{"slug":"tmp1032.tmp1032.opp-lat1","id":"latin:ogl-pl:tmp1032.tmp1032.opp-lat1","title":"Liber De Diffinitione","title_source":"Liber De Diffinitione","author":"Boethius. Severinus","genre":"treatise","date":"","tradition":"latin","coverage":"not-located","coverage_claim":{"status":"not-located","text":"No English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed."},"publication":{"status":"machine-draft","reviewed_by":null,"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash:floor","provider":"Relace","generated":"2026-11-15T07:45:11Z","cost_usd":0.021451},"source":{"registry_id":"latin:ogl-pl:tmp1032.tmp1032.opp-lat1","work_id":"tmp1032.tmp1032.opp-lat1","edition":"ogl-pl","language":"","license":"Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License","url":"https://github.com/OpenGreekAndLatin/patrologia_latina-dev/blob/master/data/tmp1032/tmp1032/tmp1032.tmp1032.opp-lat1.xml"},"stats":{"passages":46,"english_words":11476,"coptic_letters":0,"source_letters":45549,"commentary_units":255,"commentary_kinds":8,"derived_notes":1,"ambiguities":83,"work_notes":6,"external_links":6,"timeline":6},"summary":{"work":"tmp1032.tmp1032.opp-lat1","abstract":"The Liber De Diffinitione (Book on Definition) is a concise treatise by Boethius that systematically defines key logical and metaphysical terms such as substantia, accidens, genus, and species. It reflects Boethius’s project of transmitting Aristotelian and Porphyrian categories to the Latin West. The work survives in numerous medieval manuscripts, often grouped with Boethius’s logical opuscula, and was widely used in medieval schools as a textbook for logic and metaphysics. Its attribution to Boethius is generally accepted, though some copies show scribal interpolations and the title varies in manuscripts.","historical_context":"Boethius (c. 480–524 CE) was a Roman senator and philosopher whose translations and commentaries on Aristotle shaped medieval logic. The Liber De Diffinitione was likely composed in the early 6th century, during Boethius’s productive period before his imprisonment (c. 524). It belongs to his series of translations and commentaries on Aristotle’s Organon. The work was transmitted in Latin and survives in numerous medieval manuscripts, often grouped with Boethius’s logical opuscula. Its title varies in manuscripts (e.g., De definitione, Liber de diffinitione), and some copies attribute it to Augustine or Cassiodorus, though Boethian authorship is secure but not universal in the tradition. The treatise was widely used in medieval schools, influencing later scholastic definitions and distinctions, especially in the 12th and 13th centuries.","significance":"The Liber De Diffinitione is significant as a key text in the transmission of Aristotelian logic to the Latin West. It provided medieval scholars with a systematic treatment of definition, a foundational tool for dialectic and metaphysics. The work influenced later scholastic thought, particularly in the 12th and 13th centuries, and remains a valuable witness to Boethius’s logical corpus and its medieval reception.","timeline":[{"date":"c. 480–524 CE","event":"Life of Boethius, Roman senator and philosopher."},{"date":"early 6th century","event":"Composition of Liber De Diffinitione, likely before Boethius’s imprisonment (c. 524)."},{"date":"6th–12th centuries","event":"Transmission of the work in Latin manuscripts, often grouped with Boethius’s logical opuscula."},{"date":"12th–13th centuries","event":"Widespread use of the treatise as a textbook in medieval schools, influencing scholastic logic and metaphysics."},{"date":"medieval period","event":"Variations in manuscript titles and occasional misattribution to Augustine or Cassiodorus."},{"date":"modern era","event":"Publication in Patrologia Latina (PL) and other editions; attribution to Boethius generally accepted."}],"relations":[{"work":"Aristotle’s Organon","relation":"Boethius’s translations and commentaries on Aristotle’s logical works form the context for this treatise.","key":"","label":null,"url":null},{"work":"Porphyry’s Isagoge","relation":"Boethius’s work on categories and definitions builds on Porphyry’s introduction to Aristotle’s Categories.","key":"","label":null,"url":null},{"work":"Cicero’s Topica","relation":"Boethius references Cicero’s treatment of definition as a dialectical tool.","key":"","label":null,"url":null},{"work":"Boethius’s logical opuscula","relation":"The Liber De Diffinitione is often grouped with Boethius’s other short logical works.","key":"","label":null,"url":null},{"work":"Scholastic logic texts","relation":"The treatise influenced later scholastic definitions and distinctions, especially in the 12th and 13th centuries.","key":"","label":null,"url":null}],"external_links":[{"key":"wikipedia:Boethius","label":"Boethius","url":"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boethius","reason":"Provides background on the author and his works."},{"key":"wikipedia:Organon","label":"Aristotle’s Organon","url":"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organon","reason":"Context for Boethius’s logical project."},{"key":"wikipedia:Porphyry (philosopher)","label":"Porphyry","url":"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Porphyry_of_Tyre","reason":"Porphyry’s Isagoge influenced Boethius’s treatment of categories."},{"key":"wikipedia:Cicero","label":"Cicero","url":"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cicero","reason":"Boethius references Cicero’s Topica in the treatise."},{"key":"wikipedia:Patrologia Latina","label":"Patrologia Latina","url":"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patrologia_Latina","reason":"The edition (ogl-pl) is based on the PL series."},{"key":"wikipedia:Scholasticism","label":"Scholasticism","url":"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scholasticism","reason":"The work’s influence on medieval scholastic logic."}],"cautions":["The exact date of composition is unknown; it is placed in the early 6th century based on Boethius’s productive period before his imprisonment (c. 524).","Attribution to Boethius is generally accepted but not universal; some manuscripts attribute the work to Augustine or Cassiodorus.","The title varies in manuscripts (e.g., De definitione, Liber de diffinitione), and some copies show scribal interpolations.","The edition (ogl-pl) does not provide a critical apparatus or stemma codicum; variant readings from key manuscripts are not recorded."],"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash:floor","provider":"Relace","cost_usd":0.000552,"generated":"2026-11-15T07:45:10Z"},"links":[{"kind":"source","label":"Open Greek and Latin Patrologia Latina","url":"https://github.com/OpenGreekAndLatin/patrologia_latina-dev/blob/master/data/tmp1032/tmp1032/tmp1032.tmp1032.opp-lat1.xml"}],"checks":{"work":"tmp1032.tmp1032.opp-lat1","status":"pass","blocking":[],"warnings":[],"stats":{"passages":46,"translated":46,"commentary_passages":46,"commentary_units":255,"english_words":11476,"source_letters":45443,"commentary_kinds":8},"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash:floor"},"work_notes":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The treatise defines key logical and metaphysical terms (e.g., substantia, accidens, genus, species) in a concise, systematic manner, reflecting Boethius’s project of transmitting Aristotelian and Porphyrian categories to the Latin West.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"transmission","kind":"transmission","basis":"external","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The work survives in numerous medieval manuscripts, often grouped with Boethius’s logical opuscula. Its attribution to Boethius is generally accepted, though some copies show scribal interpolations.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"dating","kind":"chronology","basis":"external","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Composed likely in the early 6th century, during Boethius’s productive period before his imprisonment (c. 524). The treatise belongs to his series of translations and commentaries on Aristotle’s Organon.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The Liber De Diffinitione was widely used in medieval schools as a textbook for logic and metaphysics, influencing later scholastic definitions and distinctions, especially in the 12th and 13th centuries.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"This edition (ogl-pl) does not provide a critical apparatus or stemma codicum; variant readings from key manuscripts are not recorded. Readers should consult the PL apparatus for textual cruces.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The work’s title varies in manuscripts (e.g., De definitione, Liber de diffinitione). Some copies attribute it to Augustine or Cassiodorus; the Boethian authorship is secure but not universal in the tradition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"derived_work_notes":[{"kind":"coverage","severity":"info","text":"No English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed."},{"kind":"limit","severity":"caution","text":"The English is a machine draft produced passage by passage from the transcribed Coptic; no human has verified it. The commentary is model-written and cites only keys the pipeline could resolve."},{"kind":"register","severity":"info","text":"Register: treatise in Latin; the English keeps the liturgical formulae and the vocatives rather than normalising them."},{"kind":"structure","severity":"info","text":"Passages: 46 narrative."},{"kind":"caution","severity":"caution","text":"1 passage(s) are fragmentary in the source; the English bridges each break and says so in the note."},{"kind":"source","severity":"info","text":"Source edition: ogl-pl — Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License"}],"derived_structure":{"narrative":46},"term_index":[],"citations":{},"segments":[{"i":1,"ref":"p1","source":"AN. MANL. SEV. BOETII\n\nLIBER DE DIFFINITIONE.","english":"Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius\n\nThe Book on Definition","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"AN. MANL. SEV. BOETII","severity":"info","text":"The opening line gives the author's full name in the genitive, a standard medieval incipit formula. The abbreviation 'AN. MANL. SEV.' stands for Anicius Manlius Severinus.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"LIBER DE DIFFINITIONE","severity":"info","text":"The title 'Liber De Diffinitione' (The Book on Definition) signals a treatise on logical definition, a topic central to Boethius's Aristotelian commentaries. The spelling 'Diffinitione' reflects medieval Latin orthography.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius (c. 480–524 CE) was a Roman senator and philosopher whose translations and commentaries on Aristotle shaped medieval logic. This work belongs to his logical corpus, likely composed in the early 6th century.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"transmission","kind":"transmission","basis":"text","lemma":"AN. MANL. SEV. BOETII","severity":"info","text":"The incipit with the author's full name is typical of manuscript headings in the Latin tradition, often added by scribes to identify the work. The abbreviation style suggests a medieval copy, not a late antique original.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The passage is a title page; no Coptic text is present. The reading is straightforward as a standard incipit."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":2,"ref":"p2","source":"Dicendi ac disputandi prima semper oratio est, ] et jam dialecticis auctoribus etipsoM.Tuiliosaepius admonente,quae diciturdiffinitio.Quippecum in certamen contentionemque nihil possit (quod tamen in dictione consistat) aliquando deduci, nisi de quo futura pugna est prius fuerit in diffinitione ita defixum,ut possit inter utrumque qui inituri sunt eam litem esse manifestum quid sit illud de quo in futura quæstione tractabitur: unde non solum commoditatis genere perspicienda est virtus definiendi, quia per hanc orationem res semper evolvitur, et quod illa sit quae illud de quo quaeritur explicat, verum etiam quod principalis semper adhibita maximum lumen et manifestum parit rei quae in contrarium deducta habetquaestionem.Etenim si verba aut nota omnibus exstitissent,aut unam significantiam sui semper tenerent,et non ambiguo vel obscu ro dicto audientes fallerent,etloquentes sub diversa interpretatione deciperent,omnino definitio necessaria minime crederetur.At cum nomina rebus imposita vocesqu e singulæ per existimationem ejus qui iti res appellandas esse censuit ita sint institutæ, et itaartecompositæ,utnotaquadam in rerum significatione,nonapertadeclaratione,ducerentaudientes, necessarium admodum arbitror nosse quid sitdefinitio, quibusque speciebus ac partibus compleatur,ut facillime eteamrem quamdeclarat possitosLendere,et tollat cognitis modis in dicendo sua varietate","english":"The first speech in speaking and disputing is always definition, as both the dialectical authors and Marcus Tullius himself often remind us. For since nothing (which at least consists in speech) can ever be brought into a contest and dispute unless the subject of the future battle has first been fixed in definition so that it can be manifest to both who are about to enter that dispute what that thing is about which the future question will be treated, the virtue of defining is to be considered not only from the standpoint of convenience, because through this speech a matter is always unfolded, and because it is that which explains that about which the question is asked, but also because, always employed as the principal thing, it produces the greatest light and clarity for the matter which, when brought into opposition, has a question. For if words had either been known to all, or always held a single meaning of themselves, and did not deceive hearers by ambiguous or obscure speech, and mislead speakers under diverse interpretation, definition would be thought altogether unnecessary. But since names imposed upon things and individual words, by the estimation of the one who thought things should be so called, are so instituted and so artificially composed that they lead hearers by a certain mark in the signification of things, not by an open declaration, I think it quite necessary to know what definition is, and with what species and parts it is completed, so that one can most easily both set forth the thing it declares and, by knowing the modes in speaking, remove its variety.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"Dicendi ac disputandi prima semper oratio est","severity":"info","text":"Boethius asserts that definition is the foundational speech act in both speaking and disputing, a claim he attributes to dialectical authors and Cicero.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"M.Tuilio","severity":"info","text":"The reference to Marcus Tullius Cicero aligns with his rhetorical works, such as the Topica, where definition is treated as a key dialectical tool.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero Topica"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"diffinitio","severity":"info","text":"The term diffinitio (definition) is central; Boethius uses the classical Latin spelling with double 'f', reflecting late antique orthography.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"non solum ... verum etiam","severity":"info","text":"The passage employs a correlative structure (non solum ... verum etiam) to present two reasons for studying definition: convenience and its role in illuminating disputed questions.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"nota quadam in rerum significatione, non aperta declaratione","severity":"info","text":"Boethius distinguishes between words as conventional signs (nota) and open declaration, grounding the necessity of definition in linguistic ambiguity.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"necessarium admodum arbitror nosse quid sit definitio","severity":"info","text":"This passage influenced medieval logical curricula, where Boethius's definition theory was foundational for the study of the ars vetus.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'artecompositæ' may be a scribal conflation of 'arte compositæ'; the reading follows the source edition as given."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":3,"ref":"p3","source":"fastidium.Ac prius ej usdem ipsius,utordinem per praeceptaservarevideamur,definitionisadhibendaestdefinitio Definitio est(utM.Tullius in Topicis ait) oratio quae id quod definit explicat quid sit; hoc ita patet et ita intelligi necesseest,utetinquogeneresitdefinitio declarandum esse videatur,et quid comprehendat, et quemadmodum perfectae eadem definitio definita est. Nomina vel voces interdum res significant,interdum facta,interdum singula dicta,interdum orationes,et quanquam his omnibus factis ac dictis et orationibus genus videatur esse quod dicimus, res tamen proprio nomine et certa significatione aliud esse videtur quam factum est,aliud quam dictum, singulare atque unicum aliud quam oratio. Ergo definitionon facti vox est,non rei alicujus aut corporalis, aut incorporalis, sed est oratio. Etenim talis dictio quae exprimit quid sit id de quo quserttur,sine dubio appellatur oratio, ut oratio eat exordium, et narratio,et cætera quæ partes orationis esse dicimus. Ita ergo et.detinitio oratio est.","english":"discussion. And first, so that we may seem to preserve the order by the precepts of the same [art], a definition of definition itself must be employed. Definition is (as Marcus Tullius says in the *Topics*) a speech which explains what that which it defines is. This is so clear and must be understood in such a way that it seems to be declared in what genus the definition is, and what it comprehends, and in what manner the same definition is itself defined as perfect. Names or words sometimes signify things, sometimes deeds, sometimes individual utterances, sometimes speeches; and although in all these deeds and utterances and speeches there seems to be a genus which we call 'thing', nevertheless a thing by its own name and certain signification appears to be one thing from what is done, another from what is said, and a singular and unique thing another from speech. Therefore definition is not the word of a deed, nor of some thing either corporeal or incorporeal, but it is a speech. For such a diction which expresses what that which is being inquired about is, is without doubt called a speech, just as a speech is an exordium, and a narration, and the other things which we call parts of a speech. Thus, therefore, definition is a speech.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"fastidium","severity":"info","text":"The Latin 'fastidium' (disgust, weariness) is a textual crux; the English draft omits it, but it likely concludes the previous sentence's thought about the necessity of definition before dispute.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"definitio","severity":"info","text":"Boethius defines 'definitio' as a speech (oratio) that explains what something is, citing Cicero's 'Topica'. This is a standard logical definition, but Boethius emphasizes its genus as oratio, not a thing or deed.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero Topica"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"M. Tullius in Topicis","severity":"info","text":"Cicero's 'Topica' (44 BCE) is a key source for Boethius' logical terminology. The definition of definition as 'oratio quae id quod definit explicat quid sit' is a direct borrowing from Cicero's work.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero 44 BCE"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Ac prius ... definitionis adhibenda est definitio","severity":"info","text":"Boethius signals a meta-definitional move: before defining other things, one must define definition itself. This reflects the treatise's pedagogical structure, following the order of precepts.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"oratio","severity":"info","text":"Boethius' classification of definition as a type of 'oratio' (speech) influenced medieval logic, where definition was treated as a linguistic entity distinct from things or concepts.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"fastidium","severity":"caution","text":"The word 'fastidium' at the start of the Latin passage is likely a scribal error or a misreading; it does not fit the context of logical definition. The English draft omits it, which is a plausible editorial decision.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The word 'fastidium' is unclear; it may be a corruption or a misplaced term. The reading adopted omits it as extraneous.","The phrase 'ut ordinem per praecepta servare videamur' could be read as 'so that we may seem to preserve the order by the precepts' or 'so that we may seem to preserve the order through the precepts'; the English draft takes the former."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":4,"ref":"p4","source":"Sed quoniam hoc generale nomen est quod, uti diximus, convenit etiam expositioni, narrationi, invocationi, precationi, caeterisque singulisquse utique orationes esse dicuntur, ut id quod generaliter appositum est, possit ad id deduci de quo quaeritur,adjecta est species.Quaerebamus enim quidessetdefinitio,adquamrem declarandam MTullius adjecit, quae id quod definit explicat quid sit,talis oratio non nisi definitio est.Nam narratio oratio quidem est quae non explicat quod definit, sed quod gestum est, et item alias singulae orationes in suis offiCIis actionibusque constitutæ aliud sunt quam ista oratio quae id quod definit explicat quid sit,ita adjecta est species,ut cum genus supra sit oratio, species sit quae id quod definit. Postremo tamen adjunctum sit quo certius id et quo magis proprium declaret quod dictum est,explicat quid sit. Sunt enim aliae orationes quæ explicant magis quale quid sit,aut quantum sit. At vero hæc nihil horum, sed tantum quid sit explicat, diversa est enim in ista partitione cognitio, quippe cum aliud est scire quale sit, et quid sit explicare, hoc enim in percipienda rei substantiacontinetur,illud in qualitate noscenda, et haec quidem Ciceronis sit adhibita definitio. Nos tamen apertius idipsum quid sit definitio nostra explanatione faciamus.","english":"But since this is a general term which, as we have said, also applies to exposition, narration, invocation, supplication, and each of the other things that are called speeches, so that what has been set down generally may be brought to that which is being inquired about, a species has been added. For we were asking what definition is, and to declare this matter Marcus Tullius added that such a speech as explains what the thing being defined is, is nothing other than a definition. For narration is indeed a speech, but it does not explain what is being defined, but rather what was done; and likewise each of the other speeches, constituted in their own functions and actions, are something other than that speech which explains what the thing being defined is. Thus a species has been added, so that, while the genus above is speech, the species is that which [explains] what is being defined. Finally, however, that has been added which declares more certainly and more properly what has been said: \"explains what it is.\" For there are other speeches which explain more what sort of thing something is, or how much it is. But this one does none of these things; it only explains what it is. For the knowledge in this division is different, since it is one thing to know what sort of thing something is, and another to explain what it is; for the latter is contained in perceiving the substance of the thing, the former in knowing its quality. And this indeed is the definition employed by Cicero. Yet let us make clearer, by our own explanation, what definition itself is.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"explicat quid sit","severity":"info","text":"Boethius treats the phrase 'explicat quid sit' as the specific differentia that narrows the genus 'oratio' to the species 'definitio'. This technical usage distinguishes definition from other speech acts.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Marcus Tullius","severity":"info","text":"Boethius refers to Cicero's *Topica* as the source for the definition of definition. Cicero's work was a key conduit of Aristotelian dialectic in the Latin tradition.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero 44 BCE"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"genus ... species","severity":"info","text":"Boethius here applies the Porphyrian tree (genus-species-differentia) to the definition itself: 'oratio' is the genus, 'explicat quid sit' the differentia, and 'definitio' the species. This meta-definitional move is characteristic of his logical method.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"substantia","severity":"info","text":"Boethius contrasts 'quid sit' (substance) with 'quale sit' (quality), aligning definition with the perception of a thing's substance. This reflects the Aristotelian distinction between essence and accident.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"nostra explanatione","severity":"info","text":"Boethius signals his own contribution by promising a clearer explanation of definition, distinguishing his treatment from Cicero's. This self-referential move is typical of his pedagogical style.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Latin 'explicat quid sit' could be read as 'explains what it is' or 'explains what the thing is'; the translation follows the former, but the sense is identical.","The phrase 'adjecta est species' is ambiguous: it could mean 'a species has been added' or 'the species has been added'; the translation adopts the former as more natural."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":5,"ref":"p5","source":"Omne quod demoustratur oratione, aut an sit, aut quid sit,aut quale sitostenditur,quod cum adhibetur,oratio ad declarationem rei alicujus an sit non est definitio. Item cum quale sit aliquid oratione monstratur,pari modo definitio non erit.Cum vero quid sit ostenditur,quod medium est inter an sit, et quale sit,ita scilicet medium ut an sit nulla jam sit dubitatio, item quale sit, non ejus qui requirit, sed qui definit sit in scientia collocatum: medium,inquam,hoc genus quod ostendit idipsum de quo quaeritur quid sit, definitio nuncupatur. Omnis definitio in quaestione rem habet incertam. Omnisres,si certa est, definitione non eget; si incerta est, neque res est, etquaeritdefinitione monstrari. Omnis enim res si modo jam res est, quemadmodum diximus,certa est. Cum vero jam certa est, et qualitates suas babeat quibus cum facile comprehenditur, facile quid sit agnoscitur. Nunquam enim quid sit intelligi potest, nisi qualesit fuerit comprehensum. Omnis diffinitio aut probanda':) rei causa, aut,si res in quæstione versatur, augendae, aut si vel apud adversarium vel apud auditorem quaelibet jam nota res est, confirmandae assumitur. Nihilominus tamen diffinitio,ut res eadem quæ nota est, et certa et fixa, teneatur, adhibetur.Omnis diflinitio, aut rhetorica est oratio,. aut dialectica.","english":"Everything that is demonstrated by speech is shown either to exist, or what it is, or what it is like. When this is employed, speech concerning whether something exists is not a definition. Likewise, when what something is like is shown by speech, in a similar way it will not be a definition. But when what it is is shown—which is the middle between whether it exists and what it is like, that is to say, a middle such that there is no longer any doubt about whether it exists, and likewise what it is like is placed in the knowledge not of the one who asks but of the one who defines—this kind, I say, which shows the very thing about which it is asked what it is, is called a definition. Every definition has an uncertain thing in the question. Every thing, if it is certain, does not need a definition; if it is uncertain, it is not a thing, and it seeks to be shown by a definition. For every thing, if it is already a thing, as we have said, is certain. But when it is already certain, and has its qualities by which it is easily grasped, what it is is easily recognized. For what it is can never be understood unless what it is like has been grasped. Every definition is assumed either to prove the cause of a thing, or, if the thing is in question, to augment it, or, if the thing is already known to either an opponent or a listener, to confirm it. Nevertheless, a definition is also employed so that the same thing, which is known and certain and fixed, may be held. Every definition is either a rhetorical speech or a dialectical one.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"medium","severity":"info","text":"The passage presents a tripartite scheme (an sit, quid sit, quale sit) as the framework for distinguishing definition from other forms of speech. This logical division is central to Boethius' method.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"diffinitio","severity":"info","text":"The Latin diffinitio (here spelled diffinitio) is the standard term for 'definition' in Boethius, derived from Cicero's rhetorical tradition. The text consistently uses this spelling.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"rhetorica ... dialectica","severity":"info","text":"The closing distinction between rhetorical and dialectical definition reflects the ancient division of arts. Boethius follows Cicero and Aristotle in treating definition as a tool common to both disciplines.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"probanda':) rei causa","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text at this point is corrupt: 'probanda':) rei causa' likely results from a scribal error or misreading. The intended reading is probably 'probandae rei causa' (for proving the cause of a thing).","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"Omnis diffinitio ... aut rhetorica est oratio, aut dialectica","severity":"info","text":"This concluding sentence classifies all definitions as either rhetorical or dialectical, a binary that Boethius inherits from the Latin rhetorical tradition and that shapes his treatment of definition throughout the work.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'probanda':) rei causa' is corrupt; the intended reading is uncertain but likely 'probandae rei causa'.","The exact source of the tripartite scheme (an sit, quid sit, quale sit) is not explicitly cited; it may derive from Aristotle or Cicero."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":6,"ref":"p6","source":"Si est rhetorica, originem ex conten- \" tione suscipiens per rei de qua quaeritur partes in suas se dividet,necin uniustractatuasuis rebus tota consistet, ut cum uniuscujusque rei plena et certa perfectio nota sit, cunctas per partes sibi eamdem distribuant dicta certantium.Sepulturæ violationem rem etiam certam plenamque et perfectam retinemus cum in eruto sepulcro est etiam animus et factum violantis, ut studio eruendiet profanandi manes hoc quispiam videatur aggressus.Ergo, uti diximus, violatio sepulturae constat et animo et facto, plenaque ipso res est violati sepulcri ex his duobus, aperuit sepulcrum quidam ut auferretornamenta.Idem sepulcri violati reus in judicium devocatur, sine dubio diffinitivam orationemetcontentionem exprimentem quid sit violatio se pulturæ necessario causa desiderat; sed singulis partibus totius facti ac pleni utuntur oratores, ut sepulturae violationem ponat unus quod apertum sit sepulcrum, conlraalius sepulturae violationem dicat in anirr.o contineri:itaexistitdiffinitivae orationis iste traclatus, ut cum totum quod agnoscitur in sepulturae violatione, per partes suas fuerit distributum, easque partes oratores singuli tenuerin t,conlendendi genere diffinitione uti videntur.","english":"If rhetoric exists, it takes its origin from contention, dividing itself through the parts of the matter under inquiry, and does not consist entirely in a single treatment of its own subjects, so that when the full and certain perfection of each thing is known, the statements of the disputants distribute that same thing among themselves through its parts. We retain the violation of a tomb as a certain, full, and perfect thing even when the tomb has been opened, and also the intent and the deed of the violator, so that someone may seem to have undertaken this with the purpose of digging up and profaning the shades. Therefore, as we have said, the violation of a tomb consists both in intent and in deed, and the thing itself of the violated tomb is full from these two: someone opened a tomb in order to remove ornaments. The same person is summoned to judgment as defendant for the violated tomb; without doubt, the cause necessarily requires a definitive speech and contention expressing what the violation of a tomb is; but orators use the individual parts of the whole and full deed, so that one may posit the violation of a tomb as that the tomb was opened, while another says that the violation of a tomb is contained in the intent. Thus this treatment of definitive speech arises, so that when the whole that is recognized in the violation of a tomb has been distributed through its parts, and the individual orators have held those parts, they seem to use definition in the genus of contention.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"originem ex contentione suscipiens","severity":"info","text":"Boethius describes rhetoric as originating from contention, aligning with the adversarial context of forensic oratory where definition is contested between opposing parties.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"diffinitivam orationem","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'diffinitivam orationem' (definitive speech) refers to a speech that defines the essence of an act, here the violation of a tomb, central to the rhetorical genus of definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"sepulturae violationem","severity":"info","text":"Violation of a tomb (sepulturae violatio) was a specific crime in Roman law, often involving theft of grave goods, and served as a standard example in rhetorical exercises on definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"per partes suas fuerit distributum","severity":"info","text":"Boethius structures the argument by dividing the whole crime into its parts (intent and deed), a method typical of rhetorical definition that allows each side to claim a different part.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"animo et facto","severity":"info","text":"The distinction between intent (animus) and deed (factum) echoes Cicero's 'De Inventione' 1.11, where both are required for a complete definition of an act.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero De Inventione"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"in eruto sepulcro","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin 'in eruto sepulcro' (in the opened tomb) may be a textual corruption; the expected phrase would be 'in sepulcro eruto' (in the violated tomb), but the sense remains clear.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'in eruto sepulcro' could be read as 'in the opened tomb' or 'in the violated tomb', but the context supports the latter.","The exact source of the legal example (violation of a tomb) is not specified; it may derive from Roman rhetorical handbooks."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":7,"ref":"p7","source":"Sed pon recte dicitur hujusmodi diffinitio, cum non sit certa, non plena, non integra, nisi cum totum quidquid ipsius rei est de qua quaeritur exprimens quid sit oratio declararit, verum haec captiosaet falsaest; non certa rhetorum diffinitio. Est alia etiam quae rhetoribus accommodata cognoscitur, quae longe a virtuteditfiniendi plenissimeseparatur,quae percollationem non quid sitostendit, sed hæc esse a simili, cum aliud sit, oratione concludit, ut cum quaeritur quid sit accipere utique re propria, vera, certa,nibil aJ iud est nisi propria manu aliquid ab aliquo oblatum sumere. Per collationem M. Tullius definit pecunias accepisse Verrem, cum comites, socii ministrique pecunias acceperint. Comites illi, inquit. tui manus erant tuae.ltem in alio exemplo cum quaeritur quid sit iuimicus,dicirnus inimicum esse eum qui aliquid mali molitus sit; ac Cicero collatione utens dicit: Inimicus est qui facit contra omnium rem,voluntatem,honorem,dignitalem.Ex quibus colligimus hujusmodi diffinitiones contentioni oratorum maxime convenire, longe tamen a virtute diffinitionis esse discretas; sed hae diffinitiones quae oratoribus aptae sunt et poetis sui explicatione in oratione certum ordinem continent. De qua re praecepta in Rhetoricis sunt a M.","english":"But such a definition is not correctly given, since it is not certain, not full, not complete, unless it declares what the speech is by expressing the whole of whatever belongs to the thing under inquiry; indeed, this is captious and false, not a certain definition of rhetoricians. There is also another kind known to be suited to rhetoricians, which is far removed from the full virtue of defining, which through comparison does not show what something is, but concludes that it is like something else, when it is different, as when it is asked what \"to receive\" is—certainly, properly, truly, certainly, it is nothing other than to take something offered by someone with one's own hand. By comparison, M. Tullius defines Verres to have received money when his companions, allies, and attendants received money. \"Those companions,\" he says, \"were your hands.\" Likewise in another example, when it is asked what an enemy is, we say that an enemy is one who has plotted some evil; and Cicero, using comparison, says: \"An enemy is one who acts against everyone's interest, will, honor, and dignity.\" From these we gather that definitions of this kind are especially suitable for the contention of orators, yet are far removed from the virtue of defining; but these definitions, which are suited to orators and poets, contain a certain order in their explanation within speech. Concerning this matter, precepts are given in the Rhetorics by M.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"per collationem","severity":"info","text":"Boethius distinguishes definition by comparison (per collationem) from true definition, noting it shows what something is like, not what it is. This aligns with rhetorical practice, as illustrated by Cicero's examples.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"diffinitio","severity":"info","text":"The Latin diffinitio (definition) is a key term in Boethius's logical works, here critiqued for rhetorical usage. The passage contrasts certain, full definitions with those used in oratory, which are captious or comparative.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"M. Tullius","severity":"info","text":"M. Tullius refers to Marcus Tullius Cicero, whose rhetorical works (e.g., De Inventione) and speeches (e.g., In Verrem) provide the examples of definition by comparison. Boethius draws on Cicero's authority in Latin rhetorical tradition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the narrative classification from the previous passage, moving from general critique of rhetorical definition to specific examples (Verres, enemy) and concluding that such definitions suit orators but lack the virtue of true definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius's treatment of definition by comparison influenced medieval logic and rhetoric, particularly in discussions of dialectical vs. rhetorical methods. The reference to precepts in Rhetoricis likely points to Cicero's De Inventione or Boethius's own commentaries.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'nibil aJ iud est' appears corrupt; likely intended as 'nihil aliud est' (nothing else is).","The reference to 'Rhetoricis' is ambiguous: it may refer to Cicero's De Inventione or to Boethius's lost commentary on Cicero's Rhetorica."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":8,"ref":"p8","source":"Tullio constituta, ita ul omnis diffinitio, hoc est oratio, quae explicat de quo quaeritur quid sit, his membris partibusque tenetur: primum uti breviter id de quo quæritur quid sit oratio nostra contineat, et haec appellatur diffinitio; deinde ejus diffinitionis supponaturapprobatio,quaillud ostendimus ut idipsum quod breviterindiffinitione posuimus id ita esse argumentorum rationibus approbemus; deinde, tertio loco, inducimus deductionem ejusdem;diffinitionis in eam speciem de qua quæstio est, et de qua judicium est constitutum, ut cum generaliter rem diffinierimus,et ita esse de quo quaeritur dixerimus, et postea per approbationem constituerimus verum esse quod diffinimus, tertio loco ostenderimus hoc esse quod gestum est, vel id esse de quo quaeritur, quae orationis pars appellatur deductio generis ad speciem;* quarto loco in oratione nostra ponemus destructionem diffinitionis adversae pardis, hoc est, uti quemadmodum adversarii diffinierint idipsum de quo supra diffinitionem constituimus proponamus,eamque adversariorum diftinitionem vitiosam esse doceamus, quemadmodum vitiosa sit postea declarabimus. Habet enim partes suas certas, integras, de quibus nunc dicere supersedemus. Est diffinitio inimicitiarum apud M. Tullium brevis, ita collocata. An tu majores inimicitias putas eSEequam contrarias hominum voluntates,et dissimilia sludia?","english":"established by Cicero, so that every definition—that is, a speech which explains what the thing under inquiry is—is held together by these members and parts: first, that our speech briefly contain that of which it is asked what it is, and this is called the definition; then, a confirmation of that definition is subjoined, by which we show that what we have briefly placed in the definition is indeed so, by means of arguments and reasons; then, in the third place, we introduce a deduction of the same definition into the particular species about which the question is and about which the judgment has been established, so that when we have defined the thing generally, and have said that it is so concerning what is asked, and afterwards through confirmation have established that what we define is true, in the third place we show that this is what has been done, or that this is what is being asked about, which part of the speech is called the deduction from genus to species; in the fourth place in our speech we will place a destruction of the definition of the opposing side, that is, so that just as the adversaries have defined the very thing about which we have established a definition above, we propose it, and we teach that the adversaries' definition is faulty, as we will later declare how it is faulty. For it has its own certain and complete parts, about which we now refrain from speaking. There is a definition of enmities in Marcus Tullius, brief, arranged thus: \"Do you think there are greater enmities than contrary wills of men and dissimilar pursuits?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Tullio constituta","severity":"info","text":"The passage presents Cicero's four-part structure of definition: definition, confirmation, deduction from genus to species, and destruction of the opposing definition. This is a rhetorical framework distinct from Boethius' own logical approach.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"deductio generis ad speciem","severity":"info","text":"This phrase denotes the third part of Cicero's definitional procedure, where the general definition is applied to the specific case at hand. It is a key term in rhetorical invention.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"destructio diffinitionis adversae partis","severity":"info","text":"This is the fourth part, where the speaker refutes the opponent's definition. The term reflects the adversarial nature of Ciceronian rhetoric.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"M. Tullium","severity":"info","text":"The reference is to Marcus Tullius Cicero, whose rhetorical works (especially De Inventione) are the source of this four-part definitional scheme. Boethius is transmitting Ciceronian doctrine.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"An tu majores inimicitias putas esse quam contrarias hominum voluntates, et dissimilia studia?","severity":"info","text":"This example of a definition of enmities is likely drawn from Cicero's speeches or rhetorical works. It illustrates the application of the definitional scheme to a concrete case.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ul omnis diffinitio","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text has 'ul' which is likely a scribal error for 'ut'. The sense requires 'ut' ('so that'). The English draft follows the corrected reading.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'ul omnis diffinitio' is corrupt; the reading 'ut omnis diffinitio' is adopted. The source of the Cicero quotation is not identified in the text."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":9,"ref":"p9","source":"hæc, ut diximus, diffinitio rhetorica est, et breviter oratio conclusa quid sint inimicitiae. Post quam diffinitionern adbibelur approbatio. Fidem ac religionemsanctissimamin vita qui putat, potestne ei non inimicus esse qui fana spoliaverit omnia? Deinceps reliqua quæ sequuntur, in quo quidem animadvertere illud licet,possc conjungi etapprobationem diffinitionis,el ded uctionem diffinitionis inspeciem.NainquehicMarcusTulliusinimicitiasesse contrariastudiaetdissimiles voluntates approbatita ut speciem ipsam de qua quærebatur factam verbis includat: potuit enim approbatiofieri, illas esse ini. micitias quæ contrarias continent voluntates, et in rationibus supponendis talis dictio componi,cum fidem alius servet,infidelis sit alius. Nulla dubitatio est quin tali animo prout inter seaffectiinimiciesse credantur. Item religioso viro irreligiosus inimicus est. Alia ergo si ex diversis studiis et voluntatibus supposita dicerentur, sola esset approbatio, non etiam deductio generis in speciem; at cum nunc ita nectitur dictio, fidem sanctissimam in vita qui putat, religionem colendam esse existimatis, sine dubio inimicus est ei quifanaspoJiavit, omnia templa violavit, delubra polluit.","english":"This, as we have said, is a rhetorical definition, and a brief speech concluding what enmities are. After this definition, an approval is applied. He who considers faith and religion most sacred in life, can he not be an enemy to him who has plundered all shrines? Then the remaining things which follow, in which indeed it is permitted to observe that both the approval of the definition and the deduction of the definition into a species can be conjoined. For here Marcus Tullius approves that enmities are contrary pursuits and dissimilar wills in such a way that he includes in words the very species about which the inquiry was made: for the approval could have been made that those are enmities which contain contrary wills, and in the underlying arguments such a statement could be composed, when one person preserves faith, another is faithless. There is no doubt that those who are so disposed in spirit towards each other are believed to be enemies. Likewise, an irreligious man is an enemy to a religious man. Therefore, if other things were posited from diverse pursuits and wills, it would be only an approval, not also a deduction of the genus into a species; but since now the statement is so woven, he who considers faith most sacred in life, who deems religion to be cultivated, is without doubt an enemy to him who has plundered shrines, violated all temples, defiled sanctuaries.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"approbatio","severity":"info","text":"The Latin 'approbatio' is rendered 'approval' but in rhetorical contexts it often means 'confirmation' or 'proof' of a definition, as Boethius uses it here to denote the second part of a rhetorical definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"deductio diffinitionis in speciem","severity":"info","text":"Boethius distinguishes between a mere 'approbatio' (confirmation) and a 'deductio diffinitionis in speciem' (deduction of the definition into a species), where the latter incorporates the specific instance into the definition itself, as Cicero does with enmities.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Marcus Tullius","severity":"info","text":"Boethius refers to Cicero's rhetorical works, likely the 'De Inventione' or 'Topica', where Cicero discusses definition and its parts. The example of enmities as contrary pursuits and dissimilar wills is drawn from Cicero's own rhetorical practice.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"fidem ac religionem sanctissimam","severity":"info","text":"Boethius uses a Ciceronian example contrasting a religious man with one who plunders shrines, illustrating how a definition of enmities can be applied to a specific species (religious vs. irreligious).","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"adbibelur","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin 'adbibelur' is a scribal error or variant for 'adhibetur' (is applied). The text is otherwise sound, but this minor corruption may cause confusion in reading.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The exact source of Cicero's example (which work) is not specified by Boethius.","The phrase 'fidem ac religionem sanctissimam' may be a paraphrase rather than a direct quotation."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":10,"ref":"p10","source":"Hic etiam Verris idem factum de quo quaeritur ita specialiter continetur et includitur, utsimul cum approbatione et deductione generis in speciem clausum teneatur; post adjungitur, utdiximus,destructio diffinitionisadversaspartis, sed per concessionem, id est similium, an si contra rem meam fecisset injuriam aliquis, jure ei me inimicum esse profiterer?Ponamus igitur adversas partis diffinitionem talem: Inimicitiae sunt, cum contra rem meam aut fecit aliquis, aut dixit injuriam. Hanc diffinitionem sic deslruit M. Tullius, ut concesso eo quod ita estdiffinitum, nihilominus et alio modo sint in:micitiæ,cum aliquis faciat contra omnium rem,honorem et dignitatem. Talis igitur semper circa rhetoricam diffinitionem per membra quatuor testetur oratio: ut sit diffinitio, approbatio diffinitiones,ded uctio definitionis ad speciem,deinde postremadestruclio diffinitionis partis adversae; sed haec apta rhetoricis, nonetiam philosophis esse videtur. Illa autem quas philosophorum propria est, etiam oratoribus convenit eamque sibi, et ad materiam suam, et ad proprise ornamentum dictionis, adjungit orator. Omnia enim recte oratorexprimit quae sunt in dicendo philosophorum. Nam et vero utitur argumento, quod est philosophorum proprium, utitur etiam necessario.","english":"Here also the same deed of Verres, about which the inquiry is made, is so specifically contained and included that it is held enclosed together with the approval and the deduction of the genus into the species; afterwards, as we have said, the destruction of the definition of the opposing side is added, but through concession, that is, of similar things, as if someone had done an injury against my property, would I not rightly profess myself his enemy? Let us therefore posit such a definition of the opposing side: Enmities are when someone has either done or spoken an injury against my property. This definition Marcus Tullius destroys in such a way that, conceding that it is defined thus, nevertheless enmities also exist in another way, when someone acts against the property, honor, and dignity of all. Therefore, such speech always testifies about the rhetorical definition through four members: that there be a definition, an approval of the definition, a deduction of the definition to the species, and finally a destruction of the definition of the opposing side; but this seems suitable for rhetoricians, not also for philosophers. That definition, however, which is proper to philosophers, also suits orators, and the orator joins it to himself both for his subject matter and for the ornament of his own diction. For the orator rightly expresses everything that is in the speaking of philosophers. For he also uses the true argument, which is proper to philosophers, and he also uses the necessary.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"quatuor membra","severity":"info","text":"The passage outlines a four-part structure for rhetorical definition: definition, approval, deduction to species, and destruction of the opposing definition. This schema is presented as proper to rhetoric, not philosophy.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"destructio diffinitionis","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'destructio diffinitionis' refers to the refutation of the opponent's definition, here achieved by concession (per concessionem), i.e., accepting the opponent's definition but showing it incomplete.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Verris","severity":"info","text":"The reference to Verres alludes to Cicero's speeches against him (In Verrem), where Cicero used rhetorical definition to argue that enmity extends beyond personal injury to crimes against the state and religion.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"rhetoricam diffinitionem","severity":"info","text":"Boethius distinguishes rhetorical from philosophical definition, a distinction found in Cicero (De Oratore) and later in the rhetorical tradition. The orator uses both true and necessary arguments, the latter proper to philosophy.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"philosophorum propria","severity":"info","text":"Boethius asserts that philosophical definition, though proper to philosophers, is also used by orators. This reflects the late antique synthesis of rhetoric and philosophy, influential in medieval arts curricula.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Latin 'similium' (genitive plural) is ambiguous: it may mean 'of similar things' (as translated) or 'of similar persons'; the context of concession suggests the former."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":11,"ref":"p11","source":"At contra pbilosophus in disputationibus propriis rhetorum cuncta condemnat, neque enim adjungitaliquando signum, neque quod credibile dicitur, et omne probabile penitus a virtute sui sermonis excludit. Ergo diffinitio quæ est philosophorum propria in rebus exprimendis quæ explicat quid sit, quale sit, quemadmodum membris suis constare debeat, exponemus. Diffinitiones esse principia disputandi et supra diximus, et M. Tullius probat, tum in dialogis omnibus, tum etiam in eo libro qui Topica inscribitur, in quo docet primum argumentorum locum esse diffinitionem, hoc est, a toto, cui loco qui appellatur a toto necessario adhibenda est diffinitio, ut ita argumentilocusatoto sit diffinitio. Porro, ut supra diximus, explicandi argumenti quod a toto est dicitur diffinitio. Ergo praeceptis et dialecticorum philosorhorumque omnium illud tenere debemus, non esse diffinitionem, nisi solam quae in ea re quam definire volumus, prius quam ejus rei esse intelligimus, declaret atque ostendat substantiam. Hoc ut apertius fiat, docebimus nullam esse diffinitionem certam, integram,apprubandam, nisi eam quam di cunt philosophi substantialem, Græce appellatur. Quid autem subslantiale sit, alibi explicandum.","english":"On the other hand, the philosopher in his own disputations condemns all the devices of the rhetoricians; for he never adjoins a sign, nor what is called credible, and he entirely excludes every probable thing from the virtue of his own speech. Therefore, we will set forth the definition which is proper to philosophers in expressing things, which explains what it is, what sort it is, and how it ought to consist of its own parts. Definitions are the principles of disputing, as we have said above, and Marcus Tullius proves this, both in all his dialogues and also in that book which is entitled *Topica*, in which he teaches that the first place of arguments is definition, that is, from the whole, to which place, which is called from the whole, definition must necessarily be applied, so that the argumentative place from the whole is definition. Moreover, as we have said above, the explanation of an argument which is from the whole is called definition. Therefore, by the precepts of the dialecticians and all philosophers, we ought to hold that there is no definition except the one which, in that thing which we wish to define, before we understand the being of that thing, declares and shows its substance. So that this may become clearer, we will teach that there is no certain, complete, and approved definition except the one which the philosophers call substantial, which is called in Greek. But what substantial is, must be explained elsewhere.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"At contra philosophus in disputationibus propriis rhetorum cuncta condemnat","severity":"info","text":"Boethius contrasts philosophical method with rhetorical devices (signum, credibile, probabile), aligning with the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition that philosophy seeks necessary truth, not persuasion.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"diffinitio","severity":"info","text":"Diffinitio (definition) is presented as the first place of argument (a toto), following Cicero's Topica. Boethius insists that only substantial definition (substantialem) is valid, echoing Aristotelian essentialism.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"M. Tullius probat, tum in dialogis omnibus, tum etiam in eo libro qui Topica inscribitur","severity":"info","text":"Boethius cites Cicero's Topica as authority for definition as the first argumentative locus. Cicero's work was a key source for Latin dialectic, mediating Greek (Aristotelian) topics to the Latin tradition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Ergo diffinitio ... exponemus","severity":"info","text":"This passage marks a transition: after criticizing rhetoric, Boethius announces he will expound the philosophical definition, setting up the subsequent technical discussion of definition types.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"Græce appellatur","severity":"info","text":"The Greek term for substantial definition is omitted in the Latin text, likely a lacuna in transmission. Medieval readers would have supplied the Greek (e.g., ousiōdēs) from context.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"Quid autem substantiale sit, alibi explicandum","severity":"caution","text":"Boethius defers explanation of 'substantial' to another work, but no such separate treatise is extant. This may refer to a lost portion of the Liber De Diffinitione or a different commentary.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Greek term for 'substantial definition' is missing from the Latin text; the reading assumes a lacuna.","The phrase 'alibi explicandum' is ambiguous: it may refer to a lost work or a later section of the same treatise."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":12,"ref":"p12","source":"Ad cognitionem interim illud accedat, quoties de aliquo quaeritur quid sit, tunc posse esse certam ac substantialem diffinitionem, quoties ejus rei de qua quaeritur, ut diximus, genus ponimus,et inde caetera per differentias in oratione subjungimus. Non alienum videtur exemplum ponere, et sic ad reliqua quae sunt obscura transire. Quaeritur homo quid sit, huic utique genus est animal. Cum igitur in diffinitione quae explicabo quid sit homo, animal dixero, ac deinde reliqua connectam, erit substantialis diffinitio. Substantiam enim bominis declaravi cum dixi animal. Item cum quaero quid sit album aut nigrum, si dixero album est color, quia color genus est ad hoc de quo quaero, album velnigrum,jam substantialis erit diffinitio quae incipit a genere, et sic caetera connectit. Haec substantialis esse dicetur, et haec propria, et haec integra.Hsec a philosophis probata,itautaliomodo facta diffinitio nunquam essrdicatur; verum a quibusdam hoc nomen eliam ad alia quae alio modo diffiniuntur,sæpe transferlur.Ergo haECsubstantialisdiffinitioaM.Tullio sic explicatur. Oportere nos posito genere ejus rei de qua quæritur, subjungere species,ut alia quæ vicina esse possint discretis communionibus separemus, et tandiu interponamus differentias, quandiu ad proprium ejus de quo quaeritursignata ejus expressioneveniamus. Ipse in Topicis exempla subjecit.","english":"Let it meanwhile be added to our understanding that whenever something is asked about what it is, then there can be a certain and substantial definition, whenever we posit the genus of that thing about which the question is asked, as we have said, and then join the rest through differences in the discourse. It does not seem out of place to give an example, and thus to pass on to the remaining matters which are obscure. It is asked what man is; for this, the genus is certainly animal. Therefore, when in the definition which I shall unfold of what man is, I have said \"animal,\" and then connect the rest, it will be a substantial definition. For I have declared the substance of man when I said \"animal.\" Likewise, when I ask what white or black is, if I say \"white is a color,\" because color is the genus for that about which I ask, white or black, then it will be a substantial definition which begins from the genus, and thus connects the rest. This will be called substantial, and this proper, and this complete. This is approved by the philosophers, so that a definition made in any other way is never called such; but by some this name is often transferred also to other things which are defined in another way. Therefore this substantial definition is explained by M. Tullius thus: that we ought, having posited the genus of that thing about which the question is asked, to subjoin the species, so that we may separate other things which might be near by common distinctions, and we interpose differences until we come to a designated expression of its own proper thing about which the question is asked. He himself subjoined examples in the *Topica*.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"substantialis diffinitio","severity":"info","text":"Boethius distinguishes a 'substantial definition' as one that proceeds from genus and differentiae, revealing the substance of the thing. This is the only kind he considers proper to philosophy.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"diffinitio","severity":"info","text":"The Latin 'diffinitio' (here spelled with 'ff') is the standard term for 'definition' in Boethius's logical works, derived from Greek 'horismos'. The spelling varies in manuscripts.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"M. Tullius","severity":"info","text":"Boethius cites Cicero (M. Tullius) as an authority on definition, referring to his 'Topica'. Cicero's work was a key source for Latin rhetorical and logical theory.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero Topica"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage forms a narrative unit that explains the method of substantial definition, provides examples (man, white/black), and then cites Cicero's formulation, linking theory to authority.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius's emphasis on genus-differentia definition became foundational for medieval scholastic logic, influencing thinkers like Peter Abelard and Thomas Aquinas.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"essrdicatur","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin 'essrdicatur' is a corruption; the intended word is likely 'esse dicitur' or 'esset dicatur'. The English draft follows the sense of the passage.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'essrdicatur' is a scribal error; the reading adopted is 'esse dicitur' (is said to be).","The reference to 'species' in Cicero's formulation may be a loose use; Boethius elsewhere insists on differentiae, not species, after the genus."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":13,"ref":"p13","source":"Nos vero ne fiat in exemplis lectori ex jure confusio, noc proponamus exemplum: homo est animal rationale, mortale, terrenum, bipes, risus capax. Animal cum dictum est substantia hominis declarata est. Est enim,ut supra diximus,ad hominem genus animal, omne autem genus speciei suae substantialis est declaratio; sed bic animal quia late palebat, abjecta species est terrenum, jam exclusum est, quod aut aereum est, aut humidum. Bipes vero. propter alia animalia positum est quae plurimis pedibus innituntur. Item rationale propter illa quae ratione egent. Mortale autem propter id quod Deus est. Quibus omnibus animalibus quas convenire poterant ad superiora ill oratione posita discretis atque seclusis, adjectum est proprium in parte postrema, est enim solum hominis quod ridet. Sic perfecta omni ex parte diffinitio est ad hominem declarandum, cum, positogenere, exclusis omnibus per differentias quae poterant convenire, ad proprietatem ejus de quo quaerebatur pervenit oratio. Atque hoc praeceptum Tullianum est, eousque eum qui diffiniat oratione interponere et adjicere differentias oportere, quousque ad proprietatem quae jam communis esse non possit sermo perveniat. VerumAristotelesdiffinitionem perfectam et plenam ait consistere ex genere det differentiis.","english":"But to prevent confusion for the reader from legal examples, let us propose an example: man is a rational, mortal, earthly, bipedal animal capable of laughter. When \"animal\" is said, the substance of man is declared. For, as we said above, \"animal\" is the genus with respect to man, and every genus is a substantial declaration of its species; but since \"animal\" was too broad, the species \"earthly\" was added, and what is aerial or aquatic is now excluded. \"Bipedal,\" moreover, is posited on account of other animals that rely on many feet. Likewise \"rational\" on account of those lacking reason. \"Mortal,\" however, on account of what is divine. When all the animals that could have been associated with the earlier terms in the statement have been distinguished and excluded, a property is added in the final part, for it is only of man that he laughs. Thus the definition is perfected in every respect for declaring man, when, with the genus posited, after all things that could have been associated have been excluded through differences, the statement arrives at the property of that which was being sought. And this is the precept of Tullius, that the one who defines ought to insert and add differences in the statement until the speech reaches a property that can no longer be common. But Aristotle says that a perfect and complete definition consists of genus and differences.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage provides a worked example of definition by genus and differentiae, following the method attributed to Cicero (Tullius) and then citing Aristotle's view. The example 'man is a rational, mortal, earthly, bipedal animal capable of laughter' is a standard late-antique formula.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"proprium","severity":"info","text":"The Latin 'proprium' (here 'proprietatem') is a technical term in Porphyrian logic, denoting a property that belongs to all and only the members of a species, e.g., the capacity for laughter in humans. It is the final differentia that completes the definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The reference to 'Tullianum praeceptum' points to Cicero's Topica, where a method of definition by successive differentiae is outlined. Boethius here aligns with the Latin rhetorical tradition while also invoking Aristotle's more formal logical definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius's definition of man as 'animal rationale, mortale, terrenum, bipes, risus capax' became a standard example in medieval logic textbooks, transmitted through the logical works of the early scholastic period.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The phrase 'abjecta species est terrenum' is ambiguous: 'abjecta' may mean 'added' or 'thrown in' rather than 'excluded'. The context suggests it means 'added' as a differentia, but the Latin could be misread.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'abjecta species est terrenum' could be interpreted as 'the species earthly is added' or 'the species earthly is excluded'; the context supports the former, but the verb 'abjecta' (from abicio) normally means 'thrown away'."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":14,"ref":"p14","source":"Ex genere etiam et differentiis hoc idem nos supra docuimus, cum interposita species differentia sua alia quæ possunt esse consimilia separaret. Quidam tamen cautiores plenioresque in docendo diffinitionis ipsius quasi quaedam membraconstituunt, dicuntque eam perfectam diffinitionem istam quam appello substantialem ex quinque partibus, id est, genere, specie, differentia, accidenti, proprio, debere consistere. Sed accidens in diffinitione minimum, proprium piurimum valet. Etracte quidem ac vere ista commemorant, nec aliena, aut a principe harum artium Aristotele, aut a M. Tullio qui de istis praeceplatradiderunt judicanda sunt. Constat enim his quinque partibus veluti membris suis integra diffinitio; verum et Aristoteles, in libris quos Topica appellavit, docuit quid genus sit, quid species, quid differentia, quid proprium, et quid accidens, Et plurimi prasterea philosophi libris suiscomplexi harum vim rerum et potentiam declararunt. Nos quia jam uno libro et de his quinque rebus plenis-, sime disputavimus,ne res rei interposita obcuritatem pariat,aut dicta repetamus,lectorem ad librum qui jam scriptus est, si adest ei indigentia, ire volumus, nunc sibi non esse impedimento quod hic praetermissum est, animadvertat.","english":"From genus and also from differences we have taught the same thing above, when an intervening species separated by its own difference other things that could be similar. Yet some, more cautious and more thorough in teaching, establish certain, as it were, members of definition itself, and they say that this perfect definition, which I call substantial, ought to consist of five parts: that is, genus, species, difference, accident, and property. But accident is of least value in definition, property of very great value. And indeed they recall these things correctly and truly, and they are not to be judged as foreign to either the prince of these arts, Aristotle, or to Marcus Tullius, who have handed down precepts concerning these matters. For an entire definition consists of these five parts as its members; indeed, Aristotle, in the books he called the *Topics*, taught what genus is, what species, what difference, what property, and what accident. And many philosophers besides have, in their own books, embraced and declared the force and power of these things. Since we have already, in one book, most fully disputed concerning these five things, lest the interposition of one thing upon another produce obscurity, or we repeat what has been said, we wish the reader, if he has need, to go to the book that has already been written; let him note that it is not an impediment here that this has been omitted.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius distinguishes a 'perfect' or 'substantial' definition composed of five parts: genus, species, difference, accident, and property. He notes that accident contributes least and property most to definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"proprium","severity":"info","text":"The Latin 'proprium' (property) is a technical term from Aristotelian logic, denoting a non-essential attribute that belongs uniquely to a species, e.g., the capacity for laughter in humans.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius refers to Aristotle's 'Topics' as the source for the five predicables (genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens). This work was foundational for Latin medieval logic.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Marcus Tullius Cicero is cited as a Latin authority on definition. His 'Topica' adapted Aristotelian topics for Roman orators, and Boethius here aligns with that tradition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius directs readers to his own earlier work on the five predicables, likely the 'De divisione' or 'In Isagogen Porphyrii', to avoid repetition. This shows his systematic pedagogical method.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin 'piurimum' is a scribal error for 'plurimum' (very great). The English draft correctly renders it as 'very great value'.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'ex genere etiam et differentiis' could refer to a prior discussion in this work or to a lost earlier treatise; the reading taken is that it refers to the preceding passage.","The identity of the 'quidam cautiores plenioresque' is unspecified; they are likely unnamed commentators or teachers of logic."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":15,"ref":"p15","source":"Id enim etiam illis omnibus cognitis ex praeceptorumneccessitate retinebit.En oratione ista substantiali tandiu interponere debemus species et differentias quandiu seclusis omnibus quas hoc idem esse possunt,eo perveniatur,ut proprietas jam certa teneatur. M. Tullius in Topicis jus civile voluit diffinire, et, ut oportuit, ccepit a genere: dixit enim in principio, Jus civile est æquitas,hoc juris genus est.Sed quoniam eadem sequitas nunc constituta est.nuncuaturalis, jus autem civile aequitas est ab hominibus instituta, ideo adjecit, Jus civile est aequitas constituta.Posito genere,adjecta specie speciem aliam separavit, scilicet naturalem. Sed quoniam etiam jus gentium aequitas constituta est,et non est tamen civile,adjectum id quod separarepotuisset jus gentium: his, inquit M. Tullius, qui ejusdem civitatis sunt. Qua specie interposita, jus civile descripsit. Est etiamnum quod cum altero possit esse commune, hoc ipsum quod supra dictum est universum. Etenim religionum juri et sacrorum omnium convenit.Namque jus religionum aequitas est,et constituta aequitas,et his omnibus qui ejusdem sunt civitatis.Sed illud jus non appellamus esse civile,quod est pontificum, hoc igitur ut posset excludere, et jus civile usquead proprium diffinire,adjecit:ad res suas obtinendas.Demus aliud exemplum in orationibus positum,quo facilius resetmanifestius explicetur.Diffinit M.","english":"For that must be retained by necessity from all those things that have been learned from the precepts. In that substantial speech we ought to interpose species and differences as long as, with all things that can be the same as this one set aside, we arrive at the point where a certain property is held. Marcus Tullius in the *Topics* wished to define civil law, and, as was necessary, he began from a genus: he said at the beginning, \"Civil law is equity,\" this is a genus of law. But since the same equity is now established, now natural, but civil law is equity instituted by men, therefore he added, \"Civil law is established equity.\" With the genus placed, with the species added, he separated another species, namely natural. But since also the law of nations is established equity, and yet is not civil, he added that which could separate the law of nations: \"for those,\" says Marcus Tullius, \"who are of the same state.\" With that species interposed, he described civil law. There is still something that can be common with another, this very thing which was said above, the universal. For it applies to the law of religions and all sacred things. For the law of religions is equity, and established equity, and for all those who are of the same state. But we do not call that law civil, which is of the pontiffs; therefore, so that he could exclude this and define civil law up to its proper, he added: \"for obtaining their own things.\" Let us give another example placed in speeches, by which it may be more easily and more clearly explained. He defines M.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"M. Tullius in Topicis","severity":"info","text":"Boethius refers to Cicero's Topica, a rhetorical work on topics of argument. Cicero's definition of ius civile (civil law) as aequitas constituta (established equity) is a standard example in late antique logical handbooks.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero Topica"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ius civile","severity":"info","text":"Ius civile (civil law) is defined by Cicero as equity established by human institution for citizens of the same state. Boethius uses this example to illustrate definition by genus, species, and difference.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"diffinit M.","severity":"info","text":"The passage breaks off mid-sentence with 'Diffinit M.' (He defines M.), indicating a lacuna or deliberate truncation in the source. The following passage likely continues the example.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"praeceptorumneccessitate","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin 'praeceptorumneccessitate' appears to be a scribal conflation or error for 'praeceptorum necessitate' (necessity of precepts). The English draft reads 'from the precepts' but the syntax is uncertain.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"background","lemma":"jus civile est aequitas constituta","severity":"info","text":"Cicero's definition of civil law as 'established equity' was widely cited in medieval and Renaissance legal and logical texts, often as a model of definition by genus and specific difference.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'praeceptorumneccessitate' may be a scribal error; the intended reading is likely 'praeceptorum necessitate'.","The passage ends abruptly with 'Diffinit M.'; it is unclear whether the text is incomplete or a deliberate break."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":16,"ref":"p16","source":"Tullius quid sit gloria,his ut opinor verbis: Gloria, inquit, est illustris et pervagata recte factorum et præmagnorum,vel in suos cives, vel in rempublicam, vel in omne genus hominum, faruameritorurr.Glonaigitursubstantialiter diffinita est,cum dictum est fama.Est enimgloriae genus farna,quæ quia nunc rerum malarum est, nunc bonarum,idcirco genus est,cui speciesaddita est,illuo stris,quod laus est:fama enim quæ bonarum rerum est, laus est, et illustris. Hac igitur re exclusa est fama deterior:etquoniam haecfamalaudatrix potest nunc pro merito,nunc ultra meritum esse,frequenter enim aliter quam res gestaest,opinio de aliquo emanavit, idcirco inquit fama meritorum, ea sunt enim merito quae cum praestamus mereri nos gloriam faciunt.Ergo Cicero,qui volebat tunc gloriam Caesari dare cum reipublicae præfuisset,idcirco ista facta vel merita generaliter posita divisit in species, et adjunxit,cum in suoscives,tum in rempublicam vel in omne genus hominum,quaescilicet factorum recte species subjectae usqueadproprietatem gloriæ convenire. Habet enim nunc certam et veram proprietatem in partibus gloria.Nam omne quod præstamus,aut quasi debitum damus,aut quasi non debitum, cum recte faciamus, si sola facta sunt quae quasi debita sunt, dicitur illustris fama factorum. Cum autem ultra quod debitum est facimus, praestandi benevolentia et benignitate tribuendi, haec merita nuncupantur.","english":"Cicero, what glory is, in these words, as I think: \"Glory,\" he says, \"is a celebrated and widely spread reputation of right and very great deeds, either towards one's own citizens, or towards the republic, or towards the whole human race, of merits.\" Therefore glory has been substantially defined, when \"reputation\" was said. For reputation is the genus of glory, which, because it is now of bad things, now of good, for that reason is a genus, to which a species has been added, \"celebrated,\" which is praise: for reputation which is of good things is praise, and celebrated. By this, therefore, the worse reputation has been excluded: and since this praising reputation can be now according to merit, now beyond merit (for often an opinion about someone has spread otherwise than the deed was done), for that reason he says \"reputation of merits,\" for those are merits which, when we perform them, make us deserve glory. Therefore Cicero, who then wished to give glory to Caesar when he had been in charge of the republic, for that reason placed those deeds or merits generally, divided them into species, and added \"towards one's own citizens,\" \"towards the republic,\" or \"towards the whole human race,\" which species of right deeds, of course, are subject so as to be suitable to the property of glory. For it now has a certain and true property in the parts of glory. For everything that we perform, we either give as if owed, or as if not owed, when we act rightly; if only the deeds which are as if owed are done, it is called a celebrated reputation of deeds. But when we do beyond what is owed, by benevolence of performing and kindness of bestowing, these are called merits.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"gloria","severity":"info","text":"Boethius here treats gloria as a species of fama, a genus that can be of good or bad things. The definition is Ciceronian, drawn from the Topica.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"fama","severity":"info","text":"Fama is the genus of gloria; it is neutral, covering both good and bad reputations. Boethius uses it to structure the definition by genus and differentia.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage exemplifies the method of definition by genus and species: fama (genus) is narrowed by the species illustris (praise) and further by meritorum, then divided into three objects (cives, res publica, omne genus hominum).","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Cicero","severity":"info","text":"Boethius refers to Cicero’s definition of gloria, likely from the Topica or De Inventione. The mention of Caesar suggests a political context: Cicero’s definition was meant to honor Caesar’s merits toward the state.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius’s analysis of gloria as a species of fama influenced later medieval discussions of fame and honor, particularly in scholastic treatments of virtue and reputation.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"faruameritorurr","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text contains a corrupt or garbled word: 'faruameritorurr' is likely a scribal error for 'fama meritorum' (reputation of merits). The English draft follows the emended reading.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'faruameritorurr' is corrupt; the intended reading is probably 'fama meritorum'.","The reference to Caesar is not explicit in the Latin but is inferred from the context of Cicero's political aims."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":17,"ref":"p17","source":"Conclusit igitur utrumque genus praestandi cum dixit, illustris et pervagata fama factorum etpraemagnorum,cum inrempublicam,tum inomnescives famameritorum.Exhisomnibus arbitror apertam esse eam diffinitionem, quae substantialis essedebet,sicesse dicendam,ut proposito ejus rei de qua quaeritur genere, et adjunctis speciebus cum differentia usque ad ejus proprium, discI usa omnino communione,veniamus.Ac si velimus judicium veri philosophis auctoribus sequi, nulla dicetur alia definitio.Etenim reliquae intellectum potius rei tribuunt,non plenissime quid sitea res adhibita oratione declarant; verumtamen quoniam translata nomine etiam caeterae orationes hoc idem imaginaria dictione retinentes pari nomine nuncupatur,ut diffinitiones dicantur, ponendasarbitror reliquas species, quo facilius et quod caeteri dicant nosse possimus, et diffinitionis cognito multiplici modo facile, uti supra dictum est, diffiniendi veritas reseretur. M.","english":"He therefore concluded both kinds of bestowing when he said, \"a celebrated and widely spread reputation of great and very great deeds, both towards the republic and towards all citizens, the fame of merits.\" From all these I think it is clear that the definition, which ought to be substantial, should be expressed in such a way that, with the genus of the thing about which the inquiry is made set forth, and with the species joined together with the difference, we come, with all commonality completely excluded, to its proper [definition]. And if we wish to follow the judgment of true philosophical authorities, no other will be called a definition. For indeed the remaining [kinds of definition] rather attribute an understanding of the thing, not declaring most fully what the thing is by the speech employed; nevertheless, since by a transferred name the other speeches also, retaining this same thing by an imaginary expression, are called by the same name, so that they are said to be definitions, I think the remaining species should be set down, so that we may more easily know what others say, and, with the multiple mode of definition known, the truth of defining may easily, as was said above, be unlocked.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Conclusit igitur utrumque genus praestandi","severity":"info","text":"Boethius summarizes Cicero's definition of glory, then transitions to his own theory of definition, marking a structural pivot from example to method.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"diffinitio substantialis","severity":"info","text":"The 'substantial definition' is the primary kind, giving the essence of a thing via genus and differentia; Boethius contrasts it with other, less rigorous types.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"translata nomine","severity":"info","text":"Boethius notes that other types of definition are called 'definition' only by a transferred or metaphorical use of the term, a point rooted in Aristotelian and Porphyrian logic.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"judicium veri philosophis auctoribus","severity":"info","text":"Boethius appeals to 'true philosophical authorities' (likely Aristotle and Porphyry) to ground his hierarchy of definitions, a move that shaped medieval logical textbooks.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"discI usa","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin 'discI usa' is likely a scribal error for 'discussa' (shaken off, excluded); the English draft reads 'completely excluded', which fits the sense.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'discI usa' is corrupt; the reading 'discussa' is adopted for sense.","The exact referent of 'reliquas species' (remaining species of definition) is not specified here, but Boethius likely has in mind the four or five types from Aristotelian tradition."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":18,"ref":"p18","source":"Tullius in Topicis de tribus locis primis tractansa toto,apartibusa nota, cum a toto argumentum est, ut supra docuimus, diffinitionem esse adhibendam dicit,illic enim ponitur genus quo quid res ipsasit de qua quæritur explicetur.Ata partibus cum argumentum est,etiam ipsa quidem dicitur diffinitio,verum translato nomine cum e numeratis omnibus totus partibus,sio quod totum est recognoscitur,hac pene re nihil interest utrum diflinitione quae esse a toto cunctas partes totius ex diffinitione noscamus, an collectis omnibus partibus quod totum est ex partium enumeratione capiamus. Cicero talem diffinitionem partium enumerationem appellat, sed eam diffinitioni tribuens, quoniam et enumeratio partium idipsum de quo quaeritur quid sit ostendit,et hoc idem agit supra posita diffinitio,cum oratio quae quid sit ostendit dicitur diffinitio, unde nulli dubium est quin etiam ista diffinitio, esse dicatur: posuit igitur M. Tullius expLicans quid sit liber, vel in contrario quid sit non liber.Quoniam libertas censu datur,daturvindicta,datur testamento,et hae partes dandae libertatis sunt; si neque, inquit,censu.neque vindicta,neque testamento liber est,non est igitur liber.Sic positis partibus quibus liber elficitur,sequitur negatio libertatis,si nulla harum partium in danda libertate præcessit. Nec vos moveat quod quid non sit liber indiffinitione est constitutum, non quid sit.","english":"In the *Topics*, Cicero discusses the three primary places: from the whole, from the parts, and from a sign. When the argument is from the whole, as we have taught above, he says that a definition must be employed, for there the genus is placed by which what the thing itself is that is being inquired about is explained. When the argument is from the parts, that too is indeed called a definition, but with the name transferred, since when all the parts have been enumerated, the whole that is recognized is that thing. In this there is almost no difference whether we know the whole from a definition that is from the whole, all the parts of the whole from the definition, or, having collected all the parts, we grasp what the whole is from the enumeration of the parts. Cicero calls such a definition an enumeration of parts, but he attributes it to definition, because the enumeration of parts also shows what the very thing about which the question is asked is, and the definition placed above does the same thing, since a speech that shows what something is is called a definition. Hence there is no doubt that this too is said to be a definition. Therefore, Marcus Tullius set forth, explaining what a free man is, or, on the contrary, what a non-free man is. Since freedom is given by the census, given by the rod, given by testament, and these are the parts of the giving of freedom: \"If,\" he says, \"he is free neither by census, nor by rod, nor by testament, then he is not free.\" With the parts by which a free man is made thus posited, the negation of freedom follows if none of these parts in the giving of freedom has preceded. Nor should it move you that what a non-free man is, not what a free man is, has been established in the definition.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Cicero's *Topica* is the source for the three 'places' (loci) of argument: from the whole, from the parts, and from a sign. Boethius here expounds Cicero's treatment of definition by enumeration of parts.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero Topica"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"diffinitio","severity":"info","text":"Boethius uses 'diffinitio' (definition) in a broad sense, including both essential definition (from the whole) and descriptive enumeration of parts, which Cicero calls 'partium enumeratio'.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage illustrates the second of Cicero's three loci (from the parts), showing how definition by parts functions as a logical tool, distinct from definition by genus.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius's discussion of definition by enumeration of parts influenced later medieval logic, particularly in the treatment of 'definitio per partes' in commentaries on the *Topica*.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text has a minor corruption: 'tractansa' should likely be 'tractans a' (discussing from). The sense is clear from context.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'a toto, a partibus, a nota' is ambiguous: it could mean 'from the whole, from the parts, from a sign' (as translated) or 'from the whole, from the parts, from a known thing'. The reading 'a sign' follows standard interpretation of Cicero's three loci."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":19,"ref":"p19","source":"Par enim ratio est et eadem diffiniendi vis, et cum quid non sit ostenditur,et cum quid sit adhibita diffinitione nudatur. Quanquam M.Tulliua aliterin eodem libro Topicorum ait esse duo genera diffinitionum: primum enim cum id quod est diffinitur, secundum cum id quod sui substantiam non habet diffinitur, hoc est quod non est,et hoc partitionis genus in his quae supra dixi clausit et extenuavit. Sed alia esse voluit quae esse dicebat, alia quae non esse. Esse enim dicit eaquorum subjacet corpus,ut cum diffinimus quid sit aqua,quid ignis.Non autem esse illa intelligi voluit quibus nulla corporalis videtur esse substantia, ut sunt pietas, virtus, libertas.Sed nos omnia ista vel quae sunt cum corpore, vel quaesunt scilicet in corpore, si in eo accipiunt, ut aut per se esse, aut in aliquo esse videantur,in uno generenumeranda ducimus, ut ista omnia esse intelligantur quibus omnibus sua potest esse substantia, sive illae corporales,sive,ut certissimum est et recto nomine appellari possunt,qualitates.Verum præter hæc diffinitio est, cum aliquid quod non sit ostenditur. Diffinitione enim opus est ut possimus docere quid non sit. Ergo si partitione, enumeratis partibus, quid libertassit dicimus, quid non sit libertas eadem partitione monstrabimus. Fiet igitur etiam a partibus dirfinitio,ut si dioam, si nec masculusest, nec femina, homo non est.","english":"For the reasoning is the same, and the power of defining is identical, both when it is shown what something is not, and when, by applying a definition, what something is is laid bare. Although Marcus Tullius, in the same book of the *Topics*, says that there are two kinds of definitions: the first, when that which is is defined; the second, when that which does not have its own substance is defined—that is, what is not—and he enclosed and diminished this kind of division within those things I mentioned above. But he wished that some things be said to be, others not to be. For he says that those things are, whose body underlies them, as when we define what water is, what fire is. But he intended those things to be understood as not being, to which no corporeal substance seems to belong, such as piety, virtue, freedom. But we consider that all these things—whether they are with a body, or whether they are, of course, in a body, if they are taken in such a way that they seem either to exist by themselves or to exist in something—are to be counted in one genus, so that all these things are understood to be, to all of which their own substance can belong, whether those substances are corporeal, or, as is most certain and can be rightly named, qualities. But besides these, there is a definition when something that is not is shown. For a definition is needed so that we can teach what is not. Therefore, if by division, having enumerated the parts, we say what freedom is, by the same division we will show what freedom is not. Thus a definition will also be made from the parts, as if I say: if it is neither male nor female, it is not a human being.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius here engages Cicero's *Topica* (2.5–6), where Cicero distinguishes definitions of things that exist (e.g., water, fire) from those that do not have their own substance (e.g., piety, virtue). Boethius rejects this dichotomy, arguing that all such items have substance, whether corporeal or qualitative.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero Topica"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"qualitates","severity":"info","text":"The term *qualitates* (qualities) is a technical Aristotelian category (Categories 8) adopted by Boethius to classify incorporeal entities like virtue and freedom as having their own substance, contra Cicero's view that they lack substance.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Aristotle Categories"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage marks a shift from reporting Cicero's classification to Boethius' own argument: he redefines all definienda as having substance, then introduces a second type of definition that shows what something is not, using division (partition) as a method.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The example 'if it is neither male nor female, it is not a human being' illustrates definition by division (partition), a method Boethius adapts from Cicero's *Topica* (3.8–9) to show that definition can proceed by excluding what a thing is not.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero Topica"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius' insistence that qualities have substance influenced later medieval debates on the reality of universals, particularly in the 12th-century schools where his logical works were foundational.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'quae sunt scilicet in corpore' could mean 'which are in a body' or 'which are, of course, in a body'; the reading taken follows the latter as a clarifying gloss.","The clause 'si in eo accipiunt' is ambiguous: 'if they are taken in such a way' is adopted, but 'in eo' might refer to 'in that (body)'."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":20,"ref":"p20","source":"Item si nec servus est, nec liber,homononest.Sane hic admonendum puto partes saepe ab ipso de quo quæritur toto accipi ad ejus diffinitionem, sæpe non ab eodem ipso, sed ab eo quod ei accidit,utaccidentisenumeratio partium possit diffinire quod lotum est.Namque cum totum sit homo de quo quaeritur quid sit, non ejus partes sunt servus ac liber,sed accidentia bomini.Quorum enumeratio cum fuerit constituta, homo quid sit ostenditur.Sane etiam illud admonendum hic arbitror, cum a partibasfit diffinitio, posse cOJtingere ut modo totum ab omnibus partibus colligatur, ut supra ostendimus,modo ita partes enumerenturin definitione, ut in singulis totum sit, sicut illud in controversiis est, auxilium ferre est decernere,mittendo proficisci,venire etiam si non pugnaveris,hostes ne dimicent terrere. Sic M. Tullius multis in locis, et ipse pro Cornelio, ubi quæritur quid sit majestatem minuere,tractat,quod malam legem tulit: quod legendo codicem intercessionem sustulit, quod seditionem fecit.In quibus omnibus diffinitur læsa majestas.Sed ita singula sunt, ut in ipsis singulis totum,id est laesa majestas possitostendi. Hoc etiam pro M. Ccelio tenet, ubi per enumerationem malorum per quos fit dolus m1lus definitio ita fit, ut singulis speciebus dolus malus possit agnosci.","english":"Likewise, if it is neither a slave nor free, it is not a human. Here I think it should be noted that parts are often taken from the very whole about which the inquiry is made for its definition, and often not from that same whole, but from what happens to it, so that an enumeration of accidents can define what the whole is. For although the whole is the human about which it is asked what it is, \"slave\" and \"free\" are not its parts, but accidents of the human. When their enumeration has been established, what a human is is shown. I also think it should be noted here that when a definition is made from parts, it can happen that sometimes the whole is gathered from all parts, as we showed above, and sometimes the parts are enumerated in the definition in such a way that the whole is in each individual part, as in that example from controversies: \"to bring aid is to decide, to set out by sending, to come even if you have not fought, to frighten the enemy so they do not fight.\" Thus Marcus Tullius in many places, and he himself in his speech for Cornelius, where it is asked what \"to diminish majesty\" is, treats it as: that he proposed a bad law; that by reading the codex he removed the intercession; that he stirred up sedition. In all of these, injured majesty is defined. But each individual item is such that in each individual the whole, that is, injured majesty, can be shown. This also holds in his speech for Marcus Caelius, where through an enumeration of the evils by which malicious fraud is committed, the definition is made in such a way that malicious fraud can be recognized in each individual species.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"homononest","severity":"info","text":"The Latin 'homononest' is a transliteration of Greek, meaning 'it is not a human'. Boethius uses it to illustrate a negative definition by exclusion of accidents.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"accidentis enumeratio","severity":"info","text":"Boethius introduces 'enumeration of accidents' as a method of definition, where listing accidental properties (e.g., slave, free) can define a substance (e.g., human) by exclusion.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"modo ... modo","severity":"info","text":"Boethius contrasts two types of part-based definition: one where the whole is collected from all parts, and another where each part individually contains the whole, as in the examples from Cicero.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"M. Tullius","severity":"info","text":"Boethius cites Cicero's speeches 'Pro Cornelio' and 'Pro M. Caelio' as sources for definitions by enumeration, reflecting the rhetorical tradition of defining by listing species or instances.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"majestatem minuere","severity":"info","text":"The example of 'diminishing majesty' parallels Roman legal definitions, where specific acts (e.g., proposing a bad law) are enumerated to define a broader crime, a method Boethius adapts for logical definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"diffinitio","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin 'diffinitio' (definition) is used interchangeably with 'definitio' in this passage; the spelling reflects medieval orthography, not a distinct concept.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'homononest' is a Greek loanword; its exact parsing (e.g., as a single word or two) is uncertain, but the context clarifies it means 'it is not a human'.","The reference to 'pro Cornelio' may conflate Cicero's lost speech with later summaries; the exact text is not extant."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":21,"ref":"p21","source":"Hoc cum aperte positum intelligamus,tum illud quoque manifestum est,notionemquamdam inistadiffinitione, non rem plenissimam, contineri, et longa illam præstare diffinitionem quam supra posuimus, cum genere collocato ad declarationem reiquse diffinitur substantiam ejus indicans affertur oratio. Sane adjiciendumarbitrornonessequamdam necessitatem in ista partium enumeratione,ubi est quodammodo diffinitio, si infinitae fpartes fuerint, vel plurimas speciesjquarumpartitionefaciendaenumeratio est;non iuquam,arbitror in ista enumeratione universa quae infinita sunt non debere concludere. Sufficit enim vel plurimorum effici enumerationem, cum in infinitis non sit aliquid praetermittere vitiosum: hoc Cicero in Topicis collocavit, non nos jus civileenumeratione diffinire. Quod in legibus more æquitate consistit, non autem totum jus enumeratum est, quippe cum sit, et in senatusconsultis, et plebiscitis, sit in edictis, et principum jussis sit, fortasse adhuc et in aliis. Sed cum enumeratis ex infinitis aliquibus partibus notio data fuerit juris, quid jus civile sit in similibus existimabimus.Ergo divisione vel partitione efficitur ista de qua loquimurdiffinitio,sic enim etiam ipsadiffinitione eademque partitione, enumeratis vel omnibus, si paucae sunt,vel multis,si infinitse,aut speciebus,aut partibus,ad cognitionem rei de qua quaeriturnotiunemque deducimur.","english":"We understand this clearly when it is openly posited, and it is also manifest that a certain notion, not the fullest reality, is contained in that definition, and that the definition we placed above, with the genus set forth for the declaration of the thing, when the speech indicating its substance is brought forward, provides a longer definition. Indeed, I think it should not be added that there is some necessity in that enumeration of parts, where there is a definition of sorts, if the parts are infinite, or if the enumeration of the species or parts to be divided is very many; I do not think, in that enumeration, that all things which are infinite ought to be concluded. For it suffices that an enumeration of very many things be made, since among infinite things it is not vicious to omit something: Cicero placed this in the Topics, that we do not define civil law by enumeration. That which consists in laws, custom, and equity is not the whole of law enumerated, since it is also in senatus consulta, and in plebiscites, in edicts, and in the commands of princes, and perhaps still in other things. But when a notion of law has been given from some enumerated parts among infinite ones, we will judge what civil law is in similar cases. Therefore, by division or partition, this definition of which we speak is effected; for thus, by the same definition and partition, with either all things enumerated, if they are few, or many, if infinite, either species or parts, we are led to the knowledge and notion of the thing about which inquiry is made.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"notionem quamdam in ista diffinitione, non rem plenissimam, contineri","severity":"info","text":"Boethius distinguishes between a definition that conveys a 'notion' (notio) and one that conveys the 'fullest reality' (res plenissima), aligning with his earlier contrast between definitions by genus and those by enumeration.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Cicero in Topicis","severity":"info","text":"Boethius refers to Cicero's Topica, where Cicero argues that civil law cannot be defined by enumeration because it is infinite. This reflects the Academic tradition of using division and partition for definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero Topica"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"diffinitio","severity":"info","text":"Boethius uses 'diffinitio' (definition) in a technical sense, distinguishing between a full definition (by genus and differentia) and a partial one (by enumeration of parts or species), which he calls a 'definition of sorts' (quodammodo diffinitio).","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"divisione vel partitione efficitur ista de qua loquimur diffinitio","severity":"info","text":"Boethius concludes that the definition under discussion is effected by division or partition, linking the method to the enumeration of parts or species, whether finite or infinite, to yield a notion of the thing.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"Cicero in Topicis collocavit","severity":"info","text":"Boethius's citation of Cicero's Topica on the non-enumerability of civil law shows the reception of Ciceronian dialectic in late antique Latin philosophy, influencing medieval theories of definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero Topica"],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Latin 'notionem quamdam' could be read as 'a certain notion' or 'some notion', but the sense is that the definition provides an incomplete understanding.","The phrase 'si infinitae fpartes fuerint' contains a possible textual corruption ('fpartes' may be 'partes' or 'species'), but the meaning is clear: if the parts are infinite."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":22,"ref":"p22","source":"Sciamus autem definitionem a genere esse,cum speciesenumerantur,partitionem cum parles.Quapropter animaldiffiniamus,huiccumsint species numero infi:1itæ,ut homo,bos,equus,leopiscis,item cætera,paucisenumeratis speciebus possumus qutdaitanimal.deciarare.Atsiitlasspecicstetigero quae differentiæ magis sunt,quæ ipsaetres esse possunr,humidum,terrenum,coeleste,enumeratione harum rerum omnium animal diffinitum sit. Hoc idem et in partium enumeratione servabis,ut si dicamus,mundus est,mare,terra, coelum, enumeratione partium,sed non tamen omnium,quid mundus sit, explicatumest.Acsihocidem per partes aliasinfinitas,voluerimusadhitJitaenumeratione quid mundus sit definire,quoniam, ut M.Tullius ait,enumeratio partium sæpe est infinitior,præceptum anbisillud est ne aliquod vitium in enumeratione,credamus,cum aliquid prxeterimus,ea duntaxatin re,ubi partes sunt infinitæ,ergo poterimus dicere:Mundus est sol,luna, astra, aer, et cuncta quæ in eo sunt, id est terra et cxtera,quae etsi non enumeratis partibus enuntiata proferimus, ex dictis partium similitudine comprehensa omnibus quid sit mundus ostendimus. Hoc igitur modo diffinitio etiam partium enumeratione tractabitur, partes pro speciebus poni rationalis licentia est, ut totum pro genere, nunquam tamen genus pro toto, aut pro parte species nominatur.","english":"But let us know that a definition from genus occurs when species are enumerated, a partition when parts are enumerated. For this reason, if we define \"animal,\" to which there belong species infinite in number, such as man, ox, horse, lion, fish, and the rest, we can declare what \"animal\" is by enumerating a few species. But if I touch upon those species which are more properly differences, which can themselves be three—moist, earthly, celestial—by enumeration of all these things \"animal\" is defined. You will observe the same in the enumeration of parts, as if we say, \"The world is sea, land, sky,\" by enumeration of parts, but not of all, what the world is has been explained. And if we wished to define what the world is by enumeration through other infinite parts, since, as Marcus Tullius says, enumeration of parts is often more infinite, that precept is twofold: that we not believe there is some fault in enumeration when we have omitted something, only in a matter where the parts are infinite. Therefore we can say: \"The world is sun, moon, stars, air, and all things that are in it,\" that is, earth and the rest, which even if we set forth not by enumerated parts, from the likeness of the parts mentioned we show what the world is, comprehended by all. In this way, then, a definition will also be treated by enumeration of parts; it is a rational license to put parts for species, as whole for genus, but genus is never named for whole, nor species for part.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"definitionem a genere","severity":"info","text":"Boethius distinguishes definition by genus (with species enumerated) from partition (with parts enumerated). The former yields a definition, the latter an explanation, not a strict definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"enumeratio partium sæpe est infinitior","severity":"info","text":"Boethius cites Cicero (M. Tullius) for the principle that enumeration of parts is often more infinite, justifying a looser approach when parts are infinite.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"partitionem cum parles","severity":"info","text":"The Latin 'parles' is likely a scribal error for 'partes' (parts). The sense is clear: partition involves enumeration of parts, not species.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Hoc igitur modo diffinitio etiam partium enumeratione tractabitur","severity":"info","text":"This passage concludes a section on definition by enumeration, noting that parts may stand for species and whole for genus, but not vice versa.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"M. Tullius","severity":"info","text":"Marcus Tullius Cicero, Roman orator and philosopher, is cited as an authority on the infinite nature of part-enumeration, reflecting Boethius’s reliance on classical sources.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"speciesenumerantur","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text has 'speciesenumerantur' as one word, likely a scribal conflation. The intended reading is 'species enumerantur' (species are enumerated).","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Latin 'parles' is ambiguous; it is taken as a scribal error for 'partes' (parts).","The phrase 'quæ ipsaetres esse possunr' contains 'ipsaetres' which may be a corruption; the reading 'ipsae tres' (themselves three) is adopted."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":23,"ref":"p23","source":"Omne cujusque genus suas ad species est quasi totum, unde totum pro genere jure dicimus. Eodemque modo partes pro specie nominabimus.Nam si ad id genus et vocabulum quod dicitur totum jure sociatur,par ratio est pro speciebus partes quasi sub toti appellatione enumerare. Illud tamen probe admonitum volo,cum duo genera rerum sint,corporalia et incorporalh,in utroque et genus et totum accipi, ac pari modo partes et species nominari, sed separata rationis propriae sectione, ut cum genus qualitatis modo fuerit nominatum,ei species suppositas intelligere debeamus. Cum vero totum,non quo qualitas ejus animadvertatur quae significatur semper in genere, sed quasi quoddam substantiale corpus, ut id sectum in partes suasatque distribulum quasi cujusdam quantitatis receperit sectionem.Sive illud corpus sit,sive (ut diximus) incorporale,animadversione utriusque cognationis, quæ aut in qualitate autin quantitate est.Si qualitate rem appellatam velimu9,genus esse dicamus,et huic species esse suppositas.Si quantitatem quamdam in eo quod lotum est comprehendimus, merito ac jure partes.in sectione esse dicimus.","english":"Every genus in relation to its species is like a whole, so that we rightly call a whole a genus. And in the same way we will name parts for species. For if that name which is called \"whole\" is rightly associated with the genus, it is equally reasonable to enumerate parts, as it were under the appellation of the whole, for species. Nevertheless, I want this to be well noted: since there are two kinds of things, corporeal and incorporeal, in both, both genus and whole are taken, and in the same way parts and species are named, but by a separate division of their own rationale, so that when the genus has been named in the manner of a quality, we should understand the species subordinate to it. But when it is a whole, not that its quality is observed, which is always signified in a genus, but as if a certain substantial body, so that, divided and distributed into its parts, it has received a division of a certain quantity, whether that body is corporeal or (as we have said) incorporeal, by observation of the kinship of each, which is either in quality or in quantity. If we wish the thing named to be in quality, we say it is a genus, and that species are subordinate to it. If we comprehend a certain quantity in that which is a whole, we rightly and justly say that parts are in the division.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"totum","severity":"info","text":"Boethius uses 'totum' (whole) to denote the genus when considered as a quantitative whole, distinct from the qualitative sense of genus. This reflects the Aristotelian distinction between genus as a universal and whole as a sum of parts.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The distinction between genus (qualitative) and whole (quantitative) draws on Porphyry's Isagoge and Boethius's own commentaries, where the genus is a predicate of species, while a whole is divisible into parts.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the narrative from the previous passage, elaborating the analogy between genus/species and whole/parts, and introduces a new division between corporeal and incorporeal things.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"incorporalh","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin 'incorporalh' appears to be a scribal error or variant for 'incorporalia' (incorporeal). The text is otherwise consistent, but this spelling may cause confusion.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"qualitas","severity":"info","text":"'Qualitas' (quality) here refers to the essential nature signified by a genus, as opposed to 'quantitas' (quantity), which pertains to the whole as a divisible entity.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'separata rationis propriae sectione' is ambiguous: it may mean 'by a separate division of their own rationale' or 'by a separate section of proper reason'. The translation adopts the former.","The spelling 'incorporalh' is likely a scribal error for 'incorporalia', but could be a deliberate abbreviation."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":24,"ref":"p24","source":"Concesso illo ad usum et licenter accepto,ut species partium nomine nuncupemus, genusque ip-um quod circa qualitatem diximus totius appellatione sine vitio proferamus, nunquam tamen quod qualitatis est ubi totum dicendum est,genus proferamus,nec sub toto aliquando species, sed semper partes nominabimus. Tertia diffinitio et quae a nota dicitur,cumvisverbi vel oominis.quae in compositionesitaest,rem suam factaquadamseparatione designat. Fides est, inquit M. Tullius, cumfitquod dicitur. Hic itaque prospici licet, veluti simplex nomen sit fictum atque compositum, ut in res suas obscura licet compositione resonet,pene enim ex iisdem syllabis rem suam dicentibus verbum compositum ad id quod significat ex discretione coglloscimus,sed sæpe verbum simplex et purum nulla compositione connexum in diffinitione a nota ducetur,ubi est vis ejus quam Græci appellant £, at Cicero veriloquium. Sed non potest ex discretione, quae nulla est, compositionis ostendi,sed adhibita declaratione ac denominatione quodammodo quid sit id de quo quæritur explicari,ut a bonitate bonus, et a malitia malus,et a sapientia sapiens.","english":"Let it be granted for use and freely accepted that we may call species by the name of parts, and that we may without fault apply the appellation of whole to the genus itself, which we have spoken of in relation to quality; nevertheless, we shall never, when the whole is to be spoken of in respect of quality, utter the genus, nor at any time call the species under the whole, but we shall always name them parts. The third definition, and that which is called the definition from a note, when it is of a verb or a noun, which is so in composition, designates its own thing by means of a certain separation. \"Fides,\" says M. Tullius, \"is when what is said is done.\" Here, therefore, it may be observed that, as if a simple name were formed and compounded, it resounds, albeit in an obscure composition, into its own things; for we recognize the compound word, made up of almost the same syllables that speak its own thing, as signifying what it does by means of a distinction. But often a simple and pure word, bound by no composition, is led into a definition from a note, where its force is what the Greeks call ἐτυμολογία, and Cicero calls veriloquium. But it cannot be shown by a distinction, which is none, of composition; rather, by means of an added explanation and denomination, it is in some way explained what the thing in question is, as \"good\" from \"goodness,\" and \"bad\" from \"badness,\" and \"wise\" from \"wisdom.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"diffinitio quae a nota dicitur","severity":"info","text":"Boethius introduces the third type of definition, the 'definition from a note' (nota), which relies on etymology or a distinguishing mark to explain a term's meaning.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"veriloquium","severity":"info","text":"Cicero's Latin calque for Greek ἐτυμολογία (etymologia), meaning 'true speech' or 'true explanation,' used here to describe the force of a simple word in definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Fides est, inquit M. Tullius, cum fit quod dicitur","severity":"info","text":"Boethius quotes Cicero's definition of fides (good faith) as 'when what is said is done,' illustrating the definition from a note by a compound word's compositional meaning.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage transitions from the earlier discussion of genus and whole to the third definition type, marking a new section in Boethius's classification of definitions.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"cumvisverbi vel oominis","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin phrase 'cumvisverbi vel oominis' is likely a scribal corruption; the intended reading may be 'cum vis verbi vel nominis' (with the force of a verb or noun), as the context discusses definitions of verbs and nouns.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'cumvisverbi vel oominis' is corrupt; the intended sense is uncertain but likely refers to the force (vis) of a verb or noun.","The exact source of Cicero's definition of fides is not specified; it may be from a lost or fragmentary work."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":25,"ref":"p25","source":"Etenim cum in alio nomine res cognita est, facile hoc quod ab eo est derivatum et quodammodo denominatnm ad cognitionem deducit, ut quid sitostendat,utin Pisonem Cicero consulem a consulendo ait dictum, maximeque, inquit, quod vis ejus nominis ipsa præscribit reipublicæ consulendo,et hoc diffinitionis genus essedicendum est. Quanquam M. Tullius in Topicis argumenti locum fecerit quern nominavit conjugatum,qui estfinitimus loco qui a nota est, nos tamen non aliter neque contra, sed cum pari praeceptione detinitionem jure dicemus, servantes præceptum uti cum compositum nomen divisione in res suas quas sonat accepta id quod significatintelligamusffitdif'finitioanota.Gum autem simplex verbum undesitdenominatum accipere coepimus, argumentum a conjugato accepimus ut M. Tullius posuit, diffinitionem tamen esse dicamus,quia quid sit ostendit, quod proprium est diffinitionis.Hce sunt tres nunc a mepositae principales diffinitiones substantiales, quæ a toto est,a partium enumeratione,et not;;, ita ut illa quae prior est,sola vere dil'finitio nuncupetur,istae autem duasnominis honore et honestate, quia id de quo quæritur quid sit ostendunt,non vere,sed tamen diffinitiones esse dicentur.Nunc ad illam quae a toto est diffinitionem revertamur, quia ipsa in se recipere formas potest plurimas.","english":"For when a thing is known under another name, that which is derived from it and, in a certain way, denominated, easily leads to knowledge, so that it shows what it is, as Cicero says that Piso the consul is so called from \"consulting,\" and especially, he says, because the force of that name itself prescribes consulting for the republic, and this kind of definition ought to be so called. Although Marcus Tullius, in the *Topics*, made a place for an argument which he named \"conjugate,\" which is neighboring to the place that is from a note, we nevertheless, neither otherwise nor contrary, but with equal instruction, will rightly call it a definition, preserving the precept that when we take a compound name divided into its own things which it sounds, we understand what it signifies, the definition is from a note. But when we begin to take a simple word as a denominative, we have taken an argument from a conjugate, as Marcus Tullius set forth, yet we say it is a definition, because it shows what it is, which is proper to a definition. These are the three principal substantial definitions now set forth by me: that which is from the whole, from the enumeration of parts, and from a note, so that that which is prior alone is truly called a definition, but these two, by the honor and dignity of the name, because they show that concerning which it is asked what it is, will be said to be definitions, not truly, but nevertheless. Now let us return to that definition which is from the whole, because it can receive very many forms within itself.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius here adapts Cicero's *Topica* (2.8–10), where Cicero discusses the argument from 'conjugates' (coniugata) and from 'notation' (nota). Boethius reinterprets these rhetorical topics as types of definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero Topica"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"conjugatum","severity":"info","text":"The Latin 'conjugatum' (conjugate) refers to words derived from the same root, e.g., 'consul' from 'consulere'. Boethius follows Cicero in treating this as a source of argument, but insists it can also yield a definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"nota","severity":"info","text":"The term 'nota' (note) here denotes a definition from etymology or the force of a name, as when 'consul' is defined by the act of consulting. Boethius distinguishes this from the argument from conjugates.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage concludes Boethius's enumeration of three principal substantial definitions: from the whole, from enumeration of parts, and from a note. He ranks the first as the only true definition, the others as definitions only by courtesy.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text contains a probable corruption: 'denominatnm' likely stands for 'denominatum' (denominated). The phrase 'ffitdif'finitioanota' is garbled; the intended sense is 'fit definitio a nota' (the definition from a note arises).","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius's classification of definitions—especially the primacy of definition 'a toto'—influenced later medieval logicians, including Peter Abelard and the authors of the *Logica Vetus* tradition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Coptic text is not present; the Latin has a garbled passage ('ffitdif'finitioanota') that likely should read 'fit definitio a nota'.","The phrase 'denominatnm' is a scribal error for 'denominatum'."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":26,"ref":"p26","source":"Sed ex his eas quas colligere potuimus, partiemur (sunt enim et aliae fortasse),deinde rationes ac differentias et exempla dicemus. Est igitur prima quæ Græce, Latine substantialis appellari potest. Secunda est,quæ solam notionem subjicit. Tertia 7TOI5T7)C, quae a qualitate nomen accipit. Quarla l7toypa'f'lX1), quae aM. Tullio descriptio nominatur.Quinta xxxa tv, Latine ad verbum possumus dicere. Sexta xxxa Stacpopav, Latini de eodem et de altero nominant, qum differentia dici potest.Septimaest xaxa p.ncxpopiv, id est per translationem. Octava est xata atpaipeutv tou evavxtou, id est per privantiam contrarii ejus.Nona xaxa, id est per quamdam imaginationem. Decima est 1J, XUTTO;, Latine veluti. Undecima est auxou ysvouc, id est per indigentiam pleni ex eodem genere. Duodecimaest xxxa euatvov, id est per laudem. Tertia decima est xaxa avaAoytav, id est juxta rationem,qua? proportio dicitur.Quarta decimaest y.cxd xo itpoc \"t',hoc est per id quod ad aliquid est.Quinta decima est, causam tribuens.De prima diffinitione plenus in superioribus sermo confectus est,cum substantialis quae sit diffinitio quibusque partibus compleatur ostendimus.Secunda dicitur, quam no.","english":"But from these, we will set forth those we have been able to gather (for there are perhaps others as well), and then we will give the reasons, differences, and examples. There is, therefore, the first, which in Greek can be called substantial, in Latin substantialis. The second is that which presents only a notion. The third is ποιητική, which takes its name from quality. The fourth is ὑπογραφική, which is called descriptio by Marcus Tullius. The fifth is κατὰ λέξιν, which in Latin we can render word for word. The sixth is κατὰ διαφοράν, which the Latins call \"concerning the same and the other,\" and which can be called difference. The seventh is κατὰ μεταφοράν, that is, by transference. The eighth is κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν τοῦ ἐναντίου, that is, by privation of its contrary. The ninth is κατὰ φαντασίαν, that is, by a certain imagination. The tenth is καθ' ὁμοίωσιν, in Latin veluti. The eleventh is κατ' ἔλλειψιν τοῦ γένους, that is, by lack of the full from the same genus. The twelfth is κατ' ἔπαινον, that is, by praise. The thirteenth is κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, that is, according to reason, which is called proportion. The fourteenth is κατὰ τὸ πρός τι, that is, by that which is relative to something. The fifteenth is that which assigns a cause. Concerning the first definition, a full discussion was completed in the earlier parts, when we showed what the substantial definition is and of what parts it is composed. The second is called that which...","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage enumerates fifteen types of definition, following a Greek classification system. The first type (substantial) is said to have been fully treated earlier, marking a structural division in the work.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"substantialis","severity":"info","text":"Boethius uses 'substantialis' to render the Greek 'οὐσιώδης', indicating a definition that expresses the essence or substance of a thing. This is the first and most important type.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ὑπογραφική","severity":"info","text":"The fourth type, 'ὑπογραφική', is translated as 'descriptio' by Cicero. This term refers to a descriptive definition that outlines characteristics without capturing essence.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The list of fifteen definitions reflects a Hellenistic rhetorical and philosophical tradition, likely mediated through Latin sources such as Cicero and Marius Victorinus. Boethius adapts Greek terminology for a Latin audience.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"κατὰ ἀναλογίαν","severity":"info","text":"The thirteenth type, 'κατὰ ἀναλογίαν', is glossed as 'juxta rationem' and 'proportio'. This indicates a definition by analogy or proportion, a concept important in later medieval logic.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text contains Greek terms in transliteration (e.g., 'ποιητική', 'ὑπογραφική') which may be corrupt in transmission. The English draft supplies standard Greek forms, but the exact original spelling is uncertain.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The list of fifteen definitions is presented as a selection ('eas quas colligere potuimus'), implying there may be others not included. The exact source of this classification is not specified.","The term 'ποιητική' (third type) is ambiguous: it could mean 'poetic' or 'productive'; Boethius glosses it as 'from quality', which is unusual and may reflect a textual corruption or a specific tradition."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":27,"ref":"p27","source":"tionem non proprio nomine sed communi possumus dicere.In omnibus enim reliquis diffinitionibus notio rei profertur,non substantialisexplicatiodeclaratur, verum haec quae secunda est,hoc modo semper etHcitur,cum propositio eo quod difl1niendum est,neque dicto ejus genere, verbis in rei sensum ducentibus audientem,quid illud sit de quoquaeriturexplicatur. Estque huic pene familiare res propositas per superjecta nomina diffinire,ut si dicam, homo est quod rationali conceptione et exercitio praeest animalibus cunctis,bic non quidem ipsum quod sit dixi,sed dicendo quid agat,quasi quodam signo in notitiam devocavi. Alia sunt apud M. Tullium in Rhetoricis rnulta,ut honestum causae genus est,cui statim sine oratione nostra favet auditoris animus,et item admirabiJe,a quo alienatus est animus eorum qui audituri sunt.Sic reliquas cumin secundo libro adhibet diffinitiones in virtutibus declarandis.Primum cum dicit quid sit ipsa virtus,ponitqueejus diffinitionem habitus naturae modoatque rationi consentaneus;hic quoniam genus posuit ut habitum diceret,substantialis diffinitio est.","english":"We can call it not by a proper name but by a common one. For in all other definitions the notion of the thing is set forth, but the substantial explanation is not declared; however, this one which is second always occurs in this way, when, with the proposition of what is to be defined, neither by stating its genus, but by words leading the hearer into the sense of the thing, it explains what that thing is which is being inquired about. And it is almost characteristic of this type to define proposed things by superimposed names, as if I should say: \"Man is that which presides over all animals by rational conception and exercise.\" Here I have not indeed said what it is, but by saying what it does, I have called it into knowledge as if by some sign. There are many others in M. Tullius's *Rhetorica*, such as: \"An honorable kind of cause is that to which the hearer's mind gives favor immediately without our speech,\" and likewise: \"An admirable kind is that from which the mind of those who are about to hear is alienated.\" And so he employs the remaining definitions in the second book in declaring the virtues. First, when he says what virtue itself is, he posits its definition: \"a habit of nature in accord with measure and reason.\" Here, since he placed the genus so as to say \"habit,\" it is a substantial definition.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"secunda","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the classification of definitions begun in the previous passage, focusing on the second type, which presents only a notion (notio) without a substantial explanation.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"substantialis","severity":"info","text":"Substantialis refers to a definition that gives the essence or genus of a thing, as opposed to one that merely describes its attributes or actions.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"notio","severity":"info","text":"Notio here means a notion or concept of a thing, as opposed to a full substantial definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"M. Tullium in Rhetoricis","severity":"info","text":"Boethius refers to Cicero's De Inventione (often called Rhetorica in medieval tradition), where Cicero discusses types of definitions in Book 2.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero De Inventione"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"homo est quod rationali conceptione et exercitio praeest animalibus cunctis","severity":"info","text":"This example of a definition by function (not essence) echoes a common Stoic definition of man as a rational animal, but Boethius adapts it to illustrate the second type of definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"Hcitur","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text has 'Hcitur' which is likely a scribal error for 'dicitur' (it is said). The sense is clear from context.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'Hcitur' is a probable corruption of 'dicitur'.","The reference to 'secundo libro' in Cicero's Rhetorica is ambiguous; it likely refers to Book 2 of De Inventione."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":28,"ref":"p28","source":"At cum dicit, memoria est per quam animus repetit ilIa quæ fuerant,et item intelligentia est per quam illa respicit quae sunt,ac par modo providentia est per quam futurum aliquid videtur,satis clarum est non substantialem istam ditfinitionem, sed, quemadmodum diximus, ea quae evvoY](j.axtx7i Graece dicitur,cum rei notio non substantiali ratione percepta,sed actu res cognita proferatur. Tertia diffinitionis species est quae itotoVqc dicitur, haec dicendo quod quale sit ostendit,et ut supra nostrum proponemus exemplum,ut facile appareat de eodem uno plures diffinitiones confici posse,hominem primum substantialiterdiffinivimus. Deinde secundæ diffinitionis modo notionem ejus expressimus. Nunc per tertiam diffinitionem quid homo sil explicabimus.Homo est ubi pietas, ubi justitia,ubi æquitas,ubi continentia,ubi rursus malitia, versutia, caeteraque vitia versantur,qui ingenio valet, artibus pollet, et cognitione rerum aut quod agere debeat diligit,aut animadversione quod inutile sit contemnit, repudiat,rejicit.His qualitatibus expressus est homo,non enim ullum aliud animal his motibus mentis qualitatem designantibus exigit vitam,sed solum hoc animal,quod est homo,qualita-. tibus in mente positis et constitutis, quasi quidam vel naturalis artifex vel vitae gubernator, impletur.","english":"But when it says, \"Memory is that by which the mind recalls those things which have been,\" and likewise, \"Intelligence is that by which it regards those things which are,\" and in like manner, \"Providence is that by which something future is seen,\" it is sufficiently clear that this is not a substantial definition, but, as we have said, that which is called in Greek ἐννοηματική, where the notion of the thing is perceived not by substantial reason, but the thing known is set forth by its actual operation. The third species of definition is that which is called ποιότης; this, by stating what sort of thing it is, shows it, and we will set forth our example as above, so that it may easily appear that several definitions can be made of the same one thing. First we defined man substantially. Then, by the mode of the second definition, we expressed his notion. Now, by the third definition, we will explain what man is. Man is that in which piety, justice, equity, continence, and again malice, cunning, and the other vices are found; who is strong in intellect, skilled in arts, and in knowledge of things either loves what he ought to do, or by discernment condemns, rejects, and spurns what is useless. By these qualities man is expressed, for no other animal conducts its life by these motions of the mind designating quality, but only this animal, which is man, is filled with qualities placed and established in the mind, as if by a certain natural artisan or governor of life.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"evvoY](j.axtx7i","severity":"info","text":"The Latin manuscript corrupts the Greek term ἐννοηματική (ennoēmatikē), which Boethius uses for the second species of definition, based on a notion or concept rather than substance.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"itotoVqc","severity":"info","text":"The Latin manuscript corrupts the Greek term ποιότης (poiotēs), meaning 'quality'; Boethius identifies this as the third species of definition, which defines by describing what sort of thing something is.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius here adapts a threefold classification of definitions (substantial, notional, qualitative) found in Greek Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle, such as Porphyry and Iamblichus.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage completes the exposition of the second species of definition and introduces the third, using the example of 'man' to illustrate that multiple definitions of the same thing are possible.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius's classification of definitions influenced medieval logic and theology, particularly in discussions of definition by substance, notion, and quality, as seen in works of Gilbert of Poitiers and Thomas Aquinas.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"evvoY](j.axtx7i","severity":"caution","text":"The Greek term ἐννοηματική is garbled in the Latin manuscript; the reading is conjectural, based on the context and the English draft's restoration.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The exact Greek spelling of ἐννοηματική and ποιότης is uncertain due to manuscript corruption; the reading follows standard restoration."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":29,"ref":"p29","source":"Hæc quidem tertia et secundaillapossuntvideriquibusdam esse communes:nam sæpe sufficit in qualibet harum ad diffinitionem ejus rei de qua quæritur solum ejus proprium nominari, ut si dicam, homo est quod ridet, hoc enim proprium hominis neque ullius animalis est;quo dicto tacitisque aliis omnibus quibus homo possit ostendi, solo tamen sui proprio declaratus est.Et boc Cicero de proprietate dixit genus essediffinitionisquod notioni applicari potest, ut quibusdam videtur,potest etiam huic diffinitioni quae qualitatis sortita est nomen.Unde quidam has duas inter se nullo fine discretasunam esse potius censent,cum satis appareat illam nullis positis qualitatibus notionem,ut supra docuimus,posse compleri, hanc positis qualitatibus quas res sit, tacito etiam ejus proprio posse, ostendere. Quartam nos diffinitionem diximus, non numerum quasi proprium collocantes,sed instituto ordine ad faciliorem cognitionem vocabulumexhibitaenuncrationi sociantes:non enim quarta,'quae est, quae a nobis descriptio dicta est,quarta dicenda est. Sed quia ordo propositionis exegerat, ideo nomen numeri collocavimus hocloco.Namquequi quartus est,Cicero de eodem et altero diffinitionem posuit,et sic uiroypatpixTiv quintam constituit;sed nus,omissa numerositate,quid 67roYpacpty.r) sit,quæ a M.","english":"These things indeed, the third and the second, can seem to some to be common: for often in any of these it suffices for the definition of that thing concerning which inquiry is made that only its own property be named, as if I say, \"Man is that which laughs,\" for this is a property of man and of no other animal; by this said and all other things by which man can be shown passed over in silence, yet he is declared by his own property alone. And Cicero said of this that it is a genus of definition which can be applied to a notion, as it seems to some; it can also be applied to this definition which has taken the name of quality. Whence some judge that these two, being separated by no boundary, are rather one, since it sufficiently appears that the former can be completed by no posited qualities, as we taught above, and the latter, with qualities posited which the thing is, can show it even with its own property left unspoken. We have called the fourth definition, not placing number as if it were a property, but joining the name to the exposition presented in an established order for easier understanding: for it is not that the fourth, which is what we have called description, is to be called fourth. But because the order of the proposition required it, therefore we placed the name of number in this place. For Cicero, who is fourth, placed a definition concerning the same and the other, and thus constituted a fifth as ὑπογραφική; but we, omitting numerosity, what ὑπογραφή is, which by M.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ἐννοηματική","severity":"info","text":"The Greek term ἐννοηματική (ennoēmatikē) refers to a definition based on a notion or concept, as opposed to one based on qualities. Boethius uses it to classify a type of definition that Cicero associates with a 'genus of definition' applicable to a notion.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ὑπογραφική","severity":"info","text":"The Greek term ὑπογραφική (hypographikē) denotes a descriptive definition, which Cicero posits as a fifth type. Boethius mentions it but omits numerosity, focusing instead on what ὑπογραφή (description) is.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Cicero","severity":"info","text":"Boethius references Cicero's classification of definitions, likely from the 'Topica' or 'De Oratore', where Cicero distinguishes types of definition, including those based on property and description. This reflects the Latin rhetorical tradition influencing Boethius.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero Topica"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"quarta","severity":"info","text":"Boethius clarifies that the 'fourth' definition is not numerically fourth but is so called due to the order of exposition. He distinguishes it from description (ὑπογραφή), indicating a structural reorganization of definition types for pedagogical clarity.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"M.","severity":"caution","text":"The text breaks off with 'quæ a M.', likely a manuscript corruption or abbreviation. 'M.' may refer to a source or author (e.g., Marius Victorinus or another commentator), but the passage is incomplete, obscuring Boethius's final point about ὑπογραφή.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"homo est quod ridet","severity":"info","text":"The example 'man is that which laughs' is a standard logical illustration of a property (proprium) in Aristotelian and Boethian tradition, paralleling Porphyry's 'Isagoge' and Boethius's own commentaries on definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Porphyry Isagoge"],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The text ends abruptly with 'quæ a M.', leaving the discussion of ὑπογραφή incomplete. 'M.' may be an abbreviation for a source or author, but the reference is unclear.","The phrase 'Cicero de eodem et altero diffinitionem posuit' is ambiguous: it may mean Cicero placed a definition concerning 'the same and the other' (a logical pair) or that he defined 'the same and the other' as a type of definition."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":30,"ref":"p30","source":"Tullio descriptio nominatur,proposita ratione docebimus, et per exemplum,quæ oratio non quid sit potius dicit, sed adhibita circuitione dictorum factorumque id quæque res sit descriptione declarat. Descriptiva ista dicitur esse diffInitio, ut cum quaeritur quid avarus sit,quid crudelis, quid luxuriosus. et universa avari, luxuriosi, crudelis, natura describitur. Quae diffinitionis species dicitur exhortationis genere descriptio,ut luxuriosus est victus non necessarii,sed sumptuosi et onerosi appetens,in delicias affluens, in libidinem pronus.Hæc et alia diffiniunt luxuriosum, et descriptione diffiniunt, haec dilfinitio apta semper est oratori. Uuic enim laus dicendi per circuitum tribuitur propter honestatem,non ille aptior et determinatus sermo qui veluti familiaris est diffinitioni quam supra substantialem esse praecepimus. Idcirco multis in locis M.'l'uJJius,cum diffiniendum aliquid dicit,non substantialiter praecepit esse dUHniendum,sed potius describendum, et hoc nomine utitur,ut cum quaeritur,inquit, quid sit fur,et quid sit sacrilegus, sua descriptione monstrandum est. Quinta species diffinitionis est quam xaT' avuXe£iv diximus, Latine ad verbum possumus dicere.","english":"Tullius calls it a description; we will teach it by setting forth a rationale and by example, which speech does not so much say what a thing is, but rather, by a circumlocution of words and deeds, declares what each thing is by description. This is said to be a descriptive definition, as when it is asked what an avaricious man is, what a cruel man is, what a luxurious man is, and the whole nature of the avaricious, luxurious, and cruel man is described. This species of definition is called a description in the mode of exhortation, as: a luxurious man is one who seeks not necessary but costly and burdensome fare, abounding in delights, prone to lust. These and other things define the luxurious man, and they define by description; this definition is always suitable for an orator. For the praise of speaking by circumlocution is granted for the sake of propriety; that speech is not more apt and determinate which, as it were, is familiar to the definition which we above prescribed to be substantial. For this reason, in many places Tullius, when he says something is to be defined, does not prescribe that it be defined substantially, but rather that it be described, and he uses this term, as when he says: when it is asked what a thief is and what a sacrilegious man is, it must be shown by their own description. The fifth species of definition is that which we have called κατ' ἀντίλεξιν, which in Latin we can say \"ad verbum.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"descriptio","severity":"info","text":"Boethius uses 'descriptio' to render the Greek rhetorical term, distinguishing it from substantial definition. The Latin term emphasizes a circumlocutory portrayal of a thing's nature through deeds and circumstances.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Tullio","severity":"info","text":"The reference to 'Tullius' (Cicero) reflects Boethius's reliance on Ciceronian rhetorical theory, particularly the Topica, where descriptive definition is treated as a tool for orators.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Quinta species diffinitionis","severity":"info","text":"This passage introduces the fifth species of definition, κατ' ἀντίλεξιν, which Boethius translates as 'ad verbum'. This marks a transition from descriptive to verbal definition, completing the taxonomy.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"κατ' ἀντίλεξιν","severity":"info","text":"The Greek phrase κατ' ἀντίλεξιν, meaning 'according to contradiction' or 'verbal opposition', is rendered by Boethius as 'ad verbum'. This species likely concerns definition by negation or verbal contrast.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"M.'l'uJJius","severity":"caution","text":"The garbled form 'M.'l'uJJius' in the Latin likely represents a scribal corruption of 'M. Tullius' (Cicero). The text should be emended to 'M. Tullius' for clarity.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The exact referent of 'M.'l'uJJius' is uncertain due to textual corruption; the reading adopted is 'M. Tullius' (Cicero).","The precise meaning of κατ' ἀντίλεξιν is ambiguous; Boethius's translation 'ad verbum' suggests a verbal or literal mode of definition, but the Greek implies contradiction or opposition."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":31,"ref":"p31","source":"Haec vocem illam de cujus re quaeritur alio sermonedesignat uno ac singulari,et quodammodo quid illud sit uno verbo positum uno verbo alio declarat, ut conticescere tacere est, item latus haurit apertum, id est percutit,itemcum terminum dicimus finem, aut populatas interpretamur esse vastatas, et omnino cum unius verbi rem verbo manifestiore alio declaramus,haec erit quinta de qua loquimur diffinitio. M. Tullius hac usus est in Topicis, cum, locum argumenti diffiniens, dixit esse sedem, ita locum nomine uno cujus rem quaerebat alia appellatione ad verbum posita per diffinitionem quid esset, ostendit, sedem dicendo, hanc Graeci XCX't' appellant,ut av0pto7ro?.SextaxaTa 8tCl'fOpav, species diffinitionis est,hanc nos per differentiam dicimus.","english":"This [definition] designates that word, the thing of which is sought, by another word, one and singular, and in a certain way declares what that thing is, by one word placed in place of another word, as \"to fall silent\" is \"to be quiet,\" likewise \"he draws a broad wound\" i.e., \"he strikes,\" also when we say \"boundary\" for \"end,\" or interpret \"populated\" as \"laid waste,\" and in general when we declare the thing of one word by another, clearer word. This will be the fifth definition of which we speak. M. Tullius used this in the *Topics*, when, defining the place of an argument, he said it is a \"seat,\" thus by one word, \"seat,\" he showed, by another appellation placed for the word, through definition what the thing was, whose thing he sought. The Greeks call this [definition] *κατ' ἀντίφρασιν*, as *ἄνθρωπος*. The sixth *κατὰ διαφοράν* is a species of definition; we call this \"by difference.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"κατ' ἀντίφρασιν","severity":"info","text":"The Greek phrase κατ' ἀντίφρασιν (kata antiphrasin) is used here to denote a definition by antonym or negation, though the Latin examples (e.g., 'conticescere' = 'tacere') suggest a synonymic substitution. The term may be a corruption or misapplication in the manuscript tradition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"κατὰ διαφοράν","severity":"info","text":"The Greek phrase κατὰ διαφοράν (kata diaphoran) means 'by difference' and refers to a definition that distinguishes a species from its genus by a specific difference. Boethius translates this as 'per differentiam' in Latin.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"M. Tullius","severity":"info","text":"M. Tullius refers to Marcus Tullius Cicero, whose 'Topica' is a key source for Boethius's classification of definitions. Cicero defines 'locus' (place of argument) as 'sedes' (seat), an example of definition by synonym or substitution.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero Topica"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"quinta diffinitio","severity":"info","text":"This passage introduces the fifth type of definition in Boethius's sequence, which he calls definition by substitution of one word for another clearer word. The sixth type, 'by difference', is also mentioned but not elaborated here.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ut av0pto7ro?","severity":"caution","text":"The Greek word 'av0pto7ro?' is a garbled or corrupted form; it likely represents ἄνθρωπος (anthropos, 'human being'), but the intended example is unclear. The text may be corrupt at this point.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"background","lemma":"SextaxaTa 8tCl'fOpav","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'SextaxaTa 8tCl'fOpav' is a garbled transliteration of the Greek ἕκτη κατὰ διαφοράν (sixth by difference). This indicates a later scribal or transmission error in the manuscript, common in medieval copies of Boethius.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Greek terms κατ' ἀντίφρασιν and κατὰ διαφοράν are partially garbled in the Latin text, making their precise referents uncertain. The example 'av0pto7ro?' is likely a corruption of ἄνθρωπος, but the intended definitional relation is unclear."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":32,"ref":"p32","source":"Scriptores vero artium de eodem et altero nominant,ut cum quæritur quid inter regem sit et tyrannum adjecta differentia,quid uterque sit diffinitur,et omnis quidem diffinitio, sicuti docuimus supra, non nisi appositis differentiis comprehensoque suo proprio quid sit de quo quæritur exprimit; non tamen hoc idem videbitur esse modus iste de quonuncloquimur,siquidemsoladifferentia cum posita fuerit inter duos, de quibus quaeritur quid sit,utrumque cognoscitur: etenim in superioribus sola quaeque definitur, hie duo quasi eognita, sed quadam inter se communione confusa, adjecta differentia secernuntur, per quam quid sit utrumque cognoscitur,ut rex est modestus et temperatus,tyrannus vero crudelis.Ex:!:::oc il1ud est Terentii, pudore ac liberalitate liberos retinere satius esse puto quam metu, hoc pater ac dominus interest.ltem M. Tullius pro Sexto Roscio: Atque inter hanc vitam perpolitam humanitate et illam immanem nihil interest quam jus atque vts.Heptnua est, id est per translationem, ut Cicero in Topicis,Littus est quod fluctus eluit.ltem adolescentiaest flos ætatis,senectus occasus aetatis; hæc varie tractari potest.","english":"But the writers on the arts call this by the same and the other, as when it is asked what the difference is between a king and a tyrant, by the added difference it is defined what each is; and every definition, as we have taught above, expresses what the thing sought is only by the addition of differences and by the comprehension of its own proper [characteristic]; yet this same mode of which we speak will not seem to be the same, since when the sole difference has been placed between the two about which it is asked what each is, both are known: for in the earlier [modes] each single thing is defined, but here two things, as it were known but confused by some common bond, are separated by the added difference, through which it is known what each is, as a king is moderate and temperate, a tyrant cruel. Hence that saying of Terence: \"I think it is better to keep children by modesty and liberality than by fear; this is the difference between a father and a master.\" Likewise Marcus Tullius for Sextus Roscius: \"And between this life polished by humanity and that savage one there is no difference except law and force.\" The seventh is by translation, as Cicero in the Topics: \"A shore is what the waves wash.\" Likewise: \"Adolescence is the flower of age, old age the sunset of life\"; this can be treated in various ways.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"de eodem et altero","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'de eodem et altero' (lit. 'concerning the same and the other') is a technical term from the artes, referring to a mode of definition that distinguishes two things by a single difference, as between king and tyrant.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Terentii","severity":"info","text":"The Terence quotation is from the Adelphoe (line 57-58), where Micio contrasts paternal and masterly authority. Boethius uses it to illustrate definition by difference.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Terence"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"M. Tullius pro Sexto Roscio","severity":"info","text":"The citation from Cicero's Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino (section 49) contrasts a civilized life with a savage one, distinguished only by law and force, as an example of definition by difference.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Cicero in Topicis","severity":"info","text":"Boethius cites Cicero's Topica (section 7) for the definition of 'littus' (shore) as 'what the waves wash', an example of definition by translation (per translationem).","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Heptnua est","severity":"info","text":"The Greek term 'Heptnua' (likely a corruption of 'ἑπτά' or 'ἑπτὰ νοήματα') introduces the seventh mode of definition, 'per translationem' (by metaphor or transference), as distinct from the previous modes.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"Heptnua","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin 'Heptnua' is a garbled transliteration; the intended Greek term is uncertain, possibly 'ἑπτὰ νοήματα' (seven concepts) or a miswriting of 'ἑρμηνεία' (interpretation). The sense here is 'the seventh [mode]'.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The term 'Heptnua' is corrupt; its exact Greek original is unclear, but the context indicates it introduces the seventh mode of definition.","The phrase 'de eodem et altero' may be a technical term from the artes, but its precise source is not identified."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":33,"ref":"p33","source":"Modo enim ut moneat, modo ut designet, modo ut vituperet,aut laudet:ut moneat,nobilitas est virtus majorum apud posteros sarcina; ut designet,caput est arx corporis; ut vituperet,divitiae sunt brevis vitae longum viaticum; ut laudet,adolescentia est flos aetatis.His itaque et aliis modis proferri potest ista diffinitio,in quo genere tamen illud cavendum est, ne aut longe sit petita translatio, aut turpis. Longe petita translatio est,ut tuaba reipublicae, chaos legum, quod Tullius pro Sexto Roscio temperavit.Quasi sempiterna nox esset, inquit, in quo eliam si sit quasi ut per similitudinem sit,diffinitio accipi potest, temperamentum accipiens ex particula similitudinis.Turpis translatio fit duobus modis,cum honesta turpibus diffinimus,aut turpia honestis, ut si quis patrationem diffiniens, lacrymas dicat veneris fatigatae quem sudorem mellusnominaret.Autcontraaliquis dicat,lacrym£ e sunt doloris patratio, huic vitia nec superior particula temperamentum tribuit. Ergo magnopere istud vitare debemus.","english":"Now, it is used sometimes to warn, sometimes to designate, sometimes to censure, or to praise: to warn, \"Nobility is the burden of ancestors' virtue upon posterity\"; to designate, \"The head is the citadel of the body\"; to censure, \"Riches are the long provision for a short life\"; to praise, \"Youth is the flower of age.\" In these and other ways, this definition can be set forth; yet in that kind, one must beware that the metaphor is neither far-fetched nor base. A far-fetched metaphor is, for example, \"the trumpet of the republic,\" \"the chaos of the laws,\" which Cicero tempered in his speech for Sextus Roscius. \"As if it were an everlasting night,\" he says, in which, even if it is as if by likeness, a definition can be accepted, receiving a tempering from a particle of likeness. A base metaphor occurs in two ways: when we define honorable things by base ones, or base things by honorable ones, as if someone defining copulation were to call it \"the tears of wearied Venus,\" which he would better have named \"sweat.\" Or, on the contrary, someone might say, \"Tears are the copulation of grief\"; this vice neither the superior nor the particle of tempering bestows. Therefore, we must greatly avoid this.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"diffinitio","severity":"info","text":"Boethius classifies definitions by rhetorical function (monere, designare, vituperare, laudare), then warns against two faults in metaphorical definitions: far-fetched and base metaphors.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"translatio","severity":"info","text":"Translatio here means 'metaphor' in the rhetorical sense, not 'translation'. Boethius follows Cicero's usage in De Oratore.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Cicero pro Sexto Roscio","severity":"info","text":"Boethius cites Cicero's Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino, where Cicero uses metaphors like 'chaos of the laws' and 'everlasting night' to describe the state of the republic.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero 80 BCE"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"patratio","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin patratio (here 'copulation') is a rare and coarse term; the English draft's 'copulation' is appropriate but the passage's sexual metaphor may be euphemistic in the original context.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"diffinitio per translationem","severity":"info","text":"Boethius's discussion of metaphorical definition influenced later medieval theories of definition, especially in logic and rhetoric, as seen in works like Peter of Spain's Summulae Logicales.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"temperamentum","severity":"info","text":"Temperamentum (here 'tempering') refers to the moderating effect of a simile or likeness that makes a far-fetched metaphor acceptable in definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'quasi sempiterna nox esset' may be a direct quotation from Cicero or a paraphrase; the exact source is not identified in the passage.","The term 'patratio' is ambiguous in register; it may be deliberately vulgar or a technical term in some contexts."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":34,"ref":"p34","source":"Octava species diffinitionis xcx't' atpatpeatv tou evavxtou, id est per privantiam contrarii ejus quod diffinitur, ut bonum est quod malum non est; hoc genere diffinitionis uti debemus cum contrarium notum est.Nam haec duo cum ita intelligentur ut alterum sine altero esse non possit, alterius cognitio quomodo fiet, nisi fuerit utrumquecomprehensum?Cum igitur alterum quæritur quid sit,utique haec diffinitione comprehendi non potest,cum utrumque nescitur,quod se ita na. turaliter ligat, utnecessariam cognitionem sibi unius comprehensione connectat. Periclitatur ergo talis diffinitio,unde an contrarium ejus notum sit,scire debemus,ut hoc sublato fiat ejus cognitio quod diffinitur. Quare melius saepe fit si quaerentes aliquid quod diffiniendus. sit,contrarium ejusdiffiniamus, quo sublato illud quod quaeriturdeclarabimus,ut si bonum estquod prodest cum honestate,id quod tale non est malum est. Cicero in Rhetoricis: Necessarie demonstrantur ea quæ aliter ac debentur nec fieri nec probari possunt. Ponamus enim necessarium et non necessarium contraria, ut omnia contraria hic nos ponere intelligas quorum sublatione id quod quaeritur diffiniatur.Ergo quod non est necessarium ita diffiniri potest,quod aliter ac dicitur et fieri et probari potest: hoc cum tollo,necessal'ii diffinitionem constituo. Ergo recte fieri potest hujusmodi diffinitio,sed hoc modo quemadmodum docui.","english":"The eighth species of definition is κατὰ στέρησιν τοῦ ἐναντίου, that is, through the privation of the contrary of that which is defined, as \"good is that which is not evil\"; we ought to use this kind of definition when the contrary is known. For these two, when they are so understood that one cannot exist without the other, how will the knowledge of one come about unless both have been grasped? Therefore, when one is asked what it is, it certainly cannot be comprehended by this definition, when both are unknown, since they are so naturally bound that they connect necessary knowledge of one to the comprehension of the other. Hence such a definition is in peril; we must know whether its contrary is known, so that, with this removed, knowledge of that which is defined may come about. For this reason it often turns out better if, when seeking something that is to be defined, we define its contrary, and with that removed, we declare that which is sought, as if \"good is that which is beneficial with honor,\" then that which is not such is evil. Cicero in his *Rhetorica*: \"Necessary things are demonstrated which cannot otherwise be done or proven than as they ought.\" For let us posit necessary and not necessary as contraries, so that you understand all contraries here to be posited by whose removal that which is sought is defined. Therefore, that which is not necessary can be defined thus: that which can be done and proven otherwise than as it is said; when I remove this, I constitute the definition of the necessary. Therefore, a definition of this kind can rightly be made, but in the manner which I have taught.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"Octava species diffinitionis","severity":"info","text":"The eighth species of definition is introduced, following the seven previously enumerated in the treatise. The Greek phrase κατὰ στέρησιν τοῦ ἐναντίου is transliterated and glossed as 'per privantiam contrarii'.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Cicero in Rhetoricis","severity":"info","text":"Boethius cites Cicero's *Rhetorica* (likely the *De Inventione*) to support the method of definition by privation of the contrary. The citation is not verbatim from extant Ciceronian texts but reflects a common logical topos.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Periclitatur ergo talis diffinitio","severity":"info","text":"Boethius warns that this definition is precarious if both the term and its contrary are unknown, since they are mutually dependent. He recommends defining the contrary first, then removing it to reveal the original term.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"bonum est quod malum non est","severity":"info","text":"The example 'good is that which is not evil' echoes a standard logical illustration found in Aristotle's *Categories* and later in Porphyry's *Isagoge*, where contraries are defined by privation.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Aristotle","Porphyry"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"Octava species diffinitionis","severity":"info","text":"This classification of definition by privation of the contrary was influential in medieval logic, appearing in commentaries on Boethius and in later scholastic treatments of definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"necessal'ii","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text has 'necessal'ii' which is likely a scribal error or abbreviation for 'necessarii' (the necessary). The English draft reads 'necessary' accordingly.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'necessal'ii' in the Latin is ambiguous; it is interpreted as 'necessarii' (the necessary) based on context.","The exact source of the Cicero citation is uncertain; it may be a paraphrase rather than a direct quotation."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":35,"ref":"p35","source":"Et hoc est quod M. 'Tullius in Partitionibus prxecepit,saepe excontrariis essediffiniendum. Sub hanc diffinitionem caduntetiam notiones,cum accidentiatolluntur,et alia omnia quæ diversa sunt, et cum contrarium accidentis vel consequentis accidentis tollitur, ut si quis esse substantiam dicat, quod nequequalitas,nequequantitas,neque reliqua accidentia sit,cum alia quae diversa sunt tolluntur; talis est diffinitio, ut si quis hominem diffiniens tollat omnia animalia,vel generaliter, vel specialiter. Quo genere diffinitionis Deus diffiniri potest. Etenim cum quid sit Deus nullo modo scire possimus, sublatione omnium existentium quae Graeci 1:ncx appellant,cognitionem Dei,nobiscircumscripta et ablata notarum rerum cognitione, supponit.Deus est neque corpus, neque ullum elementum, neque,anima, neque mens, neque sensus, neque intellectus,neque aliquid quod ex his capi potest.His talibus sublatis, quid sit Deus poterit diffiniri,magis si addas quod etiam diffiniri non potest id Deum esse. Contrarium accidentis vel consequentis cum tollitur talis est diffinitio:Vigilare est uti sensibus, dormire est non uti sensibus; naturaliter possunt videri hujusmodi diffinitiones convenireilli diffinitioni quam supra diximus, Verum illa ex accidentibus ejusrei quam diffinivimus constat, vel consequentibus;baec ex contrariis,itaque ex ill a quæ est ex accidentibus fit, ut docet M.","english":"And this is what Marcus Tullius prescribed in his *Partitions*, that definition should often be made from contraries. Under this definition also fall notions, when accidents are removed, and all other things which are diverse, and when the contrary of an accident or of a consequent accident is removed, as if someone were to say that substance is that which is neither quality, nor quantity, nor the remaining accidents, when other things which are diverse are removed; such is the definition, as if someone, in defining man, were to remove all animals, either generally or specifically. By this kind of definition God can be defined. For since we can in no way know what God is, by the removal of all existing things, which the Greeks call *ὄντα*, the knowledge of God is posited for us, circumscribed and removed by the knowledge of known things. God is neither body, nor any element, nor soul, nor mind, nor sense, nor intellect, nor anything which can be grasped from these. With such things removed, what God is can be defined, especially if you add that even that which cannot be defined is God. The contrary of an accident or of a consequent, when removed, is a definition of this sort: To be awake is to use the senses; to sleep is not to use the senses. Naturally, definitions of this kind can seem to agree with that definition which we mentioned above. But that one consists of the accidents of that thing which we have defined, or of consequents; this one consists of contraries, and thus it arises from that which is from accidents, as Marcus Tullius teaches.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"M. Tullius in Partitionibus","severity":"info","text":"Cicero's *Partitiones Oratoriae* is a rhetorical handbook; Boethius here adapts its advice on defining by contraries for a logical context.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"ὄντα","severity":"info","text":"The Greek term ὄντα (onta) means 'existing things' or 'beings'; Boethius uses it to denote all entities that can be known, which are negated in the apophatic definition of God.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Sub hanc diffinitionem cadunt etiam notiones","severity":"info","text":"This sentence marks a transition: Boethius extends the eighth species (definition by privation of contrary) to include definitions by removal of accidents and diverse things, not only strict contraries.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"Deus est neque corpus, neque ullum elementum, neque anima, neque mens, neque sensus, neque intellectus","severity":"info","text":"This apophatic definition of God echoes Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and anticipates medieval negative theology; Boethius adapts it from Neoplatonic sources.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"Vigilare est uti sensibus, dormire est non uti sensibus","severity":"info","text":"The example of waking and sleeping as definitions by privation of a contrary (using vs. not using senses) parallels Aristotle's *Categories* 10a15-20, where sleep is defined as privation of waking.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"magis si addas quod etiam diffiniri non potest id Deum esse","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin syntax is ambiguous: 'id Deum esse' may mean 'that it is God' or 'that God is that which cannot be defined'; the English draft opts for the latter, but the clause is elliptical.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'id Deum esse' is ambiguous: it could mean 'that it is God' or 'that God is that which cannot be defined'.","The reference to 'M. Tullius' may conflate Cicero's *Partitiones Oratoriae* with a lost logical work."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":36,"ref":"p36","source":"Tullius Pisonem non fuisse consulem ita: An vero reliquo tempore consulem te quisquam duxit? quisquam tibi venienti in curiam assurrexit, quisquam consulenti respondendum putavit? Atque hujus locisuperiororatio at consequens in hacdiffinitione consistit,quavariis modis explicat eum non fuisse consulem,docensetiam per eaquas repugnant consuli adicLis,factis,cogitatis;a consequentibus sic diffinit consulem:animo esse oportet consilio, fide, gravitate, vigilantia, cura, toto denique munere consulatus,hucus1ue a consequentibus.Omnia enim consequentia sunt ea hoc quod dixi munere consulatus, unde, hæc erit diffinitio; hoc apertius ut fiat, dabo aliud exemplum. M. Tullius in eadem: Quid est aliud furere quam non cognoscere homines,non cognoscere leges, non senatum, non civitatem, cruentare corpus suum? Ergo consequentia accidentia colligere diffinitionis est, ejusvero quod diffinies contrarium tollere, hæc est illa quamoctavarasupradiximuydiffinitio. Nona species diffinitionis est xxxa, id est per quamdam imaginationem, ut tEneas est filius Veneris et Anchise;haec semper in individuis versatur, quae Graeci tt'top.cx vocant. Desideratur autem ista diffinitio circa nomina quæ omonyma sunt, individua duntaxat, ut Ajax et Oileus et Thelamonius. Item subvenit in eo genere dictionis, ubi aliquem pudor aut metus est nominare:Me videlicet, inquit M.","english":"Tullius concerning Piso not having been consul, thus: \"But in the remaining time, did anyone consider you consul? Did anyone rise for you when you entered the Senate, did anyone think you should be answered when you sought advice?\" And the argument of this place, both the superior and the consequent, consists in this definition, which explains in various ways that he was not consul, teaching also through those things which are repugnant to the consul—by additions, deeds, thoughts; from consequents it defines the consul thus: \"He must be in mind with counsel, faith, gravity, vigilance, care, finally with the whole office of the consulship,\" up to this point from consequents. For all these are consequents of that which I have called the office of the consulship; hence this will be the definition. To make this clearer, I will give another example. Marcus Tullius in the same: \"What else is it to be mad than not to know men, not to know the laws, not the Senate, not the state, to bloody one's own body?\" Therefore, to gather consequent accidents is of definition, and to remove the contrary of that which you are defining; this is that definition which we have called the eighth above. The ninth species of definition is *κατὰ φαντασίαν*, that is, by a certain imagination, as \"Aeneas is the son of Venus and Anchises\"; this always deals with individuals, which the Greeks call *ἄτομα*. This definition is needed, however, around names which are homonymous, only for individuals, as Ajax, both the son of Oileus and the son of Telamon. Likewise, it helps in that kind of expression where shame or fear prevents naming someone: \"Me, of course,\" says Marcus Tullius.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"octava","severity":"info","text":"The Latin 'octava' refers to the eighth species of definition, which Boethius earlier described as definition by consequents and removal of contraries.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"nona species diffinitionis est xxxa","severity":"info","text":"The Greek term 'κατὰ φαντασίαν' (kata phantasian) is transliterated as 'xxxa' in the manuscript, meaning 'by imagination' or 'by a certain mental image'.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"tt'top.cx","severity":"info","text":"The garbled Greek 'tt'top.cx' likely represents 'ἄτομα' (atoma), meaning 'individuals' or 'indivisible entities', as used in Aristotelian logic.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Tullius Pisonem","severity":"info","text":"The reference is to Cicero's speech 'In Pisonem' (against Piso), a lost oration; Boethius uses it to illustrate definition by consequents and contraries.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Ajax et Oileus et Thelamonius","severity":"info","text":"Ajax the son of Oileus (Locrian Ajax) and Ajax the son of Telamon (Telamonian Ajax) are homonymous individuals, used to illustrate definition by imagination for homonyms.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"hucus1ue","severity":"caution","text":"The reading 'hucus1ue' is a scribal corruption of 'hucusque' (up to this point), likely due to misreading of a numeral or abbreviation.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Greek terms 'xxxa' and 'tt'top.cx' are garbled in the manuscript; the reading follows standard reconstructions as 'κατὰ φαντασίαν' and 'ἄτομα'.","The reference to 'Tullius Pisonem' may be to Cicero's lost speech or a misattributed fragment; the context assumes a known oration."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":37,"ref":"p37","source":"Tullius, sicarii illi describebant ide domo sua sic. At pro Fundanio ita, descripsisti ne ejus necessarium nostrum competitorem istum ipsum; ejus nunc studio, et gratia, tota accusatio ista munita est. In metu fuerat nominare, ideo ergo descriptus est. Item pro Cornelio: Majestatis ipsa sunt,legite ut legebatis,hinc intelligetis nulla tenuissima suspicione describi aut significari Cornelium. Hæc tantum de propriis nominibus: alia illa sit quam diximus superior diffinitio. Ergo a genere, patria, corpore, factis, dictis, sive casibus,atque ab animo unumillumquem nolumus diffinitionis genere declaramus.Decima species est IBS TSar\" hanc veluti diximus,ut si quaeratur quid sit animal, respondeatur ut homo. Sic Aristoteles dicit oudiaeuxt we;, rem enim quæsitam subjunctum declarat exemplum,et hoc est proprium diffinitionis,quid sit illud quod quæritur declarare. Undecima species diffinitionis est xcx,,' svSeiav Tou auxou \"(ivoue;, id est per indigentiam pleni ex eodem genere,ut si quaeratur quid sit quadrans, respondeatur cui dodrans deest,ut sit assis.Duodecima species diffinitionis est xotr' E,camov,id est per laudem,uL M. Tullius pro Cluentio: Lex est mens, et animus, et consilium, et scientia civitatis;etnos quidem, ut diffinitionem ostenderemus, ita posuimus exemplum. Nam boc idem M.","english":"Tullius, those assassins described him from his own house thus. But for Fundanius thus: you described whether our necessary competitor that very one; his now zeal and favor, that whole accusation is fortified. He had been afraid to name, therefore he was described. Likewise for Cornelius: The charges of treason themselves are, read as you were reading, from this you will understand that Cornelius is described or indicated by no slightest suspicion. These things only concerning proper names: that other definition is as we said the superior one. Therefore from family, country, body, deeds, words, or circumstances, and from mind we declare that one whom we wish by a kind of definition. The tenth species is IBS TSar\" this as we said, as if it is asked what an animal is, one answers \"a human.\" Thus Aristotle says ousia eidos, for the thing sought the subjoined example declares, and this is proper to definition, to declare what that which is sought is. The eleventh species of definition is kata endeian tou plerous tou autou genous, that is, by the lack of the full from the same genus, as if it is asked what a quadrans is, one answers \"that to which a dodrans is lacking, so that it is an as.\" The twelfth species of definition is kat' epainon, that is, by praise, as M. Tullius for Cluentius: \"Law is the mind, and spirit, and counsel, and knowledge of the state\"; and we indeed, to show the definition, placed the example thus. For this same M.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Tullius, sicarii illi describebant ide domo sua sic","severity":"info","text":"The Latin text is corrupt; 'sicarii illi describebant ide domo sua sic' likely garbles a reference to Cicero's lost speech against the assassins of Piso. The passage illustrates definition by description of a person's circumstances.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"IBS TSar\"","severity":"caution","text":"The Coptic phrase 'IBS TSar\"' is a garbled transliteration of Greek eidos, meaning 'species' or 'form'. It likely represents the tenth species of definition, which defines by subjoining an example of the same species.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"oudiaeuxt we;","severity":"caution","text":"The Coptic 'oudiaeuxt we;' is a garbled transliteration of Greek ousia eidos, meaning 'substance and form'. This phrase refers to Aristotle's method of defining by giving the genus and species.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"xcx,,' svSeiav Tou auxou \"(ivoue;","severity":"caution","text":"The Coptic phrase is a garbled transliteration of Greek kata endeian tou plerous tou autou genous, meaning 'by the lack of the full from the same genus'. This is the eleventh species of definition, defining by privation.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"xotr' E,camov","severity":"caution","text":"The Coptic 'xotr' E,camov' is a garbled transliteration of Greek kat' epainon, meaning 'by praise'. This is the twelfth species of definition, which defines by eulogy, as illustrated by Cicero's definition of law.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"M. Tullius pro Cluentio: Lex est mens, et animus, et consilium, et scientia civitatis","severity":"info","text":"This quotation from Cicero's Pro Cluentio (a lost or fragmentary speech) is used as an example of definition by praise. The passage shows Boethius' reliance on Ciceronian rhetoric for his taxonomy of definitions.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Coptic text is heavily garbled, especially in the transliterations of Greek terms (e.g., 'IBS TSar\"', 'oudiaeuxt we;', 'xcx,,'). The reading assumes these represent the Greek terms for species, substance and form, and the phrase for definition by privation, respectively.","The phrase 'sicarii illi describebant ide domo sua sic' is corrupt; the intended reference to Cicero's speech against Piso's assassins is inferred from context.","The identity of 'Fundanius' and the precise speech referred to are uncertain."],"confidence":"low","notes":[]},{"i":38,"ref":"p38","source":"Tullius dicens non adhibitaoralionediffinitionis,simplicitercollocavit:Mens,inquit,et animus civitatis et consilium, et scientia posita est in legibus; et, ut nos supra docuimus,diffinitionemnihil aliud voluit quam orationem esse. Ergo diverso modo M.Tullius protulit quod a novis conversim oratione sua forma diffinitionis accepit, et hoc longe ab illo modo distat qui fit per metaphoram, non enim translatio est, cum lex mens dicitur civitatis, nec tamen genus est ut substantialis habeatur consequens enim est ut et per vituperationem, sed sine translatione ponatur:sic videri potest a Tullio diffinitum:Servitus est postremum malorum,non modo bello,sed morte etiam repellendum.Quanquam enim ita sit exorsus, pax est tranquilialibertas,sed inter pacem et servi. tutem plurimuminterestjut perdifferentiam diffini-.","english":"Tullius, not employing the form of definition, simply placed it: \"The mind,\" he says, \"and spirit of the state, and counsel, and knowledge is placed in the laws\"; and, as we have taught above, he wished definition to be nothing other than speech. Therefore M. Tullius in a different manner set forth what he received from the new converts in his own speech as a form of definition, and this is far removed from that mode which occurs through metaphor, for it is not a transference when the law is called the mind of the state, nor yet is it a genus so as to be considered substantial; for it follows that it is also placed without transference for the sake of censure: thus it can seem to have been defined by Tullius: \"Slavery is the worst of evils, to be repelled not only by war but even by death.\" For although he began thus, \"Peace is tranquility, liberty,\" but between peace and slavery there is a very great difference, which is defined by means of difference.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"diffinitio","severity":"info","text":"Boethius distinguishes between a proper definition (diffinitio) and a metaphorical or descriptive statement, arguing that Cicero's phrase 'law is the mind of the state' is not a true definition because it lacks the form of a definition and is not a genus-species account.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"diffinitio","severity":"info","text":"Diffinitio is the standard Latin term for 'definition' in the logical tradition, here contrasted with oratio (speech) and metaphor (translatio). Boethius insists that a definition must have a specific form, not merely be a descriptive phrase.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"external","lemma":"M. Tullius","severity":"info","text":"The passage refers to Cicero (M. Tullius) and his rhetorical works. The quoted definition of slavery ('Servitus est postremum malorum...') is not a standard Ciceronian fragment but may be a paraphrase or a lost passage; it illustrates Boethius's point about definition by difference.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues Boethius's analysis of Cicero's use of definition, contrasting it with metaphorical and genus-based definitions. The final sentence introduces definition per differentiam (by difference) as a distinct mode.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text is corrupt in the final lines: 'pax est tranquilialibertas' likely should read 'pax est tranquillitas, libertas' but the syntax is broken. The English draft attempts to reconstruct the sense, but the exact wording of Cicero's original is uncertain.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'a novis conversim' is obscure; it may refer to 'new converts' (perhaps to a rhetorical school) or be a textual corruption. The reading 'new converts' is adopted in the draft but is uncertain.","The final clause 'jut perdifferentiam diffini-' is truncated; the intended word is likely 'diffinitur' or 'diffinitio', but the exact completion is unclear."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":39,"ref":"p39","source":"tio esse videatur; tamen quia non articulum illum breviter quo distaret ostendit, sed unamquamque rem suo genere dillinivit, collatione magis quo distarent ostendit,non genere diffinitionis per differentiam.Eritigitur prior pacis diffinitio £ a consequentibusejus reiquam diffiniebat: Pax est tranquilla libertas.Hæc secuda magis per vituperationem: non enim aut consequens ejus est,autaliquid horum quæ diffinitioni dedimus sed sola vituperatioestquee servitutem malorum omnium dicitur esse postremum.Necaccipitur rursus malum quasi genus ad servitutem,nam malum qualitas est,servitus ad aliquid;unde cum diversae sint res, malum genus esse non potest ad servitutem. Jure igitur per vituperationem facta dicitur servitutis supraposita diffinitio.","english":"be seen as a definition; yet, because he did not briefly indicate that article by which it would differ, but defined each thing by its own genus, he showed by comparison rather than by the genus of definition through difference how they differ. Therefore, the first definition of peace will be from the consequents of that thing which it defined: \"Peace is tranquil liberty.\" This second one is more by way of vituperation: for it is neither a consequent of it, nor any of those things which we have given to definition, but it is solely vituperation, which says that slavery is the last of all evils. Nor, again, is \"evil\" taken as a genus in relation to slavery, for evil is a quality, slavery a relation; hence, since they are different things, evil cannot be a genus for slavery. Rightly, therefore, the above definition of slavery is said to have been made by way of vituperation.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius contrasts two definitions of peace: the first, 'Pax est tranquilla libertas,' is a definition from consequents; the second is merely vituperative, not a proper definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"diffinitio per vituperationem","severity":"info","text":"A 'definition by vituperation' is not a true definition in Boethius's system, as it does not give genus and differentia but merely denigrates the subject.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Boethius here engages with the Stoic and Academic tradition of definition, critiquing a rhetorical or moralizing approach that fails to meet logical standards.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the analysis of definitions of peace and slavery, using the earlier example of Tullius to illustrate improper definitional forms.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text has 'dillinivit' which is likely a scribal error for 'definivit'; the sense is clear but the form is non-standard.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'a consequentibus ejus rei quam diffiniebat' could be read as 'from the consequents of that thing which it defined' or 'from the consequents of that thing which was being defined'; the translation takes the former.","The reference to 'supraposita diffinitio' is ambiguous: it may refer to a definition given earlier in the text or to the immediately preceding one."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":40,"ref":"p40","source":"Tertia decima species diffinitionis estxaxa,id est juxtarationem, quæ proportio dicitur, eum aliquid quod disputari licet cum altero id esse dicitur quod illud est allerum propter rationem si[nititudiGtS;sed hoc contingit cum majoris rei nomine diffinitur inferior, et quod hoc additur quid sit inferior.Graeci sic dilfin)unt:\"Av6pa)iLO£; etrci,id est homo est minor rnundu;.Cicero hoc usus est sic: Qui plurimum tribuunLetlicto,præter edictum legem animam dicunt esse, Quarta decima species est diflinitionis xata irpoc; 'Cl, id est ad aliquid, ut Pater est,cui est filius.Cicero in Rhetoricis:Sic genus est quod plures partesamplectii.ur.Item pars est quae subest generi.","english":"The thirteenth species of definition is κατὰ λόγον, that is, according to reason, which is called proportion, when something that can be discussed with another is said to be that which the other is, on account of a reason of similarity; but this occurs when the name of a greater thing is used to define a lesser, and when it is added what the lesser is. The Greeks define it thus: ἄνθρωπός ἐστι μικρὸς κόσμος, that is, man is a little world. Cicero used it thus: Those who attribute much to the edict, beyond the edict, say that law is a living soul. The fourteenth species of definition is κατὰ πρός τι, that is, in relation to something, as \"Father is he who has a son.\" Cicero in his Rhetorics: \"Thus a genus is that which embraces several parts.\" Likewise, \"A part is that which is subordinate to a genus.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"xata λόγον","severity":"info","text":"The Greek phrase κατὰ λόγον is transliterated in the Latin as 'xata λόγον' and glossed as 'juxta rationem' (according to reason) and 'proportio' (proportion). This species of definition defines a lesser thing by analogy with a greater.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"xata πρός τι","severity":"info","text":"The Greek phrase κατὰ πρός τι is transliterated as 'xata πρός τι' and glossed as 'ad aliquid' (in relation to something). This species defines a term by its relation to another, e.g., 'Father is he who has a son.'","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"ἄνθρωπός ἐστι μικρὸς κόσμος","severity":"info","text":"The definition 'man is a little world' (μικρὸς κόσμος) is a classical topos, found in Greek philosophy (e.g., Democritus, Aristotle) and later in Latin authors. Boethius cites it as an example of definition by proportion.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"Cicero","severity":"info","text":"Boethius attributes to Cicero the example of defining law as 'a living soul' (legem animam dicunt esse). This likely refers to Cicero's lost rhetorical works, possibly the De inventione or a commentary, but the exact source is uncertain.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Tertia decima species","severity":"info","text":"This passage enumerates the thirteenth and fourteenth species of definition in Boethius's classification. The sequence continues from earlier passages, systematically listing types of definition derived from Greek sources.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"si[nititudiGtS","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text contains a corrupt or garbled word 'si[nititudiGtS', likely intended as 'similitudinis' (of similarity). The brackets and capital G suggest a scribal error or editorial mark in the source edition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'legem animam dicunt esse' is attributed to Cicero but the exact work is not specified; it may be a paraphrase or a lost text.","The corrupt 'si[nititudiGtS' is resolved as 'similitudinis' based on context."],"confidence":"high","notes":[{"kind":"lacuna","severity":"caution","text":"The source is fragmentary here: the edition marks a break or an editorial bracket, and the English carries across it. Treat the bridge as supplied, not translated."}]},{"i":41,"ref":"p41","source":"Quinta decima species est.Latini secundum rei rationem vocant, ut dies est sol super terras; nox, sol sub terris: ut enim aut dies aut nox sil,causa est aut supra terras sol aut sub terris.Sunt et aliae fortasse species diffinitionis,verum si quis invenerit, adjiciat ad numerum, modo illud diligenter attendat,ne forte harum alicui specierum illud quod invenerit possit adjungi.Nec nos rursus frustra aliquis existimet totspecies separasse,quod possunt sibi aliquas convenire.Consideratione enim plenius commodata, omnes inter se magno cernet discrimine separatas;teneat modo quod supra saepe præcepi, solam vero illam appellari diffinitionem, quae a genere exordium sumens ad proprium rei quae diffinitur,separando per differentias quae communia poterant esse, descendit.Nunc jam de vitiis diffinitionis, ut promissum est,explicemus.Diffinitio su bstantialis qUam primam docuimus,quamsolam diximusdiffinitionem,duovitiarecipit principalia. Si ea oratio quæ diffinit, aut amplius complexa fuerit,aut minus quam res plena sit declaravit.Oportet enim ut oratio diffinitiva ita componatur ad nomen cujus rem definit, ut parem potentiam exprimendae atqueipsum vocabulumpræstet,conversimque nomen et diftinitiose invicemcollatadeclarent. Ut si quaeras quid homo est,recte respondeatur animal terrenum, rationale, mortale, bipes, risus capax.","english":"The fifteenth species is that which the Latins call according to the reason of the thing, as day is the sun above the earth; night, the sun beneath the earth: for either day or night is caused by the sun either above or beneath the earth. There are perhaps also other species of definition, but if anyone discovers them, let him add them to the number, provided he carefully attend to this, lest what he has found be capable of being joined to any of these species. Nor let anyone think that we have separated these species in vain, because some of them can coincide with one another. For when consideration is more fully applied, they are all seen to be separated by a great distinction; let him only hold what I have often commanded above, that only that is called a definition which, taking its beginning from the genus, descends to the property of the thing being defined, separating by means of the differences what could be common. Now let us explain the faults of definition, as was promised. The substantial definition, which we taught as the first and which alone we called definition, admits two principal faults: if the defining speech has either comprehended more or less than the full declaration of the thing requires. For the defining speech must be so composed to the name whose thing it defines that it provides an equal power of expressing, and conversely the name and the definition, when compared with each other, declare the same. As if you ask what man is, it is rightly answered: a terrestrial, rational, mortal, bipedal animal, capable of laughter.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Quinta decima species est","severity":"info","text":"This passage marks the end of the catalogue of definition species and transitions to a discussion of definitional faults, as promised earlier in the treatise.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"secundum rei rationem","severity":"info","text":"The Latin phrase 'secundum rei rationem' translates the Greek κατὰ λόγον, here meaning 'according to the reason of the thing', a definition by proportion or analogy.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"dies est sol super terras; nox, sol sub terris","severity":"info","text":"The examples of day and night illustrate definition by cause: the sun's position relative to earth is the defining reason.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Nunc jam de vitiis diffinitionis","severity":"info","text":"This signals a new section on the faults of definition, focusing on the substantial definition as the only true definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"diffinitio su bstantialis","severity":"info","text":"The 'substantial definition' is the first species taught, defined as beginning from the genus and descending through differences to the property of the thing.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"su bstantialis","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text has a space in 'su bstantialis', likely a scribal or editorial artifact; it should read 'substantialis'.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'secundum rei rationem' could be read as 'according to the reason of the thing' or 'according to the account of the thing'; the translation adopts the former.","The text 'sil,causa est' is corrupt; the English draft interprets it as 'caused by', but the exact reading is uncertain."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":42,"ref":"p42","source":"Hoc rursus si convertas, homo sit optima declaratio.Quaerenti enim quid est animal terrenum, rationale, mortale, bipes, risus capax7fiat recta responsio,homo est. At si ita diffinias, homo est substantiaanimata sensibilis,est quidemdeclaratiohominis, nam haec omnia homo est:; verum si convertas, non valebit. Non enim substantia animata sensibilis,homo tantum est;peccat igitur diffinitio per abundantiam,quia amplius continet quam quae rebatur. Et omnino peccat diffinitio qua; genusponit quod ultra se est;dicimus enim,quod supra est genus magis declarat.Item peccat minus conlinens quam necesse est,ut cupiditasest aliena appetendi desiderium, quod similiter conversum non manet, quia minus comprehensivum diffinitione quam res nominis postulabat. Late enim cupiditas patet,nec sola avaritia est; ergo vitiosa est diffinitio minus complexa quam qucerabatur,ac si diceret,cupiditas est avaritia: quae si exemplum daret et auditorem transmitteret in totumquod cupiditas est similitudinis propositione, ut avaritiae, essetque illa diffiniendi species quam decimam collocavimus w?.Nunc non ad totum transmisit exemplum,sed quasi totum continens multa a toto praetereundo peccavit,unde non poterat fieri ad nomen ex diffinitione conversio. Haec duo vitia si vitentur, integra diffinitio est,neque haec sola quae substantialisest, sed etiam reliquae species. Nunc haec de vitiis.","english":"If you convert this again, man is the best declaration. For to one asking what is a terrestrial, rational, mortal, two-footed animal capable of laughter, a correct response is made: it is man. But if you define it thus: man is an animate, sentient substance, it is indeed a declaration of man, for man is all these things; but if you convert it, it will not hold. For not every animate, sentient substance is only man; therefore the definition errs by excess, because it contains more than what was intended. And a definition errs entirely when it posits a genus that is beyond itself; for we say that what is above is a genus that declares more. Likewise, it errs by containing less than is necessary, as in: cupidity is the desire for another's goods, which similarly does not hold when converted, because the definition is less comprehensive than what the name of the thing required. For cupidity extends widely, and is not only avarice; therefore the definition is faulty, being less comprehensive than what was sought, as if one said: cupidity is avarice. If it gave an example and transmitted the hearer to the whole that cupidity is by a proposition of similarity, as of avarice, it would be that species of defining which we placed as the tenth. But now it did not transmit the example to the whole, but as if containing the whole, it erred by passing over many things from the whole, whence a conversion from the definition to the name could not be made. If these two faults are avoided, the definition is complete, and not only this one which is substantial, but also the remaining species. So much for faults.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"declaratio","severity":"info","text":"Boethius uses 'declaratio' to render Greek 'horos' or 'horismos', meaning a definition that reveals the essence. The term is contrasted with 'diffinitio' (definition) in the broader context.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"peccat per abundantiam","severity":"info","text":"'Errs by excess' is a technical fault in definition where the definiens is too broad, including things beyond the definiendum. Boethius here adapts Aristotelian and Porphyrian logical criteria.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"conversio","severity":"info","text":"'Conversion' refers to the logical test of whether the definition and the defined term can be swapped without loss of truth. A valid definition must allow such reciprocal substitution.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage enumerates two faults of definition: excess (too broad) and deficiency (too narrow), using examples of 'man' and 'cupidity'. It then references the tenth species of definition (definition by example) from earlier in the work.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"cupiditas","severity":"info","text":"Boethius's example of 'cupidity' as desire for another's goods reflects a Stoic and early Christian moral framework, where cupidity is a broader vice than mere avarice. The fault lies in defining a wider concept by a narrower one.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"similitudinis propositione","severity":"caution","text":"The phrase 'by a proposition of similarity' is obscure. It likely refers to a definition that uses an example to convey the whole genus, but the Latin is compressed and the exact logical mechanism is debated.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'similitudinis propositione' is ambiguous: it may mean 'by a proposition of similarity' or 'by a similar proposition'. The reading taken follows the sense of definition by example (tenth species).","The term 'declaratio' is used interchangeably with 'diffinitio' in some contexts, but here it seems to denote a looser 'declaration' as opposed to a strict definition."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":43,"ref":"p43","source":"Cicero cum in Rhetoricis tria esse vitia docuit, mala, inquit, diffinitio fit cum aut communia describit hoc modo: Seditiosus est is qui malus est, atque inutilis civis. Nam boc non magis seditiosi, quam ambiliosi,quarn calumniatoris,quamalicujushominis improbi vim describit: hanc diffinitionem diximus abundantiaesse vitiosam.Aliud vitium adjungit,ita ut falsum quiddam dicat hocpacto,sapientia est pecuniae quaerendae intelligentia:hoc vitium Cicero adjecit praeter illa duo quæ dixi.Tertium enim ipseposuitquoda nobis secundum est constitutum. Ita enim ait ut aliquid non grave nec magnum continens sit: Stultitia est immensae cupiditas gloriae. Hoc ideo peccat, quia minus comprehendit quod sic exprimit M. Tullius. Est haec quidem stultitia, sed ex parte quadam,non ex omni genere diffinita.. I Præter haec idem M.Tullius in secundo Rhetoricorum adjecit duo vitia, si aut turpis sit aut inutilis diffinitio,id autem (ut ipse ait) ex honestatis et utilitatis partibus approbatur.Ac de turpi diffinitione nos in superioribus diximus cum diffinitionem per translationemtractaremus,sedillud vitium in verbo est; fieri autem potest ut omnis oratio inhonesta ista contineat vel inutilia comprehendat.In Philippicis M.Tullius in oratione prima docebatab Antonio Caesaris actasubverti,etid denegabat.Antonius.","english":"Cicero, in his *Rhetorica*, taught that there are three faults. A bad definition, he says, occurs when it describes common things in this way: \"A seditious man is one who is bad and a useless citizen.\" For this describes the force not more of a seditious man than of an ambitious man, or of a slanderer, or of any wicked man. This definition we have said is faulty by excess. He adds another fault, so that it says something false in this manner: \"Wisdom is the intelligence of seeking money.\" Cicero added this fault besides those two which I have mentioned. For he himself placed the third, which is established by us as the second. For he speaks thus, so that it contains something neither serious nor great: \"Folly is an immense desire for glory.\" This sins because it comprehends less than what M. Tullius thus expresses. This is indeed folly, but defined from a certain part, not from the whole genus. Besides these, the same M. Tullius, in the second book of his *Rhetorica*, added two faults: if the definition is either shameful or useless. This, as he himself says, is approved from the parts of honesty and utility. And concerning the shameful definition, we have spoken above when we treated definition by transference; but that fault is in the word. It can, however, happen that the whole speech contains these dishonorable things or comprehends useless ones. In the *Philippics*, M. Tullius, in the first oration, taught that Antony was overturning the acts of Caesar, and he denied this. Antony.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"Cicero cum in Rhetoricis","severity":"info","text":"Boethius refers to Cicero's De Inventione, a standard rhetorical treatise. The three faults of definition Boethius lists correspond to Cicero's categories: too broad, false, and insufficient.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero De Inventione"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"abundantia","severity":"info","text":"Abundantia here means 'excess' or 'overbreadth' in definition, a fault where the definition applies to more than the definiendum. Boethius uses it to translate Cicero's vitium of defining too broadly.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Tertium enim ipse posuit quod a nobis secundum est constitutum","severity":"info","text":"Boethius notes a discrepancy in ordering: Cicero's third fault (insufficient definition) is Boethius's second. This reflects Boethius's reorganization of Cicero's categories for his own logical framework.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"In Philippicis M.Tullius in oratione prima docebat ab Antonio Caesaris actas subverti","severity":"info","text":"Boethius cites Cicero's First Philippic (44 BCE) as an example of a definition that may be shameful or useless. The reference is to Cicero's accusation that Antony was overturning Caesar's acts, a politically charged context.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero Philippicae"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"et id denegabat. Antonius.","severity":"caution","text":"The final sentence is abrupt and possibly corrupt: 'and he denied this. Antony.' The Latin may be incomplete or mis-copied; the sense likely is that Antony denied the accusation, but the text breaks off.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The final clause 'et id denegabat. Antonius.' is unclear: it may be a fragment or a scribal error, leaving the reference to Antony's denial ambiguous."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":44,"ref":"p44","source":"Attulit uterque difffnitionem,ut ostenderet quid sit I actumejus qui togatus cum putestate in civitate ver-; setur.Docui in superioribus asserendae diffinitionis partes esse quatuor:primam esse diffinitionem,secundam approbationem diffinitionis,tertiam deductionem diffinitionis ad speciem, quartam destructionem diffinitionis adversæ partis. Cicero actum ejus qui sit in republica cum potestate degentis,diffinit leges esae; Antonius, chirographa. Ergo sua oratione Cicero et diffinit,et approbat,ei deducit ad speciem, et destruit diffinitionem adversas partis. Diffinitio Ciceronis est haec: Et quid est quod tam proprie dici possit actum ejus qui togalus in rempublicam cum potestate et imperio versatus sit, quam lex? deinde subjungitur ejus diffinitionis approbatio hoc modo: Quære acta Gracchi,legeB Semproniae proferentur. Quare Sylla?, Corneliee, quid Gh.Pompeii tertius consulatus,in quibus actis consistit? nempe inlegibus; hæc approbatio est.Deinde adjungitur deductio diffinitionis ad speciem. A Cæsare ipso si quaeres quodnam egisset in Urbe et in toga, leges multas respondet se et præclaras tulisse. Sequitur reprehenso diffinitionis adversæ partis, eaque fit bipartito: aut enim ex ilIis omnibus vitiis aliquid in ea reprehensione concluditur, aut concesso eo quod adversarii dicunt per comparationem, magis hoc esse quod nos dicimus approbamus. Hic utrumque M.","english":"Each side brought forward a definition, in order to show what is the *actum* of one who, wearing the toga, conducts himself with authority in the state. I taught in earlier sections that there are four parts of establishing a definition: the first is the definition, the second the approval of the definition, the third the deduction of the definition to the species, the fourth the destruction of the opposing party's definition. Cicero defines the *actum* of one who lives in the republic with authority as laws; Antonius, as chirographs. Therefore, in his speech, Cicero both defines, and approves, and deduces to the species, and destroys the definition of the opposing party. Cicero's definition is this: \"And what can so properly be called the *actum* of one who, wearing the toga, has conducted himself in the republic with authority and imperium, as a law?\" Then the approval of that definition is subjoined in this way: \"Why, the acts of Gracchus will be brought forth by the Sempronian law. Why those of Sulla? By the Cornelian laws. Why those of Gnaeus Pompeius' third consulship? In what do his acts consist? Surely in laws.\" This is the approval. Then the deduction of the definition to the species is added: \"If you were to ask Caesar himself what he had done in the City and in the toga, he would answer that he had carried many and excellent laws.\" The refutation of the opposing party's definition follows, and it is made in two ways: for either something from all those faults is concluded in that refutation, or, by conceding what the adversaries say, we approve through comparison that this is more what we say. Here both are [present].","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"actum","severity":"info","text":"The Latin noun 'actum' (here neuter singular) denotes a deed, action, or official act, especially in a legal or political context. Boethius uses it to translate the Greek πρᾶξις or ἔργον in rhetorical theory.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"Cicero ... Antonius","severity":"info","text":"The passage refers to a lost rhetorical debate between Cicero and Antonius (likely the orator Marcus Antonius, not the triumvir) over the definition of a statesman's 'actum'. This is drawn from Cicero's own rhetorical works, now fragmentary.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"quatuor partes","severity":"info","text":"Boethius outlines a four-part method for establishing a definition: definition, approval, deduction to species, and destruction of the opponent's definition. This structure is a rhetorical schema, not a logical one, and governs the entire passage.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"chirographa","severity":"info","text":"Antonius defines the statesman's act as 'chirographa' (handwritten documents, i.e., decrees or edicts), contrasting with Cicero's definition as 'leges' (laws). This opposition reflects a known rhetorical topos on the nature of political authority.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"background","lemma":"Cicero ... diffinit","severity":"info","text":"Boethius here preserves a fragment of Cicero's rhetorical theory that is otherwise lost. The passage is a key witness for the ancient debate on definition in Roman oratory, cited by later medieval commentators on rhetoric.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The identity of 'Antonius' is ambiguous: it could be the orator Marcus Antonius (143–87 BC) or a later figure; Boethius does not specify.","The phrase 'togatus cum potestate' may refer to a specific constitutional office (e.g., consul or praetor) but is left generic."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":45,"ref":"p45","source":"Tullius facit.Nam et de vitiis illa ponit ut falsam diffinitionem doceat, et turpem, et inutilem. Ac deinde oor.cedensmagis suam confirmet diffinitionem, dicatque potiorem.Falsam diffinitionem sic Cicero probat excutiendo quod consequens sit; his enim probatur falsa diffinitio,si suum proprium non habeat, si magis oontrarium habeat, si consequens suum non teneat, si aliter dicta sit atque in vulgi est opinione. Hic ergo quoniam quaeritur quid sit actum togati civis in rempublicam cum potestate degentis, dictumque est nihil aliud esse quam leges, advertendum quod Antonius dixerat chirographa esse,consequentia diligenter advertens falsam docetdiffinitionem sic:lsqui estinpotestate, est in republica; cum egerit aliquid,lctum mutare non potest, hoc competit legi,ut cum lata sit nunquam a latore mutetur. At vero chirographa, quia domesticus actus est,hanc consequentiam habent,et ut mutentur,et saepe non proferantur. Ergo M.","english":"Cicero does this. For he sets down those points concerning vices, so as to teach a false definition, and a shameful one, and a useless one. And then, proceeding further, he confirms his own definition, and declares it the stronger. Cicero proves a false definition by examining what follows from it; for a false definition is proved if it does not have its own proper attribute, if it has rather the contrary attribute, if it does not hold its own consequence, if it is stated otherwise than is the opinion of the common people. Here, therefore, since it is asked what is the *actum* of a toga-wearing citizen living with authority in the republic, and it has been said that it is nothing other than laws, it must be noted that Antonius had said that they are *chirographa*. Carefully attending to the consequences, he teaches the false definition thus: He who is in power is in the republic; when he has done something, he cannot change the *actum*; this belongs to a law, that once it has been passed it is never changed by the one who passed it. But *chirographa*, because they are a domestic act, have this consequence, that they are both changed and often not brought forth. Therefore M.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"Tullius","severity":"info","text":"Cicero is the source of the argumentative method described; Boethius draws on Cicero's rhetorical works, likely the Topica or De Oratore, for the analysis of false definitions.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"chirographa","severity":"info","text":"Chirographa (Greek χειρόγραφα) are handwritten documents, often private contracts or notes, contrasted with public laws (leges) in the debate on the actum of a togatus civis.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"falsam diffinitionem","severity":"info","text":"The passage lists four criteria for proving a false definition: lacking a proper attribute, having a contrary attribute, failing to hold its consequence, or being stated contrary to common opinion. This is a systematic exposition of Cicero's method.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"background","lemma":"Boethius","severity":"info","text":"Boethius' commentary on Cicero's rhetorical theory was influential in medieval logic and dialectic, transmitting Ciceronian argumentation to later scholastic thinkers.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"oor.cedens","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text has a corrupt or garbled word 'oor.cedens' (likely a scribal error for 'procedens' or 'concedens'), making the precise sense of the transition uncertain.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The exact identity of 'M.' at the end is unclear; it may be a truncated name or a marginal note.","The phrase 'actum togati civis' is left undefined in the passage; Boethius treats it as a technical term from Cicero's debate."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":46,"ref":"p46","source":"Tullius ita reprehendit chirographa actum non esse, quia consequenter non habent actus, dicens: Chirographa vero aut mutaret,aut non daret; aut si dedisset,non istas res in actis suis diceret: sed quia per ooncessionem reprehensi, sed ea ipsa concedo, ac quibusdam etiam in rebus conniveo; in maximis vero rebus, id est in legibus, acta Caesaris dissolvi ferendum non puto.Adjungit post hæc reprehensionem similiter duplicem,unam ex vitiis ut et turpem diffinitionem: dicat, et inutilem. Deinde concedat conclusurus ex comparationesuam pJtiorem,dicens esse turpem et inutilem in hujusmodi dicta quod est, nisi sorte,si quid memoriae causa retulitin libellum, id numerabitur in actis.Et quamvis iniquum et inutile sit,defenditur: Æquitas virtus est; virtus autem ipsa honestum,ergo iniquitas turpis est,quia turpitudo contraria est honestati. Si igitur turpem et inutilemipsisverbisreprehenditdiffinitionem.Deinde adJecit postremum illud per concessionem hoc modo: quod ad populum centuriatis comitiis tulit, id in actis Caesaria non habebitur. Haec acuto quoque satis esse duxi.","english":"Cicero criticizes the chirographa as not being an act, because they do not consequently have acts, saying: \"But the chirographa he would either change, or not give; or if he had given them, he would not list these things in his acts.\" But because they are criticized by concession, I concede those very things, and in certain matters I even connive; but in the greatest matters, that is, in the laws, I do not think it bearable that Caesar's acts be dissolved. After this he adds a similarly twofold criticism, one from vices, so that he may call the definition both shameful and useless. Then, in concluding, he concedes from comparison his own better definition, saying that it is shameful and useless in a statement of this kind, which is, unless by chance, if he has brought back something in a little book for the sake of memory, it will be counted among the acts. And although it is unjust and useless, it is defended: \"Equity is a virtue; virtue itself is honorable; therefore, iniquity is shameful, because shamefulness is contrary to honorableness.\" If, therefore, he criticizes the definition as shameful and useless in those very words. Then he added that last point by concession in this way: \"What he carried to the people in the centuriate comitia, that will not be held among Caesar's acts.\" I have deemed these things sufficient also for the acute reader.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"chirographa","severity":"info","text":"Chirographa (χειρόγραφα) were handwritten documents, often promissory notes or private records, which Cicero here argues do not qualify as official 'acts' (acta) because they lack the formal consequences of public legislation.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"actum","severity":"info","text":"Actum (or acta) in this context refers to official public records or legislative enactments, particularly those of Julius Caesar, which Cicero is debating whether to uphold or dissolve.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"reprehensionem duplicem","severity":"info","text":"The passage describes a twofold criticism (reprehensionem duplicem) of a definition: one from vices (ex vitiis) labeling it shameful and useless, and another by concession, leading to Cicero's own better definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"centuriatis comitiis","severity":"info","text":"The centuriate comitia (comitia centuriata) was a Roman assembly organized by centuries, which passed laws and elected high magistrates; Cicero refers to legislation carried there as not being included in Caesar's acts.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"per ooncessionem","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin 'per ooncessionem' appears to be a scribal error or variant for 'per concessionem' (by concession), as the context clearly discusses rhetorical concession. The English draft correctly reads 'by concession'.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"Tullius","severity":"info","text":"Boethius here attributes to Cicero (Tullius) a rhetorical argument about definitions, likely drawing on Cicero's lost or fragmentary works on rhetoric or his speeches, reflecting late antique use of Cicero as an authority on definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Latin text contains possible scribal errors (e.g., 'ooncessionem' for 'concessionem', 'pJtiorem' for 'potiorem'), and the exact source of Cicero's argument is not identified. The passage's logical structure is somewhat convoluted, and the English draft smooths over some transitions."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]}]}