Treatise of Treatises, Book 2

Pragmateia of the Twofold. That which is called the Treatise of Natural Things. Preparation. First Chapter: On the Theories of Accidents for Every Body. Second Chapter: On Simple Bodies and Those Lacking Composition. Third Chapter: On the Species of Souls. First Chapter. On the Theories of Accidents for Every Body. First, on the Substantiality of Body, its Essence, and its Properties. What, then, is the essence of body? When it is that which of those necessary things that are opposed to it, it is. Its essence is not in the same manner. In that it is not at all perceived. For sense perceives only those things. That it does not enter into its essence like extensions and creations, it is assisted only by sense towards the perception of being. When it is not that all perceptions of being ought to be taken from the senses. And it is indicated that it is a substance, something by which three dimensions can be measured. And the dimensions are not its properties. In that when many changes occur to it, not one change affects its nature. Like whiteness, for example, that when it is found in not a small extension, in its corporeality it receives no change at all. In that it is a body. And again, extensions, when they are accidents, are from the category of quantity, where properties are of the substance whose nature is body. And also properties are of that body which is defined, which is also an accident like them. Except that it is a sign of the sign of quantity. Spirit and individuals, from the beginning, that this is from properties, is composed not accepting division in thought together and in action, that which is known by divisible demonstrations. Demonstration: What, then, is that which fell in the middle to a place, or ceased those which are on its sides from that which meets? Behold, it is divided.

in which each one of these that are upon bodies from the accidents that are in the middle meets that which is in the middle. That is, it is not that one other meets, but rather also these meet. Therefore they do not cease. It is necessary that these meetings upon their parts one with another. And if the meetings are equal to them and the possibility of that middle and its concealment. And it is necessary again that it enters into it the causes. And that the possibility of substances is not from the augmentations of the body. For if it were right that every body in the world in every body in it touches and acts, there would not be that which ceases, and thus limits, measures, and magnitudes would be removed. And it would be right that nothing would cease of the circuits of the sphere in the east, something would be considered by reason. And it is clear that all are perceptible. Another demonstration: For the sun, when it is in the middle, something indivisible in the sky moves. The shadow of the gnomon, something or like it, another middle on the earth moves. That which is perceptible. In that it is necessary then that the place over which the shadow passes be equal to that over which the sun passes. And sensation witnesses to the falsehood. Or it does not reach that which also is perceptible. In that the accidents see its equality. And when both equalities are divided, they are perceptible. It is necessary that the shadow upon the middle be very much smaller than that which the sun moves. And thus that which is indivisible is divided, it is understood. Another demonstration: For the outer circuit of a millstone is clearly very much wider than the inner one. And when the outer moves upon the middle something indivisible, if the inner moves upon its like, both circuits are found to be equal. That which is perceptible. Therefore the remainder that is upon the middle is very much smaller than that which the inner moves. And thus it is divided, and again it is not possible that the inner does not move.

in which it is necessary that at that time the stone be divided and its parts be separated, just as the motions are from the movements. These, then, are the divisions that are continuous. Solution and resolution: It is not said that if there is no magnitude that is not divisible, there is also no point. And your teaching concerning it in the physical sciences is nullified, in that it is said that a point is something conceptual, that is, something that cannot be found with it and for it in actuality. But the word here is about these, that in actuality there is a magnitude and from these there is that which is true of the parts in every body, like those that are not divisible and he errs concerning it. In that every magnitude that is not divisible is with the principles that are in it, a magnitude that is divisible in kind, nothing prevents that which is raised from that which is not divisible from the magnitudes that are divisible. And it is composed from them a body, something that is divisible into its parts. And thus its final limit, that is, the whole, is nullified. And again, clearly, the body that is composed, when it is mixed with another that is not divisible in its parts, is known from that. It is fitting for it to be with the divisible towards the divisible in magnitude. And when their magnitudes are equal, the principles are such that also the measures of their parts are equal. Otherwise, an addition of parts would not be proper for an addition in magnitude to be made, which is continuous. And thus it is necessary that from the divisibility of magnitudes there is the divisibility of measures. And the confession that is not divisible is nullified. Demonstration: And from these it is to be known that every body can be divided without end in actuality. If it is receptive of division either in thought or not receptive of it in actuality, with the limit of the whole like the change of accidents that are not moved in nature or in the change of the forms of species, and it cannot ever receive division. With a magnitude that is not also itself such that it can be divided.

Solution and resolution: It is not said that it is fitting that the measure be equal to the whole in magnitude, since equality without limit of division is that which is possible. For it is said that the divisions that are not continuous, like these, do not exist in actuality, such that they can be conceived except by force. And this is evident from the fact that it is possible to conceive of infinite numbers of motions, in the same manner and infinite tens of motions. And it is not necessary that equality be a motion of ten to that of a thousand, just as equality is without limit. Demonstration concerning the motion of these and the rest. And it is necessary to know that body is a receiver of substance and of accident. And substance cannot receive the accident that is its opposite, that is, its privation, since the receiver must remain with the received. And substance with accident cannot remain, nor again is substance the same as its receptive nature, since it is either a receiver or it is not. And both are possible. For in truth, the one that is last becomes the receiver of that which is called matter and the received that which becomes substance, and the rest. Demonstration: And each of them is not separable in actuality, such that one can stand without the other, as is shown. And concerning the non-creation of these, and the rest, from these: Demonstration: And if matter could stand without the rest in actuality, then plurality and not one could be conceived in it, since this one cannot be without quantity. And behold, there is no one that is quantity that is the rest. It remains, therefore, that it be one. And this one, when different rests are added to it, if one of them ceases, does the other also cease? They are found to be different that do not differ, that which is possible.

It is evident that that solution is not the other solution. Here are the definitions of the terms. And the division is that which is possible, not the measure. Demonstration: If again matter without form were able to subsist in actuality, while two bodies of equal forms are considered in their formalities, their matters are either distinct or united. And how can they be distinguished when there is no distinguisher? And if united, it is necessary that simplicity, mixture, and composition be united. In that unity, and not one side of these, can be as demonstrated. And thus the formal causes that were posited. Demonstration: And when matter is not capable of being actual without form, in the same way form is also known. For that form is either not in place or not a magnitude. For every magnitude is necessarily such that there are two limits in it. And every limit is necessarily such that it is toward an extremity, which is not toward the other. It is evident, therefore, that place is body. And of body, nothing is other than the subsistence of matter. And form was shown previously. Proof: And when thus the species of equality are, they cannot be causes of each other. For the first cause in nature must be cause of the effect. And it is shown that each of them is not prior to the other. Nor can form, which is prior, be a cause, for the accident that is magnitude is of nothing. The remainder, therefore, is that the other be a third establishing them together. Proof concerning the finitude of magnitudes: For knowledge, it is necessary that every actual magnitude be finite, as demonstrated. Demonstration: If some magnitude is posited as infinite, it is not possible that from its middle a finite measure be raised.

And the one in the discussion of the limits of the continuum is that and its parts are between. And it takes another continuum, not finite, apart from the interval. And its parts are complete. And the two of them are measured together. And it is not possible that the continuum between should be equal to the complete continuum. Otherwise, the deficient would be found to be that which is not deficient, which is absurd. Therefore, it is necessary that the continuum between be finite in the measure of the complete continuum. And the complete continuum is greater than it by that finite measure which was added, and everything greater than a finite thing by a finite measure is finite. Demonstration: And a body from a simple one does not suffice for the existence of matter, in that there is not one body that is simple in actuality. For if it existed, then it would be necessary that it receive division and form. And it would leave it either infinitely or finitely, or it would not receive division at all. And by which of the kinds it would be found, it would be compelled that it not be found in other kinds, in that it would receive it by nature. And in this nature, it is generic and not one specific difference between bodies. And when from them, from those that are infinitely divided, from them, however, not infinitely. From them, however, and not at all, that generic nature, that is, simple corporeality, entered into them. Nor again can this be found, in that there is not one body in actuality apart from the natures that were mentioned. And when every body from the definition of the finite becomes in its extensions, definitions, quantities, and forms are attached to every body. Demonstration: And limits from not entering enter into the substances of bodies, in that there is a time for the corporeality of a certain body to be confirmed, when it is determined whether this limit exists or not. Intention, and that from which it is possible to say that a point by its motion made a line.

The continuum is to extension, and this is to body, as the limits of their concepts are said. And otherwise, whenever one of these is moved in place, it is necessary that the place of extension which precedes it be the interior of the body upon which the motion occurs. And when the body is prior to the motion of each of them, it is as if by their motion it comes to be. And the demonstration concerning surfaces. It is proper to know that surfaces are differences through which the movements are varied. For it is said that it is moved to a surface and not moved to another. And if the surface were not, it would not be as if shown by a finger; nor would movements be directed toward it. And this movement is not like the movement of body from blackness to whiteness, in that the one with which the motion is found is changed by motion. Here, however, the thing found is that with which motion is found; that is the surface. And surfaces, like natures, are such that above and below cannot be by emptiness or fullness of waters, and are bounded by the extremity of their difference. For when they are similar, this one is above, that one is below, for it is necessary that they be bounded by difference. And the demonstration concerning body is bounded by surfaces. And surfaces, if not in body alone, can be bounded. For in this one surface alone is bounded, and for every movement there are two surfaces: that from which and that towards which. Nor in two bodies, for if they were participants in a limit, like the container and the contained, or like two bodies in a proper surface, one of them would enter into the other. And there is no surplus from its possibility in the boundedness, or if they were foreign limits, behold the bounding of limits is like surfaces without their cause.

The continuum, then, is that which, when a body is terminated by surfaces, is not so by virtue of being one, but by virtue of something circular being like that which is terminated by proximity with the circle. By distance, however, which is in the center and the circle from the center equally to the center. The center, then, is to the circle and not to the limit, in that it is possible to conceive circles without limit in power upon one point. Nor again by the limits of the circular is it possible to terminate surfaces, in that like things are similar. An example concerning the resistance of bodies: and a body, when it is moved, is perceived in it that resistance which is that of the foot upon its walking ground. And it is not the movement itself that is that resistance, in that even he who is at rest perceives this same thing. And every body, when it is in its natural place, it is not fitting that resistance be to it except already not towards it, in that it is in it. Nor from it, in that it is naturally sought. It cannot naturally be fleeing. Nor can a body separated from resistance be conceived from this end. Demonstration: if there were a body separated from resistance, it would naturally be moved perpetually, in that natural motion is by resistance. Nor again continuously, in that it is possible to conceive then two bodies, one separated from resistance and the other in the midst of resistance, and both upon an equal surface for a certain limited time. From the thickness of that which is like coal for the time of the conjunction of one with the time of the conjunction of the middle, which is the thickness of the limit. For otherwise it is not possible to find another body complete of the limit which is the weight of the middle of its weight. And its movement also to it in it when upon the surface towards that time.

It is evident that in the determination of the time of the agreed-upon meeting, that also is determined. And it is found that the letter reaches clearly from weight, and the weight completes the letter, that in one equal time with one equal edge, the limits of something are determined, that which is contiguous. Nor again can it be said that it is not by time that that limit is reached. For it is said that the limit from the beginning to the middle of its extension is a limit. From the beginning of motion up to the end of its extension it becomes. And the priority and posteriority that are in that motion are divided only by time, and cannot be. Clarification: And when it has been well shown, the impossibility of the non-continuity of extensions. And that in a circular manner, only with a body can surfaces be limited. This, then, should not be in a place. For that which is with it has no place that can be. Nor is there a surface above it with which a straight perpendicular can be. The remainder, then, is that perpendicular, the circular one, and the variations of the limited. They are not by its parts. When they are together, they are understood, for there is nothing outside it. The remainder, then, is that in the understanding of that which is within it, they are. That is the one that is at rest. As the two types differ in the understanding of being with each other. And that from the limited, from the end of its simplicity, it became that circular schema. Clarification: For a body is that which becomes and is destroyed when it casts off some form and puts on another. From the beginning of motion, it is moved straight. For if in its own place it casts off its form. From the beginning, in the place it is that which is suitable to be clothed. Then in its own place it puts on. From the beginning, it is moved from its first place to that one. And a body from the limited, when that circular perpendicular reaches it.

It is not receptive in a fixed manner to being and corruption from the end, not by its receptivity to that rightness of the faculty of prayer. In that one measure and the same, while it is from the measures, it is to seek measure-wise that which is defined measure-wise. For it is not receptive to being and corruption. Nor is it established. In that this same again by motion is a right motion that is not receptive to it in measure. The demonstration concerning place. And concerning place, there are four indications: The first is from the mutual relation of body with another. The second, however, is the impossibility of the being of two or many bodies together in that which is one of them. The third, again, is the conjunction of the daughter of the voice that is in it. And that when it receives its meaning upon it. The fourth, again, is that it changes according to changes in surfaces. And some said that place is these. Others, however, said it is form. Others, again, said that it is that upon which body rests. And these from the first two are not place. In that it is necessary then that body be in one of its measures, that of rest. Nor is that third one place. In that there is not one of the indications that are enumerated in it that are found. Spirit and others again said that place is void, and its limit is that it is a certain extension that can receive in it the three dimensions of bodies, while it is not these. And it is filled from body. And some from the mutual relation of its power to its void from bodies. And these from outside the world of its power. And that without end it is extended and to rest from this conception was previously known. And the sum is to say its existence from these that are not able to be by these.

The demonstration: if emptiness were receptive of bodies, this middle of bodies would be more distant, and it would be right that it be from that which is in the middle of near ones. But it is not that it is not dimension; rather, it is quantity. It is not nothing. And of quantity there is no subsistence; it is not possible that it be from the end, its accidental nature being manifest. Rather, it is empty of the body in which it would be. And it is contended that emptiness is a body, and it is posited that it is not a body, that which is empty. And again, if as has been shown, if it is a body, it would be right that when bodies are dissolved in it, if it receives them, a body is found in a body, and this emptiness is shown. If, however, it does not receive them, behold, it is not a place. Chrysis: For the rising of heavy bodies that float on the surface of water, there is no other cause, apart from the impossibility of the existence of emptiness, since from the impossibilities it is that air is separated from that earthy body, and nothing is between them. For the air holds that heaviness until the waters are in the middle, so that it is separated in that manner, and the sinking of earthly bodies is by the possibility of the known impossibility of emptiness. Rather, from the bond of the air, which is compressed so that it clings, and that body which previously was not moved toward that surface, and when it is a place, it is not emptiness, nor are these which remain of what was measured. The remainder, which is the general extension of the body, is that which holds that which clings to the external extension of the body, and by it these four concepts that were mentioned are contended together. Clarification: because of the impossibility of two corporeal worlds, for these, even if it is fitting that they exist, either within are measured some surfaces, or not so, and it is not possible that they be in one measured thing.

And in each one of them, that which is in the other. In that it is necessary that two of their centers be for one circle. As surfaces are bounded. And it is necessary again that two natural places be for one limit. For when it is distinguished by its difficulty, one of them either inclines to both of them, or to neither one of them. And both are false. Or to this one from the middle, but not to that one. And how are both equal to it? Nor again is it possible that they be without being bounded. For circles cannot surround without emptiness between them. And emptiness is that which is not. And if it is said of bodies that they are filled, from the necessity that for every body there is a boundary of its dimensions, and it is established that this is not that which is false. And from these it is clearly shown that circular boundary is something that fills from the circular. Those which surround each other are contiguous without emptiness between them. And all this which is called the world is one circle, that is, a spherical body, a cycle. Demonstration concerning motion. Motion is defined as the exit of something from potentiality to actuality without ceasing. And it is this that is local, like change from place to place, or position, like alteration of qualities of that which moves without rest, by change of position. And this is like the motion of this whole which is not in a place, or quantitative, like motion in the category of increase and decrease. And a body moves towards a greater measure, or when its quantities are increased, and this motion is called growth, or not so, and is called diminution, in the same manner towards a smaller measure, or by decrease of quantities and is called diminution, or not so, and is called continuity.

or substance is like that by which a body is moved from place to place little by little. And the motions are from those three primary ones. All their changes are motions. In that they cannot be except in time. In substance, however, there is sometimes a change apart from motion, such as a will that changes or a teaching that is forgotten. And because of this, the change in substance that occurs is corruption and destruction, not motion. In that it does not occur in time but instantaneously. In that a body that begins to be destroyed, if not instantaneously, is destroyed gradually. That which is destroyed, if it is from that which is substance, it also is substance. And behold, it is already destroyed. If, however, it is not from that, behold, the destroyer does not reach it. In that every motion is in time, and every time is divisible. That which is instantaneous, however, is not in time, because it is indivisible; otherwise it would not be instantaneous. Every division of a body is either from something external that moves and cuts it, or from a power within it. And this is whether its motion and cutting are natural in one direction only, and its mover is nature, or in different directions, and its cutting is voluntary and its mover is the soul. Manifestations and demonstrations: A body, for it is not by that which is a body that it is moved. But every body is moved. Nor again is change the time of a body. In that when it is moved, it makes it; it is not the body that makes it, since it already has corporeality. In that it is from something external to it that it comes to be. And again, when motion is simple, it is new. If body were its cause, it would have to be renewed before it. And behold, it is not so. In that that to which motion belongs is the body.

ce, or substance, is like that by which a body is moved from place to place little by little. And the motions are from those three primary ones. All their changes are motions. In that they cannot be except in time. In substance, its potentiality is greater than its actuality in the measure of its nature, that which is moved. When it is not attained naturally, it is separated from it. It was separated, however, from the beginning not by its nature but by a limit. Therefore it is not substance, but accidents are with it. And the potentiality of that and its actuality are not in its nature with it, that it should be moved. For every nature, when it is from every limit, nothing moved ought to be. And because of this, there is not even one body that can be moved without end, as the philosophers supposed concerning the earth. For first the impossibility of the infinity of dimensions was demonstrated. Otherwise it would not be right that a small body should overtake that heavy one when together they are moved from a mountain. The demonstration concerning time: to know the necessity that between the beginning of every motion and its end there is some time, and it is possible that there be another motion that is slower than that one and begins with it. For it does not reach that time, but after that one is reached. In that same manner it is possible that there be another motion that is faster than that one, and when it begins with that one, before the time is reached, it ceases. Thus it is possible that there be another motion equal to it, and it begins from the middle of the course and with it reaches the time. And thus a quarter of that and a third. Behold, here are found quantitative possibilities, not qualitative, many. For the quantity of possibilities is not the quantity of the moved or of place. For there are times when the measures of motions change without a change of time, like an elephant and a mosquito when they move equally. In that same manner, there are places that change without a change of time, like two of them that in that same time are moved from one mile.

The many, then, are not even motions, that is, measures, of change and haste. For this motion from east to the middle of the sky is equal to that from it to the west. And the times vary. And when these measures cannot be measures of continuous actions, but of that which can never be increased in the continuity of this motion of movement. It was said properly that time is the measure of movement according to its priority and posteriority. These are things that cannot be together. Example: And now what is the limit of something for time in which its parts are joined together like the conjunction of the past and the future. And this is not time, nor a part of time, but only its limit. Otherwise, nothing of the present moments would be joined together in succession. A measure of something of movement would be composed from them, and then it would be found for movement a part that is indivisible, that is, the instant. Demonstration: If there were an indivisible movement, which one would it be in place? For place is either divisible or not. But it was shown that there is no place that is not divisible. Solution and resolution: It is not said that when something is now in motion, it is either at rest or in motion. And when it does not receive rest, it is in motion. And it is necessary that its measure now be that of movement. Therefore, it is not time. For it is said that it is never in motion in it.

We say again: How can a body be something that neither rests nor is moved? They say that this is not possible, while that by which motion is determined from those which are not in actuality would be as now. Clarification: And time is not the measure of motion itself, but of circular motion. For that cannot be extended to infinity, nor be cut off at a point of arrest. But as also the necessity between both motions, some time of rest is found. Demonstration: For every mover, when it reaches a limit, arrives at motion by actuality. That is, it ceases from that by which it arrives. For if again time were of another discourse, and it reached another limit, it is evident that now that by which it arrives is other than that by which it does not arrive. Therefore, from the point of arrest between two nows, time of rest occurs, because the nows and time cannot be united and compounded from them, as was shown. Clarification: And time is determined by the manifestation of motions, by which daily motion is measured, and by which motions are measured. As also when they are measured, they are either simultaneous or divided into hours, months, days, and moments. And rest, when it is something of brevity, is accidentally measured by time, because it is thought that if it were moved, it would be moved in it, either thus or thus. Clarification: And body is not said to be in time because it is body, but because it is moved. And actions are not very changeable like these natural ones. And those which change in some and persist in some, like bodies with time, are not said to be in time, but are.

And the solution of that which is with time is called with time in continuity forever. And the solution of that which is not in time is with that which is not in time, and is called perpetuity. And when time is a measure, that which is moved is that which is not perceived in this, nor can it be perceived as the days of many years and one day are considered. Second Return On these simple bodies and these lacking composition Every simple body either receives composition or does not receive it. And that which does not receive is limited to surfaces. And these are with it. For composition is by means of regular motions, as in the case of the elements to their nature. For in them simple qualities come together to form a bond. And the reception of composition and its dissolution, either in a moist manner and is called wet, or in a dry manner and is called dry. And apart from these, there is no one power that can affect all bodies placed in being and take hold of corruption. The powers, however, are the agents for every body from these that hold them: heat and cold. And this, from its being, is a certain quality which, when it prevails over the motion of circular direction, brings to the body in which it comes. And because of this, it is something dispersive and dissipative, likewise terrifying and destructive. That, however, is a certain quality which, when it prevails over the motion of straight direction, gathers bodies in which it comes. And because of this, it is something cohesive and binding, and gives spirit. Division: Every motion is either toward the center, as for the heavens, or toward the center and indicates heaviness, or from the center and indicates lightness.

of the elements, which are not without heat or cold. And these four are called operations and affections. When together with one another, four operations are formed: heat with dryness and with moisture; similarly, cold with both of them. And dryness with each of these operations, when weight or lightness is added to it. Thus the four become elements: light and mobile, like fire; and not mobile, like air; and heavy and mobile, like earth; and not mobile, like water. And for heat, with air, its levity is known upon the surface of water. And for the abundance of its moisture, the subtlety of its consistency in every form. And in its softness of all of them. Solution and dissolution: it is not said that air without motion hovers above water, but that it is stirred with them. In that which is said, that it would be fitting that the larger piece of wood, which is large, not the smaller, would float better upon the surface of water. When both together are equally disposed to be immersed, that the smaller, which is less, would be more stirred. And behold, it is not so. Demonstration: And the substances from the four that were mentioned are the mothers of all substances that are tangible. And to them, the qualities. And to the operations, sharpness and bluntness. And tastes and smells and colors. To the affections, softness and hardness, and fluidity and solidity, and roughness and smoothness. And these, when from the mixture of these, are generated not for every body the qualities. For not one is the species of composition for all of them. But rather, the two are known separately.

Demonstration: For each of these four there is a constitution by which its own matter and the possibility of its form, that is, the natural form which is not perceived, are established. For it is not absolutely the case that the perceptible qualities adhere. Nor are these their essential forms. For it is that sometimes they change while the substance remains one and the same, as water when it is heated or cooled. Again, heat and cold from these four receive increase and decrease. And if their forms were natural, it would be fitting that their substance also receive increase and decrease. And increase and decrease are indicative of the nature of substances. For it cannot be said that water, when it is colder, is more water than when it is heated. Therefore, it is not their forms. These natural forms, then, which are also called affections, when a change occurs, something adheres to them. For it is not absolutely the case that the qualities of destruction adhere to their bodies. And they are no longer constituted in their powers, like water that is evaporated, so that it is no longer water but air. The opposite of this is that when it is heated, and when it is said that water is hot or cold by nature, that same natural form to which coldness is required adheres. And quality with accident, when it is present, has the power to abolish the natural form and to bring about the opposite, making the matter of the form adhere to it. Demonstration concerning their change into one another: And these four change into one another, and air changes into fire, as is seen in the bellows. For fire increases greatly by means of the bellows, because this one changes its nature. And fire changes into air, as is seen in sparks and flames of fire, for these four, if they persisted in their fieriness.

that they are moved toward that ethereal place. For in what way should they be seen when they are elevated, even if their vapors are condensed? But it is not so. And water is changed into air, as is seen in them when they turn into vapor from the multitude of exhalations through agitation. And air is changed into watery nature, as is seen in the clouds that are condensed over the expanses of waters that have bound their waters, and not through voluntary motions. For in that case, these warm ones should have been more condensed by their own density. So it is also with those stony vessels. It would have been better if those stones that were placed over them had been condensed. But it is not so. For in what way is air condensed into clouds like these, that is, the one that is violently and coldly compressed and becomes water? In the same manner, many vapors are seen in various places, a certain vapor that is not from another place, having been brought and compressed and fallen, and all of it is watery vapor. And again, water is changed into earth, as is seen in various places. For clouds, when something of the nature of the earth's solidity falls upon the earth, they turn into a solid nature. And before they approach the earth, or are seized by that watery nature, they remain. Moreover, the changeability of fires into stoniness is also confirmed, as even now in various places there are certain stony substances that are in no way deficient in the specific forms of male and female, and of species and animals. It is also confirmed, again, that a mixture of tongues above in the air is compressed violently, and a specific form of something from earthly bodies and from aerial vapors, when bodies like this fall upon the earth, are formed.

that which at one time was found to have fallen, something resembling iron, whose weight was greater than one hundred and fifty litrai, as the last old man said, that event did not happen in its time. But earth is again dissolved into water, as the spreading out of the foundations is seen to be dug up. For in truth, it is one for all these, that their forms are cast off together and put on. And each one of them, in the first place, from that which is mixed with it in some substance, is changed. That is, through the mediation of this, it is changed into that which is not mixed with it in any way. The order of each one of them, the elements, in their simplicity, is not to be found in a hidden manner. And for earth, there are three orders. One is that which is near to fire, and it is dusty earth. After this order, however, is the muddy order, which is by means of the mixture of water in it. After it, moreover, is the upper order, upon which water is dominant. And from it, the surface is clear for slippery, moistened cracks. And because of this, it is also hard. And water is not to be found at all without the embrace of earthiness. And the seas, whether bitter or salty, are waters that are cut off by the embraces of earthly places that surround them. In that which, as long as it is not completely for the nature, that foreign element is changed, which ought to be thus. And water, to go around the earth from all its sides, follows its nature. But when some dry places are cut off by the intensity of the heat upon it, they are changed into its nature and are gathered in it, and they do not cease to be spread out upon it, and in it, the earth of these others, by reason of dryness. Some high places are found in it that are moistened from that which is held together with water. And in this, the foolishness of those animals that are of a dry nature is accomplished.

Again, mountains and seas were formed from the waters that were gathered. And because of this, something of bones, something of shells and mollusks are found in mountains. Again, from the violent winds, cracks in the earth, while in the middle of the two movements of the earth, they made hollow fissures. For also the winds, violently, as they blow strongly, from all sides they heap up dust and drive it to one place and pile it up. And thus mounds come to be around. And there is a time when this happens over villages. And because of this, there is a time when in the mounds something of vessels of gold, as it were, and of silver are found. And again, there are three orders of air: one is that which is near the earth and is mixed with the vapors that rise from it. And this is the second. In that which is near to abundance, it is warm from the rays of the sun. That which is beyond is cold from this. The second order is that which is above this. And the air is pure, not mixed with anything else. The third order is the fiery and ethereal air. In that it is in its vicinity, that of this. As for fire, it has only one order. In that it has no limit to its movement, it has the power to turn everything that is mixed in it. And fire, when it is not mixed with anything from these, will be very clear and not dark. And because of this, the rays of the sun appear to the planets as something like a sphere from the extremity of their invisibility. But they are very clear and bright. Like strong fire. In their midst, however, the rays are dark. Because of the mixture of earthly vapors in the fire, they are darkened. And from the extremity of its weakness, it is not able to destroy the air. But the heads of the planets, when the fire is much dispersed and the ethereal substance is very deep, appear.

A demonstration concerning the true nature of the change of elements, and bodies from their mutual actions, either by proximity or by contact, or by opposition of a sign. In that [case], like the melting of a mountain; in that, like its burning; and in this, like the heating of the sun. Outside of these, however, there is not a single action of one body upon another. And again, three causes of heat are found: one from the proximity of a hot body, that is, its nearness. And those who supposed that elements are these natural forms have completely denied elemental change, and they have determined that waters cannot be dissolved by fire, but only by the action of fiery qualities, when the form of coldness is without a preservative change. Thus also these other [qualities] and their own compounded mixture are from that which is said: for it is evident that when it is separated from all the power of the mixture of its qualities from the extremity of the force of coldness, it contracts and draws together the bodies above it. In that same manner, and a vessel that is suitable, how can fiery qualities enter into it for dissolution, when nothing of it goes out? And if their effort had been correct, it would have been fitting that that which is in vessels of baked clay or iron should be said and considered better than that which is in earthenware, but it is not so. And again, if waters were dissolved by the action of qualities, it would be fitting that in those channels the mouths of the vessels would never be dissolved, since they have no place from which the qualities of the water might go out, as in their place those fiery [qualities] are established. The cause of the second, however, is motion, as is seen in rubbing and friction.

And also water from the dews is somewhat colder than the marine waters and the ice and the hailstones, and from all the changes of the elements they said: that it is not by a natural motion that the mixture is moved, but by the expulsion of the elementary qualities that are hidden in bodies. And it is fitting that a rod should expel a spark from it, that is, the one that strikes its burning. And the foolishness, however, is not very fitting for it to be compared to that sound, in that if the mountain were like that hidden in it, how would it not be fitting that it should burn it while it is hidden in it, not outside of it? And how again would this not be dissolved in the cleft? And if again the addition were only the motion of those elementary qualities towards the creation of bodies, it would be fitting that through them a colder middle would remain. And behold, the whole lunar sphere is dissolved together by heat, and not by the fiery heat being dissolved. But it would be fitting that when it is at rest in the air, it would be dissolved more, as also in fire. Nor again from the extremity of the density of the mountain in the middle of that sphere does it dissolve through it, in that the mountain is towards the circumference, not towards its center, naturally. The cause, however, of the three is the solar ray, because it is strong, the light is strong, and also the heat. And this is known from the burning mirror, which is devoid of form, that is, the one that from all sides bends the rays towards its own center, so that opposite it is the sun. Because it burns that fire when it breaks in its middle. And the elements from the movement of bodies are hot and cold, solar rays, and because of this they are heated and are covered by many. For if bodies were able to receive heat from the sun, they would be generated.

And also the hot should have been cold, and in such a way that it is not receptive of the straight motions, whether hot or cold, that it could be cold in that manner, nor receptive of the dissolution of the temperate or the dry. Nor again should everything that heats the hot have been cold, as was demonstrated in the discourse on the motion of non-heat, which is within it and heats. And not even the moderate or the violent occurrences, something that happens to each other, that they adhere to each other, or the repulsions that flee from each other and are separated. And again, if a hot body were volatile, it would not move toward the center, but rather toward the circumference it should have moved. And it should have been, again, that from these bodies, the dry ones would be more strongly bent, not from the moist ones like water. In that way, it should have been that when the nature was hindered, it would not have been moved by motion. And it should have been that the multitude of its dissipation would have caused deficiency in that from which it was dissipated. And it should have been that it would descend along straight lines, not along changing lines. And it should have been that the entrance, which is of drunkenness, would have been considered the same as air. And the error of the hypothesis that all these adherences contradict the hypothesis of their predecessors. The remainder, then, of the volatile occurrence, something that is in bodies, when the opposites are placed toward the bright, which conquers all its brightness by its light through the medium of a body, something dense like air. And in summer, from the increase of much heat, when it adheres to the abundance of light. And light increases with it. In that which, in it, the opposition of the placed is naturally occurring in winter, from weakening through the weakness of light, its cause. That which also, from the end of the shortening of the bright, from that line in which it naturally occurs for the opposition of the placed, weakens.

And the elements from these are subject to something of the heavens. But that the luminaries are great, while from them things are produced slowly, as is seen in the rolling of the seas, the abundance of fruits, the ripening of fruits, the pulses of the blood in the arteries, the fevers of diseases, the fullness of houses and brains. And it is also known that heat is not from the sun as if it were from it. It would be fitting that the higher regions near it be hotter than those on earth. But it is not so. Evidence concerning the nature of mixture: For the knowledge of the essence of bodies, their mixture does not nullify their powers. And if it were not mixture, it would be not use but destruction and corruption. And mixture is an intermediate essence from simple essences that are opposed and diminish the qualities that occur. And when actions and passions from the extremes of their opposition are used in their time, this essence, which is dead in all occurring qualities, is established. And each of the elements acts according to its natural form. But it suffers in its own matter in that action and passion, while being changed, they are not able to be together at the same time, as a sword that cuts by its sharpness. But it is hard by its iron. And a compound of elements, or a mixture that acts like the heating of that which heat overcomes. And for this action, in its essence or by another power that adheres to the mixture, it is an action like this. If it is a single, small, proper quality established like the attraction of a magnet to iron, or the corruption of something by rays to the bodies of animals.

And if the operation of this kind were by mixture, it would be fitting that the simple elements be completed by a hand that had not yet been mixed with opposing elements, and would produce more. But behold, it is not so. Therefore, the power of the rays is changeable, and is called natural. And there is a time when the elements are found together with the presence of something of the qualities, as in the example. And the equality of the elements is not something accidental to the being of the mixture, in that there is a time when the lesser overcomes the greater in the mixture. For behold, the elements, with a lesser measure from the seed of the one who is more, that element which is completely bound in the place where the greater measure from the other is hindered. And when they say mixture, they ask whether it is possible or not possible for the ruler, in that from these, that which cannot be, as is shown, except according to that which follows the nature of the composition. Demonstration: A mixture with the ruler, whether it is possible that it is or becomes, it is not fitting that in one of the simple places it is more than in the other, since there is no excess towards that which is added to it. And if not, the ruler would not be possible. The remainder, therefore, is that either it is found in all of them together, or in none of them. And both are absurd. Therefore, that which is like this does not exist at all, but it is only a work of thought. And light: And in a mixture with each of the small elements, as the multitude of each of them meets with the multitude of the other. And thus operations and affections are completely used. Bodies from hard ones do not have such frequent meetings of their elements with each other, as these spirits which are like water, gently, therefore, towards the expanses, and many mixtures are restrained.

Demonstration: For each one, whether of heat or cold, when it acts in the nature of the body, it acts against its opposite in its depth. And the earth is hot in its hollows in winter. Not because heat flees from the cold that has prevailed over its surface, since on uniform bodies it is not fitting to argue. But because that heat which was sufficient to warm its nature together and its depth, while cold prevailed over its surface, acted and made it contract inward. For every natural agent, as it is acted upon, the more powerful it is, the more its action ought to be such that even a small hand, which is not able to do much, is stronger than a broad and spacious one. Demonstration concerning these things above in the air is natural. Heat, then, from the fiery element, or that elemental one, when it is something rarefied and volatile, when it is rarefied with moist things, it is called vapor; but that with dry things, smoke. And also not blackness occurs. And its ascent from dry things is more violent. From the end of the action of its cutting, and from vapor, from that which is slight, it is said not to be mixed with earthiness. But that which is heavy, and vapor from slight, when with the air it is cold, it is brought together, condensed, and bound, and smoke from it becomes of destruction and generation, likewise rain and snow. And these from cold that is very strong over the smoke prevail before it dissolves and rain falls. In the manner of a cloud of hail, that which is called snow falls. Then after the beginning of rain beneath, when in the form of drops it is formed, cold prevails over it as that.

and the heat meets the cold that is in the depths of the flood, and it boils and condenses into a vapor, and descends in the form that is called hail. As their angles are sharpened and extended, the heat from that motion, which is the hand that drives and turns them, and the vapors from those that are heavy, or the cold, something meets them before the dew and the rain descend. And if the cold were strong, in the manner of snow, it would descend thinly upon those vapors. And from the remainder that is left in the air, mist is formed. And the vapors from those that are near the earth are called, in a terrifying manner, hail or frost. And the vapor, as it is more condensed, becomes. This entire nocturnal condensation, as is seen in the bubbles that by the cold, from the smallness of the drop, something enters and their vapors are thickened, and they raise up watery blisters within themselves until even the floods and rains below. And as in many hot regions waters boil, so they are cooled. In that they thus become more cold and are made to be. There are also clouds, not only from the multitude of vapors, but also from the air that is thickened by the power of the cold, and from the air from the shadow and the thin clouds, a hard crust appears on the bodies. And this occurs from the reflection of the sun's rays upon the air that is shadowed by the cloud. And this does not complete a full circle, because if the circle were completed, the earth would fall beneath it. And this does not happen often. And the sun is in the middle of the sky. And if it were, it would be in a very small circle. And that which is in it, from the apex of the sun behind its head, would be, because as Paul says, something is its.

in the north, before the region of midday, it is seen in the west. After that, in the east, it appears on the side opposite the sun. Likewise, the circle is something that revolves around the moon. It occurs when the air that surrounds it is somewhat thin and dense, like a vision. In the north, when the brilliance of its brightness falls upon it, its form appears as a circular shape. And the vapor, as it rises, when it is covered by the force of cold, is forcibly driven downward to the face of the lower air and moves it, agitating it. And thus wind is produced. And there are times when, in its descent, a vapor like this encounters the last of what is ascending. And thus a whirlwind is produced. Moreover, whirlwinds and hailstones are produced from the collisions of two winds of different directions. And there are times when a wind meets something thick and, like a vapor, revolves it in the air. And a vapor like that, if it is gathered in some clouds, is forcibly moved upward, if it is overcome by heat, or downward, if it is overcome by cold. And thus, when it is violently forced, a violent sound is produced, which is called thunder. And by that violent motion, the nearby air is stirred. And thus lightning occurs. And that same vapor, if it becomes a solid body, when it emerges from the cloud, and by that more intense motion is ignited, while it is compressed, it melts gold and dissolves stones and the like, nor is it restrained by them from cutting and splitting them. And that which is like this is called a thunderbolt. And lightning is seen before thunder, and after it, it follows in nature, as I said, but not in time, because the sound, by the motion of the air, can reach the hearing. And since there is no motion without time, it is delayed in time. Sight, however, is not like that, as there is to demonstrate.

In the form of a circle, the shape of the blow of the short hand before every blow is perceived in a timely manner. And also together they are in time. And the sign, if it is perceived in a circular manner, reaches that same revolving circle. They are set in motion by that motion. In the form of that same halo, if it is up to the earth, all its parts, one after another, are moved in a circular manner. And thus the pillars of fire are seen from the earth towards the sky. And if it is violently cut off, it completely turns into a fiery circle and becomes invisible, as if it were extinguished, it is understood. For if the cause of its thickness is not violently cut off, and with it the circle of fire, with it the orbit revolves around the stars, these small ones are from it. And that sign, if it is within the sphere, turns while being moved. Red signs of terrible things are seen in the air. For if its fiery nature is extinguished, signs of black things are seen. And light upon those that are within the earth are kindled. Vapor, for that which is within the earth, is gathered. When they are thickened by coldness, they turn into the nature of water. In the form of a circle, if they have a filling, they are reached in a circular manner. Rivers flow. For if they do not have a filling, only those waters that are fixed are there. In that same manner, the signs that are gathered within the earth, when they are strong, they burst forth from it. When something from its parts is released at some time. And thus also hands and traps occur in the earth. And there are times when these signs from the end of the earth are moved by natural motions and are stirred up. And when they press towards the earth, they come forth. And thus fires in various places come forth from the earth. As in the islands of Alos and Bapira and Atri. In the regions, however, these same hot waters are renowned for their heat in the vicinity of the watery nature.

In the crucible, when the elements are heated from that which is its form to the earth, and in a qualitative manner they are seen. They are hidden, and in places like these, fragments and impurities are not found among the species. As in the temple of Delphos, as the philosopher recalls. As for vapors and fumes, those which by the weakness of their power do not reach the earth, and to escape they are compressed within mountains and lands, they are compressed. And when by the variation of the colors of mixtures they are mixed, according to the variation of regions, times, and climates, these bodies, lacking composition, are like scattered or buried things. And from fumes they are compressed. These bodies are not crystallized, nor are they dissolved together, nor are they dissolved individually, but are generated. Like sulfur and salt. And sulfur is when from fumes the signs are taken. Salt, however, from clay and ash, when together in water they are boiled, and they are filtered, and they are heated until they thicken. And from these, from which the vaporous nature overcomes the fumous nature. And when they are clear, they thicken. Pearls are generated, and hyacinths are not crystallized, and emeralds are not dissolved. And vitriol is from that which is from the mixture of vapors with fume and air. The complete mixture, which is the form of copper, is found. As for electrum, it is generated from the mixture of vapor with fume, vitriolic truly. And when vapor and fume are mixed together, a mixture close to metallic quality is produced. These bodies, the seventh, are generated from them. Like gold and silver and the rest. And the parents of all are electrum and vitriol. And bodies from those which do not dissolve nor are they separated, earthly nature overcomes. Like magnet and lodestone. And these are from that which is of their kind. Like iron filings. When with rust and vitriol they are arranged in a certain manner.

They are dissolved. And these, when they are dissolved, the watery quality does not remain upon them as a covering, as in glass. But those which are dissolved and separated, the substance of which is not completely bound, and a thick watery quality remains upon them as a covering. And these, when they are heated by fire, a fiery and burning quality remains upon them. And bodies, when heat binds them, are dissolved by cold, like salt. And those which cold binds are dissolved by heat. And stones, when they are solidified from a liquid which was hardened by heat, are not dissolved. The third chapter on the species of the souls. First, on that natural faculty. For in the faculties, from the works, something is made known, as in the case of growth and nutrition. These are things which, if they were found by corporeality, would be found in every body. But it is not so. It remains, therefore, that they are found by another cause which is proper to them. That cause is a certain natural form, which, by a perfect mixture from the elements, gives the primary forms to itself, and the natural faculty is called the soul. And it is the cause of works such as these, and of the substances from the elements, when they are not hindered in the perfection of that which is able to be for them. Nor again is there anything of them which is not dissolved. Nor again is it not subject to corruption. And the divine power, as is mysteriously great, is able to preserve the individuality of those which cannot endure substantially, because of these things, the whole faculty is necessarily established upon the three causes of works, which are some powers. And these are either the forms of nature which are able to change into a similar substance which is nourished, as in the case of the changes of the elements which are dissolved.

And that which is thus a potentiality is called "theoretical," or a potentiality that becomes an addition of its qualities in tertiary states, until it reaches the natural completion which is its own, and it is called "increasing" and "theoretical." Or a potentiality that becomes something that is able to distinguish some excess from that which is the cause of the possibility of another substance and is called "generative." And this, in the qualities of natures in substance, is for the sake of unity. In the qualities, however, as in trees, and in that same form and in animals, it is in two substances. For in that which is from potentiality there is passivity, but in that which is from actuality, and the generative from these two serves the rest. And for the theoretical, again, four potentialities serve: composition, I say, of theory and its maintenance until it is completed in act and solution, which by means of its mixtures of theory works to receive the opposite of the form that is being theorized. And of showing, that when it is not subject to being formed, and of the theoretical from another, it is from these two serving the rest, in that it remains after their cessation until the end. And the increasing is not the generative itself, in that it can exist while it does not cease, and all these, when they are potentialities of bodily natures, cannot endure forever as is shown. And the generative acts, while the increasing gives increase from the end of the extension of that which in growth was entering into the prior. And the theoretical endures until the time of its beginning, in that even the residue without interruption endures. And light upon the sentient soul and the elements, when from the mixture that is well completed from that of natures that are mixed, the completion of good from that which is received from above. For it, the sentient or animate soul, knows the word. And for this, the soul, after the flight of these natural potentialities.

The second of the natural powers is the cognitive and the motive. And this is a mover either by that which is impulsive or by that which is of action. And the impulsive is a potential power that, by means of cognitive sensation, or a power that is stirred, or a primary motion toward that which follows that which is desirous or that which flees that which is harmful. And in that, a small desire is called "appetite," but in this, "anger." And thus the rational and the impulsive are for that power the action of the motion that is commanded by it toward that which does it. And this itself is a power that resides in the spirits that are dense in the nerves and tendons and that serves to contract and to extend the tendons toward the joint or the limb. And the powers that are cognitive are divided in two ways: into external, I say, and internal. And the external are five: that is, the sense of touch, by which animality is more animal than the others. And its action is a power that resides in the skin that is spread over the whole body. It cognizes, then, by means of touch, when it suffers from the opposition of opposites, such as the four qualities: heat and cold, lightness and heaviness, roughness and smoothness, hardness and softness. And because of this, the physicians were divided, that it is not one power, since by different cognitions, different powers are indicated. And again, the sense of taste is a power that is arranged in the nerves that are spread over the body of the tongue, which, by the tastes that are in it, senses when they are mixed with the moistness of the saliva, the hand that is brought in their taste perceives. And again, the sense of smell is a power that is arranged in the two appendages that are before the brain, that is, the nipples of the breasts, which, by means of the air and the vapors that are carried in the air, senses.

and not by the palpability of the tangible qualities that are perceived from the objects that are moved, but by the transparency of the air, from which even from bodies that are very small, scents are carried to distant places, which if all their bodies were dissolved into these scents, they would not be able to reach them. And again from that which even hard bodies are carried, and from them again hearing, which is a power arranged in the nerve that is on the cochlear bone, which is within the ear, spread out. It perceives sounds and noises through the mediation of the air. And sound is an aerial vibration that occurs by means of a striker or a striking object, when the air is set in motion from a blow. And this vibration reaches the air that is within the ear, and imparts to it a similar form. And when it enters the skin, or rather the membrane that is spread over the delicate nerve, as over a drum it is stretched, something like a movement is generated and is perceived by the power of sensation. And from them again sight exists. It is a certain power that is arranged in the delicate nerves that are carried from the brain to the eyes, and to the forms of the crystalline humor. It perceives transparent and clear air, spirit, and illuminations; and that which is thought to be seen by the emission of a ray from the eye, which in the visible objects would be a kind of palpation, in that this, if it were a body, how could it be distinguished from that which is placed and strikes the visible objects without destruction? Or if it were a body, how could that which is confined in a small pupil be spread out over half of the entire world when it emerges? And again, it would be necessary that by its movement it would collide with these stars and would be destroyed by the motion of the spheres. And again, its motion or natural movement would have to be.

and not by the different palpable qualities ought it to have been moved, nor by will. By the air it ought to have been possible for them to be perceived together, and not to be seen when the eyes are open. And again, it ought not to have been the case that vision is altered by the distance and proximity of the visible objects. And again, it ought not to have been seen when the winds blow, in that which was being verified. And again, it ought to have been that these visible objects from the scattered bodies of the species are very far from those which would be seen in mirrors. And when all the surfaces are smooth, like them and the former are smooth, and the visible objects are from that which is placed far away, a small one is seen in that which, when a certain small spherical object is present, that by whose delineation vision is completed over the matter of smallness, in it falls the impression of the visible object according to its distance, as in the schema which is shown from below. Something is placed from the standing object, a concave object which is opposite it, that of the icy crystalline. And then the forms of the letters come out from it towards it onto the conical schema. And when on its sides the concave object is, the trigons are found, the lower ones wide and the upper ones narrow, whose heads are the small circle according to the smallness of the icy crystalline. By the air, as much as distance is added to the concave object, so all this is added to the cone which the icy crystalline has as a head. And to the base of the concave object, length; and to the angles, narrowness. And because of this, as the visible object recedes, the circle of the icy crystalline is narrowed. And thus a small one is seen. And from the senses, from those which are essentially found in every animal, touch is, as it is said, also taste. Those others, however, are when they are not hindered by anything from the animals. Section: And the senses from the body are in five powers, distinct, and are divided into three divisions.

One of the faculties of the imaginative perceptions is the second. And this one is second. And the first is that which is called the common sense. It is also the phantasia. And this one is a power arranged in the first ventricle of the brain, towards which all the sensible qualities are collected and perceived. And if it were not for this power, the perceptions would not be distinguished. For this is the power of discernment. And it is evident that it distinguishes the perceptions of that which is perceived simultaneously. And there are no external senses by which it can perceive the clarity of these things again. Thus, and from a point moving circularly in a wide circle, something is seen, and a line of a straight line is seen, and it is not necessary that it be seen clearly like these things, because this one, except for that which is placed opposite, cannot be seen. And from these, whether it is one point or a line placed fixedly like this, by the swift movement of the power, something else happens which brings with it the vision of the form in it, and through it is adorned visibly until another and another gradually adhere to it. And thus a circle or a line is composed. The second, however, is that which is called the imagination. And it is a power arranged at the end of the first ventricle (of the brain). And in it, qualities, as well as the form of all the sensibles, are collected and also adorned after their equality with the external senses and the phantasia. And this one is something of the phantasia, because in it the perceptions are preserved. And of the power of the opposite, it is not the same when it is known that it is of preservation, because not every recipient preserves. Just as water, from the side of moisture, receives qualities, and from the side of transparency and dryness, does not preserve. The division, however, of the second faculty of intellectual concepts and confirmations is the second. And this one also is second.

One of them is that which is called imagination. And it is a power arranged in the posterior part of the middle ventricle of the brain, and it perceives the non-sensible intentions that are present in the sensibles. And it composes the forms that are received from them, like the composition of the image of a wolf upon a sheep, and of a son upon his mother. The other power, however, is that which is called the recollective, and it is arranged in the other ventricle, that is, the third of the brain. And it preserves the received concepts, that is, the forms and the images. And this very one is the imagination, just as also the discourse is the phantasia. And these are the two powers of the imaginative perceptions. And the other two of the confirmative perceptions are, for each of them, a perceiver and a preserver. The third division, however, is that which is called the compositive, which combines forms with one another, and concepts with one another, and concepts with forms. And the power called the imaginative is directed toward the need of the imagination, and the cogitative toward the need of the intellect. It is arranged, then, in the middle ventricle of the brain near the pineal gland. Its function, however, is to combine and separate together, and to direct the two-headed or headless animals, and in its creation it is as if it were established without end in an hour or in a vigil. And through it the middle boundaries are formed, and the actions that occur in bodies are imitated, and the things known through the sensibles. And it runs from essences to essences, and from actions to the subjects of the opposites or the recipients in the subject. And for each of these organs, the spirit is something that is in it of its own. That is, the instrument of the composition, or the error of the power by which it is moved, whether it be a perceiver or something else. And this spirit is a subtle and warm body, which is generated from the subtlety of the humors, just as also the limbs are from their moisture. The heart, however, is the seat of the intellect.

And by its coldness the animal spirit is tempered. And when, by means of the arteries, it ascends to the brain, it is mixed with its coolness, and by means of the nerves it is distributed over the whole body, while the sensory and motor powers are conveyed to the members. And it is called the psychic spirit. And when, by means of the ducts, it reaches the liver of the head—that is, the place where all the natural powers are received—it is named the natural spirit. And the heart alone is simply the ruler. And if the brain did not receive its heat, it would be the head of the existence of the hot spirit; it would be very fitting that it be so. And since heat is something that cuts and disperses, while the brain is cold and moist, if it were hot, when the heat of the motions was added to it, it would be disturbed and agitated, not moderately. Galen and all the physicians did not think thus. And it is known that the spirit is corporeal, from the fact that when any member is blocked somewhat from the brain, sensation ceases. And it is also known from the fact that it passes through very narrow passages in the foramina, and it is led by the nerves to the recognition of the particularity of each of the organs by some power, by the closeness of their entanglement to their sensations, and by their arrangement for their health, and that diverse powers, and not one single power, are recognized. From the fact that each of them has its own proper activity in the absence of the other. Wakefulness: if the soul were a mixture, its activities would be seen more simply, since a mixture is nothing other than a composition of substances from simple substances and their intermediate, that is, the participation of their own. And if again the soul were a mixture.

It would be fitting that it be changed in the middle, just as that which is opposite to it is changed in respect of corporeality. And again, how can a mixture be possible such that it is the guardian of the mixture? While the bones are hidden, the veins flee from one another and the nerves towards the extremities, and light upon the rational soul. First, concerning its non-materiality: When you are asleep or awake or intoxicated, in that same manner, and when you are agitated, as if all your members were in fear. When you are deceived, you do not say "I". By this it is known that you are nothing from your bodily members, nor all of them. In the same manner, if you were something from those members which are seen, it could be said that you or something else would be fitting, that you would not be occupied with this inquiry. And if again you were something else from your members, the internal ones, it would be fitting that when one member is affected, you also would be affected. And that this is not so is evident, in that for each one of these, by means of a specific art, you can learn its form, and you yourself certainly know at all times. And again, if nothing were separated from your limbs, it would be fitting that you would attain a very great quantity of quantity, and behold, it is not so. And when you are certainly placed under separations, they are not the same when they are stable. You are not that same state of your essence, and there is never increase or decrease. Your self, then, is some royal and divine radiance, which is elevated above these, receiving corruptions and impressions (images). To it, the rational soul is called the Word, and it is interpreted that it is an essence not from these, nor is it in these. And from here it moves the body and directs all that are in power.

or a substance. Or in actuality. Or it is a natural disposition. The light that is upon its powers. And to this, from the two, there are powers: theoretical and practical. And each of them is called a power. And the power from the practical is the motive power of the body, which is a substance, in relation to the practical activities that are natural to it, just as also that power is set in motion in relation to that which follows that which is gentle. Or that which is distant, that which is dead, to that which is motive. In the same manner, and this, but the consequences of this substance are something that are. As is the case with goodness and wickedness and the deeds that are natural to the soul in the world of generation and corruption, and also the affections, something that are of the moment, from which the animal desire is quenched. And the theoretical power apprehends something that is not practical. It is, however, subservient, but that practical one. And that from the practical is that which ought to rule over the powers of the body of the rest. Its obligation, however, from which is the cause, is the separation from the first truth and the diminution of desire. The soul, then, and the powers of the body, each of them has a relation to the other. And if not, how then from the evil ones is that which is from the night, that it is to be set free? That, then, is to be extended towards the passions of the axis of the stomach. You, however, fill, when you make theories, you make the courage of the creator and his pride. And the cherubs or seraphs of the plants are, and the shoots of his splendor. Or listen to the herald, a divine man, of the Lord concerning that form full of the order that is before the sea of power, how it is gathered for you in the gospels. And it is raised up, a hundred from the light that springs up in yourself and turns towards your temple. And thus the powers are felt from the soul. And this is the receptive one of the intellects in power together and in actuality.

And as for the power, from three orders, one of them is that first disposition, which is a nature of the senses, and it is called the hylic [material] state. After this, the second order, which is the second disposition that comes after the theoretical knowledges, is joined to the practical knowledges, and it is called the hexis [habitual] state. After this, the third order, that which, whenever it is necessary, those knowledges that were previously apprehended are actualized by the cause of inquiry, and it is called the energeia [actualization] state. And from this, it is graduated toward the perfection, which is the existence of all knowledges in actualization, while there is in it nothing of potentiality, and it is called the entelecheia [actuality]. And in this, the first principles of the world of differentiated things are united and stabilized. And to it, that which is in actualization serves, that which from the hexis state serves, so that also that hylic state serves. And all together, from the practical state, they serve, that which from the power that is moved serves, that which also from the shared sense serves, inasmuch as also this from the external senses serves. And these serve from that motive power. And this from that agent of motion, and all the four natures serve as servants. Those whose works also serve from their instruments. And thus the composition of creation is woven and joined from the elements of each, to which everything is subordinated and serves from those that were not subordinated to it. A light upon that which is not from itself illuminated. For the soul is not able to bring itself forth from potentiality to actualization, because the agent in it is not the same as the recipient in it. And because it is simple, there is in it no duality of agents, nor again is it a body, as if it could be made into a substrate by touch and receive.

And how many of the higher souls are required to bring forth something of the power for action, and they were not able and were hindered? For every good gift is from above. And again, every apprehending power is from something, for when the form from its knowledge turns and takes something, it is evident that also from this it is newly constrained and is cast toward that which is its limit. And the soul, also from it, in many times, is constrained by forms of something that are substantial. And from the fact that the rational faculty is established, its knowledges are not one material knowledge, so as to become for it. For substances are not able to dwell in bodies as they appear. Nor again are things from something able to be for it. So that it may be from the receptive. That, however, is the limit. It remains, then, that outside of it, its knowledge, that is, its completion, is that which is the essence, not the hylic, and it becomes in its action, when the rational faculties look, the forms are impressed in it. When, however, they are turned away from it, immediately those that are written are constrained, like a kind of empty vision, which, when it is set opposite the sun, all forms without number are impressed in it according to its transparency. When, however, it is corrupted or turned, immediately from them it is emptied, for the spiritual sun is the agent and the Holy Spirit is called the Word. And according to its distances, those far or near, the soul has something by which it is stirred. When only mediating thoughts are prepared, they are able to find distances, and they are not givens. And of the prototypes, it is not in their house that they stumble against the synderesis, it is to be shown. And how many of the evil ones of that which many, by deep thoughts, did not apprehend, are clearly that they did not cease from that.

Demonstrations and proofs concerning that which is not mixed with bodies like bodily powers, for it is not in their nullification that it is nullified, but it is nullified while it itself stands for the intellect to know that the necessity of apprehension is not something else. Rather, the impression of the intellect is in the form of the essence of the thing apprehended, not in the essence of the intellect as some of those who philosophized supposed. For the multitude of actions of those which are not intellective, like some geometrical diagrams, cannot be found. And sensation is like the vision of the seer, from without, to the form from these. But it is necessary for something of the essence, a treasure which is within it, to be manifested. That which, by its being elevated, elevates apprehension. For indeed, also from that essence, it is that which produces the form. And when it apprehends, while this is not entirely, yet not completely, when it produces. For without something like that, whether substance or quantity, it cannot apprehend. For indeed, from all, it produces the form and changes until that which from Socrates, from form, something took. That which, while it is also for Plato and Zeno without change. For to all external species from that, it raised. And to it, as it is, it was known. And thus, in being sensed, that action does something by which becoming is no longer sensed. Demonstration: For the soul is intellective, which is of universal concepts like corporeality or something else. That which, together with bodies of varying magnitudes, is called heaven and ether. And if it were something in magnitude, it would not be equal to the variations of magnitudes. And when there is no magnitude in it, how can it be dissolved by magnitude? For it would be necessary then that by its division it be divided.

It remains, then, that the intellect apprehends that which is like this not by a body nor in a body, and that it is able to be for itself, if it wishes, a soul like a body. Demonstration: The simple natures are from the simple essences, from quantity, if they began in bodies. It is fitting that by their division they would be divided like accidents. For every nature is simple. If something is like another, the necessity of the equalities in nature are for the whole. And by a quantitative magnitude from it they are separated, and behold, the whole has no magnitude of its own, as was shown. Then, nature is in no way distinct from the whole that is composite. Then, for the changing natures, knowledge, which is simple, is divided. The necessity of these natures is that they are constitutive and are of the whole. And when a body is infinite, it is able to be divided, as was previously understood. Again, the necessity is that these natures are of knowledge, which are infinite, and are found in actuality with the composition that is composite, as is shown. And again, the necessity was that knowledge would never apprehend anything, but after the infinite knowledges, it apprehends. And when the infinite knowledges cannot be together in actuality, it would not be fitting that anything be apprehended. And when the knowledges apprehend, the many that are simple are not divisible. For from the beginning, from the genus, it is divided also into species and difference. It is not a quantitative division, its division is as that of composition is confused, but essential. For nature is simple, which is indivisibly found in all atoms. Demonstration: For form is from the simple, its simplicity is either according to its nature, it would be fitting that also the simple predicates would be, since they participate in its nature. Then, according to these that are from it and are taken, it would be fitting that also these would be simple, and behold, it is not so.

It remains, then, that the simplicity of the soul is according to that in which it is placed, and that from the simple, the simple is fitting to be revealed. And when by these deficient demonstrations the word of its simplicity was definitively confirmed, there is something that by proofs of its own kind demonstrates it. Demonstration: If the soul were an organic thing, something that by a material instrument has a stable existence, it would be fitting that by the weakness of the instrument it would be weakened. And behold, it is not so. For in the age after the fortieth year, in which the body begins to be weakened, the intellect performs its action. Solution and beginning: It is not said that old age weakened its knowledge, as also its bodily instruments were weakened. For it is said that if from the beginning the weakening of its instruments were the weakening of its knowledge, it would be fitting that never, when these were weakened, would it be able to perform this. And behold, it is not so. In the same way, it is not fitting. For if the maker of something ceases from his making when another comes who hinders him, it is not fitting to say that by that which hinders, the making is completed for the maker at the time when it was not hindered. And this happens to the soul, when these vital powers are deficient in the things that are known. It is then arranged, however, in them as for their healing. And if again it were organic, it would not be fitting that it should perceive its own instrument, since there is no instrument between itself and that. And behold, it is not so. For all its members together are understood together by the intellect. And again, if it were organic, it would be fitting that it be distracted among many actions, as also the senses, and it would not be fitting that it should perceive the power after its perception of that which is difficult, as also the nose for a lesser scent after the smelling of a very fragrant one. And behold, it is not so.

plicity is placed, and that from the simple, the simple is fitting to be revealed. And when by these deficient demonstrations the word of its simplicity is placed here, its composition with matter is sought, as is the case with the rest of the corporeal powers, which are neither simple nor are they revealed to the simple for comprehension. And when the simplicity of the soul was clearly shown, and not its composition with the body, and that it does not exist substantially and is bound with it, not like a bond that is in the head in the covering of all, whenever it wishes to cast off its bond, but like the bond of a prisoner in a prison. The prison, however, is that from which the prisoner can never be separated from that prison, as long as he is in it, to be imprisoned. And evidence that the soul is not one in number, nor prior to the body, and concerning other opinions. And that the soul of the ruler is not one in number among many individuals, it is known from the fact that if it were so, it would be necessary that when it knows something of the individuals, it would also know all of them. But behold, it is not so. And that it is not prior in its existence to the body, it is known from the fact that all rational souls are equal in creation at the same time. And if they were prior to bodies, it would be necessary that they not be distinguished from one another in any way, since the nature is one, which is for all of them. And because of this, even their accidents, when they are, ought to be as they are. Nor again is there matter by which they can be distinguished by accidental and essential actions. Nor again can it be said that it is one that is divided among many individuals, since it is not from those that are divided and many, that which is not matter. And again, if souls were prior to bodies, it would be absurd and not one, and it would be fitting that it be between them and between causes.

And it was necessary then that the forms not be completed in their perfection, and that they not be established upon the bodies through which they are perfected. And how was their binding with them found, and their nullity, and not a single action of theirs was such that how the stability of her wisdom might bear witness? Nor again is that body her cause. For that which is in bodies alone is able to act. Those of the ancients are found. Nor again is she the cause of body. For she is not before it. It remains, then, that another is the cause of her making, and that body is the instrument alone, by means of mixture, corresponding to her operations, and not anything else is the mixture. But like a rope, a hand which, when it was instrumental, took from the fire and was about to be consumed. And thus, on the side of mixture, the soul gives forms which are its completion. And after something binding and movements between iron and magnet, you see the soul. Not much in a binding like this is to be wondered at. And there is in the soul nothing psychic, and another thing animal. For it says, "You." You perceived and were strengthened, or you apprehended and set in motion all the actions, you. And you are soul, and you are intellect, and all the powers attached to her. And he was with the maker, a craftsman who is the sun. That one, according to the variation of recipients, and his operations are varied. And thus, in forms and animals and in living beings, forms are varied from a giver that is not varied. Light upon movements something psychic. For the soul is not its nature the cause of movement. For it would be necessary that, in the likeness of its nature which is not varied, movement also would be. And behold, it is not so. And to the unvaried, again, how does the varied attach? They are renewed, then, for her, movements and are varied.

…according to the renewals of the alteration of the natures and the privations. And just as privation does not belong to that which is sought, nor does potentiality belong to its actuality, so that which is at rest does not have its potential motions; but when it is moved by some appetitive or aversive impulse, and by the impulse of the short nerves or the long muscles, by means of some natural motion in which the principle of motion is held, the hand is raised and not at rest. Every animal, then, because of some sense, is moved locally by that sense; and by means of motions and appetites brought to it, it is brought to that which it can, desiring to flee or to a place of good, beyond the limit which is reached, and beyond that it cannot complete. But by means of appetites and motions brought, or by that which is brought, that sense is. And when many times you have it that you are moved and stirred and you think that you have been moved, it is not right that you deny it and suppose that you have not been moved. Evidence concerning this: that circular motion is voluntary and not natural. A body is moved circularly, not by its natural motion; for every position and heat that reaches it, it leaves behind and passes on. And from here it is found that the motion is not natural, but voluntary, since it is moved and not moved, and that which is stirred is that which is at rest. And if heat were not voluntary, how would it reach the appetite? And if it were voluntary, how would it be extinguished? And from these it is clearly known that the motions of the soul are all voluntary, that is, voluntary; and circular motion is natural to them, apart from another motion in the turning of the bodies. And this is the word of the philosopher who said: motion is natural and circular to them. The soul, then, has a rational motion which is superior to this one.

…according to the renewals of the alteration of the natures and the privations. And just as privation does not belong to that which is sought, nor does potentiality belong to its actuality, so that which is at rest does not belong to that which is in motion, nor does that which is in motion belong to that which is at rest. And if the elements are, in that they are simple, they are not opposed to the natures, yet it is not established that the mixture and their compositions are not capable of a better state. For it would be fitting that they be dissolved by many motions, but it is not so. Nor again are they receptivities or susceptibilities, but they are receptive of rectilinear motions. And it is not so. An element is something, a fifth, which is foreign to its own. Section: And fires, if they do not change in their qualities, some of them are clear; that is the one that is not fit for anything in thought. Some of them, however, are difficult in quality; that is the one that surpasses all in quantity and quality. And for this one there is not even one limit in which it stands. For it is not possible that a man be at the head, that man who is known by all the sciences in some small time, except by teaching through his quality. There is, moreover, another nature, that which is called holy, difficult in powers as many as are for the prophets. And the intellect is a power, something that is the preparedness of the nature for the commerce of thoughts. And reason is its excellence. And thought, again, is the motion of the intellect from causes to ends. And quality is a property that is the excellence of this motion towards the acquisition of the limit that is intermediate, except by many ends. And clarity is a property that is its strength. And here is the end of the discourse on nature according to this pragmateia. As for the rest of its investigations, in that last teaching they will be completed. By God, again, we begin with those of the pragmateia of the third after the natural ones, which is called first philosophy and theology. For first, in the discourse, he gave knowledge of that which is set for this teaching, that it is that which is.

…belong to that which is in motion. And when this is the case, the teaching concerning the substance is properly the best of all teachings, and the activities that fall within it are sought. These are the things that belong to that which is in that which it is, being attached like that which is either substance or accident, or category or predicate, or finite or infinite, or in thought or in activity, or prior or posterior, or cause or effect, or in potentiality or in actuality, or necessary or contingent. By the reversal of the three substances, that is the one that does not attach to that which is in that which it is, but to that which is in quantity. Nor does it attach to it as a relation, but to that which is in quality. And that which is and is not one boundary or definition can be made for it, because it is composed of many genera. And for this reason, when it becomes a genus, there is no substance that is more general than it. That which is the knowledge of that which is hidden in that which is manifest, and for this reason, when it becomes a definition, there is nothing that is better than the manifest. And if in some place your knowledge is confused, it is not because the knowledge of the name does not make known this accident, but because the name is known through interpretation, and not through boundary or definition.