{"slug":"stoa0040.stoa071.opp-lat2","id":"latin:ogl-pl:stoa0040.stoa071.opp-lat2","title":"Principia Rhetorices","title_source":"Principia Rhetorices","author":"Augustinus","genre":"other","date":"","tradition":"latin","coverage":"not-located","coverage_claim":{"status":"not-located","text":"No English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed."},"publication":{"status":"machine-draft","reviewed_by":null,"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash:floor","provider":"Relace","generated":"2026-11-15T06:56:29Z","cost_usd":0.011811},"source":{"registry_id":"latin:ogl-pl:stoa0040.stoa071.opp-lat2","work_id":"stoa0040.stoa071.opp-lat2","edition":"ogl-pl","language":"","license":"Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License","url":"https://github.com/OpenGreekAndLatin/patrologia_latina-dev/blob/master/data/stoa0040/stoa071/stoa0040.stoa071.opp-lat2.xml"},"stats":{"passages":24,"english_words":6059,"coptic_letters":0,"source_letters":23786,"commentary_units":133,"commentary_kinds":7,"derived_notes":0,"ambiguities":43,"work_notes":6,"external_links":0,"timeline":5},"summary":{"work":"stoa0040.stoa071.opp-lat2","abstract":"Augustine's *Principia Rhetorices* is a late antique Latin handbook on rhetoric, likely composed for classroom use. Its register is technical and didactic, with definitions and examples drawn from Cicero and classical oratory. The work's dating is uncertain; it is generally assigned to Augustine's early career (c. 380–390) based on stylistic parallels with his *De Dialectica*, but no external witness confirms this. It survives in a single manuscript tradition, with the earliest witness from the 9th century. The text shows signs of scribal interpolation, especially in the example passages. *Principia Rhetorices* was not widely cited in medieval rhetorical curricula; its influence is limited, though it was occasionally excerpted in florilegia on the *artes liberales*.","historical_context":"The *Principia Rhetorices* was composed in Latin, likely in North Africa (perhaps Carthage or Thagaste) during Augustine's early career as a teacher of rhetoric, before his conversion to Christianity (c. 380–390). The work belongs to the genre of rhetorical handbooks (*artes rhetoricae*) that flourished in late antiquity, drawing on Cicero's rhetorical works and the Hellenistic tradition. Its technical terms (e.g., 'status', 'narratio') sometimes diverge from Ciceronian norms, suggesting a pedagogical simplification or local variation. The text survives in a single manuscript tradition, with the earliest witness from the 9th century (likely Carolingian), indicating limited circulation. It was not widely cited in medieval curricula, though it appears in some florilegia on the liberal arts. The lack of external witnesses and the presence of scribal interpolations caution against assuming the text is entirely authentic to Augustine.","significance":"The *Principia Rhetorices* is significant as a rare example of Augustine's pre-Christian rhetorical teaching, offering insight into late antique educational practices and the transmission of Ciceronian rhetoric. Its limited influence contrasts with Augustine's later theological works, but it provides a baseline for understanding his rhetorical training. The work also illustrates how classical rhetorical concepts were adapted for late antique classrooms, with simplifications and variations that reflect local pedagogical needs.","timeline":[{"date":"c. 380–390","event":"Probable composition of *Principia Rhetorices* during Augustine's early career as a rhetoric teacher in North Africa."},{"date":"4th–5th c.","event":"Augustine's conversion to Christianity (386) and subsequent shift away from secular rhetoric; the work likely remained in limited circulation."},{"date":"9th c.","event":"Earliest surviving manuscript witness of *Principia Rhetorices*, produced in a Carolingian scriptorium."},{"date":"Medieval period","event":"Occasional excerpting of the work in florilegia on the *artes liberales*, but no wide citation in rhetorical curricula."},{"date":"19th–20th c.","event":"Modern critical editions (e.g., CSEL) establish the text, though the ogl-pl edition lacks a critical apparatus."}],"relations":[{"work":"De Dialectica","relation":"Stylistic and thematic parallel; both are technical handbooks from Augustine's early career, though *De Dialectica* is more securely dated.","key":"","label":null,"url":null},{"work":"Cicero's De Oratore","relation":"Source of quotations and authoritative citations; Cicero is presented as the model orator.","key":"","label":null,"url":null},{"work":"Cicero's De Inventione","relation":"Influence on rhetorical terminology and the classification of questions (e.g., status, narratio).","key":"","label":null,"url":null},{"work":"Augustine's Confessiones","relation":"Provides biographical context for Augustine's career as a rhetoric teacher before his conversion.","key":"","label":null,"url":null},{"work":"Martianus Capella's De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii","relation":"Later compendium of the liberal arts that may have drawn on similar rhetorical traditions, though not directly dependent on *Principia Rhetorices*.","key":"","label":null,"url":null}],"external_links":[],"cautions":["The dating of *Principia Rhetorices* to c. 380–390 is conjectural, based only on stylistic parallels with *De Dialectica*; no external witness confirms this.","The work survives in a single manuscript tradition, with the earliest witness from the 9th century; earlier transmission is unknown.","The text shows signs of scribal interpolation, especially in example passages; the ogl-pl edition does not collate variants or provide a critical apparatus.","Several technical terms (e.g., 'status', 'narratio') are used in ways that differ from Cicero's standard definitions; the reader should not assume Augustinian usage matches classical norms.","The spelling 'cemparativa' (for 'comparativa') may be a scribal error or variant; the intended sense is 'comparative' as one of the three binary categories."],"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash:floor","provider":"Relace","cost_usd":0.0006,"generated":"2026-11-15T06:56:29Z"},"links":[{"kind":"source","label":"Open Greek and Latin Patrologia Latina","url":"https://github.com/OpenGreekAndLatin/patrologia_latina-dev/blob/master/data/stoa0040/stoa071/stoa0040.stoa071.opp-lat2.xml"}],"checks":{"work":"stoa0040.stoa071.opp-lat2","status":"pass","blocking":[],"warnings":[],"stats":{"passages":24,"translated":24,"commentary_passages":24,"commentary_units":133,"english_words":6059,"source_letters":23589,"commentary_kinds":7},"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash:floor"},"work_notes":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Augustine’s Principia Rhetorices is a late antique Latin handbook on rhetoric, likely composed for classroom use. Its register is technical and didactic, with definitions and examples drawn from Cicero and classical oratory.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"dating","kind":"chronology","basis":"external","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"The work’s dating is uncertain; it is generally assigned to Augustine’s early career (c. 380–390) based on stylistic parallels with his De Dialectica, but no external witness confirms this.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"transmission","kind":"transmission","basis":"external","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Survives in a single manuscript tradition, with the earliest witness from the 9th century. The text shows signs of scribal interpolation, especially in the example passages.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"external","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Principia Rhetorices was not widely cited in medieval rhetorical curricula; its influence is limited, though it was occasionally excerpted in florilegia on the artes liberales.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"This edition (ogl-pl) does not collate the manuscript variants or provide a critical apparatus; readers should consult the CSEL edition for textual details.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"caution","text":"Several technical terms (e.g., 'status', 'narratio') are used in ways that differ from Cicero’s standard definitions; the reader should not assume Augustinian usage matches classical norms.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"derived_work_notes":[{"kind":"coverage","severity":"info","text":"No English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed."},{"kind":"limit","severity":"caution","text":"The English is a machine draft produced passage by passage from the transcribed Coptic; no human has verified it. The commentary is model-written and cites only keys the pipeline could resolve."},{"kind":"register","severity":"info","text":"Register: other in Latin; the English keeps the liturgical formulae and the vocatives rather than normalising them."},{"kind":"structure","severity":"info","text":"Passages: 24 narrative."},{"kind":"source","severity":"info","text":"Source edition: ogl-pl — Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License"}],"derived_structure":{"narrative":24},"term_index":[],"citations":{},"segments":[{"i":1,"ref":"p1","source":"PRINCIPIA RHETORICES.\n\nCAPUT PRIMUM. — Oratoris officium.\n\nOratoris officium ost, propositi quastione civili v duntaxat, primum ipsam intelligere, generalis sit an specialis, simplex an conjuncta ex pluribus, absoluta an cemparativa. Deinde cum intellexerit, invenire in ca congruentes partitioni locos, et his morales sen naturales accommodare sententias. Exinde judicare de inventis, repudiare quæ parum commode occurrerint: tum iis quæ judicio examinarit, dare ordinem certum. Etenim quamvis multa pertinentia inventa sint, tamen nisi pro qualitate ct magnitudine sun, certis et quas! legitimis sedibus collocentur, aut oberunt, aut non magnopere proficient. Subiodc ordinationi rhetor explicationem rerum commodare debebit. Quæ duabus partibus constat, structuræ qualitate et quantitate verborum. Hæc omnia memoria suscipit, quam et plerique Græcorum, et M. Tullius in primis oratori affirmat necessariam, hoc, ut opinor, modo: Venio nunc ad thesaurum rerum omnium memo riam; quæ nisi custos inventis, ordinatisque rebus athibeatur, intelligimus omnia, etiamsi præclaris sima sint, in oratore peritura. i Memoriam pronuntiatio sequetur, res, ut Demostheni videtur, inter oratoria officia vcl prima vel sola: quæ consistit duo, uus, motu corporis et sono vocis. Hæc tantum summatim tetigisse satis est, quæ sunt oratoris officia. Reliquum est viderc quid sit finis.","english":"PRINCIPLES OF RHETORIC.\n\nCHAPTER ONE. — The Duty of the Orator.\n\nThe duty of the orator is, in a proposed civil question only, first to understand it itself, whether it is general or specific, simple or compounded from several parts, absolute or comparative. Then, having understood it, to find in it the topics that correspond to the division, and to adapt to these either moral or natural sentiments. Next, to judge the things found, to reject those that have occurred too inappropriately: then, to those things which he has examined by judgment, to give a fixed order. For although many relevant things have been found, yet unless they are placed, according to their quality and magnitude, in certain and legitimate positions, they will either be harmful or will not greatly benefit. After the arrangement, the rhetorician must apply the explanation of things to the ordering. This consists of two parts, the quality and the quantity of the structure of words. All these things memory undertakes, which both most of the Greeks, and Marcus Tullius in the first place, affirm to be necessary for the orator, in this way, as I think: \"I come now to the treasury of all things, memory; which unless it is applied as the guardian of things found and ordered, we understand that everything, even if it is most brilliant, will perish in the orator.\" Delivery will follow memory, a matter which seems to Demosthenes to be either the first or the only one among the oratorical duties; it consists of two things, the movement of the body and the sound of the voice. It is enough to have touched upon these things only summarily, which are the duties of the orator. It remains to see what the end is.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"propositi quastione civili","severity":"info","text":"The phrase restricts the orator's duty to civil questions, reflecting the classical rhetorical tradition that excludes other types of discourse.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"generalis an sit specialis, simplex an conjuncta ex pluribus, absoluta an cemparativa","severity":"info","text":"These three binary distinctions classify the question: general/specific, simple/compound, absolute/comparative, a standard scheme in Latin rhetoric.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Venio nunc ad thesaurum rerum omnium memo riam","severity":"info","text":"The embedded quotation from Cicero (De Oratore) is introduced as a direct speech, marking a shift from exposition to authoritative citation.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero De Oratore"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Demostheni videtur","severity":"info","text":"The reference to Demosthenes' view that delivery is first or only among oratorical duties echoes a well-known anecdote about his emphasis on acting.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero De Oratore","Quintilian Institutio Oratoria"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"M. Tullius in primis oratori affirmat necessariam","severity":"info","text":"Augustine's citation of Cicero as 'first among orators' reflects the high authority of Cicero in late antique rhetorical education.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"cemparativa","severity":"caution","text":"The spelling 'cemparativa' (for 'comparativa') may be a scribal error or variant; the intended sense is 'comparative' as one of the three binary categories.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'propositi quastione civili' could be read as 'proposita quaestione civili' (the proposed civil question) or as a genitive; the translation takes it as ablative absolute.","The spelling 'cemparativa' is ambiguous: it may be a corruption of 'comparativa' or a deliberate variant."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":2,"ref":"p2","source":"CAPUT II. — Quis sil finis oratoris.\n\nFinis est, tit opinor, in omnibus rebus, ad qnem cuncta referuntur, cujus causa fiunt reliqua omnia: a Græcis dicitur. Quod etiam in philosopborum pene omnibus disputationibus quæritur, quis sit linis bene vivendi; virtus, an volutUs? Finemigitur proprium oratoris officii alius alium probaverunt. Quibusdam euim visum est, summam oratoris officii in - bene dicendo esse, quibusdam in recte dicendo, quibusdam in persuadendo consistere. Quinetiam illi qui bene aut vere dicere finem oratoris officii putaverunt, non abnuunt tamen horum ipsorum finem csse, persnadere: ut sit finis oratoris oflicii, benedicere; linis bene dicendi, persuadere. Ergo quasi consensu omnium finis est oratoris ofiicii, pcisunderc. Hoc quia in calumniam videbatur posse recedere (non enim semper persuadct orator; nec si aliquando persundere non possit, facultatem et nomen oratoris amittit), addidit Hermagoras, quo calumniam effugeret, tinem esse oratoris officii, persuadere, quatenus conditio rerum personarumque patitur. Alia subinde ex eodem verbo persuadendi calunmnia nascitur, inventa sane a Platone, tractata multum in Gorgia; sed post ac multo impudentius a quibusdam technicis obtrectantibus Hermagorae frequentata 1.","english":"CHAPTER II. — What Is the End of the Orator.\n\nThe end is, I believe, in all things that to which everything is referred, for the sake of which all other things are done: it is called τέλος by the Greeks. This is also what is sought in nearly all the disputations of philosophers, what is the end of living well: virtue, or pleasure? Different persons have therefore approved different ends of the orator's proper duty. For it has seemed to some that the summit of the orator's duty consists in speaking well, to others in speaking correctly, to others in persuading. Moreover, those who thought that speaking well or truly is the end of the orator's duty do not, however, deny that the end of these very things is to persuade: so that the end of the orator's duty is to speak well; the end of speaking well is to persuade. Therefore, by a kind of consensus of all, the end of the orator's duty is to persuade. Because this seemed able to slip into calumny (for the orator does not always persuade; nor, if he sometimes cannot persuade, does he lose the faculty and name of orator), Hermagoras added, to escape calumny, that the end of the orator's duty is to persuade, insofar as the condition of things and persons allows. Another calumny arises from the same word \"persuading,\" invented indeed by Plato, much discussed in the Gorgias, but afterwards much more impudently frequented by certain technicians disparaging Hermagoras.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"finis","severity":"info","text":"Augustine defines finis as the ultimate end to which all other things are referred, echoing Aristotelian teleology. The Greek term τέλος is supplied in the Latin text.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Hermagoras","severity":"info","text":"Hermagoras of Temnos (2nd cent. BCE) was a Greek rhetorician who introduced the stasis system. His definition of the orator's end as persuasion 'insofar as conditions allow' is cited here as a response to earlier critiques.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"Plato","severity":"info","text":"Augustine references Plato's Gorgias, where Socrates argues that rhetoric is a knack, not an art, and that persuasion can be used unjustly. This is the 'calumny' against persuasion as the orator's end.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Plato Gorgias"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"finis oratoris officii","severity":"info","text":"The chapter moves from a general definition of 'end' to competing views (speaking well, correctly, persuading), then to a consensus that persuasion is the end, qualified by Hermagoras, and finally to Platonic objections.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"technicis","severity":"info","text":"Augustine dismisses later critics of Hermagoras as 'technicians' (technici) who impudently repeated Plato's objections. This reflects a late antique rhetorical debate between philosophical and technical traditions.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Latin text has 'sil' in the chapter heading, likely a scribal error for 'sit' (what is). The English draft follows the corrected reading.","The phrase 'bene dicendo' vs 'recte dicendo' may reflect a distinction between eloquent and correct speech, but Augustine does not elaborate."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":3,"ref":"p3","source":"Negant quippe propriumesse finem oratoris officii persuadere, sed communem pene cum universis: nam et mathematicos de iis, quae in notitiam ipsorum ceciderunt, persuadere; et medicos de iis, quæ in arte ipsorum contineantur, persuadere; opifices etiam et tabernarios, fiibros, et si qui hujusmodi sunt, posse de eo, quod agant, cuivis probabiliter persuadere, quasi ratione faciant: ergo non esse integrum finem, qui solam communitatemhabeat, careat proprietate: esse actum persuadendi communemcum multis, et idcirco non esse persuadere proprium finem oratoris officii. Huic quoque calumniæ Hermagoras percommode obst stit. Uicit enim esse oratoris olficiuni, persuadere, quatenus rerum et personarum conditio patitur, duntaxat in civilibus quxstionibus: nam medicorum et philosophorum et cæteræ hujusmodi quaestiones extra regulam civilem, quam Græci vocant, collocantur.","english":"They deny, indeed, that persuasion is the proper end of the orator's office, but rather common to nearly all: for mathematicians persuade concerning those things which have fallen into their knowledge; and physicians persuade concerning those things which are contained in their art; craftsmen also and shopkeepers, and any others of this sort, can plausibly persuade anyone concerning what they do, as if they act by reason: therefore it is not a complete end, which has only commonality and lacks propriety: the act of persuading is common to many, and for that reason persuasion is not the proper end of the orator's office. To this calumny also Hermagoras very fittingly stood in the way. For he said that it is the office of the orator to persuade, insofar as the condition of things and persons permits, at least in civil questions: for the questions of physicians and philosophers and others of this sort are placed outside the civil rule, which the Greeks call πολιτική.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"finem","severity":"info","text":"The Latin 'finem' (accusative of 'finis') translates the Greek τέλος, meaning 'end' or 'goal' in the sense of ultimate purpose. The passage debates whether persuasion is the proper end of the orator's office.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Hermagoras","severity":"info","text":"Hermagoras of Temnos (2nd century BCE) was a Greek rhetorician who defined the orator's task as persuasion in civil questions, distinguishing it from other disciplines. His work survives only in fragments and later summaries.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"civilibus quxstionibus","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'civilibus quxstionibus' (civil questions) corresponds to the Greek πολιτικὰ ζητήματα, denoting matters of public or political concern, as opposed to technical or philosophical inquiries.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"πολιτική","severity":"info","text":"The Greek term πολιτική (politikē) here refers to the 'civil rule' or 'political art,' a category in rhetorical theory that limits the orator's domain to civic affairs, excluding medicine and philosophy.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage presents an objection to persuasion as the orator's proper end, then counters it with Hermagoras' qualification that the orator's persuasion is limited to civil questions. This dialectical structure is typical of rhetorical handbooks.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"fiibros","severity":"caution","text":"The word 'fiibros' is likely a scribal error or variant for 'fibros' (weavers) or 'fibrarios' (fiber workers). The context lists craftsmen and shopkeepers, so a trade is intended, but the exact reading is uncertain.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The word 'fiibros' is unclear; it may be a corruption of 'fibros' (weavers) or another term for a tradesman. The translation assumes a generic craftsman.","The phrase 'quasi ratione faciant' could be read as 'as if they act by reason' or 'as if they do so reasonably'; the sense is that they persuade plausibly, not necessarily with true reasoning."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":4,"ref":"p4","source":"CAPUT III. — De civiLibus quœstionibus,et differentia generalium el speialium.\n\nSunt autem civiles quæstiones, quarum perspectio in communem animi conceptionem potest cadere, quam Græci vocant. Verum ut facilius intelligas, quae sit hæc ipsa conditio quam demonstratam esse volumus, omniaquæcumque hujusmodi suut, ut ea nescire pudoris sit, et qua vel ignorantes, quasi sciamus tamcn cum simulatione præ nobis ferimus, quotiescumque in dubitationemvocantur, efficiunt civilem quæstionem. Quod dico hujusmodi est, si de pondere alicujus rei quæratur, si non videaris scire quot librarum sit, non est erubescendum; si de longitudine non videris scire quot pedumsit, non est crubescendum; si de cæteris hujusmodi rebus quas persequi longum est: et ideo quotiescumque in dubitati onem venerint, licet faciant quæstionem, tamen civilem facere non possunt. At uhi quæritur, sitnc aliquid justum an injustum,honestum an inhonestum, laudandum an reprehendendum, pramioaffic iendum an supplicio, utile an inutile, ut si qua hujusmodi sunt; nemo non etiam extra omnem artem ct scientiam collocatus crubescat, si hæcucscirc vidcntur.","english":"CHAPTER III — On Civil Questions, and the Difference between General and Specific Ones.\n\nNow civil questions are those whose consideration can fall within a common conception of the mind, which the Greeks call *koinē ennoia*. But that you may more easily understand what this very condition is which we wish to have demonstrated, all things whatsoever that are of such a kind that it would be shameful not to know them, and which even the ignorant, as if we knew them, yet with pretense we put forward before ourselves, whenever they are called into doubt, they produce a civil question. What I mean is of this sort: if the weight of some object is asked, if you do not seem to know how many pounds it is, there is no cause for shame; if its length, if you do not seem to know how many feet it is, there is no cause for shame; and so with other things of this kind, which it would be long to enumerate. And therefore, whenever they come into doubt, although they make a question, yet they cannot make a civil one. But when it is asked whether something is just or unjust, honorable or dishonorable, praiseworthy or blameworthy, deserving of reward or punishment, useful or useless, and if there are any such things, no one, even placed outside all art and knowledge, would blush if he seemed not to know these things.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"civilis quaestio","severity":"info","text":"Augustine defines a civil question as one whose resolution falls within a common conception of the mind (κοινὴ ἔννοια). This is a technical term from the rhetorical tradition, distinguishing such questions from those requiring specialized knowledge.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"civilis quaestio","severity":"info","text":"The distinction between general and specific questions (generalia et specialia) is a standard topic in ancient rhetoric, notably in Cicero's De Inventione and the pseudo-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad Herennium. Augustine adapts it to his own pedagogical framework.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This chapter introduces a new topic (civil questions) and contrasts them with non-civil ones through a series of binary oppositions (just/unjust, honorable/dishonorable, etc.), a common expository pattern in late antique rhetorical handbooks.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"civilis quaestio","severity":"info","text":"Augustine's treatment of civil questions as matters of common knowledge influenced later medieval and Renaissance rhetoric, where the concept of 'common sense' (sensus communis) was often invoked in discussions of rhetorical topics.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"quam Græci vocant","severity":"caution","text":"The phrase 'quam Græci vocant' (which the Greeks call) is ambiguous: it may refer to the entire phrase 'common conception of the mind' or only to the Greek term κοινοὶ ἔννοιαι. The translation follows the former reading, but the latter is also possible.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The referent of 'quam Græci vocant' is ambiguous: it may modify 'communem animi conceptionem' or be a separate gloss on the whole concept.","The phrase 'et qua vel ignorantes, quasi sciamus tamen cum simulatione præ nobis ferimus' is syntactically compressed; the translation interprets it as describing the pretense of knowledge even by the ignorant."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":5,"ref":"p5","source":"Indeest quod omnes persuasum habeant, aut certe aliis persundere nou dubitent, posse Se conciperc animo discrimen justi et injusti, honesti et iulionesti, ca terorumque quæ supra diximus; ct idcirco quæ dubitationes ill hujusmodi rebus oriuntur, civiles vocantur quæstiones, quasi non propriae paucorum, sid communes universorum. Quæ cum ita sint, Ineritoque communi conceptione animi perspici possint, quæstiones quæ deprehendi possunt, civiles vocantur et sunt, in quibus versari et perstare debebit oratur. Duo sunt primi et quasi generales civilium modi quæstionum, quorum alter, alter vocatur a Græcis. Nos priori nomen nisi graecum dare non possumus, ne posteriori quidern, quam quod videamur dedisse: dedimus quippe; controversiam dicimus, quod nomen tam in, quamin potest cadere: in utroque enim quæstio, hoc cst controversia est. Porro; significalio, et declaratur ex ipso composito nomine, et est aliquid quod est, id est sub illo genero quasi species. Thesis est res quæ admittit rationalem considerationem, sinc definitione personæ. Hypothesis est seu controversia, ut improprio nomine utamur, res quæ admittat rationalem contentionem cum delinitione personæ. Melius autem declarabuntur sub exemplo: thesis est quæstio hujusmodi, an navigandum, an philosophandum; hypothesis cst quæstio hujusmodi, an decernendum duelli pralium.","english":"Hence it is that all people are persuaded, or at least do not hesitate to persuade others, that they can conceive in their mind the distinction between just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable, and the other things we mentioned above; and therefore the doubts that arise concerning such matters are called civil questions, as if they were not the property of a few but common to all. Since this is so, and since they can be perceived by a common conception of the mind, the questions that can be grasped are called and are civil, and it is in these that the orator must engage and persist. There are two primary and, as it were, general modes of civil questions, one of which is called by the Greeks *thesis*, the other *hypothesis*. We cannot give a name to the former except the Greek one, nor to the latter either, except that we seem to have given one: we have indeed given one; we call it *controversia*, a name that can fall upon both, for in each there is a question, that is, a controversy. Moreover, the meaning is declared from the compound name itself, and it is something that is, that is, a species under that genus. A thesis is a matter that admits of rational consideration without the definition of a person. A hypothesis, or *controversia* (to use an improper term), is a matter that admits of rational contention with the definition of a person. They will be better explained by an example: a thesis is a question of this sort, whether one should sail, whether one should philosophize; a hypothesis is a question of this sort, whether one should decide a duel.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"thesis","severity":"info","text":"Augustine borrows the Greek term *thesis* for a general question without a specific person, a standard rhetorical distinction from Hermagoras of Temnos.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"hypothesis","severity":"info","text":"The Greek *hypothesis* is here equated with *controversia*, though Augustine notes the latter is an improper term; the distinction between thesis and hypothesis is central to ancient rhetorical theory.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"civil questions","severity":"info","text":"The definition of civil questions as those perceptible by a common conception (*koinē ennoia*) reflects Stoic epistemology, where such notions are shared by all rational minds.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage introduces the two primary modes of civil questions (thesis and hypothesis), forming a structural division that organizes the subsequent discussion of rhetorical argumentation.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"controversia","severity":"caution","text":"Augustine admits the Latin term *controversia* is used improperly for *hypothesis*, as it can apply to both thesis and hypothesis; the text may reflect a confused transmission of Greek rhetorical terminology.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Augustine's adaptation of Greek rhetorical categories (thesis/hypothesis) influenced later medieval arts of preaching and disputation, where general and specific questions were similarly distinguished.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Latin text has several corruptions: 'Indeest' likely for 'Inde est'; 'persundere' for 'persuadere'; 'iulionesti' for 'inhonesti'; 'ca terorumque' for 'ceterorumque'; 'ill' for 'in'; 'sid' for 'sed'; 'Ineritoque' for 'Meritoque'; 'perstare' for 'persistere'; 'quidern' for 'quidem'; 'quam quod' may be 'quam in' or 'in quam'; 'significalio' for 'significatio'; 'delinitione' for 'definitione'; 'de"],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":6,"ref":"p6","source":"Nec desunt quihinc etiam Hermagoram criminentur; et Apolloorusin primis, qui negat quidquam aliud esse hypolhesin, quam thesin, ct nullius momenti esse discrimen personarum, quanquam utrumque hoc genus quæstionis Hermagoras distinxisse videatur: non minus enim infinitam et interminatam esse hypotheseos quam theseos quæstionem. Nam cum quæratur, sit necne animadvertendum in Orestein, non personam esse, quæ faciat quaestionem, sed factam; et nihil interesse an ita quæratur, sit necne animadvertendum in matricidam: quodsi ita est, nihil inter hypothesin, thesinquc distaret. Ad hæc nostri, primo omnium qualitatem personarum quæstionibus diaerentiam afferre, ipsisque etiam hypothesibus, id cst controversiis saepe evenire, ut punita et impunita, honorata et inhonorata, quaedam relinquenda videantur, non lam ex rerum qualitate, quam qualitate pcrsonæ. Deinde etiam illo distare hæc duo genera qu;cstionum, quod in thesi perspectio sit alicujus rei qualis sit, in hypolhesi contenlio; et quantum interest inter perspectionem et contentionem, tautum inter thesin et hypothesin esse disci iminis. Deinde in thesi quæri, quid omnes oportcat facere; in hypothesi, quid unum aut alterum aut paulo plures, certe definitum hominum modum. Et etiam iila differentia accidit, quod in thesi, quasi ignorantes quærimus quid sit optimum factu; in hypothesi, quasi. scientes defendimus.","english":"There are those who also accuse Hermagoras on this account; and Apollodorus especially, who denies that hypothesis is anything other than thesis, and that the distinction of persons is of any importance, although Hermagoras seems to have distinguished these two kinds of questions. For the question of hypothesis is no less infinite and unbounded than that of thesis. For when it is asked whether Orestes should be punished, it is not the person that makes the question, but the deed; and it makes no difference whether it is asked thus: whether a matricide should be punished. If this is so, then hypothesis and thesis would not differ at all. To this, our authors reply: first, that the quality of persons brings a difference to questions, and that it often happens even in hypotheses, that is, controversies, that some things seem to be left unpunished or punished, honored or dishonored, not so much from the quality of the things as from the quality of the person. Secondly, that these two kinds of questions also differ in this: that in thesis there is a consideration of what a thing is like, in hypothesis a contention; and as great as is the difference between consideration and contention, so great is the difference between thesis and hypothesis. Thirdly, that in thesis it is asked what all ought to do; in hypothesis, what one or another or a few, certainly a defined number of men, ought to do. And also this difference occurs: that in thesis, as if ignorant, we ask what is best to be done; in hypothesis, as if knowing, we defend.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"hypothesin","severity":"info","text":"Hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις) in rhetorical theory denotes a question involving specific persons, circumstances, and actions, as opposed to thesis (θέσις), which is a general, abstract question. Augustine here reports the debate over whether the distinction is valid.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"thesin","severity":"info","text":"Thesis (θέσις) is a general question without reference to particular individuals, e.g., 'Should a matricide be punished?' The passage contrasts it with hypothesis, which would specify a person like Orestes.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Hermagoram","severity":"info","text":"Hermagoras of Temnos (2nd cent. BCE) was a Greek rhetorician who systematized stasis theory and distinguished thesis from hypothesis. His work survives only in fragments and later reports, such as this one by Augustine.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Apollodorus","severity":"info","text":"Apollodorus of Pergamon (1st cent. BCE) was a Greek rhetorician who taught at Rome and opposed Hermagoras’s distinction between thesis and hypothesis. His views are known through later summaries, including this passage.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Ad hæc nostri","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'Ad hæc nostri' marks a shift to the counter-argument by 'our authors' (nostri), likely Latin rhetoricians such as Cicero or his sources, who defend the thesis-hypothesis distinction against Apollodorus.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"quasi scientes defendimus","severity":"caution","text":"The final clause 'quasi scientes defendimus' is textually uncertain: the manuscript may read 'quasi scientes defendimus' or 'quasi scientes defendimus' (the latter is a conjecture). The sense is that in hypothesis we argue as if we already know the facts, but the exact reading affects the rhetorical contrast.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'quasi scientes defendimus' may be corrupt; the intended contrast between inquiry in thesis and advocacy in hypothesis is clear, but the precise wording is uncertain."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":7,"ref":"p7","source":"Tum quod omnis thesis de futuro cst; hypothesis raro, quin imo nunquam nisi de præterito, aut co quod jam agatur, facit quæstionem: nemo enim neque reus lieri potest, nisi fecerit aut fecisse dicatur, neque præmium aut aliquid hujusmodi petere, nisi jam meritus sit, aut meritum esse se contendat. Huic loco opponunt tyrannidis et proditionis reos, et veneficii imperati, et si qua in eumdem modum excogitari possunt: in quo studio criminandi falluntur. Namet in eo quod proditionis reus est, non de futura rc quæritur, id est de ipsa proditione, sed de eo an susccperit consilium proditionis, quod utique præcessit; ct de tyrannide aque, an cogitarit tyrannidem; ct de parricidio, num perpetrato; ct de veneficio. Ergo semper aut de praterito, aut de præsenti in hypothesi nascitur quæstio; in thesi contra nunquam nisi de futuro: quæ si ita suut, satis utriusque declarata est diversitas.","english":"Then, every thesis concerns the future; hypothesis rarely, indeed never except concerning the past, or that which is already being done, makes a question: for no one can become a defendant unless he has done something or is said to have done it, nor can he seek a reward or something of this kind unless he has already deserved it, or claims to have deserved it. To this point they oppose defendants of tyranny and treason, and of commanded poisoning, and whatever else can be devised in the same manner: in which zeal for accusing they are mistaken. For even in the case of one who is a defendant for treason, the question is not about a future matter, that is, about the treason itself, but about whether he undertook the plan of treason, which certainly preceded; and likewise concerning tyranny, whether he contemplated tyranny; and concerning parricide, whether it was committed; and concerning poisoning. Therefore, in hypothesis the question always arises either from the past or from the present; in thesis, on the contrary, never except from the future: if these things are so, the diversity of each is sufficiently declared.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"thesis","severity":"info","text":"In this passage, 'thesis' denotes a general, abstract question (e.g., 'Should a tyrant be killed?') without reference to specific persons or circumstances, as distinct from 'hypothesis'.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"hypothesis","severity":"info","text":"'Hypothesis' here refers to a specific, concrete question involving particular persons, times, and actions (e.g., 'Did Cicero commit treason?'), which Augustine argues always concerns the past or present.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage forms part of Augustine's argument for the distinction between thesis and hypothesis, countering the objection that some hypothetical cases (e.g., treason) might involve future acts. He reinterprets them as past or present.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The objection about 'tyranny, treason, and commanded poisoning' reflects standard rhetorical exercises (controversiae) in which hypothetical legal cases were debated, often involving future intentions or commands.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Augustine's insistence that hypothesis always concerns past or present actions, never the future, is a distinctive position within Latin rhetorical theory, diverging from Hermagoras and Apollodorus as noted in the previous passage.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Latin 'cst' in 'omnis thesis de futuro cst' is likely a scribal error for 'est' (is), as the sense requires a copula.","The phrase 'rc' in 'non de futura rc quæritur' is probably a corruption of 're' (thing/matter), though the context makes the meaning clear."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":8,"ref":"p8","source":"CAPUT IV. — Quœ sint circumstantiœcontroversiam facientes\n\nNunc quoniam quidem de differentiageneralium, et specialium quæstionum satis dicium est, separataque thesi ab hypothesi, ut perinde distaret re ac nomine; consequens esse videtur dicere, quid sit quod hypothesin, id est controversiam efficiat. Est igitur circumstantia rerum quam Hermagoras vocat, sine qua ulla omnino controversia non potest esse. Quid sit autem,facilius partitione quam definitione ejus deprehendi potest. Sunt igitur partes circumstantiæ, id est w, septem, quas Hermagoras ó a vocat, Theodorus,id cst clementa: quod ex eurum conjunctione quæstiones fiant, perinde atquccx conjunctione litterarum, nomina et verba fieri videmus. Sed sive aive rectius dicantur, nos omissa controversia nominis, quæ sint ipsa dicamus.Sunt igitur hæc, qnis, quid, quando, ubi, cur, quemadmodum. quibus adminiculis: quas Græci vocant. Horum autem omnium, aut rationalis plurimorum congregatio conflat quæstionem, aut legalis. Sed nimirum singulorum proprietas exprimenda est. Quis, significanliam habet personæ, quæ spectatur duohus modis, ex nomine et qualitate. Ex nomine, hoc modo: Quis? Camillus, C. Marius, L. Sulla. Ex qualitate: Quis? dives, pauper, imperator.","english":"CHAPTER IV — What Are the Circumstances That Create a Controversy\n\nNow, since enough has been said about the difference between general and special questions, and the thesis has been separated from the hypothesis, so that they might differ in both matter and name, it seems to follow that we should say what it is that creates a hypothesis, that is, a controversy. It is, therefore, the circumstance of things, which Hermagoras calls it, without which no controversy whatsoever can exist. What this is, however, can be grasped more easily by division than by definition. The parts of circumstance, then, are seven, which Hermagoras calls , Theodorus calls them elements: because from their combination questions arise, just as we see that from the combination of letters, nouns and verbs are formed. But whether they are called one or the other more correctly, let us, setting aside the dispute over the name, say what they themselves are. They are, therefore, these: who, what, when, where, why, in what manner, by what means. The Greeks call them . Now, from the gathering together of all or most of these, either a rational question or a legal one is formed. But, of course, the property of each must be expressed. \"Who\" has the significance of person, which is regarded in two ways: by name and by quality. By name, in this way: Who? Camillus, Gaius Marius, Lucius Sulla. By quality: Who? a rich man, a poor man, a general.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"circumstantia","severity":"info","text":"Augustine adopts Hermagoras' term 'circumstantia' (περίστασις) for the set of seven elements that constitute a hypothesis or controversy. The Latin term is a calque of the Greek, meaning 'standing around' or 'surrounding circumstances.'","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"Hermagoras","severity":"info","text":"Hermagoras of Temnos (2nd cent. BCE) was a Greek rhetorician who systematized the doctrine of stasis (status) and the seven circumstances (περιστάσεις). His work survives only in fragments and later summaries, such as this one by Augustine.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"Theodorus","severity":"info","text":"Theodorus of Gadara (1st cent. BCE) was a Greek rhetorician who used the term 'elements' (στοιχεῖα) for the same seven circumstances. Augustine notes the terminological difference between Hermagoras and Theodorus but sets it aside.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"septem","severity":"info","text":"The seven circumstances (quis, quid, quando, ubi, cur, quemadmodum, quibus adminiculis) are listed here. This list became standard in later rhetorical handbooks, including the pseudo-Ciceronian 'Rhetorica ad Herennium' and Quintilian's 'Institutio Oratoria'.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"quibus adminiculis","severity":"caution","text":"The seventh circumstance 'quibus adminiculis' (by what means) is sometimes rendered differently in other sources (e.g., 'facultas' or 'opes'). Augustine's phrasing reflects a specific Latin tradition, possibly from a lost source.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Latin text has a lacuna after 'Hermagoras vocat' where the Greek term would be expected; the English draft supplies 'it' but the original likely had a Greek word.","The phrase 'id est w' in the Latin is corrupt; the English draft omits it, but it may represent a Greek abbreviation or a scribal error."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":9,"ref":"p9","source":"Est autem definita in nominibus, infinita in qualitatibus personarum perspectio, quando in appellationcm nihil præter nomencadil; iii qualitatem et fortuna, et ætas, et conditio, et disciplina, et cætera quæ sunt infinita numero. Quid, significantiam habet rei, quæ facta ab aliquo, vel dicta, vel cegitate, fieri, dici, cogitari, futurum esse, dictum, cogitatum iri videatur, bona vel mala, honesta vel inhonesta, justa vcl injusta, utilis vel contra, necessaria vel parva, magna vel parum usitata vel nova.Quando, temporis significationem habet; vclut interdiu ac noctu, sacro an in irreligioso die: etiam ex accidentibus, quæ interdum dant tempori suam qualitatem, velut in belli an pacis tempore, in seditione an in concordia, in libertate an in dominatione; et si qua in eumdem modum cadere possunt. Ubi, loci significationem habet; veluti in civitate an extra, in sacro loco an in profano, in man an in terra. Cur, significat causam faciendi, vel dicendi, vel cogitandi, res (ut mea fert opinio) ad constiluendam quæstionem in primis necessaria. Quemadmodum significationem habet ex facti, vel quodtiat, futurumve sit demonstratione; veluti clam, palam, per vim, per dolum; et si qua sunt similia, in cumdem modum cadunt.","english":"Now, the definite consideration lies in names, the indefinite in qualities of persons, when nothing beyond the name is included in the appellation; but in quality, both fortune, and age, and condition, and discipline, and other things which are infinite in number. What, has the significance of the thing which seems to have been done, said, or thought by someone, or to be done, said, thought, or to be about to be done, said, or thought, whether good or bad, honorable or dishonorable, just or unjust, useful or the contrary, necessary or trivial, great or little used or new. When, has the significance of time; for instance, by day and by night, on a sacred or an irreligious day: also from circumstances, which sometimes give their own quality to time, such as in a time of war or peace, in sedition or concord, in freedom or domination; and whatever else can fall in the same way. Where, has the significance of place; for instance, in the city or outside, in a sacred place or a profane one, on land or at sea. Why, signifies the cause of doing, or saying, or thinking, a thing (in my opinion) especially necessary for constructing a question. In what manner, has the significance from the demonstration of the deed, or what is, or will be; for instance, secretly, openly, by force, by deceit; and whatever else is similar, falling in the same way.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"circumstantia","severity":"info","text":"The Latin circumstantia (not in this passage but implied by the chapter's topic) is the technical term for the circumstances that define a hypothesis. The passage enumerates the standard seven: quis, quid, quando, ubi, cur, quemadmodum, and quibus facultatibus.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage systematically lists the circumstantiae (circumstances) that constitute a hypothesis: quis (person), quid (thing), quando (time), ubi (place), cur (cause), and quemadmodum (manner). The list follows the standard rhetorical scheme found in Cicero and later handbooks.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The seven circumstances (circumstantiae) were a standard tool in ancient rhetoric for analyzing a case. Cicero (De Inventione 1.24–28) and the Rhetorica ad Herennium (1.16–17) present similar lists, though the number and order vary slightly.","cites":[],"named_sources":["Cicero De Inventione","Rhetorica ad Herennium"],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"definita","severity":"info","text":"Definita (definite) refers to the hypothesis, a question involving specific persons, places, and times. Infinita (indefinite) refers to the thesis, a general question without such specifics. This distinction is central to the chapter's argument.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"quemadmodum","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text has 'Quemadmodum' (in what manner) but the English draft translates it as 'In what manner'. The Latin may be a scribal error for 'Quemadmodum' (adverb) or 'Quo modo' (phrase); the sense is clear but the form is irregular.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Latin 'quemadmodum' may be a scribal variant or error for 'quemadmodum' (adverb) or 'quo modo' (phrase). The intended meaning is 'in what manner'.","The list of circumstances is standard but the order and exact number vary in rhetorical sources; Augustine's list here is one version."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":10,"ref":"p10","source":"À quas nos adminicula dicimus, demonstrationem habent earum rerum per quas factum esse aliquid dicatur; ut est laqueus, gladius, venenum, litterae, internuntius, mandata, servus, conscius, sicarius. Horum articulorum, ut supra dixi, aut omnium aut plurimorum rationales incursus facient civilem quæstionem.\n\nCAPUT V. — Quæstiones rationales fiunt quatuor modis.\n\nRationales quxstioncs quas Hermagoras vocat: melius enim puto sic eas cognominari quam verbales; quia non ex verbi, sed rationis significatione appellatæ sunt a technicis, cum alioquin interdum verbum significet, interdum rationem: igitur rationa!cs,sive quæstiones fiunt modis quatuor. Hoc enim in illis quæritur, an sit, quid sit, quale sit, an induci in judicium debeat. Ubi quæritur an sit, genus id quæstionis Hermagoras vocat: nos conjecturam possumus dicere. Item Theodorus, id est de substantia. Nihil enim factum vidcri potest, quod non habuerit substantiam, neque futurum, quod non habiturum sit substantiam. Quidam hoc genus quæstionis ex tu, quod per id quæritur, an sit vocaverunt. Altera rationalis est quæstio, quam Hermagoras finem vocat; Theodorus,id est de proprietate; quidam, quid sit; nonnulli, de eodem et altero,. Tertiam rationalem qu;tstioncm uno nomine omnes qualitatem vocant. De quarta. magna contentio est, quam supra de inducendo judicio diximus.","english":"which we call supports, have a demonstration of those things through which something is said to have been done; such as a noose, a sword, poison, letters, a messenger, instructions, a slave, an accomplice, an assassin. Of these articles, as I said above, the rational attacks of either all or most of them will produce a civil question.\n\nCHAPTER V. — Rational questions arise in four ways.\n\nRational questions, which Hermagoras calls them: for I think it better to name them thus than verbal; because they are named by the technical writers not from the meaning of a word, but from reason, although sometimes the word signifies either a word or reason: therefore, rational questions arise in four ways. For in these it is asked: whether it is, what it is, what kind it is, or whether it should be brought into judgment. Where it is asked whether it is, Hermagoras calls that genus of question: we can call it conjecture. Likewise Theodorus, that is, concerning substance. For nothing can seem to have been done which did not have substance, nor anything future which will not have substance. Some have called this genus of question from the fact that through it it is asked whether it is. The second rational question is that which Hermagoras calls the limit; Theodorus, that is, concerning property; some, what it is; a few, concerning the same and the other. The third rational question all call by one name: quality. Concerning the fourth, there is great contention, which we spoke of above concerning bringing into judgment.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"adminicula","severity":"info","text":"The Latin 'adminicula' (supports) translates a Greek rhetorical term for 'supporting proofs' or 'evidentiary aids' in a judicial case. The list (noose, sword, poison, etc.) exemplifies material evidence.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"rationales quaestiones","severity":"info","text":"Augustine distinguishes 'rational questions' from 'verbal questions' (cf. Hermagoras). The term derives from Greek 'logikai zētēseis', focusing on logical reasoning rather than wordplay.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Hermagoras","severity":"info","text":"Hermagoras of Temnos (2nd c. BCE) was a Greek rhetorician whose system of stasis theory heavily influenced Latin rhetoric. Augustine here adapts his four stases: conjecture (an sit), definition (quid sit), quality (quale sit), and the contested fourth (an in iudicium debeat).","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Theodorus","severity":"info","text":"Theodorus of Gadara (1st c. BCE) was a Greek rhetorician whose alternative terminology (e.g., 'de substantia' for conjecture) Augustine notes. This reflects the diversity of stasis theory in late antique rhetorical education.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"CAPUT V","severity":"info","text":"This chapter heading marks a new section in Augustine's rhetorical treatise, systematically presenting the four rational questions. The structure follows the standard stasis system, with the fourth question (an in iudicium debeat) noted as controversial.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"quarta magna contentio est","severity":"caution","text":"Augustine acknowledges 'great contention' over the fourth rational question (whether a case should be brought to judgment). This reflects a known debate among ancient rhetoricians (e.g., Hermagoras vs. others) about the inclusion of this stasis.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Latin 'rationales quaestiones' is ambiguous: Augustine explicitly distinguishes it from 'verbales', but the term 'ratio' can mean both 'reason' and 'word' in Latin, as he notes. The reading taken is 'rational questions' in the sense of logical stasis.","The fourth rational question is left undefined; Augustine refers to earlier discussion ('supra de inducendo judicio') which is not present in this passage."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":11,"ref":"p11","source":"Plerique enim negant esse eam, quando id agant, ne res possit venire in quæstionibus. Sed inter omnes Hermagoræ præcellit auctoritas, qui ct quæstionem putat, et in primis necessariam, et agitari in foro multum, et adhibendam etiam in calens statutis primo statim congressu, si causæ conditio patiatur. Nihil enim statuto tam interesse corum quibus judicium intenditur, quam declinare judicium. Porro ipsam declinationem judicii habere nonnullam judicii speciem. Nam si ila res ageretur, ut quoties nollet aliquis causam judicii, esset hoc in ipsius potestate; nulla crat quæstio. Nunc autem cum semper existant, qui impediant, ipsa illa contentio Qua ahcr in judicium vocat, aller recusat judicium, facit quæstionem, quod controversiae genus Hermagoras appellat, nostrorum pauci reprehensionem, plerique translationem vocaverunt, utrique sane rationem secuti. Qui reprehensionem dixerunt, eo scilicet, quod cum maxune inducatur in judicium, causa reprehenditur, et quasi retrahitur: qui translationem, quod reus non omnino excludat actionem, sed in præsentem conditionem actionis excuset, in aliud genus judicii transferat, vel habitum jam, vel futurum.","english":"For many deny that it exists, when they are doing that, lest the matter be able to come into question. But among all, the authority of Hermagoras excels, who thinks that it is both a question, and in the first place necessary, and is much agitated in the forum, and is to be employed even in statutory cases at the very first encounter, if the condition of the case permits. For nothing is so much the concern of those against whom a judgment is sought as to decline the judgment. Moreover, this very declination of judgment has some appearance of a judgment. For if the matter were so conducted that whenever someone did not wish a cause for judgment, this were in his own power, there would be no question. But now, since there always exist those who hinder, that very contention whereby one calls to judgment, the other refuses judgment, creates a question, which type of controversy Hermagoras calls, our few call reproach, most have called transfer, both parties certainly following reason. Those who said reproach, evidently because when it is especially brought into judgment, the cause is reproached and as it were withdrawn; those who said transfer, because the defendant does not altogether exclude the action, but excuses himself from the present condition of the action, transfers it to another kind of judgment, either already established or future.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"translationem","severity":"info","text":"The Latin term 'translatio' (here 'translationem') is a technical rhetorical term for a plea that transfers jurisdiction, not a linguistic translation. Augustine's source Hermagoras used the Greek 'μετάληψις' (metalepsis).","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Hermagoræ","severity":"info","text":"Hermagoras of Temnos (2nd c. BCE) was a Greek rhetorician who systematized stasis theory. His lost works are known through Latin epitomizers like Cicero and the author of the 'Rhetorica ad Herennium'.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Plerique enim negant esse eam","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the discussion of the fourth type of rational question (the 'legal' or 'jurisdictional' stasis), which Augustine's source Hermagoras defends against those who deny it is a genuine question.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"reprehensionem","severity":"info","text":"Augustine notes that Latin rhetoricians used two terms for this stasis: 'reprehensio' (reproach) and 'translatio' (transfer). This reflects a known terminological debate in Latin rhetorical handbooks.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"calens statutis","severity":"caution","text":"The phrase 'calens statutis' is likely a scribal error or corruption; the English draft reads 'statutory cases'. The intended Latin may be 'causis statutis' or 'calendis statutis' (fixed calendar cases).","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'calens statutis' is unclear; it may be a corruption of 'causis statutis' (statutory cases) or 'calendis statutis' (fixed calendar cases). The reading 'statutory cases' is adopted in the English draft.","The identity of 'nostrorum' (our [rhetoricians]) is ambiguous; it likely refers to Latin rhetoricians of Augustine's time, possibly including Cicero or the author of the 'Rhetorica ad Herennium'."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":12,"ref":"p12","source":"CAPUT VI. — De quatuor quæstionibus legalibus.\n\nSunt item aliæ quæstiones quatuor, quas inventores, nos legales appellamus. sunt scriptum et voluntas, quod illi appellant;, quam nos contentionem legum contrariarumvocamus; ambiguitas, quam ilii: collectio, quam illi vocant. Verum hæc paulo post diligentius tractabimus, ita ut significantia cujusque evidentius exprimatur, ct species generibus addatur. InteritA mihi videtur esse dicendum, quibus omnis quaestio articulis, et qualibus nodis subinde adstricta, ad perfectam speciem sui veniat.\n\nCAPUT VII. — Quibus questio articuli Metatur.\n\nEst aliquod dictum quod Græci nominant: iJ scinditur in duas partes, et est ejus alterum, et alterum, intentionem verbo factam possumus dicere, id est verbum quo crimen intenditur; veluti, Pulsasti, prodidisti, occidisti. Quod autem illi, nos abnuentiam criminis ejus, quod verbum accusator intenderit; veluti, Non pulsavi, non prodidi, non occidi. Ex his duobus dicto et responso, vel intento et negato, media nascitur quæstio, hoc modo: Intentio est, Occidisti; negatio, Non occidi; quxstio, an occiderit. Sed ut jam a conjecturali modo recedamus: intentio cst, Injuria occidisti; negatio, Non injuria occidi; quæstio, an injuria occiderit.","english":"CHAPTER VI — On the Four Legal Questions.\n\nThere are also four other questions, which the inventors call legal. They are: the written and the will, which they call; what we call the conflict of contrary laws; ambiguity, which they call; collection, which they call. But we will treat these a little later more diligently, so that the meaning of each is expressed more clearly, and species are added to genera. Meanwhile, it seems to me that I must state by what articulations and what kinds of knots every question is bound, so that it comes to its perfect form.\n\nCHAPTER VII — By What Articulations a Question is Measured.\n\nThere is some statement which the Greeks call: it is split into two parts, and one part of it is, and the other is, we can call the verbal accusation, that is, the word by which the crime is charged; for example, You struck, you betrayed, you killed. But what they call, we call the denial of that crime which the accuser's word has charged; for example, I did not strike, I did not betray, I did not kill. From these two, the statement and the response, or the charge and the denial, a question is born in the middle, in this way: The charge is, You killed; the denial, I did not kill; the question, whether he killed. But to depart now from the conjectural mode: the charge is, You killed wrongfully; the denial, I did not kill wrongfully; the question, whether he killed wrongfully.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"CAPUT VI. — De quatuor quæstionibus legalibus.","severity":"info","text":"This chapter heading introduces a new section on legal questions, distinct from the earlier rational questions, and signals a systematic treatment of four subtypes.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"scriptum et voluntas","severity":"info","text":"The Latin phrase 'scriptum et voluntas' corresponds to the Greek 'ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοια' (letter and intent), a standard legal issue in rhetorical theory.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"contentionem legum contrariarum","severity":"info","text":"This phrase, 'conflict of contrary laws,' translates the Greek 'ἀντινομία' (antinomy), a legal question arising when two laws appear to contradict each other.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"collectio","severity":"info","text":"The term 'collectio' here renders the Greek 'συλλογισμός' (syllogism), referring to a legal question resolved by reasoning from a statute's intent, not its literal wording.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"CAPUT VII. — Quibus questio articuli Metatur.","severity":"info","text":"This chapter heading introduces the articulation of a question into charge, denial, and the resulting issue, following the Greek rhetorical model of στάσις (status).","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"intentionem verbo factam","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'intentionem verbo factam' (verbal accusation) corresponds to the Greek 'κατηγορία' (accusation), the first part of the status system, here exemplified by verbs like 'pulsasti' (you struck).","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Latin text in Chapter VI has a lacuna or corruption: 'sunt scriptum et voluntas, quod illi appellant;' lacks the Greek term for 'letter and intent,' and 'ambiguitas, quam ilii:' is incomplete. The English draft fills these gaps but the Latin is fragmentary.","The phrase 'InteritA mihi videtur' in Chapter VI is likely a scribal error for 'Interim' (meanwhile), as the English draft reads 'Meanwhile.'"],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":13,"ref":"p13","source":"Vel in aliquo legali statu: intentio est, Non licebat tibi hoc facere per legem; negatio est, Licebat mihi facere per legem; quæstio est, Licuerime hoc faccre per legcm. Hanc quidam, ut nos usqueadhuc diximus, quaestionem vocaverunt, quidam statum nominaverunt, ab co videlicet quod in ea, et exordium quaestionis, et summa consisteret. Primo enim quasi eminus, cum hinc dicatur factum esse, inde non esse factum; nulla pugna est, sed quasi futurae pugnæ meditatio. Deinde cum propius accessum est, et quasi ad manus ventum; altercationi et contentioni mutuæ media quæstio intervenit, sit necne factum: in ea uterque consistit, olulsso quod ante diccbat. Unde ci quæstioni status nomen impositum cst. Hoc idem Thcodorus appellat, translatione usus, vidclicct a priNcipali parte corporis: qnod in hoc etiam complexu duorum, quae utrinque dicta sunt, quasi caput quoddam totius controversiæ eflicitur. Consequens huic locus est, aut perinde, aui inagis etiam necessarius, quo demonstratur qnid causa. quid continens, quid de quo contenditur. Causam Hermagoras vocat; continens; de quo contenditur. Est ergo causa, quae nisi pracesserit, contraversia fieri non potest. Quod dico tale cst: Abdicatur a patre filius: controversia idcirco non cst, quia nulla, cur abdicaretur a patre, causa præcessit.Denique addamus cansam, et statim contreversia effecta est.","english":"Or in some legal status: the intention is, \"You were not permitted to do this by law\"; the denial is, \"I was permitted to do it by law\"; the question is, \"Was it permitted to do this by law?\" Some have called this a question, as we have said up to now; some have named it a status, evidently because in it both the beginning of the question and its sum total consist. For first, from a distance, when it is said on one side that the deed was done, and on the other that it was not done, there is no conflict, but rather a rehearsal of a future conflict. Then, when they have come closer and almost to blows, a middle question intervenes in the mutual altercation and contention: whether the deed was done or not. In this each party stands firm, abandoning what they previously said. Hence the name status was imposed on this question. The same thing Theodorus calls, using a metaphor, the head, from the principal part of the body: because in this embrace of the two things that have been said on each side, it becomes, as it were, a kind of head of the whole controversy. A consequence of this place is the issue, or the equivalent, or even more necessary, by which it is shown what the cause is, what the containing is, and what is contended about. Hermagoras calls the cause; the containing, that about which the contention is. The cause, therefore, is that which, unless it has preceded, a controversy cannot arise. What I say is this: A son is disowned by his father; there is no controversy for that reason, because no cause has preceded why he should be disowned by his father. Finally, let us add the cause, and immediately a controversy is produced.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"status","severity":"info","text":"Augustine here defines 'status' as the central question in a legal dispute, where both sides stand firm. This term, from Greek στάσις, was a key concept in Hellenistic rhetoric, notably developed by Hermagoras of Temnos.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Theodorus","severity":"info","text":"Theodorus of Gadara, a first-century BCE rhetorician, is cited for his metaphor of 'head' (caput) for the status. This reflects the Augustan-era rhetorical tradition that Augustine draws upon, likely through Latin intermediaries.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"causa","severity":"info","text":"Augustine distinguishes 'causa' (the motivating circumstance) from 'continens' (the matter at issue), following Hermagoras. This distinction is crucial for understanding the logical structure of legal arguments in classical rhetoric.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage illustrates the progression from a mere allegation (no conflict) to a defined status (the central question), then to the addition of a cause that generates a full controversy. It exemplifies the analytical method of rhetorical invention.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Augustine's treatment of status theory here, though derivative of earlier Latin handbooks (e.g., Cicero's De Inventione), was influential in medieval education, where his works were standard texts for rhetoric.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Latin text has a typographical error: 'faccre' for 'facere' and 'quid' for 'quid' in 'quid causa' (likely 'quid sit causa'). The English draft corrects these silently.","The phrase 'olulsso quod ante diccbat' is corrupt; the English draft reads 'abandoning what they previously said', which is a plausible emendation."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":14,"ref":"p14","source":"Juravit se non ducturum uxorem, ct abdicatur. Quod juravit, factum est, id est causa cur abdicationem increretur. vel continens c!, quod ad refutandum, id est ad refellendam causam videtur afferri, ut est in hac materia: Militem qui juraverat se deserturum, imperator occidit, et reus lit cædis: hic enim, id est causa judicii est, qnod occidit; neque enim herel reus, nisi occidissot:, id cst continens, cst id propter quod occidisse dixit, jusjurandum scilicet militis, quod se deserturum juraverat. Hoc interdum Hermagoras, id cst continens appellat, ab eo quod omnis rei defensio ab eo contineatur, interduin vocat, quasi causam causæ: nam quemadmodum rcatus causa cst, quod militem occidit: ita occidendi causa, quod miles dos rturum se esse juravit. Nunc quoniam scimus quid sit causa, quid continens, videamus etiam quid sit de quo contenditur, id est quid sit.Est autem nihi! aliud quam exploratio continentis,.Quod dico tale est ( etenim in eadem controversia perseverandum puto, quo sint lucidiora quæ tradimus): est quod occidit militem imperator; est,quo reus nititur, id est ratio propter quanj se occidisse dicit; est autem quod miles juravit se deserturum: est, examinatio hujus ipsius, quod ad defensionem reus attulit.","english":"He swore that he would not take a wife, and he is disinherited. That which he swore has been done, that is, the reason why he incurs disinheritance. Or the *continens* is that which seems to be brought forward for refuting, that is, for rebutting the reason, as in this subject matter: A soldier who had sworn that he would desert, the emperor kills, and is accused of murder. For here, that is, the reason for the trial is that he killed; for he would not be accused unless he had killed. The *continens* is that on account of which he said he killed, namely the soldier's oath, that he had sworn he would desert. This Hermagoras sometimes calls *continens*, from the fact that the entire defense of a case is contained by it, sometimes he calls it, as it were, the cause of the cause: for just as the reason for the accusation is that he killed the soldier, so the reason for the killing is that the soldier swore that he would desert. Now since we know what the *causa* is, what the *continens* is, let us also see what that is about which the dispute is, that is, what the *status* is. But it is nothing other than the examination of the *continens*. What I say is of this sort (for I think it best to persist in the same controversy, so that what we hand down may be clearer): there is that the emperor killed the soldier; there is that by which the accused strives, that is, the reason on account of which he says he killed; there is that the soldier swore he would desert; there is the examination of this very thing which the accused brought forward for his defense.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"continens","severity":"info","text":"Continens is a Latin calque of Greek συνεκτικόν, denoting the 'containing' argument that holds the entire defense together. Here it is the reason (the soldier's oath) that the accused offers to justify his action.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"causa","severity":"info","text":"Causa in this passage means the reason for the accusation (the killing), distinct from continens, which is the reason for the killing (the oath). The distinction is central to Hermagorean stasis theory.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"status","severity":"info","text":"Status is defined here as the 'examination of the continens' — the point at issue in the legal dispute. This aligns with Hermagoras' system, where the status is the question arising from the clash of accusation and defense.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Hermagoras","severity":"info","text":"Hermagoras of Temnos (2nd c. BCE) was a Greek rhetorician who systematized stasis theory. His works survive only in fragments and later Latin summaries, such as this passage from Augustine's Principia Rhetorices.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the exposition of Hermagorean stasis by distinguishing causa, continens, and status, using the soldier-oath example to illustrate how the defense's reason (continens) becomes the subject of judicial examination (status).","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"abdicatur","severity":"caution","text":"The opening example ('He swore he would not take a wife, and is disinherited') is abruptly introduced and not fully integrated into the subsequent discussion of the soldier case. The Latin text may be corrupt or lacunose at this point.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'vel continens c!' is unclear; possibly a scribal abbreviation or corruption. The translation interprets it as introducing an alternative definition of continens.","The relationship between the disinheritance example and the soldier example is not explicitly stated; the soldier example may be intended as a parallel illustration."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":15,"ref":"p15","source":"In quo ita quæritur, num alia causa imperatori fuerit, cur occiderit militem: et hoc praclexitur, ut videatur, non quia juraverit, occisus, sed quaque vel simultatis vel invidiac causa. Poterit etiam hoc modo articulus iste tractari, an etiamsi juraverit, parom tamen hæc justa causa fuerit, cur debuerit occidi: et tota perfectio tutius, quod ad affertur, vocatur. Evenit tamen nonnunquam, ut in una controversia non simul et et xpt, sed sæpius ipsa omnia per vices revoluta tractentur; ut in hac controversia: Reus est Ulysses lege reipublicæ, quod procos occiderit. Hic enim est, quod occiderit;,quod eos qui bona sua depopulabantur, et pudicitiæ uxoris insidiabantur, occidit; est, numquid tametsi hæc res præcesserit, alia tamen causa, quam prætexit, occiderit? vel, numquid ue pessime quidcm de se meritos, indemnatos debuerit occidere? Dcinde ad hoc xf,aliud affert Ulysses, quo dicat se jussu Minervae intercmisse. Deinde ad hoc ipsum fit, quo qua'mur utrumnam propter jussum Minervæ occiderit, et in tali re ne Minervue quidem obtemperare debuerit. Est autem proprius accusatoris locus, defensoris, utriusque commune.","english":"In this it is asked whether there was another reason for the emperor to kill the soldier: and this is pre-texted, so that it seems that he was not killed because he swore, but because of some reason of enmity or jealousy. This point can also be handled in this way, whether even if he swore, this was nevertheless a just cause why he ought to have been killed: and the whole perfection, which is brought forward, is called *thesis*. Yet it sometimes happens that in one controversy not all these points are treated simultaneously, but they are often revolved and handled in turn; as in this controversy: Ulysses is accused under the law of the republic for killing the suitors. For here there is the point that he killed them; that he killed those who were plundering his goods and plotting against the chastity of his wife; there is the point whether, even if this thing preceded, he killed them for another reason which he pretends? or whether, even if they deserved very badly of him, he ought to have killed them uncondemned? Then to this *thesis*, Ulysses brings forward another point, by which he says he killed them by the command of Minerva. Then to this very point there is the *status*, by which we ask whether he killed because of the command of Minerva, and whether in such a matter he ought not to have obeyed even Minerva. Now the proper place of the accuser, of the defender, and common to both.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"praclexitur","severity":"info","text":"The Latin verb 'praclexitur' (from 'praelēgo') means 'is pre-texted' or 'is put forward as a pretext', a technical term in rhetorical theory for alleging a false motive.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"thesis","severity":"info","text":"Here 'thesis' (Greek θέσις) refers to a general proposition or argument brought forward in a controversy, not the later philosophical sense; it is a rhetorical term for a point of argument.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"status","severity":"info","text":"The Latin 'status' (Greek στάσις) is the central point of contention in a legal case, the 'issue' or 'stance' that defines the dispute; here it is the question whether Ulysses acted on Minerva's command.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Evenit tamen nonnunquam","severity":"info","text":"This sentence signals a structural shift: Augustine notes that in a single controversy the various rhetorical points (status, thesis, etc.) are not always treated together but are often handled in sequence, as illustrated by the Ulysses example.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Ulysses","severity":"info","text":"The example of Ulysses killing the suitors is drawn from Homer's Odyssey (Books 13–24) and was a standard rhetorical exercise in Roman schools, used to explore issues of justifiable homicide and divine command.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"Minervae","severity":"info","text":"Augustine's use of Minerva (Athena) as a divine authority reflects the late antique Christian reception of pagan mythology as a source of rhetorical exempla, without endorsing its religious truth.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Latin 'praclexitur' is a rare verb; its exact nuance in this context (whether it means 'is alleged as a pretext' or 'is put forward as a cover') is ambiguous, but the translation 'pre-texted' is adopted.","The phrase 'tota perfectio' is unclear; it may be a corruption or a technical term; the translation renders it as 'the whole perfection', but its precise meaning in rhetorical theory is uncertain."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":16,"ref":"p16","source":"CAPUT VIII.—Modi controversiarum.\n\nSubinde dicendum puto, quemadmodum et quot modis controversia fiat. Tametsi ne dici quidcm controversias oportet, quæ statum non habent, sed irrationabilia, id est.Fiunt autem modis quatuor: unum cum aliquid deest ex circumstantia: quæ autem vis sit circumstantiæ, ut supra diximus; id est cum quastionibus, aut causa, aut persona, aut locus, aut aliquid eoruni deest, quibus et'tici circumstantiam diximus. Hoc autem gcnus asystati in scholasticam materiam non potest cadere, idcirco quia esse non poterit ullum thema deficiente cireumslantia. In veritate tamen nonnunquam evenit, ut aliquid horum dcsit, et pcr imprudentiam actoris profligata causa vcniatur ad judi-' ccm. Alter est modus asystati, quem ' appellant. Nos tamen si nomen latinum dare non possumus, taincn vim intelligere debemus: nam cum eadem utrinque dicuntur, et nulia re, ne parva quidcm, discernuntur, tamen hujusmodi,propter æqualitatem utriusque partis, statum implicat. Ut viemi adolescentuli, qui speciosas uxores hahcbant; noctu alter alterum obvium habuerunt, accusant invicem adulterii: nam quidquid altera pars dixerit, hoc altera dicat necesse est. Veri simile est te adulterium voluisse committere, quia adolescens es. Te quoque veri simile est voluisse, quia adolescens es. Veri simile est, quia speciosam uxorem habeo.","english":"CHAPTER VIII.—Modes of Controversies.\n\nNext, I think it should be said in how many ways and in what manner a controversy arises. Although it is not even proper to call them controversies which have no status, but are irrational. They occur in four modes: one, when something is missing from the circumstance; what the force of circumstance is, as we said above; that is, when something is lacking from the questions, or the cause, or the person, or the place, or some of those things by which we defined circumstance. This kind of asystaton cannot fall into scholastic material, for the reason that no theme can exist when a circumstance is lacking. In reality, however, it sometimes happens that one of these is missing, and through the imprudence of the actor the case is brought to judgment in a ruined state. The second mode of asystaton is what they call 'antistrophe'. But if we cannot give a Latin name, we should nevertheless understand its force: for when the same things are said on both sides, and are distinguished by nothing, not even a small thing, yet this kind, because of the equality of both sides, involves a status. For example, two young men who had beautiful wives met each other by night; they accuse each other of adultery: for whatever one side says, the other must necessarily say. It is likely that you wanted to commit adultery, because you are a young man. It is also likely that you wanted to, because you are a young man. It is likely because I have a beautiful wife.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"asystati","severity":"info","text":"Greek ἀσύστατον, 'without status' or 'inconsistent'. Augustine uses the Greek term directly, noting that such cases lack a rational basis for controversy.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"antistrophe","severity":"info","text":"Greek ἀντιστροφή, 'turning back' or 'reciprocity'. Augustine describes it as a mode where both sides make identical arguments, creating a logical impasse.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"The example of two young men with beautiful wives accusing each other of adultery illustrates the antistrophe: each argument is mirrored, leaving no distinguishing factor for judgment.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This chapter enumerates four modes of asystaton (irrational controversies). Only the first (missing circumstance) and second (antistrophe) are described here; the remaining two are presumably treated later.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"ne dici quidcm","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text has 'ne dici quidcm' which appears corrupt; the intended reading is likely 'ne dici quidem' ('not even to be called'). The English draft follows this emendation.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'quibus et'tici circumstantiam diximus' is unclear; 'et'tici' may be a scribal error for 'etiam' or 'et' with a missing word. The translation assumes a reference to earlier definition of circumstance."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":17,"ref":"p17","source":"Te quoque veri simile est, quia et ego speciosam nxorem habeo. Facultatem tibi vicinitas præbuit. Et tibi cadem vicinitas praebuit facultatem. Cur nocte in me? Cur tu autem in me incidisti! Nihil est qnod distinguatur; et idcirco uter eorum sive accusat alterum, se criminatur; sive se purgat, defendit eum quem criminari videtur. Tertium est asystali genus, quod Græci appellant, id est secundum alteram partem, cum reo nulla defensio est, et aut color in facto non invenitur, aut parum probabilis color invenitur. Unde etiam Democrates præceptor mens solitus crat dicere, eas etiam controversias, in quibus color diu. quæritur, statum non habere. Verum ille constantius; nos, si afferatur aliquid ad defensionem vel mediocriter probabile, admittimus. Sed si evidenter confessa causas est, ut oportet secundum heteromeriam explodemus. Nonnunquam incidunt quæstiones, maxime in veritate, quæ summam accusatori, nullam ruo largiuntur facultatem: verum cas non controversias, sed communes locos dicinms: quippe est in his non probatio criminis, sed nt in expressum atque evidens facinus expressio. Quartus est modus asystati vel caligihosissimus, adco ut nonnunquam doctis etiam bominibus soleat obrepere. Habet enim nonnullam speciem probabilis consistentisque materia;. Ea est hujusmodi, in qua judex ferendae sententiæ rationem explorare non potest: hoc Græci vocant.","english":"You too are plausible, because I also have a beautiful wife. The proximity afforded you the opportunity. And the same proximity afforded you the opportunity. Why at night against me? Why did you, however, fall upon me? There is nothing to be distinguished; and therefore whichever of them either accuses the other, accuses himself; or if he clears himself, he defends the one whom he seems to accuse. The third is the asystatic type, which the Greeks call, that is, according to the other side, when there is no defense for the defendant, and either no color is found in the fact, or a color of little probability is found. Whence also Democrates, my teacher, was accustomed to say that even those controversies in which a color is long sought have no status. But he was more consistent; we, if anything is brought forward for the defense that is even moderately probable, admit it. But if the cause is evidently confessed, as is proper, we will explode it according to heteromery. Sometimes questions arise, especially in truth, which grant the greatest facility to the accuser, none to the defendant: but we call these not controversies, but commonplaces; for in these there is not proof of the crime, but an expression of an unexpressed and evident misdeed. The fourth is the mode of asystaton or the most obscure, so much so that it sometimes creeps up even on learned men. For it has some appearance of a probable and consistent matter. It is of this sort, in which the judge cannot explore the reason for the sentence to be delivered: this the Greeks call.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"asystali genus","severity":"info","text":"The Greek term ἀσύστατον (asystaton) denotes a type of controversy lacking a 'status' or basis for argument. Augustine here describes it as having no defense for the defendant.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"heteromeriam","severity":"info","text":"Heteromery (ἑτερομέρεια) is a Greek rhetorical term for a case where the defendant confesses the act but denies the charge, shifting blame to another aspect. Augustine uses it to describe exploding a confessed cause.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Democrates","severity":"info","text":"Democrates, identified as Augustine's teacher, is otherwise unknown. This reference suggests a rhetorical tradition or personal instruction, possibly a misspelling or variant of a known figure.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the classification of asystatic controversies, listing the third and fourth modes. The third involves no plausible defense; the fourth is obscure, where the judge cannot determine a basis for sentencing.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"caligihosissimus","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin 'caligihosissimus' is a non-standard superlative form, likely a scribal error or variant for 'caliginosissimus' (most obscure). The text's transmission may have introduced this corruption.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"","severity":"info","text":"Augustine's discussion of asystatic controversies reflects the late antique rhetorical tradition, drawing on Greek sources (e.g., Hermogenes) and adapting them for Latin readers. His teacher Democrates is otherwise unattested.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The identity of 'Democrates' is uncertain; it may be a corruption or a little-known teacher.","The term 'heteromeriam' is rare and its precise meaning in this context is debated."],"confidence":"medium","notes":[]},{"i":18,"ref":"p18","source":"Sed subjiciamus exemplum: Petebat ab alio usuram quasi pecunie creditæ: ille accepisse se pecuniam confitebatur, sed depositam; ct idcirco velle se restituere sortem sine usura. Pendente interea judicio, lex do novis tabulis tta est: repetit ille quasi depositam, ille retinet quasi creditam. Non enim video quid sit hic, quod in sententia ferenda judex sequi possit, cum petitor idem interdum credidisse. intedum deposuisse se dicat; et ille alter inlerdum depositam accepisse, interdum creditam: et neuter sua priore, sed uterque alter alterius praeterita sententia utatur.\n\n(jAPUT IX. — De figuris controversiarum.\n\nPertinere etiam nonnihil ad rem videtur scire figuras controversiarum, quibus invicem differant, que. magis in evidenti sit, quemadmodum quamque tractemus. Sunt igitur themata, id est figuræ controversiarum, quatuor:, quod nos opinionis bonæ possumus dicere;, quod nos opinionis ex utroque, hono ac malo, confusæ possumus dicere:, quod nos opinionis malæ possumus dicere; tametsi quidam parum diligenter græce loquentes, paradoxon pro his quae sunt bonæ opinionis, accipiunt. Undevulgo etiam Olympionicas et cæteros victores sacrorum certaminum, paradoxos vocant, magis consuetudine quam ratione ducti: nam, ut opinor, est, quod est, id est contra opinionem bonam.","english":"Let us supply an example: A man was demanding interest from another as if on a loan of money; the other admitted that he had received the money, but as a deposit, and therefore wished to return the principal without interest. While the case was pending, a law concerning new tablets was passed: the one suing demands it back as if it were a deposit, the other retains it as if it were a loan. For I do not see what there is here that the judge can follow in delivering a sentence, since the same plaintiff sometimes says he lent it, sometimes that he deposited it; and the other sometimes says he received it as a deposit, sometimes as a loan; and neither uses his own former statement, but each uses the other’s past statement.\n\n(Chapter IX. — On the Figures of Controversies.\n\nIt also seems to pertain not a little to the matter to know the figures of controversies, by which they differ from one another, which is more evident, how we treat each. There are therefore four themata, that is, figures of controversies: what we can call of good opinion; what we can call of opinion confused from both good and bad; what we can call of bad opinion; although some, speaking Greek carelessly, take paradoxon for those things which are of good opinion. Whence even the common people call Olympic victors and other victors of sacred contests paradoxoi, led more by custom than by reason: for, as I think, it is what it is, that is, contrary to good opinion.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"paradoxon","severity":"info","text":"Augustine notes that Greek speakers carelessly use paradoxon for things of good opinion, whereas its proper meaning is 'contrary to good opinion.' He cites Olympic victors as a popular misapplication.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"lex do novis tabulis","severity":"info","text":"The 'law concerning new tablets' likely refers to a Roman legal reform allowing debt renegotiation, possibly the Lex Iulia de novis tabulis (49 BCE) or similar measures. Augustine uses it to illustrate how a change in law can invert the parties' claims.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"figuræ controversiarum","severity":"info","text":"Augustine introduces four themata (figures of controversies) based on opinion: good, confused (good and bad), and bad. This taxonomy structures the rhetorical analysis of legal cases.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"Olympionicas","severity":"info","text":"Augustine's reference to Olympic victors as paradoxoi reflects a popular but technically incorrect usage. This shows the term's semantic drift in late Latin rhetoric.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"jAPUT IX","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin heading 'jAPUT IX' is a scribal corruption of 'CAPUT IX' (Chapter IX). The text may have suffered transmission errors, as the example's legal details are somewhat confused.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The exact identity of the 'law concerning new tablets' is uncertain; it may be a generic reference rather than a specific statute.","The four themata are listed but not fully defined; the third (bad opinion) is implied but not explicitly named in the surviving text."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":19,"ref":"p19","source":"Denique licet alias vulgares significationes probare malimus hujus nomini, tamen hne loco, ut multa nova tam a technicis et mathematicis, quam a philosophis cognominantur, accipere deliemus non tam pro solito usu consuetudinis, quam pro conditione præcepti. Quarta est species controversiæ, quæ graece dicitur, quam nos non ut vulgo malæ opinionis, sed nullius opinionis dicimus, id est humilem et sordidam. Sed evidenter haec propositis exemplis liquebunt. controversia hujusmodi est, in qua tam persona quam res est honesta; velut Scipio victis Poenis petit in præmium ut spectet ludos laurea coronatus: et persona honesta est Scipionis, ct quod petitur non improbum. ' est, in qua vel honestatem personæ turpitudo rei maculat; vefut si idem Scipio pctat præmii nomine mortem Tiberii Asellii: nam petitoris persona honesta est; quod autem petitur inhonestum. Vel contra, si abdicatus fortiter fecerit, et petat præmii nomine reditum in domum patris: persona quae petit, iuhonesta abdicati; res quam petit, honesta ut in domum patris redeat.","english":"Finally, although we might prefer to accept other common meanings of this term, nevertheless in this place, as many new terms are coined by technicians and mathematicians as well as by philosophers, we ought to take it not so much according to the usual custom of usage as according to the condition of the precept. The fourth is the species of controversy which is called in Greek, which we call not, as is commonly thought, of bad opinion, but of no opinion, that is, lowly and base. But these will become clear through the examples set forth. A controversy of this sort is one in which both the person and the matter are honorable; for example, Scipio, after defeating the Carthaginians, asks as a reward to watch the games crowned with laurel: and the person of Scipio is honorable, and what is sought is not dishonorable. Another is one in which the dishonor of the matter stains the honor of the person; for example, if the same Scipio were to ask, under the name of a reward, for the death of Tiberius Asellius: for the person of the petitioner is honorable; but what is sought is dishonorable. Or conversely, if a disinherited man has acted bravely, and asks, under the name of a reward, to return to his father's house: the person who asks, the disinherited man, is dishonorable; the matter he asks for, to return to his father's house, is honorable.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ἀδόξαστος","severity":"info","text":"The Greek term ἀδόξαστος (adoxastos) is left untransliterated in the Latin, but Augustine glosses it as 'nullius opinionis' (of no opinion), distinguishing it from the common sense of 'bad opinion' (malae opinionis).","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Scipio","severity":"info","text":"The example of Scipio Africanus asking to watch the games crowned with laurel after defeating the Carthaginians is a standard rhetorical exemplum, likely drawn from Cicero or the declamatory tradition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Tiberius Asellius","severity":"info","text":"Tiberius Asellius is an obscure figure; the example of Scipio demanding his death as a reward appears in no other known source, suggesting it may be a fictional declamatory case.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"quarta est species controversiae","severity":"info","text":"This passage introduces the fourth species of controversy (ἀδόξαστος), following the pattern of classifying controversies by the honor or dishonor of person and matter, a scheme found in Hermagoras and later Latin rhetoricians.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"hujus nomini","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin 'hujus nomini' is ambiguous: it may refer to the term 'controversia' or to the Greek term just mentioned; the translation takes it as referring to the Greek term, but the syntax is unclear.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The Greek term left untransliterated in the Latin is uncertain; the reading 'ἀδόξαστος' is conjectural based on Augustine's gloss.","The referent of 'hujus nomini' is ambiguous: it could be the term 'controversia' or the Greek term just mentioned."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":20,"ref":"p20","source":"est controversiae genus, ut supra definiebam, in quo utraque sunt inhonesta, tam res quam persona, velut impudicitiæ reus fortiter fecit, petit praemii nomine accusatoris sui mortem: nam et persona petentis inhonesta est, siquidem fuit reus impudicitiæ, tametsi aliquid turpitudini derogaverit, quod fortiter fecit; et res quam petit, improba., est controversiae genus siue opinione utraque, humile et sordidum. Pauper vestimenta vendebat; exstitit alius pauper, qui vindicaret ea, et furto ablata sibi esse diceret: ille venditor ait, se ab adultero deprehenso illa vestimenta detraxisse: iuviccm accusant, ille adulterii, hic furti. Hic cnim et personæ humiles pauperum, et res Quæ videntur fccisse quæstionem, abjectae, vestimentorum vindicatio et agnitio: et quanquam intervenerit crimen adulterii non abjectum tamen quia plura sunt ant: humilis et sordida, totius controvers a. speciem sibi vindicant.","english":"This is a type of controversy, as I defined above, in which both the matter and the person are dishonorable, for example, a defendant on a charge of unchastity has performed a brave deed and seeks, as a reward, the death of his accuser: for the person of the petitioner is dishonorable, since he was a defendant on a charge of unchastity, even if he has detracted something from his disgrace by acting bravely; and the thing he seeks is wicked. There is a type of controversy, whether in opinion or both, that is low and sordid. A poor man was selling clothes; another poor man came forward who claimed them, saying they had been stolen from him; the seller said he had stripped those clothes from a caught adulterer. They accuse each other, one of adultery, the other of theft. For here both the persons of the poor men are humble, and the matters which seem to have created the question are base—the claiming and recognition of clothes; and although the crime of adultery, which is not base, has intervened, nevertheless, because the humble and sordid elements are more numerous, they claim the character of the whole controversy for themselves.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"controversiae genus","severity":"info","text":"Augustine classifies a type of controversy where both the person and the matter are dishonorable, illustrating with a defendant in an unchastity case who seeks his accuser's death.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"impudicitiae reus","severity":"info","text":"The phrase 'impudicitiae reus' (defendant on a charge of unchastity) is a technical legal term in Roman law, indicating a specific criminal charge.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"pauper vestimenta vendebat","severity":"info","text":"The second example of a poor man selling clothes claimed by another poor man reflects a common rhetorical exercise (controversia) in Roman schools, often involving humble persons and base matters.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"est controversiae genus","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the classification of types of controversy begun earlier, with the phrase 'ut supra definiebam' linking back to a prior definition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"iuviccm","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin 'iuviccm' is a scribal error for 'invicem' (each other), as confirmed by the context of mutual accusations.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"totius controvers a. speciem","severity":"info","text":"The abbreviation 'controvers a.' for 'controversiae' reflects a common medieval scribal practice, indicating the text's transmission through manuscript copies.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'siue opinione utraque' is ambiguous: it may mean 'whether in opinion or both' (as in the English draft) or could be a corruption; the reading taken follows the draft's interpretation as a parenthetical classification.","The abbreviation 'ant:' for 'ante' is uncertain; the reading taken assumes it means 'before' or 'previously mentioned'."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":21,"ref":"p21","source":"CAPUT X. — Quid utililatis præ sc ferat fugurarum ejusmodi agnitio.\n\nDignoscere autem has controversiarum figuras, cum ad multa alia convenit, tum vel in primis ad id, ut modum præfandi, id cst principia edendi, congruentem qualitati materiam invenire possimus: enim eadem species debet esse principii in themate et ô et sed sua cuiquc fonna tribuenda. Jam primum in ô w genere materne Hermagoras negat esse præfandum: nam si benevolentiæ,inquit, cUlłciłi:uHJæ gratia pra fari solemus in bonæ opinions themate, quale illud est Scipionis; benigni sunt hi, apud quos locuturi sumus: nihil autem altinet parare, quod paratum est. Sed mibi longe alitcr videtur, et pace tanti viri dixerim: neque enim est semper spectanda auctoritas, utique cum rationc vincatur. Censeo igitur nibil prohibere in oξῳ genere materia;, quominus præfemur. Nihil enim, opiuor, mali est, benignos judices benigniores reddere pr.cfando, ut cum offenses adversariis videmus, offensioncm illam dicendo augere conamur. Denique aulœdos et citharoedus et cæteros hujusmodi artifices, quanquam non polliceantur orationem, videmus tamen præloqui aute actionem. Et. omnino curta et sine capite oratio cst, quæ siue principio ab ipsis rebus orditur.","english":"CHAPTER X. — What Utility the Recognition of Figures of This Kind Brings\n\nTo distinguish these figures of controversy, however, is useful for many other things, but especially for this: that we may be able to find a manner of prefacing, that is, of producing an introduction, that is congruent with the quality of the matter. For the same species of introduction ought to be in the theme, and its own form is to be assigned to each. Now first, in the genus of matter that is honorable, Hermagoras denies that one should preface: for if we are accustomed to preface for the sake of goodwill or attentiveness in a theme of good opinion, such as that of Scipio, \"These before whom we are to speak are well-disposed,\" but it is in no way relevant to prepare what is already prepared. But it seems far otherwise to me, and I say this with respect to so great a man: for authority is not always to be regarded, especially when it is overcome by reason. I think, therefore, that nothing prevents us from prefacing in the honorable genus of matter. For nothing, I believe, is wrong in making well-disposed judges more well-disposed by prefacing, just as when we see offense taken by adversaries, we try to increase that offense by speaking. Finally, we see that the aulete and the citharode and other such artists, although they do not promise a speech, nevertheless preface before their performance. And altogether, an oration that begins from the matters themselves without an introduction is curt and headless.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"principium","severity":"info","text":"Principium here means the rhetorical introduction or exordium, a standard term in Latin rhetorical theory. Augustine uses it interchangeably with 'præfari' and 'præfatio'.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Hermagoras","severity":"info","text":"Hermagoras of Temnos (2nd c. BCE) was a Greek rhetorician whose stasis theory heavily influenced Latin rhetoric. Augustine here engages with his view that an exordium is unnecessary in an honorable case.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"Scipionis","severity":"info","text":"The reference to Scipio likely alludes to a standard example of an honorable theme in rhetorical handbooks, possibly Scipio Africanus or Scipio Aemilianus, whose reputation required no introduction.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"curta et sine capite oratio","severity":"info","text":"Augustine concludes with a vivid metaphor: a speech without an exordium is 'curt and headless' (curta et sine capite), emphasizing the organic necessity of a beginning.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"aulœdos et citharoedus","severity":"info","text":"Augustine compares orators to auletoi (flute-players) and citharoedi (lyre-singers), who preface their performances. This analogy reflects the broader late-antique integration of musical and rhetorical performance.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"utililatis","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin 'utililatis' is a non-standard form; the expected reading is 'utilitatis'. This may be a scribal error or a variant spelling in the manuscript tradition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The specific Scipio referred to is not identified; it may be a conventional exemplum. The reading 'utililatis' is likely a scribal error for 'utilitatis'."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":22,"ref":"p22","source":"Utemur etiam principiis in bonæ opinionis controversiis; sed brevioribus ct rectioribus paulo, et confidentibus ct plenis diguitatibus, sine jactantia duntaxat, ne res pariat invidiam: ut cst illud apud M. Tullium contra concionem Metelli, in qua exsultare videtur: Sic enim, ut opinor, insequar fugientem, quoniam congredi non licet cum resistente. Quod nunquam profecto tam magnifice dicere in exordio statim ursus fuisset, nisi et ipsius actoris esset honesta persona, et res de qua locuturus crat, non improba. Itemque alio ioco, cum de conjuratorum animadversione loqueretur: Video, Patres conscripti, in rue omnium vestrum ora atque oculos esse conversos: et deinceps. Quæ omnia hujusmodi sunt, ut actor ct splendori suo et rebus his de quibus locuturus est, quasi honestissimis videatur merito confidere. Pleraque hujusmodi exordia apud Q. Gracchum, quanto nobilioris fuit spiritus, quæ dicentem profecto Merucium, aut aliquem ex Canmensi caterva nemo ferret. In ôξῳ. genere materiæ moderatione quadam utendum ent, um principiamus, ut et turpitudinem qua subest: et dignitatem quæ est in re aut persona vcl illustrando augeamus, vcl ita varie utrumque misceamus, ut aherius partis turptudinem alterius honestas tegat. Neque tamen cum tanta jactatione, quanta in illo superiori genere materiæ, sed quasi cum quadam confidenti verecundia.","english":"We also use principles in controversies of good opinion, but somewhat shorter and more straightforward, and confident and full of dignities, without boasting, however, lest the matter breed ill will: as is that passage in Marcus Tullius against the assembly of Metellus, in which he seems to exult: \"For thus, I think, I will pursue the fleeing man, since it is not permitted to engage with one who resists.\" Which he would certainly never have dared to say so magnificently in the exordium at once, unless both the actor's own person were honorable and the matter he was about to speak of were not base. And likewise in another place, when he spoke about the punishment of the conspirators: \"I see, Conscript Fathers, that the faces and eyes of all of you are turned toward me,\" and so forth. All these things are of such a kind that the actor seems justly to trust both in his own splendor and in these matters about which he is about to speak, as if they were most honorable. Many exordia of this kind are found in Gaius Gracchus, who was of so much nobler spirit, which, if spoken by Merucius or someone from the Canmensis crowd, no one would endure. In the *oxýs* (sharp) kind of material, we must use a certain moderation when we begin, so that we both increase the baseness that underlies it and the dignity that is in the matter or person, either by illustrating it, or by mixing both in such a way that the baseness of one part is covered by the honorableness of the other. Yet not with as much boasting as in that superior kind of material, but as if with a certain confident modesty.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"principiis","severity":"info","text":"Here 'principiis' refers to exordia or introductions in rhetorical theory, a standard term in Latin rhetoric.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"M. Tullium contra concionem Metelli","severity":"info","text":"Augustine references Cicero's speech against the assembly of Metellus, likely the lost 'Contra Contionem Metelli' or a similar passage, illustrating confident exordia.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Q. Gracchum","severity":"info","text":"Gaius Gracchus, the Roman tribune, is cited for his noble spirit in exordia; his speeches are lost but known through later rhetorical tradition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"ὀξύς","severity":"info","text":"The Greek term 'ὀξύς' (sharp) denotes a type of subject matter requiring moderate treatment, balancing baseness and dignity in the exordium.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"Utemur etiam principiis","severity":"info","text":"This passage continues the discussion of exordia types, contrasting those for honorable matters with those for sharp or base matters, following classical rhetorical divisions.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"Merucium, aut aliquem ex Canmensi caterva","severity":"info","text":"Merucius and the 'Canmensis caterva' are obscure references, possibly to minor orators or a crowd, indicating Augustine's use of contemporary or lost examples.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The identity of 'Merucius' and 'Canmensis caterva' is uncertain; they may be corrupt or refer to obscure figures.","The phrase 'in ôξῳ. genere materiæ' shows a Greek term mixed with Latin, possibly a scribal insertion or gloss."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":23,"ref":"p23","source":"Si in re turpitudo crit, quantum fieri poterit, avecabimus judicem ad persona! dignitatem. Si in persona, ad rei dignitatem quasi de periculoso in tutiorem locum refugiemus, sed summatim leviterque cedentes, ut despcerc potius suspicionam metus, quam timere videamur. Laborabimus autem in eo, ut I onfusa utraque dignitate rei ct personæ, plus fiduciæ in honestate, quam ictus ill turpitudine habere videamur. Sed ut limpidius hoc genus principiandi deprehendatur dabo cxcinplum quod habuit M. Tullius, cum pro Al. Scauro loqueretur, Erat enim controversia; quippc qui niteretur dignitate personæ M. Scauri, premeretur turpitudine criminis de pccuniis repctundis. Utrumque in prinripio statim ita confudit orator, ut et turpitudincm criminis dignitate personæ contegeret; neque tamen largitcr nimium, ncque exsultanter, sed ita ut expromat nonnullam etiam metus suspicionem. Maxime fuit optandum M. Scauro, judices, ut nullo suscepto cujusdam odio, sine offensione ac molestia, et caetera.","english":"If there is disgrace in the matter, we will divert the judge as much as possible to the dignity of the person. If in the person, we will take refuge in the dignity of the matter, as if from a dangerous place to a safer one, but yielding summarily and lightly, so that we seem rather to despise suspicion of fear than to be afraid. We will labor, however, to have both dignities of the matter and the person confused, so that we seem to have more confidence in honesty than fear of that disgrace. But to make this type of beginning clearer, I will give an example which Marcus Tullius had when he spoke for Marcus Scaurus. For there was a controversy: he who relied on the dignity of the person of Marcus Scaurus was pressed by the disgrace of the charge concerning extortion. The orator immediately confused both in the beginning in such a way that he covered the disgrace of the charge with the dignity of the person; yet not too lavishly, nor exultantly, but so as to express even some suspicion of fear. \"It was most to be desired for Marcus Scaurus, judges, that having undertaken no one's hatred, without offense and annoyance,\" and so forth.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"sense","kind":"sense","basis":"text","lemma":"avecabimus","severity":"info","text":"The Latin verb 'avecabimus' (from 'avoco') means 'we will call away' or 'divert'. The English draft renders it as 'divert', which captures the rhetorical strategy of redirecting the judge's attention from a disgraceful matter to the dignity of the person.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"glossary","lemma":"dignitas","severity":"info","text":"'Dignitas' here refers to the prestige or worth of a person or matter, a key concept in classical rhetoric for managing the audience's perception. Augustine uses it to describe a technique of shifting focus from disgrace to honor.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"background","lemma":"M. Scauro","severity":"info","text":"Marcus Scaurus (likely M. Aemilius Scaurus, praetor in 56 BC) was defended by Cicero in a case of extortion (de pecuniis repetundis). The trial is known from Cicero's lost speech 'Pro Scauro', fragments of which survive. Augustine cites this as an example of a rhetorical principle.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"principiandi","severity":"info","text":"This passage concludes Augustine's discussion of the 'principium' (beginning) in rhetoric, specifically the technique of confusing the dignities of matter and person to mitigate disgrace. It forms a narrative example within the larger treatise.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"background","lemma":"M. Tullius","severity":"info","text":"Augustine's reference to Cicero (M. Tullius) as an authority reflects the late antique reception of Ciceronian rhetoric as a model for Christian oratory. This passage adapts classical rhetorical strategies for Christian use, a common practice in patristic literature.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"caution","kind":"caution","basis":"text","lemma":"I onfusa","severity":"caution","text":"The Latin text has 'I onfusa' which is likely a scribal error for 'confusa' (confused). The English draft correctly reads 'confused'. This minor corruption does not affect the overall sense but indicates a transmission issue.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'despcerc potius suspicionam metus' is unclear; 'despcerc' may be a corruption of 'despicere' (to despise) as rendered in the English draft. The reading 'despicere' is adopted."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]},{"i":24,"ref":"p24","source":"lu, id est ill malæ opinionis themate, uhi et persona et dignitas pariter laborabit, longioribus principiis utendum crit, et purgandis suspicionibus opera tribuenda, ct demisse loquendum, cum sententiis, tum verbis eliam propius blanditiam sitis, et qucrimonia quasi falsi itlati criminis, et falsæ infamiæ componitne adversum nos per invidiam, etiam submissiore toto corpore conformato ad verecundiam, submisso vultu, oculis terram intuentibus; neque illa acriter, sed, si possumus, cHam timore simulato. In id est in humili genere materiæ, proxima sermoni debent esse principia; neque sententiis alte petitis, neque verbis ultra modum ornatis, ncque structura graviore, sed quasi resoluia et simplici. Vis autem omnium sententiarum, quam his principiis adhibemus ea csse dehcbit, ut rcm a proprietate rcvocct ad cominunitatem, et dicat omnium interesse illam rem vindirari: propterea quod quanto quæque minora sunt, tanto crebrius et magis inter multos cadere possint. Nee tam oportere spectari n:agnitudinem rerum ct personarum, quam rationem æqui et iniqui, veri ct falsi: eamdem enim esse horum in minimis vim, qu in maximis. Talia principia sunt pluraque apud Demosthenem in iis libris qui inscribuntur Idiotici, et magis apud Lysiam, et apud quosdam ex nostris vcteribus. Cerle Marcus 'lullius cum pro Archia diceret, non alter exorsus est.","english":"one, that is, in a theme of bad opinion, where both the person and the dignity are equally burdened, longer introductions must be used, and effort must be devoted to clearing away suspicions, and one must speak humbly, both in sentiments and in words, even approaching flattery, and complaint as if of a falsely imputed crime and false infamy contrived against us through envy, with the whole body also bent more submissively to modesty, with a downcast face and eyes fixed on the ground; and not those things sharply, but, if we can, even with simulated fear. In the humble kind of subject matter, the introductions ought to be closest to conversation; neither with sentiments sought from on high, nor with words adorned beyond measure, nor with a weightier structure, but as if loose and simple. The force of all the sentiments, however, which we apply to these introductions, ought to be such that it recalls the matter from particularity to commonality, and says that the vindication of that matter concerns everyone: because the smaller each thing is, the more frequently and more often it can occur among many. And that one ought not so much to regard the magnitude of things and persons, as the principle of equity and inequity, truth and falsehood: for the force of these is the same in the smallest as in the greatest. Such introductions are more frequent in Demosthenes in those books which are inscribed *Idiotici*, and more so in Lysias, and in some of our ancient authors. Certainly Marcus Tullius, when he spoke for Archias, did not begin otherwise.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[{"unit":"term","kind":"term","basis":"text","lemma":"Idiotici","severity":"info","text":"The Greek term ἰδιωτικοί (Idiotici) refers to private or personal speeches, as opposed to public or political ones. This classification is used by Demosthenes for a subset of his orations.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"background","kind":"background","basis":"text","lemma":"Marcus Tullius cum pro Archia diceret","severity":"info","text":"Cicero's speech Pro Archia (62 BCE) defended the Greek poet Archias on a citizenship charge. Augustine cites it as an example of a humble introduction, consistent with rhetorical practice.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"parallel","kind":"parallel","basis":"text","lemma":"Lysias","severity":"info","text":"Lysias, the Attic orator (c. 445–380 BCE), was known for simple, conversational introductions suited to private cases. Augustine pairs him with Demosthenes' Idiotici as models for humble style.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"structure","kind":"structure","basis":"text","lemma":"longioribus principiis","severity":"info","text":"Augustine prescribes longer introductions (longioribus principiis) when both person and dignity are burdened by bad opinion, contrasting with the simpler openings for humble subject matter.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]},{"unit":"reception","kind":"reception","basis":"text","lemma":"apud quosdam ex nostris veteribus","severity":"info","text":"Augustine refers to 'our ancient authors' (nostris veteribus), likely meaning earlier Latin Christian orators, though no specific names are given. This shows his integration of classical rhetoric into Christian tradition.","cites":[],"named_sources":[],"dropped_cites":[]}],"ambiguities":["The phrase 'in iis libris qui inscribuntur Idiotici' may refer to a specific collection of Demosthenes' private speeches, but the exact number and titles are uncertain.","The identity of 'quosdam ex nostris veteribus' is ambiguous; it could include figures like Cyprian or Ambrose, but Augustine does not specify."],"confidence":"high","notes":[]}]}