{"slug":"tmp1034.tmp1034.opp-lat1","id":"latin:ogl-pl:tmp1034.tmp1034.opp-lat1","title":"Elencorum Sophisticorum Aristotelis Libri Duo Severino Boetio Interprete","title_source":"Elencorum Sophisticorum Aristotelis Libri Duo Severino Boetio Interprete","author":"Boethius. Severinus","genre":"treatise","date":"","tradition":"latin","coverage":"not-located","coverage_claim":{"status":"not-located","text":"No English translation is known: a language model asked twice could name none, and the source corpus records none. That is not proof — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed."},"publication":{"status":"machine-draft","reviewed_by":null,"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash:floor","provider":"Baidu","generated":"2026-11-15T19:47:16Z","cost_usd":0.007206},"source":{"registry_id":"latin:ogl-pl:tmp1034.tmp1034.opp-lat1","work_id":"tmp1034.tmp1034.opp-lat1","edition":"ogl-pl","language":"","license":"Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License","url":"https://github.com/OpenGreekAndLatin/patrologia_latina-dev/blob/master/data/tmp1034/tmp1034/tmp1034.tmp1034.opp-lat1.xml"},"stats":{"passages":76,"english_words":20554,"coptic_letters":0,"source_letters":75859,"commentary_units":0,"commentary_kinds":0,"derived_notes":0,"ambiguities":0,"work_notes":0,"external_links":0,"timeline":0},"summary":{},"links":[{"kind":"source","label":"Open Greek and Latin Patrologia Latina","url":"https://github.com/OpenGreekAndLatin/patrologia_latina-dev/blob/master/data/tmp1034/tmp1034/tmp1034.tmp1034.opp-lat1.xml"}],"checks":{"work":"tmp1034.tmp1034.opp-lat1","status":"pass","blocking":[],"warnings":[],"stats":{"passages":76,"translated":76,"commentary_passages":0,"commentary_units":0,"english_words":20554,"source_letters":75726,"commentary_kinds":0},"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash:floor"},"work_notes":[],"derived_work_notes":[{"kind":"coverage","severity":"info","text":"No English translation is known: a language model asked twice could name none, and the source corpus records none. That is not proof — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed."},{"kind":"limit","severity":"caution","text":"The English is a machine draft produced passage by passage from the transcribed Latin; no human has verified it. The commentary is model-written and cites only keys the pipeline could resolve."},{"kind":"register","severity":"info","text":"Register: treatise in Latin; the English keeps the liturgical formulae and the vocatives rather than normalising them."},{"kind":"structure","severity":"info","text":"Passages: 76 narrative."},{"kind":"source","severity":"info","text":"Source edition: ogl-pl."},{"kind":"source","severity":"info","text":"Licence: Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License"}],"derived_structure":{"narrative":76},"term_index":[],"citations":{},"segments":[{"i":1,"ref":"p1","source":"ELENCHORUM SOPHISTICORUM ARISTOTELIS LIBRI DUO AN. MANL. SEV. BOETIO INTERPRETE.\n\nLIBER PRIMUS.\n\nCAPUT PRIMUM.\n\nQuod intendit, et aliquem syllogismum sophisticum esse.\n\nDe sophisticis autem redargutionibus, et de iis quae videntur redargutiones (sunt autem captiosae ratiocinationes, at non redargutiones)dicamus oportet, incipientes secundum naturam a primis.Quodigitur hi quidem syllogismi, illi autem (cum non sint) videntur, manifestum est.Nam quemadmodum et in aliis id fit per quamdam similitudinem,sic et in orationibussehabet; etenim hi quidem habitum probe habent, illi vero videntur, ex tribu tumentes, et componentes seipsos; et pulchri hi quidem ob pulchritudinem, illi autem videntur, seipsos fucanLes. Et in inanimatis quoque similiter, nam et illorum haecquidem argentum,istavero aurum revera sunt; illa non sunt quidem, apparent autem secundum sensum, ut lithargyrina et stannea,argentea, et felle tincta,aurea. Eodem autem modo et syllogismus, et redargutio: haec quidem est, illa vero non est, apparet autem propter imperitiam; nam imperiti velut distantes, a longe speculantur.Nam syllogismus quidem ex quibusdam estpositis,ut colligamus aliquid aliud ex necessitate ab iis quae posita sunt per ea quæ posita sunt; redargutio autem syllogismus est,cum contradictione conclusionis; illi vero id quidem non faciunt.","english":"THE TWO BOOKS OF ARISTOTLE'S SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, TRANSLATED BY ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS.\n\nBOOK ONE.\n\nCHAPTER ONE.\n\nWhat he intends, and that some syllogism is sophistical.\n\nWe must speak about sophistical refutations and about those things which appear to be refutations (for they are captious reasonings, but not refutations), beginning, according to nature, from first principles. That some of these are syllogisms, while others, though they are not, appear to be, is manifest. For just as this happens in other matters through a certain likeness, so it is also the case with arguments; for some have a good condition, while others only appear to, from being puffed up and composing themselves; and some are beautiful on account of beauty, while others appear so, painting themselves. And in inanimate things likewise: for of these, some are truly silver, others truly gold; those are not, yet appear so to the senses, as litharge and tin appear silver, and things dyed with gall appear gold. In the same way also with syllogism and refutation: the one is, the other is not, yet appears because of inexperience; for the inexperienced, as it were standing at a distance, look from afar. For a syllogism is from certain things posited, so that we conclude something else of necessity from the things posited by means of those things posited; but a refutation is a syllogism with a contradiction of the conclusion; but those do not do this.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":2,"ref":"p2","source":"Videntur autem ob multas causas,quarumunus locus aptissimus et publicissimus per nomina. Nam quia fieri non potest ut res ipsasferentes disputemus,sednominibusprorebus,; utimur signis,et quod accidit in nominibus,in rebus quoque arbitramur accidere,quemadmodum iis qui calculis supputant.ld autem non est simile,nam nomina quidem finita sunt, et orationum multitudo; res vero numero infinitae sunt. Necesse est igitur pluraeamdem orationem et nomen unum significare; quemadmodum igitur et illic qui non sunt prompti calculos suslinere,a scientibus decipiuntur, eodem quoque modo et in orationibus qui nominum virtutis sunt ignari perfacile captionibus allucinantur,ct ipsi disputantes, et alios audientes. Ob hanc igitur causam, et eas quae dicendae sunt,est syllogismus, et redargutio apparens, atque non existens.\n\nCAPUT II.-\n\nDe generibus disputationum.","english":"They seem to arise for many reasons, one of whose most apt and most public sources is through names. For since it is impossible for us to conduct disputes by bringing the things themselves, but we use names in place of things, we use signs, and what happens in names we also suppose to happen in things, just as with those who reckon with counters. But this is not similar, for names and the multitude of expressions are finite, whereas things are infinite in number. It is necessary, therefore, that many things be signified by the same expression and one name. Just as, then, in that case those who are not ready to handle counters are deceived by those who know, in the same way also in arguments those who are ignorant of the power of names are very easily led astray by captions, both when they themselves dispute and when they hear others. For this reason, then, both the syllogism and the refutation that are to be discussed are apparent and not real.\n\nCHAPTER TWO.\n\nOn the kinds of disputations.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":3,"ref":"p3","source":"Quoniam autem quibusdam magis operapretium est videri esse sapientes, quam esse et non videri (est enim sophislice apparens sapientia,non existens autem, et sophista pecuniarum aucupator ab apparente sapientia,et non existente), manifestum prorecto est quoniam necessarium estillis et sapientis opus videri facere magis quam facere,et non videri. Est autem (ut unum ad unum dicamus) in unoquoque opus sapientis, non mentiri quidem ipsum de quibus novit,mentientemautem manifestare posse. Haec autem sunt,hoc quidem in eo quod potest dare orationem, illud autem in eo quod sumere.Necesse est igitur illos qui volunt sophistice agere,dictarum orationum genus quaerere.Operae enim pretium est eis,nam hujusmodi potestas faciet videri sapientes cujus sunt desiderium habentes. Quod autem tale orationum genus est,et quod talem appetunt potestatem,illiquos vocamus sophistas,manifestum est. Quot autem sunt species sophisticarum orationum, et ex quo numero potestas ea constat, et quot par- I tescontingitessenegotii,et de aliis quæ suffragantur ad hanc artem,nunc dicamus.Sunt igitur ad disputandum orationum genera quatuor:doctrinales,dialecticae, tentativae, contentiosae.Et doctrinales quidem sunt quæ expropriisprincipiiscujusque disciplinæ, et non ex his quae videntur respondenti, colligunt: nam oportet credere eum qui dicit.","english":"But since for certain people it is more worthwhile to seem to be wise than to be and not to seem (for sophistic wisdom is apparent, not real, and the sophist is a hunter of money from apparent and not real wisdom), it is manifestly clear that for them it is necessary to seem to do the work of a wise man rather than to do it and not seem to. And (to speak one to one) in each case the work of the wise man is not to be deceived himself about the things he knows, but to be able to make manifest one who is deceived. These things are, on the one hand, in being able to give an account, and on the other, in being able to take one up. It is necessary, therefore, that those who wish to act sophistically seek the kind of arguments mentioned. For it is worthwhile for them, since a power of this sort will make them seem wise, whose desire they have. But that such a kind of arguments exists, and that those whom we call sophists seek such a power, is manifest. But how many species of sophistic arguments there are, and from what number that power consists, and how many parts the business happens to have, and concerning other things that support this art, let us now speak. There are, then, four kinds of arguments for disputing: doctrinal, dialectical, tentative, contentious. And doctrinal are those which collect from the proper principles of each discipline, and not from the things that seem so to the respondent; for it is necessary to believe the one who speaks.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":4,"ref":"p4","source":"Dialecticæ autem, quae ex probabilibus collectivæ sunt contradictionum. Tentativae vero, quae ex iis colligunt quae videDturrespondenti,et quae necessarium est eum scire qui simulatsehaberescientiam, quomodo determinandum est in aliis;porro contentiosae,quas sunt ex iis quæ apparent probabiJia, apparentes syllogistice. De demonstrativis autem in Analyticis dictum est; de dialecticis vero et tentativis,in aliis. De altercatoriis autem et contentiosis nunc dicendum.\n\nCAPUT III.\n\nFines sophistæ, et loci sophistici in dictione.\n\nPrimum igitur sumendum est quotconjectantqui in orationibus decertant et coaltercantur. Suntautem haec quinque numero, redargutior falsum, inopinabile, solcecismus, et quintum,quod est facere nugari eum qui condisputal.Hocautem est frequenter cogere idem dicere, aut quod non est,sed quod apparet quodque esse horum. Nam maxime volunt apparere redarguere; secundum autem,falsum ali. quid monstrare; tertium vero,ad hoc quod est inopinabile ducere; quartum,solcecismo uti facere.-boc autem est facere secundum locutionem barbarizare ex oratione respondentem. Ultimum autem, idem frequenter dicere. Modi autem redarguendi sunt duo:nam alii quidem sunt propter dictionem, alii vero extradictionem.Suntautem ea quidem quæ propter dictionem faciunt phantasiam ex numero; haec quidem suntaequivocatio, amphibolia, compositio, divisio, accentus, et figura dictionis.","english":"Of dialectic, however, which are collective of contradictions from probable things. But of tentative [arguments], which collect from those things which seem [probable] to the respondent, and which it is necessary for him to know who pretends to have knowledge, how it must be determined in other cases; further, of contentious [arguments], which are from those things which appear probable, [and] appear syllogistic. But concerning demonstrative [arguments] it has been said in the Analytics; concerning dialectical and tentative [arguments], in other works. But concerning eristic and contentious [arguments] it must now be spoken.\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nThe ends of the sophist, and the sophistic loci in diction.\n\nFirst, then, it must be assumed how many [are the ends] which those who contend and wrangle in speeches aim at. And these are five in number: refutation, falsity, the unexpected, solecism, and fifth, that which is to make the one disputing talk nonsense. This, moreover, is to compel him frequently to say the same thing, or what is not, but what appears and seems to be one of these. For they most of all wish to appear to refute; secondly, to show something false; thirdly, to lead to that which is unexpected; fourthly, to make use of solecism. This, moreover, is to make the respondent barbarize according to speech from the expression. The last, moreover, is to say the same thing frequently. But the modes of refuting are two: for some are due to diction, others due to things outside diction. And there are those which produce appearance due to diction from [their] number; these are equivocation, amphiboly, composition, division, accent, and figure of diction.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":5,"ref":"p5","source":"Hujus autem fides,etea quae est per inductionem,et syllogismus,et si qua sumatur alia, et quod totidem modis,si eisdem nominibus et eisdem orationibus non idem significamus.Sunt autem propter aequivocationem hujusmodi orationes,ut quod discunt scientes: nam ea quæ memoriae prodita sunt, discunt grammatici. Discere enim æquivocum esl,ad intelligere eum qui utitur disciplina,et ad accipere disciplinam. Ea rursus quod mala bonasunt,nam quae expediunt bona sunt, mala autem expediuut.Duplexenim expediens estet necessarium quod accidit plerumque in malis (estenim quoddam malum,necessarium)et bona quoque expedientiadicimusesse.Ampliusautem eumdem sedere,et stare,et aegrotare,et sanum esse: nam qui surgebat stat,etqui sanatalur,sanus est; surgebat autem sedens,et senabaturaegrotans. iEgrotantem enim aut sedentem quidlibet facere aut pati non unum significat,sed quandoque quidem qui nunc aegrotat aut sedet, quandoque autem qui aegrotabat prius; verumtamen sanabatur quidem aegrotans cum ægrotans,sanus est autem non cum aegrotans,sed aegrotans non nunc,sed prius.Propter autem amphiboliam sunt orationes tales, velle capere me pugnantes. Et putasne quod quis cognoscit, id cognoscit? nam et cognoscentem et cognitum contingit, ut cognoscentem significare hac oratione.Et putasne quod quis videt, id videt? videt autem columnam,quare columnavidet.Et putasquod tu dicis esse, id tu dicis esse?","english":"The proof of this is both the [argument] that proceeds through induction and the syllogism, and any other [method] that may be adopted, and [the fact] that in as many ways [as things are signified], we do not signify the same thing by the same names and the same expressions. Now expressions of this kind arise because of equivocation, as when we say that those who know learn; for the grammarians learn the things that have been handed down to memory. For \"to learn\" is equivocal, [meaning] both to understand the one who uses the discipline and to receive the discipline. Again, [the expression] that evils are goods; for the things that are expedient are goods, but evils are expedient. For \"expedient\" is twofold, and the necessary, which happens for the most part in evils (for there is a certain evil that is necessary), and we also say that goods are expedient. Moreover, [the expression] that the same person sits and stands, and is sick and is healthy; for the one who was rising stands, and the one who is being healed is healthy; but he was rising while sitting, and he was being healed while sick. For \"to do or suffer anything\" does not signify one thing for the sick person or the one sitting, but sometimes indeed [it signifies] the one who is now sick or sitting, and sometimes the one who was sick before; nevertheless he was being healed while sick, when he was sick, but he is healthy not when he is sick, but [he was] sick not now, but before. Now expressions of this kind arise because of amphiboly: \"I wish to grasp those who are fighting.\" And do you think that whatever someone knows, that he knows? For it happens that both the one knowing and the thing known are signified, so that this expression signifies the one knowing. And do you think that whatever someone sees, that he sees? But he sees a column; therefore he sees the column. And do you think that what you say to be, that you say to be?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":6,"ref":"p6","source":"dicis autem lapidem esse, quare tu lapis, dicis esse. Et putas est silentia dicere? duplex enim est et id, silentia dicere, hoc quidem eos qui dicunt silere, illud autem ea quæ dicuntur.Sunt autem tres modi secundum aequivocationem et amphiboliam.Unus quidem quando nomen vel oratio plura significat principaliter,ut aquila vel canis.Alius autem quando soliti sumus sic dicere. Tertius vera quando compositum plura significat, separatum vero simpliciter, ut scire litteras: nam utrumque fortasse unum quidem significat,et scire, etlittera3;ambo autem plura,autlitterasipsasscientiam habere,autlitterarum alium.Amphiboliaigitur et sequivocatio propter hos modos sunt.","english":"You say that the stone is, so that you are a stone, you say it is. And do you think that to say \"silences\" is [to say something]? For \"to say silences\" is also twofold: in one way, [it means] those who say that things are silent; in another, the things that are said. There are three modes according to equivocation and amphiboly. One is when a name or a phrase signifies several things primarily, as \"eagle\" or \"dog.\" Another is when we are accustomed to speak in this way. The third is when a compound signifies several things, but when separated, [signifies] simply, as \"to know letters\"; for perhaps each of the two, both \"to know\" and \"letters,\" signifies one thing, but both together [signify] several things: either to have knowledge of the letters themselves, or [to know] one of the letters. Therefore amphiboly and equivocation arise on account of these modes.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":7,"ref":"p7","source":"Propter compositionem verohujusmodi sunt,ut possibileest sedentem ambulare, et non scribentem scribere: non enim idem significat si dividens quis dicat, et componens,quod possibile est sedentem ambulare, et non scribentem scribere.Et hoc identidem si quis componat non scribentem scribere.Significabit profecto quod habet potestatem, utnon scribens scribat, si quis autem non componat, quoniam,habet potestatem quando non scribit, ut scribat.Et discit nunc litteras,si quisdidicitquasscit.Amplius,quod unum solum potestferre,plura pctest ferre.Propter vero divisionem quod quinque sunt duo,ettria paria et imparia.Et quod majus æquale,tantumdem enim est majus et adhuc amplius; nam eadem oratio divisa et com posita non idem semper videbitur significare. Ut ego posui teservum,esistentem liberum.Ethoc, quinquaginta virum, centum heros liquit Achilles, Propter accentum autem, in iis qua sunt sine scriptura, non facile dialecticis facere orationem; in scripturis autem ctpoematibus magis.Utet poetam defendunt nonnulli adversusredarguentesquasihtc absurde locutum. Nec gemere aeria cessabit turtur ab uimo,quod pentemimeri usus sit,et turture feminino: solvunt enim id accentu,dicentes quod aeria accentum finalem longum habet, et non ad turtur, sed ad ulmo, ut epithetum debet referri; et id de Nisa et Eurialo,cum Rutulos vino somnoque sepultos inteellexisset.","english":"But by composition such things are as it is possible for a seated person to walk and for one not writing to write; for it does not signify the same thing if someone, dividing, says it, and, composing, that it is possible for a seated person to walk and for one not writing to write. And this likewise if someone composes \"one not writing to write.\" It will assuredly signify that he has the power that, not writing, he write; but if someone does not compose it, [it signifies] that he has the power, when he does not write, to write. And he learns letters now, if someone who learned knows. Moreover, what can carry one only can carry more. But by division, that five are two, and three, [are] even and odd. And that the greater is equal, for it is as much greater and still more; for the same sentence, divided and composed, will not always seem to signify the same thing. As I placed the servant, being free. And this, fifty men, Achilles left a hundred heroes. But by accent, in those things which are without writing, it is not easy for dialecticians to make a sentence; but in writings and poems, more so. As some defend the poet against those who refute him as having spoken absurdly here. Nor shall the turtle dove cease to moan from the lofty elm, because he has used the pentameter and the feminine turtle dove; for they solve it by accent, saying that \"aeria\" has a long final accent, and should be referred not to the turtle dove but to the elm, as an epithet; and that concerning Nisus and Euryalus, when he had understood the Rutulians buried in wine and sleep.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":8,"ref":"p8","source":"Cætera per terras omneis animalia somno laxabant curas,et corda oblita laborum.Taliaigitur propter accentum sunt.Qusau tem propter figuram dictionis sunt.acciduntquandononidemut idem interpretatur, ut masculinum, femininum,vel femininum, masculinum, vel quod inter hæc est, alterum horum,vel rursus quale quantum,lel quantum quale, vel facienspatiens,vel dispositum facere, et alia ceu divisum prius. Nam est aliquid quod non est eorum quas sunt facere, ut eorum quæ sunt facere aliquid dictione signilicare; ut valcre similiter figura dictionis dicitur ei quod est secare,vel aedificare, quamvis illud quidem quale quid,et affectum quodam modo significet, haec vero facere aliquid. Eodem autem modo et in cæteris.Propter igitur dictionem redargutiones ex his existunt.\n\nCAPUT IV.\n\nDe locisredargutionumsophisiicarumextra dictionem.\n\nEarum vero quæ extra dictionem sunt captionum species sunt septem.Una quidem propter accidens; secunda autem propter id quod simpliciter,vel non simpliciter, sed aliquo modo, aut ubi, aut quando, aut ad aliquid dicitur;tertia autem propterredargutionis ignorantiam;quartaveropropterconsequens; quinta autem propter id quod est in principio sumere; sexta propter id quod non est causa,ut causam ponere;septima vero propter plures interroga- J tiones unam facere.","english":"All other animals were relaxing their cares in sleep across the lands, and their hearts forgetful of labors. Such things, then, are due to accent. But those that are due to the figure of speech occur when the same thing is not interpreted as the same, as masculine for feminine, or feminine for masculine, or what is between these, one of the two, or again quality for quantity, or quantity for quality, or acting for being acted upon, or disposed to act, and the others as divided above. For there is something that is not among the things that are able to act, as to signify by speech something of the things that are able to act; for example, \"to be well\" is similarly called by the figure of speech as \"to cut\" or \"to build,\" although the one signifies a certain quality and a certain disposition, while the other signifies to do something. And in the same way also in the others. Therefore, on account of speech, refutations arise from these.\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nOn the topics of sophistic refutations outside speech.\n\nBut of the captions that are outside speech there are seven species. One indeed is due to accident; the second due to what is said simply, or not simply, but in some respect, or where, or when, or in relation to something; the third due to ignorance of the refutation; the fourth due to the consequent; the fifth due to assuming what is in the beginning; the sixth due to what is not a cause, as positing it as a cause; the seventh due to making many questions into one.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":9,"ref":"p9","source":"Propter igitur accidens captiones sunt,quando similiter quodcunque existimabitur rei et accidenti inesse: nam quia multa eidem accidunt, non est necesse omnibus prædicatis et ei de quo prædicantur, illa omnia inesse. Nam omnia sicerunt eadem,quemadmodum sophistae dicunt:ut si Coriscus est alter ab homine,ipse est alter a se, est enim homo; aut si a Socrate alter,Socrates autem homo ab homine alterum dicunt esse confessum, eo quod accidit (a quo dixit alterum esse) hunc esse hominem.Propter id autem quod hoc quidem simpliciter, illud autem aliquo modo, et non praecipue, quando quod in parte dicitur, ut simpliciter dictum sumitur, ut si non ens est opinabile quod non ens est; non enim est idem esse quidvis, et esse simpliciter. Aut rursum quoniam quod est non est, si eorum quas sunt quidpiam non est,ut si non est homo: nam non idem est non esse quidvis,. et non esse simpliciter,apparet autem,eo quod per. quam propinquum est dictione, et parum differat esse quidvis ab eo quod est esse,et non esse,quidvisab eo quod est non esse. Similiter autem propter id quod est aliquo modo, et simpliciter,ut si Indus cum si totus niger, albus est dentibus, albus igitur et non albus est.Aut si ambo aliquo modo,quodsimul contraria inerunt,taleautem in quibusdam quidem, cuilibet facile est considerare.","english":"Therefore, there are captious arguments due to accident, when whatever is believed to belong similarly to a thing and to its accident; for because many things happen to the same thing, it is not necessary that all those predicates belong both to the thing and to that of which they are predicated. For all things will be the same, as the sophists say: for instance, if Coriscus is other than man, he is other than himself, for he is a man; or if he is other than Socrates, and Socrates is a man, they say it is admitted that he is other than man, because it happens that this, from which they said he is other, is a man. But on account of this, that one thing is said simply, another in some respect, and not primarily, when what is said in part is taken as said simply, as if what is not is opinable—that which is not; for it is not the same to be anything and to be simply. Or again, because what is is not, if something of the things that are is not, as if he is not a man; for it is not the same for anything not to be and simply not to be. But it appears so because the expression is very close, and to be anything differs little from to be, and not to be anything from not to be. Similarly, on account of what is in some respect and simply, as if the Indian, since he is wholly black, is white in his teeth, therefore he is white and not white. Or if both are in some respect, so that contraries will be present at the same time; such cases in certain instances are easy for anyone to consider.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":10,"ref":"p10","source":"Ut si sumens Æthiopem nigrum esse,dentibus dicat quod albus; si ergo ibi albus, quod niger, et non niger,putabit disputasse syllogistice, cum perfecerit interrogationem.In quibusdam vero latet frequenter,in quibuscunque cum aliquo modo dicatur,simpliciter videtur sequi,et in quibuscunque non facile est considerare utrum eorum praecipue sitassignandum.Fit autem tale, in quibuscunque similiter sunt opposita: nam videntur aut ambo,aut neutrum dandum esse simpliciter prædicari, ut si dimidium quidem album, dimidium vero nigrum, utrum album, an nigrum? Quæ autem sunt propter id quod non determinatur quid est syllogismus,aut quid redargutio,fiunt propter omissionem orationis:nam redargutio est contradictio unius et ejusdem, non nominis, sed rei,et nominis non synonymi,sed ejusdem,ex iis quæ data sunt ex necessitate,non connumerato eo quod erat in principio,secundum idem, et ad idem,et similiter, et in eodem tempore. Hoc autem modo fieri potestutquisfalsum dicat dealiquo,quidam autem omittentes aliquid eorum quae dicta sunt,apparent redarguere ut quod idem duplum et non duplum, nam duo unius quidem dupla,tria autem non dupla. Aut si ejusdem idem duplum et non duplum, sed non secundum idem, nam secundum longitudinem duplum5secundum latitudinem non duplum.Aut si ejusdem, et secundum idem, et similiter, sed non simul,quare estapparens redargutio.","english":"For example, if someone, taking an Ethiopian to be black, says that he is white in respect of his teeth—if, then, he is white there, he will think that he has argued syllogistically that he is both black and not black, when he has completed the questioning. But in some cases it often escapes notice, in all those in which something is said in a certain respect, that it seems to follow without qualification, and in all those in which it is not easy to consider which of them should be assigned primarily. This comes about in all cases in which opposites are alike; for they seem either both or neither to be granted to be predicated without qualification—for example, if half is white and half is black, is it white or black? But those that arise because it is not determined what a syllogism is, or what a refutation is, come about through an omission in the statement; for a refutation is a contradiction of one and the same thing—not of a name, but of the thing, and of a name that is not synonymous but the same—from the things that have been granted, by necessity, without counting in what was at the beginning, in respect of the same thing, and in relation to the same thing, and in the same way, and at the same time. In this way it is possible for someone to say something false about a thing; but some, omitting something of what has been said, appear to refute—for example, that the same thing is double and not double; for two are double of one, but three are not double. Or if the same thing is double and not double in respect of the same thing, but not in the same respect; for it is double in length but not double in breadth. Or if it is the same thing, and in respect of the same thing, and in the same way, but not at the same time—wherefore the refutation is apparent.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":11,"ref":"p11","source":"Trahat autem aliquis hanc et in eas quæ sunt propter dictionem. Quae autem propter id quod in principio erat sumuntur, fiunt quidem sic et tot modis quot modis contingit,quod in principio est petere;videntur autem redargnere,eo quod non possit quis inspicere idem et diversum. Quae vero propter consequens est redargutio,ideo est quod putent converti consequen-, tiam, nam si cum hoc est ex necessitate, illud sit, ^ et cum illud est,putant et alterum esse ex necessitate; unde et(quae ob opinionem eX sensu sunt)deceptiones fiunt, nam saepe esse mel fel suspicati sunt, eo quod sequitur flavus color mei. Et quia accidit terram pluvia madidam fieri, etiamsi sit madida, opinantur pluisse,id autem non necessarium est. In rhetoricis quidem quae secundum signum fiunt demonstrationes,ex consequentibus sunt,nam volentes ostendere quod adulter, quod consequens est accipiunt,quod comptus,aut quod videtur noctu errabundus; pluribus autem hæc quidem insunt, præaedicatum tamen non inest.","english":"Someone may also draw this [fallacy] into those that depend on diction. Those, however, that are assumed because of what was in the beginning come about in this way and in as many modes as there are modes of begging the principle; but they seem to refute because one cannot discern the same and the different. The refutation that depends on the consequent arises because people think that the consequent converts: for if, when this is, that follows of necessity, and when that is, they think the other also is of necessity; from this also deceptions arise (those that are based on opinion from sense), for they often suspected that honey is bile because the yellow color of honey follows. And because it happens that the earth becomes wet from rain, even if it is wet, they suppose it has rained; but that is not necessary. In rhetoric, indeed, the demonstrations that are made according to a sign are from consequents, for those wishing to show that someone is an adulterer take what is consequent—that he is adorned, or that he is seen wandering about at night; but these things are present in many, yet the predicate is not present.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":12,"ref":"p12","source":"Similiter autem et in ratiocinativis,ut est Melissi oratio, quod infinitum est universum, sumens autem universum ingenitum (nam ex nihilo nihil fieri ) quod autem factum est ex principio fieri.Si igitur non factum est, principium non habet universum, quare infinitum; non necesse est autem hoc accidere,non enim si omne quod factum est,principium habet,!etiam quidquid principium habot,factum est,quemadmodum neque si febriens calidus, etiam calidum necesse est febrire.Quae vero propter non causam,ut causam,cum assumitur quod non causa est,tanquam propter illud fiat redargutio. Accidit autem tale, ad impossibile. syllogismis: necessarium enim est in his aliquid interimere ex iis quae posita sint. Si ergo enumeretur in necessariis interrogationibus ad id ad quod accidit impossibile,videbitur propter id sæpe fieri redargutio,ut quod non est anima,et vita idem: nam si generatio corruptioni est contrarium, et alicui corruptioni erit quaedam generatio contrarium mors autem corruptio quædam et contrarium vitæ; quare vita goneratio et vivere generari: hoc autem impossibile, non ergo idem anima et vita.Nequaquam collectum est,nam accidit (tametsi quispiam non idem dicat vitam et animam) impossibile, sed solum, contrarium vitam quidem morti, cum sit corruptio, corruptioni autem generationem.","english":"Similarly also in the case of argumentative reasonings, as in the argument of Melissus: he assumes that the universe is infinite, and that the universe is ungenerated (for nothing comes to be from nothing), but that whatever has come to be comes to be from a beginning. If, then, it has not come to be, the universe has no beginning; therefore it is infinite. But this does not necessarily follow. For it is not the case that if everything that has come to be has a beginning, then also whatever has a beginning has come to be—just as it is not the case that if a man with a fever is hot, then whatever is hot must also have a fever. Those [fallacies] that arise because something is taken as a cause when it is not a cause occur when what is not a cause is assumed as though the refutation were produced on account of it. This sort of thing happens in arguments leading to an impossibility; for in these it is necessary to destroy something from among the things that have been laid down. If, then, in the necessary questions [leading] to the impossibility that results, [the premises] are enumerated, the refutation will often seem to be produced on account of that—for example, that the soul and life are not the same. For if generation is the contrary of corruption, then some generation will be the contrary of some corruption; but death is a kind of corruption and is the contrary of life; therefore life is generation and to live is to be generated. But this is impossible; therefore the soul and life are not the same. This has by no means been concluded. For the impossible result follows even if someone does not say that life and soul are the same, but only that life is the contrary of death, since death is a corruption, and generation is the contrary of corruption.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":13,"ref":"p13","source":"Incollectiles igitur simpliciter non sunt hujusmodi orationes, sed ad propositum incollectiles, et latet plerumque non I minus ipsos interroganles quod tale est.Propterigitur consequens, et propter non causam orationes hujusmodi sunt. Quæ autem propter id quod est duas interrogationes unam facere, quando latet plures esse, et perinde ac una sit, assignatur responsio una. In aliquibus autem facile est videre quod plures, et quod non danda una responsio, ut utrum terra mare est an caelum? In aliquibus vero minus, et quasi una sit, aut confitetur (eo quod nequeunt respondere ad interrogatum) aut redargui videntur,ut putas hic et hic est homo? Quare cum aliquis percusserit hunc et hunc,percutiet hominem,et non homines.Aut rursum quorum hæc sunt quidem bona, ilia autem non bona, omnia hæc bona,an non bona? Nam utrumvis dixerit, est quidem ut aut redargutionem, aut falsum apparens videatur facere, nam dicere eorum quae non sunt bona aliquid esse bonu m,aut eorum quae bona Bunt non bonum, falsum. Quandoque autem assumptis quibusdam, redargutio etiam fiet vera, ut si quis concedat similiter et unum et plura dici alba, at nuda, et casca: nam si cæcum est quod non habet visum, natum tamen habere, et caeca erunt quae non habent visum, nata autem habere; quando igitur hoc quidem habet visum, illud autem non habet, ambo erunt vel videntia, vel cæca, quod est impossibile.","english":"Therefore reasonings of this sort are not absolutely non-collective, but non-collective relative to the proposed question, and for the most part it escapes the notice of the questioners themselves that this is so. Accordingly, reasonings of this kind arise because of the consequent and because of what is not a cause. But those that arise because of making two questions into one occur when it escapes notice that there are several, and the answer is given as though there were one. In some cases it is easy to see that there are several and that one answer should not be given, as in \"Is the earth sea, or is it heaven?\" In others it is less easy, and the question appears to be one, and either the respondent concedes (because they cannot answer the question asked) or they seem to be refuted, as in \"Do you think this and this is a man?\" Therefore when someone strikes this man and this man, he will strike a man and not men. Or again, in the case of things of which some are good and others are not good, are all these good or not good? For whichever way one answers, one seems either to produce a refutation or to appear to say something false; for to say that something among things that are not good is good, or that something among things that are good is not good, is false. Sometimes, however, when certain things have been assumed, the refutation will even be true, as if someone concedes that both one and many are said to be white, but naked and blind; for if that is blind which does not have sight but is naturally capable of having it, then those things will be blind which do not have sight but are naturally capable of having it. When, therefore, one of them has sight and the other does not, both will be either seeing or blind, which is impossible.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":14,"ref":"p14","source":"CAPUT V.\n\nOmnes sophisticas redargutiones in ignorantiam redargutionis revocatum iri.\n\nAut igitur sic dividendum apparentes syllogismos et redargutiones,aut omnes reducendum ad redargutionis ignorantiam, iis qui hanc principium faciunt: fieri enim potest ut omnes resolvamus dictos modos ad redargutionis definitionem. Primum quidem si incollectiles fuerint,oportet enim ex iis quae posita sunt accidere conclusionem,et (ut ita dicam) ex necessitate,atque non apparere: deinde et secundum partes definiLionis,nam earum quæ sunt in dictione, hae quidem sunt propter duplex, ut aequivocatio et oratio,et similis figura, consuetum enim id omnia ut et illud quidpiam significare. Compositio autem, et divisio, et accentus, eo qnod non eadem est oratio, aut nomen quod differens, oportebat autem et id esse quemadmodum et rem eamdem, si debebat redargutio vel syllogismus esse, ut si tunica, non vestis syllogizetur, sed tunica, nam verumest et illud, sed non syllogizatum est; sed adhuc interrogatione indiget, quod idem significat ad eum qui quærit propter quod.","english":"CHAPTER V.\n\nThat all sophistical refutations are to be reduced to ignorance of refutation.\n\nEither, then, apparent syllogisms and refutations must be divided in this way, or all must be reduced to ignorance of refutation, for those who make this the principle; for it is possible for us to resolve all the said modes to the definition of refutation. First, indeed, if they are non-collective, for the conclusion must follow from the things laid down, and (so to speak) by necessity, and not merely appear to do so; then also according to the parts of the definition. For of those that lie in the diction, some are due to double meaning, such as equivocation and ambiguous phrasing and similar figure—for this is customary in all cases, that it signify something as well. Composition, however, and division, and accent, because the same expression or name is not the same when it differs; but it ought also to be the same just as the thing itself is the same, if there was to be a refutation or syllogism—as if one were to syllogize \"tunic\" and not \"garment,\" but \"tunic\"; for that too is true, but it has not been syllogized; but it still requires an interrogation, because it signifies the same to the one who asks on account of what.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":15,"ref":"p15","source":"Quae vero secundum accidens definito syllogismo manifestae fiunt,nam eamdem definitionem oportet syllogismi et redargutionis fieri,attamen et adjungere contradictionem,nam redargutio syllogismus estcontradictionis; si igitur non est syllogismus accidentis, non fit redargutio: non enim si cum haec sint, necesse est illud esse,id autem est album esse propter syllogismum; neque si triangulus duobus rectis tres augulos habet æquales, et accidit ei figuram esse, vel primum, vel principium, quod figura, vel primum,vel principium tale est: nam non quatenus figura, vel primum, vel principium, sed quatenus triangulus demonstratio.Similiter et in aliis. Quare si redargutio syllogismus quidam, non erit quae secundum accidens redargutio. Verum propter hoc et artifices et omnino scientes ab insciis:redarguuntur, nam secundum accidens syllogismos faciunt contra sapientes; qui vero non possunt dividere, aut interrogati concedunt, aut cum non dant, arbitrantur dedisse. Quae vero propter id quod aliquo modo et simpliciter, quoniam non de eodem affirmatio et negatio est, nam aliquo modo albi, aliquo modo non album, et simpliciter albi, simpliciter non album, negatio est; si igitur cum datur aliquo modo esse album, quis ut simpliciter dictum accipit, non facit redargutionem: apparet autem propter ignorantiam ipsius,quid est redargutio.","english":"Those refutations, however, which arise according to accident against a defined syllogism, are manifest; for the same definition must be given of a syllogism and of a refutation, yet one must also add contradiction, for a refutation is a syllogism of contradiction. If, therefore, there is no syllogism of accident, no refutation occurs; for it is not the case that if these things are, that must be—and this is to be white by virtue of a syllogism—nor, if a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, does it also happen to it to be a figure, or a first principle, or a beginning, in such a way that it is a figure, or a first principle, or a beginning; for the demonstration is not insofar as it is a figure, or a first principle, or a beginning, but insofar as it is a triangle. Similarly also in other cases. Wherefore, if a refutation is a certain syllogism, there will be no refutation according to accident. But it is on this account that both craftsmen and, in general, those who know are refuted by those who do not know; for they make syllogisms according to accident against the wise. And those who cannot make distinctions either concede when questioned, or, when they do not grant, think they have granted. Those, however, which arise because of what is in some way and simply, since affirmation and negation are not about the same thing—for it is a negation of white in some way and not white in some way, and simply of white and simply not white—if, therefore, when it is granted that something is white in some way, someone takes it as said simply, he does not produce a refutation; but it appears so because of ignorance of what a refutation is.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":16,"ref":"p16","source":"Manifestissime autem omnium quae prius dictae sunt propter redargutionis definitionem, quare et sic nuncupatae sunt,nam propter orationis omissionem phantasia fit,et divisis hoc pacto, commune in omnibus his ponendum est orationis omissio.Quæ vero propter id quod sumitur quod erat in principio, et non causaut causa ponitur,manifestae sunt per definitionem,nam oportet conclusionem accidere eo quod haec sunt, quod non erat in non causis, et rursum non connumerato eo quod erat in principio,, quod non habent eas quæ sunt propter petitionem ejus quod in principio.Quae vero propterconsequens particula sunt accidentis,nam consequens accidit; differt autem ab accidente, quoniam accidens quidem esL in uno solo sumere, ut idem esse flavum, et mel, et album, et cygnum, quod autem propter consequens, semper in pluribus; nam quae uni et eidem sunt eadem,et sibi invicem postulantur esse eadem, propter quod fit ea quae propter consequens redargutio.Est autem non omnino verum, ut si sit album secundum accidens, nam et nix et cygnus albo idem, aut rursum in Melissi oratione idem esse accipit factum esse, et principium habere, aut æqualia fieri, et eamdem magnitudinem accipere.","english":"Most manifestly, however, of all those [refutations] which were spoken of earlier, [this is clear] on account of the definition of refutation, and for this reason they are also so named; for on account of the omission of the spoken expression, an appearance is produced, and when these have been divided in this way, the omission of the spoken expression must be posited as common to all of them. But those which arise on account of what is assumed as being what was in the beginning, and not as a cause, or [when] a cause is posited, are manifest through the definition; for the conclusion must come about because these things are so, which was not [the case] in [things that are] not causes, and again, when that which was in the beginning is not counted in, [it follows] that they do not have the [refutations] which arise on account of the begging of that which was in the beginning. But those which arise on account of the consequent are a part of accident; for the consequent is an accident. It differs, however, from accident, because it is possible to assume an accident in one single case only, as that the same thing is yellow, and honey, and white, and a swan; but [the argument] on account of the consequent [proceeds] always in several cases; for those things which are the same as one and the same thing are also required to be the same as each other, on account of which the refutation on account of the consequent comes about. But it is not altogether true, as if it be white according to accident; for both snow and a swan are the same as white, or again in Melissus's argument he assumes that to have been made and to have a beginning are the same, or that to become equal and to receive the same magnitude are the same.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":17,"ref":"p17","source":"Quoniamenim principium habet quod tactum est, et quod habet principium,factum esse postulat, tanquamamboeademsint, eo quodprincipium habent factum esse et finitum.Similiter autemjetin iis quæ aequalia facta sunt, si eamdem magnitudinem, et unam sumentia aequalia fiunt,et quae aequalia facta sunt, eamdem et unam magnitudinem sumunt, quare consequens sumit; quod igitur propter accidens redargutio, in ignorantia redargutionis est, manifestum, et quod ea quæ est, est propter consequens.Inspiciendum autem est id et alias melius. Quae vero propter id quod est plures interrogationes ut unarn facere,in eo sunt quod non enucleamus, sive non dividimus propositionis orationem, nam propositio unum de uno est.Nam idem terminus unius solius hominis. Similiter autem et in aliis.Si igitnr una propositio est quae unum de uno postulat, et simpliciter erit propositio talis interrogatio. Atqui quoniam syllogismus ex propositionibus est, redargutio autem syllogismus, et redargutio erit ex propositionibus. Si igitur propositio unum de uno, manifeslum quoniam et hæc in redargutionis ignorantia, nam apparet esse propositio quae non est propositio. Si itaque dedit responsionem ut ad unam interrogationem, erit redargutio; si autem non dederit, sed apparet, apparens redargutio.","english":"For since what has been touched has a beginning, and what has a beginning is claimed to have been made, as though both were the same—because they have a beginning, to have been made and to be finished. Similarly also in the case of things that have been made equal: if taking the same and one magnitude they become equal, and things that have been made equal take the same and one magnitude, therefore it takes the consequent. That, therefore, the refutation which is on account of an accident lies in ignorance of the refutation is manifest, and that the one which is on account of the consequent does so too. But this must be examined also in other ways, and better. Those [refutations], however, which consist in making many questions into one lie in this: that we do not unravel, or do not divide, the statement of the proposition; for a proposition is one about one thing. For the same term is of one single man. Similarly also in other cases. If, therefore, a proposition is one which asks one thing about one thing, such an interrogation will also be simply a proposition. And yet, since a syllogism is from propositions, and a refutation is a syllogism, a refutation will also be from propositions. If, therefore, a proposition is one about one thing, it is manifest that these also lie in ignorance of the refutation; for that appears to be a proposition which is not a proposition. If, then, he has given a response as to one interrogation, there will be a refutation; but if he has not given it, yet it appears [that he has], there is an apparent refutation.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":18,"ref":"p18","source":"Quare omnes loci cadunt in redargutionis ignorantiam, qui quidem dicti sunt propter dictionem, quia est apparens contradictio,quod erat proprium redargutionis, alii autem propter syllogismi terminum.\n\nCAPUT VI.,\n\nCausas deceptionem, captionum sophisticarum.\n\nDeceptio autem fit in iis quidem quae propter aequivocationem et orationem, eo quod non potest quis dividere id quod multipliciter dicitur, nam quaedam non est promptum dividere, ut unum, et ens,et idem. In iis autem quai sunt propter compositionem et divisionem, eo quod nihil putatur differre composita et divisa oratio, ceu evenit in plurimis. Similiter autem et in iis quae sunt propter accentum,non enim aliud videtur significare intensa,etremissaoratio in aliquo, aut non in plu. ribus. Earum vero quæ sunt propter lfiguram, ob similitudinem dictionis: difficile est enim dividere quae similiter et quae aliter dicuntur (nam ferme qui hoc potest facere in procintu est ut videat verum, maxime autem sciet innuere), quod omne quod de aliquo pr£edicatur,arbitramuridipsum aliquid esse, et ut unum intelligimus, nam unum, et substantiam maxime videtur sequi id quod est aliquid, et ens.","english":"Therefore all the topics fall under ignorance of refutation—those that were stated on account of diction, because there is an apparent contradiction, which was the property of refutation; but others on account of the term of the syllogism.\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nThe causes of deception and of sophistic captions.\n\nDeception occurs in those cases that arise from equivocation and from speech, because one cannot divide what is said in many ways; for some things it is not easy to divide, such as one, and being, and the same. In those cases that arise from composition and division, because a composed and a divided expression is thought to differ in nothing, as happens in most cases. Similarly also in those that arise from accent; for an intensified and a relaxed expression seems to signify something else in some respect, or not in more. But of those that arise from figure, on account of the similarity of diction—for it is difficult to divide the things that are said similarly and those that are said otherwise (for nearly whoever can do this is on the verge of seeing the truth, and especially will know how to indicate it)—because we judge that everything that is predicated of something is itself something, and we understand it as one; for one, and substance, most of all seem to follow that which is something, and being.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":19,"ref":"p19","source":"Quare in iis quas sunt propter dictionem hic locus ponendus,primum quidem magis deceptio gignitur in iis qui cum aliis considerant, quam qui per seipsos: nam ea quæ cum alio est consideratio, per orationem est: quæ autem per seipsos,non minus per ipsam rem. Deinde et per seipsos decipi accidit, quando in oratione facit considerationem: praeterea deceptio quidem ex similitudine, similitudo autem ex dictione. In iis autem quæ sunt propter accidens, eo quod non potest dijudicare idem et diversum, et unum et multa, neque quibus praedicatorum omnia haec et rei accidunt.Similiter autem et in iis quae propter consequens sunt, pars enim quaedam accidentis, estconsequens. Amplius, et in multis apparet, et postulatur hoc pacto,si hoc ab illo non separatur, nec ab altero separatur alterum. In iis vero quae sunt propter omissionem orationis, et in iis quae sunt propterid quod aliquo modo et simpliciter, eo quod propter parum,deceptio est, Nam quasi nihil consignificet quid aut aliquo modo, aut simpliciter, aut alicubi, aut nunc, universaliter concedimus. Similiter autem et in iis quae quod in principio est sumunt, et in non causis, et quascunque plures interrogationes ut unam faciunt: in omnibus enim his est deceptio, ob id quod propter parum, nam non exacte discernimus neque propositionis neque syllogismi terminum, propter prædictam causam.","english":"Therefore in those refutations that arise on account of diction, this topic must be placed. First, indeed, deception is generated more in those who consider together with others than in those who consider by themselves; for consideration with another is through speech, whereas consideration by themselves is no less through the thing itself. Then, deception also happens to those by themselves when they make their consideration in speech; moreover, deception indeed arises from similarity, and similarity from diction. But in those that arise on account of accident, because one cannot distinguish the same and the different, and the one and the many, nor to which of the predicates all these things and the thing itself belong. Similarly also in those that arise on account of consequence; for the consequent is a certain part of the accident. Further, it also appears in many cases and is assumed in this way: if this is not separated from that, neither is the one separated from the other. But in those that arise on account of omission of speech, and in those that arise on account of something in a certain respect and simply, because the deception is on account of a small difference—for we universally concede that \"in a certain respect\" or \"simply\" or \"somewhere\" or \"now\" signifies almost nothing. Similarly also in those that assume what is at the beginning, and in non-causes, and in however many questions they make into one: for in all these there is deception because of a small difference, since we do not exactly discern either the term of the proposition or of the syllogism, on account of the aforementioned cause.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":20,"ref":"p20","source":"CAPUT VII.\n\nEx quibus locis captiones falsæ.\n\nQuoniam autem habemuspropterqusecunquefiunt apparentes syllogismi,habemus et propter quaecunque fiunt sophistici syllogismi et redargutiones. Dico autem sophisticam redargutionem et syllogismum, non solum apparentem syllogismum aut redargut.ionem nonexistentemquidem; sed et existentem quidem, at apparenter accommodatam rei. Sunt autem illæ, quæ non secundum rem redarguunt, et quae monstrant ignorantes, quod quidem erat proprium tentativæ.Est autem tentativa, pars dialecticas; illa autem potestsyllogizarefalsum, propter ignorantiam ejus qui dat orationem. Sophisticae autemredargutiones tametsi colligant contradictionem, non faciunt manifestum, si ignorat, nam et scientem impediunt hisce orationibus. Quod autem illas habeamus, hac via manifestum est, nam propter quæcunque apparet audientibus ut interrogata syllogizare,propter haec et respondenti utique videatur: quare erunt syllogismi falsi per haec aut omnia, aut aliqua, nam quod non interrogatus arbitratur dedissp-, et interrogatus quoque ponet.","english":"CHAPTER VII.\n\nFrom what topics deceptive arguments arise.\n\nSince we have the sources through which apparent syllogisms come about, we also have those through which sophistical syllogisms and refutations come about. I call a sophistical refutation and syllogism not only an apparent syllogism or refutation that does not exist, but also one that does exist yet is apparently accommodated to the matter. These are the ones that refute not according to the matter, and that expose those who are ignorant—which was indeed the peculiar property of the tentative art. The tentative art is a part of dialectic; it has the power to syllogize falsely on account of the ignorance of the one who gives the argument. Sophistical refutations, although they bring about a contradiction, do not make it evident if the person is ignorant; for they also impede the one who knows by means of these arguments. That we have these, then, is evident by this route: for through whatever sources a syllogism appears to the hearers to be drawn from the questions asked, through these same sources it will certainly also appear so to the respondent; wherefore there will be false syllogisms through these, either all of them or some of them. For what a person, when not questioned, supposes he has granted, he will also grant when questioned.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":21,"ref":"p21","source":"Verum in quibusdam simul accidit et interrogare quod deest,et apparere falsum, ut in iis quae sunt secundum dictionem et solcecismum.Si ergo syllogismi contradictionis propter apparentem redargutionem sunt, manifestum est quod propter tot erunt et falsorum syllogismi, propter quot et apparens redargutio,apparens autem propter particulas veri: nam cum quodcunque defuerit,apparebit redargutio,ut quod propter non accidens, propter orationem, quæ ad impossibile, et quæ duas interropationes ut unam facit, propter propositionem,et pro eo quod per se, quod propter accidens, et hujus particula, quod propter consequens.Amplius, non in re,sed in oratione accidere,deinde pro universali contradictione, et secundum idem,et ad idem,et similiter, propter id quod in aliquo,vel propter unumquodque horum peccat.Amplius,propter id quod est nun connumerato eo quod in principio, quod in principio sumere.","english":"But in certain cases it happens at once both that what is missing is asked and that the false appears, as in those arguments that depend on diction and on solecism. If, then, syllogisms of contradiction arise because of apparent refutation, it is clear that they will be false syllogisms for as many reasons as there is apparent refutation, and apparent because of the parts of truth; for whenever any one of these is missing, the refutation will appear—as the argument due to non-accident, the argument due to expression, the argument leading to the impossible, and the one that makes two questions into one, the argument due to the proposition, and the argument due to what is per se, the argument due to accident, and the part of this, the argument due to consequence. Moreover, that it happens not in the thing but in the expression; then, in place of universal contradiction, and in respect of the same, and to the same, and in like manner, it errs because of what is in some respect, or because of each one of these. Moreover, because of what is not counted together with the beginning, namely, to beg the question.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":22,"ref":"p22","source":"Quare habemus secundum quod fiuntcaptiosae ratiocinationes,nam secundum plura non erunt,secundum autem ea quæ dicta sunt erunt omnes.Est autem sophistica redargutio non simpliciter redargutio, sed ad aliquem,et syllogismus similiter.Nam si non sumatid quidem quod est propter aequivocum unum significare,et quod propter similitudinis figuram solum hoc quidem; et in aliis similiter,neque syllogismi,neque redargutiones erunt, neque simpliciter, neque ad eum qui interrogatur.Si autem sumant,ad eum qui interrogatur erunt,simpliciter autem non erunt; non enim unum significatum sumpserunt,sed apparens, et apud illum quidem.\n\nCAPUT VIII.\n\nDe veris et falsis redargutionibus.\n\nPropter quaecunque autem redarguunt qui redargutionibus utuntur,non oportet tentare sumere sine omnium quae sunt scientia. Id autem non unius artis, nam infinitae fortasse sunt scientias; quare manifestum quoniam et demonstrationes, redargutiones quidem sunt et verae. Nam quaecunque est demonBtrare,est et redarguere eum qui ponet contradictionum veri,ut si commensurabilem diametrum posuerit,redarguetquisdemonstratione,quod incommensurabilis; quare omnium oportebit esse scium: nam aliae quidem sequuntur propter ea quae in geometria Bunt principia, et eorum conclusiones; aliæ autem propter ea quæ sunt in medicina; aliae denique propter illa quae sunt aliarum disciplinarum.Sed et fal-.","english":"Therefore we have the grounds on which captious reasonings come about; for they will not be on many grounds, but on those that have been stated they will all be. But sophistical refutation is not refutation simply, but relative to someone, and a syllogism likewise. For if one does not assume that what is present signifies one thing because of equivocation, and that this alone is so because of the figure of similarity, and similarly in other cases, there will be neither syllogisms nor refutations, neither simply nor relative to the one who is questioned. But if they do assume it, they will be relative to the one who is questioned, but they will not be simply; for they have not assumed one meaning, but an apparent one, and in his case indeed.\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nOn true and false refutations.\n\nBut whatever the things are on account of which those who use refutations refute, one must not attempt to assume them without knowledge of all things that exist. This is not the work of one art, for the sciences are perhaps infinite; therefore it is clear that demonstrations too are true refutations. For whatever it is possible to demonstrate, it is also possible to refute the one who posits a contradiction of the true, as if someone posits the diameter to be commensurable, one will refute him by demonstration that it is incommensurable; therefore it will be necessary to be a knower of all things: for some things follow on account of the principles that are in geometry and their conclusions; others on account of those that are in medicine; others, finally, on account of those that belong to other disciplines. But also false—","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":23,"ref":"p23","source":"saeredargutionessimiliterinfinitaeerunt.Nam secundum unamquamque artem et falsus syllogismus,ut secundum geometriam geometricus, et secundum medicinam medicinalis. Dico autem secundum artem, secundum illius principia.Manifestum est igitur quod non omnium redargutionum,sed earum quae sunt secundum dialecticam,sumendi sunt loci.Nam ii communes sunt ad omnem artem et potentiam,et eam quidem quae estsecundum unamquamquedisciplinam,redargutionem scientis est considerare sive cum non est, apparet, sive cum est, et quare est; eam autem quae ex communibus est, et sub nulla arte cadens,dialecticorum. Nam si habemus ex quibus probabiles syllogismiin quolibet, habebimus ex quibus redargutiones: redargutio namque est syllogismus contradictionis; quare aut unus,aut duo syllogismicontradictionis,redargutio est.Habemus igitur propter quaecunque omnes hujusmodi sunt; si autem haec habemus, et solutiones habemus, nam illarum instantiae,solutiones sunt. Habemus autem propter quaecunque et apparentes fiunt,apparentes autem non cuilibet,sed talibus; infinita enim sunt, si quis consideret illa secundum quæcunque apparent quibuslibet. Quare manifestum est quoniam dialectici est posse sumere propter quæcunque fit per communia,vel quae est redargutio, vel quae apparet redargutio,vel dialeclica,vel apparens dialectica, vel tentativa.","english":"Sophistical refutations will likewise be infinite. For according to each art there is also a false syllogism, as according to geometry a geometrical one, and according to medicine a medical one. I mean \"according to the art,\" according to its principles. It is evident, therefore, that the grounds are to be taken not of all refutations, but of those that are according to dialectic. For these are common to every art and faculty, and it belongs to the man of science to consider the refutation that is according to each discipline, whether it is when it is not, or when it is, and why it is; but the refutation that is from common grounds, and falls under no art, belongs to the dialecticians. For if we have the grounds from which probable syllogisms in any subject are made, we shall have the grounds from which refutations are made; for a refutation is a syllogism of contradiction; wherefore either one or two syllogisms of contradiction are a refutation. We have them, therefore, on account of all the grounds of this sort. But if we have these, we also have the solutions; for the objections to those are the solutions. And we have them on account of all the grounds by which apparent refutations also come about—apparent, however, not to anyone, but to such persons; for they are infinite, if one considers them according to all the grounds by which they appear to anyone. Wherefore it is evident that it belongs to the dialectician to be able to take the grounds by which there comes about either a refutation, or an apparent refutation, either dialectical or apparent dialectical, or tentative.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":24,"ref":"p24","source":"CAPUT IX.\n\nOrationes ad nomen et ad intellectum non bene diduci.\n\nNonestautem differentia orationum quam quidam dicunt esse, has quidem ad nomen, illas vero ad intellectum.Inconveniens enim est opinari alias quidem esse ad nomen orationes, diversas vero ad intellectum et non easdem.Quid enim est Don ad intellectum,nisi quando non utitur nomine (qui putat interrogare) eo et ad quod is qui interrogatus dedit? Idem autem id est et ad nomen. Et ad intellectum autem,quando ad quod dedit intelligens.","english":"CHAPTER IX.\n\nThat arguments directed at the name and at the meaning are not well distinguished.\n\nThere is, however, no difference among arguments of the sort that some claim, namely that some are directed at the name and others at the meaning. For it is absurd to suppose that some arguments are directed at the name and others at the meaning, and that they are not the same. For what is \"directed at the meaning\" except when the questioner does not use the name in the sense in which the one questioned granted it? But this is the same as being directed at the name. And it is directed at the meaning, moreover, when one understands it in the sense in which he granted it.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":25,"ref":"p25","source":"Si autem aliquis (plura significante nomine) un um putet significare, et interrogans, et interrogatus (ut forte ens et unu plura significat,sed et respondens et interrogans Zeno unum putans esse interrogavit, et est oratio quod unum, omnia), haec ad nomen est, aut ad intellectum interrogantis isputata.Si vera aliquis multa putet significare, manifestum quod oratio illa non est ad intellectum.Primum igitur circa hujusmodi orationes, est ad nomen, et ad intellectum, quæcunque plura significant; deindecircaquamlibet est, non in oratione est ad intellectum esse,sed in eo quod respondens se habet aliquo modo ad ea quae dantur; deinde ad nomen contingit omnes eas esse, nam esse ad nomem, hoc in loco, est esse non ad intellectum suum; si enim non omnes,erunt quaedam aliæ quæ neque ad nomen neque ad intellectum, illi vero dicunt omnes,et dividunt vel ad nomen.-vel ad intellectum esse omnes,alias autem non.A ttamen quicunque suntsyllogismi propter id quod multipliciLer,borum aliqui sunt secundum nomen.","english":"But if someone, when a name signifies several things, thinks it signifies one, and both the questioner and the one questioned—as for instance \"being\" and \"one\" signify several things, but Zeno, both answering and asking, thought they were one and asked, and the argument is that \"one\" is all things—this argument is directed at the name, or at the thought of the questioner. But if someone thinks it signifies many things, it is clear that that argument is not directed at the thought. First, then, in the case of arguments of this sort, the distinction is between what is directed at the name and what is directed at the thought, whenever they signify several things; then, in any case whatever, it is not in the argument itself that it is directed at the thought, but in the one who answers, in that he is disposed in some way toward the things that are granted; then it happens that all of them are directed at the name—for to be directed at the name, in this place, is to be not directed at one's own thought. For if not all, there will be certain others that are directed neither at the name nor at the thought, but they say all, and they divide them as being either directed at the name or at the thought, and others not. And yet whatever syllogisms there are because of the multiplicity of words, some are according to the name.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":26,"ref":"p26","source":"Nam absurdedicatursecundum nomen esseomnes qui sunt propter dictionem; sed sunt quaedam captiones non in eo quod respondens ad easse habeataliquomodo, sed quia tamen interrogationem oratio ipsa habeat quae plura significet.Et omnino inconveniens est de redargutione disserere,et non prius de syllogismo: nam redargutio syllogismus est; quare oportet et de syllogismo prius quam de falsa redargutione, nam tal is redargutio apparenssyllogismuscontradictionis. Quare aut in syllogismo erit causa, aut in contradictione(nam adjungere oportet contradictionem),quandoque autem in utroque erit apparens redargutio; est autem de eo qnod est silentia dicere, in contradictione,non syllogismo.De eo autem quod est quod non habet aliquis dare, in utrisque; de eo vero quod est quod Homeri poema est figura per circulum in syllogismo; quæ autemin neutroest,verus est syllogismus.Verum unde sermo provenit revertamur.Utrum quae in disciplinis sunt orationes ad intellectum sint,an non? Et si cui videtur plura significare triangulus, et dedit non ut eam figuram de qua concludebat quoniam duo recti, utrum ad intellectum illius disputavit hic, an non? Amplius, si plura quidem significat nomen,ille autem non intelligit, neque putat quomodo is non ad intellectum disputat,aut quomodo oportetinterrogare eum, qui non dat divisionem?","english":"For it is absurd to say that all who exist are according to the name because of the wording; but there are certain captious arguments not in the fact that the respondent is somehow disposed toward them, but because the speech itself contains the question, which signifies several things. And in general it is inappropriate to discuss refutation and not first discuss syllogism; for refutation is a syllogism. Therefore one must also discuss syllogism before false refutation, for such a refutation is an apparent syllogism of contradiction. Therefore the cause will lie either in the syllogism or in the contradiction (for one must add the contradiction), and sometimes the apparent refutation will lie in both. Now it is possible to speak of what is in the silences in the contradiction, not in the syllogism. But of that which one does not have to give, in both; and of that which is the poem of Homer is a figure through the circle, in the syllogism; but the one that is in neither is a true syllogism. But let us return to whence the argument arose. Are the arguments in the disciplines directed toward understanding, or not? And if it seems to someone that triangle signifies several things, and he did not give it as that figure about which he was concluding that it has two right angles, did this man dispute toward his understanding, or not? Further, if the name signifies several things, but he does not understand it, nor does he think so, how does he not dispute toward understanding, or how ought one to question him who does not give the division?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":27,"ref":"p27","source":"sive interroget aliquis si est silentia dicere an non?;an est quidem ut non,an est ut sic? Si autem dat aliquis nullo modo, ille autem disputat,utrum non ad intellectum disputat, quamvis oratio videatur earum esse quas ad nomen sunt. Non igitur est genus aliquod orationum ad intellectum,sed illae quidem ad nomen sunt,et hujusmodi non omnes,non quod redargutiones,sed neque apparentes redargutiones; nam sunt et non propter dictionem apparentes redargutiones,ut quæ propter accidens,et reliquae.Si autem postulet dividendum, quod dico quidem silentia dicere,baec aulem sic, ilia vero non sic,id profecto primum,absurdum postulare: nam quandoque non videtur interrogatum multipliciter se habere, atqui impossibile est dividere,qui non putat.Deinde docere, quid aliud erit? manuestum enim faciet quonam pacto se habet,ei qui neque considerat, neque scit, neque opinatur quod aliter dicitur, quia et in non duplicibus quid prohibet hoc facere: ut putas æquales sunt unitates binariis,in quaternariis? Sunt autem hi binarii quidem inexistentes,illi autem non sic; et putas contrariorum una est disciplina an non? Sunt autem contraria haec quidem nota,illa autem ignota: quare videtur ignorare qui hoc poslulat,quod aliud est docere quam disputare,et quod oportet quidem docentem non interrogare,sed eum manifesta facere,illum autem interrogare.","english":"Or if someone asks whether to say \"silences\" is possible or not? Is it possible in one way and not in another? But if someone grants it in no way, and that person argues whether he is not arguing with respect to the meaning, although the speech seems to be of the kind that pertains to the name. Therefore there is no genus of speeches directed to the meaning, but those indeed pertain to the name, and not all of this kind, not because they are refutations, but neither are they apparent refutations; for there are also apparent refutations not due to diction, as those due to accident and the rest. But if he demands that it be divided—what I say indeed is to say \"silences,\" but these in this way, those not in this way—that is certainly absurd to demand first: for sometimes it does not seem that what has been asked is disposed in multiple ways, and yet it is impossible to divide what one does not think. Then to teach—what else will it be? For he will make clear in what way it is disposed to one who neither considers nor knows nor opines that it is said otherwise, since even in non-duplex cases what prevents this from being done: as, do you think units are equal to binaries, in quaternaries? But these are binaries indeed existing, those not so; and do you think there is one discipline of contraries or not? But contraries are these known, those unknown: wherefore he who demands this seems to be ignorant that to teach is something other than to dispute, and that the one teaching ought not to question but to make things clear, while the other questions.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":28,"ref":"p28","source":"CAPUT X.\n\nDe interrogatione tentativæ, et quid inter contentio sum sophisticumque intersit.\n\nAmplius,affirmare vel negare qui postuJat,id non monstrantis est, sed experimentum sumentis, nam tentativa dialectica quæ dam est, quapropter de omnibus inspicit,et exploratlnonscientem,sed ignorantem atque simulantem. Qui igitur secundum rem considerat communia, dialecticus est; qui autem id apparenter facit, sophisticus.","english":"CHAPTER X.\n\nOn the tentative question, and what difference there is between the contentious and the sophistical.\n\nFurthermore, one who asks that something be affirmed or denied is not doing the work of one who demonstrates, but of one who is making a test; for this is a kind of tentative dialectic, and for this reason it inspects and examines all things—not the one who does not know, but the one who is ignorant and pretending. Therefore, the one who considers common principles according to the matter is a dialectician; but the one who does this only in appearance is a sophist.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":29,"ref":"p29","source":"Et syllogismus contentiosus et sophisticus, unus quidem est apparens syllogismus, cirea ea de quibus dialectica tentativa est,quamvis vera sit conclusio: nam ejus quod est propter quid, hallucinatorius est,et quæcunque (cum non sint( secundum cujusque disciplinam captiosae ratiocinationes,videntur esse secundum artem.Nam pseudographiae non contentiosae (secundum enim ea quae sub arte sunt, captiosae sunt ratrocinationes) neque si aliqua est pseudographia circa verum, ut Hippocratis quadratura quae per lunulas; sed ut Brysso quadravit circulum,et tametsi quadraretur circulus,quia tamen non secundum rem,ideo sophisticus; quare et qui de his quidem apparens syllogismus, contentiosa est oratio: nam apparens est secundum rem,quare fallax et injusta.Quemadmodum enim ea (quae in certamineest) injuria quamdam speciem habet et est quaedam injusta pugua, sic in contradictione injusta pugna contentiosa est, nam et illic qui omnino vincere volunt,omnia tentant, et hic qui contentiosi sunt.","english":"Both the contentious and the sophistical syllogism are, in one respect, an apparent syllogism concerning those matters with which tentative dialectic is occupied, even though the conclusion be true; for it is deceptive as regards the reason why, and whatever captious reasonings there are (since they are not) according to each one's discipline, appear to be according to art. For pseudographies are not contentious (for according to those things which fall under art, they are captious reasonings), nor if there is any pseudography concerning the true, as the quadrature of Hippocrates which is by means of lunules; but as Bryson squared the circle, and even if the circle were squared, because nevertheless it is not according to the thing, therefore it is sophistical; wherefore also the apparent syllogism concerning these matters is a contentious discourse; for it is apparent according to the thing, wherefore fallacious and unjust. For just as the injury which is in contest has a certain appearance and is a certain unjust fight, so in contradiction the contentious is an unjust fight; for there too those who wish wholly to conquer attempt all things, and here too those who are contentious.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":30,"ref":"p30","source":"Qui igitur victoriæ ipsius gratia tales sunt, contentiosi homines et Iitium amatores videntur esse,qui autem gloriae gratia quae in divitiis est,sophistici sunt; nam sophistice est (ut diximus) pecuniarum quædam aucupativa ab apparente sapientia, quapropter demonstrationem apparentem appetunt.Et in eisdem orationibus quidem sunt lilium amatores et sophistae, sed non propter eadem; et oratio quidem eadem erit sophistica et contentiosa,sed non propter idem,sed quatenus quidem est ob victoriam apparentem, contentiosa; quatenus vero est ob sapientiam sophistica, nam sophistice est quaedam apparens sapientia,non autem existens.","english":"Therefore those who are such for the sake of victory itself appear to be contentious men and lovers of quarreling, while those who are such for the sake of the glory that lies in wealth are sophistical; for sophistry is (as we have said) a certain hunting after money derived from apparent wisdom, and for this reason they desire apparent demonstration. And in the same arguments there are both lovers of quarreling and sophists, but not for the same reasons; and the same argument will be both sophistical and contentious, but not for the same reason: insofar as it aims at apparent victory, it is contentious; insofar as it aims at wisdom, it is sophistical, for sophistry is a certain apparent wisdom, but not really existing.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":31,"ref":"p31","source":"Contentiosa vero quodammodo sic se habens ad dialecticam, ut pseudographa ad geometricam: nam ex eisdem contentiosa, diaserendi modo, captiose decipil, ut et pseudographa geomelrice.Sed haec quidem non contentiosa, quia ex principiis et conclusionibus quae sunt sub arte pseudographiam facit; quae autem ex iis est quae sunt sub dialectica,circa alia quidem contentiosam esse, manifestum est: ut quadratura quidem quae per lunulas,non contentiosa,Bryssonis autem contentiosa.Et illam quidem non est transferre nisi ad geometriam, solum eo quod ex propriis fit principiis; hanc autem ad plures quicunque nesciunt quid est possibile in unoquoque, et quid impossibile, nam acommodabitur, aut ut Antiphon quadravit, vel si quis non dicat melius esse post coenam deambulare per Zenonis rationem, non medicinalis,communis enim est. Si ergo omnino similiter se habeat contentiosa ad dialecticam, ut pseudographa ad geometriam, non ex illis utique erit con tentiosa.","english":"The contentious art, however, stands in a certain relation to dialectic as false drawing does to geometry; for the contentious art, by its manner of arguing, deceives captiously from the same principles, just as false drawing does from geometry. But the latter is not contentious, because it makes its false drawing from principles and conclusions that fall under the art; whereas the art that proceeds from those things that fall under dialectic is evidently contentious about other matters—as, for instance, the squaring of the circle by means of lunules is not contentious, but Bryson's is. And the former cannot be transferred except to geometry, for the sole reason that it proceeds from its own proper principles; but the latter can be transferred to many who do not know what is possible in each case and what is impossible, for it will be adapted, either as Antiphon squared the circle, or if someone should say by Zeno's argument that it is not better to walk after dinner—this is not medical, for it is common. If, therefore, the contentious art stands in altogether the same relation to dialectic as false drawing does to geometry, it will certainly not be contentious from those principles.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":32,"ref":"p32","source":"CAPUT XI.\n\nOrationes dialecticorum tenlativorumque non esse ad determinatum genus.\n\nNunc autem non est dialecticus circa genus aliquid determinatum, neque demonstrativus ullius, neque talis qualis universalis,nam nequeomnia sunt in uno aliquo genere, neque si sint, possibile est sub eisdem principiis esse ea quae sunt. Quare et nulla ars earum quae aliquam naturam monstrant, interrogativa est, nam non possibile est utramvis partium dare.Syllogismus enim non fit ex utrisque, dialecticaauteminterrogativaest(siautem monstraret, quid illud, nisi et omnia?), verumtamen prima peculiariaque principia non interrogat, nam si non daret, non jam haberet ex quibus amplius disputaret ad instantiam. Talis autem est tentativa,nam tentativa non talis est qualis est geometria,sed qualem utique haberet, non sciens aliquis. Fieri enim potest ut periculum sumat, et is qui nescit rem de eo qui nescit, siquidem et dat non ex quibus scit, neque ex propriis, sed ex consequentibus, quajomnia talia sunt quae scieatem quidem nihil prohibet nescire artem, nescientem autem necesse est ignorare. Quare maniFestum quoniam nullius determinati tentativa disciplina est, eo quod de omnibus est, nam omnes artes utunturquibusdam communibus. Ideoque omnes illitterati quodam modo utunlur diaI ectica et tentativa.","english":"CHAPTER XI.\n\nThat the arguments of dialecticians and tentative reasoners do not belong to one determinate genus.\n\nNow the dialectician is not concerned with any determinate genus, nor is the demonstrative reasoner concerned with any one thing, nor is he such as the universal reasoner; for not all things are in some one genus, and even if they were, it is not possible for the things that exist to be under the same principles. Wherefore no art among those that display some nature is interrogative, for it is not possible to grant either part. For a syllogism does not come about from both, but dialectic is interrogative (if it were demonstrative, what would it be, unless it were also all things?); nevertheless it does not interrogate the first and peculiar principles, for if it did not grant them, it would no longer have the things from which it might dispute further against an objection. Such, however, is the tentative art, for the tentative art is not such as geometry is, but such as one who does not know might have. For it can happen that one who does not know a thing makes a trial of one who does not know it, since he also grants things not from those he knows, nor from proper principles, but from consequents—all of which are such that nothing prevents one who knows from being ignorant of the art, while one who does not know must necessarily be ignorant. Wherefore it is manifest that the tentative discipline belongs to no determinate genus, because it concerns all things; for all arts use certain common principles. And for this reason all the unlettered in a certain way use dialectic and the tentative art.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":33,"ref":"p33","source":"Nam omnes usque ad aliquid conantur dijudicare eos qui pronuntiant; haec autem sunt communia, nam illa nihil minus sciunt ipsi, quamvis videantur longe extra dicere. Redarguunt igitur omnes, nam sine arte quidem eo participant, cujus artificialiter est dialectica, et arte syllogistica, tentativus, dialecticus. Quoniam autem sunt multa quidem hæc et de omnibus, non talia autem ut natura quaedam sint et genus, sed ut negationes; alia autem non talis, sed propria sunt. Ex illis de omnibus experimentum possibile est sumere, et artem esse quamdam, et non talem esse quales quas demonstrant, eo quod contentiosus non est omnino sic se habens, ut pseudographus: namnoneritcaptiosus ex determinati cujuspiam generis principiis,sed circa omne genus erit is quicontenLiosus. Loci igitur sophisticarum redargutionum hi sunt, et quod dialectici est considerare de his, et res eas posse facere, non difficile videre: nam quae circa propo. sitiones est disciplina, omnem habet hanc speculationem, et de redargutionibus quidem apparentibus dictum est.","english":"For all of them attempt to judge those who make assertions up to a point; and these things are common, for they themselves know them no less, although they seem to speak far beyond them. Therefore all refute, for even without art they participate in that of which dialectic is the art, and the tentative reasoner and the dialectician participate in the syllogistic art. But since these things are many and concern all things, yet are not such as to be a certain nature and genus, but rather negations; while others are not of this sort, but are proper. From those [common places] concerning all things it is possible to gather experience, and that there is a certain art, and that it is not such as those which the demonstrators [use], in that the contentious person is not altogether disposed as the pseudographer is; for he will not be captious from the principles of some determinate genus, but the contentious person will be concerned with every genus. These, then, are the places of sophistic refutations, and that it belongs to the dialectician to consider these things, and to be able to make these matters, it is not difficult to see; for the discipline that concerns propositions has all this speculation, and concerning apparent refutations indeed it has been said.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":34,"ref":"p34","source":"CAPUT XII.\n\nLoci sophistici interrogantium ad falsum aut inopinabile.\n\nDe aliquo est falsum quidpiam ostendere, et oratione ad inopinabile ducere. Hoc autem fuit secundum propositum sophisticae intentionis. Primum quidem ex eo quod interrogat quodam modo, et per interrogationem accidit maxime,nam id ad nullum determinatum interrogare propositum, venativum est illorum. Temere namque dicentes peccant magis; temere autem aicunt, quanao ninu habent propositum.Et id interrogare multa (quamvis id determinatum sit ad quod disputant) et id ea quas videntur, dicere se postulare, facit quamdam idoneitatem,ut ad inopinabile ducat aut falsum. Et si interrogatus affirmet aut neget illorum aliquid ducere ad ea ad quae promptus est argumentari, potest tamen nunc minus nocere per hæc quam prius, nam repetunt aliquid ad id quod in principio. Elementum autem deveniendi adfalsum aliquod autinopinabile,nullam statim interrogare positionem, sed affirmare ob id se interrogare quod discere velit, nam locum argumentationisconsideratio facit. Ad falsum autem ostendendum proprius locus sophisticus est ducere ad talia ad quae abundat orationibus, est autem bene et nonbeneid facere, quemadmodum dictum est prius. Rursum ut ad inopinabilia ducat,considerare ex quo genere est qui disputat, deinde interrogare quod pluribus illi dicunt inopinabile, estenim singulis quibusque aliquid tale.","english":"CHAPTER XII.\n\nThe sophistic topics of questioners leading to the false or the unexpected.\n\nIt is the mark of a certain kind of person to show something false and to lead by speech to what is unexpected. This, moreover, was in accordance with the intended purpose of the sophistic art. First, indeed, from the fact that he questions in a certain way, and it happens especially through questioning—for to question with no definite purpose is a hunting after these things. For those who speak rashly go wrong more; but they speak rashly who have no definite purpose. And to question many things (although that which they dispute about is definite) and to say that they demand those things which they seem to demand, produces a certain fitness, so that he leads to the unexpected or the false. And if the one questioned affirms or denies any of these things, to lead him to those things for which he is ready to argue—yet he can now do less harm through these than before, for they repeat something to that which was at the beginning. But the element of arriving at something false or unexpected is not immediately to ask a position, but to affirm that for this reason he asks what he wishes to learn; for consideration makes the place of argumentation. To show the false, however, the more proper sophistic topic is to lead to those things in which he abounds in speeches; and it is possible to do this well and not well, as was said before. Again, so that he may lead to unexpected things, to consider of what sort the one disputing is, and then to ask what seems unexpected to the many, for there is something of this sort for each individual.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":35,"ref":"p35","source":"Elementum autem horum sumere singulorumquequorumque positiones in propositionibus. Solutio vero et horum competens fertur ostendere quod non propter orationem accidit inopinabile, semper autem id quoque vult qui contendit. Amplius autem ex voluntatibus et manifestis opinionibus, nam non eadem volunt et dicunt, sed dicunt quidem decoratissimas orationes, volunt autem ea quæ videnturprodesse: utbene mori magis quam voluptuose vivere dicunt oportere, et agero juste magis quam divitis affluere prave; volunt autem contraria.Eum igiturqui dicit secundum voluntates, ad has manifestas opiniones duceudum,eum vero qui dicit secundum has, ad absconsas; utrovis enim modo necessarium estinopinabiliadicere,nam autad manifestasautimmanifestasopiniones dicunt contraria. Plurimus autem est locus faciendi inopinabilia dicere, quemadmodum Callicles in Gorgia scriptus est dicens: Et veteres autem omnes arbitrati sunt accidere propter id quod secundum naturam et secundum legtim contraria; contraria enim essenaturam et legem dicunt, etjustitiam secundum legem quidemesse bonum, secundum autem naturam non bonum. Oportet igitur ad eum quidem qui dicit secundum naturam, secundum legem obviare, ad eum vero qui secundum legem, ad naturam ducere; nam utroque modo dicere contingit inopinabilia, erit autem quod secundum naturam quidem ipsisverum,secundumautem legem quod multitudini videtur.","english":"To take the elements of these things and the positions of each particular in propositions. And the solution of these too is held to show competently that the unexpected does not come about on account of the speech, but the contender always wants this as well. Moreover, from wishes and manifest opinions; for they do not wish and say the same things, but they say indeed the most adorned speeches, yet they wish for the things that seem to be advantageous: as that one ought to die well rather than live voluptuously, and to act justly rather than abound in wealth wickedly; but they wish the contrary. Therefore the one who speaks according to wishes must be led to these manifest opinions, but the one who speaks according to these must be led to the hidden ones; for in either way it is necessary to speak what is unexpected, for they speak contrary either to manifest or to non-manifest opinions. But the most extensive topic of making people say unexpected things is the one written in Gorgias, where Callicles is said to speak: And all the ancients too judged that contraries come about on account of that which is according to nature and according to law; for they say that nature and law are contrary, and that justice is good according to law indeed, but not good according to nature. One ought therefore to oppose the one who speaks according to nature with what is according to law, but to lead the one who speaks according to law to nature; for in either way it is possible to say unexpected things, and what is according to nature will be true for them, but what is according to law will be what seems so to the multitude.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":36,"ref":"p36","source":"Quare manifestum quod et illi, quemadmodum et qui nunc, aut redarguere, aut inopinabilia dicere respondentem, conabantur efficere. Quaedam auteM interrogationumhabentutrinqueinopinabilem responsionem,ut utrum sapientibus an patri oporteat obedire,et expedientia facere an justa, et an injuriam pati eligibilius quam nocere. Oportet autem ducere ad ea quae multitudini et sapientibus sunt contraria: nam si dicat aliquis ut ii qui circa orationes ad ea quae multitudini, si autem ut multi ad ea quae iis qui in oratione; dicunt enim hi quidem ex necessitate beatumjustum esse, multitudini autem inopinabile est regem infelicem esse. Est autem ad ea quæ sic sunt, inopinabilia ducere idem ei quod est ad eam quae est secundum naturam et secundum legem contrarietatem ducere; nam lex opinio multitudinis,sapientes autem secundum naturam et veritatem dicunt, et inopinabilia quidem ex his oportet quaerere locis.","english":"Therefore it is clear that both those men and those of the present day were trying to accomplish either refutation or the stating of unexpected things in reply to the respondent. But some questions have an unexpected answer on either side, as whether one ought to obey the wise or one's father, and whether to do expedient things or just things, and whether to suffer injury is more choiceworthy than to do harm. One ought, however, to lead to the things that are contrary to the multitude and to the wise; for if someone speaks as those concerned with arguments do, he leads to the things that are to the multitude, but if as the many do, to the things that are to those concerned with argument. For the former say that the blessed man is necessarily just, but to the multitude it is unexpected that a king be unhappy. It is the same thing, in the case of things that are so, to lead to unexpected things as to lead to the contrariety according to nature and according to law; for law is the opinion of the multitude, but the wise speak according to nature and truth, and unexpected things must be sought from these places.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":37,"ref":"p37","source":"CAPUT XIII.\n\nDe captionibus nugationis et solæcismi.\n\nDe eo quidem quod estfacerenugari, quidnamdicimusnugarijam monstravimus.Omnesautem tales orationes id volunt efficere, si nihil referat nomen et orationem dicere. Duplum autem, et duplum dimidii idem est.Si igiturduplum est dimidii duplum,, eritdimidii dimidii duplum, et rursum si pro duplo duplum dimidii ponatur, ter erit dictum dimidii dimidii dimidii diplum. Et putas, estconcupiscentia delectationis? hæc autem est appetitus delectationis, est igiturconcupiscentiaappetitusdelectationisdeiectationis. Sunt autem omnes hujusmodi orationum in iis quæ sunt ad aliquid, quaecunque non solum genera, Bed et ipsa ad aliquid dicuntur, et ad idem et unum assignatur,ut appetitus alicujus appetitus,et concupiscentiaalicujus concupiscentia,et duplum alicujus duplum, et duplum dimidii, et in quibuscunque quae (cum substantia non sinl) ad aliquid omnino eorum Bunt quorum sunt habitus, aut affectus aut aliquid hujusmodi, in oratione ipsorum de illis praedicatorum declaratur, ut impar est numerus medium haj bens, estautem numerus, impar est igitur numerus numerus medium habens. Et si simum cavitas naris est, est autem naris sima, erit ergo naris naris cava.","english":"CHAPTER XIII.\n\nOn the fallacies of nugation and solecism.\n\nWe have already shown what we mean by \"to make one nugate\" in the matter of what constitutes nugation. But all such arguments aim to accomplish this: to show that it makes no difference whether one says the name or the definition. Now the double and the double of the half are the same. If, therefore, the double is the double of the half, then the double of the half will be the double of the half of the half; and again, if \"the double of the half\" is put in place of \"the double,\" then \"the double of the half of the half of the half\" will have been said three times. And do you think that desire is desire of pleasure? But this is appetite for pleasure; therefore desire is appetite for pleasure of pleasure. Now all arguments of this kind fall among those that are relative: whatever things are said not only as genera but also as relatives, and are assigned to the same and one thing—as appetite of something is appetite, and desire of something is desire, and double of something is double, and double of the half, and in whatever cases things (though they are not with substance) are altogether relative to those things of which they are habits, or affections, or something of this sort—this is made clear in the definition of them when predicated of those things: for example, the odd is a number having a middle; but it is a number; therefore the odd is a number having a middle. And if the snub is a hollow of the nose, but the nose is snub, therefore the nose will be a nose hollow of a nose.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":38,"ref":"p38","source":"Apparent autem facere non facientes quandoque,eo quod non interrogant (sifiignificetaliquidpersedictum duplum,an nihil, et si aliquid significat, utrum idem an diversum),sed conclusionem dicunt statim, et apparet propter nomen idem, esse idem, et significare.Soloecismus autem quale quid est, dictum est prius. Est autem et hoc facere, et non facientem videri, et facientem non videri, quemadmodum Levinus dixit si Venus masculinum est: nam qui dicit almarn,solæcismum quidem facitsecundum illum, non apparet autem aliis; qui autem almum, apparet autem, sed non facit solœcismum. Manifestum igitur quoniam et ars quaedam hoc potest facere, eoquod multæ orationes non colligentes,solcecismum videntur colligere, ut et in redargutionibus. Sunt autem omnes pene apparentes solcecismi propter hoc, et quando casus neque masculinum,neque femininum significat,sed neutrum: nam hic quid em masculinum significat, haec autem femininum; hoc vero neutum vult significare, saepe autem significat et illa utraque, ut quid est hoc? Calliope, lignum, Coriscus. Masculini igitur et feminini differunt casus omnes, neutri hi quidem, illi autem non. Cum datur igitur hoc saepe colligunt quasi dictum si hunc. Similiter autem et alium casum pro alio ponunt.Captiosa antem ratiocinatio fit eo quod hoc commune sit plurium casuum, nam hoc significat quandoque hic, quandoque autem hunc.","english":"But they sometimes appear to make [a solecism] without making one, because they do not ask (whether the expression signifies something twofold or nothing, and if it signifies something, whether the same or different), but they state the conclusion immediately, and it appears on account of the name that the same thing is the same and signifies. What sort of thing a solecism is has been said earlier. It is possible both to make one and to seem not to make one, and to make one and not seem to, as Levinus said if Venus is masculine: for he who says almarn makes a solecism according to him, but it does not appear to others; while he who says almum, it appears, but he does not make a solecism. It is clear, therefore, that a certain art can do this, because many expressions that do not conclude seem to conclude a solecism, as also in refutations. And nearly all apparent solecisms arise on account of this, and when the case signifies neither masculine nor feminine but neuter: for hic indeed signifies masculine, haec feminine; but hoc wishes to signify neuter, yet often signifies both of those, as in \"what is this?\" Calliope, wood, Coriscus. All the cases of masculine and feminine differ, but of neuter, these [nominative and accusative] do not, while those [other cases] do. When therefore hoc is given, they often conclude as though hunc had been said. Similarly they also put one case in place of another. A captious argument arises because this is common to several cases, for hoc sometimes signifies hic, sometimes hunc.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":39,"ref":"p39","source":"Oportet autem vicissim sig- ] nificare, cum estquidem hic, cum esse autem hunc, ut est Coriscus, esse Coriscum. Et in femininis nominibus similiter, nam in omnibus similiter, et estet esse facient differentiam. Et quodammodo in his similis est soloecismus iis redargutionibus quae propter id quod non similia aut propter figuram similiter dicuntur.Nam quemadmodum illic in rebus, sic hic in nominibus accidit soloecismum facere: nam homo, et album,etres,etnomen est; manifestum igitur quoniam solcecismumtentandumestexdictiscasibuscolligere. Species igitur sunt hæ conten tiosaru orationum, et partes specierum, et modi qui dicti sunt.\n\nCAPUT XIV.\n\nDe occultatione sophistica, et contra mole-ste respon dentes.\n\nDiffert autem non parum si ordinentur quodam modo ea quoe ad interrogationem sunt, ut lateat quemadmodum in dialecticis. Dienceps igitur ex iis quæ dicta sunt, haec primum dicenda. Est autem ad redarguendum, unum quidem prolixitas,nam difficile simul multa conspicere. Ad prolixitatem vero quae adducuntur elementis, utendum.Unum quidem festinatio, nam tardioresminus praevident; amplius autem ira et contentio, nam cunturbati minus possunt observare omnes.Elementa autem irae.","english":"But one must signify in turn \"this is Coriscus\" and \"this is to be Coriscus,\" as in the case of Coriscus, that Coriscus is. And similarly in feminine names, for in all cases alike \"is\" and \"to be\" will make a difference. And in a way the solecism in these matters is similar to those refutations which are made on account of things not being similar or on account of figure being spoken of in like manner. For just as there in things, so here in names it happens that one makes a solecism; for \"man\" and \"white\" and \"thing\" and \"name\" are [each said in many ways]. It is clear, then, that one must attempt to collect the solecism from the cases that have been stated. These, then, are the species of these contentious arguments, and the parts of the species, and the modes that have been stated.\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\nOn sophistic concealment, and against those who answer grudgingly.\n\nIt makes no small difference if the things that pertain to the interrogation are arranged in a certain way, so that it escapes notice, as in dialectical [arguments]. Next, then, from what has been said, these things must first be stated. For refutation there is, on the one hand, prolixity, for it is difficult to survey many things at once. And against the prolixity that is brought on, one must use the elements [of refutation]. One [element] is haste, for the slower foresee less; further, anger and contentiousness, for those who are disturbed are less able to observe everything. And the elements of anger [are these].","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":40,"ref":"p40","source":"Manifestum quoque eum facere qui vult juste agere, et circa omnia impudentem esse.Araplius,permutatim interrogationes ponere, sive ad idem plures habeat aliquis orationes, sive et quod sic, et quod non sic: simul enim accidit aut ad plura,aut ad contraria facere observationem. Omnino autem omnia quae ad occultandum dicta auct prius,utilia etiam ad contentiosas orationes: nam occultatio latendi gratia est, latere autem deceptionis. Ad eos autem qui renuunt quaecunque opinantur esse ad orationem, ex negatione interrogandum ceu contrarium velit, aut etiam ex æquo interrogationem facere,nam cum dubium est quod vult sumere, minus insolescunt, Et quando in partibus dederit quispiam singula in ducenti, universale saepe non interrogandum est, sed ut dato utendum,nam quandoque putant et ipsi dedisse, et audientibus quoque apparet propter inductionis memoriam, veluti perinde atque non interrogavit vane. Et in quibus non nomine significatur universale,similitudine tamen utendum est ad id quod expedit, nam latet similitudo plerumque. Et ad sumendum propositioncm,contrarium,oportet comparando interrogare, ut si debeat sumere quoniam oportet per omnia patri obedire,utrum per omnia oporteat obedire parentibus, an per omnia non obedire? et saepe id,utrum multa concedendum, an pauca? magis enim si necesse,videbuntur esse multa?","english":"It is also manifest that one should make the person who wishes to act justly, and to be shameless about everything. Araplius: to put questions alternately, whether someone has several arguments for the same point, or also both that it is so and that it is not so; for at the same time it happens that one makes an observation either toward many things or toward contraries. But in general all the things that were said earlier for the sake of concealment are useful also for contentious arguments; for concealment is for the sake of hiding, and to hide is [for the sake of] deception. But against those who refuse whatever they think bears on the argument, one must question from the negation, as whether he wants the contrary, or also make the question from an equal footing; for when what he wants to assume is doubtful, they are less insolent. And when someone has granted the particulars one by one in the induction, the universal often should not be asked, but used as though granted; for sometimes they think they themselves have granted it, and it also appears so to those listening because of the memory of the induction, as if he had not asked in vain. And in cases where the universal is not signified by a name, one must nevertheless use a likeness for what is expedient, for a likeness is mostly hidden. And to assume the proposition, one must question the contrary by comparison, as, if one ought to assume that one must obey one's father in all things, [ask] whether one ought to obey one's parents in all things, or not obey in all things? And often [ask] this: whether many things are to be conceded, or few? For if it is necessary, they will seem to be many.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":41,"ref":"p41","source":"Appositis enim juxta se contrariis,minora et majora apparent, et pejora et meliora hominibus. Valde autem et saepe facit videri redargui,maxime sophisticacalumniainterrogantium,cum nihil colligentes non interrogationem faciunt id quod est ultimum, sed concludenter dicunt veluti colligentes: non igilur hoc et hoc.Sophisticum autem esl et cum ponitur inopinabile,quod apparet postulare respondere,proposito eo quod videtur ex principio, et interrogationem talium sic facere utrum tibi videtur? nam necesse est si sit interrogatio ex quibus syllogismus, aut redargutionem, aut inopinabile fieri; cum datquidem,redargutionem,cum autem non dat neque dare videtur, fatetur inopinabile, cum vero non dat,videri autem fatetur, redargutionis simile. Amplius,quemadmodum in rhetoricis,et in redargutionibus similiter contrarietates considerandum,aut ad eas quae ab eodem sunt dictseaut ad eos quos confitetur bene dicere aut agere. Amplius, ad eos qui videntur tales,autad similes,aut ad plurimos,autad, omnes. Quemadmodum autem respondentes sæpe cum redarguuntur faciuntduplex,sidebeataccidere redargutio et interrogationibus utendum quandoque ilia, contra instantes,sisicquidem accidat,sicautem non, quoniam si sumpserit, ut facit Cleophon in Mandrobulo, oportet etiam absistentes ab oratione reliqua argumentorum dividere, et respondent (si prsesenserit) prius instare et praedicere.","english":"For when contraries are placed side by side, both smaller and greater things, and worse and better things, appear to people. And it very often and strongly makes it seem that a refutation has occurred—especially the sophistical trickery of those who question—when, though they conclude nothing, they make the last thing said not a question but speak conclusively as though drawing a conclusion: \"Therefore neither this nor this.\" It is also sophistical when something unexpected is put forward, which one appears to demand that the respondent answer, once the premise that seems initially plausible has been laid down, and to put the question about such matters thus: \"Does it seem so to you?\" For if the question is one from which a syllogism follows, it is necessary that either a refutation or something unexpected result: when he grants it, a refutation; but when he does not grant it and does not seem to grant it, he admits the unexpected; and when he does not grant it but seems to, there is something like a refutation. Further, just as in rhetorical speeches, so also in refutations one must consider contrarieties—either against the things said by the same person, or against those whom he admits to speak or act well. Further, against those who seem to be such, or against similar persons, or against most people, or against all. And just as respondents often, when they are being refuted, make the argument twofold—if the refutation ought to occur—and one must sometimes use those questions against those who press the point, whether this results in this way or not, since if he has assumed it, as Cleophon does in the Mandrobulus, one must also, standing apart from the rest of the speech, divide up the arguments, and the respondent (if he has foreseen it) must press the point beforehand and predict it.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":42,"ref":"p42","source":"Argumentandum autem quandoque etadaliudabeoquoddictum est; illud sumentibus,si non ad id quod propositum est habeataliquisargumentari,quod Lycophron fecit dum propositum esset ex arte lyram commendare. Ad eos autem qui exigunt ad aliquid argumentari,postquam videtur oportere assignare causam.Dictisautemquibusdam observabilibusquod universaliter accidit in redargutionibus, ut dicat contradictionem, ut quod affirmavit negare, aut quod negavit affirmare;sed non quod contrariorum est eadem disciplina, vel non eadem. Non oportet autem conclusionem ut propositionem interrogare; quaedam autem neque interrogandum est, sed ut concessisutendum.Ex quibus igiturinterrogationes et quomodo interrogandum,in concertatoriis exercitationibus dictum est.\n\nLIBER SECUNDUS.\n\nCAPUT PRIMUM.\n\nDe utilitate cognoscendi sophisticas orationes et ap. paratu ad eas diluendas.","english":"But sometimes one must argue also in relation to something other than what has been said, taking up that other thing—if someone's argument does not bear on what was proposed, as Lycophron did when the proposal was to commend the lyre by art. But against those who demand that one argue in relation to something, after it seems right to assign the cause. And when certain observable points have been stated, what universally happens in refutations is that one states a contradiction—that is, denies what one affirmed, or affirms what one denied; but not that the same discipline belongs to contraries, or does not belong. One ought not, however, to ask the conclusion as a premise; and some things ought not even to be asked, but must be used as conceded. From what sources, then, questions arise and how one ought to question, has been stated in the contentious exercises.\n\nBOOK TWO\n\nCHAPTER ONE\n\nOn the usefulness of knowing sophistic speeches and on the preparation for dissolving them.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":43,"ref":"p43","source":"De responsione autem, et quomodo oportet solvere, et quid, et ad quam utilitatem orationes bujusmodi prosunt,- post haec dicendum. Utiles ergo sunt ad phitosophiampropterduo.Primumquidem, quia ea quae ut plurimum propter dictionem fiunt, melius se habere faciunt ad id, quotupliciter quodque dicitur, et ea quae similiter et quæ aliter in rebus accidunt et in nominibus.Secundum autem,ad eas quae perseipsum inquisitionesfiunt,nam qui ab alio facile captiose fallitur,et id non sentit, et ipse quoque a se id patitur persaepe. Tertium vero, et reliquum adhuc, ad gloriam, eo quod circa omnia exercitatus esse videbitur, et in nullo se inexperte habere; nam si is qui in orationibus est consocius, orationes vituperat,cum nihil habeat quod determinet de vitiositate earum,dat suspicionem quod videri velit insolescere, non quia verum sit, sed propter imperitiam. Respondentibus autem,quomodoobsistendum sit adversumhujusmodiorationes,manifestum,siquidem recte dicimus prius ex quibus sunt captiosae ratiocinationes,et si(quseinquirendaesunt) superabundantias sufficienter divisimus.","english":"Next one must speak about response and how one ought to solve, and what, and for what utility speeches of this kind are useful. They are useful, then, for philosophy on account of two things. First, because the things that for the most part come about on account of diction they make to be in a better state with respect to how many ways each thing is said, and the things that happen similarly and differently in realities and in names. Second, for the inquiries that are made by oneself; for one who is easily and captiously deceived by another, and does not perceive it, also suffers this very often from himself. Third, and the remaining one besides, for reputation, in that he will seem to be exercised in all things and to be inexperienced in nothing; for if one who is a companion in speeches censures speeches, when he has nothing to determine concerning their viciousness, he gives suspicion that he wishes to seem to be insolent, not because it is true, but on account of inexperience. For those who respond, how one must stand against speeches of this kind, it is manifest, since we rightly say first from what things captious reasonings come, and if we have sufficiently divided the excesses (which are to be inquired into).","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":44,"ref":"p44","source":"Non est autem idem sumentem orationem videre,et solvere vitiositatem,et interroganti posse occurrere celeriter, nam quod scimus, saepe transpositum ignoramus.Amplius autem quemadmodum in aliis, id quod citius et tardius,ex exercitatione sit magis,sic etin orationibus se habet;quare si manifestum quidem sit nobis,immediati autem simus,privamur opportunitatibus frequenter. Accidit autem quandoque sicut in linearum descriptionibus(namet illic solventes quandoque componere verum non possumus), sic et in redargutionibus, nam scieutes propter quid orationem accidit connectere; solvere tamen orationem impotes sumus.\n\nCAPUT II.\n\nDe apparenti solutione respondentis.\n\nPrimum igitur quemadmodum syllogizare dici. jnusopinabiliterquandoquemagisquamvereeligere oportere,sic ad solvendum quandoque magis opinabiliter quam ad veritatem; nam omnino adversus contentiosos est reluctandum, non ut ad eos qui redarguunt, sed qui redarguereapparent.Non enim dicimus eos syllogizare, quare ut non videantur, emendandi sunt;nam si redargutio est contradictio non aequivoca exquibusdam,nihil opus est dividere ad amphibola, et æquivocationem (non enim facit syllogismum),sed nullius alterius gratia dividendum est,nisi quia conclusio videtur redargutioni similis.","english":"But it is not the same thing for one who is taking up a speech to see and to solve its defect, and for one who is questioning to be able to meet it quickly; for what we know, when it has been transposed, we often do not know. Moreover, just as in other things the quicker and the slower come more from practice, so also it is in speeches; wherefore if something is indeed manifest to us, but we are slow, we are frequently deprived of opportunities. It happens sometimes as in the drawing of lines (for there too, when solving, we sometimes cannot put the truth together), so also in refutations; for knowing why, it happens that we connect the speech, yet we are unable to solve the speech.\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nOn the apparent solution of the respondent.\n\nFirst, then, just as to syllogize is said in one way, so sometimes one ought to choose the more opinionable rather than the true, and likewise for solving sometimes the more opinionable rather than according to truth; for altogether one must struggle against the contentious, not as against those who refute, but as against those who appear to refute. For we do not say that they syllogize, wherefore they must be corrected so that they do not seem to; for if refutation is a contradiction from certain things that is not equivocal, there is no need to divide against ambiguous words and equivocation (for it does not make a syllogism), but it must be divided for no other reason than that the conclusion seems similar to a refutation.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":45,"ref":"p45","source":"Non ergo redargui, sed videri redargui cavendum est, eo quod interrogat amphibola, et quae propter aequivocationemsunt,etquaecunquealiae hujusmodi cavillationes quae et veram redargutionem adumbrant,et redarguentem atque non redarguentem incertum reddunt. Nam (quia licet in fine cum conclusum fuerit dicere se non idipsum quod affirmavit negare, sed aequivoce aut ampbibolice, quamvis quam maxime contingit in idem ferat) incertum si redargutus est; incertum enim si vera nunc dicit. Si vero dividens interrogasset aequivocum aut amphibolum, non certa essetredargutio, quoniam requirunt(nunc quidem minus, prius autem magis)contentiosi,sic vel non respondereeum qui interrogant si fieri potest.Nuncautem quia non bene interrogant inquirentes, necesse est ut respondeat aliquid is qui interrogatus est,emendans vitium interrogationis, quia divisio sufficienter, vel sic,vel non,necesse est dicere respondentem. Si autem aliquis puLetsecundum aequivocationemredargutionemesse quodammodo non erit respondentem e£fugere,quin redarguatur; nam in iis quae oculis subjecta sunt, necessarium quod affirmavit negare nomen,et quod negavit affirmare.","english":"Therefore one must beware not of being refuted, but of appearing to be refuted, because the questioner uses ambiguous expressions, and those which arise from equivocation, and whatever other cavils of this kind, which both cast a shadow of true refutation and make it uncertain whether he is refuting or not refuting. For since it is permitted at the end, when the conclusion has been drawn, to say that he is not denying the very thing he affirmed, but is speaking equivocally or ambiguously—although as far as possible he brings it to the same point—it is uncertain whether he has been refuted; for it is uncertain whether he is now saying what is true. But if one who divides had asked about an equivocal or ambiguous term, the refutation would not be certain, since contentious people demand this (now less, but formerly more), that the one who is questioned answer thus or not at all, if possible. But now, because those who inquire do not question well, the one who has been questioned must answer something, correcting the defect of the question, since division is sufficient, or so, or not, the respondent must say. But if anyone thinks that refutation according to equivocation is in some way [a refutation], it will not be possible for the respondent to escape being refuted; for in those things which are subject to the eyes, it is necessary to deny the name he affirmed, and to affirm what he denied.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":46,"ref":"p46","source":"Enim vero ut diluunt quidam, nihil prodest,nam non Coriscum aiunt esse musicum et non musicum,sed unc Coriscum musicum, et huncCoriscum non musicum.Eadem namque erit oratio Coriscum, ei quae est hunc Coriscum musicum esse,vel non musicum,quodsimul affirmantet negant.Sed fortasse non idem significant, nam nee illic nomen, quare in aliquo differt. Si autem hoo quidem simpliciter dicendo Coriscum assignet,illi autem addat aliquem,aut hunc,absurdumest.Nihil enim magis quam alterum,utrolibet enim nibildiffert. Non sic igitur, sed quia incertus quidem est quinondeterminavitambiguitatem,utrum redargutus est vel non redargutus,datum autem est in orationibus dividere, manifestum quod non determinando dare interrogationem,et quidem simpliciter, peccatum est,quoniam etsi non ipse, tamen oratio redargutae similis est.Accidit autem saepe videntes amphiboliam torpescere dividere, eo quod crebra talia proponantur, ne ad omne videantur molesti csse,deinde non putantibus propter id fieri orationem,sæpe profecto occurritinopinabile,quapropter quia datum est, dividere haud cunctandum, quemadmodum dictum est prius.Si autem duas interrogationesnonunamfacit quisquam interrogationem, non propter sequivocationem vel amphiboliam fiet ceptiosa collectio, nonne redargutio au non?","english":"For as some explain it away, it is of no use; for they say that it is not Coriscus who is musical and not musical, but this Coriscus is musical and that Coriscus is not musical. For the same statement will be \"Coriscus,\" as also \"this Coriscus is musical\" or \"not musical,\" which they affirm and deny at the same time. But perhaps they do not signify the same thing, for neither is the name there; wherefore it differs in something. But if one, by speaking simply, assigns \"Coriscus,\" while the other adds \"some\" or \"this,\" it is absurd. For it is no more one than the other; for in either case it differs in nothing. Not so, therefore, but because he is uncertain who has not determined the ambiguity, whether he has been refuted or not refuted; but since it is granted in arguments to divide, it is manifest that by not determining, to grant the question, and indeed simply, is a fault, since even if he himself does not, nevertheless the argument is like one refuted. But it often happens that those who see the ambiguity grow dull at dividing, because such things are proposed frequently, lest they seem troublesome in every case; then, when they do not think that the argument arises on account of this, often indeed something unexpected occurs; wherefore, since it is granted, one must not delay to divide, as was said before. But if someone makes two questions into not one question, will the captious collection not come about on account of equivocation or ambiguity—will it be a refutation or not?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":47,"ref":"p47","source":"Quid enim differt interrogare si Callias et Themistocles musici sint, quam si ambobus unum nomen esset existentibus diversis?nam si plura significat quam unum, plura interrogavit; si igitur non rectum est ad duas interrogationes unam responsionem censere sumere simpliciter,manifestum quoniam nulli eorum quae æquivoca sunt, convenit respondere simpliciter,nec side omnibus quidem verumsit,veluti censent quidam, nihil enim differt hoc,quam si interrogasset:Coriscus et Callias utrum domi sint,an non sint domi? sive adsint ambo, sive non adsint, utrinque enim plures propositiones. Non enim si verum est dicere,interrogalio propter id una,possibile est enim ad decies millenas interrogatas quaestiones, omnes sic vel non verum est dicere, attamen non est respondendum una responsione:interimitur enim disputatio.Idautem simileac si idem nomen imponatur diversis.Si igitur non oportetad duas interrogationes unam responsionem dare,manifeslum quoniam nec in aequivocis sic vel non dicendum, neque enim qui dixit respondet, tametsi dixit;sed id amittunt quodam modo in disputationibus, eo quod lateat quod accidit. Quemadmodum igitur diximusquodredargutionesqua?damvidentur esse cum non sunt,eodem quoque modo et solutiones quaedam videntur esse, quæ non sunt, quas dicimus quandoque operae pretium magis afferre quam veras in contentiosisorationibus,et in ea (quae ad duplex est) occursione.","english":"For what difference is there between asking whether Callias and Themistocles are musical, and asking whether, when they are two distinct beings, they had one name? For if it signifies more than one thing, he has asked more than one question. If, then, it is not correct to think that one answer should be taken simply for two questions, it is clear that it is fitting to answer no equivocal thing simply, nor, indeed, if it is true of all, as some think. For this differs in nothing from asking whether Coriscus and Callias are at home or are not at home: whether both are present or both are not present, in either case there are several propositions. For it is not because it is true to say it that the question is one on that account; for it is possible, in answer to ten thousand questions asked, to say that all are so or are not true, yet one must not answer with one answer, for the discussion is destroyed. And this is similar to when the same name is imposed on different things. If, then, one ought not to give one answer to two questions, it is clear that neither in the case of equivocals should one say so or not so; for he who has spoken does not answer, even though he has spoken, but they lose it in some way in discussions, because what has happened escapes notice. Just as we have said that certain refutations appear to be refutations when they are not, in the same way also certain solutions appear to be solutions which are not, which we say it is sometimes more worthwhile to bring forward than the true ones in contentious speeches, and in that occurrence which is directed at a double meaning.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":48,"ref":"p48","source":"Respondendum autem in iis quæ videntur, esto dicendo, nam et sic minime liet redargutio.Si vero aliquid quod inopinabile sit cogatur dicere, hic maxime addendum videri, sic enim neque redargutio neque inopinabile videbitur fieri. Quia autem quo pacto petitur quod est in principio, manifestum putant omnino (si sint propinquee) interimendum,et non coocedenda esse ulla, perinde ac si quod in principio est petat. Et quando aliquid tale postulaverit quispiam quodnecessarium quidem est accidere ex positione,sit autem falsum vel inopinabile, idem dicendum, nam quae ex necessitate accidunt,ejusdem videntur esse positionis.Amplius,quando universale non nomine sumitur, sed similitudine, dicendum quod non sic datum est, neque ut proposuit,sumit,nam propter id fit saepe redargutio. Cum autem prohibetur his, ad id quod non bene ostensum est redeundum, obsistendum autem secundum dictam determinationem.In iis igitur quae proprie dicuntur nominibus, necesse est respondere, vel simpliciter, vel dividendo. Quae autem subintelligentes,proponimus,ut quascunque non plane,sedtruncatiminterrogantur, propter id accidit redargutio, ut putasne quidquid est Atheniensium,possessio est Atheniensium?sic. Similiter autem et in aliis? atqui homo est animalium, sic. Possessio igitur animalium, bomo.Nam hominem animalium esse dicimus,quia animal est, et Lysandrum Lacedacmoniorum, quia Lacedtemonius est.","english":"But in the case of apparent refutations one must answer by saying so; for thus at least refutation is avoided. But if one is compelled to say something unbelievable, here especially one must add what seems right; for thus neither refutation nor anything unbelievable will appear to occur. But as to how what is at the beginning is begged, they think it is altogether manifest that if the questions are close together, one must destroy it and concede nothing, just as if he were begging what is at the beginning. And when someone has demanded something of such a kind as necessarily follows from the position, but it is false or unbelievable, the same must be said; for things that follow by necessity seem to belong to the same position. Moreover, when a universal is not taken by name but by similarity, one must say that it was not granted in this way, nor does he take it as he proposed; for it is often on this account that refutation occurs. But when one is prevented by these means, one must return to what has not been well demonstrated, and one must resist according to the stated determination. In those things, then, that are spoken by proper names, it is necessary to answer either simply or by dividing. But the things we propose by understanding them implicitly, as whenever questions are put not plainly but in a truncated way, it is on this account that refutation occurs—for example, do you think that whatever is of the Athenians is a possession of the Athenians? Yes. And similarly in other cases? But man is of animals, yes. Therefore a possession of animals is man. For we say that man is of animals because he is an animal, and Lysander of the Lacedaemonians because he is a Lacedaemonian.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":49,"ref":"p49","source":"Manifestum igitur quoniam in quibus obscurum est quod proponitur,non simpliciterconcedendum. Quando vero duobusexistentibus cum hoc quidem est, ex necessitate alterumessevidetur;cum vero alterum est,hoc nonexnecessitate,interrogato utroque, oportet quod minus est dare.Nam difficilius est colligere de pluribus.Si autem argumentetur quod huic quidem est contrarium, illi autem non est, si oratio vera sit, contrarium esse est dicendum; at nomen alterius positum non esse.Quoniam autem quædam quidem eorum quæ dicuntur plures eum qui non concedit falsum dicere aiunt, quædam autem non,utquaecunqueambigunt (utrum enim corruptibilis vel immortalis sitanima animaHum, non exploratum est multis), in quibus igitur incertum est utromodosoleatdici quodproponitur; utrum in iis quae sunt ut sententiae, vocant enim sententias, et veras opiniones, et totas negationes, ut diameter incommensurabilis est. Amplius, de quo verum dubitatur,transferensquispiamnomina maxime latebit in illis,nam quia incertum est utro modo se habet verum, non videbitur sophistice agere; propter id autem quod dubium,non videbitur falsum dicere,nam metaphora facietorationem sine redargutione videri. Amplius, quascunque interrogation um præsenserit aliquis, præinstandum est et prædicendum, nam sic maxime interrogantem prohibebit.","english":"It is clear, then, that in cases where what is proposed is obscure, one must not concede it without qualification. But when, two things being posited, the existence of one is thought to entail the other by necessity, while the existence of the other does not entail the first, then when both have been asked, one ought to grant the one that is less. For it is harder to draw a conclusion from many things. But if he argues that the contrary belongs to one thing and does not belong to the other, then if the statement is true, one must say that it is contrary, but that the name of the other has not been posited. Since, however, some of the things said are such that those who do not concede them are said to speak falsely, while others are not—for example, all those that are ambiguous (for whether the soul is corruptible or immortal is not settled for many)—in cases, then, where it is uncertain in which of the two ways what is proposed is customarily said, [one must consider] whether it falls among those things that are like opinions; for they call them opinions, both true beliefs and whole negations, as that the diagonal is incommensurable. Further, in a matter where the truth is doubted, anyone who transfers names will especially escape notice in those cases; for because it is uncertain in which way the truth stands, he will not seem to be acting sophistically; and on account of what is doubtful, he will not seem to speak falsely, for the metaphor will make the argument appear without refutation. Further, whatever questions one has foreseen, one must object in advance and state beforehand; for thus one will most effectively hinder the questioner.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":50,"ref":"p50","source":"CAPUT III.\n\nDe recta solutione loci.\n\nQuoniam autem recta solutio est manifestatio falsi syllogismi, ob quamcunque interrogationem accidat falsum(falsusautem syllogismusdicitur duo pliciter,nam aut si collectum est falsum,aut sicum non est syllogismus, videtur esse syllogimus), erit et quae nunc dicta est solutio, et apparentis syllogismi, ob quam videtur esse interrogationum correctio;quare contingit orationes syllogizantes quidem interimere,apparentes autem dividentem solvere. Rursum autem quoniam syllogizantium orationum,hae quidem veram, illæ autem falsam habent conclusionem, eas quidem quae secundum conclusionem sunt falsae,duobus modis contingit solvere: nam et eo quod interimitur aliquid eorum quae intertrogata sunt,et eo quod ostenditur conclusio non sic se habere. Eas vero quae secundum propositiones, eo quod interimitur quiddam solum,nam conclusio vera est. Quare volentibus solvere orationem, primum quidem inspiciendum si syllogizat,an non syllogizat; deinde utrum vera si conclusio, an non vera,quatenus vel dividentes,vel interimentes solvamus, et iterum interimentes hoc modo, vel illo, quemadmodum dictum est prius. Differt autem plurimum, et interrogantem, et non, solvere orationem; nam praevidere quidem difficile est, per otium autem temporis videre, facile.","english":"CHAPTER III.\n\nOn the correct solution of a locus.\n\nSince, then, the correct solution is the exposure of a false syllogism, on account of whatever question the falsehood occurs (and a false syllogism is spoken of in two ways: for either when the conclusion collected is false, or when it is not a syllogism but seems to be a syllogism), the solution just now stated will also be of the apparent syllogism, on account of which there is a correction of the questions; wherefore it happens that we destroy the arguments that are syllogistic, but dissolve the apparent ones by dividing. Again, since of syllogistic arguments some have a true conclusion and others a false one, those that are false as regards the conclusion can be solved in two ways: for both by destroying something of the things that were asked, and by showing that the conclusion does not hold so. But those that are false as regards the premises, by destroying some one thing only; for the conclusion is true. Wherefore those wishing to solve an argument must first consider whether it syllogizes or does not syllogize; then whether the conclusion is true or not true, in order that we may solve either by dividing or by destroying, and again by destroying in this way or that, as was said earlier. But it makes the greatest difference whether one solves the argument while questioning or not; for to foresee is difficult, but to see at leisure with time is easy.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":51,"ref":"p51","source":"Earum igitur quae propter aequivocationem et amphiboliam redargutionem, aliae quidem habent aliquam interrogationem plura significantem,aliaB autem conclusionem multipliciter dictam: ut in ea quidem quæ est silentia dicere,conclusio est duplex; in ea vero quae est non conscire scientem, una interrogationum amphibolia est. Et duplex quidem quandoque est ens, quandoque non est ens, et quandoque significat duplex; hoc quidem ens, illud vero non ens. Quibuscunque igitur in fine est multiplex, nisi prius sumpserit contradictionem,non fitredargutio, ut in eo quod est caecum videre, nam sine contradictione non fit redargutio. Quibuscunque vero in interrogationibus,non necesse est prænegare quod duplex est, nam non ad hoc, sed propter hoc tit oratio. In principio igitur ad duplex et nomen et orationem sic respondendum, quod est ut sic, est autem ut non; ut de eo quod est silentia dicere, quod est ut sic; est autem ut non, et quae expediunt,agendum; sunt autem quae sic, sunt autem quae non, nam expedientia dicuntur multipliciter.Si autem lateat, in fine addendo interrogationiZcorrigendum,estnesilentiadicere? non tamen eos qui silent.Et in iis autem quae se habent quidem multipliciter in propositionibus, similiter. Nonne putas consciunt, quod sciunt? sic.","english":"Of those refutations, then, which arise from equivocation and amphiboly, some have an interrogative expression that signifies several things, while others have a conclusion stated in many ways: as in the case of \"to say that there are silences,\" the conclusion is twofold; but in the case of \"not to be conscious, knowing,\" the amphiboly lies in one of the interrogatives. And the twofold is sometimes being, sometimes not being, and sometimes it signifies twofold: this indeed being, that however not being. Therefore, in whatever cases the multiplicity lies in the conclusion, unless one has first assumed the contradiction, the refutation does not come about, as in the case of \"to see the blind,\" for without a contradiction the refutation does not come about. But in whatever cases it lies in the interrogatives, it is not necessary to deny beforehand what is twofold, for the argument does not arise for this reason but on account of this. At the beginning, then, one must answer regarding both the name and the expression that it is twofold, that it is so in one way and not so in another; as concerning \"to say that there are silences,\" that it is so in one way, but is not so in another, and one must deal with the things that are expedient; for some things are so, and some are not, since expedient things are spoken of in many ways. But if it escapes notice, one must correct it at the end by adding to the interrogative: \"Is it possible to say that there are silences?\" but not those who are silent. And in those cases too which stand in many ways in the premises, similarly. Do you not think that they are conscious of what they know? Thus.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":52,"ref":"p52","source":"Sed non sic scientes, non enim est idem,quod non est conscire,atquesic quidem non esse scientes.Et omnino obluctandum est, tametsi simpliciter colligatur, quod non ram quam dixit negavit,sed nomen,quare id non est redargutio. Manifestum autem eleas quae sunt propter compositionem et divisionem, quomodo solvendum, nam si divisa et composita oratio aliud significat cum concluditur,contrarium dicendum.Sunt autem hujusmodi omnes orationes secundum compositionem et divisionem. Putasne quo vidisti tu hunc percussum,illo percussus est hic? et quo percussus est,illo tu vidisti? Habet quidem aliquid etiam ubiarum quaestionum,quamvis sit propter compositionem, nam non est duplex ob id quod est secundum divisionem,non enim eadem oratio fit divisa, et composita.Siquidemoraet hora secundumaccentum prolata significant aliud,sed in scriptisquidem idem nomen, cum ex eisdem elementis scriptum sit, et similiter,etillic autem jam signa faciunt, prolata non eadem.Quare non duplex quod propter divisionem est.Manifestum autem quoniam non omnes redargutiones propterduplex,sicut quidam dicunt.Dividendum igitur et qui respondet, non idem est enim dicere videre oculis percussum,et dicere oculis percussum videre. Et Euthydemi oratio: Palasne vidisti tu nunc existentes in Pyraeo naves,cnm in Sicilia sis? etrursum,putasmemalum sutorem bonum esse? sit autem quisbonus,sutor malus; quare sutor malus.","english":"But not so those who know; for it is not the same thing not to be conscious of a thing, and in this way not to know it. And in general one must contend against it, even if the conclusion is drawn without qualification, that he did not deny the thing itself which he said, but the name; wherefore this is not a refutation. It is evident, however, how one must solve those arguments that arise from composition and division; for if the expression, when divided and when composed, signifies something else when the conclusion is drawn, one must say the contrary. All such expressions, then, are according to composition and division. Do you think that he by whom you saw this man struck, was struck by him? And he by whom he was struck, did you see him? This has something also of the kind of questions, although it is due to composition; for it is not twofold on account of what is according to division, since the same expression does not become divided and composed. For indeed \"ora\" and \"hora,\" pronounced according to accent, signify something different; but in writing, indeed, the same name, since it is written from the same letters, and similarly; and there the marks already make a difference, but when pronounced they are not the same. Wherefore that which is due to division is not twofold. It is evident, however, that not all refutations are due to the twofold, as some say. Therefore the one who answers must also divide; for it is not the same to say \"to see with the eyes the one struck\" and to say \"with the eyes to see the one struck.\" And the argument of Euthydemus: Do you think that you have seen the ships now existing in the Piraeus, when you are in Sicily? And again: Do you think that a bad cobbler is good? But let someone be good, a bad cobbler; wherefore a bad cobbler.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":53,"ref":"p53","source":"Putasne quorum scientiae bonae, bonas esse disciplinas; mali autem bona disciplina,igitur bona disciplina malum,attamen et malum,et disciplina malum, quare mala disciplina, malum.Patasne verum dicere nunc quoniam tu factus es? factus ergo nunc.An aliud significabat divisum? verum enim dicere nunc,quod tu factus es; sed non,nunc tu factus es. Putasne ut potes, et quae potes, sic et ipsa facies? non citharizansautemhabespotestatemcitharizandi, citharizabis igitur non citharizans. An non hujus habet potestatem,ut non citharizans citharizet?sed cum non facit hoc, ut faciat. Solvunt autem quidam id et aliter, nam si dedit ut potestfacere,non dicunt accidere non citharizantem citharizare.Nom enim omnino ut potest facere datum est facere,non idem autem esse ut potest, et omnino ut potest facere.Sed manifestum quoniam non bene solvunt, nam orationem omnium quæ propter idem, eadem solutio; eadem autem non accommodabiturad omnes,nec omnino ad interrogatas,sed est ad interrogantem, et non ad orationem. Propter accentum autem orationes non sunt, neque in iis quae scribuntur,neque in iis quae dicuntur, praeterquam si quae paucæ fiunt, ut hic: putasne est quod habitas domus? sic.Nunquid,ne est quod habitas,negatio ejus est quod habitas? sic.Dicebat autem,ne esse quod habitas domum. Negas igitur te habitare domum. Quomodo autem solvendum est, palam.","english":"Do you think that the disciplines of those whose knowledge is good are good, but that a good discipline belongs to the bad? Therefore a good discipline is a bad thing—and yet both a bad thing and a bad discipline; wherefore a bad discipline is a bad thing. Do you think that he speaks truly now, because you have become? Therefore you have become now. Or did \"divided\" signify something else? For \"to speak truly now, that you have become\"—but not \"now you have become.\" Do you think that as you can, so also you will do the things you can? But you have the power to play the cithara without playing the cithara; therefore you will play the cithara without playing the cithara. Or does he not have the power of this, that one who does not play the cithara should play the cithara? But when he does not do this, that he may do it. Some solve this in another way as well; for if he granted that he can do it, they do not say it happens that one not playing the cithara plays the cithara. For it is not altogether granted to do as one can, and it is not the same thing to be as one can and altogether to do as one can. But it is manifest that they do not solve it well; for the argument of all those that are on account of the same thing has the same solution; but the same will not be accommodated to all, nor altogether to the things asked, but it is directed to the questioner, and not to the argument. But on account of accent, arguments are not, neither in those that are written nor in those that are spoken, except insofar as a few are made, as here: do you think it is that you dwell in a house? So. Is it not the case that \"not\" is the negation of \"it is that you dwell\"? So. But he was saying that \"not\" is \"to be that you dwell in a house.\" You deny, therefore, that you dwell in a house. But how it must be solved is clear.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":54,"ref":"p54","source":"Non enim idem significat graviter et acute prolatum.Manifestum autem ut in iis quae fiunt propter id quod ut eadem dicunturea quae non sunt eadem, quo pacto obsistendum,eo quod habemus generapraedicamentorum; nam hiC;quidem dedit interrogatus non esse aliquid eorum quae quid est significant, ille vero ostendit quidemessealiquid eorum quae sunt ad aliquid vel quantitatis. Videntur autem quid est significare propter dictionem,ut in hac oratione.Putasne contingit idem simul facere etfieri? non; atvero videre simulet videri idem et secundum idem contin. git.Putasne est aliquid eorum quæ sunt pati facere? non. Nonne igitur secatur, uritur operatur similiter dicuntur,et omnia quidem pati significant? rursum autem currere, videre similiter sibi invicem dicuntur,verumtamen videre, operari aliquid est, quare et parti aliquid,simul etiam et facere.Si autem ali.","english":"For \"spoken gravely\" and \"spoken acutely\" do not signify the same thing. It is clear, moreover, in the case of things that come to be for the sake of something, that when they call the same things \"the same\" which are not the same, [we see] in what way one must resist, by the fact that we have the genera of the predicaments. For the one, when asked, granted that it is not any of the things that signify \"what something is,\" while the other showed that it is indeed something of the things that are said in relation to something or of quantity. But they seem to signify \"what something is\" because of the wording, as in this statement: \"Do you think it happens that the same thing at once does and comes to be?\" No. \"But surely to see and at once to be seen happen to be the same and according to the same thing.\" \"Do you think there is any of the things that are to act [and] to undergo?\" No. \"Is it not, then, that 'is cut,' 'is burned,' 'operates' are spoken of similarly, and all signify to undergo? Again, however, 'to run,' 'to see' are spoken of similarly in relation to one another; yet to see is to do something, wherefore also [to do something] in part, and at the same time also to act.\" But if other...","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":55,"ref":"p55","source":"quis illicdans contingere simul idem facere,etpaLi, videre,et videri dicat possibile,nondum redargutus est si non dicat videre facere aliquid,et videri pati: indiget enim hac interrogatione, sed ab audiente opinatur datum esse,eum et secare facere aliquid, et secari tierialiquid dedit; etquæcunque aliasimiliter dicuntur.Nam reliquum ipse addit qui audit, veluti similiter dictum, illud autem dicitur quidem non similiter.vldetur autem:propter\"dictionem.Idem, autem accidit hic quod in aequivocationibus, putat enim in xequivocis inscius or-ationem,quam dixit negare rem,non nomen,ideoqueadhucindigetinterrogatione si ad unam aspiciens dicat aequivocum.Sic enim dante, erit redargutio. Similes autem et hae orationes illis,si quod quis habens, postea non habet,amisit; nam unum solum amittens calculum, non habebit decem calculos.An quod non habet quidem, prius habens, amisit? quantum autem habet aliquot, non necesse est tot amittere. Interrogans igitur quod habet, colligit in eo quot, nam decem aliquot. Si igitur dixisset a principio, si quot quis non habet prius habens, putasne ami sit tot?? nullus utique dedisset, sed aut tot,aut horum aliquid. Et quoniam dabit aliquis quod non habet, non enim habet unum solum calculum.An non dedit quod 'non habuit, sed ut non habuit?","english":"Whoever says that it is possible for the same person at the same time both to do and to suffer, and to see and to be seen, has not yet been refuted, if he does not say that to see is to do something and to be seen is to suffer; for he needs this question, but he supposes it to have been granted by the hearer, that to cut is to do something and to be cut is to suffer something; and whatever else is said in a similar way. For the hearer himself adds the rest, as if it had been said similarly, but that is indeed not said similarly; it seems so, however, because of the wording. The same thing happens here as in equivocations, for the inexperienced person thinks that in equivocal terms the statement he made denies the thing, not the name, and therefore he still needs the question whether he speaks of the equivocal term with respect to one thing. For if he grants this, the refutation will follow. And these statements are similar to those: if someone, having something, afterwards does not have it, he has lost it; for in losing one single counter, he will not have ten counters. Or is it that what he does not have, having had it before, he has lost? But however many he has, it is not necessary that he lose that many. So the questioner, asking what he has, gathers in that case how many, for he has ten. If therefore he had said from the beginning, \"If someone does not have as many as he had before, do you think he has lost that many?\" no one would have granted it, but either that many, or some of them. And because someone will grant that he does not have what he does not have—for he does not have one single counter. Or did he not give what he did not have, but [gave it] in such a way that he did not have it?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":56,"ref":"p56","source":"nam solum, non quod significat, neque quale, neque quantum, sed ut se habet ad aliquid,ut quod non cum alio.Quemadmodum si dicat,putasne quod non aliquis habetdabit? non anouente autem, interroget. Si dabit quis aliquid cito,quod non habet cito? astruentem autem colligat quod dabit quis quod non habet,et manifestum quoniam non syllogizavit, nam cito non est quod dare, sed hoc modo d\".re. Quo autem modo non habet,dabit aliquis, ut quod delectabililer habet,mæste dabit. Similes autem et hujusmodi orationes. Putasne quam non habet, manu percutiet quis?autquem non habet, oculo videbit? non euim habet unum solum oculum.Solvunt autem quidam dicentes, et quod habet unum solum oculum, et aliud quidlibet qui plura habet, quidam autem et ut quod habet accepit. Dedit enim unum solum hic calculum, et hic habet (dicunt) unum solum ab hoc calculum, accepit enim ab hoc, ergo unum solum habet hic calculum.Alii autem statim interrogationem interimentes, quia conlingit quod non accepit habere,ut vinum accipientem suave, si corrumpatur in acceptione, habere acre. Sed quod dictum est prius, hi omnes non ad orationem, sed ad hominem solvunt,nam si esset haec solutio,dantem oppositum non possibile esset solvere, quemadmodum et in aliis: ut si est quidem quod est, est etiam quod non est solutio. Si simpliciter det dici, concludit; si autem non concludit,non erit solutio.","english":"For he says only \"not what it signifies,\" nor \"of what sort,\" nor \"how much,\" but how it is related to something, as \"what [he has] not with another.\" For example, if someone asks, \"Do you think that what someone does not have, he will give?\" — but when the other does not assent, let him interrogate further: \"If someone will give something quickly, [will he give] what he does not have quickly?\" But let him draw the conclusion against one who has assented, that someone will give what he does not have; and it is clear that he has not syllogized, for \"quickly\" is not what is to be given, but [it is said] in this way about the manner. But in the way in which he does not have it, someone will give it — as, for instance, what he has pleasurably, he will give sorrowfully. And arguments of this sort are similar. \"Do you think that with a hand he does not have, someone will strike?\" or \"with an eye he does not have, will he see?\" For he does not have one eye only. Some solve this by saying that he both has one eye only and anything else that one who has several [has]; but others [solve it] as \"what he has, he received.\" For this one gave a single pebble, and this one (they say) has a single pebble from him; for he received from him; therefore this one has a single pebble. But others immediately destroy the interrogation, because it happens that he has what he did not receive — as one receiving sweet wine, if it is spoiled in the receiving, has sour [wine]. But those who have spoken earlier all solve [the argument] not in relation to the argument but in relation to the person. For if this were the solution, it would not be possible to solve [the argument] against one who grants the opposite, as also in other cases: for example, if what is, is, there is also a solution that what is not, is. If he grants it to be said simply, he concludes; but if he does not conclude, there will be no solution.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":57,"ref":"p57","source":"In praedictis autem (omnibus datis) non dicimus fieri syllogismum. Amplius autem et hæ sunt ex hujusmodi orationibue.Putasne quod scriptum est,scripsit quis? scriptum est autem nunc quod tu sedes, falsaoratio;eratautem vera cum scribebatur,igitur simul scribebatur falsa et vera.Nam falsamvelveram orationem,vel opinionem esse, non quod, sed tale significat, nam eadem ratio et in opinione. Et putas quod discit discens,hoc est quod discit? discit autem aliquis quod est tarde, celeriter. Non igitur quod discit, Bed ut discit dixit. Et putas quod ambulat aliquis, pessundat? ambulat autem totam diem. An non quod ambulat, sed quando ambulat dixit. Nec cum scyphum quis bibat, quod bi-. bit, sed ex quo? Et putas quod quis scivit in-; veniens, vel discens scivit? quorum autem hoc; quidem invenit, illud autem didicit, ambo haec neutrum. An haec quidem omne, quod autem non omne? Et quoniam est quis tertius homo a se, et ab unoquoque.Nam homo et omne commune,non hoc aliquid, sed quale quid, vel ad aliquid, vel aliquo modo,vel hujusmodi aliquid significat.Similiterautem et in hoc, Coriscus et Coriscus musicus, utrum idem an alteram?","english":"But in the cases stated above (all of them granted), we do not say that a syllogism comes about. Moreover, these too arise from arguments of this sort. Do you think that what was written, someone wrote? But it has now been written that you are sitting—a false statement; it was true, however, when it was being written; therefore it was being written both false and true at the same time. For to be a false or a true statement or opinion signifies not what but of what sort, for the same account holds also in opinion. And do you think that what a learner learns is what he learns? But someone learns what is slow, quickly. Therefore it is not what he learns, but as he learns, that he stated. And do you think that what someone walks, he ruins? But he walks all day. Or did he state not what he walks, but when he walks? Nor, when someone drinks a cup, [is it] what he drinks, but from what? And do you think that what someone knew by finding out, or learned by learning, he knew? But of these, one he found and the other he learned—both of these are neither. Or are all these [the former] one thing, but the latter not all? And because someone is a third man besides himself and besides each one. For man and every common term signifies not this something, but of what sort, or in relation to something, or in some way, or something of this kind. Similarly also in this: Coriscus and musical Coriscus—are they the same or another?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":58,"ref":"p58","source":"Nam hoc quidem hoc aliquid,illud autem quale quid significat, quare non est idem exponere.Exponere autem non facit tertium hominem, sed idipsum quid est concedere,non enim erit hoc aliquid esse id quod Callias et id quod homo est; neque si quis expositum non id quidem quod hoc aliquid esse dicat, sed idem quod quale, nihil referet,nam erit a multis unum quiddam,ut homo; manifestumergo quoniam non dandum hoc aliquid esse quid quod communiter praedicatur de omnibus,sed aut quantum, aut quale,aut ad aliquid, aut aliquid talium significare.Omnino autem in quae propterdictionem sunt orationibus,semperper oppositum erit solutio quam propter quod est oratio,ut si propter compositionem oratio, solutio dividendo, si autem propter divisionem,componendo.Rursum si propter accentum acutum,graviseritsolutio; si vero propter gravem, acutus. Si autem propter sequivocationem est,oportet oppositum nomen dicendo solvere, ut si animatum accidit dicere, negando non esse,manifestum quod est inani matum; si vera inanimatum dixit, hic autem animatum colligat, dicendum quod est inanimatum. Similiter autem et in amphibolia. Si autem secundum similitudinemdictionis,oppositum erit solutio,putasque quod non habet dabit aliquis? An non quod non habet, sed ut non babet? ut unum solum calculum. Putasne quod scit discens, vel inveniens scit?","english":"For this indeed signifies \"this particular thing,\" while that signifies \"of what sort,\" so that it is not the same to expound them. But expounding does not produce the third man; rather, it is to concede the very what-it-is. For it will not be that \"this particular thing\" is what Callias is and what man is; nor, if someone should say that what is expounded is not \"this particular thing\" but the same as \"of what sort,\" will it make any difference. For there will be one thing from many, as man. It is clear, therefore, that one must not grant that \"this particular thing\" is what is predicated in common of all things, but that it signifies either a quantity, or a quality, or a relation, or something of that sort. In general, in arguments that arise from a figure of speech, the solution will always be the opposite of that on account of which the argument is made: for example, if the argument is on account of composition, the solution is by dividing; but if on account of division, by composing. Again, if on account of the acute accent, the solution will be by the grave; but if on account of the grave, by the acute. But if it is on account of equivocation, one must solve it by stating the opposite name—for example, if someone has said \"animated,\" by denying that it is not [so], it is clear that it is inanimate; but if he has said \"inanimate,\" and this one concludes \"animated,\" one must say that it is inanimate. And similarly also in the case of amphiboly. But if [the argument is] according to similarity of diction, the solution will be the opposite. Do you think that what does not have [something] will give something? Or is it not \"what does not have,\" but \"as not having\"? As, for example, one alone [has] a pebble. Do you think that what he knows, the learner or the discoverer knows?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":59,"ref":"p59","source":"attamen non quae scit, et si quod ambulat pessundat,non tamen quando.Similiter autem et in aliis.\n\nCAPUT IV.\n\nDe diluendis argutiis accidentis.\n\nAd illas vero quae propter accidens, una quidem solutio est ad omnes.Nam quia indeterminatum est quando dicendum de re,cum quidpiam accidentiinest (et in quibusdam quidem videtur, et dicunt, in aliquibus aulem non dicunt necessarium esse), dicendumigiturconformantessimiliterad omnesquod non est necessarium; habere autem oportetquorefellat dicendo id quod perinde est. Sunt autem omnes hujusmodi orationes propter accidens, ut putasne id scis, quod debeo te interrogare? Age, cognocisne venientem, aut coopertum? Statuane tuum opus est? An tuus canis pater? Suntne paucies pauca,pauca? Manifestum enim est in omnibus his quoniam non necesse est quod de accidente dicitur,et de re verum esse: solis enim iis quae secundum substantiam sunt indifferentia, et quae unum sunt,omnia videntur eadem inesse,bono autem non idem est bonum esse, et venturum esse interrogare, neque venienti, aut cooperto, et venientem esse et Coriscum. Quare non si cognosco Coriscum, ignoro autem venientem,eumdem cognoscoetignoro,neque si hoc est meum, est autem opus, meum est opus sed possessio, vel res, vet aliquid quidpiam.Eodem autem modo et in aliis. Solvunt autem quidem in.","english":"Nevertheless, not the things which he knows; and if one who walks ruins something, still not when. And similarly in other cases.\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nOn resolving sophistical arguments concerning accident.\n\nFor those arguments that arise from accident, there is indeed one solution for all. For since it is indeterminate when one ought to predicate something of a thing when an accident is present (and in some cases it seems so, and they say it, while in others they do not say it is necessary), one must therefore say, applying the same reasoning to all, that it is not necessary; but one must have at hand the means to refute by stating what is equivalent. All arguments of this kind are due to accident, for example: Do you know what I ought to ask you? Come now, do you recognize the one who is coming, or the one who is covered? Is standing your work? Or is your dog a father? Are few things few, or few? For it is evident in all these cases that it is not necessary that what is said of the accident be true of the thing; for only in those things that are indifferent with respect to substance, and that are one, do all things seem to be present in the same way. But for the good, it is not the same to be good and to ask the one who is coming, nor for the one coming or the one covered, both to be coming and to be Coriscus. Therefore, if I know Coriscus but do not know the one who is coming, it does not follow that I both know and do not know the same person; nor, if this is mine, and it is a work, is it my work, but rather a possession, or a thing, or some such. And in the same way in other cases. And they resolve them in this way.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":60,"ref":"p60","source":"terimentes interrogationem,dicunt enim conlingere eamdem rem cognoscere, et ignorare, sed non secundum idem; venientem igitur non noscentes, Coriscum autem noscentes, eumdem quidem cognoscere et ignorare dicunt, sed non secundum idem. Attamen primum quidem (quemadmodum jam diximus) oportet earum quae propter idem sunt orationum eamdem esse solutionem; id autem non erit si quis non in cognoscere, sed in quod est esse,aut aliquo modo se habere ipsum quod approbant,sumat (ut si hic est pater, est autem tuus): nam tametsi in quibusdam id verum est,et contingit idem cognoscere et ignorare, tamen hic nibil commune habet quod dictum est.Nihil autem prohibet eamdem orationem plures vitiositates habere, sed non omnis peccati manifestio solutio est.\n\nNam possibile estostendere quempiam, quod falsum quidem syllogizavit, propter quod autem non ostendere (ut Zenonis orationem quod non est moveri); quare et si quis conetur colligere ut ad,impossibile, peccat, et si millies syllogizet, non enim est hæc solutio,nam erat solutio manifestatio syllogismi falsi propter quod falsus. Si igitur non syllogizavit, quamvis aut verum,aut falsum conetur colligere, illius manifestatio solutio est. Fortasse autem et id in quibusdam nihil prohibet accidere, verum in his nec hoc videbitur,nam et Coriscum quod Coriscus, cognoscit, et venientem quod veniens.","english":"Those who are afraid of the question say that the same thing both knows and does not know, but not in the same respect. So, not knowing the one who is coming, but knowing Coriscus, they say that the same person both knows and does not know, but not in the same respect. However, first, as we have already said, the solution of arguments that depend on the same point must be the same; but this will not be the case if one takes the solution to lie not in knowing but in being, or in being somehow disposed, the very thing they approve (for example, if this man is a father, but he is yours). For although in some cases this is true, and it happens that the same thing is both known and unknown, nevertheless here what has been said has nothing in common. Nothing prevents the same argument from having several faults, but the exposure of every error is not a solution.\n\nFor it is possible to show that someone has drawn a false conclusion, but not to show the reason why (as in Zeno's argument that nothing moves). Therefore, even if someone tries to infer something as leading to an impossibility, he errs, and even if he reasons a thousand times, this is not a solution; for the solution was the exposure of the false syllogism, showing why it is false. If, then, he has not syllogized, even if he tries to infer either something true or something false, the exposure of that is the solution. Perhaps, however, nothing prevents this from happening in some cases, but in these it will not even seem so; for he knows Coriscus as Coriscus, and the one coming as coming.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":61,"ref":"p61","source":"Contingere autem idem cognoscere et non, ut quod album quidem cognoscere, quod autem musicum, non cognoscere: sic enim idem cognoscit et non cognoscit, sed non secundum idem, venientem autem et Cori. scum, et quod veniens,etquod Coriscus, cognoscit. Similiter autem peccant et qui solvunt quoniam omnis numerus paucus,ut ii quos diximus, utpote qui cum non conclusum est, id omittentes, verum conclusum esse dicunt (omnia enim esse et multum et paucum dicentes),peccaut. Quidam autem et duplici solvunt syllogismos,ut quoniam tuus est pater, aut filius,autservus. Attamen manifestum quoniam si eo quod multipliciterdiciturapparet redargutio, oportet nomen vel orationem proprie esse plurium, hunc autem esse hujus filium,, nemo dicit proprie, si dominus est filii,sed propter accidens compositio est(putasne est hoc tuum? sic; est autem hoc filius, tuus igitur filius), quia accidit esse et tuum, et filium, sed non tuum filium. Et esse aliquid malorum bonum, nam prudentia estdisciplinamalorum.","english":"But to have the same thing both know and not know—for instance, to know that it is white, but not to know that it is musical—in this way the same person both knows and does not know, but not in the same respect; but the one coming and Coriscus, both as coming and as Coriscus, he knows. In the same way, those also err who resolve the argument that every number is small, as those whom we mentioned, namely those who, when the conclusion has not been established, omit that and say that the conclusion is true (for in saying that all things are both many and few, they err). But some also resolve syllogisms by a double sense, as that your father is either son or slave. Yet it is clear that if the refutation appears because of something said in many senses, the name or the phrase must properly belong to several things; but that this man is this man's son, no one says properly, if he is the master of the son, but the combination is due to an accident (do you think this is yours? yes; but this is a son, therefore he is your son), because it happens that he is both yours and a son, but not your son. And that something among evils is good, for prudence is the discipline of evils.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":62,"ref":"p62","source":"Hoc autem horum esse non dicitur multipliciter,sed possessio: siquidem fortasse multipliciter (nam et hominem animalium dicimus esse),sed non possessionem, et si quid ad mala dicitur ut aliquorum propterid malorum est, sed nun malorum, propter id igitur quod aliquo modo etiam simpliciter apparel, quanquam contingit fortasse bonum essealiquid malorum dupliciter, non tamen in orationehac, sed magis si quod mancipium sit bonum mali. Fortasse autem neque sic.Non enim si bonum est et hujus, bonum hujus simul, verum neque hominem dicere animalium esse, dicitur multipliciter; non enim si aliquid significamus auferentes,id dicitur multipliciter, nam et dimidium dicentes versus da mihi, Hiada significamus, Iram pande, dea.\n\nCAPUT V.\n\nDe solutione sex ultimorum locorum extra dictionem\n\nEas vero quae sunt propter id quod praecipue, illud autcm, vel qua, vel ubi, vel aliquomodo, vel ad aliquid dicitur, et non simpliciter, solvendum est considerando conclusionem ad contradictionem,si contingithorum aliquid passas esse.Nam contraria et opposita, et affirmationem, et negationem, simpliciter quidemimpossibile iness eidem, qua autem utrumque, vel ad aliquid, vel aliquo modo, vel hoc quidem qua,illud autem sin.pliciter nihilprohibet; quare si hoc quidem simpliciter, illud autem qua, nondum est redargutio.","english":"But to be one of these things is not said in many ways, but rather possession; although perhaps it is said in many ways (for we also say that man is of animals), but not as possession, and if something is said in relation to evils as being of certain evils, it is on account of this that it is of evils, but not now of evils; therefore on account of that which in some way also appears simply, although perhaps it happens that something of evils is good in two ways, yet not in this expression, but rather if some slave is a good of a bad thing. But perhaps not even in this way. For if it is good and of this, it is not at once good of this; but neither is saying that man is of animals said in many ways; for if we signify something by taking it away, that is not said in many ways; for also when we say \"give me half the verse,\" we signify \"Sing, goddess, the wrath.\"\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nOn the solution of the last six locations outside diction\n\nBut those which are on account of that which is chiefly, or that, or in what respect, or where, or in some way, or in relation to something, and not simply, must be solved by considering the conclusion in relation to the contradiction, if it happens that any of these have been undergone. For it is impossible for contraries and opposites, and affirmation and negation, simply to be present in the same thing, but in respect of which both, or in relation to something, or in some way, or this indeed in respect of which, that however simply, nothing prevents; wherefore if this indeed simply, that however in respect of which, there is not yet a refutation.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":63,"ref":"p63","source":"Hoc autem in conclusione considerandum ad contradictionem.Sunt autem hujusmodi orationes omnes id habentes,putasne contingit quod non est esse? attamen non est aliquid id quod non est. Similiter autem et quod est non erit, nam non erit aliquid cum sunt. Nunquid contingit eumdem simul bene jurare et pejerare?Nunquid possibile est simul eidem suadere et dissuadere? An neque esse quid, et esse, idem? quod autem non est, non si est quid, etiam est simpliciter. Neque si benejurat id quidem, et qua, necesse est et bene jurare,nam qui jurat se pejeraturum,bene jurat perjurans hoc solum, at non bene jurat. Neque qui dissuadet, suadet, sed secundum quid suadet. Similis autem ratio est et de eo quod est mentiri eumdem simul et verum dicere,sed propter id quod non est facile inspicere utrum quis assignet simpliciter veracem esse, vel mendacem difficile apparet. Prohibet autem eumdem nihil simpliciter quidem esse mendacem, qua autem veracem, vel alicujus esse veracem aliquem, veracem autem non. Similiter autem et in ad aliquid, et ubi,et quando,omnes enim hujusmodi orationes propter ld accidunt.Putasnesanitas,vel divitiae bonum? attamen insipienti, et non recte utenti non bonum,ergo bonum, et non bonum. Estne sanum esse, vel potestatem habere in civitate bonum? verumtamen est quandoque non bonum; idem igitur eidem bonum, et non bonum.","english":"But this must be considered in the conclusion with respect to contradiction. All statements of this kind have this feature: do you think it happens that what is not is? And yet what is not is not something. Likewise also what is will not be, for it will not be something when they are. Does it happen that the same man at the same time swears rightly and perjures himself? Is it possible at the same time to persuade and dissuade the same person of the same thing? Or is being something and being the same? But what is not, if it is something, is not also simply. Nor, if he swears rightly in this respect and in this way, is it necessary that he also swear rightly; for he who swears that he will perjure himself swears rightly in perjuring himself in this alone, but he does not swear rightly. Nor does he who dissuades persuade, but he persuades in a certain respect. And the reasoning is similar also concerning the same man lying and telling the truth at the same time; but because of the fact that it is not easy to discern whether one assigns that he is simply truthful or a liar, it appears difficult. But it prevents the same man from being simply a liar, while in the respect in which he is truthful, or from being someone's truthful man, but not truthful. Similarly also in relation to something, and where, and when; for all statements of this kind occur because of this. Do you think health, or wealth, is a good? And yet for the foolish man and the one not using it rightly it is not a good; therefore it is a good and not a good. Is being healthy, or having power in the city, a good? And yet sometimes it is not a good; the same thing, therefore, is a good and not a good for the same person.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":64,"ref":"p64","source":"An nihilprohibet quod simpliciter est bonum, huic non esse bonum? aut huic quidem bonum, at non nunc, vel non boc in loco bonum. Putasne quod non vull sapiens,malum; amittere autem non vult bonum, malum igitur bonum. Non enim idem est dicere malum est bonum,et amittere bonum.Similiter autem et qua; de iure est oratio, non enim si malum est fur, etiam capere est malum, ergo,vult malum, sed potius bonum,nam capere bonum est, Et aegritudo malum est, sed non amittere aegritudinem malum. Putasne justum injusto, et quod juste eo quod injuste magis eligendum est? sed mori injuste magis est eligendum.Putasne justum est sua habere quemque?qua?autem aliquis adjudicabit secundum opinionem suam et si sit falsa, sua sunt ex lege, idem igitur justum et injustum.Et utrum oportet judicare eum qui justa dicit, an qui injusta? at vero eum quiinjuriam passus est,justum estabunde dicere quæ passus est, ea autem erant injusta. Non enim etsi pati aliquid injuste eligendum, id quod est injuste eligibilius quam quod juste,sed simpliciter quidem quod juste, hoc autem nihil prohibet si injuste, an juste: et habere sua quemque justum, aliena autemnonjustum.Judiciumvero bocjustum esse nihil prohibet, ut quod sit secund umopiDionem judicantis, non enim si justum est hoc modo vel huic, et simpliciter justum est. Similiter autem et quae injusta sunt, nihil prohibet dicere ea justum esse.","english":"Does anything prevent what is simply good from not being good for this person? Or good for this person, but not now, or not good in this place? Do you think that what the wise man does not wish is bad, but to lose it he does not wish—so bad is good? For it is not the same to say \"bad is good\" and \"to lose the good.\" Likewise also in matters of right: the argument does not hold, for if a thief is bad, it does not follow that to seize him is bad; therefore he wishes the bad, but rather the good, for to seize him is good. And sickness is bad, but not to lose sickness is bad. Do you think that what is just is more to be chosen by the unjust man than what is unjust? But to die unjustly is more to be chosen. Do you think it is just for each person to have his own? But in what way? Someone will judge according to his own opinion, and even if it is false, his own possessions are his by law; therefore the same thing is just and unjust. And whether ought one to judge the man who speaks just things or the man who speaks unjust things? But in fact for the man who has suffered injury it is just to speak of the things he has suffered, and those things were unjust. For even if to suffer something unjustly is to be chosen, that which is unjustly is more choiceworthy than that which is justly—but simply what is just; this, however, nothing prevents from being unjust, or just. And for each person to have his own is just, but to have another's is not just. But nothing prevents this judgment from being just, namely that it be according to the opinion of the one judging; for it is not because it is just in this way or for this person that it is simply just. Likewise also in the case of unjust things, nothing prevents one from saying that they are just.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":65,"ref":"p65","source":"Non enim si dicere justum est, necesse est justa esse, sicut nec si est utile dicere,utilia.Similiter autem et in justis. Quare non si quæ dicuntur injusta qui dicit injustaconvincitur, dicitenim quae dicere est justa, simpliciter autem et quae pati injusta. Iis autem quae propter definitionem fiunt redargutiones,quemadmodumdictum est prius, obsistendum considerantibus conclusionem ad contradictionem, ut sit idem, et secundum idem, et ad idem, et similiter, et in eodem tempore. Si vero in principio interroget,non confitendum (quoniam inpossibile est idem esse et duplum et non duplum), sed dicendum, non sic ut forte sit redarguere confitentem. Sunt autem omnes hae orationes propter hoc. Putas qui novit quidque, quod quamque cognovit rem,et qui ignorat similiter? cognoscens au-tem quis Coriscum quod Coriscus, ignorabit quod musicus; quare idem cognoscit et ignorat. Putasne quadricubitum tricubito majus? fieri enim potest ex tricubito quadricubitum secundum longitudinem, majus autem minore majus, idem igitur eodem secundum idem majus et minus. Illa vero quae fiunt propter id quod petunt,atque sumunt quod in principio, si interroganti quidem manifestum sit, non dandum neque si probabile sit dicentem esse veracem. Si autem lateant, ignorantiam ob vitiositatem talium orationum ad interrogantem retorquendum.","english":"For it is not the case that if it is just to say something, it is necessary that the things said be just—just as neither, if it is useful to say something, are the things said useful. And similarly also in the case of just things. Wherefore, if someone who says unjust things is convicted of saying unjust things, it does not follow that the things he says are unjust; for he says things which it is just to say, but simply the things which it is just to suffer. But the refutations which arise on account of definition, as was said earlier, must be resisted by those who consider the conclusion in relation to the contradiction, so that it is the same, and in the same respect, and in relation to the same thing, and similarly, and at the same time. But if he asks at the outset, one must not concede (since it is impossible for the same thing to be both double and not double), but one must say that it is not such as perhaps to refute the one who concedes. And all these arguments are for this reason. Do you think that the one who knows each thing, and the one who is ignorant, are similarly related to whatever thing each has come to know? But someone who knows Coriscus, that he is Coriscus, will be ignorant that he is musical; wherefore he both knows and is ignorant of the same thing. Do you think that a four-cubit thing is greater than a three-cubit thing? For it is possible for a four-cubit thing to come to be from a three-cubit thing according to length, and the greater is greater than the lesser; therefore the same thing is both greater and lesser than the same thing in the same respect. But those arguments which arise on account of what they beg and assume as a principle, if it is manifest to the one asking, must not be granted, nor, even if it is probable, must one say that the speaker is truthful. But if they escape notice, the ignorance, on account of the viciousness of such arguments, must be turned back upon the questioner.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":66,"ref":"p66","source":"tanquam non redarguentem, nam redargutio sine eo est quod est in principio, deinde datum est non ut eo uteretur,sed ut ad illud colligeret contrarium, ut in non semotis redargutionibus.Et eas quae propter consequens sunt conjectantes,in ipsa oratione monstrandum. Est autem duplex sequentium consequentia, aut enim ut particularescquitur universale, ut hominem animal (postulant enim si hoc cum ilia, et illud esse cum hoc),aut secundum oppositiones.Nam si huic est illud consequens,et opposito oppositum, propter quod et Melissi oratio. Nam si genitum est, habet principium, ingenitum postulat non nabereprincipium.Quare si ingenitum est caIum, et infinitum. Id autem non est, e converso enim consequentia. Quæcunque autem propter id quod addituraliquid colligunt,considerandum si (eo sublato)accidit nihil minus impossibile; deinde id manifestandum et dicendum quod dedit non tanquam videretur,sed ut adorationem,quo vero usus est, nihil ad orationem. Ad eas autem quae plures interrogationes unam faciunt, statim in principio determinandum est. Nam interrogatio una est, ad quam una responsio est. Quare neque plura de uno, neque unum de pluribus, sed unum de uno affirman dum vel negandum. Sicut autem in aequivocis quandoque quidem ambobus, quandoque neutri inest.","english":"as though he were not refuting; for refutation does not depend on that which is at the beginning. Then it was granted not in order that he might use it, but in order that he might collect the contrary to it, as in the case of refutations that are not set apart. And those who make conjectures on account of the consequent must be shown this in the argument itself. Now the consequence of things that follow is twofold: for either the universal follows the particular, as animal follows man (for they demand that if this is with that, that also is with this), or [the consequence is] according to oppositions. For if this has that as a consequence, the opposite also has the opposite as a consequence; on account of which also is the argument of Melissus. For if it has been generated, it has a beginning; but if it is ungenerated, he demands that it not have a beginning. Wherefore if the heaven is ungenerated, it is also infinite. But that is not so; for the consequence is the other way round. And whatever things they collect on account of something added, one must consider whether, when that is removed, nothing the less impossible results; then one must make this clear and say that he granted it not as it seemed [fit], but for the sake of refutation, whereas what he used contributes nothing to the argument. But against those who make many questions into one, one must determine at once at the beginning. For a question is one to which there is one answer. Wherefore neither many things about one, nor one about many, but one about one must be affirmed or denied. But as in the case of equivocals, sometimes it is present in both, sometimes in neither.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":67,"ref":"p67","source":"Quare cum non simplex est interrogatio, simpliciter respondentibus nihil accidit pati.SimiIiter et in his, quando igitur plurauni,velunum pluribus inest, vel non inest, simpliciter dantiaethoc peccato peccanti, nihil contrarium accidit. Quandoque autem huic quidem inest, iIli autem non, aut plura de pluribus,et est ut insint ambobus,est autcm ut non insint rursum,quare id cavendum.Ut in his orationibus,Sihoc quidem estbonum,il!ud autem malum, quod verum est dicere quoniam haec bonum et malum et rursum neque bonum neque malum; non enim inest utrumque utique; quare idem bonum et malum, et nequebonum nequemalum. Et si unum quodque ipsum sibi idem est et aliis diversum, quoniam non aliis eadem, sed sibi, et diversa eisdem, ipsa sibimet diversa et eadem. Amplius, si bonum quidem malumsitjmalumautembonumjduo utique ftent.Etduorumetinaequaliumutrumqueipsum sibi esse aequale; quare aequalia et inæqualia ipsa sibi. Incidunt autem hae orationes et in alias solutiones, nam ambo et omna plura significant; non igitur idem praeter nomen accidit affirmare et negare. Id autem non erat redargutio, sed manifestum, quoniam si non una interrogatio plures fiant, sed unum de uno affirmet aut neget, id non erit impossibile.","english":"Therefore, since the question is not simple, nothing happens to those who answer simply. Similarly also in these cases: whenever, then, either many things belong to one, or one thing to many, or do not belong, those who grant this simply commit this error, and nothing contrary results. But sometimes it belongs to this one and not to that one, or many things belong to many, and it is possible for them to belong to both, and again possible for them not to belong; therefore this must be guarded against. As in these arguments: if this is good and that is evil, it is true to say that these are good and evil, and again that they are neither good nor evil; for it is not the case that both belong at any rate; therefore the same thing is good and evil, and neither good nor evil. And if each thing is the same as itself and different from others, since it is not the same as others but as itself, and different from the same things, then the things themselves are different from themselves and the same. Furthermore, if good is evil and evil is good, two things will certainly come about. And of two unequal things, each is equal to itself; therefore the equal and unequal things themselves are equal to themselves. But these arguments also fall under other solutions, for both and all signify more than one thing; therefore it does not turn out to be the same thing beyond the name to affirm and to deny. But that was not a refutation, but it is clear that if the questions are not one but many, but one affirms or denies one thing of one thing, this will not be impossible.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":68,"ref":"p68","source":"CAPUT VI.\n\nDilationes negationis et soloscismi..,,\n\nIn illis autem quai deducunt ad idem frequenter dicere,manifestum quod non dandum eorum quae ad aliquid dicuntursignificare,aliquidseparatas perse praedicationes, ut duplum, sine eo quod est dimidii quid inesse apparet,nam et decem in deficientibus uno ad decem, et facere in non facere, et omnino in negatione affirmatio; non tamen si quis dicat hoc non esse album,dicit idem album esse, duplum autem neque significat aliquid fortasse, quemadmodum neque quod in dimidio. Quod si forte significat, attamen non idem et conjunctum, neque scientia in specie, ut si est medicina scientia,ipsum quod commune,illudautemeratscientiascibilis. In iis autem quae per se ostenduntur praedicatis, id dicendum, quod non idem est seorsum et in orationequod ostenditur,nam cavum communiter guidemidem signiScat in simo et curvo,additum autem, nihil prohibet hoc quidem naso,illud autem cruri significare,et nihil differt dicere,nasus simus,et nasus cavus.Amplius,non dandaestdictio secundum rectum.Falsum enim est,nam non est simum nasus cavus,sed nasi hoc ut passio,quare nihil est absonum,si nasus simus est nasus habens cavitatem nasi.De solœcismis autempropterquidapparentaccidere,dixi.n prius, quomodo autem solvendum, in ipsis orationibus erit manifestum. Omnes enim hujusmodi volunt construere.Putas quod dicis quidpiam vere esse,etiam est illud vere?","english":"CHAPTER VI.\n\nThe extensions of negation and of solecisms.\n\nIn those cases, however, which lead to saying the same thing frequently, it is clear that one must not grant that the things said in relation to something signify some separate predications in themselves, as double, without that which appears to be present in it of the half; for ten is also among those deficient by one to ten, and to do is in not to do, and in general affirmation is in negation; yet not if someone says that this is not white, he says that the same thing is white. But double perhaps signifies nothing, just as neither does that which is in the half. But if perchance it does signify, still it is not the same and conjoined, nor is knowledge in the species, as if medicine is a science, that which is common, but that is rather the knowable. In those things, however, which are shown through predications in themselves, it must be said that it is not the same thing shown separately and in the phrase; for hollow commonly indeed signifies the same in the snub and the curved, but when added, nothing prevents it from signifying this in the nose, that in the leg, and it makes no difference to say the nose is snub and the nose is hollow. Moreover, the expression must not be granted according to the straight case. For it is false, since the snub is not a hollow nose, but of the nose this as a property; wherefore it is nothing absurd if the snub nose is a nose having the hollowness of a nose. Concerning solecisms, however, why they appear to occur, I have said before; but how they are to be resolved will be manifest in the phrases themselves. For all such people wish to construct. Do you think that what you say is something truly, and is that also truly?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":69,"ref":"p69","source":"dicis autem quidpiam lapidem esse, est igitur quidpiam lapidem.An dicere lapidem non est dicere quod, sed quem, non hoc, sed hunc? si igiturdicat aliquis, putas quem vere dicis estistum? non videtur Romane loqui.Quemadmodumneque si dicat,pulas quam dicis esse,est iste? lignum autem dicere iste,vel quæcunque neque masculinum, neque feminin um significant, nihil refert; quare etiam non fit solcecismus,si quod dicis esse,eHt istud; lignumautem dicis esse, est igitur lignum istud; lapis autem etiste,masculinihabentdeclinationem.Quod si quis dicat,putasne iste,illa est? deinde rursum, quid autem nonne iste est Coriscus? ita dicat. Est igiturilIa,noncollegitsolcecismum,siCoriscusetiam non significet idem quod ilia, non dat autem qui respondet, sed oportet hoc praeinterrogare, si autem neque est,neque dat non collegit, neque in eo quod est esse aliquid,neque ad eum qui interrogatus est. Similiter igitur oportet,et illic lapidem signiiicare iste; si autem neque est, neque datur,non dicenda conclusio,apparet autem eo quod dissimilis casus nominis similis appareat.Putasne verum est dicere quoniam ista est id quod esse ais,eam esse autem ais aspidem,est igitur ista aspidem.An non necesse est,si non istaaspidemsignificat,sedaspis,aspidem autem istam; neque si quem dicis esse istum, est iste,dicis autem istum esse Cleonem,est igitur iste Cleonem; non enim est iste Cleonem.","english":"You say that something is a stone; therefore it is something, a stone. Or is to say \"a stone\" not to say \"what\" but \"whom,\" not \"this\" but \"him\"? If, then, someone says, \"Do you think that he whom you truly say is, is this man?\" he does not seem to speak in Latin. Just as neither if he says, \"Do you think that she whom you say is, is this woman?\" But to say \"this\" of wood, or of whatever things signify neither masculine nor feminine, makes no difference; wherefore a solecism does not even arise if, when you say that something is, it is this thing; but you say that it is wood, therefore it is this wood; but \"stone\" and \"this man\" have a masculine declension. But if someone says, \"Do you think that this woman is that woman?\" and then again, \"But what, is this not Coriscus?\" let him speak thus. Therefore that woman is not, and he has not committed a solecism, if Coriscus also does not signify the same thing as that woman; but the one who answers does not grant it, but one ought to ask this beforehand; if however it is not so, and he does not grant it, he has not committed a solecism, neither in the matter of its being something nor in relation to the one who was asked. Similarly, then, it is fitting also in that case that \"this\" signify a stone; but if it is not so, and it is not granted, the conclusion must not be stated; and it appears so because the case of the noun, though dissimilar, appears similar. Do you think it is true to say that this woman is what you say she is, and you say that she is a shield? Therefore this woman is a shield. Or is it not necessary, if this woman does not signify a shield, but a shield does, and you say that this woman is a shield? Nor if you say that he whom you say is, is this man, and you say that this man is Cleon, therefore this man is Cleon; for this man is not Cleon.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":70,"ref":"p70","source":"Dictum est enim quoniam quem dico istum esse, est iste, non istum,neque enim Romane dicetur quo pacto interrogatio dicta.Putas,islud scis? istud autem est lapis,scis igitur lapis.An non idem significat istud in eo quod est,putas istud scis,et in hoc, istud autem lapis,sed in primo quidem hunc,in posteriore autem hic.Putasne cujus scientiam habes,scisillud? scientiam autem habes lapidis,scis igitur lapidis.An hujus quidem lapidis dicis,hunc autem lapidem? datum est autem cujus scientiahabes illud scis,non illius,sed illud; quare non lapidis,sed lapidem.Quod igitur hujus modi orationes non colligunt solœcismum sed apparent,et propter quid apparent,et quomodo est obsistendum illis, est manifestum ex iis quae dicta sunt.\n\nCAPUT VII.\n\nDe oratione facili, difficili et acuta.\n\nOportet autem intelligere quoniam omnium orationum aliæ quidem sunt faciles conspici,aliæ autem difficiliores,propter id quod etinaliquosubdole decipiunt audientem,cum frequentereaedem illis existant,nam eamdem orationem oportet vocare,quae propter idem fit.","english":"For it has been said that he whom I say to be this man is this man, not this man; for it will not be said in Latin how the question was put. Do you think—do you know that? But that is a stone; therefore you know a stone. Or does \"that\" not signify the same in \"do you think you know that?\" and in \"but that is a stone,\" but in the first case \"this man\" and in the latter \"this\"? Do you think that what you have knowledge of, you know that? But you have knowledge of a stone; therefore you know a stone. Or do you say \"of this stone\" in one case and \"this stone\" in the other? But it is granted that what you have knowledge of, you know—not of it, but it; therefore not \"of a stone\" but \"a stone.\" That, then, arguments of this sort do not produce a solecism but only appear to, and why they appear to, and how they must be resisted, is clear from what has been said.\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nOn easy, difficult, and acute argument.\n\nBut one must understand that of all arguments some are easy to see through, others more difficult, for the reason that they also deceive the hearer somewhat craftily, since the same things frequently occur in them; for the same argument must be called that which is made on account of the same thing.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":71,"ref":"p71","source":"Eadem autem oratio aliis quidem propterdictionem, aliisautempropteraccidens,aliis vero propter aliud videbitur esse,quia un um quod que translatitium non similiter est manifestum.Quemadmodum igitur in iis quæ sunt propter æquivocationem (qui modus videtur esse ineptissimus) captiosarum ratiocinationum,haec quidem et quibuslibet sunt manifesta(nam etorationespeneridiculosae sunt omnes propter dictionem:Utvirferebaturcurru in scalas, ubi venit servus, apud Ceream? Et Boreas purusne? non certe5perdit enim pauperem, et ementem. Et utra bonum ante pariet? neutra, sed retro ambæ. Putasne est Evarchus? non certe,sed Apollonides. Eodem autem modo et aliarum fere quam pJurimæ),illa autem et peritissimos videntur latere. Signum autem horum quoniam contendunt saepe de nominibus, et utrum idem significent de omnibus ens et unum, an aliud; aliis enim videtur significare ens et unum; alii autem Zenonisorationem et Parmenidis solvunt, eo quod multipliciter dicant unum dici,et ens. Similiter autem et propter accidens et aliorum singulum quodque,aliae quidem orationes erunt faciles videri, alia; vero difficiliores. Et sumere in quo genere, et utrum redargutio, an non redargutio,non facile similiter in omnibus est.","english":"But the same argument will seem to some to be on account of diction, to others on account of accident, and to others on account of something else, because each of the transferred expressions is not equally manifest. Therefore, just as in those arguments that are on account of equivocation (which mode seems to be the most inept of captious reasonings), some of these are manifest even to anyone (for nearly all arguments on account of diction are ridiculous: \"A man was carried in a chariot to the stairs, where the slave came, at Cerea\"? And \"Is Boreas pure? Certainly not, for he destroys the poor man and the buyer.\" And \"Did either woman bear a good child before the wall? Neither, but both backward.\" \"Do you think it is Evarchus? Certainly not, but Apollonides.\"), but others seem to escape even the most skilled. A sign of these is that they often contend about names, and whether being and one signify the same thing in all cases, or something else; for to some it seems that being and one signify the same, while others resolve the argument of Zeno and Parmenides on the ground that one is said in many ways, and being as well. Similarly also with respect to accident and each single one of the others, some arguments will be easy to seem, others harder. And to grasp in which genus it is, and whether it is a refutation or not a refutation, is not equally easy in all cases.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":72,"ref":"p72","source":"Est autem acuta oratio,quae dubitare facit maxime, mordet enim hæc maxime, dubitatio autem estduplex, haec quidem in syllogizantibus, quam eligat quis interrogationum, i Ila autem in contentiose sustinentibus, quomodo dicat quis propositum. Quapropter in iis quae syllogizant, acutiores orationes inquirere magis faciunt. Est autem ea quae syllogizat quidem,oratio acutissima, si ex quam maxime apparentibus quam maxime;probabile interimitetconstruit.Nam cum una oratio sit (transposita contradictione)omnes similiter habebit syllogismos: semper enim ex probabilibus similiter probabile interimet aut construe!; quapropter dubitare necessarium est.Maxime igitur talis acuta, quae ex æquo conclusionem facit interrogationibus; secunda autem quae ex omnibus similibus.Hæc enim similiter facietdubitare, quae interrogationum interimenda est; id autem difficile est? nam interimendam quidem, quid autem interimendum,d ubium.Contentiosarum autem acutissima, quae primum statim dubia est, utrum syllogizat,an non, vel utrum propter falsum, an divisionem solutio. Secunda aulem aliarum, quas manifesta quidem quod propter divisionem vel interemptionem est, non tamen est explorata per cujus interrogationum interemptionem, vel divisionem, solvenda est, scilicet utrum propter conclusionem, an propter aliquam interrogationum id est.","english":"A sharp argument is one that makes one most doubt, for this above all bites; and doubt is twofold: one kind in those who are syllogizing, namely which of the questions one should choose; the other in those who contentiously withstand, namely how one should state the proposition. Therefore in matters that are syllogized, sharper arguments make one inquire more. Now the argument that syllogizes is sharpest if from the most apparent premises it destroys or constructs what is most probable. For since it is one argument (with the contradiction transposed), it will have all its syllogisms alike; for always from probable premises it will alike destroy or construct the probable; wherefore it is necessary to doubt. Such an argument is therefore sharpest which makes the conclusion equal to the questions; second is that which [proceeds] from all similar [premises]. For this will make one doubt alike which of the questions is to be destroyed; but is this difficult? For it is clear that something is to be destroyed, but what is to be destroyed is doubtful. Of contentious arguments, however, the sharpest is that which is immediately at first doubtful whether it syllogizes or not, or whether the solution is on account of the false or on account of division. Second is that of the others in which it is manifest indeed that the solution is on account of division or destruction, yet it is not ascertained by the destruction or division of which of the questions it is to be solved, namely whether on account of the conclusion or on account of some one of the questions.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":73,"ref":"p73","source":"Quandoque igitur non syllogizans oratio facilis est, si sint valde inopinabilia, vel falsa quae sumuntur, quandoque autem non digna despici. Nam quando deest aliqua talium interrogationem, de qua oratio et propter quam est, et qui non sumit illam,et colligit, inepta est ratiocinatio; quando autem eorum, quae extrinsecus non despicienda ullo modo, sed oratio quidem justa, interrogans autem non probe interrogavit.Et est sane solvendum quandoque quidem ad orationem,quandoque autem ad interrogantem,et interrogationem,quandoque vero ad neutrum horum; similiter etinterrogandum et syllogizandum est et ad positionem,et ad respondente::n,et ad tempus, quando fuerit pluris temporis egens solutio, quam praesentis temporis (quo disputantur)ad solutionem.\n\nCAPUT VIII.\n\nEpilogus octo pruecedenlium et,duorum præsentium librorum.\n\nEx quot igitur, et ex quibus fiunt iis qui disputant captiosae ratiocinationes, et quomodo ostendemus,falsum et inopinabilia dicere faciemus, amplius autem ex quibus accidit syllogismus, et quomodo interrogandum,et quis ordo interrogationum,insuper autem ad quid sunt utiles bujusmodi omnesorationes,et de responsione simpliciter omni, et quomodo solvendum estorationes et syllogismos, dicta sint de omnibus a nobis hæc.","english":"Sometimes, then, an argument that does not syllogize is easy [to refute], if the things assumed are very contrary to opinion or false; but sometimes [the argument is] not to be despised. For when there is lacking some one of such questions about which the argument is and on account of which it exists, and the one who does not assume it also draws the conclusion, the reasoning is inept; but [this happens] when [there is lacking] one of those things which are not in any way to be despised from outside, but the argument is indeed just, while the questioner has not questioned properly. And indeed one must sometimes solve [the argument] with reference to the argument, sometimes with reference to the questioner and the question, and sometimes with reference to neither of these; similarly one must both question and syllogize with reference both to the position and to the respondent and to the time, when the solution requires more time than the present time in which the disputations are conducted for the solution.\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nEpilogue of the eight preceding books and of the two present books.\n\nFrom how many [sources], then, and from what kinds of things those who dispute produce captious reasonings, and how we shall show [this], and [how] we shall make them state what is false and contrary to opinion, and further from what sources a syllogism comes about, and how one must question, and what is the order of questions, and besides for what purpose all such arguments of this kind are useful, and concerning every response simply, and how one must solve arguments and syllogisms—these things have been said by us concerning all matters.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":74,"ref":"p74","source":"Reliquum autem est de eo quod a principio erat propositum ad memoriam revocantes, quidpiam de ea re sub brevitate dicere,et finem imponere dictis.Praemisimus igitur, inveniendi facultatem quamdam ratiocinativam de proposito de iis quae sunt quam probabilissima; id enim opus est dialectices secundum se,ettentativæ. Quia autem præinstruitur quis ab ea propter sophistice vicinitatem, ut non solum experimentum possit sumere dialectico more, sed etiam quasi scientifico, propter id non solum dictum negotii officium posuimus orationem posse sumere, sed etiam ut, orationem sustinentes, tutemur positionem per quam probabilissimasimili modo.Causam autem diximus hujus,quia et propter id Socrates interrogabat,sed non respondebat: confitebatur enim se non scire. Manifestum autem est in prioribus ex quot et ad quod id erit, et unde idonei erimus horum. Adhuc autem quomodo interroganda velordinandaqu?estio omnis, et de responsionibus quae sunt ad syllogismos. Patefaclum estautemetdealiisquaecunquehujusce disciplinae sunt orationes. Praeter haecautem et de captiosis ratiocinationibus pertractavimus quemadmodum diximusjam prius.Quod igitur nacta suntfinem sufficienter ea quæ proposuimus, manifestum.","english":"It remains, then, recalling to memory what was proposed from the beginning, to speak briefly on that matter and to set an end to our discourse. We have therefore premised a certain faculty of discovery, ratiocinative concerning the proposed subject, from the things that are as probable as possible; for that is the work of dialectic in itself, and also of tentativeness. But because one is pre-instructed by it on account of its nearness to sophistry, so that one can take a test not only in the dialectical manner but also, as it were, in the scientific manner, for that reason we have set down the task of the work not only as the ability to take up discourse, but also that, sustaining the discourse, we may guard the position through what is most probable in a similar way. We have stated the cause of this, because it was also for this reason that Socrates used to ask questions but not answer: for he confessed that he did not know. It is manifest in the earlier [books] from how many [things] and to what end this will be, and whence we shall be fit for these. Furthermore, how every question is to be asked or ordered, and concerning the responses that are directed to syllogisms. It has also been made clear concerning the other discourses, whatever belong to this discipline. Besides these, we have also treated captious reasonings, as we said already before. That, therefore, the things we proposed have sufficiently reached their end is manifest.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":75,"ref":"p75","source":"CAPUT IX.\n\nPeroratio.\n\nOperae pretium autem est nos non latere quidnam accidit circa hoc negotium. Nam eorum quæ inveniunturomnium,quae quidem ab aliis sumpta sunt prius,elaborata paulatim incrementum sumunt ab illis qui postmodum accipiunt; quas autemabinitio comperiuntur,parvum in primis sumere solent incrementum,attamen utilius multo eo (quod postea ab aliis fit) accremento. Maximum enim fortasse principium omnium, ut dicitur, quare et difficillimum. Quanto enim potestate validissimum, tanto mole minimum, difficillimum est videri. Eo autem comperLo,facile est adjicere,coaptareque reliquum. Quod et circa rhetoricas orationes accidit,pene autem et circa alias artes omnes: nam qui principia invenere, omnino ad eixguum quid perduxerunt; qui autem nunc celebriores habentur, vindicantes a multis,ve!utexsuccessione particulatim colligentes, sic auxerunt. Tisias quidem post priores, Thrasymachus vero post Tisiam, Theodorus autem post hunc, et multi mullas coadunavere partes. Quapropter nihil mirum si in amplum quidem creverit ars.Hujus autem negotii non hoc quidem eratexplo. ratum, illud autem non erat, verum nihil ipsius prorsus erat, nam eorum qui circa litigiosas orationes erant mercenarii, similis quidem doctrina, Gorgiae negotio.","english":"CHAPTER IX.\n\nPeroration.\n\nIt is worthwhile that we not be ignorant of what has happened in this matter. For of all things that are discovered, those which have been taken up by others first and elaborated little by little receive increase from those who take them up afterward; but those which are discovered from the beginning are accustomed to receive little increase at first, yet that increase is much more useful than what is afterward made by others. For perhaps the greatest principle of all, as is said, is also the most difficult. For by how much it is most powerful in potential, by so much is it smallest in bulk, and it is most difficult to see. But once this has been discovered, it is easy to add and fit together the rest. This has happened also in the case of rhetorical speeches, and nearly in all the other arts as well: for those who discovered the principles brought them to a very small point indeed; but those who are now held in renown, taking them up from many or collecting them piece by piece as if by succession, thus increased them. Tisias indeed after the earlier ones, Thrasymachus after Tisias, Theodorus after him, and many others gathered together many parts. Wherefore it is no wonder if the art has grown to a great size. But of this matter, one part was not elaborated, another was not, but in truth there was nothing of it at all; for those who were engaged in contentious speeches for hire had a doctrine similar to the business of Gorgias.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":76,"ref":"p76","source":"Orationes enim hi quidem rhetoricas, illi autem interrogativas docebant ediscere, in quas saepius incidere solebant alternatim utrorumque ad invicem orationes. Quapropter veloxquidem, ut pote quae sine arte,erat doctrina discentibus ab illis: nun enim artem, sed quæ ab arte sunt dantes, arbitrati sunt loqui erudite. Perinde ac si quis disciplinam dicat se tradere ut non doleant pedes, deinde sutoriam quidem non doceat, usque unde possint comparari talia, det autem quam plurima genera omnimodorum calceorum. Hic profecto profuit ad usum,artem autem non tradidit.Et derhetori cis quidem erant multa et antiqua dicta, desyllogismis autem omnino nihil habuimus prius aliud quidquam quod diceremus,quam mora perquirentes,multo tempore insudaverimus.Si autem videtur ex considerationibus nostris (ut ex iis quae sunt ex principio) hæc habere,disciplina sufficienlersupra alia negotia quae ex traditione inducta sunt, reliquum erit omnium vestrum,vel eorum qui audierint hoc opus, omissa quidem artis, venia dignari, inventa autem, multa prosequi gratia.","english":"For some taught people to learn rhetorical speeches, others interrogative ones, into which the speeches of both parties in turn, against each other, were more often apt to fall. Wherefore that instruction was swift—as being without art—for those who learned from them; for they did not give art, but the things that are from art, thinking they spoke learnedly. Just as if someone should say he is handing on a discipline so that one's feet do not hurt, and then should not teach the shoemaker's art, nor from what source such things can be procured, but should give the greatest number of kinds of shoes of every sort. This man indeed was useful for use, but he did not hand on the art. And for the rhetoricians there were many ancient sayings, but concerning syllogisms we had previously nothing at all else that we could say, than that, seeking by delay, we had sweated over it for a long time. But if from our considerations (as from those which are from the beginning) these things seem to hold, the discipline is sufficiently above other matters which have been introduced from tradition; it will remain for all of you, or of those who will hear this work, to deem worthy of pardon the things omitted of the art, but to pursue with much gratitude the things discovered.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]}]}