself, that received the laws, then a human must also undergo the penalty for sins committed, not a soul by itself; since God did not ordain for souls to abstain from things that do not pertain to them, such as adultery, murder, theft, plunder, dishonor toward parents, and generally every desire that arises for injustice and harm to neighbors. For neither is the command "honor your father and your mother" fitting for souls alone, since such names do not pertain to them; for it is not souls that generate souls and claim the appellation of father or mother, but humans generate humans.

Neither, then, could the command "Thou shalt not commit adultery" ever be properly spoken or conceived with reference to souls, since in them there is no distinction of male and female, nor any aptitude for union, nor any desire for it. And with no such desire, union is impossible; and where there is no union at all, there is no lawful union, which is marriage; and with no lawful union, it is impossible for there to be the unlawful desire or union that takes place with another's wife, for that is adultery. Nor is the prohibition of theft or the desire for more fitting for souls; for they have no need of those things which those who are in need, through natural deficiency or necessity, are accustomed to steal and plunder, such as gold or silver or an animal or anything else suitable for food or shelter or use; for everything that is desirable to the needy as useful is useless to an immortal nature. But let the more complete discussion of these matters be left to those who wish to examine each point more diligently or to contend more ambitiously with those who disagree; for us, what has just been said is sufficient, and since the resurrection is confirmed in agreement with these things, to dwell further on the same points would no longer be opportune. For we have not made it our aim to omit nothing that could be said, but to indicate summarily to those assembled what they ought to think concerning the resurrection, and to proportion the arguments leading to this to the capacity of those present.

Having examined in some detail the matters set before us, it would remain to consider also the argument from the end, which is already indicated in what has been said, but requires only so much further attention and addition as not to seem, by leaving something of what was said a little earlier unmentioned, to harm the hypothesis or the division made from the beginning. For the sake of these things, then, and of the objections that will be raised in addition to them, it would be well to note only this much: that there must be an end proper to each of the things constituted by nature and of those produced by art, as both the common understanding of all teaches us and the things that revolve before our eyes bear witness. For do we not observe one end set before those who farm, and another before those who practice medicine, and again one thing for plants that grow from the earth, and another for the animals nourished upon it and generated according to some natural sequence? If this is evident, and if the natural or artificial powers and the activities arising from them must necessarily be followed by the end according to nature, then by all necessity the end of human beings, as belonging to a distinct nature, must be separated from the commonality of others; since it is not lawful to posit the same end for those who lack rational judgment and for those who act according to innate law and reason, employing a life of prudence and justice. Therefore, neither would freedom from pain be the proper end for them, for even those entirely without sensation would partake of this; nor would the enjoyment of things that nourish or delight the body, nor a multitude of pleasures; for then the brutish would necessarily take precedence.

life, but the life according to virtue is incomplete. For this end, I think, is proper to cattle and grazing beasts, not to human beings who use an immortal soul and rational judgment. Nor indeed is the blessedness of a soul separated from the body; for we were not considering the life or end of either of these from which the human being is composed, but of the composite of both; for every human being who has obtained this life is such, and there must be some end proper to this life. If the end belongs to the composite, and this end can be found neither while they are still living in this life, due to the reasons already frequently stated, nor when the soul is in separation, since such a human being does not exist when the body is dissolved or even completely dispersed, even if the soul remains by itself, then it is absolutely necessary that the end of human beings appear according to some other constitution of the composite and of the same living being. And since this follows necessarily, there must certainly occur a resurrection of the bodies that have died or even been completely dissolved, and the same human beings must be constituted again; for the law of nature does not posit the end simply or for any random human beings, but for those very ones who lived in the preceding life, and it is impossible for the same human beings to be constituted again unless the same bodies are restored to the same souls. And for the same body to receive back the same soul is impossible in any other way, but is possible only through resurrection; for when this occurs, the end appropriate to the nature of human beings follows.

The end of a rational and intelligent life one would not err in saying is to continue uninterruptedly with those things to which the natural reason is primarily and most intimately attuned, and to rejoice unceasingly in the contemplation of the giver and of what is pleasing to him. Even if the majority of human beings, being more passionately and vehemently attached to things here, fail to attain this end. For the multitude of those who fall short of their proper end does not invalidate the common allotment, since the examination of these matters is individual, and the honor or penalty for lives well or ill lived is measured out to each.