{"slug":"khazarzar-john-of-damascus-contra-manichaeos","id":"greek:khazarzar:khazarzar-john-of-damascus-contra-manichaeos","title":"Contra Manichaeos","title_source":"Contra Manichaeos","author":"John of Damascus","genre":"polemic/apologetic","date":null,"tradition":"greek","coverage":"not-located","coverage_claim":{"status":"not-located","text":"No English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed."},"publication":{"status":"machine-draft","reviewed_by":null,"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash:floor","provider":"Baidu","generated":"2026-11-15T18:25:56Z","cost_usd":0.008187},"source":{"registry_id":"greek:khazarzar:khazarzar-john-of-damascus-contra-manichaeos","work_id":"khazarzar-john-of-damascus-contra-manichaeos","edition":"khazarzar","language":"","license":null,"url":null},"stats":{"passages":69,"english_words":19777,"coptic_letters":0,"source_letters":72160,"commentary_units":0,"commentary_kinds":0,"derived_notes":0,"ambiguities":0,"work_notes":0,"external_links":0,"timeline":0},"summary":{},"links":[],"checks":{"work":"khazarzar-john-of-damascus-contra-manichaeos","status":"pass","blocking":[],"warnings":[],"stats":{"passages":69,"translated":69,"commentary_passages":0,"commentary_units":0,"english_words":19777,"source_letters":72160,"commentary_kinds":0},"model":"deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash:floor"},"work_notes":[],"derived_work_notes":[{"kind":"coverage","severity":"info","text":"No English translation could be identified: a language model asked twice could not name one, though it could not rule one out either. That is not proof that none exists — translations in dissertations, recent books and other modern languages are easily missed."},{"kind":"limit","severity":"caution","text":"The English is a machine draft produced passage by passage from the transcribed Greek; no human has verified it. The commentary is model-written and cites only keys the pipeline could resolve."},{"kind":"register","severity":"info","text":"Register: polemic/apologetic in ancient Greek; the English keeps the liturgical formulae and the vocatives rather than normalising them."},{"kind":"structure","severity":"info","text":"Passages: 69 narrative."},{"kind":"source","severity":"info","text":"Source edition: khazarzar."}],"derived_structure":{"narrative":69},"term_index":[],"citations":{},"segments":[{"i":1,"ref":"p1","source":"Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἰωάννου μοναχοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τοῦ Δαμασκηνοῦ κατὰ Μανιχαίων Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἐπειδὴ συνεληλύθαμεν ἀλλήλοις λογικὴν συζήτησιν ποιήσασθαι, ἐρωτῶ σε· Τί τὸ ζητούμενον; Ὁ Μανιχαῖος· Τὸν περὶ πίστεως γυμνάσαι λόγον, ὅπως ἂν εὕρωμεν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τί γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια; Μανιχαῖος· Ἡ τοῦ ὄντος διάγνωσις καὶ ὁμολογία. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τὸ ψεῦδος τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐναντίον; Μανιχαῖος· Παντὶ τρόπῳ. Ὀρθόδοξος· Πῶς τοῦτο φῄς; Μανιχαῖος· Ἐπειδὴἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ γνῶσις, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐ καλῶς ἀπεκρίθης· ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ γνῶσις, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος μὴ ὄντος γνῶσις· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὐ γινώσκεται. Μανιχαῖος· Τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος; Ὀρθόδοξος· Τῶν ὄντων ἀγνωσία. Μανιχαῖος· Ὀρθῶς εἴρηκας. Ὀρθόδοξος· Εἰ οὖν ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ γνῶσις, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος ἄγνοια τοῦ ὄντος, εἰπέ μοι· Ἡ γνῶσις ἕξις; Μανιχαῖος· Ναί. Ὀρθόδοξος· Εἰ ἡ γνῶσις ἕξις, ἡ ἄγνοια πάντως στέρησις. Μανιχαῖος· Καὶ ἡ ἄγνοια ἕξις. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τί ἐστιν ἄγνοια; Μανιχαῖος· Τὸ μὴ ἔχειν γνῶσιν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τὸ μὴ στερητικόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀποφαντικὸν καὶ ἑκτικόν; Μανιχαῖος· Τὸ μὴ στερητικόν ἐστιν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Μὴ ὂν λέγομεν τὸ ἐστερημένον τοῦ εἶναι; Μανιχαῖος· Δηλονότι. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἡ ἄγνοια τὸ μὴ ἔχειν γνῶσίν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ μὴ στερητικόν, ἡ ἄγνοια ἄρα στέρησις καὶ οὐχ ἕξις. Μανιχαῖος· Ὀρθῶς εἴρηκας. Ὀρθόδοξος· Εἰ οὖν ἡ ἀλήθεια γνῶσις, ἕξις δηλονότι· καὶ εἰ τὸ ψεῦδος ἄγνοια, στέρησις κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας λόγον.","english":"From our father among the saints, John the monk, presbyter of Damascus, an Orthodox [treatise] against the Manichaeans. Since we have come together with one another to make a rational inquiry, I ask you: What is the matter under investigation? The Manichaean: To exercise the argument concerning faith, so that we may find the truth. The Orthodox: For what is the truth? The Manichaean: The discernment and confession of what exists. The Orthodox: Is falsehood contrary to truth? The Manichaean: In every way. The Orthodox: How do you say this? The Manichaean: Because truth is the knowledge of things that exist, while falsehood is of what does not exist. The Orthodox: You have not answered well; truth is the knowledge of things that exist, but falsehood is knowledge of what does not exist—for what does not exist is not known. The Manichaean: What then is falsehood? The Orthodox: Ignorance of things that exist. The Manichaean: You have spoken correctly. The Orthodox: If, then, truth is the knowledge of things that exist, and falsehood is ignorance of what exists, tell me: Is knowledge a state? The Manichaean: Yes. The Orthodox: If knowledge is a state, ignorance is altogether a privation. The Manichaean: Ignorance too is a state. The Orthodox: What is ignorance? The Manichaean: Not having knowledge. The Orthodox: Is \"not\" privative, or is it negative and positive? The Manichaean: \"Not\" is privative. The Orthodox: Do we call that which is deprived of being \"what does not exist\"? The Manichaean: Clearly. The Orthodox: Consequently, if ignorance is not having knowledge, and \"not\" is privative, then ignorance is a privation and not a state. The Manichaean: You have spoken correctly. The Orthodox: If, then, truth is knowledge, it is clearly a state; and if falsehood is ignorance, it is a privation, in accordance with the account of truth.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":2,"ref":"p2","source":"Ἔσται οὖν ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια ἕξις, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος στέρησις, καὶ ἔσται ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια ὄν, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος μὴ ὄν. Μανιχαῖος· Ἐκ παντός. Ὀρθόδοξος· Ψεῦδος ἡ κακία ἢ ἀλήθεια; Μανιχαῖος· Ψεῦδος. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐκ ὂν ἄρα ἡ κακία, ἀλλ' ὄντος στέρησις καὶ μὴ ὂν καὶ ὡς στέρησις ἕξει ἀντίκειται τῷ ἀγαθῷ. Ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον ἐπανέλθωμεν. Μανιχαῖος· Ἔλθωμεν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Μίαν ἀρχὴν λέγεις τῶν ὄντων ἢ δύο; Μανιχαῖος· Δύο, μίαν ἀγαθὴν καὶ μίαν πονηράν· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀγαθὴν ὀνομάζω δένδρον ἀγαθόν, παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ περιεκτικὸν καὶ ποιητικόν, μὴ δυνάμενον καρπὸν κακὸν ποιεῖν· τὴν δὲ πονηρὰν σκότος, φθοράν, δένδρον πονηρόν, παντὸς πονηροῦ καὶ πάσης κακίας περιεκτικόν, μὴ δυνάμενον καρπὸν ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Κοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις αὗται αἱ δύο ἀρχαὶ ἢ οὔ; Μανιχαῖος· Παντελῶς ἀκοινώνητοι καὶ ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις ὑπάρχουσιν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἐν ἀλλήλαις καὶ σὺν ἀλλήλαις εἰσὶν ἢ κεχωρισμέναι; Μανιχαῖος· Κεχωρισμέναι ἦσαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἑκάστη ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ὅροις. Ὀρθόδοξος· Πῶς οὖν νῦν εἰσι συμμεμιγμέναι; Μανιχαῖος· Ἦν ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ τόπῳ, ἐν πάσῃ ἀγαθοσύνῃ καὶ μακαριότητι, ἡ δὲ ὕλη ἤγουν ἡ κακία ἄζως, ἀκίνητος, αἰσχρά, σκότος δυσειδές, ἀναίσθητος ἐπὶ πολλοὺς αἰῶνας· ὕστερον δὲ ἐστασίασεν ἡ ὕλη πρὸς ἑαυτήν, καὶ οἱ καρποὶ αὐτῆς ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ τῶν μὲν διωκόντων, τῶν δὲ φευγόντων ἔφθασαν εἰς τὰ ὅρια τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ ἰδόντες τὸ φῶς ἐπεθύμησαν τοῦ κάλλους αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπαύσαντο τοῦ πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολέμου καὶ συμφωνήσαντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπέθεντο τῷ φωτί·","english":"Therefore truth will be a state of possession, and falsehood a privation, and truth will be being, and falsehood non-being. Manichaean: From every [passage]. Orthodox: Is evil falsehood or truth? Manichaean: Falsehood. Orthodox: Therefore evil is not being, but a privation of being and non-being, and as a privation it is opposed to the good. But let us return to the matter at hand. Manichaean: Let us return. Orthodox: Do you say there is one principle of beings or two? Manichaean: Two, one good and one evil; and the good one I call a good tree, containing and producing every good, unable to bear evil fruit; and the evil one [I call] darkness, corruption, an evil tree, containing every evil and every wickedness, unable to bear good fruit. Orthodox: Do these two principles have fellowship with one another or not? Manichaean: They are utterly without fellowship and are opposed to one another. Orthodox: Are they in one another and with one another, or separated? Manichaean: They were separated from the beginning, each within its own boundaries. Orthodox: How then are they now mixed together? Manichaean: The good one was in its own place, in all goodness and blessedness, but matter, that is, evil, was lifeless, motionless, shameful, a foul-looking darkness, insensate for many ages; but later matter rebelled against itself, and its fruits warred against one another, and some pursuing and some fleeing, they reached the boundaries of the light, and seeing the light they desired its beauty and ceased their war against one another, and having come to agreement with one another they attacked the light.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":3,"ref":"p3","source":"καὶ ἀπέστειλεν ὁ ἀγαθὸς δύναμιν παρ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ συμπλοκῆς γενομένης ἔφαγον μέρος τοῦ φωτὸς οἱ ἄρχοντες τοῦ σκότους. Παρεχώρησε γὰρ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἁρπαγῆναι δύναμιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ φοβηθείς, ἵνα μὴ κατακυριεύσωσι τοῦ τόπου αὐτοῦ. Τοῦτο δὲ ἐποίησεν, ἵνα διὰ τῆς μοίρας, ἧς παρέδωκε, κατακυριεύσῃ τῆς κακίας. Καὶ οὕτως ἐγένετο σύγκρασις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ πονηροῦ· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς μοίρας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐγένοντο αἱ ψυχαί, ἐκ δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς κακίας τὰ σώματα. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τέως περὶ τούτων\n\nδιασκεψώμεθα. Μανιχαῖος· Διασκεψώμεθα.\n\n3 Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἡ ἀρχὴ ποσαχῶς λαμβάνεται; Μανιχαῖος· Φράσον σύ. Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἄναρχον μέν ἐστι τὸ μὴ ἐσχηκὸς ἀρχήν, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄνομα ὁμώνυμόν ἐστι· καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ σημαίνει. Λέγεται γὰρ ἀρχὴ κατὰ χρόνον, ὡς λέγομεν ἀρχὴν ἡμέρας τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου ἀνατολήν, καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐνιαυτοῦ. Λέγεται ἀρχὴ καὶ κατὰ τόπους, ὡς λέγομεν· Ἀρχὴ ὁδοῦ, καὶ ἀρχὴν τοῦ Φυσὼν τὸν παράδεισον. Λέγεται ἀρχὴ καὶ κατὰ ἀξίωμα καὶ ἐξουσίαν, ὡς λέγομεν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ τὸν βασιλέα τῶν ὑπηκόων. Λέγεται ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ φύσει πρότερον ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ. Δύο μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται τὸ ἕν, ἑνὸς δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ δύο· ἔσται γὰρ δύο ἓν καὶ ἕν, τὸ δὲ ἓν οὐ δύο. Ἀρχὴ οὖν τῶν δύο τὸ ἕν. Λέγεται ἀρχὴ καὶ κατὰ τάξιν ὡς πρῶτον τὸ τοῦ ἀναγνώστου ἀξίωμα, εἶτα ὑποδιακόνου, εἶτα διακόνου, καὶ οὕτως πρεσβυτέρου, καὶ οὕτως ἐπισκόπου. Λέγεται ἀρχὴ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦτο τριχῶς; ἢ γὰρ φυσικὸν ὡς ἀρχὴ υἱοῦ πατήρ, ἢ ποιητικὸν ὡς ἀρχὴ κτίσεως ὁ κτίστης, ἢ μιμητικὸν ὡς ἀρχὴ εἰκόνος τὸ εἰκονιζόμενον.","english":"And the good one sent a power from himself, and when a conjunction occurred, the rulers of darkness ate a portion of the light. For the good one conceded that a power be snatched from him, having become afraid, so that they might not lord it over his place. And he did this so that through the portion which he handed over, he might lord it over evil. And thus there came to be a mixture of the good and the evil; for from the portion of the good came the souls, and from the substance of evil the bodies. Orthodox: For now let us consider these things. Manichaean: Let us consider.\n\n3 Orthodox: In how many senses is \"beginning\" taken? Manichaean: You explain. Orthodox: That which has not had a beginning is without beginning, but the name of \"beginning\" is homonymous; for it signifies many things. For \"beginning\" is said with respect to time, as we say the beginning of the day is the rising of the sun, and the beginning of the year. \"Beginning\" is also said with respect to places, as we say, \"The beginning of the road,\" and the beginning of the Phison, the paradise. \"Beginning\" is also said with respect to rank and authority, as we say that the king is also a beginning of his subjects. \"Beginning\" is also said of what is prior by nature, as in the case of number. For when there are two, there will necessarily be one, but when there is one, there are not necessarily two; for two will be one and one, but the one is not two. So the one is the beginning of the two. \"Beginning\" is also said with respect to order, as first the rank of reader, then of subdeacon, then of deacon, and thus of presbyter, and thus of bishop. \"Beginning\" is also said with respect to cause, and this in three ways: either natural, as the father is the beginning of the son, or productive, as the creator is the beginning of creation, or mimetic, as the thing depicted is the beginning of the image.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":4,"ref":"p4","source":"Κατὰ τοσούτους οὖν τρόπους λεγομένης τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκεῖνό ἐστι τὸ ὄντως ἄναρχον λεγόμενον· τὸ κατὰ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους ἄναρχον λεγόμενον. Πῶς οὖν δύο ἀρχὰς σὺ φῂς ἀνάρχους; Μανιχαῖος· Κατὰ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους· οὕτως γὰρ ἔσονται ἄναρχοι. Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἀλλ' ἐψεύσω κατὰ τῆς σεαυτοῦ κορυφῆς· ἀπὸ δὲ ψεύδους ἀρξάμενος ἀδόκιμον ἕξεις τὸ τέλος. Μανιχαῖος· Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; Ὀρθόδοξος· Δύο εἰπὼν ἀπὸ ἀριθμοῦ ἤρξω, τὰ δὲ δύο οὐκ ἀρχή· ἄλλη γὰρ ἀρχὴ τῶν δύο, ἡ μονάς. Περὶ ἀρχῆς οὖν διαλεγόμενος μίαν ἀρχὴν εἰπέ, ἵνα ᾖ τελεία ἡ ἀρχή· φύσει γὰρ μονὰς ἀρχὴ δυάδος. Εἰ οὖν δύο ἀρχαί, ποῦ ἡ φύσει προτέρα ἀρχή, τουτέστιν ἡ μονάς; Μανιχαῖος· Σὺ οὖν τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις λέγεις, καὶ πῶς λέγεις, ὅτι ἀπὸ μονάδος δεῖ ἄρχεσθαι; Ὀρθόδοξος· Εἰ καὶ τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις λέγω, ἀλλὰ μίαν ἀρχήν φημι· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ υἱοῦ καὶ πνεύματος οὐ κατὰ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ κατ' αἰτίαν. Ἐκ πατρὸς γὰρ λόγος καὶ πνεῦμα, εἰ καὶ μὴ μετὰ πατέρα. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς φῶς καὶ οὐ προτερεύει κατὰ χρόνον τὸ πῦρ τοῦ φωτός–ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι πῦρ ἀφώτιστον, ἀρχὴ δέ ἐστι καὶ αἰτία τὸ πῦρ τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ φωτός–, οὕτω καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος–ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γὰρ λόγος καὶ πνεῦμα–, οὐ προτερεύει δὲ χρόνῳ· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι πατέρα ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἢ λόγον ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος. Μίαν οὖν ἀρχὴν ὁμολογῶ ὡς καὶ αἴτιον φυσικὸν τὸν πατέρα λόγου καὶ πνεύματος. Σὺ δὲ οὐ λέγεις ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸν πονηρὸν οὐδὲ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ. Ὅτι δὲ οὐ κατὰ χρόνον ἀνάρχους εἶναι δυνατὸν τὰς καθ' ὑμᾶς δύο ἀρχάς, οὕτω γνωσόμεθα.","english":"When \"beginning\" is spoken of in all these ways, that which is truly called without beginning is the one that is called without beginning in all ways. How then do you say that two beginnings are without beginning? Manichaean: In all ways; for in this way they will be without beginning. Orthodox: But you have lied against your own head; and having begun from a lie, you will have a reprobate end. Manichaean: How do you say this? Orthodox: By saying \"two\" you have begun from number, but the two are not a beginning; for another beginning of the two is the monad. So when discussing a beginning, speak of one beginning, so that the beginning may be perfect; for by nature the monad is the beginning of the dyad. If then there are two beginnings, where is the beginning that is prior by nature, that is, the monad? Manichaean: You then speak of three hypostases, and how do you say that one must begin from a monad? Orthodox: Even if I speak of three hypostases, I affirm one beginning; for the Father is the beginning of the Son and the Spirit, not in time but in cause. For from the Father are the Word and the Spirit, even if not after the Father. For just as light is from fire and the fire does not precede the light in time—for it is impossible for fire to be without light, and the fire is the beginning and cause of the light that is from it—so also the Father is the beginning and cause of the Word and the Spirit—for from the Father are the Word and the Spirit—and he does not precede in time; for it is impossible for there to be a father from the son, or a word from the spirit. I confess one beginning, since the Father is also the natural cause of the Word and the Spirit. But you do not say that the evil one is from the good, nor the good from the evil. That it is not possible for the two beginnings according to you to be without beginning in time, we shall know as follows.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":5,"ref":"p5","source":"Τὸ μὴ ἀρξάμενον τοῦ εἶναι ἄτρεπτόν ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ ἐτράπη, οὐ παντελῶς ἐστιν ἄναρχον. Τρεπόμενον γὰρ ἐξ ἀσωμάτου εἰς σῶμα ἢ ἐξ ἀνειδέου εἰς εἶδος ἢ ἐξ ἀκινήτου εἰς κίνησιν ἢ ἐξ ἡσυχίας καὶ ἠρεμίας εἰς στάσιν ἄρχεται τοῦ γίνεσθαι, ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν πρότερον. Καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄναρχον τρεπόμενον ἐξ ἀνάρχου εἰς ἀρχόμενον· τὸ γὰρ ἀρχὴν λαμβάνον καὶ ἠργμένον οὐκ ἄναρχον. Μανιχαῖος· Τί οὖν; Ὁ κατὰ σὲ θεὸς οὐκ ἐτράπη γεννήσας υἱὸν καὶ προαγαγὼν πνεῦμα; Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐδαμῶς· οὐ γὰρ λέγω· Μὴ ὢν πρότερον πατὴρ ὕστερον γέγονε πατήρ, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ ἦν ἔχων ἐξ αὑτοῦ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον καὶ διὰ τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ ἐξ αὑτοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ ἐκπορευόμενον. Μανιχαῖος· Εἶτα οὐδὲ κτίσας ὕστερον τὴν κτίσιν ἐτράπη δημιουργὸς γενόμενος; Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐδαμῶς. Μανιχαῖος· Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; Ὀρθόδοξος· Ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ τὴν κτίσιν προήγαγεν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι θελήματι. Μανιχαῖος· Εἶτα ὅτε ἠθέλησε γενέσθαι τὴν κτίσιν, οὐκ ἐτράπη θελήσας, ὅπερ οὐκ ἤθελε πρότερον; Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐδαμῶς· οὐ γὰρ πρότερον μὴ θέλων ὕστερον ἠθέλησεν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἤθελεν ἐν","english":"That which did not begin to be is immutable; for if it were changed, it would not be altogether without beginning. For that which is changed from incorporeal to body, or from formless to form, or from immobility to motion, or from quiet and rest to standing, begins to come to be, which it was not before. And that which is changed from without beginning to having a beginning is not without beginning; for that which receives a beginning and has begun is not without beginning. Manichaean: What then? Was not your God changed when he begot a Son and brought forth a Spirit? Orthodox: By no means; for I do not say that he who was not previously a Father later became a Father, but he always was, having from himself his own Word and through his own Word his own Spirit proceeding from himself. Manichaean: Then did he not also, when he later created the creation, change by becoming a Creator? Orthodox: By no means. Manichaean: How do you say this? Orthodox: Because he did not bring forth the creation from his own essence, but from non-being into being by his will. Manichaean: Then when he willed the creation to come to be, was he not changed by willing what he did not will before? Orthodox: By no means; for he did not first not will and later will, but he always willed in","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":6,"ref":"p6","source":"τῷ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὡρισμένῳ καιρῷ γενέσθαι τὴν κτίσιν. Ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ κατὰ τόπον δυνατὸν δύο εἶναι ἀνάρχους, οὕτω γνωσόμεθα· Τὰ δύο ἢ ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἰσίν–ἀδύνατον δὲ φῶς καὶ σκότος ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι· φωτὸς γὰρ παρουσία σκότος διαλύει–ἢ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ ἰδιάζοντι τόπῳ ἐστί. Περιορίζονται οὖν ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ τόπῳ, καὶ τὸ τέλος τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀρχὴ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἑτέρου γίνεται. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἄμικτον εἶναι τῷ σκότει τὸ φῶς μὴ ὄντος τινὸς διαφράγματος τοῦ κωλύοντος συγκραθῆναι ἀλλήλοις. Χρὴ οὖν εἶναι τὸ φῶς καὶ τὸν τόπον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ σκότος καὶ τὸν τόπον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ διάφραγμα τὸ διατειχίζον καὶ διορίζον ἑκάστου αὐτῶν τὸν τόπον· καὶ ἔσονται οὐ δύο ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ πέντε. Μανιχαῖος· Τί οὖν; Ὁ κατὰ σὲ θεὸς καὶ ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ οὐ τοῖς αὐτοῖς περιπεσοῦνται; Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐδαμῶς. Ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ φημὶ εἶναι τὸ θεῖον–ἄποσον γὰρ καὶ ἀπερίληπτόν ἐστιν–οὐδὲ κεχωρισμένας ἀλλήλων φημὶ τὰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὁ λόγος ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ γεννώμενος οὐκ ἐκφοιτᾷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ χωρίζεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννᾶται καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν, οὕτως ὁ υἱὸς καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ πατρός εἰσι καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ. Μία γὰρ οὐσία καὶ ὑποστάσεις ἀδιάστατοι, ἐπειδὴ αἱ δυνάμεις τοῦ νοῦ ἀδιάστατοι αὐτοῦ εἰσιν. Ὑπερφυῶς γὰρ ὁ λόγος καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ δυνάμεις εἰσὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀνεκφοίτητοι καὶ ὑποστάσεις τελεῖαι, ἐπειδὴ πρέπει τὰς τοῦ ὑπερφυοῦς θεοῦ δυνάμεις ὑπερφυῶς εἶναι ὑποστάσεις. Διὸ εἰ καὶ τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, ἀλλ' εἷς θεὸς καὶ οὐ τρεῖς.","english":"at the time determined by him, the creation came to be. That two without beginning cannot exist even in place, we shall understand thus: two things are either in one another—but it is impossible for light and darkness to be in one another; for the presence of light dissolves darkness—or each of them is in its own proper place. Each, then, is bounded within its own place, and the end of the one's place becomes the beginning of the other's place. But it is also impossible for light to be unmixed with darkness unless there is some partition preventing them from being mingled together. There must therefore be light and its place, and darkness and its place, and the partition that walls off and separates the place of each of them; and there will be not two principles, but five. Manichaeus: What then? Will the God according to you, and his Son, and his Spirit, not fall into the same difficulties? Orthodox: By no means. For I do not say that the divine is in a place—for it is without quantity and incomprehensible—nor do I say that the three hypostases are separated from one another, but just as the word begotten from the mind does not go forth from it nor is separated from it, but is begotten from it and is in it, so the Son and the Spirit are from the Father and in him. For there is one essence and hypostases without distance, since the powers of the mind are without distance from it. For in a manner beyond nature the word and the Spirit are powers of the Father that do not go forth, and perfect hypostases, since it is fitting that the powers of the God who is beyond nature be beyond nature hypostases. Therefore, even if there are three hypostases, there is one God and not three.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":7,"ref":"p7","source":"Ὁ γὰρ νοῦς καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ εἷς νοῦς καὶ οὐ τρεῖς νόες, ὡς τὸ φυτὸν τοῦ ῥόδου καὶ τὸ ἄνθος καὶ ἡ εὐωδία ἑκάστου αὐτῶν ῥόδον λέγεται καὶ ἔστι καὶ οὐ τρία ῥόδα λέγονται ἐν τῇ συναριθμήσει, ἀλλ' ἓν ῥόδον ἡ ῥίζα καὶ ὁ κλάδος καὶ τὸ ἄνθος.\n\n9 Ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀξίωμα καὶ κράτος ἔσονται δύο ἀρχαί, οὕτω γινώσκομεν. Δύο μόνων ὄντων, θεοῦ καὶ ὕλης, ἢ ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐκράτει καὶ ἦρχεν ἢ οὐδεὶς οὐδενὸς ἦρχεν ἢ καὶ ἄλλα ἦσαν τὰ ὑποτασσόμενα καὶ κυριευόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν δύο ἀρχῶν συναΐδια αὐταῖς καὶ οὐ δύο μόνον ἔσονται, ἀλλὰ πλείονα–δύο μὲν τὰ ἄρχοντα, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ἀρχόμενα–ἢ, εἰ μὴ ἦσαν τὰ ἀρχόμενα συναΐδια ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, ἦν ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε οὐκ ἦσαν ἀρχαί. Μανιχαῖος· Εἶτα καὶ τῷ σῷ θεῷ οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ συμβήσεται; Ἢ γὰρ συναΐδιος αὐτῷ ἦν ἡ ὑποχείριος αὐτοῦ κτίσις ἢ ἦν καιρός, ὅτε οὐκ ἦρχεν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐχ οὕτως· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κτίσις οὐ συναΐδιος αὐτῷ, ἀεὶ δὲ καὶ κύριος ἦν καὶ ἔσται τοῦ εἶναι ἐξουσιάζων ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παράγων οὐσίας τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ. Οὔτε δὲ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ προφορικός, ἀλλ' οὐσιώδης καὶ ἐνυπόστατος, οὔτε τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ μέλος σωματικὸν οὔτε τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ πνοὴ λυομένη, ἀλλ' ὑπερούσια πάντα τὰ τοῦ ὑπερουσίου, εἰ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς κατανοοῦμεν τὰ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς.","english":"For his mind and his word and his spirit are one mind, and not three minds, just as the plant of the rose and the flower and the fragrance of each of them is called and is a rose, and they are not called three roses in the reckoning, but one rose—the root and the branch and the flower.\n\n9 That there will not be two principles even in respect of rank and power, we know thus. Since there are only two, God and matter, either the one prevailed over and ruled the other, or neither ruled anything, or there were also other things subject to and dominated by the two principles, coeternal with them, and there will not be only two but more—two ruling, and others ruled—or, if the things ruled were not coeternal with the principles, there was once a time when there were no principles. Manichaeus: Then will not the same things happen to your God? For either his subject creation was coeternal with him, or there was a time when he did not rule. Orthodox: Not so; for creation is not coeternal with him, but he was always and will be Lord, having authority over what exists, bringing substances out of non-being into being by his word and by the spirit of his mouth. Neither is his word uttered, but essential and subsistent, nor is his mouth a bodily member, nor is his spirit a breath that is dissolved, but all things of the superessential are superessential, even if we understand the things beyond us from the things that are ours.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":8,"ref":"p8","source":"10 Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κατὰ φυσικὴν καὶ οὐσιώδη αἰτίαν ἔσονται αἱ καθ' ὑμᾶς δύο ἀρχαί· ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ ὁμοουσίου υἱοῦ γεννήτωρ, ἀΐδιος ἀϊδίου, ἀσώματος ἀσωμάτου. Εἰ οὖν αἱ καθ' ὑμᾶς δύο ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὸ φυσικὸν αἴτιον ἀρχαί εἰσι πάντων τῶν ὄντων, ἔσονται τὰ πάντα ὁμοούσια καὶ συναΐδια ταῖς καθ' ὑμᾶς ἀρχαῖς. Εἰ δὲ ἀΐδια, καὶ ἄτρεπτα καὶ ἐναντία καὶ ἀκοινώνητα καὶ ἄρχοντα καὶ οὐκ ἀρχόμενα καὶ κύρια καὶ οὐ δοῦλα. Εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ἀρχαί εἰσι τῶν ὄντων αἱ καθ' ὑμᾶς δύο ἀρχαί, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ θεοῦ αἱ ψυχαὶ οὐδὲ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ὕλης τὰ σώματα, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρήχθησαν, καὶ οὔτε ἐπολέμησεν ἡ ὕλη μετὰ τοῦ φωτὸς οὔτε ἥρπασεν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μέρος καὶ ἐποίησε τὰς ψυχάς. Πῶς δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία καὶ ἀκοινώνητα συνεβιβάσθησαν εἰς ἑνὸς κόσμου ποίησιν; Ἢ πῶς ὁ μὲν πονηρὸς κατεσκεύασε τὸ σῶμα,\n\nὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἓν ζῷον, τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀπετέλεσαν; Εἰ δὲ κατὰ μίμησιν ὡς πρωτότυπον εἰκόνος αἴτιον τὸ εἰκονιζόμενον, ἄλλοι κόσμοι εἰσὶν αἱ καθ' ὑμᾶς ἀρχαί, ὧν καθ' ὁμοίωσιν γέγονεν ὁ κόσμος. Οὐ γὰρ ἓν εἶδος οὐδὲ μία ἢ δύο μορφαὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀναρίθμητοι. Καὶ πῶς τὰ ἀναρίθμητα εἴδη τῶν δύο παρ' ὑμῖν ἀρχῶν εἰκόνες εἰσίν; Οὕτως ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀσύστατον τὸ παρ' ὑμῖν περὶ τῶν δύο ἀρχῶν φρόνημα. Ἐρωτήσατε γὰρ τὴν ἀπειρόκακον τῶν παίδων πληθύν· Ἡ δυὰς ἀρχὴ ἢ ἡ μονάς; Καὶ ἐροῦσιν, ὡς ἡ μονὰς ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ. Ὢ νηπίων νηπιωδέστεροί τε καὶ ἀφρονέστεροι.","english":"But neither will your two principles exist according to a natural and substantial cause; for the Father is the begetter of a consubstantial Son, eternal of an eternal one, incorporeal of an incorporeal one. If, then, your two principles are principles of all things according to a natural cause, all things will be consubstantial and coeternal with your principles. And if they are eternal, they are also immutable and contrary and uncommunicated and ruling and not ruled and lords and not slaves. But if your two principles are principles of things according to an efficient cause, souls are not from the substance of God, nor bodies from the substance of matter, but they were brought from non-being into being, and neither did matter wage war with light, nor did it snatch a part from it and make the souls. But how were things contrary and uncommunicated brought together into the making of one world? Or how did the evil one construct the body, and the good one the soul, and together complete one living being, man? But if according to imitation, as the archetype is the cause of the image, the thing imaged, then your principles are other worlds, according to whose likeness the world came to be. For there is not one form nor one or two shapes among existing things, but innumerable ones. And how are the innumerable forms images of your two principles? Thus impossible and incoherent is your doctrine concerning the two principles. For ask the multitude of children who know no evil: Is the dyad a principle, or the monad? And they will say that the monad is the principle of every number. O more childish than children and more foolish!","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":9,"ref":"p9","source":"11 Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἡμῖν ἐρωτῶσιν εἴπατε· Ἡ πολυαρχία ἐστὶ καλὸν καὶ στάσιμον καὶ τακτικὸν ἢ ἡ μοναρχία; Πᾶσι δῆλον, ὡς ἡ πολυαρχία ἀναρχία ἐστὶ καὶ στασιώδης καὶ πολέμου καὶ μάχης καὶ κακῶν αἰτία καὶ λύσεως, ἡ δὲ μοναρχία βεβαία καὶ ἔννομος καὶ εἰρήνης αἰτία καὶ τάξεως καὶ γαλήνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον αὐξήσεως. Εἰ οὖν δύο ἀρχαὶ ἄναρχοι καθ' ὑμᾶς, πολυαρχία ἀρχὴ τῶν ὄντων, καὶ ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων κακία, καὶ οὕτω μία ἀρχὴ ἡ κακία. Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἀκοινωνήτους παντελῶς λέγετε τὰς δύο ἀρχάς, ἃς αὐτοὶ ἀνεπλάσατε. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ αὐτή ἐστι κἀκείνη καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσία ἐστὶν ἄναρχος ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀίδιος κἀκείνη ὁμοίως, οὔκ εἰσι παντελῶς ἀκοινώνητοι. Κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ κατά τε τὸ εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ οὐσία καὶ ἄναρχος ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀίδιος εἶναι, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ψευδὴς ὁ λόγος ὑμῶν ἀποδέδεικται. Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ δύο ἀρχαὶ ἄναρχοι, ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τῷ οἰκείῳ χαίρει καὶ τέρπεται καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σύστασιν ἀγαθὸν λογίζεται· ἑκάστῳ γὰρ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ συστατικὸν τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως. Καὶ ὁ παρ' ὑμῖν οὖν ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὁ παρ' ὑμῖν πονηρός, ἕκαστος ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ χαίρει καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐπιτέρπεται καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀγαθὰ λογίζεται. Τίς οὖν ὁ κρίνας τὸν ἕνα ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸν ἕτερον πονηρόν; Κἀκεῖνος μᾶλλόν ἐστι θεός, μείζων ἀμφοτέρων· τὸ γὰρ ἔλαττον ὑπὸ τοῦ κρείττονος καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄρχοντος κρίνεται. Εἰπὲ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· Κοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις αἱ παρ' ὑμῖν δύο ἀρχαὶ ἢ παντελῶς εἰσιν ἀκοινώνητοι; Μανιχαῖος· Ἀκοινώνητοι ἦσαν παντελῶς·","english":"And tell us this also, since you ask us: Is polyarchy a good thing, stable and orderly, or is monarchy? It is clear to all that polyarchy is anarchy, factious, and the cause of war and battle and evils and dissolution, while monarchy is firm and lawful and the cause of peace and order and calm and justice and growth toward the better. If, then, according to you there are two unoriginate principles, polyarchy is the principle of beings, and the principle of all things is evil, and thus evil is one principle. But how do you say that the two principles are completely without fellowship with one another, which you yourselves have fabricated? For if this one is also that one, and the same essence is an unoriginate principle and eternal, and that one likewise, they are not completely without fellowship. For they have fellowship in being and in essence and in being an unoriginate principle and eternal, and in every respect your account has been shown to be false. And again: If there are two unoriginate principles, each rejoices and delights in its own and considers its own constitution good; for to each that which constitutes its own nature is good. And so your good one and your evil one, each rejoices in itself and takes delight in its own things and considers its own things good. Who, then, is the one who judged the one good and the other evil? And that one is rather God, greater than both; for the lesser is judged by the better, and the ruled by the ruler. Tell us this also: Do the two principles of yours have fellowship with one another, or are they completely without fellowship? Manichaeus: They were completely without fellowship.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":10,"ref":"p10","source":"ἡ μὲν γὰρ μία ἐν πληρώματι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἦν, ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα ἐν πληρώματι τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλ' ἐγένετο μετὰ ταῦτα σύγκρασις. Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἀναβαλοῦ τέως τὸν τῆς συγκράσεως λόγον. Φράσον δὲ ἡμῖν πρότερον· Τὸ ὂν τῷ ὄντι κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ ὄντι; Μανιχαῖος· Τὸ ὂν κακὸν τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθῷ ἐναντίον. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐκ ἠρώτησα, εἰ κατὰ τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν εἰσιν ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι. Τὰ γὰρ ὄντα οὐ παντελῶς ἐναντία· κατὰ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι κοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις, τῷ δὲ ὄντι τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐναντίον. Ὥστε, εἰ παντελῶς ἐναντίον τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸ κακόν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κακόν. Ὥστε τὸ κακὸν στέρησίς ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι καὶ κακὸν λέγεται· καὶ εἰ οὐσία τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀνούσιον τὸ κακὸν ἢ οὐ πάντη ἐναντία.\n\n14 Μανιχαῖος· Εἶτα· Οὐχ ὁρᾶται κακία ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν; Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἡ παντελὴς κακία οὐχ ὁρᾶται ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ὁ ὄντως ὢν καὶ τοῦ εἶναι αἴτιος κακία οὔτε τι τῶν γεγονότων, καθὸ γέγονε, κακόν, ἀλλὰ τό τε τῶν πάντων αἴτιον ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα τὰ γενόμενα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαθά. Πάντα δὲ τὰ ὄντα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρήχθη καὶ πάντα καλὰ καὶ λίαν καλά. Τὸ δὲ κακὸν οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν εἰ μὴ ἀποβολὴ καὶ στέρησις ἑκούσιος τῶν ὑπὸ θεοῦ τῇ λογικῇ φύσει δεδωρημένων, ὥσπερ πενία πλούτου ἀποβολή· πλοῦτος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὄντων κτῆσις χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου καὶ λίθων διαυγῶν καὶ ἐσθῆτος διαφόρου, παίδων καὶ παιδισκῶν, ἀλόγων καὶ ἀρουρῶν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ὧν ἕκαστον οὐσία ἐστί. Διὸ καὶ πλούσιος λέγεται ὁ ταῦτα κτησάμενος· οἷόν τις πολυούσιος πολλὴν ἔχων περὶ ἑαυτὸν οὐσίαν.","english":"For the one was in a plenitude of goods, and the other in a plenitude of evils, but afterward there came a mixture. Orthodox: Set aside for now the account of the mixture. Tell us first: Is being, as being, contrary to being, or is non-being contrary to being? Manichaean: Evil being is contrary to good being. Orthodox: I did not ask whether they are contrary according to evil and good, but according to being. For beings are not wholly contrary; for according to being itself they share with one another, but non-being is contrary to being. So that, if evil is wholly contrary to good, and good exists, then evil does not exist. So that evil is a privation of being and is called evil; and if good is substance, evil is non-substantial, or they are not wholly contrary.\n\n14 Manichaean: Then: Is wickedness not seen among beings? Orthodox: Complete wickedness is not seen among beings; for neither is God, who truly is and is the cause of being, wickedness, nor is any of the things that have come to be, insofar as it has come to be, evil, but the cause of all things is good, and all things that have come to be by him are good. And all beings were brought by him from non-being into being, and all are fair and exceedingly fair. And evil is nothing other than a voluntary casting away and privation of the things given by God to the rational nature, just as poverty is a casting away of wealth; for wealth is the possession of existing things—of gold and silver and translucent stones and varied clothing, of boys and girls, of dumb animals and fields and the like, each of which is a substance. Therefore the one who has acquired these is called rich; as it were, someone of much substance, having much substance around himself.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":11,"ref":"p11","source":"Ἡ δὲ πενία μερικὴ μὲν μερικὴ\n\nτούτων ἀποβολή, παντελὴς δὲ παντελὴς τούτων στέρησις, καὶ ὥσπερ ἡ ὁλοκληρία τοῦ σώματος καλόν, ἡ δὲ ἑνὸς μέλους ἀποβολὴ μερικὸν κακὸν οὐχ ὑπάρχον, ἀλλ' ὑπάρχοντος στέρησις. Ὁρᾶται δὲ ἤτοι νοεῖται ἐν τῷ ὄντι οὐχ ὡς ὄν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπογενόμενον, οἷον ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ ἡ ὅρασις ὑπάρχει καὶ ἔστιν, ἡ δὲ τύφλωσις οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὑπάρξαντος ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀπώλεια. Θεωρεῖται δὲ ἐν τῷ συνισταμένῳ καὶ ὄντι σώματι οὐχ ὡς ὄν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὑπάρξαντος ὀφθαλμοῦ στέρησις. Καὶ οὕτως κατὰ μέρος ἡ προσθήκη τῆς τῶν μελῶν στερήσεως προσθήκη κακοῦ λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ κακόν, ἀλλὰ λέγεται καὶ θεωρεῖται ἐν τῷ ὑπολελειμμένῳ σώματι ἡ τῶν ἀποβληθέντων ἀνυπαρξία οὐχ ὡς ὄν, ἀλλ' ὡς μὴ ὄν, οὐχ ὡς ἕξις, ἀλλ' ὡς στέρησις. Οὕτω καὶ ἡ κακία ἤτοι ἁμαρτία ἑκούσιός ἐστι τῶν ἐκ θεοῦ δεδωρημένων τῇ λογικῇ φύσει ἀγαθῶν· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ ἀψύχων οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἑκούσιον, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν λογικῶν. Ἔστιν οὖν κακία ἡ τῶν φυσικῶν δυνάμεων παράχρησις. Εἰ γὰρ χρησόμεθα ταῖς παρὰ θεοῦ δεδωρημέναις τῇ ψυχῇ δυνάμεσιν, ἐφ' ᾧ ἐλάβομεν, τουτέστι κατὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ δεδωκότος, καλόν. Εἰ δὲ οὔκ, ἐφ' ᾧ ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ δεδωκότος χρησόμεθα, κακόν· καὶ οὐκ αὐταὶ αἱ δυνάμεις οὐδὲ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ κακή, ἀλλ' ὁ κακὸς τρόπος τῆς χρήσεως ὁ παρὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ δεδωκότος θεοῦ. Εἰ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς ὁ θεός, ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὁ νόμος αὐτοῦ φυσικὸς καὶ ὢν ἐξ ὄντος.","english":"Poverty is in part the loss of some of these things, and complete poverty is the complete deprivation of them; and just as the integrity of the body is good, so the loss of one member is a partial evil—not something that exists, but the deprivation of something that exists. It is seen or conceived in what exists, not as existing, but as having perished; for example, the eye and sight exist and are, but blindness is not a substance, but the destruction of an eye that once existed. It is contemplated in the constituted and existing body, not as existing, but as the deprivation of an eye that once existed. And in this way, in part, the addition of the deprivation of members is called an addition of evil; for evil is not, but the non-existence of the things cast off is spoken of and contemplated in the remaining body, not as being, but as not being, not as a state, but as a deprivation. So too vice or sin is the voluntary [loss] of the goods given by God to the rational nature; for in the case of irrational and inanimate things it cannot be called voluntary, but only in the case of rational beings. Vice, then, is the misuse of natural powers. For if we use the powers given by God to the soul for the purpose for which we received them—that is, according to the law of the giver—it is good. But if we use them not for the purpose for which we received them, but contrary to the law of the giver, it is evil; and it is not the powers themselves, nor their use, that is evil, but the evil manner of use that is contrary to the law of the God who gave them. For if God is good, his law is also good, being natural and existing from what exists.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":12,"ref":"p12","source":"Ἡ δὲ τούτου παρακοὴ στέρησις τοῦ ὑπάρξαντος ἡμῖν νόμου, οἷον ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμὸς καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ ἐνέργεια καὶ πρὸ τούτων ὁ λογισμὸς οὐ κακά, ἀλλὰ καλά, ἐάν, ἐφ' ᾧ ἐλάβομεν, χρησώμεθα κατὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ δεδωκότος· κακὰ δὲ οὐκ αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ κατὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ δεδωκότος χρήσασθαι. Εἰ γὰρ πρὸς σύστασιν τῆς ζωῆς χρησόμεθα βρώσει, πόσει, ὕπνῳ καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καλὸν τούτων ἕκαστον. Καὶ εἰ τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἀγάπῃ χρησόμεθα πρὸς τὸν θεὸν τὸν μόνον φύσει ἐπιθυμητὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸν πλησίον κατὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ θεοῦ καλόν. Καὶ εἰ τῇ μίξει χρησόμεθα ταῖς ἑαυτῶν γυναιξὶ πρὸς τεκνογονίαν κατὰ τὸν νόμον τὸν δοθέντα τῇ φύσει παρὰ θεοῦ, καλόν· εἰ δὲ χρησόμεθα τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ πρὸς τὰ ἀλλότρια παρὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ θεοῦ, κακόν. Εἶπε γὰρ ὁ θεός· «Οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις τὸν ἀγρὸν τοῦ πλησίον σου οὐδὲ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ ὅσα αὐτῷ ἐστιν.» Ἡ πορνεία οὐ διὰ τὴν συνάφειάν ἐστι κακή, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ συναφθῆναι. Ἡ κενοδοξία, οὐ διὰ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν τὴν δόξαν κακή, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ δόξαν ἀγαπᾶν. Τὸ μῖσος καὶ ὁ θυμός, εἰ μὲν κατὰ τῶν κωλυόντων τὴν σωτηρίαν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν πρὸς θεὸν δι' ὑπακοῆς αὐτοῦ συνάφειαν καὶ ἀφιστώντων ἐκ θεοῦ, τουτέστι κατὰ τοῦ διαβόλου καὶ τῶν θεραπόντων αὐτοῦ, καλόν. Φησὶ γάρ· «Οὐχὶ τοὺς μισοῦντάς σε, κύριε, ἐμίσησα καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς σου ἐξετηκόμην; Τέλειον μῖσος ἐμίσουν αὐτούς, εἰς ἐχθροὺς ἐγένοντό μοι.» Καὶ οἱ ἅγιοι μάρτυρες ἐθυμοῦντο κατὰ τῶν τυράννων δικαίως θυμούμενοι. Καὶ ἐὰν κατὰ τοῦ οἰκείου λογισμοῦ θυμωθῶ χωρίζοντός με ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, καλόν.","english":"But his disobedience is a deprivation of the law that existed for us—for example, desire and anger and action and activity, and before these, reason, are not evil but good, if we use them according to the law of the giver, for the purpose for which we received them. Evil is not these things themselves, but the use of them not according to the law of the giver. For if we use food, drink, sleep, and the like for the maintenance of life, each of these is good. And if we use desire and love toward God, who alone is by nature desirable, and toward our neighbor according to the law of God, it is good. And if we use intercourse with our own wives for the procreation of children according to the law given to nature by God, it is good; but if we use desire toward what belongs to others, contrary to the law of God, it is evil. For God said: \"You shall not desire your neighbor's field, nor his wife, nor whatever is his.\" Fornication is evil not because of union, but because of union with what belongs to another. Vainglory is evil not because of loving glory, but because of not loving the glory that comes from God. Hatred and anger, if directed against those who hinder the salvation of the soul and its union with God through obedience to him, and who lead away from God—that is, against the devil and his servants—are good. For it says: \"Have I not hated those who hate you, O Lord, and been consumed with grief over your enemies? I hated them with a perfect hatred; they became enemies to me.\" And the holy martyrs were angry against the tyrants, being justly angry. And if I am angry against my own thought when it separates me from God, it is good.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":13,"ref":"p13","source":"Ἐάν τις ἀποστερῇ με τῆς σωτηρίας, καλὸν θυμωθῆναι καὶ μισῆσαι· ἐὰν δὲ λυπῇ κατὰ κόσμον καὶ ὠφελείας γίνηται πρόξενος ἀποστερῶν τῶν ὑλικῶν, ἀγαπήσω μᾶλλον ἤπερ μισήσω. Ὁ φόνος κακόν· μόνου γὰρ θεοῦ τὸ χωρίζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, τοῦ καὶ συνδήσαντος· εἰ δὲ φονεύσω ὑπὸ θεοῦ κελευόμενος, καλόν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθόν. Κακὸν οὖν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν ἁρπάζειν, ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμέτερον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῦ. Ἡ κατάκρισις κακή· θεοῦ γὰρ μόνου τὸ κρίνειν, καὶ κακὸν ἁρπάζειν τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀξίωμα, οἷς μὴ δέδοται παρὰ θεοῦ τὸ κρίνειν. Ἡ κενοδοξία καὶ ἡ ὑπερηφανεία κακή· θεῷ γὰρ μόνῳ πρέπει τὸ ἔπαρμα καὶ ἡ δόξα. Ὥστε οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἡ κακία εἰ μὴ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸν νόμον κεχρῆσθαι ταῖς φυσικαῖς δυνάμεσιν, ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία, ἀλλ' ἡμέτερον ἐπιτήδευμα.\n\n15 Χρὴ γὰρ εἰδέναι, ὡς διττῶς λέγεται τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ κυρίως λέγεται τὸ ἐκ τοῦ φύσει ἀγαθοῦ θεοῦ δεδωρημένον. Ὥσπερ πᾶν φῶς ἐξ ἡλίου ἤτοι πυρὸς φωτίζεται, οὕτω πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἀορίστου καὶ ἀκαταλήπτου πελάγους τῆς ἀγαθότητος τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἔχει καί, ὅσα παρὰ θεοῦ, ἀγαθὰ κυρίως καὶ ἀληθῶς. Λέγεται δὲ ἀγαθὸν οὐ κυρίως, ἀλλὰ καταχρηστικῶς καὶ καθ' ἡμετέραν συνήθειαν τὸ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡμῶν καὶ τῇ ἐφέσει φαινόμενον ἡδύ, ὃ πρὸς καιρὸν μὲν τέρπει, ὕστερον δὲ πικρὸν καρπὸν ἀποδίδωσι, παρὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ κτίσαντος γινόμενον καὶ δοκοῦν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ κυρίως κακόν. Καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὁμοίως· κυρίως μὲν κακὸν ἔστι καὶ λέγεται τὸ παρὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ κτίσαντος γινόμενον.","english":"If someone deprives me of salvation, it is good to be angry and to hate; but if he grieves me according to the world and becomes the cause of benefit by depriving me of material things, I will love him rather than hate him. Murder is evil; for it belongs to God alone to separate the soul from the body, since He also bound them together; but if I murder at God's command, it is good; for everything that comes from the good is good. It is evil, then, to desire to seize what is not ours but God's. Condemnation is evil; for it belongs to God alone to judge, and it is evil to seize God's prerogative, for those to whom the right to judge has not been given by God. Vainglory and pride are evil; for exaltation and glory befit God alone. So evil is nothing other than the use of natural powers contrary to nature and the law, which is not a substance but our own practice.\n\nFor one must know that both good and evil are spoken of in two ways; for good is spoken of in the proper sense as that which has been given by God, who is good by nature. Just as all light is illuminated by the sun or fire, so every good has its existence from the boundless and incomprehensible sea of goodness, and whatever comes from God is good in the proper and true sense. But good is spoken of not in the proper sense but by misuse and according to our custom as that which appears pleasant to our senses and desire, which delights for a time but afterward yields a bitter fruit, being done contrary to the law of the Creator and seeming to be good, though it is not good but in the proper sense evil. And evil likewise: in the proper sense evil is and is called that which is done contrary to the law of the Creator.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":14,"ref":"p14","source":"Λέγεται κακὸν οὐ κυρίως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν συνήθειαν τὸ καθ' ἡμετέραν αἴσθησιν ἐπίπονον καὶ ἀλγεινόν, ὅπερ πρὸς μὲν τὸ παρὸν ὀδύνας, ὕστερον δὲ καρπὸν σωτηρίας καὶ ἀεννάου εὐφροσύνης ἀναδίδωσιν.\n\n16 Εἰπὲ δέ· Ἀρχὴ παντὸς πράγματος μία ἢ δύο, οἷον ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τῆς ψυχῆς μία ἢ δύο; Μανιχαῖος· Μία. Εἰ γὰρ δύο, πῶς ἐκ δύο ἐναντίων ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ προέρχεται; Τὰ γὰρ παντελῶς ἐναντία ἀκοινώνητον ἔχουσι τὴν ἐνέργειαν· πῶς γὰρ ἡ ἄυλος ψυχὴ ἐξ ἀύλου καὶ ὕλης ἔσται; Ἢ πῶς τὸ αὐτὸ τὰ ἐναντία παρήγαγον μὴ ὁμονοήσαντα; Παντελῶς γὰρ ἀκοινώνητα τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἐναντία. Ὀρθόδοξος· Καλῶς ἔφης· ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων πάντων μία ἀρχή; Μανιχαῖος· Παντὶ τρόπῳ. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τὸ εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν δύο ἀρχῶν τῶν κατὰ σέ ἐστιν ἢ αἱ δύο ἀρχαὶ ἀρχαὶ τοῦ εἶναι; Μανιχαῖος· Πρὸς τί γὰρ συντείνει τοῦτο; Ὀρθόδοξος· Εἰ μὲν τὸ εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν κατὰ σὲ δύο ἀρχῶν, ἰδοὺ μία ἀρχὴ καὶ οὐ δύο. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχὴ τοῦ εἶναι, ἐν μιᾷ οὖν ἀρχῇ· οὐ γὰρ τὸ τοιῶσδε εἶναί φημι, τουτέστι κακὸν εἶναι ἢ καλόν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἁπλῶς εἶναι. Εἰ οὖν τὸ εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν κατὰ σὲ δύο ἀρχῶν, μία ἀρχὴ καὶ οὐ δύο. Εἰ δὲ αἱ κατὰ σὲ ἀρχαὶ ἀρχαὶ τοῦ εἶναι, ἔσονται δύο ἐναντία τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἁπλῶς οὐσία μία οὖσα δεκτική ἐστι διαφόρων ποιοτήτων καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο λέγονται πολλαὶ οὐσίαι, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς εἶναι ἕν ἐστι, εἰ καὶ ἐν διαφόροις θεωρούμενον πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα παρωνύμως ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖ κατονομάζεσθαι. Ὁρίσω οὖν ἀκοινώνητον παντελῶς εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων ἐνέργειαν, οὐκ ἐκ δύο ἀρχῶν τὸ εἶναι μάλιστα καὶ ἐναντίων, ἀλλ' ἐκ μιᾶς.","english":"It is called evil not in the strict sense, but according to our custom, meaning what is painful and grievous to our perception, which brings pains for the present but afterward yields the fruit of salvation and of everlasting gladness.\n\n16 But say: Is the beginning of every matter one or two—for example, is the beginning and cause of the soul one or two? Manichaean: One. For if two, how does one and the same thing proceed from two opposites? For things that are wholly opposite have an activity that admits of no fellowship. For how will the immaterial soul be from the immaterial and from matter? Or how did the same thing produce opposites that did not agree? For things that are opposite by nature are wholly without fellowship. Orthodox: You have spoken well. Is there one beginning of each of all existing things? Manichaean: In every way. Orthodox: Is being the beginning of the two beginnings that are according to you, or are the two beginnings beginnings of being? Manichaean: To what end does this tend? Orthodox: If being is the beginning of the two beginnings according to you, behold, one beginning and not two. For if being is the beginning of being, then it is in one beginning; for I do not speak of being in this way or that, that is, being evil or good, but of being simply. If, then, being is the beginning of the two beginnings according to you, there is one beginning and not two. But if the beginnings according to you are beginnings of being, they will be two opposites of the same thing. For just as substance simply, being one, is receptive of different qualities, and in this respect many substances are spoken of, so also being simply is one, even if, contemplated in different things, it causes the things that exist to be named many by derivation from itself. I will define, then, that the activity of opposites is wholly without fellowship, and that being—especially of opposites—is not from two beginnings but from one.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":15,"ref":"p15","source":"Οὐ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι αἴτιον τοῦ ὄντος· οὐ γὰρ προῆν τὸ εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος. Ἐν τίνι γὰρ ἐθεωρεῖτο; Ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ἀνάρχῳ ὄντι τὸ εἶναι θεωρούμενον, ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὡς αἰτίου ὑφέστηκε. Μία οὖν ἀρχὴ τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ταύτης οὐκ ἔστι.\n\n17 Καὶ πάλιν· Ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων κινήσεως μία ἢ δύο, ὑπαρκτική τε καὶ χρονικὴ καὶ τοπικὴ καὶ ἐνεργητική–ὑπαρκτικὴ μὲν τῆς ἑκάστου γενέσεως, –χρονικὴ δέ, ἀφ' οὗ χρόνου ἤρξατο, –τοπικὴ δέ, ἀφ' οὗ τόπου ἤρξατο τὰ ἀπὸ τόπου ἀρχόμενα, – ἐνεργητικὴ δέ, ἐξ ἧς ἐνεργείας ἐνεργεῖ τὸ ἐνεργούμενον, οἷον ἡ πρώτη ὕπαρξις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἀφ' οὗ χρόνου ἐγένετο καὶ ἀφ' οὗ τόπου ἤρξατο κινεῖσθαι, βαδίζειν τυχόν, καὶ τῆς βαδιστικῆς ἐνεργείας; Μανιχαῖος· Μία. Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἀληθῶς ἔφης· ἀδύνατον γὰρ δύο ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ὑπάρξεως. Μανιχαῖος· Οὕτως ἔχει. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τοῦτο ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων θεωρεῖται ἢ οὔ; Μανιχαῖος· Ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων. Ὀρθόδοξος· Ὅπερ οὖν ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν ἁπάντων θεωρεῖται, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων κοινῶς θεωρηθήσεται, οἷον, ὅπερ ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχει, καὶ πᾶσα ἡ ἀνθρωπότης ἔχει, ὡς τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ λογίζεσθαι, καὶ ὅπερ ἑκάστη οὐσία ἔχει, καὶ ἡ κοινὴ οὐσία ἔχει, ὡς τὸ αὐθύπαρκτον καὶ μὴ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι. Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ εἰ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐκ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς συνέστηκε, καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐκ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς συνέστηκε καὶ οὐκ ἐκ δύο, καὶ οὐκ ἔσονται δύο ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ μία.","english":"For being is not the cause of the existent; for being did not preexist the existent. For in what was it contemplated? But being, contemplated in the unoriginate existent, subsists in it and from it as from a cause. Therefore there is one principle of being, and its contrary does not exist.\n\n17 And again: The principle of the movement of each of existing things is one or two—substantive, temporal, local, and operative: substantive, of the generation of each; temporal, from the time when it began; local, from the place where things that begin from a place begin; operative, from the operation by which the operated operates—for example, the first existence of a human being, and the time from which he came to be, and the place from which he began to move, to walk perhaps, and of the walking operation. Manichaean: One. Orthodox: You have spoken truly; for it is impossible for there to be two principles of the existence of one thing. Manichaean: So it is. Orthodox: Is this contemplated in each of existing things, or not? Manichaean: In each of all existing things. Orthodox: What, then, is contemplated in each of all things will also be contemplated in common in all things—for example, what each of human beings has, humanity as a whole also has, such as living and reasoning, and what each substance has, the common substance also has, such as being self-subsistent and not having its being in another. In this way, then, if each of existing things has been constituted from one principle, all existing things have also been constituted from one principle and not from two, and there will not be two principles, but one.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":16,"ref":"p16","source":"18 Μανιχαῖος· Διὰ τί ἄναρχος ὁ θεός; Ὀρθόδοξος· Ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἔχει ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ εἶναι. Τὸ οὖν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ μὴ ἔχον τὸ εἶναι, πῶς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔσται; Καὶ χρὴ οὖν ἔκ τινος ὄντος τὸ μὴ ὂν τὸ εἶναι λαβεῖν· τὸ δὲ πρῶτον μεταδοτικὸν τοῦ εἶναι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον τὸ εἶναι, ἄναρχον ἀεὶ ἔσται.\n\n19 Μανιχαῖος· Διὰ τί μία ἀρχὴ καὶ οὐ δύο; Ὀρθόδοξος· Ὅτι δυὰς ἐκ μονάδος προέρχεται ὡς μονάδος γέννημα καὶ ἀρχὴ δυάδος μονὰς καὶ πρὸ τῆς δυάδος πάντως μονὰς καὶ ὅτι παντὸς πράγματος ἀρχὴ μία καί, εἰ ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων μία ἀρχή, καὶ πάντων ἔσται ἀρχὴ μία· ὁ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων ἀποδεδομένος λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀποδοθήσεται.\n\n20 Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ δύο ἀρχαί, πολυαρχία· εἰ δὲ πολυαρχία, στάσις· εἰ δὲ στάσις ἀρχὴ τῶν ὄντων, κακία τῶν ὄντων ἀρχή· στάσις γὰρ κακία ἐστί. Πρέπει οὖν τῷ θεῷ ἁπάντων τῶν λεγομένων καὶ νοουμένων μείζονι εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν. Ποῖον οὖν μεῖζον, τὸ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων θεοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν οὐσίας ἢ ἀνθρωπίνως τῇ δημιουργικῇ, μᾶλλον δὲ τεκτονικῇ τέχνῃ περὶ τὴν ὕλην καταγίνεσθαι; Μανιχαῖος· Πάντως, ὅτι τὸ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐκοῦν πρέπει θεῷ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων ποιεῖν οὐσίας, καὶ οὐκ ἦν ὕλη, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ θεοῦ ἐγένετο. Μανιχαῖος· Ὁ θεὸς κατὰ πάντα ἐστὶν ἄναρχος ἢ κατὰ τὶ μέν, κατὰ τὶ δὲ οὔ; Ὀρθόδοξος· Εἰ οὐ κατὰ πάντα ἄναρχος, καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ οὐκ ἄναρχος. Εἰ δὲ κατὰ πάντα ἄναρχος, ὄντως ἄναρχος καὶ φύσει ἄναρχος. Τὸ δὲ ἄναρχον καὶ ἀπέραντον· ἓν γὰρ ἀρχῆς εἶδος καὶ τὸ τέλος. Πᾶν οὖν ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος ἔχει κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, καὶ πᾶν τέλος ἔχον καὶ ἀρχὴν ἔχει.","english":"18 Manichaeus: Why is God without beginning? Orthodox: Because what is not does not have being from itself. That, then, which does not have being from itself, how will it be from itself? And so what is not must receive being from something that is; but the first giver of being, having being from itself, will always be without beginning.\n\n19 Manichaeus: Why is there one principle and not two? Orthodox: Because a dyad proceeds from a monad as the offspring of a monad, and the monad is the principle of the dyad, and before the dyad there is in every way a monad; and because every thing has one principle, and if each of existing things has one principle, all things too will have one principle; for the account given in the case of each of existing things will be given in the case of all things as well.\n\n20 And again: If there are two principles, there is multiplicity of rule; but if multiplicity of rule, faction; but if faction is the principle of existing things, then evil is the principle of existing things; for faction is evil. It is fitting, then, for God to be and to have something greater than all things spoken and conceived. Which, then, is greater—to create substances out of non-being in a manner befitting God, or to busy oneself in a human way with matter by the creative, or rather the carpentry, craft? Manichaeus: Certainly the former, that which is out of non-being. Orthodox: Therefore it is fitting for God to create substances out of non-being, and matter did not exist, but came to be by God. Manichaeus: Is God without beginning in all respects, or in some respects yes and in some respects no? Orthodox: If he is not without beginning in all respects, then he is both without beginning and not without beginning. But if he is without beginning in all respects, he is truly without beginning and without beginning by nature. And what is without beginning is also without limit; for the form of the beginning and of the end is one. Everything, then, that has a beginning also has an end according to its own nature, and everything that has an end also has a beginning.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":17,"ref":"p17","source":"Καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι γοῦν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες καὶ τέλος ἔχουσι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν, εἰ καὶ τῇ θείᾳ χάριτι πάλιν ἄρχονται τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἀνακαινίζονται. Ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἀκίνητον σῶμα ἀρξάμενον τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἐκ τόπου ἤρξατο, τουτέστι τὸ κυκλικόν, φθάνον δὲ τὸν τόπον, ὅθεν ἤρξατο, ἐπλήρωσε τὴν περιφέρειαν καὶ τὸν κύκλον, πάλιν δὲ ἄρχεται τῆς κινήσεως καὶ νέαν ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ποιεῖται καὶ οὕτω διαμένει κινούμενον, ἕως ἂν ὁ κελεύων αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι θέλῃ, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι κινούμενοι ζωτικῶς καὶ φθάνοντες τὸ φυσικὸν τέλος τῆς ἑαυτῶν ὑπάρξεως ἄρχονται τῆς ζωτικῆς κινήσεως, ἕως πάλιν προστάξει τοῦ ποιήσαντος αὐτοὺς παύσονται τῆς κινήσεως. Ἀεὶ γὰρ παρὰ θεοῦ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ζωτικῶς καὶ νοερῶς κινεῖσθαι λαμβάνουσιν οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντες τοῦτο. Ὥσπερ δὲ τροχὸς κινηθεὶς κινεῖται καὶ παύεται–ἐὰν δὲ ἔχῃ τὸ ἀεικίνητον, ἀεὶ κινεῖται οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἔχων τὴν κίνησιν–, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντες τὸ εἶναι, ὅσον κινεῖ αὐτοὺς ὁ ποιήσας, κινοῦνται· ἂν μέντοι ἐκεῖνος μὴ κινήσῃ, παύονται τῆς κινήσεως. Ὥστε τὸ ἀρχὴν ἔχον πάντως καὶ τέλος, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἔχον πάντως καὶ ἀρχήν. Καὶ τὸ φύσει ἄναρχον κατὰ πάντα ἄναρχόν ἐστι, κατά τε αἰτίαν καὶ χρόνον καὶ τόπον καὶ ἐξουσίαν. Τὰ οὖν δύο ἢ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἔσονται ἢ τόπῳ περιγραφήσονται καὶ οὐκ ἄναρχοί εἰσι. Πῶς οὖν ἐν ἀλλήλοις τὸ φῶς καὶ τὸ σκότος; Τὸ γὰρ φῶς τοῦ σκότους ἀναιρετικόν. Εἰ οὐ μεθόριά εἰσι τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ μεθόρια τοῦ σκότους, οὐδὲ τὸ φῶς ἀπερίγραπτον ὡς μὴ πανταχοῦ ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ σκότος. Καὶ οὐ παντελῶς ἄναρχα ἔχοντα τοπικὴν ἀρχήν.","english":"And indeed the angels, having a beginning, also have an end according to their own nature, even if by divine grace they again begin to exist and are renewed. For just as a motionless body, once it has begun to move, has begun from a place—that is, the circular body—and reaching the place from which it began, it has completed the circumference and the circle, and again begins its motion and makes a new beginning of motion, and thus remains moving as long as the one who commands it to move wishes, so too the angels, moving in a living way and reaching the natural end of their own existence, begin their living motion, until again the one who made them commands and they cease from motion. For they always receive from God both to be and to move in a living and intelligent way, not having this from themselves. And just as a wheel, once set in motion, moves and stops—but if it has the property of being ever-moving, it is always moved, not having its motion from itself—so too the angels, not having their being from themselves, are moved as far as the one who made them moves them; but if that one does not move them, they cease from motion. So that what has a beginning altogether also has an end, and what has an end altogether also has a beginning. And what is by nature without beginning is without beginning in all respects—in cause, in time, in place, and in power. Therefore the two will either be in each other or be circumscribed by place, and are not without beginning. How then are light and darkness in each other? For light is the destroyer of darkness. If the boundaries of light and the boundaries of darkness are not [distinct], then neither is light uncircumscribed, as not being everywhere, nor is darkness. And they are not entirely without beginning, having a beginning in place.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":18,"ref":"p18","source":"Ἀμήχανον γὰρ μὴ ὄντος τινὸς διατειχίσματος καὶ μεσοτοίχου ἀνεπίμικτον παντελῶς εἶναι τὸ φῶς καὶ τὸ σκότος. Εἰ γὰρ ἐν νυκτὶ λύχνον ἀνάψωμεν, ὁ μὲν περὶ τὸν λύχνον τόπος φωτεινότερος ἔσται, κατὰ μικρὸν δὲ διάστημα ἔσται σκοτεινότερον, μέχρις ἂν τελείως ἐκλίπῃ τὸ φῶς καὶ καθαρὸν σκότος γένηται φωτὸς ἀνεπίμικτον. Ἢ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμίγνυτο τῷ φωτὶ τὸ σκότος, καὶ οὐκ ἐναντία ταῦτα παντελῶς καὶ ἀκοινώνητα, ἢ ἕτερόν τι μεσότοιχον ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸ ταῦτα χωρίζον, καὶ οὐκέτι δύο ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ τρεῖς. Τὸ φύσει πεφυκὸς οὐ μεθίσταται, τὸ δὲ μεταβαλλόμενον οὐ φύσει. Εἰ οὖν φύσει\n\nἀκοινώνητα τὸ φῶς καὶ τὸ σκότος, πῶς ἐκοινώνησαν μετὰ ταῦτα; Πῶς ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πονηροῦ ἓν ζῷον ἀπετελέσθη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος; Εἰ γὰρ συνεβιβάσθησαν, ἐκοινώνησαν ἀλλήλοις· ὁ γὰρ συμβιβασμὸς κοινωνία γνώμης ἐστί. Καὶ οὔτε ὁ ἀγαθὸς καθαρῶς καὶ τελείως ἔμεινεν ἀγαθὸς οὔτε ὁ πονηρός, ἀλλ' ἀμφότεροι ἐτράπησαν. Τὸ δὲ τρεπόμενον οὐκ ἄναρχον οὐδὲ θεός· ὁ γὰρ θεὸς πάντα προειδὼς τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν πάντα τὰ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὁρίζει. Καὶ πάλιν· Τὸ εἶναι τῷ εἶναι ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ εἶναι τῷ μὴ εἶναι; Μανιχαῖος· Τὸ εἶναι τῷ μὴ εἶναι. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐκοῦν τῶν κατὰ σὲ δύο παντελῶς ἐναντίων ἀρχῶν ἡ μία ἔσται, ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα οὐκ ἔσται.","english":"For it is impossible, when there is no dividing wall and partition, for light and darkness to be completely unmixed. For if we light a lamp in the night, the place around the lamp will be brighter, but over a short distance it will be darker, until the light completely fails and pure darkness comes to be, unmixed with light. For either darkness was mixed with light from the beginning, and these things are not completely contrary and without fellowship, or there was some other partition from the beginning separating them, and there are no longer two principles, but three. What is by nature naturally so does not change, but what changes is not by nature. If, then, light and darkness are by nature\n\nwithout fellowship, how did they have fellowship afterward? How was one living being, the human, completed from good and evil? For if they were brought together, they had fellowship with each other; for a bringing-together is a fellowship of mind. And neither did the good remain purely and completely good, nor the evil, but both were turned. But what is turned is not without beginning nor God; for God, foreknowing all things that are in our power, determines all things that are not in our power. And again: Is being contrary to being, or is being contrary to not being? Manichaean: Being is contrary to not being. Orthodox: Therefore, of the two completely contrary principles according to you, one will be, and the other will not be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":19,"ref":"p19","source":"23 Καὶ πάλιν· Τὸ εἶναι τῷ εἶναι ἐναντίον; Μανιχαῖος· Τὸ εἶναι κακὸν τῷ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐκοῦν ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ συνυπάρχουσι καὶ συνουσίωνται τὰ ἐναντία. Καὶ πῶς ἐναντία; Μανιχαῖος· Τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀκατωνόμαστον· δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ οὕτως ὀνομάζεσθαι. Πῶς οὖν τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐναντίον τῷ ὄντι; Τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις δεῖ πρῶτον εἶναι καὶ τότε ἐναντία εἶναι καὶ τότε ὀνομάζεσθαι ἐναντία· ὅπερ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τι, οὐκ ὀνομάζεται. Ὀρθόδοξος· Μὴ ὂν εἰπὼν ὠνόμασας ἢ οὔ; Μανιχαῖος· Ὠνόμασα κατὰ ἀπόφασιν, οὐ κατὰ κατάφασιν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἡ κατάφασις ἕξιν δηλοῖ καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις στέρησιν; Μανιχαῖος· Ναί. Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἐναντία ἡ ἕξις τῇ στερήσει; Μανιχαῖος· Ναί.Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἐναντίον ἄρα τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἕξις στερήσει; Μανιχαῖος· Ναί. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τὸ κακὸν καθ' ἕξιν λέγεται ἢ κατὰ στέρησιν; Μανιχαῖος· Καθ' ἕξιν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τὸ καλὸν καθ' ἕξιν λέγεται ἢ κατὰ στέρησιν; Μανιχαῖος· Καθ' ἕξιν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐκοῦν οὐ πάντη ἐναντίον τὸ κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ· ἕξις γὰρ ἕξει οὐκ ἐναντίον. Μανιχαῖος· στέρησις καὶ ἔλλειψις ὁλοκληρίᾳ. Μανιχαῖος· Καὶ τί φῄς; Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὕτω καὶ τὸ κακὸν στέρησις μᾶλλον ἔσται καὶ οὕτως ἐναντίον τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὡς ἕξει στέρησις· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν εἰ μὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ στέρησις καὶ τὸ παντελὲς κακὸν παντελὴς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ στέρησις. Διὸ τὸ κακόν φαμεν μὴ ὂν μᾶλλον ὡς στέρησιν τῆς φυσικῆς ἕξεως ἤπερ ὄν.","english":"And again: Is being opposed to being? Manichaean: Evil being is opposed to good being. Orthodox: Then opposites coexist and share the same substance in one and the same thing. And how are they opposites? Manichaean: That which is not is unnameable; for it must be and thus be named. How then is that which is not opposed to that which is? For opposites must first exist and then be opposites and then be called opposites; for what is not something is not named. Orthodox: When you said \"that which is not,\" did you name it or not? Manichaean: I named it by negation, not by affirmation. Orthodox: Does affirmation indicate a state and negation a privation? Manichaean: Yes. Orthodox: Is the state opposed to the privation? Manichaean: Yes. Orthodox: Then that which is not is opposed to that which is as state is to privation? Manichaean: Yes. Orthodox: Is evil spoken of according to state or according to privation? Manichaean: According to state. Orthodox: Is good spoken of according to state or according to privation? Manichaean: According to state. Orthodox: Then evil is not in every way opposed to good; for state is not opposed to state. Manichaean: Privation and deficiency are opposed to completeness. Manichaean: And what do you say? Orthodox: In this way too evil will be rather a privation, and thus opposed to good as privation is to state; for evil is nothing other than a privation of good, and complete evil is a complete privation of good. Therefore we say that evil is not being, rather as a privation of natural state than as being.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":20,"ref":"p20","source":"24 Τί οὖν φῂς τὴν ὕλην, ζωὴν ἢ φθορὰν καὶ θάνατον, κίνησιν καὶ κινουμένην ἢ ἀκινησίαν καὶ κινητόν, φῶς ἢ σκότος; Μανιχαῖος· Φθορὰν καὶ θάνατον, ἀκινησίαν καὶ ἀκίνητον, σκότος καὶ οὐ φῶς. Ὀρθόδοξος· Εἰ οὖν φθορά, πῶς καρποὺς προήγαγε; Πῶς ἔζησεν; Ἡ γὰρ φθορὰ οὐ ζῇ οὐδὲ ζωὴν ἔχει οὐδὲ ζωῆς μεταδίδωσιν· ὃ γάρ τις οὐκ ἔχει, πῶς μεταδίδωσι; Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἀκίνητος οὖσα ἐκινήθη καὶ μέχρι τῶν ὁρίων τοῦ φωτὸς ἔφθασε; Τίς ὁ ταύτῃ δοὺς τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τὸ κινητόν; Εἰ μὲν ὁ ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἀγαθὸς οὐδὲ σοφός· –οὐκ ἀγαθὸς μὲν τὴν κακίαν ζωώσας καὶ κινήσας, οὐ σοφὸς δὲ οὐδὲ γνωστικὸς ἑαυτῷ παρεσχηκὼς πολέμους καὶ πράγματα καὶ καθ' ἑαυτοῦ κινήσας τὴν κακίαν ἠρεμοῦσαν καὶ ἡσυχάζουσαν· στάσεως γὰρ καὶ κακῶν ἐγένετο πρόξενος–, εἰ δὲ οὐχ ὁ θεός, ἕτερος, καὶ οὐκέτι δύο, ἀλλ' ἢ τρεῖς· ὃ γάρ τις οὐκ ἔχει, οὐ δύναται ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ κτήσασθαι. Μανιχαῖος· Ἀλλὰ δυνάμει εἶχε τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Εἰ δυνάμει εἶχε ζωὴν καὶ κίνησιν, δυνάμει ἦν ἀγαθή, εἴπερ ζωὴ καὶ κίνησις ἀγαθή. Μανιχαῖος· Ἡ τῆς κακίας ζωὴ καὶ κίνησις οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ κακόν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τὸ ἐκ δυνάμεως ἐρχόμενον εἰς ἐνέργειαν τρεπτὸν καὶ ἀρχόμενον καὶ οὐκ ἄναρχον καί, εἰ δυνάμει εἶχε ζωὴν καὶ κίνησιν, ἐνέργειαν ἔσχεν ὕστερον· εἰ μὲν κακὴ ἡ ταύτης ζωή τε καὶ κίνησις, δυνάμει ἦν κακὴ καὶ οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ ἔσται ἡ κακία οὐκ ἄναρχος. Εἰ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἡ ταύτης ζωή τε καὶ κίνησις, ἐκ κακίας ἦλθεν εἰς ἀγαθόν. Μανιχαῖος· Τί δαί; Οὐχ ἡ ἑτέρου φθορὰ ἑτέρου γένεσις; Ὀρθόδοξος·","english":"What then do you say matter is—life or corruption and death, motion and that which is moved, or immobility and that which is movable, light or darkness? Manichaean: Corruption and death, immobility and the immovable, darkness and not light. Orthodox: If then it is corruption, how did it bring forth fruits? How did it live? For corruption does not live, nor has it life, nor does it impart life; for what someone does not have, how can he impart? And how, being immovable, was it moved and reached even to the boundaries of the light? Who is it that gave it life and the capacity to be moved? If it was the good one, then he is not good nor wise—not good, in that he gave life and motion to evil; not wise, nor knowing, in that he furnished wars and troubles for himself and stirred up evil against himself when it was at rest and quiet; for he became the cause of faction and evils—but if it was not God, then it is another, and there are no longer two, but either three; for what someone does not have, he cannot acquire from himself. Manichaean: But it had life and motion potentially. Orthodox: If it had life and motion potentially, it was potentially good, if indeed life and motion are good. Manichaean: The life and motion of evil is not good, but evil. Orthodox: What comes from potentiality into actuality is changeable and has a beginning and is not without beginning; and if it had life and motion potentially, it received actuality later. If its life and motion are evil, it was evil potentially and not in actuality, and evil will not be without beginning. But if its life and motion are good, it came from evil into good. Manichaean: What then? Is not the corruption of one thing the generation of another? Orthodox:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":21,"ref":"p21","source":"Οὐχ ἡ φθορὰ γίνεται γένεσις, ἀλλ' ἡ ὑπὸ θεοῦ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι προστάξει θεοῦ δημιουργηθεῖσα, τρεπτὴ οὖσα ὡς ἀπὸ τροπῆς ἀρξαμένη. Τροπὴ γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἐλθεῖν· ὧν δὲ τὸ εἶναι\n\nἀπὸ τροπῆς ἤρξατο, τρεπτὰ πάντως καὶ ἀλλοιωτά. Τρεπτὴ οὖν οὖσα ἡ ὕλη τῷ θείῳ προστάγματι ζωοῦται καὶ φθείρεται καὶ πάλιν ζωοῦται· ὥστε οὐχ ἡ φθορὰ δημιουργεῖ γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ θεῖον πρόσταγμα ζωοῖ καὶ γενεσιουργεῖ. Εἰπὲ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· Τὰ ἐκ τοῦ φωτὸς ὅρια φωτὸς πεπλήρωται ἢ οὔ; Μανιχαῖος· Παντί που δῆλον, ὡς φωτὸς πεπλήρωται. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τὸ φῶς καὶ τὸ σκότος δεκτικὰ ἀλλήλων εἰσὶν ἢ ἀνεπίδεκτα; Μανιχαῖος· Δεκτικά. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐκοῦν οὔκ εἰσι φύσει, ὅ εἰσι· τὸ γὰρ φύσει πεφυκὸς οὐ μεθίσταται, καὶ ἡ φύσει ζωὴ ἀνεπίδεκτος θανάτου. Πῶς οὖν ὡμίλησε φωτὶ τὸ σκότος καὶ οὐ διελύθη; Εἶτα ὁ τόπος τοῦ φωτὸς ἐπεπλήρωτο τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ φωτὸς ἢ οὔ; Μανιχαῖος· Ἐπεπλήρωτο. Ὀρθόδοξος· Πῶς οὖν ἐχωρήθη τὸ σκότος; Οὐ γὰρ μεδιμναῖον ἀγγεῖον χωρήσει διμέδιμνον, τουτέστιν ἀγγεῖον ἑνὸς μοδίου χωρητικὸν οὐκ ἂν δύο χωρήσει μοδίους.","english":"Corruption does not become generation, but that which was created by God from non-being into being by God's command, being mutable since it began from a turning. For a turning is this: to come from non-being into being; and those things whose being began from a turning are altogether mutable and subject to change. Matter, then, being mutable, is given life by the divine command and is corrupted and again given life; so that corruption does not create generation, but the divine command gives life and generates. But tell me this also: Are the boundaries of the light filled with light or not? Manichaean: It is clear to everyone, surely, that they are filled with light. Orthodox: Are light and darkness receptive of each other or not receptive? Manichaean: Receptive. Orthodox: Then they are not by nature what they are; for that which is by nature does not change, and life by nature is not receptive of death. How then did darkness associate with light and not dissolve? Then, was the place of the light filled with the good and with the light or not? Manichaean: It was filled. Orthodox: How then was darkness contained? For a one-modius vessel will not contain a two-modius one, that is, a vessel capable of holding one modius would not hold two modii.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":22,"ref":"p22","source":"26 Εἶτα εἰσελθόντες οἱ τοῦ σκότους καρποὶ εἰς τὰ τοῦ φωτὸς ὅρια τί πεποιήκασιν ἢ τί πεπόνθασιν; Μανιχαῖος· Εἶδον τὸ φῶς καὶ ἠγάσθησαν καὶ προσεκίσσησαν αὐτῷ καὶ εἰς ἔρωτα αὐτοῦ ἦλθον. Ὀρθόδοξος· Ὢ σκοτεινοὶ καὶ ἀνόητοι. Τυφλὸν τὸ σκότος ἢ φωτεινόν; Μανιχαῖος· Τυφλόν. Ὀρθόδοξος· Καὶ πῶς ὁρᾶν δύναται τὸ τυφλὸν ἢ πῶς τὸ παντελῶς κακὸν θαυμάσει ἢ ἐρασθήσεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; Ὅμως αὗται αἱ δύο ἀρχαὶ φθαρτικαὶ ἀλλήλων εἰσί; Μανιχαῖος· Ναί. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐκοῦν οὐ μόνη ἡ κακία ἐστὶ φθορά, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός. Μανιχαῖος· Ἡ μὲν κακία φθορά, ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς ζωή. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν κακία φθείρει τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐχ ὑφίσταται, ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς ζωοῖ τὴν κακίαν, καὶ ὑποστήσεται μὲν ἡ κακία, ἀπωλεῖται δὲ ὁ ἀγαθός. Ὡς οὖν ἔφης, ἡ ὕλη κακὸν καὶ φθορὰ καὶ θάνατος. Τὸ οὖν κακόν, εἰ μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ἀγαθόν, συνίσταται μὲν ἑαυτῷ, οὐ παντελῶς κακόν, οὐ παντελῶς φθορά· συνιστῶν γὰρ ἑαυτῷ, κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔσται κακόν. Εἰ δὲ παντελῶς κακὸν καὶ παντελῶς φθορά, καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἔσται ἀναιρετικὸν καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον. –Ἔκθου δὲ ἡμῖν καί, ὃν ἔφης, συγκράσεως λόγον.","english":"Then, when the fruits of darkness entered the boundaries of light, what did they do or what did they suffer? Manichaeus: They saw the light and were amazed and were delighted with it and came into love of it. Orthodox: O dark and senseless ones. Is darkness blind or luminous? Manichaeus: Blind. Orthodox: And how can the blind see, or how will that which is wholly evil marvel at or fall in love with the good? Nevertheless, are these two principles destructive of each other? Manichaeus: Yes. Orthodox: Therefore not only is evil corruption, but the good also. Manichaeus: Evil is corruption, but the good is life. Orthodox: Therefore evil corrupts the good and does not subsist, while the good gives life to evil, and evil will subsist, but the good will be destroyed. As you said, then, matter is evil and corruption and death. If, then, evil is evil to others but good to itself, it is established for itself, and is not wholly evil, not wholly corruption; for in establishing itself, in this respect it will not be evil. But if it is wholly evil and wholly corruption, it will also be destructive of itself and non-existent. —Set before us also, as you said, the account of the mixture.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":23,"ref":"p23","source":"28 Μανιχαῖος· Ἦν, ὡς ἔφην, θεὸς καὶ ὕλη, ἕκαστον ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις ὅροις, ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς θεός, ζωή, φῶς, κίνησις, γνῶσις, νόησις καὶ πᾶν ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ ὕλη κακία, φθορά, σκότος, θάνατος, ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ ἀκινησίᾳ παντελεῖ. Εἶτα μετὰ πολλοὺς αἰῶνας ἐστασίασεν ἡ ὕλη πρὸς ἑαυτὴν καὶ οἱ ταύτης καρποὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ οὕτω τῶν μὲν διωκόντων, τῶν δὲ διωκομένων, καὶ ἦν, ὡς ἔφην, θεὸς καὶ ὕλη, τουτέστι δύο ἀρχαί· καὶ τοῦ μὲν φωτὸς μέρος ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή, τοῦ δὲ σκότους καὶ τῆς ὕλης δημιούργημα τὸ σῶμα. Ἡ δὲ μίξις οὕτως ἐγένετο. Καὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀνὰ μέρος ἦν, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἐν ἑνὶ μέρει ἦν, ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς ἐν τρισίν. Εἶτα ἐκινήθη ὁ πονηρὸς ἀτάκτῳ ὁρμῇ ἐκ τῶν ὁρίων αὐτοῦ καὶ ἦλθεν εἰς τὰ ὅρια τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ γνοὺς ὁ ἀγαθὸς προέβαλεν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν λεγομένην μητέρα ζωῆς, καὶ ἡ μήτηρ τῆς ζωῆς προεβάλετο τὸν πρῶτον ἄνθρωπον, τοῦτον δὲ τὸν πρῶτον ἄνθρωπον λέγω τὰ πέντε στοιχεῖα, ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀήρ, ἄνεμος, φῶς, ὕδωρ καὶ πῦρ. Ταῦτα οὖν ἐνδυσάμενος ἀπῆλθε καὶ ἐπολέμησε τῷ σκότει. Οἱ δὲ τοῦ σκότους ἄρχοντες ἔφαγον ἐκ τῆς πανοπλίας αὐτοῦ μέρος, ὅ ἐστι ψυχή· κατέσχον δὲ καὶ τὸν πρῶτον ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἐβασανίζετο ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὢν ἐν τῷ σκότει καὶ ἐβόησε πρὸς τὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ προεβάλετο ἄλλην δύναμιν λεγομένην ζῶν πνεῦμα. Καὶ κατῆλθε καὶ ἔδωκε δεξιὰν τῷ πρώτῳ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἀνήγαγεν αὐτόν. Ἀφῆκε δὲ κάτω τὸ μέρος, ὃ ἔφαγον οἱ ἄρχοντες, τουτέστι τὴν ψυχήν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς μοίρας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐγένοντο αἱ ψυχαί, ἐκ δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς κακίας τὰ σώματα. Ὀρθόδοξος·","english":"Manichaeus: There was, as I said, God and matter, each within its own boundaries—the good God being life, light, motion, knowledge, understanding, and every good thing; and matter being evil, corruption, darkness, death, in rest and quiet and complete inactivity. Then after many ages matter rebelled against itself, and its fruits against one another, and so some pursued and others were pursued, and there was, as I said, God and matter, that is, two principles; and the soul is a portion of the light, while the body is a product of darkness and matter. And the mixture came about in this way. And each of them was in a portion: the good one was in one portion, and the evil one in three. Then the evil one was moved by a disorderly impulse out of his own boundaries and came into the boundaries of the good; and the good one, perceiving this, put forth from himself a power called the Mother of Life, and the Mother of Life put forth the First Man—and by this First Man I mean the five elements, which are air, wind, light, water, and fire. Having clothed himself with these, then, he went out and made war on the darkness. But the rulers of the darkness ate a portion of his armor, which is the soul; and they also seized the First Man, and he was tormented by them while he was in the darkness, and he cried out to the good one, and he put forth another power called the Living Spirit. And he came down and gave his right hand to the First Man and brought him up. But he left below the portion which the rulers had eaten, that is, the soul; for the souls came from the lot of the good, and the bodies from the substance of evil. Orthodox:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":24,"ref":"p24","source":"Εἰ κατὰ τὸν θεῖον ἀπόστολον οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνία φωτὶ πρὸς σκότος, πῶς ἐγένετο σύγκρασις ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος; Καὶ αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ πεῖρα, ἥτις ἐστὶ τῶν\n\nματαίων λόγων ἰσχυροτέρα, διδάσκει. Εἰσῆλθε τὸ σκότος εἰς τὰ ὅρια τοῦ φωτός, καὶ οὐκ ἐλύθη; Καὶ πάλιν· Πῶς ἐχωρήθη τὸ σκότος ἐν τοῖς τοῦ φωτὸς ὁρίοις; Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ μὲν σοφὸς ἦν ὁ ἀγαθός, πῶς οὐ προέγνω τὴν ἐπιδρομὴν τοῦ πονηροῦ καὶ προωχύρωσεν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὸν τόπον αὐτοῦ; Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν σοφὸς μηδὲ προγνώστης, μωρός· τὸν δὲ μωρὸν πῶς λέγεις ἀγαθόν; Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ ὅλον τὸ σκότος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὰ ὅρια τοῦ φωτός, κενὸς ἔμεινεν ὁ τόπος αὐτοῦ· εἰ δὲ μέρος αὐτοῦ, πῶς μέρος αὐτοῦ ἐνίκησε τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀποσταλέντα πολεμῆσαι αὐτῷ; Ἄσοφος γὰρ ὁ ἀποστέλλων ἀσθενέστερον πρὸς ἰσχυρότερον. Ἢ ἀσθενὴς ὁ ἀγαθός, ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς ἰσχυρότερος. Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ μὲν ἑκουσίως προέδωκεν ὁ ἀγαθὸς μέρος ἑαυτοῦ, τουτέστι τὴν ψυχήν, οὐκ ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἀγαθὸν κακῷ ἐκδιδούς. Πῶς δὲ αὐτὸς ἔκδοτον δέδωκε τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ πονηρῷ; Κρίνειν τοὺς δουλεύοντας τῷ πονηρῷ; Ἐροῦσι γὰρ αὐτῷ· Σὺ παρέδωκας ἡμᾶς, ἀνῄρηται ἡ κρίσις. Εἰ δὲ αὐτοῦ μὴ θέλοντος ἀφήρπασαν μέρος αὐτοῦ οἱ ἄρχοντες τῆς κακίας, ἀσθενέστερός ἐστι καὶ ἀμαθέστερος, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπολέσας μέρος αὐτοῦ, δεύτερον μὴ δυνηθεὶς ἀφαρπάσαι τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἁρπαγέν· εἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐκ ἠδυνήθη, οὐδὲ μετὰ ταῦτα δυνηθήσεται. Πῶς δὲ παραλαβὼν τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῆς κακίας ἐσταύρωσε καὶ ἐκ τῶν σαρκῶν αὐτῶν ἐποίησε τοὺς οὐρανούς, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ὀστῶν αὐτῶν τὰ ὄρη, τὸ δὲ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἁρπαγὲν οὐ παρέλαβε; Καὶ οὕτως δὲ ἀναιρεῖται ἡ κρίσις.","english":"If, according to the divine apostle, there is no fellowship of light with darkness, how did the commingling of soul and body come about? And experience itself, which is stronger than vain words, teaches this. Did darkness enter into the boundaries of light and not be dissolved? And again: How was darkness contained within the boundaries of light? And again: If the good one was wise, how did he not foreknow the assault of the evil one and fortify himself and his place? For if he was not wise nor foreknowing, he is foolish; and how do you call the foolish one good? And again: If all the darkness entered into the boundaries of light, his place remained empty; but if a part of it, how did a part of it conquer the one sent by the good to fight against it? For the one who sends a weaker against a stronger is unwise. Either the good is weak, and the evil is stronger. And again: If the good willingly handed over a part of himself, that is, the soul, the good is not good, since he delivers a good thing over to evil. But how did he himself give the soul over as a hostage to the evil one? To judge those who serve the evil one? For they will say to him: You handed us over; judgment is abolished. But if, against his will, the rulers of evil snatched away a part of him, he is weaker and more ignorant—first, because he lost a part of himself; second, because he was not able to snatch back what was snatched from him; for if he could not from the beginning, neither will he be able afterward. But how, after taking the rulers of evil, did he crucify them and make the heavens from their flesh and the mountains from their bones, yet did not take back the part of himself that was snatched away? And in this way too judgment is abolished.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":25,"ref":"p25","source":"Ἀναίτιοι γὰρ οἱ ἁμαρτάνοντες· εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠδυνήθη τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἀπολαβεῖν, πῶς ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ κατακυριευθεῖσα δυνήσεται μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν καὶ ἀναίτιος ἔσται; Καὶ εἰ τελευταῖον δεσμήσει ὁ ἀγαθὸς τὴν κακίαν, ἀπολήψεται τελείως τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ οὐ κολασθήσεται ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ ἡ κακία, ἀναίτιος ἡ ψυχή. Καὶ πάλιν· Τὸ σῶμα νεκρὸν κείμενον οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει. Οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἡ κακία, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς.\n\n30 Εἴπατε ἡμῖν, ὦ Μανιχαῖοι, ἡ παρ' ὑμῖν ἄναρχος κακία, ἣν ὕλην ὀνομάζετε, ἀσώματός ἐστιν ἢ σῶμα ἢ σύνθετον; Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀσώματος, πῶς ὕλη; Ἡ γὰρ ὕλη οὐκ ἀσώματος. Ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐρεῖτε, ὅτι ἀσώματος μέν ἐστιν, ἐποίησε δὲ τὸ σῶμα. Εἴπατε οὖν ἡμῖν· Ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος; Καὶ εἰ μὲν «ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας» εἴπητε, ψεύδεσθε. Ἐκ γὰρ ἀσωμάτου οὐσίας σῶμα οὐ προέρχεται–τὸ γὰρ φύσει πεφυκὸς οὐ μεθίσταται οὔτε ἐξ ἀσωμάτου εἰς σῶμα οὐσία τραπήσεται–οὐδὲ ἐκ σώματος εἰς ἀσώματον οὐδὲ ἐκ λογικοῦ εἰς ἄλογον οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀλόγου εἰς λογικόν. Ἡ γὰρ οὐσιώδης ποιότης ἀκίνητος, τὰ δὲ μεταβάλλοντα καὶ τρεπόμενα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τρέπεται, ἅτινα γίνονται καὶ ἀπογίνονται δίχα τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς. Εἰ δὲ εἴπητε «ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος», εἴπατε ἡμῖν, διὰ τί ἀσώματος ὢν καὶ πονηρὸς μὴ ἐποίησε καὶ τὴν σύμμιξιν ἀπὸ πονηρῶν, διὰ τί μὴ ἐποίησε καὶ ψυχὰς φύσει πονηρὰς ὡς καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ὡς λέγετε, φύσει κακόν, διὰ τί συνεκέρασε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ κακίᾳ μέρος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; Ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς τοῦτο οὐκ ἐποίησεν· ὥστε οὐ τελέως ἐστὶ πονηρός, ἀλλ' ἔχει μέρος ἀγαθόν. Καὶ ταῦτα μέν, εἰ ἀσώματον λέγετε.","english":"For those who sin are not responsible; for if he himself was unable to recover his own part, how will the soul that has been dominated be able not to sin and be free of blame? And if the good one finally binds evil, he will recover the soul completely, and a human being will not be punished. And again: If evil comes to the soul from the body, the soul is not responsible. And again: The body lying dead does not sin. Therefore evil does not come from the body, but from the soul.\n\nTell us, O Manichaeans, is the evil without beginning that you have, which you call matter, incorporeal, or a body, or composite? And if it is incorporeal, how is it matter? For matter is not incorporeal. But perhaps you will say that it is incorporeal, but made the body. Tell us then: from its own substance, or from what is not? And if you say \"from its own substance,\" you lie. For a body does not come forth from an incorporeal substance—for what is by nature does not change, nor will substance be turned from incorporeal into body—nor from body into incorporeal, nor from rational into irrational, nor from irrational into rational. For essential quality is immovable, while things that change and turn are turned according to accident, things which come to be and pass away without the destruction of the underlying subject. But if you say \"from what is not,\" tell us, why, being incorporeal and evil, did he not also make the commingling from evil things? Why did he not also make souls evil by nature, as he made the body evil by nature, as you say? Why did he mix a part of the good with his own evil? For the good one did not do this; so that he is not completely evil, but has a part of good. And this is so, if you say he is incorporeal.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":26,"ref":"p26","source":"Εἰ δὲ σῶμα, πῶς ἐκινήθη; Πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἀπροαίρετον καὶ νεκρόν. Πῶς οὖν ἐκινήθη; Τίς αὐτῷ δέδωκε τὴν κίνησιν; Ὁ ἀγαθός; Οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἀγαθὸς ἢ οὐ σοφὸς οὐδὲ προνοητικὸς κινήσας τὴν κακίαν. Εἰ δὲ σύνθετον εἴπητε, γνῶτε, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ σύνθετον εὐδιάλυτον, καὶ ἀνάγκη, πρῶτον εἶναι τὰ ἁπλᾶ, ἐξ ὧν ἡ σύνθεσις γέγονεν, ὡς ἀνάγκη, πρῶτον εἶναι τὴν πίσσαν καθ' ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὸν κηρὸν καθ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ τότε γενέσθαι τὴν τοῦ κηροπίσσου σύνθεσιν. –Ἔσονται οὖν αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῆς κακίας δύο καὶ οὐ μία.\n\n31 Εἴπατε οὖν, ὦ Μανιχαῖοι· Αἱ παρ' ὑμῖν δύο ἀρχαὶ παντελῶς εἰσιν ἀκοινώνητοι ἢ ἔν τισι κοινωνοῦσι καὶ ἔν τισι διαφέρουσι καί, εἰ μὲν παντελῶς εἰσιν ἀκοινώνητοι, ἡ\n\nμία ἔσται καὶ ἡ μία οὐκ ἔσται. Εἰ δὲ κοινωνοῦσι κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ὡς οὐσία καὶ συμβεβηκός, τὸ ἓν ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἔχει τὴν ὕπαρξιν· τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς καθ' αὑτὸ οὐχ ὑφίσταται, ὡς τὸ χρῶμα οὐ δύναται συστῆναι ἄνευ σώματος. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα οὐσία, τὸ δὲ χρῶμα συμβεβηκός· τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς φθορᾶς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τοῦ χρώματος ἀλλασσομένου τὸ σῶμα τὸ αὐτὸ μένει. Οἵαν οὖν θέλετε, εἴπατε οὐσίαν καί, οἷον θέλετε, συμβεβηκός· εἰ δὲ ἀμφότεραι οὐσίαι, γνῶτε, ὅτι οὐσία οὐ διαφέρει μὲν οὐσίας, οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ ἐναντία οὐσία οὐσίας εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Εἰ ἔστιν ὁ ἀγαθός, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ πονηρός, καὶ οὐσία ἐστὶν ἀίδιος καὶ ἄτρεπτος, ἐνεργητική, δημιουργητικὴ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν· ἕν εἰσι τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀμφότεροι, ποιότητι δὲ διαφέρουσι. Καὶ πάλιν·","english":"But if it is a body, how was it moved? For every body, of itself, is without choice and dead. How then was it moved? Who gave it motion? The good one? Then it was not good, or not wise, nor provident, that moved evil. But if you say it is composite, know that everything composite is easily dissolved, and it is necessary that the simple things first exist, from which the composition came to be—as it is necessary that the pitch first exist by itself and the wax by itself, and then the composition of wax-pitch come to be. Therefore the principles of evil will be two and not one.\n\n31 Tell us then, O Manichaeans: Are the two principles among you wholly without communion, or do they have communion in some things and differ in some things? And if they are wholly without communion, the one will be and the one will not be. But if they have communion according to being, as substance and accident, the one has its existence in the other; for an accident does not subsist by itself, as color cannot subsist without a body. And the body is substance, but the color is accident; and the accident comes to be and ceases to be without the destruction of the subject—when the color changes, the same body remains. Say, then, whatever substance you wish, and whatever accident you wish. But if both are substances, know that substance does not differ from substance, nor is one substance contrary to another except according to accident. If there is the good one, and there is the evil one, and each of them is an eternal and immutable substance, active, creative—both are one in substance, but differ in quality. And again:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":27,"ref":"p27","source":"Ὁρῶμεν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τοὺς καιρούς, οὐρανόν τε καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρων κινήσεις καὶ ὄμβρους καὶ τὰ τῆς γῆς ἐκφόρια κατὰ λόγον καὶ καθ' εἱρμὸν τεταγμένα καὶ ῥυθμιζόμενα. Εἰ οὖν δύο ἀρχαὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι, πῶς εὐθέτως τὰ πάντα διεξάγεται, εἰ μὴ συνεβιβάσθησαν φιλικῷ τρόπῳ; Εἰ ἑαυτὴν ἀνήλωκεν ἡ ὕλη, πῶς ἐκινεῖτο; Εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἀνάλωσιν ἐκινεῖτο, πῶς ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ φωτὸς ὅρια; Εἰ κατωφερὴς ἡ ὕλη καὶ φυσικὸς τόπος αὐτῆς τὰ κατώτερα καὶ σκοτεινότερα, πῶς ἐλθοῦσα ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ φωτὸς ὅρια ἐξῆλθεν ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῆς φύσεως; Τὸ σκότος τυφλόν· πῶς οὖν εἶδε τὸ φῶς; Εἰ ἄτακτος καὶ ἄνους ἡ ὕλη, πῶς ἔχει ἄρχοντας; Πῶς δὲ καὶ πολεμῆσαι δύναται τῷ λόγον καὶ τάξιν ἔχοντι; Ἢ καὶ πολεμοῦσα ἐπικρατεστέρα γενήσεται, ὥστε ἁρπάσαι τι παρὰ τοῦ σοφοῦ καὶ μὴ ἁρπαγῆναι; Εἰ δὲ ὁ ἀγαθὸς θεὸς συνεχώρησε μέρος αὐτοῦ ἁρπαγῆναι διὰ τὸ ἐπισχεῖν αὐτὴν τοῦ μὴ προβῆναι εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὅρια οὐ δυνηθεὶς ἄλλως, ἰσχυρότερος ὁ πονηρὸς καὶ δολοπλόκος ὁ ἀγαθός. Καὶ πῶς ἀγαθὸς ἢ θεὸς δόλῳ καὶ μὴ δυνάμει χρώμενος; Τὸ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον ἀλήθειά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια ἀγαθόν· τὸ δὲ ἄναρχον ἄτρεπτον. Εἰ οὖν ἄναρχος ἡ ὕλη, καὶ ἄτρεπτος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ ἄτρεπτος, ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσα· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσα, ἀλήθειά ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν, ἀγαθὸν ἔσται. Εἰ δὲ τρέπεται ἡ ὕλη, ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ εἰς κακόν, καὶ πρότερον οὖσα ἀγαθὴ ὕστερον ἐγένετο κακή, ἢ εἰς ἀγαθὸν ἐκ κακοῦ, καὶ πρότερον οὖσα κακὴ ὕστερον ἐγένετο ἀγαθή· ἡ γὰρ τροπὴ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον ἄγει.","english":"We see the elements and the seasons, heaven and earth and sea always in the same state, and night and day, the motions of sun and moon and stars, and rains, and the fruits of the earth, ordered and regulated according to reason and in sequence. If, then, there are two principles opposed to each other, how is everything conducted fittingly, unless they were brought together in a friendly manner? If matter has consumed itself, how was it moved? But if it was moved toward its own consumption, how did it come to the boundaries of the light? If matter is downward-tending and its natural place is the lower and darker regions, how, having come to the boundaries of the light, did it depart from its own nature? Darkness is blind; how then did it see the light? If matter is disorderly and irrational, how does it have rulers? And how can it wage war against what has reason and order? Or will it, even while warring, become the stronger, so as to snatch something from the wise one and not be snatched? But if the good God allowed a part of himself to be snatched because he was unable otherwise to restrain it from advancing into his own boundaries, then the evil one is stronger, and the good one is crafty. And how is he good or God, using craft and not power? What is always in the same state is truth, and truth is good; and what is without beginning is unchanging. If, then, matter is without beginning, it will also be unchanging; and if unchanging, always in the same state; and if always in the same state, it is truth; and if it is truth, it will be good. But if matter changes, from good to evil, then, being good before, it became evil afterward; or to good from evil, and being evil before, it became good afterward; for change leads to the opposite.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":28,"ref":"p28","source":"Ἡ ἀίδιος οὐσία ἄτρεπτός ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ εἶναι· οὗ δὲ ἡ ὕπαρξις οὐκ ἐκ προκοπῆς, ἄτρεπτος ἡ οὐσία. Ἀγαθὸς οὖν ὢν ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἀίδιος οὐχ ὑπομένει τροπήν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἀγαθός ἐστι καί, ἃ δὲ ποιεῖ, ἀγαθά ἐστιν· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ κακὰ γίνεσθαι, ὅμως δὲ τρεπτά, ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παράγει. Τὰ οὖν λογικὰ δεκτικὰ μέν ἐστι τροπῆς διὰ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραγωγήν, ἀλλ' αὐτεξούσια διὰ τὸ λογικὰ εἶναι. Αὐτεξούσια δὲ μένει, καθὼς γέγονε, τουτέστιν ἀγαθά, δοῦλα καὶ ἐπιγνώμονα καὶ ὑπήκοα τοῦ πεποιηκότος, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῇ κτιστῇ φύσει· ἀρετὴ γάρ ἐστι τὸ μένειν ἐν τοῖς ὅροις τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως. Αὐτεξουσίως οὖν ἐτράπη ὁ ἄνθρωπος μεγάλου ἐπιθυμήσας, οὐ καλῶς δέ· μέγα γὰρ τὸ εἶναι θεόν, ἀλλὰ κακὸν τῷ μὴ ὄντι θεῷ ἀγνωμονεῖν τῷ ποιήσαντι καὶ ὑπερβαίνειν τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν καὶ θέλειν εἶναι, ὃ γενέσθαι αὐτὸν ἀδύνατον· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μὴ ἄναρχον εἶναι θεὸν ἢ τὸν ἠργμένον εἶναι ἄναρχον. Ἄγει οὖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν στέρησιν ἡ τοῦ μὴ προσήκοντος ζήτησις.","english":"The eternal essence is immutable; for it did not come into being from non-being. And that whose existence is not from progress has an immutable essence. Therefore God, being good and eternal, does not admit of change, but is always good, and the things he makes are good; for from the good it is not possible for evils to come. Yet they are changeable, since he brings them from non-being into being. Rational beings, then, are capable of change because of their being brought from non-being into being, but they are self-determining because they are rational. And they remain self-determining, as they were made, that is, good, servile and obedient and subject to their Maker, which belongs to created nature; for virtue is to remain within the bounds of one's own nature. So man was changed by his own free choice, desiring something great, but not rightly; for it is great to be God, but it is evil for one who is not God to be disobedient to his Maker and to overstep his own nature and to wish to be what it is impossible for him to become; for it is impossible for one who is not without beginning to be God, or for one who has a beginning to be without beginning. Therefore the pursuit of what is not proper brings about the deprivation of things that exist.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":29,"ref":"p29","source":"32 Μανιχαῖος· Τίς ἡ κακία τοῦ διαβόλου; Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἡ κατὰ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἐπανάστασις. Δέδωκεν οὖν αὐτῷ ὁ θεὸς τὸ εἶναι, ἵνα τε μὴ δόξῃ φοβεῖσθαι τὴν τοῦ δούλου ἐπανάστασιν καὶ ἵνα διδάξῃ ἡμᾶς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κακοὺς εὐεργετικῶς διακεῖσθαι. Οὐ μόνον γὰρ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄρχοντα τοῦ κόσμου ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν καί, εἴπερ θελήσει ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι, δέχεται καὶ εὐεργετεῖ. Διὸ καὶ δυνάμενος ἀνελεῖν αὐτὸν οὐκ\n\nἀνεῖλεν, ἀλλ' ἀνέχεται τῆς ἀφροσύνης αὐτοῦ εὐεργετικῶς καὶ ἀφθόνως τὸ εἶναι παρέχων αὐτῷ, ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ. Τὸ δὲ καλὸν γενέσθαι αὐτὸν οὐ τοῦ θεοῦ μόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοῦ· τὸ γὰρ βίᾳ γινόμενον οὐ καλὸν οὐδὲ ἀρετή. Εἰ δὲ λέγεις ὅτι, διὰ τί εἴασεν αὐτὸν πολεμεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φημί, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον· πολλοὶ γὰρ δι' αὐτοῦ στεφανοῦνται. Εἰ δὲ λέγεις, ὅτι καὶ πολλοὶ ἀπόλλυνται, φημί, ὅτι, ὥσπερ ἠδυνήθη αὐτὸς ὁ διάβολος ἐκτὸς προσβολῆς ἄλλου γενέσθαι κακὸς ἐξ οἰκείας γνώμης, ὅπερ καὶ χεῖρον αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἔγκλημα, οὕτως ἠδύνατο καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τὸν προσβάλλοντα γενέσθαι κακός, καὶ ἐγίνετο ἂν αὐτῷ ἡ ἁμαρτία χείρων· πλείονος γὰρ ἀπολογίας καὶ συγγνώμης ἀξιοῦται ὁ ἐξ ὑποβολῆς ἄλλου ἁμαρτάνων ἤπερ ὁ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ. Ὁ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἁμαρτάνων ἀναπολόγητός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ μετερχόμενος τὴν ἀρετὴν πλέον ἐπαινεῖται. Διὸ ὁ διάβολος μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἁμαρτήσας ἀμετανόητος ἔμεινεν, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἁμαρτήσας, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τοῦ διαβόλου προσβολῆς ἐν μετανοίᾳ γέγονε καὶ ἠξιώθη τῆς ἀνακαινίσεως καὶ ἀφέσεως τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν. Τὸ οὖν εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστι καὶ δῶρον θεοῦ.","english":"Manichaeus: What is the evil of the devil? Orthodox: His rebellion against his Maker. God therefore gave him existence, so that He might not seem to fear the rebellion of a servant, and so that He might teach us to be beneficent even toward the wicked. For He not only made him, but also made him a ruler of the world, and if he should wish to become good, He receives him and benefits him. Therefore, though He was able to destroy him, He did not destroy him, but bears with his folly beneficently and generously granting him existence, which is his. But that he become good is not of God alone, but also of himself; for what is done by force is neither good nor virtue. But if you say, Why did He allow him to wage war against men? I say, for their advantage; for many are crowned through him. But if you say that many also perish, I say that, just as the devil himself was able to become evil from his own will without another's suggestion, which is also a worse charge against him, so too man was able to become evil of himself even without having one who suggests, and his sin would have been worse for him; for he who sins at another's prompting is deemed worthy of greater defense and pardon than he who sins of himself. For he who sins of himself is without defense, just as he who pursues virtue of himself is praised the more. Therefore the devil, having sinned of himself, remained unrepentant, but man, having sinned not of himself but from the devil's suggestion, came to repentance and was deemed worthy of renewal and the forgiveness of sins. To be good, then, is a gift of God.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":30,"ref":"p30","source":"34 Μανιχαῖος· Διὰ τί προγνοὺς ὁ θεὸς πονηρὸν ἐσόμενον τὸν διάβολον ἐποίησεν αὐτόν; Ὀρθόδοξος· Δι' ὑπερβολὴν ἀγαθότητος ἐποίησεν αὐτόν. Ἔφη γάρ· Ἐπειδὴ οὗτος πονηρὸς μέλλει ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀπολλύειν πάντα τὰ διδόμενα αὐτῷ ἀγαθά, στερήσω αὐτὸν κἀγὼ τελείως τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον αὐτὸν ποιήσω; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ αὐτὸς πονηρὸς ἔσται, ἐγὼ τῆς μετουσίας μου μὴ στερήσω αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ δώσω αὐτῷ ἓν ἀγαθόν, τὴν διὰ τοῦ εἶναι μετουσίαν μου, ἵνα, κἂν μὴ θέλῃ, μετέχῃ μου τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διὰ τοῦ εἶναι. Οὐδεὶς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ συγκρατῶν καὶ συνέχων τὰ ὄντα ἐν τῷ εἶναι εἰ μὴ ὁ θεός· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστι καὶ δῶρον θεοῦ.\n\n35 Μανιχαῖος· Τὸ εἶναι τοῖς οὖσιν ἐκ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· εἰ οὖν πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶναι ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δεδομένον, καὶ τῷ διαβόλῳ ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶναι. Ὀρθόδοξος· Πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἔσχε τὸ εἶναι. Πάντα τὰ δοθέντα ἑκάστῳ ὑπὸ θεοῦ, ἃ καὶ ἀγαθά ἐστι· τὰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διδόμενα ἀγαθά. Κακὸν δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν εἰ μὴ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τουτέστι τῶν ὑπὸ θεοῦ δοθέντων, ἀποβολή. Οἱ οὖν ἐκ θεοῦ κἂν τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντες ἐν μετουσίᾳ μερικῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰσι κατ' ἔσχατον ἀπήχημα. Καλὸν οὖν ἐστιν εἶναι τὸν διάβολον καὶ διὰ τοῦ εἶναι μετέχειν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Τὸ οὖν εἶναι καλόν, τὸ δὲ εὖ εἶναι κάλλιον. Τελεία γὰρ ὕπαρξις τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, τὸ νοσεῖν καὶ εἶναι μερικὸν κακὸν καὶ φθορά· οὐ γὰρ τελεία ἀνυπαρξία, ἀλλὰ μερικὴ ὕπαρξις καὶ μερικὴ ἀνυπαρξία. Τὸ μὴ εἶναι τέλειον κακόν· τελεία γὰρ φθορὰ καὶ ἀνυπαρξία τὸ τελείως μὴ ὄν.","english":"Manichaeus: Why did God, foreknowing that the devil would be evil, make him? Orthodox: He made him out of an abundance of goodness. For he said: Since this one is going to be evil and is going to destroy all the good things given to him, shall I also deprive him completely of the good and make him non-existent? By no means. But even if he himself will be evil, I will not deprive him of my participation, but I will give him one good thing, participation in me through existing, so that, even if he does not wish it, he may partake of my good through existing. For there is no one who holds together and keeps the things that exist in existence except God; for existence is good and a gift of God.\n\nManichaeus: Existence belongs to things that exist from God, who is good; if, then, existence is good for all things that exist, as given from God who is good, then existence is also good for the devil. Orthodox: All things that exist received their existence from God. All things given to each by God are also good; for the things given from the good are good. And evil is nothing other than the loss of good things, that is, of the things given by God. Those, then, who have their existence from God are in a partial participation of the good, according to the last reflection. It is good, then, for the devil to exist and through existing to partake of the good. Existing, then, is good, but existing well is better. For perfect existence is health; to be sick is both a partial evil and corruption; for it is not perfect non-existence, but partial existence and partial non-existence. Not to exist is perfect evil; for perfect corruption and non-existence is that which perfectly does not exist.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":31,"ref":"p31","source":"Τὸ οὖν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ εἶναι καλὰ καὶ παρὰ θεοῦ, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ γενέσθαι τῆς τοῦ γινομένου γνώμης. Ὁ οὖν θεὸς δι' ὑπερβολὴν ἀγαθότητος καὶ τῷ πονηρῷ τὰ ἀγαθὰ δέδωκε, τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ εἶναι. Ἐγκαλεῖτε ἡμῖν, ὦ Μανιχαῖοι, διὰ τί προγινώσκων ὁ θεὸς τὸν διάβολον κακὸν ἐσόμενον ἐποίησεν αὐτόν, καὶ ἀπεδείξαμεν διὰ πλειόνων, ὅτι κατὰ τὸν φυσικὸν τοῦ δικαίου λόγον καλῶς ἐποίησεν αὐτόν· κρεῖσσον γὰρ κατὰ τὸν φυσικὸν λόγον κἂν εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον μετέχειν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ γὰρ τοῦ μόνου ἀεὶ ὄντος αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι, ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀγαθῶν παρεκτικοῦ· τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθὸν πάντως ἐστίν. Εἰ δὲ λέγετε, ὅτι συνέφερεν αὐτῷ μὴ γενέσθαι ἤπερ γενέσθαι καὶ κολασθῆναι ἀτελευτήτως, φαμέν, ὅτι ἡ κόλασις ἐκείνη οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν εἰ μὴ πῦρ ἐπιθυμίας τῆς κακίας καὶ ἁμαρτίας καὶ πῦρ ἀστοχίας τῆς ἐπιθυμίας. Οὐ γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι θεοῦ οἱ ἐν τῇ κακίᾳ τὸ ἄτρεπτον ἐσχηκότες, ἀλλὰ τῆς κακίας, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐνέργεια κακίας καὶ ἁμαρτίας οὐκ ἔσται. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐσθίομεν οὐδὲ πίνομεν οὐδὲ","english":"Therefore to be and to be well are good things and from God, but evil comes to be from good by the choice of the one who becomes. God, then, out of an abundance of goodness, has given good things even to the evil one—both to be and to be well. You accuse us, O Manichaeans, asking why God, foreknowing that the devil would be evil, made him; and we have demonstrated at greater length that according to the natural principle of justice he made him well. For according to the natural principle it is better that he both exist and, according to the principle of existence, partake of the good. For from God, who alone always is, comes existence itself, and he is the provider of good and of good things; and what is from the good is altogether good. But if you say that it would have been better for him not to have come to be than to have come to be and be punished endlessly, we say that that punishment is nothing other than a fire of desire for evil and sin, and a fire of failure of desire. For those who have acquired in evil an unchangeable state do not desire God, but evil; yet there will be no activity of evil and sin there. For we neither eat nor drink nor","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":32,"ref":"p32","source":"ἐνδυόμεθα οὐδὲ γαμοῦμεν οὐδὲ πλουτοῦμεν οὐδὲ φθόνος ἰσχύει οὐδέ τι τῶν τῆς ἁμαρτίας εἰδῶν. Ἐπιθυμοῦντες οὖν καὶ μὴ ἔχοντες τὰ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας πυρὸς δίκην ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καταφλέγονται. Οἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τουτέστι μόνου τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐπιθυμοῦντες, τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντος, καὶ τυγχάνοντες εὐφραίνονται κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας αὐτῶν, καθ' ἣν τυγχάνουσι τοῦ ἐπιθυμουμένου. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ὄντως ἀγαθὸν τὸ φύσει ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, κἂν ποσῶς μετέχειν κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Τὸ δὲ δοκοῦν ἀγαθὸν οὐ φύσει ἀγαθόν ἐστι, ἀλλὰ κακόν. Τὸ προκρίνειν τὴν τῶν κτισμάτων ἀπόλαυσιν τῆς τοῦ κτίστου ἀπολαύσεως καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον θέλημα τοῦ θελήματος τοῦ δημιουργοῦ οὐκ ἔστι δικαίου οὐδὲ ἀγαθοῦ, προκρίνειν τὸ ἡμῖν δοκοῦν ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ κακὸν μᾶλλον ἐδείχθη, τοῦ ὄντος φύσει ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν αὐτὸν καὶ ἔχειν μοῖράν τινα καὶ σμικροτάτην τοῦ ὄντως ἀγαθοῦ ἤπερ διὰ τὸ κακόν, τουτέστι τὴν ἄδικον ἔφεσιν καὶ λύπην, στερηθῆναι καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς μικρᾶς μοίρας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Ὁ γὰρ θεὸς οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν κρίσιν τὴν ἄλογον κρίνει, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ὄντως ἀγαθὸν καὶ δίκαιον, οὐδὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἡμῶν ἐξακολουθεῖ οὐδὲ διὰ νομιζομένην συμπάθειαν, τὴν ὄντως ἐμπάθειαν, τὸν τοῦ δικαίου λόγον προδίδωσι. Καὶ πάλιν· Ὁ θεὸς τὰ μήπω ὄντα ὡς ὄντα καλεῖ καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα ὡς ἤδη γεγενημένα θεωρεῖ καὶ κρίνει.","english":"We put on clothing, we do not marry, we do not grow rich, nor does envy prevail, nor any of the forms of sin. Those who desire and do not have the objects of their desire are consumed by their desire like fire. But those who desire the good—that is, God alone, who is and always is—and obtain it, rejoice in proportion to their desire, according to which they obtain what they desire. The truly good is good by nature, even if it is participated in in some measure according to its very being. But what seems good is not good by nature, but evil. To prefer the enjoyment of created things to the enjoyment of the Creator, and one's own will to the will of the Maker, is not the act of a just or good person—to prefer what seems good to us, which has been shown rather to be evil, to the good that is by nature—but rather that he should come to be and have some portion, even the smallest, of the truly good, rather than through evil, that is, through unjust desire and grief, be deprived even of that small portion of the good. For God does not judge according to our irrational judgment, but according to the truly good and just, nor does he follow our passions, nor through supposed compassion does he betray the principle of justice—which is truly a passion. And again: God calls the things that are not yet as though they were, and beholds and judges things to come as already having come to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":33,"ref":"p33","source":"Ὥσπερ οὖν τὸν ἤδη ἁμαρτήσαντα ὁ κριτὴς δικαίως κολάζει–κἂν μὴ κολάσῃ, ἄδικός ἐστι–καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸς αἴτιος τῆς τοῦ κολαζομένου ἁμαρτίας ἢ τιμωρίας, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ ἁμαρτήσαντος προαίρεσις, οὕτως ὁ θεὸς ὡς ἤδη γεγενημένον τὸ ἐσόμενον βλέπων ἔκρινεν γενέσθαι καί, εἰ κακὸς γένοιτο, ἐξ αὐτοῦ κολασθῆναι. Διὸ καὶ ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησεν αὐτόν· αὐτὸς δὲ ἐξ οἰκείας προαιρέσεως γέγονε κακὸς καὶ ἑαυτῷ γέγονε τῆς τιμωρίας αἴτιος, μᾶλλον δὲ ἑαυτὸν τιμωρεῖται τῶν μὴ ὄντων ἐφιέμενος. Ὅτι δὲ οὐχ ἡ πρόγνωσις τοῦ θεοῦ γέγονεν αἰτία αὐτῷ τῷ διαβόλῳ τοῦ κακὸν ἔσεσθαι, δῆλον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ προγινώσκων ἰατρὸς τὴν ἐσομένην νόσον αἴτιός ἐστι τῆς νόσου, ἀλλ' αἴτιον μὲν τῆς νόσου ἡ ἀταξία, ἡ δὲ πρόγνωσις τῆς τοῦ ἰατροῦ ἐπιστήμης γνώρισμα καὶ αἴτιον τῆς προγνώσεως τὸ οὕτως μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι. Ὅτι δὲ οὕτως ἐστί, φησὶν ὁ ἀπόστολος· Ὁ «καλῶν τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα». Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ εἰδέναι χρή, ὅτι, καθὼς ἐξέλθῃ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, οὕτως διαμένει ἄτρεπτος τοῦ λοιποῦ εἴτε τὸ ἀγαθὸν ποθοῦσα, εἴτε τὸ πονηρόν. Ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις τοῦτό φαμεν ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ θέλει ὁ θεός· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ φῶς ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου ὁρίζεται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ. Πᾶν οὖν, ὃ θέλει ὁ ἀγαθός, ἀγαθόν ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, ὃ θέλει. Κριτής ἐστιν ὁ θεός, οὐχ ἡμεῖς κριταὶ τοῦ θεοῦ. Τί οὖν αὐτὸν ἀνακρίνομεν; Θεὸς ὀρρωδεῖ καὶ δειλιᾷ καὶ δέδοικε; Θεὸς φοβούμενος μὴ εἴη θεός.","english":"Just as a judge justly punishes the one who has already sinned—and if he does not punish, he is unjust—and he himself is not the cause of the sin or punishment of the one being punished, but the free choice of the one who sinned, so God, seeing the future as already having come to be, judged that it should come to be, and, if it should become evil, that it should be punished from itself. Therefore he made him and made him good; but he himself from his own free choice became evil and became the cause of punishment for himself, or rather he punishes himself, desiring things that are not. But that the foreknowledge of God has not become the cause for the devil himself of being evil is clear; for neither is the physician who foreknows the illness that will come the cause of the illness, but the cause of the illness is disorder, while foreknowledge is a mark of the physician's knowledge, and the cause of the foreknowledge is that it is going to be so. And that it is so, the apostle says: \"Who calls the things that are not as though they were.\" And this too one must know, that just as the soul has departed from the body, so it remains thereafter unchangeable, whether desiring the good or the evil. And in addition to all these things, we say that this is good, which God wills; for just as light is defined from the sun, so also good is from God. Everything, therefore, that the good one wills is good, and this is good, which he wills. God is judge, not we judges of God. Why then do we interrogate him? Does God shudder and cower and fear? May God not be God if he fears.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":34,"ref":"p34","source":"39 Εἰ ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ἡ σελήνη πλοῖα γεγόνασι διὰ τὸ ἀγαγεῖν τὴν μοῖραν, ἣν ἥρπασεν ἡ ὕλη ἀπὸ θεοῦ, οὐκ ἦν πρὸ τούτου ἥλιος οὐδὲ σελήνη, καὶ σκότῳ ἦν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.\n\n40 Εἰ καθ' ὑμᾶς ἡ θλῖψις κακή, πάντως ἡ ἡδονὴ καὶ ἡ ἀπόλαυσις ἀγαθή, καί, εἰ τοῦτο, ἀγαθὸν ἡ πορνεία καὶ ἡ γαστριμαργία καὶ ὅσα τέρπει καὶ ἥδει τὸν πράττοντα, ὅσα δὲ λυπεῖ, ἐγκράτεια, νηστεία, ἀγρυπνία καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακά. Εἰ ἐγκαλεῖτε θεῷ τὴν τοῦ κατακλυσμοῦ πανολεθρίαν καὶ τῶν Σοδομιτῶν τὴν ἐκφλόγωσιν καὶ τοῦ Φαραὼ τὸν ποντισμὸν πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον παιδεύοντι, ἐγκαλέσατε μᾶλλον αἰωνίως κολάζοντι.\n\n42 Τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας προφέρειν οὐ δημιούργημα, τὸ δὲ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων δημιούργημα. Εἰ οὖν δημιουργεῖ ἡ κακία, ἐκ μὴ ὄντων παράγει, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐκ τῆς ὕλης\n\nτὸ σῶμα· εἰ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης, τουτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς κακίας, εἰ μὲν ἄναρχος ἡ κακία, καὶ ἀθάνατος πάντως καὶ ἄτρεπτος–τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀρξάμενον οὐ παύεται οὐδὲ τρέπεται· εἰ δὲ τρέπεται καὶ φθείρεται, οὐκ ἄναρχος–, εἰ δὲ ἡ κακία ἄτρεπτος, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς σῶμα ἄφθαρτον ἔσται καὶ ἄτρεπτον. Τίνος οὖν ἦν ἡ φθορὰ καὶ ἡ κακία; Ἡ γὰρ φθορὰ πάντως φθείρει τι ἢ οὐκ ἔστι φθορά. Εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν παθητόν, παθητὸς καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, καὶ πῶς τελέως ἀγαθός; Φθειρόμενος δὲ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ὑπὸ αὐτῆς εἰς ἀνυπαρξίαν χωρήσει. Εἰ δὲ ἑαυτὴν ἔφθειρεν, ἐφθάρη καὶ ἀπώλετο καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν. Εἰ δὲ μέρος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ μέρος ἑαυτῆς ἔφθειρεν. Ἧς δὲ φύσεως τὸ μέρος φθαρτόν, καὶ πᾶσα φθαρτή· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν καὶ φθαρτὴν εἶναι καὶ ἄφθαρτον.","english":"39 If the sun and the moon became boats because they carried the portion of fate which matter snatched from God, then before this there was neither sun nor moon, and man was in darkness.\n\n40 If, according to you, affliction is evil, then surely pleasure and enjoyment are good; and if this is so, then fornication and gluttony and all things that delight and please the one who does them are good, while all things that cause pain—self-control, fasting, vigil, and the like—are evil. If you charge God with the total destruction of the flood, the burning of the Sodomites, and the drowning of Pharaoh, when He was disciplining them for their benefit, then charge Him all the more with punishing eternally.\n\n42 To bring forth from one's own substance is not a creature, but to bring forth from non-being is a creature. If, then, evil creates, it produces from non-being, and the body is no longer from matter; but if it is from matter, that is, from the substance of evil—if evil is without beginning, it is certainly also immortal and immutable; for what has not begun does not cease nor change. But if it changes and is corrupted, it is not without beginning. And if evil is immutable, then the body that comes from its substance will also be incorruptible and immutable. Whose, then, were corruption and evil? For corruption certainly corrupts something, or else it is not corruption. If the good is passible, then the good is passible—and how is it perfectly good? And the good, being corrupted by it, will pass into non-existence. But if it corrupted itself, it was corrupted and destroyed and does not exist. And if it is a part of the good, it has also corrupted a part of itself. And of whatever nature the part is corruptible, the whole is also corruptible; for it is impossible for the same nature to be both corruptible and incorruptible.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":35,"ref":"p35","source":"Εἰ γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φθαρτὸν μέρος ὂν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἄφθαρτον, ἀλλ' οὔκ εἰσι μιᾶς φύσεως. Ἡ γὰρ ψυχή, εἰ καὶ ἐν σώματι πολιτεύεται, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα, ἀλλ' ἀσώματος· ὥστε ἄλλης φύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἄλλης τὸ σῶμα, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν μέρος τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως φθαρτόν, τὸ δὲ ἄφθαρτον, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν μία φύσις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φθαρτή, ἡ δὲ ἄφθαρτος. Καὶ οὔτε ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξ ἀνάρχου οὐσίας–τρεπτὴ γάρ–οὔτε τὸ σῶμα· καὶ αὐτὸ γὰρ τρεπτὸν καὶ φθαρτόν. Μιᾶς δὲ φύσεως λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐχ ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα μιᾶς ἐστι φύσεως, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὁμοίως ἕκαστος ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ σῶμα καὶ ἕκαστος δύο φύσεις ἔχει.\n\n43 Ἡ τροπὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον μεταβολή, ἐκ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἢ ἐξ ὄντων εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἢ ἐξ ἀρετῆς εἰς κακίαν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν φυσικῶν ἕξεων εἰς τὴν τούτων στέρησιν. Ἡ ἀρετὴ πλήρωσίς ἐστι τοῦ νόμου τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ δὲ νόμος τοῦ θεοῦ θέλημα αὐτοῦ ἐστιν–οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐντέλλεται, ὃ οὐ θέλει–, τὸ δὲ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἄτρεπτον, ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον. Ὥστε τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὄν ἐστιν, ὁμοίως καὶ ἡ ἀρετή– ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἡ ἀρετή–, ἡ δὲ κακία οὐκ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὄντος, τουτέστι τοῦ νόμου τοῦ θεοῦ, ἑκούσιος παρακοὴ καὶ ἀναίρεσις κατὰ σύμβασιν ἐν τῷ πράττεσθαι παρυφισταμένη καὶ ἅμα τῷ παύσασθαι τῆς πράξεως παυομένη.","english":"For if we say that the body of man is a corruptible part of man, but the soul is incorruptible, yet they are not of one nature. For the soul, even if it lives in a body, is not a body, but is incorporeal; so that the soul is of one nature and the body of another, and it is not that one part of the same nature is corruptible and the other incorruptible, but the one nature of man is corruptible and the other incorruptible. And neither is the soul from an unoriginate substance—for it is subject to change—nor is the body; for it too is subject to change and corruptible. But man is said to be of one nature, not because the soul and the body are of one nature, but because all men alike, each one, have a soul and a body, and each one has two natures.\n\n43 Change is a transition from the opposite to the opposite, from non-being to being, or from beings to non-being, or from virtue to vice, which is from natural states to the privation of these. Virtue is the fulfillment of the law of God, and the law of God is His will—for no one commands what he does not will—and the will of God is good, unchangeable, always remaining the same. So that the good is being, and likewise virtue—for virtue is good—but vice is non-being, but a voluntary transgression and destruction of being, that is, of the law of God, subsisting alongside by convention in the act of doing and ceasing as soon as the action ceases.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":36,"ref":"p36","source":"44 Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ εἰδέναι δεῖ, ὅτι ὁ θεὸς οὐ κολάζει τινὰ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι, ἀλλ' ἕκαστος ἑαυτὸν δεκτικὸν ποιεῖ τῆς μετοχῆς τοῦ θεοῦ, Ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν μετοχὴ τοῦ θεοῦ τρυφή, ἡ δὲ ἀμεθεξία αὐτοῦ κόλασις· ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὐ κολάζων ἐπιφέρει τοὺς πειρασμοὺς ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ παιδεύων καὶ ἰώμενος τὴν κακίαν, ἵνα ἐπιγνῶμεν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐπιστρέφωμεν καὶ τύχωμεν τῆς ἁγιότητος αὐτοῦ. «Ἡ γὰρ παιδεία κυρίου ἀνοίγει μου τὰ ὦτα.» 45 Μανιχαῖος· Εἰ ἀγαθός, διὰ τί ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι αἰῶνι κολάζει τὸν πονηρὸν καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ἀναιρεῖ αὐτόν; Ὀρθόδοξος· Ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιος· ὡς ἀγαθὸς οὖν ἐποίησεν, ὅσα ἐποίησεν, ἀγαθά. Ὥσπερ οὖν δίκαιον ἦν, τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐσομένους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ μέλλοντας οὐ μόνον φυλάττειν τὸ δοθὲν αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπεργάζεσθαι αὐτό, γενέσθαι καὶ ἀξιωθῆναι τοῦ τελείου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς αἰωνίου τρυφῆς, οὕτως καὶ δίκαιον ἦν, τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐσομένους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ μέλλοντας οὐ φυλάττειν τὸ δοθὲν αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἑκουσίως ἐκκλίνειν διὰ τῆς ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ τὴν κακίαν καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς ἀιδίου τρυφῆς. Πλέον ἀπέχει τὰ σεραφὶμ ἀπὸ θεοῦ ἤπερ ὁ πονηρὸς ἀπὸ τῶν σεραφίμ. Εἰ οὖν μὴ ἐγένετο ὁ διάβολος, ὁ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀνεφαίνετο χείρων πάντων καὶ κακὸν ἐν συγκρίσει τῇ πρὸς τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐλέγομεν· Διὰ τί προειδὼς ὁ θεός, ὅτι τοιοῦτος μέλλει ἔσεσθαι, ἐποίησεν αὐτόν; Ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πρὸ ἐκείνου, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωμεν καὶ εἰς αὐτὰ τὰ σεραφίμ. Καὶ γὰρ πολλάκις θεωροῦμεν πρᾶγμα ἐλεεινότατον καὶ δοκοῦμεν μὴ εἶναι ἐλεεινότερον αὐτοῦ ἕτερον καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ὁρῶμεν ἕτερον χεῖρον.","english":"And this too one must know, that God does not punish anyone in the age to come, but each one makes himself receptive of participation in God. Participation in God is delight, and non-participation in him is punishment. Here, however, God does not bring trials as one who punishes, but as one who disciplines and heals wickedness, so that we may come to know him and turn back and attain his holiness. \"For the discipline of the Lord opens my ears.\" Manichaean: If he is good, why in the age to come does he punish the wicked man and not rather destroy him? Orthodox: God is good, but also just. As good, then, he made all things that he made good. Just as it was just that those who would be good by him, and who were going not only to guard the good given to them but also to work upon it, should become and be deemed worthy of the perfect good and of eternal delight, so too it was just that those who would be good by him and were going not to guard the good given to them but voluntarily to turn aside through the loss of goods toward wickedness should also become and be deprived of eternal delight. The seraphim are further from God than the wicked one is from the seraphim. If, then, the devil had not come to be, the one before him would have appeared worse than all, and evil in comparison with those before him, and we would say: Why, foreknowing that he was going to be such, did God make him? Likewise also in the case of the one before him, until we come even to the seraphim themselves. For often we observe a most pitiable thing and think that there is no other more pitiable than it, and afterward we see another worse.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":37,"ref":"p37","source":"Ὅπερ γὰρ ἂν ἔσχατον κακόν, ὧν εἴδομεν, λογισώμεθα, ὑπονοοῦμεν μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ χεῖρον.\n\n47 Ἐποίησεν οὖν ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα καλὰ λίαν ἕκαστον κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν, καθὼς ἠθέλησεν· οὐ γὰρ ὑπόκειται νόμῳ, ἀλλ', ὅπερ θέλει, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, οὐχ ὅπερ ἡμεῖς κρίνομεν. Οὐ γάρ ἐσμεν ἡμεῖς κριταὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου ἤτοι τοῦ πυρὸς πᾶν φῶς φωτίζεται, οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ θελήματος τοῦ θεοῦ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ὁρίζεται. Εἰ γὰρ λέγεις, ὅτι καλῶς ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ἐν τούτῳ καὶ κακῶς ἐν τούτῳ καί, διὰ τί ἐποίησε τοῦτο καὶ διὰ τί οὐκ ἐποίησε τοῦτο, σὺ κριτὴς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ μείζων αὐτοῦ καὶ σοφώτερος. Ἐξουσίαν οὖν ἔχει ὡς θεὸς ποιῆσαι, ὅπερ θέλει, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἔχει, ὧν ποιεῖ, ἃς θέλει, αἰτίας ἀποκαλύψαι ἡμῖν καί, ἃς θέλει, ἀποκρύψαι. Ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν γενομένων λογικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑκουσίως ἢ ἐνέμεινεν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ὡς ἐκτίσθη, ἢ ἑκουσίως ἐτράπη καὶ ἀπεφοίτησε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπώλεσεν αὐτό. Ἀγαθὸν μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ἀρίστη ἑκάστῳ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεῖον διασῴζουσα–ταυτὸν δέ ἐστι καὶ ἀρετή–, κακία δὲ ἡ τῆς τάξεως λύσις εἴτουν ἀταξία. Τὰ ὄντα πάντα, καθόσον ἔστι, καὶ ἀγαθά ἐστι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καθόσον δὲ ἐστέρηται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὔτε ἀγαθὰ οὔτε ὄντα ἐστί. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄζωα, καθόσον οὐκ ἔσχεν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ζωήν, ἄζωά ἐστιν ὡς ἐστερημένα ζωῆς, ὁμοίως καὶ τὰ ἀναίσθητα καὶ τὰ ἄλογα, καθόσον ἔσχεν, ἀγαθά ἐστιν. Οἶδεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ κακὸν ὡς ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ τὴν πορνείαν οἶδεν ὡς ἔφεσιν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ ἕνωσιν. Καὶ παρ' αὐτῷ καὶ αἱ αἰτίαι τῶν κακῶν δυνάμεις ἀγαθοποιοί·","english":"For let us consider whatever we have seen to be the last evil, and we suspect that there is nothing worse than it.\n\n47 God therefore made all things exceedingly good, each according to its own nature, just as he willed; for he is not subject to law, but whatever he wills, that is good, not whatever we judge. For we are not judges of God, but just as all light is illuminated by the sun or by fire, so every good is defined by the will of God. For if you say that God made well in this and badly in that, and, why did he make this and why did he not make that, you are a judge of God and greater than he and wiser. He has authority, then, as God to make whatever he wills, and that is good, and he has authority to reveal to us the causes of the things he makes, as many as he wills, and to hide as many as he wills. But each of the rational goods that came to be either willingly remained in the good, as it was created, or willingly turned and departed from the good and lost it. For good is the best order preserving for each thing what is proper according to nature—and this is the same as virtue—while vice is the dissolution of order, that is, disorder. All things that exist, insofar as they exist, are both good and from the good, but insofar as they are deprived of the good, they are neither good nor existent. For inanimate things, insofar as they did not receive life from the good, are inanimate as being deprived of life, and likewise insensate and irrational things, insofar as they have received it, are good. God knows evil as good, just as he knows fornication as desire and friendship and union. And with him the causes of evils are also beneficent powers.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":38,"ref":"p38","source":"πολλάκις ἐκ πορνείας γεγένηνται σκεύη ἐκλογῆς. Εἰ κακὸν ἡ κακία, καλὸν ἡ κόλασις τοῦτο ἐξορίζουσα. Κακὸν γὰρ ἡ πορνεία, οὐχ ὁ σωφρονισμός· οὐ γὰρ ἡ κόλασις κακή, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄξιον ἑαυτὸν ποιῆσαι κολάσεως. Εἰ τὸ κακὸν ἀίδιον καὶ δημιουργεῖ καὶ δύναται καὶ ἔστι καὶ δρᾷ, πόθεν αὐτῷ ταῦτα; Ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἐκ τοῦ κακοῦ ἢ ἀμφοῖν ἐξ ἄλλης αἰτίας, ὅτι καὶ τὸ κακὸν ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ παρυφίσταται καὶ ὅτι ἀγαθύνει καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ στέρησιν. Ἡ γὰρ φιλία ἀγαθὴ οὖσα ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ φανῆναι τὴν πορνείαν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ φιλονεικεῖ πως καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι. Μὴ εἶναι γὰρ λέγεται ὁ θεὸς κατὰ τὴν πάντων ὑπεροχικὴν ἀφαίρεσιν.\n\n51 Ὅτι δὲ ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ τὴν ἀρχὴν μίαν προβάλλεται, δηλοῖ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀριθμὸς οὐκ ἀπὸ δύο ἀρχόμενος, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μιᾶς. Εἰ οὖν ἀρχὴ ἀριθμοῦ μονάς, καὶ ἀρχὴ τῶν ὄντων μία. Εἰ μὴ πάντη ἀκοινώνητον τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸ κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ὄν, τὸ κακὸν οὐκ ὄν· δύο γὰρ ὄντα κατὰ τὸ εἶναι κοινωνοῦσιν. Εἰ οὐσία τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀνούσιον τὸ κακόν· δύο γὰρ οὐσίαι κατὰ τὸ εἶναι οὐσίας κοινωνοῦσιν. Εἰ ἀκίνητον ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ κακόν, καλὸν ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ἀκινησία κακόν. Πόθεν οὖν ἔσχε τὸ κακὸν τὴν κίνησιν; Ἡ ζωὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κίνησις καὶ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, καὶ ζῶν ἐστι καὶ ἦν ὁ ἀγαθός. Ὁ θάνατος, ὥς φατε, κακὸν καὶ ἀκινησία καὶ φθορὰ καὶ νέκρωσις καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀνυπαρξία. Θάνατος δὲ ἦν ἡ κακία, ὡς ὑμεῖς λέγετε. Ὥσπερ οὖν ζωὴ καὶ ζῶν ὁ ἀγαθός, θάνατος καὶ νέκρωσις καὶ νενεκρωμένον τὸ κακόν. Πόθεν οὖν ἀνέζησε καὶ ἐκινήθη; Εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, ἐκ τοῦ κακοῦ ζωή, ὅπερ ἀμήχανον· ἡ φθορὰ γὰρ οὐ ζωοποιεῖ.","english":"Often from fornication have vessels of election come to be. If vice is evil, the punishment that banishes it is good. For fornication is evil, not chastisement; for punishment is not evil, but rather making oneself worthy of punishment. If evil is eternal and both creates and has power and exists and acts, whence does it have these things? Either from the good, or the good from evil, or both from another cause—since evil also subsists alongside in the good, and since it even makes evils good and its own privation. For friendship, being good, makes fornication appear good, because in the good non-being somehow strives to be. For God is said not to be, according to the transcendent removal from all things.\n\n51 That nature itself puts forth one principle, the number itself makes clear, beginning not from two but from one. If, then, the principle of number is the monad, the principle of beings is also one. If evil is not entirely without communion with the good, and the good is being, then evil is non-being; for two things that are communicate according to being. If the good is substance, evil is without substance; for two substances communicate according to being substances. If evil is motionless from the beginning, motion is good and motionlessness is evil. Whence, then, did evil get motion? Life is good and motion, and it always was and is in the good, and the good is living and was living. Death, as you say, is evil and motionlessness and corruption and mortification and none the less non-existence. But vice was death, as you yourselves say. Just as, then, life and the good is living, so death and mortification and the evil is deadened. Whence, then, did it come to life and move? If from itself, then life is from evil, which is impossible; for corruption does not give life.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":39,"ref":"p39","source":"Εἰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὐκ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῷ κακῷ ζωῆς καὶ κινήσεως γεγονὸς αἴτιον. Καὶ διὰ τί προειδὼς τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐσόμενα κακὰ ἐζωοποίησεν αὐτόν;\n\n54 Τὸ κακόν, καθό ἐστι κακόν, τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ ἀκοινώνητον καὶ ἐναντίον καὶ ἐχθρόν, ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθόν. Πῶς οὖν τὸ ἄκρως κακὸν ἐπεθύμησε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ;\n\n55 Ἡ κακία ἀκίνητος καὶ φθορὰ μᾶλλον καὶ οὐ γένεσις. Πῶς οὖν προεβάλετο τὰ ἑαυτῆς προβλήματα ἡ κακία ἄζωος καὶ ἀναίσθητος; Πῶς οὖν αἰσθάνεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ\n\nτῶν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ προβλημάτων;\n\n56 Τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ἀνάρχου καὶ ἀκτίστου ἄναρχον καὶ ἄκτιστόν ἐστι. Πῶς οὖν τὰ πάντα ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τῶν καθ' ὑμᾶς ἀρχῶν λέγετε; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν εἰσι τὰ πάντα, ἀρχαὶ ἄναρχοι εἰσι καὶ οὐδέν. Εἰ δὲ κτίσματά εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν εἰσι.\n\n57 Τὸ κακὸν φθορὰ καὶ θάνατος. Τὸ οὖν κακόν, εἰ μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ἀγαθόν, συνιστᾷ μὲν ἑαυτό, οὐ παντελῶς δὲ κακόν· συνιστᾷ γὰρ ἑαυτό, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι κακόν. Εἰ δὲ παντελῶς κακόν, καὶ ἑαυτῷ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἀναιρετικὸν καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑτέρου φθορᾷ ἑτέρων γένεσις γίνεται, οὐχ ἡ φθορὰ γενέσεώς ἐστιν αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν δι' ὑπερβολὴν ἀγαθότητος καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἑτέρου φθορᾶς ἑτέρου κατεργάζεται γένεσιν. Ἡ γὰρ ὕλη ὑποχείριος τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενομένη, ἀγαθή· καὶ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἐν ἀρχῇ τὰ πάντα παρήγαγεν. Οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὐδὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φθορὰ καὶ γένεσις, ἡ αὐτὴ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δύναμις οὔτε αὐτοδύναμις ἢ αὐτοφθορά.","english":"But if from the good, the good is not good by having become the cause of life and motion for evil. And why, foreknowing the evils that would come from him, did he give him life?\n\n54 Evil, insofar as it is evil, is both uncommunicative with the good and contrary and hostile to it, but the desire of the good is good. How then did the supremely evil desire the good?\n\n55 Vice is motionless and rather corruption and not generation. How then did vice, lifeless and senseless, project its own projections? How then does it perceive the good and the projections of the good?\n\n56 What is from the substance of the unbegun and uncreated is unbegun and uncreated. How then do you say that all things are from the substance of your principalities? For if all things are from their substance, the principalities are unbegun and nothing. But if they are creatures, they are not from their substance.\n\n57 Evil is corruption and death. Evil, then, if it is evil to others but good to itself, it establishes itself, and is not wholly evil; for it establishes itself, and in this respect it is not evil. But if it is wholly evil, it is evil to itself and destructive of itself and non-existent. And if in the corruption of one there comes the generation of others, it is not corruption that is the cause of generation, but the good, through excess of goodness, even from the corruption of one works out the generation of another. For matter, having become subject to the good by it, is good; for in the beginning he brought all things from non-being into being. The same thing is not, in the same respect, good and evil, nor is the corruption and generation of the same thing the same power in the same respect, nor self-power or self-corruption.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":40,"ref":"p40","source":"Τὸ μὲν οὖν αὐτοκακὸν οὔτε ὂν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε γενεσιουργὸν οὔτε ὄντων ἢ ἀγαθῶν ποιητικόν· τὸ δὲ ἀγαθόν, ἐν οἷς μὲν ἂν τελέως ἐγγένηται, τέλεια ἀγαθὰ ἀποδείκνυσιν, ἐν οἷς δὲ μερικῶς, μερικά· ἐν οἷς δὲ μηδόλως, οὔτε εἰσὶ καὶ κακὰ λέγονται παντελῶς. Ἡ πορνεία καθὸ μὲν ἔφεσις καὶ φιλία καὶ ἕνωσις ἀγαθόν, καθὸ δὲ τοῦ μὴ ὀφείλοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀπηγορευμένου ἔφεσις κακόν· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐντεταλμένον, ἀλλ' ἀπηγορευμένον οὐκ ὂν ὡς μὴ ὀφεῖλον. Διὸ καὶ ἡ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος μηδὲ ὀφείλοντος γενέσθαι ἔφεσις κακόν.\n\n60 Τὸ κακὸν διττόν. Τὸ μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ κακὸν ὡς ἡ τῶν φυσικῶν ἕξεων ἀπόπτωσις. «Ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἐποίησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον εὐθῆ, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐζήτησαν λογισμοὺς πολλούς.» Ἕτερον δὲ κακὸν λέγεται τὸ κατ' αἴσθησιν ὡς αἱ θλίψεις αἱ κατὰ τοὺς πειρασμούς· τὸ γὰρ τῆς κακίας ὄνομα ὁμώνυμόν ἐστι. Δύο γὰρ σημαίνει· ποτὲ μὲν γὰρ σημαίνει τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς στέρησιν, ποτὲ δὲ τὴν τῆς χαρᾶς, τουτέστι τοῦ ἐπιθυμουμένου. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ πορνεία οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν εἰ μὴ σωφροσύνης στέρησις καὶ κακὴ χρῆσις· ἀντὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαπῆσαι καὶ μιγῆναι τὸ ἴδιον σκεῦος, τουτέστι τὴν ἰδίαν γυναῖκα, ἀγαπᾷ καὶ μίγνυται τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ. Ἡ ἀπιστία ἀντὶ τοῦ πιστεῦσαι καὶ ἀγαπῆσαι τὸν φύσει θεὸν πιστεύει τῷ μὴ ὄντι θεῷ. Τοῦτο οὖν ἐστι κακία τὸ τῷ μὴ ὄντι ὡς ὄντι χρήσασθαι, τὸ μὴ παρέχειν ἑκάστῳ τὰ ἴδια· ἴδια ἑκάστῳ τὰ ὑπὸ θεοῦ ὁριζόμενα. Ἴδιον μὲν θεοῦ ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ τιμὴ ὡς δημιουργῷ πρέπουσα, ἴδιον δὲ τῶν κτισμάτων τὸ μέτρον, ὃ ἑκάστῳ ὥρισεν ὁ τὸ εἶναι δούς.","english":"The self-existent evil is therefore neither being nor good, neither generative nor productive of beings or goods. But the good, in whatever things it comes to be perfectly, proves them perfect goods; in whatever things partially, partial goods; and in whatever things not at all, these are not and are called altogether evil. Fornication, insofar as it is desire and affection and union, is good; but insofar as it is desire of what ought not to be and of what is forbidden, it is evil; for what is not commanded but forbidden is not, as not being owed. Therefore also the desire of what is not and ought not to come to be is evil.\n\nEvil is twofold. One is truly evil, as the falling away from natural states. \"For God made man upright, but they sought out many devices.\" Another is called evil according to perception, as the afflictions that come with temptations; for the name of evil is homonymous. For it signifies two things: sometimes it signifies the privation of virtue, and sometimes the privation of joy, that is, of what is desired. For fornication is nothing other than the privation and evil use of chastity; for instead of loving and being joined to one's own vessel, that is, one's own wife, one loves and is joined to another's. Unbelief, instead of believing and loving the God by nature, believes in a god that is not. This, then, is evil: to use what is not as though it were, and not to render to each his own; and each one's own are the things defined by God. God's own is glory and honor, as befitting the Creator; the creatures' own is the measure that he who gave being defined for each.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":41,"ref":"p41","source":"Ἐφ' ἡμῖν δέ ἐστιν ἢ χρήσασθαι τοῖς δοθεῖσιν ἡμῖν ὑπὸ θεοῦ, ἐφ' ᾧ δέδωκεν ἡμῖν αὐτά, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι χρήσασθαι οὐκ ἐφ' ᾧ δέδωκεν, οἷον ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, ἵνα ἐπιθυμῶμεν αὐτοῦ τοῦ μόνου ἀγαθοῦ. Ἐὰν ἐπὶ τούτῳ χρησώμεθα τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἀρετὴ καὶ καλόν· εἰ δὲ ἕτερόν τι παρ' αὐτὸν ἀγαπήσωμεν, οὐκ ἔστι χρῆσις, ἀλλὰ παράχρησις. Εἰς αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς, ἵνα μετέχωμεν αὐτοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντες.\n\n61 Ἦν, φησίν, ἡ ὕλη ἄναρχος, ἀγένητος, ἐν ἰδίοις ὅροις, ἀεὶ ἀτάκτως κινουμένη, ἀεὶ ἑαυτῇ μαχομένη καὶ ἑαυτὴν ἀναλίσκουσα. Ἦν δέ, φησί, καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἐν ἰδίοις ὅροις, ἄναρχος, ἀγένητος, ἀίδιος, ἀσώματος, ὅλος φῶς, ἀλλ' ἡ ὕλη, φησίν, ἀτάκτως καὶ ἀλόγως κινουμένη ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ὅρια ἦλθε. Καὶ θαυμάσασα τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ φῶς τῆς μὲν πρὸς ἑαυτὴν μάχης ἐπαύσατο, τῷ δὲ φωτὶ ἐπέθετο μαχομένη ὡς καὶ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἁρπάσαι εἰς ἑαυτήν· καὶ γὰρ ἄρχοντας ὡς ἐπὶ κεκρυμμένου βασιλείου τὴν ὕλην ἔχειν διαβεβαιοῦνται, οὓς καὶ «κοσμοκράτορας τοῦ σκότους» καὶ «πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας»","english":"It is in our power to use the things given to us by God for the purpose for which he gave them to us, and it is in our power to use them not for the purpose for which he gave them; for example, he gave us the desiring faculty so that we might desire him, the one who alone is good. If we use desire for this, it is virtue and a beautiful thing; but if we love something other than him, it is not a use but a misuse. For he made us for this very thing, that we might partake of him by desiring him.\n\nThe matter, he says, was without beginning, ungenerated, within its own bounds, always moving in disorder, always fighting against itself and consuming itself. And God, he says, was also within his own bounds, without beginning, ungenerated, eternal, incorporeal, wholly light. But the matter, he says, moving disorderly and irrationally, came to the bounds of God. And marveling at the light of God, it ceased from its struggle against itself, but it set upon the light, fighting so as even to snatch a part of it for itself; for they maintain that matter has rulers, as it were over a hidden kingdom, whom they also call \"world-rulers of the darkness\" and \"spiritual [powers] of wickedness.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":42,"ref":"p42","source":"εἶναι φάσκουσι. Συνεχώρησε δέ, φησίν, ὁ ἀγαθὸς θεὸς μέρος ἑαυτοῦ ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἁρπασθὲν αἰχμάλωτον γενέσθαι, ὅπως αὐτὴν περιγράψῃ καὶ περιορίσῃ τοῦ μὴ περαιτέρω προβαίνειν εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὅρια. Εἰ ἄναρχος, ἀγένητος, ἀσώματος, ἄποιος, ἀόρατος ἡ ὕλη, ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς θεός, ἐκ δὲ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν τὰ πάντα, πῶς ὁρῶνται τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν γενόμενα; Τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀσωμάτου καὶ ἀοράτου οὐσίας προερχόμενον ἀσώματον πάντως ἔσται καὶ ἀόρατον. Καὶ πρὸ τούτου, εἰ καὶ αἱ δύο οὐσίαι ἄναρχοι καὶ ἀγένητοι καὶ ἀίδιοι, ἐξ αὐτῶν δέ ἐσμεν ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὑπ' αὐτῶν παραχθέντες, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν, ἄναρχοι καὶ ἀίδιοί ἐσμεν ἡμεῖς· ἑκάστης γὰρ οὐσίας γέννημα ὁμοούσιον τῇ γεννησάσῃ οὐσίᾳ· ἀιδίου ἀίδιον, ἀγεννήτου ἀγέννητον, ἀνάρχου ἄναρχον. Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ πονηροῦ ἡ σύστασις ἡμῶν, οὐ κτίσματα, ἀλλὰ τέκνα ἐσμέν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι κτίσις ἐν κόσμῳ. Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ ἀδύνατον τραπῆναι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰς πονηρὸν καὶ ὅλως λογίσασθαι ἢ πρᾶξαι πονηρὸν καὶ ἀδύνατον τὸν πονηρὸν τραπῆναι καὶ λογίσασθαι ἢ πρᾶξαί τι ἀγαθόν· –ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ–, ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν λογίσασθαι φαῦλόν τι καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν πρᾶξαι ἀγαθόν. Ἀλλ' ὁρῶμεν πολλὰς ψυχὰς λογιζομένας πονηρὰ ὡς τὰς τῶν Μανιχαίων καὶ πολλὰ σώματα ποιοῦντα ἀγαθὰ ὡς τὰ τῶν ἁγίων. Καὶ πάλιν·","english":"They claim it to be. But the good God, he says, permitted a part of himself, snatched by her, to become captive, so that he might circumscribe and confine her, so that she should not advance beyond her own boundaries. If matter is without beginning, unbegotten, incorporeal, without quality, invisible, and likewise the good God, and all things are from their substance, how are the things that came to be from them seen? For what proceeds from an incorporeal and invisible substance will certainly be incorporeal and invisible. And before this, if the two substances are without beginning, unbegotten, and eternal, and we are from them—not brought by them from non-being into being, but from their substance—then we are without beginning and eternal; for the offspring of each substance is consubstantial with the substance that begot it: from an eternal, eternal; from an unbegotten, unbegotten; from one without beginning, one without beginning. And again: If our constitution is from the substance of the good and of the evil, we are not creatures but children, and there is no creation in the world. And again: If it is impossible for the substance of the good to turn to evil and altogether to think or do evil, and impossible for the evil to turn and think or do anything good—and our soul is of the good—then it is impossible for our soul to think anything base and for our body to do good. But we see many souls thinking evil things, as those of the Manichaeans, and many bodies doing good things, as those of the saints. And again:","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":43,"ref":"p43","source":"Εἰ καὶ ὁ πονηρὸς σύνθετός ἐστιν ἐξ ἀσωμάτου καὶ σώματος καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ὁμοίως καὶ ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ ἡμῶν τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τοῦ πονηροῦ, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν σύνθετος ἔσται ἐξ ἀσωμάτου καὶ σώματος καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν. Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ ἄναρχος ἡ ὕλη, εἰ μὲν ἀσώματος, πῶς ἐξ ἀσωμάτου οὐσίας προῆλθε; Τὸ γὰρ ἄναρχον, πάντως ἄτρεπτον· τὰ φύσει ἁπλᾶ οὐ πέφυκεν ἑνοῦσθαι. Πῶς οὖν ἐγένετο σύγκρασις; Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ σύνθετος ἡ ὕλη ἐξ ἀσωμάτου καὶ σώματος, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἐναντίον τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ, τίς ὁ ἑνώσας τὰ ἐναντία; Οὐκ ἂν γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὡμίλει φιλικῶς συναπτόμενα εἰς ἓν ὕφος καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν, εἰ μὴ ἡ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ δύναμις εἰς ἓν αὐτὰ συνεβίβασεν. Ἡ ὕλη ἄρα σύνθετος οὖσα ὑπὸ θείου λόγου τὸ εἶναι εἴληφε. Καὶ πάλιν· Ἡ ὕλη φθορά ἐστιν ἢ φθαρτή; Ἡ μὲν γὰρ φθορὰ φθείρει καὶ οὐ φθείρεται, τὸ δὲ φθαρτὸν φθείρεται ὑπὸ τῆς φθορᾶς· καὶ τὸ μὲν φθαρτόν, τουτέστιν τὸ φθειρόμενον, ἡ ὕλη. Τί ἐστι φθεῖρον ἢ φθορὰ ἢ φθαρτή; Φθορὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τῶν συντεθέντων διάλυσις. Φθείρει δὲ ὁ τὴν φθορὰν ἐπάγων, φθείρεται δὲ τὸ διαλυόμενον σύνθετον. Καὶ τὸ μὲν φθεῖρον καὶ φθειρόμενον οὐσίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ φθορὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τῷ λύεσθαι τὰ συντεθέντα θεωρουμένη καὶ οὔτε προϋπάρχουσα οὔτε μετὰ τὸ λυθῆναι διαμένουσα. Τί οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ὕλη, φθείρουσα ἢ φθορὰ ἢ φθαρτή; Καὶ εἰ μὲν εἴπητε, ὅτι φθείρουσα, εἴπατε, τί φθείρει εἰ μὴ τὸν ἀγαθόν; Οὐδὲν γὰρ λέγετε ἕτερον εἰ μὴ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸν ἀγαθόν. Εἰ οὖν δύο ἦσαν, φθείρει ἡ ὕλη, γενεσιουργεῖ δὲ ὁ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἡ μὲν ὕλη συνίσταται, φθείρεται δὲ καὶ ἀπόλλυται ὁ ἀγαθός.","english":"If the evil one is composite, made of incorporeal and body, and the good one likewise, and our soul is of the substance of the good, but the body of the evil, then our soul will also be composite, made of incorporeal and body, and our body as well. And again: If matter is without beginning, if it is incorporeal, how did it proceed from an incorporeal substance? For that which is without beginning is altogether immutable; things naturally simple are not by nature united. How then did a blending come about? And again: If matter is composite, made of incorporeal and body, and the body is contrary to the incorporeal, who is it that united the contraries? For contraries would not associate with contraries, being joined in friendship into one web and one hypostasis, unless the power of the craftsman had brought them together into one. Matter, therefore, being composite, has received its existence from the divine Word. And again: Is matter corruption or corruptible? For corruption corrupts and is not corrupted, but the corruptible is corrupted by corruption; and the corruptible, that is, that which is being corrupted, is matter. What is it that corrupts—corruption or the corruptible? For corruption is the dissolution of things composed. And that which corrupts is the one who brings on corruption, while that which is corrupted is the composite that is dissolved. And both that which corrupts and that which is corrupted are substances, but corruption is an accident, contemplated in the dissolving of things composed, neither pre-existing nor remaining after the dissolution. What then is matter—that which corrupts, or corruption, or the corruptible? And if you say that it is that which corrupts, say what it corrupts, if not the good? For you name nothing else besides matter and the good. If, then, there were two, matter corrupts and the good generates, or matter is constituted while the good is corrupted and destroyed.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":44,"ref":"p44","source":"Εἰ δὲ ἑαυτὴν φθείρει, γνῶτε, ὡς οὐδὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν φθαρτικόν· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἔφθειρεν, ἀνάλωσεν ἂν ἑαυτὸ καὶ εἰς ἀνυπαρξίαν ἤλασε. Πῶς δὲ καὶ τὸ φθειρόμενον ἄναρχον; Εἰ δὲ φθαρτή, ὑπὸ τίνος φθείρεται εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ ἔσται ὁ ἀγαθὸς φθορεύς. Εἰ δὲ φθορά ἐστιν, ὑπὸ τίνος ἐνεργεῖται καὶ ἔστιν; Ἡ γὰρ φθορὰ διάλυσίς ἐστιν, ὡς εἴπομεν. Τίς οὖν ὁ διαλύων καὶ τί τὸ διαλυόμενον; Ὅτι δὲ οὐ δύναται ἡ ὕλη φθορὰ εἶναι καὶ φθαρτὴ οὐσία, ἐντεῦθεν γνωστόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ φθαρτὴ οὐσία προηγεῖται καὶ προϋφίσταται ὡς συντεθεῖσα ὑπόστασις. Ἡ δὲ φθορὰ ἐπιγίνεται μετὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν λύουσα τὰ συντεθειμένα. Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἦν ἡ οὐσία τῆς ὕλης σύνδρομον καὶ συνουσιωμένην ἔχουσα τὴν φθοράν; Ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐρεῖτε, ὅτι ἦν ποτε οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ φθορά, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει, ὁμοίως καὶ φθαρτόν. Ἀλλὰ γνῶτε, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι φθαρτικὸν ἢ δημιουργικόν, μήπω δὲ ἐνεργεῖν τὴν φθορὰν ἢ τὴν\n\nδημιουργίαν διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὰ φθειρόμενα ἢ δημιουργούμενα συναΐδια εἶναι τῷ φθείροντι ἢ δημιουργοῦντι ἀληθές. Ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραχθῆναι λέγετε, ἀλλ' αὐτὴν ἑαυτῆς εἶναι τὴν κακίαν φθαρτικὴν καὶ ἀναλωτικήν, ὥστε αὕτη δυνάμει ἔχουσα τό τε φθείρειν καὶ φθείρεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ ἀτελὴς ἦν. Τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀτελοῦς προκόπτον εἰς τελειότητα οὐκ ἄναρχον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἄτρεπτον ἄναρχον, τὸ τρεπόμενον οὐκ ἄναρχον. Καὶ πάλιν· Τί πρῶτον τῆς ὕλης, ἡ οὐσία αὐτῆς ἢ ἡ φθορά; Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡ φθορά, ἀδύνατον αὐτὴν ὑπάρξαι πρὸ τοῦ εἶναι ἀναλισκομένην.","english":"But if it destroys itself, understand that nothing is destructive of itself; and if it had destroyed itself, it would have consumed itself and driven itself into non-existence. And how is that which is being destroyed without beginning? But if it is corruptible, by whom is it destroyed, if not by the good? And the good will be a destroyer. But if it is destruction, by whom is it activated and exists? For destruction is a dissolution, as we said. Who, then, is the one dissolving, and what is the thing being dissolved? But that matter cannot be destruction and a corruptible substance is known from this: for the corruptible substance comes first and pre-exists as a composed hypostasis, while destruction comes upon it after the composition, dissolving the things that have been composed. And how was the substance of matter, having destruction running along with it and consubstantial with it? But perhaps you will say that it was once destruction not in actuality but in potentiality, and likewise corruptible. But understand that to be destructive or creative, yet not yet to be activating destruction or creation, because the things being destroyed or created cannot be co-eternal with the one destroying or creating—this is true. But you say that nothing was brought from non-being into being, but that evil itself is destructive and consuming of itself, so that this, having both the power to destroy and to be destroyed in potentiality, and not in actuality, was imperfect. But that which advances from imperfect to perfection is not without beginning; for if the immutable is without beginning, the mutable is not without beginning. And again: Which is first of matter, its substance or its destruction? And if destruction, it is impossible for it to exist before it is, being consumed.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":45,"ref":"p45","source":"Εἰ δὲ ἡ οὐσία αὐτῆς προϋπῆρξε τῆς φθορᾶς, οὐσία μᾶλλον καὶ ὕπαρξίς ἐστι καὶ οὐ φθορὰ καὶ ἦν ἀφθαρσία ποτὲ μὴ ἔχουσα ἐναντίαν τὴν φθορὰν καὶ οὐκ ἄναρχος ἡ φθορά. Εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ἦν ἡ οὐσία αὐτῆς ἀναλίσκουσα ἑαυτήν, πῶς προήγαγε τοὺς καρπούς; Εἰ μερικῶς ἀνήλισκεν, οὐ παντελῶς φθαρτικὴ οὐδὲ παντελῶς φθαρτὴ καὶ οὐ τελέως κακή. Εἰ δὲ φθαρτικὴ οὖσα ἐπαύσατο τοῦ ἑαυτὴν φθείρειν, ἢ κακὸν τὸ φθείρειν καὶ ἐκ κακοῦ εἰς ἀγαθὸν ἐτράπη ἢ ἀγαθὸν τὸ φθείρειν καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ γέγονε κακή. Εἰ ἡ ὕλη κακία, ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἔφθειρεν, ἀγαθή· τὸ γὰρ φθεῖρον τὸ κακὸν ἀγαθόν. Καὶ πάλιν εἴπατε· Ἡ ὕλη φῶς ἦν ἢ σκότος; Καὶ εἰ μὲν φῶς, τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· καὶ ἰδοὺ μία ἀρχὴ καὶ οὐ δύο. Εἰ δὲ σκότος, πῶς τὸ σκότος θεωρεῖ; Εἰ γὰρ θεωρεῖ, φῶς ἔχει. Εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἔχει φῶς, τυφλόν ἐστι, καὶ πῶς εἶδε τὸ φῶς; Πῶς δὲ καὶ σκότος ἔσται ἐν τῷ φωτεινῷ καὶ οὐ λυθήσεται; Ἢ «ποία κοινωνία φωτὶ πρὸς σκότος;» Καὶ πάλιν· Ἡ ὕλη ἔζη ἢ οὔ; Καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔζη, πῶς ἐκινήθη; Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ζωὴν ἀκίνητον. Εἰ δὲ ἔζη, ἢ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἔχει τὴν ζωὴν ἢ ἀλλαχόθεν. Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς, ζωὴ ἦν καὶ οὐ θάνατος. Εἰ δὲ ἀλλαχόθεν ἔσχε τὴν ζωήν, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀγαθὸς ὁ ζωώσας τὴν κακίαν; Εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἄλλου, οὐκ ἔσονται δύο, ἀλλὰ τρεῖς. Καὶ πάλιν· Ἡ ὕλη ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς ἦν ἄναρχος ἢ ἐξ ἄλλου ἐγένετο. Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἄλλου ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἄναρχος. Εἰ δὲ ἄναρχος ἦν, πάντοτε εἶχε τὸ εἶναι καὶ οὐδέποτε ἔσχε τὸ μὴ εἶναι. Πῶς δὲ λέγετε αὐτὴν φθορὰν καὶ θάνατον; Ἡ γὰρ φθορὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι παρέχει, ἡ δὲ ὕλη οὐκ ἔσχε ποτὲ τὸ μὴ εἶναι· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦν, ὡς λέγετε.","english":"But if its substance existed before corruption, it is substance and existence rather than corruption, and it was once incorruptibility, not having corruption as its opposite; and corruption is not without beginning. But if its substance was always consuming itself, how did it produce fruits? If it consumed itself partially, it is not wholly destructive nor wholly corruptible, and not perfectly evil. But if, being destructive, it ceased to destroy itself, either destroying is evil and it turned from evil to good, or destroying is good and it became evil from good. If matter is evil, but destroyed itself, it is good; for what destroys evil is good. And again say: Was matter light or darkness? And if light, it belongs to the substance of the good; and behold, one principle and not two. But if darkness, how does darkness see? For if it sees, it has light. But if it has no light, it is blind, and how did it see the light? And how will darkness be in the light and not be dissolved? Or \"what fellowship has light with darkness?\" And again: Did matter live or not? And if it did not live, how was it moved? For everything that does not have life is immovable. But if it lived, either it has life from itself or from elsewhere. And if from itself, it was life and not death. But if it had life from elsewhere, either from the good—and how is the good one who gave life to evil?—or if from another, there will not be two, but three. And again: Was matter without beginning from itself, or did it come to be from another? And if it came to be from another, it is not without beginning. But if it was without beginning, it always had being and never had non-being. But how do you say that it is corruption and death? For corruption provides non-being, but matter never had non-being; for it always was, as you say.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":46,"ref":"p46","source":"Πῶς οὖν, ὃ οὐκ ἔχει, δύναται δοῦναι; Καὶ πάλιν· Ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορὰ ἐναντία. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραγωγή, ἡ δὲ φθορὰ ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι διάλυσις. Εἰ οὖν ἡ ὕλη καθ' ὑμᾶς φθορά, πῶς ποιεῖ καρποὺς καὶ γεννᾷ; Καὶ πάλιν· Ἡ φθορὰ ἡ παντελὴς καὶ ἑαυτὴν φθείρει· εἰ γὰρ ἑαυτὴν συνιστᾷ, οὐ παντελὴς φθορά. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἑαυτὴν φθείρει, οὐκ ἔσται.\n\n64 Ἀγαθὸν λέγεται παρὰ τὸ ἄγαν θεῖν πάντα πρὸς αὐτό, ὃ καὶ φύσει ἐστὶν ἐραστὸν καὶ ἐφετόν, οὗ φυσικῶς πάντα ἐφίεται. Κακὸν δέ ἐστιν ἡ παρὰ φύσιν ἔφεσις, τουτέστιν ὅταν ἑτέρου τινὸς παρὰ τὸ φύσει ἐφετὸν ἐφιέμεθα. «Πάντων οὖν καὶ τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ὅσα ἀγαθὰ καὶ ὅσα ἐναντία· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα πράττομεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ποθοῦντες. Οὐδεὶς γὰρ εἰς τὸ κακὸν ἀποβλέπων ποιεῖ, ἅπερ ποιεῖ. Διὸ οὐδὲ ὑπόστασιν ἔχει τὸ κακόν, ἀλλὰ παρυπόστασιν, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ οὐχ ἑαυτοῦ γινόμενον·» πᾶν γὰρ γινόμενον ἢ δι' ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ἢ διὰ νομιζόμενον ἀγαθόν.","english":"How then can it give what it does not have? And again: generation and corruption are opposites. For generation is a leading forth from non-being into being, while corruption is a dissolution from being into non-being. If, then, matter according to you is corruption, how does it produce fruits and generate? And again: complete corruption destroys itself; for if it establishes itself, it is not complete corruption. But if it also destroys itself, it will not exist.\n\nGood is so called from the fact that all things rush exceedingly (agan thein) toward it, which is by nature both lovable and desirable, and which all things naturally desire. Evil is desire contrary to nature, that is, when we desire something other than what is desirable by nature. \"Of all things, then, both good and evil, the good is the beginning and the end; for all things are for the sake of the good, both those that are good and those that are contrary; for we do these things too, longing for the good. For no one, looking toward evil, does what he does. Therefore evil has no substance (hypostasis), but a para-substance (parhypostasis), coming to be for the sake of the good and not for its own sake;\" for everything that comes to be comes to be either for the sake of a good or for the sake of what is thought to be a good.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":47,"ref":"p47","source":"65 Πλανᾶται ὑπὸ θεοῦ προφήτης ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ παραχωροῦντος αὐτὸν πλανηθῆναι κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας αὐτοῦ ἢ προλέγων καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄλλα ποιοῦντος, παρ' ἃ προεῖπε, πεπλανῆσθαι λέγεται ὑπὸ θεοῦ, τουτέστι πλάνος ἀποδεδεῖχθαι. Εἴπατε οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ Μανιχαῖοι· Ἡ ὕλη, ἣν λέγετε κακίαν καὶ σκότος καὶ φθορὰν καὶ θάνατον, ἄναρχον καὶ ἀίδιον, οὐσία ἦν ἢ συμβεβηκός; Καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐσία, ἢ σῶμα ἦν, οἷον γῆ, ὕδωρ, ἀήρ, πῦρ, ἢ ἀσώματον, οἷον θεός, ἄγγελος, ψυχή, ἢ ἐκ σώματος καὶ ἀσωμάτου σύνθετος. Καὶ εἰ μὲν σῶμα, ἀκίνητος ἦν· πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα ἄψυχον καὶ\n\nἀκίνητον. Καὶ πῶς μὴ κινουμένη ἦλθεν εἰς τὰ ὅρια τοῦ φωτός; Ἢ πῶς ἔσχε κίνησιν; Ἢ ἀγαθὸς καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθὸς ὁ δεδωκὼς τῇ κακίᾳ κίνησιν ἢ ἄλλος ἔδωκεν αὐτῇ τὴν κίνησιν παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἔσονται τρεῖς ἀρχαὶ καὶ οὐ δύο. Εἰ δὲ λέγετε, ὅτι ἀσώματος ἦν ἡ ὕλη, πόθεν τὸ σῶμα; Ἡ γὰρ ἀσώματος καὶ ἄναρχος οὐσία οὐ δύναται εἰς σῶμα τραπῆναι. Πόθεν οὖν ἡ ἀναρίθμητος τῶν σωμάτων πληθύς; Εἰ δὲ σύνθετον εἴπητε τὴν ὕλην ἐξ ἀσωμάτου καὶ σώματος, γνῶτε, ὅτι ἀδύνατον σύνθετον γενέσθαι εἰ μὴ ἐξ ἁπλῶν, ὥσπερ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι δύο εἰ μὴ ἐκ μιᾶς καὶ μιᾶς καὶ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπον εἰ μὴ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος καὶ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι σῶμα εἰ μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἁπλῶν στοιχείων, τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τοῦ πυρός. Χρὴ οὖν πρῶτον εἶναι τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ τότε γενέσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἁπλῶν σύνθετον. Ἔσονται οὖν οὐ δύο ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ τρεῖς. Οὕτως ἀδύνατον ἄναρχον εἶναι τὴν ὕλην.","english":"A prophet is deceived by God either when God permits him to be deceived according to the worth of his own desire, or when he foretells something and God does other things contrary to what he foretold, and he is said to have been deceived by God, that is, to have been shown to be a deceiver. Tell us then, O Manichaeans: the matter which you call evil and darkness and corruption and death, unoriginate and eternal—was it a substance or an accident? And if a substance, was it a body, such as earth, water, air, fire, or incorporeal, such as God, an angel, a soul, or composite of body and incorporeal? And if a body, it was motionless; for every body is soulless and motionless. And how, not being moved, did it come to the boundaries of the light? Or how did it have motion? Or was the one who gave motion to evil good and not good, or did another give it motion besides the good one, and there will be three principles and not two? But if you say that the matter was incorporeal, whence the body? For the incorporeal and unoriginate substance cannot be turned into a body. Whence then the countless multitude of bodies? But if you say that matter is composite of incorporeal and body, know that it is impossible for a composite to come to be except from simples, just as it is impossible for two to come to be except from one and one, and impossible for a man to come to be except from soul and body, and impossible for a body to come to be except from the simple elements, earth and water and air and fire. It is necessary, then, that the simples exist first and then that the composite come to be from the simples. There will be, then, not two principles, but three. Thus it is impossible for matter to be unoriginate.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":48,"ref":"p48","source":"Καὶ εἰ σύνθετος ἐξ ἀσωμάτου καὶ σώματος, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐποίησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ τῆς ἀσωμάτου αὐτοῦ φύσεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος; «Ἄκουε, οὐρανέ, καὶ ἐνωτίζου, γῆ.» «Πρόσεχε, οὐρανέ, καὶ λαλήσω, καὶ ἀκουέτω γῆ ῥήματα ἐκ στόματός μου.» Λαλήσω γὰρ ῥήματα οὐκ ἐμῆς καρδίας, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐσκοτισμένων καὶ μεμιαμμένων Μανιχαίων. Ἀκούσατε, λαοί, φυλαί, γλῶσσαι, ἀκούσατε. Ἓν θέατρον γενέσθω σήμερον ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ. Ἀκούσατε, τί λέγουσιν οἱ ἐπικατάρατοι Μανιχαῖοι, οἱ ἐσκοτισμένοι περὶ τὸ φῶς, τὸ στόμα τοῦ διαβόλου. Λέγουσιν, ὅτι ἡ ὕλη ἐπολέμησε μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἀπέσπασε μέρος ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. Περιγραπτὸν λέγουσι τὸν θεόν, πολεμοῦντα καὶ πολεμούμενον καὶ λυπούμενον καὶ ἀποτεμνόμενον. Πολεμεῖται ὁ θεός; Ἀποκόπτεται ὁ θεός; Οἴμοι, οἴμοι, οὐκ ἀποκτενοῦμεν αὐτούς; Οὐ πυρὶ καταναλώσομεν; Τούτοις ὁμιλήσομεν; Τούτους εἰς κοινωνίαν δεξόμεθα; Ὁ κοινωνῶν αὐτοῖς ὅμοιος αὐτοῖς ἐστι καὶ τῆς μερίδος αὐτῶν ἔσται καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι αἰῶνι. Ἀδελφοί, κοινωνία λέγεται· ἀποθάνωμεν καὶ μὴ δεξώμεθα εἰς κοινωνίαν τοὺς Μανιχαίους. Ἀποθάνωμεν, ἵνα ζήσωμεν· ὁ δεχόμενος αὐτοὺς εἰς κοινωνίαν Μανιχαῖός ἐστιν, ὅμοιος αὐτοῖς. Κρεῖττόν ἐστιν ἰουδαΐσαι καὶ Ἰουδαῖον ἀποθανεῖν ἤπερ κοινωνῆσαι τοῖς Μανιχαίοις. Ὦ ἀπὸ τῶν Μανιχαίων. Ἀκούσατε δὴ πρὸς θεοῦ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀκούσατε, τί φησιν ὁ θεώλεστος Μάνης. Οὐκ ἔστι, φησίν, ὁ κόσμος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ διαβόλου. Ἀπαλλοτριῶσαι ἡμᾶς βούλονται τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν. Καὶ ἐλυπήθη, φησίν, ὁ θεός, ὅτι ἀπεκόπη μέρος ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐπόνησεν. Ἐὰν ἀπεκόπη μέρος ἐξ αὐτοῦ, φθαρτός ἐστι·","english":"And if he is composite, of incorporeal and body, why did he not make man from his incorporeal nature and from body? \"Hear, O heaven, and give ear, O earth.\" \"Give heed, O heaven, and I will speak, and let the earth hear the words out of my mouth.\" For I will speak words not of my own heart, but of the darkened and defiled Manichaeans. Hear, peoples, tribes, tongues, hear. Let heaven and earth become one theater today. Hear what the accursed Manichaeans say, who are darkened concerning the light, the mouth of the devil. They say that matter warred with God and tore away a part from him. They say that God is circumscribed, warring and being warred against, grieving and being cut off. Is God warred against? Is God cut off? Woe, woe, shall we not kill them? Shall we not consume them with fire? Shall we converse with these? Shall we receive these into communion? He who communes with them is like them and will be of their portion both in the present and in the coming age. Brethren, communion is spoken of; let us die and not receive the Manichaeans into communion. Let us die, that we may live; he who receives them into communion is a Manichaean, like them. It is better to judaize and to die a Jew than to commune with the Manichaeans. O you from the Manichaeans. Hear now, by God, O men, hear what the God-beloved Manes says. The world, he says, is not God's, but the devil's. They wish to alienate us from our God. And God, he says, grieved because a part was cut off from him, and he labored. If a part was cut off from him, he is corruptible.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":49,"ref":"p49","source":"πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τεμνόμενον φθαρτόν ἐστιν. Ἐσύλησε καὶ ἥρπαξε, φησίν, ἡ κακία μέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πέμπει ὁ θεὸς καὶ συλᾷ καὶ ἁρπάζει τὸ μέρος τὸ συληθὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. Λῃστὰς θεοῦ εἰσάγεις, ὦ θεώλεστε; Ἀλλὰ καὶ μηχανάς, φησίν, ἐποίησεν ὁ θεός, δώδεκα κάδους καὶ τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην, ἵνα λάβῃ τὸ ἴδιον. Εἶτα τί, ἵνα τι τελευταῖον γένηται, ἵνα πέμψῃ πῦρ ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ καύσῃ τὸν κόσμον καὶ ἀναλώσῃ πάντα καὶ ἀποκαταστήσῃ τὴν ὕλην κάτω εἰς τὸν τόπον αὐτῆς καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τὰς μὴ δεξαμένας τὸν Μάνεντα; Ἀκούσατε, οἷα λέγει ὁ ἀντίδικος τοῦ θεοῦ, πόσην δύναμιν δίδωσι τῇ ὕλῃ· Καταβάλλει τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ὑψίστου τὴν δύναμιν. Πρῶτον μέν φησιν, ὅτι ἐσυλήθη καὶ ἐκλάπη. Ὢ ἀδυναμίας. Τὸν θεόν μου λέγεις ἀδύνατον; Ἀλλ' ἑκὼν παρεχώρησε. Πῶς οὖν ἐλυπήθη, εἰ μὴ ἐβιάσθη; Οὐδεὶς προδίδωσι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἑκουσίως καὶ λυπεῖται. Εἰ δέ, ἵνα μὴ κατακυριευθῇ ὁ τόπος αὐτοῦ, μὴ δυνηθεὶς ἄλλως περιγενέσθαι τῆς ὕλης, ἐλυπήθη, πῶς οὐκ ἀδύναμος; Εἶτα λυπεῖται, καὶ κολάζεται τὸ μέρος τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ τεχνάζεται καὶ μηχανὰς ποιεῖ, ἵνα λάβῃ τὸ ἴδιον, καὶ οὐδὲ ὅλον ἀπολαμβάνει τὸ ἴδιον· αἱ γὰρ ψυχαὶ αἱ μὴ ἀκολουθήσασαι τῷ Μάνεντι εἰς αἰῶνα κολάζονται· καὶ τελευταῖον ἡ ὕλη πάλιν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις τόποις στασιάσασα τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ θλίψασα, αὐτὴ δὲ μὴ θλιβεῖσα, ἀλλὰ τὸ","english":"For everything that is cut is corruptible. \"Evil,\" he says, \"plundered and snatched a part from God, and for this reason God sends and plunders and snatches back the part that was plundered from him.\" Do you introduce robbers of God, O God-forsaken one? But also, he says, God made contrivances—twelve vessels and the sun and the moon—in order to take back his own. Then what, so that something final may happen, so that the good one may send fire and burn the world and consume all things and restore matter below to its own place, and the souls that did not receive Manes? Hear what the adversary of God says, how much power he gives to matter: he casts down the power of God the Most High. First, he says, that he was plundered and stolen. O weakness! Do you call my God powerless? But he yielded willingly. How then was he grieved, if he was not compelled? No one betrays his own willingly and is grieved. But if, so that his place might not be dominated, being unable otherwise to prevail over matter, he was grieved—how is he not powerless? Then he is grieved, and the part from him is punished, and he devises and makes contrivances in order to take back his own, and he does not even receive back his own entirely; for the souls that did not follow Manes are punished forever; and finally matter, having again rebelled in its own places and oppressed the good, while itself not being oppressed, but the","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":50,"ref":"p50","source":"ἔσχατον πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον παλινδρομήσασα μετὰ καὶ τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν μὴ πιστευσασῶν τῷ Μάνεντι. Ἀλλὰ τυχὸν καὶ πάλιν ἀναστήσεται.\n\n68 Εἴπατε ἡμῖν, ὦ Μανιχαῖοι· Ἡ ὕλη ἡσυχάζουσα τὸ πρότερον καλὴ ἦν ἢ κακή; Εἰ μὲν κακή, ὕστερον στασιάσασα καλὴ ἐγένετο. Εἰ δὲ πρῶτον καλή, ὕστερον κακή. Εἶτα στασιάσασα πρὸς ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἀτάκτως κινηθεῖσα καὶ ἐλθοῦσα εἰς τὰ τοῦ φωτὸς ὅρια, εἰ μὲν ἐθεάσατο τὸ ἄυλον φῶς, πῶς τυφλή; Πῶς δὲ καὶ ὕλη ἄυλον φῶς θεάσεται; Εἰ δὲ ἐνόησε, πῶς ἄλογος καὶ ἄνους; Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἠράσθη καθ' ὑμᾶς, πῶς ἄψυχος; Πῶς δὲ κακή; Τὸ γὰρ ἐρῶν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐ κακόν. Πῶς δὲ ἄνους καὶ ἄσοφος ἡ ἐκβᾶσα ἐκ τῶν αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ζῷον οὐκ ἄλογον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄριστος στρατηγὸς καὶ εὔτακτος, καὶ λαβοῦσα ἀξιόλογον λάφυρον τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ εἰς τὰ ἑαυτῆς ὑποστρέψασα; Πῶς δὲ καὶ φαύλην λέγετε τὴν τὸ ἀγαθὸν δεξαμένην καὶ χωρήσασαν; Τὰ γὰρ δεκτικὰ ἀγαθοῦ οὐκ ἐναντία οὐδὲ πολέμια. Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ ἡ ὕλη ἀφήρπασε μέρος τοῦ θεοῦ, δραστήριος μὲν καὶ ποιητικὴ ἡ ὕλη, παθητὴ δὲ καὶ ῥευστὴ ἡ φύσις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Εἰ δὲ ἐκείνη μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐπεθύμησεν, ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς μέρος αὑτοῦ ἔδωκε τῷ κακῷ, ἀμφότερα ἐτράπησαν· καὶ τὸ κακὸν γὰρ ἐπεθύμησε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν δεξάμενον μιγῆναι τῷ κακῷ κακὸν ἐγένετο. Καὶ πάλιν· Ἐβλάβη τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ἁρπαγῆς καὶ τῆς μίξεως ἢ ἔβλαψεν, ἢ ὠφέλησεν ἢ ὠφελήθη; Εἰ μὲν ὠφελήθη, ἐνεργὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ὠφελῆσαν καὶ ἧττον τὸ ὠφεληθὲν καὶ παθητόν. Εἰ δὲ ἐβλάβη, καὶ οὕτω παθητὸν τὸ βλαβὲν καὶ ἐπικρατέστερον τὸ βλάψαν. Εἰ δὲ ἔβλαψε, κακόν ἐστι.","english":"Finally it returns to what is its own, together with the souls of those who did not believe in Manes. But perhaps it will rise again.\n\n68 Tell us, O Manichaeans: Was matter, when it was at rest beforehand, good or evil? If indeed it was evil, then later, having rebelled, it became good. But if it was good at first, later it became evil. Then, having rebelled against itself and moved in disorder and come to the boundaries of the light—if indeed it saw the immaterial light, how is it blind? And how will matter see immaterial light? But if it understood, how is it irrational and mindless? And if, according to you, it fell in love, how is it soulless? And how is it evil? For that which loves the good is not evil. And how is it mindless and foolish—that which went forth from its own realm as though it were not an irrational beast, but as though it were the best and most well-ordered general, and took a notable spoil of the light and returned to its own realm? And how do you call evil that which received the good and contained it? For things receptive of the good are not contrary or hostile to it. And again: If matter snatched away a part of God, then matter is active and productive, while the nature of the good is passive and fluid. But if matter desired the good, and the good gave a part of itself to evil, both were turned: for evil also desired the good and became good, and the good, having received a mixing with evil, became evil. And again: Was the good harmed by the plundering and the mixing, or did it harm, or did it benefit, or was it benefited? If indeed it was benefited, then that which benefited is active and good, and that which was benefited is lesser and passive. But if it was harmed, then in this way too the harmed is passive and the harmer is more powerful. But if it harmed, it is evil.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":51,"ref":"p51","source":"Εἰ δὲ ὠφέλησε, φθονερὸς ὁ ἀγαθός, λυπηθεὶς καὶ μνησίκακος, πυρὶ παραδοὺς τὴν ὕλην καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς μνησικακίας καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ μέρος σὺν αὐτῇ. Εἰ δὲ οὐδὲ ἔβλαψεν οὐδὲ ἐβλάβη οὐδὲ ὠφέλησεν οὐδὲ ὠφελήθη, πρῶτον μὲν ἀνενέργητον· τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθόν, ἔνθα ἂν γένηται, ὠφελεῖ, ἐὰν ἔχῃ ἀγαθὴν ἐνέργειαν· δεύτερον δὲ ἄδικον, ὅτι μηδὲ ὠφεληθεὶς μηδὲ βλαβεὶς κολάσει τὴν μηδὲν ἀδικήσασαν ὕλην. Εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐρασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν ὕλην καὶ μετασχεῖν αὐτοῦ ὀργίζεται ὁ θεὸς καὶ λυπεῖται καθ' ὑμᾶς, μηδεὶς ἐρασθῇ αὐτοῦ. Εἰ δέ, ὥς φατε, γνοὺς ὁ θεὸς τὴν ὕλην ἐπερχομένην αὐτῷ ἑκὼν συνεχώρησεν ἁρπαγῆναι μέρος αὐτοῦ ὑπ' αὐτῆς, ἵνα αὐτῆς τὴν κίνησιν περιγράψας τιμωρήσηται ὥσπερ βόλον ἐντήξας τῇ γεέννῃ, πρῶτον μέν, τίνος ἕνεκεν οὐκ εὐθέως ἔτηξε καὶ παρέδωκεν αὐτὴν τῇ γεέννῃ; Εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐδύνατο εἰ μὴ τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἡμῖν τί μέμφεται μὴ ἀνθισταμένοις τῷ πονηρῷ, αὐτὸς προδοὺς τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν διὰ ἀδυναμίαν; Εἶτα γέενναν λέγοντες ἢ ὁμοούσιον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ταύτην ἐρεῖτε ἢ ὁμοούσιον τοῦ πονηροῦ ἢ ἄλλην οὐσίαν, καὶ οὐκέτι δύο, ἀλλὰ τρεῖς. Εἰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πῶς κολάζει; Οὐκ ἀγαθὴ γὰρ ἡ γέεννα. Εἰ δὲ τοῦ πονηροῦ, οὐ κολάζει τὸ πονηρόν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἑαυτὸ κολάζει. Εἰ δὲ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὰ δύο, τρεῖς ἀρχαὶ καὶ οὐ δύο, ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρήχθη. Καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, διὰ τί μὴ πρὸς τὴν εὐθεῖαν ἐρχόμενοι εἴπομεν, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρῆχθαι τὰ πάντα; Τὸ ἄναρχον ἄτρεπτον· τροπὴ γάρ ἐστι τὸ μὴ πρότερον ὄντα ὕστερον γενέσθαι. Ὧν δὲ τὸ εἶναι ἀπὸ τροπῆς, τρεπτά εἰσι φύσει·","english":"But if it benefited, then the good one is envious, grieved and resentful, handing matter over to fire, and by the excess of his resentment also a part of himself along with it. But if it neither harmed nor was harmed, neither benefited nor was benefited, then first, it is inactive; for the good, wherever it may be, benefits, if it has a good activity; and second, it is unjust, because though neither benefited nor harmed, it punishes matter that did no wrong. But if, because matter loved it and partook of it, God is angry and grieved according to you, then let no one love him. But if, as you say, God, knowing that matter was coming against him, willingly allowed a part of himself to be seized by it, in order that, having circumscribed its motion, he might punish it, as it were casting a clod into Gehenna—first, for what reason did he not immediately melt it and hand it over to Gehenna? But if he could not except in such a way, why does he blame us who do not resist the evil one, when he himself betrayed our souls through weakness? Then, when you speak of Gehenna, you will say either that it is consubstantial with the good, or consubstantial with the evil, or another substance—and then no longer two, but three. For if it is of the good, how does it punish? For Gehenna is not good. But if it is of the evil, the evil does not punish; for nothing punishes itself. But if it is something else besides the two, then there are three principles and not two, or it was brought from non-being into being. And if so, why do we not come to the straight answer and say that all things were brought from non-being into being? The unoriginate is immutable; for it is a change for something that did not exist before to come into being later. But those whose being is from change are mutable by nature.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":52,"ref":"p52","source":"ὧν δὲ εἶναι οὐκ ἀπὸ τροπῆς ἤρξατο, ἀλλ' ἄναρχον, ἄτρεπτα φύσει. Πῶς οὖν ἐκ τῶν ἀνάρχων οὐσιῶν ἐγενόμεθα; Εἰ μὴ γὰρ καὶ αὐταὶ τοιαῦταί εἰσιν, οἷοι ἡμεῖς, ἄνθρωποι καὶ αὐτοί. Εἰ δὲ τοιαῦται, πῶς ἐτράπησαν; Οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἀνάρχων τοίνυν οὐσιῶν ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. Εἰ ἄναρχος ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀίδιος ἡ ὕλη καὶ ἡ κακία ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσα τὸ εἶναι καὶ ὅσα ἔχει, τουτέστι τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν κακίαν, ἄτρεπτα ταῦτα ἕξει. Πῶς οὖν ὁ τοσοῦτον αὐτὴν φοβηθείς, ὥστε παραχωρῆσαι μέρος ἑαυτοῦ αἰχμάλωτον ὑπ' αὐτῆς γενέσθαι, ἐσχάτως αὐτῆς περιγενέσθαι δυνήσεται;\n\n69 Μανιχαῖος· Διὰ τί προγινώσκων ὁ θεὸς τὸν διάβολον, ὅτι ἔμελλε τρέπεσθαι ἐκ\n\nτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰς τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀποβάλλεσθαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἀνυπαρξίᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κακόν, ἐποίησεν αὐτόν; Ὀρθόδοξος· Εἰ προεγίνωσκεν αὐτόν, ὡς πάντως ἐσόμενον προεγίνωσκεν αὐτόν· ἡ γὰρ μὴ πάντως ἐσομένου πρόγνωσις οὐ πρόγνωσίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἀγνωσία καὶ πλάνη. Μανιχαῖος· Θέλων ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν ὁ θεός; Ὀρθόδοξος· Ναί, θέλων. Μανιχαῖος· Καὶ διὰ τί ἠθέλησε ποιῆσαι αὐτὸν ἀγαθὸς ὤν, τὸν κακὸν ἐσόμενον; Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν ὁ θεὸς καλόν· αὐτὸς δὲ ἑκουσίως ἐτράπη καὶ ἀπεβάλετο τὸ ἀγαθόν. Μανιχαῖος· Διὰ τί ἀπεβάλετο τὸ ἀγαθόν; Ὀρθόδοξος· Ὅτι αὐτεξούσιος ἐγένετο. Μανιχαῖος· Καὶ διὰ τί ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τρεπτόν; Ὀρθόδοξος· Τρεπτὸν μὲν ἅπαν κτίσμα κατὰ φύσιν· ὧν γὰρ ἡ γένεσις ἀπὸ τροπῆς ἤρξατο, ταῦτα ἀνάγκη κατὰ φύσιν τρεπτὰ εἶναι. Ἦ οὐ τροπὴ ἡ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραγωγή;","english":"But those things whose existence did not begin from change are without beginning and by nature immutable. How, then, did we come to be from the unbegun substances? For unless these too are such as we are—human beings ourselves—[how could we come from them]? But if they are such, how were they changed? We are therefore not from the unbegun substances, but from what is not. If matter and evil are an unbegun principle and eternal, having their existence from themselves and all that they have—that is, tyranny and strength and evil—they will possess these immutably. How, then, will the one who feared it so greatly that he yielded a part of himself to become captive under it be able finally to prevail over it?\n\n69 Manichaeus: Why did God, foreknowing that the devil was going to turn from good to evil and to cast off the good and to be in the non-existence of the good, which is evil—why did he make him? Orthodox: If he foreknew him, he foreknew him as one who would certainly be; for foreknowledge of one who will not certainly be is not foreknowledge, but ignorance and error. Manichaeus: Did God make him willingly? Orthodox: Yes, willingly. Manichaeus: And why, being good, did he wish to make him who would be evil? Orthodox: God made him good; but he himself willingly turned and cast off the good. Manichaeus: Why did he cast off the good? Orthodox: Because he was made self-determining. Manichaeus: And why did he make him self-determining and mutable? Orthodox: Every creature is by nature mutable; for those whose generation began from change must by nature be mutable. Or is not the production from what is not into being a change?","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":53,"ref":"p53","source":"Μόνον οὖν φύσει ἄτρεπτον τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἄκτιστον καὶ ἀεὶ ὄν. Τὰ δὲ κτίσματα, ὅσα μὲν λογικά, ἐθελότρεπτα, τῷ θελήματι τρεπόμενα, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ κατὰ σῶμα. Αὐτεξούσιον δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· πᾶν γὰρ λογικὸν αὐτεξούσιον. Εἰς τί γὰρ τῷ λογικῷ χρήσηται μὴ ὢν αὐτεξούσιος; Ἢ πῶς ἐν ἀρετῇ γενήσεται ἢ ἀγαθὸς ἔσται μὴ ὢν αὐτεξούσιος; Τὸ γὰρ βίᾳ γινόμενον ἢ ἀνάγκῃ φύσεως οὐκ ἀρετή· ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἔχει ἀρετὴν τὰ ἄλογα. Τὸ δὲ διά τινα ῥαθυμίαν ἀνελεῖν τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀρετήν, οὐ δικαίου. Μανιχαῖος· Ὤφειλεν οὖν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐναρέτους ἔσεσθαι μόνους ποιῆσαι, ἵνα μόνον ᾖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μόνη ἡ ἀρετὴ πολιτεύηται. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τέλειον ἀγαθὸν ὁ θεὸς μόνος, τῇ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν συγκρίσει πάντα ἀτελῆ, κατὰ τοῦτο ὄντα καὶ λεγόμενα ἀγαθά, καθ' ὅσον αὐτοῦ μετέχουσι, καὶ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα συγκρίσει. Ὅπερ γὰρ πλέον μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πλέον ἀγαθὸν ἔστι τε καὶ λέγεται· ὅπερ δὲ ἔλαττον, ἔλαττον· ὅπερ δὲ οὐδ' ὅλως, ἀγαθὸν οὐδ' ὅλως. Τὸ δὲ οὐδ' ὅλως ἀγαθόν, παντελῶς κακόν. Καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ εἶναι, ἀγαθόν· ἐκ θεοῦ γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ εἶναι, ὥστε ὢν ὁ διάβολος κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθός ἐστι.","english":"Only the divine nature is by nature immutable, as uncreated and always existing. But created things—those that are rational are changeable by will, being turned by their will, while the rest are changeable in body. And they are self-determining because they are not by necessity; for every rational being is self-determining. For to what use would reason be to a rational being if it were not self-determining? Or how would it come to be in virtue or be good if it were not self-determining? For what comes about by force or by necessity of nature is not virtue; which is why irrational creatures do not possess virtue either. But to destroy the virtue of good things on account of some carelessness is not the act of a just person. Manichaeus: He ought, then, to have made only those who were going to be virtuous, so that good alone might exist and virtue alone might be practiced. Orthodox: God alone is perfect good, but in comparison with him all things are imperfect, being and being called good insofar as they participate in him, and also in comparison with one another. For whatever participates more in the good is and is called more good; whatever less, less; and whatever not at all, not at all good. But what is not at all good is completely evil. And being itself is good; for being is from God, who is good, so that the devil, insofar as he exists, is good by virtue of his very being.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":54,"ref":"p54","source":"70 Μανιχαῖος· Διὰ τί λέγει ὁ κύριος· «Καλὸν ἦν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκείνῳ, εἰ οὐκ ἐγεννήθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος;» Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἐπειδὴ τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ πρέπει τὸ διδόναι τὰ ἀγαθά, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνοντι αἰσχύνη καὶ ὄνειδος τὸ μὴ φυλάξαι, ἃ ἔλαβεν ἀγαθά, οὐ διὰ τὸν διδοῦντα, ἀλλὰ δι' ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ῥαθυμίαν. Καὶ ὁ θεὸς οὐ δύναται μὴ παρέχειν τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀγαθὸς ὤν, τουτέστιν οὐ θέλει· ὁ δὲ μὴ θέλων λαβεῖν αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ αἴτιος, ἑαυτῷ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν κρεῖττον ποιῶν τοῦ λαβεῖν. Οὐ δίκαιον οὖν οὐδὲ καλόν, διὰ τὸ μὴ θέλειν τοῦτον λαβεῖν κωλυθῆναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν τοῦ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ διδόναι τὰ ἀγαθά. Οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἡ κακία ἐνίκα τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθότητι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παράγει, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἔσεσθαι ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ ἑκουσίως τρεπόμενον ἐκώλυσε τὴν ἀγαθὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δημιουργίαν. Διὸ οὐκ εἶπεν ὁ κύριος· Συνέφερεν, εἰ οὐκ ἐγεννήθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος, ἀλλά· «Συνέφερε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκείνῳ.» Καλὸν μὲν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸν ἀγαθὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ διδόναι τὰ ἀγαθά, ὁ δὲ λαβὼν καὶ μὴ φυλάξας ἐπονείδιστον ἑαυτῷ τὸ λαβεῖν ἐποίησεν· αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ μὴ θέλων τὸ ἀγαθὸν καί, ὃ ἔχει ἀγαθόν, οὐ θέλει οὐδὲ ἥδεται. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκ θεοῦ μόνου, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ ἐξ ἡμῶν. Ὁ θεὸς οὖν, ὅπερ αὐτοῦ ἐστι, δίδωσι τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ εἶναι, ἡμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι, τὸ φυλάξαι τὰ δοθέντα ἀγαθά, ἢ ποιοῦμεν ἢ οὔ. Ὅπερ δὲ μόνου θεοῦ ἐστι, καὶ θελόντων καὶ μὴ θελόντων ἡμῶν αὐτὸς δίδωσιν ὡς ἀγαθός, ἵνα κἂν ποσῶς ᾖ ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ ἀγαθόν.","english":"Manichaeus: Why does the Lord say, \"It were good for that man if that man had not been born\"? Orthodox: Because it is fitting for the good to give good things, but for the one who receives, it is a shame and a reproach not to guard the good things he received—not because of the giver, but because of himself and his own slackness. And God, being good, cannot fail to provide good things—that is, he does not will to withhold them; but the one who does not will to receive is himself the cause, making his not receiving better for himself than receiving. It is therefore neither just nor good that, because this man does not will to receive, the good God should be prevented from doing good and giving good things. For in that way evil would conquer good, if God by his goodness brings things from non-being into being, but evil—turning voluntarily from good—prevented the good creation of the good God. Therefore the Lord did not say, \"It were better if that man had not been born,\" but \"It were better for that man.\" It is good both by nature and by justice for the good to do good and to give good things, but the one who received and did not guard them made the receiving a reproach to himself; for he himself does not will the good, and even the good he has he does not will nor delight in. For to exist is not in our power, but from God alone; but to be good is from God and from us. God, then, gives what is his own—existence and well-being—but we do what is in our power: guard the good things given, or not. And what is God's alone, he himself gives as good, whether we will or not, so that good may be in us to some extent.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":55,"ref":"p55","source":"71 Ὁ θεὸς καὶ τῷ διαβόλῳ ἀεὶ παρέχει τὰ ἀγαθά, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος οὐ θέλει λαβεῖν. Καὶ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι αἰῶνι πᾶσι δίδωσιν ὁ θεὸς τὰ ἀγαθά· πηγὴ γάρ ἐστι τῶν ἀγαθῶν πᾶσι βρύουσα τὴν ἀγαθότητα, ἕκαστος δέ, καθὼς ἑαυτὸν κατεσκεύασε δεκτικόν, μετέχει\n\nτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν περὶ ἄλλα τὴν ὄρεξιν ἔχοντες καὶ ἐπιτυγχάνοντες κἂν ποσῶς ἡδώμεθα, ἐκεῖσε δέ, ὅταν «ὁ θεὸς εἴη τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσι», μὴ βρώσεως οὔσης, μὴ πόσεως μηδέ τινος σαρκικῆς ἡδονῆς μηδέ τινος ἀδικίας οἱ μηδὲ τὰς συνήθεις ἡδονὰς ἔχοντες μηδὲ τῶν ἐκ θεοῦ δεκτικοὶ ὄντες ὀδυνῶνται ἀνηκέστως, οὐ τοῦ θεοῦ κόλασιν ποιήσαντος, ἀλλὰ ἡμῶν ἑαυτοῖς τὴν κόλασιν εὐτρεπισάντων, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ θάνατον ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησε, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἑαυτοῖς τοῦτον ἐπεσπασάμεθα. Φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν σύνθετον διαλύεται, ἀλλ' ὅσον θεῷ διὰ θεωρίας ἥνωτο ὁ Ἀδάμ, ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶχε τὴν ζωὴν ὑπὲρ φύσιν ζωοποιοῦσαν τὴν θνητὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν. Ὅτε δὲ ἀπέστη τῆς πρὸς τὴν ζωὴν ἤγουν τὸν θεὸν ἑνώσεως, ἦλθεν ἐκ τῆς ὑπὲρ φύσιν ἀφθαρσίας εἰς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ συνθέτου διάλυσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ θάνατος.","english":"God always provides good things even to the devil, but he does not wish to receive them. And in the age to come God gives good things to all; for he is a fountain of good things, pouring forth goodness to all, and each one partakes of the good insofar as he has prepared himself to receive it. Here, then, while we have our desire set on other things and attain them, we are pleased to some extent; but there, when \"God is all in all,\" since there is no eating, no drinking, nor any fleshly pleasure, nor any injustice, those who have not even the customary pleasures nor are capable of receiving the things from God are pained incurably—not because God made punishment, but because we prepared punishment for ourselves, since God did not make death either, but we drew it upon ourselves. For by nature every composite thing is dissolved, but insofar as Adam was united to God through contemplation, he had life in himself, life-giving beyond nature to his mortal nature. But when he fell away from union with life, that is, with God, he came from the incorruptibility beyond nature into the dissolution according to nature of the composite, which is death.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":56,"ref":"p56","source":"72 Ἐπειδὴ δέ τινές φασιν, ὡς ἔδει τὸν θεὸν προειδότα τοὺς ἁμαρτήσοντας καὶ μὴ μετανοήσοντας καὶ κριθησομένους μὴ παραγαγεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι– οὐ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ ποιῆσαι καὶ κολάσαι–, φαμὲν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοῦ ἀποστόλου· «Μενοῦν γε, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, σὺ τίς εἶ ὁ ἀνταποκρινόμενος τῷ θεῷ; Τῷ γὰρ θελήματι αὐτοῦ τίς ἀνθέστηκεν;» Ὃ γὰρ θέλει, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀγαθόν· «Καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἔχει ὁ κεραμεὺς ποιῆσαι ὃ μὲν εἰς τιμὴν σκεῦος, ὃ δὲ εἰς ἀτιμίαν.» Αὐτὸς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν τούς τε δικαίους καὶ τοὺς ἁμαρτωλούς–ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ αὐτοὺς δικαίους ἢ ἁμαρτωλούς–ἢ τιμίους ἢ ἀτίμους· φησὶ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀπόστολος ἐν τῇ πρὸς Τιμόθεον ἐπιστολῇ, προαριθμήσας τὰς κακίας, ἐπάγει λέγων· «Ὅστις οὖν ἐκκαθάρῃ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ τούτων, γέγονε σκεῦος ἐκλογῆς.» Αὐτεξούσιοι γὰρ γενόμενοι ἐξουσίαν ἔχομεν καθᾶραι ἑαυτοὺς ἐκ τῶν αἰσχίστων παθῶν καὶ μολῦναι ἑαυτούς. Ὅμως πάντας ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθοὺς ἐποίησεν. Αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ εἶναι πᾶσι παρέχει ὥσπερ ἥλιος ἐφαπλῶν τὰς ἀκτῖνας τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ. Καὶ τὸ μὲν εἶναι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν λαβεῖν, τὸ δὲ εὖ εἶναι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν. Ἂν τοίνυν θελήσωμεν καὶ ποθήσωμεν, μετέχομεν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν φωτὶ εἰς αἰῶνας ἐσόμεθα. Ἐὰν δὲ ῥαθυμήσωμεν καὶ ἑαυτοὺς τυφλώσωμεν καὶ μὴ ποθήσωμεν αὐτόν, ἀμέτοχοι αὐτοῦ ἐσόμεθα. Οὐκ ἔδει οὖν διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ῥαθυμίαν αὐτὸν ἀμετάδοτον γενέσθαι τῶν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ δωρεῶν, ὧν πρώτη ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἔδει τὴν ἡμετέραν κακίαν νικῆσαι καὶ ἀνενέργητον ποιῆσαι τὴν ἀγαθότητα αὐτοῦ.","english":"Since some say that God, foreknowing those who would sin and not repent and would be judged, ought not to have brought them from non-being into being—for it is not the part of a good being to make and to punish—we say to them, first, the word of the apostle: \"Nay but, O man, who are you that replies against God? For who has resisted his will?\" For what he wills is good; \"and the potter has power to make one vessel to honor, and another to dishonor.\" For he himself is the one who makes both the righteous and the sinners—but he does not himself make them righteous or sinners—or honorable or dishonorable. For the same apostle says in the letter to Timothy, after first listing the vices, adding: \"Whoever therefore purifies himself from these has become a vessel of election.\" For having been made self-determining, we have the power to purify ourselves from the most shameful passions and to defile ourselves. Nevertheless God made all things good. He himself therefore provides both being and well-being to all, like the sun spreading the rays of his goodness over all his works. And to receive being is not in our power, but well-being is in our power. If, then, we will and desire it, we partake of his goodness and shall be in light for ages. But if we grow slack and blind ourselves and do not desire him, we shall be without a share in him. It was not fitting, then, that because of our slackness he should become uncommunicative of the gifts of his goodness, the first of which is being, nor was it fitting that our wickedness should conquer and render his goodness inoperative.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":57,"ref":"p57","source":"Εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἦν, οὐδὲν ἂν τῶν ὄντων ἐγένετο· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἀξίως πολιτεύεται τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ. Δικαίως γὰρ πρὸς αὐτὸν συγκρινόμενα τὰ πάντα ἀνάξια τοῦ εἶναί εἰσιν. Ὅμως οὐ μόνον ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιος καὶ ὁρῶν τὰ πάντα μήπω γενόμενα ὡς ὄντα. Ὁ καλῶν γάρ, φησί, «τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα.» Εἰ μὲν ὤφειλε δι' ἀγαθότητα μὴ ποιῆσαι τοὺς κολαζομένους, μᾶλλον δι' ὑπερβάλλουσαν ἀγαθότητα ὤφειλε καὶ ποιῆσαι αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ κολάσαι, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῆσαι αὐτοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσιν· αὐτὸς γὰρ κύριος ἀμφοτέρων ἐστί, καὶ τοῦ ποιῆσαι καὶ τοῦ συγχωρῆσαι. Εἰ δὲ δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸ κολάζεσθαι τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας, δίκαιον ἦν καὶ γενέσθαι αὐτούς. Ὁρᾷ γὰρ «τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα» ὁ θεὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀποβάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων κρίνει, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς προγνώσεως τῶν ἐσομένων. Ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἐκ τῆς ἀποβάσεως τῶν γινομένων γινώσκει, ἀλλὰ προγινώσκει τὰ ἐσόμενα καὶ κατὰ τὴν πρόγνωσιν αὐτοῦ προορίζει. Πῶς δὲ καὶ προγινώσκει τὸ μὴ ἐσόμενον; Εἰ γὰρ προέγνω τὸν ἁμαρτάνοντα καὶ μὴ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν, οὐ πρόγνωσις ἦν, ἀλλὰ πλάνη· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ γνῶσις τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ πρόγνωσις τῶν πάντως ἐσομένων ἐστί.","english":"For if this were so, nothing that exists would have come into being; for nothing that exists conducts itself worthily of his goodness. For all things, when compared with him, are justly unworthy to exist. Nevertheless, God is not only good but also just, and he sees all things that have not yet come to be as though they were. For he calls, it says, \"the things that are not as though they were.\" If, then, on account of goodness he ought not to have made those who are punished, then rather on account of surpassing goodness he ought both to have made them and not to have punished them, but to have forgiven them their sins; for he himself is lord of both—of making and of forgiving. But if it is just that those who sin be punished, it was also just that they come into being. For God sees \"the things that are not as though they were,\" and he does not judge from the outcome of events but from the foreknowledge of things to come. Since he does not know from the outcome of what happens, but foreknows what will be and predetermines according to his foreknowledge. But how does he also foreknow what will not be? For if he foreknew the one who would sin and did not make him, it was not foreknowledge but error; for just as knowledge is of things that exist, so also foreknowledge is of things that will certainly come to be.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":58,"ref":"p58","source":"74 Μὴ οὖν κρίνωμεν τὸν θεόν· οὐ γὰρ οἴδαμεν τὴν βουλὴν αὐτοῦ. «Τίς γὰρ ἔγνω νοῦν κυρίου; Ἢ τίς σύμβουλος αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο;» Οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν τὴν βουλὴν αὐτοῦ\n\nἀπεκάλυψεν ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ συνέφερεν ἡμῖν γνῶναι· ὅπερ δὲ οὐ συνέφερεν ἡμῖν γνῶναι, ἀπέκρυψε. Μὴ οὖν εὐθύνωμεν τὸν θεόν· αὐτὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κριτὴς καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν ἡ πηγὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, εἰ μὴ ὃ αὐτὸς βούλεται, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἔστι φῶς εἰ μὴ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου πηγαζόμενον.\n\n75 Αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν ὁ θεὸς φύσει ἀγαθὸς καὶ συμπαθὴς ὢν οὐ θέλει τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, οὐ θέλει τὸν θάνατον τοῦ ἁμαρτωλοῦ οὐδὲ τέρπεται ἐπ' ἀπωλείᾳ ζώντων οὐδὲ πάθει ὀργῆς κατέχεται ἢ κολάζει, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι βρύει τὰ ἀγαθά. Ὁ ποθῶν λαμβάνει καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀγαθῶν τυγχάνει· καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ βίῳ τούτῳ οἰκονομία τίς ἐστι καὶ κυβέρνησις καὶ πρόνοια ἄρρητος πρὸς ἐπιστροφὴν καὶ μετάνοιαν καλοῦσα τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας, μετὰ δὲ θάνατον οὐκέτι τροπή, οὐκέτι μετάνοια, οὐχὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μὴ δεχομένου μετάνοιαν–αὐτὸς γὰρ ἑαυτὸν ἀρνήσασθαι οὐ δύναται οὐδὲ ἀποβάλλεται τὴν συμπάθειαν–, ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ οὐκέτι τρέπεται. Διὸ κἄν τις ποιήσῃ πάσας τὰς δικαιοσύνας καὶ ἐπιστρέψας ἁμαρτήσῃ καὶ ἐξέλθῃ ποθῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐκ τοῦ βίου, ἐν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἀποθανεῖται. Ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ ἁμαρτωλός, ἐὰν μετανοήσῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ μετανοίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἀποθάνῃ, οὐ μὴ μνησθῶσιν αἱ ἁμαρτίαι αὐτοῦ.","english":"Let us not, then, judge God; for we do not know his counsel. \"For who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has become his counselor?\" For he has not revealed to us his whole counsel, but only what was beneficial for us to know; and what was not beneficial for us to know, he concealed. Let us not, then, call God to account; for he himself is the judge and he himself is the source of good things, and there is no good except what he himself wills, just as there is no light except what wells forth from the sun.\n\nGod himself, then, being good and compassionate by nature, does not will sin, does not will the death of the sinner, nor does he delight in the destruction of the living, nor is he overcome by the passion of anger or punish, but he pours forth good things upon all. He who longs receives, and the good man obtains good things; and in this life there is a certain economy and governance and ineffable providence calling sinners to conversion and repentance, but after death there is no longer change, no longer repentance—not because God does not accept repentance (for he cannot deny himself nor cast off his compassion)—but because the soul no longer turns. Therefore even if someone should practice all righteousness and, having turned back, should sin and depart this life longing for sin, he will die in his sin. Likewise also the sinner, if he repents and dies in his repentance, his sins shall not be remembered.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":59,"ref":"p59","source":"Ὡς γὰρ οἱ δαίμονες μετὰ τὴν ἔκπτωσιν οὐ μετανοοῦσιν οὐδὲ οἱ ἄγγελοι νῦν οὐχ ἁμαρτάνουσι, ἀλλ' ἀμφότεροι ἔσχον τὸ ἄτρεπτον, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι μετὰ θάνατον τὸ ἄτρεπτον ἔχουσι, καὶ οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι ποθοῦντες τὸν θεὸν καὶ ἔχοντες αὐτὸν ἀεὶ ἐν αὐτῷ εὐφραίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἁμαρτωλοὶ ποθοῦντες τὴν ἁμαρτίαν καὶ μὴ ἔχοντες τὰς ὕλας τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ὡς ὑπὸ πυρὸς καὶ σκώληκος κατεσθιόμενοι, κολάζονται μηδεμίαν παρηγορίαν ἔχοντες. Τί γάρ ἐστι κόλασις εἰ μὴ τοῦ ποθουμένου στέρησις; Κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν οὖν τοῦ πόθου οἵ τε τὸν θεὸν ποθοῦντες εὐφραίνονται καὶ οἱ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ποθοῦντες κολάζονται· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐπιτυγχάνοντες τοῦ ποθουμένου κατὰ τὸ μέτρον τοῦ πόθου εὐφραίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀποτυγχάνοντες κατὰ τὸ μέτρον τοῦ πόθου ὀδυνῶνται.\n\n76 Ὑμεῖς δὲ εἴπατε ἡμῖν· Τί ἐστι παντοκράτωρ; Πάντως ὁ πάντων κρατῶν· φησὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀπόστολος· «Ὁ δὲ πάντα κατασκευάσας θεός.» Καὶ πῶς παντοκράτωρ ὁ θεὸς μὴ κρατῶν τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς κακίας; Ἢ πῶς δημιουργὸς μὴ αὐτὸς δημιουργήσας τὴν ὕλην; Ἢ πῶς θεὸς ἀτελὴς ὢν καὶ ἐλλιπῆ ἔχων τὴν δύναμιν; Διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ ἀνεῖλε καὶ ὑπέταξε τὴν ὕλην, ἀλλ' εἴασεν αὐτὴν στασιάζουσαν καὶ μέχρι ῥοπῆς καιροῦ; Εἰ μὲν μὴ βουληθείς, οὐκ ἀγαθός· οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ οὐδὲ δικαίου τὸ ἐφησυχάζειν τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσιν. Εἰ δὲ μὴ δυνηθείς, θεὸς ἀδύνατος μὴ εἴη θεός· οὐ γὰρ δύνασθε εἰπεῖν, καθὼς ἡμεῖς ἔφημεν περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ εἶναι τὸν διάβολον, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν. Ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διδόντες αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δικαίως εἴποιμεν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διδόμενον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.","english":"For just as the demons after their fall do not repent, nor do the angels now sin, but both have attained immutability, so too men after death have immutability: the righteous, longing for God and always possessing him, rejoice in him, while the sinners, longing for sin and not having the materials of sin, are punished, consumed as it were by fire and worm, having no consolation. For what is punishment if not the deprivation of what is longed for? According to the proportion of their longing, then, those who long for God rejoice and those who long for sin are punished; for those who obtain what they long for rejoice in the measure of their longing, and those who fail to obtain it are pained in the measure of their longing.\n\nBut you say to us: What is \"almighty\"? Surely the one who rules all things; for the apostle says: \"God, who made all things.\" And how is God almighty if he does not rule matter and evil? Or how is he a creator if he did not himself create matter? Or how is God imperfect and having power that is lacking? For why did he not destroy and subdue matter, but allowed it to rebel even to a moment of time? If he did not wish to, he is not good; for it is not the part of a good or just being to be at ease while others sin. But if he was not able, let not an impotent god be God; for you cannot say, as we said concerning the devil's coming to be and being, that his very being is good. For we, granting him being from the good, would rightly say that his being is good; for what is given from the good is good.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":60,"ref":"p60","source":"Ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διδόντες τῇ ὕλῃ ὕπαρξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακὴν ταύτην λέγοντες καὶ φύσει κακὴν καὶ παντελῶς ἀμέτοχον ἀγαθοῦ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν δυνήσεσθε εἰπεῖν τὸ εἶναι αὐτήν. Οὐκοῦν ἢ οὐκ ἀγαθὸς ἢ οὐ δυνατὸς ὁ θεὸς καθ' ὑμᾶς μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αὐτὴν ἀνελών. Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ κακοῦ τὰ πάντα, οὐδὲ ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ δημιουργὸς οὐδὲ ὁ πονηρός, ἀλλὰ πατέρες τῶν ὄντων. Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ ἡ κακία ἐναντία τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὡς ὂν ὄντι καὶ ἀρχὴ ἀρχῇ καὶ οὐσία οὐσίᾳ καί, καθ' ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν, θεὸς θεῷ, ἐν ἡμῖν δέ ἐστι ποιῆσαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, ἐν ἡμῖν ἐστι δοῦναι τὰ νικητήρια τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ τῷ πονηρῷ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν αἴτιοι τῆς ἐπικρατείας ἑκατέρου. Ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἕνα θεόν φαμεν ἀγαθόν, δίκαιον, πάντων δημιουργόν, πάντων κρατοῦντα, παντοδύναμον, ὅσα θέλει δυνάμενον, καὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκτίσθαι τὰ πάντα, τά τε ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ ἀόρατα, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι–\n\n»πάντα γάρ, ὅσα ἠθέλησεν, ἐποίησεν ὁ κύριος»–, καὶ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν φαμεν, ὃ θέλει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ ποιήματα κρίνει τὸν ποιήσαντα. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἴσμεν τὸν λόγον τῆς προνοίας αὐτοῦ· «τίς γὰρ ἔγνω νοῦν κυρίου ἢ τίς σύμβουλος αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο;» Εἰ ἔγνωστο ἡ βουλὴ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἦν θεὸς οὐδὲ θαυμαστός. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἀκατάληπτος, οὕτω καὶ ἡ θέλησις καὶ ἡ πρόνοια αὐτοῦ.","english":"But you, who do not grant existence to matter from the good, but even call it evil and evil by nature and wholly without share in the good, will not be able to say that its existence is good. Therefore, according to you, God is either not good or not able, since he did not remove it from the beginning. And again: If all things are from the substance of the good and the substance of evil, then neither the good one nor the creator, nor the evil one, but fathers of existing things. And again: If evil is contrary to the good as being to being and principle to principle and substance to substance and, to speak as you do, god to god, and it is in our power to do good and evil, it is in our power to give the victory to the good or to the evil, and we are the causes of the dominion of each. For we say that there is one God, good, just, creator of all, ruler of all, almighty, able to do whatever he wills, and that all things were created by him, both visible and invisible, not from his own substance, but from non-being into being—\n\n\"for all things, whatever the Lord willed, he made\"—and this we say is good, which he wills; for the works do not judge the maker. But neither do we know the reason of his providence; \"for who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor?\" If his counsel and his will were known, he would not be God nor wonderful. For just as his substance is incomprehensible, so also are his will and his providence.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":61,"ref":"p61","source":"Εἰ γὰρ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἐπίσταται εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα ἑκάστου τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πάντα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπίσταται–οὐ γὰρ τὸ μέλλον γινώσκει οὐδέ, τί βούλεται ἢ τί θελήσει καὶ βουληθῇ αὔριον, ἐπίσταται–, πῶς οὖν τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ θέλημα καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ βουλὴν γνώσεται, ὃς πολλάκις καί, ὧν ἐβουλεύσατο, εἰς λήθην ἔρχεται; Προνοεῖται ὁ θεὸς κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πρόγνωσιν τῶν ἁπάντων. Καὶ δοκεῖ μὲν ἡμῖν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσι μηδὲ τὰ μέλλοντα μηδὲ τὰ προγεγονότα μηδὲ πάντα τὰ ἐνεστῶτα ἀνώμαλος ἡ κυβέρνησις αὐτοῦ, ὁμαλὴ δέ ἐστι καὶ ἀγαθὴ καὶ δικαία τῷ ὄντι. Προγινώσκων γὰρ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὡς ὄντα τὰ ἐσόμενα δικαίως, ὡς αὐτὸς θέλει καὶ βούλεται, κρίνει· οὐ γάρ, ὡς ὁρᾷ ἄνθρωπος, ὄψεται ὁ θεός. «Ἄνθρωπος γὰρ εἰς πρόσωπον ὁρᾷ, θεὸς δὲ εἰς καρδίαν.» Ἡμεῖς καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ πάντων κρινόμενον δίκαιον πολλάκις ἄδικον ὁρῶμεν διὰ πρόληψιν κακίας καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν ἀρεστὸν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν ἀρεστόν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ. Κρίνει δὲ ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐκ μεταμελείας ἢ ἐπιγνώσεως, ἀλλ' ἐκ προγνώσεως. Προεγνωκὼς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα πρὶν γενέσεως αὐτῶν προώρισεν ἑκάστῳ δικαίως καὶ προνοητικῶς καὶ συμφερόντως κατάλληλα τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Ἄλλο γάρ ἐστι γνῶσις καὶ ἄλλο πρόγνωσις καὶ ἄλλο ἐπίγνωσις καὶ ἄλλο ὁρισμὸς καὶ ἄλλο προορισμός. Γνῶσις μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ ὄντα ἢ τὰ γινόμενα, πρόγνωσις δὲ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ ἐσόμενα πρὶν γενέσεως αὐτῶν, ἐπίγνωσις δέ ἐστιν ἡ μετὰ ψευδῆ γνῶσιν ἐπιγινομένη ἀληθὴς γνῶσις·","english":"For if no one knows the things of men except the spirit of each man that is in him, but not even each man knows all his own affairs—for he does not know the future, nor does he know what he wills or what he will will and wish tomorrow—how then will he know the will of God and his counsel, who often even comes to forget the things he has deliberated? God provides for all things according to his own foreknowledge. And to us who do not know either future things or past things or all present things, his governance seems uneven, but it is even and good and truly just. For foreknowing the things that are in our power as they will justly be, he judges as he himself wills and wishes; for God will not see as man sees. \"For man looks on the outward appearance, but God looks on the heart.\" We often see even the justice judged by all to be unjust, through a preconception of evil and because the same thing is not pleasing to all; for the same thing is not pleasing to all, but one thing to one and another to another. But God judges not from afterthought or subsequent knowledge, but from foreknowledge. For God, having foreknown all things before their generation, foreordained for each one justly and providentially and beneficially, in accordance with the things that are in our power, the things that are not in our power. For knowledge is one thing, foreknowledge another, recognition another, determination another, and foreordination another. For knowledge is the knowing of things that exist or come to be, while foreknowledge is the knowing of future things before their generation, and recognition is the true knowledge that comes after false knowledge.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":62,"ref":"p62","source":"καὶ ὁρισμὸς μέν ἐστι κρίσις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγενημένοις, προορισμὸς δὲ κρίσις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐσομένοις.\n\n79 Προειδὼς οὖν ὁ θεὸς τὰ ἐσόμενα ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἑκουσίως ἤγουν τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἀρετήν φημι καὶ κακίαν, προορίζει τὰ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Καὶ ἡ μὲν προγνωστικὴ δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ οὐκ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἔχει τὴν αἰτίαν, τὸ δὲ προγνῶναι, ἃ μέλλομεν ποιεῖν, ἐξ ἡμῶν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐμέλλομεν ποιεῖν, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς προεγίνωσκε τὸ μὴ ἐσόμενον. Καὶ ἡ μὲν πρόγνωσις τοῦ θεοῦ ἀληθής ἐστι καὶ ἀπαράβατος, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτή ἐστιν ἡ αἰτία τοῦ γενέσθαι πάντως τὸ ἐσόμενον, ἀλλ', ὅτι μέλλομεν ποιεῖν τόδε ἢ τόδε, προγινώσκει. Προγινώσκει δὲ πολλά, ἃ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ἀρεστά, καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς αἴτιος τούτων. Ὡς οὐδὲ ἰατρὸς αἴτιος τῆς νόσου, εἰ προγνῶ, ὅτι μέλλει τις νοσεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν νοσῆσαι ἄλλης αἰτίας τῆς ποιούσης τὴν νόσον, ἡ δὲ πρόγνωσις τοῦ ἰατροῦ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τέχνης· οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐσόμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἡμῶν θέλημα· οὐ κακὸν δὲ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, εἰ, ὡς ἐδόθη ἡμῖν καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ ἐδόθη, χρησόμεθα αὐτῷ. Τὸ δὲ προγνῶναι τὸν θεὸν τῆς προγνωστικῆς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ αἱ τιμωρίαι ἡμῶν τὸν θεὸν ἔχουσιν αἴτιον. Οὐ γὰρ ὁ κριτής ἐστι τῆς τιμωρίας τοῦ πονηροῦ αἴτιος, εἰ καὶ αὐτὸς θέλων κρίνει, ἀλλ' αἴτιος μέν ἐστιν ὁ πταίσας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τιμωρίας, ὁ δὲ κριτὴς τῆς δικαιοσύνης αἴτιος· ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη. Εἰ γὰρ θέλων κρίνει, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ προηγούμενον θέλημα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον. Προηγούμενον οὖν ἐστι θέλημα, ὅπερ τις ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ θέλει, ἑπόμενον δέ, ὅπερ ἐκ τῆς τῶν γινομένων αἰτίας·","english":"And a definition is a judgment and declaration concerning things that have happened, while predestination is a judgment and declaration concerning things that are to come.\n\n79 Knowing beforehand, then, the things that will be done by us voluntarily—that is, the things that are in our power, I mean virtue and vice—God predestines the things that are not in our power. And the foreknowing power of God does not have its cause from us, but the foreknowing of what we are going to do is from us; for if we were not going to do it, he would not have foreknown what would not be. And the foreknowledge of God is true and unerring, but it is not itself the cause of what will certainly come to be; rather, because we are going to do this or that, he foreknows it. And he foreknows many things that are not pleasing to him, and he is not himself the cause of these. Just as a physician is not the cause of a disease if he foreknows that someone is going to fall sick, but the falling sick has another cause that produces the disease, while the physician's foreknowledge belongs to the art in him; so too what will be done by us does not have its cause from God, but from our self-determining will; and the self-determining will is not evil, if we use it as it was given to us and for the purpose for which it was given. But God's foreknowing belongs to his foreknowing power. Nor do our punishments have God as their cause. For the judge is not the cause of the punishment of the wicked man, even if he himself willingly judges, but the one who has done wrong is the cause of his own punishment, while the judge is the cause of justice; and justice is good. For if he willingly judges, it is not according to his antecedent will, but according to his consequent will. An antecedent will, then, is what someone wills of himself, while a consequent will is what comes from the cause of things that come to be;","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":63,"ref":"p63","source":"προηγουμένως γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ «θέλει ὁ θεὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους σωθῆναι καὶ εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἐλθεῖν». Ἁμαρτανόντων δὲ ἡμῶν θέλει παιδεύεσθαι ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. Καὶ τὸ μὲν προηγούμενον θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς ἀγαθότητός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ\n\nἑπόμενον τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ.\n\n80 Ὅτι δὲ προώρισεν ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα κατὰ τὴν πρόγνωσιν αὐτοῦ, οὕτως γνωσόμεθα. Ἄτρεπτον τὸ θεῖον καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιγνώσεως κρῖνον, ἀλλ' ἐκ προγνώσεως. Εἰ οὖν καθ' ἡμέραν κρίνει καὶ ὁρίζει, καθ' ἡμέραν γινώσκει τὸ γινόμενον καί, ὥς τινές φασι, καὶ μεταμελεῖται καὶ προστίθησιν ἔτη ζωῆς, μὴ εἰδότες, τί φασιν. Εἰ γὰρ μεταμελεῖται καὶ προστίθησι, τρεπτὸν ἔχει καὶ τὸ θέλημα καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν, καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάξιον τοῦ θεοῦ. Εἰ δὲ λέγεται προστεθεικέναι τῷ Ἐζεκίᾳ κατὰ τὴν γραφήν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγνοῶν οὐδὲ μὴ προορίσας προσέθηκεν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς μὲν καὶ προέγνω καὶ προώρισε τὰ κατὰ τὸν Ἐζεκίαν· προνοητικῶς δὲ ἐσχηματίσατο οἰκονομῶν τὴν σωτηρίαν ἡμῶν, ἵνα δείξῃ, πόσον δύναται ἡ μετάνοια. Μεταμελεῖσθαι δὲ λέγεται ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς. Ἡ γὰρ γραφὴ ἀνθρωπικώτερον περὶ θεοῦ διαλέγεται πρὸς τὴν νηπιότητα τῶν ἀκουόντων. Ὥσπερ γὰρ λέγεται· «Ἵνα τί ὑπνοῖς, κύριε;» –οὐχ ὑπνοῖ δὲ ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνοχὴν καὶ τὴν μακροθυμίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ὑπέρθεσιν τῆς βοηθείας αὐτοῦ ὕπνον ἐκάλεσε· παρ' ἡμῖν γὰρ οἱ ὑπνοῦντες οὐ βοηθοῦσιν–, οὕτω καὶ μεταμέλειαν· ἡμεῖς γάρ, ὅταν δῶμέν τινι πλοῦτον καὶ κακῶς ἐκεῖνος χρήσηται αὐτῷ, μεταμελούμεθα.","english":"For by way of precedence, God of himself \"wills that all men be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth.\" But when we sin, he wills that we be disciplined for our benefit. And the preceding will of God belongs to his goodness, while the consequent will belongs to his justice.\n\n80 That God foreordained all things according to his foreknowledge, we shall understand as follows. The divine nature is immutable and does not judge from [subsequent] knowledge but from foreknowledge. If, then, he judges and determines daily, he knows daily what comes to be; and, as some say, he also repents and adds years of life—not knowing what they say. For if he repents and adds, he has a will and a knowledge that are mutable, and this is unworthy of God. But if it is said that he added to Hezekiah according to the Scripture, he did not add without knowing or without foreordaining, but he himself both foreknew and foreordained the things concerning Hezekiah; yet in his providence he arranged it economically for our salvation, in order to show how great is the power of repentance. And he is said to repent by analogy with our own experience. For the Scripture speaks of God in a more human way, accommodating the childishness of its hearers. For just as it is said, \"Why do you sleep, Lord?\"—yet God does not sleep, but he called his forbearance and long-suffering and the delay of his help \"sleep\"; for with us those who sleep do not help—so also \"repentance.\" For we, when we give someone wealth and he uses it badly, repent.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":64,"ref":"p64","source":"Οὕτως τοῦ θεοῦ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ποιήσαντος καὶ τὸν Σαοὺλ χρίσαντος εἰς βασιλέα καὶ ἁμαρτησάντων αὐτῶν μεταμελεῖσθαι λέγεται, οὐ τοῦ θεοῦ μεταμεληθέντος–προῄδει γὰρ τὸ ἐσόμενον–, ἀλλὰ τούτων ἄξια μεταμελείας πραξάντων. Ἀγωνισώμεθα οὖν ποιῆσαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθοὶ γενέσθαι, ἵνα ὦμεν τῶν προεγνωσμένων ἀγαθῶν καὶ προωρισμένων εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον. Ἰστέον δέ, ὡς ἀγαθὸν μέν ἐστι τάξις ἀρίστη ἑκάστῳ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεῖον διασῴζουσα–ταυτὸν δέ ἐστι καὶ ἀρετή–, κακία δὲ ἡ τῆς τάξεως λύσις ἤγουν ἀταξία. Δισσῶς δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν λέγεται· ἢ τὸ ὄντως ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἡ ῥηθεῖσα τάξις ἢ καὶ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀγαθόν, ἡ κατ' αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴ παρὰ τὴν προειρημένην τάξιν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον κακόν. Καὶ ἡ κακία δὲ δισσῶς λέγεται· ἢ τὸ ὄντως κακόν, τουτέστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν φυσικὴν τάξιν γινόμενον καὶ παρὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ κτίσαντος κατ' οἰκείαν γνώμην– φυσικὴ γὰρ τάξις ἡ ὑπακοὴ τοῦ κτίσαντος, ἀταξία δὲ ἡ παρακοή–ἢ τὸ δοκοῦν κακόν, τὸ κατ' αἴσθησιν λυπηρὸν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐπίπονον ὡς ἡ παιδεία, ἥτις μᾶλλον ἀγαθόν ἐστι καὶ συμφέρον πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπανάγουσα τάξιν. Καὶ λέγονται τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια κακά, τὰ ὄντως κακά, τὰ εἴδη τῆς ἁμαρτίας, τὰ δὲ ἀκούσια, τὰ ἐπίπονα. Οὔτε τούτων οὖν οὔτε ἐκείνων αἴτιος ὁ θεός, ὡς ἐδείξαμεν.","english":"Thus, when God made man and anointed Saul as king, and they sinned, he is said to repent—not that God repented (for he foreknew what would be), but because they did things worthy of repentance. Let us therefore strive to do good and to become good, so that we may be among those foreknown as good and predestined to eternal life. But it must be understood that good is, on the one hand, the best order, preserving for each thing what is proper to it by nature—and this is the same as virtue—while evil is the dissolution of order, that is, disorder. But \"good\" is spoken of in two ways: either the truly good, as the order just mentioned, or the apparent good, the pleasure according to sense contrary to the aforementioned order, which is not good but rather evil. And \"evil\" is also spoken of in two ways: either the truly evil, that is, what comes about contrary to the natural order and contrary to the law of the Creator by one's own choice—for the natural order is obedience to the Creator, and disorder is disobedience—or the apparent evil, what is painful according to sense and troublesome to us, such as discipline, which is rather good and beneficial, leading us back to the order according to nature. And the voluntary evils are called truly evil, the forms of sin, while the involuntary are called painful. Therefore God is the cause of neither these nor those, as we have shown.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":65,"ref":"p65","source":"Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἀκούσια λεγόμενα κακὰ διὰ τὸ ἡμῖν δοκεῖν κακὰ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ ἀηδὲς καὶ διὰ τὸ παράβουλον ἡμῶν καὶ διὰ τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν ἡμᾶς, τουτέστιν ἀποτυγχάνειν τοῦ δέοντος σκοποῦ, τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν λίχνῳ δικαίῳ λόγῳ ὁ θεὸς ἐπάγει παιδεύων πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἑκουσίων κακῶν ἤρτηται τὰ ἀκούσια λεγόμενα κακά· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις κακοῖς τὰ ἀκούσια. Τιμωρίαι γὰρ καὶ παιδεῖαι ὡς τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς διόρθωσιν αἱ συμφοραὶ γίνονται, καὶ ἡ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος κόλασις τελεία τῆς κακίας καὶ ἁμαρτίας ἀναίρεσις ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον εἰπεῖν τοῖς ἐπιποθοῦσι τὰς σωματικὰς παρὰ τὸν φυσικὸν νόμον ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς διὰ ταύτας ἁμαρτίας ἡ κόλασις καὶ ἀπορία τῆς τούτων χρήσεως ἔσται αἰωνία κόλασις. Κόλασις γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ποθουμένου ἀποτυχία. Ἄχρι γὰρ ἁμαρτίας ἡδονὴ παρὰ τὸν νόμον τῆς φύσεως· αὕτη δὲ διττή, ἢ ψυχικὴ ἢ σωματική· καὶ ψυχικὴ μὲν ἡ τῆς δόξης ἔφεσις, σωματικὴ δὲ βρῶσις, πόσις, ἄνεσις σώματος, ὕπνος, συνουσία γυναικῶν. Ταῦτα πάντα φυσικὰ καὶ καλὰ κατὰ τὴν φυσικὴν τάξιν καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦ κτίσαντος γινόμενα, κακὰ δὲ παρὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ κτίσαντος καὶ τὴν φυσικὴν τάξιν καὶ χρῆσιν.","english":"For even the things called involuntary evils, because they seem to us to be evils—because of what is unpleasant and contrary to our will, and because we sin, that is, miss the proper mark—God, by the just reason of his discipline, brings upon us for our benefit, training us toward what is advantageous. But the things called involuntary evils depend on voluntary evils; for involuntary evils follow upon voluntary evils. For punishments and chastisements, for the most part, and calamities come for correction, and the punishment of the age to come is a complete removal of wickedness and sin; or, to say the opposite, for those who lust after bodily pleasures contrary to the law of nature and the sins that come through them, the punishment and the deprivation of the use of these things will be eternal punishment. For punishment is the failure to obtain what is desired. For pleasure contrary to the law of nature extends as far as sin; and this pleasure is twofold, either of soul or of body: of the soul, the desire for glory; of the body, eating, drinking, bodily relaxation, sleep, intercourse with women. All these things, when they come to be according to the natural order and the law of the Creator, are natural and good; but they are evil when they come to be contrary to the law of the Creator and the natural order and use.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":66,"ref":"p66","source":"83 Φυσικὴ δὲ τάξις τὸ ἐφίεσθαι τῆς παρὰ θεοῦ δόξης, τὸ δὲ τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων\n\nδόξης ἐφίεσθαι παρὰ φύσιν· θεῷ γὰρ μόνῳ τῷ φύσει δοξαστῷ πρέπει ἡ παρὰ πάντων τῶν κτισμάτων αὐτοῦ δόξα, ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ ταπεινοῦσθαι θεῷ ὡς δημιουργῷ καὶ ἀλλήλοις διὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ κτίσαντος. Τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς πρὸς θεὸν ἀγάπης καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸν πλησίον τεκμήριον, ὃς νόμος θεοῦ ἐστιν· «Ἀγαπήσεις γὰρ κύριον τὸν θεόν σου ἐξ ὅλης τῆς καρδίας σου καὶ τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς ἑαυτόν», καὶ «πᾶς ὁ ὑψῶν ἑαυτὸν ταπεινωθήσεται, ὁ δὲ ταπεινῶν ἑαυτὸν ὑψωθήσεται». Ὥστε τὸ ἀγαπᾶν τὴν παρ' ἀλλήλων δόξαν ἀπιστίαν συνίστησιν. «Οὐ δύνασθε» γάρ, φησί, «πιστεύειν εἰς ἐμὲ δόξαν παρ' ἀλλήλων λαμβάνοντες καὶ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ μόνου θεοῦ οὐ ζητοῦντες.» Πάλιν·\n\nἩ σωματικὴ ἡδονή, βρῶσις καὶ πόσις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ κατὰ τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦ κτίσαντος λαμβανόμενα καλά, παρὰ δὲ τὸν νόμον τοῦ θεοῦ καθ' ἡμετέραν γνώμην καὶ παράχρησιν γινόμενα κακά· οἷον βρῶσις καὶ πόσις, ὅσον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν καὶ σύστασιν τοῦ σώματος, καλά, ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ ὕπνος καὶ ἡ τῆς γυναικὸς χρῆσις, τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἴδιον σκεῦος, καλόν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονὰς ἀλόγους κεχρῆσθαι βρώσει καὶ πόσει καὶ γυναιξὶν ἀδιαφόρως ἀλόγων δίκην πονηρόν.","english":"It is a natural order to desire the glory that comes from God, but to desire the glory that comes from one another is against nature. For the glory that comes from all his creatures is fitting for God alone, who is by nature glorious, while for us it is fitting to be humble before God as Creator and before one another because of the law of the one who created. For this is the proof of love toward God and toward one's neighbor, which is the law of God: \"For you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and your neighbor as yourself,\" and \"Everyone who exalts himself will be humbled, but the one who humbles himself will be exalted.\" So then, loving the glory that comes from one another constitutes unbelief. For he says, \"You cannot believe in me, you who receive glory from one another and do not seek the glory of the only God.\" Again:\n\nBodily pleasure—eating and drinking and the rest—when taken according to natural use and the law of the Creator, is good; but when it comes about contrary to the law of God by our own judgment and misuse, it is evil. For example, eating and drinking, insofar as it is for living and the constitution of the body, is good; likewise sleep and the use of a woman—to know one's own vessel—is good; but to use food and drink and women indiscriminately for irrational pleasures, like irrational beasts, is evil.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":67,"ref":"p67","source":"85 Διὰ οὖν τὴν κενὴν δόξαν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἄμετρον βρῶσιν καὶ πόσιν καὶ τὰς πορνείας ἡ φιλαργυρία, τὸ τούτων ἔρεισμα, φθόνοι τε καὶ ἔριδες καὶ πονηρίαι καὶ ψεῦδος καὶ συκοφαντίαι καὶ ἁρπαγαὶ καὶ φόνοι καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὸν πλησίον μῖσος. «Διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληθυνθῆναι τὴν ἀνομίαν ἐψύγη ἡ ἀγάπη τῶν πολλῶν.» Πολλοὺς δὲ ἔφη τοὺς κεχρημένους τῇ ἀνομίᾳ. Ἐκ τῶν φυσικῶν οὖν ἔρχονται τὰ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ διαβόλου προσβάλλοντος.\n\n86 Πρὸς πάντα ταῦτα δύο δὲ ἡμῖν τρόποι μέγιστοι πρὸς βοήθειαν, τὸ βιάζεσθαι ἑαυτούς–ἔνδειγμα γὰρ ἀγάπης πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἡ βία– καὶ ἡ προσευχή· ἔνδειγμα γὰρ ταπεινώσεως ἡ προσευχή. Ἐπιγινώσκοντες γὰρ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀσθένειαν τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπικαλούμεθα δύναμιν. Δεῖ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ κρίνειν λυτροῦται ἀπὸ ἁμαρτίας· τὸ γὰρ μὴ κρίνειν ταπεινώσεως σημεῖον. Οὐδὲν οὕτως προσκαλεῖται τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ βοήθειαν ὡς ἡ ταπείνωσις. «Ἴδε» γάρ, φησί, «τὴν ταπείνωσίν μου καὶ τὸν κόπον τῆς βίας μου καὶ ἄφες πάσας τὰς ἁμαρτίας μου,» καὶ «ἴδε τὴν ταπείνωσίν μου καὶ ἐξελοῦ με,» δηλονότι ἐκ τοῦ πολεμοῦντός με ἐχθροῦ καὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ ἀφροσύνης μου. Συμβάλλεται δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ ἡ μετὰ ἐναρέτων διαγωγή–μιμητικὸν γὰρ ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος–καὶ τὸ ἀπέχεσθαι τῆς κατ' αἴσθησιν ὁμιλίας τῶν ἐρεθιζόντων· ὅσον γὰρ ἀπὸ ὀφθαλμῶν, τοσοῦτον καὶ ἀπὸ καρδίας. Δι' αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡ μνήμη τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῇ ψυχῇ γίνεται. Πρόκειται δὲ ἡμῖν, χωρίσαι τὸν νοῦν τῆς μνήμης τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἵνα κούφῳ πτερῷ πρὸς τὸν νοητὸν ἀναπτῇ ἥλιον καὶ τῷ ἀπροσίτῳ καὶ ἀμηχάνῳ αὐτοῦ κάλλει καταυγασθῇ.","english":"Therefore, because of empty glory and because of immoderate eating and drinking and fornications, there is love of money, the support of these things, and envy and strife and wickedness and falsehood and slander and robberies and murders and hatred toward one's neighbor. \"For because lawlessness increased, the love of many grew cold.\" And he said \"many\" of those who have used lawlessness. So the things contrary to nature come from natural things, when the devil attacks.\n\nAgainst all these things we have two very great means of help: to force ourselves—for force is a proof of love toward God—and prayer; for prayer is a proof of humility. For recognizing our own weakness, we call upon the power of God. But one must know that not judging also ransoms from sin; for not judging is a sign of humility. Nothing so summons the help of God as humility. For \"see,\" it says, \"my humility and the labor of my force, and forgive all my sins,\" and \"see my humility and deliver me,\" clearly from the enemy warring against me and from my sin and folly. And conduct with virtuous men also contributes to virtue—for man is an imitative animal—and abstaining from the sensory intercourse of those who provoke; for as far as from the eyes, so also from the heart. For through them the memory of sensible things comes to the soul. But it is set before us to separate the mind from the memory of sensible things, so that with a light wing it may fly up to the intelligible sun and be illumined by his unapproachable and incomprehensible beauty.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":68,"ref":"p68","source":"Παχύνεται γὰρ νοῦς ὑπὸ τῆς μνήμης τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καθέλκεται καὶ ἀφίσταται τῆς κατανοήσεως καὶ ἀπολαύσεως τοῦ νοητοῦ κάλλους· «οὐδεὶς γὰρ δύναται δυσὶ κυρίοις δουλεύειν.» Ἔθει κατορθοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πᾶσαν τέχνην καὶ ἐπιμονῇ καὶ βίᾳ. Διὰ βίας οὖν τῆς ἐξ ἀγάπης γινομένης καὶ προσευχῆς τῆς ἐκ ταπεινώσεως καὶ ἀποφυγῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ τοῦ φυγεῖν τὴν τῶν ἀμελεστέρων συνοίκησιν καὶ τοῦ μὴ κρίνειν καὶ ταπεινώσεως καὶ τῆς τῶν ἐναρέτων συναναστροφῆς καὶ ὑπακοῆς τὴν ἑαυτῶν σωτηρίαν κατεργασώμεθα, μὴ κρύπτοντες τοὺς λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πάθη. Πᾶν γὰρ κρυπτὸν φαῦλον, τὸ δὲ φανερούμενον φῶς ἐστιν. Οὐ γὰρ γεννᾷ ὄφις ἐν ἡλίῳ, ἀλλ' ἐν φωλεοῖς, οὐδὲ σπόρος αὐξάνει ὑπὲρ γῆς κείμενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ γῆν κρυπτόμενος. Οὕτω καὶ οἱ πονηροὶ λογισμοὶ μὴ δημοσιευόμενοι καρποφοροῦσιν εἰς φθορὰν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον. Ἧς γένοιτο πάντας ἡμᾶς ἐπιτυχεῖν χάριτι τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, μεθ' οὗ τῷ πατρὶ ἡ δόξα ἅμα τῷ παναγίῳ καὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ","english":"For the mind is made fat by the memory of sensible things and is dragged down toward them and withdraws from the contemplation and enjoyment of intelligible beauty; \"for no one can serve two masters.\" By habit, perseverance, and force people bring every art to success. Therefore by force—the force that comes from love—and by prayer that comes from humility, and by fleeing from sensible things and escaping the company of the more negligent, and by not judging, and by humility, and by association with the virtuous, and by obedience, let us work out our own salvation, not hiding our thoughts and the passions within us. For everything hidden is base, but what is brought to light is light. For the serpent does not give birth in the sun, but in dens, nor does seed grow when it lies above the ground, but when it is hidden beneath the ground. So too evil thoughts, when not made public, bear fruit unto corruption, and good thoughts unto eternal life. May we all obtain this by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, with whom to the Father be the glory, together with the all-holy and good","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]},{"i":69,"ref":"p69","source":"ζωοποιῷ καὶ ὁμοουσίῳ πνεύματι νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων. Ἀμήν.","english":"by the life-giving and consubstantial Spirit, now and always and unto the ages of ages. Amen.","structure":"narrative","commentary":[],"ambiguities":[],"confidence":"","notes":[]}]}